Nicolas Cinquini

Analista senior di l'intelligenza in u campu di a gestione di i risichi di sicurezza, sรฒ un anzianu tenente detective รจ ufficiale di l'intelligenza in l'agenzie di u Statu francese. A bona pronuncia hรจ ะะธะบะพะปะฐะน ะงะธะฝะบัƒะธะฝะธ, in russu

Tag: EW

  • Flash: Ukraine manages to damage Crimea bridge

    French State radio station RFI reveals that without knowledge or consent of the national legislature, active-duty military personnel are deployed in Ukraine. Their mission is involving maintaining French military equipment and training Ukrainian non-commissioned officers in close proximity to the combat zone. That secret operation is codenamed Volia and based in Poland, its official cover is known as Gerfaut

    On November 17, 2026, with British support in intelligence and EW, scores of cruise missiles and drones manage before dawn to overwhelm air defense in Kerch and damage the Crimea bridge, a symbolic target.

    in The Atlanticist defeat in Donbass and Ukraine

    chronicle of a new catastrophic NATO venture

    Related

    Panzer, Marsch

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    November 11, 2025: Der Krieg

    in French, November 11, 2025 is an opportunity to highlight how the way Europe is sacrificing forcibly mobilized Ukrainian conscripts is reminiscent of the spectacular carnage of WW1

    August 2, 2025: Russophrenia: the Westโ€™s favourite delusion about Russia โ€“ Brian McDonald

    Ten years after I coined the term, the mediaโ€™s still convinced Russia is both collapsing, and conquering the world

    May 9, 2025: Victory Day

    January 9, 2025: Total Kievan Debellation โ€“ Big Serge

    The Russo-Ukrainian War: Year 3

    March 1, 2024: Russo-Ukrainian war: The Deluge โ€“ Big Serge

    Z World Turns Two

    December 12, 2023: The Atlanticist ยซ counter-offensive ยป

    the last NATO attempt to avoid defeat in its proxy war in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia

    August 29, 2023: Escaping Attrition: Ukraine Rolls the Dice โ€“ Big Serge

    The Zaporizhia Summer Blockbuster

    June 2, 2023: The Battle of Bakhmut: Postmortem โ€“ Big Serge

    Russo-Ukrainian War Update

    May 20, 2023: Countdown of the Atlanticist defeat in Bakhmut

    January 20, 2023: Russo-Ukrainian War : The World Blood Pump โ€“ Big Serge

    Gradually, and then Suddenly

    November 29, 2023: How American Neocons Wrecked the Middle East and Ukraine โ€“ David Stockman, Antiwar.com

    This is part 2 of โ€œWhy There Is Still No Peace on Earth: Washingtonโ€™s Folly From The Persian Gulf to Ukraine.โ€  Read part 1

    Nazism in Ukraine

    its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine, chronicle

    The Western disinformation about Ukraine

    chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia

    Music

    https://youtu.be/JQUiYm6iK7c
  • [Sharing] A Report from Russia: How Close are Europe and Russia to a Wider Conflict? – Scott Ritter

    This article is the product of visits to Russia I made in June and September 2026 where I met with senior Russian leaders, leading academics, and specialists in military and security issues

    There has been a spate of irresponsibly aggressive rhetoric from within Europe strongly posturing for a conflict with Russia by the end of the decade. This rhetoric comes in the context of the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine, which is well into its fifth year, a conflict which both Europe and the United States openly acknowledge operates in the form of a proxy war between the collective West and Russia. The Russian response has been to accelerate its military efforts against Ukraine while putting NATO on notice that any effort to threaten Russian territory, and particularly the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, would see Russia responding with the full compliment of military capabilities, including nuclear weapons. The current situation in Europe today in many ways replicates the conditions that existed on the continent in the summer of 1914, where military mobilization and war preparations created a momentum that produced a war no politician was seriously looking to prosecute. The consequences of war in 1914 were a disaster for Europe; the consequences of a war today would be fatal to civilization as we know it.

    In examining the geopolitical map of Europe/Eurasia today, one can assess four points of military friction between Russia, the United States and Europe. These are Ukraine, the Arctic, Kaliningrad, and Outer Space. While each represents a physically distinct problem set politically and militarily, they are all four inextricably linked through a common Russophobic mindset in Europe and the United States which treats Russia as a singular security issue. Moreover, both Europe and the US operate from a strategic mindset driven by zero-sum thinking, which postures Russia as being structurally motivated to bring harm to both Europe and the United States, thereby stifling the possibility of cooperation with Russia that could resolve many if not all of the underlying issues which are collectively construed by the West as presenting a threat. For its part, Russia operates from a mindset derived from the psychology of perpetual victimhood dating back centuries, and a historical foundation of resistance to aggression which seeks diplomatic resolution until which point military confrontation becomes the only solution

    Ukraine: The (perceived) chink in the Soviet/Russian armor

    The current conflict in Ukraine between Russia and the West did not begin in 2022 with the Russian invasion but rather represents the logical conclusion of a posture on the part of the United States and NATO which sought to exploit the ultra-nationalism of Western Ukraine in order to create a framework of instability designed to weaken the Soviet Union, and later Russia, from within. To understand this mindset, one first must delve into the psychology underpinning the concept of Ukrainian nationalism. For Russia, Ukraine represents part of a larger family of Slavic peoples which include the Russians and Belarussians; indeed, this notion is shared by millions of Ukrainians as well. One only need to look at the integration of Ukraine within the cultural and historical roots of Russia over time to understand the reality of this sentiment.

    For the West, this reality presents a problem, since it lends itself toward the existence of a singular Slavic state possessing tremendous geographical advantages and unmatched natural resources which in turn creates massive economic penitential that competes with Western notions of global supremacy. Nazi Germany sought to nullify this Slavic potential through the implementation of Generalplan Ost, the literal cultural and physical genocide of the Slavic race. The United States and the United Kingdom (and later, NATO, inclusive of a newly militarized West Germany), continued this policy of Slavic nullification by promoting anti-Soviet resistance on the part of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), including military support of partisans operating in Ukraine loyal to Stepan Bandera, a former ally of Nazi Germany whose forces perpetrated large-scale atrocities against Jews, Poles and Russians during the Second World War. When the war ended, the German intelligence organization responsible for managing the OUN operations was taken over by the US military and later, under the auspices of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), used to direct anti-Soviet armed resistance up until 1954-55. The CIA continued to provide active support for the OUN, using the Ukrainian diaspora, through the 1990โ€™s.

    The role of western intelligence, led by the CIA and the British Special Intelligence Service (SIS), in post-Soviet Ukraine was singularly focused on promoting Ukrainian nationalism at the expense of Russia. The political campaign waged against the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine by western intelligence emerged front and center when the two-term President of Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma, stepped down in 2005 after carrying out policies designed to improve Ukraine-Russian relations. Kuchma threw his support behind the Russian-speaking Viktor Yanukovych. For the West, a Yanukovych presidency would undermine their strategic goal of stripping Ukraine away from Russia. The result was the so-called โ€œOrange Revolutionโ€, which saw Yanukovych’s electoral victory overturned in favor of Ukrainian nationalists who promoted a distinctly anti-Russian policy which saw Ukraine pivot toward the European Union and seek NATO membership. The latter development was seen by Russia as a red line which, if pursued, would inevitably lead to a military conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Yanukovych’s election in 2010 was deemed a setback to the Western designs on Ukraine, leading to the West supporting a violent coup in February 2014 that saw Yanukovych driven from power, replaced by pro-western Ukrainian nationalists.

    It should be clear that a physical confrontation between Ukraine and Russia has always been the goal of the collective West. Efforts to take control of the Russian political space had, by 2014, failed. The so-called โ€œresetโ€ of 2009 was little more than a political cover for a regime change operation designed to replace Vladimir Putin, who had ruled Russia since taking over from Boris Yeltsin at the end of 1999, and in the intervening decade taken Russia down the road of economic and national recovery that the West, operating in full zero-sum mode, simply could not tolerate. The concerted efforts of President Obama to interfere in the Russian parliamentarian elections of 2011 and the presidential election of 2012 failed to remove Putin from power. The actions in Ukraine in 2014 and afterwards must be viewed in this light; nothing happens in a vacuum.

    The Ukraine conflict was never avoidable, despite Russiaโ€™s concerted efforts to engage in diplomacy designed to do just that. The defeat of the Ukrainian army in 2014-15 at the hands of Russian-backed separatists in the Donbas led to the adoption of the Minsk peace accords. It is now established fact that neither Ukraine, its two European partners (France and Germany), nor the United States ever had any intention of following through on the Minsk process. Instead, the Minsk process was designed to buy time for NATO to build a new Ukrainian army capable of holding its own against Russia. Indeed, from 2015-to 2022, the United States and NATO did just that, training over 80,000 Ukrainian forces, including thousands of Ukrainian nationalists labeled as neo-Nazi by the United States Congress, to NATO military standards. The stated purpose of this training was to enable Ukraine to take physical possession of the Donbas and Crimea, which was annexed by Russia in 2014 following the CIA-backed coup in Kiev. When Ukraine began amassing these NATO-trained troops in the Donbas region in early 2022, Russia launched a pre-emptive action which, more than five years later, has become an openly acknowledged proxy war with the collective West, inclusive of the US and NATO.

    The stated goal of both the US and Europe in pursuing this proxy conflict with Russia is nothing less than the strategic defeat of Russia. What does this mean in practice? First of all, the proxy war was never intended to result in a Ukrainian military victory against Russia. Rather, the goal was to draw Russia into a conflict which would exhaust its military potential, break its economy, and collapse its society to the point that the government of Vladimir Putin would be removed from power. This entire policy is postulated on the understanding that Vladimir Putin must be removed from power. As such, and solution that does not attain that objective is rejected out of hand, a pattern of behavior reflective of the zero-sum mentality that drives western policy making. As a result, every potential off-ramp that Russia has been willing to consider, from the Istanbul communique of 2022 to the Anchorage compromise of 2025, has been rejected by the West, exposing the reality that for the West diplomacy is just a tool to buy time to further strengthen Ukraine militarily in order to draw the Ukraine-Russian conflict out to its desired conclusionโ€”the collapse of Russia. In short, Minsk on replay.

    Russia has proven to be surprisingly resilient in the face of this concerted western effort designed to collapse it as a viable nation state. The Russia economy not only has survived in the face of western sanctions but, in concert with effective Russian diplomacy that has exploited western diplomatic miscues to build a large and supportive global constituency, thrived as it has found foreign markets in the Global South that have largely replaced the lost European and US markets. Russian society, blindsided by a war it was not prepared for, has rallied solidly behind President Putin, as the results of the recent parliamentarian elections underscored. And far from exhausting Russia militarily, the Ukraine conflict has enabled Russia to fine-tune its defense industrial base, producing significant quantities of advanced military equipment and weaponry that for the most part far exceeds that being produced by the collective West in both quality and quantity. When this material is matched up with a combat-hardened pool of manpower, the result is that Russia today possesses the most combat-capable military force in the world, far exceeding anything either NATO or the United States can put into the field.

    In short, the western gambit targeting Russia has failedโ€”the Russian military is stronger today by an order of magnitude, its economy far more diverse and self-sustaining, and its population far more unified than it was in 2022. Moreover, Russia shows no signs of faltering on any frontโ€”economically, diplomatically, socially, or politically.

    The same cannot be said for either Europe or the United States. Despite the war-like rhetoric coming out of Germany and Poland and backed up by statements made by US military officers, both active duty and retired, the reality is that the proxy war between the collective West and Russia was always meant to be just thatโ€”a proxy war. There has never been a realistic plan for the conflict to become a direct clash between Russia and NATO, if for no other reason than NATO simply lacks the capacity to generate sufficient forces capable of high-intensity conflict for any sustainable period. NATOโ€™s military power has largely atrophied in the decades since the end of the Cold War, requiring an infusion of investment over time to recover which Europe currently does not seem capable of providing. The United States is itself in a posture of global retrograde, seeking to withdraw from Europe rather than resume a Cold War-like posture that is neither politically or economically viable.

    With Russia seemingly closing the door on the possibility of a negotiated settlement with the west over Ukraine, Europe and the United States are confronted with the uncomfortable reality that their strategic objectives in Ukraine will not reach fruition. Russia will continue to press for a military solution which meets all its stated objectives, including the kind of concerted de-Nazification which would make extinct the very virulent Ukrainian nationalism which has always fueled the western efforts in Ukraine against Russia.

    In short, there will be no war between Europe and Russia over Ukraine. Europe will support Ukraine until Ukraine has exhausted its resourcesโ€”manpower and economicโ€”and then watch helplessly as Russia consolidates its position in what is left of the Ukrainian nation. โ€œTo the last Ukrainianโ€ appears to be a concept that both Ukraine and its western supporters have taken to heart

    The Arctic: The economic trigger of potential conflict

    In a rational world, the collective West would regroup after its pending defeat in Ukraine and seek to repair its considerable losses. But in a zero-sum world, this is not possible. A Russian victory in Ukraine requires, in the minds of those Russophobes in the west still dreaming of the collapse of Vladimir Putinโ€™s Russia, a โ€œwinโ€ which will level the geopolitical playing field. Given the reality that one of the consequences of the westโ€™s failed Ukrainian gambit is the economic decimation of Europe, issues of economic import, not surprisingly take on increased importance when configuring a post-Ukraine geopolitical posture in opposition to Russia.

    One of the main issues confronting Europe today is discerning a coherent economic and foreign policy when it comes to China. European diplomacy in this regard has been disastrous, resulting in the collapse of critical sectors of the European economy (car manufacturing, for instance) as a result of ill-conceived notions of โ€œde-riskingโ€ (an American-origin term designed to camouflage the real intent of such policy, which is โ€œde-linking.โ€) But one cannot possibly speak of โ€œde-risking/de-linkingโ€ when there are no viable alternative markets to replace that which oneโ€™s policies seek to vacate.

    Europeโ€™s strategic objective of isolating Russia from China has backfiredโ€”today it is Europe that is increasingly isolated, and Russia-Chinese relations, including economic, are strong and getting stronger. One of the critical areas of Russia-Chinese cooperation is the development of the Northeast Passage or, as it is often referred to in China, the โ€œIce Silk Roadโ€, a 5,500-kilometer stretch of waterway running from the Bering Strait in the east to the Barents Sea in the west. Use of this waterway has become increasingly possibleโ€”and profitableโ€”enabling container ships to make the journey from East China to European ports such as Rotterdam around 20-days faster that the current Suez Canal route used by most shipping companies.

    The Northeast Passage operates exclusively in Russian territorial waters. It also transits the Arctic zone, meaning that for much of the year its functionality is dependent upon Russian icebreakers. The passage also operates under the umbrella of Russian security and legal norms. The economic potential of the Arctic used to the sole purview of the Arctic Council, who members used to meet on a regular basis to coordinate policies impacting on the economy, security, and ecology of the Arctic region. However, in 2022, following the invasion of Ukraine, Russia was kicked out of the Arctic Council. And, following the admission of Finland and Sweden to NATO, the Arctic Council has assumed a NATO-only posture, with its policies reflecting the strategic goals and objectives of its collective membership, namely being the strategic defeat of Russia.

    Climate change has altered the geopolitical realities of the Arctic region, with melting ice caps not only opening sea lines of communication previously denied and/or restricted because of weather but also making economic exploitation of significant mineral resources exposed by the retreating ice physically possible and fiscally viable. Normally, the Arctic Council would seek to regulate access to the Arctic to balance economic and ecological concerns within a security framework where all partiesโ€™ interests are taken into consideration.

    But in the zero-sum world, the Russo-Sino economic penetration of the Arctic space is deemed a threat to the collective West requiring a military response. This reality was underscored during the recently convened European Arctic Summit, hosted by Finland in mid-September. The European Union leadership, citing unsubstantiated claims of โ€œsignificant and long-term threatsโ€ from Russia to Euro-Atlantic security, committed itself to strengthening its Arctic security postureโ€”i.e., the militarization of the Arctic, focusing on military mobility, cross-border connectivity and necessary infrastructure in the northernmost regions of the Arctic.

    The fact is, however, that NATO is non-competitive with Russia when it comes to Arctic security issues. What the European Arctic Summit gave lip service to about the militarization of the Arctic, Russia has already fully implemented and continues to improve. While NATO nations are capable of engaging in acts of provocation, such as the recent seizure of a Russian research vessel off the northern Norwegian island of Svalberg, the rapidity in which the Norwegian government most to ensure similar actions are not undertaken in Norwegian territorial waters underscores the fact that Norway is not keen of provoking any sort of direct confrontation with Russia in the Arctic. The real threat to the West in the Arctic is not Russiaโ€™s capable military forces, but the fact that Russia, together with China, are imposing a new transit-based economic reality which will provide extraordinary leverage going forward by making traditional shipping carriers and routes non-competitive with the new โ€œIce Silk Roadโ€ Russia and China have already implemented. The ability to sustainably ship containers to Europe at half the cost of the current shipping routes is a game changer in every way and creates a new reality that the West will not be able to catch up to for some time, if ever

    Kaliningrad: low-hanging fruit, or impregnable fortress?

    The psychosis of the zero-sum trap the West has set for itself when it comes to Russia requires that NATO manufacture a victoryโ€”perceived or otherwiseโ€”capable of off-setting its failures in Ukraine and impotence in the Arctic. In this regard, the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad has emerged as a perceived Russian Achilles Heel. The former commander of NATO ground forces in Europe, US General Chris Donahue, openly bragged this past July that NATO forces would be able to overwhelm Russian defenses in Kaliningrad in short order. Germany and Poland have argued for intensified NATO military exercises near the borders of Kaliningrad, the goal of which would be to generate sufficient concern within the Russian leadership to cause them to pull troops out from the Special Military Operation zone to Kaliningrad in response. Several western military and security analysts have articulated assessments which indicate that Russiaโ€™s actual military posture in Kaliningrad is much weaker that publicly acknowledged. And numerous western politicians have made declarations indicating that Russia is preparing to carry out acts of aggression against NATO using the Kaliningrad exclave as a base of operations.

    But the reality is that while Russia is more than capable of defending Kaliningrad from any NATO aggression, the Russian military is not currently postured in the Kaliningrad exclave to carry out any sustainable offensive operations of any scale against any of its NATO neighborsโ€”any contention to the contrary is simply rhetorical propaganda. Both the Russian 11th Army Corps and the Baltic Marinesโ€”the core ground combat forces stationed in Kaliningradโ€”have extensive combat experience in Ukraine and have developed a skill set with combat drones that would most likely disrupt and defeat any NATO offensive operations directed at the Kaliningrad exclave. The Russia military has likewise created an active reserve Rifle Regiment, BARS-39, which draws upon veteran soldiers possessing active-duty combat experience, especially in drone warfare.

    But the real threat to Kaliningrad doesnโ€™t come from any potential ground offensive launched by NATO. Rather, it would emerge in the form of a naval blockade of the exclave. Since 2022, the railway lines that connect Kaliningrad with Russia have been subjected to severe restrictions by Lithuania when it comes to the transit of good to and from Russia; the issue of compliance with European Union sanctions of Russia lays at the heart of this matter. Russian-registered vehicles are likewise not permitted to transit Lithuania and Poland. Russia has compensated for this loss of connectivity by increasing the scope and scale of water ferry service between Russia and Saint Petersburg. While Russia has been able to sustain economic growth through this resupply effort, the fact is that this ferry-boat lifeline is very expensive, and many goods, such as gasoline, are subsidized by the Russian government to keep prices under control. If NATO were to impose naval restrictions on shipping into and out of Kaliningrad, as some of its members have suggested, the economic viability of the exclave would be threatened. It is because of this vulnerability that the Russian government put NATO on notice that any effort to subject Kaliningrad to a naval blockade, or any other act of military aggression, would be responded to with the totality of Russiaโ€™s military capability, including nuclear weapons.

    This nuclear muscle flexing appears to have dampened the enthusiasm on the part on some of the most vociferous NATO proponents of plucking what they thought would be low-hanging fruit; now that it is clear that any conflict involving a NATO attacks on Kaliningrad would not be treated in isolation, but rather constitute a conflict of existential proportions, the war drums have been muted

    Space: The final frontier

    The last topic on the list of potential points of conflict-generating friction between Russia and the US-European collective is outer space. Space-based sensors have played a critical role in the collection of intelligence used to support military operations in Ukraine and, in the case of Ukraine, to strike strategic targets in the depth of Russia. Likewise, the US commercial Starlink satellite communications system has assumed an essential role in Ukrainian military communications, to include playing a critical part in enabling Ukrainian long-range drone attacks on Russian energy infrastructure.

    The United States has recently announced that it has deployed โ€œon orbit space control weaponsโ€ in Earthโ€™s orbit. While the technical characteristics of these weapons has not been detailed, evidence suggests that these weapons are non-kinetic in nature, using reversible technology such as electronic warfare to temporarily โ€œblindโ€ a targeted satellite. US President Donald Trump has alluded to the use of a space-based weapon operating in support of US military strikes on Iranian nuclear-related targets in June 2025.

    Russia is in the process of deploying its own Starlink analog satellite constellation, known as Rassvet. When fully functional, Rassvet will provide Russia with satellite-based communications capability on par with Starlink. Ukraine, recognizing that Rassvet will enable Russia to more effectively guide its drones to their targets, has requested the United States to disable the Russian satellite network. Russia has indicated that it would take down the entire Starlink system in retaliation, using kinetic means which could threaten other satellites operating in earth orbit.

    The weaponization of space represents a dangerous point of escalation, especially given the US capability of temporarily blinding satellites. In the zero-sum world that the US and Europe reside in, the need to be seen as offsetting a Russian win in Ukraine, and Russiaโ€™s stymying of NATO escalation efforts in the Arctic and against Kaliningrad, may prove too much of a temptation in the minds of western leaders unable to structure a behavioral model in relationship with Russia that isnโ€™t premised on Russophobic goals and objectives requiring Russiaโ€™s strategic defeat.

    Conclusion

    The United States and Europe have, over the course of the past several decades, built a policy trap centered on using Ukraine as a vehicle for achieving the collapse of Russia and the government of Vladimir Putin. The โ€œtrapโ€ is the zero-sum mentality which governs implementation of this policy, linking the political and economic viability of those pursuing such policy to its successful implementation. The looming failure in Ukraine has created a need for finding new vectors capable of furthering the policy objective of achieving a strategic victory over Russia, including options to expand the zone of conflict between the US-European collective and Russia into the Arctic, the Baltics, and Outer Space. Russia has effectively countered each one of these efforts which, when viewed in isolation, appear to be manageable problem sets with limited escalation potential. However, when viewed in the aggregate, the potential for a misunderstanding and/or miscalculation driven by domestic political imperatives existent in the nations comprising the US-European collective. Here, nations possessing considerable influence over the decisions being made by the collective, such as the US, France, and Germany, are undergoing political transformations that could alter the existing political posture, including policies related to the strategic defeat of Russia as a desirable outcome. The enemy in all of this is not Russia, but rather the zero-sum thinking of the collective West which leaves them married to a policy model that is incapable of being successfully implemented, and which, if pursued aggressively, will lead to their collective demise.

    Note: I was able to visit the Special Military Operation zone, the Arctic region, oil fields, and Kaliningrad, in addition to participating in high level forums and meetings in Moscow and Saint Petersburg. The views expressed here are my personal assessment based upon these meetings, and are not meant as a formal expression of official Russian policy.

    This article is the byproduct of the independent journalism I have been undertaking for the past several years, traveling to Russia for the singular purpose of capturing the Russian reality and bringing it to the attention of a western audience held hostage by Russophobic corporate media. I cover all of my expenses, which means that the trips necessary for the production of this article could not have taken place without the generous support of subscribers and followers who have provided donations for that purpose. I will continue to write articles and release videos about these past visits. I will also continue planning and preparing for future visits to Russia, including one scheduled for November where I will attend a conference on humanitarian issues and continue to meet and interview interesting and knowledgeable people. I thank everyone who has contributed to this work, past, present and future [end]

    The original article

    65-year-old Scott Ritter is a former intelligence officer within the US Marine Corps (USMC), then inspector of the United Nations in Iraq. When in 2003, the US and their British minions were about to invade the country under this false pretext, Ritter was claiming that there was no weapon of mass destruction (WMD) there. He was right.

    Related

    Nazism in Ukraine

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    The Atlanticist defeat in Donbass and Ukraine

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    September 16, 2026: Operation Free Jacques Baud โ€“ Scott Ritter

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    February 23, 2026: The Flamingo Effect โ€“ Scott Ritter

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    January 9, 2026: Sanctionnez-Moi, Sale Garce! โ€“ Scott Ritter, Forum Geopolitica

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    June 18, 2023: Ukrainian Counteroffensiveโ€™s Second Week Ends in Failure โ€“ Scott Ritter

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    June 10, 2023: Finally the Bull Charged โ€“ Scott Ritter

    January 27, 2023: Never Forget the Soviet Heroes Who Liberated Auschwitz โ€“ Scott Ritter

  • Lโ€™engagement franรงais dans les rangsย ukrainiens

    • Yahmi, Nicolas, nรฉ le 28 janvier 1990,

    se fait appeler Professeur Didier Ragoรปt sur Twitter, est conseiller en gestion de patrimoine ร  Besanรงon, lorsqu’en mars 2022, sans expรฉrience militaire, il se prรฉcipite en Ukraine

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    C’est en plus charmante compagnie que le 13 juin, le joli coeur entonne gaiement Zrodylysสน my z velykoyi hodyny [Nous sommes nรฉs ร  une grande รฉpoque], l’hymne pendant la 2de guerre mondiale de l’UPA, formation paramilitaire nazie ukrainienne.

    Aux derniรจres nouvelles, il est bien au front, opรฉrateur de drones. Yahmi est Looping, l’un des deux personnages ร  l’รฉtรฉ 2023 du cirque animรฉ par le propagandiste Xavier Tytelman. L’autre est Franck Malandain, le sniper.

    Sur Twitter le 11 septembre, il rรฉpond en Anglais, que je traduis ici, ร  un message ancien du ministรจre russe des affaires รฉtrangรจres, le 8 juin 2022, qui fit mention dโ€™une base publique de donnรฉes sur les mercenaires et volontaires รฉtrangers dans les rangs atlantistes

    Tous les Russes doivent mourir : je suis vraiment fier dโ€™apparaรฎtre sur votre siteโ€ฆ ordures !

    Le gรฉnocide russe est un fantasme historique et rรฉcurrent chez les nationalistes ukrainiens. Il nโ€™a pas รฉtรฉ nรฉcessaire de beaucoup gratter le vernis du cรฉlibataire en bonne situation professionnelle [Yahmi, selon Tytelman].

    Le propagandiste l’interviewe le 7 janvier 2024. Nul besoin de s’attarder sur leurs mรฉdiocres analyses. Le document est mรฉmorable, car les traits tirรฉs, Tytelman se dรฉvoile depuis Kiev sur des questions plus gรฉnรฉrales. La Russie nous fait du mal, disent ils tous deux. En quoi fait elle du mal ? L’expert de LCI l’explique avec sincรฉritรฉ, dirait le commandant Thรฉobald Dromard

    Les Black Lives Matter [BLM, mouvement de protestation contre les violences policiรจres dont sont plus particuliรจrement victimes les gens de couleur], aux ร‰tats Unis, sont financรฉes par la Russie. Les ONG de soutien, woke et tout ces trucs lร , sont soutenues. La famille Traore [celle d’Adama, tuรฉ par des gendarmes en 2016], vous connaissez l’histoire de la famille Traore, est soutenue financiรจrement, l’ONG qui la soutient, a รฉtรฉ crรฉรฉe par Wagner

    Voilร  donc les angoisses existentielles qui dรฉterminent lโ€™engagement de ces deux petits bourgeois rรฉactionnaires. Voilร  pourquoi Yahmi, ร  son arrivรฉe en Ukraine, intรฉgra une formation paramilitaire nazie. Il ose mรชme brandir sa judaรฏcitรฉ comme une certificat dโ€™antifascisme, alors que le ghetto palestinien de Gaza est ร  feu et ร  sang

    Le petit bourgeois rรฉactionnaire a รฉtรฉ et sera toujours lโ€™engrais du fascisme, dans une Europe qui en restera le ventre fรฉcond

    Le 7 octobre 2024, la tรฉlรฉvision ukrainienne diffuse un entretien avec Yahmi. Aprรจs une blessure six mois plus tรดt, fin mars ou dรฉbut avril, il a quittรฉ les forces armรฉes et participe ร  la conception dโ€™un nouveau modรจle de drone

    Le journaliste arbore un t-shirt ร  la gloire de l’organisation nazie Azov et le Franรงais sโ€™autorise ร  blรขmer les rรฉfractaires, les Ukrainiens qui ne vont pas se battre

    Quelques centaines de milliers ont dรฉjร  รฉtรฉ immolรฉs, aprรจs leur mobilisation de force dans une guerre par procuration de lโ€™OTAN. Le fat rรฉclame aussi un affrontement direct entre lโ€™Europe et la Russie. Je lโ€™encourage vivement ร  y retourner, pour donner lโ€™exemple.

    Dans une vidรฉo quโ€™il publie le 31 janvier 2025, il taquine un poste frontalier de la rรฉgion russe de Belgorod, quand la sanction atteint le bรขtiment qui lui sert de poste de pilotage, peut รชtre un tir direct de char. Son camarade Micha semble plus particuliรจrement blessรฉ. Jโ€™imagine que leurs moyens de guerre รฉlectronique ont permis aux Russes de localiser les opรฉrateurs. Les images datent du 12 mars 2024, illustrent donc sa propre blessure

    Petite remarque dรฉontologique : il nโ€™est pas trรจs honnรชte, pour faire croire au succรจs de son propre travail de rรฉglage dโ€™artillerie, dโ€™avoir mixรฉ des images russes -avec logo tchรฉtchรจne- de frappes sur le mรชme poste frontalier de Belgorod, lors de lโ€™incursion ukrainienne de mai 2023.

    Dans un article du 11 fรฉvrier 2025 pour Intelligence Online, Gรฉgory Priolon nous en apprend plus. Yahmi exerรงait depuis avril 2023 la fonction de pilote dโ€™essai et consultant pour lโ€™entreprise parisienne Parrot

    fabricant de premier plan de drones plรฉbiscitรฉs par les services rรฉgaliens des dรฉmocraties les plus exigeantes

    rien de moins, qui le congรฉdia le 31 janvier 2025, jour de la publication de la vidรฉo de sa blessure. L’ex consultant rรฉclame aujourdโ€™hui 110 millions dโ€™euros, dont 100 pour frais mรฉdicaux, se rรฉserve le droit de rรฉvรฉler aux vastes restes du monde ce quโ€™il sait de la juteuse collaboration entre Parrot, services de renseignement ukrainien (HUR) et DGSE.

    Je serai toujours du cรดtรฉ des forรงats de la faim, lance ici un appel solennel ร  Henri Jรฉrรดme Seydoux Fornier de Clausonne et ร  la finance occidentale. Payez donc le pourboire que vous devez ร  votre porte-flingue malheureux Nicolas Yahmi

    Je suggรจre au lanceur dโ€™alerte dโ€™รชtre trรจs attentif dans les prochains jours aux risques que prรฉsentent les tirs amis, car il รฉvolue quand mรชme dans un environnement oรน les gens sont presque aussi armรฉs quโ€™en Corse.

    Il a sans doute aussi menacรฉ un peu de sโ€™en prendre ร  lโ€™intรฉgritรฉ physique des trous du cul [c’est moi qui le dis] qui peuplent les couloirs de Parrot. Arrรชtรฉ en France le 26 aoรปt 2025, il est dโ€™abord placรฉ en dรฉtention provisoire ร  Fresnes

    Le 19 octobre, dans une dรฉcision qui rappelle le bon vieux temps de la Cour de sรปretรฉ de lโ€™ร‰tat, le tribunal correctionnel condamne le gueux Yahmi ร  deux ans de prison, dont quatre mois ferme, pour menaces et tentative dโ€™extorsion. Dormez sur vos deux oreilles, les pinzuti ; votre justice veille tout particuliรจrement ร  la sรฉrรฉnitรฉ du marchand d’armes Henri Seydoux.

    in Lโ€™engagement franรงais dans les rangs ukrainiens

    chronique alphabรฉtique et nรฉcrologique de lโ€™engagement franรงais dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas

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  • [Sharing] Blinded giant: How Iran crippled Americaโ€™s multi-billion dollar THAAD network in days – Ivan Kesic, Press TV

    In the first week of the US-Israeli aggression on Iran, the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) conducted a series of precision strikes that systematically degraded the much-hyped US integrated air and missile defense architecture across the region

    The strikes destroyed or severely damaged at least two AN/TPY-2 THAAD radars, a billion-dollar early-warning radar installation in Qatar, multiple supporting sensor nodes, and critical communications infrastructure.

    Executed in a coordinated sequence of precision engagements, Iranian retaliatory operations under the banner โ€˜True Promise 4โ€™ have significantly disrupted the regional defensive network and forced US commanders to urgently reassess and reconstitute capabilities that took two decades and tens of billions of dollars to deploy.

    The scale and sophistication of the Iranian operation mark a significant moment in contemporary warfare, demonstrating that even highly advanced missile defense systems, often presented as near-impenetrable shields, remain vulnerable to determined adversaries equipped with precision guidance, reliable intelligence, and an operational doctrine focused on disabling the core command, sensor, and communications nodes of defensive networks.

    As commercial satellite imagery continues to emerge from across the region, the extent of the damage is becoming increasingly difficult to conceal, revealing substantial operational setbacks that raise serious questions about the resilience of the defensive architecture underpinning American force posture from the Persian Gulf to the Korean Peninsula.

    The targeting doctrine evident in the strikes reflects years of detailed analysis and planning, with Iranian strategists identifying critical nodes and developing the capability to strike them simultaneously across a wide geographic area.

    The coordinated targeting of early-warning radars, fire-control radars, communications infrastructure, and supporting facilities demonstrates a systemic approach to warfare rarely executed at such scale, focusing on neutralizing the command-and-control backbone of the defensive network rather than peripheral elements.

    For US commanders currently operating in the region, the immediate challenge lies in sustaining operations with degraded detection and response capabilities, safeguarding remaining strategic assets, and reassuring regional allies whose security frameworks depend heavily on the integrity of these systems.

    How these challenges are addressed will shape not only the trajectory of the current war but also the future configuration of American military posture in a region where the balance of power may have shifted significantly in the opening days of March 2026

    Heart of the beast: Understanding AN/TPY-2 radar’s critical role

    The AN/TPY-2 transportable radar represents the technological centerpiece of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system. This massive X-band active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar consumes roughly two megawatts of power and is distributed across five forty-foot trailers.

    With an antenna area of 9.2 square meters and an instrumental range exceeding 2,000 kilometers in forward-based mode, the radar functions as the primary sensor of the entire THAAD battery. Without it, the launchers and their 48 interceptors are effectively rendered inoperative, deprived of the detection and tracking data required for engagement.

    Manufactured by Raytheon using gallium nitride technology, each AN/TPY-2 radar carries an estimated cost ranging from $500 million to $1 billion. Since development began in the 1990s, only about twenty units have been produced worldwide.

    The radar performs two distinct operational missions depending on configuration. In terminal mode, it provides fire-control quality tracking data directly to THAAD interceptors during the engagement phase.

    In forward-based mode, it feeds detection and tracking data into the broader ballistic missile defense architecture, cueing Aegis warships, Patriot batteries, and other integrated systems. The loss of even a single radar unit can therefore have cascading effects across multiple layers of the defensive network.

    Jordan: The first thousand-kilometer precision strike

    At Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan, located more than 800 kilometers from the nearest Iranian territory, satellite imagery captured on March 2 reveals the charred remains of an AN/TPY-2 radar that had reportedly been deployed at the base since at least mid-February.

    The imagery shows debris scattered across the deployment site, surrounding what appears to have been a fully assembled radar system. Two large impact craters, each roughly thirteen feet in diameter, are visible in the sand nearby, suggesting that multiple precision munitions were employed to ensure the destruction of the system.

    Prior to the escalation of hostilities, the base had served as a major hub for American air operations, with more than fifty fighter aircraft visible on the tarmac in pre-war satellite imagery.

    The deployment of a THAAD battery at the site fulfilled two key operational objectives: protecting the concentration of air assets from potential ballistic missile threats and extending a defensive coverage umbrella toward Israeli territory.

    The strike itself represents a notable demonstration of long-range precision engagement capability, requiring not only a missile with sufficient range but also advanced terminal guidance systems capable of identifying and targeting the radarโ€™s distinctive configuration amid surrounding infrastructure

    United Arab Emirates: Systematic elimination of terminal defenses

    The Al Ruwais facility in the United Arab Emirates, positioned to protect critical energy infrastructure along the Persian Gulf coast, suffered near-simultaneous strikes against both its THAAD radar and the supporting infrastructure that housed the system.

    Satellite imagery from March 1, the second day of the war that was imposed on Iran, shows dark markings from apparent strikes on three buildings, including a pull-through vehicle shed specifically designed to shelter the radar system.

    The pattern of damage suggests Iranian planners understood not only where the radar would be positioned when active but also where it would be maintained and stored.

    At a second UAE installation near Al Sader, satellite imagery reveals an almost identical strike pattern with four buildings damaged, including multiple vehicle sheds configured for radar storage.

    The symmetry between the two attacks suggests either simultaneous execution by multiple strike platforms or a methodical campaign that systematically worked through a target list developed over years of surveillance.

    Commercial imagery providers captured before and after images that leave little doubt about the severity of the damage, with burned equipment visible at the precise locations where radar components had been regularly observed.

    Qatar: Billion-dollar early warning backbone destroyed

    The destruction of the AN/FPS-132 Block 5 Upgraded Early Warning Radar at Umm Dahal in Qatar represents perhaps the single most expensive individual loss of the campaign, with that system alone costing approximately one point one billion dollars when installed in 2013.

    Unlike the mobile THAAD radars that can theoretically be replaced by redeploying systems from other theaters, the Qatari early warning radar was a fixed installation designed to provide continuous surveillance of ballistic missile launches across a five-thousand-kilometer arc.

    The Qatari Ministry of Defence’s rare public confirmation of the radar’s destruction carries strategic significance beyond the military impact, as host-nation acknowledgment forecloses any possibility of concealing the loss and signals to regional allies that American assurances of protective capability may no longer carry their former weight.

    The AN/FPS-132 represents the outer layer of the missile defense onion, providing the strategic warning that enables all downstream systems to prepare for incoming threats. Its elimination compresses reaction timelines from minutes to seconds

    Saudi Arabia: Smoke rising from Prince Sultan Air Base

    At a site near Prince Sultan Air Base in Al Kharj, Saudi Arabia, satellite imagery captured on March 1 shows smoke rising from a compound where a THAAD radar had been previously positioned, with a tent used to shelter the antenna unit showing extensive charring and debris scattered across the surrounding area.

    Imagery from January had shown the radar antenna pointed northeast toward Iran in its operational configuration, suggesting the site was fully functional when struck.

    This base hosts dozens of American aircraft and serves as a major command and control node, making the apparent failure to protect a critical sensor positioned within its perimeter particularly embarrassing.

    Kuwait: Communications infrastructure and radar domes destroyed

    The strikes extended beyond the core missile defense sensors to target the communications infrastructure that enables these systems to function as an integrated network.

    At Arifjan base in Kuwait, satellite imagery confirms the destruction of three radomes, the protective spherical structures housing satellite communications antennas that provide the data links connecting distributed sensors to command nodes.

    Eight additional buildings related to satellite communications infrastructure were destroyed at separate locations in Kuwait, representing a systematic effort to attack the network backbone.

    The AN/GSC-52B radars destroyed in Bahrain represent another category of communications and surveillance assets, providing both satellite communications connectivity and contributing to the space surveillance network.

    Their destruction at a facility housing the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet headquarters demonstrates that no American installation in the region can consider itself beyond reach

    Strategic calculus: Twenty years of investment destroyed in seven days

    The development of the THAAD system began in 1992, with the US Army finally fielding the first operational batteries in April 2012. The journey from initial concept to deployable capability required approximately twenty years and tens of billions of dollars.

    The radars now destroyed or severely damaged across at least four countries represent a significant fraction of the total global inventory of approximately twenty units.

    Each unit requires years to manufacture, and the destruction of multiple units simultaneously creates a capability gap that cannot be quickly filled.

    The financial losses are staggering. Individual AN/TPY-2 radars cost between five hundred million and one billion dollars. The AN/FPS-132 early warning radar cost approximately one point one billion dollars.

    The AN/GSC-52B radars, the radomes, the communications buildings, and support infrastructure add hundreds of millions more.

    The campaign’s first week has inflicted damages approaching or exceeding ten billion dollars against a target set selected for maximum strategic effect.

    Tactical paralysis: The loss means for current operations

    The immediate tactical consequence is the effective paralysis of multiple THAAD batteries that now sit blind on their launch positions. Without the AN/TPY-2 radar providing tracking data and fire control solutions, the launchers and their forty-eight interceptors per battery cannot engage incoming threats.

    The interceptors themselves, each costing approximately thirteen million dollars, cannot be employed without the radar’s guidance.

    The degradation extends to the entire regional defense network. Patriot batteries that relied on THAAD radar data for cueing now face incoming threats with reduced reaction time.

    Aegis warships must rely solely on their own SPY radar systems. The integrated battle management system now resembles disconnected nodes fighting local engagements without a common operating picture.

    The psychological impact cannot be overstated. Soldiers assured that the most advanced missile defense systems would protect them, but now find their protective shield penetrated repeatedly.

    The sight of satellite imagery showing the blackened remains of billion-dollar systems creates a perception of vulnerability that no amount of official reassurance can counter

    Global implications: South Korea, Guam, and the strategic reserve dilemma

    The destruction of multiple THAAD systems in West Asia has immediate implications for American force posture worldwide, particularly in the Indo-Pacific, where North Korea’s advancing missile program has long justified THAAD deployment.

    Reports that Washington is considering relocating THAAD and Patriot systems from South Korea to West Asia reflect the severity of the capability gap.

    The THAAD battery in Seongju, South Korea, represents not merely a defensive asset but a political commitment that has survived years of diplomatic tension with China.

    Removing it would signal a shift in American priorities, potentially encouraging North Korea to react. Guam, home to another THAAD battery protecting critical American bases, would face similar exposure if its systems were stripped.

    The interceptor stockpile faces equally severe pressure. The expenditure of approximately thirty percent of the total THAAD interceptor inventory in a twelve-day aggression in June 2025 demonstrated how quickly these scarce resources can be consumed.

    With production capacity limited to approximately eleven to twelve interceptors annually, reconstituting inventory will require years.

    Technology question: What Iranian precision reveals about US vulnerabilities

    The successful destruction of hardened, defended targets across distances exceeding 800 kilometers reveals Iranian technological capabilities that many Western analysts had previously dismissed.

    The terminal guidance required to place a warhead within meters of a specific radar antenna reflects maturation in seeker technology and potentially man-in-the-loop targeting.

    The strikes also reveal sophisticated intelligence collection operating for years beneath the threshold of detection, building detailed targeting folders on facilities across multiple countries.

    The symmetry between strikes in different countries suggests a targeting process that understood standardized American configurations.

    The electronic warfare dimension likely played a critical role in enabling strikes to penetrate defended airspace.

    The fact that no Iranian missiles or drones were intercepted before reaching targets across four countries suggests either that defenses were neutralized electronically or that the volume and coordination overwhelmed engagement capabilities

    Production constraints: Why replacement takes years, not weeks

    The industrial base that produces AN/TPY-2 radars operates on peacetime assumptions, with production lines sized to meet gradual replacement requirements rather than the surge demands of major conflict.

    The supply chain for specialized components extends across multiple states and countries, with some materials sourced from single suppliers operating at limited capacity.

    Even with emergency funding, the time required to produce a single AN/TPY-2 radar cannot be compressed below physical limits.

    The most optimistic assessments place replacement timelines in the range of three to five years for a single unit.

    The radars destroyed in the first week of March 2026 will not return to the operational inventory until late in the decade at the earliest.

    Regional power shift: The new strategic reality

    The destruction of America’s premier missile defense assets across four countries fundamentally alters the strategic calculus in West Asia, shifting the initiative decisively toward Tehran.

    Iranian military planners who previously had to calculate interception probabilities now face a dramatically reduced defensive threat, enabling expanded targeting options with reduced risk.

    Persian Gulf Cooperation Council states that have invested billions in American missile defense now face uncomfortable questions about the wisdom of those investments.

    If billion-dollar radars can be destroyed by missiles costing a fraction of that amount, the entire foundation of the Persian Gulf defense relationship requires reexamination.

    For the Israeli regime, which has integrated its Arrow and David’s Sling systems with American sensors, the loss of THAAD coverage in Jordan represents a direct blow.

    The anti-missile umbrella that previously extended from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean now has a gap in its center

    Fiasco verdict: Why two lost radars mean total system failure

    Military analysts have begun using language rarely applied to American systems, with experts noting that the loss of a single AN/TPY-2 radar represents an event of significant operational importance while the loss of two constitutes a total fiasco.

    The gap between what THAAD was supposed to accomplish and what it achieved against Iranian precision strikes could hardly be wider.

    The system’s inability to protect itself while supposedly protecting others constitutes the most damning indictment.

    A multilayered air defense architecture should have established protective rings around each THAAD site, with Patriot batteries positioned to intercept threats before reaching billion-dollar radars.

    The fact that this protection failed at multiple sites across multiple countries suggests the threat was too sophisticated or the defenders simply overwhelmed.

    If radars were struck by ballistic missiles, the embarrassment would be compounded, as this would mean the system designed specifically to defeat ballistic missiles failed not only in its assigned mission but also in self-preservation.

    Potential American adversaries from Pyongyang to Beijing study the satellite imagery and draw their own conclusions [end]

    The original article

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  • [Petition] STOP THE IRAN WAR! – Eisenhower Media Network

    Preamble

    The U.S./Israeli-led war against Iran is illegal, unconstitutional, immoral, and dangerously escalatory. Protestations to the contrary, Iran posed no imminent threat to U.S. national security. The Trump administrationโ€™s policy (announced by Pete Hegseth) of โ€œwar without mercyโ€ is both unjust and un-American. In Americaโ€™s proud ideal of the citizen-soldier, this is not who we are. This war is not America first. This is not what we do.

    Put bluntly, this war is not in the national interest of patriotic Americans.

    We the undersigned of the Eisenhower Media Network (EMN) oppose this murderous war of aggression and hereby call for an immediate ceasefire followed by negotiation and war reparations to be paid for by the aggressors. This war is wrong and it must end.

    A War the United States Should Not Wage

    President Donald Trump promised the American people he would end wars, not start them. Yet within months of returning to office, his administration launched military strikes against Iran, igniting a conflict that is quickly spiraling into a regional catastrophe.

    The United States is once again marching to an ill-conceived war in the Middle East without clear objectives or a clearly defined, realistic path to victory. Unlike previous (and disastrous) wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, this time the American people were not asked to support it. History will be even less kind as it judges the immorality and illegality of this latest war of choice.

    The question is not whether the United States can inflict enormous damage on Iran. Of course it can. The real question is whether America can achieve any meaningful result through this war. The answer here is simple: no. There is no reason or cause worth fighting for here.

    A War Driven by Israel

    Saliently, by Secretary of State Marco Rubioโ€™s own admission, the Israeli government drove the timing and initial targets of this war. This isnโ€™t to say that Israel alone is responsible. Since 1979, large parts of the American foreign policy establishment have been eager for war with Iran. Complicit as well is the military-industrial complex, the fossil fuel industry, and the influence of the exiled Iranian lobby.

    A shared desire to enforce American hegemony, aligned with Zionist hegemonic goals of a โ€œgreaterโ€ Israel, is generating a dynamic that approaches that of Armageddon. Even more frightening is that U.S. and Israeli leaders are citing Biblical passages and alleged Judeo-Christian beliefs in support of this war. It seems we are only a few steps away from the madness of the Crusades.

    A War Without Public Support or Understanding

    Legitimacy is a major issue here. After two decades of costly and ultimately futile conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the American public has little appetite for another Middle Eastern war. Polling in the first few days of this war found only one in four Americans supported it.

    A large-scale war against Iran would be an act of colossal military and political folly. It may require national mobilization โ€” perhaps even conscription. That is politically impossible. The American people will not support a military draft for yet another open-ended conflict in the region.

    No Capacity for Ground War

    The active-duty U.S. Army today numbers fewer than 500,000 soldiers. Iran is a nation of roughly ninety million people spread across a mountainous territory roughly four times the size of California. Even if the political will existed, the United States lacks the manpower for a major invasion of Iran.

    Conquering and occupying such a country would require hundreds of thousands of ground troops and reliable allies willing to fight alongside them.

    Those allies do not exist.

    Israel, Americaโ€™s overbearing partner in this conflict, lacks the manpower to deploy large ground forces to Iran. Gulf States have neither the military capability nor the political willingness to undertake such a war.

    Already, America and Israel have lost the moral high ground in this war. They have yet more to lose if this war persists.

    Air Power Alone Cannot Win

    History shows air power alone has never been enough to win a major war.

    During the Korean War, General Douglas MacArthur attempted to halt North Korean advances through naval and air power. It failed. Only ground forces ultimately stabilized the front.

    In Vietnam, the United States dropped more bombs than were used against Germany and Japan combined during World War II. Yet overwhelming air power could not secure victory.

    Technology has improved dramatically since those wars, but the basic nature of war has not changed. Despite decades of talk about a โ€œRevolution in Military Affairs,โ€ wars are still decided by control of territory and the political will of populations.

    Bombs alone cannot impose lasting political outcomes. Bombs alone do not spread democracy. However, bombs alone do spread destruction; the conflict began primarily as a destructive and often imprecise air campaign that has resulted in the deaths of hundreds of innocents, which has stiffened the spine of Iranian resistance.

    Strategic Exhaustion

    America has been engaged in nearly continuous conflict since September 11, 2001. The war in Ukraine, the ongoing U.S.โ€“Israeli destruction of Gaza, and extensive military commitments across the globe have strained American resources.

    The U.S. is entering another conflict without being prepared for a long one. Weapons stockpiles are being depleted faster than they can be replenished. Industrial production has not kept pace with demand. Rebuilding the capacity necessary for a prolonged war would take years.

    Poor preparation is a recipe for calamitous defeat; meanwhile, the broader the war, the less sustainable it will prove.

    Iran Is Ready for This War

    Iran, by contrast, has spent decades preparing for precisely this scenario.

    Iranian strategy is built around attrition. Rather than trying to match U.S. conventional military power, Iran has invested heavily in asymmetric capabilities โ€” ballistic missiles, drones, cyber warfare, and networks of aligned militias throughout the region.

    Instead of seeking decisive battlefield victories, Iran will attempt to impose steady costs on U.S. forces and its allies. U.S. bases across the Middle East, Israeli cities, shipping lanes, and global infrastructure are all potential targets.

    Great Power Complications

    In an era of great-power competition, regional wars rarely remain isolated. This conflict is happening within a broader geopolitical struggle.

    China and Russia have strong incentives to prevent an American-Israeli victory in Iran. Neither wants the U.S. or Israel to dominate the Middle East unchallenged. Both possess advanced missile, radar, and electronic warfare technologies that could assist Iran with intelligence sharing, technological support, and economic backing. Such assistance could significantly complicate U.S. and Israeli operations.

    While direct military intervention is unlikely, retaliation for blocking much needed energy supplies to China should be considered. Among other considerations, America remains vulnerable to Chinese restrictions on exports to the U.S. of rare earth minerals and metals. This war may soon dramatically degrade our economy.

    The Pattern of American War

    There is also a deeper structural problem in the way the United States fights wars.

    In Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, American leaders repeatedly entered conflicts without clearly defined political objectives. Goals shifted as conditions changed. Military strategies often bore little relationship to achievable political outcomes.

    The result was a recurring pattern: enormous expenditures of blood and treasure without success of any measurable kind. Exploding national deficits were among the chief results of exploding U.S. bombs. That, and millions of dead around the world, as planeloads of caskets draped in American flags returned to the homeland.

    With its allies, Americans won World War II because we were united and because we knew what we were fighting for. Right made might, as President Abraham Lincoln once said. Our leaders today believe only that might makes rightโ€”and they couldnโ€™t be more wrong.

    The Iran War risks becoming the next chapter in that same tragic story of wrong.

    Military strategy requires harmony between three elements: the political objective, the resources committed, and the methods used to achieve the goal. When those elements are misaligned, failure becomes almost inevitable.

    In this war, the objective remains vague, the resources limited, and the strategy uncertain. That makes one thing certain: defeat.

    The Danger of Escalation

    The greatest danger now is further escalation.

    Already there is discussion of deploying U.S. Special Forces inside Iran to support opposition groups. Such missions begin small but often expand rapidly, as they did in Vietnam and Afghanistan.

    The moment American troops begin operating on Iranian soil, the risk of a wider and far more destructive war will increase dramatically. So too will the risk of disastrous, Bay of Pigs-like, operations involving U.S. troops and foreign proxies.

    A Moment for Congress to Act

    Under the Constitution, the authority to declare war belongs to Congress. That responsibility exists precisely to prevent this nation from drifting into unnecessary and illegal conflicts at the whim of a president enabled and empowered by a misbegotten warrior ethos. America has fought too many wars based on illusions of technological superiority and quick victory. Those illusions have repeatedly collided with reality. And reality always wins over illusion.

    A war with Iran will almost certainly follow the same path and continued external attacks will likely strengthen Iran politically. History shows that foreign intervention often unifies societies rather than dividing them.

    Congress must now decide whether to continue funding and expanding this disastrous war โ€” $1 billion U.S. per dayโ€”or to assert its constitutional role and stop it. The longer the conflict continues, the higher the cost in lives and resources, and the greater the threat to global stability.

    Unless American leaders find the spine to stop it, the United States will once again learn that starting a war is easy, but ending one is not. And that fighting a war for the wrong reasons, at the wrong time, with the wrong enemy, is not just foolish, not just indefensible, but a supreme exercise in folly that will deeply harm our country and our prospects as a people.

    SIGNERS

    • Anthony Aguilar, former Ltc. US Army Special Operations Officer, Green Beret
    • William J. Astore, former Ltc. U.S. Air Force (Ret.)
    • Michael Baker, former Rear Admiral U.S. Navy (Ret.)
    • Gregory A. Daddis, former Col. U.S. Army, (Ret.) and West Point professor
    • Dennis Fritz, former CMD CMSgt U.S. Air Force (Ret.)
    • Josephine Guilbeau, former U.S. Army All-Source Intel Analyst 
    • Matthew Hoh, former Capt., USMC, Iraq & Foreign Service Officer, Afghanistan (associate VIPS)
    • Karen Kwiatkowski, former Lt. Col., U.S. Air Force (ret.), at Office of Secretary of Defense watching the manufacture of lies on Iraq, 2001-2003
    • Dennis Laich, Director of EMN. former Maj. Gen. U.S. Army, (Ret.) & USA Reserve
    • Adrian R. Lewis, Professor and former U.S. Army, (Ret.)
    • Ray McGovern, former U.S. Army infantry/intelligence officer & C.I.A. analyst; C.I.A. Presidential briefer (ret.)
    • Elizabeth Murray, former Deputy National Intelligence Officer for the Near East, National Intelligence Council & C.I.A. political analyst (ret.)
    • John D. Rosenberger, former Col. U.S. Army, (Ret.)
    • Coleen Rowley, F.B.I. Special Agent and former Minneapolis Division Legal Counsel (ret.)
    • Christian Sorensen, Assoc. Director of EMN, former U.S. Air Force Arabic linguist
    • Ted Strickland, EMN Senior Political Advisor and former Ohio Governor
    • Brett R. Weimer, former Sgt. Maj. U.S. Army, (Ret.)
    • Lawrence Wilkerson, EMN Senior Advisor, former Col. U.S. Army, (Ret.)
    • Ann Wright, Col., U.S. Army (ret.); Foreign Service Officer (resigned in opposition to the war on Iraq)
    • Mike Young, Ph.D., former Ltc. U.S. Army, (Ret.)

    [end]

    The original article

    Eisenhower Media Network is an organization of expert former military, intelligence, and civilian national security officials who have an independent, alternative story to tell

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  • [Sharing] Once upon a time in the borderland – RYBAR 60

    adventures in country-404

    On the territory of the Belgorod region, UAVs of the Ukrainian Armed Forces regularly attack civilian sites and vehicles belonging to local residents – people who keep living and working in frontline villages.

    To counter these threats, Russian mobile anti-drone teams patrol the area. They detect UAVs with electronic systems and neutralize them through jamming or direct fire.

    Today, we’ll show the standoff between one of these anti-drone crews, a civilian driver delivering goods to frontline villages, and the UAV operators hunting for them


    ยฉ๏ธ RYBAR

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  • [Sharing] Ursula von der Leyenโ€™s flight to Plovdiv: what the data tells us – Ian Petchenik, Flightradar24

    On 31 August, European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen was en route from Warsaw to the Bulgarian city of Plovdiv aboard a luxaviation Dassault Falcon 900. During the initial approach to Plovdiv, the pilots reported an โ€œissue with GPSโ€ and requested an alternate approach. The pilots coordinated with the controller, who provided instructions for an Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach and the aircraft landed without incident. So where did a multi-day discussion of GPS jamming come from?

    Jammed up โ€” where did the headlines come from?

    The aircraft carrying von der Leyen and other European Commission officials and journalists departed Warsaw at 12:37 UTC. At 13:45 the flight began its initial descent into Plovdiv.

    As the flight neared Plovdiv and the pilots prepared to land, they reported issues with their ability to fly a GPS-based arrival and asked if an ILS approach was possible instead. Coordinating with ATC, the pilots requested to fly to the VOR near the airport and begin the ILS approach to land on Runway 30. The flight landed at 14:32 UTC without incident

    Circling for hours and paper maps

    On 1 September, the Financial Times published an initial article claiming that the aircraft lost the ability to navigate with GPS, circled the airport for an hour and that the pilots had to rely on paper maps to land the plane. Certainly, such extensive degradation of the aircraftโ€™s systems is great cause for concern, especially in light of the dramatic rise of GPS interference around the world over the past few years.

    As we began to look into the data from this flight, it was immediately clear that the aircraft did not circle for an hour, the flight time appears to have been extended by only a few minutes due to the need for an alternative approach. But what does the data tell us about GPS jamming?

    Howโ€™s your NIC?

    ADS-B data sent by the aircraft contained no clearly anomalous positions that would indicate GPS spoofing, so we looked at the raw data to investigate the possibility of GPS jamming. ADS-B data contains a field called Navigation integrity category (NIC) that encodes the quality and consistency of navigational data received by the aircraft. Throughout the flight from Poland, OO-GPE sent NIC values of 8, indicating a good signal. The map below shows the aggregate of all NIC values received as part of ADS-B messages by the Flightradar24 network during the six-hour period from 12:00-18:00 UTC on 31 August. The red areas indicate high levels of interference with many aircraft reporting degraded NIC values

    Flightradar24 GPS jamming map 31 Aug 12-18UTC
    Aggregated GPS interference map for the six hour period including 14:30 UTC on 31 August 2025

    Flightradar24 GPS jamming map

    Looking into the data further, this aircraft also transmitted the Navigation accuracy category for position (NACp). This value provides a 95% accuracy bound on the horizontal position of the aircraft, meaning that for any position, the probability of the aircraft being outside a given radius of a circle centered on that position is 5%. OO-GPE transmitted a NACp value of 10 for the entire flight from Warsaw to Plovdiv, which provides a 95% accuracy bound of 10 meters. An NACp value of 10 does not indicate the presence of GPS jamming. 

    A changing story

    On 4 September, the Bulgarian government clarified that it had no evidence of GPS jamming affecting the aircraft as it landed in Plovdiv. Politico quotes Bulgarian Deputy Prime Minister and Transport Minister Grozdan Karadzhov saying

    According to empirical data, according to the radio detection, the records of our agencies, civilian and military, there is not a single fact supporting the claim to silence the GPS signal that affected the planeย 

    However, just hours later, Bulgarian Prime Minister Rosen Zhelyazkov held a press conference suggesting that while there is no current evidence of jamming, it could still have been jamming.

    Politico quotes Zhelyazkov as saying, โ€œIn this regard, I have instructed the Civil Aviation Authority to contact the airline that is operating the flight in order to conduct an additional check regarding the instruments and computers in the aircraft.โ€

    GPS interference is a real problem

    In the map above, you can easily see the pervasiveness of GPS interference. The problems of satellite navigation interference are often seen in flight paths in the area around the Black Sea and the Baltics.

    At Flightradar24, we unfortunately canโ€™t do anything directly about the causes of GPS jamming, but we can use data to correct the flight paths as they appear on our service. In an effort to counteract the erroneous positions generated by GPS interference, we now perform Multilateration (MLAT) calculations on all flights, not just those without ADS-B transponders. In areas with good MLAT coverage, this allows us to plot the true path of a flight rather than the disrupted path.

    Countering GPS jamming with MLAT

    GPS interference on the previous flight

    Prior to flying from Warsaw to Plovdiv, von der Leyenโ€™s plane had traveled from Helsinki to Warsaw via an air base in Estonia the day before. En route to Warsaw the aircraft experienced GPS interference over southwestern Estonia near the Gulf of Riga. Because of the calculated MLAT positions, this was not evident when viewing the flight on Flightradar24, but is visible in the raw ADS-B data

    During this flight, the NIC value transmitted by the aircraft dropped from 8 to 0 and the NACp value dropped from 11 to 0, indicating the presence of GPS interference. The disruption lasted from approximately 14:33 to 14:44 UTC. 

    How pilots react to GPS interference

    Pilots are trained to deal with navigational failures and disruptions and the redundant systems both within the aircraft itself and in coordination with air traffic control enable the continued safe operation of the aircraft. For a detailed look at how crews manage the aircraft in areas affected by GPS interference, see the video below. We joined the SAS crew aboard the A350 from Copenhagen to Bangkok and encountered GPS jamming for a large portion of the flight

    So what actually happened in Plovdiv?

    At this point, we donโ€™t know what specific fault the crew encountered that prevented them from using the GPS-based approach, but we do know the data indicates it wasnโ€™t GPS jamming directed at the aircraft. Perhaps the investigation by Bulgarian authorities will be able find definitive answers [end]

    The original article

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  • [Sharing] Drug cartel operatives snuck into Ukraine for drone training: report – Linus Hรถller, DefenseNews

    THE HAGUE, Netherlands โ€” Ukrainian counterintelligence services are investigating the infiltration of Latin American drug cartel members into the countryโ€™s International Legion, with operatives seeking advanced drone training to later deploy against rivals and security forces in their home countries.

    The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) launched a joint investigation with military intelligence after Mexicoโ€™s National Intelligence Center warned in early summer that Mexican volunteers had joined Ukraineโ€™s foreign fighter units specifically to acquire first-person view (FPV) drone capabilities. The probe has since expanded to include Colombian nationals, raising concerns about Ukraineโ€™s inadvertent role as a training ground for transnational criminal organizations.

    French outlet Intelligence Online was the first to report the story on Tuesday.

    The investigation centers on several Spanish-speaking units within the International Legion, particularly the tactical group โ€œEthos,โ€ operating in the Donetsk and Kharkiv regions. Ukrainian investigators reportedly suspect that some Mexican and Colombian volunteers intentionally sought placement in drone operator units to later use this training in the service of foreign criminal organizations.

    One noteworthy case is that of a Mexican national operating under the alias โ€œรguila-7,โ€ who registered in March 2024 using fraudulent Salvadoran documentation. Posing as a humanitarian volunteer, he completed comprehensive drone training in Lviv while demonstrating exceptional technical expertise that eventually had instructors suspicious.

    His extensive technical knowledge, including familiarity with electronic warfare countermeasures and thermal detection avoidance, reportedly stood out. Background investigations later revealed probable connections to Mexicoโ€™s elite GAFE special forces, some of whose former personnel have historically transitioned to cartel employment, notably through the ultra-violent Zetas organization.

    The infiltration demonstrates remarkable operational sophistication for a nonstate group, with suspects employing false identities, forged documentation and front companies to facilitate their passage into Ukrainian territory and military structures. Intelligence analysts have identified a network of private security firms across Latin America that appear to have coordinated these placements.

    Additional cases have emerged involving former FARC guerrillas who infiltrated the system using Panamanian and Venezuelan identity documents. At least three former FARC fighters passed through the International Legion using forged documents, with their relocation reportedly organized by cartel-linked entities.

    The revelations highlight Ukraineโ€™s unintended emergence as a premier training ground for modern asymmetric warfare techniques amid its conflict with Russia. Ukrainian authorities have developed comprehensive curricula covering drone manufacturing, tactical deployment, electronic warfare resistance and real-time battlefield coordination. Coincidentally, these capabilities also represent exactly the type of force multiplication that criminal organizations seek.

    Mexican cartels are already conducting drone attacks against rivals and security forces domestically, making the acquisition of Ukrainian battlefield-tested tactics particularly concerning for regional security.

    An unnamed SBU official told Intelligence Online: โ€œWe welcomed volunteers in good faith. But we must now recognize that Ukraine has become a platform for the global dissemination of FPV tactics. Some come here to learn how to kill with a $400 drone, then sell this knowledge elsewhere to the highest bidderโ€ [end]

    The original article

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  • [Sharing] Total Kievan Debellation – Big Serge

    The Russo-Ukrainian War: Year 3

    On March 5, 2022, the wreck of the sailing ship Endurance was found in the depths of the Weddell Sea off the coast of Antarctica. This, of course, was the vessel lost in Ernest Shackeltonโ€™s third expedition to Antarctica, which became trapped in the ice and sank in 1915. The story of that expedition is an extraordinary tale of human fortitude – with the Endurance lost to the ice, Shackletonโ€™s crew evacuated to a loose ice flow where they camped for nearly 500 days, drifting about the Antarctic seas, before making a desperate dash across the open ocean in an open 20 foot lifeboat, finally reaching the southern shore of inhospitable and mountainous South Georgia Island, which they then had to cross on foot to reach the safety of a whaling station.

    The story itself has an essentially mythic quality to it, with Shackletonโ€™s crew surviving for years on free floating ice floes in the most inhospitable seas on earth. For our purposes, however, it is the storyโ€™s coda that is particularly interesting. In Shackletonโ€™s memoirs, he remembered that, upon finally reaching the safety of the Stromness whaling station, one of his first questions was about the war in Europe. When Shackleton first set out on his ill-fated expedition on August 8, 1914, the First World War was less than a week old, and the German Army had just begun its invasion of Belgium. There was little expectation then that the war would proceed as it did, unleashing four years of slaughterous positional warfare that engulfed the continent.

    Shackleton, having been adrift at sea for years, clearly did not imagine that the war could still be raging, and asked the commandant of the whaling station โ€œtell me, when was the war over?โ€

    The answer came back: โ€œThe war is not over. Millions are being killed. Europe is mad. The world is mad.โ€

    The timing is serendipitous, since the discovery of the Enduranceโ€™s wreck, after more than a hundred years, happened to occur only a few weeks after the world again went mad, with the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian War in February 2022. As time continues its inexorable march and the calendar turns yet again, the war is passing through its third full winter. In February, Z-World will be three years old.

    Of course, modern communications make it extremely unlikely that anybody could be cut fully out of the loop for years at a time, like Shackleton and his men. Instead of being ignorant as to whether or not the war is over, many of us are exposed on a daily basis to footage of men being killed, buildings being blown up, and vehicles being shredded. Twitter has made it essentially impossible to live under a rock, or on an ice floe, as it were.

    If anything, we have the very opposite problem of Shackleton – at least as far as our wartime information infrastructure goes. We are saturated in information, with daily updates tracking advances of a few dozen meters and never ending bombast about new game changing weapons (which seem to change very little), and bluster about โ€œred linesโ€. This war seems to have an unyielding dynamic on the ground, and no matter how many grand pronouncements we hear that one side or the other is on the verge of collapse, the sprawling front continues to grind up bodies and congeal with bloody positional fighting.

    It would seem difficult to believe that a high intensity ground war in Europe with hundreds of miles worth of front could be boring, yet the static and repetitive nature of the conflict is struggling to hold the attention of foreign observers who have little immediately at stake.

    My intention here is a radical zoom-out from these demoralizing and fatiguing small scale updates (as valuable as the work of the war mappers is), and consider the aggregate of 2024 – arguing that this year was, in fact, very consequential. Taken as a whole, three very important things happened in 2024 which create a very dismal outlook for Ukraine and the AFU in the new year. More specifically, 2024 brought three important strategic developments:

    1. Russian victory in southern Donetsk which destroyed the AFUโ€™s position on one of the warโ€™s key strategic axes.
    2. The expenditure of carefully husbanded Ukrainian resources on a failed offensive towards Kursk, which accelerated the attrition of critical Ukrainian maneuver assets and substantially dampened their prospects in the Donbas.
    3. The exhaustion of Ukraineโ€™s ability to escalate vis a vis new strike systems from NATO – more broadly, the west has largely run out of options to upgrade Ukrainian capabilities, and the much vaunted delivery of longer range strike systems failed to alter the trajectory of the war on the ground.

    Taken together, 2024 revealed a Ukrainian military that is increasingly stretched to the limits, to the point where the Russians were able to largely scratch off an entire sector of front. People continue to wonder where and when the Ukrainian front might begin to break down – I would argue that it *did* break down in the south over the last few months, and 2025 begins with strong Russian momentum that the AFU will be hard pressed to arrest.

    Front Collapse in South Donetsk

    What stands out immediately about the operational developments in 2024 is the marked shift of energies away from the axes of combat that had seen the most intense fighting in the first two years of the war. In a sense, this war has seen each of its fronts activate in a sequence, one after the other.

    After the opening Russian offensive, which boasted as its signature success the capture of the Azov coastline and the linkup of Donetsk and Crimea, the action shifted to the northern front (the Lugansk-Kharkov axis), with Russia fighting a summer offensive which captured Severodonetsk and Lysychansk. This was followed by a pair of Ukrainian counteroffensives in the fall, with a thrust out of Kharkov which pushed the front back over the Oskil, and an operation directed at Kherson which failed to breach Russian defenses but ultimately resulted in a Russian withdrawal in good order over the Dnieper due to concerns over logistical connectivity and an over-extended front. Energies then pivoted yet again to the Central Donbas axis, with the enormous battle around Bakhmut raging through the spring of 2023. This was followed by the failed Ukrainian offensive on Russiaโ€™s defenses in Zaporozhia, in the south.

    Just to briefly recapitulate this, we can enumerate several operational phases in the first two years of the war, occurring in sequence and each with a center of gravity in different parts of the front:

    • A Russian offensive across the land bridge, culminating in the capture of Mariupol. (Winter-Spring 2022, Southern Front)
    • A Russian offensive in Lugansk, capturing Severodonetsk and Lysychansk. (Summer 2022, Donets-Oskil front)
    • Ukrainian Counteroffensives towards the Oskil and Kherson (Autumn 2022, Oskil and Dnieper fronts)
    • The Russian assault on Bakhmut (Winter-Spring 2023, Central Front)
    • Ukrainian counteroffensive on the land bridge (Summer 2023)

    Amid all of this, the front that saw the least movement was the southeastern corner of the front, around Donetsk. This was somewhat peculiar. Donetsk is the urban heart of the Donbas – a vast and populous industrial city at the center of a sprawling conurbation, once home to some 2 million people. Even if Russia succeeds in capturing the city of Zaporizhia, Donetsk will be by far the most populous of Ukraineโ€™s former cities to come under Moscowโ€™s control.

    In 2014, with the outbreak of the proto-Donbas war, Donetsk was the locus of much of the fighting, with the airport on the cityโ€™s northern approach the scene of particularly intense combat. This made it rather strange, then, that at the start of 2024 the Ukrainian Army continued to occupy many of the same positions that they built a decade prior. As intense fighting ebbed and flowed along other sectors of front, Donetsk remained besieged by a web of powerfully held Ukrainian defenses, anchored by heavily fortified urban areas stretching from Toretsk to Ugledar. Early Russian attempts to crack this iron ring open, including an assault on Ugledar in the winter of 2023, met with failure.

    The signature operational development of 2024, then, was the re-activation of the Donetsk front, after years of static combat. It is not an exaggeration to say that after years of coagulation, the Russian Army cracked this front wide open in 2024 and Ukraineโ€™s long and strongly held network of urban strongpoints collapsed

    Russian Progress on the Donetsk Axis in 2024

    The year began with the AFU fighting for its fortress in Avdiivka, where it continued to block the northern approach to Donetsk. At the time, the typical argument that one heard from the Ukrainian side was that the Russian assault on Avdiivka was pyrrhic – that the Russians were capturing the city with exorbitantly costly โ€œmeat assaultsโ€ that would inevitably sap Russian combat power and exhaust their ability to continue the offensive.

    With the full measure of the year behind us, we can definitively say that this is not the case. After the fall of Avdiivka, Russian momentum never seriously slackened, and in fact it was the AFU that appeared to be increasingly exhausted. The Ukrainian breakwater position at Ocheretyne (which had previously been their staging point for counterattacks around Avdiivka) was overrun in a matter of days, and by the early summer the frontline had been pushed out towards the approach to Pokrovsk.

    The Russian thrust towards Pokrovsk led many to believe that this city was itself the object of Russian energies, but this was a misread of the operational design. Russia did not need to capture Pokrovsk in 2024 to render it sterile as a logistical hub. Simply by advancing towards the E50 highway, Russian forces were able to cut off Pokrovsk from Ukrainian positions to the south on the Donetsk front, and Pokvrovsk is now a frontline city subject to the full spectrum of overwatch from Russian drones and tube artillery.

    By autumn, the Russian advance had put the Ukrainians in a severe salient, creating an unstable chain of positions in Selydove, Kurakhove, Ugledar, and Krasnogorivka. Russiaโ€™s advance from Ocheretyne onto the southern approach to Pokrovsk acted like an enormous scythe, isolating the entire southeastern sector of the front and allowing Russian forces to carve through it in the closing months of the year

    Russian Operations in 2024, Donetsk Axis

    This war has turned the word โ€œcollapseโ€ into a devalued buzzword. We are told repeatedly that one side or the other is on the verge of collapse: sanctions will โ€œcollapseโ€ the Russian economy, the Wagner uprising of 2023 proved that the Russian political system was โ€œcollapsingโ€, and of course we hear that exorbitant losses have one army or the other on the verge of total failure – which army that may be depends on who you ask.

    I would argue, however, that what we saw from October 2024 onward represents a real occurrence of this oft-repeated and discarded word. The AFU suffered a genuine collapse of the southeastern front, with the forces positioned in their strongpoints too attrited and isolated to make a determined defense, Russian fires becoming too heavily concentrated in ever more compressed areas to endure, and no mechanized reserve in the theater available to counterattack or relieve the incessant Russian pressure.

    Ukraine does maintain enough drones and concentrated fires to limit a full Russian exploitation – that is, Russia is still not able to maneuver at depth. This gave the Russian advance a particular stop-start quality, leapfrogging from one settlement and fortress to the other. More generally, Russiaโ€™s preference to use dispersed small-unit assaults limits the potential for exploitation. We have to emphasize, however, that Russian momentum on this axis has never seriously slackened since October, and many of the key Ukrainian positions were overrun or abandoned very quickly

    Ugledar is a good example: the Russians began their final push toward the town on September 24. By September 29, the 72nd Mechanized Brigade began evacuating. By October 1, Ugledar was fully under Russian control. This was a keystone Ukrainian position put in a completely untenable position and it went down in a week. One could argue, of course, that Ugledar held out for years (how then can we say with a straight face that it was captured in a week), but this is precisely the point. In early 2023 Ugledar (with the help of artillery stationed around Kurakhove) successfully repelled a multi-brigade Russian attack in months of heavy fighting. By October 2024, the position was completely untenable and was abandoned almost immediately when attacked.

    The Ukrainians did no better trying to hold Kurakhove – previously a critical rear area that served as both a logistical hub and a base of fire for supporting (former) frontline strongpoints like Ugledar and Krasnogorivka. Kurakhove, now under full Russian control, will in turn serve as a base of support for the ongoing Russian push to the west towards Andriivka.

    Taking the state of the front holistically, the AFU is currently holding two severe salients at the southernmost end of the line – one around Velyka Novosilka, and another around Andriivka. The former is likely to fall first, as the town has been fully isolated by Russian advances on the flanks. This is not a Bakhmut-like situation, where roads are described as โ€œcutโ€ because they are under Russian fire – in this case, all of the highways into Velyka Novosilka are cut by physical Russian blocking positions, making the loss of the position only a matter of waiting for the Russians to assault it. Further north, a more gentle and less strongly held salient exists between Grodivka and Toretsk. With Toretsk now in the final stages of capture (Ukrainian forces now hold only a small residential neighborhood on the cityโ€™s outskirts), the front should level here as well in the coming months.

    This leaves the Russians more or less in full control of the approaches to Kostyantinivka and Pokrovsk, which are in many ways the penultimate Ukrainian held positions in Donetsk. Pokrovsk has already been bypassed several miles to the west, and the map portends a re-run of the typical Russian tactical methodology for assaulting urban areas – a methodical advance along the wings of the city to isolate it from arterial highways, followed by an attack on the city itself via several axes

    The coming months promise continued Russian advances across this front, in a continuation of what can only be regarded as the collapse of a critical front on the part of the AFU. The Russian Army is advancing to the western border of Donetsk oblast and will ferret the Ukrainians out of their remaining strongpoints at Velyka Novosilka and Andriivka, while pushing into the belly of Pokrovsk. At no point since the fall of Avdiivka have the Ukrainians demonstrated the ability to seriously stymie Russian momentum along this 75 mile front, and the ongoing dissipation of Ukrainian combat resources indicates that little will change in this regard in 2025.

    Toehold: The Incredible Shrinking Kursk Salient

    Throughout the autumn of 2024 and these early months of winter, as Ukrainian forces were dug out of their dense web of fortified positions in the southern Donbas, their comrades continued to stubbornly hold on to their position in Russiaโ€™s Kursk Oblast. The basic shape of Ukraineโ€™s offensive into Kursk is by now well known – billed by Kiev as a gambit to change the psychological trajectory of the war and strike a prestige blow to Russia, the Ukrainian attack had early momentum after achieving initial strategic surprise, but quickly faltered after Ukrainian columns ran into effective Russian blocking positions on the highways out of Sudzha. Efforts to force the roads through Korenovo and Bolshoe Soldatskoe were defeated, and the Ukrainian grouping was left holding on to a modest salient around Sudzha, jutting out into Russia.

    Throughout the autumn, Russian counterattacks have focused on chiseling away at the base of the Ukrainian salient – forcing the Ukrainians out of Snagost and pushing them away from Korenovo. The progress here has been incremental, but significant, and by the start of January the โ€œneckโ€ of the Ukrainian salient had been compressed down to a little over nine miles wide, after their initial penetration in the summer had forced a breach of over twenty miles. All told, Ukraine has lost about 50% of the territory that they grabbed in August.

    The Russian pressure on the flanks of the salient have amplified many of the qualities that make this position wasteful and dangerous for the AFU. There is limited road connectivity for Ukrainian forces – a problem amplified by the rollback from Snagost, which cost them access to the highway running from Korenovo to Sumy. Apart from a few circuitous side roads, Ukrainian forces only have a single highway – the R200 route – to run material and reinforcements into the pocket, which allows Russian forces to surveil their lines of communication and conduct effective interdiction strikes. The compression of the pocket also greatly narrows the targeting area for Russian drones, tube artillery, and rocketry, and creates more condensed and saturating bombardment

    Despite the fact that this position has been profoundly unproductive for Ukraine – being steadily rolled back and having no synergy with other, more critical theaters – the same grouping of Ukrainian units remain here, fighting in a steadily more compressed space. Even more baffling, the Ukrainian grouping consists largely of premiere assets – Mechanized and Air Assault brigades – that could have contributed meaningfully as a reserve in the Donbas over the last three months.

    On January 5, there was a surprise in the form of a renewed Ukrainian attack out of the salient. The internet of course jumped to the conclusion that the AFU was going back over to some sort of general offensive posture in Kursk, but the reality was very underwhelming – something like a battalion sized assault up the axis towards Bolshoe Soldaskoe, which got a few kilometers up the road before it ran out of steam. Ukrainian efforts to jam Russian drones were stymied by the increasing ubiquity of fiber-optic systems, and the Ukrainian attack collapsed within a day

    Kursk Salient – General Situation, January 2025

    The tactical particulars of the Ukrainian attack are interesting, and thereโ€™s ongoing speculation as to its purpose – perhaps it was intended to cover a rotation or withdrawal, to improve tactical positions on the northern edge of the salient, or for inscrutable propaganda purposes. However, these specifics are rather unimportant: attacking out the end of the salient (that is, trying to deepen the penetration into Russia) does nothing to reverse Ukraineโ€™s problems in Kursk. These problems are first, on the tactical level, that the salient has been greatly compressed on the flanks and continues to narrow, and on the strategic level the willful expenditure of valuable mechanized assets on a front that does not impact the critical theaters of the war. More simply, Kursk is a sideshow, and it is a sideshow that has gone wrong even within its own operational logic.

    One thing that has been of endless interest, of course, have been the continued rumors of North Korean troops fighting in Kursk. Western intelligence agencies have been adamant about the presence of North Koreans in Kursk. Some people are predisposed to instinctively disbelieve everything that western officialdom says – while I think some skepticism is warranted, I do not automatically assume that they are lying. One recent report lays out what would seem to be a plausible version of this story: that the idea actually originated in Pyongyang, not Moscow, and that a modest number of Korean troops (perhaps 10,000) are embedded with Russian units. The presumption here is that the Koreans hatched the idea as a way to gain combat experience, with the Russians in turn getting auxiliary forces, though of questionable combat effectiveness.

    However, it is worth noting that this is not nearly as important as it has been made out to be. Much has been made of the idea that the North Korean presence proves some sort of Russian state of desperation, but this is fairly silly on its face – with more than 1.5 million active personnel in the Russian military, 10,000 Korean troops in Kursk represents a paltry appendage. More importantly, there has been an attempt to portray the North Korean contingent as a major departure point in the war. In particular, the formulation โ€œNorth Korean troops in Europeโ€ has been used to conjure cold war imagery of communist despotism clawing at the free world

    The point, however, is that North Korean troops are presumed specifically to be in Kursk, which is in Russia. This is linked, of course, to the recently concluded mutual defense agreement signed between Moscow and Pyongyang. By attacking into Kursk – widening the front into prewar Russian territory – Ukraine created a defensive combat task for Russia which triggers the possibility of military assistance from North Korea. However much one may wish to link the Korean contingent to Russiaโ€™s dreaded โ€œwar of aggressionโ€, the force in Kursk is very objectively engaged in the defense of Russian territory, and that makes it possible for Russia to use auxiliary forces – including conscripts and the troops of its allies – to fight there.

    Ultimately, then, the presence of North Koreans in Kursk is interesting, but perhaps not very important after all. These troops are not in Ukraine (even under the most maximal definition of the Ukrainian territorial unit), they are not carrying the primary combat load, and they are unequivocally not the problem that the AFU is facing in Kursk. The โ€œbig problemโ€ for Ukraine, very simply, is not the presence of some amorphous Korean horde dedicated to spreading Glorious Juche to Europe – it is the loitering of large grouping of their own precious mechanized brigades in a compressed salient, far far away from the Donbas, where they are greatly needed.

    Scraping the Barrel: AFU Force Generation

    I think it is well understood, of course, that Ukraine faces severe manpower constraints relative to Russia, both in terms of the raw totals of male biomass available – with roughly 35 million fighting aged males in Russia against perhaps 9 million in prewar Ukraine – but also in terms of its capacity to mobilize them.

    Ukraineโ€™s mobilization scheme is hampered by both widespread draft evasion (with willingness to serve decreasing as the war has stretched on) and a stubborn unwillingness to draft younger men, aged 18-25. Ukraine is structurally burdened with a deeply imbalanced population structure: there are roughly 60% more Ukrainian men in their 30โ€™s than in their 20โ€™s. Given the relative scarcity of young men, particularly in their early 20’s, the Ukrainian government rightly views this 18-25 year old cohort as a premium demographic cohort that it is loathe to burn away in combat. Given the ubiquity of draft evasion, the refusal to mobilize younger males, and the corruption and inefficiency characteristic of the Ukrainian government, it should come as no surprise when Ukrainian mobilization falters

    Russia, in contrast, has both a much larger pool of potential recruits and a more efficient apparatus for mobilization. In contrast to Ukraineโ€™s scheme of compulsory conscription, Russia has relied on generous sign-on bonuses to solicit volunteers. Russiaโ€™s incentive system, to this point, has provided a steady stream of enlistments that has been more than enough to offset Russian losses. Without going too far into the various speculative estimates of Russian casualties, it is widely acknowledged by western military leadership that Russia has significantly more personnel now than it did at the start of the war.

    All of that is to say: Ukraine faces a severe structural disadvantage in military manpower in the aggregate, which is exacerbated by the idiosyncrasies of the Ukrainian mobilization law, ameliorated slightly by the relatively low troop densities and the preponderant power of strike systems in this war.

    The argument that I want to make here, however, is that Ukraineโ€™s systemic problems matching Russian manpower have been exacerbated by several developments which specifically became prominent in 2024. In other words, 2024 can and should be marked as the year where Ukrainian manpower constraints became markedly and perhaps irretrievably worse due to specific decisions made in Kiev, and particular developments on the ground.

    These are as follows:

    1. The decision to expand the AFUโ€™s force structure through the creation of the โ€œ15 seriesโ€ brigades
    2. The decision to deliberately widen the front and create additional demands for manpower by launching the incursion into Kursk
    3. The stall out of Ukraineโ€™s new mobilization program in the autumn
    4. Accelerating problems with desertion in the AFU

    Weโ€™ll run through these in order.

    An army that is intaking new personnel has to decide between two possible allocations for them. New personnel can be used as replacements to replenish existing frontline units, or they can be used to expand the force structure by creating new units. That much seems fairly obvious, and ideally mobilization will exceed losses and make it possible to do both. Where armies face hard manpower constraints, however – that is, where losses are equal to or greater than intake of men, the decision to expand the force structure can have monumental consequences. The stereotypical example, of course, would be the late-war Wehrmacht, which created premiere new assets in the form of Waffen SS divisions, which received privileged access to recruits and equipment while regular army divisions in the line suffered from a trickle of replacements which could not keep up with losses.

    Ukraine, with its garbled force structure, has created a mess through its own attempts to expand its force structure in the face of dwindling strength on the line. Late in 2023, the AFU announced intentions to form an entirely new grouping of brigades – the so-called โ€œ15 seriesโ€, given their designations as the 150th, 151st, 152nd, 153rd, and 154th Mechanized Brigades. This was followed in 2024 with the appending of the 155th Mechanized Brigade, which was to be trained and equipped in France.

    Forming a new grouping of mechanized brigades is essential to the way that Ukraine is presenting its war. Because Ukraine still aims (at least on paper) to recapture all of its Russian held territory, there must always be the illusory possibility of a future offensive, and in order for that illusory possibility to remain, Ukraine must present itself as actively preparing for future offensive operations. Ukraineโ€™s presentation of its own strategic animus – the idea that it is holding the front while it prepares to go back on the offensive – essentially locks it into a program of expanding its force structure

    The problem for Ukraine is that the immense pressure on the front makes it essentially impossible for them to properly husband resources the way they would like. Properly training and equipping half a dozen fresh mechanized brigades and holding them in reserve would be very helpful, but they cannot really do this in light of the demands for personnel at the front. These brigades instead become โ€œpaper formationsโ€ that have a bureaucratic existence, while their organic assets are pulled apart and sucked into the front – stripped down into battalion or company sized elements that can be plugged into sectors of need on the frontline. At the moment, none of the 15 series brigades have seen action as organic units – that is, fighting as themselves.

    The French-trained 155th brigade forms a useful example. Originally designed as an overweight formation of some 5800 men, equipped with premiere European equipment, the brigade was hemorrhaging personnel from the start, with Ukrainian sources reporting that some 1700 men – many of them forcibly conscripted off the streets of Ukraine – deserted the unit during training and formation. A collapse in the brigadeโ€™s leadership – with its commander resigning – made matters even more complicated, and the formationโ€™s first action around Pokrovsk went badly. Now, the brigade is being dismembered, if not formally disbanded, with personnel and vehicles being stripped down and parceled out to bolster neighbor units.

    The decision to allocate personnel to new mechanized brigades (though given stocks of armored vehicles it is questionable whether those designations mean anything) does not necessarily change Ukraineโ€™s manpower balance in the aggregate, but it is certainly an inefficient way to use personnel. To return again to the 155th brigade, one problem noted by Ukrainian analysts was the fact that much of the brigade was formed whole cloth from forcibly mobilized personnel, without a proper cadre of veterans and experienced NCOs – some 75% of the brigade, it turns out, had been mobilized less than two months before arriving in France for training. This fact was certainly instrumental in the mass desertions and the brigadeโ€™s poor combat effectiveness.

    Given Ukraine’s constraints, the best course of action would undoubtedly be to allocate new personnel and equipment as replacements to build out the depleted veteran brigades on the front lines, plugging in replacements around existing veterans and officers. Kiev, however, prizes the prestige that comes from force expansion and the โ€œshiny new toyโ€ factor of new formations equipped with scarce and valuable equipment like Leopard tanks. These new brigades, though billed as premiere assets, clearly have lower combat effectiveness than existing formations, given their lack of experience, shortage of veteran officers, and low unit cohesion.

    The simple reality, however, is that replacements for existing brigades are nowhere close to keeping up with burn rates. Frontline units have complained of increasingly dire infantry shortages for months, with some brigades on the Pokrovsk axis reporting that they are down to less than 40% of their allocated infantry complements.

    In short, Ukraineโ€™s decision to embark on force expansion in the face of significant manpower shortages has exacerbated the problem – both starving veteran units of replacements and concentrating newly mobilized personnel into combat ineffective formations that lack a veteran core, experienced officers, and vital equipment. They have tried, belatedly, to square this circle by parceling out new formations to backstop line brigades, but this is less than ideal – it leads to a patchwork order of battle with lower unit cohesion and a fragmented defense.

    Unfortunately, this comes precisely as Ukraine has created additional self-imposed strains on its resources, in particular through its incursion into Kursk. At the moment, elements of at least seven mechanized brigades, two marine infantry brigades, and three air assault brigades are stationed on the Kursk axis. Without going too far into the weeds rehashing Ukraineโ€™s operation here, itโ€™s important to remember that Ukraine – facing extreme pressures on its force generation – voluntarily chose to widen the front into a secondary theater, diverting scarce assets and reducing its own ability to economize forces.

    In summary, Ukraine has made deliberate decisions to widen the front and expand its force structure, both of which have been decidedly detrimental to its efforts to economize personnel. This comes precisely as a 2024 effort to ramp up mobilization has come off the rails.

    Ukraineโ€™s mobilization program suffered from a variety of defects, including gaps and errors in its databases and endemic corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency. Laws passed in 2024 aimed to rectify many of these problems, including through the rollout of an app that would allow draft-eligible men to register and check their status without having to visit recruitment offices. It appeared that matters had come to a head when Zelensky fired several recruitment chiefs in 2023, and there was a real sense of urgency. After some signs of initial promise, it is clear that this intensified mobilization drive has faltered over the autumn and early winter

    There were initially signs of optimism for Ukraine – in the first month after the new mobilization law was passed, there was a surge and the army enlisted 30,000 new personnel. However, by the end of the summer this initial burst of enlistments had faded, and mobilization was again running behind the AFUโ€™s losses. An October briefing from the Ukrainian General Staff confirmed that enlistments had already declined by 40% after the brief surge brought on by the new mobilization law. Around the same time, officials in Odessa (Ukraineโ€™s third largest city) admitted that they were running at only 20% of their mobilization quota.

    The problems are myriad. The new mobilization law led to some initial improvements but has ultimately failed to resolve problems with draft evasion, bureaucratic miscues remain endemic, and employers desperate to retain workers filed an avalanche of employment related draft deferments. Unable to sustain the initial surge of enlistments, Ukraine faces a looming manpower crisis.

    Furthermore, Ukraineโ€™s continued inability to provide either demobilization or timely rotations means that mobilized personnel face the prospect of indefinite service on the frontlines. This is obviously bad for morale, with soldiers contemplating the possibility of years of uninterrupted service, and this in turn drives the desertions that are becoming a mounting problem for the AFU. Some reports indicate that as many as 100,000 Ukrainian troops have deserted by this point, many no doubt driven by the psychological and physical strains of endless combat with no prospect of rotation.

    A deadly feedback loop is now at work, with the lack of rotations and the shortage of replacements synergizing to accelerate the burn of Ukrainian personnel. The AFU is unable to regularly rotate units out of combat, and the inadequate flow of replacements causes frontline infantry complements to wear thin. Unable to rotate or reinforce, line brigades resort to cannibalization – scraping support personnel like mortar teams, drivers, and drone operators to fill out frontline positions. This further accelerates losses as brigades fight with thinned out support and fires elements, and makes Ukrainian men more unwilling to enlist – because there is now no guarantee that becoming a drone operator, for example, will save one from being sent to a frontline trench eventually.

    Where does this leave us? Ukraine continues to dispose of a very large force, with more than a hundred brigades and hundreds of thousands of men under arms. This force, however, is both substantially outnumbered by the Russian army and in a clear trend of decay. Despite a highly touted attempt to reinvigorate the mobilization apparatus in 2024, the intake of new personnel is clearly too low to offset losses, and the heavy lifting formations in critical sectors of front have seen their strength – particularly in the infantry complements – decline, in some cases to critical levels.

    The failure of Ukraineโ€™s 2024 mobilization program has coincided with several strategic choices which have exacerbated manpower concerns – specifically the decision to embark on a program of force expansion even as the AFU voluntarily extended its commitments by opening a new secondary front in Kursk. In other words, Ukraineโ€™s mobilization falls short of its force requirements, and the AFU has also made choices that sabotaged its ability to economize. Units are ground up, replacements come in a paltry trickle, rotations are late or absent, units cannibalize themselves, and angry and weary men desert.

    Itโ€™s not at all clear that this will lead to a โ€œbreaking pointโ€, in the sense that people are anticipating. Ukrainian strike capabilities and the Russian preference for dispersed, leapfrogging assaults limit the potential for grand breakthroughs and exploitation. However, what we saw over the past three months on the southern Donetsk axis offers a preview of what awaits: an exhausted force being steadily rolled back, dug out of its strongpoints, and mauled – covering its retreat with drones but losing position after position. The line holds, until it doesnโ€™t.

    End of the Line: ATACMs, JASSMs, and Hazelnuts

    Ukraineโ€™s ability to remain in the field depends on a titration of two indispensable resources: first, Ukrainian male biomass, and secondly the critical western weaponry that gives them combat effectiveness. We have evaluated the first: Ukraine is not exactly out of men, but the trends of its mobilization program are poor and personnel shortages are mounting. The trends regarding the second are, if anything, even more foreboding for Kiev.

    There are two general dynamics that have emerged, neither of which create an optimistic picture for Ukraine, which weโ€™ll examine in turn. These are as follows:

    1. The delivery of heavy weaponry to Ukraine (tanks, IFVs, and artillery tubes) has largely dried up in recent months.
    2. The west has essentially run out of escalatory weaponry (strike systems) to give, and those systems already given have failed to meaningfully altar the trajectory of the war.

    In 2023, building out new mechanized units was the name of the game, with the Pentagon leading a multinational effort to stand up an entire army corps worth of units equipped with Leopards, Challengers, and a whole slew of western IFVs and APCs. When that lovingly assembled grouping bashed its head on a rock in the botched assault on the Zaporizhia line, the United States belatedly and begrudgingly dispatched its own Abrams to backstop the Ukrainian tank force. In 2024, however, deliveries of heavy weapons slowed to a trickle.

    The role of the tank in Ukraine has been greatly misunderstood. The vulnerability of tanks to the myriad strike systems of the modern battlefield led some observers to declare that the tank as a weapons system was now obsolete, but this did not really square with the fact that both combatants in this war were eager to deploy as many as possible. Tanks need more critical enablers – more combat engineering, air defense, and electronic warfare support – but they continue to fill an indispensable role and remain an essential item in this war. The failure of Ukraineโ€™s 2023 counteroffensive showed, if anything, that tanks simply are not โ€œgame changingโ€ systems, but mass consumption items – but this has always been the case. The signature quality of iconic tanks like the Sherman and the T34 was that they were numerous

    Unfortunately for Ukraine, deliveries of tanks have dropped off dramatically after the failures of 2023. Americaโ€™s drawdowns for Ukraine in 2024 were almost entirely devoid of armored vehicles of any kind. Data from the Kiel Institute, which has been meticulous tracking weaponry commitments and deliveries, confirms a sharp dropoff in heavy weapons in 2024. In 2023, Ukraineโ€™s backers pledged 384 tanks. This dropped to just 98 in 2024 – which explains why the new Ukrainian mechanized brigades are perilously light on the equipment indicative of their designations.

    While 2023 was all about building out Ukraineโ€™s mechanized package with tanks, IFVs, and engineering, 2024 has been largely about enhancing Ukraineโ€™s strike capabilities. There have been two separate elements at play – first, the delivery of both air and ground launched systems (most notably the British Storm Shadows and American ATACMs respectively), and secondly the loosening of the rules of engagement to allow Ukraine to strike targets inside pre-war Russia.

    This dovetailed, as it turned out, with Ukraineโ€™s operation in Kursk, and in many ways the most direct impact of the Kursk incursion has been to force the westโ€™s hand on the rules of engagement. While Ukraine has long been striking inside Russia with indigenous systems, most notably drones, the White House continued to drag its feet on formal approval for strikes with American systems. By launching a ground assault on Kursk, Ukraine made the decision for them: the United States gave clearance to use ATACMs to support the ground forces in Kursk, and this metastasized into general license to strike Russia with the full range of available systems. This was a poignant reminder that, however we conceive of the proxy-sponsor relationship, Ukraine has some ability to force Americaโ€™s hand: a classic example of the tail wagging the dog.

    In any case, 2024 saw Ukraine and its western backers slowly but surely bash through all the supposed red-lines in this domain: the British breached first with the delivery of Storm Shadows late in 2023, and this was followed by the delivery of ATACMs (with a handful of F16โ€™s to boot), and finally the loosening of the rules of engagement to clear strikes on Russia.

    Where does this leave us? There would seem to be three important things to consider.

    1. The west has essentially reached the end of its escalation chain. The only remaining step that they can take would be to supply Ukraine with JASSMs (Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile), which would mark a quantitative but not a meaningful qualitative upgrade to Ukraineโ€™s strike capabilities.
    2. Ukraineโ€™s use of western-supplied strike assets has been dissipated and has not materially improved their situation on the ground.
    3. Russia maintains a dominant strike advantage, both qualitative and quantitative.

    Ukraine faces a stark disadvantage in strike capability relative to Russia, in a variety of ways. Russian strike assets are far more numerous and have significant range advantages, but it is also important to take into consideration both Russiaโ€™s significantly greater strategic depth and its more dense and relatively unscathed air defense. Unlike Ukraine, which has seen its air defense stretch to the limit with destroyed launchers and a mounting interceptor shortage, Russiaโ€™s air defenses have been essentially untouched, as Ukraine has lacked the large numbers of assets required to conduct a proper SEAD/DEAD (Suppression/Destruction of Enemy Air Defense) campaign.

    Given this basic calculus, using western strike systems to wage a blow for blow strategic air campaign is bad math for Ukraine. It is generally unwise to engage in a bat fight when your opponent is a bigger man with a much longer bat. Instead, Ukraineโ€™s strike systems should have been leveraged to support ground operations – concentrating strikes spatially and in time to synergize with efforts on the ground. Just as a simple thought experiment, it is not difficult to imagine ATACMs making a difference if they had been available in 2023 and used to saturate Russian rear areas during the assault on the Zaporizhia line – striking in tempo with the mechanized assault to disrupt Russian command and control and prevent reinforcement of critical areas.

    Instead, Ukraineโ€™s strike capacity has been largely dissipated in attacks that sometimes achieve success hitting Russian installations but fail to directly support successful operations on the ground. The result is a diffusion of Ukrainian striking power that is less than the sum of its parts. Now, Ukraine has essentially run dry on missiles – of the 500 ATACMs sent by the United States, perhaps 50 are left in Kievโ€™s stockpiles. Stocks of air launched Storm Shadow missiles are similarly low, and Britainโ€™s commitment to resupply is limited to โ€œa few dozenโ€

    The last option for the west to backstop Ukrainian strike capability are American JASSMs. While there is a longer-range variant in production (the JASSM-ER, or Extended Range), these are relatively new and expensive and are earmarked for American stocks – it is therefore presumed that the Ukrainians would receive the standard variant. The standard JASSM has slight range advantages over Storm Shadows and ATACMs, at roughly 230 miles. In the event that JASSMs are not given, there is a shorter range system called the SLAM (Standoff Land Attack Missile) with a range of some 170 miles. Both JASSMs and SLAMs would be compatible with Ukrainian F-16s.

    Two things need to be noted about the JASSM. First, the JASSM – while offering slightly longer ranges – would essentially serve as a backstop/replacement for the rapidly dwindling ATACMs and particularly the air launched Storm Shadows – instead of Ukraineโ€™s native SU-24s launching Storm Shadows, they would utilize F-16s launching JASSMs. This would not represent a dramatic upgrade in Ukrainian capabilities, but would instead simply serve to maintain a bare minimum Ukrainian strike capability. JASSMs are a replacement for dwindling capabilities, not an augmentation to them.

    Secondly, it must be understood that JASSMs are the last stop. Weโ€™re now entering the territory, not of artificially constructed red lines, but physical and real limits. Russia has essentially eaten the gifted stocks of ATACMs and Storm Shadows, with little discernable effect on their ability to fight, and JASSMs are the last extant item in the inventories to keep Ukrainian strike capabilities operative. We are at the last rung of the aid ladder.

    In the case of JASSMs, however, there are notable downsides for the United States. This is an important case of putting all of oneโ€™s eggs in the same technological basket. In 2020, the United States scrapped the development of its conventionally armed Long Range Standoff Missile, making the JASSM – particularly the new extended range variants – the system for the United States, earmarked to play a critical role in future conflicts, particularly in the Pacific. This makes the JASSM an extremely sensitive system, as a centerpiece of American strike capabilities, particularly with the modernization of the Tomahawk system crawling along at a few dozen units per year.

    Given the fact that JASSMs are GPS guided, there are real reasons to be reticent about giving Ukraine such a technologically sensitive system. Russian electronic warfare has enjoyed considerable success jamming GPS and disrupting similarly guided American systems. Allowing the Russians to gain familiarity with a keystone American system could wreak havoc on Pentagon war planning – most, if not all of the strike eggs are in this basket, so why let an adversary peek inside?

    Itโ€™s probable, given what we have seen to this point, that these concerns will ultimately be dismissed and Ukraine will receive a line of JASSMs which will backstop their strike capabilities – but given the size of Ukraineโ€™s F-16 fleet, the scale will be constrained. Furthermore, air launched systems are less optimal for Ukraine, given their dependence on large and easily targeted airfields, in contrast to ground launched systems which are mobile and more easily concealed.

    Certainly, JASSMs will never give Ukraine the ability to match Russiaโ€™s own strike capacity. After hearing endlessly about how Russia is running out of missiles, it has at last been concluded that this is simply not true, and indeed never was. Recently, Ukrainian defense intelligence admitted that per their own estimates Russia retains about 1,400 long range missiles in its reserves, with a monthly production of roughly 150 units. Russian production of inexpensive Geran drones has also skyrocketed, with Ukrainian intelligence estimating a ceiling as high as 2,000 drones per month.

    There is also the matter of the new Russian missile system – the now famous Oreshnik, or Hazel Tree. Russia tested the Oreshnik system on a large machining plant in Dnipro on November 21, 2024, which allowed the basic capabilities of the system to be gauged. The Oreshnik is an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile, characterized by its hypersonic capabilities (exceeding Mach-10) and its Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle equipped with six separate warheads, with the potential for submunitions in each. Although the attack on Dnipro was essentially a demonstration which used inert training warheads (that is, without explosive payloads), the missile can be configured with nuclear or conventional warheads

    As in the case of the North Korean troops in Kursk, I rather think that the Oreshnik launch was not nearly as important as it was made out to be. The system is expensive and likely impractical for conventional use. I understand the desire to conceive of Oreshnik as a massively powerful conventional weapon – showering its target with half a dozen warheads with the power of an entire flight of Kalibr missiles – but there are several problems with this. The accuracy of the system (the CEP, or โ€œCircular Error Probableโ€ in the technical parlance) is much more consistent with a nuclear delivery system than a conventional one. Furthermore, the problem with using an IRBM for conventional strikes is the danger of miscalculation – foreign adversaries may misinterpret the launch as a nuclear attack and respond appropriately. This is precisely why the Russian government actually alerted the United States to the launch ahead of time – a fine arrangement for a demonstration, but impractical for a weapon that is intended to be used regularly.

    We may see another use of the Oreshnik against Ukraine, but ultimately this is unlikely to be a system of consequence in this war. The demonstration in Dnipro was instead likely intended to send a message to Europe – reminding NATO that Russia has the capacity to deliver strikes against European targets that cannot be intercepted. It also serves as a poignant reminder that Europe lacks the equivalent capability, and in essence provides a demonstration of Russiaโ€™s ability to launch missiles from far beyond the range of either Ukrainian or European response. The Hazelnut is a tangible reminder of Russiaโ€™s strategic depth and strike dominance in Ukraine.

    Ultimately, Ukraine will lose the strike game. Itโ€™s strike capacity has dwindled, with missiles frittered away in a dissipated air campaign, and though the exhaustion of Storm Shadow and ATACMs stocks can be offset somewhat by JASSMs, Ukraine simply lacks the range or quantities necessary to match Russian capabilities. Needing to do more with less, Ukraine instead diffused its assets and failed to synergize its strikes with ground operations. We are now at the end of the line – after JASSMs, thereโ€™s nothing left in western warehouses to upgrade Ukrainian capabilities. Hazelnuts or no, the math on this bat fight is bad for Kiev.

    Conclusion: Debellation

    Trapped in an endless news cycle, with daily footage of FPV strikes and exploding vehicles, and a dutiful cottage industry of war mappers alerting us to every 100 meter advance, it can easily feel like the Russo-Ukrainian War is trapped in an interminable doom loop which will never end – Mad Max meets Groundhog Day.

    What I have endeavored to do here, however, is argue that 2024 actually saw several very important developments which make the coming shape of the war relatively clear. To briefly recapitulate:

    1. Russian forces caved in Ukrainian defenses at depth across an entire critical axis of front. After remaining static for years, Ukraineโ€™s position in Southern Donetsk has been obliterated, with Russian forces advancing through an entire belt of fortified positions, pushing the front into Pokrovsk and Kostayantinivka.
    2. The main Ukrainian gambit on the ground (the incursion into Kursk) failed spectacularly, with the salient being progressively caved in. An entire grouping of critical mechanized formations wasted much of the year fighting on this unproductive and secondary front, leaving Ukrainian positions in the Donbas increasingly threadbare and bereft of reserves.
    3. An attempt by the Ukrainian government to reinvigorate its mobilization program failed, with enlistments quickly trailing off. Decisions to expand the force structure exacerbated the shortage of manpower, and as a result the decay of Ukraineโ€™s frontline brigades has accelerated.
    4. Long awaited western upgrades to Ukraineโ€™s strike capabilities failed to defeat Russian momentum, and stocks of ATACMs and Storm Shadows are nearly exhausted. There are now few options remaining to prop up Ukrainian strike capacity, and no prospect of Ukraine gaining dominance in this dimension of the war.

    In short, Ukraine is on the path to debellation – defeat through the total exhaustion of its capacity to resist. They are not exactly out of men and vehicles and missiles, but these lines are all pointing downward. A strategic Ukrainian defeat – once unthinkable to the western foreign policy apparatus and commentariat – is now on the table. Quite interestingly, now that Donald Trump is about to return to the White House, it is suddenly acceptable to speak of Ukrainian defeat. Robert Kagan – a stalwart champion of Ukraine if there ever was one – now says the quiet part out loud:

    Ukraine will likely lose the war within the next 12 to 18 months. Ukraine will not lose in a nice, negotiated way, with vital territories sacrificed but an independent Ukraine kept alive, sovereign, and protected by Western security guarantees. It faces instead a complete defeat, a loss of sovereignty, and full Russian control

    Indeed.

    None of this should be particularly surprising. If anything, it is shocking that my position – that Russia is essentially a very powerful country that was very unlikely to lose a war (which it perceives as existential) right in its own belly – somehow became controversial or fringe. But here we are.

    Carthago delenda est [end]

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    During his annual end-of-year press conference, on December 14, 2023, Vladimir Putin states

    There will be peace when we achieve our goals. They don’t change. Let me remind you what we talked about – the denazification and demilitarization of Ukraine, its neutral status

    Historical benchmarks

    Around an ancient Cossack core in 1654, established after a revolt against the Polishโ€“Lithuanian Commonwealth and the consecutive allegiance to the Russian Czar, the Russian authorities added new territories to Ukraine. After the Russian revolution, especially, Vladimir Lenin assigned in 1922 the Russian regions of Odessa, Nikolaev, Kherson, Zaporozhye, Donetsk, Lugansk and Kharkov, to the new Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. These are the current battlefield. After the Soviet victory over Nazism in 1945, Joseph Stalin added western territories, especially Lviv, which are still the hotbed of the modern Ukrainian Nazism.

    Soviet Union was dissolved in 1991 and Ukraine became independent. The 2010 presidential election highlighted the rift between eastern Ukraine and the nationalists, right-wing and pro European Union, in the west, who lost

    Ukraine was still an associate member of the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States, former Soviet Union). Elected president Viktor Yanukovych was negotiating a free trade agreement with the European Union, but on February 25, 2013, Jose Manuel Barroso, president of the European Commission, stated that its enforcement required that Ukraine quit its association with the CIS. On November 21, Yanukovych put the signature of the agreement on hold. In Lviv, Western Ukraine, protestors started chanting

    for the EU, death to the enemies, dirty Russian speakers on the gallows

    Their sponsor was Oleh Tyahnybok, leader of Nazi Svoboda [Liberty] party. First a few and peaceful in Kiev, the protestors were 500,000 on Maidan square on December 1, the most from the west, around a Nazi and bellicose core. US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, Victoria Nuland visited Kiev on December 5, supported the protestors. The economy was deteriorating, Ukraine was asking for financial support. Europe refused, Russia agreed. On December 17, 2013, a new deal was signed with Russia

    On Maidan square, on February 18, 2014, shots targeted the riot police and the protestors, the situation escalated to a bloodbath. On February 21, Yanukovych signed an agreement with the leaders of the parliamentary opposition and left the country. 103 protestors and 13 police officers had died. The Nazis held one third of the interim government, notably defense. NATO had achieved a rightist coup in Ukraine

    On February 27, 2014, Russia took action in Crimea, the last region that a Soviet leader had assigned to Ukraine, in 1954. The armed forces secured without fighting the Russian naval base in Sevastopol and the Russian-speaking population all over the peninsula

    On March 11, 2014, the 2010 elected local legislative body, Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, proclaimed its independence. On March 16, through referendum, 96.77% voters supported the reunification of Crimea with Russia.

    Pro-Europe citizens and Nazi militants had rebelled late 2013, in the west and Kiev, against the legal government of Ukraine. Pro-Yanukovych and pro-Russia citizens, rose up in Donbass against the Russophobia of the new authorities. On April 6, 2014, activists seized in Lugansk the headquarters of the Ukrainian State security (SBU). On April 7, they occupied in Donetsk the building of the Ukrainian regional administration. They were demanding either autonomy within a federal Ukraine or incorporation to Russia. Donetsk Peopleโ€™s Republic (DNR) and Lugansk People’s Republic (LNR) were founded on April 8

    On May 2, in order to deter federalism in Odessa, nationalist thugs set ablaze the Trade Unions House and slaughtered 48 Russian-speaking activists. The new Ukrainian authorities disowned as terrorists the autonomy partisans, sent against Donbass the loyal members of the armed forces and Nazi militants, legalized meanwhile as paramilitary formations, like Azov battalion. The Ukrainian forces started deliberately shelling civilian areas. These terrorist attacks were the beginning of the war in Donbass

    For the first time, on May 26, 2014, the Ukrainian armed forces shelled Donetsk airport. On June 2, air strikes targeted Lugansk, where 8 civilians were killed and 28 injured.

    On September 5, 2014, representatives from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Ukraine, Russia and both new Peopleโ€™s Republics, signed in Minsk, Belarus, a first protocol for ceasefire. Another agreement was signed on February 15, 2015, but its guarantors, Angela Merkel and Franรงois Hollande, for Germany and France, will have confessed years later that the agreements were a scam, an attempt to buy Ukraine time, in order for NATO to reinforce the Ukrainian military power

    Volodymyr Zelenskyy is not necessarily a Nazi, rather a former professional actor and an opportunist. He has been elected on May 20, 2019, on the promise of peace in Donbass, but quickly, the Nazi deep State taught him what should be his policy if he loved life. He did not disarm the Nazi paramilitary formations nor implement Minsk agreements. Former US intelligence officer Scott Ritter told that story in March 2022

    https://youtu.be/WPc8SRmSSMo

    Zelenskyy is indeed enjoying life and through the endemic corruption, has earned several hundred million dollars in four years

    The Ukrainian membership of NATO was more seriously raised in the West, while the terrorist shelling were worsening in Donbass, when on February 24, 2022, Russia started a special military operation, to liberate Donbass, denazify and demilitarize Ukraine

    The Russian offensive threatened Kiev and Kharkov, in order to divert the Ukrainian forces from Donbass, where Mariupol was encircled on March 11

    Bilateral talks began as soon as February 28, in Belarus and Turkey, but Ukraine withdrawn late March, after the US and UK had vetoed peace and promised full logistic support. The neocons and their European lackeys were regarding that new proxy war as an opportunity of strategic victory. Their wet dream was to dismember Russia and subdue China

    But the Russian and republican [from Donetsk People’s Republic, DNR] forces completed on May 20 the liberation of Mariupol. The West lost the war at that point.

    On September 27, a US secret operation sabotaged Nord Stream pipelines, in order to secure the loyalty of its European lackeys. Through referendums the same day, the inhabitants of Kherson, Zaporozhye, Donetsk and Lugansk, voted for their reunification with Russia

    Ukraine had mobilized and while in September, its numerical superiority was temporarily 3 to 1, counterattacked with success in Kharkov region. At the other end of the battlefield, Russia was unable to ensure the supply through the dniepr of its forces in Kherson, which was evacuated in November.

    In October, another major battle began in DNR, where the Russian fighters of Wagner PMC (Private Military Company) attacked Bakhmut. Zelenskyy was regarding the city as a symbol of resistance and the Atlanticist cannon fodder was thrown through the crossfire of a superior Russian artillery. Although outnumbered, Wagner managed to crush the garrison and its reinforcements, completed the cleansing of the city on May 20, 2023, one year after the Russian victory in Mariupol

    NATO countries were flooding Ukraine with high technology, air defense systems, tanks, armored vehicles, artillery and ammunition. The long advertised counter-offensive began on June 4, 2023. The axis of attacks, between Zaporozhye region and Donetsk People’s Republic, suggested the strategic goals. The Atlanticist ambition was to reach Azov sea, to cut Crimea from mainland Russia

    But the counter-offensive failed, the Atlanticist forces did not even managed to break through the first Russian defensive lines. A now iconic picture is showing wrecks, one German Leopard 2A6 tank and several US Bradley infantry fighting vehicles (IFV), near Rabotino, Zaporozhye region, on June 9

    In December, Russia is completing the cleansing of Marinka, a town in Donetsk southwestern suburb, where the Atlanticist forces were entrenched since 2014

    NATO countries have depleted their own military stocks, but the Russian firepower has never been matched. The information is secret but several clues are suggesting that about 500,000 Ukrainian fighters may have been killed since February 24, 2022. Serious analysis are concluding that the Russian casualties are much lower.

    It took the arrogant Western leaders 6 months to admit the failure of the counter-offensive. Ukraine is widening the mobilization criteria, military police is chasing draft-dodgers. Zelenskyy traveled once more to Washington DC on December 12, 2023, begged for more military support, but the US Congress departed without a deal with Joe Biden’s administration.

    Will the carnage go on ?

    • December 19, 2023

    According to Sergey Shoigu, the Russian defense minister, Ukraine has received $203 billion worth aid. The military deliveries have come from 15 countries,

    • 28 planes,
    • 87 helicopters,
    • 23,000 drones,
    • 5,220 armored vehicles,
    • 1,300 artillery systems,
    • 2,650,000 155 and 122 mm shells.

    NATO service members are controlling Ukrainian air defense, tactical missiles systems and Western multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS). 410 Western spacecraft are operating in the interests of Ukraine. Since February 24, 2022, the Atlanticist losses amount to

    • 383,000 killed and wounded fighters,
    • 553 planes,
    • 259 helicopters,
    • 14,000 armored vehicles,
    • 8,500 artillery systems
    • December 26, 2023

    Around 3:00 am, the Atlanticist forces attack Feodosia harbor, on the southeastern coast of Crimea. Jets launch two Storm Shadow cruise missiles from Nikolaev region, west of the Dnieper. One at least hits and sinks the Novocherkassk, a Ropucha-class landing ship which was docked for reparation.

    • December 29, 2023

    The Russian strategic strikes are almost daily but according to the Ukrainian authorities, the operation is a record this morning, with 5 hypersonic, 90 cruise and 14 ballistic missiles, 36 kamikaze drones. Military value targets are attacked all over Ukraine

    A technical improvement appears in an amateur video : one cruise missile is dropping flares, in order to counter infrared homing air defense.

    • December 30, 2023

    One day after a massive Russian strategic operation all over Ukraine, the Atlanticist forces commit the terrorist shelling of Belgorod, which is about 35 km north of the border. The cluster rockets, some from Czech Republic, fall among civilians, at the center of the city, where no troops are garrisoned, no military nor industrial facilities are set. 21 civilians, including three children, are killed, according to a preliminary toll. More than one hundred are injured

    Russia is always targeting military value sites, is never targeting civilians. In contrast, Ukraine is deliberately targeting civilians in Donbass since 2014. In retaliation for a strategic operation that has undoubtedly killed many service members, likely including Western operatives, the Atlanticist forces enforce their usual terrorist strategy. The US State Department comments in the afternoon

    The United States does not encourage or enable such attacks

    In the evening, one Russian cruise missile strikes the Kharkiv Palace, which is hosting foreign military personnel

    According later to the Russian defense ministry, the targeted strike has also liquidated members of the Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR), who had planned the terrorist attack in Belgorod.

    • January 1, 2024

    As usual on New Year’s Eve, the Atlanticist artillery deliberately targets civilians in downtown Donetsk city. Anti-personnel ammunition, rockets and NATO cluster 155 mm shells, fall right after midnight, some on Lenin square, where fortunately, no mass celebration has been scheduled. Four civilians are killed

    One symbolic strategic strike before dawn, one Russian Geran [Geranium] kamikaze drone burns the house in Lviv, western Ukraine, which was a museum in tribute to Nazi war criminal Roman Shukhevych (1907-1950)

    Fascist militant, auxiliary from 1941 of the Abwehr [German military intelligence], then officer until 1943 within the Schutzmannschaft [auxiliary police], against anti-Nazis partisans, he became commander in August 1943 of the UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army), a nationalist paramilitary formation which until 1945, with benevolence of the German occupiers, slaughtered at least 50,000, perhaps 100,000 Polish civilians, fought the victorious Red Army until 1950, for the benefit of the Germans until 1945, later as proxy of the Anglo-US intelligence.

    • January 2, 2024

    Russia is conducting in the morning a new massive strategic operation all over Ukraine. Especially in Kiev, kamikaze drones, hypersonic and cruise missiles hit air defense systems, command posts, military factories and warehouses

    As usual, amateur videos show how air defense missiles (SAM), US and German ones, fall back in the city and damage civilian buildings.

    As retaliation in the evening, the Atlanticist forces target once more Belgorod, but the Russian air defense manage to shoot down 9 ballistic missiles and 300 mm rockets, which fall outside the city.

    • January 3, 2024

    The French foreign affairs ministry refuses to condemn the deliberate Ukrainian strikes against civilians in Belgorod, is calling them legitimate defense

    Dmitry Medvedev is Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of Russia. He reacts on Telegram to the French statement

    We never liked the French.
    Like frogs, they fought with us. And in general, theseโ€ฆ p-ry
    [fagots] (not pioneers like) [reference to the battle of the Berezina].
    And now we are convinced of that. Written by the French Foreign Ministry. A strike on Belgorod using cluster munitions is the โ€œright to self-defense.โ€
    Scum. Bastards. Freaks

    130 years after their catastrophic defeat in Russia, most French would have embraced any winners of WW2 and some fought in the Nazi ranks, while Soviet Union was scoring 80% of the German military losses

    The legacy of Philippe Pรฉtain, French fascist leader during WW2, is currently predominant in France and Emmanuel Macron is a perfect illustration of that inclination, with traditional arrogance and cowardice

    Moreover, the deliberate slaughter of civilians is a usual way of waging war for the French, like in Algeria, which was fighting for its independence between 1954 and 1962, fortunately won.โ€‚

    • January 10, 2024

    After sundown, a Russian strike demilitarizes [Russian euphemism] the Park Hotel, which is hosting foreign fighters in Kharkov

    The official final toll will be 13 injured victims. These are likely civilians, because the Ukrainian authorities are always hiding the military losses due to Russian strategic attacks, a way to falsely substantiate that Russia would target civilians.

    • January 16, 2024

    In the evening, a Russian strike knocks down in Kharkov region a former obstetric clinic which is hosting foreign military personnel, whose core is French, according later to the statement of the Russian defense ministry, which assesses that about 60 have been killed. No fatality, according to the Ukrainian authorities, which are never conceding the military losses due to the Russian strategic strikes.

    • January 18, 2024

    The target two days before seems more serious than the individual mercenaries whom I am usually listing. The French ambassador is summoned to the Russian ministry of foreign affairs. The strategic strike in Kharkov region was a message to a country, which despite the failure of the proxy war against Russia, is still strengthening its military ties with Ukraine. The missive was not addressed to French or international public opinion but to the French government, would be without substance if the losses were not real. These were rather operatives, whom the French government had commissioned, whatever their formal status in Ukraine.

    • January 19, 2024

    The Russian foreign affairs ministry states that

    the French ambassador to Russia was presented with the facts of Franceโ€™s involvement in the Ukraine conflict

    • January 20, 2024

    The Russian fighters are also advancing west of Artemovsk, former Bakhmut, Donetsk Peopleโ€™s Republic. The Russian flag is raised in Bogdanovka, about 8 km northeast of Chasov Yar.

    • January 21, 2024

    The Atlanticist artillery targets on Sunday morning a market in Donetsk city. The shells fall in Tekstilshchik and Kirovsky districts, where according later to the provisional toll, 25 civilians have been killed

    From Krasnogorovka and Kurakhovo, at 20 km and 40 km west of downtown Donetsk, a dozen 152 and NATO 155 mm shells have been fired.

    Ukraine is deliberately shelling civilians in Donbass for 9 years, 7 months and 26 days. As a retaliation since February 2022 for the Russian special military operation for liberation of Donbass, denazification and demilitarization of Ukraine, these terrorist attacks are often carried out with NATO weapons and ammunition.

    • January 24, 2024

    At 11:00 am, a Russian Ilyushin 76 crashes in Belgorod border region. An amateur video is showing flames during the fall down

    The Ukrainian authorities are controlling all national media, which first boast that the Ukrainian air defense has shot down the plane. Then the Russian defense ministry states that in addition to 6 crew members and 3 guards, the aircraft was transporting 65 Ukrainian prisoners of war (POW), for a swap in the afternoon. Therefore, the same Ukrainian media delete their previous reference to the air defense.

    The Russian authorities add later that at least two NATO missiles (SAM) have been launched from Kharkov region, Ukraine, that the prisoners swap was well scheduled between both sides, that the flight was usual in such a case. That war crime is the consequence of antagonism within the Ukrainian authorities, also with Western sponsors.

    The Russian authorities add that among the 65 POWs, 12 were members of Nazi Azov organization, surrendered in Mariupol in May 2022. On July 28, 2022, already, the Atlanticist forces deliberately shelled the pretrial detention center in Yelenovka, Donetsk Peopleโ€™s Republic, killed 53 inmates, who had been taken prisoners in Mariupol.

    In his daily evening address to the public, 12 hours after the crash, Volodymyr Zelenskyy attempts to defuse the foreseeable crisis

    It is obvious that the Russians are playing with the lives of Ukrainian prisoners, with the feelings of their relatives and with the emotions of our society. It is necessary to establish all clear facts. As much as possible, given that the plane crash happened on Russian territory โ€“ beyond our control

    International investigation is the workaround. Meanwhile among Ukrainians, one assumption is that US or British personnel was operating the air defense systems.

    • January 29, 2024

    In the evening, Russia strikes the oil depot in Zmiev, about 40 km south of downtown Kharkov.

    • January 31, 2024

    In the afternoon, the Russian air defense shoots down 20 Atlanticist missiles which are targeting Crimea.

    • February 1, 2024

    Between 3:40 and 3:50 am, three Atlanticist unmanned surface vehicles (USV) manage to hit off Crimea the Molniya [Lightning] class Ivanovets missile corvette, which sinks.

    • February 3, 2024

    Ukraine and its Western sponsors commit a new terrorist massacre in Donbass. In Lisichansk, Lugansk Peopleโ€™s Republic, the Atlanticist artillery shells and levels a bakery-cafรฉ, full of customers and families on Saturday afternoon. The weapons are US High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) or French Lance-roquettes unitaire (LRU). Their fire is accurate and the target is deliberate

    At midnight, the rescuers are still working on the site. 20 dead victims have already been recovered. Many more people may still be under the rubble.

    • February 8, 2024

    Due to the Atlanticist defeat in Donbass and Ukraine, Valerii Zaluzhnyi is replaced as chief of staff with Oleksandr Syrskyi, commander of the ground forces

    Near midnight in Germany, BILD discloses the Nazi grandfather of Annalena Baerbock, the warmongering German foreign affairs minister

    For some reason, everyone had the illusion that Russia could be defeated on the battlefield. Because of arrogance, because of a pure heart, but not because of a great mind

    Tucker Carlson publishes later his interview of Vladimir Putin, recorded in the Kremlin on February 6.

    • February 11, 2024

    The situation has become serious in Avdeevka for the Atlanticist garrison, that the Ukrainian command, according to Forbes, may have reinforced with one of its best formations, the 3rd assault brigade, military branch of Nazi Azov organization

    Situation map in Avdeevka on February 11, 2024 (RYBAR)

    That would be the first strategic consequence of Oleksandr Syrskyi appointment as chief of staff. Despite defeat in Bakhmut in May 2022, he would agree to send more cannon fodder under the crossed fire of a superior Russian artillery.

    • February 14, 2024

    The Anglo-Ukrainian naval forces achieve a new success in the Black Sea. Before dawn, six USVs attack off Crimea the Ropucha-I-class Tsezar Kunikov landing ship. Two drones are destroyed but four others hit the target, which sinks

    On social networks, Ukraine supporters are boasting that the ship is sunk for the death anniversary of the historical figure she is named after

    Major Tsezar Kunikov (1909-1943) is a Hero of the Soviet Union. Fighter within the naval infantry, he was killed on February 14, 1943, against the Nazi armies.

    • February 15, 2024

    As a retaliation for their defeat on the battlefield, the Atlanticist forces perpetrate once more the terrorist shelling of Belgorod, Russia, about 40 km north of Ukraine. The weapons are Czech multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), the ammunition are 122 mm rockets that Serbia has delivered. The Russian air defense manages to shoot 14 down, but 4 reach the city. According to the provisional toll, 7 civilians are killed, including one baby

    An amateur video surfaces from an armored vehicle, is showing Azov fighters who leave Avdeevka in hurry, under artillery fire. The Russian forces are threatening the garrison with encirclement and reports are appearing on social networks, about losses within the 3rd assault brigade, emanation of the Nazi organization in the Ukrainian regular army.

    • February 16, 2024

    Fighters of the 114th Russian brigade have raised the victory banner at the western gate of Avdeevka, where Volodymyr Zelenskyy took a selfie on December 29, 2023

    The Ukrainian Pravda [Truth] quotes Oleksandr Borodin, press officer of the 3rd assault brigade

    Borodin added that defensive operations in some areas are being conducted in a 360-degree area of engagement from the Russians. He specified that this does not mean encirclement

    • February 17, 2024

    Russian fighters raise the flag on Avdeevka coke plant. In the evening, the Nazi elite of the Ukrainian army has been crushed and the city is also cleansed. The Atlanticist forces had built there a fortress, 15 km north of downtown Donetsk, were deliberately shelling civilians since 2014

    (RYBAR)
    • February 28, 2024

    The Atlanticist defenses are collapsing west of Avdeevka, Donetsk Peopleโ€™s Republic, where the Russian forces are liberating Berdichi, Orlovka and Tonenkoye villages

    (RYBAR)
    • March 3, 2024

    The Russian naval infantry, 155th brigade, is cleansing Novomikhailovka, about 40 km southwest of downtown Donetsk

    • March 5, 2024

    Once more, a pack of Ukrainian USVs manages to sink a Russian ship in the Black Sea. One drone is destroyed but before 3 am, 5 others hit the Sergei Kotov, a patrol ship which is operating south of the Crimea bridge

    The same day, the Russian defense ministry releases pictures from [Sergey] Shoigu’s greenhouse, a factory which is growing Geran [Geranium] strategic kamikaze drones

    • March 8, 2024

    The citizens are not rushing to defend the Ukrainian democracy. Actually, the draft dodgers are trying to leave the country

    In Chernivtsi region, southwestern Ukraine, the border guards (DPSU) and State security (SBU) arrest 34 men, who inside a truck, attempt to reach Romania. Between 25 and 40 years old, they flee the threat of mobilization. Most Ukrainians are not eager to die for the proxy war that NATO is conducting with their blood, in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia. Moreover, Ukraine is not a democracy. Volodymyr Zelenskyy has banned left political parties on March 20, 2022. The State is censoring and controlling all media.

    • March 9, 2024
    • March 10, 2024

    Quickly after the beginning of the special military operation then the Anglo-US sabotage of peace talks, two years ago, Russia has enforced an attrition war, that Ukraine cannot win and which is a carnage for the Ukrainian cannon fodder. The Russian advantage is fire power, which is decisive.

    Russian hackers managed in February to seize the list of fatalities since June 2022, within Sich battalion, a Nazi formation in the 93rd Ukrainian mechanized brigade. Only 14% have died through another cause that a Russian shelling. Early 2024, the Russian artillery is able to achieve up to 12,000 shots per day, while according to Kiev, the Atlanticist forces do not exceed 2,000 shells.

    Even if the West boosted its ammunition shipment, Ukraine would never match the number of Russian howitzers. Moreover, Russian air force has began to widely drop glide bombs, which are devastating

    • March 12, 2024

    The Russian army, border guards and State security agency (FSB) trounce Atlanticist troops which attempt to conduct a raid in Belgorod region

    With the support of tanks, the assailants are small groups of Russian Nazi exiles, members of the Russian Volunteer Corps (Russkiy dobrovolโ€™cheskiy korpus, RDK), subordinate to the Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR). The goal of such operations are propaganda and to terrorize Russian civilians. The first one was conducted in Bryansk region on March 2, 2023, others thereafter. The motive is now that the Russian presidential election will be hold at the end of the week.

    • March 15, 2024

    One Iskander ballistic missile wipes out in Odessa the staff of Tsunami battalion, a combat formation within the Ukrainian national police. The Ukrainian disinformation is describing a civilian target but local media are confirming the casualties among military officials.

    • March 21, 2024

    Before dawn, Russia strikes the facilities of the Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR), which are scattered in Kiev, in an attempt to avoid being targeted.

    • March 22, 2024

    In the morning, Russia conducts a wide strategic operation across Ukraine. According to Volodymyr Zelenskyy, about 90 cruise missiles and 60 Geran drones are committed. Actually, some of these objects are used to deceive the Atlanticist air defense and the Ukrainian propaganda could also count its own missiles, which are usually missing their targets and falling to the ground

    Anyway, several energy facilities are hit, including Dnipro hydroelectrical power plant (DHES), in Zaporozhye

    In the evening in Krasnogorsk, Moscow northwestern suburb, gunmen burst in Crocus City Hall, where a concert is scheduled a few minutes later, slaughter the spectators, set ablaze the building. More than one hundred victims die.

    • March 23, 2024

    Usual news agency of the Caliphate, Amaq takes credit, publishes pictures that the perpetrators have sent to the organization. But the Russian security agency (FSB) and Chechen Akhmat regiment manage to intercept in Bryansk region and take alive four Tajik terrorists, who are attempting to seek safety in Ukraine. They confess that they attacked the auditorium for money.

    Jihadists are the auxiliaries of the Atlanticist policies for 45 years and their terrorist attacks in the West have always been the collateral damage of these policies. Some Jihadists are already fighting under command of the Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR) and on March 7, the US embassy to Russia has issued a security alert over public gatherings

    For Andrew Napolitanoโ€™s Judging Freedom, former CIA analyst Larry Johnson is explaining the best theory so far. The terrorist attack in Moscow is a Ukrainian plot. Increasingly frustrated by unauthorized, Ukrainian blatant actions, the US knows it, were terrified for weeks.

    • March 24, 2023

    The four terrorists are taken to the Investigative Committee and later, appear before the court, over their pretrial detention.

    • March 25, 2024

    With hypersonic missiles, according to Ukraine, Russia strikes Kiev, wipes out some US Patriot air defense systems and levels buildings where are working officials of the Ukrainian security agency (SBU)

    The particularity of hypersonic missiles is that air warning sirens sound after the strike. In Bryansk border region, the governor awards the officers who have arrested alive the four Tajik terrorists, prevented them from seeking refuge in Ukraine

    • March 26, 2024

    ISIS or Ukraine ?

    Of course Ukraine

    the Secretary of the Russian Security Council, Nikolai Patrushev, replies to journalists, about the terrorist attack on March 22, in Krasnogorsk, that Ukraine has subcontracted with remnants of the Caliphate

    Director of the security agency (FSB), Alexander Bortnikov, adds that Kyrylo Budanov, head of the Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR), is a legitimate target

    One Iskander ballistic missile destroys an Atlanticist command Bunker in the southern vicinity (48ยฐ34’38.5″N 37ยฐ51’28.3″E) of Chasov Yar, Donetsk People’s Republic. Russian sources clarify that it was sheltering regular officers from NATO countries, notably the US and Poland

    Later, Polish staff and media tell that brigadier general Adam Marczak, Eurocorps deputy chief of staff, has died unexpectedly of natural causes, in his free time. To survive an Iskander direct hit would be indeed unnatural. Vacation in a Bunker was not a good idea

    In the evening, the Atlanticist forces target once more downtown Belgorod, but the Russian air defense manages to shoot down 18 rockets. US independent journalist Patrick Lancaster is there and reports.

    • April 2, 2024

    In the morning, the Atlanticist forces carry out a strategic operation in Russia. Drones strike several targets, including an industrial facility in Yelabuga, Tatarstan, about 1,200 km from the front line in Ukraine or Donbass. In that case, the weapon is a converted Aeroprakt A-22 Foxbat light aircraft

    The facility could be related to the production of Russian Geran [Geranium] strategic drones (cf. supra, March 5, 2024). In order to avoid air defense, the route has been obviously elaborated with assistance of NATO space intelligence.

    • April 7, 2024

    Ukraine resumes its nuclear blackmail, the attacks against Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), in Energodar. Several drones hit the facility. Three employees are injured. Such a terrorist campaign was already conducted in the Summer 2022.

    • April 12, 2024

    In a video for the Daily Mail, former UK prime minister Bojo [Boris Johnson] confesses the motive for the Western proxy war in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia

    With Ukrainian cities once again being pounded to rubble and the casualties mounting, I’m afraid I have to ask once again : why the hell we are being so slow in giving those heroic Ukrainians the weapons they so desperately need ? Because if Ukraine falls, it will be a catastrophe for the West, it will be the end of Western hegemony and we will have no one to blame but ourselves

    It will

    • April 17, 2024

    Up to three missiles, according to Ukraine, flatten a hotel in Chernigov, northeast

    As usual, the target was military. Photos of the rescue operation are showing military furniture in the rubble. Journalist and Nazi political figure, Ihor Mosiychuk discloses on social networks that dozens service members have been killed or injured. But as usual, the Ukrainian propaganda and its Western proxies are claiming that the target would have been civilian, concede 18 dead, likely civilian collateral damage, hide the military casualties.

    • April 23, 2024

    In a continuous effort to replenish the military ranks after huge losses, Ukraine temporarily blocks men aged 18 to 60 from accessing consular services, in order to force them to repatriate

    The United Nations have counted more than 6 million Ukrainian refugees abroad, whose many are draft dodgers.

    • April 24, 2024

    During a press conference, US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan discloses that by order of Joe Biden, first ATACMS have been supplied to Ukraine in March. The Army Tactical Missile System is a long range tactical ballistic missile that the already delivered HIMARS can launch, one ATACMS per HIMARS. He believes that the Atlanticist forces will use it within Ukraine, which in his mind is including Donbass and Crimea, not against Russia

    Here is the analysis of Scott Ritter

    The pro-Ukrainian social media is ablaze with posts proclaiming doom and gloom for Russia now that the US government has signed off on providing Ukraine with long-range (up to 300 kilometers) ATACM missiles.

    While there is no doubt that a weapon of this accuracy and range will complicate Russian military operations, exposing critical command and control and logistics hubs to attack, as well as put critical civilian infrastructure, such as the Crimea Bridge, at risk, ATACMs is not the game changer the US and Ukraine is proclaiming it to be.

    First and foremost, the ATACMs will be introduced into a deteriorating military reality where Russia enjoys superiority and/or supremacy in terms of control of the battle space, both at the front, and well into the Ukrainian rear areas.

    Ukraine will have a hard time building up the logistical support infrastructure needed to make ATACMs a viable weapon system in the face of Russian deep interdiction capabilities. As a result, while Ukraine may enjoy the occasional ATACMs success, the ability to thoroughly integrate ATACMs into a cohesive fire support system will not be possible.

    Another key factor is that the guidance system used by ATACMsโ€”and inertial/GPS hybridโ€”is very similar to that used on the HIMARS. Russia has already fielded electronic warfare capabilities which have severely restricted the performance of HIMARS. It is anticipated that Russia will similarly suppress ATACMs.

    Lastly, Russian air defense systems have shown a remarkable ability to adapt to new threats, such as HIMARS and the Storm Shadow/SCALP cruise missiles. It is anticipated that a firing solution to ATACMs will be developed shortly after the first missiles are employed against Russian forces.

    In short, the ATACMs will go the way of all previous examples of western โ€œwonder weaponsโ€โ€”much ado about nothing

    • May 8, 2024

    The West celebrates today Victory in Europe. Tomorrow will be Victory Day in Russia, the anniversary of the Soviet victory over German Nazism and European fascism. With the assistance of Gazprom workers from Rostov, the Eternal Flame has been restored, is now lit in Avdeevka, Donetsk People’s Republic, Donbass, Russia. The Russian forces achieved the liberation of the city on February 17 (cf. supra).

    • May 10, 2024

    Russia is of course silent when Ukraine reports a Russian offensive south of Belgorod, a Russian city which is a usual target of terrorism, the deliberate Atlanticist shelling of its civilians (cf. supra, December 30, 2023)

    The Russian forces are indeed carrying out offensive operations. Their scale is still unknown when Volodymyr Zelenskyy announces a fierce battle there. Kharkov is threatened and the RDK, a formation of Russian Nazi exiles under command of the Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR), is showing on social networks that it has been sent as reinforcement in the sector

    • May 11, 2024

    Second day, a Russian offensive is indeed developing toward Kharkov. Russia has previously formed in April a new group of forces, called North. Its mark is Gungnir rune, Odin’s spear

    • May 12, 2024

    As usual, the Atlanticist forces are retaliating for their defeat on the battlefield with the deliberate shelling of civilians. In Belgorod, in the rear of the Russian offensive toward Kharkov, a residential building collapses as the result of an Atlanticist strike

    The explosion was powerful, right at the base of the building, not the impact of a 122 mm rocket. Russian Investigative Committee opens a criminal case for terrorism. The detectives will find what weapon was used.

    • May 16, 2024

    For the first time since the beginning of the Russian special military operation for liberation of Donbass, demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine, mathematical model Wartears assesses that more than 500,000 Atlanticist fighters have been killed in the proxy war that NATO is conducting against Russia. Dead in vain for the fantasy of protracting Western hegemony.

    • May 23, 2024

    Atlanticist drones attack and cause damage to Russian Voronezh-DM early warning radars at Baronovsky station, Krasnodar region, 600 km from the front. Their purpose is the detection of a strategic nuclear attack. Austrian colonel Markus Reisner clarifies that these radars are working for altitudes from 2,000 to 6,000 km, while Ukrainian ballistic weapons are flying at a maximum height of 60 km. What is the goal of such a strike ?

    • June 6, 2024

    To celebrate the 80th anniversary of the Normandy landings, Emmanuel Macron had the bad taste to invite Volodymyr Zelenskyy, representative of a country at ethnic war since the far-right coup in 2014, who unlike his electoral promises but under pressure from a Nazi deep state, did not end the conflict, a revisionist country which is paying tribute to the fascists who fought in the ranks of the III. Reich

    With the invitation of Germany since 2004 and now Ukraine, the anniversary of D-Day is a vulgar Atlanticist show, the cringe spectacle of veterans who are still attending it. Through his personality, Macron accentuates its vulgarity.

    • June 7, 2024

    That photo is showing the disgrace of the forced mobilization of cannon fodder, in order to feed the Western proxy war in Ukraine. The collapse of the Western hegemony is mechanical, the result of demography, economyโ€ฆ etc Pushed to its limits, NATO is also showing what are its values, those of unhealthy thugs like Emmanuel Macron, who is contributing to sending these elders to the meat grinder, when he has never carried a rifle in his own life. What is the difference between these recruits and the Nazi Volkssturm at the end of WW2 ?

    • June 14, 2024

    In the context of NATO defeat on the battlefield, Vladimir Putin offers a fair peace. The causes of the 10-year war and Russia achievements on the battlefield dictate the conditions for such a peace:

    • Ukraine should withdraw from Donetsk and Lugansk Peopleโ€™s Republics, Kherson and Zaporozhye regions, where the drawing into Russia got a landslide victory through referendum in September 2022,
    • Ukraine should not join NATO,
    • Ukraine should not get nuclear weapons,
    • The West should lift the Ukraine-related sanctions on Russia and recognize the new territories of the Russian Federation, including Crimea.

    Putin warns that the continuation of the conflict will increase the Russian gains and harden the conditions for peace.

    • June 23, 2024

    From Nikolaev, Ukraine, the Atlanticist forces target Sevastopol, Crimea, 190 km to the southeast. The Russian air defense manages to shoot down five US ATACMS ballistic missiles, but one cluster warhead explodes above crowded Uchkuevka beach, in Sevastopol northern suburb. According to the provisional toll, five victims, including three children, are killed, 146 more are injured

    As usual, the US intelligence was involved. From NATO Aviano air base, Italy, one US RQ-4 Global Hawk drone was circling above the Black Sea, about 200 km south of Yalta, Crimea. At the time of the attack, the drone momentarily turned off its radar transponder.

    • July 8, 2024

    During Russian strategic strikes all over Ukraine, a hospital for children is hit in Kiev. The Ukrainian propaganda and its stooges in Western mainstream media are telling that Russia would have targeted it. That is a blatant lie. An amateur video is clearly showing that the missile was actually a US AMRAAM (advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile), that the Atlanticist air defense is using and which fell back after a failed interception.

    • August 4, 2024

    In a brand new show, Volodymyr Zelenskyy displays some Ukrainian F-16s fighters. Ukraine should receive a few dozen jets in the coming months, from Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands

    From HIMARS to Abrams, after two years, five months, eight days and several previous Western Wunderwaffen [wonder weapons], a few dozen F-16s will not be game changers. In order to preserve them, Ukraine could use them in the deep of the territory, to intercept the drones and missiles of the Russian strategic operations. Why is that ? Since the Atlanticist propaganda is usually claiming that the air defense is managing to shoot down all hostile targets.

    • August 7, 2024

    It reminds December 1944. The bulk of the European fascist armies had irretrievably lost against Soviet Union and in a far-fetched attempt to reach a separate peace with Anglo-US allies, Nazi Germany attacked on the west front, in the Bulge. The operation code name was Wacht am Rhein

    While Ukraine is unable to contain the Russian onslaught in Donbass, where its manpower is irretrievably decimated, the Atlanticist forces started attacking toward Kursk on August 6, in a foolish attempt to terrorize Russian civilians, ward off defeat with a PR stunt and quickly gain territories through a less defended Russian border region, in the prospect of negotiations that the Western puppet is starting evoking

    Launched on December 16, 1944, Wacht am Rhein stalled by Christmas. The Allies brought reinforcements and the assailants lost all previous gains in January 1945. I guess that the conclusion will be quicker in Russia

    On August 7, an Atlanticist drone targets in Kursk region the car of Russian war correspondent Evgeny Poddubny, who manages to survive

    • August 11, 2024

    While Ukraine is unable to contain the Russian onslaught in Donbass, where its manpower is irretrievably decimated, while its diversionary offensive has stalled five days after its launching toward Kursk, the Atlanticist forces target for the umpteenth time Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), in Energodar, as often in case of military failure

    One Ukrainian drone has hit the cooling systems facility. The Russian authorities of Zaporozhye region clarify that all six power units of the plant are hence in cold shutdown, that there is no threat of steam explosion or other consequences, while employees of the emergency situations ministry are extinguishing the blaze.

    Spokeswoman of the Russian foreign affairs ministry, Maria Zakharova comments

    Where is Rafael Grossi and the entire IAEA ? Where is at least some imitation of the work of this UN structure in this critical area ?

    Meanwhile, Volodymyr Zelenskyy finds no better inspiration than an episode of the US series The Simpsons, claims on social networks that the Russians would burn tires at ZNPP.

    • August 26, 2024

    Russia conducts once more a strategic operation all over Ukraine. According to the command of the Ukrainian air forces, the missiles/drones strikes are the greatest so far of the Russian special military operation

    Ukraine is indeed using its new F-16s (cf. supra, August 4, 2024) in the deep of its territory, to intercept the Russian drones and missiles. By the way, the Ukrainian air defense shoots one down

    Apparently, the Russian targets are mostly energy infrastructure. For several weeks, the Ukrainian authorities are highlighting that next winter will be harder in the country than the previous one.

    • August 30, 2024

    Due to the previous days events, Volodymyr Zelenskyy sacks Mykola Oleshchuk, commander of the air forces. And for its failure on the battlefield, Ukraine retaliates as usual against civilians

    In the evening, 40 Czech rockets indiscriminately target civilian neighborhoods in Belgorod and its suburb. The Russian air defense shoots 30 of them down. Five people are killed, dozens others injured.

    • September 3, 2024

    Several Russian Iskander ballistic missiles hit in Poltava the buildings of Ukrainian army’s 179th Training Center of Signal Troops [Ukrainian source]. The target was a gathering of electronic warfare specialists

    As usual, Volodymyr Zelenskyy lies, states that the missiles targeted an educational institution and a nearby hospital. Some Western media and politicians, like Bundesministerin des Auswรคrtigen [federal foreign affairs minister] Annalena Baerbock, are peddling that deceit.

    In the evening, the official Ukrainian provisional toll counts 51 killed people and 200 injured others. But a few hour before, Ukrainian far-right politician and journalist Ihor Mosiychuk has already conceded 190 dead. My guess is that the Ukrainian authorities, as usual, are reporting civilian deaths, likely civilian employees of the military facility. The delta would be the number of killed service members.

    • September 10, 2024

    The Russian forces start counterattacking against the Atlanticist bulge in Kursk region.

    • September 17, 2024

    Fighters of the 114th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade, Vostok, raise their victory banner in liberated Ukrainsk, Donetsk People’s Republic, of which these men are native.

    • September 19, 2024

    In der Region Kursk brennen noch immer deutsche Panzer.

    • September 20, 2024

    US military analyst Big Serge reports

    Russian forces in Kursk reached the village of Sverdlikovo, which sits on the line of communication to the Ukrainian units attacking on the Korenovo axis. The western half of the Ukrainian salient is about to be pinched off, leaving just the position around Sudzha

    • September 24, 2024

    The Russian forces have started storming Ugledar, that Ukraine was still occupying in Donetsk Peopleโ€™s Republic. According to reliable military analysts, the Ukrainian 72nd mechanized brigade may be annihilated there

    (RYBAR)
    • October, 1, 2024

    The Russian forces complete the liberation of Ugledar, Donetsk People’s Republic. According to reports the day before, the Ukrainian command has authorized the escape from encirclement of the remaining elements of the 72nd mechanized brigade

    The coal mining town was an Atlanticist fortress on the front line since January 2023.

    • October 31, 2024

    The New York Times notes

    […] In October, Russia made its largest territorial gains since the summer of 2022 […] Over the past month, Russian forces have seized more than 160 square miles of land in Ukraineโ€™s eastern Donbas region […] Half of Russiaโ€™s territorial gains in Ukraine so far this year were made in the past three months alone […]

    • November 6, 2024

    In the evening, after the landslide victory of Donald Trump in the US presidential election, social democrat chancellor Olaf Scholz dismisses Christian Lindner, his neoliberal finance minister. Thatโ€™s the collapse of the government coalition in Germany

    (Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen)

    The Germans have bowed down to the US sabotage by Joe Biden administration of Nord Stream pipelines, only to end up with Donald Trumpโ€™s America First doctrine in economy and defense. Olaf Scholz is the fall guy.

    • November 7, 2024

    According to the Telegraph, Donald Trump will propose freezing the battlefield in Donbass and Ukraine

    A buffer zone would be created along the former front line. Troops from the European Union and UK would patrol it. During 20 years, Ukraine would not seek to join NATO, but the US would carry on with the shipment of weapons.

    • November 17, 2024

    In the early morning, Russia conducts once more a large strategic operation all over Ukraine. According to Kiev, 120 missiles and 90 long range drones are engaged. The targets are military facilities and energy infrastructure

    According to the New York Times in the evening, Joe Biden would have agreed, twelve days after Donald Trumpโ€™s victory and two months before his ousting from the White House, with ATACMS (cf. supra, April 24, 2024) strikes in Russia. As usual, the decision of the senile thug will not change the game, only escalate the conflict

    At the same time, Sergey Lavrov arrives in Rio de Janeiro for the G20 summit, which is lasting two days, until Tuesday, November 19

    The reasoning of Russia over potential strategic strikes on its territory is clear. The range of the Western missiles is one aspect. But in order to select targets, Ukraine needs intelligence that only NATO satellites are able to collect. That is why such strategic strikes would be regarded as NATO attack. Vladimir Putin stated on September 12

    There is an attempt to substitute concepts. Because the issue is not about allowing or prohibiting the Kiev regime from carrying out strikes on Russian territory. It is already doing so, with drones and other means. But when it comes to using Western-made long-range precision weapons, the story is completely different. I have already said this and any expert, Russian or Western, will confirm it. The Ukrainian army is not capable of carrying out strikes with Western long-range precision weapons [โ€ฆ] That is possible only by using data from spy satellites that Ukraine does not have. These data are from satellites belonging to the EU or the United States, in short, NATO satellites. Secondly, and this is very important, the flight programs of these missiles can be elaborated only by NATO countries military. The issue is therefore not about allowing or not allowing the Ukrainian regime to carry out strikes against Russia with these weapons, but about deciding whether NATO countries are directly involved in the military conflict [โ€ฆ]

    In its proxy war, the West was regarding Russia as a frog in boiling water. But Russia is now fed up with that game.

    • November 18, 2024

    One tragic but usual anecdote : during Russian strikes, a missile hits a residential building in Odessa and at least ten civilians are killed. Most Western media are immediately parroting the Ukrainian disinformation, which is claiming that Russia would have targeted the victims

    But Russia is never targeting civilians and the evidence of the gross lie surfaces later on social networks, where a Ukrainian witness shares his video of debris. The missile was clearly US, from a Patriot air defense system.

    • November 19, 2024

    According later to the Ukrainian defense ministry, US ATACMS ballistic missiles targeted in the early morning an ammunition depot in Karachev, about 115 km from the border, Bryansk region, Russia

    The Russian defense ministry confirms, clarifies that the air defense destroyed 5 ATACMS in the air. A sixth one was damaged and debris fell on a military facility.

    The same day, Vladimir Putin approves changes to the nuclear doctrine of Russia. The attack from a non-nuclear state, if backed by a nuclear power, will be henceforth regarded as a joint assault on Russia and a condition under which Russia will consider using its nuclear arsenal.

    • November 20, 2024

    The Atlanticist forces attack Kursk region, Russia, with up to 12 NATO missiles. According later to Russian sources on the ground and British media quoting Western informants, some of the weapons were British Storm Shadows and/or French SCALPs, actually the same cruise missile. Downing Street refuses to comment, so the information are true

    On a Ukrainian aerial video, missiles have saturated a tiny area on Baryatinsky estate, perhaps a command post, in Maryino village

    US embassy in Kiev closed before the strikes and for fear of strong Russian retaliation, other Western diplomatic offices shut after their execution.

    • November 21, 2024

    As warning, Russia uses in the early morning one ballistic missile, this time with conventional load. The target is a military factory in Dnipro, where a CCTV video is clearly showing the entries of six distinct projectiles. The missile may be one Rubezh [Frontier] ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile), which instead of conventional warheads, can carry four nuclear ones, 300 kt TNT equivalent each, 20 Hiroshimas

    In an evening address, Vladimir Putin clarifies that Russia used in the morning a new missile system called Oreshnik [Hazel]. The hypersonic intermediate-range ballistic missile (hypersonic IRBM) is flying at a speed close to Mach 10. Its 5,000 km range makes it suitable for the treatment of targets in Europe

    He adds

    We are considering ourselves entitled to use our weapons against military facilities of those countries which are allowing to use their weapons against our facilities, and in case of an escalation of aggressive actions, we will respond decisively and in mirror-like manner

    • November 26, 2024

    The Russian defense ministry describes the latest attacks of NATO missiles in Kursk region. On 23, five US ATACMS were aimed at the positions near Lotarevka of a S-400 air defense division. Three were destroyed in the air, two others reached their target. A radar system was damaged. On 25, eight ATACMS targeted Vostochny airfield, in Kursk eastern suburb. Seven were shot down, one other damaged some infrastructure.

    • November 27, 2024

    The Associated Press discloses that Joe Bidenโ€™s administration is urging Ukraine to quickly increase the size of its military by drafting more men and revamping its mobilization laws to allow for the conscription of citizens as young as 18.

    • December 13, 2024

    Via confidential documents from a German security agency, der Spiegel reports that unidentified drones have been sighted in recent weeks over sensitive industry locations and in the evening hours of December 3 and 4, over the US air base in Ramstein

    One of the targets is the Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrik [BASF], flagship of the chemical industry in Germany.

    • December 17, 2024

    In the early morning in Moscow, a bomb attack kills Igor Kirillov and his driver. The lieutenant general was commanding the Russian NBC protection troops. He was leading the investigations about US military biological laboratories in Ukraine

    According later to the Associated Press and one of its anonymous Ukrainian sources, the Ukrainian security agency (SBU) has conducted the attack. Through dirty atavism, Western mainstream media, a coterie of mercantile, dishonest, fetid and whorish stooges, are parroting fake news from the Ukrainian propaganda, which is claiming to the contrary, that Russian troops would have carried out chemical attacks on the battlefield.

    • December 18, 2024

    The Russian security agency (FSB) identifies and arrests the man who planted the bomb which killed general Igor Kirillov

    Akhmad Kurbanov is a textbook case: 29-year-old Uzbekistan national, whom his Ukrainian handler promised $100 k and a residence permit in a NATO country.

    What else could Joe Biden’s administration and its European stooges commit, in order to escalate the conflict before Donald Trump’s inauguration on January 20.

    • January 4, 2025

    In 2021, European Lithium, an Australian company, has secured rights to Shevchenko deposit, one of the largest in Europe, in the vicinity of Kurakhovo, Donetsk People’s Republic

    But the Russian forces completed the liberation of the town on January 3, 2025, seize the lithium deposit the day after

    Key component in the production of batteries, electric vehicles and smartphones, lithium is one of the motives of the proxy war that the West is conducting since 2014 in Donbass, against Russia.

    • January 11, 2025

    Fighters with the 4th company / 3rd battalion / 109th rifle regiment raise their flag on the mine waste heap, in the market area of Dzerzhynsk, Donetsk People’s Republic

    In the evening, the Russian forces are controlling 95% of the city, that the Atlanticist authorities renamed Toretsk, under the 2016 decommunization law in 2016

    • January 15, 2025

    In an advert, the SBU (Ukrainian State security agency) identify and arrest young characters who covertly monitor a serviceman and burn a military vehicle

    That campaign means that the antifascist resistance has gained an operational value which is alarming Atlanticist authorities whose defeat is inevitable in Donbass and Ukraine

    At his Senate confirmation hearing the same day, next US Secretary of State Marco Rubio emphasizes that

    The problem with Ukraine is not that theyโ€™re running out of money, but that theyโ€™re running out of people

    Most conscripts are mobilized by force and consumed as cannon fodder in a lost war. Moreover, its Western sponsors are weighing on Ukraine to lower draft age to 18. In that context, military vehicles, preferably Territorial Centers of Recruitment and Social Supportโ€˜s (TCC) ones, are often burning in the Ukrainian cities.

    • January 18, 2025

    Around noon, on January 17, 2025, two Russian missiles, likely Iskander ballistic ones, struck an air force college in Krivoy Rog, southern Ukraine, west of Dnieper river

    In the afternoon, an X user paid tribute to Jeppe Hansen, a Danish serviceman killed during the strikes in Krivoy Rog. But the X account of the relative was later deleted. Hansen was holder on LinkedIn of an account which according to Google cache, had been created with its profile picture more than one year ago. On January 18, the erasure of that LinkedIn account, after I have read it, confirms his death and the wish of Western authorities to censor these information

    After a bachelor degree in medialogy, he studied at the Royal Danish Defense College from 2017 to 2020, got an air force officer diploma. Within the Royal Danish Air Force since 2021, his last function was cyber case manager.

    Alongside Belgium and the Netherlands (cf. supra, August 4, 2024), Denmark started delivering F-16 fighter aircraft to Ukraine in August 2024.

    • January 31, 2025

    On August 6, 2024, in a foolish attempt to terrorize Russian civilians, ward off defeat with a PR stunt and quickly gain territories through a less defended Russian border region, the Atlanticist forces started toward Kursk an offensive (cf. supra, August 7, 2024) which from its beginning, was promised the same success than German Nazi operation Wacht am Rhein, in December 1944, Belgian Ardennes.

    Clues of war crimes against Russian civilians have surfaced quickly. One case is now formal, with the indictment today of Evgeny Fabrisenko. Between September 28 and November 24 2024, with three comrades, he slaughtered 11 men and 11 women in Russkoe Porechnoye, a village about 20 km from Ukraine border. Eight women were raped before their murders. The criminals were acting under control of the commander of 11th coy / 4th battalion / 92nd Ukrainian mechanized brigade, who had ordered them to kill all civilians

    While the Russian army was counterattacking, Fabrisenko was later captured and confessed the crimes. In detailed admission, he told the investigators the place where the criminals had concealed the corpses

    In the evening, at the other end of the battlefield, one Russian Iskander ballistic missile hits Odessa Bristol hotel, which according to the Russian intelligence, is hosting foreign military personnel and a strategic meeting.

    • February 1, 2025

    The day after Russian investigators disclosed Ukrainian war crimes against Russian civilians in Kursk region (cf. supra), in order to create a smokescreen, the Atlanticist forces perpetrate a new one and falsely accuse Russia, new episode in a long series of false flags, this time in Sudzha, same Kursk region.

    • February 12, 2025

    In Washington, the Senate confirms Tulsi Gabbard, a staunch opponent so far to proxy wars, as Director of National Intelligence. Meanwhile, at NATO headquarters in Brussels, new Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth states that the US does not support the membership of Ukraine, where no US troops will be deployed. He adds that potential European peacekeepers should not be covered under NATO article 5

    A bitter disavowal for Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who has told the British Ecomonist, in an interview published the same day, that in such case, Ukraine would build NATO on its territory.

    • February 14, 2025

    At around 1:50 am, local time, less than two days after Donald Trump thrown Volodymyr Zelenskyy under the bus (cf. supra), while a security conference is held in Munich and near negotiations between US and Russia are raised, a drone strikes the confinement of reactor #4 at Chernobyl nuclear power plant (NPP)

    Ukraine accuses Russia. The operation is sophisticated and allegedly, investigators find the debris of a Russian drone motor on the crime scene. But the fear of a nuclear incident is a usual psychological leverage of the Ukrainian authorities, who shelled Zaporozhye NPP (ZNPP, cf. supra, April 7, 2024). The attack is obviously a false flag.

    • February 18, 2025

    The day after Emmanuel Macron attempted to create a diversion through the meeting in Paris of European leaders opposed to the prospects for peace that the victory of Donald Trump is fostering, Russian and US diplomats meet in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia

    Foreign affairs minister Sergey Lavrov and Secretary of State Marco Rubio agree on the goal of normalizing their relation and to appoint teams to work for peace in Ukraine. Later in a press conference, Lavrov clarifies as a comment to the meeting in Paris that the deployment of Western troops in Ukraine is unacceptable.

    • February 21, 2025

    As the third anniversary of the Russian special military operation for liberation of Donbass, demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine, is approaching, the Danish parliament gives a standing ovation to a Ukrainian serviceman, Dmytro Kanuper

    The hero is member of the 12th special [police] brigade, emanation of Azov Nazi organization in the Ukrainian national guard. The social networks are showing that he is usually bearing a patch of the Misanthropic Division, an international Nazi brotherhood, founded and based in Ukraine since 2013. I guess that in their tiny country, some Danes are still fantasizing about the supremacy of the Nordic race. As logistical personnel for F-16 fighter aircraft that Denmark is delivering to Ukraine, one Danish serviceman was already killed (cf. supra, January 18, 2025)

    During WW2, while Denmark was under protection of the Reich, 6,000 Danes enrolled in the SS, with complacency of the Danish government, against Soviet Union. Fortunately, they died or lost the war. The Danish case is somehow neurotic, but like Boris Johnson explained it (cf. supra, April 12, 2024), all Europe, especially UK and France, is terrified from the collapse of the Western hegemony. 80 years after the failure of European fascist armies on the same battlefield, against Bolshevism, Europe cannot acknowledge defeat in Ukraine, against Russia. In the context of its decline, through its desperate support to Nazi organizations in Ukraine, its complacency with Israeli war crimes, mass killing and ethnic cleansing in Palestine, Europe is also losing its honor.

    • February 28, 2025

    In Washington, Volodymyr Zelenskyy has a public argument with Donald Trump and Vice President JD Vance. His visit is cut short as he is kicked off the White House. Later, Trump writes

    We had a very meaningful meeting in the White House today. Much was learned that could never be understood without conversation under such fire and pressure. Itโ€™s amazing what comes out through emotion, and I have determined that President Zelenskyy is not ready for Peace if America is involved, because he feels our involvement gives him a big advantage in negotiations. I donโ€™t want advantage, I want PEACE. He disrespected the United States of America in its cherished Oval Office. He can come back when he is ready for Peace

    • March 3, 2025

    Three days after Volodymyr Zelenskyy was kicked off the White House, the US suspends all military aid to Ukraine. The support would resume if Donald Trump determined that Ukraine had demonstrated a commitment to peace negotiations with Russia. The order is affecting more than $1 billion in arms and ammunition in the pipeline.

    • March 5, 2025

    The Financial Times reports that the US has cut off intelligence sharing, frozen dedicated channels with Ukraine

    In the evening, as a reply to the latest lies and boasts of Emmanuel Macron (in French) on French TV, Russia demilitarized in Krivoy Rog, Ukraine, a hotel which was hosting foreign service members, likely French and British ones.

    • March 7, 2025

    British Reuters agency and most Western mainstream media are alarmed, because the news from Kursk are pretty bad for the Atlanticist side. The Ukrainian offensive (cf. supra, August 7, 2024) began like Wacht am Rhein, when Adolf Hitler staked everything late 1944 in the Belgian Ardennes. It may end like Stalingrad, when a European fascist army was encircled late 1942, then crushed

    Russia is threatening to encircle the Atlanticist forces still involved in Kursk region and their lines of communication with Ukraine are almost cut. The New York Post reports that according to anonymous Ukrainian sources, their troops may attempt to retreat within two weeks from the Russian territory, in order to avoid annihilation

    Situation map in Kursk region in the evening of March 7, 2025 (RYBAR)

    Without real strategic goal, the offensive was a PR operation, a Western way of doing stuff nowadays. Its inevitable failure may shatter the Atlanticist morale, while the military situation is not better in Donbass.

    • March 8, 2025

    600 Russian elite volunteers burst out behind the enemy lines and wreck havoc on Atlanticist defense north of Sudzha, the Russian town that Ukraine is occupying since August 2024 in Kursk region, 12 km east of the border. That is operation Potok [Flow]

    With special equipment, they have navigated over 15 km through a 1.4-meter-wide pipe, where the gas was pumped out and oxygen, injected.

    • March 12, 2025

    A serviceman with the 11th Guards Air Assault brigade raises the flag in Mirny, which has been cleansed, 6 km east of Sudzha, the Russian town that the Atlanticist forces were occupying since August 2024 (cf. supra, August 7, 2024) in Kursk region, 12 km east of the border.

    After the US-Ukrainian proposal on March 11 for a ceasefire that Russia is expected to reject, US intelligence and ammunition support to Ukraine has resumed.

    • March 13, 2025

    The Russian forces complete the cleansing of Sudzha

    • March 18, 2025

    Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin talk on the phone, agree on the project of a lasting peace in Ukraine, that the conflict should never have started, should have been ended long ago through sincere peace efforts. Putin backs Trumpโ€™s idea of a mutual 30-day moratorium on strikes against energy infrastructure

    The European leaders are fussing, attempt to be heard, but nobody cares about what they are thinking or expecting over Ukraine. Europe is sidelined because it is nothing, but an unhealthy bunch.

    In an interview later with Fox News, the US president discloses that 2,500 Atlanticist troopers are still encircled in Russian Kursk region. One source from the anti fascist resistance in Ukraine has already reported a few days ago that about 30 NATO operatives are among them.

    • March 19, 2025

    Over Sumy region, Ukraine, the Russian air defense manages to shoot down one Atlanticist jet fighter, likely a F-16. According to not yet officially confirmed reports, the kill is the result of an ambush

    A F-16 was spotted the day before in the same area, where it was flying in support to the Atlanticist operations at the border with Kursk region. One S-400 air defense system is now in a good position to pick the prey, that the radar of a Su-35 jet fighter is illuminating.

    Another F-16 was shot down on August 26, 2024 (cf. supra), but that was the work of the Ukrainian air defense

    In the night, among other strategic strikes in the country, Geran drones pound the railway hub in Kirovograd, central Ukraine.

    • March 20, 2025
    (RYBAR)

    In the early morning, as part of a broader air offensive in Russia, a Ukrainian heavy drones swarm targets Engels-2 strategic bomber airbase, in Saratov region, more than 600 km from the front line

    The Russian authorities state later that the air defense has shot down 132 drones, including 54 in Saratov region, where due to debris or direct hits, a dozen people have been injured

    Western media are reporting a blaze there, but several hours after the attack NASA FIRMS (Fire Information for Resource Management System) has detected zero thermal anomaly at Engels-2 strategic bomber airbase

    The Russian authorities are pretty not experts in Western PR, while the Atlanticist ones in Ukraine are paying an army of operatives, in order to misinform the West, notably in the context of military operations like that one

    Besides, called Stalingrad Falcons, a Russian formation of Geran drone pilots releases a video where embedded cameras are showing their successful attack the day before of the railway hub in Kirovograd (cf. supra, March 19)

    https://youtube.com/watch?v=iN7t-G2n2Hk%3Ffeature%3Doembed

    Finally for today, Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, challenges on X Friedrich Merz, next German Kanzler

    Future Chancellor Merz accuses Russia of waging war in Europe and targeting Germany with arson, contract killings & disinformation. Youโ€™re not in power yet but already lying like Goebbels. Nazi Germany attacked us like this from 1941-1945. We know how it ended. Bad start, Fritz!

    I guess that he addresses more broadly the madness of most European leaders, a pathology that I am watching as the atavistic legacy of more than two centuries of fanatical nationalism.

    • March 22, 2025

    In order to fat a skinned army, Ukraine is enforcing since February 11, 2025, a new program to encourage youngsters to enlist for the meat grinder

    Titled The Generation That Decides Now, it is offering several benefits to 18- to 24-year-olds: higher bonuses than other troopers and a service period of just one year, while the others are indefinitely in the ranks

    Ukraine was already mobilizing the elders, easy targets of the forced mobilization (cf. supra, January 15, 2025), because they are running slower. If it managed to lower the age limit to 16 years old, it would match the ambition of the Volkssturm [Peopleโ€™s assault], the last batch of cannon fodder in Nazi Germany.

    • March 27, 2025

    The Russian forces are completing the cleansing of the territory that the Atlanticist soldiery has occupied in Kursk region, during the failed offensive (cf. supra, August 7, 2024) which began on August 6, 2024

    War crimes against Russian civilians were already established on January 31, 2025 (cf. supra), with the indictment of a Ukrainian serviceman who has confessed the 22 murders that his squad had committed in Russkoe Porechnoyethe.

    Such atrocities were widespread, as the Russian victory has already revealed dozens more corpses of civilians in the liberated areas. On Telegram, I have watched several videos from these crime scenes. The bodies are already in advanced state of decay, are still showing clear evidences of deliberate murders. The victims were of all ages and both genders.

    • March 28, 2025

    In the evening, Russia targets Bartolomeo hotel in Dnipro, a scenic resort on Dnieper river, known for its pirate ship-themed design. Later, the Ukrainian authorities report 4 dead victims and 15 injured ones

    As usual in case of Russian strategic strikes, I think that the official toll counts civilian collateral casualties but forgets military ones, especially Western stowaways.

    • April 9, 2025

    For RIA Novosti, Sergey Bobylev takes that splendid photo of Chechen fighters with Kashtana battalion tactical group, who are deploying a D-20 152 mm howitzer in Kursk region, where the Russian army is expelling the last Atlanticist elements.

    • April 12, 2025

    Ukraine acknowledges the loss in combat mission the same day of another F-16 and pays tribute to pilot Pavlo Ivanov

    According to the Ukrainian edition of the BBC and its anonymous official Ukrainian source, Russian missiles, either ground or air-launched, shot down the NATO fighter jet

    Meanwhile, Russia and its friends are celebrating worldwide the 64th anniversary of the first space flight.

    • April 13, 2025

    In the morning, two Russian Iskander ballistic missiles strike in downtown Sumy the Congress Center and the Bank Academy, where Atlanticist military meetings are held

    Sadly, collateral casualties are heavy. About one hundred civilians are injured or killed, according to the Ukrainian authorities.

    • April 14, 2025

    In reaction to the Russian strategic strikes against military targets in Sumy, on April 13, 2025 (cf. supra), the emotion caused by their civilian collateral casualties, Friedrich Merz confirms his readiness to deliver German Taurus cruise missiles to Ukraine, what the incumbent chancellor Olaf Scholz has so far refused.

    Merz should be appointed on May 6, clarifies that these new weapons should enable Ukraine to take the lead, by targeting for example the Crimea bridge. He thinks that the West should not make peace offers to Russia, rather that Vladimir Putin should acknowledge the hopelessness of this war.

    His strategic analysis is totally wrong. Russia is winning. The Atlanticist offensive (cf. supra, August 7, 2024) failed in Kursk region and Russia is inexorably advancing in Donbass. The more the war will last, the more the Western defeat will be cruel. Taurus missiles would not be more game changers than the previous Wunderwaffen, like HIMARS or Leopard Panzerkampfwagen. Last but not the least: since the Russian gains in Zaporozhye and Kherson regions, the Crimea bridge is not a major line of supply

    Actually, the German missiles would appear as the modern version of WW2 Vergeltungswaffen [retaliatory weapons, V-1 and V-2]. Merz is a reactionary politician and a revanchist German grocer. Germany should once for all accept its defeat against Soviet Union in 1945.

    How interesting is the same day the statement of Kaja Kallas, vice-president of the European Union for foreign affairs, a dumb politician from Estonia, which as a Baltic country, was during WW2 a nest of Nazi auxiliaries. She warns any leader who would attend on May 9 in Moscow the celebration of the 80th anniversary of the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany.

    • April 19, 2025

    Vladidmir Putin states

    For humanitarian consideration, from 6:00 PM until midnight, the Russian Federation declares an Easter truce. I order for this period to stop all the hostilities

    • April 23, 2025

    The European divas sabotage the negotiations for peace in Ukraine. A meeting between NATO countries is scheduled today in London. But at the last moment, Volodymyr Zelenskyy warns through the press that he is refusing the loss of Crimea, yet a lesser evil given the military situation. Consequently, Secretary of State Marco Rubio waives the trip, what also triggers cancellation for the European foreign ministers.

    What devil could have inspired the Ukrainian comedian? While visiting Madagascar, in the wake of his colony in Mayotte, Ursula von der Leyen’s spokesman Emmanuel Macron makes that known via his ร‰lysรฉe palace

    Ukraine’s territorial integrity and European vocation are demands of Europe

    His Special Envoy Keith Kellogg should travel to Moscow later in the week and Donald Trump writes on social media

    [โ€ฆ] The situation for Ukraine is dire – He [Zelenskyy] can have Peace or, he can fight for another three years before losing the whole Country [โ€ฆ]

    It is hard to better summarize the military situation, which by tradition in war, dictates the direction of peace negotiations. Its dogmatic opposition to peace and its inability to accept the ground reality are illustrating how the corrupt European Union is today nothing more than a tool for the demented neocon US deep state. I am very optimistic because convinced Europe will pay dearly for that.

    • April 24, 2025

    After midnight, Russia reminds ground reality through strategic strikes all over Ukraine. According to the Ukrainian authorities, 215 drones, cruise and ballistic missiles are involved in the attack

    In Kiev, where the civilian collateral fatalities amount to nine people, the targets are air defense systems and transport infrastructure. Russia clarifies that all are hit.

    • April 25, 2025

    Today is an anniversary; 80 years ago, US and Soviet troops achieved their junction on Elbe river, in Torgau

    In the afternoon, Vladimir Putin meets Steve Witkoff, Special Envoy of Donald Trump. Their talk last three hours in the Kremlin

    Just before, in an attempt in the morning to sabotage the negotiations, the Ukrainian secret services assassinated lieutenant general Yaroslav Moskalik, a member of the Russian general staff, through a car bomb attack in Balashikha, Moscow suburb

    The car owner is named Ignat Kuzin, native of Sumy. He lived six months as neighbor of the victim and left a few days before for Turkey. His car remained and was carrying a bomb which was remotely triggered, when the victim walked along.

    • April 26, 2025

    Chief of the General Staff, Valery Gerasimov reports to Vladimir Putin that the Russian army has completed the cleansing of Kursk region

    He pays also tribute to the Korean troops which have fought there shoulder to shoulder with the Russian ones, thus officially acknowledges their involvement in the battle. That confirmation will exacerbate the fear among Western leaders of the yellow peril

    Volodymyr Zelenskyy attends the funeral of pope Francis for the sole purpose of meeting Donald Trump in Rome. For the Times, British cartoonist Peter Brookes is pretty not optimistic

    But the US president gives him a 15-minutes conversation and the promise of a longer one after the ceremony.

    • April 28, 2025

    On April 28, 2025, Russia releases several videos which are showing North Korean soldiers who were training or fighting alongside Russian comrades in Russian Kursk region, where the last Atlanticist troops were wiped out two days before (cf. supra). Vladimir Putin States

    We will always honor the Korean heroes who gave their lives for Russia, for our common freedom, on an equal basis with their Russian brothers in arms

    On June 18, 2024, in accordance with article 51 of the UN Charter, Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un signed a Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, which was enforced on December 4, after ratification in both countries

    Musical interlude
    • May 5, 2025

    Donald Trump is an erratic character and above all, the errand boy of Israel. Ukraine is boring him because he is not strong enough to be able to contribute to the resolution of the conflict

    After the signature with Ukraine, on April 30, of the so-called Mineral Resources Agreement, which is just hot air, since Russia is controlling most of Donbass, he decides to ignore the main Russian demand: the Ukrainian waiver of Crimea, Donetsk, Kherson, Lugansk and Zaporozhye.

    Hence, according to the rumor, Russia is ready to alter its strategy, in order to end the conflict in less than two months. Its technical aspects are the annihilation of the current Ukrainian authorities and the destruction of all critical infrastructure. What the US would have done three years ago.

    • May 9, 2025

    Each year, Soviet Union and now Russia are celebrating on May 9 their victory over European fascist armies. 2025 is its 80th anniversary. Despite the pettiness of the European Union and its Baltic states, 29 foreign leaders attend the ceremony, notably from Brazil, Burkina Faso, China, Cuba, Egypt, Serbia, Slovakia, Venezuela and Vietnam. Several foreign detachments parade alongside the Russian army, notably from China, Egypt and Vietnam

    The apparent reason for the European bad mood is the war in Donbass and Ukraine, that the hypocrites have pretended to discover in 2022, when the Russian Special Military Operation was the result of the Western shenanigans since 2014 in Ukraine and Donbass, to trigger a proxy war against Russia. Nazi paramilitary formations are fighting again in the Atlanticist ranks and Russia is once more winning

    Here at left, on February 18, 2024, Gwendal Delange was a French Nazi volunteer in the ranks of the 3rd assault brigade, emanation of Azov organization in the Ukrainian regular army. He is currently fighting within a proud Nazi French squad of the International Legion (social media)

    That impeding victory and the guests at the celebration of the previous one in 1945 are illustrating a changing world. The imperialism is losing and the Western hegemony comes to its end. And that is the actual reason for the anger of the European Union

    • May 11, 2025

    While Emmanuel Macron seems every day more hysterical, the Europeans have issued an ultimatum: new sanctions unless Russia agrees to cease fire for one month from May 12. Their wet dream is then the official commitment in Ukraine of British and French troops. As we already know, Russia is retaining the option of resolving the conflict in less than two months, through a decisive strategic campaign which would wipe out the Ukrainian leadership and destroy all critical infrastructure (cf. supra, May 5)

    Instead, at the end after midnight of a Russian unilateral 3-day truce in memory of the Soviet victory over European fascist armies, Vladimir Putin offers to resume direct negotiations with Ukraine, on May 15, in Istanbul. The US and UK sabotaged them more than three years ago, at the beginning of the Russian Special Military Operation.

    • May 16, 2025

    The Russian plenipotentiaries arrived in Istanbul the day before. Under the aegis of the Turkish foreign minister, they meet a Ukrainian delegation for the first time since 2022, when the US and UK sabotaged the previous peace negotiations

    In order to implement a ceasefire, Russia is demanding that the defeated Atlanticist troops withdraw first from the positions they are still occupying in Donetsk, Kherson, Lugansk and Zaporozhye regions.

    • May 24, 2025

    In the early morning, more than 250 Geran drones and Iskander ballistic missiles target Kiev, according to Ukraine. The Russian defense ministry confirms later a raid on a Patriot air defense system, a radio intelligence center and a military factory

    The Ukrainian air force comments that the last version of the Iskander is harder to intercept, because the missile is no longer following a simple ballistic trajectory and is dropping radar decoys.

    • May 31, 2025

    As part of a large Atlanticist terrorist campaign in the Russian territories which are bordering Ukraine, a bomb attack triggers in the evening the derailment of a passengers train from Klimovo, Bryansk region, to Moscow. Seven victims die.

    • June 1, 2025

    The Ukrainian secret services carry out in the morning a wide drones attack on strategic bombers airbases all over Russia

    The UAVs are truck-borne and take off close to the targets. On the car parks, Russian truck drivers are filmed climbing onto the launchers and trying to disrupt them with stones and other improvised means. But the vehicles are also booby-trapped

    • June 7, 2025

    During a new meeting on June 2 in Istanbul, Russia and Ukraine agreed on a new prisoners swap. Moreover, Russia offered the repatriation of the corpses of 6,000 fallen Ukrainian soldiers. As agreed, a first batch of 1,212 bodies arrives on June 7 in refrigerated vehicles at the planned exchange point in Belarus. But then, Volodymyr Zelenskyy refuses to collect them. The corpses of fighters whom Ukraine is likely regarding as missing in action (MIA) would indeed enlighten the terrible Atlanticist casualties

    Money is the main reason for the Ukrainian procrastination. 6,000 confirmed killed in action (KIA) would amount to 90 billion Hryvnias (โ‚ฌ 1,903,770,000) in compensation for the families. That is 10% of the annual defense budget and much money for the corrupted Ukrainian plutocrats. Ukraine is acknowledging so far a few dozen thousands KIAs, when the losses are actually close to one million.

    • July 1, 2025

    The Iranian victory in a 12-day war that Israel started in June has worsened the depletion of the US military stockpile. Therefore, the White House announces a pause in the shipment to Ukraine of critical ammunition and equipment.

    • July 4, 2025

    In the early morning, Russia strikes toughly the Atlanticist military-industrial complex (MIC) in Kiev, with hundreds of drones, cruise and ballistic missiles

    The operation is surgical and the Ukrainian authorities declare only one dead. Since they are never disclosing military losses during Russian strategic strikes, that means one dead civilian.

    • July 9, 2025

    In the early morning, Russia conducts, according to Ukraine, the most massive strategic operation so far against the Atlanticist military-industrial complex (MIC), with 728 drones and 13 missiles. The mains targets are military bases in Lutsk and Zhytomyr, western Ukraine

    • July 10, 2025

    In Kiev, a gunman shoots dead Ivan Voronich, colonel within the State security agency (SBU). According to the rumor, the target was involved in secret operations on Russian territory.

    • July 11, 2025

    Generalmajor Christian Freuding is heading the Planning and Command Staff within the German defense ministry. He was publicly enthused about the offensive that the Atlanticist forces started in Russian Kursk region (cf. supra, August 7, 2024). Alas, he may think, the operation met the same fate than Wacht am Rhein, in 1944, in the Belgian Ardennes

    Freuding is once more in Kiev, where an agreement is signed. Germany is henceforth financing the Ukrainian production of long-range missiles. His wording is unclear. For the Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen, the Generalmajor explains

    We [sic] need weapons systems that can reach deep into Russian territory, capable of attacking command facilities, airfields and aircraft

    After the successive defeats of HIMARS (from June 2022), Panzerkampfwagen (from March 2023), F-16 (from August 2024, cf. supra) and various NATO-supplied air defense systems, what kind of Wundervergeltungswaffen will soon be deployed?

    Is Germany once more at war against Russia?

    • July 13, 2025
    • July 14, 2025

    To sum up the diplomatic situation, Russia has already articulated its conditions for a ceasefire: withdrawal of the Atlanticist forces from the positions they are still occupying in Donetsk, Kherson, Lugansk and Zaporozhye regions. Alas, the West is not yet ready to acknowledge its military defeat

    For lack of stomach, Donald Trump has lost interest in Ukraine. However he is angry about the success of the almost daily strategic strikes that Russia is conducting against the Ukrainian military-industrial complex (MIC)

    On July 14, 2025, the US president announces the close shipment to Ukraine of 17 Patriot air defense systems, but clarifies that the European Union will pay for them

    • July 17, 2025

    While Germany is rattling its sabers against Russia (cf. supra, July 11), France files for bankruptcy protection and historian Emmanuel Todd is forced to resort to psychiatry to understand the side effects of the Western decline. He concludes that Russia is the target of erotomaniac fantasies of Emmanuel Macron and his lackeys

    Today is also an anniversary. In the course of Soviet operation Bagration, which over summer 1944, killed about 750,000 Nazi fighters and destroyed the Heeresgruppe Mitte, 57,000 German POWs were granted the opportunity to parade in Moscow, before their summer camp in Siberia.

    • July 26, 2025

    Krasnoarmeysk [Red Army], that the new Ukrainian authorities renamed Pokrovsk in 2016, is a coal-mining town and a major communication hub, in the part that the Atlanticist troops are still occupying in Donetsk Peopleโ€™s Republic

    The Russian assault troops reached the southern limits of Krasnoarmeysk on July 22. Stosstruppen [German shock troops during WW1, detachments which are infiltrating the defenses] are wrecking havoc among defenders deeper in the town.

    • July 29, 2025

    With the greatest of pleasure, the Russian foreign intelligence agency (SVR) discloses what it has found out

    A few days before, the US and UK have organized a secret meeting in an Alpine resort. The guests were Andriy Yermak, head of the Office of the President of Ukraine, Kyrylo Budanov, head of the Ukrainian military intelligence (HUR), and Valerii Zaluzhnyi, former chief of staff and current ambassador to UK. The Anglo-muricans have announced their will to replace Volodymyr Zelenskyy with Valerii Zaluzhnyi, as President of Ukraine. Yermak and Budanov have agreed.

    On July 27, Zaluzhnyi was indeed championed in the Ukrainian edition of US Vogue magazine

    Combat General, former Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and currently the Ambassador of Ukraine to the United Kingdom, Valeriy Zaluzhny, in his column reflects on the roots of identity, the power of unity and the most important historical lessons that Ukrainians are forced to learn right now [โ€ฆ]

    • July 31, 2025

    To conclude a siege which began in April 2024, Russian paratroopers complete in the morning the cleansing of the last neighborhoods that the Atlanticist troops were holding in Chasov Yar, 15 km west of Artemovsk, which was liberated in May 2023. The ruins of the fortified town are 15 km northeast of Konstantinovka, that the enemy is still occupying in Donetsk People’s Republic

    • August 11, 2025

    In Donetsk Peopleโ€™s Republic, the Russian forces achieve a 10-km-deep breakthrough between Krasnoarmeysk (Pokrovsk) and Konstantinovka, cut the highway between Dobropolie and Kramatorsk

    According to unofficial reports, the Russian vanguards are platoons of motorbikes, who are advancing at high speed through undefended areas, behind the original front line. The Ukrainian and Western commentators are alarmed because so far, the Atlanticist command has no more troops in the sector to counter the threat of encirclement.

    • August 13, 2025

    Both sides confirm that elements of the 1st Army Corps are henceforth involved in Krasnoarmeysk sector, in an attempt to contain the Russian breakthrough

    Under command of Azov, that corps is consisting of several brigades, combined around the 12th, emanation of the Nazi organization in the Ukrainian national guard. These are reinforcements and likely, disciplinary forces, to prevent other troops from retreating

    Meanwhile, according to a video, a Russian laser air defense system has managed, for the first time in operation, to shoot down a Ukrainian drone.

    • August 15, 2025

    Vladimir Putin travels to Anchorage, Alaska, where far from the European brats, he meets Donald Trump

    Behind closed doors, they negotiate during two hours and a half over the war in Donbass and Ukraine. They do not reach a ceasefire settlement but agree on most points [Trump], should meet again soon, likely in Moscow.

    • August 17, 2025

    Ukrainian journalist Yefrem Lukatsky discloses a new Wunderwaffe. The FP-5 Flamingo is a cruise missile with a range of 3,000 km, looks a bit like a WW2 Vergeltungswaffe-1

    According to the Ukrainian propaganda that Western mainstream media are parroting, a Ukrainian startup company, Fire Point, has developed and is producing the weapon

    The new Wunderwaffe is actually a British joke. Its design and capabilities are obviously showing a British FP-5, that Milanion Group displayed in February. The missile is likely shipped in spare parts, then assembled in Ukraine.

    • August 18, 2025

    Nobel Peace Prize is the last obsession of Donald Trump, who three days after his meeting with Vladimir Putin in Anchorage, hosts Volodymyr Zelenskyy and a bunch of European leaders in the White House

    The choreography of the gathering in DC of daddy Trump’s stooges is a psychological work, a catharsis, in order for the West to finally recognize its defeat in Ukraine.

    • August 20, 2025

    In partnership with other hackers groups, Killnet has carried out a campaign with a viral solution called Nyuans [Nuance], claims the collection of terabytes from the general staff of Ukraine: military losses and other sensitive data

    The hackers disclose today verifiable lists of Ukrainian military casualties. The sum is beyond all expectations. Since February 2022, Ukraine would have lost more than 1.7 million KIAs and MIAs:

    2022: 118.5 thousand;

    [mobile warfare]

    2023: 405.4 thousand;

    [development of Russian attrition strategy and tactics, battle for Artemovsk (Bakhmut), failed Atlanticist counteroffensive in Zaporozhye region and Donetsk Peopleโ€™s Republic]

    2024: 595 thousand;

    [battle for Avdeevka, emergence of Russian glide bombs, failed Atlanticist offensive in Kursk region]

    2025: 621 thousand, so far

    [slow Russian steamroller in Donetsk Peopleโ€™s Republic].

    • August 22, 2025

    CNN publishes a splendid graphic about the scale of Russian strategic operations with kamikaze drones.

    • September 2, 2025

    On August 30, 2025, in Lviv, the historical hotbed and still fruitful womb of the Ukrainian endemic Nazism, a gunman shot dead Andriy Parubiy, a Nazi militant and former chairman of the Ukrainian parliament. Arrested the day before, a suspect appears today before the court

    Mykhailo Stselnikov states that he acted in revenge against the Ukrainian authorities for the death of his son, killed in the Atlanticist ranks in Donetsk Peopleโ€™s Republic in May 2023. He clarifies that his target was Parubiy because both were living in Lviv, that if he has been resident of Vinnitsa, he would have shot former president Petro Poroshenko.

    • September 7, 2025

    Prime minister Yulia Svyrydenko shows the aftermath on social media. In the early morning, during a usual wave of surgical strikes all over Ukraine, Russia has targeted the cabinet room in Kiev

    I guess that henceforth, the Ukrainian government will be much more aware of the situation on the ground. In an expression of their own arrogance, the European politicians and mainstream media are outraged at the blaze of an institution, less shocked by the death in vain of 1.7 million soldiers (cf. supra, August 20), often mobilized against their will.

    • September 9, 2025

    Now Corsican, ยซ French State Security ยป has long since ceased to interest me and on the contrary, I am even reputed to be ยซ undermining ยป it. Others have ยซ started the career ยป, as the Marseillaise is saying, suffer now a cruel setback. That happens even to the best ones. But the allies are not happy. France may deny the leaks, but they know the data is authentic

    Members of Killnet group (cf. supra, August 20), Russian computer aces, have managed to collect sensitive information from the French administration: minutes and other documents of secret meetings on Ukraine between France, Poland, Romania, and UK. Including a map dated April 28, 2025, intended for the French military headquarters, which is made public on the web today.

    Alongside the document, which anyone can consult, the hackers have produced a summary of the Coalition of the Willing project, so dear to Emmanuel Macron. For Russia, the entire Donbass, as well as Kherson and Zaporozhye regions, up to the ceasefire line; for France, mineral resources in Zhytomyr, Kharkov, and Sumy; for Poland and Romania, Odessa and border regions; UK would be satisfied with logistics platforms throughout; 50,000 troops would package the Western spoils

    But Russia has already said and continues to repeat that it will not tolerate NATO troops on the current territory of Ukraine. Besides in France, since August 31, Thierry Burkhard is no longer Chief of the General Staff.

    • September 12, 2025

    Eleven days after the fake news that Western mainstream media spread, upon lies from the European commission about an alleged GPS jamming from Russia, two days after the alleged incursion of Russian drones in Poland, German magazine der Spiegel publishes a splendid cover

    The Drone warrior

    Putin’s attacks and the new threat from cheap, remote-controlled weapons

    If the UAVs over Poland were part of a false flag operation, that would be its pyschological goal. Anyway, the Russian drones, strategic and tactical ones, are indeed defeating NATO in Donbass and Ukraine.

    • September 27, 2025

    After Poland, an epidemic of paranoia is striking Europe. Mainstream media are frantically reporting the alleged incursions. Drones โ€”obviously Russian, who else ?โ€” are being detected above military and industrial facilities in Denmark, France, Germanyโ€ฆ etc

    • October 17, 2025

    In a video from downtown Krasnoarmeysk -that Kiev is naming Pokrovsk, in Donetsk Peopleโ€™s Republic- two Atlanticist fighters surrender to a Russian drone

    The same day, Volodymyr Zelenskyy is once more in the White House, where Donald Trump replies

    Hopefully, we will be able to end the war without thinking about Tomahawks

    In the collective mind of most supporters of the Atlanticist side in Ukraine, these US cruise missiles are the brand new Wundervergeltungswaffen. The technocratic stupidity is a serious issue in the declining West, especially imploding Europe.

    In the case of Atlanticist strategic strikes with Tomahawks, Russia would not cancel its victorious campaign on the front line, will rather flatten Ukraine, at the very leastโ€ฆ What the US would have done at the beginning of their operations, 44 months ago.

    • November 20, 2025

    Vladimir Putin visits the headquarter of Zapad [West] group of forces, where chief of staff Valery Gerasimov reports the complete cleansing of Kupyansk, Kharkov region.

    • November 21, 2025

    After Donald Trump has proposed an umpteenth peace initiative that once more, Europeans and Volodymyr Zelensky are so far rejecting, Vladimir Putin comments

    Russia is ready for peace negotiations, but is also satisfied with the current dynamics of the special military operation, which is leading to the achievement of objectives by military means

    According to two US sources, via Reuters, Washington has threatened to cut off intelligence sharing and weapons supplies if Kiev does not accept that plan by November 27.

    • November 23, 2025

    Russian troops take control of the last occupied neighborhoods of Krasnoarmeysk, that Kiev is naming Pokrovsk, in Donetsk People’s Republic. That liberation also seals the encirclement of several thousand Atlanticist fighters in Myrnograd, a few km to the east.

    • November 28, 2025

    Ukrainian naval drones (USV) attack civilian tankers in the Black Sea, off Turkish coasts. Both are flying the flag of Gambia and were empty when targeted. Kairos was sailing from India to Russia and Virat was holding there for orders

    Kiev does not take credit and most Western media are legitimating these acts of piracy, because both are vessels of the so-called shadow fleet, a list of ships which are transporting Russian oil despite Western sanctions.

    • December 9, 2025

    UK announces for the first time the death of an active British serviceman in Ukraine, injured in the morning

    in a tragic accident whilst observing Ukrainian forces test a new defensive capability, away from the front lines

    The government wants its audience not to believe that the fatality would have been the result of a long-range Russian strike or the involvement in combat operation. One fact is henceforth consensual: there are active British service members in Ukraine.

    • December 11, 2025

    In Donetsk People’s Republic, the Russian army completes the liberation of Seversk, another link in the Atlanticist fortified lines in Donbass.

    • December 27, 2025

    In Donetsk People’s Republic, 34 days after the liberation of Krasnoarmeysk (cf. supra, November 23, 2025), the Russian army completes the cleansing of the nearby pocket in Dimitrov, that Kiev was calling Myrnograd

    The same day in Zaporozhye region, the Atlanticist troops lose the last neighborhoods of Gulyaipole.

    • December 29, 2025

    During his Christmas Eve address on December 24, Volodymyr Zelenskyy declared

    Today we all have one dream. And we make one wish for everyone: Let him [Vladimir Putin] croak

    In the night of December 28-29, in an obvious attempt to trigger harsh Russian retaliation and sabotage the peace negotiations through US mediation, when Donald Trump has publicly acknowledged that the West has lost the war, 91 Ukrainian drones target the dacha of Vladimir Putin on the shores of lake Uzhin, in Novgorod region

    The aircraft are launched to the north from Chernigov and Sumy, in northern Ukraine. 49 are quickly shot down in Bryansk border region, one more in Smolensk. 41, finally, over Novgorod, where the specific site is strongly protected.

    • December 31, 2025

    Donald Trump is a real moron. That pedophile pig dares to question Vladimir Putin’s word regarding the attack in Novgorod region two days before, on the grounds that no Ukrainian drone came within 50 km of the dacha. The distance between their launch points and the target was 700 km. I am delighted they were shot down en route. In the context of critical negotiations, a proud man would strongly blame Volodydymyr Zelenskyy, but cowardice is Trump’s main character trait

    Zelenskyy lied because he has always lied on everything. After Ukraine, France was the first country to deny the facts, based on assessment of its intelligence agencies, when French intelligence was not even able to thwart the jihadist attacks in Paris on November 13, 2015. Emmanuel Macron is obviously a little whore, the errand boy of European and US neocon plutocrats. More broadly, the pinzuti [French, in Corsican] are often fearful, petty, coward, incompetent and arrogant. The French presstitutes have been spreading the Western disinformation a few hours before the complete report. I had a lot of fun, watching how these demi-mondaines were happy to find their Daddy again, when Trump laconically denied the attack.

    • January 15, 2026

    Early morning, a CCTV camera grants us a symbolic picture

    While strategic attacks are methodically degrading the Ukrainian energetic system, a Russian drone strikes in Lviv, a few meter from the statue that the city erected in 2007 as tribute to WW2 Nazi criminal Stepan Bandera.

    • February 6, 2026

    In the morning in Moscow, a gunman shoots at Vladimir Alekseyev, deputy head of the military intelligence (GRU), who survives

    According on social media to Ukrainian Nazi militant Denys Prokopenko, current commander of the 1st Army Corps and loser in Mariupol in May 2022, Alekseyev was heading the Russian negotiators when Azov garrison surrendered in Azovstal.

    • February 7, 2026

    In the early morning, Russia conducts a heavy strategic raid with 447 drones and missiles, according to Ukraine

    In the case of the assassination attempt of lieutenant general Alekseyev, a suspect has been identified, arrested in Dubai and brought back in Russia.

    • February 8, 2026

    The Russian security agencies have managed to identify and dismantle the enemy cell in less than 36 hours after the attack in Moscow (cf. supra, February 6) against Vladimir Alekseyev.

    The shooter, Lyubomyr Korba, is Ukrainian, received also Russian citizenship. The Ukrainian intelligence sent him in Moscow in 2025. After the attack, he fled to the United Arab Emirates, where he was arrested on February 7

    Russian, Viktor Vasin was a political supporter of Alexei Navalny. Logistics provider in the cell, he was arrested in Moscow on February 7.

    Russian, Zinaida Serebritskaya was the intelligence agent, rather for money. Living in the same residential complex, she was monitoring the target for a long time and managed to flee to Ukraine after the attack.

    • February 21, 2026

    Around midnight, on February 20-21, a machine building plant is struck in Votkinsk, Udmurtia Republic, Russia, some 1,300 km from Ukraine. The facility is one of the most important Russian strategic missile production site. Due to fog of war, the real impact is not known to the general public

    Former intelligence officer within the US Marine Corps (USMC), then famous inspector of the United Nations in Iraq, Scott Ritter knows reliable Russian sources and on 22, will provide details about the function of the damaged workshop.

    At Munich Security Conference, one week before the attack, neocon Secretary of State Marco Rubio pushed for a new era of Western imperialism. And presto, a UK-designed cruise missile (cf. supra, August 17, 2025), partially built in western Europe, targets and damages -thanks to US intelligence- a critical strategic facility in the heart of Russia.

    Like the Ukrainian attack in May 2024 -under Joe Biden administration- against early warning radars at Baronovsky station, Krasnodar region (cf supra, May 23, 2024), the Atlanticist operation is driven by considerations wider than the defense of Ukraine.

    • March 23, 2026

    In the early hours of the morning, Ukrainian drones strike an oil storage depot in Primorsk, Leningrad region, the largest Russian oil export terminal, on Baltic Sea

    Vladimir Putin is contested over the conduct of the war in Ukraine. He is an amorous suitor of the West and Europe; that is his only weakness. But Iran is showing him the way.

    • March 25, 2026

    In the morning, the defense ministry of Lithuania states

    In the past 48 hours, drones have crashed in the territories of all three Baltic states: a clear indication that Russiaโ€™s war against Ukraine is generating wider regional risk

    The facts and the tone confirm that as analyzed on March 23, in order to attack Primorsk (cf. supra), the Ukrainian drones flew safely over Poland and the Baltic States, all NATO members. They broke into the Russian airspace from Estonia.

    • April 28, 2026

    The previous night, for the third time since April 16, Ukrainian drones struck Tuapse oil refinery and terminal on the Black Sea, in Krasnodar region

    The refinery suspended operations indefinitely. Blazes and contamination are an environmental disaster.

    • May 24, 2026

    From midnight, as retaliation for the Ukrainian terrorist attack which slaughtered 21 sleeping teenagers in a boarding college on May 22, Russia is punishing the Atlanticist regime

    According later to the Ukrainian authorities, the punishment consisted of 690 drones and missiles. The Russian defense ministry confirms the use of ballistic, cruise and hypersonic missiles, including Iskander, Kinzhal, Tsirkon and Oreshnik. The targets were headquarters, military factories and warehouses, in Kiev and other cities. As usual, Ukrainian air defense missiles missed interception and fell back

    They remained silent when a Ukrainian terrorist attack slaughtered 21 teenagers in Starobelsk two days before. The European leaders are howling after four civilians died, when 690 Russian drones and missiles struck military targets across Ukraine. Of course, the Atlanticist regime never discloses the military casualties of the Russian strategic strikes. I hope that many European secret military operators were wiped out.

    • June 12, 2026

    Russia has warned since the beginning of its special military operation in Donbass and Ukraine. But Joe Biden denied and lied. Servile Western media decried that reality as a conspiracy theory. On December 17, 2024, the Ukrainian security agency (SBU) assassinated in Moscow lieutenant general Igor Kirillov, who was leading the Russian investigation on that matter

    Still Director of National Intelligence for a few more weeks, Tulsi Gabbard discloses declassified documents which are proving that the previous administration has funded more than 120 secret biolabs in over 30 countries. 40 were in Ukraine. Research was conducted on dangerous pathogens, including the acquisition of new functions.

    • June 18, 2026

    A massive Ukrainian strategic operation targets Moscow, where the air defense shoots almost 200 drones down. A few ones hit however the local refinery (MNPZ)

    Images are impressive and the aftermath, smoky. The attack is also a PR operation, in order to lift up deteriorated Ukrainian spirits and help Volodymyr Zelenskyy, when he attempts to convince Donald Trump that the tide would be turning. Actually in Donetsk People’s Republic, the Russian army is close to liberate Krasny Liman and Konstantinovka.

    The same day, the German weekly magazine Spiegel discloses its new cover

    Our War Against Russia
    85 years ago, Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union. How the crimes continue to have an impact on families and politics

    The article is recalling the crimes that 10 million German soldiers committed in Soviet Union. But in the context of a new East Front in Europe against Russia, the title is controversial in Germany.

    • June 24, 2026

    Under any pretext, Emmanuel Macron is pursuing his obsessive plan to deploy French troops to Ukraine. Online publication Intelligence Online discloses that under the guise of training, French service members from the rรฉgiment de cyberdรฉfense are operating there, within the Ukrainian security agency (SBU)

    Russia has consistently warned that it is not tolerating Western troops in Ukraine. The Iskander ballistic missile which may land on the heads of these cyber-warriors will be anything but virtual.

    Later, French officials deny, are of course lying. As with the Franco-Ukrainian support to jihadist groups in the Sahel, that was supposed to be a secret operation.

    • June 26, 2026

    Executive body of the European Union, the Commission, recommends to exclude the Ukrainian males of fighting age from the protection granted to refugees.

    A few days before, Russian hackers (cf. supra, August 20, 2025) have updated the information collected from the Ukrainian bureaucracy: the Ukrainian military fatalities since 2022 are largely exceeding 2 million

    The non-elected European technocrats are planning to protract their proxy war to the last Ukrainian.

    • July 3, 2026

    70 km north of Donetsk, the Russian army has completed the liberation of Konstantinovka, that Ukraine started fortifying in 2014; has broken the last Atlanticist defensive line in Donbass, less than 35 km southeast of Kramatorsk

    • July 6, 2026

    In the early morning, Russia destroys an ammunition depot which was concealed in a residential area of Vyshneve, Kiev western suburb

    The secondary explosions of NATO anti-aircraft missiles and depleted uranium (DU) shells level some nearby buildings.

    • July 16, 2026

    Once more, Russia and Ukraine swap the bodies of fallen fighters.

    • July 21, 2026

    On July 15, Volodymyr Zelenskyy sacked defense minister Mykhailo Fedorov, who wanted to replace the chief of staff. That triggered public protests and anger within the army. Chief of staff Oleksandr Syrskyi is eventually fired today

    His replacement is Mykhailo Drapatyi, who major on May 9, 2014, was commanding the mechanized battalion which crushed the barricades that the Russian-speaking citizens had erected to defend Mariupol, in Donetsk People’s Republic

    Russia has charged him with various war crimes against civilians in Donbass.

    • July 24, 2026

    In Kapitanovka, Kiev western suburb, several Iskander ballistic missiles demilitarize a weapons exhibition on an outdoor firing range

    At the time of the strikes, the event is gathering 300 guests from Ukraine and the West, including officials from army and intelligence, international drone developers and manufacturers.

    • August 19, 2026

    The amateur video surfaces on social media. The location is Kamianske, Dnepropetrovsk region

    On her knees, the woman begs TCC recruitment sergeants not to abduct her husband. That is a usual scene in Ukraine of forced mobilization, also called busification.

    • August 21, 2026

    In Lviv, a draft dodger stabs one TCC recruitment sergeant to death.

    • August 22, 2026

    Mathias Dรถpfner, the CEO of German Axel Springer mass media company and a pro-Israel zealot, makes the cover of the weekly British Spectator conservative magazine with an article titled

    Thereโ€™s still time to save the West

    He is regarding the West as an idea, a way of life, which has become an invalid and should be strengthened. As the sketch is showing, the bad guys are Russia and China, whom I am rather regarding as the standard bearers of a new multipolar world.

    Well, after five centuries of colonialism and imperialism, the invention of fascism and two world wars, the Western hegemony is crumbling. Moreover, the genocide that Israel is committing in Palestine is very adverse publicity.

    That mechanical and inevitable phenomenon is terrifying Boris Johnson too (cf. supra, April 12, 2024). Decadence is not the point. Europe could complete the dismantling of welfare and build armies instead, but one fact remains: the others are becoming stronger in all fields

    Even geniuses like Donald Trump or Emmanuel Macron will not be able to turn the tide. Russia is winning in Ukraine and Iran, in the Gulf.

    Mathias Dรถpfner is the kind of German who believes that an extreme support to Israel would clean his breed from the Nazi crimes, from one genocide to another. Moreover, he has not accepted the victory of Soviet Union over Nazi Germany and is fantasizing about a revenge against Russia. Calm down, Heini Kraut.

    • August 26, 2026

    Volodymyr Zelenskyy entrusts Andriy Biletsky and Denys Prokopenko, two Nazi Azov executives, with the defense of the still occupied part of Donbass, the positions that Ukraine is still holding in Donetsk People’s Republic

    After having honored and awarded them, in order to consolidate his fragile power, he sends them and their troops to the meat grinder.

    • August 28, 2026

    For 48 hours, night and day, Russia is striking Kiev region over and over. In the evening, a warehouse is hit in Myla, western suburb

    There, Fire Point company was secretly storing components for drones. Secondary explosions kill dozens civilians in the vicinity.

    • September 1, 2026

    Volodymyr Zelenskyy threatens to shoot down civilian airliners in the Russian airspace

    The crook should remember what Vladimir Putin stated on September 24, 1999. The Russians would correct the Ukrainian terrorist in the toilets.

    • September 4, 2026

    A lonely drone strikes the office in downtown Kiev of Oleksandr Poklad, the acting head of the State security agency (SBU). Volodymyr Zelenskyy claims right away that the attack is Russian, but both the target and its treatment would be an unusual way of working for Russia

    The firework is rather the escalation of an obscure dispute between spooks, which has already resulted in violent deaths over the past few days. The adversary of the SBU is the military intelligence (HUR) and its horde of Russian Nazi activists (RDK), who have found refuge in Ukraine after the 2014 West-backed right-wing coup in Kiev. Chief of Zelenkyy’s office, Kyrylo Budanov is supporting the HUR, that he was heading until January 2026.

    • September 16, 2026

    UK defense ministry discloses the name of a British serviceman who was killed in Ukraine on Saturday, September 12. Major Paul Wilks, 40 years old, was member of the Intelligence Corps from his graduation at Sandhurst academy in 2012. He has been deployed on multiple operational tours, including to Afghanistan

    The official cause of his death is a road traffic accident. A Russian drone may have committed a right-of-way violation

    After a first death declaration on December 9, 2025 (cf. supra) -another accident– Wilks is the second official fallen British serviceman in Ukraine.

    • October 14, 2026

    There was a sort of mysterious glitch (cf. supra, March 5, 2025) the night before in Ukraine and here is the new official prayer under Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s regime

    Starlink unser im Himmel,
    geheiligt werde dein Name,
    deine Verbindung komme

    Meanwhile, the stooge of the European proxy war is begging for help in London.

    • November 16, 2026

    French State radio station RFI reveals that without knowledge or consent of the national legislature, active-duty military personnel are deployed in Ukraine. Their mission is involving maintaining French military equipment and training Ukrainian non-commissioned officers in close proximity to the combat zone. That secret operation is codenamed Volia and based in Poland, its official cover is known as Gerfaut.

    • November 17, 2026

    With British support in intelligence and EW, scores of cruise missiles and drones manage before dawn to overwhelm air defense in Kerch and damage the Crimea bridge, a symbolic target.

    Music

    https://youtu.be/y25dK6rytZM