Nicolas Cinquini

Analista senior di l'intelligenza in u campu di a gestione di i risichi di sicurezza, sò un anzianu tenente detective è ufficiale di l'intelligenza in l'agenzie di u Statu francese. A bona pronuncia hè Николай Чинкуини, in russu

Tag: volodymyrzelenskyy

  • L’engagement français dans les rangs ukrainiens

    • Andreoni, Guillaume, né le 16 novembre 1995,

    est un nationaliste révolutionnaire, lorsqu’en mai 2022, il quitte la région de Nîmes et rejoint la Légion internationale pour la défense territoriale de l’Ukraine

    Il y arbore un insigne qui évoque la Légion des volontaires français (LVF) contre le bolchevisme, supplétifs de la Wehrmacht sur le front de l’est entre 1941 et 1944

    Le 14 octobre, il apparaît dans une série de neuf portraits, que la photographe états-unienne Rebecca Floto réalise de volontaires étrangers en Ukraine

    Il est blessé en novembre 2022, une grenade, précise un autre Français, Berenger Minaud

    En compagnie du nazi compulsif Alan Vigneron, son camarade de la 92e brigade mécanisée ukrainienne, il prend un FlixBus à Lviv, ouest de l’Ukraine, parvient à Paris le soir du 22 avril 2023, quand tous deux sont arrêtés par la douane en gare routière de Bercy, en possession d’optique de visée et chargeur de fusil d’assaut, équipement classé catégorie A. En garde à vue puis déférés, ils sont condamnés le 24 avril à six mois de prison ferme, plus du sursis

    Je demande par la suite à accéder à son compte Instagram privé, mais Andreoni est pudique, réserve ses photographies et vidéos à un cercle restreint de personnes. Il me salue pourtant le 24 août 2023

    Il ne répond pas et nous ne saurons pas encore si pour seulement 6 mois fermes, il a effectivement été écroué en avril, si avec les éventuelles aménagements, il est maintenant sorti.

    Pour aller un peu plus loin : dans bones_french_lvf, il y a Bones [os, en anglais], qui est son surnom depuis des années. LVF désigne bien sûr la Légion des volontaires français (1941-1944). Dans Bones_318, 318 signifie CAH et AH, Adolf Hitler. C18 ou Combat 18 est une organisation terroriste nazie, fondée au Royaume-Uni en 1992. Elle a ensuite infecté le Canada, les USA puis l’Allemagne, où ses membres ont été impliqués dans les assassinats de migrants et d’une personnalité politique allemande. La devise d’Andreoni est croire, combattre, obéir, qui se dit en Italien et dans un ordre un peu différent, credere, obbedire, combattere, celle des fascistes italiens entre 1922 et 1945

    Il prétend pourtant à des origines corses. Ce serait oublier que les Corses, les vrais, ont protégé les Juifs et affronté en 1943 la brigade Reichsführer SS, qui a même subi des pertes cruelles, alors que des troupes marocaines s’apprêtaient à débarquer pour libérer l’île

    Le 5 janvier 2024, la journaliste Cécile Deffontaines, qui m’a contacté et que j’ai rencontrée en septembre, publie pour L’Obs le premier article de grand média français qui s’attaque à la question du nazisme parmi les combattants français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine. Guillaume Andreoni y a gagné sa place de haute lutte, y est désigné par son surnom, Bones

    Le 20 avril, il affiche son affection pour un très jeune représentant du Volkssturm [Assaut populaire, 1944-1945], affublé de l’insigne du régiment Kraken, émanation de l’organisation nazie Azov dans le renseignement militaire ukrainien (HUR).

    Après le propagandiste nazi lyonnais Gwendal Delange, en septembre, trois volontaires français rendent hommage depuis l’Ukraine, le 5 octobre, à Philippine Le Noir de Carlan, dont le corps a été retrouvé au bois de Boulogne le 21 septembre 2024, victime de viol et d’homicide. Les images sont partagées sur un canal nazi francophone bien connu

    Celui de gauche arbore sur les épaules la Totenkopf SS et le blason de la division SS française Charlemagne (1943-1945). Son écusson LVF, sa silhouette, sa calvitie, les emplacements et couleurs des tatouages floutés, permettent à l’oeil expérimenté de reconnaître au centre Guillaume Andreoni.

    Il est absolument superbe, dans une vidéo que le service de presse de l’armée ukrainienne diffuse le 28 février 2025. Il considère que

    l’Ukraine est une terre européenne, que le peuple ukrainien est un peuple européen, que c’est son devoir, en tant qu’homme européen, de venir aider le peuple ukrainien

    Il arbore le drapeau rouge et noir des nazis ukrainiens de la 2de guerre mondiale et aujourd’hui, de Pravyi sektor [Secteur droit], son habituel écusson de la LVF et nouveauté, celui de la Section Brennos (cf. Gwendal Delange), groupe récemment formé de volontaires français qui revendiquent leurs héritages gaulois et nazi.

    Il n’a pas intégré l’armée régulière est toujours dans la Légion internationale. Il décrit Brennos comme une formation de pionniers (génie d’assaut), où il exerce la fonction de grenadier, avec son Mk 19 US. Il compte rester en Ukraine, prendre sa retraite dans un chalet des Carpathes. Cela lui sera en effet plus facile dans l’ouest lointain ukrainien que dans le Donbass, aujourd’hui terre russe.

    Le même jour à Washington, Donald Trump congédie avec fracas un Volodymyr Zelenskyy dopé par l’agrochimie colombienne et stimulé par ses groupies européennes, au point de refuser une paix qui lui permettrait pourtant de préserver ce qu’il reste pour l’instant de son pauvre pays, d’éviter qu’un second million d’Ukrainiens ne soient tués au combat, en vain

    La scène révolte François Bayrou, qui tel un cabri, aux cris de EUROPE, commence à faire de petits bonds, comme dans un rituel sexuel pour séduire Ursula von der Leyen

    Nous ne partageons pas la même définition de l’honneur, car mon expérience m’a permis de comprendre que dans une large majorité, les Français sont vaniteux, mais dépourvus du moindre orgueil.

    Moins emphatique que Bayrou mais aussi pour l’Europe et contre la Russie, Guillaume Andreoni se bat depuis trois ans, sait depuis plus longtemps encore de quel côté il est. Moi aussi.

    Le 4 avril, anniversaire de l’OTAN, la confrérie nazie internationale Misanthropic Division, fondée et basée en Ukraine depuis 2013 (cf. Sébastien Bernard & Wilfried Blériot), publie cette image pour promouvoir son drapeau en hommage à la 33. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS, Charlemagne

    Mes lecteurs chevronnés reconnaissent bien sûr Guillaume Andreoni, à gauche. À droite, son petit camarade est probablement Alan Vigneron

    Le 10 avril, l’État ukrainien le promeut représentant officiel de son agence de recrutement de volontaires étrangers, dont le compte TikTok publie un extrait de sa vidéo du 28 février. Le militant nazi français y arbore son écusson de la LVF.

    Je suis intervenu dans un reportage de l’émission Voyenkory [Correspondants de guerre, VPN nécessaire en Union européenne, qui censure ces programmes d’information], que la chaîne Rossiya 1 diffuse le 18 mai 2025.

    Ce fut avec surprise, scepticisme et réprobation que les employés de presse française réagirent aux témoignages de volontaires qui se battent dans l’armée russe et se réfèrent avec fierté au groupe de chasse Normandie Niémen, des pilotes français libres de l’Armée rouge entre 1942 et 1945.

    Mon expertise concerne à l’inverse des volontaires encensés par les mêmes médias hexagonaux, qui se battent dans les rangs atlantistes et se réfèrent avec fierté à leurs compatriotes engagés entre 1941 et 1945 dans la Wehrmacht ou Schutzstaffel (SS). Les deux groupes sont extraordinairement antinomiques et le reportage russe les compare

    Parmi la petite centaine de Français que le club OSINT TrackANaziMerc a identifiés à ce jour, la sélection a été rude, voire élitiste. Ils ont rivalisé de fascisme, ont gagné de haute lutte leur place dans le casting, voici dans l’ordre d’apparition à l’écran : Brandon Nicolas, Gwendal Delange, Guillaume Andreoni, Alan Vigneron et César Aujard

    https://youtu.be/5kPiTncRrqI
    Un extrait de l’émission sur YouTube

    Andreoni a plus particulièrement gagné l’attention des journalistes russes, car il conjugue comme nul autre ardeur fasciste et faveurs de la propagande ukrainienne, qui l’a choisi pour promouvoir le recrutement de volontaires étrangers. Je dis pour ce reportage

    En préambule, il s’agit d’un travail d’équipe. Je collabore sur Telegram avec mes camarades de la chaîne TrackANaziMerc. Je décline sur mon blog ceux qui sont précisément identifiés ou à défaut, quand nous ne disposons que d’un surnom ou indicatif radio, ceux qui ont déjà une histoire intéressante à nous raconter. À ce titre, je compte à ce jour, depuis 2022, 92 combattants. 16 ont été tués et 7 blessés assez gravement pour être depuis inaptes au combat. 32 sont revenus en France. Leur nombre réel est bien sûr supérieur. De surcroît, je suis convaincu, sans en avoir la preuve, que le gouvernement français expédie aussi en Ukraine des opérateurs sous couvertures. Ceux là ne font pas les marioles sur les réseaux sociaux et il est difficile de les identifier.

    Ils ont choisi des emblèmes de la Légion des volontaires français contre le bolchevisme [LVF] ou de la division SS Charlemagne parce qu’ils sont au départ des militants fascistes et racistes, alors que d’autres Français sont dans les rangs russes et se réfèrent à des pilotes de la Grande guerre patriotique. Ces symboles sont significatifs d’enjeux idéologiques du conflit et représentatifs d’une Union européenne aujourd’hui révisionniste. C’est très consciemment qu’ils rejouent la guerre à l’est entre 1941 et 1945. Le fait que Stepan Bandera et Roman Choukhevytch soient depuis 2014 des héros populaires en Ukraine, le fait que l’Ukraine célèbre chaque année, le 10 octobre, la fondation de l’UPA, les a convaincus que leur place était dans les rangs atlantistes

    Le 1er août, au côté d’Alan Vigneron, Guillaume Andreoni lève le corps de Kevin Lazzari, un compatriote, militant nazi et camarade de la Section Brennos, tué le 14 juillet

    Le 20 janvier 2026, un article de StreetPress illustre aussi cet antagonisme entre des volontaires nazis français dans les rangs atlantistes et leurs compatriotes dans l’armée russe qui au contraire, revendiquent l’héritage de pilotes de l’Armée rouge.

    in L’engagement français dans les rangs ukrainiens

    chronique alphabétique et nécrologique de l’engagement français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas

    Articles connexes

    The Atlanticist defeat in Donbass and Ukraine

    en Anglais, chronicle of a new catastrophic NATO venture

    Nazism in Ukraine

    chronique en Anglais, its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine

    The footprint of the Ukrainian Nazism in the West

    chronique en Anglais, interactions between Ukrainian Nazi organizations and Western supremacist militants

    The Western disinformation about Ukraine

    chronique en Anglais, censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia

    14 novembre 2026 : Tombés pour l’Allemagne et l’OTAN

    la liste non exhaustive mais certifiée des Français tués dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine

    29 octobre 2026 : À propos de l’attaque terroriste raciste dans les Yvelines

    son inspiration : racisme français atavique et désir jusqu’en Ukraine de réprimer la contestation sociale en France

    5 août 2026 : Ylian Fort « chique » comme le dernier des voleurs à la tire

    le volontaire français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine souffre de ne pas parvenir à assumer son idéologie fasciste

    1er août 2026 : Censure de la journaliste pacifiste Xenia Fedorova

    loi visant à prévenir les ingérences étrangères en France

    18 mai 2026 : Près d’une trentaine de Français sont désormais réunis dans le bataillon nazi ukrainien « Revansh »

    de quoi faire trembler le microcosme politico-médiatique parisien

    11 mai 2026 : Ma réponse au Canard enchaîné

    qui pleure les jeunes français tués dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine et n’aime pas mon travail

    25 avril 2026 : De Philippe Pétain à Quentin Deranque

    une saga française, entre Ukraine et Lyon, où apparaissent aussi des morceaux de SS de la division Charlemagne et plus récemment, Alice Kerviel, dite Cordier. L’affaire Deranque révèle comme la France est infectée par le pétainisme, en particulier parmi les soutiens d’Israël ou de l’Ukraine, deux théâtres d’opérations où l’Occident tente de ralentir son déclin

    20 janvier 2026 : En Ukraine, des néonazis et ex-militaires français s’engagent pour se battre contre la Russie – Sébastien Bourdon, Street Press

    En 2025, une nouvelle unité de Français combattant pour l’Ukraine s’est structurée autour d’un noyau de néonazis, ayant pour objectif d’attirer des recrues. Parmi ces volontaires, d’anciens militaires. StreetPress les a identifiés

    20 janvier 2026 : En Ukraine, les Français des deux camps s’affrontent sur fond d’imaginaire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale – Sébastien Bourdon, Street Press

    En Ukraine, les volontaires français pro-ukrainiens et pro-russes se partagent l’imaginaire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Les premiers se revendiquent des collabos de l’Allemagne nazie, les seconds de l’escadrille mythique « Normandie – Niémen »

    15 novembre 2025 : « Gardez votre confiance en la France éternelle »

    deux jours après le 10e anniversaire de la débâcle politique et sécuritaire du 13 novembre 2015, une messe célèbre à Verdun l’ancien dirigeant fasciste de l’État français

    11 novembre 2025 : Der Krieg

    ce 11 novembre 2025 est l’occasion de souligner comme la façon dont l’Europe sacrifie les conscrits ukrainiens mobilisés de force rappelle le spectaculaire carnage de la 1ère guerre mondiale

    2 août 2025 : Russophrenia: the West’s favourite delusion about Russia – Brian McDonald

    Ten years after I coined the term, the media’s still convinced Russia is both collapsing, and conquering the world

    9 mai 2025 : Victory Day

    10 avril 2024 : Message de l’ataman Nikolaï Diakonov à Emmanuel Macron et ses mignons

    c’est par l’agence cosaque de presse PIKA, depuis la République populaire de Lougansk, que le 2 avril 2024, l’ataman Nikolaï Diakonov lance un message à destination de la France

    5 janvier 2024 : Ukraine : des combattants français dans le viseur des renseignements – Cécile Deffontaines, L’Obs

    ce papier est le premier des grands médias français qui s’attaque à la question des militants nazis français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, le nouveau danger qu’ils présenteront à terme pour la sûreté intérieure

    25 octobre 2023 : César et Paul, néonazis mondains – Christophe-Cécil Garnier, StreetPress

    où nous apprenons que le nazi français Allan Duchézeau, camarade de César Aujard dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, était surnommé Dox, quand il secondait à Paris le leader nazi Marc de Cacqueray Valménier

    21 juillet 2023 : Les oeils de Moscou

    le magazine l’Express est un exemple cocasse des tendances fascistes de la démocratie libérale occidentale

    19 juin 2023 : David Piguet, un commissaire aux questions russes

    son révisionnisme, en détails

    30 mai 2023 : Fils de Pétain

    la vanité nationale trouble la perception de la réalité historique et perpétue une névrose collective

    14 mai 2023 : Pauvre Sacré Charlemagne

    la mythologie européiste

    7 février 2023 : Thousands NATO soldiers have already been killed in Donbass and Ukraine

    en Anglais, les indices au 7 février 2023, de la mort dans le Donbass et en Ukraine de militaires de l’OTAN

    31 janvier 2023 : the European fascist armies lose WW2

    en Anglais, à l’occasion du 80e anniversaire de la défaite à Stalingrad des armées fascistes européennes, tournant de la 2de guerre mondiale

    21 septembre 2022 : The Western operatives in Mariupol

    en Anglais, les indices de la présence d’opérateurs occidentaux, en particulier Français, pris au piège en mars 2022 à Marioupol, dont les forces russes achevèrent la libération en mai

  • L’engagement français dans les rangs ukrainiens

    • Albert, Aymeric, né le 22 décembre 1999, dit Sizyf,

    est un sportif, nageur dans son adolescence, mais son éponyme est vaniteux. Fondateur grec ancien de Corinthe, Sisyphe voulut jouer au plus malin avec les dieux. Pour sa repentance, il fut condamné à faire éternellement rouler un rocher jusqu’au sommet d’une montagne, d’où le fardeau finit toujours par dégringoler. Quel enfer

    Le Tarnais est parmi les premiers Français qui partent pour l’Ukraine en mars 2022 et c’est à ce titre que son identité nous est alors révélée dans une liste que des as russes de l’informatique recueillent auprès de la bureaucratie ukrainienne. Sa première expérience de la Légion internationale est éphémère, puisqu’il est de retour au plus tard en septembre

    Il nage en France en janvier 2023, mais les as russes le retrouvent quelques temps après dans les papiers de la police ukrainienne, qui vérifie les antécédents des candidats à l’enrôlement dans l’armée régulière

    Les tatouages martiaux ukrainiens ne font pas le héros. A t il combattu ? A t il seulement porté les armes pour Volodymyr Zelenskyy ? Ne serait ce que du flan ?

    Il est aussi coach dans le milieu des MMA (mixed martial arts), où il a préparé le nazi Paul Bichet, ami du combattant nazi en Ukraine César Aujard, affiche aussi sa proximité avec le nazi Maxime Bellamy, qui n’a pas choisi de naître Breton, aurait préféré Corse et se fait appeler Orsu Corsu

    Associée à son inclination idéologique, sa réputation usurpée ou pas d’ancien combattant en Ukraine suscite aujourd’hui de l’inquiétude en Occitanie, comme en témoigne un article que France 3 publie le 26 mai 2025.

    in L’engagement français dans les rangs ukrainiens

    chronique alphabétique et nécrologique de l’engagement français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas

    Articles connexes

    The Atlanticist defeat in Donbass and Ukraine

    en Anglais, chronicle of a new catastrophic NATO venture

    Nazism in Ukraine

    chronique en Anglais, its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine

    The footprint of the Ukrainian Nazism in the West

    chronique en Anglais, interactions between Ukrainian Nazi organizations and Western supremacist militants

    The Western disinformation about Ukraine

    chronique en Anglais, censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia

    14 novembre 2026 : Tombés pour l’Allemagne et l’OTAN

    la liste non exhaustive mais certifiée des Français tués dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine

    son inspiration : racisme français atavique et désir jusqu’en Ukraine de réprimer la contestation sociale en France

    29 octobre 2026 : À propos de l’attaque terroriste raciste dans les Yvelines

    5 août 2026 : Ylian Fort « chique » comme le dernier des voleurs à la tire

    le volontaire français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine souffre de ne pas parvenir à assumer son idéologie fasciste

    1er août 2026 : Censure de la journaliste pacifiste Xenia Fedorova

    loi visant à prévenir les ingérences étrangères en France

    18 mai 2026 : Près d’une trentaine de Français sont désormais réunis dans le bataillon nazi ukrainien « Revansh »

    de quoi faire trembler le microcosme politico-médiatique parisien

    11 mai 2026 : Ma réponse au Canard enchaîné

    qui pleure les jeunes français tués dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine et n’aime pas mon travail

    25 avril 2026 : De Philippe Pétain à Quentin Deranque

    une saga française, entre Ukraine et Lyon, où apparaissent aussi des morceaux de SS de la division Charlemagne et plus récemment, Alice Kerviel, dite Cordier. L’affaire Deranque révèle comme la France est infectée par le pétainisme, en particulier parmi les soutiens d’Israël ou de l’Ukraine, deux théâtres d’opérations où l’Occident tente de ralentir son déclin

    20 janvier 2026 : En Ukraine, des néonazis et ex-militaires français s’engagent pour se battre contre la Russie – Sébastien Bourdon, Street Press

    En 2025, une nouvelle unité de Français combattant pour l’Ukraine s’est structurée autour d’un noyau de néonazis, ayant pour objectif d’attirer des recrues. Parmi ces volontaires, d’anciens militaires. StreetPress les a identifiés

    20 janvier 2026 : En Ukraine, les Français des deux camps s’affrontent sur fond d’imaginaire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale – Sébastien Bourdon, Street Press

    En Ukraine, les volontaires français pro-ukrainiens et pro-russes se partagent l’imaginaire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Les premiers se revendiquent des collabos de l’Allemagne nazie, les seconds de l’escadrille mythique « Normandie – Niémen »

    15 novembre 2025 : « Gardez votre confiance en la France éternelle »

    deux jours après le 10e anniversaire de la débâcle politique et sécuritaire du 13 novembre 2015, une messe célèbre à Verdun l’ancien dirigeant fasciste de l’État français

    11 novembre 2025 : Der Krieg

    ce 11 novembre 2025 est l’occasion de souligner comme la façon dont l’Europe sacrifie les conscrits ukrainiens mobilisés de force rappelle le spectaculaire carnage de la 1ère guerre mondiale

    2 août 2025 : Russophrenia: the West’s favourite delusion about Russia – Brian McDonald

    Ten years after I coined the term, the media’s still convinced Russia is both collapsing, and conquering the world

    9 mai 2025 : Victory Day

    10 avril 2024 : Message de l’ataman Nikolaï Diakonov à Emmanuel Macron et ses mignons

    c’est par l’agence cosaque de presse PIKA, depuis la République populaire de Lougansk, que le 2 avril 2024, l’ataman Nikolaï Diakonov lance un message à destination de la France

    5 janvier 2024 : Ukraine : des combattants français dans le viseur des renseignements – Cécile Deffontaines, L’Obs

    ce papier est le premier des grands médias français qui s’attaque à la question des militants nazis français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, le nouveau danger qu’ils présenteront à terme pour la sûreté intérieure

    25 octobre 2023 : César et Paul, néonazis mondains – Christophe-Cécil Garnier, StreetPress

    où nous apprenons que le nazi français Allan Duchézeau, camarade de César Aujard dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, était surnommé Dox, quand il secondait à Paris le leader nazi Marc de Cacqueray Valménier

    21 juillet 2023 : Les oeils de Moscou

    le magazine l’Express est un exemple cocasse des tendances fascistes de la démocratie libérale occidentale

    19 juin 2023 : David Piguet, un commissaire aux questions russes

    son révisionnisme, en détails

    30 mai 2023 : Fils de Pétain

    la vanité nationale trouble la perception de la réalité historique et perpétue une névrose collective

    14 mai 2023 : Pauvre Sacré Charlemagne

    la mythologie européiste

    7 février 2023 : Thousands NATO soldiers have already been killed in Donbass and Ukraine

    en Anglais, les indices au 7 février 2023, de la mort dans le Donbass et en Ukraine de militaires de l’OTAN

    31 janvier 2023 : the European fascist armies lose WW2

    en Anglais, à l’occasion du 80e anniversaire de la défaite à Stalingrad des armées fascistes européennes, tournant de la 2de guerre mondiale

    21 septembre 2022 : The Western operatives in Mariupol

    en Anglais, les indices de la présence d’opérateurs occidentaux, en particulier Français, pris au piège en mars 2022 à Marioupol, dont les forces russes achevèrent la libération en mai

  • [Sharing] Sanctionnez-Moi, Sale Garce! – Scott Ritter, Forum Geopolitica

    In the Jacques Baud case, the EU is sanctioning, for the first time, an analyst not for spreading disinformation but for expressing a politically inconvenient truth, all while admitting he has broken no law. Will it have the courage to go after an American citizen?

    The European Union has sanctioned the veteran Swiss Intelligence Officer and Geopolitical analysts, 70-year-old Colonel Jacques Baud.

    His crime?

    He is a “regular guest on pro-Russian television and radio programs,” which makes him “a mouthpiece for pro-Russian propaganda” who “makes conspiracy theories” such as “accusing Ukraine of orchestrating its own invasion in order to join NATO.”

    Damn, this dude is bad ass.

    I quiver in fear at the thought of this septuagenarian “making conspiracy theories.”

    What’s a world powerhouse like the European Union to do in the face of such a threat?

    Why sanction the bugger, of course!

    Which is precisely what Kaja Kallas, the Estonian-born High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, did, promulgating a notice on December 15, 2025 which added twelve “natural persons” and two “entities” to a list of people and entities deemed to have run afoul of Council Regulation (EU) 2024/2642 (“EU Russia Destabilization Sanctions”). Passed in October 2024, this regulation introduced “new restrictive measures against Russia in response to its destabilizing activities against the EU and EU Member States.” The regulation was “designed to respond to Russia’s campaign of hybrid activities against the EU and its Member States.”

    The EU deemed this regulation necessary to counter alleged Russian hybrid actions designed to undermine elections, support violent demonstrations, commit acts of sabotage against democratic institutions, economic activities, or services of public interest, exploiting armed conflict for the purposes of illicit trade, and instigating or facilitating armed conflict.

    All the above listed actions could—and should—constitute criminal acts if carried out by any person.

    The question is, which of these nefarious deeds is Colonel Baud accused of undertaking?

    None of the above.

    Instead, he has fallen afoul of an additional listed activity, “supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.” In short, the EU has accused Colonel Baud of “implementing or supporting actions or policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in a third country (Ukraine) by engaging in the use of information manipulation and interference.”

    Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) is the recent brainchild of the European External Action Service (EEAS), the diplomatic service in charge of executing all international relations of the European Union. Back in 2022 the EEAS collaborated with the EU Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) to study and analyze the threat landscape concerning Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) and disinformation. The mandate for this action was direction derived from the November 27, 2019, European Democracy Action Plan, which tasked the EEAS to “work with Member States, civil society and industry towards refined common definitions and methodologies in order to address different categories of disinformation and influence activities.”

    FIMI is defined by the EEAS as follows: “A mostly nonillegal pattern of behavior that threatens or has the potential to negatively impact values, procedures and political processes. Such activity is manipulative in character, conducted in an intentional and coordinated manner. Actors of such activity can be state or non-state actors, including their proxies inside and outside of their own territory.”

    By its own admission, the EEAS definition of what constitutes FIMI “puts emphasis on manipulative behavior, as opposed to the truthfulness of the content being delivered.”

    In short, the “crimes” Colonel Baud is accused of are procedural in nature and not derived from any actual disinformation or promulgation of lies or mistruths. Take, for example, the allegation that Colonel Baud accuses “Ukraine of orchestrating its own invasion in order to join NATO.”

    The basis for this accusation is Colonel Baud’s 2024 book, L’art de la guerre russe. Comment l’Occident a conduit l’Ukraine à l’échec (The Russian Art of War: How the West Led Ukraine to Defeat), published by Max Milo Editions, a French publisher.

    The offending passages read as follows:

    Zelensky’s decree of March 24, 2021 for the reconquest of Crimea and the Donbass was the real trigger for the SMO. From that moment on, the Russians understood that if there was military action against them, they would have to intervene. But they also knew that the cause of the Ukrainian operation was NATO membership, as Oleksei Arestovitch had explained. That is why, in mid-December 2021, they were submitting proposals to the USA and NATO on extending the Alliance: their aim was then to remove Ukraine’s motive for an offensive in the Donbass.

    The reason for the Russian Special Military Operation (SMO) is indeed the protection of the populations of Donbass; but this protection was necessary because of Kiev’s desire to go through a confrontation to enter NATO. The extension of NATO is therefore only the indirect cause of the conflict in Ukraine. The latter could have spared itself this ordeal by implementing the Minsk Agreements—but what we wanted was a defeat for Russia.

    Jacques Baud in Art of War: How the West Led Ukraine to Defeat

    Nothing Colonel Baud wrote is a lie, distortion of fact, or mistruth.

    Moreover, he published his work using a well-known French publisher—not a Russian mouthpiece.

    And it turns out every thing Colonel Baud wrote about Ukraine and NATO was true.

    Amanda Sloat, the former Biden Administration senior director for Europe at the National Security Council whom Politico has labeled “an architect of President Joe Biden’s Europe policy,” has recently admitted that the Russian initiation of the SMO could have been avoided if the US took NATO membership off the table when it came to Ukraine.

    “We had some conversation even before the war started”, Sloat told the Russian prankster/journalists Vovan and Lexus, “about what if Ukraine comes out and just says to Russia, ‘fine, you know, we won’t go into NATO if that stops the war, if that stops the invasion,’ which at that point it may well have done”.

    Amanda Sloat

    Sloat, however, noted that she was “uncomfortable with the idea of the US pushing Ukraine not to do that, and sort of implicitly giving Russia some sort of sphere of influence or veto power on that”, adding “I don’t think Biden felt like it was his place to tell Ukraine what to do then, to tell Ukraine not to pursue NATO”.

    In conclusion, Sloat admitted that

    “I guess if you want to do an alternative version of history, one option would have just been for Ukraine to say in January of 2022, ‘fine, you know, we won’t go into NATO, we will stay neutral.’ Ukraine could have made a deal around March/April of 2022 around the Istanbul talks. There is certainly a question,” she added, “almost three years on now, would that have been better to do before the war started, would that have been better to do in Istanbul talks, it certainly would have prevented the destruction and the loss of life”.

    Amanda Slout

    Damn.

    I guess the EU had better fire up its sanction machine.

    Amanda Sloat, how dare you say such things!

    You see, it doesn’t matter that what she said is true.

    What matters is that it goes against the official narrative promulgated by Ukraine, which has been adopted without question by the EU.

    Colonel Jacques Baud is guilty of nothing more than telling the fact-based truth, no matter how inconvenient it may be to the established powers in the EU.

    He has committed no crime—by their own admission, the EU states that the FIMI “crime” Colonel Baud has been convicted of, without benefit of due process, is nothing more than a “nonillegal pattern of behavior” in which the fact that he told the unvarnished truth is no factor.

    Colonel Baud told the truth outside the officially mandated informational pathways established by the EU, and in a manner which contradicted the lies and distortions being promulgated by Ukraine, and he had to be punished.

    Well, Ms. Kallas, I have a challenge for you.

    I, too, have been telling the truth about the Russian-Ukraine conflict.

    I have been put on the Mirotvorets death list by the Unkrainian intelligence service for the crime of telling the truth.

    The Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation has listed me as the number one “information terrorist” and demanding that I be treated as an actual terrorist and hunted down and killed.

    What the hell.

    I need a little more adventure in my life.

    Sanction me, Bitch.

    Do it.

    “F” around and find out.

    I’m an American.

    We believe in free speech.

    Seriously.

    Like, we will fight and die over this issue.

    Sanction me, and my country will fuck you up.

    It’s a damn shame Switzerland has abandoned Colonel Baud to his fate.

    The Swiss were once viewed as the defenders of democracy and all that attends it, inclusive of free speech.

    But no more. So pick on someone your own size.

    Sanction an American citizen.

    I dare you [end]

    The original article

    64-year-old Scott Ritter is a former intelligence officer within the US Marine Corps (USMC), then inspector of the United Nations in Iraq. When in 2003, the US and their British minions were about to invade the country under this false pretext, Ritter was claiming that there was no weapon of mass destruction (WMD) there. He was right.

    Related

    December 13, 2025: Jacques Baud nous répond – Hélène Richard-Favre

    December 10, 2025 : Censorship in Western Academia and the War in Ukraine – New Global Politics

    Why are liberal institutions censoring discussion of forced mobilization in Ukraine? – Volodymyr Ishchenko, Marta Havryshko, Tarik Cyril Amar, Milica Popović and Almut Rochowanski

    December 1, 2025 : Psychose – Pierre Rimbert, le Monde diplomatique

    November 11, 2025 : Der Krieg

    ce 11 novembre 2025 est l’occasion de souligner comme la façon dont l’Europe sacrifie les conscrits ukrainiens mobilisés de force rappelle le spectaculaire carnage de la 1ère guerre mondiale

    August 29, 2025 : How U.S. Support for Ukraine’s Neo-Nazis Imperils Diplomacy – Harrison Berger, The American Conservative

    Since the Cold War, Washington has empowered violent anti-Russian extremists

    August 21, 2025 : « Ukraine über alles! » – Susann Witt-Stahl, junge Welt

    Azov paramilitaries are aiming to debunk Kremlin « myths ». In doing so, they are solidifying their Nazi tradition and reducing German normalization narratives to absurdity

    August 2, 2025 : Russophrenia: the West’s favourite delusion about Russia – Brian McDonald

    Ten years after I coined the term, the media’s still convinced Russia is both collapsing, and conquering the world

    March 14, 2025 : « Pensions ou munitions ? » : la fabrique du consentement à « l’effort de guerre » – Pauline Perrenot, Acrimed

    Depuis l’allocution d’Emmanuel Macron à propos de la guerre en Ukraine, le 5 mars, les grands médias sont en ordre de marche. Réhabilitation du président en « chef de guerre », patriotisme exacerbé, concert militariste et glorification des industriels de guerre… Mené tambour battant, le SAV du discours présidentiel s’accompagne d’une nouvelle séquence de matraquage patronal contre le « modèle social » et pour « travailler plus » au nom, prétendument, de l’« effort de guerre » : « Pensions ou munitions ? » ; « Les canons ou les allocations ? » Signés Dominique Seux (Les Échos, 10/03) et Étienne Gernelle (RTL, 10/03), les deux slogans donnent le ton

    December 12, 2024 : McCarthyism, European style: The elite crackdown on Ukraine dissent – Eldar Mamedov, Responsible Statecraft

    Experts lambasted as Kremlin mouthpieces turned out to be right

    November 26, 2024 : How the Strategy of Fighting to the Last Ukrainian Was Sold to the Public as Morally Righteous – Glenn Diesen

    April 11, 2024 : U.S. Government Helps Pro-Ukraine Media Spread Propaganda And Silence American Critics – Lee Fang, RealClearInvestigations

    Media outlets organized with substantial funding and direction from the U.S. government have supported censorship, disseminated disinfo, and sought to silence American critics of the war

    January 1, 2024 : The Russian Art of War: How the West Led Ukraine to Defeat – Jacques Baud, The Postil Magazine

    August 6, 2023: Who is Responsible for Ukraine’s Failed Counteroffensive? – Scott Ritter, Sputnik

    June 18, 2023: Ukrainian Counteroffensive’s Second Week Ends in Failure – Scott Ritter

    Operation enters the second week of Ukraine’s long-awaited and highly touted counteroffensive, some basic conclusions can be drawn even though the fighting continues, and will continue to rage, for some time to come

    June 10, 2023: Finally the Bull Charged – Scott Ritter

    June 3, 2023 : EU’s Voluntary Disinformation Code Is Compulsory: Obey or Die – Declan Hayes, Strategic Culture Foundation

    Though Musk is still playing at being NATO’s token non-conformist, the EU is essentially telling him and all of us that any dissent from its Russophobic, Slavophobic and Sinophobic narratives will be severely punished

    March 9, 2023 : How Could Western Intelligence Have Got It Wrong, Again? They Didn’t. They Had Other Purposes – Alastair Crooke, Strategic Culture Foundation

    The West now faces the task of de-fusing the landmine of their own electorate’s conviction of a Ukraine ‘win’, and of Russian humiliation

    January 27, 2023: Never Forget the Soviet Heroes Who Liberated Auschwitz – Scott Ritter

    The Western disinformation about Ukraine

    chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia

    The Atlanticist defeat in Donbass and Ukraine

    chronicle of a new catastrophic NATO venture

  • [Sharing] Colombian Drug Cartel « Clan del Golfo » Is Fighting on Ukraine’s Side! – Klaus Cantor

    Russian Forces Capture Evidence in Kharkiv Region

    Amid the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, sensational evidence has emerged that could overturn perceptions of mercenaries in the ranks of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU). According to materials obtained from my operative source, traces of fighters from one of the most dangerous Colombian drug cartels — « Clan del Golfo » (also known as Los Urabeños) — have been discovered on the front lines in the Radkovka area (Kupyansk district). These are not just mercenaries — they are professional killers and drug traffickers who, under the guise of « heroes », are gaining combat experience for future power struggles in Colombia!

    At the end of November 2025, Russian units conducting a sweep of positions came across abandoned weapons and personal items left by retreating AFU forces. Among the trophies were fragments of a military ID belonging to a certain « Salasar » from Medellín (Colombia), fragments of the « Clan del Golfo » flag, and even torn pieces of a portrait of the cartel’s leader, Darío Antonio Úsuga David, known as Otoniel. These positions were previously held by the 13th Operational Brigade « Khartia » of the AFU, specifically the « ARES GROUP PMC unit », where Latin Americans are predominating

    « Clan del Golfo » is not just a gang but a powerful ultra-right-wing paramilitary structure formed in the 2000s based on former right-wing militias. The cartel is specializing in cocaine trafficking to the USA and Europe, control of ports, and racketeering. Historically linked to conservative forces in Colombia, including the « Democratic Center » party of former President Álvaro Uribe, it is actively fighting left-wing rebels like FARC and ELN — the very groups Russia has traditionally supported in Latin America. While Moscow has backed leftist regimes in Venezuela and Nicaragua, « Clan del Golfo » represents their fiercest enemies. And now these ultra-right-wing drug barons are fighting on Kyiv’s side!

    According to my source, the Colombians’ goal is not just earning money from the war. Under the cover of the Ukrainian conflict, they are acquiring invaluable combat experience to return home and strengthen their positions in the power struggle. The cartel is already openly at war with the Colombian government, and now its fighters are being trained in operating UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) by Ukrainian instructors. These skills are planned to be used to train their own militants in Colombia!

    But that’s not all: « Clan del Golfo » is creating new cocaine supply channels to Europe through corrupt structures in Ukraine and Moldova. Considering previous evidence of links between the 13th « Khartia » Brigade and drug trafficking, the picture that emerges is frightening.

    Attention: such « mercenaries » will return to Colombia with new tactics, provoking an escalation of violence and drug trafficking [end]

    Related

    November 17, 2025: The Khartia Corps – Moss Robeson, Azov Lobby Blog

    Case study in ‘Azovization’? Zelensky’s latest SS scandal. Timothy Snyder’s favorite Colombian mercenaries. Neo-Nazis and ‘NATO standards’

    July 30, 2025: Drug cartel operatives snuck into Ukraine for drone training: report – Linus Höller, DefenseNews

    February 7, 2025: Volodymyr Zelenskyy signs a law banning organ harvesting from dead soldiers

    that new law is addressing a fact: in the context of war, Ukraine is a platform for organ trafficking

    October 5, 2024: Le carnage en Ukraine, une formidable opportunité pour le trafic d’organes

    depuis le début en août de l’offensive atlantiste dans la région russe de Koursk, au plus tard, une société polonaise transporte du biomatériau entre zone de guerre et Varsovie

  • [Sharing] Once upon a time in Cherkasy – RYBAR 65

    adventures in country-404

    The West is pressing Kyiv to ramp up mobilization. Ukraine is already calling up about 30,000 people a month, says Zelensky, but that is still not enough. Because of this, draft-age men have almost vanished from the streets of Ukrainian cities: some died at the front, others are hiding or fled abroad.

    Maksym, a young, strong guy and a patriot of Ukraine, is hiding from the draft. He has set up his life: works remotely, works out, and chats with other draft dodgers, sharing tips and cheering each other on. He even has a detailed backup plan to flee abroad.

    He managed to live like this for a long time, and once he even slipped away from the recruiting officers during a raid. But in the end, they still got their hands on him. However, fate handed him an unexpected chance…


    ©️ RYBAR

    Related

    Five to One – RYBAR 83

    a reward shared by all

    Autumn near Bakhmut – RYBAR 82

    the balance between command and trust

    Ribbon on the Helmet – RYBAR 81

    how one symbol divided us and them

    The Grey Sky of Hostomel – RYBAR 80

    the way to our guys through fire and smoke

    Half a Meter from Death – RYBAR 79

    under the sights of an enemy drone

    We Don’t Abandon Our Own – RYBAR 78

    battle for Snake Island

    Easter Ceasefire – RYBAR 77

    silence regime or dangerous mercy

    The Road Back – RYBAR 76

    don’t give up your own and return home

    Survive Underground – RYBAR 75

    rescue at the risk of life

    Life on the Front Lines – RYBAR 74

    the moment that divides into before and after

    The Price of Life – RYBAR 73

    the only chance for survival

    Combat Cheburashka – RYBAR 72

    the story of a toy

    Call Sign Yan – RYBAR 71

    loyalty that cost a life

    Once upon a time between the lines – RYBAR 70

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time near Stepnohirsk – RYBAR 69

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in Varvarovka – RYBAR 68

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in Pokrovsk – RYBAR 67

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time near Kostyantynivka – RYBAR 66

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in Aleksandro-Kalinovo – RYBAR 64

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in Novohryhorivka – RYBAR 63

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time near Hnativka – RYBAR 62

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in Mala Tokmachka – RYBAR 61

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in the borderland – RYBAR 60

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time near Filiya – RYBAR 59

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in Pavlohrad – RYBAR 58

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in Crimea – RYBAR 57

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in the Serebryanskyi forest – RYBAR 56

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time on the AFU’s positions – RYBAR 55

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in Voronezh – RYBAR 54

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in a tank brigade – RYBAR 53

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in Toretsk – RYBAR 52

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time near Tykhe – RYBAR 51

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time near Skudne – RYBAR 50

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time near Staromayorske – RYBAR 49

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in the basements – RYBAR 48

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in the gray zone – RYBAR 47

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in the flow – RYBAR 46

    adventures in country-404

    Once on the Platform – RYBAR 45

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, on the way home – RYBAR 44

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Ukrainsk – RYBAR 43

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in hard times – RYBAR 42

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, it couldn’t be otherwise – RYBAR 41

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Vesyoloye – RYBAR 40

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in Trudovoe – RYBAR 39

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Kurakhove – RYBAR 38

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Vuhledar – RYBAR 37

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in captivity – RYBAR 36

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in Poltava – RYBAR 35

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in Krasnohorivka – RYBAR 34

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in Verkhnya Syrovatka – RYBAR 33

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in Pervomais’ke – RYBAR 32

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, while fleeing from the 404 country – RYBAR 31

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, at sea – RYBAR 30

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, on that very street – RYBAR 29

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, during a surrender – RYBAR 28

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Artemivka – RYBAR 27

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Umanske – RYBAR 26

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Novoselivka Persha – RYBAR 25

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Ostroverkhivka – RYBAR 24

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Krasnohorivka – RYBAR 23

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Chasiv Yar – RYBAR 22

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in Kharkiw – RYBAR 21

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in Spain – RYBAR 20

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, on the election day – RYBAR 19

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near Berdychi – RYBAR 18

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near Kostyantynivka – RYBAR 17

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Oleshky – RYBAR 16

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, on February 24 – RYBAR 15

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near Bakhmut – RYBAR 14

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near Robotyne – RYBAR 13

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near Kreminna – RYBAR 12

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Lugansk – RYBAR 11

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Krynky – RYBAR 10

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Mar’inka – RYBAR 9

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Avdiivka – RYBAR 8

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Nova Kakhovka – RYBAR 7

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in the Azovets camp – RYBAR 6

    adventures in country -404

    Once upon a time, in Klishchiivka – RYBAR 5

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near the Russia-Ukraine border – RYBAR 4

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near Novodarivka – RYBAR 3

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, on Independence Day in country 404 – RYBAR 2

    the tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Urozhaine – RYBAR 1

    A tale of a failed counter-attack

  • [Partage] Jacques Baud nous répond – Hélène Richard-Favre

    Bonjour Jacques BAUD! Vous vous rappelez bien sûr la série d’entretiens que nous avions menés ensemble sur ce blog. C’était un article de Sylvain Besson qui avait motivé ma démarche auprès de vous pour en savoir un peu plus. Nous étions début septembre 2020. 

    Voici ce même journaliste reprendre un article paru sur Radio free Europe et parler de vous en termes que je vous serais reconnaissante de commenter. L’article en question, paru sur le site de la Tribune de Genève, est déjà suivi de plus de 300 commentaires. Qu’avez-vous à nous en dire ?

    Merci pour votre question. Oui, j’ai été surpris par cette information, même si je ne sais pas encore en ce moment si elle est vraie ou non. Je pars de l’idée qu’elle l’est.

    Mon approche du conflit russo-ukrainien (comme des autres, d’ailleurs) est d’exposer les faits afin de comprendre ce qui se passe, avec la finalité d’y trouver une solution. Comme je le répète souvent: « de la manière de comprendre une crise découle celle de la résoudre ». Cette compréhension doit se faire indépendamment de toute préférence pour l’une ou l’autre des parties en présence. Aujourd’hui, particulièrement en Europe, si votre appréciation s’écarte un tant soit peu de la ligne officielle, vous êtes considéré comme « pro-russe » ou « conspirationniste ». Si vous lisez les commentaires des différentes interviews que j’ai accordées, les commentaires « équilibrés », « factuels » ou « balancés » reviennent le plus souvent. Après une interview qui a été publiée sur un média américain, un internaute a commenté: « Bien que Baud soit pro-ukrainien, il a bien compris la position russe! ». On est aux antipodes de ce que racontent nos journalistes. En novembre 2022, le journaliste suisse Jean-Philippe Schaller de la RTS déclarait que j’étais un agent au service de Vladimir Poutine! Quelles sont ses sources? Aucune: c’est du conspirationnisme pur et simple.

    Le problème aujourd’hui est que si l’on dit que « la Russie gagne » on est automatiquement considéré comme « pro-russe ». Mais la victoire ou la défaite de l’un ou de l’autre ne dépend pas de ce que nous disons ou pensons! C’est une réalité. On pourrait même aller plus loin, j’ai expliqué dès 2022 pourquoi l’Ukraine perdait. Si on en avait tenu compte et aidé l’Ukraine non pas pour affaiblir la Russie mais pour qu’elle gagne, elle gagnerait aujourd’hui. Tout était parfaitement clair à la fin 2022. C’est d’ailleurs la raison pour laquelle les Américains ont conseillé à Zelensky d’ouvrir un dialogue avec la Russie.

    Nos journalistes croient aider l’Ukraine, mais c’est faux. À Bruxelles, j’ai été à quatre reprises arrêté dans la rue par des Ukrainiens (de Kharkiv, Odessa et Dniepropetrovsk) qui m’ont remercié pour ce que je fais. Un Ukrainien m’a même envoyé une carte postale avec le timbre de l’attaque contre le croiseur russe Moskva dans la Mer Noire. Nous avons un regard plus polarisé que les Ukrainiens eux-mêmes sur ce conflit. D’ailleurs, pour ceux qui veulent prendre la peine de lire mes livres, ils constateront que je n’utilise aucune source russe, mais exclusivement la presse ukrainienne et américaine: je prends la presse européenne (suisse en particulier) pour les mauvais exemples! Nos journalistes n’utilisent que l’information qui sort des bureaux de l’administration ukrainienne. Les journalistes ukrainiens sont beaucoup plus honnêtes et professionnels que les nôtres. La catastrophe de la bataille de Krinky, sur le Dniepr, par exemple, a été rapportée en grands détails avec des critiques sérieuses contre les militaires britanniques qui l’avaient planifiée et dirigée. Pas un mot dans nos médias. Lisez mes livres. Il y a des centaines de notes: elles viennent presque toutes de médias ukrainiens ou américains.

    Aujourd’hui, même le premier-ministre belge reconnaît qu’une défaite de la Russie est une illusion. C’était déjà ce que les Américains pensaient en novembre 2022, lorsqu’ils ont conseillé à Zelensky d’ouvrir un dialogue avec Moscou. Dire que la Russie ne perd pas ne signifie pas que l’on est pro-russe, c’est un avertissement. Qu’ont fait les Besson et autres plumitifs pour tenir compte de ces avertissements et faire en sorte que l’on aide l’Ukraine efficacement ? Rien! Rien du tout, à part vociférer contre la Russie. Le problème est qu’aujourd’hui le narratif entre en collision avec la réalité et, après 4 ans (!), le système se défend en interdisant les vues qui ne lui plaisent pas. J’ai décrit exactement les mécanismes internes à la conduite ukrainienne qui la défavorisaient sur le terrain. Qui s’en est soucié pour améliorer la conduite ukrainienne? Personne. Aujourd’hui, on s’aperçoit qu’on a loupé une occasion. Cette guerre, qu’on le veuille ou non, est plus dictée par la haine de la Russie que par l’amour de l’Ukraine. Même Zelensky s’en est aperçu.

    Lorsque Sylvain Besson m’a appelé vendredi 12 décembre, il m’a demandé si je croyais que la Russie avait bien attaqué l’Ukraine, j’ai répondu que oui, mais que je pense qu’il y a eu provocation, exactement comme en Géorgie en 2008, et que je m’appuyais sur une interview d’Olekseï Arestovitch (alors conseiller de Zelensky), dans une interview du 18 mars 2019 au média ukrainien Apostrof’, lors de laquelle il explique qu’il faudra une guerre avec la Russie pour pouvoir entrer dans l’OTAN et que cette guerre aurait probablement lieu en « 2021-2022 ».  À ceci s’ajoutent les observations faites par les observateurs de l’OSCE entre le 16 et le 21 février 2022, qui montraient une claire intensification des frappes contre les populations du Donbass. Sans compter le décret du 24 mars 2021 de Zelensky qui déclare la reprise de la Crimée et qui marque le début de la montée en puissance de l’Ukraine sur les pourtours du Donbass. Évidemment, Besson s’est bien gardé de le mentionner dans son article!… et pour cause!

    Mais il y a d’autres choses pas honnêtes. Par exemple, j’ai toujours refusé les invitations de médias officiels russes, parce que je voulais éviter que mes analyses puissent être instrumentalisées à des fins de propagande. J’ai expliqué ça aux journalistes russes qui l’ont très bien compris. Les médias mentionnés par Besson (Agoravox, media 4-4-2 et RT) sont des médias qui ont repris (sans me le demander) des interviews faites sur d’autres plateformes et/ou vendues par elles. Omerta est un média qui m’interviewe occasionnellement, dont le directeur (Régis le Sommier) apparaît également sur Europe 1 et d’autres médias mainstream français.

    Quant à la présence de soldats nord-coréens en Ukraine, je ne l’ai pas mise en doute. J’ai mis en doute leur intégration dans les forces russes. Et les faits m’ont donné raison.  La conférence à laquelle j’ai participé à Winterthour portait sur la neutralité de la Suisse. Je ne me suis jamais exprimé sur les questions liées au Covid et aux vaccins, comme le suggère Besson. Contrairement à ce qu’il affirme, je n’ai jamais participé à la « formation d’armées locales », j’ai toujours été engagé dans le cadre des Nations Unies et sous leur contrôle.

    Conclusion: une fois de plus, Sylvain Besson ne s’est pas montré comme un  journaliste intègre. Une étude de l’Université d’Uppsala (pas une officine comme Conspiracy Watch payée par le gouvernement britannique!) le qualifie de conspirationniste et d’inspirateur d’Anders Breivik, responsable de la tuerie d’Utoya.

    Dans tous les cas de figure, penser que l’UE conduit l’Ukraine à sa perte n’est – à ma connaissance – pas un délit!

    Merci beaucoup de vos réponses, Jacques Baud. Et juste encore pour préciser à nos lecteurs que si vous avez donc eu droit à être fiché conspirationniste par Conspiracy Watch, du seul fait de vous avoir interrogé sur mon blog m’a valu d’être étiquetée telle sur ledit site. C’est dire où on en est! [fin]

    L’article original

    Jacques Baud a été colonel du renseignement suisse, spécialiste de l’Europe de l’Est. Entre 2009 et 2011, il dirigeait à New York l’équipe Politiques et Doctrine du Bureau des affaires militaires du Département des opérations de maintien de la paix des Nations Unies. Ce fut dans le cadre de l’OTAN qu’il participa à des programmes en Ukraine en 2014 et 2017

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  • [Sharing] The Khartia Corps – Moss Robeson, Azov Lobby Blog

    Case study in ‘Azovization’? Zelensky’s latest SS scandal. Timothy Snyder’s favorite Colombian mercenaries. Neo-Nazis and ‘NATO standards’

    During a recent trip to frontline areas near the encircled strategic city of Pokrovsk, the Ukrainian president, his chief of staff, and commander-in-chief visited the 1st Azov Corps from the National Guard of Ukraine, and they found themselves standing next to a neo-Nazi flag, awarding soldiers who appeared to be wearing SS bolts on their arms. Actually, that PR debacle (which the international press has dutifully ignored) occurred at another command post — a brigade from the National Guard’s 2nd Khartia Corps

    The neo-Nazi flag in question not only featured an Azov-style wolfsangel but, as another researcher noted, includes “the cog-and-wreath that emphasizes this is a ‘social’ nationalism.” (Ukrainian Nazis often prefer to call themselves “social nationalists” instead of “national socialists”)

    This year’s “corps reform” in the National Guard of Ukraine (NGU) elevated the 12th Azov and 13th Khartia brigades, which still exist within the larger units. It was the 4th Rubizh brigade that Zelensky visited from the 2nd NGU corps, another “elite” unit, which has two battalions (3rd and 4th) affiliated with the far-right political party “Svoboda.” Upon closer inspection, the “SS” troops were “trolling.” Their chevrons did not contain Nazi runes but a stylized 44, as in “4th brigade, 4th battalion,” as well as the fascist “44 Rules of Life of a Ukrainian Nationalist” from the 1930s

    The prevalence of soldiers from this “SS” battalion at the ceremony, and a neo-Nazi (“social-nationalist”) flag prominently displayed at the Rubizh command post, obviously raises some questions about the brigade, which was “established as an elite unit trained and organized under NATO standards.” The Azov and Khartia brigades also pride themselves on training according to NATO standards, “to be a model” for a “new Ukrainian army” liberated from the “Soviet-era mindset.”

    The famous historian Timothy Snyder is helping “pro-Ukraine” internet trolls to fundraise for Rubizh and other brigades of the 2nd NGU corps, including one which has a symbol that creates the visual impression of a swastika. But it’s the PR-driven Khartia brigade that appears to be Snyder’s favorite—a watered-down Azov copycat unit, led by a former Rubizh commander who quotes 20th century Ukrainian fascists. International volunteers have called it “the worst brigade,” but in another sense, it is an elite unit, founded by an oligarch who is “convinced the key to success is ‘radical’ reform of Ukraine’s military”

    Timothy Snyder with Vsevolod Kozhemyako, oligarch Khartia founder

    The Azov movement has its “White Fuhrer” (Andriy Biletsky), and Khartia has Vsevolod Kozhemyako, the founder and CEO of Agrotrade Group, “one of Ukraine’s largest grain production, storage and export companies.” In 2003, he received a degree from the Interregional Academy of Personnel Management, a private university in Kyiv that the historian Per Rudling wrote about in 2006 as a pillar of organized antisemitism in Ukraine. Now a proud nationalist who praises the memory of Stepan Bandera, even before 2022, Kozhemyako appears to have been a supporter of the “Da Vinci Wolves,” a far-right militia affiliated with the Nazi-infested “Right Sector” movement

    Kozhemyako visiting the Da Vinci Wolves in 2019

    Whereas the Azov units originated in an infamous volunteer battalion from 2014 and the NGU Azov Regiment made famous by the Russian siege of Mariupol, Khartia has also become “one of Ukraine’s most famous units” and much more quickly expanded, thanks to its unique financing and PR. This year, the country’s largest oil and gas producer, Ukrnafta, raised 100 million hryvnia (~$2.4 million) for the Khartia Corps. Just a year after Kozhemyako formed a territorial defense unit in March 2022, it joined the National Guard as a brigade. According to Forbes Ukraine,

    If we describe Kozhemyako’s role at Khartia in business terms, he is an executive chairman, a founder who has moved away from operational management and focused on strategic interactions with the government, key partners, suppliers, and thought leaders. His interlocutors include [Ukrainian writer/singer] Serhiy Zhadan and Howard Buffett, [Ukrainian singer/politician] Slavko Vakarchuk and [former CEO of Google] Eric Schmidt, generals and deputy prime ministers, owners and managers of private companies with revenues in the hundreds of millions of dollars

    Serhiy Zhadan, a famous poet in Ukraine, is a friend of Vsevolod Kozhemyako and the most prominent “culture warrior” in Khartia, who represents the unit publicly (and even wrote its anthem) but doesn’t actually fight. As “Events in Ukraine” tells us, “This phenomenon of culture-warriors is particularly widespread in the 13th ‘Khartiya’ brigade of the 2nd Corps of the National Guard”

    Zhadan, wearing a Khartia shirt that reminds me of those from the NGU Azov unit

    Khartia is supported by a high-level marketing agency in Ukraine, the Fedoriv Group, which started to work with the Ministry of Digital Transformation in 2022, and launched the wartime United24 fundraising platform and media brand on behalf of the Office of the President. Andriy Fedoriv became a “great friend for me and Khartia” says Kozhemyako. “He helped me build a creative team within Khartia, and then worked with us and continues to work on creating and promoting the brand”

    Kozhemyako and Fedoriv, CEO of the Fedoriv Group

    This year, United24 highlighted the Khartia brigade as a unit that is “changing the battlefield” with “Robotic Combat Systems.” The Azovites pride themselves as pioneers in this field, and I’ll be writing more about that soon. Andriy Biletsky, commander of the Azovite 3rd Army Corps, told the Yalta European Strategy (YES) conference in Kyiv this past summer, “the revolution of ground-based robotic systems … will radically change the battlefield.”

    Ihor Obolensky, commander of the 2nd Khartia Corps, also remotely joined this panel discussion at YES 2025 with former CIA director David Petraeus, former Swedish prime minister Carl Bildt, and Ukrainian military brass. (Obolensky spoke at YES 2024 as well.) According to an ideological officer in Khartia, “our commander, Colonel Ihor Obolensky, can say in a conversation: ‘As Dontsov claimed…’ or ‘According to Konovalets…’” referring to the main ideologue of genocidal Ukrainian fascism (Dmytro Dontsov) and the founder of the fascist Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (Yevhen Konovalets)

    Obolensky, who worked at Agrotrade before the 2022 Russian invasion

    Before the corps reform, Obolensky commanded the Khartia brigade, which established a nationalist ideological department or “Khorunza service,” inspired by the Azov units, that uses the emblem of “Dontsov’s beast.” Khartia now promotes glorification of Stepan Bandera, the 1940s Ukrainian Insurgent Army, and even the pro-Nazi monarchist Pavlo Skoropadsky. Azov salutes and Azovite brands such as Company Group Team (CGT) are commonly seen in the Khartia brigade. For example, in a promotional video published this year by Khartia, and still pinned on the Facebook page of the 2nd NGU Corps, we can see soldiers making Azov salutes, a tank emblazoned with an emblem of the Wehrmacht, and someone wearing a CGT shirt who appears to be making a Nazi salute while riding another tank

    There is another ugly side to the Khartia brigade, which has reportedly “developed a reputation as an elite brigade, making it highly desirable for foreign soldiers seeking opportunities to fight in Ukraine.” To hear it from members of the “Ukraine Foreign Legion” community on Reddit, dedicated to “news and information about joining foreign units in Ukraine,” Khartia is among “the worst” to join, at least for international volunteers

    Adorable_Class_4733 (4 months ago): Khartiia is insane in the sane that just when you think it can’t possibly get any worse, it does. Nobody that has ever served in another unit and then came to Khartiia has ever liked it. I regret ever recruiting for this unit but I was naive and thought that maybe if I bring some good soldiers the problems would go away. They didn’t. Every person there with experience unanimously agree it’s the worst brigade they have ever seen. The battalion commanders either are completely dumb and retarded or intentionally lie to their soldiers saying the russians are all dead and they’re surrendering and that we cut off their logistics route and that you’re gonna be sent to clear trenches when you’re actually going on a suicide assault mission. … Khartiia is REALLY good at propaganda and hiding this shit, they had a camera crew following us 24/7, camera crew in the command centers, everywhere. But that’s it. They suck at everything else.

    ATLAS_UA (4 months ago): I dont use reddit but i made an account just to write this. I fought in Ukraine on every front and this brigade is the worst it is the worst brigade I worked in. They said I will redo basic training when I came to this unit so I told them to fuck off and then they tried to send me on a mission one hour after with zero bullets or equipment. I agreed to go to the mission after a few days … I kept training for a while after this mission, really bad shitty training and then did another mission with a epileptic company commander who had a seizure in the middle of the mission after he slip in a mortar crater in nighttime. I guarantee you he bribed someone I don’t know why they made a epileptic guy company commander. and also everyone abuses drugs there. the platoon commander consumes drugs and alcohol all the time he is an alcoholic.

    DonaFlotilde (1 week ago): I reactivated my account just to leave a comment here for whoever is still in doubt if they should join khartia, as i saw some posts asking about the unit … (forgive my english its not my first language) … khartia training is in the least mediocre, my training was literally how to run and how to shoot standing and kneeling, thats it, 1 month, doing this. … they call our group again, this time its an assault mission. Nice. sergeant, who is in ukraine for 5 months, says its an assault so we gonna stay there 5 days maximum, the vehicle will drop us 500m from assault point. … ended up walking 8km to position, we gotta stay in trench until we get green light. 13 days passed and we learn the fuckin assault point is 20 km away and we know theres no fuckin vehicles. they call us to advance. our guide gets lost he doesnt know how to use the FUCKIN COMPASS We walk 20km away to position, theres PLUS 4KM OF MINED OPEN FIELD TO REACH THE FIRST RUSSIAN POSITION AND A BUNCH OF FPV TRYING TO HIT US, AND OUR FUCKIN UNIT GAVE US 4 MAGAZINES, 2 GRENADES, AND ONE BOTTLE OF WATER FOR OUR WHOLE GROUP. WE HAD TO RUN, WE DISCOVER THAT THE ONE LINE OF ENEMY TRENCH IS ACTUALLY A RUSSIAN SECTOR WITH 4 LINES, 2 BMPS, AND I DONT EVEN KNOW HOW MANY FUVKIN SOLDIERS, SINCE WE MANAGED TO CLEAN ONLY THE FIRST POSITION. … [After the mission] they put me and another guy inside a a car, drive us to the woods and beat the shit out of us. they got pissed cuz of the report accuse us of treason and desertion cuz we didnt advance 2 weeks they hold our documents and cellphones. we never left the base we didnt advance cuz no fuckin ammo and no fuckin nothing.

    FishAndChipsSalad (1 month ago): Just don’t! I’ve been contacted to 3 brigades and hands down Khartiia is the worst in every way. Everything from shoddy equipment, appalling command and reckless missions. I was unfortunate to suffer my worst injury in this sorry excuse for a unit and naturally received no compensation at all. On top of that you will be fighting alongside the Guajiro International Unit… These twats are often worse than the russian terrorists.

    The Spanish-speaking Guajiro unit largely consists of right-wing Colombian soldiers who decided to fight in Ukraine instead of serve under the leftist president Gustavo Petro. “Perhaps hundreds of Colombians have passed through our brigade,” said a deputy battalion commander from Khartia, which claims that the Guajiro unit “undertakes extremely challenging combat missions.” They might have inspired the Azovite 3rd Assault Brigade (that now spearheads the 3rd Army Corps) to form a “Spanish Storm Company.” Earlier this year, members of Khartia even trained with the 3rd Assault Brigade

    Khartia training with the 3rd Assault Brigade

    In recent days, since Zelensky’s visit to the Donetsk region, the 2nd Khartia Corps of the National Guard hosted a delegation of NATO ambassadors from the United States, UK, Germany, France, Italy, Poland, the Netherlands, and Canada. Everyone seems to love the Khartia brigade: NATO, the historian Timothy Snyder, the artist Ai Weiwei, and even the “White Fuhrer” has said that it’s one of the best in Ukraine. But in my opinion, the most interesting thing about Khartia is the convergence of Banderite memory warriors and the “Azovization” of the Ukrainian armed forces—to be continued on my other Substack…

    Ai Weiwei visiting the Khartia brigade in the summer of 2025

    [end]

    The original article

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  • [Sharing] Living Dangerously – Big Serge

    Russo-Ukrainian War: Autumn 2025

    The Russo-Ukrainian War seems to have been engineered in a laboratory to frustrate people with repetition and analytic paralysis. Headlines appear to be circulating on a choreographed loop, all the way down to the place names. Kaja Kallas at the European Commission recently announced, without a hint of irony, that Europe’s new sanctions package – the 19th one – is the toughest yet. Ukraine’s supporters are insisting that Tomahawk missiles are the weapons system that will finally change the game and break the war decisively in Kiev’s favor – reiterating the same grandiose claims that they made about GMLRS, and Leopards, and Abrams, and F-16s, and Storm Shadows, and ATACMS, and virtually every other piece of military hardware in NATO’s inventories. On the ground, Russia is attacking settlements named Pokrovsk and Pokrovs’ke; it recently captured Toretsk and Tors’ke and is now attacking Torets’ke. The more things change, the more things stay the same.

    The analytic frameworks applied to the war have also changed relatively little, buried and obfuscated by the nebulous concept of attrition. On the Ukrainian side, there is continued insistence that Russia is suffering exorbitant losses and straining under the pressure of Ukrainian deep strikes, while Ukrainian setbacks are blamed in large part on the failure of the United States to expand its largesse and give Ukraine everything it needs. Many pro-Russian lines of thinking mirror this and suppose that the AFU is on the verge of disintegration, while the Kremlin is accused of failing to “take the gloves off”, particularly in regards to the Ukrainian energy grid, Dnieper bridges, and dams.

    The result is a very strange sort of war. This is an extraordinarily high-intensity ground war. Both armies remain in the field, holding hundreds of miles of continuous front after years of bloody fighting. Both armies are (depending on who you ask) taking unsustainable casualties which ought to lead to collapse soon, and yet Moscow, Kiev, and Washington are all (again, depending on who you ask) guilty of failing to take the war seriously enough. All of this is maddeningly repetitive, and one could be forgiven for tuning out entirely. Even the diplomatic tango between Trump, Zelensky, and Putin, after delivering a few entertaining moments, failed to really move the needle in any discernable direction.

    Few would argue that the trajectory of the war changed in an obviously dramatic way in 2025, and it is important to avoid the worn out and clichéd language about “turning points” or “collapse” or any such silly thing. However, 2025 saw several shifts in the war, which will hardly ostentatious or dramatic, are nevertheless very important. 2025 has been the first year of the war in which Ukraine launched no ground offensives or proactive operations of its own. This fact is not only a hint at the threadbare state of Ukraine’s ground forces, but also a testament to the way Russian forces transformed “attrition” from a buzzword into a method of persistent pressure across a variety of axes this year.

    In lieu of initiative on the ground, and facing a slow but relentless rollback of their defenses in the Donbas, the theory of Ukrainian victory has shifted in an unacknowledged but dramatic way. After years of insisting that it would achieve maximal territorial integrity – an outcome which would require the total and decisive defeat of Russia’s ground forces – Ukraine has reframed its path to victory mainly as a process of inflicting strategic costs on Russia that mount until the Kremlin agrees to a ceasefire. Consequentially, the debate about arming Ukraine has shifted from a conversation about armor and artillery – equipment useful for retaking lost territories – to a discussion about deep striking weapons like Tomahawks, which can be used to shoot at Russian oil refineries and energy infrastructure. In short, rather than move to prevent Russian from achieving immediate operational objectives in the Donbas, Ukraine and its sponsors are now seeking ways to make Russia pay a price such that victory on the ground is no longer worth it. It is unclear whether they have thought about what price Ukraine will pay in the exchange. Perhaps they do not care.

    About Tomahawks

    Notwithstanding Ukraine’s attempts to jumpstart indigenous production, it is inevitable that Ukrainian capabilities will be largely determined by the largesse of western sponsors. This aspect of the war took a sudden turn at the beginning of the October when fresh reporting began to circulate that Tomahawk missiles might be on the table for Ukraine. Tomahawks have always been on Ukraine’s wish list (given that the Ukrainian wish list as such consists of essentially all the military equipment in NATO’s combined inventories) but this was the first reporting that they might be under serious consideration.

    As is frequently the case, the discussion spiraled away from realistic grounding, with some suggesting that the Tomahawk would be a “game changer” for Ukraine (where have we heard that before?) and the pro-Russian sphere dismissing it as an irrelevant distraction. There’s a tendency to focus on the quality of American weapons systems, casting them as either unrivaled technological marvels or overhyped and overpriced baubles, but this is generally not productive and largely irrelevant to the matter at hand. The Tomahawk, broadly speaking, is exactly as advertised, and provides proven and reliable strike capability at strategic depths in excess of 1,000 miles. In role, range, and payload it is essentially an analog to Russia’s Kalibr missiles (I am begging the enthusiasts to note the phrase “essentially an analog” rather than rake me over the coals over the different guidance systems and other technical minutia). Such a system will always be valuable and would obviously improve Ukraine’s deep strike capabilities.

    The “problem” with Tomahawks does not relate to any “problem” with the missile itself, but with its availability and Ukraine’s technical capability to launch them. The Tomahawk is conventionally a ship-launched missile (there is no extant air-launched variant) with a few novel options for ground launch. Ukraine, obviously, would require ground launch systems, and the problem is that these systems are essentially brand new and available in very limited quantities: more importantly, American service branches are in the process of trying to build out these capabilities throughout the decade. Providing ground-launchable Tomahawks to Ukraine in any meaningful numbers would therefore essentially require the US Army and Marines to scrap their own force buildout plans.

    There are two basic options for ground launching Tomahawks. One of these is the US Army’s MRC (Mid-Range Capability) Launcher, dubbed the Typhon. This is an enormous tractor-trailer launcher with four launch tubes, first delivered in 2023. It has an enormous footprint – so large, apparently, that the Army is already asking for a smaller replacement – and is intended to give the Army an organic fires component in the gap between the shorter range Precision Strike Missile and hypersonic systems (which do not yet exist). The critical fact is this: the Army intends to field a total of five Typhon batteries by 2028, of which two have been delivered so far. Each battery consists in turn of four launchers, implying that eight out of a planned twenty launchers have been delivered. Even more importantly, both of the currently operational batteries are already deployed, with one in the Philippines and one in Japan. These systems are being actively used in exercises and trials, including an exercise this summer in Australia

    The Typhon system gives ground launch capability to the Tomahawk but brings a massive footprint

    The situation with the Marine Corps’ launch system is quite similar, although the launch platforms themselves could not be more different. Unlike the lumbering Typhon tractor trailer, the Marines are fielding a significantly more lithe and compact LMSL system, with the tradeoff of a single launch tube compared to the Typhon’s four. What matters is not so much the technical differences, as the fact that the Marines – like the Army – only received their first deliveries in 2023, and they are currently in the process of building out the force. In the case of the marines, the goal is to have a Tomahawk battalion built out by 2030. In fact, the production contract came into effect as recently as 2025.

    What does all of that mean? It means that, although the Tomahawk itself is a fine missile, the systems for ground launch are so new and available in such limited quantities that equipping Ukraine with Tomahawks would require either the US Army or the Marines to materially alter their force structure in the near term (through 2030, essentially). These are essentially the opposite of much of the gear that’s been given to Ukraine to this point: far from being inventories of older systems that can be earmarked as surplus or tabbed for replacement, Tomahawk ground launch is a brand new capability that is in the middle of deployment and buildout for the first time.

    This is, of course, a layered complication on top of Tomahawk quantities in and of themselves. The issue of Tomahawk availability is both over and under emphasized, depending on the context. The United States has something like 4,000 Tomahawks in its inventories (although half of these are currently inside their cells on American ships), so it is not quite correct to say (as some have) that America is running out of these critical weapons. The issue is that production rates are relatively anemic (generally between 55 and 90 per year) and are fail to replenish the expenditure from even relatively brief strike campaigns, such as the repeated strikes on Yemen. Broadly speaking, then, the issue is not so much that the United States is in immediate danger of running out of Tomahawks, but that procurement schedules are so slow that even relatively minor expenditures can erase multiple years worth of deliveries.

    It may be useful, then, to consider Tomahawks in comparison to the ATACMS missiles which have already been provided to Ukraine. Unlike the Tomahawk, the ATACMS is a system which has already been tabbed for replacement, with the Precision Strike Missile in the early phases of its rollout. ATACMS were also compatible with launch systems that Ukraine already had. In comparison to Tomahawks, then, ATACMS are both vastly more strategically expendable, produced in larger numbers, and easier to deploy. Despite all these points in their favor, the United States provided Ukraine with just 40 ATACMS. Even if the Army could be pressured into handing over one or two of its brand new Typhon launchers, it is difficult to imagine that more than few dozen Tomahawks could be spared for Ukraine: a token inventory far too small to wage a sustained strike campaign in the Russian heartland

    Peace, Sponsored by Raytheon

    Given that Tomahawks for Ukraine would be measured in the dozens, rather than the hundreds, it’s worth asking whether this could actually change anything for the AFU at the front. The answer is clearly no in the long run, but it would be unwise to dismiss the possibility that even a limited tranche of Tomahawks (let’s say 40 to 50 missiles) could help alleviate pressure on Ukrainian forces at the front, provided they were used appropriately. A short term boost to Ukrainian strike capabilities, if deployed against Russian rear areas, could force further dispersal and rationing of Russian assets and temporarily stall Russia’s emerging multi-axis offensive. This could defer the loss of key positions until early 2026. This presumes, however, that the Ukrainians would be content to use Tomahawks against operational targets. In reality, Ukraine can never seem to resist lobbing missiles at targets that have little bearing on the front, like the Kerch Bridge. Indeed, a failure to synergize strikes at depth with operations on the ground is a major reason why the ATACMS achieved so little.

    On the other side of this equation, it is a common complaint from the Russian perspective that Moscow has done too little to “deter” the United States from empowering Ukraine’s strike campaign – both by directly providing munitions and supplying the planning, ISR, and guidance systems. This, however, rather misses the point. Russia has done nothing of note to deter the United States because both Moscow and Washington understand fully that there is essentially no appetite (on either side) for a direct confrontation. In the (sensible) absence of a willingness to strike back at NATO targets, there is really nothing Russia can do to deter beyond maintaining its own retaliatory capabilities. The issue is not that Russia has failed to actively deter, but that there is nothing they could do even if they wanted to.

    The basic pattern here is well established. The United States has done what it can to backstop Ukrainian strike capabilities, but it has held them at a level where Ukraine’s damage output falls far short of decisive levels. So long as that is the case, Russia has clearly demonstrated that it will simply eat the punches and retaliate against *Ukraine*. Hence, when the United States helps Ukraine target Russian oil facilities, it is Ukraine that receives the reprisal, and it is Ukraine which has its natural gas production annihilated as the winter approaches. In a sense, neither side is really trying to deter the other at all. The United States has raised the cost of this war for Russia, but not enough to create any real pressure for Moscow to end the conflict; in response, Russia punishes Ukraine, which is something the United States does not really care about. The result is a sort of geostrategic Picture of Dorian Gray, where the United States vicariously inflicts cathartic damage on Russia, but Ukraine accrues all the soul damage.

    In the case of Tomahawks, the risk-reward calculus is just not there. Tomahawks are a strategically invaluable asset that the United States cannot afford to hand out like candy. Even if the launch systems could be provided (highly doubtful), the missiles could not be made available in sufficient quantities to make a difference. The range of the missiles, however, significantly raises the probability of miscalculation or uncontrolled escalation. Ukraine shooting American missiles at energy infrastructure in Belgorod or Rostov is one thing; shooting them at the Kremlin is another thing entirely.

    There is, however, another aspect of this which seems to be garnering little attention. The biggest risk of sending Tomahawks is not that the Ukrainians will blow up the Kremlin and start World War Three. The bigger risk is that the Tomahawks are used, and Russia simply moves on after eating the strikes. Tomahawks are arguably one of the last – if not *the* last – rung in the escalation ladder for the USA. We have rapidly run through the chain of systems that can be given to the AFU, and little remains except a few strike systems like the Tomahawk or the JASSM. Ukraine has generally received everything it has asked for. In the case of Tomahawks, however, the United States is running the most serious risk of all: what if the Russians simply shoot down some of the missiles and eat the rest of the strikes? It’s immaterial whether the Tomahawks damage Russian powerplants or oil refineries. If Tomahawks are delivered and consumed without seriously jarring Russian nerves, the last escalatory card will have been played. If Russia perceives that America has reached the limits of its ability to raise the costs of the war for Russia, it undercuts the entire premise of negotiations. More simply put, Tomahawks are most valuable as an asset to threaten with.

    Reading between the lines of President Trump’s public statements recently, it seems likely that he has rationally weighed these considerations. Publicly, he used the threat of Tomahawks to try and force Russia to keep negotiating, and he’s received a commitment for another meeting with Putin for his trouble (more on that later). He has now, for the time being, shelved the Tomahawk plan, commenting that “we need them” and applying the usual Trumpian linguistic style to the broadly accepted issue of inventories which I have outlined here. Tomahawks are simply more valuable to the United States as a tool to threaten escalation, rather than as an actual kinetic asset in Ukrainian hands, and so long as Trump keeps his powder dry he can re-raise the issue later.

    Ultimately, perhaps, this discussion is not about Tomahawks at all. These missiles, rather, are simply a totem which demonstrate two important dovetailing points. First, that American resources are not infinite, and as the United States reaches deeper into its bag to help Ukraine, it begins to grab at strategically critical assets that the US military simply cannot spare. Secondly, we must remember that America’s policy in Ukraine is a game of titration, with Washington probing the limits of Russia’s willingness to “eat the strikes” without allowing the reprisal violence to spill out of Ukraine.

    The Big Banana: Russia’s Operational Schema

    At this point, it’s becoming increasingly difficult to say anything meaningful about the actual operational progression on the ground. There are several reasons for this. First and foremost, the war has now gone on so long and is consistently moving at such an apparently glacial pace that most people simply do not care at this point whether Russia holds Yampil or not, or whether they have advanced past the rail line in Pokrovsk. There is severe fatigue (or perhaps boredom is the better word) with the status of an interminable sequence of apparently small settlements, industrial complexes, and forestry plantations, and as a result most people have essentially checked out. Not the least among these must surely be President Trump, who apparently chucked Zelensky’s map of the frontline and complained that he was tired of being shown the same maps over and over again.

    On the other hand, we have the true obsessives who continue to dutifully follow the frontlines regularly and are voluntarily intaking daily updates. We end up with a bifurcated system where some people are still highly plugged in to the micro movements on the battlefield, but most people just don’t care, and we can hardly blame the latter. I think it would be profitable, then, to think about the broader Russian operational scheme, what it has achieved, and what it aims to achieve in the coming year. This is probably more interesting and less repetitious than fixating on the exact positioning within Pokrovsk or Kupyansk.

    There are two larger points that I think are worth making before we look at some specifics.

    First and foremost, much of the battlefield analysis that comes out (particularly from western analysts) makes firm pronouncements as to what constitutes Russia’s “primary” and “secondary” efforts, but these are essentially interpolated and frequently incorrect. For example, it’s become a fairly mainstream conception that Russia’s “primary” point of effort right now is the capture of Pokrovsk, but this does not actually seem supported by Russian actions. There is no particular advantage to be gained for Russia by pushing to capture Pokrovsk as soon as possible – the city is already in a stranglehold partial encirclement. To be sure, Pokrovsk *was* a major logistic hub for Ukrainian forces, but it can no longer serve that role and was sterilized as a transit hub months ago, once it became a frontline city. The opposite side of this coin is that other Russian axes of advance, particularly in southern Donetsk and the bend of the Donets River, are dismissed as “secondary” efforts. This is a major mistake, and I will attempt to show that these are critical advances where Russia is shaping the battlefield to its advantage for follow on operations.

    Secondly, it should be understood and appreciated that Ukraine has lost essentially all battlefield initiative. In 2024, the AFU was able to assembled a mechanized reserve and launch their operation into Kursk. This operation ultimately failed and resulted in severe Ukrainian losses, but this is unrelated to the fact that Ukraine was still able to accumulate forces and pursue offensive operations on its own initiative. In 2025, however, Ukraine has been in a permanent state of reactivity. This was the first year of the war in which Ukraine did not launch any proactive operations or counteroffensives of its own, and Ukrainian hopes have instead pivoted to their strategic strike campaign against Russian oil facilities.

    In a larger sense, the effect of attrition can be seen year by year with the shrinking scope of Ukraine’s proactive operations. In 2022, Ukraine was able to launch a pair of widely separated offensives which yielded modest successes: an offensive out of Kharkov rolled the front back over the Oskil River (though it failed to collapse the Lugansk shoulder), meanwhile, a series of battles outside of Kherson failed to break through the Russian lines, but they did play a role in persuading the Russians to abandon their bridgehead over the Dnieper. The point of course is not to once again autopsy these offensives, but to point out that there were two of them, that they were meaningful in scale, and they did result in important territorial gains for Ukraine. In 2023, by contrast, Ukraine launched a single theater-level offensive in the south, which failed. In 2024, we got the Kursk operation: smaller and less lavishly equipped than 2023’s Zaoprizhia offensive, and aimed at a peripheral theater. This year, there were no proactive Ukrainian operations at all. There is a very clear pattern at play here, with Ukraine’s offensive punch progressively shrinking before disappearing entirely in 2025. This was a year of essentially uninterrupted Russian initiative

    Putting Ukraine permanently on the backfoot is a significant Russian achievement, and it is owed to a few converging factors. Obviously, the attrition of Ukrainian forces is a major factor. We’ve gone through the flailing Ukrainian mobilization, the cannibalization of its forces, and the general lack of reserves in detail on several occasions, and there’s no need to retread that ground here. Suffice it to say, Ukraine’s ability to husband forces for offensive operations appears to be severely degraded. Russia has exacerbated this problem by pressing steadily on a variety of different axes. At the moment, there are no fewer than seven Russian axes of attack, pressuring a slew of cities all along the line. This creates a series of defensive emergencies, maintains the burn rate on Ukrainian forces, and fixes them on the line. Finally, in a point to be detailed shortly, Russian advances have begun unraveling Ukraine’s logistic connectivity, which puts strain on supply and prevents the concentration and accumulation of forces

    Eastern Ukraine: Approximate Situation and Axes of Russian Advance

    Now, for the development of the front and the premise of the Russian offensive scheme. The main point that I want to impress is essentially as follows: rather than fixating on Pokrovsk, Russia’s advances across Southern Donetsk and on the inner bend of the Donets River ought to be thought of as vital operations which have severely disrupted the coherence of both the Ukrainian front and their logistics. This has the triple effect of preventing the Ukrainians from launching offensives of their own, accelerating the attrition of Ukrainian forces, and shaping the front for the coming operation to capture the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration.

    To begin, let’s consider the progress that Russia has made in southern Donetsk, both in raw territorial terms and its implications for Ukrainian logistic connectivity. To demonstrate this, I’ve pulled maps from DeepState (again, a Ukrainian mapping enterprise) for August 2023 (when Ukraine was attempting its counterattack out of Orikhiv) and for October 20th, the week of this writing. I have noted both the length of the southern front (obviously a linear approximate, as the actual front has many bends and bulges) and highlighted the key highways that Ukraine uses to run the backbone of its logistics

    The Southern Front: 2023 vs 2025

    Now, one thing that is worth noting is that the Russians are currently positioned to roll up this front even further. Ukrainian defensive lines are primarily oriented towards on a north-south axis. Once Russian forces cleared Kurakhove, they entered the seams in these defensive lines – that is to say, they are advancing laterally along the face of the prepared defenses, rather than trying to bash through them from the front. This is one reason why their progress has been relatively steady and uninterrupted. Now approaching the “elbow” in the lines, where they pivot southward, and having crossed the Yanchur River, the Russians are entering a substantial space that lacks meaningful prepared defenses. Using the Military Summary map (Ukrainian fortifications are mapped with yellow dots), the void in the defense is fairly obvious as the Russians work their way into the elbow of the line

    Apart from the obvious development of note here – that Russian forces have, to this point, rolled up roughly half the length of the southern front and are positioned to roll up another ten to fifteen miles – we want to note two things which are emblematic of the way the war is going for Ukraine, but curiously receive little attention. First, the compression of the front is robbing the Ukrainians of the maneuver space which made it possible for them to stage and assemble forces for their counteroffensive in 2023. Two years ago, there was a wide, lateral buffer zone around the Ukrainian staging area in Orikhiv, and Ukrainian forces had access to multiple highways where they could disperse forces in their marching columns and run their logistics.

    Today, that buffer zone is gone, as is the easy access to several of the branch highways. The Russian advance, which started with the breakthrough at Ugledar and Kurakhove last year and which has now rolled up some 50 miles of front, has essentially sterilized Ukraine’s capacity to attack in the south, because they have neither the space nor the roads to safely accumulate forces here. It has also shattered the interconnectivity of Ukrainian logistics: rather than having several highways to shuttle troops and material to the east, Ukraine now has to support several disconnected logistic fronts with individual highways. More to the point, there is no longer a single Donetsk “front” to speak of, but rather a series of logistic fronts: one in the south, around Orikhiv, another at Pokrovsk, and the largest one in the Slovyansk Banana. These are lacking lateral connectivity to each other for the Ukrainians due to the wedges that the Russians have forced in the front, particularly in the south, funneling logistics and reinforcements down individuated corridors.

    The bigger issue, however, lies farther north on the Pokrovsk and Donets axes, and in the way that they synergize. People who are focusing, to the exclusion of all else, on when and how Russia will capture Pokrovsk are failing to see the bigger picture, and indeed are not even trying to understand it.

    The ultimate Russian operational objective (in this phase of the war, at least) is the belt of cities which runs in an arc from Slovyansk to Kostyantinivka, which I affectionately call “the Slovyansk Banana” due to its curved shape. A cursory look at the map shows us why the very operations that are being dismissed as secondary efforts are in fact critical axes of Russian effort which are shaping the battlefield for the attack on the Banana

    There are two very important facts about the Banana, from the perspective of operational geography. The first is that, although the combined mass of the agglomeration is far larger than any of the urban areas that have been fought over to this point, the Banana is relatively difficult to defend because it sits on the floor of a river valley: the Kazennyi Torets flows through all the cities in the Banana before it flows into the Donets. Russian forces approaching the city from the southwest, the east, and the north will all be advancing along the high ground that overlooks the cities on the floor.

    The second important fact about the Banana is that, despite its size, it is supported by just two highways which approach from the southwest and northwest respectively, funneling into the Banana like a wedge. Taking the northern highway/MSR (the E40 highway) as an example, we see that Russia’s operations inside the Donets bend are hardly secondary efforts: they are vital shaping operations linked to the integrity of the Banana. The E40 highway tracks the Donets bend very closely (it generally stays within five miles of the river. If the Russians sustain their progress north of the Donets and reach the river at Bogorodychne or Svyatogirsk, it will not only put E40 under persistent drone attack but also curl the defensive line behind the Banana, to say nothing of the enormous pressure on the Siversk salient.

    On the Pokrovsk front as well, Russia’s progress is being misinterpreted. After their breakthrough at the end of the summer, Russian forces have consolidated the bulge north of Pokrovsk (despite weeks of Ukrainian counterattacks) and are steadily working their way towards Rais’ke and Sergiivka. This is not about Pokrovsk at all – reaching Rais’ke would put Russian forces directly in the backfield of Kostyantinivka, on the supply lines to the underside of the Banana.

    I am not suggesting at all that Russian forces are on the verge of some great offensive surge that will carry them into the heart of the Banana instantly. However, there is a fairly well established Russian operational methodology in this war, which involves working their way methodically into Ukraine’s logistical lanes and seams, segmenting the front and strangulating their strongpoints, forcing them to supply frontline strongholds with single file logistics and dirt roads. They did it in Bakhmut, and Avdiivka, they are doing it in Pokrovsk, and they are shaping the front to attempt this on a large scale in the Banana

    Assault on the Banana: Coming 2026

    The general point that we are trying to make here is that dismissing Russian advances in the Serebryanka Forest, the emerging bulge north of Pokrovsk, and their move into the Donets Bend as “secondary efforts” is mistaken. Zooming out to the appropriate scale shows that these are concentric operations, shaping the front for a 2026 assault on the Banana – moving towards the E40 road from the north, bending the defensive shield around Siversk, and working into the underbelly of the Banana through Rais’ke.

    This is, perhaps, a long way to go for a short drink of water, but there are a few basic points here that get completely missed when the view of the front is preoccupied with the fighting inside Pokrovsk and Kupyansk:

    1. Russia’s advance out of Kurakhove across the southern front is not a secondary axis. They have rolled up half of the southern front, condensing Ukrainian forces into a compact space which sterilizes their ability to attack in the south.
    2. Broad Russian pressure across a half-dozen axes maintained a steady burn rate on Ukrainian forces and prevented the accumulation of forces for proactive operations. 2025 has been the first year of the war in which Ukraine has not launched any offensive operations on its own initiative.
    3. Advances in the Donets bend and the interstitial space between Pokrovsk and Kostyantinivka are not subsidiary or secondary operations: they are critical shaping operations that are moving concentrically toward the Banana.

    To be frank, the general mood of optimism in the Ukrainian infosphere, which lasted for much of the summer, struck me as remarkably odd. The frontline has yielded no real good news for Ukraine at any point this year. Beyond the broader strategic point, that Ukraine has lost the initiative and does not seem capable of getting it back, Russia is in the process of capturing two important urban centers (Russian troops are in the city centers of Pokrovsk and Kupyansk), it has begun the assault on at leas two more (Lyman and Kostyantinivka), it has rolled up half of the southern front, and cleared most of the inner Donets-Oskil bend. The Banana is on deck for 2026.

    Ukraine’s Cost Theory of Victory

    One thing that has become apparent over the last year is that Kiev has abandoned previous notions of outright victory on the battlefield and adopted a new strategic framework predicated on imposing unacceptable costs on Russia, so that Moscow will agree to freeze the conflict.

    This is a subtle and unspoken yet extremely important distinction. It is easy to miss, because both Ukrainian leadership and Ukraine’s western backers continue to speak of Ukrainian “victory” and the possibility of Ukraine “winning” the war. What is crucial to understand is that the “victory” that they speak of now is categorically different than the victory of 2022 and 2023. In the first years of the war, it was possible to at least speak of Ukraine taking the initiative to advance on the ground and retake territory. There were concrete examples of Ukrainian offensives in 2022, and the battle in Zaporizhia – although unsuccessful – showed that it was at least possible for Ukraine to attempt a proper mechanized offensive.

    Therefore, in the first years of the war, when leaders in Kiev and Brussels and London and Washington spoke of Ukrainian victory, they essentially meant the defeat of the Russian ground forces and the reconquest of much (or all) of the Donbas. The Kursk Operation of 2024 began to split the difference: Ukraine still had some resources to mount proactive operations, but these operations were no longer aimed at the dense eastern front and instead aimed at relatively soft subsidiary fronts with an eye to out-levering the Russians.

    Today, with the Ukrainian army stuck in a permanent state of reactivity and slowly receding defense, it no longer makes any sense to speak of Ukrainian victory in the most straightforward sense, which is to say victory on the battlefield – no matter how tenaciously or bravely the Ukrainian rank and file continues to fight in essentially intolerable circumstances. Instead, Ukrainian “victory” has been transmogrified to mean essentially that Russia absorbs such exorbitant costs that it agrees to some sort of ceasefire without preconditions.

    The costs to be imposed on Russia are implicitly assumed to be a mixture of battlefield casualties and damage to strategic assets inflicted by Ukrainian air strikes, and in regards to the latter Ukraine seems to be particularly placing its hopes in a strategic strike campaign against Russian oil. Ukraine’s attempts to disable Russian oil production and refining have dovetailed with ever more aggressive sanctions from the United States against Russian fossil fuel exports – although it is worth noting that the limited price response to these sanctions indicates that markets expect that Russian oil will continue to flow.

    Trump’s suggestion that Tomahawks may be on the table for Ukraine must be seen as a constituent element of this new strategy and theory of victory. And this, ultimately, is very important to understand. Tomahawks are not being bandied about because anybody (in Kiev or Washington) believes that 50 cruise missiles will allow Ukraine to defeat the Russian Army and recapture the Donbas. Tomahawks were mentioned because the Ukrainian alliance is threatening to cripple the Russian fossil fuels industry (through a mixture of sanctions and kinetic strikes on production facilities) unless Putin agrees to a ceasefire.

    This is why it is wrong to be surprised that Trump abruptly cancelled his meeting with Putin and instead announced more sanctions. There’s nothing abrupt or erratic about this. Threats to Russian oil are now, without exaggeration, the main lever that the Ukrainian bloc has against Russia. It certainly should not have been a surprise that the Kremlin, which has reiterated the same fundamental war aims since day one, was not excited about coming to Budapest to freeze the conflict, and neither should it surprise us that Trump would instead prefer to pull harder on the oil lever. The two powers are playing entirely different games: Russia is slow-walking negotiations while it advances on the ground, and the United States is playing a pain game designed to raise the costs for Russia

    We have fundamentally reached an impasse when it comes to negotiations. For Moscow, negotiations with the United States are essentially a way to string Washington along. Moscow feels that it is winning on the ground, therefore a diplomatic impasse suits Russian interests. When western leadership complains that Russia does not seem interested in ending the war, they are correct, but they are missing the point. Russia is not interested in ending the war right now because doing so would not serve Russian interests. The Banana is in the crosshairs, and a ceasefire now would be an egregious compromise when victory on the ground is in sight.

    The sense of urgency that Washington feels to end the war – mainly by yanking furiously on the oil lever until the Kremlin cries uncle – stems from the fact that this is now the only sort of victory that Ukraine can hope to win. The ground war has been written off as a total loss, and all that remains is to lob missiles and drones at Russian refineries, sanction Russian firms and banks, and harass shadow tankers until the costs become intolerable. The longer the Ukrainian ground forces can hold the line the better, but this is merely a matter of limiting the downside. The fact that Russia can retaliate disproportionately against Ukraine barely factors into this thinking.

    The key point here, however, is that the concept of Ukrainian victory has been completely transformed. There is now no real discussion of how Ukraine can win on the ground. For the Ukrainian bloc, the war is no longer a contest against the Russian Army, but a more abstract contest against Russia’s willingness to incur strategic costs. Rather than preventing Russian capture of the Donbas, the west is testing how much Putin is willing to pay for it. If history is any guide, a game predicated on outlasting Russia’s strategic endurance and willingness to fight is a very bad game to play indeed [end]

    The original article

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    Gradually, and then Suddenly

  • [Translation] Ukraine, nationalism, Nazism and the threat that Europe does not see – Andrea Lucidi, International Reporters

    The word Nazism has returned to circulate with an impressive frequency, along with fascism and neo-fascism or neo-Nazism. No longer just as a historical concept, but as a political label. For most people that is meaning absolute evil, violence, fanaticism. Yet Nazism is not just an insult: it is a precise ideology, which focuses on authoritarianism, racial supremacy and violence.

    Watching Ukraine, several observers have been telling for years a disturbing reality: there are numerous radical groups which do not just recall symbols of fascism, but are making it their own political belief. They are not marginal formations. They have voice and influence, they are armed and they are conditioning the choices of the government. Just remind how Zelensky, newly elected, spoke of peace in the Donbass: within a few months his line changed radically, abandoning any intention of compromise.

    The issue is not just ideological. Some neo-Nazi groups are integral part of the Ukrainian armed forces. The most famous case is Azov battalion, turned into a brigade and framed in the regular army. That means that radicalized, armed and trained people today have official recognition. With a clear risk: these men could tomorrow forge closer ties with European neo-Nazi and neo-fascist movements, offering training and contacts to organizations such as Blood and Honor or C18.

    Meanwhile, the conflict with Russia has done the rest. Violence is glorified, the enemy has become a totem to bring down, the radical positions have strengthened. What will happen when the war will end? It will end sooner or later. Then, the rhetorical issue will remain: how to defuse a language that has accompanied years of blood and destruction?

    Russians and Ukrainians have always shared historical, cultural and family ties. Today however, talking about brotherhood is dividing. Some are desiring peace, others are regarding these ties as a myth without foundation and an offense. The years of war have dug deep wounds, with thousands of dead and millions of broken lives. Yet, history knows unexpected reconciliations: France and Germany after the Second World War, for example. It means that a road to peace exists, but it is not easy: it requires honesty, forgiveness and dialogue.

    The present, however, is going in the opposite way. In Ukraine, radical nationalism and desire for revenge are growing. Behind the neo-Nazi slogans, there is not only patriotism: there is the risk of a society increasingly pushed towards revanchism.

    That is not just about Kiev. Contagion could come to Europe. That is not a fudged alarm: signals are already visible. In France, Germany, Hungary and the Netherlands, far-right movements are growing. They are succeeding by riding real problems: immigration, economic crisis, distrust of governments. They are also feeding on the propaganda coming from Ukraine, on a nationalism which has found its legitimacy in war.

    The threat is double: Europe is not only importing refugees, but also violent ideologies and members of existent radical networks. A Europe fighting against an enemy which it has funded.

    The conclusion leaves no room for optimism. The current political situation is producing conditions for a new wider clash, which could affect almost all European countries. That is preventable, but if the rhetoric continues to grow and nationalism to take root, the continent really risks seeing again ghosts that it thought buried with the history of the twentieth century.

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  • [Sharing] On European imperialism – Events in Ukraine

    EU responsibility and hypocrisy. The angry, betrayed Ukrainians. Update on the forever war

    At the start of the year, I had some hope that the war might really come to an end. Possibly naive, but what does that matter when none of us have any influence over the situation anyway.

    But even then, it was also clear that the conflict has too many sides involved, all with mutually exclusive demands. Now, the fact that the war will continue much longer seems certain. Ukrainian military commander Officer wrote this on September 15:

    Lately, I feel like a total traitor-fuck, because I’ve been writing very little good news on the channel, really very little—so much so that some commanders have started whispering that Officer is actually a Russian psyop. Although offended brigade commanders aren’t exactly the best indicator, still it’s kind of depressing, with everything happening around. In the air there’s a sense of a prolonged war and the potential for brutal beatings in the near future

    European hypocrisy

    So why is the war so intractable?

    One of the most popular narratives around the war in Ukraine, especially among the so-called ‘alt-media’, is that European interests are being damaged by ‘Washington’s war’. There is no arguing with the fact that the war has been good for American energy exports and bad for European price levels and industry

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    European struggles are slowing the global industrial upturn | Oxford  Economics
    a line chart showing the Evolution of EU's value of sold industrial production from 2014 to 2024. For more details please use the link to the source dataset code below the image.

    However, it isn’t just about American energy. 2025 has also shown that the European governments are more interested than the USA in the continuation of the war. It is European leaders that have tried desperately to maintain the frayed relations between Zelensky and Trump, it is European leaders that have agreed to all forms of humiliation by the White House on condition that it continues military shipments to Kyiv

    Europe, without success in the game of Trump and Putin

    Clearly, Europe is not merely a puppet of the US. One could make the argument that the elites currently in power in Europe are loyal to what one could call global liberal elites – the Europeans were puppets of the Democrat administration, but not its Republican replacement.

    However, personally, I don’t particularly like this concept. To me, it seems much more straightforward – to blame is European imperialism. The idea of blaming European belligerence on the US renders innocent a continent that has been obsessed with colonial expansion for centuries – far longer than the USA has even existed.

    Today, Europe is stagnating. Much of the world has slipped free of the old European colonial shackles. What was for centuries a ‘jungle’ of prosperity is now being forced to compete on the free market with countries that produce the same or better products for lower prices

    Terrified by such global transformations, no wonder the Europeans have latched onto their oldest tradition – conquering the east. Back in the medieval times, the Teutonic Order ravaged the Slavic east. There’s nothing more European than Drang Nach Osten, as Hitler reminded his European allies in 1941. Tens of thousands of Europeans volunteered in various fascist units to aid in Operation Barbarossa – France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and many other countries had their own SS divisions

    Drang Nach Osten! | My Board Game Library

    Hitler was convinced that Germany, kept out of Asia and Africa by the stronger colonial powers, had no option other than to focus on the Soviet Union. Today, all of Europe faces the same dilemma. Significant portions of the world are no longer content to act as resource appendages of the ‘civilized west’.

    Sure, China’s growth also offers a number of opportunities to Europe. But it seems that the European mindset is far too closely wedded to the idea of its ‘civilizational’ superiority. Equality is out of the question.

    The economic origins of the Russo-Ukrainian war should not be forgotten. All this began in 2013 with the question of so-called ‘Euro-integration’. Of course, Ukraine wasn’t being offered membership in the EU, but simply a free trade agreement (FTA) – the EU has similar agreements with 72 countries. Most of the operative agreements are are with poor countries, like Ukraine

    EU Trade Agreements 2023

    The agreement Ukraine eventually signed in 2016, like the EU’s other FTAs, is highly exploitative. I covered its deleterious effects in detail in this series of articles. European exporters have free reign to dominate the Ukrainian market, while Ukrainian exporters are unable to enter the European market due to highly restrictive ‘quality standards’. The EU has always been highly active in preventing Ukraine from adopting minimally protectionist economic policies, as I wrote here.

    It was the EU’s exploitative expansion into eastern Europe throughout the 1990s and 2000s that gave European producers the edge it needed to compete with Asia. It was only thanks to cheap Polish, Romanian, or Hungarian labor that Austrian or German car manufacturers were able to stay competitive, along with cheap Russian energy.

    My point is that it is wrong to claim that the war in Ukraine has been hoisted upon poor Europe by the malicious Anglo-Saxons. Certainly, I won’t dispute the nefarious intentions of the latter. But the Europeans have their own reasons.

    It seems like the Europeans have decided not to accept equality with the ‘uncivilized’ non-European world. Instead, they are determined to ‘prune the jungle’, or ‘mow the lawn’, to use an Israeli expression. Hence their furious support for both Ukraine and Israel.

    Instead of trade, Europe has chosen to stake its economic future on war. 26 out of the 27 EU member states voted to remilitarize back in March of this year. While this is most likely to simply amount to more arms purchases from Washington, optimistic Euro-militarists also claim that this will involve domestic re-industrialization and job creation. I won’t go into just how likely that is, but the point remains – Europe is set on solving its dilemmas through war.

    It’s worth taking a step back in time to appreciate European culpability.

    Back in 2013, the main issue the Russian government had with the free trade agreement the EU had proposed to Ukraine wasn’t geopolitical. It was quite mercantile. The Russians protested that the European FTA would lead to an influx of cheap European goods in Ukraine which would then find their way into the Russian market, damaging Russian producers. Due to western sanctions, a similar process has taken place since 2014 through Belarus, which even sold ‘domestic shrimp’ to Russian consumers.

    In late 2013, Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych proposed trilateral negotiations involving Ukraine, Russia, and the EU. But the Europeans rejected the idea. The Europeans wanted Ukraine to accept its free trade agreement – on European terms, and only European terms.

    Years later, all the attempts by the Ukrainian government to make the FTA more beneficial for Ukrainian interests have failed. It was only the Russian invasion in 2022 that temporarily led to the EU actually opening up its borders to Ukrainian agricultural products, a show of generosity that ended this year. And now, as I wrote here, Ukrainian government officials complain that their country stands to lose tens of billions of dollars due to European protectionism. Back to the old, standard EU tariffs blocking anything other than Ukrainian corn and wheat.

    So much for Ukraine being the dearest ally of Europe. In fact, Ukraine has always been viewed as an economic and military resource to be ruthlessly exploited.

    Stilted lovers

    Ukrainian nationalists have always seen their war with Russia as a ‘war for Europe’. Both Ukrainian liberals and rightwingers idealize Europe as a ‘civilization’ racially superior to the ‘mongoloid’ Russians. Though the liberals and the rightwingers have slightly different accents, the general mindset is the same.

    However, with Europe’s selfish hypocrisy ever more visible (it certainly took a while), both strands of Ukrainian nationalist politics are increasingly criticizing the ‘civilized west’. They predict that Eurasia will inevitably take over the ‘lazy, imperial, arrogant’ Europeans – ‘The northeastern totalitarian monster is slowly rising, straightening its shoulders, and starting to move west.’

    Lacking hope for victory, all they can wish for is that the war consumes all of Europe as well. Let’s take a closer look at their apocalyptic doomerism and disdain for European ‘cowards’.

    Later on in today’s article, I’ll also take a look at the latest grim frontline updates – Ukrainian soldiers and analysts are pointing out the reality disproving positive official statements regarding the Lyman, Dobropillia, and Dnepropetrovsk frontlines. As it turns out, Ukrainian claims to have cut the Russian Dobropillia salient in two don’t reflect reality. Particularly interesting is the rapidly developing situation around the village of Yampil, where Russian forces have leaped through porous Ukrainian defensive lines and continue to stay, despite official Ukrainian claims otherwise […]

    The complete article

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