Nicolas Cinquini

Analista senior di l'intelligenza in u campu di a gestione di i risichi di sicurezza, sรฒ un anzianu tenente detective รจ ufficiale di l'intelligenza in l'agenzie di u Statu francese. A bona pronuncia hรจ ะะธะบะพะปะฐะน ะงะธะฝะบัƒะธะฝะธ, in russu

Tag: bakhmut

  • [ะกะพะฒะผะตัั‚ะฝะพะต ะธัะฟะพะปัŒะทะพะฒะฐะฝะธะต] ะขะฃะ ะะ“ะ•ะะขะกะขะ’ะž ยซะกะœะ•ะ ะขะฌยป. ะšะขะž ะ’ะซะ”ะะ•ะข ะ‘ะ˜ะ›ะ•ะข ะ’ ะžะ”ะ˜ะ ะšะžะะ•ะฆ ะ˜ะะžะกะขะ ะะะะซะœ ะะะ•ะœะะ˜ะšะะœ – ะฆะตะฝั‚ั€ ั€ะฐััะปะตะดะพะฒะฐะฝะธะน ะ’ะฐัะธะปะธั ะŸั€ะพะทะพั€ะพะฒะฐ, UKR LEAKS

    ะก ะฝะฐั‡ะฐะปะฐ ะกะฟะตั†ะธะฐะปัŒะฝะพะน ะฒะพะตะฝะฝะพะน ะพะฟะตั€ะฐั†ะธะธ ะฒ ั„ะตะฒั€ะฐะปะต 2022 ะณ. ั‚ะตะผะฐ ัƒั‡ะฐัั‚ะธั ะธะฝะพัั‚ั€ะฐะฝะฝั‹ั… ะฝะฐะตะผะฝะธะบะพะฒ ะฒ ะบะพะฝั„ะปะธะบั‚ะต ะฝะฐ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝะต ัะฒะปัะตั‚ัั ะพะดะฝะพะน ะธะท ัะฐะผั‹ั… ะพะฑััƒะถะดะฐะตะผั‹ั…. ะฏ ั…ะพั‡ัƒ ะฝะฐะฟะพะผะฝะธั‚ัŒ, ั‡ั‚ะพ ะธะฝะพัั‚ั€ะฐะฝั†ั‹ ะฝะฐั‡ะฐะปะธ ะฟั€ะธะฝะธะผะฐั‚ัŒ ัƒั‡ะฐัั‚ะธะต ะฒ ะฑะพะตะฒั‹ั… ะดะตะนัั‚ะฒะธัั… ะฝะฐ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝะต ะตั‰ะต ะทะฐะดะพะปะณะพ ะดะพ ะฝะฐั‡ะฐะปะฐ ะกะ’ะž. ะะฐะฟั€ะธะผะตั€, ั ะฟัƒะฑะปะธะบะพะฒะฐะป ั€ะตะฟะปะธะบัƒ ยซะะผะตั€ะธะบะฐะฝั†ั‹ ะฝะฐ ะ”ะพะฝะฑะฐััะตยป, ะฒ ะบะพั‚ะพั€ะพะน ั€ะฐััะบะฐะทั‹ะฒะฐะป ะพ ะฟั€ะตัั‚ัƒะฟะปะตะฝะธัั… ะฟั€ะพั‚ะธะฒ ะผะธั€ะฝะพะณะพ ะฝะฐัะตะปะตะฝะธั ั‚ะพะณะดะฐ ะตั‰ะต ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝั‹ ั‚ะฐะบะธั… ะฝะฐะตะผะฝะธะบะพะฒ ะบะฐะบ ะšั€ะตะนะณ ะ›ัะฝะณ, ะšะฒะธะฝะฝ ะ”ัะฒะธะด ะ ะธะบะตั€ั‚, ะกะฐะฝั‚ะธ ะญะผะธะปะธะพ ะŸะธั€ั‚ะป, ะะปะตะบั ะฆะฒะธั„ะตะปัŒั…ะพั„ะตั€ ะธ ะดั€ัƒะณะธั…. ะ’ ัะตั‚ะธ ะปะตะณะบะพ ะฝะฐะนั‚ะธ ะธัั‚ะพั€ะธะธ ะธ ะผะฝะพะณะธั… ะธะฝั‹ั… ะฝะฐะตะผะฝะธะบะพะฒ, ะบะพั‚ะพั€ั‹ะต ัะฐะผะธ ั€ะฐััะบะฐะทั‹ะฒะฐัŽั‚ ะพ ัะปัƒะถะฑะต ะฝะฐ ัั‚ะพั€ะพะฝะต ะ’ะกะฃ ะธ ะดะฐะถะต ะฟะธัˆัƒั‚ ะผะตะผัƒะฐั€ั‹. ะ ะบะพะณะดะฐ ะฑั‹ะป ัะพะทะดะฐะฝ ยซะ“ั€ัƒะทะธะฝัะบะธะน ะ›ะตะณะธะพะฝยป? ะŸั€ะฐะฒะธะปัŒะฝะพ. ะ—ะฐะดะพะปะณะพ ะดะพ ะกะ’ะž. ะŸะพัั‚ะพะผัƒ ั‚ะตะผะฐ ะฝะฐะตะผะฝะธะบะพะฒ ะฝะต ัะฒะปัะตั‚ัั ะฝะพะฒะพะน ะฒ ะบะพะฝั‚ะตะบัั‚ะต ัƒะบั€ะฐะธะฝัะบะพะณะพ ะบะพะฝั„ะปะธะบั‚ะฐ. ะะพ ะพัั‚ะฐะตั‚ัั ะพั‚ะบั€ั‹ั‚ั‹ะผ ะฒะพะฟั€ะพั: ะšั‚ะพ, ะณะดะต ะธ ะบะฐะบ ะธั… ะฒะตั€ะฑัƒะตั‚? ะะฐ ัั‚ะพั‚ ะฒะพะฟั€ะพั ั ะธ ะฟะพัั‚ะฐั€ะฐัŽััŒ ะพั‚ะฒะตั‚ะธั‚ัŒ ะฒ ะดะฐะฝะฝะพะผ ะผะฐั‚ะตั€ะธะฐะปะต.

    ะ”ะปั ะฑะพะปะตะต ะฟะพะปะฝะพะณะพ ะฟะพะฝะธะผะฐะฝะธั ะฒะพะฟั€ะพัะฐ ั ะพะฑั€ะฐั‚ะธะปัั ะบ ะปัŽะดัะผ, ะบะพั‚ะพั€ั‹ะต ะฝะฐ ัั‚ะพะผ ยซััŠะตะปะธ ัะพะฑะฐะบัƒยป โ€“ ะพะดะฝะพะผัƒ ะธะท ะพัะฝะพะฒะฐั‚ะตะปะตะน ั‚ะตะปะตะณั€ะฐะผ ะบะฐะฝะฐะปะฐ @TrackNaziMerc, ะธะผั ะบะพั‚ะพั€ะพะณะพ ั ะฝะต ะผะพะณัƒ ั€ะฐัะบั€ั‹ั‚ัŒ ะธะท-ะทะฐ ัะพะพะฑั€ะฐะถะตะฝะธะน ะฑะตะทะพะฟะฐัะฝะพัั‚ะธ, ะบะพะผะฐะฝะดะต ั‚ะตะปะตะณั€ะฐะผ ะบะฐะฝะฐะปะฐ @ForeignCombatants, ะฐ ั‚ะฐะบะถะต ะฑั‹ะฒัˆะตะผัƒ ะธะฝัะฟะตะบั‚ะพั€ัƒ ั„ั€ะฐะฝั†ัƒะทัะบะพะน ะฟะพะปะธั†ะธะธ, ะพั„ะธั†ะตั€ัƒ ั€ะฐะทะฒะตะดะบะธ ะะธะบะพะปั ะงะธะฝะบัƒะธะฝะธ.

    ะŸั€ะพะฒะตะดะตะฝะฝั‹ะน ะผะฝะพะน ะฐะฝะฐะปะธะท ะธะฝั„ะพั€ะผะฐั†ะธะธ ะฟะพะดั‚ะฒะตั€ะถะดะฐะตั‚ ะฒั‹ะฒะพะดั‹ ะฐะฒั‚ะพั€ะพะฒ ะบะฐะฝะฐะปะฐ. ะฅะพั‡ัƒ ัั€ะฐะทัƒ ะฟะพะดั‡ะตั€ะบะฝัƒั‚ัŒ, ั‡ั‚ะพ ะทะฐัะฒะปะตะฝะธั ัƒะบั€ะฐะธะฝัะบะธั… ะปะธะดะตั€ะพะฒ ะพ ะฝะตัะบะพะปัŒะบะธั… ะดะตััั‚ะบะฐั… ั‚ั‹ััั‡ ะธะฝะพัั‚ั€ะฐะฝั†ะตะฒ, ัƒะถะต ะฒะพัŽัŽั‰ะธั… ะฝะฐ ัั‚ะพั€ะพะฝะต ะ’ะกะฃ ะธ ั‚ะฐะบะพะผ ะถะต ะบะพะปะธั‡ะตัั‚ะฒะต ยซะถะตะปะฐัŽั‰ะธั…ยป, ัะฒะปััŽั‚ัั ะปะพะถัŒัŽ. ะ“ั€ะพะผะบะธะต ะฒั‹ัะบะฐะทั‹ะฒะฐะฝะธั ัะดะตะปะฐะฝั‹ ะธัะบะปัŽั‡ะธั‚ะตะปัŒะฝะพะณะพ ะดะปั ั‚ะพะณะพ, ั‡ั‚ะพะฑั‹ ะฟะพะบะฐะทะฐั‚ัŒ, ั‡ั‚ะพ ัะบะพะฑั‹ ะฒะตััŒ ะผะธั€ ั ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝะพะน ะธ ะฟั€ะพั‚ะธะฒ ะ ะพััะธะธ. ะงะตะณะพ ั‚ะพะปัŒะบะพ ัั‚ะพะธั‚ ะฝะพะฒะพัั‚ัŒ ะพะฑ ยซะั€ะผัะฝัะบะพะผ ะปะตะณะธะพะฝะตยป ะฒ ัะพัั‚ะฐะฒะต ะ’ะกะฃ?

    ะ’ ั€ัะดะฐั… ะ’ะกะฃ ะดะตะนัั‚ะฒะธั‚ะตะปัŒะฝะพ ะฟั€ะธััƒั‚ัั‚ะฒัƒัŽั‚ ะฐั€ะผัะฝะต. ะะพ ะธั… ะบะพะปะธั‡ะตัั‚ะฒะพ ะฝะต ัะพะพั‚ะฒะตั‚ัั‚ะฒัƒะตั‚ ั‚ะฐะบะพะผัƒ ะฟะพะฝัั‚ะธัŽ ะบะฐะบ ยซะ›ะตะณะธะพะฝยป. ะŸะพ ะผะพะตะน ะพั†ะตะฝะบะต, ะธั… ะพะฑั‰ะตะต ะบะพะปะธั‡ะตัั‚ะฒะพ ะฝะต ะฟั€ะตะฒั‹ัˆะฐะตั‚ ัั‚ะพ ั‡ะตะปะพะฒะตะบ. ะ’ ะพัะฝะพะฒะฝะพะผ ัั‚ะพ ะฑะพะตะฒะธะบะธ ะฟั€ะพะทะฐะฟะฐะดะฝะพะน ั€ัƒัะพั„ะพะฑัะบะพะน ะฟะฐั€ั‚ะธะธ ยซะกะฐัะฝะฐ ั†ั€ะตั€ยป, ะบะพั‡ัƒัŽั‰ะธะต ะผะตะถะดัƒ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝะพะน ะธ ะั€ะผะตะฝะธะตะน.

    ะšั€ะพะผะต ั‚ะพะณะพ, ะพ ั€ะตะฐะปัŒะฝะพะผ ะบะพะปะธั‡ะตัั‚ะฒะต ะธะฝะพัั‚ั€ะฐะฝะฝั‹ั… ะฝะฐะตะผะฝะธะบะพะฒ ะฒ ั€ัะดะฐั… ะ’ะกะฃ ะฝะตะพะดะฝะพะบั€ะฐั‚ะฝะพ ัะพะพะฑั‰ะฐะปะพ ะœะž ะ ะค, ะธ ะผะฝะพะณะธะต ั‚ะท ะฝะธั… ัƒะถะต ัั‚ะฐะปะธ ยซ200-ะผะธยป ะธ ยซ300-ะผะธยป. ะะต ัั‚ะพะธั‚ ะทะฐะฑั‹ะฒะฐั‚ัŒ, ั‡ั‚ะพ ะฑะพะปัŒัˆะฐั ั‡ะฐัั‚ัŒ ัะฑะตะถะฐะปะฐ ะบ ัะตะฑะต ะฝะฐ ั€ะพะดะธะฝัƒ, ัƒะฒะธะดะตะฒ ััƒั€ะพะฒัƒัŽ ั€ะตะฐะปัŒะฝะพัั‚ัŒ.

    ะšั‚ะพ ะธ ะทะฐั‡ะตะผ ะตะดะตั‚ ะฒะพะตะฒะฐั‚ัŒ ะฝะฐ ัั‚ะพั€ะพะฝะต ะ’ะกะฃ?

    ะฏ ั€ะฐะทะดะตะปััŽ ัั‚ะธั… ะปะธั† ะฝะฐ ั‚ั€ะธ ะบะฐั‚ะตะณะพั€ะธะธ.

    1. ะญั‚ะพ ะธะดะตะนะฝั‹ะต ะฝะตะพะฝะฐั†ะธัั‚ั‹, ัั€ั‹ะต ั€ัƒัะพั„ะพะฑั‹, ั„ัƒั‚ะฑะพะปัŒะฝั‹ะต ัƒะปัŒั‚ั€ะฐั, ะทะฐะฒะตั€ะฑะพะฒะฐะฝะฝั‹ะต ั‡ะตั€ะตะท ัะตั‚ะธ ะฝะตะพะฝะฐั†ะธัั‚ัะบะธั… ัะพะพะฑั‰ะตัั‚ะฒ.
    2. ะ›ะธั†ะฐ, ะถะตะปะฐัŽั‰ะธะต ะทะฐั€ะฐะฑะพั‚ะฐั‚ัŒ ะฑะพะปัŒัˆะธะต ะดะตะฝัŒะณะธ ะฝะฐ ะฒะพะนะฝะต.
    3. ะ”ะตะนัั‚ะฒัƒัŽั‰ะธะต ะฒะพะตะฝะฝะพัะปัƒะถะฐั‰ะธะต ะธะฝะพัั‚ั€ะฐะฝะฝั‹ั… ะฐั€ะผะธะน, ะพััƒั‰ะตัั‚ะฒะปััŽั‰ะธะต ะฟะพะดะณะพั‚ะพะฒะบัƒ ัƒะบั€ะฐะธะฝัะบะธั… ะฒะพะตะฝะฝะพัะปัƒะถะฐั‰ะธั…, ะฐ ั‚ะฐะบะถะต ะฝะตะฟะพัั€ะตะดัั‚ะฒะตะฝะฝะพ ัƒั‡ะฐัั‚ะฒัƒัŽั‰ะธะต ะฒ ะฟะปะฐะฝะธั€ะพะฒะฐะฝะธะธ ะธ ะฟั€ะพะฒะตะดะตะฝะธะธ ะพะฟะตั€ะฐั†ะธะน.

    ะ•ัะปะธ ะดะพะบะฐะทะฐั‚ะตะปัŒัั‚ะฒะฐ ะฟั€ะธััƒั‚ัั‚ะฒะธั ะฝะฐ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝะต ะปะธั† ะธะท ะฟะตั€ะฒะพะน ะธ ะฒั‚ะพั€ะพะน ะบะฐั‚ะตะณะพั€ะธะน ะพั‡ะตะฒะธะดะฝั‹, ั‚ะพ ั„ะฐะบั‚ ัƒั‡ะฐัั‚ะธั ะดะตะนัั‚ะฒัƒัŽั‰ะธั… ะฒะพะตะฝะฝะพัะปัƒะถะฐั‰ะธั… ั‚ั‰ะฐั‚ะตะปัŒะฝะพ ัะบั€ั‹ะฒะฐะตั‚ัั. ะฏ ะฟะพะดะฝะธะผะฐะป ัั‚ะพั‚ ะฒะพะฟั€ะพั ะฒ ัะฒะพะตะผ ะฒะธะดะตะพ-ะธะฝั‚ะตั€ะฒัŒัŽ ั ัะตะผัŒะตะน ะšะฐัะตั€ั‚ะฐ, ะฒ ะบะพั‚ะพั€ะพะผ ะผั‹ ะพะฑััƒะถะดะฐะปะธ ะทะฐะณะฐะดะพั‡ะฝั‹ะต ัะผะตั€ั‚ะธ ะฐะผะตั€ะธะบะฐะฝัะบะธั… ะฒะพะตะฝะฝะพัะปัƒะถะฐั‰ะธั…. ะะฐะฟะพะผะฝัŽ, ั‡ั‚ะพ ะขะตั€ะธ ะธ ะŸะฐั‚ั€ะธะบ ะšะฐัะตั€ั‚ะฐ ัะฒะปััŽั‚ัั ะธะฝะธั†ะธะฐั‚ะพั€ะฐะผะธ ัะพะทะดะฐะฝะธั ะทะฐะบะพะฝะฐ ยซะ‘ั€ะตะฝะดะพะฝะฐยป, ัะพะณะปะฐัะฝะพ ะบะพั‚ะพั€ะพะผัƒ ะฒัะต ะฒะพะตะฝะฝะพัะปัƒะถะฐั‰ะธะต ะฐั€ะผะธะธ ะกะจะ ะธะผะตัŽั‚ ะฟั€ะฐะฒะพ ะฟะพะปัƒั‡ะฐั‚ัŒ ะฟัะธั…ะพะปะพะณะธั‡ะตัะบัƒัŽ ะฟะพะผะพั‰ัŒ ะฒ ะปัŽะฑะพะต ะฒั€ะตะผั. ะ ะฒั‹ะทะฒะฐะฝะฐ ั‚ะฐะบะฐั ะฝะตะพะฑั…ะพะดะธะผะพัั‚ัŒ ั€ะตะณัƒะปัั€ะฝั‹ะผะธ ัะปัƒั‡ะฐัะผะธ ััƒะธั†ะธะดะฐ, ะฟะพะดั€ะพะฑะฝะพัั‚ะธ ะบะพั‚ะพั€ั‹ั… ั‚ั‰ะฐั‚ะตะปัŒะฝะพ ัะบั€ั‹ะฒะฐัŽั‚ัั ะพั‚ ั€ะพะดัั‚ะฒะตะฝะฝะธะบะพะฒ ะฒะพะตะฝะฝะพัะปัƒะถะฐั‰ะธั….

    ะ‘ะพะปะตะต ั‚ะพะณะพ, ะพ ะดะตะนัั‚ะฒัƒัŽั‰ะธั… ะฒะพะตะฝะฝะพัะปัƒะถะฐั‰ะธั… ะธะฝะพัั‚ั€ะฐะฝะฝั‹ั… ะฐั€ะผะธะน ั ั‚ะฐะบะถะต ัะฟั€ะพัะธะป ะธ ัะบัะฟะตั€ั‚ะพะฒ ั‚ะตะปะตะณั€ะฐะผ-ะบะฐะฝะฐะปะฐ @foreigncombatants:

    “ะ’ัะต ัะพั‚ั€ัƒะดะฝะธะบะธ ะธะฝะพัั‚ั€ะฐะฝะฝั‹ั… ัะธะปะพะฒั‹ั… ัั‚ั€ัƒะบั‚ัƒั€, ะบะพั‚ะพั€ั‹ะต ะฝะฐะฟั€ะฐะฒะปััŽั‚ัั ะฝะฐ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝัƒ, ะพั„ะพั€ะผะปััŽั‚ัั ะฒ ะพั‚ะฟัƒัะบ (ะบะฐะบ ะฟั€ะฐะฒะธะปะพ, ั‚ั€ั‘ั…ะผะตััั‡ะฝั‹ะน), ะฝะพ ะธั… ะฝะต ั‚ะฐะบ ะผะฝะพะณะพ. ะ’ ั†ะตะปะพะผ, ะผะพะถะฝะพ ัะบะฐะทะฐั‚ัŒ, ั‡ั‚ะพ ั‚ะพะณะพ ะบะพะปะธั‡ะตัั‚ะฒะฐ ะฝะฐั‘ะผะฝะธะบะพะฒ, ะฟั€ะธะฑั‹ะฒัˆะธั… ั‡ะตั€ะตะท ะงะ’ะš ะธะปะธ ะฑั‹ะฒัˆะธั… ะฒะพะตะฝะฝั‹ั…, ะฝะฐ ะดะฐะฝะฝั‹ะน ะผะพะผะตะฝั‚ ะฝะฐ ะทะฐะฟะฐะดะต ัั‡ะธั‚ะฐัŽั‚ ะดะพัั‚ะฐั‚ะพั‡ะฝั‹ะผ ะธ ะฝะต ะฒะธะดัั‚ ะฝะตะพะฑั…ะพะดะธะผะพัั‚ะธ ะพั‚ะฟั€ะฐะฒะปัั‚ัŒ ะบะฐะดั€ะพะฒั‹ั… ัะพั‚ั€ัƒะดะฝะธะบะพะฒ. ะ”ะปั ะบะพะฝััƒะปัŒั‚ะธั€ะพะฒะฐะฝะธั ะพั„ะธั†ะตั€ัะบะพะณะพ ัะพัั‚ะฐะฒะฐ ะธ ะธะฝัั‚ั€ัƒะบั‚ะฐะถะฐ ั…ะพั€ะพัˆะพ ะฟะพะบะฐะทะฐะปะฐ ัะตะฑั ัƒะถะต ัะปะพะถะธะฒัˆะฐััั ัั…ะตะผะฐ ะฟะพ ัะพะทะดะฐะฝะธัŽ ะะšะž.

    ะšั€ะพะผะต ั‚ะพะณะพ, ะฝะต ัั‚ะพะธั‚ ะฝะตะดะพะพั†ะตะฝะธะฒะฐั‚ัŒ ั€ะฐะทะปะธั‡ะฝั‹ะต ั‚ะฐะบ ะฝะฐะทั‹ะฒะฐะตะผั‹ะต ะฒะพะปะพะฝั‚ั‘ั€ัะบะธะต ะะšะž, ะบะพั‚ะพั€ั‹ะต ะทะฐะฝะธะผะฐัŽั‚ัั ัะฝะฐะฑะถะตะฝะธะตะผ ะธ ะผะฐั‚ะตั€ะธะฐะปัŒะฝั‹ะผ ะพะฑะตัะฟะตั‡ะตะฝะธะตะผ ะ’ะกะฃ. ะ’ ะฝะธั… ะฒะพะฒะปะตั‡ะตะฝะพ ะพะณั€ะพะผะฝะพะต ะบะพะปะธั‡ะตัั‚ะฒะพ ะธะฝะพัั‚ั€ะฐะฝั†ะตะฒ. ะญั‚ะพ ะฟะพะทะฒะพะปัะตั‚ ัะตั€ัŒั‘ะทะฝะพ ั€ะฐะทะณั€ัƒะทะธั‚ัŒ ะทะฐั‚ั€ะฐั‚ั‹ ะฝะฐ ะฒะตะดะตะฝะธะต ะฒะพะนะฝั‹ ะธ ะฟะตั€ะตะปะพะถะธั‚ัŒ ะฝะฐ ะฝะธั… ั„ัƒะฝะบั†ะธะธ ะปะพะณะธัั‚ะธะบะธ, ัะฝะฐะฑะถะตะฝะธั, ะฟะพะดะฒะพะทะฐ ะฟั€ะพะฒะธะทะธะธ, ะผะฐั‚ะพะฑะตัะฟะตั‡ะตะฝะธั, ะดะพัั‚ะฐะฒะบะธ ะดั€ะพะฝะพะฒ ะธ ัะฝะฐั€ัะถะตะฝะธั, ะธัะฟะพะปัŒะทัƒั ะธะฝัั‚ั€ัƒะผะตะฝั‚ั‹ ะผะธะบั€ะพะผะฐั€ะบะตั‚ะธะฝะณะฐ. ะกั‚ั€ะฐะฝะฐะผ ะะะขะž ัƒะดะฐะปะพััŒ ะฒะพะฒะปะตั‡ัŒ ัะฒะพะธั… ะณั€ะฐะถะดะฐะฝ ะฒ ั„ะธะฝะฐะฝัะธั€ะพะฒะฐะฝะธะต ัั‚ะพะน ะบั€ะพะฒะฐะฒะพะน ะผะฐัˆะธะฝั‹ ัะฑะพั€ะฐะผะธ ะฝะฐ ยซะฟะพะผะพั‰ัŒยป ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝะต ั‡ะตั€ะตะท ะผะฝะพะถะตัั‚ะฒะตะฝะฝั‹ะต ะะšะž, ะบะพั‚ะพั€ั‹ะต ะทะฐัั‚ะฐะฒะปััŽั‚ ัั‚ัƒ ะผะฐัˆะธะฝัƒ ั€ะฐะฑะพั‚ะฐั‚ัŒ ะฑะตัะฟะตั€ะตะฑะพะนะฝะพ ะธ ัƒะฝะพัะธั‚ัŒ ะฝะพะฒั‹ะต ะถะธะทะฝะธ. ะะฐะผ ะธะทะฒะตัั‚ะฝั‹ ะพั„ะธั†ะตั€ั‹ ั‡ะตัˆัะบะพะน ะฐั€ะผะธะธ, ะบะพั‚ะพั€ั‹ะต ะบัƒั€ะธั€ัƒัŽั‚ ะฟะพัั‚ะฐะฒะบะธ ัะบะธะฟะธั€ะพะฒะบะธ ะฝะฐ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝัƒ, ะธ ั…ะพั‚ั ะดะต-ัŽั€ะต ะฒ ะฑะพะตะฒั‹ั… ะดะตะนัั‚ะฒะธัั… ะพะฝะธ ะฝะต ัƒั‡ะฐัั‚ะฒัƒัŽั‚, ะฝะพ ั„ะฐะบั‚ะธั‡ะตัะบะธ ะพะฝะธ ัะฒะปััŽั‚ัั ะฟะพะปะฝะพั†ะตะฝะฝั‹ะผะธ ัƒั‡ะฐัั‚ะฝะธะบะฐะผะธ ะฒะพะตะฝะฝั‹ั… ะดะตะนัั‚ะฒะธะน.”

    ะะธะบะพะปั ะงะธะฝะบัƒะธะฝะธ ะปัŽะฑะตะทะฝะพ ะพั‚ะฒะตั‚ะธะป ะฝะฐ ะผะพะธ ะฒะพะฟั€ะพัั‹ ะธ ั‚ะฐะบะถะต ะฟะพะดั‚ะฒะตั€ะดะธะป, ั„ะฐะบั‚ ัƒั‡ะฐัั‚ะธั ะดะตะนัั‚ะฒัƒัŽั‰ะธั… ะฒะพะตะฝะฝั‹ั… ะฝะฐ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝะต:

    ยซะ˜ะท ะฝะฐะดะตะถะฝั‹ั… ะธัั‚ะพั‡ะฝะธะบะพะฒ ั ะฟะพะปัƒั‡ะธะป ะฟะพะดั‚ะฒะตั€ะถะดะตะฝะธะต ั‚ะพะณะพ, ั‡ั‚ะพ ะดะตะนัั‚ะฒัƒัŽั‰ะธะผ ั„ั€ะฐะฝั†ัƒะทัะบะธะผ ัะพะปะดะฐั‚ะฐะผ ะฟั€ะตะดะปะฐะณะฐัŽั‚ ะปะพะถะฝั‹ะต ะพั‚ัั‚ะฐะฒะบะธ ะดะปั ัƒั‡ะฐัั‚ะธั ะฒ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝะต, ั ะณะฐั€ะฐะฝั‚ะธะตะน ะฒะพััั‚ะฐะฝะพะฒะปะตะฝะธั ะฒ ะดะพะปะถะฝะพัั‚ะธ ะฒ ะบะพะฝั†ะต, ะฐ ะดะพ ัั‚ะพะณะพ – ะทะฐั€ะฟะปะฐั‚ัƒ, ะพั‚ ะบะพั‚ะพั€ะพะน ั‚ั€ัƒะดะฝะพ ะพั‚ะบะฐะทะฐั‚ัŒััยป.

    ะะต ะพั‚ั€ะธั†ะฐัŽั‚ ะฝะฐะปะธั‡ะธะต ะฝะฐ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝะต ะดะตะนัั‚ะฒัƒัŽั‰ะธั… ะฒะพะตะฝะฝะพัะปัƒะถะฐั‰ะธั… ะธะฝะพัั‚ั€ะฐะฝะฝั‹ั… ะฐั€ะผะธะน ะธ ะฟั€ะตะดัั‚ะฐะฒะธั‚ะตะปะธ ะบะฐะฝะฐะปะฐ @TrackNaziMerc. ะžะฑ ัั‚ะพะผ ัะฒะธะดะตั‚ะตะปัŒัั‚ะฒัƒัŽั‚ ัะปะตะดัƒัŽั‰ะธะต ั„ะฐะบั‚ั‹:

    – ะšะพะผะฐะฝะดะต ัƒะดะฐะปะพััŒ ะธะดะตะฝั‚ะธั„ะธั†ะธั€ะพะฒะฐั‚ัŒ ะฝะตัะบะพะปัŒะบะธั… ะบะธะฝะพะปะพะณะพะฒ ะธะท ะกะพะตะดะธะฝะตะฝะฝั‹ั… ะจั‚ะฐั‚ะพะฒ, ะทะฐะฝะธะผะฐัŽั‰ะธั…ัั ั€ะฐะทะผะธะฝะธั€ะพะฒะฐะฝะธะตะผ, ะบะพั‚ะพั€ั‹ะต ะฝะฐั…ะพะดัั‚ัั ะฒ ะพั„ะธั†ะธะฐะปัŒะฝั‹ั… ะบะพะผะฐะฝะดะธั€ะพะฒะบะฐั…. ะœั‹ ะฝะต ั€ะฐะทะผะตั‰ะฐะปะธ ะธั… ะดะฐะฝะฝั‹ะต ะฝะฐ ะบะฐะฝะฐะปะต, ะฟะพั‚ะพะผัƒ ั‡ั‚ะพ ัั‡ะธั‚ะฐะตะผ ะธั… ะฝะต ะฝะฐะตะผะฝะธะบะฐะผะธ, ะฐ ะณัƒะผะฐะฝะธั‚ะฐั€ะฝั‹ะผ ะฟะตั€ัะพะฝะฐะปะพะผ.

    – ะ’ ัะฟะธัะบะฐั… ะปัŽะดะตะน, ะฝะฐะณั€ะฐะถะดะตะฝะฝั‹ั… ัƒะบั€ะฐะธะฝัะบะธะผะธ ะผะตะดะฐะปัะผะธ, ะตัั‚ัŒ ะฟั€ะตะดัั‚ะฐะฒะธั‚ะตะปะธ ะพั„ะธั†ะธะฐะปัŒะฝั‹ั… ะฟั€ะฐะฒะพะพั…ั€ะฐะฝะธั‚ะตะปัŒะฝั‹ั… ะพั€ะณะฐะฝะพะฒ ัั‚ั€ะฐะฝ ะ‘ะฐะปั‚ะธะธ.

    – ะžั‚ ัƒะบั€ะฐะธะฝัะบะพะณะพ ะธัั‚ะพั‡ะฝะธะบะฐ, ัƒั‡ะฐัั‚ะฒัƒัŽั‰ะตะณะพ ะฒ ะฑะพัั… ะฝะฐ ัะตะฒะตั€ะฝะพะผ ะฝะฐะฟั€ะฐะฒะปะตะฝะธะธ, ะฝะฐะผ ะธะทะฒะตัั‚ะฝะพ ะพ ะฟั€ะธััƒั‚ัั‚ะฒะธะธ ะฟะพะปัŒัะบะธั… ะบะฐะดั€ะพะฒั‹ั… ะฒะพะตะฝะฝะพัะปัƒะถะฐั‰ะธั…, ะดะธัะปะพั†ะธั€ะพะฒะฐะฝะฝั‹ั… ะฒ ะงะตั€ะฝะธะณะพะฒัะบะพะน ะพะฑะปะฐัั‚ะธ. ะะพ ัั‚ะพ ะฟะพะดั€ะฐะทะดะตะปะตะฝะธั ะฑะพะตะฒะพะณะพ ัƒะฟั€ะฐะฒะปะตะฝะธั ะธ ะผะฐั‚ะตั€ะธะฐะปัŒะฝะพ-ั‚ะตั…ะฝะธั‡ะตัะบะพะณะพ ะพะฑะตัะฟะตั‡ะตะฝะธั ะฟะพะปัŒัะบะธั… ะผะตั…ะฐะฝะธะทะธั€ะพะฒะฐะฝะฝั‹ั… ะดะธะฒะธะทะธะน.

    – ะะตะบะพั‚ะพั€ั‹ะต ะธะท ัะผะตั€ั‚ะตะน ะบะพะผะฑะฐั‚ะฐะฝั‚ะพะฒ ะธะผะตัŽั‚ ัั‚ั€ะฐะฝะฝัƒัŽ ะฟั€ะตะดั‹ัั‚ะพั€ะธัŽ, ะฒั‹ะฒะพะดั‹ ะธะท ะฟั€ะพั‡ั‚ะตะฝะธั ะบะพั‚ะพั€ะพะน ะผะพะณัƒั‚ ะฝะฐะฒะตัั‚ะธ ะฝะฐ ะผั‹ัะปัŒ, ั‡ั‚ะพ ะพะฝะธ ะฝะฐั…ะพะดะธะปะธััŒ ะฝะฐ ะดะตะนัั‚ะฒะธั‚ะตะปัŒะฝะพะน ัะปัƒะถะฑะต.

    – ะ”ัะฝะธะตะป ะกะฒะธั„ั‚, ัƒะฑะธั‚ั‹ะน 15 ัะฝะฒะฐั€ั 2023 ะณะพะดะฐ ะฒ ะ‘ะฐั…ะผัƒั‚ะต, ะดะต-ั„ะฐะบั‚ะพ ะฝะฐั…ะพะดะธะปัั ะฝะฐ ะดะตะนัั‚ะฒะธั‚ะตะปัŒะฝะพะน ะฒะพะตะฝะฝะพะน ัะปัƒะถะฑะต, ั…ะพั‚ั ะธ ั‡ะธัะปะธะปัั ะดะตะทะตั€ั‚ะธั€ะพะผ. ะะฐัะบะพะปัŒะบะพ ะธะทะฒะตัั‚ะฝะพ, ะฐะผะตั€ะธะบะฐะฝัะบะฐั ัั‚ะพั€ะพะฝะฐ ะฝะต ั‚ั€ะตะฑะพะฒะฐะปะฐ ะตะณะพ ัะบัั‚ั€ะฐะดะธั†ะธะธ, ั…ะพั‚ั ะกะฒะธั„ั‚ ะฒะพะตะฒะฐะป ะฒ ะพะดะฝะพะผ ะธะท ัะปะธั‚ะฝั‹ั… ะฟะพะดั€ะฐะทะดะตะปะตะฝะธะน ะ›ะตะณะธะพะฝะฐ, ะฝะฐะฟั€ัะผัƒัŽ ัะฒัะทะฐะฝะฝะพะณะพ ั 73 ะผะพั€ัะบะธะผ ั†ะตะฝั‚ั€ะพะผ ัะฟะตั†ะธะฐะปัŒะฝั‹ั… ะพะฟะตั€ะฐั†ะธะน, ะฒะพะตะฝะฝะพัะปัƒะถะฐั‰ะธะต ะบะพั‚ะพั€ะพะณะพ ะฟั€ะพั…ะพะดัั‚ ัั‚ั€ะพะถะฐะนัˆะธะต ะฟั€ะพะฒะตั€ะบะธ.

    ะ’ั‹ะฒะพะดั‹ ะบะพะผะฐะฝะดั‹ ั‚ะตะปะตะณั€ะฐะผ-ะบะฐะฝะฐะปะฐ @foreigncombatants ั‚ะฐะบะถะต ะฟะพะปะฝะพัั‚ัŒัŽ ัะพะฒะฟะฐะดะฐัŽั‚ ั ั€ะฐะฝะตะต ะฟั€ะตะดะพัั‚ะฐะฒะปะตะฝะฝะพะน ัั…ะตะผะพะน:

    ะ’ะตั€ะฑะพะฒะบะฐ ะฝะฐั‘ะผะฝะธะบะพะฒ ะฟั€ะพะธัั…ะพะดะธั‚ ะฟะพ ั€ะฐะทะฝั‹ะผ ะบะฐะฝะฐะปะฐะผ ะฒ ะทะฐะฒะธัะธะผะพัั‚ะธ ะพั‚ ัั‚ั€ะฐะฝ. ะŸั€ะพั„ะตััะธะพะฝะฐะปั‹ ั ะฑะพะตะฒั‹ะผ ะพะฟั‹ั‚ะพะผ ะฒ ะณะพั€ัั‡ะธั… ั‚ะพั‡ะบะฐั… ะธะท ะกะจะ ะธ ะ’ะตะปะธะบะพะฑั€ะธั‚ะฐะฝะธะธ ะฒ ะพัะฝะพะฒะฝะพะผ ะฟะพะฟะฐะดะฐัŽั‚ ะฝะฐ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝัƒ ั‡ะตั€ะตะท ะบะพะฝั‚ะฐะบั‚ั‹ ั ะฝะฐั‘ะผะฝะธะบะฐะผะธ, ะธะผะตัŽั‰ะธะผะธ ัะฒัะทะธ ั ะทะฐะฟะฐะดะฝั‹ะผะธ ะงะ’ะš ะธะปะธ ะฒะพะตะฒะฐะฒัˆะธะผะธ ะฝะฐ ัั‚ะพั€ะพะฝะต ะบัƒั€ะดะพะฒ (YPG) ะฒ ะ˜ั€ะฐะบะต ะธ ะกะธั€ะธะธ. ะšะฐะบ ะฟั€ะฐะฒะธะปะพ, ะทะฐั‚ะตะผ ะพะฝะธ ั„ะพั€ะผะธั€ัƒัŽั‚ ะพั‚ะดะตะปัŒะฝั‹ะต ะฟะพะดั€ะฐะทะดะตะปะตะฝะธั ะฝะฐ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝะต ะธ ะผะพะณัƒั‚ ะธะผะตั‚ัŒ ั„ะธะฝะฐะฝัะธั€ะพะฒะฐะฝะธะต ะพั‚ ยซั‡ะฐัั‚ะฝั‹ั… ัะฟะพะฝัะพั€ะพะฒยป. ะ•ัั‚ัŒ ะฒะตั€ะฑะพะฒั‰ะธะบะธ ะฒะพ ั„ั€ะฐะฝั†ัƒะทัะบะพะผ ะธะฝะพัั‚ั€ะฐะฝะฝะพะผ ะปะตะณะธะพะฝะต ะธ ะฒ ะธะฝะถะตะฝะตั€ะฝะพ-ะดะตัะฐะฝั‚ะฝะพะผ ะฟะพะปะบัƒ ะฒ ะœะพะฝั‚ะพะฑะฐะฝะต. ะคั€ะฐะฝั†ัƒะทั‹ ะฑะตะท ะฑะพะตะฒะพะณะพ ะพะฟั‹ั‚ะฐ ะฝะฐ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝัƒ ะฟะพะฟะฐะดะฐัŽั‚ ะธะท ะฟั€ะฐะฒะพั€ะฐะดะธะบะฐะปัŒะฝั‹ั… ะดะฒะธะถะตะฝะธะน, ะบะพั‚ะพั€ั‹ะต ะธะผะตัŽั‚ ัะฒัะทะธ ั ยซะะทะพะฒะพะผยป ะธะปะธ ยซะŸั€ะฐะฒั‹ะผ ัะตะบั‚ะพั€ะพะผยป. ะ›ะฐั‚ะธะฝะพะฐะผะตั€ะธะบะฐะฝั†ั‹ ะฒะตั€ะฑัƒัŽั‚ัั ั‡ะตั€ะตะท ะฒะพะตะฝะฝั‹ะน ะฐั‚ั‚ะฐัˆะฐั‚ ะฟะพัะพะปัŒัั‚ะฒะฐ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝั‹. ะะฐั‘ะผะฝะธะบะธ ะฟั€ะธั…ะพะดัั‚ ะธะท ะฟะพะปะธั†ะธะธ ะธ ัะธะปะพะฒั‹ั… ัั‚ั€ัƒะบั‚ัƒั€, ัƒะฒะพะปัŒะฝััััŒ ั€ะฐะดะธ ะฒั‹ัะพะบะพะน ะฟะพ ะผะตัั‚ะฝั‹ะผ ะผะตั€ะบะฐะผ ะทะฐั€ะฟะปะฐั‚ั‹. ะŸะพะปัะบะธ ะธ ัะบะฐะฝะดะธะฝะฐะฒั‹ ะฟะพะฟะฐะดะฐัŽั‚ ะฝะฐ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝัƒ ั‡ะตั€ะตะท ะบะพะฝั‚ะฐะบั‚ั‹ ะฒ ัะฒะพะธั… ะฒะพะพั€ัƒะถั‘ะฝะฝั‹ั… ัะธะปะฐั…, ะณะดะต ะพะฝะธ ัะปัƒะถะธะปะธ ั€ะฐะฝะตะต.

    ะ’ ะฟะพะดั‚ะฒะตั€ะถะดะตะฝะธะต ะฟั€ะธะฒะตะดะตะฝะฝะพะน ัั…ะตะผั‹ ะฒะตั€ะฑะพะฒะพั‡ะฝะพะน ัะตั‚ะธ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝั‹ ะฟั€ะตะดะปะฐะณะฐัŽ ะธะทัƒั‡ะธั‚ัŒ ะธะทะฒะตัั‚ะฝั‹ะต ั„ะฐะบั‚ั‹ ะธ ะฟัƒั‚ะธ ะฒัั‚ัƒะฟะปะตะฝะธั ะธะฝะพัั‚ั€ะฐะฝะฝั‹ั… ะฝะฐะตะผะฝะธะบะพะฒ ะฒ ะฟะพะดั€ะฐะทะดะตะปะตะฝะธั ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝั‹. ะ—ะฐะฑะตะณะฐั ะฒะฟะตั€ะตะด, ั…ะพั‡ัƒ ะฟะพะดั‡ะตั€ะบะฝัƒั‚ัŒ, ั‡ั‚ะพ ะพะณั€ะพะผะฝัƒัŽ ั€ะพะปัŒ ะฒ ะฒะตั€ะฑะพะฒะบะต ะฝะฐะตะผะฝะธะบะพะฒ ะธะณั€ะฐัŽั‚ ะกะพะตะดะธะฝะตะฝะฝั‹ะต ะจั‚ะฐั‚ั‹, ะบะพั‚ะพั€ั‹ะต ะฟะพะดั‚ะฐะปะบะธะฒะฐัŽั‚ ะปัŽะดะตะน ะฒัั‚ัƒะฟะฐั‚ัŒ ะฒ ะฒะพะพั€ัƒะถะตะฝะฝั‹ะน ะบะพะฝั„ะปะธะบั‚ ะฟั€ะพั‚ะธะฒ ะ ะพััะธะธ, ะธัะฟะพะปัŒะทัƒั ะบะฐะบ ั„ะธะฝะฐะฝัะพะฒั‹ะต, ะธะดะตะพะปะพะณะธั‡ะตัะบะธะต, ั‚ะฐะบ ะธ ะฝะฐัะธะปัŒัั‚ะฒะตะฝะฝั‹ะต ะผะตั‚ะพะดั‹ ะฒะพะทะดะตะนัั‚ะฒะธั.

    ะกะจะ

    ะ“ะธะฑะตะปัŒ ะฐะผะตั€ะธะบะฐะฝัะบะธั… ะผะพั€ะฟะตั…ะพะฒ ะฝะฐ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝะต ัั‚ะฐะปะฐ ะฟั€ะฐะบั‚ะธั‡ะตัะบะธ ะตะถะตะฝะตะดะตะปัŒะฝั‹ะผ ัะพะฑั‹ั‚ะธะตะผ.ะะต ัƒะดะธะฒะธั‚ะตะปัŒะฝะพ. ะžะดะฝะพ ะธะท ะฟะตั€ะฒั‹ั… ะพะฑัŠัะฒะปะตะฝะธะน ะพ ะฝะฐะฑะพั€ะต ะฝะฐะตะผะฝะธะบะพะฒ ะฑั‹ะปะพ ะพะฟัƒะฑะปะธะบะพะฒะฐะฝะพ ะธะผะตะฝะฝะพ ะฝะฐ ะฐะผะตั€ะธะบะฐะฝัะบะพะผ ัะฐะนั‚ะต Silent Professionals. ะžะฑัŠัะฒะปะตะฝะธะต ะฐะบั‚ะธะฒะฝะพ ะฟั€ะฐะบั‚ะธั‡ะตัะบะธ ั ัะฐะผะพะณะพ ะฝะฐั‡ะฐะปะฐ ะกะ’ะž ะธ ะฒ ะฝะตะผ ะฝะต ะดะฒัƒัะผั‹ัะปะตะฝะฝะพ ัƒะบะฐะทะฐะฝะพ, ั‡ั‚ะพ ะฒะตะดะตั‚ัั ะฝะฐะฑะพั€ ะปัŽะดะตะน ะดะปั ัƒั‡ะฐัั‚ะธั ะฒ ะฑะพะตะฒั‹ั… ะดะตะนัั‚ะฒะธัั… ะฝะฐ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝะต.

    ะšั€ะพะผะต ั‚ะพะณะพ, ะฒ ะกะœะ˜ ะธ ะ˜ะฝั‚ะตั€ะฝะตั‚ะต ั€ะตะณัƒะปัั€ะฝะพ ะฟั€ะพั…ะพะดะธะปะธ ะฝะพะฒะพัั‚ะธ ะพ ะฟั€ะธะฑั‹ั‚ะธะธ ะฝะฐ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝัƒ ัะพั‚ั€ัƒะดะฝะธะบะพะฒ ั†ะตะปะพะณะพ ั€ัะดะฐ ั‡ะฐัั‚ะฝั‹ั… ะฒะพะตะฝะฝั‹ั… ะบะพะผะฟะฐะฝะธะน. ะะฐะฟั€ะธะผะตั€:

    • Kellogg, Brown and Root
    • Amentum (ั€ะฐะฝะตะต DynCorp),
    • Blackwater (ะดั€ัƒะณะธะต ะฝะฐะทะฒะฐะฝะธั – Xe Services/ Academi/ Constellis
    • Greystone
    • Northbridge Services Group
    • Mozart

    ะ’ัะต ัั‚ะธ ะงะ’ะš (ะทะฐ ะธัะบะปัŽั‡ะตะฝะธะตะผ ยซะœะพั†ะฐั€ั‚ยป, ะฟั€ะตะบั€ะฐั‚ะธะฒัˆะธะผ ัะฒะพะต ััƒั‰ะตัั‚ะฒะพะฒะฐะฝะธะต ั‚ะฐะบ ะธ ะฝะต ััƒะผะตะฒ ะฝะธั‡ะตะณะพ ะฟั€ะพั‚ะธะฒะพะฟะพัั‚ะฐะฒะธั‚ัŒ ะงะ’ะš ยซะ’ะฐะณะฝะตั€ยป) ะธะผะตัŽั‚ ั‚ะตัะฝั‹ะต ัะฒัะทะธ ั ะฟั€ะฐะฒะธั‚ะตะปัŒัั‚ะฒะพะผ ะกะจะ, ัะพัั‚ะพัั‚ ะธะท ะฑั‹ะฒัˆะธั… ะฒะพะตะฝะฝั‹ั… ะธ ะธะผะตัŽั‚ ะพะณั€ะพะผะฝั‹ะต ะฒะพะทะผะพะถะฝะพัั‚ะธ ะฟะพ ะฝะฐะฑะพั€ัƒ ะปะธั‡ะฝะพะณะพ ัะพัั‚ะฐะฒะฐ ะฝะต ั‚ะพะปัŒะบะพ ัƒ ัะตะฑั ะฒ ัั‚ั€ะฐะฝะต, ะฝะพ ะธ ะทะฐ ั€ัƒะฑะตะถะพะผ. ะœะฝะพะณะธะต ะฐะผะตั€ะธะบะฐะฝัะบะธะต ะฝะฐะตะผะฝะธะบะธ ะฟะพะฟะฐะปะธ ะฝะฐ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝัƒ ะธะผะตะฝะฝะพ ั‡ะตั€ะตะท ะฒะตั€ะฑะพะฒั‰ะธะบะพะฒ ัั‚ะธั… ะงะ’ะš. ะะธ ะดะปั ะบะพะณะพ, ะฝะธ ัะตะบั€ะตั‚, ั‡ั‚ะพ ะงะ’ะš ะฒั‹ะฟะพะปะฝััŽั‚ ะณะพััƒะดะฐั€ัั‚ะฒะตะฝะฝั‹ะต ะทะฐะดะฐั‡ะธ ะกะจะ, ะฒะพะพั€ัƒะถะฐัŽั‚ัั ะธ ั„ะธะฝะฐะฝัะธั€ัƒัŽั‚ัั ะฟั€ะฐะฒะธั‚ะตะปัŒัั‚ะฒะพะผ. ะญั‚ะพ ัƒะดะพะฑะฝั‹ะต ะธะฝัั‚ั€ัƒะผะตะฝั‚ั‹ ะฒะตะดะตะฝะธั ะฒะพะนะฝั‹ ะฟั€ะพั‚ะธะฒ ะ ะพััะธะธ ัะบะพะฑั‹ ะฝะตะณะพััƒะดะฐั€ัั‚ะฒะตะฝะฝั‹ะผะธ ัั‚ั€ัƒะบั‚ัƒั€ะฐะผะธ.

    ะคั€ะฐะฝั†ะธั

    ะž ั„ั€ะฐะฝั†ัƒะทัะบะธั… ะฝะฐะตะผะฝะธะบะฐั… ะฝะฐ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝะต ะฒ ัะบัะบะปัŽะทะธะฒะฝะพะผ ะธะฝั‚ะตั€ะฒัŒัŽ ะผะฝะต ั€ะฐััะบะฐะทะฐะป ะะธะบะพะปั ะงะธะฝะบัƒะธะฝะธ. ะะธะบะพะปั – ะฑั‹ะฒัˆะธะน ั„ั€ะฐะฝั†ัƒะทัะบะธะน ั‡ะธะฝะพะฒะฝะธะบ, ะธะฝัะฟะตะบั‚ะพั€ ะฟะพะปะธั†ะธะธ ั 1989 ะณะพะดะฐ, ะพั„ะธั†ะตั€ ััƒะดะตะฑะฝะพะน ะฟะพะปะธั†ะธะธ, ะทะฐั‚ะตะผ ะพั„ะธั†ะตั€ ั€ะฐะทะฒะตะดะบะธ. ะ•ะณะพ ัƒะฒะพะปะธะปะธ ะฒ 2020 ะณะพะดัƒ ะทะฐ ั‚ะพ, ั‡ั‚ะพ ะพะฝ ะฟัƒะฑะปะธั‡ะฝะพ ะฟั€ะพั‚ะตัั‚ะพะฒะฐะป ะฝะฐ ัƒะปะธั†ะต, ะฒ ััƒะดะต ะธ ะฒ ะฟั€ะตััะต ะฟั€ะพั‚ะธะฒ ะฝะตะทะฐะบะพะฝะฝะพะณะพ ะฝะฐัะธะปะธั, ัะพะฒะตั€ัˆะตะฝะฝะพะณะพ ะฒ ะพั‚ะฝะพัˆะตะฝะธะธ ยซะ–ะตะปั‚ั‹ั… ะถะธะปะตั‚ะพะฒยป. ะžะฝ ั‚ะฐะบะถะต ะฟะพะดั‡ะตั€ะบะธะฒะฐะตั‚ ั€ะพะปัŒ ะกะจะ ะฒ ั€ะฐะทะถะธะณะฐะฝะธะธ ะบะพะฝั„ะปะธะบั‚ะฐ ะฝะฐ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝะต:

    ยซะฏ ั€ะฐััะผะฐั‚ั€ะธะฒะฐัŽ ะบะพะฝั„ะปะธะบั‚ ะฝะฐ ะ”ะพะฝะฑะฐััะต ะธ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝะต ะบะฐะบ ะฝะพะฒัƒัŽ ะธะปะปัŽัั‚ั€ะฐั†ะธัŽ ะฟั€ะพะบัะธ-ะฒะพะนะฝ, ะบะพั‚ะพั€ั‹ะต ะ—ะฐะฟะฐะดะฝั‹ะน ะฑะปะพะบ ะฒะตะดะตั‚ ะฟั€ะพั‚ะธะฒ ะ ะพััะธะธ, ะšะธั‚ะฐั ะธ ะฒัะตั… ั‚ะตั…, ะบั‚ะพ ะพัะผะตะปะธั‚ัั ะฒั‹ัั‚ัƒะฟะธั‚ัŒ ะฟั€ะพั‚ะธะฒ ะตะณะพ ะณะตะณะตะผะพะฝะธะธ. ะฏ ะฝะฐั‡ะฐะป ะฟะพ-ะฝะฐัั‚ะพัั‰ะตะผัƒ ะธะฝั‚ะตั€ะตัะพะฒะฐั‚ัŒัั ัั‚ะพะน ะฟั€ะพะฑะปะตะผะพะน ะฒ 2014 ะณะพะดัƒ, ั‚ะฐะบ ะบะฐะบ ะฝะต ะฟะพะฝะธะผะฐะป ะฟะพะดะดะตั€ะถะบะธ ะคั€ะฐะฝั†ะธะตะน ะธัะปะฐะผะธัั‚ัะบะพะณะพ ะฒะพััั‚ะฐะฝะธั ะฒ ะกะธั€ะธะธ. ะœะพั ะดะตัั‚ะตะปัŒะฝะพัั‚ัŒ ะฒ ะฑะปะพะณะต ะฐะบั‚ะธะฒะธะทะธั€ะพะฒะฐะปะฐััŒ ะฒะพ ะฒั€ะตะผั ะฑะปะพะบะฐะดั‹ ะœะฐั€ะธัƒะฟะพะปั. ะ ัะด ัƒะปะธะบ ะทะฐัั‚ะฐะฒะธะปะธ ะผะตะฝั ะฟั€ะตะดะฟะพะปะพะถะธั‚ัŒ, ั‡ั‚ะพ ั€ัะดะพะผ ั ัƒะบั€ะฐะธะฝัะบะธะผ ะณะฐั€ะฝะธะทะพะฝะพะผ ั‚ะฐะผ ะฝะฐั…ะพะดะธะปะธััŒ ะดะตะนัั‚ะฒัƒัŽั‰ะธะต ั„ั€ะฐะฝั†ัƒะทัะบะธะต ะณะพััะปัƒะถะฐั‰ะธะต. ะงั‚ะพะฑั‹ ะฟะพะดั‚ะฒะตั€ะดะธั‚ัŒ ัั‚ัƒ ั‚ะตะพั€ะธัŽ, ั ะฝะฐั‡ะฐะป ัะพะฑะธั€ะฐั‚ัŒ ะธะฝั„ะพั€ะผะฐั†ะธัŽ ะพ ะดะตะนัั‚ะฒัƒัŽั‰ะธั… ะฝะฐ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝะต ั„ั€ะฐะฝั†ัƒะทัะบะธั… ะฝะฐะตะผะฝะธะบะฐั…. ะฏ ะฟะพะฝัะป, ั‡ั‚ะพ ะผะฝะพะณะธะต ะธะท ะฝะธั… ะฑั‹ะปะธ ัั‚ะพั€ะพะฝะฝะธะบะฐะผะธ ะธะดะตะน ะฝะตะพะฝะฐั†ะธะทะผะฐ, ะบะพั‚ะพั€ั‹ั… ั„ั€ะฐะฝั†ัƒะทัะบะฐั ะฟั€ะตััะฐ ะฟั‹ั‚ะฐะปะฐััŒ ะพะฑะตะปะธั‚ัŒ ะธ ะฟั€ะตะฒั€ะฐั‚ะธั‚ัŒ ะฒ ะณะตั€ะพะตะฒ. ะŸะพ ะผะพะตะผัƒ ะผะฝะตะฝะธัŽ, ะฟะพะณะธะฑัˆะธะน ั„ั€ะฐะฝั†ัƒะท ะขะธะฑะพ ะ ะธะณะพะฝ, ะฟะพัะผะตั€ั‚ะฝะพ ะฝะฐะณั€ะฐะถะดะตะฝะฝั‹ะน ะ—ะตะปะตะฝัะบะธะผ, ะผะพะณ ัะฒะปัั‚ัŒัั ะดะตะนัั‚ะฒัƒัŽั‰ะธะผ ะณะพััะปัƒะถะฐั‰ะธะผ, ั‚ะฐะบ ะบะฐะบ ะฒะพะบั€ัƒะณ ะตะณะพ ัะผะตั€ั‚ะธ ะพั‡ะตะฝัŒ ะผะฝะพะณะพ ะทะฐะณะฐะดะพั‡ะฝั‹ั… ะพะฑัั‚ะพัั‚ะตะปัŒัั‚ะฒ, ะธ ั ัั‚ะฐั€ะฐัŽััŒ ะฟั€ะพััะฝะธั‚ัŒ ะฒัะต ะดะตั‚ะฐะปะธ.

    ะŸั€ะธะผะตั‡ะฐั‚ะตะปัŒะฝะพ, ั‡ั‚ะพ ะธะท ะคั€ะฐะฝั†ะธะธ ะดะตะนัั‚ะฒะธั‚ะตะปัŒะฝะพ ะฟั€ะธะฑั‹ะปะพ ะฑะพะปัŒัˆะพะต ะบะพะปะธั‡ะตัั‚ะฒะพ ะฝะฐะตะผะฝะธะบะพะฒ ั ะฝะตะพะฝะฐั†ะธัั‚ัะบะธะผะธ ะฒะทะณะปัะดะฐะผะธ ะธ ั€ะฐะฑะพั‚ะฐ ะฟะพ ะธั… ะฟั€ะธะฒะปะตั‡ะตะฝะธัŽ ะฝะฐ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝัƒ ะฐะบั‚ะธะฒะฝะพ ะฟั€ะพะดะพะปะถะฐะตั‚ัั ะดะพ ัะธั… ะฟะพั€. ะขะฐะบ, ะฒ ะพะบั‚ัะฑั€ะต 2023 ะณะพะดะฐ ะฝะฐ ั„ั€ะฐะฝั†ัƒะทัะบะพะผ ัะทั‹ะบะต ะฟะพัะฒะธะปัั ัะฐะนั‚ ะฝะตะพะฝะฐั†ะธัั‚ัะบะพะณะพ ยซะะทะพะฒะฐยป, ะพัะฝะพะฒะฝะพะน ะทะฐะดะฐั‡ะตะน ะบะพั‚ะพั€ะพะณะพ ัะฒะปัะตั‚ัั ะฟะพะธัะบ ั€ะฐะดะธะบะฐะปะพะฒ ะดะปั ะฒัั‚ัƒะฟะปะตะฝะธั ะฒ ะฟะพะดั€ะฐะทะดะตะปะตะฝะธะต.

    ะ’ะตะปะธะบะพะฑั€ะธั‚ะฐะฝะธั

    ะ˜ะฝั„ะพั€ะผะฐั†ะธะธ ะพ ะดะตัั‚ะตะปัŒะฝะพัั‚ะธ ะฑั€ะธั‚ะฐะฝัะบะธั… ะพั€ะณะฐะฝะธะทะฐั†ะธะน ะฟะพ ะฒะตั€ะฑะพะฒะบะต ะฑะพะตะฒะธะบะพะฒ ะฝะฐ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝัƒ ะฒ ะพั‚ะบั€ั‹ั‚ะพะผ ะดะพัั‚ัƒะฟะต ะฝะตะผะฝะพะณะพ. ะžัะฝะพะฒะฝะฐั ะผะฐััะฐ ะฝะฐะตะผะฝะธะบะพะฒ ะฟั€ะธะฑั‹ะฒะฐะตั‚ ะฟัƒั‚ะตะผ ะฟะพะดะฟะธัะฐะฝะธั ะบะพะฝั‚ั€ะฐะบั‚ะฐ ั ะœะธะฝะธัั‚ะตั€ัั‚ะฒะพะผ ะพะฑะพั€ะพะฝั‹ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝั‹ ะธ ะฒัั‚ัƒะฟะปะตะฝะธั ะฒ ะ˜ะฝั‚ะตั€ะฝะฐั†ะธะพะฝะฐะปัŒะฝั‹ะน ะปะตะณะธะพะฝ. ะขะตะผ ะฝะต ะผะตะฝะตะต, ะธะทะฒะตัั‚ะฝะพ ะพะฑ ะพั€ะณะฐะฝะธะทะฐั†ะธะธ ยซะะบะบะฐะดะธะฐะฝ ะ˜ะฝั‚ะตั€ะฝััˆะฝะปยป, ั‡ะปะตะฝั‹ ะบะพั‚ะพั€ะพะน ะฑั‹ะปะธ ะทะฐะผะตั‡ะตะฝั‹ ะฝะฐ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝะต, ะฝะตะพะดะฝะพะบั€ะฐั‚ะฝะพ ะฟั€ะพะฒะพะดะธะปะธ ะบะพะฝั„ะตั€ะตะฝั†ะธะธ ะฒ ะŸะพะปัŒัˆะต ะธ ะ’ะตะปะธะบะพะฑั€ะธั‚ะฐะฝะธะธ, ะฟั€ะธะทั‹ะฒะฐั ะฒัั‚ัƒะฟะฐั‚ัŒ ะฒ ะบะพะฝั„ะปะธะบั‚ ะฝะฐ ัั‚ะพั€ะพะฝะต ะบะธะตะฒัะบะพะณะพ ั€ะตะถะธะผะฐ.

    ะŸะพะปัŒัˆะฐ

    @TrackNaziMerc:

    ะ’ัะต ะฝะฐะตะผะฝะธะบะธ, ะฟั€ะธะฑั‹ะฒะฐัŽั‰ะธะต ะฝะฐ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝัƒ, ะฟะพะฟะฐะดะฐัŽั‚ ะฒ ัั‚ั€ะฐะฝัƒ ั‡ะตั€ะตะท ะŸะพะปัŒัˆัƒ.

    ะŸัƒั‚ัŒ ะฝะฐะตะผะฝะธะบะฐ ั‡ะฐัั‚ะพ ะฒะบะปัŽั‡ะฐะตั‚ ะฒ ัะตะฑั ัะปะตะดัƒัŽั‰ะธะต ัั‚ะฐะฟั‹:

    ะ’ะฐั€ัˆะฐะฒะฐ => ะ›ัŒะฒะพะฒ/ะ”ั€ะพะณะพะฑั‹ั‡ => ะ ะพะฒะฝะพ, ะณะดะต ั€ะฐัะฟะพะปะพะถะตะฝะฐ ะฒะพะธะฝัะบะฐั ั‡ะฐัั‚ัŒ ะ7420 ะธ ัƒั‡ะตะฑะฝั‹ะน ะฟะพะปะธะณะพะฝ.

    ะšะปะฐััะธั‡ะตัะบะธะน ะผะฐั€ัˆั€ัƒั‚ ะดะปั ะฑะพะตะฒะธะบะพะฒ ั ะ›ะฐั‚ะธะฝัะบะพะน ะะผะตั€ะธะบะธ ั‚ะฐะบะถะต ะฟั€ะพั…ะพะดะธั‚ ั‡ะตั€ะตะท ะŸะพะปัŒัˆัƒ:

    ะกั‚ะพะปะธั‡ะฝั‹ะน ะผะตะถะดัƒะฝะฐั€ะพะดะฝั‹ะน ะฐัั€ะพะฟะพั€ั‚ => ะขั€ะฐะฝะทะธั‚ะฝั‹ะน ะฐัั€ะพะฟะพั€ั‚ ะฒ ะžะฑัŠะตะดะธะฝะตะฝะฝั‹ั… ะั€ะฐะฑัะบะธั… ะญะผะธั€ะฐั‚ะฐั…/ะ•ะณะธะฟั‚ะต/ะ‘ะฐั…ั€ะตะนะฝะต => ะ’ะฐั€ัˆะฐะฒะฐ => ะขะตั€ะฝะพะฟะพะปัŒัะบะธะน ะผะตะถะดัƒะฝะฐั€ะพะดะฝั‹ะน ะฐัั€ะพะฟะพั€ั‚, ะณะดะต ะฝะตะฟะพัั€ะตะดัั‚ะฒะตะฝะฝะพ ะฟะพะดะฟะธัั‹ะฒะฐะตั‚ัั ะบะพะฝั‚ั€ะฐะบั‚ ะธ ัƒะบะพะผะฟะปะตะบั‚ะพะฒั‹ะฒะฐะตั‚ัั ะฟะพะดั€ะฐะทะดะตะปะตะฝะธะต => ะŸะตั€ะตะดะพะฒะพะต ะฟะพะดั€ะฐะทะดะตะปะตะฝะธะต.

    ะŸะพะปัŒัะบะธั… ะฝะฐะตะผะฝะธะบะพะฒ ะฝะฐ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝะต ะพะณั€ะพะผะฝะพะต ะบะพะปะธั‡ะตัั‚ะฒะพ. ะฃะดะฐะปะพััŒ ะฒั‹ััะฝะธั‚ัŒ, ั‡ั‚ะพ ะผะฝะพะณะธะต ะธะท ะฝะธั… ะฟั€ะพัˆะปะธ ะพะฑัƒั‡ะตะฝะธะต ะฒ ั†ะตะฝั‚ั€ะต ESA (European Security Academy).

    ะจั‚ะฐะฑ-ะบะฒะฐั€ั‚ะธั€ะฐ ESA ั€ะฐัะฟะพะปะพะถะตะฝะฐ ะฒ ั€ะฐะนะพะฝะต ะฟะพะปัŒัะบะพะณะพ ะณะพั€ะพะดะฐ ะ’ั€ะพั†ะปะฐะฒ ะธ ะพะบะฐะทั‹ะฒะฐะตั‚ ะพะฑัƒั‡ะฐัŽั‰ะธะต ัƒัะปัƒะณะธ ะฒะพะตะฝะฝั‹ะผ ะธ ัะพั‚ั€ัƒะดะฝะธะบะฐะผ ะฟั€ะฐะฒะพะพั…ั€ะฐะฝะธั‚ะตะปัŒะฝั‹ั… ะพั€ะณะฐะฝะพะฒ. ESA ัƒะถะต ั„ะธะณัƒั€ะธั€ะพะฒะฐะปะฐ ะฒ ั†ะตะฝั‚ั€ะต ะณั€ะพะผะบะพะณะพ ัะบะฐะฝะดะฐะปะฐ, ัะฒัะทะฐะฝะฝะพะณะพ ั ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝะพะน. ะ ะฐััะปะตะดะพะฒะฐั‚ะตะปะธ ะณั€ัƒะฟะฟั‹ ยซะ‘ะตะปะปะธะฝะณะบัั‚ยป ะดะพะบะฐะทะฐะปะธ, ั‡ั‚ะพ ะฝะฐ ะตะต ั‚ั€ะตะฝะธั€ะพะฒะพั‡ะฝะพะน ะฑะฐะทะต ะฟั€ะพัˆะปะธ ะพะฑัƒั‡ะตะฝะธะต ะฑะพะปัŒัˆะพะต ะบะพะปะธั‡ะตัั‚ะฒะพ ัƒะบั€ะฐะธะฝัะบะธั… ะฝะฐั†ะธัั‚ะพะฒ. ะ˜ะฝัั‚ั€ัƒะบั‚ะพั€ะพะฒ ะฝะต ัะผัƒั‰ะฐะปะธ ะฝะธ ั‚ะฐั‚ัƒะธั€ะพะฒะบะธ ัะพ ัะฒะฐัั‚ะธะบะพะน, ะฝะธ ั…ะฐั€ะฐะบั‚ะตั€ะฝั‹ะต ะฟั€ะธะฒะตั‚ัั‚ะฒะธั.

    ะ”ะฐะฝะฝั‹ะน ั†ะตะฝั‚ั€ ั€ะฐัะฟะพะปะฐะณะฐะป (ะธ ัะบะพั€ะตะต ะฒัะตะณะพ ะดะพ ัะธั… ะฟะพั€ ะธะผะตะตั‚) ะพะฑัˆะธั€ะฝัƒัŽ ัะตั‚ัŒ ั„ะธะปะธะฐะปะพะฒ ะฒะพ ะฒัะตั… ั€ะตะณะธะพะฝะฐั… ะผะธั€ะฐ, ะพ ั‡ะตะผ ัะฒะธะดะตั‚ะตะปัŒัั‚ะฒัƒัŽั‚ ะฐะบะบะฐัƒะฝั‚ั‹ ะฒ ะ˜ะฝัั‚ะฐะณั€ะฐะผ. ะœะพะถะฝะพ ะฝะฐะนั‚ะธ ะกะบะฐะฝะดะธะฝะฐะฒะธัŽ, ะ ัƒะผั‹ะฝะธัŽ, ะ‘ะพะปะณะฐั€ะธัŽ, ะะฒัั‚ั€ะธัŽ, ะฎะถะฝัƒัŽ ะะผะตั€ะธะบัƒ, ะธ ะดั€ัƒะณะธะต ะฐะบะบะฐัƒะฝั‚ั‹ ั„ะธะปะธะฐะปะพะฒ ะบะพะผะฟะฐะฝะธะธ.

    ะŸั€ะตะดัั‚ะฐะฒะธั‚ะตะปะธ ะบะพะผะฟะฐะฝะธะธ ัƒะดะฐะปะธะปะธ ั ะพั„ะธั†ะธะฐะปัŒะฝะพะณะพ ัะฐะนั‚ะฐ ั€ะฐะทะดะตะป ั ัะฒะพะธะผะธ ะทะฐั€ัƒะฑะตะถะฝั‹ะผะธ ะฟั€ะตะดัั‚ะฐะฒะธั‚ะตะปัŒัั‚ะฒะฐะผะธ, ะฝะพ ะธั… ั„ัƒะฝะบั†ะธะพะฝะธั€ะพะฒะฐะฝะธะต ะฝะต ะพัั‚ะฐะฝะพะฒะปะตะฝะพ. ะžะฝะธ ะทะฐะฝะธะผะฐัŽั‚ัั ะฟะพะธัะบะพะผ ะธ ั‚ั€ะตะฝะธั€ะพะฒะบะพะน ะฝะฐะตะผะฝะธะบะพะฒ ะฒ ะทะพะฝะฐั… ัะฒะพะตะน ะพั‚ะฒะตั‚ัั‚ะฒะตะฝะฝะพัั‚ะธ.

    ะญั‚ะพ ะปะตะณะบะพ ะดะพะบะฐะทะฐั‚ัŒ ะธะทัƒั‡ะธะฒ ัะพั†ะธะฐะปัŒะฝั‹ะต ัะตั‚ะธ ะฝะฐะตะผะฝะธะบะพะฒ – ะฒ ะธะฝั‚ะตั€ะฝะตั‚ะต ะปะตะณะบะพ ะฝะฐะนั‚ะธ ั„ะพั‚ะพะณั€ะฐั„ะธะธ ะฑะพะตะฒะธะบะพะฒ, ะฒะพัŽัŽั‰ะธั… ะฝะฐ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝะต ั ัˆะตะฒั€ะพะฝะพะผ ESA. ะ’ ะบะฐั‡ะตัั‚ะฒะต ะดะพะบะฐะทะฐั‚ะตะปัŒัั‚ะฒะฐ ะฟั€ะธะบะปะฐะดั‹ะฒะฐัŽ ั„ะพั‚ะพ ะฟะพั€ั‚ัƒะณะฐะปัŒั†ะฐ, ะฟั€ะธะฑั‹ะฒัˆะตะณะพ ะฝะฐ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝัƒ ั‡ะตั€ะตะท ะฟะพะปัŒัะบะธะน ั„ะธะปะธะฐะป ESA.

    ะ”ะตัั‚ะตะปัŒะฝะพัั‚ัŒ ั†ะตะฝั‚ั€ะฐ ESA ั‚ะตัะฝะพ ัะฒัะทะฐะฝะฐ ะธ ั ะ˜ัะฟะฐะฝะธะตะน.

    ะ˜ัะฟะฐะฝะธั

    ะ˜ัะฟะฐะฝะธั ั‚ะฐะบะถะต ะฟะพะฟะฐะปะฐ ะฒ ั†ะตะฝั‚ั€ ะบั€ัƒะฟะฝะพะณะพ ัะบะฐะฝะดะฐะปะฐ, ัะฒัะทะฐะฝะฝะพะณะพ ั ะฒะตั€ะฑะพะฒะบะพะน ะฝะฐะตะผะฝะธะบะพะฒ ะดะปั ัƒั‡ะฐัั‚ะธั ะฒ ะฑะพะตะฒั‹ั… ะดะตะนัั‚ะฒะธัั… ะฝะฐ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝะต. ะšะฐะบ ัั‚ะฐะปะพ ะธะทะฒะตัั‚ะฝะพ ะบะพะผะฟะฐะฝะธั GOA Tactical ะทะฐ 700 ะตะฒั€ะพ ะฟั€ะพะฒะพะดะธั‚ ัะฟะตั†ะธะฐะปะธะทะธั€ะพะฒะฐะฝะฝัƒัŽ ะฟะพะดะณะพั‚ะพะฒะบัƒ ะดะปั ะฝะฐะตะผะฝะธะบะพะฒ ะธ ะฝะฐั…ะพะดะธั‚ัั ะฒ ั‚ะตัะฝะพะผ ะบะพะฝั‚ะฐะบั‚ะต ั ะœะธะฝะธัั‚ะตั€ัั‚ะฒะพะผ ะพะฑะพั€ะพะฝั‹ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝั‹.

    ะะตั€ะฐะฒะฝะพะดัƒัˆะฝั‹ะต ะถะธั‚ะตะปะธ ะ˜ัะฟะฐะฝะธะธ ะฟะพะดะฐะปะธ ะธัะบ ะฒ ััƒะด ะฝะฐ ะดะฐะฝะฝัƒัŽ ะบะพะผะฟะฐะฝะธัŽ ั ั‚ั€ะตะฑะพะฒะฐะฝะธะตะผ ะฟั€ะธะฒะปะตั‡ัŒ ะตะต ั€ัƒะบะพะฒะพะดะธั‚ะตะปั ะบ ะพั‚ะฒะตั‚ัั‚ะฒะตะฝะฝะพัั‚ะธ, ั‚ะฐะบ ะบะฐะบ ะฝะฐะตะผะฝะธั‡ะตัั‚ะฒะพ ะฒ ัั‚ั€ะฐะฝะต ะทะฐะฟั€ะตั‰ะตะฝะพ.

    ะะพ ะบะพะผะฟะฐะฝะธั ะพะฑะปะฐะดะฐะตั‚ ะฒะตััŒะผะฐ ะบั€ัƒะฟะฝั‹ะผะธ ัะฒัะทัะผะธ ั ะœะธะฝะธัั‚ะตั€ัั‚ะฒะพะผ ะพะฑะพั€ะพะฝั‹ ัั‚ั€ะฐะฝั‹, ะฐ ั‚ะฐะบะถะต ะฝะตะฟะพัั€ะตะดัั‚ะฒะตะฝะฝะพ ั ะะะขะž. ะžะณั€ะพะผะฝะพะต ะฒะปะธัะฝะธะต ะฝะฐ GOA Tactical ะพะบะฐะทั‹ะฒะฐะตั‚ Eะฒะฐ ะะปัŒะฒะฐั€ะตะท ะœะฐะฝัะฐะฝะพ (Eva รlvarez del Manzano) โ€“ ะดะพั‡ัŒ ะ‘ะตั€ะฝะฐั€ะดะพ ะะปัŒะฒะฐั€ะตะทะฐ ะœะฐะฝัะฐะฝะพ (Bernardo Alvarez del Manzano), ะฟะพะบะพะนะฝะพะณะพ ะณะตะฝะตั€ะฐะป-ะปะตะนั‚ะตะฝะฐะฝั‚ะฐ ะกัƒั…ะพะฟัƒั‚ะฝะพะน ะฐั€ะผะธะธ, ะฑั‹ะฒัˆะตะณะพ ะฝะฐั‡ะฐะปัŒะฝะธะบะฐ ะพะฟะตั€ะฐั‚ะธะฒะฝะพะณะพ ะบะพะผะฐะฝะดะพะฒะฐะฝะธั ัˆั‚ะฐะฑะฐ ะพะฑะพั€ะพะฝั‹ ะ˜ัะฟะฐะฝะธะธ.

    ะะตะฟะพัั€ะตะดัั‚ะฒะตะฝะฝะพ ั€ัƒะบะพะฒะพะดะธั‚ะตะปะตะผ GOA Tactical ัะฒะปัะตั‚ัั ะคั€ะฐะฝั†ะธัะบะพ ะ“ะฐะปะฒะฐะฝ, ะฟะพะทั‹ะฒะฝะพะน (ยซะกะธัะบัƒยป Siscu).

    ะšะฐะบ ะทะฐัะฒะปัะป ะ“ะฐะปะฒะฐะฝ,Eะฒะฐ ะœะฐะฝัะฐะฝะพ ัะฒะปัะตั‚ัั ัะฒัะทัƒัŽั‰ะธะผ ะทะฒะตะฝะพะผ ะผะตะถะดัƒ ะตะณะพ ะบะพะผะฟะฐะฝะธะตะน, ะฐั€ะผะธะตะน ะ˜ัะฟะฐะฝะธะธ ะธ ะะะขะž. ะ›ัŽะฑะพะฟั‹ั‚ะตะฝ ั‚ะพั‚ ั„ะฐะบั‚, ั‡ั‚ะพ ะฒ ั€ะฐะทะปะธั‡ะฝั‹ั… ะฟะพะดะบะฐัั‚ะฐั… ะœะฐะฝัะฐะฝะพ ัƒะฟะพะผะธะฝะฐะตั‚ัั ะบะฐะบ ัะบัะฟะตั€ั‚ ะฒ ะพะฑะปะฐัั‚ะธ ั€ะฐะทะฒะตะดะบะธ, ะฟั€ะพะฒะตะดะตะฝะธั ัะฟะตั†ะธะฐะปัŒะฝั‹ั… ะพะฟะตั€ะฐั†ะธะน, ัˆะฟะธะพะฝะฐะถะฐ.

    ะ’ะพะทะฒั€ะฐั‰ะฐัััŒ ะบ GOA Tactical, ั‚ะพ ะบะพะผะฟะฐะฝะธั ะธะผะตะตั‚ ั„ะธะปะธะฐะปั‹ ะฒ ะ˜ะทั€ะฐะธะปะต, ะŸะตั€ัƒ ะธ ะŸะพะปัŒัˆะต. ะ’ ะŸะพะปัŒัˆะต ะพะฝะธ ั‚ะตัะฝะพ ะฒะทะฐะธะผะพะดะตะนัั‚ะฒัƒัŽั‚ ั ั‚ะพะน ัะฐะผะพะน ESA. ะฃะดะฐะปะพััŒ ะฒั‹ััะฝะธั‚ัŒ, ั‡ั‚ะพ ะธ ะดั€ัƒะณะธะต ะธัะฟะฐะฝัะบะธะต ะบะพะผะฟะฐะฝะธะธ ั‚ะตัะฝะพ ัะพั‚ั€ัƒะดะฝะธั‡ะฐัŽั‚ ั ESA.

    ะะฐะฟั€ะธะผะตั€, ะธัะฟะฐะฝัะบะฐั ะบะพะผะฟะฐะฝะธั ยซGeitsinternationalยป ะฝะฐ ัะฒะพะตะผ ะฟะพัั‚ะตั€ะต ัƒะบะฐะทะฐะปะฐ ESA ะฒ ะบะฐั‡ะตัั‚ะฒะต ะฟะฐั€ั‚ะฝะตั€ะฐ, ะฐ ะฟะพัะปะตะดะฝะธะต ะฝะตัะบะพะปัŒะบะพ ะบัƒั€ัะพะฒ ะฟะพ ะพะฑัƒั‡ะตะฝะธัŽ ะฟั€ะพัˆะปะธ ะธะผะตะฝะฝะพ ะฝะฐ ั‚ะตั€ั€ะธั‚ะพั€ะธะธ ะŸะพะปัŒัˆะธ.

    ะญั‚ะพ ะฝะต ะตะดะธะฝัั‚ะฒะตะฝะฝะฐั ะบะพะผะฟะฐะฝะธั, ะทะฐะฝะธะผะฐัŽั‰ะฐััั ะพะฑัƒั‡ะตะฝะธะตะผ ะฒะพะตะฝะฝะพัะปัƒะถะฐั‰ะธั… ะธ ะฟะพะปะธั†ะตะนัะบะธั…, ะบะพั‚ะพั€ะฐั ะฑะปะธะทะบะพ ะฒะทะฐะธะผะพะดะตะนัั‚ะฒัƒะตั‚ ั ะฟะพะปัŒัะบะธะผ ESA. ะะฐะฟั€ะธะผะตั€, ยซAstespanaยป, ั€ะฐัะฟะพะปะพะถะตะฝะฝะฐั ะฒ ะœะฐะดั€ะธะดะต, ั‚ะฐะบะถะต ะฐะบั‚ะธะฒะฝะพ ะฒะทะฐะธะผะพะดะตะนัั‚ะฒัƒะตั‚ ั ะฟะพะปัŒัะบะพะน ESA ะธ ะฟั€ะพะฒะพะดะธั‚ ะฝะฐ ะตะต ั‚ั€ะตะฝะธั€ะพะฒะพั‡ะฝะพะน ะฑะฐะทะต ะฑะพะตะฒะพะต ะพะฑัƒั‡ะตะฝะธะต.

    ะ“ั€ัƒะทะธั

    ะะฐ ั‚ะตั€ั€ะธั‚ะพั€ะธะธ ะ“ั€ัƒะทะธะธ ะฟั€ะธ ั„ะธะฝะฐะฝัะพะฒะพะน ะฟะพะดะดะตั€ะถะบะต ะฟะพัะพะปัŒัั‚ะฒะฐ ะกะจะ ะพััƒั‰ะตัั‚ะฒะปััŽั‚ัั ะผะตั€ะพะฟั€ะธัั‚ะธั ะฟะพ ะฟะพะดะณะพั‚ะพะฒะบะต ะธ ะพั‚ะฟั€ะฐะฒะบะต ะฒ ะทะพะฝัƒ ะฑะพะตะฒั‹ั… ะดะตะนัั‚ะฒะธะน ะฝะฐ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝะต ะฝะฐะตะผะฝะธะบะพะฒ ะบะฐะบ ะธะท ั‡ะธัะปะฐ ะณั€ัƒะทะธะฝัะบะธั… ะณั€ะฐะถะดะฐะฝ, ั‚ะฐะบ ะธ ะฟะพะดะดะฐะฝะฝั‹ั… ะดั€ัƒะณะธั… ะณะพััƒะดะฐั€ัั‚ะฒ. ะก ัั‚ะพะน ั†ะตะปัŒัŽ ะฒ ะ“ั€ัƒะทะธะธ ะพั€ะณะฐะฝะธะทะพะฒะฐะฝะฐ ั€ะฐะฑะพั‚ะฐ ะบะพะพั€ะดะธะฝะฐั†ะธะพะฝะฝะพะณะพ ัˆั‚ะฐะฑะฐ (ะณ. ะขะฑะธะปะธัะธ), ัะพะทะดะฐะฝะฝะพะณะพ ะฝะฐ ะฑะฐะทะต ะฝะตะฟั€ะฐะฒะธั‚ะตะปัŒัั‚ะฒะตะฝะฝะพะน ะพั€ะณะฐะฝะธะทะฐั†ะธะธ ยซะกะฒะพะฑะพะดะฝะฐั ะทะพะฝะฐยป. ะ’ ัะพัั‚ะฐะฒ ะพั€ะณะฐะฝะธะทะฐั†ะธะธ ะฒั…ะพะดัั‚ ะฟั€ะตะดัั‚ะฐะฒะธั‚ะตะปะธ ะผะพะปะพะดะตะถะฝะพะณะพ ะบั€ั‹ะปะฐ ะพะฟะฟะพะทะธั†ะธะพะฝะฝะพะน ะฟะพะปะธั‚ะธั‡ะตัะบะพะน ะฟะฐั€ั‚ะธะธ ยซะ•ะดะธะฝะพะต ะฝะฐั†ะธะพะฝะฐะปัŒะฝะพะต ะดะฒะธะถะตะฝะธะตยป: ะ“ะฐะณะฝะธะดะทะต ะ‘ะพะฝะดะพ, ะ“ะธะณะฐัƒั€ะธ ะ—ัƒั€ะฐะฑ, ะšะตะธะฝะฐัˆะฒะธะปะธ ะ”ะตะผัƒั€, ะšะธะผะฐะดะทะต ะ”ะฐะฒะธะด, ะšัƒะผัะธัˆะฒะธะปะธ ะ“ัƒั€ะฐะผ, ะšัƒั€ะบัƒะผัƒะปะธ ะ›ะพะปะฐ (ะถะตะฝ.), ะœะฐะผัƒะปะฐัˆะฒะธะปะธ ะ’ะฐั…ั‚ะฐะฝะณ, ะŸะพั†ั…ะฒะตั€ะฐัˆะฒะธะปะธ ะขะฐั‚ะธั (ะถะตะฝ.), ะ ะฐั‡ะฒะตัˆะฒะธะปะธ ะ“ัƒั€ะฐะผ, ะกะธั€ะฐะดะทะต ะะฝะฝะฐ (ะถะตะฝ.), ะขะบะตัˆะตะปะฐัˆะฒะธะปะธ ะ˜ั€ะฐะบะปะธะน, ะฅัƒั€ั†ะธะปะฐะฒะฐ ะ‘ะพั€ะธั, ะงะพั…ะตะปะธ ะจะผะฐะณะธ.

    ะŸะพัะปะต ะฟั€ะพะฒะตะดะตะฝะธั ะฑะพะตะฒะพะณะพ ัะปะฐะถะธะฒะฐะฝะธั ะฝะฐะตะผะฝะธะบะพะฒ ั„ะพั€ะผะธั€ัƒัŽั‚ัั ะณั€ัƒะฟะฟั‹ ะดะปั ะฟะพัั‚ะฐะฟะฝะพะน ะพั‚ะฟั€ะฐะฒะบะธ ะฝะฐ ั‚ะตั€ั€ะธั‚ะพั€ะธัŽ ะŸะพะปัŒัˆะธ. ะŸะตั€ะตะฑั€ะพัะบะฐ ะพััƒั‰ะตัั‚ะฒะปัะตั‚ัั ั‡ะฐั€ั‚ะตั€ะฝั‹ะผะธ ั€ะตะนัะฐะผะธ, ะฐ ั‚ะฐะบะถะต ัะฐะผะพะปะตั‚ะฐะผะธ ะฒะพะตะฝะฝะพ-ั‚ั€ะฐะฝัะฟะพั€ั‚ะฝะพะน ะฐะฒะธะฐั†ะธะธ ะกะจะ ะธะท ะผะตะถะดัƒะฝะฐั€ะพะดะฝะพะณะพ ะฐัั€ะพะฟะพั€ั‚ะฐ ะะพะฒะพะฐะปะตะบัะตะตะฒะบะฐ (ะณ. ะขะฑะธะปะธัะธ, ะ“ั€ัƒะทะธั) ะดะพ ะผะตะถะดัƒะฝะฐั€ะพะดะฝะพะณะพ ะฐัั€ะพะฟะพั€ั‚ะฐ ะธะผ. ะค.ะจะพะฟะตะฝะฐ (ะณ. ะ’ะฐั€ัˆะฐะฒะฐ, ะŸะพะปัŒัˆะฐ). ะ’ัั‚ั€ะตั‡ัƒ ะฟั€ะธะฑั‹ะฒัˆะธั…, ะธั… ัะพะฟั€ะพะฒะพะถะดะตะฝะธะต ะดะพ ะฟะพะปัŒัะบะพ-ัƒะบั€ะฐะธะฝัะบะพะน ะณั€ะฐะฝะธั†ั‹ (ะฟัƒะฝะบั‚ ะฟั€ะพะฟัƒัะบะฐ ยซะจะตะณะตะฝะธ-ะœะตะดะธะบะฐยป) ะพััƒั‰ะตัั‚ะฒะปััŽั‚ ะณั€ะฐะถะดะฐะฝะธะฝ ะ“ั€ัƒะทะธะธ ะ”.ะšะพะบะพะปะฐะดะทะต ะธ ะณั€ะฐะถะดะฐะฝะธะฝ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝั‹ ะ.ะฏะฒะฐะฝััŒะบะธะน.

    ะคะธะฝะฐะฝัะธั€ะพะฒะฐะฝะธะต ะฟะพะดะณะพั‚ะพะฒะบะธ ะธ ะฟะตั€ะตะฟั€ะฐะฒะบะธ ะณั€ัƒะทะธะฝัะบะธั… ะฝะฐะตะผะฝะธะบะพะฒ ั‡ะตั€ะตะท ะณะพััƒะดะฐั€ัั‚ะฒะฐ ะ•ะก ะฝะฐ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝัƒ ะพััƒั‰ะตัั‚ะฒะปัะตั‚ัั ะฟั€ะธ ะฝะตะฟะพัั€ะตะดัั‚ะฒะตะฝะฝะพะผ ัƒั‡ะฐัั‚ะธะธ ะฒะพะตะฝะฝั‹ั… ัะพะฒะตั‚ะฝะธะบะพะฒ ะธ ัะพั‚ั€ัƒะดะฝะธะบะพะฒ ะดะธะฟะปะพะผะฐั‚ะธั‡ะตัะบะธั… ะฟั€ะตะดัั‚ะฐะฒะธั‚ะตะปัŒัั‚ะฒ ะกะจะ ะฒ ะ“ั€ัƒะทะธะธ ะธ ะŸะพะปัŒัˆะต. ะะบั‚ะธะฒะฝะพะต ัะพะดะตะนัั‚ะฒะธะต ะฒ ะฟั€ะพะฒะตะดะตะฝะธะธ ัƒะบะฐะทะฐะฝะฝั‹ั… ะผะตั€ะพะฟั€ะธัั‚ะธะน ะพะบะฐะทั‹ะฒะฐัŽั‚ ะฒะปะธัั‚ะตะปัŒะฝั‹ะต ะฟั€ะตะดัั‚ะฐะฒะธั‚ะตะปะธ ะณั€ัƒะทะธะฝัะบะพะน ะดะธะฐัะฟะพั€ั‹ ะฒ ะŸะพะปัŒัˆะต ะธ ะกะจะ, ัั€ะตะดะธ ะบะพั‚ะพั€ั‹ั… ะข.ะะปะฐัะฐะฝะธั โ€“ ะณั€ะฐะถะดะฐะฝะธะฝ ะกะจะ, ั€ะพะดะธะปัั ะฒ 1950 ะณะพะดัƒ ะฒ ะ“ั€ัƒะทะธะธ. ะกะพัั‚ะพะธั‚ ะฒ ั€ะพะดัั‚ะฒะตะฝะฝั‹ั… ัะฒัะทัั… ั ัะบั-ะฟั€ะตะทะธะดะตะฝั‚ะพะผ ะ“ั€ัƒะทะธะธ ะœ.ะกะฐะฐะบะฐัˆะฒะธะปะธ. ะ’ 1985 ะณะพะดัƒ, ั€ะฐะฑะพั‚ะฐั ะฒ ัั‚ั€ัƒะบั‚ัƒั€ะต ะžะžะ, ะฟะพะดะพะทั€ะตะฒะฐะปัั ะฒ ั‚ะพั€ะณะพะฒะปะต ะพั€ัƒะถะธะตะผ. ะ’ 2004 ะณะพะดัƒ ะฟั€ะธะฒะปะตะบะฐะปัั ะบ ัƒะณะพะปะพะฒะฝะพะน ะพั‚ะฒะตั‚ัั‚ะฒะตะฝะฝะพัั‚ะธ ะทะฐ ะฒั‹ะผะพะณะฐั‚ะตะปัŒัั‚ะฒะพ, ะพะดะฝะฐะบะพ, ะฟะพ ัƒะบะฐะทะฐะฝะธัŽ ะœ.ะกะฐะฐะบะฐัˆะฒะธะปะธ, ะดะตะปะพ ะฑั‹ะปะพ ะฟั€ะตะบั€ะฐั‰ะตะฝะพ. ะ’ ั‡ะธัะปะต ั€ะพะดัั‚ะฒะตะฝะฝะธะบะพะฒ ะข.ะะปะฐัะฐะฝะธั ะธะผะตัŽั‚ัั ัะปะตะดัƒัŽั‰ะธะต ะณะพััƒะดะฐั€ัั‚ะฒะตะฝะฝั‹ะต ะดะตัั‚ะตะปะธ: ะะปะฐัะฐะฝะธั ะœะฐะผะธั โ€“ ะทะฐะผะตัั‚ะธั‚ะตะปัŒ ะฟั€ะตะดัะตะดะฐั‚ะตะปั ะผะธะฝะธัั‚ะตั€ัั‚ะฒะฐ ะณะพััƒะดะฐั€ัั‚ะฒะตะฝะฝะพะน ะฑะตะทะพะฟะฐัะฝะพัั‚ะธ ะ“ั€ัƒะทะธะธ (1991 โ€“ 1993 ะณะณ.); ะะปะฐัะฐะฝะธั ะ˜ั€ะฐะบะปะธะน โ€“ ะฟะพัะพะป ะ“ั€ัƒะทะธะธ ะฟั€ะธ ะžะžะ (2006 โ€“ 2008 ะณะณ.), ะผะธะฝะธัั‚ั€ ะพะฑะพั€ะพะฝั‹ ะ“ั€ัƒะทะธะธ (2012 โ€“ 2014 ะณะณ.).

    ะ‘ะตะปะฐั€ัƒััŒ

    ะŸั€ะพ ะฑะตะปะพั€ัƒััะบะธั… ะฝะฐะตะผะฝะธะบะพะฒ ั ั‚ะฐะบะถะต ั€ะฐััะบะฐะทั‹ะฒะฐะป ะพั‡ะตะฝัŒ ะผะฝะพะณะพ ะธ ะฟัƒะฑะปะธะบะพะฒะฐะป ะฟะพะบะฐะทะฐะฝะธั ั ะดะฒัƒะผั ะฟะปะตะฝะฝั‹ะผะธ ะฑะพะนั†ะฐะผะธ ะธะท ะฟะพะปะบะฐ ยซะšะฐัั‚ัƒัั ะšะฐะปะธะฝะพะฒัะบะพะณะพยป.

    ะšะฐะบ ะฟั€ะฐะฒะธะปะพ, ัั‚ะพ ัะฑะตะถะฐะฒัˆะธะต ะทะฐะณั€ะฐะฝะธั†ัƒ ะพะฟะฟะพะทะธั†ะธะพะฝะตั€ั‹.ะก ะฝะฐั‡ะฐะปะพะผ ะฑะพะตะฒั‹ั… ะดะตะนัั‚ะฒะธะน ะฝะฐ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝะต ะฝะตัะพัั‚ะพัะฒัˆะธั…ัั ะฑะตะปะพั€ัƒััะบะธั… ั€ะฐะดะธะบะฐะปะพะฒ ะทะฐัั‚ะฐะฒะธะปะธ ั ะพั€ัƒะถะธะตะผ ะฒ ั€ัƒะบะฐั… ะฒะพะตะฒะฐั‚ัŒ ะฝะฐ ัั‚ะพั€ะพะฝะต ะ’ะกะฃ ะฟะพะด ัƒะณั€ะพะทะพะน ะฒั‹ะดะฐั‡ะธ ะพั„ะธั†ะธะฐะปัŒะฝะพะผัƒ ะœะธะฝัะบัƒ.

    ะ˜ัั‚ะพั€ะธั ะฒะตั€ะฑะพะฒะบะธ ะธ ะดะฐะปัŒะฝะตะนัˆะตะน ะพั‚ะฟั€ะฐะฒะบะธ ะฟั€ะฐะบั‚ะธั‡ะตัะบะธ ะฒัะตั… ะฑะตะปะพั€ัƒััะบะธั… ะฝะฐะตะผะฝะธะบะพะฒ ะฝะฐ ั„ั€ะพะฝั‚ ะฟั€ะพะธัั…ะพะดะธั‚ ะฟั€ะธ ะฟะพะผะพั‰ะธ ะฟั€ะพะทะฐะฟะฐะดะฝะพะน ะะŸะž ยซะ‘ะตะปะพั€ัƒััะบะธะน ะดะพะผยป.

    ะขะฐะดะถะธะบะธัั‚ะฐะฝ, ะšะธั€ะณะธะทะธั, ะฃะทะฑะตะบะธัั‚ะฐะฝ, ะšะฐะทะฐั…ัั‚ะฐะฝะฐ ะธ ะดั€ัƒะณะธะต ัั‚ั€ะฐะฝั‹ ะฟะพัั‚ัะพะฒะตั‚ัะบะพะณะพ ะฟั€ะพัั‚ั€ะฐะฝัั‚ะฒะฐ

    ะ’ ัะตั‚ะธ ะธะผะตัŽั‚ัั ัะฒะตะดะตะฝะธั ะปะธัˆัŒ ะพ ะตะดะธะฝะธั‡ะฝั‹ั… ัะปัƒั‡ะฐัั… ัƒั‡ะฐัั‚ะธั ะฒ ะฑะพะตะฒั‹ั… ะดะตะนัั‚ะฒะธัั… ะฝะฐ ัั‚ะพั€ะพะฝะต ะ’ะกะฃ ะฝะฐะตะผะฝะธะบะพะฒ ะธะท ะขะฐะดะถะธะบะธัั‚ะฐะฝะฐ, ะšะธั€ะณะธะทะธะธ, ะฃะทะฑะตะบะธัั‚ะฐะฝะฐ, ะšะฐะทะฐั…ัั‚ะฐะฝะฐ ะธ ะดั€ัƒะณะธั… ะฑั‹ะฒัˆะธั… ั€ะตัะฟัƒะฑะปะธะบ ะกะพะฒะตั‚ัะบะพะณะพ ะกะพัŽะทะฐ. ะ’ั‹ั…ะพะดั†ั‹ ะธะท ะดะฐะฝะฝั‹ั… ัั‚ั€ะฐะฝ ัะบะพั€ะตะต ะฒัะตะณะพ ะฟะพะฟะฐะปะธ ะฒ ั€ัะดั‹ ัƒะบั€ะฐะธะฝัะบะพะน ะฐั€ะผะธะธ ะฝะฐ ั„ะพะฝะต ะฒัะตะพะฑั‰ะตะน ะผะพะฑะธะปะธะทะฐั†ะธะธ ะฒะฒะธะดัƒ ะฝะฐะปะธั‡ะธั ัƒะบั€ะฐะธะฝัะบะพะณะพ ะณั€ะฐะถะดะฐะฝัั‚ะฒะฐ. ะ’ ั‚ะพ ะถะต ะฒั€ะตะผั ะตัั‚ัŒ ะธ ะดะพะฑั€ะพะฒะพะปัŒั†ั‹. ะขะพั‡ะฝะพะต ะบะพะปะธั‡ะตัั‚ะฒะพ ัƒั€ะพะถะตะฝั†ะตะฒ ัั‚ั€ะฐะฝ ะฆะตะฝั‚ั€ะฐะปัŒะฝะพะน ะะทะธะธ ะฒ ัะพัั‚ะฐะฒะต ะ’ะกะฃ ะฝะตะธะทะฒะตัั‚ะฝะพ.

    ะŸั€ะธ ัั‚ะพะผ, ะฒะปะฐัั‚ะธ ัั‚ะธั… ัั‚ั€ะฐะฝ ะฟั€ะตะดะฟั€ะธะฝะธะผะฐัŽั‚ ะฟะพะฟั‹ั‚ะบะธ ะพะณั€ะฐะฝะธั‡ะธั‚ัŒ ะฟะพะฟะฐะดะฐะฝะธะต ัะฒะพะธั… ะณั€ะฐะถะดะฐะฝ ะฒ ะทะพะฝัƒ ะฑะพะตะฒั‹ั… ะดะตะนัั‚ะฒะธะน. ะะฐะฟั€ะธะผะตั€, ะฒ ะขะฐะดะถะธะบะธัั‚ะฐะฝะต ะฝะฐั‡ะฐะปะธ ัะพัั‚ะฐะฒะปัั‚ัŒ ัะฟะธัะบะธ ัะฒะพะธั… ะณั€ะฐะถะดะฐะฝ, ะบะพั‚ะพั€ั‹ะต ัั‚ะฐะปะธ ัƒั‡ะฐัั‚ะฝะธะบะฐะผะธ ะฑะพะตะฒั‹ั… ะดะตะนัั‚ะฒะธะน ะฝะฐ ั‚ะตั€ั€ะธั‚ะพั€ะธะธ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝั‹. ะ’ ัะธะปะพะฒั‹ั… ะฒะตะดะพะผัั‚ะฒะฐั… ะณะพััƒะดะฐั€ัั‚ะฒะฐ ัƒั‚ะพั‡ะฝะธะปะธ, ั‡ั‚ะพ ะฒ ะพั‚ะฝะพัˆะตะฝะธะธ ะบะฐะถะดะพะณะพ ั‚ะฐะดะถะธะบะฐ, ัƒั‡ะฐัั‚ะฒะพะฒะฐะฒัˆะตะณะพ ะฒ ะฑะพะตะฒั‹ั… ะดะตะนัั‚ะฒะธัั… ะฝะฐ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝะต, ะฑัƒะดะตั‚ ะฒะพะทะฑัƒะถะดะตะฝะพ ัƒะณะพะปะพะฒะฝะพะต ะดะตะปะพ. ะžะดะฝะฐะบะพ ัƒั€ะพะถะตะฝั†ั‹ ะขะฐะดะถะธะบะธัั‚ะฐะฝะฐ, ะธะผะตัŽั‰ะธะต ะณั€ะฐะถะดะฐะฝัั‚ะฒะพ ะ ะค ะธะปะธ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝั‹, ะบ ัƒะณะพะปะพะฒะฝะพะน ะพั‚ะฒะตั‚ัั‚ะฒะตะฝะฝะพัั‚ะธ ะฟั€ะธะฒะปะตะบะฐั‚ัŒัั ะฝะต ะฑัƒะดัƒั‚. ะšั€ะพะผะต ั‚ะพะณะพ, ะฟะพัะพะปัŒัั‚ะฒะพ ะฃะทะฑะตะบะธัั‚ะฐะฝะฐ ะฒ ะœะพัะบะฒะต ะฟั€ะตะดัƒะฟั€ะตะถะดะฐะปะพ ะพ ั‚ะพะผ, ั‡ั‚ะพ ัะพะทะดะฐะฝะธะต ะดะพะฑั€ะพะฒะพะปัŒั‡ะตัะบะพะณะพ ะฑะฐั‚ะฐะปัŒะพะฝะฐ ะธะปะธ ัƒั‡ะฐัั‚ะธะต ะฒ ะฑะพะตะฒั‹ั… ะดะตะนัั‚ะฒะธัั… ะฝะฐ ั‚ะตั€ั€ะธั‚ะพั€ะธะธ ะธะฝะพัั‚ั€ะฐะฝะฝั‹ั… ะณะพััƒะดะฐั€ัั‚ะฒ ัะฒะปัะตั‚ัั ะฟั€ะตัั‚ัƒะฟะปะตะฝะธะตะผ ั ั‚ะพั‡ะบะธ ะทั€ะตะฝะธั ะทะฐะบะพะฝะพะฒ ัั‚ั€ะฐะฝั‹. ะŸะพ ัั‚ะฐั‚ัŒะต ัƒะณะพะปะพะฒะฝะพะณะพ ะบะพะดะตะบัะฐ ะฃะทะฑะตะบะธัั‚ะฐะฝะฐ ะทะฐ ะฝะฐะตะผะฝะธั‡ะตัั‚ะฒะพ ะณั€ะพะทะธั‚ ะพั‚ ะฟัั‚ะธ ะดะพ ะดะตััั‚ะธ ะปะตั‚ ั‚ัŽั€ัŒะผั‹. ะะฐ ั‚ะตั€ั€ะธั‚ะพั€ะธะธ ะšะธั€ะณะธะทะธะธ ะทะฐ ัƒั‡ะฐัั‚ะธะต ะฒ ะฑะพะตะฒั‹ั… ะดะตะนัั‚ะฒะธัั… ะฝะฐ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝะต ะฟั€ะธะผะตะฝัะตั‚ัั ะฐะฝะฐะปะพะณะธั‡ะฝะพะต ัƒะณะพะปะพะฒะฝะพะต ะฝะฐะบะฐะทะฐะฝะธะต.

    ะ’ ัะตั‚ะธ ะฑั‹ะปะธ ะพะฑะฝะฐั€ัƒะถะตะฝั‹ ัะฒะตะดะตะฝะธั ะพะฑ ะพั‚ะดะตะปัŒะฝั‹ั… ะณั€ะฐะถะดะฐะฝะฐั… ะฑั‹ะฒัˆะธั… ั€ะตัะฟัƒะฑะปะธะบ ะกะกะกะ , ะฟั€ะพั…ะพะดัั‰ะธั… ัะปัƒะถะฑัƒ ะฒ ั€ัะดะฐั… ะ’ะกะฃ. ะขะฐะบ, ะฝะฐ ั€ะฐะทะปะธั‡ะฝั‹ั… ะฟะปะพั‰ะฐะดะบะฐั… ะฟะธั€ะฐั‚ัะบะธั… ะพะฝะปะฐะนะฝ-ะบะธะฝะพั‚ะตะฐั‚ั€ะพะฒ ะฒ ะบะฐั‡ะตัั‚ะฒะต ั€ะตะบะปะฐะผั‹ ะฟะตั€ะตะด ะฟั€ะพัะผะพั‚ั€ะพะผ ะบะพะฝั‚ะตะฝั‚ะฐ ะฟะพะปัŒะทะพะฒะฐั‚ะตะปัะผะธ ั ั‚ะตั€ั€ะธั‚ะพั€ะธะธ ะ ะพััะธะนัะบะพะน ะคะตะดะตั€ะฐั†ะธะธ ยซะณัƒะปัะตั‚ยป ะฒะธะดะตะพั€ะพะปะธะบ ั ัƒั‡ะฐัั‚ะธะตะผ ัะบะพะฑั‹ ะณั€ะฐะถะดะฐะฝะธะฝะฐ ะšะธั€ะณะธะทะธะธ ะฝะฐ ั„ะพะฝะต ัะผะฑะปะตะผั‹ ะ“ะฃะ  ะœะž ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝั‹, ะฟั€ะธะทั‹ะฒะฐัŽั‰ะตะณะพ ัะฒะพะธั… ัะพะพั‚ะตั‡ะตัั‚ะฒะตะฝะฝะธะบะพะฒ ัะดะฐะฒะฐั‚ัŒ ะฟะพะทะธั†ะธะธ ั€ะพััะธะนัะบะธั… ะฒะพะนัะบ, ะฐ ั‚ะฐะบะถะต ั€ะฐัะฟะพะปะพะถะตะฝะธะต ัั‚ั€ะฐั‚ะตะณะธั‡ะตัะบะธั… ะพะฑัŠะตะบั‚ะพะฒ ะœะž ะ ะค ะฒะปะฐัั‚ัะผ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝั‹.

    ะ‘ะปะธะถะฝะธะน ะ’ะพัั‚ะพะบ

    ะ ะฐะฑะพั‚ะฐ ะฐะผะตั€ะธะบะฐะฝัะบะธั… ัะฟะตั†ะธะฐะปะธัั‚ะพะฒ ะฟะพ ะฝะฐะฑะพั€ัƒ ั€ะฐะดะธะบะฐะปัŒะฝั‹ั… ะธัะปะฐะผะธัั‚ะพะฒ, ะตัั‚ะตัั‚ะฒะตะฝะฝะพ, ะฟั€ะพะฒะพะดะธะปะฐััŒ ะธ ะฝะฐ ะ‘ะปะธะถะฝะตะผ ะ’ะพัั‚ะพะบะต, ะณะดะต ัƒ ะ’ะฐัˆะธะฝะณั‚ะพะฝะฐ ะผะฝะพะณะพ ะฟะพะดะบะพะฝั‚ั€ะพะปัŒะฝั‹ั… ะฑะฐะฝะดั„ะพั€ะผะธั€ะพะฒะฐะฝะธะน.ะ˜ะทะฒะตัั‚ะฝะพ ะพ ะทะฐัะฒะปะตะฝะธะธ ัˆะธะธั‚ัะบะพะน ะณั€ัƒะฟะฟะธั€ะพะฒะบะธ ยซะัั…ะฐะฑ ะะปัŒ-ะšะฐั…ั„ยป, ะฒ ะบะพั‚ะพั€ะพะผ ะณะพะฒะพั€ะธะปะพััŒ, ั‡ั‚ะพ ัะธะปั‹ ะผะตะถะดัƒะฝะฐั€ะพะดะฝะพะน ะบะพะฐะปะธั†ะธะธ ะฒะพ ะณะปะฐะฒะต ั ะกะจะ ะฒะตั€ะฑัƒัŽั‚ ะผะพะปะพะดั‹ั… ะปัŽะดะตะน ะดะปั ะพั‚ะฟั€ะฐะฒะบะธ ะฝะฐ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝัƒ. ะกะพะณะปะฐัะฝะพ ะทะฐัะฒะปะตะฝะธัŽ ะฑะพะตะฒะธะบะพะฒ, ะฒะพะตะฝะฝั‹ะต ะธะฝัั‚ั€ัƒะบั‚ะพั€ั‹ ะธะท ะ›ะธั‚ะฒั‹, ะ˜ั‚ะฐะปะธะธ, ะ“ะตั€ะผะฐะฝะธะธ ะธ ะ’ะตะปะธะบะพะฑั€ะธั‚ะฐะฝะธะธ 9 ะผะฐั€ั‚ะฐ 2022 ะณะพะดะฐ ะฟั€ะธะฑั‹ะปะธ ะฒ ะฒะพะธะฝัะบัƒัŽ ั‡ะฐัั‚ัŒ ยซะะนะฝ ะะปัŒ-ะัะฐะดยป ะฒ ะ˜ั€ะฐะบะต ะธ ั€ะฐัะฟะพะปะพะถะตะฝะธะต ะ’ะก ะกะจะ ยซะั‚-ะขะฐะฝั„ยป ะฒ ะกะธั€ะธะธ. ะขะฐะผ ะธะฝะพัั‚ั€ะฐะฝั†ั‹ ะทะฐะฝัะปะธััŒ ะฒะตั€ะฑะพะฒะบะพะน ะฑะพะตะฒะธะบะพะฒ ะดะปั ัƒั‡ะฐัั‚ะธั ะฒ ะฑะพะตะฒั‹ั… ะดะตะนัั‚ะฒะธัั… ะฝะฐ ัั‚ะพั€ะพะฝะต ะฒะพะพั€ัƒะถะตะฝะฝั‹ั… ัะธะป ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝั‹. ะ’ ะบะฐั‡ะตัั‚ะฒะต ะผะพั‚ะธะฒะฐ ะดะปั ัƒั‡ะฐัั‚ะธั ะฒ ะบะพะฝั„ะปะธะบั‚ะต ะฝะฐะตะผะฝะธะบะฐะผ ะฝะฐะทั‹ะฒะฐัŽั‚ ะผะตัั‚ัŒ ะ ะพััะธะธ ะทะฐ ะฟะพะดะดะตั€ะถะบัƒ ะฟั€ะฐะฒะธั‚ะตะปัŒัั‚ะฒะฐ ะ‘.ะัะฐะดะฐ. ะขะฐะบะถะต ะฟั€ะตะดัั‚ะฐะฒะธั‚ะตะปะธ ะทะฐะฟะฐะดะฝั‹ั… ัะฟะตั†ัะปัƒะถะฑ ะฟั€ะพะฒะตะปะธ ั€ัะด ะฒัั‚ั€ะตั‡ ั ัˆะตะนั…ะฐะผะธ ะฝะตะบะพั‚ะพั€ั‹ั… ะบะปะฐะฝะพะฒ ะธะท ะกะธั€ะธะธ ะธ ะ˜ั€ะฐะบะฐ ะดะปั ะฑะพะปะตะต ะปะพัะปัŒะฝะพะณะพ ะพั‚ะฝะพัˆะตะฝะธั ะบ ั‚ะฐะบะพะน ยซะฟั€ะธะทั‹ะฒะฝะพะน ะบะฐะผะฟะฐะฝะธะธยป.

    ะšั€ะพะผะต ั‚ะพะณะพ, ะฐะผะตั€ะธะบะฐะฝัะบะพะต ะธะทะดะฐะฝะธะต The People’s Voice ะพะฟัƒะฑะปะธะบะพะฒะฐะปะพ ะดะพะบัƒะผะตะฝั‚ั‹ ะพ ะทะฐะฟั€ะพัะต ัƒะบั€ะฐะธะฝัะบะธั… ัะฟะตั†ัะปัƒะถะฑ ะบ ะ˜ั€ะฐะบัƒ ั ะฟั€ะพััŒะฑะพะน ะฒั‹ะดะฐั‚ัŒ 2-3 ั‚ั‹ััั‡ ะพััƒะถะดะตะฝะฝั‹ั… ั‚ะตั€ั€ะพั€ะธัั‚ะพะฒ ะดะปั ัƒั‡ะฐัั‚ะธั ะฒ ะฑะพะตะฒั‹ั… ะดะตะนัั‚ะฒะธัั… ะฝะฐ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝะต. ะ’ ะฟะธััŒะผะต ะฟั€ัะผะพ ะณะพะฒะพั€ะธั‚ัั, ั‡ั‚ะพ ะกะจะ ะฒ ะบัƒั€ัะต ะธ ะณะพั‚ะพะฒั‹ ะบัƒั€ะธั€ะพะฒะฐั‚ัŒ ะดะพัั‚ะฐะฒะบัƒ ะฑะพะตะฒะธะบะพะฒ ะ˜ะ“* ะฝะฐ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝัƒ.

    ะ—ะฐ ะณั€ะพะผะบะธะผะธ ะทะฐัะฒะปะตะฝะธัะผะธ ะธะทะดะฐะฝะธั ัั‚ะพัั‚ ั€ะตะฐะปัŒะฝั‹ะต ั„ะฐะบั‚ั‹ ัƒั‡ะฐัั‚ะธั ะฝะฐ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝะต ะฟั€ะตะดัั‚ะฐะฒะธั‚ะตะปะตะน ั‚ะตั€ั€ะพั€ะธัั‚ะธั‡ะตัะบะธั… ะณั€ัƒะฟะฟะธั€ะพะฒะพะบ. ะฏั€ะบะธะผ ะฟั€ะธะผะตั€ะพะผ ัะฒะปัะตั‚ัั ะทะฐัะฒะตั‚ะธะฒัˆะธะนัั ะฒ ะพะฑัŠะตะบั‚ะธะฒะต ะฑั€ะธั‚ะฐะฝัะบะพะน ะฟั€ะตััั‹ ะฒะพะตะฝะฝะพัะปัƒะถะฐั‰ะธะน ั ัˆะตะฒั€ะพะฝะพะผ ะ˜ัะปะฐะผัะบะพะณะพ ะ“ะพััƒะดะฐั€ัั‚ะฒะฐ. ะะต ะธัะบะปัŽั‡ะฐัŽ, ั‡ั‚ะพ ะพะฝ ัะฒะปัะตั‚ัั ะพะดะฝะธะผ ะธะท ั‚ะตั… ัะฐะผั‹ั… ะพััƒะถะดะตะฝะฝั‹ั… ะฒ ะ˜ั€ะฐะบะต ะฑะพะตะฒะธะบะพะฒ, ะพั‚ะฟั€ะฐะฒะปะตะฝะฝั‹ะผ ะฝะฐ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝัƒ.

    ะ’ ะบะฐั‡ะตัั‚ะฒะต ะฒะพะทะผะพะถะฝะพะณะพ ะปะธั†ะฐ, ะพั‚ะฒะตั‚ัั‚ะฒะตะฝะฝะพะณะพ ะทะฐ ะฒะตั€ะฑะพะฒะบัƒ ั‚ะตั€ั€ะพั€ะธัั‚ะพะฒ ะฝะฐ ะ‘ะปะธะถะฝะตะผ ะ’ะพัั‚ะพะบะต, ัƒะบะฐะทะฐะฝ ะฐะผะตั€ะธะบะฐะฝัะบะธะน ะณะตะฝะตั€ะฐะป ะœะฐะบะคะฐั€ะปะตะนะฝ, ะฒะพะทะณะปะฐะฒะปัะฒัˆะธะน ะžะฑัŠะตะดะธะฝะตะฝะฝัƒัŽ ะพะฟะตั€ะฐั‚ะธะฒะฝัƒัŽ ะณั€ัƒะฟะฟัƒ ะฟะพ ะฑะพั€ัŒะฑะต ั ั‚ะตั€ั€ะพั€ะธัั‚ะฐะผะธ ะฒ ะกะธั€ะธะธ.

    ะ˜ะทะฒะตัั‚ะฝะพ ะธ ะพ ะดะตะนัั‚ะฒะธัั… ะฝะฐ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝะต ั‚ัƒั€ะตั†ะบะพะน ะงะ’ะš SADAT. ะšะพะผะฟะฐะฝะธั ะฟะพะดะบะพะฝั‚ั€ะพะปัŒะฝะฐ ั‚ัƒั€ะตั†ะบะธะผ ะฒะปะฐัั‚ัะผ ะธ ะฟั€ะธะฝะธะผะฐะตั‚ ะฐะบั‚ะธะฒะฝะพะต ัƒั‡ะฐัั‚ะธะต ะฒ ะฒะพะตะฝะฝั‹ั… ะดะตะนัั‚ะฒะธัั… ะฒ ะกะธั€ะธะธ ะธ ะ›ะธะฒะธะธ. ะกะพะทะดะฐะฝะฐ ะฒ 2012 ะณะพะดัƒ ะดะฐะฒะฝะธะผ ะดั€ัƒะณะพะผ ะธ ัะพะฒะตั‚ะฝะธะบะพะผ ะญั€ะดะพะณะฐะฝะฐ, ั‚ัƒั€ะตั†ะบะธะผ ะณะตะฝะตั€ะฐะปะพะผ ะะดะฝะฐะฝะพะผ ะขะฐะฝั€ั‹ะฒะตั€ะดะธ. ะ˜ะฝั„ะพั€ะผะฐั†ะธั ะพ ะฟั€ะธะฑั‹ั‚ะธะธ ะพะบะพะปะพ ัะพั‚ะฝะธ ะฑะพะนั†ะพะฒ ะดะฐะฝะฝะพะณะพ ะฟะพะดั€ะฐะทะดะตะปะตะฝะธั ะฝะฐ ัƒะบั€ะฐะธะฝัะบัƒัŽ ั‚ะตั€ั€ะธั‚ะพั€ะธัŽ ะฟะพัะฒะธะปะฐััŒ ะฒ ัะตะฝั‚ัะฑั€ะต 2022 ะณะพะดะฐ. ะ•ะต ะฑะพะตะฒะธะบะธ ะฒะฟะตั€ะฒั‹ะต ะฑั‹ะปะธ ะทะฐะดะตะนัั‚ะฒะพะฒะฐะฝั‹ ะฒ ะฑะพะตะฒั‹ั… ะดะตะนัั‚ะฒะธัั… ะฒ ะฅะฐั€ัŒะบะพะฒัะบะพะน ะพะฑะปะฐัั‚ะธ.

    ะั„ะณะฐะฝะธัั‚ะฐะฝ

    ะžะฑ ัƒั‡ะฐัั‚ะธะธ ะฐั„ะณะฐะฝัะบะธั… ะฝะฐะตะผะฝะธะบะพะฒ ะฝะฐ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝะต ั ั€ะฐััะบะฐะทั‹ะฒะฐะป ะฒ ัะฒะพะตะน ั€ะตะฟะปะธะบะต ยซะั„ะณะฐะฝัะบะธะน ะ›ะตะณะธะพะฝยป ะธ ะดะตะผะพะฝัั‚ั€ะธั€ะพะฒะฐะป ัะตะบั€ะตั‚ะฝั‹ะน ะดะพะบัƒะผะตะฝั‚ ะกะ‘ะฃ ะพั‚ะฝะพัะธั‚ะตะปัŒะฝะพ ะฒัั‚ัƒะฟะปะตะฝะธั ะฐั„ะณะฐะฝั†ะตะฒ ะฒ ะ’ะก ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝั‹.

    ะž ั‚ะพะผ, ั‡ั‚ะพ ะกะจะ ะพั‚ะฟั€ะฐะฒะปััŽั‚ ะฝะฐ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝัƒ ะฐั„ะณะฐะฝัะบะธั… ะฒะพะตะฝะฝั‹ั…, ะทะฐัะฒะปัะป ะธ ัะฟะตั†ะฟั€ะตะดัั‚ะฐะฒะธั‚ะตะปัŒ ะฟั€ะตะทะธะดะตะฝั‚ะฐ ะ ะค ะฟะพ ะั„ะณะฐะฝะธัั‚ะฐะฝัƒ ะ—ะฐะผะธั€ ะšะฐะฑัƒะปะพะฒ. ะž ั‡ะตะผ ะณะพะฒะพั€ะธั‚ัŒ, ะตัะปะธ ะดะฐะถะต ะฐะผะตั€ะธะบะฐะฝัะบะธะน ะดะธะฟะปะพะผะฐั‚ ะคะธะปะธะฟะฟ ะšะพัะฝะตั‚ั‚ ะทะฐัะฒะปัะป

    ะพ ะฝะตะพะฑั…ะพะดะธะผะพัั‚ะธ ัะพะทะดะฐะฝะธั ยซะั„ะณะฐะฝัะบะพะณะพ ะปะตะณะธะพะฝะฐยป. ะ ะฐะทะฑั€ะพัะฐะฝะฝั‹ะต ะฟะพ ะฒัะตะผัƒ ะผะธั€ัƒ ะฑะตะถะตะฝั†ั‹ ะดะพ ัะธั… ะฟะพั€ ะฝะฐั…ะพะดัั‚ัั ะฟะพ ะฑะพะปัŒัˆะตะน ั‡ะฐัั‚ะธ ะฒ ะปะฐะณะตั€ัั… ะธ ะฟั€ะฐะบั‚ะธั‡ะตัะบะธ ะฝะต ะธะผะตัŽั‚ ัั€ะตะดัั‚ะฒ ะบ ััƒั‰ะตัั‚ะฒะพะฒะฐะฝะธัŽ. ะะธ ะกะจะ, ะฝะธ ะ•ะฒั€ะพะฟะฐ, ะฝะธ ะดั€ัƒะณะธะต ัั‚ั€ะฐะฝั‹ ะฒั€ะตะผะตะฝะฝะพะณะพ ะฟั€ะตะฑั‹ะฒะฐะฝะธั ะฝะต ัะฟะตัˆะฐั‚ ะธะฝั‚ะตะณั€ะธั€ะพะฒะฐั‚ัŒ ะธั… ะฒ ัะฒะพะต ะพะฑั‰ะตัั‚ะฒะพ. ะ—ะฐ ะพั‚ะบะฐะท ะพั‚ ะฟะพะตะทะดะบะธ ะฝะฐ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝัƒ ะฒะตั€ะฑะพะฒั‰ะธะบะธ ะผะพะณัƒั‚ ะฟั€ะธะณั€ะพะทะธั‚ัŒ ะดะตะฟะพั€ั‚ะฐั†ะธะตะน ะฒ ะั„ะณะฐะฝะธัั‚ะฐะฝ, ะณะดะต ะฑะตะถะตะฝั†ะตะฒ ะถะดะตั‚ ะฝะตะผะธะฝัƒะตะผะฐั ัะผะตั€ั‚ัŒ. ะ’ ะพัะพะฑะตะฝะฝะพัั‚ะธ, ะฑั‹ะฒัˆะธั… ะฒะพะตะฝะฝะพัะปัƒะถะฐั‰ะธั….

    ะž ั‚ะพะผ, ั‡ั‚ะพ ะฐะบั‚ะธะฒะฝะฐั ะบะพะผะฟะฐะฝะธั ะฟะพ ะฒะตั€ะฑะพะฒะบะต ะฐั„ะณะฐะฝั†ะตะฒ ะดะตะนัั‚ะฒะธั‚ะตะปัŒะฝะพ ะฟั€ะพะฒะพะดะธะปะฐััŒ, ัะฒะธะดะตั‚ะตะปัŒัั‚ะฒัƒะตั‚ ะธ ะฟั€ะธะปะพะถะตะฝะฝะพะต ะผะฝะพัŽ ะฝะธะถะต ะพะฑัŠัะฒะปะตะฝะธะต, ะฒ ะบะพั‚ะพั€ะพะผ ะฝะตะบะธะน ะคะฐะทะฐะป ะญะปั…ะฐะผ ะฟั€ะธะทั‹ะฒะฐะตั‚ ะฐั„ะณะฐะฝั†ะตะฒ ะพั‚ะฟั€ะฐะฒะธั‚ัŒัั ะฝะฐ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝัƒ.

    ะšั€ะพะผะต ั‚ะพะณะพ, ะดะพัั‚ะพะฒะตั€ะฝะพ ะธะทะฒะตัั‚ะฝะพ ะพ ะณะธะฑะตะปะธ ะฐั„ะณะฐะฝัะบะพะณะพ ะฝะฐะตะผะฝะธะบะฐ ะ”ะถะฐะปะฐะปะฐ ะัƒั€ะธ ะฝะฐ ะทะฐะฟะพั€ะพะถัะบะพะผ ะฝะฐะฟั€ะฐะฒะปะตะฝะธะธ ะฒ ะธัŽะฝะต 2023 ะณะพะดะฐ.

    ะ˜ั€ะฐะฝ

    ะœะฝะพะณะธะต ะธะท ะ’ะฐั ะผะพะณัƒั‚ ะทะฐะดะฐั‚ัŒัั ะฒะพะฟั€ะพัะพะผ, ะบะฐะบ ะธั€ะฐะฝั†ั‹ ะผะพะณัƒั‚ ะฒะพะตะฒะฐั‚ัŒ ะฝะฐ ัั‚ะพั€ะพะฝะต ะ’ะกะฃ, ะตัะปะธ ะขะตะณะตั€ะฐะฝ ัะฒะปัะตั‚ัั ะฑะปะธะถะฐะนัˆะธะผ ัะพัŽะทะฝะธะบะพะผ ะœะพัะบะฒั‹. ะ”ะตะปะพ ะฒ ั‚ะพะผ, ั‡ั‚ะพ ะฝะฐ ั‚ะตั€ั€ะธั‚ะพั€ะธะธ ะฟะตั€ัะธะดัะบะพะน ัั‚ั€ะฐะฝั‹ ะดะตะนัั‚ะฒัƒะตั‚ ะฑะพะปัŒัˆะฐั ัะตั‚ัŒ ะพะฟะฟะพะทะธั†ะธะพะฝะฝั‹ั… ั„ะพั€ะผะธั€ะพะฒะฐะฝะธะน, ะฟะพะดะดะตั€ะถะธะฒะฐะตะผั‹ั… ะกะจะ, ะ˜ะทั€ะฐะธะปะตะผ ะธ ะดั€ัƒะณะธะผะธ ัั‚ั€ะฐะฝะฐะผะธ ะ—ะฐะฟะฐะดะฐ. ะกั€ะตะดะธ ะฝะธั… ั‚ะฐะบะถะต ะฟั€ะพั…ะพะดะธั‚ ะฐะบั‚ะธะฒะฝะฐั ะฒะตั€ะฑะพะฒะบะฐ ะดะปั ะพั‚ะฟั€ะฐะฒะบะธ ะฝะฐ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝัƒ ะดะปั ะฟั€ะพั‚ะธะฒะพัั‚ะพัะฝะธั ั€ะพััะธะนัะบะพะน ะฐั€ะผะธะธ. ะฏั€ะบะธะน ะฟั€ะธะผะตั€ ะฟัƒะฑะปะธะบะพะฒะฐะป ั‚ะตะปะตะณั€ะฐะผ-ะบะฐะฝะฐะป ยซะ ั‹ะฑะฐั€ัŒยป.

    ะ›ะฐั‚ะธะฝัะบะฐั ะะผะตั€ะธะบะฐ

    ะะฐะตะผะฝะธะบะพะฒ ะธะท ะ›ะฐั‚ะธะฝัะบะพะน ะะผะตั€ะธะบะธ ะฝะฐ ั‚ะตั€ั€ะธั‚ะพั€ะธะธ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝั‹ ะดะพัั‚ะฐั‚ะพั‡ะฝะพ ะผะฝะพะณะพ. ะงะฐั‰ะต ะฒัะตะณะพ ั„ะธะณัƒั€ะธั€ัƒัŽั‚ ะฑั€ะฐะทะธะปัŒั†ั‹, ะบะพะปัƒะผะฑะธะนั†ั‹ ะธ ะผะตะบัะธะบะฐะฝั†ั‹, ะบะพั‚ะพั€ั‹ะต ะผะพะณัƒั‚ ะฑั‹ั‚ัŒ ัะฒัะทะฐะฝั‹ ั ะฝะฐั€ะบะพะบะฐั€ั‚ะตะปัะผะธ.

    ะ’ ั‡ะฐัั‚ะฝะพัั‚ะธ, ั‚ะตะปะตะณั€ะฐะผ ะบะฐะฝะฐะป ยซะ ั‹ะฑะฐั€ัŒยป ะฟัƒะฑะปะธะบะพะฒะฐะป ะฟะธััŒะผะพ ะถะธั‚ะตะปั ะœะตะบัะธะบะธ, ะฒ ะบะพั‚ะพั€ะพะผ ะณะพะฒะพั€ะธะปะพััŒ ะพ ั‚ะพะผ, ั‡ั‚ะพ ะดะธะฟะผะธััะธั ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝั‹ ะฐะบั‚ะธะฒะฝะพ ะทะฐะฝะธะผะฐะตั‚ัั ะฒะตั€ะฑะพะฒะบะพะน ะปะฐั‚ะธะฝะพะฐะผะตั€ะธะบะฐะฝั†ะตะฒ ะดะปั ะฒัั‚ัƒะฟะปะตะฝะธั ะฒ ั€ัะดั‹ ยซะ˜ะฝั‚ะตั€ะฝะฐั†ะธะพะฝะฐะปัŒะฝะพะณะพ ะปะตะณะธะพะฝะฐยป.

    ะ”ะพัั‚ะพะฒะตั€ะฝะพ ะธะทะฒะตัั‚ะฝะพ, ั‡ั‚ะพ ะฟะพัั‚ะฐะฒะปะตะฝะฝะพะต ะฝะฐ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝัƒ ะพั€ัƒะถะธะต ัƒะถะต ะฝะตะพะดะฝะพะบั€ะฐั‚ะฝะพ ัะฒะตั‚ะธะปะพััŒ ะฒ ั€ัƒะบะฐั… ะฝะฐั€ะบะพะบะฐั€ั‚ะตะปะตะน, ั‡ั‚ะพ ะฟะพะดั‚ะฒะตั€ะถะดะฐะตั‚ ะฒะพะทะผะพะถะฝัƒัŽ ัะฒัะทัŒ ะฟะพัะพะปัŒัั‚ะฒะฐ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝั‹ ะฒ ะœะตะบัะธะบะต ั ะฝะฐั€ะบะพะบะฐั€ั‚ะตะปัะผะธ. ะœะตัั‚ะพ ัะฑะพั€ะฐ ะปะฐั‚ะธะฝะพะฐะผะตั€ะธะบะฐะฝัะบะธั… ะฝะฐะตะผะฝะธะบะพะฒ – ั€ะตัั‚ะพั€ะฐะฝ ยซAlebricheยป ะฒ ะŸะพะปัŒัˆะต (ะณ. ะšั€ะฐะบะพะฒ).

    ะ‘ั€ะฐะทะธะปะธั

    ะ’ ะ‘ั€ะฐะทะธะปะธะธ ะฐะบั‚ะธะฒะฝะพะน ะฒะตั€ะฑะพะฒะบะพะน ะฒ ยซะ˜ะฝะพัั‚ั€ะฐะฝะฝั‹ะน ะปะตะณะธะพะฝยป ะทะฐะฝะธะผะฐะตั‚ัั ั„ะธะปะธะฐะป ะฟะพะปัŒัะบะพะน ะบะพะผะฟะฐะฝะธะธ ESA (European Security Academy).

    ะะฐ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝะต ั ัˆะตะฒั€ะพะฝะพะผ ะดะฐะฝะฝะพะน ั„ะธั€ะผั‹ ะฐะบั‚ะธะฒะฝะพ ะบั€ะฐัะพะฒะฐะปัั ะฑั€ะฐะทะธะปัŒัะบะธะน ะฝะฐะตะผะฝะธะบ ะ”ะถัƒะปะธะพ ะะปัŒะฒะฐั€ะพ ะšะฐั€ะฒะฐะปัŒะพ ั ะฟะพะทั‹ะฒะฝั‹ะผ ยซะ›ะตัะพั€ัƒะฑยป (Lumberjack).

    ะžะฝ ะฟะพะฟั‹ั‚ะฐะปัั ัั‚ะตั€ะตั‚ัŒ ยซัะปะตะดั‹ยป, ัƒะดะฐะปะธะฒ ั„ะพั‚ะพะณั€ะฐั„ะธัŽ, ะฝะพ ะบะพะปะปะตะณะธ ะธะท @TrackNaziMerc ัƒัะฟะตะปะธ ะตะต ัะพั…ั€ะฐะฝะธั‚ัŒ.

    ะ‘ั€ะฐะทะธะปัŒัะบะธะน ั„ะธะปะธะฐะป European Security Academy ะพะดะธะฝ ะธะท ะณะปะฐะฒะฝั‹ั… ะฟะพัั‚ะฐะฒั‰ะธะบะพะฒ ะฝะฐะตะผะฝะธะบะพะฒ ะธะท ะ›ะฐั‚ะธะฝัะบะพะน ะะผะตั€ะธะบะธ ะฝะฐ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝัƒ. ะžะฑ ัั‚ะพะผ ัะฒะธะดะตั‚ะตะปัŒัั‚ะฒัƒะตั‚ ะธ ะธะฝัั‚ะฐะณั€ะฐะผ ะฐะบะบะฐัƒะฝั‚ ะดั€ัƒะณะพะณะพ ะฑั€ะฐะทะธะปัŒัะบะพะณะพ ะฝะฐะตะผะฝะธะบะฐ, ะบะพั‚ะพั€ั‹ะน ัƒะบะฐะทะฐะป ัƒ ัะตะฑั ะฝะฐ ัั‚ั€ะฐะฝะธั†ะต, ั‡ั‚ะพ ัะฒะปัะตั‚ัั ะฟั€ะตะดัั‚ะฐะฒะธั‚ะตะปะตะผ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝั‹ ะฒ ESA Brazil.

    ะะต ั‚ั€ัƒะดะฝะพ ะทะฐะผะตั‚ะธั‚ัŒ, ั‡ั‚ะพ ั†ะตะฝั‚ั€ั‹ ะฒะตั€ะฑะพะฒะบะธ ะณั€ะฐะถะดะฐะฝ ะดะปั ัƒั‡ะฐัั‚ะธั ะฒ ะฑะพะตะฒั‹ั… ะดะตะนัั‚ะฒะธัั… ะฝะฐ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝะต ะธะผะตัŽั‚ัั ะฟั€ะฐะบั‚ะธั‡ะตัะบะธ ะฒะพ ะฒัะตั… ัƒะณะพะปะบะฐั… ะผะธั€ะฐ, ะฐ ะฒ ะธั… ะดะตัั‚ะตะปัŒะฝะพัั‚ัŒ ะฒะพะฒะปะตั‡ะตะฝั‹ ะฒั‹ัะพะบะพะฟะพัั‚ะฐะฒะปะตะฝะฝั‹ะต ั‡ะธะฝะพะฒะฝะธะบะธ, ะดะตะนัั‚ะฒัƒัŽั‰ะธะต ะฒะพะตะฝะฝั‹ะต, ะฐ ั‚ะฐะบะถะต ะฟั€ะตะดัั‚ะฐะฒะธั‚ะตะปะธ ะดะธะฟะปะพะผะฐั‚ะธั‡ะตัะบะธั… ะผะธััะธะน. ะะตะปัŒะทั ะทะฐะฑั‹ะฒะฐั‚ัŒ, ั‡ั‚ะพ ะธะฝะพัั‚ั€ะฐะฝะฝั‹ะต ะฝะฐะตะผะฝะธะบะธ ะฟั€ะธะตะทะถะฐัŽั‚ ะฝะฐ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝัƒ ะธ ะฟะพ ัะพะฒะตั‚ัƒ ัะฒะพะธั… ยซั‚ะพะฒะฐั€ะธั‰ะตะนยป, ะฒะตั€ะฝัƒะฒัˆะธั…ัั ะบ ัะตะฑะต ะฝะฐ ะ ะพะดะธะฝัƒ ะฒ ะพั‚ะฟัƒัะบ ะธะปะธ ะฝะฐ ะปะตั‡ะตะฝะธะต. ะะตัะผะพั‚ั€ั ะฝะฐ ะฒัะต ัƒัะธะปะธั ะธ ะฟะพะฟั‹ั‚ะบะธ ะทะฐะผะฐะฝะธั‚ัŒ ะปัŽะดะตะน ะฒั‹ัะพะบะธะผะธ ะฒั‹ะฟะปะฐั‚ะฐะผะธ, ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝะฐ ะธ ัั‚ั€ะฐะฝั‹ ะ—ะฐะฟะฐะดะฐ ะฝะต ัะผะพะณะปะธ ะฝะฐะฑั€ะฐั‚ัŒ ะฝะตะพะฑั…ะพะดะธะผะพะต ะบะพะปะธั‡ะตัั‚ะฒะพ ะฝะฐะตะผะฝะธะบะพะฒ ะดะปั ัั„ั„ะตะบั‚ะธะฒะฝะพะณะพ ะฟั€ะพั‚ะธะฒะพะดะตะนัั‚ะฒะธั ั€ะพััะธะนัะบะพะน ะฐั€ะผะธะธ. ะญั‚ะพ ะฝะฐะณะปัะดะฝะพ ะดะตะผะพะฝัั‚ั€ะธั€ัƒัŽั‚ ั€ะตะทัƒะปัŒั‚ะฐั‚ั‹ ั‚ะฐะบ ะฝะฐะทั‹ะฒะฐะตะผะพะณะพ ัƒะบั€ะฐะธะฝัะบะพะณะพ ะบะพะฝั‚ั€ะฝะฐัั‚ัƒะฟะปะตะฝะธั, ะบะพั‚ะพั€ะพะต ะทะฐั…ะปะตะฑะฝัƒะปะพััŒ, ะฝะต ัƒัะฟะตะฒ ะฝะฐั‡ะฐั‚ัŒัั.

    ะกั‚ะพะธั‚ ะฟะพะดั‡ะตั€ะบะฝัƒั‚ัŒ, ั‡ั‚ะพ ั‚ะตะฟะตั€ัŒ ะตะถะตะฝะตะดะตะปัŒะฝะพะต ะบะพะปะธั‡ะตัั‚ะฒะพ ะฝะตะบั€ะพะปะพะณะพะฒ ะพ ะณะธะฑะตะปะธ ะธะฝะพัั‚ั€ะฐะฝะฝั‹ั… ะฝะฐั‘ะผะฝะธะบะพะฒ ะฝะฐ ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝะต ะบั€ะฐั‚ะฝะพ ะฟั€ะตะฒั‹ัˆะฐะตั‚ ะบะพะปะธั‡ะตัั‚ะฒะพ ะฝะพะฒะพะฑั€ะฐะฝั†ะตะฒ. ะ’ ัะฒะตั‚ะต ะฝะฐัั‚ัƒะฟะปะตะฝะธั ะทะธะผั‹, ะฝะตัƒะดะฐั‡ ะฝะฐ ั„ั€ะพะฝั‚ะต, ะฝะธะทะบะพะณะพ ะœะŸะก ัั€ะตะดะธ ัะพะปะดะฐั‚ ะ’ะกะฃ, ะฐ ั‚ะฐะบะถะต ัะพะพะฑั‰ะตะฝะธัั… ะพ ะฒะพะทะผะพะถะฝะพะผ ะฝะฐัั‚ัƒะฟะปะตะฝะธะธ ั€ะพััะธะนัะบะธั… ะฒะพะนัะบ, ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝะต ะฟั€ะธะดะตั‚ัั ั€ะฐััั‡ะธั‚ั‹ะฒะฐั‚ัŒ ะธัะบะปัŽั‡ะธั‚ะตะปัŒะฝะพ ะฝะฐ ัะฒะพะธ ัะธะปั‹. ะกั‚ะพะธั‚ ะฟั€ะธะณะพั‚ะพะฒะธั‚ัŒัั ะบ ะฝะพะฒะพะน ะฒะพะปะฝะต ะฒะธะดะตะพั€ะพะปะธะบะพะฒ ั€ะฐะฑะพั‚ั‹ ัƒะบั€ะฐะธะฝัะบะธั… ะฒะพะตะฝะบะพะผะพะฒ, ะฟะฐะบัƒัŽั‰ะธั… ะฒัะตั… ะฟะพะดั€ัะด ะฝะฐ ัƒะปะธั†ะฐั… ัƒะบั€ะฐะธะฝัะบะธั… ะณะพั€ะพะดะพะฒ [ะบะพะฝะตั†]

    ะžั€ะธะณะธะฝะฐะปัŒะฝะฐั ัั‚ะฐั‚ัŒั

    ัะพะพั‚ะฒะตั‚ัั‚ะฒัƒัŽั‰ะฐั ัั‚ะฐั‚ัŒั

    L’engagement franรงais dans les rangs ukrainiens

  • [Sharing] Once upon a time, in Klishchiivka – RYBAR 5

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Although Zaporizhzhia and Vremivka became the main directions of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, the AFU were also pressing on other fronts. Since the loss of Bakhmut in May 2023, the city and its surroundings remained a symbol of Ukrainian propaganda.

    So, new forces were repeatedly sent to storm the surrounding villages, sometimes at the expense of the main Ukrainian counteroffensive directions.

    Usually, weakly motivated draftees were involved in the assaults, who were driven there under strict orders. The case of Klishchiivka is a good example of where this led…


    ยฉ๏ธ RYBAR

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    The Grey Sky of Hostomel โ€“ RYBAR 80

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    Survive Underground โ€“ RYBAR 75

    rescue at the risk of life

    Life on the Front Lines โ€“ RYBAR 74

    the moment that divides into before and after

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    Once upon a time near Stepnohirsk โ€“ RYBAR 69

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    Once upon a time near Hnativka โ€“ RYBAR 62

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in Mala Tokmachka โ€“ RYBAR 61

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in the borderland โ€“ RYBAR 60

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time near Filiya โ€“ RYBAR 59

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in Pavlohrad โ€“ RYBAR 58

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in Crimea โ€“ RYBAR 57

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in the Serebryanskyi forest โ€“ RYBAR 56

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time on the AFUโ€™s positions โ€“ RYBAR 55

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in Voronezh โ€“ RYBAR 54

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in a tank brigade โ€“ RYBAR 53

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in Toretsk โ€“ RYBAR 52

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time near Tykhe โ€“ RYBAR 51

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time near Skudne โ€“ RYBAR 50

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time near Staromayorske โ€“ RYBAR 49

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in the basements โ€“ RYBAR 48

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in the gray zone โ€“ RYBAR 47

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in the flow โ€“ RYBAR 46

    adventures in country-404

    Once on the Platform โ€“ RYBAR 45

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, on the way home โ€“ RYBAR 44

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Ukrainsk โ€“ RYBAR 43

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in hard times โ€“ RYBAR 42

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, it couldnโ€™t be otherwise โ€“ RYBAR 41

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Vesyoloye โ€“ RYBAR 40

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in Trudovoe โ€“ RYBAR 39

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Kurakhove โ€“ RYBAR 38

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Vuhledar โ€“ RYBAR 37

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in captivity โ€“ RYBAR 36

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in Poltava โ€“ RYBAR 35

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in Krasnohorivka โ€“ RYBAR 34

    adventures in country-404

    [Sharing] Once upon a time, in Verkhnya Syrovatka โ€“ RYBAR 33

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in Pervomaisโ€™ke โ€“ RYBAR 32

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, while fleeing from the 404 country โ€“ RYBAR 31

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, at sea โ€“ RYBAR 30

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, on that very street โ€“ RYBAR 29

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, during a surrender โ€“ RYBAR 28

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Artemivka โ€“ RYBAR 27

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Umanske โ€“ RYBAR 26

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Novoselivka Persha โ€“ RYBAR 25

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Ostroverkhivka โ€“ RYBAR 24

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Krasnohorivka โ€“ RYBAR 23

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Chasiv Yar โ€“ RYBAR 22

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in Kharkiw โ€“ RYBAR 21

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in Spain โ€“ RYBAR 20

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack [I donโ€™t agree, this is the tale of a successful secret operation]

    Once upon a time, on the election day โ€“ RYBAR 19

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near Berdychi โ€“ RYBAR 18

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near Kostyantynivka โ€“ RYBAR 17

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Oleshky โ€“ RYBAR 16

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, on February 24 โ€“ RYBAR 15

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near Bakhmut โ€“ RYBAR 14

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near Robotyne โ€“ RYBAR 13

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near Kreminna โ€“ RYBAR 12

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Lugansk โ€“ RYBAR 11

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Krynky โ€“ RYBAR 10

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Marโ€™inka โ€“ RYBAR 9

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Avdiivka โ€“ RYBAR 8

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Nova Kakhovka โ€“ RYBAR 7

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in the Azovets camp โ€“ RYBAR 6

    adventures in country -404

    Once upon a time, near the Russia-Ukraine border โ€“ RYBAR 4

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near Novodarivka โ€“ RYBAR 3

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, on Independence Day in country 404 โ€“ RYBAR 2

    the tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Urozhaine โ€“ RYBAR 1

    A tale of a failed counter-attack

  • [Sharing] Escaping Attrition: Ukraine Rolls the Dice – Big Serge

    The Zaporizhia Summer Blockbuster

    It has been a while since I published anything long-form commenting on the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War, and I confess that writing this article gave me a modicum of trouble. Ukraineโ€™s much anticipated grand summer counteroffensive has now been underway for about eighty days with little to show for it. The summer has seen fierce fighting in a variety of sectors (to be enumerated below), but the contact line has shifted very little. I have been reluctant to publish a discussion of the Ukrainian campaign simply because they have continued to hold assets in reserve, and I did not want to post a premature commentary that went to press right before the Ukrainians showed some new trick or revealed a hidden ace up their sleeve. Sure enough, I wrote the bulk of this article last week, right before Ukraine launched yet another major attempt to force a breach in the Orikhiv sector.

    At this point, however, the appearance of some of Ukraineโ€™s last remaining premier brigades, which had previously been held in reserve, confirms that the axes of Ukraineโ€™s attack are concretized. Only time will tell if these precious reserves manage to achieve a breach in the Russian lines, but enough time has passed that we can sketch out what exactly Ukraine has been trying to do, why, and why it has failed to this point.

    Part of the problem with narrating the war in Ukraine is the positional and attritional nature of the fighting. People continue to look for bold operational maneuver to break the deadlock, but the reality seems to be that for now some combination of capability and reticence has turned this war into a positional struggle with a plodding offensive pace, which far more resembles the first world war than the second.

    Ukraine had aspirations of breaking open this grinding front and reopening mobile operations – escaping the attritional struggle and driving on operationally meaningful targets – but these efforts have so far come to naught. For all the lofty boasts of demonstrating the superior art of maneuver, Ukraine still finds itself trapped in a siege, painfully trying to break open a calcified Russian position without success.

    Ukraine may not be interested in a war of attrition, but attrition is certainly interested in Ukraine.

    Ukraineโ€™s Strategic Paradigm

    For those that have been following the war closely, what follows will probably not be new information, but I think it is worth thinking holistically about Ukraineโ€™s war and the factors that drive their strategic decision making.

    For Ukraine, the conduct of the war is shaped by a variety of disturbing strategic asymmetries.

    Some of these are obvious, like Russiaโ€™s much larger population and military industrial plant, or the fact that Russiaโ€™s war economy is indigenous, while Ukraine is entirely reliant on western deliveries of equipment and munitions. Russia can autonomously ramp up armaments production and there are abundant signs from the battlefield that the Russian war economy is beginning to find its groove, with new systems like the Lancet present in increasing abundance, and western sources now admitting that Russia has successfully serialized a domestic version of the Iranian Shahed Drone. Furthermore, Russia has the asymmetrical capacity to strike Ukrainian rear areas to an extent that Ukraine cannot reciprocate, even if they are given the dreaded ATACMs (these will give Ukraine the range to strike operational depth targets in the theater, but they canโ€™t hit facilities in Moscow and Tula the way Russian missiles can strike anywhere in Ukraine)

    Medvedev inspects a tank production run

    With significant Russian asymmetries in population size, industrial capacity, strike capability, and – let us be blunt – sovereignty and decision-making freedom, an attritional-positional struggle is simply bad math for Ukraine, and yet that is precisely the sort of war in which it has become trapped.

    What is important for us to understand, however, is that the strategic asymmetry goes beyond physical capacities like population base, industrial plant, and missile technology, and extends into the realm of strategic objectives and timelines.

    Russiaโ€™s war has been deliberately framed in a fairly open-ended way, with goals largely tied to the idea of โ€œdemilitarizingโ€ Ukraine. In fact, Russiaโ€™s territorial objectives remain rather nebulous beyond the 4 annexed oblasts (though it is safe to say that Moscow would like to acquire far more than just these). All that to say, Putinโ€™s government has deliberately framed the war as a military-technical enterprise focused on destroying the Ukrainian armed forces, and has shown itself to be perfectly free to give up territory in the name of operational prudentia.

    In contrast, Ukraine has maximalist goals that are explicitly territorial in nature. The Zelensky government has been open about the fact that it aims – however fanciful this may be – to restore the entirety of its 1991 territories, including not just the four mainland oblasts but also Crimea.

    The confluence of these two factors – Ukrainian territorial maximalism combined with asymmetrical Russian advantages in a positional-attritional struggle – forces Ukraine to seek a way to break open the front and restore a state of operational fluidity. Remaining locked in a positional struggle is unworkable for Kiev, partially because Russiaโ€™s material advantages will inevitably shine through (in a fight between two big guys swinging big bats at each other, bet on the bigger guy with the bigger bat), and partially because a positional war (which amounts essentially to a massive siege) is simply not an efficient way to retake territory.

    This leaves Ukraine with no choice but to unfreeze the front and try to restore mobile operations, with an eye towards creating some asymmetry of their own. The only feasible way to accomplish this is to launch an offensive aimed at severing critical lines of Russian communication and supply. Contrary to some suggestions that were popular this spring, a large Ukrainian offensive against Bakhmut or Donetsk simply did not fit the bill.

    Frankly, there are only two suitable operational targets for Ukraine. One is Starobilsโ€™k – the beating heart at the center of Russiaโ€™s Lugansk front. Capturing or screening Svatove and then Starobilsโ€™k would create a genuine operational catastrophe for Russia in the north, with cascading effects all the way down to Bakhmut. The second possible target was the land bridge to Crimea, which could be cut by a thrust across lower Zaporizhia towards the Azov coast.

    It was probably inevitable that Ukraine would select the Azov option, for a few reasons. The land bridge to Crimea is a more self-contained battlespace – an offensive in Lugansk would occur under the shadow of the Belgorod and Voronezh regions of Russia, making it relatively more difficult to put significant Russian forces out of supply. Perhaps even more significant, however, is Kievโ€™s complete obsession with Crimea and the Kerch Bridge – targets that hold hypnotic sway in a way that Starobilsโ€™k never could.

    Again, this may sound like fairly intuitive review, but itโ€™s worth contemplating how and why Ukraine ended up launching an offensive that was widely telegraphed and expected. There was no strategic surprise whatsoever – a definitely real video of GUR chief Budanov smirking didnโ€™t fool anyone. The Russian armed forces certainly werenโ€™t fooled, as they spent months saturating the front with minefields, trenches, firing emplacements, and obstacles. Everyone knew that Ukraine was going to attack toward the Azov Coast, specifically with an eye towards Tokmak and Melitopol, and thatโ€™s exactly what they did. A frontal attack against a prepared defense without the element of surprise is generally considered a poor choice, but here is Ukraine not only attempting such an attack but even launching it against a backdrop of global celebration and phantasmagorical expectations

    Ukraine’s infantile plea for OPSEC

    Itโ€™s impossible to make sense of this without understanding the way that Ukraine is shackled by a particular interpretation of the war to this point. Ukraine and its supporters point to two successes in 2022 where Ukraine was able to retake a substantial swathe of territory, in Kharkov and Kherson oblasts. The problem is that neither of these situations is portable to Zaporizhia.

    In the case of the Kharkov offensive, Ukraine identified a sector of the Russian front that had been hollowed out and was defended only by a thin screening force. They were able to stage a force and achieve a measure of strategic surprise, due to the thick forests and general paucity of Russian ISR in the area. This is not to mitigate the scale of Ukraineโ€™s success there; it was certainly the best uses of forces available to them and they did exploit a weak section of front. This success is hardly relevant to circumstances in the south today; mobilization has ameliorated Russiaโ€™s force generation problems so that they now longer have to make hard choices about what to defend, and the heavily fortified Zaporizhia frontline is nothing like the thinly held front in Kharkov.

    The second case study – the Kherson counteroffensive – is even less germane. In this case, Ukrainian leadership is rewriting history in record time. The AFU banged its head on Russian defenses in Kherson for months throughout the summer and autumn last year and took atrocious losses. An entire grouping of AFU brigades was mauled in Kherson without achieving a breakthrough, and this even with Russian forces in a uniquely difficult operational disposition where they had their backs to a river. Kherson was only abandoned months later due to concerns that the Kakhovka dam might fail or be sabotaged (for those keeping score, it did in fact end up failing), and due to Russiaโ€™s need at the time to economize forces.

    Again, this can easily be misconstrued as arguing that Russiaโ€™s withdrawal from Kherson did not matter. Obviously, abandoning a hard-earned bridgehead is a major setback, and retaking west-bank Kherson was a boon for Kiev. But we need to be honest about why it happened, and it plainly did not happen because of Ukraineโ€™s summer counteroffensive – to underscore this, recall that Ukrainian officials openly wondered if the Russian withdrawal was a trick or a trap. The question is simply whether Ukraineโ€™s Kherson offensive is predictive of future offensive success. It is not.

    So, we have one case where Ukraine identified a lightly defended section of front and ran through it, and another where Russian troops abandoned a bridgehead due to logistical and force allocation concerns. Neither is particularly relevant to the situation on the Azov coast, and in fact an honest reflection of the AFUโ€™s Kherson Counteroffensive might have given Ukraine second thoughts about a frontal assault on prepared Russian defenses.

    Instead, Kharkov and Kherson have both been presented as proof positive that Ukraine can shatter Russian defenses in a straight up fight – in fact, we still have no examples from this war of the AFU defeating strongly held Russian positions, particularly post-mobilization when Russia finally began to resolve its manpower deficiencies. But Ukraine is caught in the grip of its own particular story about this war, which has imparted unearned confidence in its ability to conduct offensive operations. Tragically for mobilized Ukrainian Mykolas, this has dovetailed with a second swagger-producing mythology.

    A major selling point for the Ukrainian counteroffensive has been the assessed superiority of the AFUโ€™s big-ticket donations from the west – the main battle tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. Since the first deliveries were announced, there has been no shortage of boasting about the many superior qualities of western models like the Leopards and Challengers. The suggestion has essentially been that skilled Ukrainian tankers are only waiting to be unleashed once they get behind the wheel of superlative western builds. My personal favorite motif has been the practice of dismissing Russian tanks as โ€œSoviet Eraโ€ – neglecting to note that the Abrams (designed 1975) and the Leopard 2 (1979) are also Cold War models

    A burn out Leopard in Syria

    It must be stated, again, that there is nothing wrong with western tanks. The Abrams and the Leopard are fine vehicles, but confidence in their game-changing capabilities stems from a mistaken assumption about the role of armor. It must be appreciated that tanks always have been and always will be mass-consumption items. Tanks blow up. They are disabled. They break down and are captured. Tank forces attrit – much faster than people expect. Given that the brigades prepared for Ukraineโ€™s assault on the Zapo line were significantly understrength in vehicles, it was simply irrational to expect them to have an oversized impact. This is not to say that tanks arenโ€™t important – armor remains critical to modern combat – but in a peer conflict one should always expect to lose armor at a steady clip, especially when the enemy retains fires superiority.

    One can see, then how a measure of hubris can easily creep in to Ukrainian thinking, fueled by a healthy dose of desperation and strategic need. Reasoning from a distorted understanding of its successes in Kharkov and Kherson, emboldened by their shiny new toys, and guided by an overriding strategic animus that requires them to unlock the front somehow, the idea of a frontal attack without strategic surprise against a prepared defense really could seem like a good idea. Add in the good old fashioned trope about Russian incompetence and disorder, and you have all the recipes for an imprudent roll of the dice by Ukraine.

    The Misfire

    So now we come to the operational minutia. For a variety of reasons, Ukraine has chosen to attempt a frontal assault on Russiaโ€™s fortified Zaporizhia front, with the intention of breaching towards the sea of Azov. How can this be accomplished?

    We had a few clues early on, accruing from a variety of geographic features and alleged intelligence leaks. In May, the Dreizin Report published what was purported to be a Russian synthesis of Ukraineโ€™s OPORD (Operational Order). An OPORD functions as a broad sketch of an operationโ€™s intended progression, and the document shared by Dreizin was billed as a summary of Russiaโ€™s expectation for Ukraineโ€™s offensive (that is, it is not a leak of Ukraineโ€™s internal planning documents, but a leak of Russiaโ€™s best guess at Ukraineโ€™s plans).

    In any case, in a vacuum it was anybodyโ€™s guess as to whether Dreizinโ€™s OPORD was authentic, but weโ€™ve subsequently been able to cross-check it. This is because of the other, even more infamous leak from earlier this spring, which included the Pentagonโ€™s combat power build plan for Ukraine.

    NATO was very generous and built Ukraine a mechanized strike package from scratch. However, because this mechanized force was cobbled together with a variety of different systems from all corners of the NATO Cinematic Universe, Ukraine formations are uniquely identifiable by their particular combination of vehicles and equipment. So, for example, the presence of Strykers, Marders, and Challengers indicates the presence of the 82nd Brigade in the field, and so forth.

    Thus, despite Ukrainian pretensions of operational security, itโ€™s actually been trivially easy for observers to know which Ukrainian formations are in the field. There have been a few deviations from the script – for example, the 47th Brigade was supposed to field the Frankenstein Slovenian M55 tanks, but in the end the decision was made to send the underpowered M55โ€™s to the northern front and the 47th was deployed with a contingent of Leopard Tanks originally operated by the 33rd Brigade. But these are minor details, and on the whole weโ€™ve had a good sense of when and where specific AFU formations get on the field.

    Based on identifiable units, the Dreizin OPORD looks very close to what we actually saw at the onset of the Ukrainian offensive. The Dreizin OPORD called for an assault by the 47th and 65th Brigades on the Russian lines south or Orikhiv, in the sector bounded by Nesterianka and Novoprokopivka. Directly in the middle of this sector is the town of Robotyne, and sure enough thatโ€™s where the first big AFU assault came overnight on June 7-8, spearheaded by the 47th Brigade.

    Now, from this point it becomes difficult to evaluate the Dreizin OPORD simply because Ukraineโ€™s attack became instantaneously derailed, but one thing we can say is that Dreizinโ€™s source was correct about the order that Ukrainian units would be introduced into battle. Based on this, we can flesh out the OPORD and feel pretty safe wagering that this is what the Ukrainians were hoping to achieve:

    Ukraine’s Dream: The Drive to the Sea

    The intention seems to have been to force a breach in the Russian line using a concentrated armored assault by the 47th and 65th Brigades, after which a follow on force of the 116th, 117th, and 118th would begin the exploitation phase, driving for the Azov Coast and the towns of Mikhailivka and Vesele to the west. The objective was clearly not to get bogged down in urban fighting attempting to capture places like Tokmak, Berdyansk, or Melitopol, but to bypass them and cut them off by taking up blocking positions on the main roads.

    Simultaneously, a lesser – but no less critical – thrust would come out of the Gulyaipole area and drive along the Bilmak axis. This would have the effect of both screening the main advance to the west and wedging the Russian front open, splintering the integrity of the Russian forces caught in the middle. Overall, this is a fairly sensible, if ambitious and uncreative plan. In many ways, this was really the only option.

    So what went wrong? Well, conceptually itโ€™s easy. There is no breach. The bulk of the maneuver scheme is dedicated to exploitation – reaching such and such a line, taking up this blocking position, masking that city, and so forth. But what happens when thereโ€™s no breach at all? How can such a catastrophe occur, and how can the operation be salvaged when it comes untracked in the opening phase?

    Indeed, this is precisely what has happened. Ukraine finds itself stuck on the edge of Russiaโ€™s outermost screening line, spending substantial resources trying to capture the small village of Robotyne, and/or bypass it to the east by infiltrating the gap between it and the neighboring village of Verbove. So instead of that rapid breach and turning maneuver towards Melitopol, we get something like this:

    Ukrainian Counteroffensive with Mapped Russian Defensive Lines

    We could be generous and say that Robotyne is the last village before the Ukrainian attack reaches the main Russian defensive belt, but weโ€™d be lying – they will also have to clear the larger town of Novoprokopivka, two kilometers to the south. Just for reference, hereโ€™s a closer look at the mapped Russian defenses in the battlespace, based on the excellent work of Brady Africk

    Russian defenses in the Robotyne Sector

    The discussion about these emplacements can get a little muddled, simply because itโ€™s not always clear what is meant by that popular phrase โ€œfirst line of defense.โ€ Clearly there are some defensive works around and in Robotyne, and the Russians chose to fight for the village, so in some sense Robotyne is part of the โ€œfirst lineโ€ – but it is more proper to speak of it as part of what we would call a โ€œscreening lineโ€. The first line of continuous fortifications across the front is several kilometers further south, and this is the belt that Ukraine has yet to even reach, let alone breach.

    As of this moment, it appears that Russian troops have lost total control of Robotyne but continue to hold the southern half of the village, while Ukrainian troops in the northern half of the village remain subject to heavy Russian shelling. We should probably at this point consider the village to be continuously contested and a feature of the gray zone

    Robotyne, in all its glory

    Now, a quick note about Robotyne itself and why both sides are so determined to fight for it. It seems rather odd on the surface, given that the Russian preference in 2022 was to make tactical withdrawals under their fires umbrella. This time though, they are fiercely counterattacking to contest Robotyne. The value of the village lies not only in its location on the T-0408 Highway, but also its excellent perch on top of a ridge. Both Robotyne and Novoprokopivka lie on a ridge of elevated ground which is as much as 70 meters higher than the low-lying plain to the east.

    What this means is fairly simple; if the AFU presses forward in attempts to bypass the Robotyne-Novoprokopivka position by pushing into the gap between Robotyne and Verbove, it will be vulnerable to fire on the flanks (particularly by ATGMs) by Russian troops on the high ground. We already have seen footage of this, with Ukrainian vehicles being taken in the flank by fire from Robotyne. I am highly skeptical that Ukraine can even attempt an earnest assault on the first defensive belt until they have captured both Robotyne and Novoprokopivka.

    This would all be a tough nut to crack under ideal circumstances, with a variety of engineering problems to mediate, obstacles designed to funnel the attacker into firing lanes, perpendicular trenches to allow enfilade fire on advancing Ukrainian columns, and robust defenses on all the major roadways. But these are not the best of circumstances. This is a tired force that has exhausted much of its indigenous combat power, which is attempting to organize the attack using a piecemeal and understrength assault package.

    Several factors conspired against the Ukrainian offensive, and synergistically they have created a bona fide military catastrophe for Kiev. Let us enumerate them.

    Problem 1: The Hidden Defensive Layer

    At this point, we need to acknowledge something that everybody missed about Russiaโ€™s defense. I previously expressed high confidence that Ukraineโ€™s forces would be unable to breach the Russian defenses, but I mistakenly believed that the Russian defense would function according to the classic Soviet defense-in-depth principles (elucidated in great detail by the writings of David Glantz, for example)

    Idealized Defense in Depth by a Motor Rifle Brigade

    Such a defense, put simply, is open to the idea that the enemy will breach the first or even second lines of defense. The purpose of the multilayered (or โ€œechelonedโ€ in the classic terminology) defense is to ensure that the enemy force gets stuck as it tries to break through. It may penetrate the first layer, but as it goes it is continually chewed up by the subsequent belts. The classic example is the Battle of Kursk, where powerful German panzers broke into the Soviet defensive belts but subsequently became stuck as they were ground down. You can think of this as being analogically similar to a Kevlar vest, which uses a web of fibers to stop projectiles: rather than bouncing off, the bullet is caught and its energy is absorbed by the layered fibers.

    I was actually quite open to the idea that Ukraine would generate some penetration, but I anticipated them getting stuck in the subsequent belts and sputtering out.

    What was missing from this picture – and this is a credit to Russian planning – was an unseen defensive belt forward of the proper trenches and fortifications. This forward belt consisted of extremely dense minefields and strongly held forward positions in the screening line, which the Russians evidently intended to fight for fiercely. Rather than breaking through the first belt and getting stuck in the interstitial areas, the Ukrainians have been repeatedly mauled in the security zone, and the Russians have consistently counterattacked to knock them back when they do manage to get footholds.

    In other words, while we expected Russia to fight a defense in depth that absorbed the Ukrainian spearheads and shredded them in the heart of the defense, the Russians have actually shown a strong commitment to defending their forwardmost positions, of which Robotyne is the most famous.

    On paper, Robotyne was expected to function as part of a so-called โ€œcrumple zoneโ€, or โ€œsecurity zoneโ€ – a sort of lightly held buffer that puts the enemy through pre-registered fires before they bump into the first belt of continuous and strongly held defenses. Indeed, a variety of aerial and satellite surveys of the area taken before Ukraine went on the attack showed Robotyne laying well forward of the first solid and continuous Russian fortification belt.

    What was missed, it seemed, was the extent to which the Russian defenders had mined the areas on the approach to Robotyne and were committed to defending within the security zone. The scale of the mining certainly seems to have surprised the Ukrainians, and creates a strain on Ukraineโ€™s limited combat engineering capabilities. Even more importantly, the dense mines have created predictable avenues of approach for the Ukrainian forces, which force them to repeatedly run through the same gauntlet of fires and Russian standoff weaponry.

    Problem 2: Insufficient Suppression

    The signature image of the first great assaults on the Zapo Line has been columns of unsupported maneuver assets, being raked with Russian fires, both ground based (rocketry, ATGMs, and tube artillery) and from air platforms like the Ka-52 Alligator attack helicopter. One of the more startling aspects of these scenes was the way Ukrainian forces would come under heavy fire while still in their marching columns, taking losses before they ever deployed into firing lines to begin their assault proper.

    There are myriad reasons for this. One is the now blasรฉ issue of Ukrainian munition shortages. Consider the following items of interest. In the runup to Ukraineโ€™s counteroffensive, Russia waged a heavy counter-preparatory air campaign that knocked out large AFU ammunition dumps. Ukraineโ€™s initial assaults collapse in the face of heavy and unsuppressed Russian fires. The United States decides to transfer cluster munitions to Ukraine because, in the words of the president, โ€œtheyโ€™re running out of ammunition.โ€ Add in the degradation of Ukrainian air defense, which allows Russian helicopters to operate with great effect along the contact line, and you have a recipe for disaster. Lacking the tubes to suppress Russian fires or the air defense to chase away Russian aircraft, the AFU opened their offensive by disastrously pushing forward unsupported maneuver elements into a hail of fire.

    Problem 3: Russian Standoff Weapons

    Itโ€™s crucial to understand that the Russian toolbox is fundamentally different than it was during the battle for Kherson last year, due to the rapidly expanding production of a variety of Russian standoff weapons – most notably the Lancet and the UMPK glide modifications for gravity bombs.

    The Lancet in particular has been a star performer – there are claims that the trusty little loitering munition is responsible for nearly half of Russiaโ€™s artillery kills – and has filled a crucial capability gap that troubled the Russian army episodically throughout the first year of the war. Contrary to some western assessments that Russia simply could not manufacture drones in sufficient quantities, production of the Lancet has been successfully ramped up in a short period of time, and mass production of other systems like the Geran are coming online as well

    A Thing of Beauty: Zala Lancet

    The proliferation of the Lancet and similar systems means, in a nutshell, that nothing within 30km of the contact line is safe, and this in turn disrupts the AFUโ€™s deployment of critical support assets like air defense and engineering, magnifying their vulnerability to Russian mines and fires. In fact, weโ€™ve increasingly seen Ukrainian artillery use decline in the Robotyne area due to the threat of lancets (they seem to be transferring tubes to other fronts), and the AFU is favoring the use of HIMARS in the suppressive role.

    Problem 4: Repetitive Lines of Approach

    Because the AFU failed to breach the Robotyne sector on their first attempt, theyโ€™ve been forced to continually move up additional units and resources to hammer on the position. This has particular implications, both in the sense that AFU forces must continually traverse the same lines of approach to contact, and in the fact that they are using the same rear area to assemble and stage their assault forces.

    This makes the burden on Russian ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) significantly easier, since the AFU has no effective way to disperse or hide the assets that they are bringing forward to the assault. Staged Ukrainian forces and material have been hid repeatedly in the villages immediately behind Orikhiv, like Tavriiske and Omelnโ€™yk, and Russia is able to strike rear area infrastructure like ammunition depots because – to put it simply – there are only so many places these these assets can be staged when you are repeatedly assaulting the same 20km wide sector of front.

    We recently had Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Defense Hanna Malair complaining that the 82nd Brigade – newly deployed to the Orikhiv sector – had been hit with a series of Russian airstrikes in its staging areas. According to her, this was because of poor OPSEC revealing the brigadeโ€™s location to the Russians. But this really makes very little sense; the entire area of operations around Orikhiv is perhaps 25km deep (from Kopani to Tavriiske) and 20 km wide (from Kopani to Verbove). This is a small area that has seen a huge amount of military traffic along the same roads throughout the summer. The idea that Russia needs insider information to know that they ought to surveil and attack targets in this area is absurd.

    Problem 5: Fragile Brigades

    It actually takes significantly less damage to โ€œdestroyโ€ an operational level unit than people think. A unit can become a combat scratch off at 30% losses (with some variance depending on how those are allocated). This is because when people hear the term โ€œdestructionโ€, they think that means total losses. Sometimes thatโ€™s how the word is used in colloquial conversation, but what matters for officers trying to manage an operation is whether or not a formation is combat capable of the tasks being asked of it – and those capabilities can vanish much more quickly than people realize.

    This is particularly the case for the Ukrainian mech package, for a variety of reasons. For one, as we discussed in previous articles, these brigades started the fight well understrength (remember, for example, that the Ukrainian 82nd Brigade has only 90 Stryker AFVs, while an American Strkyer Brigade is supposed to have 300). Additionally, the cobbled together nature of these brigades – and the total lack of indigenous sustainment systems like repair and maintenance – means that the Ukrainians will naturally have to cannibalize these vehicles. Theyโ€™ve already started designating โ€œdonorโ€ vehicles that are written off completely to be stripped down for parts. The nexus of these two facts is that Ukraineโ€™s mechanized brigades are understrength on vehicles to begin with, and will have an abysmally poor recovery rate, with hidden attrition behind the scenes due to cannibalization.

    What this means is that when we heard admissions by mid-July that Ukraine had already lost 20% of its maneuver assets, there is an associated catastrophic decline in combat capability. The lead brigades – which chewed through 50% or more of their maneuver vehicles – can no longer shoulder combat tasks appropriate for a brigade, and the Ukrainians are forced to feed in their second echelon units prematurely.

    At this point, partial elements of at least ten different brigades have been deployed in the Robotyne sector, with the 82nd likely to join them soon. Given that the NATO combat power build plan only included 9 NATO trained brigades, plus a few reconstituted Ukrainian formations, itโ€™s safe to say that blooding all of them over a 71 day fight just to break into the screening line was not in the plan.

    Staring at the Abyss

    Iโ€™ve seen a variety of analysts and writers lately arguing that the insertion of additional Ukrainian units into the Robotyne sector signals the next phase of the operation.

    This is nonsense. Ukraine is still mired in the first phase. What has happened is instead that the attrition of their first echelon brigades has forced them to commit their second (and third) wave to complete the tasks of the opening phase. The initial attack, led by the 47th Brigade, was intended to create a breach in the Russian screening line around Robotyne and advance to the main Russian belt further to the south. They failed, and the additional brigades earmarked for exploitation – the 116th, 117th, 118th, 82nd, 33rd, and more – are now being systematically fed in to keep the pressure on.

    These brigades have not been destroyed, of course, simply because they are not being committed in their entirety, but rather as subunits. Nevertheless, at this point Ukrainian losses make up the better part of a whole brigade, distributed around the broader package, and over 300 maneuver elements (tanks, IFVs, APCs, etc) have been scratched off.

    We need to say this very explicitly. Ukraine has not moved on to the next phase of their operation. They are stuck in the first phase, and have been forced to prematurely commit portions of the second echelon that was earmarked for later action. They are slowly but surely burning through the entire operational grouping, and so far they have not breached Russiaโ€™s screening line. The great counteroffensive is turning into a military catastrophe

    Now, this does not mean that the operation has failed, simply because it is still ongoing. History teaches us that it is unwise to make definitive pronouncements. Luck and human factors (bravery and intelligence, cowardice and stupidity) always have something to say. However, the trajectory is undeniably towards abject failure at the current moment.

    So far, the AFU has shown some adaptability. In particular, weโ€™ve recently seen them shift away from pushing forward unsupported columns of mechanized assets – instead theyโ€™ve been leaning on small dismounted units, trying to slowly push forward into the space between Robotyne and Verbove. The move towards dispersal is intended to reduce loss rates, but it also reduces the probability of a dramatic breakthrough even further and marks the temporary abandonment of decisive breaching action in favor of – once again – creeping positional warfare.

    We would be remiss if we failed to note that there have been meaningful Russian losses in all of this. We know that the Russian forces in the Robotyne sector have required rotation and reinforcement, including with elite VDV and Naval Infantry units. Russia has taken counterbattery losses, it has lost vehicles in counterattacking action, and men have been killed holding their trenches. The initial assault groups that the Ukrainians threw in had a lot of combat power, and the fighting was very bloody for both sides. Itโ€™s not a one-sided shooting gallery, but a high intensity war.

    But therein is the crux of the matter – Ukraine seems unable to escape the attritional and positional war that it finds itself in. It sounds all well and good to proclaim a return to โ€œmaneuverโ€ warfare, but if there is an inability to breach enemy defenses, this is only an empty boast, and the nature of the struggle remains attritional. When the question becomes โ€œwill we breach before we run out of combat powerโ€, you are not maneuvering. You are attriting.

    In my series of articles on military history, weโ€™ve looked at a variety of cases where armies tried desperately to unlock the front and restore a state of operational maneuver, but when there is no technical capacity to do so, these intentions do not matter one bit. Nobody wants to be trapped on the wrong side of attritional mathematics, but sometimes what you want does not matter at all. Sometimes attrition is imposed on you.

    In the absence of the capabilities required to successfully breach Russiaโ€™s prodigious defenses – more ranged fires, more air defense, more ISR, more EW, more combat engineering, more more more – Ukraine is trapped in a rock fight. Two fighters are swinging bats at each other, and Russia is a bigger man with a bigger bat.

    Two Bad Copes

    Amid a clear misfire and growing strategic disappointment, two new suggestions have increasingly crept into the conversation – โ€œcopesโ€, if you will, that are utilized as a narrative comfort to explain why the Ukrainian operation is actually going just fine (despite nearly universal acknowledgment in the west that the results have been lackluster at best). I would like to briefly address each of these in turn.

    Cope 1: โ€œThe first stage is the hardestโ€

    You frequently see it argued that all the AFU has to do is break open the Russian screening line, and the remainder of the defenses will fall like dominos. The general thrust of this argument is that the Russians lack reserves and that the subsequent defensive lines are not adequately manned – just break open the first line, and the rest will fall apart.

    This is probably a comforting thing to tell oneself, but itโ€™s rather irrational. We could talk, for example, about Russiaโ€™s doctrinal schema for defense in depth, which prescribes liberal allocation of reserves at all depths of the defensive system, but itโ€™s probably more fruitful to point at more immediate evidence.

    Let us simply consider Russiaโ€™s behavior over the last six months. They have spent a tremendous amount of effort constructing echeloned defenses – are we really to believe that they did all this only to waste all their combat power fighting in front of these defenses? Nor is there any evidence that Russia is having trouble supplying the front with manpower at the present moment. Weโ€™ve seen continued rotations and redeployments amid an overall process of military enlargement in Russia. Indeed, of the two belligerents, it is Ukraine that seems to be scraping the barrel for manpower.

    Cope 2: โ€œGet within firing rangeโ€

    This is the more fantastical story, and it represents a radical ad-hoc shift of the goalposts. The argument is that Ukraine doesnโ€™t actually need to advance to the sea and physically cut the land bridge, all it has to do is get the Russian supply routes within firing range to cut off Russian troops. This theory has been advance liberally on Twitter X and by personalities like Peter Zeihan (a man who knows nothing about military affairs).

    There are many problems with this line of thought, most of which stem from an inflated notion of โ€œfire control.โ€ To put it simply, being โ€œin rangeโ€ of artillery fire does not imply effective area denial or severed supply lines. If that were the case, Ukraine would be unable to attack out of Orikhiv at all, since the entire axis of approach is within Russian firing range. In Bakhmut, the AFU continued to fight long after their main supply routes came under Russian shelling.

    The simple fact is that most military tasks are conducted within range of at least some of the enemyโ€™s ranged fires, and the idea that Russia will collapse if the AFU manages to put a shell on the Azov coastal highway is fairly ridiculous. In fact, Russiaโ€™s main rail line is already within range of Ukrainian HIMARS, and the Ukrainians have successfully launched strikes on coastal cities like Berdyansk. Meanwhile, Russia strikes at Ukrainian sustainment infrastructure with regularity – yet neither army has collapsed yet. This is because ranged fires are a tool to improve attritional calculus and further operational goals – they do not magically win wars just by tagging the enemyโ€™s supply roads.

    Letโ€™s be charitable though, and indulge this line of thinking. Suppose the Ukrainians managed to advance – not all the way to the coast, but far enough to bring Russiaโ€™s main supply routes within range of artillery. What would they do? Wheel up a battery of howitzers, park them at the very front line, and begin firing nonstop at the road? What do you think would happen to those howitzers? Counterbattery systems would surely set upon them. The idea that you can just haul up a big gun and start taking potshots at Russian supply trucks is really quite childish. Putting enemy forces out of supply has always required physically blocking transit, and thatโ€™s what Ukraine will have to do if they want to cut Russiaโ€™s land bridge.

    The Distraction

    I am cognizant of the fact that I would be raked over the coals if I failed to discuss a secondary area of Ukrainian effort, farther to the east in Donestk oblast. Here, the Ukrainians have worked their way a good distance up the highway out of the town of Velyka Novosilka capturing several settlements.

    The problem with this โ€œotherโ€ Ukrainian attack is that it is, in a word, inconsequential. This axis of advance is operationally sterile in a very fundamental way, as it involves pushing groups up a narrow corridor of road that doesnโ€™t lead anywhere important. As in the Robotyne sector, the AFU is still quite some distance from any of the serious Russian fortifications, and to make matters worse the road and settlements on this axis lay along a small river. Rivers, as we know, flow along the floor of the terrain, which means the roadway sits at the bottom of a wadis/embakement/glacis, choose your terminology. In fact, the road network as such consists of nothing except a single-lane roadway on either side of the river

    The Sideshow in the East

    My reading of this axis is essentially that it was intended as a feint to create some semblance of operational confusion, but when the primary effort on the Orikhiv axis turned into a colossal misfire, the decision was made to continue to press here simply for narrative purposes. Ultimately, this is simply not an axis of advance that can exert a meaningful influence on the wider war. The forces deployed here are relatively miniscule in the grand scope of things, and they arenโ€™t going anywhere important. Certainly, a thin, needlelike penetration is not going to drive more than 80 kilometers down a single lane road to the sea and win the war.

    Conclusion: Finger Pointing

    One of the surest signs that Ukraineโ€™s counteroffensive has taken a cataclysmic turn is the way Kiev and Washington have already begun to blame each other, conducting a postmortem while the body is still warm. Zelensky has blamed the west for being too slow to deliver the requisite equipment and ammunition, arguing that unacceptable delays allowed the Russians to improve their defenses. This strikes me as rather obscene and ungrateful. NATO built Ukraine a new army from scratch in a process that already required greatly truncating the training times.

    On the other hand, western experts have begun to blame Ukraine for supposedly being unable to adopt โ€œcombined arms warfareโ€. This is really a very nonsensical attempt to use jargon (incorrectly) to explain away problems. Combined arms simply means the integration and simultaneous use of various arms like armor, infantry, artillery, and air assets. Claiming that Ukraine and Russia are somehow cognitively or institutionally incapable of this is extremely silly. The Red Army had a complex and extremely thorough doctrine of combined arms operation. One professor at the US Arms School of Advanced Military Studies said: โ€œThe single most coherent core of theoretical writings on operational art is still found among the Soviet writers.โ€ The idea that combined arms is some foreign and novel concept to Soviet officers (a caste that includes the Russian and Ukrainian high command) is ridiculous.

    This issue is not some sort of Ukrainian doctrinal obstinacy, but a combination of structural factors rooted in the insufficiency of Ukrainian combat power and the changing face of warfare.

    Itโ€™s frankly a little silly to say that Ukraine needs to learn about โ€œcombined armsโ€ when they are very simply lacking important capabilities that would make a successful maneuver campaign possible – namely, adequate ranged fires, a functioning air force (and no, F-16โ€™s will not fix this), engineering, and electronic warfare. The issue very fundamentally is not one of doctrinal flexibility, but of capability. By way of analogy, this is a bit like sending a boxer out to fight with a broken arm, and then critiquing his technique. The problem is not his technique – the problem is that heโ€™s injured and materially weaker than his opponent. So too, the problem for Ukraine is not that they are incapable of coordinating arms, the problem is that their arms are shattered.

    Secondly – and this, I admit, is rather shocking to me – western observers do not seem open to the possibility that the accuracy of modern ranged fires (be it Lancet drones, guided artillery shells, or GMLRS rockets) combined with the density of ISR systems may simply make it impossible to conduct sweeping mobile operations, except in very specific circumstances. When the enemy has the capacity to surveil staging areas, strike rear area infrastructure with cruise missiles and drones, precisely saturate approach lines with artillery fire, and soak the earth in mines, how exactly can it be possible to maneuver?

    Combined arms and maneuver are predicated on the ability to rapidly concentrate enormous fighting power and attack with great violence at narrow points. This is probably impossible given the density of Russian surveillance, firepower, and the many obstacles they have put up to deny Ukrainian freedom of movement and scleroticize their activity. The main examples of maneuver in recent western memory – the campaigns in Iraq – have only tenuous relevance to circumstances in Zaporizhia.

    Ultimately, we have returned to a war of mass – particularly massed ISR assets and fires. The only way Ukraine can maneuver the way they want is to break open the front, and they can only do this with more of everything – more mine clearing equipment, more shells and tubes, more rocketry, more armor. Only mass can crack open a suitable breach in the Russian lines. Otherwise, they are stuck in a positional creep through the dense Russian defenses, and criticizing them for being unable to grasp some sort of magical western notion of โ€œcombined armsโ€ is the strangest sort of finger pointing.

    So, whence goes the war from here? Well, the obvious question to ask is whether we believe Ukraine will ever have a more potent assault package than the one they started the summer with. The answer clearly seems to be no. It was like pulling teeth to scrape together these understrength brigades – the idea that, following on a defeat in the Battle of Zaporizhia, NATO will somehow put together a more powerful package seems like a stretch. More to the point, we have American officials saying fairly explicitly that this was the best mechanized package Ukraine was going to get.

    It does not seem controversial to say that this was Ukraineโ€™s best shot at some sort of genuine operational victory, which at this point seems to be slowly trickling away into modest but materially costly tactical advances. The ultimate implication of this is that Ukraine is unable to escape a war of industrial attrition, which is precisely the sort of war that it cannot win, due to all the asymmetries that we mentioned earlier.

    In particular, however, Ukraine cannot win a positional-attritional war because of its own maximalist definition of โ€œwinning.โ€ Since Kiev has insisted that it will not give up until it returns its 1991 borders, an inability to dislodge Russian forces poses a particularly nasty problem – Kiev will either need to admit defeat and acknowledge Russian control over the annexed areas, or it will continue to fight obstinately until it is a failed state with nothing left in the tank.

    Trapped in a bat fight, with attempts to unlock the front with maneuver coming to naught, what Ukraine needs most is a much bigger bat. The alternative is a totalizing strategic disaster [end]

    The original article

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  • [Sharing] Ukrainian Counteroffensiveโ€™s Second Week Ends in Failure – Scott Ritter

    Operation enters the second week of Ukraineโ€™s long-awaited and highly touted counteroffensive, some basic conclusions can be drawn even though the fighting continues, and will continue to rage, for some time to come.

    First and foremost, the counteroffensive gambit has failed. While there is still considerable combat strength left in the Ukrainian military, including more than 75% of the NATO-trained and -equipped 60,000-strong cohort Ukraine had assembled in the past eight months, fundamentally flawed assumptions about the quality of the force on which Ukraine and its NATO allies had placed their collective hopes for victory over Russia have been exposed. In short, Ukraine lacks the military capacity to overcome Russian defenses.

    Ukraineโ€™s most elite assault brigades, equipped with the latest Western military technology, failed to advance out of what Russian defensive doctrine calls the โ€œcoverโ€ line of defenseโ€”the buffer that is designed to channel and disrupt an attacking force prior to reaching the โ€œmainโ€ line of defense. Ukrainian casualties were extremely heavy, with Russia achieving a 10:1 kill ratio in terms of manpower, which is unsustainable from the Ukrainian perspective. The reasons for the Ukrainian failure are fundamental in nature, meaning that they cannot be overcome as things currently stand and, as such, the Ukrainian military has zero chance of success, no matter how hard they press subsequent attacks.

    First and foremost is the quality of the Russian defenses, especially in terms of the barrier network (minefields, obstacles, and trenches) which, when combined with the tenacity of the Russian defender and the overwhelming superiority Russia enjoys in terms of fire support (both artillery and air-delivered), is the reason the Ukrainians are unable to advance beyond the โ€œcoverโ€ layer of the Russian defenses. Ukrainian equipment and tactics are insufficient to the task of breaching the Russian obstacle barriers in any meaningful manner, dooming the attacking forces to be destroyed piecemeal by Russian artillery and air strikes, as well as local counterattacks mounted by Russian special forces.

    Besides the poor tactics and equipment deficiencies (yes, the Leopard tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles were not the miracle weapons Ukraine and its Western supporters had hyped them up to be), the Ukrainians are paying the price for Russiaโ€™s impressive suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) campaign that has been ongoing for many weeks now. Russia has not only neutralized Ukraineโ€™s ability to defend strategic targets far beyond the front lines, but also to project any meaningful air defense capability into the actual zone of conflict. This, combined with the lack of any viable air force, leaves the attacking Ukrainian ground forces exposed to the full weight of Russian air power.

    Russian fixed-wing aircraft have been able to deliver precision-guided munitions with deadly effect to the assembly areas used by Ukraine to gather their attacking forces prior to committing them to the battlefield. It is estimated that between 25-30% of Ukraineโ€™s casualties occur from these strikes. Russian helicopters can use their anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) with lethal effect on Ukrainian forces operating in the zone of contact, and Russian loitering munitions (i.e., โ€œkamikaze dronesโ€) have taken a heavy toll of Ukrainian forces as well. Unless Ukraine can reassert some semblance of air defense onto the battlefield, both in the rear areas as well as the frontlines, and sortie its own air power capable of challenging Russian air superiority over the battlefield, then no amount of courage and tactical innovation on the part of the Ukrainian ground forces will alter the deadly calculus of war that currently prevails today.

    One of the many tragedies of the ongoing Ukrainian-Russian conflict is the fact that much of what Ukraine does on the battlefield is dictated not by military necessity, but rather political imperative. The recently concluded months-long Battle for Artemovsk (Bakhmut) is a case in point, where Ukrainian President Zelensky insisted on pouring manpower and equipment into a battle for a town that most military experts believed to hold minimal strategic military value. The geography, however, did not dictate the scope and scale of the battle, but rather the perception of Ukrainian defensive tenacity, and as a result between 60-75.000 Ukrainian soldiers lost their lives in what was a losing effort. Similarly, the Ukrainian army is being asked to make what amounts to a suicide attack against well-prepared Russian defenses under conditions which, as detailed earlier, can only result in a decisive Ukrainian defeat. This time, the culprit is Ukraineโ€™s NATO allies who, on the eve of their annual summit, are desperate for any sign that the multi-billion-dollar investment they have collectively made in the Ukrainian military can pay even the most rudimentary dividends. For this reason, NATO will continue to pressure Ukraine to double down on defeat, pressing the Russians offensively even though any gains, if in fact any can be had, would be pyrrhic in nature and unsustainable over the long run.

    The reality is that when NATO gathers in Vilnius on July 11, the Russians will be well into the process of destroying the third Ukrainian army built by NATO. The first was assembled during the buffer provided by the diplomatic โ€œshamโ€ of the Minsk Accords, from 2015-2022. Some 260,000 strong, this force was largely destroyed by June of 2022. The second army, consisting of some 80,000 newly trained and equipped Ukrainian soldiers backed by thousands of foreign mercenaries, the direct result of tens of billions of dollars of military aid provided by NATO, was able to launch the successful Ukrainian counterattack in the fall of 2022, before being decimated in the positional war that followed (including the Bakhmut slaughter).

    The 60,000-strong 12-brigade Ukrainian counterattack force currently operating against the Russians, again the result of tens of billions of dollars in military equipment (including modern Western tanks, artillery, and infantry fighting vehicles), will most probably be destroyed, or facing imminent destruction, by the time the NATO summit convenes. The primary question facing NATO is does it have the political, economic, and military capacity to raise a fourth Ukrainian army, and after its demise, a fifth, sixth, and more?

    NATO is politically committed to waging a proxy conflict with Russia โ€œto the last Ukrainian.โ€ This tragic reality means that, regardless of the battlefield reality that exists in Ukraine, NATO will continue to push Ukraine to sacrifice its manpower in a fruitless struggle against Russia for the simple fact that NATO is unwilling to willingly lose political face at home and abroad.

    However, this political will does not automatically mean that NATO will be able to sustain this objective either economically or militarily.

    While recent statements made by US General Mark Miley, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, indicate that there are tens of thousands of Ukrainian soldiers in the US/NATO training โ€œpipelineโ€, and that the US/NATO is assembling equipment sufficient to equip these soldiers, they will not be ready for combat for several months yetโ€”long after the third Ukrainian army has met its fate on the field of battle.

    Miley spoke of new air defense systems for Ukraine, and other NATO officials speak of the possibility of providing Ukraine with (old) F-16 aircraft. New air defense systems, however, cannot in and of themselves alter a military reality imposed by Russia on Ukraine through its strategic SEAD victory. Ukraine will simply continue a losing struggle against Russian air power. The same holds true of any F-16 fighters that might be provided to Ukraineโ€”too little, too late, and in any event incapable of achieving a meaningful battlefield result.

    In Vilnius, NATO will be confronted with the reality of its impotency as a military alliance when it comes to countering Russia in Ukraine. Any military analyst of any competence will know that, as things currently stand, Ukraine simply cannot prevail over Russia. NATO illusions of a โ€œfrozen conflictโ€ that seem to drive their insane desire to arm Ukraine to infinity and beyond, moreover, are driven by fundamentally flawed assessments regarding Russian economic competence and capacity, Russian military proficiency, and the will of the Russian people to sustain this conflict.

    Here is the root cause of NATOโ€™s strategic failure in Ukraineโ€”a complete lack of understanding about the reality of Russia today. Russia will be able to out-produce NATO from a standpoint of military technology until which time NATO nations fully transition into a wartime economy, something NATO nations neither have the political will nor economic means to accomplish.

    The Russian military has largely overcome the deficiencies which plagued it in the initial phases of the Special Military Operation, and the Russia armed forces assemble in the Special Military Operation zone are highly trained, well-equipped, and properly trained for the tasks they have been assigned. Moreover, the Russian nation has rallied around the leadership of Russian President Vladimir Putin in an overwhelming fashion, united in the belief that the proxy war NATO is waging against Russia in Ukraine is existential in nature and, as such, one that Russia cannot lose.

    NATO will not alter course in the immediate period following the Vilnius summitโ€”there is simply too much political momentum in place to bring about any meaningful alteration of the current trajectory in Ukraine. But neither will NATO produce a winning formula in Ukraine. Rather, NATO will continue to pursue little more than a variation of an existing themeโ€”to arm Ukraine so that it can fight as long as it is capable of sustaining the fight.

    This short-sighted posture will result in the inevitable military collapse of Ukraine, probably sometime between late summer/early fall of this year. When this happens, NATO will be left scrambling to construct some sort of face-saving mechanism to salvage its weakened geopolitical position vis-ร -vis Russia. What that will look like is unknown at this time. But one thing is for certainโ€”because NATO refuses to consider an off-ramp from the Ukrainian conflict today, there will be no future for Ukraine tomorrow. NATO political pride will be the downfall and destruction of the Ukrainian nation, its military, and its people [end]

    The original article

    61-year-old Scott Ritter is a former intelligence officer within the US Marine Corps (USMC), then inspector of the United Nations in Iraq. When in 2003, the US and their British minions were about to invade the country under this false pretext, Ritter was claiming that there was no weapon of mass destruction (WMD) there. He was right.

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  • [Sharing] The Battle of Bakhmut: Postmortem – Big Serge

    Russo-Ukrainian War Update

    On May 20th, PMC Wagner forced Ukrainian troops out of their last remaining position within the city limits of Bakhmut, consequentially bringing about the nominal end of the largest battle of the 21st century (so far). Bakhmut has been the most substantial locus of military operations in Ukraine for most of the past nine months. Combat there took on a frustrating tempo, with progress often measured in single city blocks. This was a battle that was extremely violent and bloody, but at times agonizingly slow and seemingly indecisive. After countless updates in which nothing of note seemed to have happen, many people were surely beginning to roll their eyes at the very mention of Bakhmut. Consequentially, the abrupt capture of the city by Wagner in May (rather predictably, the final 25% of the city fell very quickly relative to the rest) seemed a bit surreal. To many it likely seemed that Bakhmut would never end – and then, suddenly, it did.

    Bakhmut, like most high-intensity urban battles, exemplifies the apocalyptic potential of modern combat. Intense bombardment reduced large portions of the city to rubble, lending the impression that Wagner and the AFU were not so much fighting over the city as its carcass.

    The slow pace and extreme destruction has made this battle a rather difficult one to parse out. It all seems so senseless – even within the unique paradigm of war-making. In the absence of an obvious operational logic, observers on both sides have been eager to construct theories of how the battle was actually a brilliant example of four-dimensional chess. In particular, you can easily find arguments from both pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian commentators claiming that Bakhmut was used as a trap to draw in the other sideโ€™s manpower and material for destruction, while buying time to accumulate fighting power

    Pro-Ukrainian sources are adamant that a huge amount of Russian combat power was destroyed in Bakhmut, while the AFU received western armor and training to build out a mechanized package to go back on the offensive. Pro-Russian writers similarly seem convinced that the AFU burned a huge amount of manpower, while the Russian army preserved its strength by letting Wagner do most of the fighting.

    Clearly, they cannot both be correct.

    In this article, I would like to take a holistic survey of the Battle of Bakhmut and adjudicate the evidence. Which army was really destroyed in this โ€œstrategically insignificantโ€ city? Which army was being profligately wasteful of its manpower? And most importantly – why did this middling city become the site of the largest battle of the century? Homicide was committed, but nobody can agree on who murdered whom. So, let us conduct an autopsy.

    The Road to the Death Pit

    The Battle of Bakhmut lasted for so long that it can be easy to forget how the front ended up there, and how Bakhmut fits into the operations in the summer of 2022. Russian operations in the summer were focused on the reduction of the Ukrainian salient around Lysychansk and Severodonetsk, and came to a climactic head when Russian forces broke open the heavy defended Ukrainian stronghold of Popasna, encircled a pocket of Ukrainian forces around Zolote, and approached the Bakhmut-Lysychansk highway. The actual fall of the Lysychansk-Severodonetsk urban agglomeration came relatively quickly, with Russian forces threatening to encircle the entire bag and forcing a Ukrainian withdrawal.

    Just for reference, here is what the frontline in the central Donbas looked like on May 1, 2022, courtesy of MilitaryLand

    In this context, Bakhmut already threatened to become a major battleground. It lay at a literal crossroad directly in the center of the Ukrainian salient. As Ukrainian positions in Lysychansk, Popasna, and Svitlodarsk were broken open, the axes of Russian advance converged on Bakhmut.

    Ukrainian forces greatly needed to stabilize the front, and establish a stable blocking position, and there was really nowhere else to do this except at Bakhmut. Between Lysychansk and Bakhmut there are no sufficiently robust urban areas to anchor the defense, and there was absolutely no question of failing to adequately defend Bakhmut, for a few reasons that we can enumerate:

    1. Bakhmut is in the central position in this sector of front, and its loss would both threaten Siversk with envelopment and allow Russian forces to bypass the well fortified and strongly held defenses at Toretsk.
    2. The Russian strategic objective at Slavyansk-Kramatorsk cannot be successfully defended if the Russian army controls both the heights to the east (in the Bakhmut area) and Izyum.

    Bakhmut itself, meanwhile, was a defensible urban area with dominating heights in its rear, multiple routes of supply, good linkages to other sectors of front, and a peripheral belt of smaller urban areas protecting its flanks.

    This set up a rather obvious operational decision for Ukrainian forces. The choice was, all things considered, to either commit reserves to stabilize the front at Bakhmut (a strong and operational vital defensive anchor) or risk letting Russia bypass and sweep away an entire belt of defenses in places like Siversk and Toretsk. Asked to choose between a reasonably good option and an extremely bad option, there was no great controversy in the deciding.

    Falling back from the loss of their eastern defensive belt, Ukraine needed to stabilize the front somewhere, and the only suitable place was Bakhmut – so this is where Ukrainian reserves were sent in force, and the AFU chose to fight. Operational logic, indifferent to those things that normally recommend cities to us as โ€œimportantโ€, decreed that the Styx should flow through Bakhmut.

    Russia came to meet this challenge – bringing as their spearhead a mercenary group, staffed by convicts, wielding shovels, run by a bald caterer. What could go wrong?

    Operational Progression

    Because the general impression of Bakhmut is characterized by urban combat, it can be easy to forget that most of the battle took place outside the city itself, in the exurbs and fields around the urban center. The approach to Bakhmut is cluttered with a ring of smaller villages (places like Klynove, Pokrovsโ€™ke, and Zaitseve) from which the AFU was able to fight a tenacious defense with the support of artillery in the city itself.

    While Russian forces nominally reached the approach to Bakhmut late in June (even before Lysychansk was captured) and the city came under the extremes of shelling range, they did not immediately begin a concerted push to reach it. On August 1, the first assaults on the outer belt of villages began, and the Russian Ministry of Defense stated in its briefings that โ€œbattles for Bakhmutโ€ had begun. This date is the most logical starting date for historiographical purposes, so we may firmly say that the Battle of Bakhmut was fought from August 1, 2022 to May 20, 2023 – a total of 293 days.

    The first two months of the battle saw the Russian capture of most of the settlements east of the T0513 highway south of the city and the T1302 highway to the north, stripping Bakhmut and Soledar of most of their eastern buffer zones and pushing the line of contact right up to the edge of the urban areas proper

    Phase 1: The Outer Belt

    At this point, the frontlines largely froze up for the remainder of the year, before Wagner set the stage for further advances with the capture of the small village of Yakovlivka, to the north of Soledar. This success can be construed as the first domino in a chain of events which led to Ukrainian defeat in Bakhmut.

    Soledar itself serves a unique and critical role in the operational geography of Bakhmut. Laid out in a relatively long and thin strip, Soledar and its suburbs form a continuous urban shield stretching from the T0513 highway (which runs north to Siversk) all the way to the T0504 road (running east to Popasna). This makes Soledar a natural satellite stronghold which defends Bakhmut across nearly ninety degrees of approach. Soledar is also liberally gifted with industrial build, including the salt mine for which it is named, which makes it a relatively friendly place to wage a static defense, full of deep places and strong walls.

    Wagnerโ€™s capture of Yakovlivka on December 16, however, marked the first sign that the defense of Soledar was in trouble. Yakovlikva sits on an elevated position to the northeast of Soledar, and its capture gave Wagner a powerful position atop Soledarโ€™s flank. The Ukrainians recognized this, and Soledar was powerfully reinforced in response to the loss of Yakovlivka and the anticipated oncoming assault. The capture of Bakhmutske on December 27 (a suburb of Soledar directly on its southern approach) set the stage for a successful assault.

    The attack on Soledar ended up being relatively fast and extremely violent, characterized by intense levels of Russian artillery support. The assault began almost immediately after the loss of Bakhmutske on December 27th, and by January 10th Ukraineโ€™s cohesive defense had been shattered. Ukrainian leadership, of course, denied losing the town and wove a story about glorious counterattacks, but even the Institute for the Study of War (a propaganda arm of the US State Department) later admitted that Russia had captured Soledar by January 11th.

    The loss of Soledar, in combination with the early January capture of Klischiivka to the south, put Wagner in a position to begin a partial envelopment of Bakhmut

    Phase 2: Clearing the Flanks

    It was at this point that the discussion shifted towards a potential Russian encirclement of Bakhmut. To be sure, the Russian wings did expand rapidly around the city, placing it in a firebag, but there was never a concerted effort to take the city into a proper encirclement. The Russian advance subsided on the approach to Ivanivske in the south, and over the vital M03 highway in the north.

    A genuine encirclement was probably never in the cards, mainly because of the complication of Chasiv Yar – a strongly held rear area stronghold. To fully encircle Bakhmut, Russian forces would have been forced to choose between two difficult options: either blockade the road from Chasiv Yar to Bakhmut, or flare the envelopment wide enough to take Chasiv Yar into the pocket as well. Either option would have greatly complicated the operation, and so Bakhmut was never genuinely encircled.

    What the Russians did succeed in doing, however, was establish dominant position on the flanks which accrued three significant advantages. First, they were able to direct fire on Bakhmutโ€™s remaining supply lines. Secondly, they were able to pummel Bakhmut itself with intense artillery fire from a variety of axes. Third – and perhaps most importantly – they were able to assault the Bakhmut urban center itself from three different directions. This, in the end, greatly hastened the fall of the city. By April, it was clear that the focus had shifted from expanding the envelopment on the flanks to assaulting Bakhmut itself, and it was reported that Russian regular units had taken custody of the flanks so that Wagner could clear the city

    Phase 3: Flaring the Wings

    Fighting throughout April and early May at last shifted to the struggle in the urban center. AFU units in the city ultimately proved incapable of stopping Wagnerโ€™s advance, largely due to tight Russian fires coordination and the cramped confines of the Ukrainian defense – with Wagner advancing into the city from three axes, the firing grids for Russian artillery became very narrow, and the AFUโ€™s static defense – while bravely contested – was slowly ground down.

    By early May, it was clear that the city would fall soon, with the AFU desperately holding on to the western edge of the city. Attention soon shifted, however, to a Ukrainian counterattack on the flanks.

    This became a rather classic instance of events on the ground being outrun by the narrative. There had been rumors of an impending Ukrainian counterattack circulating for quite some time, advanced by both Ukrainian and Russian sources. Ukrainian channels were predicated on the idea that General Oleksandr Syrskyi (commander of AFU ground forces) had hatched a scheme to draw the Russians into Bakhmut before launching a counterattack on the wings. This idea was seemingly corroborated frantic warnings from Wagner head Yevgeny Prigozhin that the Ukrainians had massed enormous forces in the rear areas behind Bakhmut which would be unleashed to counter-encircle the city.

    In any case, the spring months came and went without any astonishing AFU counterattack, and all manner of material shortages and weather delays were blamed. Then, on May 15, all hell seemed to be breaking loose. The AFU finally attacked, and Prigozhin screeched that the situation on the flanks was approaching the worst case scenario.

    In fact, what happened was rather anticlimactic. The AFU did bring a hefty grouping of units to play, including several of their best and most veteran formations. These included units from:

    • The 56th Brigade
    • The 57th Mechanized Brigade
    • The 67th Mechanized Brigade
    • The 92nd Mechanized Brigade
    • The 3rd Assault Brigade (Azov)
    • The 80th Air Assault Brigade
    • The 5th Assault Brigade

    This sizeable strike package attacked a handful of mediocre Russian Motor Rifle brigades, achieved a bit of initial success, and culminated with heavy losses. Despite Prigozhinโ€™s assertion that the Russian regulars abandoned their posts and left the Russian wings undefended, we later learned that these forces – including mobilized motor rifle units – doggedly defended their positions and only withdrew under orders from above. These withdrawals (distances of a few hundred meters at most) brought the Russian defensive line to strongly held positions along a series of canals and reservoirs, which the AFU was unable to push through.

    Now, this is not to say that Russia did not suffer losses defending against a tenacious Ukrainian attack. The 4th Motor Rifle Brigade, which was largely responsible for the successful defense outside Klishchiivka, was badly chewed up, its commander was killed, and it had to be promptly rotated out. However, the offensive potential of the Ukrainian assault package was exhausted, and there have been no follow on attempts in the past two weeks

    The Final Act: Ukraineโ€™s Counterattack

    In the end, the vaunted Syrskyi plan looked rather lame. The counterattack did successfully unblock a few key roads out of Bakhmut, but it did nothing to prevent Wagner from finalizing the capture of the city, it burned through the combat power of several premier brigades, and on May 20th the last Ukrainian positions in the city were liquidated.

    So. This was a strange battle. An agonizingly slow creep around the flanks of the city, a materializing threat of encirclement, and a sudden concentration of Wagnerโ€™s combat energy in the city itself – all taking place under threats of an enormous counteroffensive by the AFU, which turned out to be ineffective and ephemeral.

    Itโ€™s not obvious, then, how this battle suited the operational logic of either army, nor that anyone would come away fully satisfied. Ukraine obviously lost the battle in nominal terms, but the Russian advance seemed so slow and Bakhmut so strategically random (at least superficially) that Wagnerโ€™s success can be portrayed as a pyrrhic victory. To fully adjudicate the Battle of Bakhmut, we need to contemplate relative losses and expenditure of combat power.

    The Butcherโ€™s Bill

    Estimating combat losses in Ukraine is a difficult task, largely because โ€œofficialโ€ casualty estimates are often patently absurd. This leaves us with a need to fumble for reasonable figures using proxies and ancillary information. One such important source of knowledge is deployments data – we can get a general sense of the burn rate by the scale and frequency of unit allocation. In this particular case, however, we find that unit deployments are somewhat difficult to work with. Letโ€™s parse through this.

    First and foremost, we need to grapple with the incontrovertible fact that a huge share of the Ukrainian military was deployed at Bakhmut at one point or another. The Telegram Channel Grey Zone compiled a list of all the Ukrainian units that were positively identified (usually by social media posts or AFU updates) as being deployed in Bakhmut throughout the nine month battle (that is, they were not there all at once)

    This is an absolutely enormous commitment (37 brigades, 2 regiments, and 18 separate battalions (plus irregular formations like the Georgian Legion) which indicates obviously severe losses (for what itโ€™s worth, the pro-Ukrainian MilitaryLand Deployment Map admits a similarly titanic Ukrainian deployment in Bakhmut). However, this does not really get us close to accurately assessing losses, largely because Ukraineโ€™s Order of Battle (ORBAT) is a bit confused. Ukraine frequently parcels out units below the brigade level (for example, their artillery brigades never deploy as such) and they have a bad habit of unit cannibalization.

    Doing some extremely rough back of the envelop math, minimal scratching off of just the 37 brigades could easily have pushed Ukraine past 25,000 casualties, but there are all manner of shaky assumptions here. First, this assumes that Ukraine withdraws its brigades when they reach combat ineffective loss levels (15% would be a placeholder number here), which isnโ€™t necessarily true – there is precedent for the AFU leaving troops in place to die, especially from lower quality units like Territorial Defense. In fact, an Australian volunteer (interview linked later on) claimed that the 24th mechanized brigade suffered 80% casualties in Bakhmut, so itโ€™s possible that a great many of these brigades were chewed up beyond task ineffectiveness levels (that is, they were not correctly rotated out) but were instead destroyed entirely. A recent article in the New Yorker, for example, interviewed survivors of a battalion that was almost entirely wiped out. In another instance, a retired Marine Colonel said that units at the frontline routinely suffer 70% casualties.

    We can say a few things for certain. First, that Ukraine had an extremely high burn rate which forced it to commit nearly a third of its total ORBAT. Secondly, we know that at least some of these formations were left at the front until they were destroyed. Finally, we can definitively say that pro-Ukrainian accounts are incorrect (or maybe lying) when they say that the defense at Bakhmut was conducted to buy time for Ukraine to build up strength in the rear. We know this first and foremost because Bakhmut insatiably sucked in additional units, and secondly because this burn included a large number of Ukraineโ€™s premier and veteran forces, including fully a dozen assault, airborne, and armored brigades.

    Thereโ€™s another problem with the ORBAT approach to casualties, however, and this concerns Wagner. You see, one of our objectives here is to try to get a sense of the comparative rates of loss, and ORBAT simply isnโ€™t a good way to do this in the particular case of Bakhmut. This is because the battle was mostly fought from the Russian side by the Wagner Group, which is a huge formation with an opaque internal structure.

    Whereas on the Ukrainian side we can enumerate a long list of formations that fought at Bakhmut, on the Russian side we just put the 50,000 strong Wagner Group. Wagner of course has internal sub-formations and rotations, but these are not visible to those of us on the outside, and so we cannot get a sense of Wagnerโ€™s internal ORBAT or force commitment. We understand generally that Wagner has a structure of assault detachments (probably a battalion equivalent), platoons, and squads, but we do not have a sense of where these units are deployed in real time or how quickly they are rotated or burned through. Sadly, when Prigozhin went in front of cameras he brought maps without unit dispositions on them, leaving ORBAT nerds squinting in vain trying to extract useful information. So, lacking good insight into Wagnerโ€™s deployments, we are unable to make an adequate comparison to the bloated Ukrainian ORBAT in Bakhmut.

    There are other ways that we can get at the casualties, however. The Russian dissident (that is, anti-Putin) organization Mediazona tracks Russian losses by tabulating obituaries, death announcements on social media, and official announcements. For the entire period of the Battle of Bakhmut (August 1 – May 20), they counted 6,184 total deaths among PMC personnel, inmates, and airborne forces (these three categories accounting for most of the Russian force in Bakhmut).

    Meanwhile, Prigozhin claimed that Wagner had suffered 20,000 KIA in Bakhmut while inflicting 50,000 KIA on the Ukrainians. Concerning the first number – the context of this claim was an interview in which he was lambasting the Russian Ministry of Defense (as is his habit), and he has an incentive to overstate Wagnerโ€™s losses (since he is trying to play up Wagnerโ€™s sacrifice for the Russian people).

    So, here is where we are at with Wagner losses. We have a โ€œfloorโ€, or absolute minimum of a little over 6,000 KIA (these being positively identified by name) with a significant upward margin of error , and something like a ceiling of 20,000. The number that I have been working with is approximately 17,000 total Wagner KIA in the Bakhmut operation (with a min-max range of 14,000 and 20,000, respectively)

    However, something we need to consider is the composition of these forces. Among the positively identified KIA, convicts outnumber professional PMC operators by about 2.6 to 1 (that is, Wagnerโ€™s dead would be about 73% convicts). According to the Pentagon, however (taken with a large grain of salt), nearly 90% of Wagnerโ€™s losses are convicts. Taking a conservative 75/25 split and rounding the numbers to make them pretty, my estimate is that Wagner lost about 13,000 convicts and 4,000 professional operators. Adding in VDV losses and motorized rifle units fighting on the flanks, and total Russian KIA in Bakhmut are likely on the order of 20-22,000.

    So, what about Ukrainian losses? The major outstanding question remains: who is on the right end of the loss ratios?

    Ukrainian commentators consistently ask us to believe that Russian losses were far worse due to their use of โ€œhuman waveโ€ attacks. There are several reasons why this can be dismissed.

    First, we have to acknowledge that after nine months of combat we have not yet seen a single video showing one of these purported human waves (that is, Wagner convicts attacking in a massed formation). Keeping in mind that Ukraine loves to share footage of embarrassing Russian mistakes, that they have no qualms about sharing gory war porn, and that this is a war being fought with thousands of eyes in the sky in the form of reconnaissance drones, it must strike us as curious that not one of these alleged human wave attacks has yet been caught on camera. When videos are shared purporting to show human waves, they invariably show small groups of 6-8 infantry (we call this a squad, not a human wave).

    However, the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. That being said, the โ€œhuman waveโ€ narrative has been contradicted on multiple occasions. Just for starters, General Syrskyi himself contradicted the human wave narrative and said that Wagnerโ€™s methodology is to push small assault groups forward under intense artillery cover. Witnesses from the front concur. An Australian Army Veteran volunteering in Ukraine gave a very interesting interview in which he downplayed Wagner casualties and instead emphasized that โ€œUkraine is taking way too many casualtiesโ€ – he later adds that the 24th brigade suffered 80% casualties in Bakhmut. He also notes that Wagner favors infiltration groups and small units – the veritable opposite of massed human waves.

    I found this article from the Wall Street Journal to be nicely emblematic of the human wave issue. It contains the obligatory claim of human wave tactics – โ€œThe enemy pays no attention to huge losses of its personnel and continues the active assault. The approaches to our positions are simply littered with the bodies of the adversaryโ€™s dead soldiers.โ€ This description, however, comes from the bureaucratic apparatus at the Ministry of Defense. What about people on the ground? A Ukrainian officer at the front says: โ€œSo far, the exchange rate of trading our lives for theirs favors the Russians. If this goes on like this, we could run out.โ€

    Ultimately, itโ€™s difficult to believe that the kill ratio favors Ukraine for the simple reason that the Russians have enjoyed a tremendous advantage in firepower. Ukrainian soldiers speak freely about Russiaโ€™s enormous superiority in artillery, and at one point it was suggested that the AFU was outgunned by ten to one. The New Yorkerโ€™s interview subjects claimed that their battalionโ€™s mortar section had a ration of a mere five shells per day!

    The enormous Russian advantage in artillery and standoff weaponry suggests the a-priori assumption that the AFU would be taking horrific casualties, and indeed thatโ€™s what we hear from myriad sources at the front. Then, of course, there was the shocking February claim by a former US Marine in Bakhmut that the life expectancy at the front line was a mere four hours.

    All of this is really ancillary to the larger point. The enormous inventory of AFU units that were churned through Bakhmut included something on the order of 160,000 total personnel. Taking loss rates of between 25 and 30% (roughly on par with Wagnerโ€™s burn rate), itโ€™s clear that Ukraineโ€™s losses were extreme. I believe total irretrievable losses for Ukraine in Bakhmut were approximately 45,000, with some +/- 7,000 margin of error.

    So, my current working estimates for losses in the Battle of Bakhmut are some 45,000 for Ukraine, 17,0000 for Wagner, and 5,000 for other Russian forces.

    But perhaps even this misses the point.

    Ukraine was losing its army, Russia was losing its prison population.

    Adjudicating the Battle of Bakhmut is relatively easy when one looks at what units were brought to the table. Bakhmut burned through an enormous portion of the AFUโ€™s inventory, including many of its veteran assault brigades, while virtually none of Russiaโ€™s conventional forces were damaged (with the notable exception of the Motor Rifle brigades that defeated the Ukrainian counterattack). Even the Pentagon has admitted that the vast majority of Russian casualties in Ukraine were convicts.

    Now, this is all rather cynical – nobody can deny it. But from the unsentimental calculus of strategic logic, Russia churned through its single most disposable military asset, leaving its regular ORBAT not only completely intact, but actually larger than it was last year.

    Meanwhile, Ukraine was left with virtually no indigenous offensive power – the only way it can conduct offensive operations is with a mechanized package built from scratch by NATO. For all Ukraineโ€™s bluster, the force commitment at Bakhmut left it unable to undertake any proactive operations all through the winter and spring, its multi-brigade counterattack at Bakhmut lamely fizzled out, and it left its supporters grasping at straws about an immanent counteroffensive to encircle Wagner by a reserve army that doesnโ€™t exist. It was even reduced to sending small flying columns into Belgorod Oblast to launch terror raids, only to have them blown up – discovering that the Russian border is in fact crawling with forces of the very much intact Russian army.


    I think that ultimately, neither army anticipated that Bakhmut would become the focal point of such high intensity combat, but the arrival of Ukrainian reserves in force created a unique situation. Russia was beginning a process of major force generation (with mobilization beginning in September), and the gridlocked, slow moving, Verdun-like environs of Bakhmut offered a good place for Wagner to bear the combat load while much of the regular Russian forces underwent expansion and refitting.

    Ukraine, meanwhile, fell into the sunk cost fallacy and began to believe its own propaganda about โ€œFortress Bakhmutโ€, and allowed brigade after brigade to be sucked in, turning the city and its environs into a killing zone.

    Now that Bakhmut is lost (or as Zelensky put it, exists โ€œonly in our heartsโ€), Ukraine faces an operational impasse. Bakhmut was after all a very good place to fight a static defense. If the AFU could not hold it, or even produce a favorable loss exchange, can a strategy of holding static fortified belts really be deemed viable? Meanwhile, the failure of the Syrskyi plan and the defeat of a multi-brigade counterattack by Russian motor rifle brigades casts serious doubt on Ukraineโ€™s ability to advance on strongly held Russian positions.

    Ultimately, both Ukraine and Russia traded for time in Bakhmut, but whereas Russia put up a PMC which primarily lost convicts, Ukraine bought time by chewing up a significant amount of its combat power. They bought time – but time to do what? Can Ukraine do anything that will be worth the lives it spent in Bakhmut, or was it all just blood for the blood god? [end]

    The original article

    Related

    Countdown of the Atlanticist defeat in Bakhmut

    a so predictable chronicle

    The Atlanticist counter-offensive

    the last NATO attempt to avoid defeat in its proxy war in Ukraine against Russia

  • The Atlanticist “counter-offensive”

    the last NATO attempt to avoid defeat in its proxy war in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia

    • Preamble

    The countdown of the Atlanticist defeat in Bakhmut

    • May 12, 2023

    The fighting is going on in Bakhmut and in the evening, Yevgeny Prigozhin, head of Wagner private military company (PMC), states that the Atlanticist forces are controlling less than two square km

    (RYBAR)
    • May 13, 2023

    In Khmelnytskyi, western Ukraine, about 325 km southwest of Kiev, Russian cruise missiles or/and drones destroy an ammunition depot. Secondary explosions and blaze are tremendous. At 4:52 am, local time, the European Mediterranean Seismological Centre (EMSC) records 3.4 magnitude shocks northwest of the city

    When will we finally stop putting all the eggs in one basket ?

    comments Yuri Kasyanov, a former Ukrainian official. The targeted facility was concealing a huge amount of ammunition and high-tech military equipment from NATO countries.

    • May 14, 2023

    The day after the raid, the firefighters are still using robots to extinguish the destroyed ammunition depot

    The European radioactivity monitoring is clearly showing a rise of gamma dose rate in Khmelnytskyi since May 12

    If Russia had used nuclear ammunition, the radiation would have started rising on May 13, not on May 12. Ukrainian journalist and member of Svoboda [liberty], a Nazi political party, Ihor Mosiychuk sounds the alarm, advises to take children away from the epicenters of the explosions.

    A dirty bomb is combining radioactive material with conventional explosive, in order to disperse the former. Through the stockpile in Khmelnytskyi of the British depleted uranium (DU) armor piercing (DUAP) shells, Ukraine has likely and unintentionally made its own dirty bomb

    • May 16, 2022

    In the previous night, Russia conducted a raid in Kiev, where the US had delivered a Patriot air defense system, which launched at least 20 SAMs (surface-to-air missiles), as shown in Ukrainian CCTV footage. Each SAM is costing โ‚ฌ5,275,000, for a โ‚ฌ105,500,000 total. But at the end, a Russian Kinzhal [dagger] hypersonic missile demilitarized the US air defense system, which is costing $1.1 billion

    In the morning, some US SAMs are found in Kiev. This one has not hit a building

    • May 17, 2023

    The Russian defense ministry details that the raid in Kiev the day before has managed to destroy one radar station and five SAMs launchers. Over a month, the shares of Raytheon Technologies Coporation, the manufacturer, have lost 7%.

    • May 20, 2023

    Wo sind die Panzer ?

    Except some armored personnel carriers (APCs), mostly destroyed or seized, no other Western armored vehicles, no Panzekampfwagen, have been involved so far on the battlefield. At 3:50 pm, local time, one year after another liberation, the surrender in Mariupol of Nazi Azov regiment, Yevgeny Prigozhin announces that the Russian forces have achieved a complete victory in Bakhmut, Donetsk Peopleโ€™s Republic, Donbass, Russia. No Atlanticist fighter remains alive in the city

    I do not think that a few dozen Western tanks would turn the tide in Donbass or Ukraine. But the spectacle of their combustion may have a larger psychological and political impact than their military influence. That is the reason why failing a real counter-offensive so far, they have not been involved. Because the way the Atlanticist forces have been bled since August 2022, in the trap of Bakhmut meat grinder, may have ruined the opportunities for such a counter-offensive.

    • May 22, 2023

    In order to ward off the psychological impact of the humiliating defeat in Bakhmut two days earlier, Ukraine is raiding border villages in Russia. A few motorized/mechanized platoons are involved. Noise and panic are the goals. Fake alarming messages are simultaneously addressed to the Russian citizens through social networks. That is a psychological operation (PSYOP).

    The targets are in Grayvoron district, Belgorod region

    about 80 km northwest of Kharkov

    The assaillants are members of Svoboda Rossii [Freedom of Russia] and the Russian Volunteer Corps (Russkiy dobrovolโ€™cheskiy korpus, RDK), a bunch of Nazi defectors, who have deserted recently or settled in Ukraine for years, are usually working for the psychological department of the Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR), which confirms the operation as its own

    Their vehicles are mostly US, MaxxPros and Humvees

    As usual after enough noise, the assailants are endeavoring to avoid direct confrontation with the Russian forces (border guards, FSB, national guard, army) and to retreat to Ukraine.

    • May 23, 2023

    In the morning, the Russian defense ministry claims scores of dead militants in Belgorod region, releases a video which is showing air strikes

    Journalists share other documents, which are disclosing enemy corpses, destroyed Humvees and one of the seized MaxxPros

    More than half of the assailants may have been killed. That is a carnage for a psychological operation, that Kiev does not comment further. Ukraine has usually no problem with the sacrifice of fighters. As usual, the commando may have let numerous mines behind

    Meanwhile, Volodymyr Zelenskyy visits the armed forces in the area of Ugledar and Maryinka, still occupied part of Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR), where Kiev is reinforcing its positions but the Russian army is still advancing.

    • May 24, 2023

    Four days after the Ukrainian defeat in Bakhmut, the Russian navy manages to destroy three unmanned surface vessels (USVs) and their explosive payloads, which race toward a military ship

    The attack occurs about 140 km northeast of Bosphorus. Where the drones operate from ? Probably not Bulgaria nor Turkey, rather another ship. Ukraine is unable to carry out such operation alone, has at least received air intelligence from abroad. Once more, NATO attacks Russia through the Black sea grain initiative corridor

    The victorious ship is Ivan Khurs, a signals intelligence (SIGINT) vessel, Yury Ivanov-class, which is ensuring the security of the Turkish Stream and Blue Stream gas pipelines in the exclusive economic zone of Turkey

    Ivan Khurs transits Bosphorus on August 30, 2021 (Yรถrรผk IลŸฤฑk)

    These Ukrainian USVs are already known, are boarding some Canadian-made navigation modules

    Russia already blamed United Kingdom for its involvement when on October 29, 2022, nine drones and seven torpedoes attacked Sevastopol harbor, Crimea, were destroyed before reaching the base of the Russian Black sea fleet.

    Meanwhile, the Ukrainian defense minister, Oleksii Reznikov shares on Twitter a photo that his UK counterpart, Ben Wallace, has dedicated

    A Su-24 tactical bomber is carrying a British Storm Shadow cruise missile. The postcard is also identifying the 7th tactical aviation brigade, which is based in Starokonstantinov. A gift to the Russian intelligence.

    • May 25, 2023

    The video surfaces on Ukrainian social networks. The dialogue between the protagonists is explaining what has happened a few second before : a company leader, who was disagreeing, has shot his battalion commander, who was endeavoring to send his men to the slaughter

    The incident may not be the first one. The context is harsh for the Ukrainian cannon fodder of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine. Many amateur videos have already shown that men who have escaped mobilization, are abducted in the streets or even at home, in order to replenish the ranks. Excluding Wagner losses in Bakhmut, the Ukrainian military casualties are likely ten times the Russian ones. Women are demonstrating in the cities for news about their alleged missing relatives.

    War is a simple art, all execution

    said Corsican general Napoleone Buonaparte. Through their support, NATO countries are depleting their own stocks, but with more guns and more ammunition, the Russian fire power is far higher. Moreover, airstrikes and missiles are targeting the Atlanticist forces in the deep of the Ukrainian territory. The current Ukrainian military fatalities may be over 250,000.

    • May 26, 2023

    Despite the claims of the Ukrainian propaganda and its lackeys in the West, victorious Ivan Khurs docks without damage in Sevastopol

    • May 27, 2023

    For several days, the Atlanticist forces are shelling with US rockets and British Storm Shadow cruise missiles in the deep of the Russian territory. The strikes are spread along and around a line from Vasilyevka, on the left bank of Dnieper river, to Berdyansk, on the Black Sea, about 140 km to southeast, also in Zaporojie region. If successful, an offensive along the same axis may isolate Crimea from mainland Russia

    • May 28, 2023

    The situation is improving in Ukraine. Three days ago, a company leader shot a battalion commander, in an amateur video which was the first evidence of a mutiny. Today, another document is showing that young people have beaten a recruitment sergeant and enabled the escape of who would have been sent to the meat grinder

    For about a year, we have seen the evidences of recruits violent abductions in Ukraine. I was wondering how long it would last before the first cases of legitimate and collective rebellion.

    • May 29, 2022

    Russia is conducting a new wave of strategic strikes all over Ukraine, aimed at military targets on airfields. In Starokonstantinov for example, about 250 km southwest of Kiev, a stock of British Storm Shadow cruise missiles is hit, as well as planes supposed to launch them, thanks to Oleksii Reznikov (cf. supra, May 24). In the capital, people are seeking refuge in the subway

    The actual threat is not Russian. The Atlanticist air defense is launching volleys of US SAMs, which are later raining on the city

    President of Ukraine in June, after the right-wing coup in Kiev, late February 2014, Petro Poroshenko disowned and threatened the people who were demanding autonomy in Russian-speaking Donbass

    our children will go to schools and kindergartens, their children will sit in basements. Because they can do nothing. This is how we will win this war

    That was the beginning of the Ukrainian terrorism. History is cruel and today, Poroshenko is sitting in a cellar

    The raid is a success because Kyrylo Budanov is angry. The head of the GUR threatens to make Russia pay, what may mean new terrorist operations

    • May 30, 2023

    As retaliation for the successful strikes of military facilities the day before, Ukraine targets Moscow with drones. Three ones are jammed, the air defense shoots five others down, according to the Russian authorities, all fall in western suburb. Three ones hit however residential buildings but fortunately, nobody is injured

    • June 1, 2023

    In the vein of the whole British press, the Guardian publishes a complacent article about the training of new recruits who west of Bakhmut, have replaced the severe losses in the 3rd Ukrainian assault brigade, which was formed in November 2022, with the depot of Azov regiment, a Nazi formation within the Ukrainian national guard

    Like ourselves, the subjects are waiting for the Atlanticist counter-offensive. They are aspiring to seize back the city.

    A few days before, Yevgeny Prigozhin detailed the human cost of the first leg. Wagner lost 20,000 fighters killed in action. Ukraine consumed 31 brigades. The Atlanticist military fatalities were 55,000, including 6,500 foreigners. And the Russians were the assailants.

    • June 2, 2023

    Due to the greater Russian firepower, strategic strikes on lines of communication and ammunition depots, a Ukrainian strategy focused on politics and propaganda, huge Atlanticist losses, the sacrifice of dozens brigades in Bakhmut, Ukraine appears unable to conduct a successful counteroffensive, despite the depletion among its Western sponsors of their military resources

    Rather than drawing the political conclusions, but as a result of the incitement from NATO and its free-trade area, the European Union, historical hotbed of Nazism, Ukraine is relying once more on terrorism. For about a week, after a PSYOP (cf. supra, May 22) in the same Belgorod region, the Atlanticist artillery is heavily shelling civilian areas at the border. The same terrorist strategy is enforced in Donbass for nine years, was one of the reasons for the Russian special military operation.

    • June 3, 2023

    Ihor Zhovkva is deputy head of the presidency office. In an interview for the Times, amid usual Ukrainian lies for a complacent press, he states

    if you want to start a successful counter-offensive you need everything at your disposal, including artillery, armoured vehicles and tanks, so probably we donโ€™t have enough

    That confirms that the Russian strategic strikes on ammunition depots are efficient, are exempting the Ukrainian cannon fodder from a new carnage, because Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his NATO sponsors have no conscience.

    • June 4, 2023

    Maybe the first test of the Russian defenses at the border between Zaporojie region and DNR, about 130 km north of Berdyansk, where an Atlanticist mechanized battalion is attacking throughout the day

    In order to thwart the attack, over a width of 20 km, from Novodaryevka, Zaporojie region, to Neskuchnoye, DNR, the Russian air forces take also action, on the front line and in the deep, against several other battalions in reserve.

    • June 5, 2023

    I think that the counteroffensive will be when and where NATO Panzerkampfwagen will be committed. In a region about 140 km north of Berdyansk, where Ukrainian formations have already tested the Russian defenses the day before, a few Leopard 2 are spotted in Novodonetskoye, a village that the assailants manage to seize, about 80 km southwest of Donetsk

    (RYBAR)

    As expected, the Atlanticist losses are already significant and the first photos of abandoned, likely damaged Western AFVs, surface on social networks. These are French AMX-10 recce vehicles

    (Battle Sailor)

    In the night, the Russian defense ministry counts 137 enemy armored vehicles, including 25 tanks, all destroyed that day in the same region. The Atlanticist forces would have lost eight Leopards and three AMXs.

    • June 6, 2023

    Terrible news, an explosion blows up the dam of the hydroelectric power plant in Novaya Kakhovka, on Dnieper left bank, 80 km upstream of Kherson. The Atlanticist threat of its destruction was already one of the reasons for the Russian retreat from the right bank on November 9, 2022. Here is a map of the predictable flooding

    According to unconfirmed reports, an explosion occurred at 1:30 am, 45 minutes before Russian cruise missiles entered the Ukrainian airspace, in a new wave of strategic strikes on military targets all over Ukraine.

    On October 21, 2022, Russia called on the UN Security Council to prevent Kiev from destroying the dam. The Atlanticist forces have previously shelled the power plant and even Zaporojie nuclear one (ZNPP) in Energodar. Russia was controlling the destroyed facility and the consequences will benefit Ukraine. Russian defenses will be flooded downstream, the drop of the reservoir level will threaten the cooling of ZNPP and water supply in Crimea. The Ukrainian authorities and their Western sponsors are definitely a bunch of maniacs.

    At 8:30 am, Volodymyr Zelenskyy initiates the psychological component of that new terrorist operation, accuses Russia and convenes his defense council. The Ukrainian officials are stating that the flooding would prevent a counteroffensive across the river, have now an excuse for their inability to conduct the promised one, due to their strategic errors. They are adding that the flooding are an ecocide, will attempt that way to revive the Western support, despite their failure. Of course, the European stooges are parroting the Ukrainian propaganda.

    Meanwhile, 300 km to northeast, the Russian forces regain Novodonetskoye, Donetsk People’s Republic, that the Atlanticist forces have seized the day before at a heavy price.

    • June 8, 2023

    On social networks, some members of Azov regiment are bragging

    tonight is the night of the nights

    At 1:30 am, an attack begins south of Orekhov, Zaporojie region, about 100 km southwest of the failure on June 6

    The assault on the front line is synchronized with shelling in Tokmak, 40 km further south, 60 km north of Melitopol, which could be a new goal, in order to isolate Crimea from mainland Russia. The ammunition are US made GMLRS rockets, that HIMARS are launching

    In the evening, the Russian defense ministry releases a splendid video from Orekhov vicinity. An Atlanticist mechanized column is entangled in minefields and shelled, a platoon of Leopards 2 in front, US made M113 behind. At least one Leopard is burning, more seem disabled.

    • June 9, 2023

    At midnight, the Atlanticist attack resumes south of Orekhov. One mechanized battalion is committed, according to journalist Alexander Sladkov. The assailants do not succeed and for the first time, Russian sources are reporting the destruction of several US made Bradley infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs)

    The outcome appears in the afternoon, through a video which has surfaced on social networks. One German made Leopard 2 and several Bradleys are burnt along a trail. The analysis of the whole document shows, in that sole section of the battlefield, the wrecks of 5 Leopards, 6 Bradleys, 3 MaxxPro mine-resistant ambush protected vehicles (MRAP), one French VAB [vรฉhicule de lโ€™avant blindรฉ] armored personnel carrier (APC) and several others

    Based on the work of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, through satellite intelligence, here is a map of the Russian defenses in Zaporojie region

    (Defense Politics Asia)
    • June 10, 2023

    A third time in a row, the Atlanticist forces attack the same positions, south of Orekhov, of the 42nd -Evpatoriyskaya Red Banner- guards motorized division. Minefield, artillery, kamikaze drones and anti tank guided missiles (ATGM) repel the mechanized columns. The offensive is losing steam and that time, the Russian defenders do not even need air support

    On June 7, Olaf Scholz has stated

    we are at war for so many weeks and now, it is important that we take decisive steps forward

    Seid ihr ? But the situation has worsened for the German Panzerkampfwagen, since the battle around Kursk, in July 1943. Nowadays, the Nazis are unable to break the first Russian defense line

    New Bradleys have agglomerated at the site spotted the day before. Such a traffic jam of wrecked armored fighting vehicles is rare in history

    • June 11, 2023

    After the repeated failures, for one week, of their mechanized attacks in the same region and one hundred km southwest, near Orekhov, the Atlanticist forces have displaced once more their focus, are now using Stosstruppen tactics, the infiltration of infantry small formations, south of Velyka Novosyolka, at the border between Zaporojie region and DNR

    They have managed to temporarily seize outposts, villages like Novodonetskoye, Neskuchnoye or Blagodatnoye, where they are however easy targets for the Russian artillery. Propaganda is the goal of these new attacks, in order to raise Ukrainian flags in battered villages.

    NATO also resumes its asymmetric operations. What a propaganda victory if a Russian vessel was sunk in the Black Sea

    But Priazovye, a Vishnya-class SIGINT ship, manages to destroy six more Ukrainian USVs, which are attacking in partnership with one US Global Hawk surveillance drone

    In Strasbourg on September 14, 2022, Ursula von der Leyen, the German president of the European Commission, stated

    Russian military is taking chips from dishwashers and refrigerators to fix their military hardware, because there are no semiconductors anymore. Russiaโ€™s industry is in tatters

    Let us have fun

    • June 12, 2023

    In Donetsk People’s Republic, south of Velyka Novosyolka, the 127th -Red Banner Order of Kutuzov- motorized division is stabilizing the front

    • June 14, 2023

    According to GOP senator Dick Black, Ukraine has lost in one week 7,000 killed in action (KIA), 160 tanks and 360 other armored vehicles

    Ukraineโ€™s offensive hit a steel wall. 7,000 KIA, 160 tanks and 360 armored vehicles destroyed in just one week with trivial gains. It is a pointless bloodbath. Charred Leopard tanks and Bradley vehicles lie everywhere. Telling Ukraine to fight โ€œfor as long as it takesโ€ is inhuman. End this tragic war now

    • June 15, 2023

    An alleged plan of the Ukrainian offensive surfaces on social networks. The operation would have begun on June 4, with a feint south of Velyka Novosyolka, Donetsk People’s Republic. A limited attack indeed occurred there. The breakthrough should have been achieved toward Tokmak on June 6. Kakhovka dam was blown up that day and the attack in Zaporojie region, on June 8, was actually a bloody failure for the spearhead of the Ukrainian armed forces, their Western Panzerkampfwagen. The main goal would have been Berdyansk, in order to isolate Crimea from mainland Russia.

    • June 16, 2023

    The Atlanticist forces are attacking in vain Pyatikhatki, a village 15 km northeast of Vasilyevka, on the left bank of Dnieper river, in Zaporojie region

    The 19th -Red Banner of Labor- motorized division is defending the area, has been reinforced with T-62 tanks, which are used as assault guns

    Along the front line, Russian special forces (SSO) are hunting the Western Panzerhampfwagen with ATGMs, sometimes onboard customized civilian vehicles

    • June 20, 2023

    Kyrylo Budanov speaks about the dam in Novaya Kakhovka, accuses Russia of having destroyed it

    He adds that Russia would have also mined Zaporojie nuclear power plant (ZNPP), in Energodar, when actually, Ukraine has previously shelled both Russian controlled facilities, the hydroelectric power plant and the nuclear one. Russia has even alerted the United Nations to prevent the attacks against both sites. Anyway, the Ukrainian propaganda jumps at the opportunity, in order to trigger fear

    That is the usual strategy of exacerbating the situation. That is how Ukraine has been able to perpetrate false flag war crimes and has destroyed the dam. The head of the Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR) resurfaces and plays that card while the counter-offensive is a bloody failure.

    As usual, some Western mainstream media and among them, the atavistic or else, congenital courtiers in France, are parroting the Ukrainian disinformation

    In my mind, the threat is that the Ukrainian authorities and the Nazi deep State are fanatical enough to attempt to ward off defeat through a deliberate nuclear incident in Energodar. Moreover, I suspect that somehow, some governments of NATO countries may be already hostages of these fanatics.

    • June 22, 2023

    Today is an anniversary. 82 years ago, on June 22, 1941, the European Nazi armies from Bulgaria, Croatia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Romania, Slovakia and Spain attacked Soviet Union

    At 5:00 am, with four British Storm Shadow cruise missiles, the Atlanticist forces conduct a strategic strike on Russian lines of communication between Crimea and Kherson region, in Chongar (45ยฐ59โ€™16.9โ€ณN 34ยฐ33โ€™10.1โ€ณE), about 160 km southeast of the current front line

    where the bridge is damaged

    The weather has improved in Zaporojie region and once more, the Atlanticist forces are striving to advance south of Orekhov, toward Rabotino. Several attacks are carried out at 4:00 am and thereafter during the day, waves of infantry that tanks are supporting. A tragic video surfaces from the Russian side. A Ukrainian BMP infantry fighting vehicle comes from the rear, in order to evacuate a squad of infantrymen under fire. Able-bodied and injured ones get in, but on the way to a safer place, a few hundred meters later, an antitank mine blows up the vehicle.

    Ukraine needs more cannon fodder. Several categories are usually considered for mobilization

    • men between 18 and 60, with military experience,
    • men between 25 and 60, without military experience,
    • men not too much disabled.

    250,000, according to a scrupulous Russian mathematical model, have already been killed since February 24, 2022, more are injured or disabled, other ones are already in the ranks, others have received summons but did not obey, the last were so far more lucky

    The order has been signed on June 19, is now public in Kiev region. Those still civilian and well should all pass under the yoke of the recruitment centers within 10 days.

    • June 23, 2023

    CNN has interviewed two western officials and a senior US military official, who have conceded that the Atlanticist offensive is not meeting expectations on any front. The US and its allies are likely to wait until at least July for a fuller assessment of the results. After the Western Panzerkampfwagen have been bogged down, the assailants are carrying out more dismounted operations, which means waves of cannon fodder. The Blitzkrieg is over. And in this screenshot, south of Velyka Novosyolka, Donetsk People’s Republic, the Russian servicemen are holding the line

    • June 24, 2023

    Yevgeny Prigozhin has freaked out. In his personal feud against the Russian defense minister, Sergey Shoigu, the head of Wagner private military company (PMC) has claimed that the Russian forces were retreating, which is an obvious lie and Ukrainian propaganda, while they are breaking the Atlanticist attacks for three weeks. In the evening of June 23, he has even called for an armed uprising. The judiciary authorities have opened a criminal case against him and the State security agency (FSB) has asked Wagner fighters to arrest him

    In Gustave Flaubertโ€™s novel, the mercenaries wanted money, Prigozhin is seeking power. My opinion is that he is either insane or a player of the Atlanticist hybrid counteroffensive. A joke is trending on social networks

    Objection ! The defendant could not organize an armed rebellion because the defense minister has not provided him with enough ammo !

    I think now that during the battle for Bakhmut, Sergey Shoigu was pretty right. More seriously, the dispute over ammunition supply was then the result of Wagner tactics on the battlefield. The private fighters are attacking with a huge artillery support, are using far more shells than their counterparts. At the scale of the whole Russian special military operation, Wagner was an abyss for ammunition.

    Fomer US intelligence officer within the US Marines Corps (USMC), then United Nations inspector in Iraq, Scott Ritter has written a must-read article. MISE (Money, Ideology, Sex, Ego) is the matrix that the intelligence agencies are using worldwide, in order to recruit agents. Ritter tells us how the oversized ego of Yevegeny Prigozhin may have enabled the Ukrainian and Western intelligence agencies to make him the ultimate and pathetic tool of their hybrid strategy, in order to dismantle Russia.

    The defense ministry is henceforth requiring that all volunteer military formations sign a contract which is subordinating them to the general staff. All have accepted, except Wagner. But that contract is now a prerequisite for the financial and material support from the ministry. Failing that, Prigozhin will be unable to find more glory on the battlefield.

    At about 3:30 am, on June 24, the first fighting breaks out in the vicinity of Rostov, where Prigozhinโ€™s gunmen shoot down a Russian helicopter. But the federal authorities appear weak and no airstrike targets on the highway the column of insurgents, who around 5:00 am, seize control of the administrative buildings in the city, including the headquarters of the southern military command

    (Erik Romanenko / TASS)

    Later, around 7:00 am, the Russian forces manage to destroy two vehicles in the vicinity of Voronej, 600 km north of Rostov, 600 south of Moscow. That is a second column

    After a serious delay, I think, the FSB starts at about 9:00 am searching the headquarters of Wagner in Saint Petersburg. At 10:00 am, at last, Vladimir Putin addresses the country, states that the traitors will be punished and Rostov, pacified

    From Ukraine, Nazi militant Denis Kapustin, commander of the Russian Volunteer Corps (Russkiy dobrovolโ€™cheskiy korpus, RDK), a bunch of Nazi defectors and a combat formation of the Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR), is supporting Prigozhin. The rebels have officially become the vanguard in Russia of the Atlanticist forces.

    From the front line of the proxy war that NATO is waging in Donbass and Ukraine, among many others, servicemen of the 155th naval infantry brigade, Pacific fleet, are expressing their support to Russia and Vladimir Putin

    President of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko is acting as broker between Vladimir Putin and the rebels, who start leaving Rostov after 9:00 pm. The Kremlin states that the charges will be dropped if Prigozhin leaves Russia, that Belarus is ready to host him. In consideration of their military feats, the rank and file will not be sued. Members of Wagner who have refused to participate in the uprising will be allowed to sign a contract with the defense ministry. Prigozhin has miserably failed, but due to his vanity and the stupidity of his followers, 15 Russian service members have died. The rebels have shot down seven aircraft.

    • June 26, 2023

    Three days after the armed rebellion of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s followers, Russian defense minister Sergey Shoigu visits the headquarters of Zapad [west] Group of Forces

    • June 27, 2023

    In the evening, a missile targets a pizzeria in Kramatorsk, Donetsk People’s Republic, about 45 km northwest of the current front line on the western outskirts of Bakhmut. The emergency relief are still working on the site hours later

    Volodymyr Zelenskyy is denouncing a terrorist attack. At first glance, the strike could be a war crime against civilians, but an amateur video on Ukrainian social networks is showing that on the site, several protagonists, one injured, are speaking English. One is bearing a tattoo of the US 3rd Ranger battalion. These victims are foreign fighters

    Canadian private military instructor Alex Gallant writes on Instagram

    Jesus christ… this is where we always ate our dinners. It is nothing even remotely close to a military target

    does not understand why his fellows were the target. In another amateur video amid the rubble in the night, Peter, an affected South African, says

    Look what these bastards are doing to this country. Thereโ€™s soldiers under this rubble all over

    Some victims are unfortunately real civilians. Before midnight, the official provisional toll is 4 dead and 42 injured victims, but I suspect that Ukrainian and foreign military personnel is not counted.

    • June 28, 2023

    In the morning, the Russian defense ministry specifies that the target in Kramatorsk, the day before, was a staff meeting of the 56th motorized brigade. Confirmation, the Ukrainian State security agency (SBU) states that a suspected agent of the Russian military intelligence (GRU) has been arrested in the vicinity of the pizzeria.

    • July 1, 2023

    The Russian strike on June 27, in Kramatorsk, Donetsk People’s Republic, likely an Iskander ballistic missile, has indeed hit a military meeting in a pizzeria. At least two generals, dozens other Ukrainian and foreign service members have been killed. US media confirm so far one death, former marine Ian Tortorici, from California

    • July 4, 2023

    In Zaporojie region, the Russian air defense has managed to shoot down a French-made British Storm Shadow cruise missile

    After their sabotage of Novaya Kakhovka dam (cf supra, June 6, 2023), the Ukrainian authorities have started accusing Russia of having mined Zaporojie nuclear power plant (ZNPP), in Energodar, the most powerful (6,000 MW) one in Europe. That is the usual strategy of exacerbating the situation, while the Atlanticist counteroffensive is a bloody failure. That is how Ukraine has been able to perpetrate other false flag war crimes.

    Facts are not the friends of Ukraine and its allies, said Scott Ritter, former US intelligence officer, on April 4, 2022, after the Ukrainian false flag war crimes in Bucha. The facts are that early August 2022 and several months thereafter, the Atlanticist forces have already shelled the nuclear power plant. Moreover, these attacks have activated the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). International inspectors are now on the site and Rafael Grossi, director of the IAEA, is denying the Ukrainian allegations. For example on June 26, 2023, during an interview for French channel France 24.

    [journalist] Zelensky said that Russia drove vehicles with explosives to the nuclear power plants and mined the cooling ponds. Did you see it ?
    [Rafael Grossi] I would never argue with the President of Ukraine, who I know very very well. I can only say that I was there and did not see it. Our teams are there reporting every day

    The actual threat is that the Ukrainian authorities and the Nazi deep State are fanatical enough to attempt to ward off defeat through a deliberate nuclear incident in Energodar.

    Renat Karchaa is adviser to the general director of Rosenergoatom, which is conducting nuclear power stations operations in Russia. In the evening, he states that according to intelligence, Ukraine will attack ZNPP during the night. Why now ? The next NATO summit will begin in Vilnius on July 11.

    Later, the Ukrainian health ministry releases flyers on the actions to be taken in case of incident and Volodymyr Zelenskyy repeats the same blatant lies

    Now we have information from our intelligence that the Russian troops have placed objects resembling explosives on the roof of several power units of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. Perhaps to simulate an attack on the plant. Perhaps they have some other scenario. But in any case, the world sees โ€“ can’t but see โ€“ that the only source of danger to the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant is Russia and no one else

    • July 7, 2023

    The Western leaders have so far prevented Volodymyr Zelenskyy from triggering a nuclear disaster in Energodar, but like in a deal, US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan announces that the US will deliver cluster munitions to Ukraine. That is a new escalation

    Due to the large spreading area of bomblets, cluster bombs are a threat of collateral damage among civilians. Entered into force on 1 August 2010, the international Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) is forbidding their produce, use or transfer, but China, Russia or the US have not even signed it. 111 countries have ratified it, mostly in Africa and Europe, including France, Germany and the UK.

    • July 12, 2023

    After the bloody failure of the Atlanticist counteroffensive that NATO project management has dictated to the Ukrainian cannon fodder, some Anglo-Saxon mercenaries are fleeing the battlefield, in a Sky News report

    https://youtube.com/watch?v=9J_wBx-FBcc%3Fversion%3D3%26rel%3D1%26showsearch%3D0%26showinfo%3D1%26iv_load_policy%3D1%26fs%3D1%26hl%3Den%26autohide%3D2%26wmode%3Dtransparent

    When the first foreign fighters arrived in March 2022, the word safari was arrogantly spoken. Maybe, but the prey is not Russian. Donbass is not Afghanistan, Iraq or Sahel, a real war is so tough against a real army which is also using artillery.

    • July 17, 2023

    At about 3:00 am, the Atlanticist forces attack and damage Kerch bridge, between Taman peninsula and continental Russia, to southeast, Crimea peninsula, to northwest, which is a major Russian line of communication, for military and civilians, has been completed in June 2020. Two civilian travelers are killed in their car, their daughter is hospitalized

    The weapons are two unmanned surface vessels (USVs), that Ukraine is often using at sea and in amphibious environment (cf. supra, May 24, 2023), may have triggered on June 6 the collapse of Novaya Kakhovka dam (cf. supra). On October 8, 2022, the Atlanticist secret services already detonated on the bridge a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED).

    Once more, the naval drones have been likely launched from a ship which was sailing in the UN-brokered grain corridor for the export from Ukraine of agricultural products. In the afternoon, Russia suspends definitively its participation in the implementation of that agreement

    After examination of the structure, a passengers train crosses the bridge in the afternoon.

    • July 18, 2023

    The Ukrainian propaganda claims that 38 Russian air objects have been destroyed during the night. The statement is pretty right. 24 hours after Atlanticist USVs have targeted Kerch bridge, large volleys of cruise missiles and kamikaze drones have stricken military facilities in Nikolaev and Odessa, including fuel storage, where British operatives are involved in the Ukrainian launches of naval drones. Local witnesses are reporting detonations and blazes on the ground. The targeted facilities are hit and de facto, the successful Russian weapons are also destroyed.

    In the afternoon, due to Russia withdraw the day before from the UN-brokered grain agreement, British Ascot company and other insurers suspend their cover for naval shipments via the Black sea corridor, from Odessa to the Bosphorus.

    • July 19, 2023

    During the night, a new wave of cruise missiles and kamikaze drones, at least as large as the previous one, strikes facilities in Odessa and vicinity

    The Russian defense ministry states in the afternoon

    Due to the termination of the Black Sea Initiative and its humanitarian maritime corridor, from 12 am Moscow time on July 20, 2023, all vessels sailing in the Black Sea to the ports of Ukraine will be regarded as potential carriers of military cargo. Therefore, the countries of such vessels will be considered to be involved in the Ukrainian conflict on the side of the Kiev regime

    As retaliation for the Atlanticist naval attack against Kerch bridge on July 17, Ukraine is now under naval blockade.

    • July 22, 2023

    The Atlanticist forces have started firing the cluster munitions that NATO is now delivering (cf. supra, July 7)

    At about noon, a group of journalists is spotted with drone and shelled in Zaporojie region, far from any military target. Bomblets injure four of them. Rostislav Zhuravlev, RIA Novosti, later dies.

    • July 23, 2023

    As usual, the Atlanticist air defense has managed to shoot down a civilian building, this time in Odessa, while it was attempting at night to intercept Onyx cruise missiles, aimed at military value targets

    As usual, the Ukrainian propaganda is claiming that a Russian projectile would have hit the cathedral of the Saviour Transfiguration. Once again, the weight of the warhead resolves the enigma. With 300 kg of high explosive, an Onyx would have flattened the religious building.

    • July 26, 2023

    In order to protract the myth of a possible success, despite failure for seven weeks and debates through western media on the reasons for that failure, the Pentagon announces that the main thrust has begun. Several attacks have indeed resumed in the morning, in Zaporijie region and Donetsk People’s Republic, but fail once more. The British press is daily more hysterical and in a twilight zone, a tabloid imagines a huge breakthrough south of Bakhmut. The carnage must go on.

    In the evening Russia conducts a major wave of strategic strikes in western Ukraine, where the targets are headquarters and airbases. The Ukrainian State security agency (SBU) is usually arresting the witnesses and the authorities remind the ban on broadcasting of strikes footage. No video surfaces today and Kiev falsely claims that all missiles, more than 30, would have been shot down. We already know through experience that all missiles indeed fell, mostly on their targets.

    • July 28, 2023

    As usual, when the Atlanticist forces are defeated on the battlefield, their deliberate shelling of cities increases, where no troops nor military value facilities are set. That is terrorism. They use today a S-200 long range air defense system as a surface weapon and target downtown Taganrog, in Rostov region, about 280 km southeast of Zaporojie

    The missile falls near the museum. Several victims are injured but fortunately, nobody is killed.

    Later, one Russian Iskander ballistic missile, up to 700 kg of high explosive, flattens the headquarters of the regional counterintelligence (SBU) in Dnieper city. The Russian intelligence may have heard that a meeting is held there

    The Ukrainian propaganda claims that the building was empty, but the hospitals are calling for blood donors.

    • July 30, 2023

    Among daily terrorist attacks against civilians in Donbass, Crimea and other border areas, three Atlanticist drones target Moscow in the night. One is shot down in the suburb, two are jammed and fall in the business district. Nobody is injured.

    • August 3, 2023

    The so-called Defence Intelligence, British, writes

    The predominantly arable land in the combat zone has now been left fallow for 18 months, with the return of weeds and shrubs accelerating under the warm, damp summer conditions. The extra cover helps camouflage Russian defensive positions and makes defensive mine fields harder to clear

    How dare they ?

    • August 4, 2023

    A propaganda victory for NATO, especially UK and Ukraine, when in the night, for the first time after several failures (cf. supra), a USV has managed to damage a Russian warship in the Black Sea. The Olenegorsky Gornyak is a Ropucha-class landing ship, docks for reparation in Novorossiysk, Krasnodar region, continental Russia

    According to the Russian defense ministry, since the beginning early June of their counteroffensive, the Atlanticist forces have lost

    • 43,000 killed fighters, excluding the casualties of strategic strikes in the deep.
    • 26 jets,
    • 9 helicopters.
    • 1,831 armored vehicles, including
    • 25 German Leopard Panzerkampfwagen,
    • 7 French AMX-10 wheeled tanks, actually armored recce vehicles,
    • 21 US Bradley infantry fighting vehicles.
    • 747 artillery pieces and mortars, including
    • 84 NATO self-propelled howitzers,
    • 76 US M777 howitzers.

    As ever, war is a simple art, all execution [Corsican general Napoleone Buonaparte], the Russian forces are well entrenched, are developing a greater fire power, their own losses are far lesser. According to a well known Russian mathematical model, Ukraine, only Ukraine, has lost 245,823 killed in action fighters since February 24, 2022, beginning of the Russian special military operation. Negotiations could have stopped the fighting in March 2022, but the US and UK vetoed peace

    • August 5, 2023

    In the night, a USV has attacked the Sig, a civilian tanker, near Kerch strait. The ship remains afloat, is repaired

    In the afternoon, Russia conducts strategic strikes. An aeronautical factory in Zaporojie and Starokonstantinov military airfield, where Ukrainian jets are taking off with NATO cruise missiles (cf. supra, May 24), are heavily hit

    As retaliation in the evening, the Atlanticist forces attack once more downtown Donetsk, where no troops nor military value facilities are set. Half a dozen NATO 155 mm cluster shells cause blazes in the city. The roof of the University of Economics and Trade is on fire.

    • August 6, 2023

    After midnight, Russia replies to the terrorist shelling of downtown Donetsk with a massive wave of strategic strikes. 40 cruise missiles, 3 Kinzhal hypersonic ones and 27 Geran kamikaze drones hit several military airbases. The Ukrainian authorities release later a set of pictures from Starokonstantinov airbase

    In the afternoon, Volodymyr Zelenskyy visits an undisclosed base, where one French SCALP cruise missile is displayed with an awful heraldry : an Eiffel tower is mating with a Ukrainian trident. SCALP is the French name for Storm Shadow, that UK is shipping to Ukraine since May

    Later, the Atlanticist forces target once more bridges between Kherson region and Crimea peninsula, in Chongar and Genichesk. According to the Russian authorities, the air defense manages to shoot down nine Storm Shadows / SCALPs, but three others damage their targets

    • August 7, 2023

    In Pokrovsk (Krasnoarmeysk until 2016), Ukraine-occupied part of Donetsk People’s Republic, about 75 km northwest of downtown Donetsk, two Iskander ballistic missiles target in the evening a hotel and a restaurant where Atlanticist service members and mercenaries are meeting

    As usual, the Ukrainian officials and journalists are focusing on minor collateral damage in the vicinity, where civilians are injured, are enforcing a gag order about the real target.

    • August 10, 2023

    The first notable territorial change of the Ukrainian counteroffensive is that the Russian forces are threatening Kupyansk, Kharkov region, in the north, while the Atlanticist forces are attacking in vain, in the south, since early June

    In Zaporojie, several Russian cruise missiles strike a former hotel, which is used as barracks for foreign mercenaries. According later to Turkish sources, which are usually supposed to leak information from the Israeli intelligence, 45 foreigners have been killed, including NATO regular soldiers, 70 are injured. The day after, Google will report that Reikartz Zaporojie is temporarily closed.

    • August 12, 2023

    Two successive S-200 missiles target Kerch bridge, the Russian air defense shoots both down. The white smoke may be a defensive screen.

    • August 13, 2023

    Can our super weapon decide the war ?

    Bild is a tabloid for West German rednecks, whose elders have not been enough cracked down for their Nazism during WW2, is dreaming once more about the impact of a new Wunder Vergeltungswaffe [miracle weapon of revenge], after HIMARS, Leopard and Storm Shadow. The German authorities seem undecided about the delivery to Ukraine of Taurus cruise missiles

    That is endless. Bild is a popular expression of the fanaticism among Western leaders. The caprices of hysterical spoiled children, arrogant and insensitive to the carnage and suffering they are spreading, in vain.

    • August 16, 2023

    For the first time, the Atlanticist forces commit US Stryker armored personnel carriers (APCs), which later burn near Rabotino, Zaporojie region. According to Western media, a single Ukrainian formation is equipped with Strykers, the 82nd air assault brigade, which was kept within the strategic reserve. That suggests that the Atlanticist command is about to launch its last fresh troops against the Russian defenses in the south

    Ukrainian chief of staff Valerii Zaluzhnyi (6th from left) attends a technical meeting with US and UK military representatives. Here are Kyrylo Budanov (3rd), head of the Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR), US general Christopher Cavoli (5th), head of the United States European Command (USEC) and UK admiral Anthony Radakin (7th), head of the Defence Staff.

    • August 18, 2023

    Three civilians are killed in Donetsk city, when a ticking time bomblet explodes in a tree above them. As usual, the Atlanticist forces are shelling residential areas, now with cluster munitions (cf. supra, July 7) that the US, maybe other NATO countries, are delivering since July

    Vladimir Putin holds a meeting with the command staff of the special military operation in Rostov.

    • August 19, 2023

    An Atlanticist drone manages to break through the Russian air defense, reaches Soltsy air base, 650 km north of the Ukrainian border, Novgorod region, where one Tu-22M strategic bomber is destroyed

    The retaliation is prompt

    Ukrainian drone manufacturers, representatives of flight schools and military personnel who are using drones on the front line

    are expected in Chernigov theater, about 140 km north of Kiev. For security reasons, the site is disclosed 4 hours before the event

    After the opening, a Russian cruise missile closes the drones fair

    • August 22, 2023

    In Zaporojie region, after 75 days of almost daily attacks from Orekhov to the south, exhaustion of the formations which were supposed to breakthrough, involvement of the 82nd air assault brigade from the strategic reserve, the Atlanticist forces are still in the Russian cover area. They are tackling 15 km south of Orekhov, in Rabotino village, the first of three successive defensive lines, still 80 km from Melitopol, which was their goal in June

    The drittes Reich performed better 80 years ago. Despite their own defeat in July-August 1943, in a similar battle around Kursk, Soviet Union, the German Nazis managed to advance deeper than the Atlanticist forces, today in Zaporojie region.

    • August 23, 2023

    While Ukraine is celebrating the Day of the National Flag, Vladimir Putin attends a ceremony for the 80th anniversary of the Soviet victory at Kursk, the largest tank battle in history, against the Nazi armies.

    The news will go round the world in the evening, a private plane crashes in Tver region, during a flight for Saint Petersburg from Moscow. Ten crew members and passengers die, including Yevgeny Prigozhin and Dmitry Utkin, co-founders of Wagner PMC in 2014, liberators of Bakhmut in May 2023 but leaders of a coup attempt on June 24 (cf. supra)

    According to witnesses and amateur videos, the plane may have been blown up. An investigation begins

    Prigozhin made his last public appearance in a broadcast on August 21 from West Africa, where its former colonies are expelling France.

    • August 27, 2023

    Despite their redoubled efforts for two weeks, heavy casualties and the Ukrainian propaganda, which is claiming that Rabotino has been seized, when the ongoing fighting have already leveled the village (less than 500 inhabitants in peacetime), the Atlanticist forces have not yet managed to break through the first Russian line of defense in Zaporojie region.

    • August 29, 2023

    August 29 is in Ukraine the Day of Remembrance of the Defenders, a tribute to the fallen. Kyivstar is the main mobile network, broadcasts an advert, later erased, which discloses that 400,000 Ukrainian service members have died since February 24, 2022

    In the night, the Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR) and its allies conduct an air raid in Pskov, almost 700 km from Ukraine but close to the Baltic States. Their goal is more psychological than military

    A swarm of drones targets the airport, where at least one Ilyushin 76 airlift plane is destroyed, several others damaged

    • September 1, 2023

    The main phone operator in Ukraine has leaked on August 29 that about 400,000 Atlanticist fighters have been killed since February 24, 2022. The butchers need more cannon fodder. Representatives of Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s party start demanding the extradition of the Ukrainian refugees abroad

    According to German tabloid Bild, 160,000 potential fighters are living in Germany alone.

    • September 3, 2023

    Ukraine needs a new batch of cannon fodder. Henceforth, these illnesses are no more inappropriate for military service at the front line

    • clinically cured tuberculosis,
    • viral hepatitis with minor dysfunction,
    • asymptomatic HIV,
    • chronic diseases of the blood and blood organs,
    • diseases of the endocrine system with minor dysfunctions,
    • mild short-term painful manifestations of mental disorders,
    • neurotic, stress-related and somatoform disorders (phobic, anxiety, adaptive, somatoform and other neurotic disorders, neurasthenia, reactions to severe stress) with moderate, short-term manifestations,
    • slowly progressive diseases of the central nervous system,
    • episodic and paroxysmal disorders

    Except the children of the plutocracy leaders, a broader percentage of males is eligible to die for the US interests in Donbass and Ukraine. In the evening, Volodymyr Zelenskyy announces the dismissal of the defense minister

    I have decided to replace the Minister of Defense of Ukraine. Oleksiy Reznikov has gone through more than 550 days of full-scale war. I believe that the Ministry needs new approaches and other formats of interaction with both the military and society at large. Now Rustem Umerov should lead the Ministry

    Rustem Umerov is a Tatar from Crimea.

    • September 6, 2023

    Here is the satellite view of the battlefield at 47ยฐ27’45.0″N 35ยฐ54’07.0″E, 5 km northeast of Rabotino

    Less than 500 inhabitants in peacetime, the village has been flattened. The Russian forces are holding high grounds in its southern outskirts. 92 days after the beginning of their attacks in Zaporojie region, southward to Tokmak and Melitopol, the Atlanticist forces have not broken through the first of three Russian lines of defense. Rabotino is the bonfire of the Western arrogance.

    While US Secretary of State Antony Blinken is visiting Ukraine, the Atlanticist forces, in order to stimulate the Western support, commit a new false flag war crime, the slaughter of civilians in Konstantinovka, Donetsk Peopleโ€™s Republic

    Blinken and his Ukraininian counterpart Dmitro Kuleba visit a cemetery in Kiev. The counter-offensive is a bloody failure and the whole proxy war is a carnage for the Ukrainian cannon fodder.

    • September 8, 2023

    In the morning, a Russian missile levels the police headquarters in Krivoy Rog, about 160 km west of Zaporojie, when a military meeting is held, likely with NATO representatives. The toll would be almost null, according to the Ukrainian authorities, which are usually hiding the military casualties after Russian strategic strikes. But according to anonymous sources via Turkish media, dozens service members and foreigners are killed. The pets are unhurt

    Today is an anniversary in Russia. 80 years ago, the Red Army drove the Nazi troops out of Stalino, today Donetsk city, completed the liberation of Donbass. The legislative elections begin in the four new Russian region, Kherson, Donetsk, Lugansk and Zaporojie, will end on September 10.

    • September 13, 2023

    In the night, the Atlanticist forces saturate Sevastopol air defense with a volley of ten British Storm Shadow cruise missiles. Seven are shot down but three hit Ordzhonikidze shipyard, where two vessels under repair are damaged

    • September 15, 2023

    A splendid illustration of the Ukrainian propaganda, that most Western media are parroting. The counter-offensive would not be a three-month bloody failure, because the 3rd assault brigade, one of the military formations within Nazi Azov organization, would have liberated Andreevka, about 10 km south of Bakhmut

    Actually, 71 people were living in the hamlet, which does not exist anymore.

    • September 17, 2023

    As usual, despite failure, the various Ukrainian authorities are eager to claim success, in order to protract Western support, but they are lacking coordination. Kleshcheevka is a village (512 inhabitants in peacetime), about 10 km southwest of downtown Bakhmut, Donetsk People’s Republic. In the ambition to seize back the city, the Atlanticist forces are attacking the village for three months.

    On September 14 already, Ukrainian deputy defense minister Hanna Maliar announced the conquest of Kleshcheevka, but while operating in the area, the 3rd assault brigade, branch of Nazi Azov organization within the regular army, denied the gain

    A video surfaces today, is showing Atlanticist fighters with flags, near a church, at the center of the former village, now in ruins. Nice picture, but the Ukrainian staff does not confirm its control. Volodymyr Zelenskyy claims it later, but is always lying. Kleshcheevka is still a battlefield.

    • September 18, 2023

    Ukrainian deputy defense minister Hanna Maliar is sacked

    Arrived in New York for a general assembly of the United Nations, Volodymyr Zelenskyy visits injured Ukrainian servicemen who are undergoing rehabilitation in Staten Island

    • September 20, 2023

    A video surfaces on September 20, 2023, from the Russian military. In Donbass or Ukraine, one Atlanticist squad surrenders. Before their move, the deserters have used a radio frequency, 149.200, that the Russian forces are devoting to the enemy surrender. Volga is the call sign of the Russian contact

    • September 21, 2023

    After midnight, the Atlanticist forces attempt once more to saturate the Russian air defense, which manages to shoot down 19 drones, mostly above Black sea and Crimea. Later, the other way around, 43 cruise missiles, according to the Ukrainian authorities, strike all over Ukraine. In Cherkasy, a garrison of foreign mercenaries is hit

    • September 22, 2023

    In the afternoon, while a NATO Poseidon reconnaissance aircraft is gathering intelligence from the Black sea, off Romania, 300 km from the Russian port, a new strategic and psychological attack targets Sevastopol, a volley of Storm Shadows and likely their French version, SCALPs

    According to the synthesis of several reports, the air defense manages to shoot down 5 cruise missiles. Two others hit the historical, not operational, headquarters of the Black sea fleet, in downtown Sevastopol

    • September 28, 2023

    The New York Times publishes this map, which is showing the change in control, since January 1, in Donbass and Ukraine, while the Atlanticist counter-offensive has begun on June 4

    • October 5, 2023

    At about 1:25 pm, scores of civilians are killed in a cafe and vicinity in Groza [thunderstorm], a village that the Atlanticist forces are controlling in Kharkov region, about 35 km west of Kupyansk, a little further from the front line. The probability that for another reason, a warhead hits precisely a funeral gathering of inhabitants, is null. The civilian target is deliberate

    Despite the Ukrainian criminal records, as examples

    • Kramatork, Donetsk Peopleโ€™s Republic, on April 8, 2022, where a Ukrainian Tochka-U ballistic missile killed dozens civilians at the railway station, after Russian cruise missiles had destroyed military targets at other railway stations in the region, while Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, was visiting Kiev,
    • Konstantinovka, Donetsk Peopleโ€™s Republic, on September 6, 2023, where a strike ravaged the market place, while US State Secretary Antony Blinken was visiting Kiev, when the CCTV footage that Volodymyr Zelenkyy clumsily shared on social networks proved actually that the missile had arrived from the west, was therefore Ukrainian,

    the Western mainstream media and crooked politicians are still parroting the Ukrainian statement, which blames Russia. Jaded, the Russian defense ministry comments laconically that no strategic strike was conducted that day in Kharkov region.

    Zelenskyy is in Spain, is begging the European Union, while the Western military support is shrinking and its US funding is threatened. Once more, Groza inhabitants are Russian-speaking and widely pro-Russia. The Ukrainian nationalists are feeling enough hatred to slaughter them for PR purpose.

    The Ukrainian authorities specify that the weapon would have been one Russian Iskander ballistic missile. Interesting. Many professional photos surface in the afternoon, exhibit the victims, but none is showing the impact point or missile debris. Bastards.

    • October 6, 2023

    The day after, a video is showing the whole site. The building has absorbed the blast, no crater is visible. The strike was extremely precise. Where are the debris of the alleged Iskander ? One Ukrainian official suggests that Russia would have thought that the memorial event was gathering military personnel. Spokesman of the Kremlin, Dmitry Peskov reminds that Russia is not targeting civilians, when a ballistic missile, likely Iskander, indeed strikes a hotel which is hosting foreign mercenaries in Kharkov

    Another document is showing a crater, on the other side of the building. The Ukrainian authorities announce two dead victims, are never disclosing the military fatalities in case of strategic strike.

    • October 10, 2023

    At dawn, Russian artillery and air strikes are pounding the entrenchments in Avdeevka, where the Atlanticist artillery is usually targeting Donetsk civilians, 15 km to southeast. Later, concentric stormings are threatening to encircle the garrison. Video surface, are showing that the Atlanticist fighters are fleeing from the first lines of defense

    • October 17, 2023

    For the first time, the Atlanticist forces use the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), that the US has delivered, a ballistic cluster missile which may carry several hundreds bomblets

    Six missiles, GLSDBs (Ground Launched Small Diameter Bombs) and ATACMS, target the airport in Berdyansk, Zaporojie region, a coastal city which was one goal of the failed Atlanticist counter-offensive. The air defense shoots down three of them. An ammunition depot is hit and several helicopters are damaged.

    • October 21, 2023

    In the evening, Russia strikes a road terminal in Korotich, Kharkov western suburb

    Obviously, the facility was used as a hub for military supply. Previous Western documents have shown how Western armored vehicles are concealed inside heavy-duty trailers. As usual, Volodymyr Zelenskyy is claiming that the attack would be terrorist, against civilians.

    • October 24, 2023

    Former Vostok brigade, former Donetsk People’s Militia 11th regiment, the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle brigade has seized the slag heap of the Coke and Chemical Plant (AKHZ), 5 km northwest of downtown Avdeevka, a major Atlanticist stronghold, 14 km north of downtown Donetsk city.

    • October 31, 2023

    Joe Bidenโ€™s administration and the Ukrainian authorities are unable to bring themselves to officially end their counter-offensive, which is a failure since early June. Rather the opposite, the Russian forces are advancing, are threatening to encircle in Avdeevka, Donetsk Peopleโ€™s Republic, the Ukrainian troops which since 2014, are deliberately shelling civilians in Donetsk city

    Some Atlanticist armored formations have been transferred from the south to Avdeevka area, in an attempt to thwart the Russian advance. In the evening, German tabloid Bild takes us back in time, a leap about 80 years ago.

    • November 3, 2023

    In the night and early morning, during an almost daily wave of Russian strategic strikes all over Ukraine, Geran [geranium] kamikaze drones target in Kharkov a building where foreign mercenaries are garrisoned

    Later, the concentration of cell phone signals enables the Russian military intelligence (GRU) to localize a Ukrainian parade in Zaporojie region. About one hundred artillerymen of the 128th mountain assault brigade are gathered

    The Russian strike kills about 50 service members, including the deputy commander of the brigade.

    • November 7, 2023

    As usual since 2014, in order to retaliate for their military failure, the Atlanticist forces in Ukraine are deliberately shelling civilian targets in downtown Donetsk city. The weapons are US HIMARS and 6 civilians are killed

    The Russian actions are always warfare. In many instances, Atlanticist ones are terrorism. While 2000 km to the south, another US trading post, Israel, is acting in Gaza like the German Nazis, in 1943, in Warsaw ghetto.

    • November 30, 2023

    Still no official end of the Atlanticist counter-offensive, when Russian forces from Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) complete the cleansing of the industrial area, in Avdeevka southeastern suburb.

    • December 12, 2023

    While Volodymyr Zelenskyy is in Washington DC, begging for more support, against the opinion of the US Congress, Russia completes the cleansing of Marinka, where the Atlanticist forces were entrenched since 2014 in Donetsk southwestern suburb

    No one speaks anymore in the West about the conter-offensive. The perspective of Ukrainian defeat has become the issue.

    • Music
  • [Sharing] Russo-Ukrainian War: Leak Biopsy – Big Serge

    A Russian Nesting Doll of Embarrassment

    […] If they [the leaked classified US military intelligence document] are indeed authentic (and it appears that they are), they offer important insight into force generation and combat power in Ukraine – and perhaps even more importantly, into the intelligence framework that the Pentagon is working with. None of the items adduced paint a particularly rosy picture for either the AFU or its benefactors on the Atlantic seaboard […]

    Ukrainian Force Generation

    The most significant implication of the documents is simple: Ukraineโ€™s combat power is significantly degraded, and in particular their mechanized units and artillery forces are in very rough shape.

    The relevant material here in particular is a page entitled โ€œUS Allied & Partner UAF Combat Power Buildโ€, which details the force generation, training, and equipment tranches that will create the mechanized package which Ukraine will use in its spring offensive. The plan calls for a force of twelve nominal brigades, nine of which will be equipped by NATO and three internally generated by the Ukrainians. The leak does not offer insight into the three Ukrainian brigades, but the intended complement of the nine NATO brigades is meticulously listed).

    All told, the combat power build calls for these brigades to field a total of 253 tanks, 381 Infantry Fighting Vehicles, 480 Armored Personnel Carriers, and 147 artillery pieces. This implies that these will be brigades in name only, and will in fact be far understrength. Parceling these systems out across nine brigades will give an average strength of a mere 28 tanks per brigade, along with some 95 IFVs/APCs and 16 artillery tubes. Compare this to a US Army Armored Brigade Combat Team, which would have almost 90 tanks and almost 200 IFVs/APCs. An American Stryker Brigade (a lighter, rapidly deployable formation) would have about 300 Strykers – the Ukrainian 82nd Brigade is listed to receive only 90.

    In combat power terms, therefore, these new brigades are going to be far understrength. Their tank strength, far from being full brigade level, amounts to less than an American armored battalion.

    Another key aspect of the force build document is the training schedules. This document dates from the beginning of March, at which point five of the nine brigades were listed at โ€œTraining 0% Completeโ€. Only one of the brigades was more than halfway trained, rated at 60% complete. Despite this, six out of nine were scheduled to be ready by the end of March and the remainders by the end of April. This can only be achieved with significantly truncated training times, and these are detailed in the document. Leopard tank training, for example, is listed at only six weeks. Just for context, American tankers can pencil in 22 weeks of training for the Abrams […]

    We have known for quite some time that Ukraine is facing a critical shell shortage, but the leaked documents reveal just how acute this issue is. Ukraineโ€™s usage rate is very low right now – the report claims only 1,104 shells had been expended in the previous 24 hours – compare this to the 20,000 or so shells that the Russian army is firing on a daily basis. Even more alarming for Ukraine is the note that they have only 9,788 shells on hand.

    Even with a low burn rate that leaves the AFU massively outgunned, they have enough on hand to sustain combat for a little over a week, and they rely on a trickle of deliveries from the USA to keep these stocks stable. The report noted a shipment of 1,840 shells departing in the next 24 hours. Batches of this size are obviously insufficient for Ukraine to build up its stocks, and can only serve to backstop and replenish daily expenditure. There is no possibility of America quickly ramping up the size of these deliveries, because a mere 14,000 shells are produced per month. US officials hope to get this number up to 20,000 this year, but this is still below Ukraineโ€™s current burn rate […]

    The American Analytic Framework

    […] The Pentagon does not seem to have a strong sense of Ukrainian unit strength, location, or activities. They also list their assessed Ukrainian KIA at a mere 16k-17.5k. This is an absurdly low number – where could they have gotten it? In fact, it is a direct copy-paste of the casualty numbers reported publicly by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.

    The fact that the Pentagon does not seem to have any independently generated intelligence about the Ukrainian army is shocking. They seem to have be relying on Ukrainian propaganda numbers and publicly available deployments data, like the open source Deployment Map. For the record, this is not a knock on the Deployment Map site – I use this resource frequently and find it very useful. The point, of course, is that the Pentagon, with its nearly unlimited resources, does not seem to have any unique insight or intelligence streams of its own in this regard. They gesture vaguely at the map and mutter, โ€œthereโ€™s probably a brigade or two in this area, maybe 8,000 men. Or 4,000. We donโ€™t really know.โ€ In fact, all of their axis strength assessments for Ukraine have a 100% margin of error (that is, the upper limit of the range is double the lower limit).

    One can only conclude that the tail is wagging the dog. The Ukrainians are able to extract material, training, and cash from the west, but there is little accountability or honest information flow in return. There were hints of this earlier in the war – that Ukraine is a sort of black box which sucks in resources but does not communicate honestly in return; American officials have complained (and Ukrainian leaders have confirmed) that Kiev simply does not tell DC all that much. Apparently this remains an issue well over a year into the conflict. One particularly alarming footnote in the leaked documents states:

    “We have low confidence in Russian (RUS) And Ukrainian (UKR) attrition rates and inventories because of information gaps, OPSEC and IO efforts, and potential bias in UKR information sharing.“

    Good grief […]

    Air Defense at the Brink

    One last major revelation from the leak is the greatly degraded state of Ukrainian air defense. Very simply, Ukraine is quickly running out of munitions, especially for its critical S-300 and BUK systems, and it can only endure two or three more wave strikes before breaking completely.

    Air defense systems can be complicated to talk about for people who arenโ€™t familiar with the nomenclature. This is because there are a large number of different systems required for a modern air defense, which must be โ€œlayeredโ€ with different systems that intercept targets at various altitudes, phases of flight, and trajectories. The conversation can quickly become even more muddled because the launch systems have both a Russian designation and a NATO designation, and their munitions have different designations still – just for example, the air defense system which the Russians call the S-300 is designated the SA-10 by NATO, and it fires a variety of different interceptor missiles which have their own names, like the 9M83. Multiply this by the many different types of air defense systems currently in use in Ukraine, and you can see how it can easily decay into a morass of acronyms and serial numbers.

    In any case, the key thing to understand about air defense systems is the layering aspect – if one node in the layer fails, not only does one lose full spectrum coverage, but the burn rate on the remaining systems increases because they are now bearing an undue load. Ukraine is now almost completely out of interceptors for the S-300 and BUK systems, which comprise almost all of its medium to long range defense. At the current burn rate, they are projected to run out by the first week of May and have had to make hard choices about where and what to defend. There is no prospect of acquiring more interceptors for these systems because they are manufactured in Russia […]

    Conclusion: Asleep at the Wheel

    […] There does not seem to be any long term plan to sustain Ukraineโ€™s war. The Pentagonโ€™s procurement plans do not indicate any real intent to ramp up production of key systems. For FY2024, they have ordered a modest 5,016 GMLRS – the missiles launched by the famous HIMARS system. Ukraine has already fired nearly 10,000 GMLRS, making this yet another system where Ukrainian expenditures vastly exceed supply.

    To salvage the situation, Kiev must place its hopes on one desperate dice roll with a mechanized attack package comprised of half-strength brigades wielding a disparate inventory of different vehicles and systems. This Frankensteinโ€™s monster of armies – sewn together with a bevy of different tanks, IFVs, APCs, and artillery systems drawn from all corners of the NATO alliance, will likely be asked to smash through the heavily fortified and robustly manned Russian lines in the south, where it will be pulverized and become only so much more mulch for the Pontic Steppe [end]

    The full article

    my related piece

    Countdown of the Atlanticist defeat in Bakhmut

  • Ukrainian terrorist raid in Russia

    for the purification of Russia

    First reports

    A hostage situation has broken out on March 2, 2023, in Bryansk region, near Ukraine border. Reports on social networks, media and Russian authorities are describing the ongoing crisis.

    Maybe two Ukrainian diversion and recce groups (DRG), about 40 fighters, have infiltrated trough the border. Their original mission is unclear, maybe the destruction of infrastructures like power substations.

    But witnesses are testifying that the assailants have deliberately shot at civilians in at least one village, Sashuny (52.19516958514104, 32.31158488547411), which is less than two km from the border. Several residents have already been killed or injured. The criminals are currently detaining a handful of civilians. That is terrorism

    The Russian State security agency (FSB) and attached elements of the defense ministry are working there, in order to clear the threat.

    The assailants

    Advisor to Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Ukrainian journalist Mykhailo Podolyak starts accusing Russia of a classic deliberate provocation. But other Atlanticist channels demonstrate his lies, are sharing on social networks a pair of videos, which are showing personnel of the DRGs in broad daylight. They were displaying their flag in one or several identifiable Russian tiny villages. One of their original tasks was therefore propaganda, due likely to the defeat in Bakhmut

    The characters are members of the Russian Volunteer Corps (Russkiy dobrovolโ€™cheskiy korpus, RDK), a bunch of Nazi defectors, who have settled in Ukraine for years, are usually working for the psychological department of the Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR), are bearing sometimes the symbols of the Russian Liberation Army (Russkaya Osvoboditelโ€™naya Armiya, ROA, 1942-1945), Nazi auxiliaries during WW2

    The leader is 36-year-old Denis Kapustin, alias Denis Nikitin, alias White Rex

    In 2001, he settled with his mother in Germany, under a program for Jewish migrants, became Nazi, started beating migrants. He visited Kiev during the rightist coup on Maidan square, in 2013-2014, is living in Ukraine since 2017.

    Another assailant is Alexei Kozhemyakin, former criminal convict in Russia, whose tattoo was a passport in 2015 for post-Maidan Ukraine

    Andriy Yusov is spokesman of the GUR, states that the operation is

    a continuation of the transformation of Russia, its purification and liberation from Putinโ€™s dictatorship

    Thank for these words, quod erat demonstrandum.

    Epilogue

    In the afternoon, the Russian authorities confirm that the raid has killed two civilians in Lyubechane, other victims have been injured there or elsewhere. The members of the DRGs, 45, according to themselves, later, to the Ukrainian media, have come back to the Atlanticist lines in Ukraine. They are recounting that they managed to escape without meeting the Russian security forces. But in the previous videos, we can hear bursts of assault rifle fire in the distant. Despite their deny, they shot therefore at civilians. They have also left mines behind them. Here is a DM31, the German version of a Swedish anti-tank mine

    Fedor – Hero of Russia

    The inhabitants pay tribute to Fedor, 11 years old, who already injured, shot in the back, has led two young girls to a safe place

    Former intelligence officer within the US Marine Corps (USMC), then UN inspector in Iraq, who warned in 2003 that no weapons of mass destruction (WMD) were there, Scott Ritter tells Sputnik

    it’s clear there were no military objectives. This was a deliberately provocative attack, and it was an attack that was designed to anger Russia by intent. You don’t target women, children, you don’t target a civilian, a village, unless your goal is to anger Russia and provoke Russia into perhaps overreacting. I think that’s the objective […] an overreaction that could then be used by the Zelensky government as justification for requesting even more military assistance

    The European Union is censoring Sputnik. But my readers can use a virtual private networks (VPN) or easier, an online proxy, in order to foil that political censorship.

    As usual, a disgrace for most Western mainstream media, dishonest journalists and stooges of politicians, who do not report a reality which is incompatible with their crooked narrative, a disinformation in support to a proxy war that the Atlanticist block has provoked in Donbass and Ukraine.

  • Thousands NATO soldiers have already been killed in Donbass and Ukraine

    In a bitter proxy war that NATO is conducting against Russia, in Donbass and Ukraine, Joe Biden stated on October 21, 2022

    the conflict in Ukraine should not end with the success of Russia. Washington has spent a lot of money to help Kyiv. But itโ€™s about much more than Ukrainians, itโ€™s about NATO, itโ€™s about Western Europe. Itโ€™s about making sure Putin canโ€™t succeed

    Without the explicit mention of a cyanide alternative, the German president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, added on November 24

    the European Union will not rest until Ukraine defeats Putin

    I am usually neglecting the statements from politicians, who in the West, have become psychodrama or comedy characters. But these harsh words make sense.

    The military facts are however cruel and along with many other analysts, I would suggest Leyen an alternative from big pharma. Russia has already liberated Mariupol, reached the left bank of Dnieper river, seized Zaporojie nuclear power plant (ZNPP) in Energodar, is conducting in Donbass an implacable attrition war, with a much more powerful artillery and the air supremacy. Bakhmut is currently a meat grinder for the Ukrainian cannon fodder. Its near liberation may trigger a wider collapse of the Atlanticist defense in Donbass. NATO is providing Ukraine with a huge intelligence support, is flooding the country with weapons and ammunition, is depleting its own stocks, but these shipments are so far insufficient against the military power of Russia, better trained troops and better command. Politics and propaganda are affecting too much an Atlanticist strategy, which is despising the life of its own fighters

    Negotiations between Russia and Ukraine started quickly after the beginning on February 24, 2022, of the Russian special military operation. Its goals were moderate and clear : liberation of Russian-speaking Donbass, demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine. The third point sought the enforcement of a legal arsenal against Russophobia and the Nazi organizations which are populating the Ukrainian deep State since Maidan, a rightist coup in February 2014. The peace was reachable in March 2022, but the US and UK prevented it. NATO is striving, against all forecasts, to achieve a strategic victory and I suspect, for the wet dream of dismantling Russia. Dire situation. How to protract the moronic ambition to achieve victory, without the direct involvement of NATO forces, which would trigger a nuclear WW3 ? Well, they did it. A kind of unofficial direct involvement of NATO.

    The Russian gains have been punctuated with the discoveries of weird clues. Under the command in Mariupol of Nazi Azov regiment, the last defenders of Azovstal steel mill surrendered on May 20, 2022

    Several hundred corpses had been gathered in cold-storage rooms during the siege. But in June, the Russian forces found that the Ukrainians had used a blast furnace as a crematorium, inside and nearby, the remnants of a dozen incinerated corpses. Why ? Clue : the scraps of a US passport card, related to [โ€ฆ.] Louise [โ€ฆ.]ford, born on April 7, [โ€ฆ.] Yet, the involvement of Western mercenaries in the Ukrainian ranks was a common military fact from the beginning. Many are proud of their feats, which are described on social networks. A British national, Aiden Aslin, was the first captured mercenary, on April 12, 2022, in Mariupol. But on January 29, 2023, in Bakhmut, Russian fighters with Wagner private military company (PMC) found several corpses, whose heads and hands had been cut off, in order to prevent their identification. Why ?

    When the HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System), for example, arrived in Ukraine in June 2022, some experts were discussing the necessary presence of US service members at some echelons, in order to ensure the efficiency of such a weapon. Meanwhile, the casualties had been severe from the beginning, Ukraine had lost most of its best fighters. The general mobilization had brought replacements, which were poorly trained conscripts. That new infantry needed mentoring and during the first counteroffensives, early September 2022, foreign mercenaries appeared in force at the forefront. One way for NATO to unofficially inject troops is the fake resignation of service members, who later surface on the battlefield, within PMCs

    The Israeli intelligence may have achieved a precise distinction between fake and real mercenaries, between undercover NATO fighters and mercenaries. An alleged Israeli assessment has leaked to Turkey, where the press has written on January 25, 2023, that by January 14,

    • 165,000 Atlanticist fighters, including
    • 8,000 foreigners, had been killed in Donbass and Ukraine since February 24, 2022. Among the 8,000 foreigners, the most were mercenaries, but
    • 2,692 were actually service members from NATO countries (Germany, Lithuania, Poland, UK, US… etc) According to the same piece, the Russian fatalities were
    • 18,500, nine times less, at the same date.

    From March to September 2022, I have written a chronicle about the siege of Mariupol. I am still convinced that dozens French operatives were taken prisoners there.

  • Panzer, Marsch

    the saga of the Western Panzerkampfwagen in Donbass and Ukraine

    • Overture

    A little over 80 years ago, in 1941, under the leadership of Germany, Europe invaded the Soviet Union. In June 1942, Ukraine was the rear base of a Nazi offensive toward the Caucasus and Volga river, but in January 1943, the annihilation of Friedrich Paulus’ 6. Armee at Stalingrad reversed the tide of WW2. The last Nazi offensive, in July, triggered around Kursk the largest tank battle in history and a new Soviet victory. The Red Army liberated Kiev in November 1943 and seized Berlin in May 1945

    Lviv is in western Ukraine the epicenter of a Nazi legacy since WW2. Late 2013, an economical dispute with the European Union led, in western Ukraine and Kiev, to a pro-Europe uprising against the legal government. With the help of Nazi political organizations from Lviv and likely, foreign provocative gunmen, NATO achieved a rightist coup in February 2014. Later, Russian-speaking residents of Crimea and Donbass have risen up against the Russophobia of the new authorities, which called them terrorists, cracked down on them with the loyal members of the armed forces and the same Nazi militants, legalized meanwhile as paramilitaries. That was the outbreak of war in Donbass. NATO countries are offering their military support to Ukraine since the beginning. Galvanized, the successive Ukrainian governments did not seriously negotiate, have not implemented Minsk peace agreements. Former German Kanzlerin, Angela Merkel confessed to der Zeit on December 7, 2022

    2014 Minsk agreement was an attempt to buy Ukraine time. It has used this time to strengthen itself, as can be seen today

    France and Germany were hypocritical when they sponsored an agreement which was supposed to cease fire and bring peace. The Western goal was actually to gain time, in order for NATO to reinforce the military power of the Ukrainian Nazi deep State. Ukraine has carried on with the terrorist shelling of civilians and on February 24, 2022, Russia has started a special military operation, in order to liberate Donbass, demilitarize and denazify Ukraine. That is the proxy war that NATO was seeking. Why ? In order to preserve a hegemony on the decline if not already an illusion, against Russia, China and most of the wide world, for a new world order against a multipolar one, the US and their European vassals are regarding that war as an opportunity of strategic victory. Their wet dream is to dismember Russia and subdue China

    Among other symbolic references to Nazism and German army during WW2, the Ukrainian military vehicles are displaying a white cross since September 2022

    The Balkenkreuz [bar cross] was the common sign on German Panzer on September 1, 1939, when began the invasion of Poland and WW2. The symbol later evolved and remained until 1945

    Russia is enforcing an attrition strategy. The operations are a carnage for the Ukrainian forces. While the Ukrainian artillery is firing around 6,000 shells a day all over the front line, the Russian consumption may raise to 50,000, has reminded late November 2022 a senior anonymous NATO official. In view of the Russian air supremacy, tactical, operational and strategic strikes on military targets, despite the massive involvement of Western intelligence, the Ukrainian casualties are obviously far higher

    According to a Russian mathematical model, the Ukrainian military fatalities since February 24 are currently above 150,000. On November 30, the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, confirmed that the death toll was already above 100,000. The fatalities are not restricted to the Ukrainian cannon fodder, Western mercenaries are also killed in the ranks of that Atlanticist army

    Lock of the Atlanticist defense system in the still occupied part of Donbass, Bakhmut, also called Artemovsk, is a hot spot, where the Ukrainian reserves are currently sacrificed

    For Wagner private military company (PMC), a major Russian force involved so far in the area, Yevgeny Prigozhin has already stated on November 26, 2022

    Bakhmut is a large, well-fortified area with roads, suburbs, and water barriers. The Ukrainian army is well-prepared and offers decent resistance. Our task is not Bakhmut itself, but the attrition of the Ukrainian army to reduce its combat potential, which is why this operation has been dubbed the โ€˜Bakhmut meat grinder.โ€™ In this regard, do not run ahead of the locomotive, we will let you know, happiness loves silence

    In the hope of turning the tide in 2023, Ukraine should receive Western armored fighting vehicles (AFV), 59 US infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) Bradley, 40 German IFV Marder and 30 French AMX-10 RC, which are not tanks, despite their 105 mm gun, but old armored recce vehicles

    On January 11, 2023, Volodymyr Zelenskyy met in Lviv, western Ukraine, his counterparts from Lithuania and Poland, Gitanas Nausฤ—da and Andrzej Duda. Together, they decided to reinforce in Ukraine the defense of the so-called Euro-Atlantic coalition. Poland would transfer a company of German-made Leopard tanks

    In the wake, the UK has announced the delivery of 14 Challenger tanks. But in matter of Leopards, Poland and the other east European good wills need that Germany allows their export.

    German newspaper Sรผddeutsche Zeitung reported that in a phone call with US president Joe Biden on January 17, Kanzler Olaf Scholz has claimed to be ready to deliver Leopards to Ukraine, but on one condition : if the US in turn delivered Abrams tanks. On January 19, der Bundestag debated the delivery of Panzer to Ukraine. Member of parliament Peter Bystron, AfD (Alternative fรผr Deutschland, Alternative for Germany, right-wing), stated

    German Panzer against Russia in Ukraine ? By the way, you already tried that with the Melnyks and Banderas [Stepan Bandera, Ukrainian Nazi leader during WW2] and what is the result ? Unspeakable suffering, millions of dead on both sides and in the end, Russian tanks here in Berlin !

    He added

    The conflict in Ukraine cannot be solved with Panzer, only with diplomacy [โ€ฆ] Only the US armaments companies benefit from arms deliveries [โ€ฆ] The majority of the German people reject arms deliveries to Ukraine. The traffic light government [red-green] should finally start conducting politics in the interests of the German people

    A number of parties were opposing the transfer and the decision was postponed. Meanwhile, the Russian regular forces started attacking in the south, are threatening Orekhovsky, 65 km southeast of Ukrainian-occupied Zaporojie, on the left bank of Dnieper river. If confirmed and successful, such an offensive could lead to the destruction of the Atlanticist forces east of the river

    Situation map on January 20 (RYBAR)

    Andriy Melnyk is the previous ambassador to Germany, a revisionist and an apologist of his national hero, Ukrainian Nazi war criminal Stepan Bandera. On November 18, Volodymyr Zelenskyy has appointed him deputy foreign affairs minister. On January 20, 2023, Melnyk called for a tank coalition in Ukraine

    Representatives of the Atlanticist coalition, the US, Ukraine and their auxiliaries, met the same day in the US military base in Ramstein, Germany, but did not announce the delivery of Leopard or Abrams tanks

    According to dem Spiegel, the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND, German intelligence) was then assessing that the Atlanticist forces were losing three-digit numbers of soldiers every day around Bakhmut.

    On January 21, a Wagner fighter proudly displayed his trophies, including the chevrons that he had seized in Bakhmut area, on demilitarized foreign mercenaries from Canada, Georgia, Italy, Turkey, the UK and US

    In the Ostgebiete [eastern territories] on January 23, the psychodrama went on when Polish prime minister Mateusz Morawiecki stated

    We will apply for such consent from Germany, but this is a secondary topic. Even if we do not get this consent at the end, as part of a small coalition, even if the Germans would not be in this coalition, we will still hand over our tanks [German Leopards] together with others to Ukraine. The condition for us at the moment is to build at least a just small coalition of States [โ€ฆ] in Western Europe [โ€ฆ]

    The campaign #FreeTheLeopards was trending on social networks, with involvement of characters like Finnish prime minister Sanna Marin

    and German stylist Frank Peter Wild, who was advocating for a while on Instagram, from his elevator in Berlin

    Here was the distribution of Leopard Panzerkampfwagen across Europe on January 23, 2023

    The French press may be the worst coterie worldwide of atavistic lackeys. The State is subsidizing them all. Their reports about the prospects of tanks delivery to Ukraine are hilarious. The public propaganda channel franceinfo asks on January 24

    War in Ukraine: why does Germany have control over Polandโ€™s [German] tanks ?

    But the right-wing Point states

    It would not be a good idea to deliver [French] Leclerc tanks to Ukraine

    The suspense ends the same day, when according to dem Spiegel and other German outlets, Kanzler Olaf Scholz has agreed to send German Panzerkampfwagen to Ukraine. The historians will measure the part of the submission to the US and that of a pure German neurosis

    My brief forecast : the Western tanks are carrying four crew members, require training, will not be soon on the front line. A few dozens will not turn the tide in Ukraine, but will be destroyed. According to the Russian defense ministry, the Atlanticist forces have already lost more than 7,600 tanks and other AFVs in 11 months, since February 24, 2022. The spectacle of the combustion on the battlefield of Western tanks may have a larger psychological and political impact than their military influence

    • January 25, 2023

    The government confirms that Germany will send 14 Leopards to Ukraine. The plan is to form two battalions, that is about 88 tanks, with contribution of other countries. New German defense minister, Boris Pistorius predicts that these formations may reach the front line in about three months, that is early May.

    Poland has already announced the delivery of a company, that is 14 vehicles. Germany has managed to convince the US, which will deliver 31 Abrams, confirms Joe Biden. 14 British Challengers should be also part of the 88 Western Panzerkampfwagen ultimately engaged in Ukraine. 75% of mankind are eager to watch their wrecks on the battlefield. Government by grocers is a curse.

    For a wide majority of Russians, the near involvement of Western tanks is a reminder of the Great Patriotic War against Nazi Europe. Some channels are giving advice on how to burn the new German Panzerkampfwagen

    Ukraine needs now crew members and more broadly, a new batch of cannon fodder. I guess some recruits were volunteer in March 2022, but the most are likely dead, now. The scenes of forced mobilization are increasingly cruel. An amateur video surfaces from Cherkasy. The woman has attempted to record the abduction of the man

    • January 26, 2023

    The first rewards are offered on social networks. One million rubles for the first captured Panzerkampfwagen, the half for the first destroyed one

    The same day, Pentagon spokeswoman Sabrina Singh states

    we just donโ€™t have these tanks [Abrams M1A2] available in excess in our US stocks

    That is why the vehicles for Ukraine shall be manufactured. According to Politico, the sole plant is producing 12 machines per month, is overbooked for Taiwan and Poland, which is eager to replace its 250 T-72 already delivered to Ukraine.

    • January 27, 2023

    The near shipment of German Panzerkampfwagen to Ukraine makes people think in Charlottenburg, West Berlin

    • January 29, 2023

    The supposed Ukrainian crew members of British Challenger tanks have arrived in the UK for training

    • February 3, 2023

    Berlin has approved their exportation, Rheinmetall company plans to sell 88 Leopard I (one) to Ukraine for โ‚ฌ100 million. The tank entered service in 1965. The version should be 1A5, an improvement in 1987, but the gun is still 105 mm and the armor is feeble. The Westerners have no regard for the Ukrainian cannon fodder

    • February 7, 2023

    German defense minister Boris Pistorius (left) visits Kiev, has brought the model of a Leopard 2 to Oleksii Reznikov, who is still his counterpart for a few days. Reznikov is falling because of a corruption scandal within his ministry. Surprising. The prosecution of a corruption case is surprising in Ukraine

    Meanwhile, Ukrainian formations are training at Belarus border, are displaying their Balkenkreuze

    • February 9, 2023

    Handelsblatt has interviewed Armin Papperger, Rheinmetall CEO. The German company is talking to Kyiv about exporting the Panther [โ€ฆ] in 15 to 18 months. Still under development, the KT (Kettenfahrzeug [tracked vehicle]) 51 Panther is based on the hull of the Leopard 2A4, with a new turret, a 130 mm gun and its auto-loader

    The Panzerkampfwagen [armored fighting car] V Panther was intended to counter the Soviet T-34, was baptized in Kursk vicinity in July 1943, during the largest tank battle in history, a Soviet victory and a defeat for Nazi Europe

    The disgrace is that so many Germans have forgotten so quickly that they are most offspring of Nazis. If modern Germany was a respectable country, its leaders would consider the legitimate demands of Russia, would strive to bring peace in such a situation, would not send Panzer.

    • February 10, 2023

    Public radio station Deutschlandfunk broadcasts the interview of 96-year-old Joachim Hรถppner, who was tank gunner within the Wehrmacht, 2. Panzerdivision, was involved in the battle of the Bulge, from December 1944 to January 1945, was later taken prisoner on the east front and detained in Soviet Ukraine. The interview provokes the ire of Andriy Melnyk and BILD, a grassroots reactionary tabloid for German rednecks. Melnyk is the current deputy foreign affairs minister in Ukraine, a revisionist and an ardent thurifer of Stepan Bandera, the Ukrainian Nazi leader during WW2.

    Hรถppner has become paficist, states about Panzerkampfwagen shipment to Ukraine

    What are these heavy weapons which are being supplied ? What are the people who make such decisions thinking about ? You canโ€™t solve any problems with weapons

    BILD trolls hard, attacks Hรถppner and Deutschlandfunk over the military experience of the first, veteran within the Wehrmacht, but is supporting a modern Ukrainian State who is usually paying tribute to the Ukrainian SS and the UPA, a Nazi paramilitary formation during WW2. Its editorial line is for the Germans, the most in West Germany, who under the US umbrella, did not achieve their grieve about the German Nazi defeat against Soviet Union, which scored 80% of the German military losses during WW2. BILD is the prominent illustration of a German neurosis. How dumm or rather neurotic are such Germans, who become mad when Russia is conducting a special military operation in Donbass and Ukraine, but duck when the US sabotage Nord Stream.

    • February 17, 2023

    The Washington Post is a US militant outlet, which is expressing a strong support to Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s Ukraine. On February 14, Michael de Adder has drawn an interesting cartoon. The NATO team, no specific country, is hurrying up to prepare Ukraine for a spring offensive. And the tank is a German Leopard

    But reality is more difficult. On January 24, the German government has agreed to deliver them and to allow their export by customers. Most of these leaders are exalted blabbermouths and soon, the announcements added up to dozens machines from several European countries. Three weeks later, the fever is gone. Der Spiegel has interviewed Boris Pistorius, the German defense minister. Germany should transfer 14 Leopard 2A6 and Portugal, three. Older versions and even archaic Leopards 1 could be delivered, but many of these tanks are in poor condition and need repairs. I stress that one German demand for the agreement was the shipment of US Abrams, but it could be postponed indefinitely.

    • February 24, 2023

    The Polish prime minister announces that the first batch of Polish tanks, already transferred to Ukraine, is including four Leopard 2. In the wake, the German defense ministry adds that Germany will send four additional ones. Platoon by platoon ? Warfare or communication ? Please hurry up, gentlemen, you can hardly imagine how the wide world is eager to watch them… in action

    The Ukrainian government confirms later with photos the Polish delivery. The machines are an old version, Leopard 2A4

    As usual in Ukraine, here in Odessa, volunteers are rushing to become crew members of the new tanks and defend democracy. The two men in military fatigues are recruitment officers. In black uniforms, two police officers watch the abduction

    In the previous night, a damaged tank has been set up in front of the Russian embassy, on Unter de Linden avenue, Berlin. An art performance, that the administrative court had authorized in October. The T-72 has come from a museum in Kiev, was allegedly Russian, would have been seized during the special military operation. Still that German neurosis, I guess

    I really love this splendid picture in May 1945 of a victorious T-34, in front of the Brandenburger Tor

    Kitatasumi.com
    • February 25, 2023

    The organizers were hardly expecting how their propaganda operation is hijacked in front of the Russian embassy. While other demonstrators are gathering a few hundreds meters away, in front of the Branderburger Tor, Berliners are laying hundreds red flowers on the Russian tank, in protest to the Western military support, which is protracting the Atlanticist proxy war in Ukraine, despite a Chinese peace plan.

    • February 26, 2023

    Yevgeny Prigozhin states that according to intelligence, the Atlanticist command is sending the Leopards 2A4, four machines, one platoon, to Chasov Yar, a town about 15 km west of Bakhmut, a city that the Russian forces have caught in a vice.

    I hope so, did not expect it.

    The alternative is that the Panzerkampfwagen are game changers or they are not. In the first case, engagement by dropper will dilute them on the battlefield. In both cases, the pictures of destroyed machines will be a propaganda victory for Russia, while various countries are still wondering if they will deliver Western tanks.

    never interrupt an enemy who is making a mistake

    has said Corsican general Napoleone Buonaparte.

    • March 6, 2023

    No Western Panzerkampfwagen has been committed so far in the fighting, which have reached the outskirts of Chasov Yar, where a Ukrainian T-64 burns

    • March 13, 2023

    Ukrainian service members wrapped up a four-week training near Zaragoza

    Spain has schooled 40 crew members and 15 mechanics, should deliver six Leopard 2A4.

    • March 20, 2023

    Annabel Goldie is Minister of State for Defense, a subordinate of defense minister Ben Wallace. She answers a question on the site of the parliament and confirms that the UK would send to Ukraine depleted uranium (DU) armor piercing rounds with the Challenger tanks

    During the invasion of Iraq in 2003, Anglo-Saxon troops shot between 1,000 and 2,000 tonnes of DU munitions. Their debris are chemically and radiologically toxic for their users and later, for the population of the former battlefield.

    • March 21, 2023

    An amateur video surfaces on social networks, is showing a Leopard 2A4, allegedly in Ukraine or Donbass

    • March 22, 2023

    The Daily Mail explains to its readers what are the DU armor piercing rounds

    • March 27, 2023

    The Ukrainian defense ministry publishes a photo where Oleksii Reznikov stands in front of Western vehicles

    From the left, the second one is a US Stryker Interim Armored Vehicle (IAV), the third, a British Challenger tank and the fourth, a German Marder Schรผtzenpanzer.

    • March 31, 2023

    Ukraine has received so far several dozen Western heavy armored vehicles, Panzer and infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) like German Marders, is about to receive US Bradleys. None has been engaged in fighting. They are gathered in the prospects of a counteroffensive, which may begin in April.

    Its goals could be the rescue of Bakhmut garrison or to the south, the Russian continental lines of communication to Crimea.

    • April 11, 2023

    A leak of classified documents from the Pentagon has wrecked havoc within the US intelligence community. They look authentic and as Big Serge writes, are a Russian nesting doll of embarrassment

    First of all, they are showing how in this case, the US intelligence is relying on open sources (OSINT), because Ukraine simply does not share its data. The known facts are ascertaining that the country is facing a critical shortage of artillery and air defense ammunition, a deficit that the West is unable to bridge.

    Besides, Ukraine is planning a spring offensive, that 12 brigades should carry out. NATO is equipping nine of them, which appear understrengthed, according to Western standards, will still be ill trained by late April.

    Big Serge concludes

    To salvage the situation, Kiev must place its hopes on one desperate dice roll with a mechanized attack package comprised of half-strength brigades wielding a disparate inventory of different vehicles and systems. This Frankensteinโ€™s monster of armies โ€“ sewn together with a bevy of different tanks, IFVs, APCs, and artillery systems drawn from all corners of the NATO alliance, will likely be asked to smash through the heavily fortified and robustly manned Russian lines in the south, where it will be pulverized and become only so much more mulch for the Pontic Steppe

    • April 13, 2023

    The fighting are ongoing in Bakhmut, where Wagner fires a Fagot antitank guided missile (ATGM), in this splendid photo from RIA Novosti

    In a video from Evgeny Poddubnyโ€™s team, a Russian T-90 is firing

    • April 17, 2023

    On social networks, Poles are sharing the photos of US made Bradley infantry fighting vehicles (IFV), with Ukrainian camouflage but no 25 mm gun

    Another one surfaces, is allegedly showing the aftermath of an accident on a training ground in Poland. Two facts are undeniable : the damage tank is a Leopard 2A4 and the two men are wearing Ukrainian uniforms

    • April 19, 2023

    A photo surfaces on social networks, allegedly from members of the Ukrainian 47th assault brigade, is showing modernized T-55 tanks from Slovenia and US Bradley IFVs

    From a TV set, Ukrainian unter-defense minister Hanna Maliar states that the counteroffensive has already begun, along four axes, Bakhmut, Marinka, Avdiivka and Liman, all in Donetsk Peopleโ€™s Republic, Donbass, Russia. She adds however that no offensive actions are conducted, but a set of strategic measures. Indeed, the Russian fighters have noticed nothing so far

    NATO is eager, despite the clear Ukrainian incapacity to conduct offensives with success. In the evening, Moscow time, the US announces an umpteenth military package, artillery ammunition. That proxy war is such a crime, such a caricature of the West, that it will be likely the end of the Western hegemony. The wide world is disgusted.

    • May 13, 2023

    In Khmelnytskyi, western Ukraine, about 325 km southwest of Kiev, Russian cruise missiles or/and drones destroy an ammunition depot. Secondary explosions and blaze are tremendous. At 4:52 am, local time, the European Mediterranean Seismological Centre (EMSC) records 3.4 magnitude shocks northwest of the city

    When will we finally stop putting all the eggs in one basket ?

    comments Yuri Kasyanov, a former Ukrainian official. The targeted facility was concealing a huge amount of ammunition and high-tech military equipment from NATO countries.

    The day after, the firefighters will still be using robots to extinguish the destroyed ammunition depot. The European radioactivity monitoring will clearly be showing a rise of gamma dose rate in Khmelnytskyi since May 12

    If Russia used nuclear ammunition, the radiation would start rising on May 13, not on May 12. Ukrainian journalist and member of Svoboda [liberty], a Nazi political party, Ihor Mosiychuk will sound the alarm, advise to take children away from the epicenters of the explosions.

    A dirty bomb is combining radioactive material with conventional explosive, in order to disperse the former. Through the stockpile in Khmelnytskyi of British DUAP rounds (cf. supra, March 20), Ukraine has likely and unintentionally made its own dirty bomb.

    • May 18, 2023

    A moving spectacle. Who has imagined one year ago what we are now contemplating : the wreck of an armored vehicle, came from a declining but arrogant West, is lying in Bakhmut, Donetsk Peopleโ€™s Republic, Donbass, Russia, the current critical point of a proxy war that NATO is waging in that region

    (Photo Sketches, screenshot)

    A video surfaces on May 18, 2023, is showing a damage British Spartan armored personnel carrier (APC), that the defeated Atlanticist forces have abandoned in the battered city.

    • May 20, 2023

    Wo sind die Panzer ?

    Except some APCs, mostly destroyed or seized, no other Western armored vehicles, no Panzekampfwagen, have been involved so far on the battlefield. At 3:50 pm, local time, one year after another liberation, the surrender in Mariupol of Nazi Azov regiment, Yevgeny Prigozhin announces that the Russian forces have achieved a complete victory in Bakhmut, Donetsk Peopleโ€™s Republic, Donbass, Russia. No Atlanticist fighter remains alive in the city

    I do not think that a few dozen Western tanks would turn the tide in Donbass or Ukraine. But the spectacle of their combustion may have a larger psychological and political impact than their military influence. That is the reason why failing a real counter-offensive so far, they have not been involved. Because the way the Atlanticist forces have been bled since August 2022, in the trap of Bakhmut meat grinder, may have ruined the opportunities for such a counter-offensive.

    • May 25, 2023

    Remake in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, of what happened in Berlin, Germany, on February 25. In partnership with the Ukrainian authorities, the municipality displays a Russian damaged T-72 tank in the city. But people are later coming to lay flowers on the vehicle and demonstrate against the military support to Ukraine

    The mayor is 57-year-old Femke Halsema (left), member of GroenLinks [green left], the same political affiliation than Annalena Baerbock, the cataclysmic 42-year-old German foreign affairs minister.

    • June 5, 2023

    I think that the counteroffensive will be when and where NATO Panzerkampfwagen will be committed. In a region about 140 km north of Berdyansk, where Ukrainian formations have already tested the Russian defenses the day before, a few Leopard 2 are spotted in Novodonetskoye, a village that the assailants manage to seize, about 80 km southwest of Donetsk

    As expected, the Atlanticist losses are already significant and the first photos of abandoned, likely damaged Western AFVs, surface on social networks. These are French AMX-10 recce vehicles

    In the night, the Russian defense ministry counts 137 enemy armored vehicles, including 25 tanks, all destroyed that day in the same region. The Atlanticist forces would have lost eight Leopards and three AMXs.

    • June 6, 2023

    Russia has regained Novodonetskoye, Donetsk People’s Republic, that the Atlanticist forces seized the day beforeo9 at a heavy price. The Ukrainian counteroffensive appears so far as a bloody failure.

    • June 8, 2023

    On social networks, some members of Azov regiment are bragging

    tonight is the night of the nights

    At 1:30 am, a new attack begins south of Orekhov, Zaporojie region, about 100 km southwest of the failure on June 6

    (RVvoenkory)

    The assault on the front line is synchronized with shelling in Tokmak, 40 km further south, 60 km north of Melitopol, which could be a new goal, in order to isolate Crimea from mainland Russia. The ammunition are US made GMLRS rockets, that HIMARS are launching

    In the evening, the Russian defense ministry releases a splendid video from Orekhov vicinity. An Atlanticist mechanized column is entangled in minefields and shelled, a platoon of Leopards 2 in front, US made M113 behind. At least one Leopard is burning, more seem disabled.

    • June 9, 2023

    Volodymyr Zelenskyy publishes on Telegram the photo of a military meeting. Commander of the Ukrainian ground forces, colonel general Oleksandr Syrskyi stands at his right. Valery Zaluzhny, the chief of staff, is missing

    At midnight, the Atlanticist attack resumes south of Orekhov. One mechanized battalion is committed, according to journalist Alexander Sladkov. The assailants do not succeed and for the first time, Russian sources are reporting the destruction of several US made Bradley infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs)

    The outcome appears in the afternoon, through a video which has surfaced on social networks. One German made Leopard 2 and several Bradleys are burnt along a trail. The analysis of the whole document shows, in that sole section of the battlefield, the wrecks of 5 Leopards, 6 Bradleys, 3 MaxxPro mine-resistant ambush protected vehicles (MRAP), one French VAB [vรฉhicule de lโ€™avant blindรฉ] armored personnel carrier (APC) and several others

    • June 10, 2023

    A third time in a row, the Atlanticist forces attack the same positions, south of Orekhov, of the 42nd -Evpatoriyskaya Red Banner- guards motorized division. Minefield, artillery, kamikaze drones and anti tank guided missiles (ATGM) repel the mechanized columns. The offensive is losing steam and that time, the Russian defenders do not even need air support

    On June 7, Olaf Scholz has stated

    we are at war for so many weeks and now, it is important that we take decisive steps forward

    Seid ihr ? But the situation has worsened for the German Panzerkampfwagen, since the battle around Kursk, in July 1943. Nowadays, the Nazis are unable to break the first Russian defense line

    New Bradleys have agglomerated at the site spotted the day before. Such a traffic jam of wrecked armored fighting vehicles is rare in history

    • June 11, 2023

    On another site of the battlefield, south of Orekhov, members of the 22nd -Joukov- guards special brigade have recorded a video. Here are new wrecks of Leopard 2A6 tank, Leopard 2R heavy mine breaching vehicle (HMBV), Bergepanzer 3 armoured recovery vehicle (ARV), Bradley and MaxxPro

    In Strasbourg on September 14, 2022, Ursula von der Leyen, the German president of the European Commission, stated

    Russian military is taking chips from dishwashers and refrigerators to fix their military hardware, because there are no semiconductors anymore. Russiaโ€™s industry is in tatters

    Let us have fun

    • June 15, 2023

    An alleged plan of the Ukrainian offensive surfaces on social networks. The operation would have begun on June 4, with a feint south of Velyka Novosyolka, Donetsk Peopleโ€™s Republic. A limited attack indeed occurred there. The breakthrough should have been achieved toward Tokmak on June 6. Kakhovka dam was blown up that day and the attack in Zaporojie region, on June 8, was actually a bloody failure for the spearhead of the Ukrainian armed forces, their Western Panzerkampfwagen. The main goal would have been Berdyansk, in order to isolate Crimea from mainland Russia.

    • June 16, 2023

    The Atlanticist forces are attacking in vain Pyatikhatki, a village 15 km northeast of Vasilyevka, on the left bank of Dnieper river, in Zaporojie region

    (RVvoenkory)

    The 19th -Red Banner of Labor- motorized division is defending the area, has been reinforced with T-62 tanks, which are used as assault guns

    Along the front line, Russian special forces (SSO) are hunting the Western Panzerhampfwagen with ATGMs, sometimes onboard customized civilian vehicles

    • June 18, 2023

    After the breakage of dozens Leopard Panzerkampfwagen and Bradley IFVs, a British Challenger tank appears close to the front in a video that Ukrainian channels are sharing on social networks

    According to the Russian defense ministry in the evening, the Atlanticist forces have lost 33 tanks and 65 other armored vehicles in Zaporojie region in just one day, the equivalent of two NATO armored/mechanized battalions.

    • June 23, 2023

    CNN has interviewed two western officials and a senior US military official, who have conceded that the Atlanticist offensive is not meeting expectations on any front. The US and its allies are likely to wait until at least July for a fuller assessment of the results. After the Western Panzerkampfwagen have been bogged down, the assailants are carrying out more dismounted operations, which means waves of cannon fodder. The Blitzkrieg is over. And in this screenshot, south of Velyka Novosyolka, Donetsk Peopleโ€™s Republic, the Russian servicemen are holding the line

    • June 25, 2023

    An impressive drone video surfaces from Makarovka, south of Velyka Novosyolka, where the Atlanticist forces started attacking three weeks before, in Donetsk People’s Republic. A Russian T-80 tank erupts through a main street, a few hundred meters from a pair of US made MRAPs, fires a first shell, turns back, fires a second shell and leaves

    • July 2, 2023

    Here is a french wheeled tank [the sole expression makes me laugh] that the Atlanticist forces have abandoned during the bloody failure of their offensive in Zaporojie region and Donetsk People’s Republic. The picture surfaces when the Ukrainian defense ministry states that the vehicle is unfit for attack

    I could have told them for a long time, was a kid when the French army was testing it before commission, maybe 45 years ago. The AMX-10 is not a tank but an armored recce vehicle, compliant with an outdated French doctrine. Its 105 mm gun is not bad, but its armor, inadequate. The Russian soldier says

    The Russian land is too tough for French wheels

    • July 7, 2023

    Die Welt broadcasts a report from a camp where Ukrainian troops have withdrawn after the failure of their attack. A tank battalion commander tells that during training abroad, he asked

    How do you get through a minefield ?

    The German instructor replied

    Simply drive the tank around it

    Funny are the bitter comments on the web of pro-NATO nerds who have never handled an assault rifle. The German instructor was simply right. A tank, even a Leopard Panzerkampfwagen, is not intended to drive on anti tank mines. How to avoid them is an operational and tactical issue which is the sole responsibility of the Ukrainian command.

    • July 23, 2023

    In a splendid video which surfaces on social networks, Chechen operators drone one Leopard 2A6 Panzerkampfwagen somewhere in the south, between Zaporojie region and Donetsk Peopleโ€™s Republic, where the Atlanticist counteroffensive is failing since early June.

    • July 25, 2023

    How hopeless the situation must be for NATO. BHL is now leading the Atlanticist counteroffensive ahead of a Swedish CV90 IFV

    Bernard-Henri Lรฉvy is a french author, was a long time a supposed philosopher. He is actually involved for years in all NATO dirty tricks.

    • June 26, 2023

    NATO armchair generals are reproaching the Ukrainians for their tactics, are demanding an armored Schwerpunkt [main focus], in accordance with NATO doctrine and the training of Ukrainian servicemen in the West. The blames have leaked in German media and the Ukrainian command obeys its US masters. Massive mechanized attacks resume in Zaporojie region and Donetsk People’s Republic, where the assailants are once more repelled with heavy casualties.

    • July 27, 2023

    The Russian forces have seized an AMX-10 armored reconnaissance vehicle, that French chauvinistic commentators were calling wheeled tank. But despite its 105 mm gun, the vehicle is unfit as tank. The Atlanticist forces have likely abandoned that one in June

    In Rabotino direction, Zaporojie region, ATGMs, artillery and kamikaze drones chop another Atlanticist mechanized infantry company.

    • July 29, 2023

    On July 29, 2023, a splendid video surfaces on social networks, from Zaporojie region, where a single Russian tank (left) chops a whole Atlanticist mechanized company (right). With artillery support and a top-notch tactical leadership, the three crew members manage first to destroy two enemy tanks. After that, the fighting is a slaughter. The Atlanticist forces lose two tanks and six infantry vehicles. The event dates back to no later than July 8

    • August 4, 2023

    According to the Russian defense ministry, since the beginning early June of their counteroffensive, the Atlanticist forces have lost

    • 43,000 killed fighters, excluding the casualties of strategic strikes in the deep.
    • 26 jets,
    • 9 helicopters.
    • 1,831 armored vehicles, including
    • 25 German Leopard Panzerkampfwagen,
    • 7 French AMX-10 wheeled tanks, actually armored recce vehicles,
    • 21 US Bradley infantry fighting vehicles.
    • 747 artillery pieces and mortars, including
    • 84 NATO self-propelled howitzers,
    • 76 US M777 howitzers.

    As ever, war is a simple art, all execution [Corsican general Napoleone Buonaparte], the Russian forces are well entrenched, are developing a greater fire power, their own losses are far lesser. According to a well known Russian mathematical model, Ukraine, only Ukraine, has lost 245,823 killed in action fighters since February 24, 2022, beginning of the Russian special military operation. Negotiations could have stopped the fighting in March 2022, but the US and UK vetoed peace

    The same day, defense minister Sergey Shoigu inspects a Swedish CV90 IFV, that the Russian forces have seized on the battlefield

    • August 5, 2023

    Defense minister Sergey Shoigu awards the title of Heroes of the Russian Federation to three servicemen, one from Yakutia, the crew members of Alyosha tank, for their achievement on the battlefield before July 8 (cf. supra, July 29)

    The tank crew under the command of Senior Lieutenant Rasim Baksikov came under massive artillery fire, as a result of which a driver was wounded. The crew commander Baksikov evacuated the wounded serviceman from the vehicle and gave him first aid. Having transferred the driver to the forward medical unit, Rasim decided to take his place in the battle.
    Lieutenant Aleksandr Levakov, having assessed the situation, decided to replace the wounded crew member and took the tank commander’s workplace and moved in the direction of the positions of Russian motorized rifle regiment to provide support to the defenders.
    On the approach to one of the settlements, Lieutenant Levakov detected 8 enemy vehicles, including two tanks, in one of the nearby wooded areas.
    Having assessed the situation, Senior Lieutenant Baksikov made a decision and immediately engaged the superior enemy forces. Thanks to skillful control of the combat vehicle and competent use of the terrain conditions for stealthy movement, the Russian tank’s entry into the firing line was unexpected for the enemy.
    Rasim Baksikov, at the driver’s seat, skillfully manoeuvred on the battlefield and directed the work of the crew. Lieutenant Aleksandr Levakov, in the commander’s position, promptly and competently relayed target guidance to the gunner and directed the tank’s fire.
    In the first minutes of the battle, the gunner-operator Alexey Neustroyev destroyed both enemy T-72B tanks with accurate fire. In the next 30 minutes, one M113 armoured personnel carrier and five U.S.-manufactured MaxxPro armoured personnel carriers, together with the troops, were destroyed.
    After the last enemy combat vehicle was destroyed, the tank crew continued to cover the motorized rifle units deploying in combat formation for about 40 minutes. When the combat vehicle ran out of ammunition, crew commander Rasim Baksikov decided to go to reload, and another tank was sent to the battle site.
    Having fired three shots at the advancing infantry, the second tank was damaged by enemy artillery fire. Having quickly orientated himself in the situation and realizing that the crew of the damaged vehicle required immediate assistance, Senior Lieutenant Rasim Baksikov and his crew decided to evacuate the damaged tank from the line of contact to a safe place.
    The towing of the tank was carried out under incessant enemy fire. Thanks to the resolute actions of the servicemen, the crew of the tank was rescued.
    During the battle, the enemy losses, apart from destroyed hardware, were up to 100 fighters killed and wounded

    • August 15, 2023

    Seized NATO armored vehicles are displayed in Patriot Park, near Moscow

    Here are for example one French wheeled tank, actually an AMX-10RC armored recce vehicle, one Swedish CV90 infantry fighting vehicle, one British Saxon armored personnel carrier and one British Husky protected support vehicle.

    • August 16, 2023

    For the first time, the Atlanticist forces have committed US Stryker armored personnel carriers (APCs), which have burnt near Rabotino, Zaporojie region.

    According to Western media, a single Ukrainian formation is equipped with Strykers, the 82nd air assault brigade, which was kept within the strategic reserve. That suggests that the Atlanticist command is about to launch its last fresh troops against the Russian defenses in the south. And all available British Challenger tanks would have been delivered to the same brigade

    After the success of a previous information campaign (cf. supra, January 25) on how to disable a German Leopard Panzerkampfwagen, Russian social networks are now sharing advice against the Challenger

    Half a league, half a league,
    Half a league onward,
    All in the valley of Death
    Rode the six hundred.
    โ€œForward, the Light Brigade!
    Charge for the guns!โ€ he said.
    Into the valley of Death
    Rode the six hundred.

    โ€œForward, the Light Brigade!โ€
    Was there a man dismayed?
    Not though the soldier knew
    Someone had blundered.
    Theirs not to make reply,
    Theirs not to reason why,
    Theirs but to do and die.
    Into the valley of Death
    Rode the six hundred.

    Cannon to right of them,
    Cannon to left of them,
    Cannon in front of them
    Volleyed and thundered;
    Stormed at with shot and shell,
    Boldly they rode and well,
    Into the jaws of Death,
    Into the mouth of hell
    Rode the six hundred.

    Flashed all their sabres bare,
    Flashed as they turned in air
    Sabring the gunners there,
    Charging an army, while
    All the world wondered.
    Plunged in the battery-smoke
    Right through the line they broke;
    Cossack and Russian
    Reeled from the sabre stroke
    Shattered and sundered.
    Then they rode back, but not
    Not the six hundred.

    Cannon to right of them,
    Cannon to left of them,
    Cannon behind them
    Volleyed and thundered;
    Stormed at with shot and shell,
    While horse and hero fell.
    They that had fought so well
    Came through the jaws of Death,
    Back from the mouth of hell,
    All that was left of them,
    Left of six hundred.

    When can their glory fade?
    O the wild charge they made!
    All the world wondered.
    Honour the charge they made!
    Honour the Light Brigade,
    Noble six hundred!

    • August 22, 2023

    In Zaporojie region, after 75 days of almost daily attacks from Orekhov to the south, exhaustion of the formations which were supposed to breakthrough, involvement of the 82nd air assault brigade from the strategic reserve, the Atlanticist forces are still in the Russian cover area. They are tackling 15 km south of Orekhov, in Rabotino village, the first of three successive defensive lines, still 80 km from Melitopol, which was their goal in June

    The drittes Reich performed better 80 years ago. Despite their own defeat in July-August 1943, in a similar battle around Kursk, Soviet Union, the German Nazis managed to advance deeper than the Atlanticist forces, today in Zaporojie region.

    • August 24, 2023

    The day before, he attended a ceremony for the 80th anniversary of the Soviet victory at Kursk, largest tank battle in history, against the Nazi armies. On August 24, 2023, Vladimir Putin hosts in the Kremlin five servicemen, the crew members of Alyosha tank and fellow fighters of the 127th motorized infantry division / 5th combined arms army, who received the title of Heroes of the Russian Federation for their achievement on the battlefield (cf. supra, July 29)

    In June in Zaporojie region, Alyosha chopped a whole Atlanticist mechanized company. With artillery support and a top-notch tactical leadership, the crew members managed first to destroy two enemy tanks. After that, the fighting was a slaughter. The enemies lost two tanks and six infantry vehicles.

    • September 2, 2023

    A video surfaces, is showing in Zaporojie region a demilitarized German Leopard 2A4, which had been upgraded with explosive reactive armor (ERA) bricks

    • September 5, 2023

    A Ukrainian amateur video surfaces, is showing a burning one. Here is the first ever British Challenger 2 tank destroyed on the battlefield, likely in Zaporojie region

    Later a Russian drone ascertains the historical kill

    • September 6, 2023

    While US Secretary of State Antony Blinken is visiting Ukraine, which in order to stimulate the Western support, commits a new false flag war crime, the slaughter of civilians in Konstantinovka, Donetsk Peopleโ€™s Republic, the Pentagon announces the shipment of depleted uranium (DU) armor piercing (DUAP) rounds, as part of a new $175 million aid package. The 120 mm shells are for US Abrams tanks, which should be delivered in autumn.

    • September 8, 2023

    The Russian political head of Zaporojie region announces the destruction of a second British Challenger tank.

    • September 20, 2023

    I am wondering if US magazine Newsweek is making jokes. 108 days after the start of the Atlanticist counter-offensive, which is a bloody failure, after the fighting have shown that Leopards and Challengers, top notch European tanks, are also burning, the journalist asks if US Abrams would be a game-changer. $1 is definitely too expensive

    Like for the two previous Western Panzerwunderkampfwagen, the Russians are waiting for Abrams, are sharing advice on how to burn it

    • September 26, 2023

    The Russian fighters have burnt one more Marder Sonderkraftfahrzeug [name of the German halftracks during WW2] in the vicinity of Rabotino, where according to the Western propaganda, the Atlanticist forces are supposed to have broken through

    • October 31, 2023

    Joe Biden’s administration and the Ukrainian authorities are unable to bring themselves to officially end their counter-offensive, which is a failure since early June. Rather the opposite, the Russian forces are advancing, are threatening to encircle in Avdeevka, Donetsk People’s Republic, the Ukrainian troops which since 2014, are deliberately shelling civilians in Donetsk city

    Some Atlanticist armored formations have been transferred from the south to Avdeevka area, in an attempt to thwart the Russian advance, where the 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade manages to burn one more Panzerwunderkampfwagen [wonder tank], a German Leopard 2A6

    In the evening, German tabloid Bild takes us back in time, a leap about 80 years ago.

    • December 14, 2023

    Russia has completed on December 12 the cleansing of Marinka, where the Atlanticist forces were entrenched since 2014, in the southwestern suburb of Donetsk

    A video surfaces, is showing an ablaze French VAB armored personnel carrier (APC) in the same area.

    • December 18, 2023

    It took the arrogant Western leaders 6 months to admit the failure of the counter-offensive. The perspective of a Ukrainian [Atlanticist] defeat has become the issue. Ukraine is still widening the mobilization criteria, military police is carrying on with the chase of draft-dodgers

    A video surfaces, is showing on a snowy battlefield the work of Russian drones, demilitarization of a dozen armored vehicles, including several tanks and one Swedish CV90 infantry fighting vehicles (IFV).

    • December 22, 2023

    A video surfaces, is showing in Kupyansk area an ablaze Stridsvagn [fighting car] 122, improved version for Sweden of the German Leopard 2A5.

    • December 27, 2023

    A splendid photography surfaces, is showing another Swedish Stridsvagn 122, which has lost its engine near Kremennaya, Lugansk People’s Republic (LNR).

    • January 2, 2024

    When an ecologist leader begs arms dealers, the situation is serious. Die Welt has interviewed Sebastian Schรคfer, who has written for help to Rheinmetall and Krauss-Maffei Wegmann (KMW), the manufacturers. He is defense expert within the Green Party, a political fellow of the foreign affairs minister, prodigious Annalena Baerbock.

    Of the 18 German Leopard 2A6 Panzerkampfwagen delivered to Ukraine in March, only a very small number are still in use. Vehicles have suffered battle damage and significant technical wear and tear are also due to driving and shooting. Moreover, Ukrainian repair attempts have led to further damage to the tanks. Schรคfer is calling for faster steps to make them operational again. According to the industry repair workshop in Lithuania, suitable spare parts are lacking.

    We also know that battle damage is often an euphemism.

    • January 15, 2024

    An epic video surfaces, is showing in Avdeevka area the ambush of one Russian T-90M, that several kamikaze UAVs strike and two Bradleys pound during several minutes with their 25 mm guns. The damage prevent the tank from destroying the two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) with its 125 mm gun, but the crew manages to escape to safety.

    • January 26, 2024

    Slowly but steadily, the Russian forces are advancing in most areas of the battlefield, with minimal losses. Destroyed or discarded Atlanticist armored vehicles are scattered across the former no manโ€™s land

    Here in former Bakhmut, now Artemovsk region, in the operations area of the 200th motorized rifle brigade, a Dutch YPR-765 armored personnel carrier (APC) is still in moving order, was previously assigned to the 110th Ukrainian mechanized brigade.

    • February 22, 2024

    North of Avdeevka, Donetsk Peopleโ€™s Republic, that the Russian forces liberated on February 17, a drone documents the destruction of one M1150 Assault Breacher Vehicle (ABV). According to Forbes, Ukraine may have received 6 such mine clearing systems from the US.

    • February 23, 2024

    The Ukrainian army releases a video which is showing an Abrams tank in operation in the northwestern vicinity of Avdeevka

    After the failure of the German Leopards, the US has previously demanded that its tanks were kept in reserve, in order to avoid their public destruction. But the military situation is so serious that such PR issue seems now negligible.

    The 47th Ukrainian mechanized brigade is already equipped with US Bradley infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) and Leopards, was trounced during the failed Atlanticist counter-offensive in Zaporozhye region.

    • February 26, 2024

    In the northwestern vicinity of Avdeevka, Donetsk Peopleโ€™s Republic, that the Russian forces liberated on February 17, fighters of the 15th Guards Motorized Rifle brigade manage to drone their first US Abrams tank

    The kill is the achievement of a drone platoon that Kolovrat, his call-sign, is leading.

    The same day, a seized US Bradley IFV is freighted to Russia.

    • March 3, 2024

    A new video surfaces, is showing another knocked out US tank in the northwestern vicinity of Avdeevka, Donetsk Peopleโ€™s Republic. Abrams hunting is going on in Donbass

    • March 19, 2024

    Russian intelligence officers inspect a damaged Abrams tank in the northwestern vicinity of Avdeevka.

    • April 26, 2024

    Defeated, the Abrams retreat from the battlefield. The Associated Press writes

    Ukraine has sidelined U.S.-provided Abrams M1A1 battle tanks for now in its fight against Russia, in part because Russian drone warfare has made it too difficult for them to operate without detection or coming under attack, two U.S. military officials told The Associated Press. The U.S. agreed to send 31 Abrams to Ukraine in January 2023 after an aggressive monthslong campaign by Kyiv arguing that the tanks, which cost about $10 million apiece, were vital to its ability to breach Russian lines. But the battlefield has changed substantially since then, notably by the ubiquitous use of Russian surveillance drones and hunter-killer drones. Those weapons have made it more difficult for Ukraine to protect the tanks when they are quickly detected and hunted by Russian drones or rounds. Five of the 31 tanks have already been lost to Russian attacks [โ€ฆ]

    The US tanks were usually burning in the northwestern vicinity of Avdeevka, Donetsk Peopleโ€™s Republic, Donbass, Russia.

    • April 28, 2024

    Slowly but steadily, the Russian forces are advancing almost everywhere and in Avdeevka sector, engineers manage to seize the wreck of a US Abrams tank.

    • May 1, 2024

    One Abrams tank has reached Moscow, but under circumstances which does not please NATO. A splendid collection of Western armored vehicles is displayed in Victory Park, on Poklonnaya Gora. The most prestigious items are the Abrams and one German Leopard

    Let’s play a mind game : spot the differences between these two Panzerkampfwagen. 79 years ago, Soviet Union achieved victory in Berlin over Nazi Germany

    The exhibition is already a great success on Poklonnaya Gora

    • May 9, 2024

    According to intern Ukrainian military documents, that Russian media SHOT has received, the British Challenger tank is faulty. Critical parts of the equipment are breaking. The serial number DS35AA, for example, suffered three critical failures within two weeks: two starters and one flywheel. If these parts malfunction, the tank is stuck. Moreover, the Ukrainian army is complaining that the 71-ton Challengers are under motorized, often bogged down in the Ukrainian soft soil

    • August 7, 2024

    It reminds December 1944. The bulk of the European fascist armies had irretrievably lost against Soviet Union and in a far-fetched attempt to reach a separate peace with Anglo-US allies, Nazi Germany attacked on the west front, in the Bulge. The operation code name was Wacht am Rhein

    While Ukraine is unable to contain the Russian onslaught in Donbass, where its manpower is irretrievably decimated, the Atlanticist forces started attacking toward Kursk on August 6, in a foolish attempt to terrorize Russian civilians, ward off defeat with a PR stunt and quickly gain territories through a less defended Russian border region, in the prospect of negotiations that the Western puppet is starting evoking

    Launched on December 16, 1944, Wacht am Rhein stalled by Christmas. The Allies brought reinforcements and the assailants lost all previous gains in January 1945. I guess that the conclusion will be quicker in Russia

    Situation map in the evening of August 7, at the border between Ukraine and Kursk region (RYBAR)
    • September 18, 2024
    • September 19, 2024

    In der Region Kursk brennen noch immer deutsche Panzer.

    • October, 15, 2024

    The Russian press publishes this splendid photo

    Here is the turret of a former British Challenger tank, which has exploded when a Russian drone impacted its ammunition. The tank was in the ranks of the Ukrainian 82nd air assault brigade ; the turret is in Kursk region, where the Atlanticist PR offensive began on August 6 (cf. supra, August 7, 2024).

    • November 25, 2024

    In Kursk region, a Russian drone is showing the impact of one 152 mm guided artillery shell on a US Bradley infantry fighting vehicle (IFV), which was likely carrying ammunition.

    • January 5, 2025

    On January 5, 2024, one Russian platoon -one tank and three infantry vehicles- meets at close range two Atlanticist tanks, on a forest road in Pokrovsk sector, Donetsk Peopleโ€™s Republic

    With speed and accuracy, the Russian crew manages to knock out one Atlanticist tank. The second one withdraws

    Russian war correspondent Alexander Sladkov provides later a drone recording of the fight.

    • March 10, 2025

    Russia is expelling the Atlanticist forces from Kursk region, where an almost intact US Abrams tank is seized.

    Incredible, how quickly time goes. When the special military operation began, three years ago, I was far from thinking that in 2025, there would be wrecks of US armored vehicles on Russian territory.

    We have witnessed that escalation like frogs in boiling water. Or perhaps me, because I donโ€™t fear violence. I remember that in January 2023 (cf. supra), the shipment of Western armored vehicles to Ukraine was still under debate.

    How could the world be the same after such a war, so close to nuclear apocalypse ?

    • March 21, 2025
    (lostarmour on Telegram)

    Russian lostarmour OSINT team is recording the documented losses of military equipment in local conflicts of the 21st century, has mapped them for the Atlanticist forces, in the failed offensive which started in Kursk region, Russia, on August 6, 2024. Today, they exceed 1,000 units.

    • April 7, 2025

    Russian drone pilots manage to knock out another US-supplied Abrams tank, this time in Sumy region

    The specimen was heavily reinforced with additional reactive armor and anti drone metal grills.

    • April 15, 2025
    (Ulyana Strizh)

    A touch of art in this brutish world; the lady is war correspondent Ulyana Strizh, the tank is US.

    • Music