Nicolas Cinquini

Analista senior di l'intelligenza in u campu di a gestione di i risichi di sicurezza, sò un anzianu tenente detective è ufficiale di l'intelligenza in l'agenzie di u Statu francese. A bona pronuncia hè Николай Чинкуини, in russu

Tag: petrograd

  • [Enemy media] Track a Nazi Merc: Inside Russia’s Shadowy Network of Digital Informers – Matthew Parish, Lviv Herald

    There is a peculiar corner of the internet in which the foreign volunteers who have travelled to Ukraine to resist the Russian invasion are hunted, photographed, catalogued and publicly denounced as Nazis and mercenaries. Their personal histories are reconstructed, their social media accounts are scrutinised and their deaths, whether real or imagined, are occasionally celebrated with a degree of enthusiasm that would be disturbing even by the standards of contemporary Russian wartime propaganda. This is the world of TrackANaziMerc, an English-language Telegram channel whose activities raise serious questions about the relationship between amateur internet investigators, Russian intelligence agencies and the Kremlin’s wider machinery of psychological warfare.

    At the end of October 2026, the channel had approximately 81,400 subscribers, rather than the 100,000 sometimes attributed to it, while its associated discussion group had around 11,000 members. These are nevertheless substantial figures for an organisation dedicated to monitoring individual foreigners serving in the Ukrainian Armed Forces and other people supporting Ukraine’s resistance to Russian aggression. The channel has become an international clearing house for hostile information about Ukraine’s foreign supporters, and its activities demonstrate how the boundaries between propaganda, intelligence gathering and personal intimidation have become increasingly blurred.

    The organisation describes itself as being administered by something called the Dirty Rats Team, an informal association of online investigators whose members have sought, with varying degrees of success, to conceal their identities. Its stated purpose is to track Nazis and mercenaries in Ukraine, although the definition of these terms appears sufficiently elastic to encompass virtually any foreigner who has expressed support for the Ukrainian cause. The central question is whether this group represents a collection of obsessive pro-Russian internet enthusiasts or whether there is a more substantial organisation behind its activities, potentially connected to the Russian security services.

    The distinction matters because there is an enormous difference between an unpleasant Telegram channel populated by political extremists and an intelligence operation designed to identify, intimidate and potentially facilitate attacks against foreign citizens. Yet the Russian approach to modern warfare frequently involves cultivating precisely this ambiguity, relying upon networks of sympathetic individuals who may act independently while nevertheless advancing the strategic objectives of the Russian state.

    The origins of TrackANaziMerc appear to date from the autumn of 2022, when the channel began publishing photographs and biographical sketches of foreigners fighting in Ukraine. Initially these were comparatively modest exercises in what internet investigators call open-source intelligence, or OSINT, involving the collection and analysis of information already available on social media and other public websites. The operation subsequently expanded into something more systematic, with participants encouraged to contribute identifying information and administrators coordinating their activities in private discussions.

    A July 2025 investigation by the Central European investigative journalism consortium VSquare, working alongside FRONTSTORY and researchers associated with the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism in The Hague, described the operation as a coordinated exercise in doxing. This is the practice of assembling and publishing identifiable personal information about individuals, generally with the intention of exposing them to harassment, intimidation or other forms of harm. The investigators found that the Telegram operation was connected to a broader network of websites and information repositories devoted to identifying individuals regarded as enemies of Russia.

    The importance of this activity should not be underestimated. A foreign soldier serving in a Ukrainian infantry brigade may be relatively anonymous on the battlefield, where he is known principally by his callsign and military function, but the publication of his name, photographs, nationality and personal history creates opportunities for hostile actors to connect his military identity with his civilian existence. This may place not only the individual concerned but also his family and associates at risk, particularly where the published information is accompanied by threatening language.

    There is a further distinction between collecting information and manufacturing accusations. TrackANaziMerc routinely employs the language of Nazism to describe individuals whose principal offence appears to be their opposition to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This mirrors the Kremlin’s longstanding assertion that its war is an exercise in denazification, an argument whose extraordinary breadth has allowed Russian propagandists to redefine virtually every form of resistance to Russian imperial ambitions as an expression of fascism.

    The term mercenary is similarly abused. Under Article 47 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, the definition of a mercenary involves several cumulative requirements, including participation principally for private financial gain, promises of compensation substantially exceeding that paid to comparable regular soldiers and exclusion from membership of a party’s armed forces. Foreign nationals who enlist in the Ukrainian Armed Forces and serve as ordinary members of those forces are not mercenaries merely because they hold foreign passports or receive military salaries. To describe them indiscriminately as mercenaries is therefore not simply an exercise in political invective but a distortion of international humanitarian law.

    The systematic misuse of these descriptions serves a psychological purpose. A foreign soldier identified as a Nazi mercenary is presented not as a person participating in the defence of a sovereign state but as an illegitimate combatant whose suffering or death deserves celebration. This rhetorical manoeuvre makes it easier to encourage hostility towards individuals who might otherwise attract public sympathy, and it creates a moral pretext for the exposure of their private information.

    The question of who operates TrackANaziMerc has been the subject of substantial investigative efforts. In June 2025, the Ukrainian media organisation UNITED24 published the findings of an OSINT collective called the Unintelligence Agency, which claimed to have identified several of the channel’s principal administrators. The most significant allegation concerned Daria Khaltourina, a Russian public health and demography specialist whom the investigators identified as the channel’s owner and principal organiser, operating under the pseudonym Ekaterina II.

    According to the published investigation, Khaltourina had professional connections to Russian public health institutions and described herself as holding a senior position at an institute associated with the Russian Ministry of Health. The investigators attributed to her a series of statements advancing familiar Kremlin narratives about the war, including the denial or distortion of well-documented Russian atrocities and historical crimes. VSquare subsequently repeated the identification in its investigation of Russian doxing networks. These findings are important, although they should properly be understood as reported OSINT attributions rather than identities independently established by the Lviv Herald.

    The reported identification of a Russian public health professional as an organiser of a campaign against foreign soldiers is striking because it illustrates the breadth of civilian participation in Russia’s information war. There is no particular reason to imagine that every person engaged in such activities is a trained intelligence officer. A state engaged in a prolonged conflict can derive considerable advantage from politically committed civilians who volunteer their time to identifying and discrediting its enemies.

    Other individuals identified in the investigation were even more geographically dispersed. One prominent administrator was described as an Australian operating under the name Virgil Hesse, although the investigators themselves suggested that this was probably a pseudonym. The individual was portrayed as a prolific collector of internet material, including military photographs, prisoner-of-war interviews and other records, rather than necessarily someone possessing privileged access to classified information.

    Another figure was Nicolas Cinquini, a former French police intelligence officer who has become an outspoken commentator sympathetic to Russian positions concerning the war. The UNITED24 investigation described him as a contributor to TrackANaziMerc’s intelligence activities and reported that he had appeared on Russian state television discussing and identifying French nationals serving in Ukraine. Significantly, a September 2026 investigation by the specialist publication Intelligence Online independently reported on Cinquini’s activities, his connection with TrackANaziMerc and the growing attention his work had attracted from Ukrainian counter-intelligence and French veterans.

    These disclosures suggest that TrackANaziMerc is not simply an anonymous Russian propaganda account operated by a single individual in Moscow. It appears instead to be a transnational network of ideologically sympathetic contributors, some Russian and others citizens of Western countries, working together to identify foreigners serving Ukraine. Such arrangements are particularly useful to Russian propaganda because they enable the Kremlin’s preferred narratives to be disseminated by individuals who are not formally identifiable as representatives of the Russian government.

    Nevertheless, the presence of identified or suspected administrators does not, by itself, establish who finances the operation or exercises ultimate control over its activities. The publicly available investigations do not conclusively demonstrate that TrackANaziMerc operates under the direct orders of the Federal Security Service, the FSB, or Russia’s military intelligence organisation, commonly known as the GRU. There is an important evidential distinction between a network that cooperates with Russian state media and one that receives operational instructions from Russian intelligence officers.

    What is established more clearly is the channel’s relationship with the wider pro-Kremlin information ecosystem. Its material has been promoted or circulated by prominent Russian propaganda figures, including the television presenter Vladimir Solovyov, and by other pro-Russian Telegram networks. Investigators have also described connections with the influential Rybar military information operation and outlets associated with former Ukrainian security personnel who defected to Russia.

    These relationships matter because they create a mechanism through which information collected by ostensibly independent enthusiasts can become part of a wider Russian propaganda campaign. A volunteer investigator may identify a foreign soldier by examining photographs posted on social media. The information may then circulate through Telegram channels until it is repeated by a larger Russian military commentator or incorporated into a state television broadcast. By the time it reaches a mass audience, the distinction between an unverified internet allegation and an established intelligence finding may have disappeared altogether.

    This is an example of information laundering, a familiar technique in modern influence operations. Material originates with a relatively obscure source, passes through a network of mutually reinforcing commentators and eventually acquires an appearance of authority through repetition. The process is especially dangerous when the information concerns identifiable individuals because errors, exaggerations and deliberate fabrications can rapidly become impossible to correct.

    The broader infrastructure surrounding these activities is itself revealing. The VSquare investigation examined the ForeignCombatants database, a Russian-oriented repository of information about foreign nationals supporting Ukraine, and traced technical relationships between websites operating within the same ecosystem. Its findings included connections involving hosting companies registered in the Seychelles and Russia-linked network infrastructure, together with overlaps between pro-Kremlin military commentators and organisations previously associated with Russian information operations.

    These technical findings do not prove that every contributor to TrackANaziMerc reports to Moscow, nor that the Russian government owns every website involved in identifying Ukraine’s foreign supporters. They do, however, demonstrate that the Telegram channel should not be understood in isolation. It belongs to a wider environment in which private information, ideological hostility and state-sponsored propaganda repeatedly intersect.

    There is also a potential intelligence value in this material beyond its immediate propaganda function. Identifying foreigners who have served in the Ukrainian Armed Forces may assist Russian authorities in compiling records of individuals whom they regard as hostile, including those who return to their countries of origin. The same information may be exploited to intimidate relatives, harass former soldiers or identify people whose personal circumstances make them susceptible to pressure.

    An August 2025 report by the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism examined precisely these dangers. Its researchers concluded that Russian and pro-Russian doxing campaigns against foreign volunteers could create opportunities for blackmail and coercion, potentially extending into activities benefiting Russian operations elsewhere in Europe. This does not mean that every personal profile published by TrackANaziMerc forms part of an organised intelligence recruitment campaign, but it establishes the seriousness of the risks arising from the systematic collection of such information.

    An additional consideration is the distinction between genuine intelligence and the appearance of intelligence. Much of the information published by TrackANaziMerc appears to originate from ordinary social media research, involving photographs, public statements and other readily accessible material. Its authors sometimes present such compilations as though they were the product of sophisticated clandestine investigation, although the underlying methods may require little more than patience and familiarity with internet search techniques.

    This is not necessarily a weakness from the organisers’ perspective. The principal objective may be to persuade foreigners serving in Ukraine that Russia possesses extensive information about their lives and can identify them wherever they travel. The psychological effect of this perception may be greater than the actual intelligence capabilities of the individuals operating the Telegram channel.

    The activity has continued into 2026. Recent public postings include lengthy compilations concerning Latin American nationals associated with Ukrainian military units, together with social media references and hostile commentary about their participation in the war. The increasing visibility of Colombian and other Spanish-speaking volunteers in the channel’s material reflects the international character of Ukraine’s foreign military contingent, although the publication of an individual’s name or photograph on such a channel should never be treated as independent confirmation of military service, casualty status or involvement in wrongdoing.

    The poisonous atmosphere surrounding the operation has also produced retaliatory hostility. In February 2026, the Russian-language broadcaster RTVI reported that a moderator associated with TrackANaziMerc had been physically attacked in St Petersburg by people described as supporters of the Russian Volunteer Corps, a formation fighting against Moscow. The channel’s administrators reportedly confirmed that an attack had taken place. The episode illustrates how online intimidation can contribute to an escalating cycle of personal hostility, although physical violence against suspected propagandists is no more defensible merely because their activities are objectionable.

    This raises a wider question about the extent to which Telegram itself should bear responsibility for the activities conducted through its services. Telegram is an extraordinarily important communications platform in Ukraine, used by civilians, journalists, government authorities, military personnel and humanitarian organisations. Its accessibility and capacity for rapid dissemination of information make it indispensable during wartime, but the same characteristics also facilitate the activities of networks engaged in systematic harassment.

    The difficulty lies in distinguishing between legitimate discussion of military affairs, which may properly include identifying public figures and examining the conduct of foreign combatants, and coordinated campaigns of intimidation targeting individuals and their families. Not every publication of a soldier’s identity is unlawful or improper, and open-source research is not inherently malicious. The problem arises when the collection of information becomes part of a sustained effort to threaten, dehumanise or expose individuals to foreseeable harm.

    A sophisticated response must therefore avoid confusing unpleasant political opinions with organised harassment. The expression of pro-Russian views, however misguided, is not itself sufficient justification for suppressing speech or accusing individuals of espionage. Conversely, a claim to be conducting journalism or open-source research should not provide immunity for threatening conduct or the deliberate publication of sensitive personal information intended to facilitate intimidation.

    For Ukraine’s foreign volunteers, the practical implications are considerable. Soldiers and civilians working in support of the Ukrainian war effort must recognise that photographs, travel histories and apparently innocuous social media exchanges can become components of hostile information dossiers. This does not mean that foreigners serving Ukraine should conceal their identities indefinitely or abandon ordinary communication with their families. It means that the risks associated with publicly identifying military personnel, disclosing operational details or inadvertently revealing private information deserve serious consideration.

    Foreign governments also have an interest in these matters. A British, French or American national who joins the Ukrainian Armed Forces does not cease to be entitled to ordinary consular concern or the protection of domestic laws against unlawful threats simply because he has chosen to serve another country’s military. Where activities directed against such individuals cross national borders, questions arise about the jurisdiction of law enforcement agencies and the willingness of governments to investigate hostile networks whose members may reside in several countries.

    Ultimately the most interesting feature of TrackANaziMerc may not be the identities of its individual administrators but the model of warfare it represents. Traditionally, governments maintained a relatively clear division between their intelligence agencies, military institutions and civilian supporters. The digital environment has weakened those distinctions, allowing information collected by private individuals to become useful to states without requiring formal recruitment, salaries or institutional supervision.

    Russia has particular experience of exploiting this phenomenon. Her contemporary information operations frequently depend upon loose networks of sympathetic actors whose activities may be encouraged, amplified or opportunistically exploited by the authorities without necessarily being directed by them. Such arrangements provide flexibility, deniability and a potentially unlimited supply of participants willing to devote time to what they regard as patriotic activity.

    TrackANaziMerc appears consistent with this model. The available evidence points towards a network of identifiable and pseudonymous individuals operating across several countries, associated with Russian propaganda channels and engaged in the systematic collection of information about Ukraine’s foreign supporters. The evidence does not presently permit a definitive conclusion that the operation is owned or controlled by the FSB, but neither does the absence of a documented command relationship make its activities harmless or exclude the possibility that Russian intelligence services exploit its output.

    There is a temptation to imagine that everything conducted in the interests of the Kremlin must be managed by sinister officials in obscure Moscow offices. Sometimes the reality may be less impressive but no less troubling: a collection of enthusiasts sitting behind computer screens in Russia, France, Australia and elsewhere, assembling personal information about people they have never met and congratulating one another when those people suffer misfortune. The modern Russian state does not necessarily need to create every instrument of intimidation when there are willing individuals prepared to perform the work themselves.

    This is perhaps the most unsettling lesson of TrackANaziMerc. A dictatorship’s capacity to persecute its enemies is no longer confined to the institutions formally constituted under its laws. Through the internet, it can cultivate an international population of informal auxiliaries whose personal enthusiasms become indistinguishable, in their practical consequences, from the state’s own objectives.

    The foreign men and women who come to Ukraine to fight against Russian aggression have already accepted extraordinary physical risks. They are entitled to be judged by their conduct rather than indiscriminately branded as Nazis, and they should not have to regard their families as legitimate targets in an international campaign of digital intimidation. Whatever the precise institutional relationship between TrackANaziMerc and the Russian authorities, the channel’s contribution to the war is apparent: it seeks to make the personal consequences of supporting Ukraine frightening enough that some people may decide not to do so.

    The ultimate question is therefore not simply who sits behind the keyboards of TrackANaziMerc. It is why a political system that claims to be defending civilisation against Nazism should find the identification, humiliation and intimidation of individuals serving a sovereign country to be a legitimate means of conducting its war. The answer tells us considerably more about the nature of contemporary Russian authoritarianism than it does about the foreign volunteers who have chosen to resist it [end]

    L’article original

    […] Accredited by the Armed Forces of Ukraine after approval by the State Security Service of Ukraine [SBU]

    ⟶ In far western Ukraine, Lviv is the still fruitful womb of the Ukrainian endemic Nazism.

    ⟶ British lawyer Matthew Parish was convicted of forgery in Switzerland related to his client work and is currently suspended from practising as a solicitor in the United Kingdom.

    ⟶ More than half of the French military volunteers in Ukraine are fascist activists and as a professional investigator, I prove it.

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  • [Sharing] Fifteen Minutes of Assault – RYBAR 89

    a character tempered by fire and blood

    Valery Anatolyevich Yenin was born on January 18, 1981. In 1985, his family moved to the Volosovsky District of the Leningrad Region, and Valery later settled in the village of Klopitsy. He did his compulsory military service with a deployment to Chechnya, where he was wounded for the first time and received his baptism of fire. After the army, he worked at a factory and on construction sites, then served in OMON, the riot police. In 2019, he graduated from the Saint Petersburg University of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Valery met his future wife in 2004, and the couple had two children.

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    ©️ RYBAR

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    Once upon a time near Tykhe – RYBAR 51

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time near Skudne – RYBAR 50

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time near Staromayorske – RYBAR 49

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in the basements – RYBAR 48

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in the gray zone – RYBAR 47

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in the flow – RYBAR 46

    adventures in country-404

    Once on the Platform – RYBAR 45

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, on the way home – RYBAR 44

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Ukrainsk – RYBAR 43

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in hard times – RYBAR 42

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, it couldn’t be otherwise – RYBAR 41

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Vesyoloye – RYBAR 40

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in Trudovoe – RYBAR 39

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Kurakhove – RYBAR 38

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Vuhledar – RYBAR 37

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in captivity – RYBAR 36

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in Poltava – RYBAR 35

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in Krasnohorivka – RYBAR 34

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in Verkhnya Syrovatka – RYBAR 33

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in Pervomais’ke – RYBAR 32

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, while fleeing from the 404 country – RYBAR 31

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, at sea – RYBAR 30

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, on that very street – RYBAR 29

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, during a surrender – RYBAR 28

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Artemivka – RYBAR 27

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Umanske – RYBAR 26

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Novoselivka Persha – RYBAR 25

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Ostroverkhivka – RYBAR 24

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Krasnohorivka – RYBAR 23

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Chasiv Yar – RYBAR 22

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in Kharkiw – RYBAR 21

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in Spain – RYBAR 20

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, on the election day – RYBAR 19

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near Berdychi – RYBAR 18

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near Kostyantynivka – RYBAR 17

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Oleshky – RYBAR 16

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, on February 24 – RYBAR 15

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near Bakhmut – RYBAR 14

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near Robotyne – RYBAR 13

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near Kreminna – RYBAR 12

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Lugansk – RYBAR 11

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Krynky – RYBAR 10

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Mar’inka – RYBAR 9

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Avdiivka – RYBAR 8

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Nova Kakhovka – RYBAR 7

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in the Azovets camp – RYBAR 6

    adventures in country -404

    Once upon a time, in Klishchiivka – RYBAR 5

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near the Russia-Ukraine border – RYBAR 4

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near Novodarivka – RYBAR 3

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, on Independence Day in country 404 – RYBAR 2

    the tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Urozhaine – RYBAR 1

    A tale of a failed counter-attack

  • [Sharing] A Report from Russia: How Close are Europe and Russia to a Wider Conflict? – Scott Ritter

    This article is the product of visits to Russia I made in June and September 2026 where I met with senior Russian leaders, leading academics, and specialists in military and security issues

    There has been a spate of irresponsibly aggressive rhetoric from within Europe strongly posturing for a conflict with Russia by the end of the decade. This rhetoric comes in the context of the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine, which is well into its fifth year, a conflict which both Europe and the United States openly acknowledge operates in the form of a proxy war between the collective West and Russia. The Russian response has been to accelerate its military efforts against Ukraine while putting NATO on notice that any effort to threaten Russian territory, and particularly the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, would see Russia responding with the full compliment of military capabilities, including nuclear weapons. The current situation in Europe today in many ways replicates the conditions that existed on the continent in the summer of 1914, where military mobilization and war preparations created a momentum that produced a war no politician was seriously looking to prosecute. The consequences of war in 1914 were a disaster for Europe; the consequences of a war today would be fatal to civilization as we know it.

    In examining the geopolitical map of Europe/Eurasia today, one can assess four points of military friction between Russia, the United States and Europe. These are Ukraine, the Arctic, Kaliningrad, and Outer Space. While each represents a physically distinct problem set politically and militarily, they are all four inextricably linked through a common Russophobic mindset in Europe and the United States which treats Russia as a singular security issue. Moreover, both Europe and the US operate from a strategic mindset driven by zero-sum thinking, which postures Russia as being structurally motivated to bring harm to both Europe and the United States, thereby stifling the possibility of cooperation with Russia that could resolve many if not all of the underlying issues which are collectively construed by the West as presenting a threat. For its part, Russia operates from a mindset derived from the psychology of perpetual victimhood dating back centuries, and a historical foundation of resistance to aggression which seeks diplomatic resolution until which point military confrontation becomes the only solution

    Ukraine: The (perceived) chink in the Soviet/Russian armor

    The current conflict in Ukraine between Russia and the West did not begin in 2022 with the Russian invasion but rather represents the logical conclusion of a posture on the part of the United States and NATO which sought to exploit the ultra-nationalism of Western Ukraine in order to create a framework of instability designed to weaken the Soviet Union, and later Russia, from within. To understand this mindset, one first must delve into the psychology underpinning the concept of Ukrainian nationalism. For Russia, Ukraine represents part of a larger family of Slavic peoples which include the Russians and Belarussians; indeed, this notion is shared by millions of Ukrainians as well. One only need to look at the integration of Ukraine within the cultural and historical roots of Russia over time to understand the reality of this sentiment.

    For the West, this reality presents a problem, since it lends itself toward the existence of a singular Slavic state possessing tremendous geographical advantages and unmatched natural resources which in turn creates massive economic penitential that competes with Western notions of global supremacy. Nazi Germany sought to nullify this Slavic potential through the implementation of Generalplan Ost, the literal cultural and physical genocide of the Slavic race. The United States and the United Kingdom (and later, NATO, inclusive of a newly militarized West Germany), continued this policy of Slavic nullification by promoting anti-Soviet resistance on the part of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), including military support of partisans operating in Ukraine loyal to Stepan Bandera, a former ally of Nazi Germany whose forces perpetrated large-scale atrocities against Jews, Poles and Russians during the Second World War. When the war ended, the German intelligence organization responsible for managing the OUN operations was taken over by the US military and later, under the auspices of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), used to direct anti-Soviet armed resistance up until 1954-55. The CIA continued to provide active support for the OUN, using the Ukrainian diaspora, through the 1990’s.

    The role of western intelligence, led by the CIA and the British Special Intelligence Service (SIS), in post-Soviet Ukraine was singularly focused on promoting Ukrainian nationalism at the expense of Russia. The political campaign waged against the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine by western intelligence emerged front and center when the two-term President of Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma, stepped down in 2005 after carrying out policies designed to improve Ukraine-Russian relations. Kuchma threw his support behind the Russian-speaking Viktor Yanukovych. For the West, a Yanukovych presidency would undermine their strategic goal of stripping Ukraine away from Russia. The result was the so-called “Orange Revolution”, which saw Yanukovych’s electoral victory overturned in favor of Ukrainian nationalists who promoted a distinctly anti-Russian policy which saw Ukraine pivot toward the European Union and seek NATO membership. The latter development was seen by Russia as a red line which, if pursued, would inevitably lead to a military conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Yanukovych’s election in 2010 was deemed a setback to the Western designs on Ukraine, leading to the West supporting a violent coup in February 2014 that saw Yanukovych driven from power, replaced by pro-western Ukrainian nationalists.

    It should be clear that a physical confrontation between Ukraine and Russia has always been the goal of the collective West. Efforts to take control of the Russian political space had, by 2014, failed. The so-called “reset” of 2009 was little more than a political cover for a regime change operation designed to replace Vladimir Putin, who had ruled Russia since taking over from Boris Yeltsin at the end of 1999, and in the intervening decade taken Russia down the road of economic and national recovery that the West, operating in full zero-sum mode, simply could not tolerate. The concerted efforts of President Obama to interfere in the Russian parliamentarian elections of 2011 and the presidential election of 2012 failed to remove Putin from power. The actions in Ukraine in 2014 and afterwards must be viewed in this light; nothing happens in a vacuum.

    The Ukraine conflict was never avoidable, despite Russia’s concerted efforts to engage in diplomacy designed to do just that. The defeat of the Ukrainian army in 2014-15 at the hands of Russian-backed separatists in the Donbas led to the adoption of the Minsk peace accords. It is now established fact that neither Ukraine, its two European partners (France and Germany), nor the United States ever had any intention of following through on the Minsk process. Instead, the Minsk process was designed to buy time for NATO to build a new Ukrainian army capable of holding its own against Russia. Indeed, from 2015-to 2022, the United States and NATO did just that, training over 80,000 Ukrainian forces, including thousands of Ukrainian nationalists labeled as neo-Nazi by the United States Congress, to NATO military standards. The stated purpose of this training was to enable Ukraine to take physical possession of the Donbas and Crimea, which was annexed by Russia in 2014 following the CIA-backed coup in Kiev. When Ukraine began amassing these NATO-trained troops in the Donbas region in early 2022, Russia launched a pre-emptive action which, more than five years later, has become an openly acknowledged proxy war with the collective West, inclusive of the US and NATO.

    The stated goal of both the US and Europe in pursuing this proxy conflict with Russia is nothing less than the strategic defeat of Russia. What does this mean in practice? First of all, the proxy war was never intended to result in a Ukrainian military victory against Russia. Rather, the goal was to draw Russia into a conflict which would exhaust its military potential, break its economy, and collapse its society to the point that the government of Vladimir Putin would be removed from power. This entire policy is postulated on the understanding that Vladimir Putin must be removed from power. As such, and solution that does not attain that objective is rejected out of hand, a pattern of behavior reflective of the zero-sum mentality that drives western policy making. As a result, every potential off-ramp that Russia has been willing to consider, from the Istanbul communique of 2022 to the Anchorage compromise of 2025, has been rejected by the West, exposing the reality that for the West diplomacy is just a tool to buy time to further strengthen Ukraine militarily in order to draw the Ukraine-Russian conflict out to its desired conclusion—the collapse of Russia. In short, Minsk on replay.

    Russia has proven to be surprisingly resilient in the face of this concerted western effort designed to collapse it as a viable nation state. The Russia economy not only has survived in the face of western sanctions but, in concert with effective Russian diplomacy that has exploited western diplomatic miscues to build a large and supportive global constituency, thrived as it has found foreign markets in the Global South that have largely replaced the lost European and US markets. Russian society, blindsided by a war it was not prepared for, has rallied solidly behind President Putin, as the results of the recent parliamentarian elections underscored. And far from exhausting Russia militarily, the Ukraine conflict has enabled Russia to fine-tune its defense industrial base, producing significant quantities of advanced military equipment and weaponry that for the most part far exceeds that being produced by the collective West in both quality and quantity. When this material is matched up with a combat-hardened pool of manpower, the result is that Russia today possesses the most combat-capable military force in the world, far exceeding anything either NATO or the United States can put into the field.

    In short, the western gambit targeting Russia has failed—the Russian military is stronger today by an order of magnitude, its economy far more diverse and self-sustaining, and its population far more unified than it was in 2022. Moreover, Russia shows no signs of faltering on any front—economically, diplomatically, socially, or politically.

    The same cannot be said for either Europe or the United States. Despite the war-like rhetoric coming out of Germany and Poland and backed up by statements made by US military officers, both active duty and retired, the reality is that the proxy war between the collective West and Russia was always meant to be just that—a proxy war. There has never been a realistic plan for the conflict to become a direct clash between Russia and NATO, if for no other reason than NATO simply lacks the capacity to generate sufficient forces capable of high-intensity conflict for any sustainable period. NATO’s military power has largely atrophied in the decades since the end of the Cold War, requiring an infusion of investment over time to recover which Europe currently does not seem capable of providing. The United States is itself in a posture of global retrograde, seeking to withdraw from Europe rather than resume a Cold War-like posture that is neither politically or economically viable.

    With Russia seemingly closing the door on the possibility of a negotiated settlement with the west over Ukraine, Europe and the United States are confronted with the uncomfortable reality that their strategic objectives in Ukraine will not reach fruition. Russia will continue to press for a military solution which meets all its stated objectives, including the kind of concerted de-Nazification which would make extinct the very virulent Ukrainian nationalism which has always fueled the western efforts in Ukraine against Russia.

    In short, there will be no war between Europe and Russia over Ukraine. Europe will support Ukraine until Ukraine has exhausted its resources—manpower and economic—and then watch helplessly as Russia consolidates its position in what is left of the Ukrainian nation. “To the last Ukrainian” appears to be a concept that both Ukraine and its western supporters have taken to heart

    The Arctic: The economic trigger of potential conflict

    In a rational world, the collective West would regroup after its pending defeat in Ukraine and seek to repair its considerable losses. But in a zero-sum world, this is not possible. A Russian victory in Ukraine requires, in the minds of those Russophobes in the west still dreaming of the collapse of Vladimir Putin’s Russia, a “win” which will level the geopolitical playing field. Given the reality that one of the consequences of the west’s failed Ukrainian gambit is the economic decimation of Europe, issues of economic import, not surprisingly take on increased importance when configuring a post-Ukraine geopolitical posture in opposition to Russia.

    One of the main issues confronting Europe today is discerning a coherent economic and foreign policy when it comes to China. European diplomacy in this regard has been disastrous, resulting in the collapse of critical sectors of the European economy (car manufacturing, for instance) as a result of ill-conceived notions of “de-risking” (an American-origin term designed to camouflage the real intent of such policy, which is “de-linking.”) But one cannot possibly speak of “de-risking/de-linking” when there are no viable alternative markets to replace that which one’s policies seek to vacate.

    Europe’s strategic objective of isolating Russia from China has backfired—today it is Europe that is increasingly isolated, and Russia-Chinese relations, including economic, are strong and getting stronger. One of the critical areas of Russia-Chinese cooperation is the development of the Northeast Passage or, as it is often referred to in China, the “Ice Silk Road”, a 5,500-kilometer stretch of waterway running from the Bering Strait in the east to the Barents Sea in the west. Use of this waterway has become increasingly possible—and profitable—enabling container ships to make the journey from East China to European ports such as Rotterdam around 20-days faster that the current Suez Canal route used by most shipping companies.

    The Northeast Passage operates exclusively in Russian territorial waters. It also transits the Arctic zone, meaning that for much of the year its functionality is dependent upon Russian icebreakers. The passage also operates under the umbrella of Russian security and legal norms. The economic potential of the Arctic used to the sole purview of the Arctic Council, who members used to meet on a regular basis to coordinate policies impacting on the economy, security, and ecology of the Arctic region. However, in 2022, following the invasion of Ukraine, Russia was kicked out of the Arctic Council. And, following the admission of Finland and Sweden to NATO, the Arctic Council has assumed a NATO-only posture, with its policies reflecting the strategic goals and objectives of its collective membership, namely being the strategic defeat of Russia.

    Climate change has altered the geopolitical realities of the Arctic region, with melting ice caps not only opening sea lines of communication previously denied and/or restricted because of weather but also making economic exploitation of significant mineral resources exposed by the retreating ice physically possible and fiscally viable. Normally, the Arctic Council would seek to regulate access to the Arctic to balance economic and ecological concerns within a security framework where all parties’ interests are taken into consideration.

    But in the zero-sum world, the Russo-Sino economic penetration of the Arctic space is deemed a threat to the collective West requiring a military response. This reality was underscored during the recently convened European Arctic Summit, hosted by Finland in mid-September. The European Union leadership, citing unsubstantiated claims of “significant and long-term threats” from Russia to Euro-Atlantic security, committed itself to strengthening its Arctic security posture—i.e., the militarization of the Arctic, focusing on military mobility, cross-border connectivity and necessary infrastructure in the northernmost regions of the Arctic.

    The fact is, however, that NATO is non-competitive with Russia when it comes to Arctic security issues. What the European Arctic Summit gave lip service to about the militarization of the Arctic, Russia has already fully implemented and continues to improve. While NATO nations are capable of engaging in acts of provocation, such as the recent seizure of a Russian research vessel off the northern Norwegian island of Svalberg, the rapidity in which the Norwegian government most to ensure similar actions are not undertaken in Norwegian territorial waters underscores the fact that Norway is not keen of provoking any sort of direct confrontation with Russia in the Arctic. The real threat to the West in the Arctic is not Russia’s capable military forces, but the fact that Russia, together with China, are imposing a new transit-based economic reality which will provide extraordinary leverage going forward by making traditional shipping carriers and routes non-competitive with the new “Ice Silk Road” Russia and China have already implemented. The ability to sustainably ship containers to Europe at half the cost of the current shipping routes is a game changer in every way and creates a new reality that the West will not be able to catch up to for some time, if ever

    Kaliningrad: low-hanging fruit, or impregnable fortress?

    The psychosis of the zero-sum trap the West has set for itself when it comes to Russia requires that NATO manufacture a victory—perceived or otherwise—capable of off-setting its failures in Ukraine and impotence in the Arctic. In this regard, the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad has emerged as a perceived Russian Achilles Heel. The former commander of NATO ground forces in Europe, US General Chris Donahue, openly bragged this past July that NATO forces would be able to overwhelm Russian defenses in Kaliningrad in short order. Germany and Poland have argued for intensified NATO military exercises near the borders of Kaliningrad, the goal of which would be to generate sufficient concern within the Russian leadership to cause them to pull troops out from the Special Military Operation zone to Kaliningrad in response. Several western military and security analysts have articulated assessments which indicate that Russia’s actual military posture in Kaliningrad is much weaker that publicly acknowledged. And numerous western politicians have made declarations indicating that Russia is preparing to carry out acts of aggression against NATO using the Kaliningrad exclave as a base of operations.

    But the reality is that while Russia is more than capable of defending Kaliningrad from any NATO aggression, the Russian military is not currently postured in the Kaliningrad exclave to carry out any sustainable offensive operations of any scale against any of its NATO neighbors—any contention to the contrary is simply rhetorical propaganda. Both the Russian 11th Army Corps and the Baltic Marines—the core ground combat forces stationed in Kaliningrad—have extensive combat experience in Ukraine and have developed a skill set with combat drones that would most likely disrupt and defeat any NATO offensive operations directed at the Kaliningrad exclave. The Russia military has likewise created an active reserve Rifle Regiment, BARS-39, which draws upon veteran soldiers possessing active-duty combat experience, especially in drone warfare.

    But the real threat to Kaliningrad doesn’t come from any potential ground offensive launched by NATO. Rather, it would emerge in the form of a naval blockade of the exclave. Since 2022, the railway lines that connect Kaliningrad with Russia have been subjected to severe restrictions by Lithuania when it comes to the transit of good to and from Russia; the issue of compliance with European Union sanctions of Russia lays at the heart of this matter. Russian-registered vehicles are likewise not permitted to transit Lithuania and Poland. Russia has compensated for this loss of connectivity by increasing the scope and scale of water ferry service between Russia and Saint Petersburg. While Russia has been able to sustain economic growth through this resupply effort, the fact is that this ferry-boat lifeline is very expensive, and many goods, such as gasoline, are subsidized by the Russian government to keep prices under control. If NATO were to impose naval restrictions on shipping into and out of Kaliningrad, as some of its members have suggested, the economic viability of the exclave would be threatened. It is because of this vulnerability that the Russian government put NATO on notice that any effort to subject Kaliningrad to a naval blockade, or any other act of military aggression, would be responded to with the totality of Russia’s military capability, including nuclear weapons.

    This nuclear muscle flexing appears to have dampened the enthusiasm on the part on some of the most vociferous NATO proponents of plucking what they thought would be low-hanging fruit; now that it is clear that any conflict involving a NATO attacks on Kaliningrad would not be treated in isolation, but rather constitute a conflict of existential proportions, the war drums have been muted

    Space: The final frontier

    The last topic on the list of potential points of conflict-generating friction between Russia and the US-European collective is outer space. Space-based sensors have played a critical role in the collection of intelligence used to support military operations in Ukraine and, in the case of Ukraine, to strike strategic targets in the depth of Russia. Likewise, the US commercial Starlink satellite communications system has assumed an essential role in Ukrainian military communications, to include playing a critical part in enabling Ukrainian long-range drone attacks on Russian energy infrastructure.

    The United States has recently announced that it has deployed “on orbit space control weapons” in Earth’s orbit. While the technical characteristics of these weapons has not been detailed, evidence suggests that these weapons are non-kinetic in nature, using reversible technology such as electronic warfare to temporarily “blind” a targeted satellite. US President Donald Trump has alluded to the use of a space-based weapon operating in support of US military strikes on Iranian nuclear-related targets in June 2025.

    Russia is in the process of deploying its own Starlink analog satellite constellation, known as Rassvet. When fully functional, Rassvet will provide Russia with satellite-based communications capability on par with Starlink. Ukraine, recognizing that Rassvet will enable Russia to more effectively guide its drones to their targets, has requested the United States to disable the Russian satellite network. Russia has indicated that it would take down the entire Starlink system in retaliation, using kinetic means which could threaten other satellites operating in earth orbit.

    The weaponization of space represents a dangerous point of escalation, especially given the US capability of temporarily blinding satellites. In the zero-sum world that the US and Europe reside in, the need to be seen as offsetting a Russian win in Ukraine, and Russia’s stymying of NATO escalation efforts in the Arctic and against Kaliningrad, may prove too much of a temptation in the minds of western leaders unable to structure a behavioral model in relationship with Russia that isn’t premised on Russophobic goals and objectives requiring Russia’s strategic defeat.

    Conclusion

    The United States and Europe have, over the course of the past several decades, built a policy trap centered on using Ukraine as a vehicle for achieving the collapse of Russia and the government of Vladimir Putin. The “trap” is the zero-sum mentality which governs implementation of this policy, linking the political and economic viability of those pursuing such policy to its successful implementation. The looming failure in Ukraine has created a need for finding new vectors capable of furthering the policy objective of achieving a strategic victory over Russia, including options to expand the zone of conflict between the US-European collective and Russia into the Arctic, the Baltics, and Outer Space. Russia has effectively countered each one of these efforts which, when viewed in isolation, appear to be manageable problem sets with limited escalation potential. However, when viewed in the aggregate, the potential for a misunderstanding and/or miscalculation driven by domestic political imperatives existent in the nations comprising the US-European collective. Here, nations possessing considerable influence over the decisions being made by the collective, such as the US, France, and Germany, are undergoing political transformations that could alter the existing political posture, including policies related to the strategic defeat of Russia as a desirable outcome. The enemy in all of this is not Russia, but rather the zero-sum thinking of the collective West which leaves them married to a policy model that is incapable of being successfully implemented, and which, if pursued aggressively, will lead to their collective demise.

    Note: I was able to visit the Special Military Operation zone, the Arctic region, oil fields, and Kaliningrad, in addition to participating in high level forums and meetings in Moscow and Saint Petersburg. The views expressed here are my personal assessment based upon these meetings, and are not meant as a formal expression of official Russian policy.

    This article is the byproduct of the independent journalism I have been undertaking for the past several years, traveling to Russia for the singular purpose of capturing the Russian reality and bringing it to the attention of a western audience held hostage by Russophobic corporate media. I cover all of my expenses, which means that the trips necessary for the production of this article could not have taken place without the generous support of subscribers and followers who have provided donations for that purpose. I will continue to write articles and release videos about these past visits. I will also continue planning and preparing for future visits to Russia, including one scheduled for November where I will attend a conference on humanitarian issues and continue to meet and interview interesting and knowledgeable people. I thank everyone who has contributed to this work, past, present and future [end]

    The original article

    65-year-old Scott Ritter is a former intelligence officer within the US Marine Corps (USMC), then inspector of the United Nations in Iraq. When in 2003, the US and their British minions were about to invade the country under this false pretext, Ritter was claiming that there was no weapon of mass destruction (WMD) there. He was right.

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    September 16, 2026: Operation Free Jacques Baud – Scott Ritter

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  • L’engagement français dans les rangs ukrainiens

    • Barrat, Maxime, né le 15 juin 1989,

    est camionneur, réserviste de l’armée française, pourrait bien travailler pour le renseignement français, depuis son engagement en Syrie en 2015, dans les milices marxistes kurdes YPG. La rumeur dit que le renseignement serait plutôt belge

    Son premier affrontement attesté de l’armée russe date du 9 juin 2022, dans la région de Kharkov, au sein d’un groupe appelé Dark Angels, à l’origine une ONG britannique d’assistance en Pologne aux réfugiés d’Ukraine.

    Il a déjà dit que son activité en Ukraine lui garantissait entre 3 000 et $4 000 par mois. Le 25 avril 2023, il fait aussi appel aux dons sur Twitter, où son compte porte le nom qui était le sien autrefois en Syrie, Max Azadî

    Il nous gratifie de nouvelles photos. Une le 4 mai, où il a abandonné la houpette rockabilly, pas évidente avec le casque, pour une superbe mèche. Il s’est aussi taillé une moustache ukrainienne. Mais avec un nouveau changement le 7, Maxime se cherche.

    Son écusson dit Pour Kherson, 11 novembre 2022. En raison de problèmes logistiques insurmontables sur le Dniepr, les forces russes se retirèrent en bon ordre de Kherson le 9 novembre. Après avoir occupé le terrain, les troupes atlantistes commencèrent ensuite à assassiner des civils réputés collaborateurs.

    Il partage aussi des joies simples sur les réseaux sociaux. Le 9 mai 2023 est le jour anniversaire célébré en Russie et autrefois en Ukraine aussi, de la victoire de l’Union soviétique sur l’Allemagne nazie

    À l’instar des guerriers du clavier de NAFO, un groupe international de nerds favorables à l’OTAN, il rêve en cette occasion de parader à Saint Pétersbourg, autrefois Leningrad, où plus d’un million de civils sont morts quand les armées fascistes européennes l’ont assiégée de 1941 à 1944. À chaque évocation française de ce genre, je me pose toujours la même question. Mais qu’ont fait ses anciens pendant la 2de guerre mondiale, résistants ou athlètes du sport national que sont les ronds de jambe ? À une époque où l’Armée rouge accomplissait 80% de toutes les pertes militaires allemandes

    Le 8 juin, il pose fièrement devant sa collection d’écussons ukrainiens, où l’observateur expérimenté remarque le portrait du criminel de guerre nazi Stepan Bandera et commercialisée par une entreprise locale appelée R3ich, la populaire adaptation de la Totenkopf SS

    Il n’a donc pas que de bonnes fréquentations en Ukraine. Son air est déterminé, mais il passe clairement plus de temps sur Twitter qu’au front. Il arbore aussi sur son béret un insigne qu’une admiratrice lui a offert, celui du renseignement militaire ukrainien (GUR)

    Il apparaît en tenue de combat le 4 juillet. Son camouflage suggère qu’il serait tireur de précision. Belle photo.

    Le 7 juillet, RTL enquête sur les combattants français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine et présente Barrat en tête de gondole. Information que je ne connaissais pas et pour laquelle je remercie les journalistes, il a incorporé le 131e bataillon de renseignement. Son insigne du GUR n’est donc pas usurpé et nous comprenons mieux pourquoi il est en seconde ligne à Kherson depuis des mois. Sa formation pourrait bien être employée à la chasse aux collaborateurs, civils pro-Russie qui sont souvent assassinés

    J’ignore si la faute incombe aux journalistes ou à l’intéressé, mais l’article sur le web est illustré par la pire photo possible, alors que d’autres sont bien meilleures. Je la connaissais mais ne l’ai pas publiée avant, par respect. Il ressemble à Rambo de la Beauce.

    Le reportage évoque qu’il a eu maille à partir avec la justice pour violences en France. Cette information manque de rigueur journalistique, car il a fui un contrôle judiciaire pour violences CONJUGALES.

    MAXIME, POURQUOI TU LA COGNAIS ?

    Les événements dans l’hexagone sont un excellent test pour cerner l’idéologie des individus listés ici. Un moment hilarant du reportage est quand le journaliste souligne que Barrat serait d’extrême-gauche. Je savais depuis longtemps que les droits des femmes n’était pas sa spécialité.

    Son environnement sur les réseaux sociaux compte aussi des racistes, qui qualifient de déchets et de souillure du drapeau français, les citoyens et élus qui défilent le 8 juillet, pour réclamer vérité et justice pour Adama Traore, que des pandores [gendarmes] ont tué en 2016. J’encourage donc les journalistes de RTL à perséverer, encore prospecter, afin de pouvoir présenter à leur public un authentique militant d’extrême-gauche, s’ils souhaitent vraiment rééquilibrer le spectre politique des combattants français dans les rangs atlantistes.

    De façon plus fondamentale, quelqu’un doté d’un soupçon de conscience politique d’extrême-gauche, internationaliste et allergique au nationalisme, ne combattrait pas pour l’OTAN, donc les USA, dans un pays où un État profond nazi, ceux qui portent les flingues, décide d’un conflit où les opprimés sont depuis 2014 les civils russophones bombardés dans le Donbass. Quelques rappels historiques

    Après le coup d’État du 21 février 2014, Arseni Iatseniouk forma le 27 un gouvernement issu de l’opposition parlementaire au président élu mais déchu Viktor Ianoukovytch. Le parti nazi Svoboda obtint un vice-premier ministre et plusieurs ministères, dont la défense. Ce cabinet est resté en fonction jusqu’au 2 décembre, après les élections législatives du 26 octobre

    Le 27 février 2014, jour de l’entrée en fonction à Kiev du gouvernement insurrectionnel, l’armée russe sécurisa la Crimée, russe jusqu’en 1954 et russophone, où est basée aussi sa flotte de la mer Noire

    Issus de scrutins antérieurs à la crise, les élus locaux de Crimée firent sécession de l’Ukraine le 11 mars. Par référendum du 16, la population vota pour son rattachement à la Russie

    En raison de la posture immédiatement hostile à la langue russe des nouvelles autorités de Kiev, le Donbass se souleva début avril. Les insurgés russophones réclamaient une Ukraine fédérale ou leur rattachement à la Russie

    Le 2 mai, afin de dissuader les velléités séparatistes à Odessa, des voyous nationalistes ukrainiens massacrèrent 42 syndicalistes et militants de gauche.

    Les autorités de Kiev qualifiaient de terroristes les autonomistes et séparatistes russophones, quand le 26 mai, les troupes loyalistes bombardèrent l’aéroport de Donetsk. Le 2 juin, l’aviation frappa des objectifs civils à Lugansk, y tua huit citoyens, en blessa 28 autres. Ainsi commença la guerre au Donbass, où les forces atlantistes n’ont jamais cessé de bombarder délibérément les civils

    Si notre perception se limitait au spectacle des grands médias français, les mots n’auraient plus de sens ou celui que leur donnent les écoles de commerce. Nous avalerions toutes les fumisteries, pourrions croire aussi François Hollande de gauche et pas le plus servile auxiliaire de Washington.

    Revenons à Maxime Barrat. Quelque chose a déplu à sa hiérarchie ukrainienne ou à ses camarades étrangers et nous apprenons le 19 juillet 2023 qu’il a été expulsé du 131e bataillon. Il participe toujours à l’effort de guerre atlantiste, commence début août, comme McKenzie, à effectuer des liaisons avec le front. Sa première mission consiste à y conduire une ambulance

    En l’attente d’une nouvelle affectation militaire, il explique ne pas toucher de solde et fait appel aux dons sur les réseaux sociaux pour payer l’essence. Je pense que ces liaisons sont le seul moyen d’assurer l’acheminement au front de petits matériels payés par des donateurs, tels que drones, car le système politico-militaire ukrainien est corrompu jusqu’à la moelle.

    Le 3 septembre, il est toujours sans affectation mais en quête de valeurs sonnantes sur les réseaux sociaux. Dans son environnement, l’atmosphère vire au roman de gare. J’adore

    Fondateur en 2022 des Dark Angels, groupe que Barrat intégra alors, le Britannique Daniel Burke a disparu depuis le 11 août. Il était également sans affectation. Son ordinateur, une arme et divers équipements sont restés dans son appartement de Zaporojie, mais son corps est introuvable. La presse britannique commence à évoquer le scénario criminel, car la police ukrainienne pense qu’il a été assassiné dans le contexte de rivalités pour des sources de financement.

    Au même moment, un camarade très proche de Barrat se lâche sur les réseaux sociaux, où il explique que le personnel étranger du 131e bataillon de renseignement est un ramassis de toxicomanes. Sale affaire.

    Drame le 25 octobre 2023. Tous deux quittèrent le 131e bataillon en juillet, vivaient habituellement sous le même toit

    Barrat avait déjà expliqué que sa future affectation militaire exigerait plus de discrétion sur les réseaux sociaux. Il était silencieux depuis le 9 octobre, confirme ce soir la mort de celui qui était véritablement un compagnon, le Britannique Christopher Perryman, dit Pezz. Les Russes ou a t il trop parlé ?

    Barrat reçoit le 4 janvier 2024. Le tee-shirt préféré de feu Perryman est offert à l’opérateur EOD (explosive ordnance disposal) britannique Gary Mitchell

    Barrat a recruté trois gamins, qui vivent depuis sous le même toit, les Français Allan Leroy (3e par la gauche), Enzo Proupin (4e) et Quentin Evanno, qui prend probablement la photographie. Vous remarquerez qu’ils sont encore moins d’extrême-gauche que lui.

    Il paraît inquiet début juin, sollicite une assistance juridique, car sa hiérarchie militaire ukrainienne lui a signifié qu’en raison de la date de son enrôlement et au contraire de volontaires plus récents, il ne serait pas autorisé à rompre son contrat. Ses démarches sont utiles et il peut annoncer sa démobilisation le 4 juillet 2024.

    Il a des projets civils en Ukraine, où il compte rester. Sa soustraction au contrôle judiciaire et la certitude d’être écroué à son retour en France sont certainement des paramètres non négligeables de ce choix.

    Fatalitas, disait Chéri Bibi. Le 15 août, il est très officiellement recherché par la justice russe, dans une sordide affaire de viol

    Les faits datent du 5 mai, à Glubokoe, dans la région de Kharkov, une semaine avant la prise du village par l’armée russe. Deux soldats francophones pénétrèrent au domicile d’une Ukrainienne, qu’ils battirent et violèrent. Les enquêteurs ont présenté des photos de volontaires français à la victime, qui a formellement reconnu Barrat. Monsieur le président, je demande la relégation

    Il exerce le 18 août son droit à la défense, mais aurait mieux fait de s’adresser à un avocat compétent, avant de publier sur X un texte en Anglais que je traduis ici

    L’année dernière, j’ai entendu des rumeurs selon lesquelles je trafiquais les organes de volontaires [tués] et maintenant, j’ai violé une femme. Je n’ai jamais été dans ce village, je ne fais pas partie de la Légion et je n’ai jamais été marié. Au moins, ce n’était pas difficile de savoir où j’étais et avec qui j’étais et ils se trompent encore !

    Cette défense est désespérante de maladresse. Je ne connaissais pas les rumeurs de trafic d’organes. Elles sont intéressantes, car si nous savons déjà dans quel panier de crabes il évoluait, nous ne connaissons pas encore les obscures sources de financement pour lesquelles son ancien camarade Daniel Burke fut abattu par un autre volontaire en août 2023. Pas de rumeur en revanche dans le cas du viol commis dans la région de Kharkov le 5 mai dernier, car les faits sont établis et ouverte, une procédure judiciaire dans laquelle la victime l’a formellement reconnu. Les enquêteurs de TrackANaziMerc se mettent sur l’affaire.

    Business d’abord. Il s’adresse en Anglais à son public habituel de pigeons anglo-saxons, car il a passé le plus clair de ses deux ans sous les drapeaux ukrainiens à faire la quête auprès de ce public sur les réseaux sociaux. Les plus avisés l’ont d’ailleurs traité de scammer [arnaqueur]. Il leur suggère qu’il n’aurait pas été l’auteur en France de violences conjugales parce que célibataire. Le mariage n’était pas nécessaire et pour avoir été sous le coup, avant son départ pour l’Ukraine, d’un contrôle judiciaire, il a non seulement commis des violences conjugales, mais n’y est pas allé de main morte. Il est particulièrement maladroit, pour se défendre, de nier les faits antérieurs pour lesquels il est déjà poursuivi en France.

    Dans la Légion [internationale] ? Qui l’affirme ? Il était bien sous les drapeaux jusqu’à la date en juillet dernier de sa démobilisation. D’abord dans un bataillon du renseignement militaire ukrainien (GUR), il semble avoir été affecté plus récemment à l’UDA (Ukrayinsʹka dobrovolʹcha armiya, Armée des volontaires ukrainiens), formation paramilitaire nazie de Dmytro Iarosh, fondateur en 2014 de Pravyi sektor [Secteur droit]

    Quant à savoir où et avec qui il était le 5 mai, je soupçonne l’identité de son coauteur du viol : le seul Français à notre connaissance, encore avec lui en mai, le nazi Quentin Evanno

    Les enquêteurs russes le confirment, procèdent à son identification auprès de la victime et le 18 septembre, Evanno est officiellement recherché par la justice, comme coauteur présumé du viol commis dans la région de Kharkov le 5 mai.

    Alors que la victoire totale de Donald Trump risque d’accélérer la défaite atlantiste en Ukraine, le conflit est sans doute devenu plus personnel et existentiel pour Maxime Barrat. S’il se rapatriait, il serait écroué en France pour ses anciens méfaits ; lorsque la Russie aura gagné, l’Ukraine le remettra certainement à la justice russe, qui lui laisse envisager la perpétuité

    En ces circonstances, il a décidé de rempiler. Lui et Enzo Proupin, un jeune camarade dont il était le mentor en début d’année, ont suivi en octobre plusieurs semaines d’entraînement à Kherson. Ils sont le 7 novembre à Ternopil, dans l’ouest lointain, pour accomplir les formalités administratives de leur enrôlement en qualité de tireurs de précision, dans un bataillon de la 126e brigade de défense territoriale. Ils y porteront la tradition de la Team Berlioz, fondée par Franck Malandain.

    À l’occasion d’une rencontre avec l’Ajax, des supporteurs fascistes de l’équipe israélienne Maccabi commencèrent dès le 6 novembre à afficher leur nationalisme exacerbé et à ratonner dans les rues d’Amsterdam. Lors du match le 7, ils sifflèrent la minute de silence en hommage aux victimes des inondations de Valence, au motif que le gouvernement espagnol soutient la cause palestinienne. La police néerlandaise les a laissés faire et en réaction à ces comportements de voyous, des habitants ont ensuite pourchassé en ville et corrigé les fâcheux

    https://youtu.be/ZGRpCQxIeZw
    Voici le reportage des incidents d’Amsterdam, que sous la pression de lobbies, la chaîne britannique Sky News effacera ensuite le 9 novembre

    Ces incidents suscitent le 8 novembre une réaction en Anglais de Maxime Barrat, que je traduis ici

    La faiblesse de l’Occident fait que nous avons des ennemis à l’intérieur et à nos frontières… Une période sombre pour l’Europe, causée par des peuples faibles… Il est temps de laisser les peuples forts prendre des décisions fortes pour préserver l’Europe et sa culture

    Nous savons déjà qu’il n’est jamais aussi fort que lorsqu’il commet en France des violences conjugales ou viole une habitante de la région de Kharkov. Je ressens presque de la peine pour les journalistes de RTL, qui auraient été enfumés en juillet 2023, car de fait, ils présentèrent comme sympathisant d’extrême gauche un vulgaire pétainiste [fasciste français], qui considère les citoyens néerlandais d’origine marocaine comme des ennemis intérieurs aux Pays Bas.

    Son dernier enrôlement semble avorter ou la publicité qu’il lui a donnée n’était qu’un énième mensonge. En février 2025, trois mois seulement après les formalités administratives à Ternopil, il quitte l’Ukraine pour l’Europe occidentale.

    Désormais loin du champ de bataille, il commente l’actualité française. À l’approche de la chute probable du gouvernement de Français Bayrou, dans le contexte d’une catastrophe financière causée par le sabotage des finances publiques au profit des plus riches, que la même droite exploite ensuite comme un prétexte pour essorer encore les plus pauvres, l’escroc et violeur ravale ses glaires racistes pour exprimer le 26 août la profondeur de sa conscience politique

    Que l’on fasse des coupes franches, surtout dans le social… La France est bien trop généreuse, les gens bien trop confortable et sécurisé par toutes ces aides… Au moins les français auront de quoi se plaindre réellement que de se complaire dans leur médiocrité !

    Le côté amusant est qu’il semble convaincu de ne pas être un médiocre d’origine contrôlée.

    Je continue de lire avec attention ses commentaires de l’actualité. Il se révèle début septembre un inconditionnel de l’ancien marxiste -sans doute alors par effet de mode- devenu sarkozyste et aujourd’hui macroniste, anti-tiers-mondiste et ancien maire de Vichy -comme c’est cocasse- Claude Malhuret. Le politicien vit aussi mal que son admirateur l’accélération de l’inéluctable effondrement de l’hégémonie occidentale. Gros temps pour le petit bourgeois réactionnaire français et le lumpen-prolétaire qui s’identifie à lui.

    Au soir du 4 décembre 2025, Maxime Barrat est sur le plateau de LCI, qu’il partage avec l’animateur Darius Rochebin et des personnages comme le foudre de guerre béarnais Michel Goya, qui semble convaincu que ses séjours touristiques en Afrique ou à Sarajevo mériteraient la croix de guerre

    Ce qui est savoureux est que de sa soirée spéciale, la chaîne de propagande ne republie pas ensuite d’extrait avec l’ex mercenaire français. La raison de cette censure tient de la vanité nationale : contrairement au message que LCI veut faire passer à son public innocent, il soutient que l’armée française se ferait étriller

    Le 22 août 2026, Le Dauphiné Libéré publie la vidéo d’un entretien avec Maxime Barrat, au sujet de ses exploits homériques sur la champ de bataille ukrainien. Son témoignage souffre hélas de nombreuses omissions. C’est du journalisme du niveau de Laurent Brayard, mais dans l’autre camp.

    in L’engagement français dans les rangs ukrainiens

    chronique alphabétique et nécrologique de l’engagement français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas

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    On June 25, Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky ordered the initiation of a 40-day offensive intended to “influence” Russia to end the war. In a message delivered via social media, Zelensky announced that “I approved a 40-day influence operation for the service against the aggressor state aimed at compelling it to end the war.”

    On August 3, on the eve of the expiration of the 40-day campaign, Zelensky acknowledged that the 40-day campaign had not achieved its objective of driving Russia to embrace peace. Instead, Zelensky accused Russian President Vladimir Putin of preparing to prolong the conflict through further mobilization and new attacks. Rather than acknowledging failure, however, Zelensky declared that Ukraine would double down on renewed diplomatic efforts, increased economic restrictions, and continued military actions to create conditions where Russia would have no alternative but to agree to negotiations on terms acceptable by Ukraine.

    The 40-day gap between the commencement of Zelensky’s “influence operation”, and the admission by the Ukrainian President that Russia was far from acknowledging defeat, has created a widening chasm between fact and fantasy, between reality and fiction, that appears to be recognized by virtually everyone but the Ukrainian President.

    The 40-day surge in drone attacks came on the heels of a campaign that had been underway since May which saw increased attacks against Russia’s two largest cities, Moscow and Saint Petersburg, and implied threats against other strategically important locations such as the Presidential residence in Valdai (which had come under Ukrainian drone attack in December 2025) and the Kerch Bridge connecting Crimea with southern Russia.

    The goal of these attacks was to force Russia to redeploy air defense forces to protect these strategically important targets, thereby stripping away air defense units from other regions. The 40-day drone campaign announced by Zelensky would seek to exploit these gaps in air defense coverage to bring the “pain” of war home to the people of Russia.

    None of the pressure points Zelensky hoped to engage by his 40-day drone campaign produced anything remotely resembling the desired results. Indeed, in every instance, the opposite outcome was achieved. Zelensky hoped to trigger an energy crisis by attacking Russian petroleum refineries. While a compliant pro-Ukrainian western media declared that Russia had lost up to 40% of its refining capacity, the reality was far different: far from breaking the spirit of the Russian population by denying them access to gasoline and making them wait in long lines to get gas at high prices, the fact is that gasoline in August 2026 is cheaper than it was this time last year (AI-95, the most popular grade of gasoline, was 63.06 rubles per liter in August 2025, as opposed to 61.71 rubles per liter today), and there are virtually no lines of vehicles waiting to refuel.

    Moreover, the timing couldn’t have been worse for Ukraine when it came to reducing Russian refining capacity—Russia simply diverted the stocks of crude destined for domestic refining into the export pipeline at a time when global demand rapidly absorbed these increased exports at record high prices. Zelensky’s war on the Russian energy sector was a major contributor to Russia’s oil and gas revenue, which accounts for around a fifth of total budget income, rising ‌by more than 60% in July 2026 from the same month a year ago.

    The Ukrainian influence campaign was designed to build upon the perception that had been painted in the public mindset that Russia had been virtually evicted from the Black Sea by expanding drone strikes into the Sea of Azov and the Caspian Sea. Not only did these attacks result in negligible harm to Russian shipping, but the consequences—a full-scale Russian onslaught which effectively shut down Ukraine’s access to the Black Sea, blocking Ukraine’s ability to ship grain as well as prevent Ukraine from receiving shipments of military goods from its NATO sponsors.

    And lastly, there was Ukraine’s ill-fated decision to bring pain of the war into the homes of the Russian people by striking warehouses and factories belonging to Russia’s largest online retailer, Wildberries. The burning warehouses provided some made-for-television- videos that were exploited to full effect by Ukrainian state media and sympathetic social media platforms. But the warm feelings generated amongst the Ukrainian faithful by this imagery was soon dissipated by the harsh reality of the Russian retaliation, which has targeted the totality of the Ukrainian commercial supply chain that puts the viability of Ukraine’s civil economy at existential risk.

    Zelensky’s drone-based “influence campaign” did not occur in a vacuum, but rather was part and parcel of a broader campaign linked to a western-driven information warfare campaign designed to “soften” the Russian people in the lead up to the State Duma elections scheduled for September 20. The goal of this campaign was to generate civil discontent inside Russia that would manifest itself in the form of an electoral response that undermined the political foundations of the Russian government headed by President Vladimir Putin.

    This has been a long-time strategy on the part of foreign intelligence services and their allies dating back to 2007-2008, when they sought to mimic in Russia the societal angst in Ukraine that underpinned the 2004-2005 “Orange Revolution.”

    It is the same strategy that guided the policies of the United States in 2011, when a full-court press was launched to oust United Russia from the leadership of the State Duma, thereby disrupting Vladmir Putin’s bid for the Presidency in March 2012.

    These campaigns all failed.

    And the current campaign will fail as well.

    Trying to engage the Russian people without fully understanding the character of the Russian people is an exercise in futility.

    Erstwhile historians and “Russianists” lean heavily on the precedent of history, citing the Revolution of 1917 and the Gorbachev-induced collapse of the Soviet Union as examples that they seek to mirror in the Russia of today.

    But Vladimir Putin is not a Tsar, nor is he a confused Soviet bureaucrat.

    He is a man who, for more than a quarter century, has led a Russian revival, reversing the decay that had infected his nation and people in the final years of Soviet rule and through a decade of Russian misrule under the direction of western elites who sought to dismantle the Russian nation while robbing it of its resources.

    The Russian people of 2026 are not the Russian people of 1917 or 1992.

    Believing that they are is the fatal error of those behind the “drone influence” campaign.

    This is the danger of systemic Russophobia.

    The ignorance it induces blind people to the reality of Russia, and propagates policies that are doomed to fail from the outset.

    Zelensky’s 4-Day War was always doomed to fail.

    And now we know what failure looks like.

    Ukraine has been abandoned by its Western masters.

    No air defense.

    No Patriot license.

    No Patriot missiles.

    No “magical” solution.

    Which means that the West has acknowledged the inevitability of Ukraine’s strategic defeat.

    Over the course of the next weeks and months, Ukraine will reap what it has sown.

    Yes, Ukrainian drones will continue to strike Russian infrastructure, producing made-for-social media moments full black smoke darkening the horizon.

    Meanwhile, Kiev will burn.

    And so, too, will the other cities of Ukraine.

    The Russian army will continue to advance.

    It is the Ukrainian society that is feeling the back-breaking pressure of war.

    No gas.

    No water,

    No heat.

    No food.

    This is the future of Ukraine under Zelensky.

    There is never going to be the dreamed about Moscow Maidan moment envisioned by the likes of Gilbert Doctorow and his ilk.

    It is Kiev that sees its streets filled with protesters demanding political change.

    The collapse of Ukraine as a nation state is inevitable.

    Not a question of if, but rather when.

    And the answer is sooner, rather than later.

    40 Days that sealed Ukraine’s tragic fate.

    40 Days that shook the West [end]

    The original article

    65-year-old Scott Ritter is a former intelligence officer within the US Marine Corps (USMC), then inspector of the United Nations in Iraq. When in 2003, the US and their British minions were about to invade the country under this false pretext, Ritter was claiming that there was no weapon of mass destruction (WMD) there. He was right.

    Related

    The Atlanticist defeat in Donbass and Ukraine

    chronicle of a new catastrophic NATO venture

    July 19, 2026: Decision Point – Scott Ritter

    Ukraine is defenseless in the face of Russian missile attacks. Now is not the time for negotiations. Russia must finish the job

    February 23, 2026: The Flamingo Effect – Scott Ritter

    Ukraine has struck the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant using a Flamingo cruise missile. The ramifications of this event could reverberate globally

    January 9, 2026: Sanctionnez-Moi, Sale Garce! – Scott Ritter, Forum Geopolitica

    In the Jacques Baud case, the EU is sanctioning, for the first time, an analyst not for spreading disinformation but for expressing a politically inconvenient truth, all while admitting he has broken no law. Will it have the courage to go after an American citizen?

    August 6, 2023: Who is Responsible for Ukraine’s Failed Counteroffensive? – Scott Ritter, Sputnik

    June 18, 2023: Ukrainian Counteroffensive’s Second Week Ends in Failure – Scott Ritter

    Operation enters the second week of Ukraine’s long-awaited and highly touted counteroffensive, some basic conclusions can be drawn even though the fighting continues, and will continue to rage, for some time to come

    June 10, 2023: Finally the Bull Charged – Scott Ritter

    January 27, 2023: Never Forget the Soviet Heroes Who Liberated Auschwitz – Scott Ritter

  • [Sharing] Decision Point – Scott Ritter

    Ukraine is defenseless in the face of Russian missile attacks. Now is not the time for negotiations. Russia must finish the job

    The United States Department of Defense defines the term “decision point” as “A geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving success.”

    Today Russia has reached a decision point in its conflict with the collective West, inclusive of the United States, and their Ukrainian proxy.

    The Russian leadership has, in my opinion, been preparing for some time for the confluence of the physical and psychological manifestation of a campaign designed to create an unbridgeable gap between perception and reality which, when exposed through action, will cause the artificially constructed edifice of Ukrainian defensive viability to collapse, and with it the false pillars of Western democracy, industry, and military might which propped it up.

    This campaign wasn’t designed from scratch by the Russians, but rather emerged from the lies and deceit of those in the West who postured as peacemakers but in reality served as the promulgators of war.

    The Europeans had long proved themselves to be charlatans, with their perfidy regarding Minsk forever exposing them as absolutely unreliable partners for resolving a Ukrainian crisis they themselves orchestrated.

    The more curious thing is Russia’s attitude towards the United States. It was the United States which served as the architect of policies which have been in place for decades designed to weaken Russia and undermine to the point of collapse the government of Russia.

    And yet Russia continued to hold out hope that the United States —especially under the second iteration of the Trump administration— could somehow serve as a force of rational stability when it came to managing both Europe and Ukraine.

    The Anchorage Summit of August 2025 was the culminating moment of this conceptualization, manifesting itself into the so-called “Spirit of Anchorage”, the idea that through compromise a solution that addressed in serious fashion Russian concerns could be crafted that would be acceptable to all.

    Within months, however, it became clear that the “Spirit of Alaska” was as illusory as the “Spirit of Minsk” that preceded it, another perfidious diplomatic ploy designed to buy time to build up Ukrainian military capability by lulling Russia into a false belief that a negotiated peace was possible.

    But the United States, like Europe, never intended for the Ukrainian conflict to end in anything other than a strategic Russian defeat.

    The Russian leadership has now come to embrace —however belatedly— this uncomfortable reality.

    The ultimate question that now confronts Moscow is how to act on this realization.

    Russia finds itself in a situation where it enjoys considerable strategic advantages over Ukraine and its Western partners across a broad spectrum of disciplines —diplomatic, economic, military, and social.

    Russia, despite the concerted efforts of the West, is not isolated. Just the opposite, in fact. In many ways, Russia enjoys a stronger geopolitical posture today that it did before the initiation of the Special Military Operation if for no other reason that the conflict has exposed the nefarious nature of the so-called “rules-based international order” and those who conceived and implemented it, and as such breathed viability into the concepts of multilateralism that Russia and other nations, especially China, had been promoting with mixed results.

    The Russian economy has withstood the challenges posed by economic sanctions and direct military action, and today is recognized by most of the world as a viable place to do business, as witnessed by the $84 billion in direct investments accrued during the Saint Petersburg International Economic Forum this past June.

    Russia today possesses a large, well trained, well equipped, combat hardened military backed by a robust and capable defense industry which is not only prevailing in an extended war of attrition against Ukraine and the collective West, but has positioned itself to defend Russia’s interests in the Baltic, Arctic, Pacific, and the totality of its periphery, as well as defend and advance Russian interests in the Middle East and Africa. The advances in Russian technology —especially in ballistic missiles— has provided a qualitative edge which, when combined with Russia’s quantitative strengths, makes Russia a very formidable force.

    Russian society continues its long and painful divorce with the West. The incomplete nature of this split, which sees small pockets of western liberalism holding on to relevance in the face of a larger societal gravitation toward a new Russian national awareness, has provided the collective West with its only opportunity to dismantle the advantages Russia has accrued diplomatically, economically, and militarily. The western intelligence services have worked with Ukraine to craft a narrative of Ukrainian resistance, resilience, and relevance that is then juxtaposed on the perception of Russian weakness that emerges in the wake of the false hope of negotiated peace that Russia had embraced in Minsk, Istanbul and Anchorage.

    This hope was always designed to energize the residual western liberal elites inside Russia into believing everything would be better if Russia simply embraced the spirit of compromise. But the spirit of compromise was nothing more than a wolf in sheep’s clothing, a disguise to blind Russians from the reality that the collective West was seeking Russian surrender instead.

    By planting the false hope of compromised-induced peace and prosperity in the minds of the residual Russian western liberal elites, western intelligence was sowing the seeds of a larger Russian societal disruption that was intended when the desired peaceful outcome failed to materialize. The fact that the failure to find a pathway to peace originated in the collective West’s perfidy didn’t matter in this regard —the Russian liberal elites were conditioned to blame their leadership for this failure, regardless of the truth.

    Having sown the seeds of societal unrest, the western intelligence services themselves embarked on one of the largest information operations ever conducted, flooding the mainstream western press and social media outlets with an endless stream of stories designed to promote the narrative of Ukrainian victory and Russian defeat. This narrative would then be injected into Russian social discourse either through the resonance brought on by the incessant Western echo chamber, or through agents of influence —witting and unwitting alike— whose access to the Russian information market helped magnify a message of Russian weakness, corruption, and indecisiveness designed to collapse Russian public confidence in their leadership.

    And now we find ourselves at the Point of Decision.

    The information operation against Russia was backed by three supporting campaigns.

    The first was the transition by Ukraine and its western supporters away from the traditional battlefield, where Russia was prevailing, to a drone-based war designed to create the perception of Ukrainian strength and, in doing so, the prospect of Ukrainian victory.

    This campaign was not just designed to influence the Russian liberal elites, but also to build a foundation of political support within Europe and the United States for increased economic and military support for Ukraine.

    The drone campaign served as the fuel that energized the G-7 meeting in June where pledges of economic support were made, as well as the NATO summit in July where similar pledges were made regarding military support.

    But rather than constructing a structurally sound foundation upon which a viable Ukrainian counter to Russia could be assembled, the entire Western effort had produced little more than a ghost of what was being sought —a veritable house of cards that could collapse at the slightest of breezes.

    The fact is the ability to turn the promises of the G-7 and NATO into reality are as illusory as the drone campaign upon which these promises were promulgated.

    The European “Big 3” —Germany, France and the UK— are led by leaders who political viability is measured in months.

    The United States is distracted by a losing military effort in the Middle East and a genuine lack of goodwill between American President Trump and his European and NATO partners.

    The only thing that could coalesce this dysfunctional US-European alliance would be a Russian overreaction to the pressures brought on by the Ukrainian drone campaign.

    This, of course, is one of the primary goals of the Western intelligence services through their information operation.

    The “Russia must attack Europe” thematic has taken hold in Russia, promoted by western observers and analysts (I myself have been guilty of this) as well as Russian commentators and influencers.

    But it has been resisted by the Russian leadership, simply because to attack Europe would undo all of the advantages Russia has accrued diplomatically, economically and militarily and, in doing so, potentially trigger the very collapse of Russian society the West has long sought.

    A Russian attack on Europe would also create a window of viability for both the failing European leadership and the flagging US-NATO alliance.

    A Russian attack on Europe is exactly what the Western intelligence seek.

    Today Russia finds itself confronted by a confluence of events that has opened up a window of strategic opportunity.

    The Ukraine drone campaign has failed. This conclusion has manifested itself in the political turmoil inside Ukraine as President Zelensky fired the person responsible for this campaign —Mikhailo Federov— and instead appeared to favor a reallocation of resources to the Ukrainian ground forces.

    The Ukrainian public, which had embraced the narrative of Ukrainian drone dominance as the magic formula to bring an end to the war, have taken to the streets in protest, creating an unprecedented political crisis for Ukrainian President Zelensky.

    Meanwhile Europe and the US struggle to follow through on the promises made at the G-7 and NATO Summits.

    The gap between the theory of Ukrainian victory and the ability of Ukraine and its Western partners to achieve this has never been greater.

    The only thing that could save the Ukraine project is either Russian indecision or Russian overreaction.

    It is time, instead, for Russian action.

    Russia has initiated a massive bombardment of Ukraine using missiles and drones.

    Ukraine has no defense.

    Neither Europe nor the US are in a position to change this calculus in the near term.

    Every Russian missile attack underscores the false narrative of the Western intelligence information operation.

    Every Russian missile attack exposes the impotence of Europe.

    Every Russian missile attack underscores the dysfunction of NATO and the US.

    And every Russian missile attack shreds the credibility of the residual Russian liberal elite.

    This is the Decision Point.

    Keep raining missiles down on Ukraine.

    Confront the Ukrainian people with the inevitability of their collective demise should they continue to fight.

    Confront Europe with the emptiness of their promised support.

    Confront the US and NATO with their collective military impotence.

    And confront the Russian people with the inevitability and necessity of a decisive Russian victory.

    The collective West set itself up for disaster by engaging in perfidy designed to destroy Russia.

    Policies based upon lies and deception cannot succeed if the lies and deception are exposed in time for an effective counter to be implemented.

    Russia has exposed the lies and deception of the West.

    Now it simply needs the courage to act.

    This is the Decision Point that will decide the future of Russia.

    The vulnerability of Ukraine to Russian missile and drone attack has presented itself.

    Russia now needs to exploit this vulnerability with every resource it has.

    Ukraine will be defeated.

    Europe will collapse.

    And the United States will be left holding an empty bag.

    There’s no need to strike Europe.

    Simply darken the skies of Ukraine with Russian missiles and drones [end]

    The original article

    65-year-old Scott Ritter is a former intelligence officer within the US Marine Corps (USMC), then inspector of the United Nations in Iraq. When in 2003, the US and their British minions were about to invade the country under this false pretext, Ritter was claiming that there was no weapon of mass destruction (WMD) there. He was right.

    Related

    The Atlanticist defeat in Donbass and Ukraine

    chronicle of a new catastrophic NATO venture

    Operation Epstein Files

    once more, the US and Israel attack Iran, chronicle

    February 23, 2026: The Flamingo Effect – Scott Ritter

    Ukraine has struck the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant using a Flamingo cruise missile. The ramifications of this event could reverberate globally

    January 9, 2026: Sanctionnez-Moi, Sale Garce! – Scott Ritter, Forum Geopolitica

    In the Jacques Baud case, the EU is sanctioning, for the first time, an analyst not for spreading disinformation but for expressing a politically inconvenient truth, all while admitting he has broken no law. Will it have the courage to go after an American citizen?

    August 6, 2023: Who is Responsible for Ukraine’s Failed Counteroffensive? – Scott Ritter, Sputnik

    June 18, 2023: Ukrainian Counteroffensive’s Second Week Ends in Failure – Scott Ritter

    Operation enters the second week of Ukraine’s long-awaited and highly touted counteroffensive, some basic conclusions can be drawn even though the fighting continues, and will continue to rage, for some time to come

    June 10, 2023: Finally the Bull Charged – Scott Ritter

    April 7, 2023: A prank targets a Western war criminal

    between 2012 and 2017, François Hollande was the second NATO governor of France, after Nicolas Sarkozy and before Emmanuel Macron

    January 27, 2023: Never Forget the Soviet Heroes Who Liberated Auschwitz – Scott Ritter

  • [Enemy media] We Tracked the Trackers: Who’s Behind Russia’s TaNM Doxing Channel? An Interview with the OSINT Team – United24

    They dox and harass foreign volunteers and spread Kremlin propaganda. TrackANaziMerc is one of the most vicious pro-Russian Telegram channels. Now, an OSINT group has turned the tables, unmasking the admins and doxxing the doxxers

    An open-source intelligence (OSINT) unit, The Unintelligence Agency (TUA), @UnintelAgency on X, has granted UNITED24 Media behind-the-scenes access to their investigation into exposing the administrators of one of the most prolific pro-Russian Telegram channels: “TrackANaziMerc” (TaNM).

    TaNM “will 100% dig up anything ‘they’ can on you, I hope you’re prepared,” the OSINT team warned when preparing this article. 

    TaNM has been aggressively pushing disinformation about Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine since 2022. Its core mission is to dox foreign nationals working in support of Ukraine, mocking and intimidating them, and whenever they get the chance, celebrating their deaths. 

    Russia’s “Nazi” narrative is central to its war propaganda. The channel’s name suggests a mission to hunt down so-called “Nazi mercenaries”—foreigners fighting for Ukraine and resisting Russian aggression.

    When hearing about the TUA’s expose on the group, one of the TaNM administrators [me] wrote on X “Nazi sleuths are spending #Yurop-ean tax payers’ money to ‘identify’ people,” a rather ironic comment, as TaNM do exactly that—identify people [not exactly 1]. 

    Many suspect that the Russian Security Services (FSB) are behind the channel, but not everything is as it seems. In fact, the information obtained by the OSINT group reveals—sometimes rather humorous—profiles of the European-wide TaNM group administrators. 

    Exposing these individuals for what they truly are, and not the lies and fanciful personas that they’ve created for themselves, strips them of whatever credibility they may think they have. These aren’t geopolitical experts, intel analysts, or experts on foreign affairs. They are little more than delusional LARPers and deranged individuals seeking validation online.

    Anonymous “B”

    The Unintelligence Agency (TUA)

    We interviewed members of The Unintelligence Agency, who requested anonymity due to privacy concerns. Their insights—labeled Anonymous A, B, and C—offer a rare look into the minds behind TaNM and the wider disinformation ecosystem they operate in.

    But first, here’s what the OSINT team uncovered about TaNM’s ties to Russian media and the people who run the channel.

    TaNM’s connections to Russian state media and political assets [United24 is a Ukrainian government-run platform]

    The TaNM channel grew exponentially in August 2023 after various other pro-Russian platforms and figures amplified it. Among them are Nikolay Valuev, a Russian politician and former heavyweight boxer, and Vladimir Solovyov, one of the Kremlin’s most infamous TV propagandists.

    Rybar, owned by Mikhail Zvinchuk and Denis Shchukin, is one of several media channels that amplify TaNMs’ content. Shchukin, a computer programmer with a prior cybercrime charge, renounced his German citizenship in 2021 in favor of a Russian passport, according to reports. Zvinchuk is a former press officer with Russia’s Defense Ministry. Both men have ties to the Internet Research Agency, the Kremlin-linked troll farm once associated with the Wagner Group, the OSINT group says.

    TaNM’s reach is further amplified by UKR Leaks, a pro-Russian outlet operated by Vasily Prozorov, a former officer of Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) and a known defector. Prozorov, who is currently wanted by Ukrainian authorities, has openly admitted to leaking sensitive information to Russian intelligence beginning in 2014, citing ideological motives. In April 2024, Prozorov was targeted in a car bomb attack in Moscow [indeed, a terrorist attack that the SBU conducted in Moscow on April 12, 2024].

    Having lost the honor of an officer due to drunkenness, Prozorov decided to trade his conscience and military oath, finding ‘worthy’ people in the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation.

    Ukrainian Secret Service (SBU)

    TaNM has worked in coordination with Russian state media outlets, including Zvezda [my interview, that Zvezda published in April 2024], which is owned by the Russian Defense Ministry, TUA reports. Other pro-Kremlin platforms, such as Komsomolskaya Pravda, War Gonzo, and so-called “war reporters” like Alexander Simonov, have also collaborated with the channel, amplifying its campaigns of doxxing, harassment, and targeted intimidation.

    Another is Dmitry Astrakhan, a prominent mouthpiece for the so-called “Donetsk People’s Republic” (DNR). Now a war correspondent for RT Russia, Astrakhan began his career by “trolling” on social media. He later styled himself as the editor-in-chief of Pravda DNR—a propaganda outlet where, according to Evocation, the entire editorial board consisted of just one person: Astrakhan himself.

    Who are the admins of the TrackANaziMerc group?

    Daria Khaltourina

    Daria Khaltourina, posting under her alias “Ekaterina II,” is the owner of TaNM and their “de facto ring leader,” who has close connections to Russia. According to her social media, she is the “Head of Department at Federal Research Institute for Health Organization and Informatization of the Ministry of Health of the Russian Federation”

    Daria Khaltourina (Source Facebook)
    Daria Khaltourina (Source Facebook)

    When Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began, she posted on Facebook, “I condemn the war, I do not approve.” However, since then, as the owner of TaNM, she has consistently repeated pro-Kremlin narratives, claiming that civilians in the Bucha massacre were killed by Ukrainians [they were 2] and that a 1930s Moscow-made famine and genocide—Holodomor—is a “propaganda lie created by Ukrainian nazis”

    We (TaNM) frame, expose mercs, make them cry and shiver all their lives.

    Daria Khaltourina

    Khaltourina is a founding member and board member of the International Longevity Alliance and Chair of the Board of the Russian Council for Public Health and Demography. In recent years, the Kremlin has been “crazy about eternal life,” making millions of dollars from state funds through anti-aging and genetic projects while promoting several “bizarre” ideas and conspiracies.

    Virgil Hesse

    “Love him or hate him, the man is interesting and boring at the same time,” wrote an Encyclopedia Dramatica user about Virgil Hesse, an Australian, likely from St. Kilda, Melbourne. One of the most active TaNM admins, Hesse has a long history of online trolling under aliases like “Lesleyblood” and now “Digitalfolklore.”

    Once called a “bastion of ridiculousness” and “serial fantasist,” Hesse now mostly posts screenshots of interviews with Ukrainian POWs. For over 15 years, he’s collected, archived, and spread content online. The Unintelligence Agency (TUA) believes “Virgil Hesse” is a nom de plume

    Virgil Hesse, who had posted parts of his face on separate occasions, OSINT groups pieced them together to reveal his identity. (Source: Encyclopedia Dramatica via The Unintelligence Agency (TUA) )
    Virgil Hesse, who had posted parts of his face on separate occasions, OSINT groups pieced them together to reveal his identity (Source: Encyclopedia Dramatica via The Unintelligence Agency (TUA))

    “He’s (ironically) a privacy advocate…and he’s writing to the Australian government, so it seems in character he wouldn’t use his real name when The Man is out to get him,” TUA said. In the early 2000s, as Lesleyblood, he regularly engaged in chaotic online arguments, which escalated and “turned into these bizarre back-and-forths” and led to mocking videos and leaked recordings of him. 

    Offline, he’s been known to lodge “endless complaints with his local city council for a variety of banal issues,” like off-leash dog zones and bin removal. TUA found footage and documents of these efforts, along with Hesse’s submissions to Australian government inquiries on crypto and surveillance laws.

    He claims to have “high-end education” but also says he “never went to high school or brainwashing camps.” On X, he once told Elon Musk he’d built a “bespoke, handmade… better than yours” version of Grok.

    Though UA describes him as more of an archiver, Hesse likely sees himself as a hacker. He’s compiled an enormous collection of leaks, drone videos, and files tied to WikiLeaks, Anonymous, the war in Ukraine, and ISIS. He’s also filmed and posted drone footage from Melbourne and discussed drone-making in the TaNM chats.

    TUA says Hesse’s accounts follow—and are followed by—Adam Bennett, aka “Lorax” CEO of Australian cybersecurity firm Red Piranha. Bennett once ran the Anonymous Australia Twitter and in 2016 received a suspended sentence for hacking government sites. Hesse is an active poster in “Beregini,” a Telegram group that brands itself as Ukrainian hacktivists, but is actually based in St. Petersburg. The group has pushed fake Ukrainian intel and taken credit for leaks.

    As “Digitalfolklore,” Hesse also leaked a phone call between the FBI and Scotland Yard discussing LulzSec—a hacking group behind attacks on PlayStation Network and the CIA site. The FBI later confirmed Anonymous accessed an email containing the call code, raising further suspicions of Hesse’s links to the group. TUA adds he may have known people in Julian Assange’s inner circle [impressive].

    Nicolas Cinquini

    Cinquini is a former French lieutenant detective and intelligence officer, dismissed from duty after his support for the yellow vest protests in France. 

    On social media, Cinquini portrays an intriguing, multifaceted personality, much like Hesse. Sharing Russian propaganda, videos of cats and dogs, to even arguing with Grok, Elon Musk’s AI chatbot 

    Nicolas Cinquini (Source: The Unintelligence Agency)
    Nicolas Cinquini (Source: The Unintelligence Agency) [a screenshot from the interview that Zvezda, TV channel of the Russian defense ministry, published in April 2024]

    Cinquini disseminates very typical pro-Kremlin narratives, promotes conspiracy theories, and spreads misinformation about Ukraine. He claims to be the intelligence lead for TaNM [no, I have never claimed that] and has been suspected of leaking information about French volunteers, which Russia used to make false claims about their supposed deaths

    He didn’t even try to hide – his ego matched his idiocy [is that a threat ?]. Once sworn to protect France, now cheers terrorists.

    The Unintelligence Agency

    On May 18, 2025, he was interviewed [that is an excerpt on my YouTube channel, here is rather the complete report on Rossiya 1] by Russian state-media Rossiya 1 where he discussed French fighters serving in the Ukrainian army against Russian aggression. Cinquini, during his interview, furthered his pro-Kremlin narrative and told Russian media that the Frenchmen TrackANaziMerc have identified, “competed with each other in fascism, and won their place in the cast through hard work.” He then went on to dox five servicemen throughout the interview [QED: five French Nazi militants].

    There are several more admins of the TaNM channel, some have maintained an anonymous identity. 

    Other admins behind the channel

    Dmitry Levin from Moscow (Source: The Unintelligence Agency)
    Dmitry Levin from Moscow (Source: The Unintelligence Agency)
    Maxim Bugaev a children’s karate intructor (Source: The Unintelligence Agency)
    Maxim Bugaev a children’s karate intructor (Source: The Unintelligence Agency)

    Luico Festa says he is Italian-Croatian and claims to be affiliated with Camorra, an Italian Mafia-type criminal organization. He has openly threatened previous TaNM members, claiming that within Camorra, his purpose is extortion, drug dealing, and money laundering. Following the TUA’s leak, Festa deleted both his Facebook and VKontakte pages.

    “BulgARYAN”—“For someone in a group that supposedly hates Nazis they decided to spell their username with the word “Aryan” in all caps instead of the more usual -rian suffix” TUA said. 

    Mikhail Yevgenevich Rapoport is a Russian national who has left several reviews about parks and businesses on Google Maps. He is thought to live near Kudrovo, a notorious town where Russia’s largest residential complex, known as the “human anthill,” is located.

    “Nataliahunter”—”Natalia is a common nickname Russian soldiers use when referring to Ukrainian women, which makes this individual, who claims to be in the Russian army, particularly disturbing,” TUA said. 

    “Drexy baba” established a reputation of sorts as someone who collected and documented rare combat footage from the war in Afghanistan, always with a pro-Taliban angle, the OSINT team said

    It’s cliché that the KGB recruited ‘winners’ who were really losers—but these guys aren’t even that. The technical term is ‘useful idiot

    Anonymous A

    The Unintelligence Agency

    Interviewing The Unintelligence Agency

    Why do you want to expose the admins from TaNM?

    Anonymous A: Combating channels like TaNM is a stop-gap, a temporary solution. For every group and individual we can ID, there will always be more. What we really need is a change in how we interact with social media, or rather, how social media interacts with us.

    This is not to say that this will necessarily stop them from continuing what they’re doing, but the truth matters and does have an impact.

    Vote for people who don’t benefit from disinformation. Demand that whoever is in power acts to put an end to its prevalence and popularity on social media. Start petitions calling for action. Organise protests. Don’t ask—demand!

    If we do nothing, then we will rapidly find ourselves in an oligarchy of those with the means to run massive disinformation campaigns that will be bowing down to dictators all over the world. 

    Why is OSINT important in the modern digital world?

    Anonymous A: Social media platforms have become central to how the world consumes news, yet they continue to allow, amplify, and even financially reward those who spread disinformation. 

    By identifying people like the TaNM admins, we help map the architecture of propaganda networks, removing the mystery of where disinformation originates. More often than not, they aren’t listening to a renowned expert or someone with lived experiences in a subject, but a charlatan and a fraud [I have worked 30 years as police detective and intelligence officer in counter-terrorism]. 

    Anonymous C: Russia is using digital media a force multiplier for its soft power and propaganda apparatus, and Western governments haven’t, by and large, figured out how to counter it effectively yet. Nor have they put sufficient resources into it. But Russia, very cheaply, can produce these outsize effects, largely aimed at shaping narratives, disrupting public discourse, and planting the seeds of doubt.

    Their big picture goal is to cut Ukraine off from its allies and its support network. Russia goes about this by shaping public opinion in the West. Or in the case of the “Ukraine is overrun by Nazis” narrative, trying to give Westerners the impression that Ukraine is simply unworthy of support. 

    What do you believe is TaNM’s main goal?

    Anonymous A: After more than two years, it’s evident they’ve failed to stop or even slow the number of people choosing to defend freedom and democracy in Ukraine. Today, TaNM seems more like a small online community of socially isolated individuals who’ve found validation in a space that reinforces their fringe views. Their focus on doxxing and harassment appears less about impact and more about maintaining engagement with like-minded followers, creating a feedback loop of radicalisation.

    The real danger isn’t their investigative abilities—often resembling little more than basic social media searches—but the fact that they’ve become a nexus for disinformation and extremism.

    Anonymous B: While they claim to be documenting and tracking the presence of “foreign nazi mercenaries” in Ukraine, the true purpose of their channel is to sow doubt and fear. The doxxing serves as a form of intimidation, with people on their chat openly making violent threats and discussing ways to harass volunteers and their family members. Furthermore, there’s a concerted effort to promote paranoia and suspicion amongst volunteers [poor darlings]. 

    Is there a common theme amongst admins from pro-Russian channels?

    Anonymous C: Essentially, every Westerner cheering Russia that we’ve come across has been more or less the same archetype–an overinflated sense of self-worth with a lack of any real accomplishments, plus an inability to accept any responsibility for personal failings. 

    Almost without fail, you can guarantee that they’re online lying about accomplishments they never had, that they’ve all failed in their lives in some way, shape, or form, and all feel like something more was owed to them, but that somehow they were thwarted by the system. They all, therefore, resent the West, and at some level fantasize about how well they’d do if society were shaken up and whatever bit of the system it is they blame for not having succeeded were destroyed.

    This archetype must be extremely fertile soil for the Russians because it keeps repeating in the people we come across [end]

    The original article

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  • [Sharing] Happy birthday, President Putin – Declan Hayes, Strategic Culture Foundation

    Putin’s race is not yet run because NATO’s game plan remains the same one of subjugating Russia and, mad though it seems, using it as a springboard to dismember China

    Though Russian President Putin has reasons galore to be quietly cheerful when he marks his 72nd birthday this Monday, 7th October, chief of these are that he has been loyal to his faith, his family and his motherland. Were his mother or his elder brother, who died as an infant in Finland’s Siege of Leningrad, to testify to us from beyond the Styx, they would be rightly very proud of how Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin not only stayed true to all of them but to Mother Russia as well.

    The collapse of the Soviet Union around Putin’s ears was a pitiable sight. Red Army soldiers in Budapest sold their kits for pennies to passersby, vodka and depression slashed the life expectancy of Russia’s males, patriotic Russian teachers were paid with cabbage heads and Western gangsters, together with their local collaborators, robbed Russia blind. To the extent that Putin has reversed all of that, he and his helpers should be immensely proud of the work they have done thus far.

    Not that those enemies have gone away. They have not and one very important vector worth examining is the soft war NATO is directing through the cross dressing Ukrainian dictator Zelensky and Russian fifth columnists like the Pussy Riot slappers, who enjoy the same considerable support amongst the brothels and bordellos of Eastern Europe that the Gestapo did in occupied France.

    That Putin’s most vehement Ukrainian critics have, like Hitler’s French collaborators, degenerated into nothing more than hired hitmen, should not unduly surprise us, as they were nothing much better to begin with. What is, at first glance, far more noteworthy is the unrelenting attack on everything Russian, from the great Dostoevsky to the equally great Masha and the Bear, which makes no sense until we read this very day that children in Ukraine are still being brutalised for speaking their Russian mother tongue, the same mother tongue they share with the cross-dressing Ukrainian dictator and far too many immortal musicians, artists and authors to adumbrate here.

    Although those attacks, in the context of the Ukrainian conflagration, might seem trivial, they are anything but. Their purpose, when juxtaposed with the elevation of Pussy Riot, Zelensky and similar Central Asia civil society degenerates, is to demean, denigrate and marginalise all of Russia. Although all that might seem crazy to us, no less a figure than Herr Hitler would have understood its pivotal role in helping NATO physically and spiritually divide and conquer Russia which, as these NATO links here, here, here and here detail, remains its post-Putin Ukrainian end game.

    But Putin, it seems, is going nowhere anytime soon, at least not until his work of consolidating Russia within and without is done. Although the Pussy Rioters are a cancer that must be excised, the Ukrainian conflict must get priority. Although Russia’s recent capture of the fortress city of Vuhledar portends well, so do recent pronouncements of Ukrainian dictator Zelensky and serial British philanderer Boris Johnson.

    Because Zelensky implored American companies to invest in Ukraine’s energy grid during his recent American junket, the Russian air force must now reduce that infrastructure to dust to show that investing in Zelensky’s Ukraine has no upside. As regards Poundland Dr Strangloves like Boris Johnson, who demand that NATO should help its Ukrainian proxies to blitz Moscow and St Petersburg, Putin must show such charlatans that such bravado carries personal risk to obese armchair generals like them.

    Either way, if Russia is to survive, Putin must show NATO and their Ukrainian proxies that their dreams of conquest are not worth the candle and, if the Romanian or Polish juntas or, heaven help us, the non-entity who is Prime Minister of Denmark, have problems with that, so be it, and let the cards fall where they will.

    Although Putin unquestionably has his critics, much of that criticism is no more than cat yowling. Take, for example, this fine BBC piece, where Mariana Katzarova tells us of Putin’s ‘systematic crackdown’ on human rights since the Ukraine invasion. A fine demolition job on Putin, until we check Katzarova’s Wikipedia entry, which tells us that this Bulgarian brasser makes her living writing screeds like that, and that she knows no more about the internal dynamics of Russia than you or I do about the Yaifo tribe of the East Sepik province of Papua New Guinea who, to give them their due, are far more honest and honourable than carpetbaggers like Katzarova.

    Although NATO is also raising the stakes on Russia’s border with Japan, the key to these border brush fires is crushing NATO in Ukraine, so that all 14 countries that border Russia get the message that the Russian bear retains a fearsome bite.

    With her borders secure, Putin can then concentrate on the no less important task of securing Russia’s economic future with trade and other agreements with countries, great and small, that are not NATO’s cats’ paws. Though two of the most important of such countries are North Korea and China. Israel has also made Russian cooperation with Iran far more important than it was even a fortnight ago.

    The key to such co-operation is for each participant to know and to agree upon the extent and depth of their co-operation. Fortunately for Putin and for Russia, NATO’s Ukrainian adventurism has made that co-operation between Russia and a host of other Asian and African countries that bit easier.

    All of that said, Putin’s race is not yet run because NATO’s game plan remains the same one of subjugating Russia and, mad though it seems, using it as a springboard to dismember China. When we look at Russia in NATO’s global context, we can see how cautious Putin must be and what a monumental thorn in the side of NATO he is. That said, in the wider context of Russian and, indeed, European history, that is something Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin and those who work closest with him can be immensely proud of as they have measured themselves against Russia’s Immortal Regiment and they have passed with flying colours. Now, that is something for the septuagenarian Putin to be very happy about, indeed [end]

    The original article

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  • [Sharing] One of the results of the US-Russia war: Africa rebels against imperialism – Elijah J. Magnier, dossierSul

    Amidst the war between the US and Russia, events unfolding on the African continent are signalling a significant rebellion against imperialist control due to the wider impact of the war on the global geopolitical landscape.

    The war between the West and Russia on Ukrainian soil is still ongoing and its outcome is yet to be known. However, its effects are being felt on several fronts. The most important of these is the significant economic impact caused on the European continent, whose leaders have chosen to engage in a war without tangible benefits.

    A notable consequence of the conflict is the emergence of a rebellion against long-standing US unilateral dominance of the world. This rebellion would not have taken root if Russian President Vladimir Putin has not courageously accepted the challenge and actively participated in the conflict that Washington had meticulously prepared for Moscow.

    A key result of this shift is the public defiance of African countries against Western domination. These nations are raising their voices against decades of exploitation, resource depletion, abject poverty and rampant corruption left behind by the imperialist powers. The vast African continent, with a population of over one billion two hundred million people, has considerable natural resources, including 40% of the world’s gold reserves, 30% of various minerals, 90% of platinum and chromium, 12% of petroleum and 8% natural gas.

    The region is undergoing significant political changes in response to the global turmoil. Military coups in the Sahel region of Africa, such as Guinea (2021), Mali (2021) and Burkina Faso (2022), brought military officers from the middle and poor classes to power. As a result, these newly formed governments announced their intention to create their own union, different from the one created in 1960.

    France, which had a significant presence in Africa, was expelled from most countries after these military coups. Only Niger, which supplies 20% to 30% of France’s uranium needs, and Chad, where France has military bases, maintain a French military presence.

    Last April, Chad expelled the German ambassador, Jean-Christian Gordon Crick, because he had criticized the head of state, General Mohamed Deby, son of Chad’s leader, Idriss Deby (who died fighting the rebels in 2021), for not holding elections in the country.

    Neither France nor the United States of America took a stand against Chad for fear of losing their essential military bases in the country. However, the African popular classes welcomed the expulsion of the German ambassador. African popular classes in several Sahelian countries celebrated the departure of France, expressing their frustration with the rise of extremist movements, corruption, poverty and inequality, and the failure of the West to deal with these issues and to quell rebellions.

    Pressure from the World Bank, which is saddling African countries with debt and is imposing austerity measures, has turned many African nations against foreign investors and multinationals. US-based Exxon Mobil and France’s Total have also faced opposition in Mozambique, where widespread rebellion has erupted over perceived unfair exploitation of the country’s second-largest natural gas field.

    In response to Africa’s shifting alliances with Russia and China, the United States has increased its presence on the continent, establishing military bases and entering into negotiations with countries such as Zambia and Ghana to counter the growing Sino-Russian-African relationship. The United States is pressuring African leaders to cut ties with China and Russia. However, the St. Petersburg conference demonstrated Africa’s determination to diversify its options and seek independence from unilateral domination. African leaders believe that competition between the world’s superpowers is healthy and can bring better opportunities to the African continent.

    At the second Russia-Africa Summit, which was attended by 49 of the 54 African countries, including 17 presidents, African leaders reaffirmed their quest for freedom of choice. Russian President Vladimir Putin welcomed them warmly and eased their concerns by offering free grain, fertilizer and vital financial facilities, mainly to Burkina Faso, Zimbabwe, Mali, Somalia, Central Africa and Eritrea. Putin promised to deliver what Africa needed in terms of food at low prices and financial ease. The gesture was received with enthusiasm and sparked a new economic and political vision that emphasized Africa’s central role in the world.

    The African authorities would not have gone to Russia in the midst of a fierce war between the country and the United States if President Putin had not dared to accept the Western challenge and stand firm in the face of the Western alliance. Russia has demonstrated that it is not afraid of a war being waged – as US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin put it – by top military officials from over 50 countries at the Ramstein base in Germany. Africa’s participation at the summit, including the presence of the Egyptian president, underscored the continent’s willingness to explore multiple options and to embrace China and Russia, despite Western calls to marginalize Russia. The presence of Egyptian President Adel Fattah el-Sisi shows how the Middle East is also diversifying its options, moving away from unilateral US dominance. In fact, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Iraq have already decided to establish strong economic and trade ties with China and Russia, just one year after the war between the US and Russia in Ukraine. The Middle East and Africa are no longer under the domination of the US and the West.

    Blessed with a third of the world’s mineral wealth and 65% of its arable land, Africa has long suffered from hunger, poverty, conflict and coups. However, with officials from Western, Russian and Chinese nations in attendance, the continent is witnessing a realignment of geopolitical and economic trends. This shift is challenging the Western influence that has dominated the continent for decades and is being accelerated by Africa’s growing ties with China.

    The war between the US and Russia, fueled by the belief of dragging Russia into a destructive cycle, has inadvertently led to unintended consequences in other continents such as Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Latin America. These unintended consequences are undermining the hegemony of the United States and its allies, which are facing diminishing influence on the world stage.

    During a crucial vote in the General Assembly in March last year, there was a significant shift in Africa’s position, which called for Russia’s withdrawal from Ukraine and an end to the war. A remarkable 31% of African countries were absent from the vote, 15% abstained and 1% voted against the resolution. This unprecedented stance has raised alarm bells among Western powers that have historically occupied and exploited Africa and exercised their influence over policy decisions on the continent. This newfound assertiveness came after Africa’s increased engagement with the world, especially China. It has been instrumental in developing more than 46 ports and land roads in Africa, connecting nations and linking them to the global economy. This transformation raised concerns in the West, which previously benefited from keeping Africa underdeveloped and dependent.

    The impact of the ongoing war further underscore that the United States miscalculated in provoking Russia and underestimated the consequences on other continents, such as Africa, where regional dynamics have changed dramatically. As Africa and other regions, including the Middle East, Asia and Latin America, are experiencing unforeseen shifts in geopolitical alliances and economic trends, the influence of the United States and its allies continues to wane.

    Africa’s bold moves to diversify its partnerships and assert its independence from unilateral domination is challenging the status quo and promote a new global balance of power. With a wealth of natural resources and a growing population, Africa is increasingly becoming a major player in international relations, attracting the attention of countries in conflict seeking to strengthen their position on the world stage.

    As the war between the US and Russia continues to unfold, it is clear that the world is witnessing a significant shift in geopolitical dynamics. The rebellion against imperialist control that arose in Africa is just one example of the conflict’s unforeseen consequences. As Africa is signalling its willingness to explore diverse partnerships and challenge long-standing dominance, the global order is being reshaped, prompting countries to reassess their positions and realign their strategies.

    As events are unfolding, the full extent of the war’s impact on Africa and the wider international community remains uncertain. But one thing is certain: the war between the US and Russia is contributing to a tectonic shift in global geopolitics, with Africa at the forefront of asserting its independence and defining its destiny. The continent’s growing influence and evolving alliances could redefine the post-Cold War balance of power and impact international relations. Africa is opposing unilateral domination amidst global geopolitical shifts [end]

    The original article

    Elijah J Magnier is a veteran war correspondent and senior political risk analyst with over 35 years of experience

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  • [Sharing] Africa and a new world order – Stephen Sefton, Tortilla con Sal (Nicaragua)

    [the sense of history]

    The successful second Russia-Africa Summit on July 27-28 represents an extraordinary breakthrough in the development of a new world order free from the domination of Western imperialist powers. Delegations from 49 African countries participated in the summit, including seventeen heads of state. They adopted a 74-point final declaration on virtually all areas of cooperation, trade and security, with a preamble clarifying the fundamental principles that should govern international relations. The summit built on the initiative of the first Russia-Africa forum held in 2019, reaffirming the historic bonds of fraternal cooperation resulting from their common struggle in the 20th century against Western colonialism.

    In fact, the Final Declaration of the Summit is a clear challenge to the West because it asserts strongly the growing role and global influence of Africa and the African Union as an essential pillar of a multipolar world. It insists on the need to oppose neocolonialism expressed in the imposition of conditions and double standards that prevent sovereign decision-making about countries’ different paths to development. Russia and Africa also reject the use of coercive measures and expressed the commitment of the signatory countries “to the fundamental principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter, subscribing to safeguarding and upholding international law and emphasizing the need for the adherence thereto by all States,”

    The Russian Federation pledged to promote an expansion of Africa’s representation in the UN Security Council. The African countries and Russia are going to create a strategic partnership mechanism and Russia will negotiate opening new embassies in Africa among other measures to improve diplomatic relations between African countries and the Russian Federation. Along with these decisions, it should be noted that the Russian Federation has cancelled bilateral debt with African countries worth US$23 billion dollars is supporting African nations to develop their energy infrastructure. Currently, Russia is engaged in over 30 electricity generating projects in 16 African countries while gas infrastructure projects are also being negotiated to facilitate the shipment of liquefied gas.

    President Vladimir Putin thanked Africa’s proposals to settle the conflict in Ukraine, commenting, “The initiative itself, like any other peace initiative, is good… There are things that are already being implemented after we discussed them at our meeting in St. Petersburg a month and a half ago.” Regarding the failure of the agreement on the export of grain through the Black Sea, noting the bad faith and hypocrisy of the West benefiting its large agribusiness corporations, President Putin observed that under the grain agreement: “Countries like Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and some others received, please note this, less than 3% of the total volume, less than one million tons.” On the other hand, it was announced that, in the near future, Russia will supply grain free to six African countries (Burkina Faso, Zimbabwe, Mali, Somalia, Central African Republic and Eritrea), while during the current year the trade of agro-industrial products between Russia and Africa has grown by 60%.

    The speeches by the heads of State participating in the Summit touched on issues of global relevance, especially for Latin America, stressing the issues of colonialism, neocolonialism and the imperative of defending national sovereignty. President Putin commented, “Sovereignty cannot be viewed as something that can be achieved once and for all. It is something you must fight for all the time.” Regarding the same issue of sovereignty, the head of the Libyan Presidential Council Mohamed Younis Ahmed Al-Manfi said: “Africa believes that it was subjected to unfair exploitation for several centuries and that although formally all countries got rid of the colonial yoke, we haven’t yet managed to create genuinely national states. Now we must strive, together with the African Union, to change the membership system in the UN Security Council. Despite a number of unimportant reforms, the West has recently continued preserving its dominant position. It is trying to exert all-round pressure on us, using our financial debts in its own interest, destroying our economies and increasing poverty and misery in our countries in every possible way.”

    Of central importance at the Summit was the topic of financial independence and the use of national currencies in trade. Russian exports of oil and its derivatives to African countries have multiplied by two point six times in the last two years. Being able to pay for these imports in their local currencies would be a great financial relief for African countries and would be in line with the decision recently announced by the president of the New Development Bank of the BRICS bloc, Dilma Rousseff, to offer at least 30% of the bank’s loans in local currencies. Interviewed on July 29th, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksey Overchuk noted, “We propose the creation of an independent financial infrastructure. This implies mutual settlements in national currencies, the use of national payment systems, which requires an interaction between the relevant structures: central banks, ministries of finance, financial institutions, without this nothing will develop.”

    The African countries went through a long drawn out, arduous process of struggle for independence. In North Africa, Egypt had been an independent monarchy since 1922 but it was not until 1954 under Gamal Abdel Nasser that it was possible to end the British occupation of the Suez Canal and, in 1956, to win the independence of neighboring Sudan. France accepted defeat in its brutal colonial war against Algeria in 1962. Morocco and Tunisia had already won their independence in 1956, Niger and Mauretania in 1960. Similar to Egypt, the former Italian colony Libya became an independent kingdom in 1951 but it was not until 1966 that it became an independent republic under the leadership of Muammar al Gaddhafi. By the end of 1961 almost the entire western and central part of Africa had become politically independent from the former colonial powers, France, the United Kingdom and Belgium.

    In East Africa, Ethiopia was declared independent in 1947 after being liberated from Italy’s colonial aggression. Somalia became independent in 1960, followed in the coming years by Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya, Uganda, Zambia, Malawi, Tanzania and Madagascar. Portugal maintained its colonial rule over Guinea-Bissau until 1974 and, after many years of armed conflict, in 1975 finally recognized the independence of Angola, Mozambique, and Cape Verde. In southern Africa, Botswana achieved its independence in 1966. But Zimbabwe only achieved independence in 1980 after a fierce, bloody war. Namibia was occupied by the apartheid regime of South Africa until 1990. South Africa itself only held its first democratic elections in 1994, won by Nelson Mandela, to end the brutal apartheid regime.

    The reaction of the imperialist powers to the independence of their former colonies has been to seek to consolidate their control of Africa’s natural resources and economies through their domination of global trade, international finance and their control of international institutions such as the United Nations, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Speaking in Algeria in February 1965, Che Guevara explained: “As long as imperialism exists, by definition, it will exercise its domination over other countries; that domination is today called neocolonialism. Neocolonialism developed first in South America, in an entire continent, and today it is beginning to be noticed with increasing intensity in Africa and Asia. Its way of penetration and development has different characteristics; one is the brutal one we met in Congo. Brute force, without considerations or cover-ups of any kind, is his extreme weapon. There is another more subtle one: penetration into countries that are politically liberated”.

    During the second Russia-Africa Summit, the heads of state of the African continent spoke repeatedly to condemn the decades of neocolonialism that have continued the impoverishment of their peoples through unfair and unequal treatment by the United States and the countries of the European Union. Among them were the President of the African Union Azali Assoumani, and the presidents of Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Uganda, Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Libya and Mali, among others.

    Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni commented, “The independence of most African countries does not mean healthy disengagement with the imperialist economies. Up to now, many of the African economies still face the bottlenecks and distortions of the colonial era. Although some progress has been achieved, a lot remains to be done. That is why you hear that the GDP of Africa is currently $2.7 trillion smaller than the individual economies of countries such as Japan, Germany, etc. Not to mention the US or China.”

    The President of the Congo, Denis Sassou Nguesso, commented to President Putin: “It is impossible to industrialise our continent without electrification. You will remember the famous slogan of the great revolutionary of your country – ‘Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country.’ Meanwhile, today, 600 million Africans – I will repeat this figure – 600 million Africans live without electricity.”

    The President of Mali, Assimi Goïta, said: “Russia has been able to show in difficult moments its status as Mali’s faithful partner, has been loyal, dynamic and has helped us in dealing with difficulties, accompanied us and respected our sovereignty. That is very important in restoring peace, stability and security, which is why we must now, above all, protect our population and defend the territorial integrity of our country. This strategic choice is very important to us, and we must, of course, become completely independent and self-sufficient and strengthen our armed forces. That is why we, in Mali, have a military partnership with the Russian Federation..”

    Given these comments by a majority of African leaders, it is no surprise that right now the first Deputy Secretary of State of the United States, Victoria Nuland, is on a visit to South Africa, Ivory Coast and the Democratic Republic of Congo. She is visiting there to communicate her country’s imperial dictates to be shared among the other governments of the region. But the vast majority of African countries have shown that they want to emancipate themselves from the neocolonial yoke, from the racism and arrogance, from the cynicism and hypocrisy, of the United States and the European Union. With their inevitable defeat in Ukraine in sight, it remains to be seen to what extent the United States and the European Union can maintain their accustomed power and privilege in their relations with African countries whose leaders have categorically shown their anti-imperialist position at this second Russia-Africa summit [end]

    The original article