Analista senior di l'intelligenza in u campu di a gestione di i risichi di sicurezza, sò un anzianu tenente detective è ufficiale di l'intelligenza in l'agenzie di u Statu francese. A bona pronuncia hè Николай Чинкуини, in russu
se dit de gÔche, est en réalité social-démocrate et lit même L’Express. Il est aussi radical et s’emporte aussi facilement contre La France insoumise que contre la Russie. Je suis toujours ravi quand j’en attrape un. Au terme d’études à l’université Saint Joseph de Beyrouth puis l’Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques de Paris (IRIS), il décrocha en 2013 un master en géopolitique et relations internationales
(Russia Today)
Le 21 février 2019, sur le plateau de Russia Today, il se faisait appeler Damien Charles, quand il commenta les revendications sur Istrie et Dalmatie de l’Italien Antonio Tajani, alors président du Parlement européen
Le 13 octobre 2007, une statue est dévoilée à Lviv en l’honneur du criminel de guerre nazi Stepan Bandera (Yuri Gvozdovich)
Porteur en janvier 2026 de projets associatifs, le Parisien visita Lviv puis Dnipro. Sa sagacité sociale-démocrate ne lui permit cependant pas de distinguer les traces du fascisme dans le ventre toujours fécond du nazisme endémique ukrainien, car il s’intéresse surtout aux églises et à la nourriture
(Réseaux sociaux)
Il se militarise en mai, est affecté dans la région de Zaporojie au bataillon Iberia, qui réunit des volontaires internationaux. Son indicatif radio est Redouane. En octobre, il cherche une nouvelle affectation militaire.
chronique alphabétique et nécrologique de l’engagement français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas
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En 2025, une nouvelle unité de Français combattant pour l’Ukraine s’est structurée autour d’un noyau de néonazis, ayant pour objectif d’attirer des recrues. Parmi ces volontaires, d’anciens militaires. StreetPress les a identifiés
En Ukraine, les volontaires français pro-ukrainiens et pro-russes se partagent l’imaginaire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Les premiers se revendiquent des collabos de l’Allemagne nazie, les seconds de l’escadrille mythique « Normandie – Niémen »
deux jours après le 10e anniversaire de la débâcle politique et sécuritaire du 13 novembre 2015, une messe célèbre à Verdun l’ancien dirigeant fasciste de l’État français
ce 11 novembre 2025 est l’occasion de souligner comme la façon dont l’Europe sacrifie les conscrits ukrainiens mobilisés de force rappelle le spectaculaire carnage de la 1ère guerre mondiale
c’est par l’agence cosaque de presse PIKA, depuis la République populaire de Lougansk, que le 2 avril 2024, l’ataman Nikolaï Diakonov lance un message à destination de la France
ce papier est le premier des grands médias français qui s’attaque à la question des militants nazis français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, le nouveau danger qu’ils présenteront à terme pour la sûreté intérieure
où nous apprenons que le nazi français Allan Duchézeau, camarade de César Aujard dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, était surnommé Dox, quand il secondait à Paris le leader nazi Marc de Cacqueray Valménier
en Anglais, les indices de la présence d’opérateurs occidentaux, en particulier Français, pris au piège en mars 2022 à Marioupol, dont les forces russes achevèrent la libération en mai
est après Nicolas Sarkozy et François Hollande, le troisième gouverneur d’une France inféodée aux États-Unis et à leurs intérêts. Et en même temps, que ce soit l’expression de son arrogance ou une façon de séduire ses rares électeurs, il s’agite dans des efforts désespérés pour apparaître au dessus de ses moyens
ici à droite, avec Volodymyr Zelenskyy, le 16 juin 2022 à Kiev (Ludovic Marin / AFP)
Sa personnalité infantile, ses caprices, sa vacuité abyssale de politicien typique de l’Occident de ce début de troisième millénaire, de pur communicant, en font sans doute le personnage le moins intéressant de ce panthéon. Je retiens quand même de Macron qu’il tenta le 11 novembre 2018 de réhabiliter le dirigeant fasciste Philippe Pétain.
Compte tenu des qualités réelles de l’imposteur, il est heureux que la France soit aujourd’hui vassale des USA, qui au Niger ou en Ukraine, savent calmer d’un sifflet les rodomontades des autorités françaises. Car même les États-uniens sont plus compétents et moins nuisibles aux restes de l’humanité
Capture d’écran d’un film de l’armée française, qui montre le meurtre habituel d’un civil pendant la guerre de libération de l’Algérie (1954-1962)
Quand des pays comme l’Allemagne ou la France, avec leurs passifs historiques, ont l’insolence de prétendre défendre, comme des vierges de Delphes, la démocratie ou la liberté, les vastes restes du monde rigolent doucement. La décence la plus élémentaire exigerait plus d’humilité.
La dernière action indépendante et décente de la France sur la scène internationale fut pour le bien, en 2003, l’opposition de Jacques Chirac à l’invasion anglo-états-unienne de l’Irak
Sarkozy, il faut lui marcher dessus. Et du pied gauche, cela porte bonheur – Jacques Chirac, le 14 juillet 2004 (photo de Charles Platiau / Reuters)
Une invasion qui précéda la destruction en 2011 de la Libye (Sarkozy), cause de l’activité djihadiste au Sahel, le soutien à l’insurrection sunnite radicale contre le gouvernement laïc de Syrie (Hollande), que les Parisiens payèrent un vendredi, puis le coup d’État d’extrême-droite en Ukraine et la guerre au Donbass depuis 2014. Les Occidentaux sont devenus des fous furieux et les Français sont aujourd’hui parmi les pires
Tout vient à point qui sait attendre. Le 2 janvier 2023, ma récompense fut la lippe de Bruno Le Maire, qui de son plateau TV, contemplait une frappe russe contre des renforts atlantistes en République populaire de Donetsk. En mars 2022, le surintendant des finances voulait provoquer l’effondrement de l’économie russe. Mais ce sont les Français, qui deux ans plus tard, sont dilatés comme jamais
En juin 2023, déjà, la 12e brigade spéciale, émanation de l’organisation nazie Azov dans la garde nationale ukrainienne, employait au front l’obusier de 155 mm TRF1, prédécesseur dans l’armée française du CAESAR
En 1991, l’Union soviétique s’effondra et l’OTAN fut confrontée à une crise existentielle : sa raison d’être n’existait plus. Mais plutôt que de se démanteler, elle s’est donnée une nouvelle mission : s’étendre. Et dans une boucle autoréférentielle, l’expansion de l’OTAN créerait l’hostilité nécessaire pour se justifier
Et voila le résultat, la descente d’une prise de coke qui était censée apaiser les troubles anxieux de petits bourgeois froussards, que leur lâcheté fait aujourd’hui immoler des centaines de milliers d’Ukrainiens, enrôlés de force dans les troupes atlantistes. Les incantations sur la démocratie ou la liberté ne sont qu’une bouillie politiquement correcte, le colonialisme du XIXe siècle, qui déjà prétendait civiliser, passé au blender. La question se pose encore une fois : qui sont les barbares ?
Un peu d’humour biélorusse le 9 mars 2024
Le 30 mars 2024, deux vrais journalistes, Serge Halimi et Pierre Rimbert, décrivent enfin dans le Monde diplomatique ce qui se passe dans le microcosme politico-journalistique d’un pays qu’au tout début de ce troisième millénaire, la CIA classait déjà parmi les républiques bananières
Troupes françaises en Ukraine, une gaffe présidentielle sous escorte médiatique : les nouveaux chiens de guerre […] À la fin de l’hiver, les journalistes français se sont évertués à transformer une gaffe présidentielle en un joyau de l’analyse géopolitique […]
Le phénomène est paradoxal, mais plus La France rétrécit, plus elle se prend pour le centre du monde. Dans la réalité, le camp occidental a aussitôt rabroué le fanfaron, qui a donc raté sa brillante manoeuvre psychologique. Seule la presse bleu horizon ne le trouve pas ridicule et si l’armée française devait obéir à l’ordre absurde de s’engager seule en Ukraine, les survivants en reviendraient plus traumatisés que ceux de la Bérézina.
Alors que selon la rumeur, Macron serait sur le point d’officialiser la présence de militaires français sur le champ de bataille en Ukraine et au Donbass, le vice-président du Conseil italien, Matteo Salvini, écrit le 4 juin et illustre sur les réseaux sociaux
Je dirai à Macron : tu devrais aller en Ukraine pour te battre, mettre un casque et ne pas jouer avec les têtes des Italiens
Avec l’invitation de l’Allemagne depuis 2004 et maintenant celle de l’Ukraine, l’anniversaire du débarquement de Normandie est une vulgaire sauterie atlantiste, un spectacle cringe, qui fait de la peine pour les vétérans qui s’y prêtent encore. Par sa personnalité, Macron en accentue la vulgarité
Son mandat présidentiel échut le 19 mai et le comédien professionnel ukrainien harangue l’Assemblée nationale le 7 juin 2024 (Julien de Rosa / AFP)
Le spectacle de cabaret ne porte pas chance aux Playmobil et à leur brigadier Yaël Braun Pivet. L’Assemblée nationale est dissoute le 9 juin, à l’issue d’élections européennes qui sont une déroute pour Macron et tous ceux qui ont ovationné Zelenskyy
le 11 juin 2024 (The Times)
Le 9 octobre, il partage sur X une jolie vidéo de l’entraînement en France de militaires ukrainiens et commente
J’en avais pris l’engagement : nos militaires forment actuellement 2 300 soldats ukrainiens dans le Grand Est, avec des équipements qu’ils utiliseront en mission.
La brigade Anne de Kyiv sera formée et équipée grâce à la solidarité de la France
C’est sans doute Gabin Donnio Choupeaux, qui dans un entretien du mois de mars, a soufflé le nom de la brigade à la propagande bleu horizon. Bravo
Nous partageons une histoire commune avec Anne de Kiev, épouse de Henri Ier et reine des Francs de 1051 à 1060
(Captures d’écran)
En guise de référence, dans un souci de communication, une femme politique âgée d’environ 1000 ans est plus commode que beaucoup de personnages français ou ukrainiens de la 2de guerre mondiale. Mais le diable est dans les détails. Personne à la cour de sa Vacuité n’a remarqué l’écusson ? Porté notamment par un instructeur en tenue camouflée française, il reprend les couleurs rouge et noir, qui n’ont rien de nationales mais sont en Ukraine celles des nazis d’hier et d’aujourd’hui
Drapeau de l’organisation politique moderne Pravyi sektor [Secteur droit]
Il est l’insigne de la 155e brigade, formée en juin avec de nouveaux contingents de chair à canon ukrainienne. L’unité est d’infanterie ou mécanisée, l’histoire n’est pas encore catégorique sur ce point
Cela dépendra sans doute de la solidarité du contribuable français. Car comme disait autrefois l’État français, ils donnent leur sang, donnez votre travail
Anne de Kiev ou Eva Braun ? L’image a été découverte par des internautes polonais qui la partagent le 4 novembre et s’en offusquent à juste titre. Des stagiaires ukrainiens de la 155e brigade et probablement aussi leurs instructeurs français, tous en tenue camouflée française, posent dans l’automne champenois
Le groupe déploie un étendard qui ne reproduit pas l’insigne de la brigade, est une des multiples versions du drapeau que les nazis ukrainiens considèrent comme un emblème national. Les couleurs rouge et noir sont celles de l’Armée des insurgés (UPA), milice nazie ukrainienne qui entre 1943 et 1945, a massacré au moins 50 000, peut être 100 000 civils polonais. Coquetterie de cette version, le bien connu Reichsadler [aigle impérial] (cf. Sylvain Caupin), où le trident ukrainien a remplacé le swastika des nazis allemands de la 2de guerre mondiale.
À l’instar de l’ex premier ministre, le vraiment très jeune Gabriel Attal, le département commercial de la Misanthropic Division, confrérie nazie internationale, fondée et basée en Ukraine depuis 2013, célèbre le 19 novembre le 1000e jour de l’opération militaire spéciale russe, dernier chapitre d’une guerre qui fait rage au Donbass depuis 3830 jours, soit 10 ans, 5 mois et 24 jours
1000 days for blood & soil (Misanthropic Division)
Les nazis ukrainiens n’oublient pas la contribution française à leur cause. Leur collage comporte l’image d’un militant du GUD parisien et celle partagée le 4 par des internautes polonais, prise en Champagne par des stagiaires miltaires ukrainiens, qui aux frais de la princesse, déployèrent leur drapeau nazi
(Gabriel Attal)
Pour sa part, le petit Gabriel partage cette image sur X, où il clame en Ukrainien Сла́ва Украї́ні! Героям слава! [Gloire à l’Ukraine ! Gloire aux héros !]. Ses anciennes fonctions le dispensent d’ignorer que le slogan Gloire aux héros fut inauguré en avril 1941 par les fascistes de l’OUN (Organisation des nationalistes ukrainiens), alors implantés dans le Generalgouvernementfür die besetzten polnischen Gebiete [Gouvernement général des territoires polonais occupés].
J’ai la conviction que c’est en référence à des individus comme Jean-Noël Barrot que les Français sont qualifiés de grandes gueules puantes dans la littérature grecque contemporaine (captures d’écran antérieures)
Quel est le contexte des fanfaronnades du frais émoulu ministre des affaires étrangères de la Macronie ? En guise d’avertissement, au petit matin du 21 novembre, la Russie utilisa un missile balistique, pour cette fois à charge conventionnelle. La cible était une usine militaire à Dnipro, où la vidéosurveillance montre clairement les arrivées de six ogives distinctes
(Captures d’écran)
Dans une allocution en soirée, Vladimir Poutine précisa que le nouveau système d’armes est appelé Oreshnik [Noisette]. Le missile balistique hypersonique de portée intermédiaire (IRBM hypersonique) vole à une vitesse proche de Mach 10. Sa portée de 5 000 km le prédispose au traitement de cibles en Europe
(Voyennaya khronika)
Il ajouta
Nous nous considérons en droit d’utiliser nos armes contre les installations militaires des pays qui autorisent l’utilisation de leurs armes contre nos installations. Et en cas d’escalade des actions agressives, nous répondrons de manière décisive et en miroir
Le 30 octobre 1961, la Tsar Bomba était l’équivalent de 50 mégatonnes de TNT, soit environ 3000 Hiroshima. Une telle puissance correspond aujourd’hui à la charge militaire totale d’un missile balistique intercontinental (ICBM) Sarmat, en une douzaine de sous-munitions, environ 300 Hiroshima chacune (capture d’écran)
Que justifie les menaces russes de frappes nucléaires ? Depuis le déclenchement en 2014 des opérations militaires, contre les insurgés russophones du Donbass, d’un pouvoir ukrainien issu d’un coup d’État d’extrême-droite en février de cette année là, de façon encore plus évidente après le début en 2022 de l’opération militaire spéciale russe, les stratèges occidentaux voient la Russie comme une grenouille plongée dans une eau lentement portée à ébullition. L’escalade de leur guerre par procuration est graduelle, avec l’ambition illusoire de ne pas provoquer de réaction russe symétrique. Point particulier : elle est conduite aujourd’hui avec des armes que l’Ukraine ne pourrait pas employer en territoire russe sans le concours des satellites et techniciens de l’OTAN. C’est à cette escalade graduelle que répondent les menaces de frappes nucléaires. Non pas aux effets réels de quelques missiles tactiques dont la plupart sont abattus par la défense aérienne avant d’atteindre leur cibles en territoire russe. Car cette variable est essentielle à l’analyse de la situation : les tirs de ces munitions occidentales ne changeront pas le rapport de force et n’empêcheront pas la victoire militaire de la Russie.
Pourquoi ces tirs de missiles de l’OTAN ? Escalade graduelle donc. Mais encore ? Biden les autorisa moins de deux semaines après la victoire sans appel de Donald Trump et à deux mois de son retour à la Maison blanche. Envenimer la situation militaire pour saboter ou compliquer le règlement politique ultérieur du conflit ? C’est bien possible. L’inaliénable alliance historique entre les USA et le Royaume-Uni est une constante de l’équation. De surcroît, la russophobie épidermique et tout aussi historique des classes dirigeantes d’Albion explique aussi la position britannique.
Mais pourquoi cette posture française de supplétif doublé d’une mouche de coche ? Pour galvaniser la masse des innocents qui s’informent auprès de BFMTV, CNews ou LCI ? Sans doute, tant la communication est une préoccupation majeure des gouvernements de la Macronie. Pour satisfaire l’égo puéril d’Emmanuel Macron ? Je le crains, mais pas seulement
Humour russe le 20 novembre 2024
Les classes dirigeantes françaises sont épouvantées par l’effondrement de l’hégémonie occidentale, ce que la perte de la Françafrique pourrait coûter à l’économie française
Les tentacules étaient Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso et République centrafricaine (alarabblog.com, 2023)
Mais plus les Occidentaux et Français feront monter les enchères, sans pourtant empêcher la victoire russe en Ukraine ou les légitimes aspirations des Africains à leur libération, plus la défaite sera finalement humiliante et plus dure sera la chute.
Le drame est évoqué en public le 13 décembre 2024, par le journaliste ukrainien Iouri Butoussov. Le reconstituer dans son intégralité est une tâche aisée pour l’observateur chevronné.
Engagée en République populaire de Donetsk, soumise dans le secteur de Pokrovsk à l’étreinte puissante des forces russes, la brigade Frénégonde de Pouille [ou quelque chose comme ça] s’est désagrégée le 10 décembre. Au moins un millier d’hommes, près de la moitié de son effectif théorique total, sont partis en déroute et ont déserté
La bataille de Pavia est livrée le 24 février 1525 (Joachim Patinir). La victoire du Saint Empire romain germanique sanctionne la bêtise tactique du roi de France. Vaincu et prisonnier, François 1er écrit le lendemain à sa mère : tout est perdu, fors l’honneur
C’est aux frais de la princesse, que cette 155e brigade mécanisée avait été équipée de matériel français et entraînée en Champagne. Macron s’en vanta le 9 octobre sur les réseaux sociaux. Mais tout est perdu, même l’honneur.
Le 2 janvier 2025, pour boire le calice jusqu’à la lie, le Parisien nous rappelle la brigade Frénégonde de Pouille [ou quelque-chose comme ça], pour nous apprendre que le nombre de désertions s’élèverait alors à 1 700. Soit 74% d’un effectif total de 2 300, que j’ai pris la peine de relever en octobre. Et non pas 4 500, comme le quotidien cocardier le prétend, quand il relaie la propagande atlantiste. 4 500 est l’effectif moyen d’une brigade états-unienne, mais celles formées en Ukraine sont toujours de petits calibres.
L’article stimule ma curiosité et alors que le récit de ces déboires fait le tour des rédactions des vastes restes du monde, dont hilares, celles de la perfide Albion, une source peu suspecte de sympathie pour la Russie, Wikipedia, nous précise le 3 janvier que début décembre, le nombre de désertions s’élèvaient déjà à 1 883, dont 50 en France, soit 82% d’un effectif total de 2 300
Le 30 décembre 2024, les réseaux sociaux partagent la vidéo de la démilitarisation dans le même secteur d’un char à roues [presse bleu horizon] français AMX-10RC, en réalité, un viel engin blindé de reconnaissance (capture d’écran)
Comme nous le savions déjà, le reliquat a été engagé dans le secteur de Pokrovsk, République populaire de Donetsk, où il s’est fait étriller. La guerre tue, surtout les vaincus, c’est un peu le principe. Mais un animateur de foire comme Emmanuel Macron est si peu équipé pour en saisir le sens ou les vertus.
Le 17 février 2025, veille de l’ouverture en Arabie Saoudite de négociations entre Russie et États-Unis au sujet de l’Ukraine, il accueille à Paris une réunion impromptue de dirigeants européens qui s’opposent aux perspectives de paix favorisées par la victoire de Donald Trump. Leur hostilité à la fin de la guerre atlantiste par procuration en Ukraine est d’ailleurs la raison pour laquelle ces matamores européens ne sont pas invités à participer aux négociations entre les deux grandes puissances. Les États-uniens ont beau jeu de rappeler que France et Allemagne étaient censées garantir depuis 2014 le respect par l’Ukraine des accords de Minsk. La presse bleu horizon tâche de vanter l’événement, mais la réalité est sordide
L’image truquée d’Emmanuel Macron et de ses faux muscles, que sa photographe officielle publie sur les réseaux sociaux le 19 mars 2024 (Soazig de La Moissonnière)
Aussi peu performants en général ou populaires à domicile que Macron, le Britannique Keir Starmer et l’Allemand Olaf Scholz sont les vedettes de la réunion. Donald Tusk est aussi présent, mais la Pologne a déjà décidé de ne pas engager son armée en Ukraine. D’autres chefs d‘États et la bureaucrate teutonne Ursula von der Leyen complètent le tableau. Leur tactique immédiate consiste à quémander une participation européenne aux négociations et pour l’Ukraine, un accès à l’OTAN que Washington refuse déjà. Royaume-Uni et France clament leur volonté de déployer des troupes de maintien d’un éventuel cessez-le-feu mais ne disposent plus en volume d’armées capables de mener une telle opération.
Le même jour, le philosophe Harold Bernat publie un texte fort à propos, où il constate l’effondrement [intellectel] sidérant d’une bourgeoisie dont Emmanuel Macron est le héraut.
Un autre exemple spectaculaire de ce syndrome est une femme, également impliquée dans les méfaits de l’Europe en Ukraine : la ministre allemande des affaires étrangères Annalena Baerbock, qui a sidéré depuis 2022 par ses lacunes en géométrie et géographie. Toujours le 17 février, elle se montre incapable de garder un secret stratégique et révèle à la presse berlinoise le projet européen d’une nouvelle aide financière apportée à Volodymyr Zelenskyy et ses amis, pour un montant de 700 milliards d’euros.
Le 20 février, il se prête sur les réseaux sociaux à une conférence citoyenne au sujet de l’Ukraine. Son introduction est une farce, qui s’adresse à des demeurés, qui n’auraient pas suivi l’actualité et ne comprendraient rien à la géopolitique. Il commence par recyler tous les lieux communs de la propagande et désinformation atlantiste, les mensonges qui avec la nouvelle administration de Donald Trump, ont disparu dans la communication états-unienne
(Capture d’écran)
Le flot de questions sur les nombreuses plateformes est évidemment filtré par une équipe d’assistants, qui ignorent celles qui posent vraiment problème. J’en retiens deux qui resteront sans réponse, tout d’abord de Jacques [Baud, analyste stratégique suisse] et Aude [Lancelin, journaliste française]
Bonjour M Le Président. Question de Jacques de Genève et Aude de Paris. Pourquoi les européens ont ils empêché le président Zelensky, à 3 reprises au printemps 22, de signer un accord avec la Russie garantissant l’intégrité territoriale de l’Ukraine ?
puis la mienne
Bonjour,
votre stratégie d’engagement militaire français apparaît confuse, vos déclarations, contradictoires.
La possibilité semble se dégager du stationnement dans l’ouest du pays de militaires français qui permettraient à l’Ukraine, par translation, d’en envoyer autant au front.
Pensez vous que les Russes se dispenseront de mener des frappes stratégiques contres les militaires français stationnés en Ukraine ?
Pete Hegseth, Secrétaire à la défense US, précisa déjà le 12 février qu’engagées en Ukraine, les troupes européennes ne seraient pas couvertes par l’article 5 de l’OTAN.
Le 22 février, Donald Trump fait longuement patienter Andrzej Duda et ne lui accorde ensuite qu’une dizaine de minutes. Le président polonais est le premier d’un convoi de dirigeants européens qui se précipitent à Washington pour tenter d’infléchir la stratégie en Ukraine de la nouvelle administration US. Lorsqu’il s’adressa aux Français le 20, Emmanuel Macron se prévalut d’une familiarité qui devait lui permettre de faire la leçon à son homologue états-unien, de le convaincre de ne pas se montrer faible à l’égard de Vladimir Poutine
(Maison Blanche)
Comme l’illustrent ses traits tirés par la fatique sur la photographie prise à la Maison Blanche le 24 février, il n’obtient rien de Trump. Je suppose au contraire que ses fanfaronnades antérieures, ses familiarités à Washington et les questions de fond exaspèrent le président US, trois jours avant qu’à son tour, le Britannique Keir Starmer ne se prête à l’exercice
[…] on a des moyens de renseignement, dont nous faisons bénéficier les Ukrainiens […]
Dans la foulée de nouveaux mensonges et fanfaronnades télévisuels d’Emmanuel Macron, il cherche aussi à stimuler le sens civique de ses concitoyens
[…] placez votre argent de manière patriotique, pour financer la défense […]
On [qui est un con] pourrait aussi appeler cela la Banque de l’Indochine, ou… les Emprunts russes. L’inspecteur Clouseau s’en va t’en guerre
(Captures d’écran)
Pendant ce temps, le MEDEF (Mouvement des entreprises de France), qui ne perd pas le nord, la presse bleu horizon ou macroniste, distillent l’idée d’une retraite à 70 ans, qui serait justifiée par l’opportunité d’un effort militaire en soutien à l’Ukraine. Car en réalité, la seule démarche stratégique cohérente de Macron est très simple ; elle consiste à casser les acquis sociaux et imposer une société ultra libérale. Si personne ne peut vraiment le qualifier d’homme intelligent, il est cependant malin comme un singe
(L’Opinion le 6 mars 2025)
Il sait comment faire avaler des couleuvres. Son terrain est facile : il flatte la vanité nationale des Français. Le philosophe allemand Arthur Schoppenhauer (1788-1860) énonça avant 1851
La fierté nationale est la forme la moins coûteuse de fierté. Si un homme est fier de sa nation, cela signifie qu’il n’a aucune qualité dont il puisse être fier. Autrement, il ne pourrait pas faire appel à celles qu’il partage avec des millions de ses concitoyens. L’homme qui possède des qualités personnelles importantes ne verra que trop bien dans quels domaines sa propre nation est déficiente, car ses défauts seront constamment sous ses yeux. Mais tout misérable imbécile qui n’a rien dont il puisse être fier, adopte en dernier recours la fierté de la nation à laquelle il appartient ; il est prêt et heureux de défendre bec et ongles tous les défauts et les folies de la nation, se dédommageant ainsi de sa propre infériorité
Les derniers événements permettent de clarifier la subordination d’Emmanuel Macron. Il n’est pas fidèle aux autorités légales des États-Unis, puisqu’il s’oppose à l’administration de Donald Trump, qui accomplit une inflexion stratégique majeure, quand Joe Biden et Européens étaient au diapason. Il s’affirme plutôt comme l’hériter d’un François Hollande, qui alors Premier secrétaire du Parti socialiste, protestait contre l’opposition de Jacques Chirac à l’invasion anglo-états-unienne de l’Irak en 2003 et faisait des ronds de jambes à l’ambassade parisienne de l’administration de George W Bush.
Il ne défend pas non plus les intérêts des Français, puisqu’il a besoin de leur mentir de façon grotesque, quand il prétend qu’après l’Ukraine, la Russie pourrait attaquer d’autres pays. L’idée est farfelue, car une telle agressivité déclencherait l’article 5 de l’OTAN. Leur ment quand il prétend que la Russie n’aurait pas respecté les accords de Minsk, alors que c’était évidemment l’Ukraine qui ne les a pas appliqués et le même François Hollande qui mentait, quand il prétendait les garantir. Lui-même et Angela Merkel reconnurent fin 2022 et début 2023 que dans leur esprit, ces accords étaient une escroquerie pour tromper la Russie, devaient donner à l’OTAN le temps d’armer l’Ukraine. Non, Macron n’est pas un aigle, mais même lui ne peut croire de telles sornettes
Angela Merkel et François Hollande se montrent au carnaval de Düsseldorf le 3 mars 2014 (Martin Meissner/AP)
Alors de quoi est il le nom ? Comme le montre aussi sa politique intérieure et à l’instar du social-démocrate Keir Starmer comme de la droitarde Ursula von der Leyen, il apparaît comme le soldat d’une collusion puissante entre ploutocrates européens et néoconservateurs US, plus sournois quand ils appartiennent au Parti démocrate. Trump bouleverse des décennies de politique étrangère des États-Unis et Macron est le caniche de von der Leyen. Sa relation aux femmes plus âgées est compliquée.
Le 23 avril 2025, les divas européennes sabotent les négociations de paix en Ukraine. Ce jour là à Londres, une réunion est prévue entre pays occidentaux. Mais au dernier moment, Volodymyr Zelenskyy prévient par voie de presse qu’il refuse d’accepter la perte de la Crimée, pourtant un moindre mal, vu la situation militaire. Par conséquent, le Secrétaire d’État Marco Rubio se décommande, ce qui annule aussi la participation des ministres européens des affaires étrangères.
Quel âme damnée a bien pu inspirer le comédien ukrainien ? Alors en visite à Madagascar, dans la foulée de la colonie de Mayotte, le porte parole d’Ursula von der Leyen le fait savoir dans la journée par l’Élysée
L’intégrité territoriale et la vocation européenne de l’Ukraine sont des exigences très fortes des Européens
Alors que son Envoyé spécial Keith Kellogg se rendra à Moscou dans la semaine, Donald Trump écrit sur les réseaux sociaux
[…] La situation de l’Ukraine est désastreuse. Il [Zelenskyy] peut obtenir la paix ou se battre pendant trois ans de plus, avant de perdre tout le pays […]
Difficile de mieux résumer la situation militaire, qui par tradition bien ancrée dans une guerre, dicte le sens des négociations de paix. Son opposition dogmatique à la paix et son incapacité à accepter la réalité du terrain illustrent à quel point la corrompue Union européenne n’est plus aujourd’hui que l’automate des illuminés de l’État profond néoconservateur US. Je suis très optimiste car convaincu qu’elle le paiera cher.
Emmanuel Macron subit à nouveau une spectaculaire humiliation diplomatique au cours du weekend des 10 et 11 mai 2025. Ses partenaires l’ont déjà adoubé héraut de l’Europe, alors qu’à défaut de l’estomac nécessaire pour mener à terme ses projets pacifiques en Ukraine, Donald Trump se désintéresse désormais du sujet. En conséquence, la Russie envisage la possibilité d’adapter sa stratégie, de résoudre le conflit en moins de deux mois, par une campagne décisive de frappes qui liquiderait les dirigeants ukrainiens et détruirait en totalité les infrastructures critiques de l’Ukraine
Un humoriste russe a immortalisé l’événement, Emmanuel Macron est adoubé représentant de l’Europe : voici de gauche à droite Kaja Kallas, Ursula von der Leyen, Keir Starmer et Emmanuel Macron
Volodymyr Zelenskyy et les Européens commencent par proposer un cessez le feu d’un mois à compter du 12 mai. Donald Trump soutient l’idée et voilà que sa Vacuité explose en plein vol, exige le respect de ce cessez-le-feu par la Russie, qu’il menace à défaut de nouvelles sanctions économiques. Effets indésirables, peut être, de l’abus de substances pyschotropes. Son obsession est toujours d’employer un tel cessez-le-feu à injecter en Ukraine des troupes françaises et britanniques
Une histoire de mouchoirs (capture d’écran d’une fameuse vidéo ferroviaire)
Après minuit, le 11 mai, à l’issue d’une trêve unilatérale russe de trois jours, en mémoire de la victoire soviétique, 80 ans plus tôt, sur les armées fascistes européennes, Vladimir Poutine méprise avec calme l’ultimatum de l’arrogant Français. Il propose la reprise à Istanbul, le 15 mai, des négociations de paix qui avaient bien commencé en mars 2022, mais que le Royaume-Uni et les États-Unis de Joe Biden sabotèrent, pour poursuivre contre la Russie une guerre par procuration aujourd’hui perdue. Donald Trump lui apporte son soutien dans la journée. Volodymyr Zelenskyy accepte aussi et peut être encore en altitude, écrit sur les réseaux sociaux qu’il pense rencontrer personnellement Vladimir Poutine à Istanbul.
L’anecdote illustre mon analyse supra de la subordination d’Emmanuel Macron. Après la réception à l’Élysée le 7 mai du djihadiste Abou Mohammed al Joulani, dictateur d’une Syrie désormais saignée par les persécutions religieuses, Jean-Noël Barrot, erreur de casting au ministère des affaires étrangères, est le 15 à Istanbul, où il présente ses ronds de jambe à la plus grotesque figure néoconservatrice, l’immonde sénateur sudiste républicain Lindsey Graham
(Jean-Noël Barrot, soi-même, sur les réseaux sociaux)
Sur le fond, la Russie ignore les gesticulations françaises et européennes. Dans la même ville, le lendemain, ses plénipotentiaires présentent à une délégation ukrainienne leurs conditions pour un cessez-le-feu : le retrait des troupes atlantistes des positions qu’elles occupent encore dans les régions de Donetsk, Kherson, Lugansk et Zaporojie
(Réseaux sociaux)
Heureusement, pour notre détente, Emmanuel Macron et ses pérégrinations internationales, comme le 25 mai 2025 à Hanoï, sont aussi une source inépuisable de plaisanteries.
Savamment synchronisés, à deux jours d’intervalle, le chef d’état-major Thierry Burkhard puis Emmanuel Macron, le 13 juillet, se succèdent à la tribune pour galvaniser les crétins qui s’appellent eux-mêmes patriotes
Préserver un modèle social hérité du Conseil national de la résistance (CNR) au lendemain de la 2de guerre mondiale ou doubler* le budget militaire, Macron a choisi, car il veut être craint. Mission délicate, car depuis huit ans, il passe pour un imbécile auprès de ses homologues étrangers. Parmi ses soutiens, le mignon Gabriel Attal veut tenir son rang
Face aux menaces, les plus pressantes sans doute depuis 1945, la France doit impérativement continuer son réarmement. Pour tenir son rang, être respecté, et protéger nos intérêts vitaux [en Françafrique]
Maintenant la bonne nouvelle : puisqu’ils ont choisi l’affrontement, je prédis que les pinzuti [Français] se feront quand même humilier. Car aucun sacrifice social ne suffira à empêcher l’effondrement de l’hégémonie occidentale. Pas plus que furent victorieuses les guerres anachroniques pour préserver l’empire colonial.
* l’objectif est de doubler par rapport à 2017 et avant la fin de son second mandat, un budget militaire en constante augmentation. Il est de €50,5 milliards en 2025, devrait être de €63,4 milliards en 2027
(Gros / L’Humanité du 16 juillet 2025)
Malheureux concours de circonstances ou bien schizophrénie française et perversion d’Emmanuel Macron ? Le 15 juillet, le premier ministre François Bayrou dévoile les grandes lignes du budget 2026 d’une France en redressement judiciaire, après 18 ans de gouvernement atlantiste. Cette actualité nationale est riche d’enseignements et dans un article qu’il publie le 17 juillet, Emmanuel Todd est contraint de recourir à la psychiatrie pour comprendre les effets de bord du déclin occidental et français. La conclusion s’impose : la Russie est la cible des fantasmes érotomanes d’Emmanuel Macron et ses laquais.
Le prix Nobel de la paix est la dernière obsession de Donald Trump, qui le 18 août 2025, trois jours après sa rencontre avec Vladimir Poutine à Anchorage, accueille Volodymyr Zelenskyy et un quarteron de dirigeants européens à la Maison Blanche. La chorégraphie de la réunion des laquais de daddy Trump est un travail psychologique, une catharsis, pour que l’Occident reconnaisse enfin sa défaite dans le Donbass et en Ukraine
(Aaron Schwartz)
Encore traumatisé par son humiliation à Washington, Emmanuel Macron accorde le lendemain un entretien aux journalistes de LCI. Lors de cette nouvelle envolée lyrique, il déclare
Ne soyons pas naïfs. Y compris pour sa propre survie, il [la Russie où Vladimir Poutine ?] a besoin de continuer de manger. C’est un prédateur, un ogre à nos portes
La sûreté de l’État français a cessé depuis longtemps de m’intéresser et au contraire, je suis même réputé lui porter atteinte. D’autres sont entrés dans la carrière, dit la chanson, essuient aujourd’hui un échec cruel. Ce qui arrive même aux meilleurs. Mais ce sont les Alliés qui ne sont pas contents. La France aura beau nier, eux savent que les données sont authentiques.
la carte
Membres du groupe Killnet (cf. David Piguet), des as russes de l’informatique sont parvenus à recueillir auprès de l’administration française des informations sensibles : les procès-verbaux et autres documents de réunions secrètes au sujet de l’Ukraine entre France, Pologne, Roumanie et Royaume-Uni. Dont une carte datée du 28 avril 2025, destinée à l’état-major des armées françaises, qui est rendue publique sur le web le 9 septembre.
En marge du document que chacun peut consulter, les pirates ont réalisé une synthèse du projet de la Coalition de volontaires, si cher à Emmanuel Macron. Aux Russes, l’intégralité du Donbass, ainsi que les régions de Kherson et Zaporojie, jusqu’à la ligne de cessez-le-feu ; aux Français, les ressources minérales de Jytomir, Kharkov et Soumy ; aux Polonais et Roumains, Odessa et les régions frontalières ; les Britanniques se contenteraient de plateformes logistiques un peu partout ; 50 000 hommes pour emballer le butin occidental
Mais la Russie a dit et répète jusqu’à ce jour qu’elle ne tolérera pas de troupes de l’OTAN sur le territoire de l’actuelle Ukraine. Notez que depuis le 31 août, Thierry Burkhard n’est plus Chef d’état-major.
Dans un entretien que le journal italien de gauche Il Fatto Quotidiano publie le 13 septembre, le prestigieux économiste Jeffrey Sachs révèle une conversation personnelle avec Emmanuel Macron. À l’époque où le professeur de l’université Columbia fut fait chevalier de la Légion d’honneur, ce qui nous ramène en mai 2022, trois mois après le début de l’opération militaire spéciale russe, le président français lui expliqua que l’OTAN portait l’entière culpabilité du conflit. Cette information confirme, dans tous les cas de figure, que sa Vacuité ment comme un arracheur de dent
(Atlantic Council)
À New York le 24 septembre 2025, à l’instar de son grand ami [c’est Emmanuel Macron qui le dit] Javier Milei, catastrophe néo-libérale pour l’économie de l’Argentine et son peuple, sa Vacuité est reconnue employé de l’année par l’Atlantic Council, un think tank militariste dont la mission est de défendre les intérêts de l’empire états-unien.
Il ne tarde pas à mettre en scène une nouvelle farce, car son psychisme est trop faible pour parvenir à accepter sa défaite au Donbass et en Ukraine. De dépit le 2 octobre, il compense par une nouvelle envolée lyrique au Sommet de la Communauté politique européenne (EPC) de Copenhague. L’Europe est alors en proie à une épidémie d’hystérie collective, voit des drones partout. Qui d’autre que des Russes pourraient les piloter ?
Humour biélorusse le 27 septembre 2025
La bulle médiatique contient surtout paranoïa et désinformation, car la presse bleu horizon est incapable d’envisager l’hypothèse la plus probable de plaisantins locaux, aux commandes de quelques inoffensifs aéronefs. Au contraire, les mêmes pressetitués colportent une fable ukrainienne particulièrement farfelue : les drones seraient lancés par la flotte dite fantôme, des navires armés par les vastes restes du monde, qui transportent du pétrole russe et n’ont pas le goût ou l’envie de se soumettre aux sanctions administratives occidentales
Un équipage de vaisseau fantôme (Pirates des Caraïbes, 2003)
Sa Vacuité est incapable de limiter ses gesticulations à la scène danoise et alors que le Droit garantit pourtant le libre passage dans les eaux internationales, il décide à 47 ans de se lancer dans la piraterie maritime
Victrix causa diis placuit, sed victa catoni
Ses officiers sont chinois et chargé de pétrole russe, le navire béninois vogue paisiblement vers l’Inde, quand le 27 septembre, les corsaires français montent à l’abordage du Boracay dans les eaux internationales. Mais vaine recherche et choux blanc, pas le moindre indice n’étaye les accusations ukrainiennes de lancement de drones en Scandinavie. Bien qu’aux ordres de l’exécutif, le parquet français est contraint au soir du 2 octobre de laisser le pétrolier lever l’ancre. Illustration de la mesquinerie atavique des pinzuti, la convocation du commandant à comparaître le 23 février 2026 à Brest pour refus d’obtempérer, quand la piraterie et leurs pitreries en treillis obligeraient plutôt les autorités à présenter de plates excuses
Bruno Le Maire, le 25 avril 2023 (Florence Brochoire / Libération)
Huit jours après que des corsaires français soient montés à l’abordage du pétrolier fantôme béninois Boracay, le nouveau ministre de la contre-menace-prédatrice-et-existentielle [Macron], Bruno Le Maire, est enfin prêt le 5 octobre 2025 à provoquer l’effondrement [Le Maire] de l’armée Russe, à la dilater comme jamais [Le Maire]
Le lendemain, les vastes restes du monde ont tort de ricaner, car la Russie tremble. Vladimir Poutine a bien compris que l’implosion de l’éphémère gouvernement Lecornu est une ruse de guerre.
Vous n’aimez pas votre travail ? Essayez de vous mettre à la place des pauvres garçons, le 17 novembre 2025, qui font les jardinières sur la base aérienne de Villacoublay, pendant qu’au premier plan, deux divas posent pour Gala
(Emmanuel Macron sur les réseaux sociaux)
On me dit à l’oreillette que Volodymyr Zelenskyy s’engage à acheter 100 chasseurs Rafale. Avec quel argent ? Avant ou après détournement par son équipe ? Pour en faire quoi et surtout, quand ?
Emmanuel Macron figure parmi les dirigeants européens qui défilent à Berlin le 15 décembre, mettent en scène leur vacuité pour geindre et quémander encore une fois auprès des États-Unis. Ils semblent ignorer que le résultat d’une guerre se décide sur le champ de bataille. Le Donbass sera libéré par la diplomatie ou par la force, que cela leur plaise ou pas. Le même jour, le Conseil de l’Europe impose des sanctions à plusieurs personnes, dont l’expert suisse Jacques Baud, qui selon le communiqué
sert de porte-parole à la propagande pro-russe et propage des théories du complot
Paul (2011)
L’accusation est délirante. Jacques Baud a été colonel du renseignement suisse, spécialiste de l’Europe de l’Est. Entre 2009 et 2011, il dirigeait à New York l’équipe Politiques et Doctrine du Bureau des affaires militaires du Département des opérations de maintien de la paix des Nations Unies. Ce fut dans le cadre de l’OTAN qu’il participa à des programmes en Ukraine en 2014 et 2017. Sa rigueur et son travail d’analyse sont considérables
En 2013, Jacques Baud présente au château de Morges sa collection d’objet du renseignement (VQH)
Alors pourquoi cette punition administrative ? Dès la fin 2022, à l’instar de votre serviteur et beaucoup d’autres, l’expert énonça la réalité : l’Occident subit une défaite humiliante au Donbass et en Ukraine. Washington l’a aussi compris. Elle semble s’imposer aujourd’hui à des foules, puisqu’à croire l’immense majorité hystérique des employés de presse française, les chars russes se rapprochent dangereusement de la place de l’Étoile
Le 10 décembre 2025, des combattants russes sont accueillis en libérateurs à Seversk, en République populaire de Donetsk (capture d’écran)
Radio Free Europe, un organe de la CIA, dévoila dès le 10 décembre sa sanction et l’intéressé put la commenter. En l’apprenant, il m’a bien semblé sentir une odeur fétide, un peu comme l’haleine d’un Philippe Henriot (1889-1944), Secrétaire à l’information et à la propagande de l’État français, une grande voix française que des résistants communistes arrachèrent à l’affection des siens. Il porte à Bruxelles sa tête habituelle de détraqué, quand Jean-Noël Barrot confirme que ces sanctions sont prises à l’initiative de la France
(Capture d’écran)
Je crois le ministre des affaires étrangères assez crétin pour exercer des représailles par dépit de sa défaite par procuration au Donbass et en Ukraine. Car sa punition amplifiera le succès des excellentes analyses de Jacques Baud
Si l’objectif est plutôt de dissuader la résistance à la désinformation occidentale, alors je crains pour eux que les Français n’aient fait comme souvent une projection de leurs propres carences. Chaque jour qui passe, leur gouvernement alimente de vilains préjugés à leur sujet : froussards, mesquins, lâches, incompétents et arrogants
Nicolas Cinquini, journaliste et ancien officier du renseignement (France) [plus exactement Corse, capture d’écran]
C’était avec grand plaisir que je me suis entretenu avec une journaliste russe, pour un documentaire que la chaîne Russia Today, censurée en Europe mais largement regardée aux États-Unis, en Afrique ou en Chine, diffuse le 19 décembre.
Les premiers jours de 2026 éclairent d’une lumière crue la fonction politique de l’employé de banque Macron et par conséquent, sa posture au sujet de l’Ukraine. Grouillot de ploutocrates européens et néoconservateurs états-uniens, il s’illustre comme le plus inconditionnel soutien européen du raid que les porte-flingues de Donald Trump exécutent au Venezuela au petit matin du 3 janvier
Le candidat bolivarien Nicolas Maduro remporte les élections présidentielles au Venezuela le 29 juillet 2024 (Juan Barreto)
De l’aveu même du président des États-Unis, son objectif est colonial, pour le pétrole et le bien d’un empire néolibéral doté de deux capitales : Jérusalem et Washington
avec la complicité d’une intelligence artificielle
Non content d’avoir fait ricaner la terre entière avec ses lunettes de soleil au Forum économique mondial de Davos le 20 janvier, Emmanuel Macron poursuit ses facéties et pour prouver sa virilité le 22, envoie les corsaires de la Marine nationale à l’abordage en toute illégalité en méditerranée du pétrolier comorien Grinch, un parmi les quelques centaines de très sournois navires de la vilaine flotte fantôme russe.
Sa Vacuité, vous dis je, faiseur de vent de la catégorie des tempêtes du grand large. Contrairement à ce qu’assènent les posts brouillons et vindicatifs du compte French Response sur X, organe burlesque du quai d’Orsay, rien ne peut justifier la rétention du pétrolier comorien Grinch. Les sanctions occidentales ne sont pas de Droit international ou maritime. Aucune infraction pénale française n’a été constatée et finalement, aucune information judiciaire n’est ouverte. Même le parquet, corps de magistrats chargés d’initier les poursuites pénales et qui en France, sont des laquais du pouvoir exécutif, est frappé de confusion mentale quand il évoque brièvement une immobilisation administrative. Rien ne va dans cette opération publicitaire de piraterie, une ratatouille juridique où un chef d’État puéril s’affranchit du Droit national et international
avec la complicité d’une intelligence artificielle
Abus de substances psychotropes ? Revenu dans le monde réel le 29 janvier, Emmanuel Macron s’entretient au téléphone avec Volodymyr Zelenskyy et piteux, se plaint du Droit français, qui l’oblige à relâcher le navire et son équipage indien – il est temps de s’en apercevoir. Ces paroles sont rapportées le lendemain par le journal en ligne ukrainien European Pravda, qui nous apprend aussi que puisqu’il a violé la loi, le fanfaron s’engage auprès de son homologue kievien à la faire changer sine die. C’est une autre réforme juridique que l’Europe attend depuis longtemps en France : la séparation du parquet et du pouvoir exécutif
Beaucoup de talent chez le dessinateur français qui le 13 février, sait croquer avec tant de précision la personnalité de Jean-Noël Barrot, ministre des affaires étrangères de la Macronie.
Ce sont probablement des agents implantés en Ukraine qui ont informé le SVR. L’agence russe de renseignement extérieur dévoile l’affaire le 24 février 2026, quatrième anniversaire du déclenchement de l’opération militaire spéciale au Donbass et en Ukraine. Dans le contexte de la défaite militaire générale des troupes atlantistes, la France et le Royaume-Uni projettent de doter en secret l’Ukraine de l’arme nucléaire
La détonation d’une tête nucléaire (Nick Bockelman / Scientific American)
Une solution technique envisagée est le transfert de têtes françaises TN75, que portent les missiles balistiques intercontinentaux en cours de remplacement M51.1. Chacune délivre une petite charge de 110 kt équivalents de TNT, soit 7,5 Hiroshima. Le vice consiste à faire croire que l’arme nucléaire ukrainienne serait le résultat d’un développement national. Le communiqué russe précise que sollicitée, l’Allemagne a décliné l’offre de se joindre à l’affaire.
Vice-président du Conseil de sécurité de Russie, Dmitri Medvedev éclaire ensuite le public sur les raisons stratégiques de cette révélation. Elle est un avertissement ; en cas de transfert effectif du matériel, la Russie lancerait pour le moins des frappes nucléaires tactiques sur les sites ukrainiens de destination.
Le projet secret européen est non seulement une violation du traité de non-prolifération, mais aussi une folie stratégique qui risque de dégénérer en confrontation nucléaire. Le fanatisme affiché depuis quatre ans par les dirigeants européens, les personnalités retorses et déséquilibrées d’un Emmanuel Macron ou d’un Volodymyr Zelenskyy ne laissent guère de doute sur l’authenticité des informations que le SVR a exploitées
Le 3 mai 2026, soldats maliens et russes patrouillent ensemble dans un village du Mali (The African Corps)
Dans un article que RTL publie le 8 mai 2026, Georges Malbrunot confirme de sources françaises ce qu’affirment depuis longtemps les autorités du Mali : dans une tentative de restaurer son emprise néocoloniale au Sahel et pour nuire du même coup à la Russie, la France collabore avec l’Ukraine dans leur soutien de groupes djihadistes.
Sous quelque prétexte que ce soit, sa Vacuité poursuit son projet maniaque d’injecter des troupes françaises en Ukraine. Le 24 juin, le quotidien numérique Intelligence Online révèle que sous couvert de formation, des militaires du régiment de cyberdéfense de Saint Jacques de la Lande y opèrent avec la Sûreté d’État ukrainienne (SBU)
Le régiment de cyberdéfense (ministère des Armées)
La Russie a toujours averti qu’elle ne tolère pas de troupes occidentales en Ukraine. Ne sera pas virtuel, le missile balistique Iskander que ces cyberguerriers risquent de recevoir sur la tête.
Les autorités françaises nient, mentent évidemment. Comme dans le cas du soutien franco-ukrainien de groupes djihadistes au Sahel, cette implication aurait du rester secrète
Cette belle photographie date du 10 juillet. Elle est ensuite partagée par Lostarmour, un site russe qui documente les véhicules atlantistes détruits ou capturés. Au cours de leur progression, les combattants russes ont atteint cette épave de canon automoteur français CAESAR.
Convoqués en grande pompe le 18 septembre 2026, des représentants de partis politiques se font présenter à l’Élysée un état de la menace, le leurre d’une prétendue guerre hybride russe en Europe. Comme nous le savons déjà, les agences occidentales dites de renseignement n’en font plus guère et sont plutôt payées pour servir la communication d’éphémères gouvernements d’incompétents.
Bien plus intéressant, les autorités avouent ce que nous avions déjà compris
Les Forces armées françaises ont mené des ripostes militaires conventionnelles non rendues publiques contre la Russie à la suite d’attaques hybrides [Le Monde]
Le commandant Paul Wilks, du renseignement militaire britannique, est tué en Ukraine le 12 septembre 2026 (gouvernement britannique)
L’engagement direct des coqs gaulois dans des opérations offensives injustifiées contre la Russie rend sans doute leur défaite plus amère encore. Pour sa part, le Royaume Uni a commencé depuis décembre 2025 à rendre publiques des pertes.
chronique alphabétique et nécrologique de l’engagement français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas
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Pruvate à truvà me, canaglia di l’OTAN, pruvate solu
chronique en Anglais, its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine
chronique en Anglais, censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia
une saga française, entre Ukraine et Lyon, où apparaissent aussi des morceaux de SS de la division Charlemagne et plus récemment, Alice Kerviel, dite Cordier. L’affaire Deranque révèle comme la France est infectée par le pétainisme, en particulier parmi les soutiens d’Israël ou de l’Ukraine, deux théâtres d’opérations où l’Occident tente de ralentir son déclin
En 2025, une nouvelle unité de Français combattant pour l’Ukraine s’est structurée autour d’un noyau de néonazis, ayant pour objectif d’attirer des recrues. Parmi ces volontaires, d’anciens militaires. StreetPress les a identifiés
En Ukraine, les volontaires français pro-ukrainiens et pro-russes se partagent l’imaginaire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Les premiers se revendiquent des collabos de l’Allemagne nazie, les seconds de l’escadrille mythique « Normandie – Niémen »
deux jours après le 10e anniversaire de la débâcle politique et sécuritaire du 13 novembre 2015, une messe célèbre à Verdun l’ancien dirigeant fasciste de l’État français
ce 11 novembre 2025 est l’occasion de souligner comme la façon dont l’Europe sacrifie les conscrits ukrainiens mobilisés de force rappelle le spectaculaire carnage de la 1ère guerre mondiale
c’est par l’agence cosaque de presse PIKA, depuis la République populaire de Lougansk, que le 2 avril 2024, l’ataman Nikolaï Diakonov lance un message à destination de la France
ce papier est le premier des grands médias français qui s’attaque à la question des militants nazis français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, le nouveau danger qu’ils présenteront à terme pour la sûreté intérieure
où nous apprenons que le nazi français Allan Duchézeau, camarade de César Aujard dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, était surnommé Dox, quand il secondait à Paris le leader nazi Marc de Cacqueray Valménier
en Anglais, les indices de la présence d’opérateurs occidentaux, en particulier Français, pris au piège en mars 2022 à Marioupol, dont les forces russes achevèrent la libération en mai
devint parachutiste de l’armée française en 2013, probablement au 3e RPIMa (régiment parachutiste d’infanterie de marine) de Carcassonne. Il fit en 2015 une rotation au Mali
(Réseaux sociaux)
Peut être pour des raisons affectives, le Lot-et-Garonnais commença à s’intéresser à l’Ukraine en 2017. En 2021, il fréquentait à Kiev des sociétés privés de sûreté
(Réseaux sociaux)
En 2023, il entraînait des policiers et militaires ukrainiens à Kharkov et Soumy. De l’instruction combat & medic à la pratique, a t il sauté le pas, un peu tiraillé aussi ? Possible en 2024, en compagnie par exemple du mercenaire écossais Lewis Donaldson
Sylvain Laffitte est ici à gauche (réseaux sociaux)
Publié le 27 février 2026, un article du Figaro nous confirme qu’il est bien devenu combattant
(Albert Lores / Le Figaro)
Son bataillon de Légion internationale, le 3e, a été dissous fin décembre et quand il rencontre la journaliste, Sylvain Laffitte ronge son frein dans la région de Dnipro, où il attend sa réaffectation dans l’armée régulière ukrainienne.
chronique alphabétique et nécrologique de l’engagement français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas
Articles connexes
Pruvate à truvà me, canaglia di l’OTAN, pruvate solu
chronique en Anglais, its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine
chronique en Anglais, censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia
une saga française, entre Ukraine et Lyon, où apparaissent aussi des morceaux de SS de la division Charlemagne et plus récemment, Alice Kerviel, dite Cordier. L’affaire Deranque révèle comme la France est infectée par le pétainisme, en particulier parmi les soutiens d’Israël ou de l’Ukraine, deux théâtres d’opérations où l’Occident tente de ralentir son déclin
En 2025, une nouvelle unité de Français combattant pour l’Ukraine s’est structurée autour d’un noyau de néonazis, ayant pour objectif d’attirer des recrues. Parmi ces volontaires, d’anciens militaires. StreetPress les a identifiés
En Ukraine, les volontaires français pro-ukrainiens et pro-russes se partagent l’imaginaire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Les premiers se revendiquent des collabos de l’Allemagne nazie, les seconds de l’escadrille mythique « Normandie – Niémen »
deux jours après le 10e anniversaire de la débâcle politique et sécuritaire du 13 novembre 2015, une messe célèbre à Verdun l’ancien dirigeant fasciste de l’État français
ce 11 novembre 2025 est l’occasion de souligner comme la façon dont l’Europe sacrifie les conscrits ukrainiens mobilisés de force rappelle le spectaculaire carnage de la 1ère guerre mondiale
c’est par l’agence cosaque de presse PIKA, depuis la République populaire de Lougansk, que le 2 avril 2024, l’ataman Nikolaï Diakonov lance un message à destination de la France
ce papier est le premier des grands médias français qui s’attaque à la question des militants nazis français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, le nouveau danger qu’ils présenteront à terme pour la sûreté intérieure
où nous apprenons que le nazi français Allan Duchézeau, camarade de César Aujard dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, était surnommé Dox, quand il secondait à Paris le leader nazi Marc de Cacqueray Valménier
en Anglais, les indices de la présence d’opérateurs occidentaux, en particulier Français, pris au piège en mars 2022 à Marioupol, dont les forces russes achevèrent la libération en mai
[mon illustration : en 2013, Jacques Baud présentait au château de Morges sa collection d’objet du renseignement (VQH)]
Bonjour Jacques BAUD! Vous vous rappelez bien sûr la série d’entretiens que nous avions menés ensemble sur ce blog. C’était un article de Sylvain Besson qui avait motivé ma démarche auprès de vous pour en savoir un peu plus. Nous étions début septembre 2020.
Voici ce même journaliste reprendre un article paru sur Radio free Europe et parler de vous en termes que je vous serais reconnaissante de commenter. L’article en question, paru sur le site de la Tribune de Genève, est déjà suivi de plus de 300 commentaires. Qu’avez-vous à nous en dire ?
Merci pour votre question. Oui, j’ai été surpris par cette information, même si je ne sais pas encore en ce moment si elle est vraie ou non. Je pars de l’idée qu’elle l’est.
Mon approche du conflit russo-ukrainien (comme des autres, d’ailleurs) est d’exposer les faits afin de comprendre ce qui se passe, avec la finalité d’y trouver une solution. Comme je le répète souvent: « de la manière de comprendre une crise découle celle de la résoudre ». Cette compréhension doit se faire indépendamment de toute préférence pour l’une ou l’autre des parties en présence. Aujourd’hui, particulièrement en Europe, si votre appréciation s’écarte un tant soit peu de la ligne officielle, vous êtes considéré comme « pro-russe » ou « conspirationniste ». Si vous lisez les commentaires des différentes interviews que j’ai accordées, les commentaires « équilibrés », « factuels » ou « balancés » reviennent le plus souvent. Après une interview qui a été publiée sur un média américain, un internaute a commenté: « Bien que Baud soit pro-ukrainien, il a bien compris la position russe! ». On est aux antipodes de ce que racontent nos journalistes. En novembre 2022, le journaliste suisse Jean-Philippe Schaller de la RTS déclarait que j’étais un agent au service de Vladimir Poutine! Quelles sont ses sources? Aucune: c’est du conspirationnisme pur et simple.
Le problème aujourd’hui est que si l’on dit que « la Russie gagne » on est automatiquement considéré comme « pro-russe ». Mais la victoire ou la défaite de l’un ou de l’autre ne dépend pas de ce que nous disons ou pensons! C’est une réalité. On pourrait même aller plus loin, j’ai expliqué dès 2022 pourquoi l’Ukraine perdait. Si on en avait tenu compte et aidé l’Ukraine non pas pour affaiblir la Russie mais pour qu’elle gagne, elle gagnerait aujourd’hui. Tout était parfaitement clair à la fin 2022. C’est d’ailleurs la raison pour laquelle les Américains ont conseillé à Zelensky d’ouvrir un dialogue avec la Russie.
Nos journalistes croient aider l’Ukraine, mais c’est faux. À Bruxelles, j’ai été à quatre reprises arrêté dans la rue par des Ukrainiens (de Kharkiv, Odessa et Dniepropetrovsk) qui m’ont remercié pour ce que je fais. Un Ukrainien m’a même envoyé une carte postale avec le timbre de l’attaque contre le croiseur russe Moskva dans la Mer Noire. Nous avons un regard plus polarisé que les Ukrainiens eux-mêmes sur ce conflit. D’ailleurs, pour ceux qui veulent prendre la peine de lire mes livres, ils constateront que je n’utilise aucune source russe, mais exclusivement la presse ukrainienne et américaine: je prends la presse européenne (suisse en particulier) pour les mauvais exemples! Nos journalistes n’utilisent que l’information qui sort des bureaux de l’administration ukrainienne. Les journalistes ukrainiens sont beaucoup plus honnêtes et professionnels que les nôtres. La catastrophe de la bataille de Krinky, sur le Dniepr, par exemple, a été rapportée en grands détails avec des critiques sérieuses contre les militaires britanniques qui l’avaient planifiée et dirigée. Pas un mot dans nos médias. Lisez mes livres. Il y a des centaines de notes: elles viennent presque toutes de médias ukrainiens ou américains.
Aujourd’hui, même le premier-ministre belge reconnaît qu’une défaite de la Russie est une illusion. C’était déjà ce que les Américains pensaient en novembre 2022, lorsqu’ils ont conseillé à Zelensky d’ouvrir un dialogue avec Moscou. Dire que la Russie ne perd pas ne signifie pas que l’on est pro-russe, c’est un avertissement. Qu’ont fait les Besson et autres plumitifs pour tenir compte de ces avertissements et faire en sorte que l’on aide l’Ukraine efficacement ? Rien! Rien du tout, à part vociférer contre la Russie. Le problème est qu’aujourd’hui le narratif entre en collision avec la réalité et, après 4 ans (!), le système se défend en interdisant les vues qui ne lui plaisent pas. J’ai décrit exactement les mécanismes internes à la conduite ukrainienne qui la défavorisaient sur le terrain. Qui s’en est soucié pour améliorer la conduite ukrainienne? Personne. Aujourd’hui, on s’aperçoit qu’on a loupé une occasion. Cette guerre, qu’on le veuille ou non, est plus dictée par la haine de la Russie que par l’amour de l’Ukraine. Même Zelensky s’en est aperçu.
Lorsque Sylvain Besson m’a appelé vendredi 12 décembre, il m’a demandé si je croyais que la Russie avait bien attaqué l’Ukraine, j’ai répondu que oui, mais que je pense qu’il y a eu provocation, exactement comme en Géorgie en 2008, et que je m’appuyais sur une interview d’Olekseï Arestovitch (alors conseiller de Zelensky), dans une interview du 18 mars 2019 au média ukrainien Apostrof’, lors de laquelle il explique qu’il faudra une guerre avec la Russie pour pouvoir entrer dans l’OTAN et que cette guerre aurait probablement lieu en « 2021-2022 ». À ceci s’ajoutent les observations faites par les observateurs de l’OSCE entre le 16 et le 21 février 2022, qui montraient une claire intensification des frappes contre les populations du Donbass. Sans compter le décret du 24 mars 2021 de Zelensky qui déclare la reprise de la Crimée et qui marque le début de la montée en puissance de l’Ukraine sur les pourtours du Donbass. Évidemment, Besson s’est bien gardé de le mentionner dans son article!… et pour cause!
Mais il y a d’autres choses pas honnêtes. Par exemple, j’ai toujours refusé les invitations de médias officiels russes, parce que je voulais éviter que mes analyses puissent être instrumentalisées à des fins de propagande. J’ai expliqué ça aux journalistes russes qui l’ont très bien compris. Les médias mentionnés par Besson (Agoravox, media 4-4-2 et RT) sont des médias qui ont repris (sans me le demander) des interviews faites sur d’autres plateformes et/ou vendues par elles. Omerta est un média qui m’interviewe occasionnellement, dont le directeur (Régis le Sommier) apparaît également sur Europe 1 et d’autres médias mainstream français.
Quant à la présence de soldats nord-coréens en Ukraine, je ne l’ai pas mise en doute. J’ai mis en doute leur intégration dans les forces russes. Et les faits m’ont donné raison. La conférence à laquelle j’ai participé à Winterthour portait sur la neutralité de la Suisse. Je ne me suis jamais exprimé sur les questions liées au Covid et aux vaccins, comme le suggère Besson. Contrairement à ce qu’il affirme, je n’ai jamais participé à la « formation d’armées locales », j’ai toujours été engagé dans le cadre des Nations Unies et sous leur contrôle.
Conclusion: une fois de plus, Sylvain Besson ne s’est pas montré comme un journaliste intègre. Une étude de l’Université d’Uppsala (pas une officine comme Conspiracy Watch payée par le gouvernement britannique!) le qualifie de conspirationniste et d’inspirateur d’Anders Breivik, responsable de la tuerie d’Utoya.
Dans tous les cas de figure, penser que l’UE conduit l’Ukraine à sa perte n’est – à ma connaissance – pas un délit!
Merci beaucoup de vos réponses, Jacques Baud. Et juste encore pour préciser à nos lecteurs que si vous avez donc eu droit à être fiché conspirationniste par Conspiracy Watch, du seul fait de vous avoir interrogé sur mon blog m’a valu d’être étiquetée telle sur ledit site. C’est dire où on en est! [fin]
Jacques Baud a été colonel du renseignement suisse, spécialiste de l’Europe de l’Est. Entre 2009 et 2011, il dirigeait à New York l’équipe Politiques et Doctrine du Bureau des affaires militaires du Département des opérations de maintien de la paix des Nations Unies. Ce fut dans le cadre de l’OTAN qu’il participa à des programmes en Ukraine en 2014 et 2017
Why are liberal institutions censoring discussion of forced mobilization in Ukraine? – Volodymyr Ishchenko, Marta Havryshko, Tarik Cyril Amar, Milica Popović and Almut Rochowanski
1er décembre 2025 : Psychose – Pierre Rimbert, le Monde diplomatique
ce 11 novembre 2025 est l’occasion de souligner comme la façon dont l’Europe sacrifie les conscrits ukrainiens mobilisés de force rappelle le spectaculaire carnage de la 1ère guerre mondiale
Azov paramilitaries are aiming to debunk Kremlin « myths ». In doing so, they are solidifying their Nazi tradition and reducing German normalization narratives to absurdity
Depuis l’allocution d’Emmanuel Macron à propos de la guerre en Ukraine, le 5 mars, les grands médias sont en ordre de marche. Réhabilitation du président en « chef de guerre », patriotisme exacerbé, concert militariste et glorification des industriels de guerre… Mené tambour battant, le SAV du discours présidentiel s’accompagne d’une nouvelle séquence de matraquage patronal contre le « modèle social » et pour « travailler plus » au nom, prétendument, de l’« effort de guerre » : « Pensions ou munitions ? » ; « Les canons ou les allocations ? » Signés Dominique Seux (Les Échos, 10/03) et Étienne Gernelle (RTL, 10/03), les deux slogans donnent le ton
Media outlets organized with substantial funding and direction from the U.S. government have supported censorship, disseminated disinfo, and sought to silence American critics of the war
Though Musk is still playing at being NATO’s token non-conformist, the EU is essentially telling him and all of us that any dissent from its Russophobic, Slavophobic and Sinophobic narratives will be severely punished
chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia
During the offensive of the Russian Armed Forces in the Dnipro region, the settlement of Filiya was liberated. Russian units continue to expand the control zone, but every step forward comes under fierce resistance from a prepared enemy.
A group of Russian assault troops receives the order to clear a key hamlet near Filiya, where, according to intelligence, Kraken militants are hiding. But instead of scattered fighters, they run into a nasty surprise — the hamlet is covered by a squad of foreign mercenaries, armed to the teeth.
A handful of Russian contract soldiers takes on an uneven battle against seven professionals. At stake is not only the mission but the very chance to survive. Who will prove stronger: the soldiers of fortune fighting for money, or those who fight for their Motherland?
On the other side of the line of combat contact, in Ukraine, live all kinds of people. Some silently wait for Russia to come, others loudly hate everything Russian. But there are also those who risk their lives to help bring Russia victory: they pass on coordinates of military objects, intelligence, and help their relatives and friends in the Ukrainian Armed Forces surrender and survive.
Russian soldiers always respond to such requests. They create special lines of communication and run operations to evacuate Ukrainian servicemen from the front. One evening, when a message arrived in the chat-bot of a Russian military public channel begging to save a brother who serves in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the admins reacted at once – such appeals had become routine for them.
But what happened next surprised everyone. Even hardened military counterintelligence officers…
EU responsibility and hypocrisy. The angry, betrayed Ukrainians. Update on the forever war
[my illustration, with the complicity of an artificial intelligence]
At the start of the year, I had some hope that the war might really come to an end. Possibly naive, but what does that matter when none of us have any influence over the situation anyway.
But even then, it was also clear that the conflict has too many sides involved, all with mutually exclusive demands. Now, the fact that the war will continue much longer seems certain. Ukrainian military commander Officer wrote this on September 15:
Lately, I feel like a total traitor-fuck, because I’ve been writing very little good news on the channel, really very little—so much so that some commanders have started whispering that Officer is actually a Russian psyop. Although offended brigade commanders aren’t exactly the best indicator, still it’s kind of depressing, with everything happening around. In the air there’s a sense of a prolonged war and the potential for brutal beatings in the near future
European hypocrisy
So why is the war so intractable?
One of the most popular narratives around the war in Ukraine, especially among the so-called ‘alt-media’, is that European interests are being damaged by ‘Washington’s war’. There is no arguing with the fact that the war has been good for American energy exports and bad for European price levels and industry
However, it isn’t just about American energy. 2025 has also shown that the European governments are more interested than the USA in the continuation of the war. It is European leaders that have tried desperately to maintain the frayed relations between Zelensky and Trump, it is European leaders that have agreed to all forms of humiliation by the White House on condition that it continues military shipments to Kyiv
Clearly, Europe is not merely a puppet of the US. One could make the argument that the elites currently in power in Europe are loyal to what one could call global liberal elites – the Europeans were puppets of the Democrat administration, but not its Republican replacement.
However, personally, I don’t particularly like this concept. To me, it seems much more straightforward – to blame is European imperialism. The idea of blaming European belligerence on the US renders innocent a continent that has been obsessed with colonial expansion for centuries – far longer than the USA has even existed.
Today, Europe is stagnating. Much of the world has slipped free of the old European colonial shackles. What was for centuries a ‘jungle’ of prosperity is now being forced to compete on the free market with countries that produce the same or better products for lower prices
Terrified by such global transformations, no wonder the Europeans have latched onto their oldest tradition – conquering the east. Back in the medieval times, the Teutonic Order ravaged the Slavic east. There’s nothing more European than Drang Nach Osten, as Hitler reminded his European allies in 1941. Tens of thousands of Europeans volunteered in various fascist units to aid in Operation Barbarossa – France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and many other countries had their own SS divisions
Hitler was convinced that Germany, kept out of Asia and Africa by the stronger colonial powers, had no option other than to focus on the Soviet Union. Today, all of Europe faces the same dilemma. Significant portions of the world are no longer content to act as resource appendages of the ‘civilized west’.
Sure, China’s growth also offers a number of opportunities to Europe. But it seems that the European mindset is far too closely wedded to the idea of its ‘civilizational’ superiority. Equality is out of the question.
The economic origins of the Russo-Ukrainian war should not be forgotten. All this began in 2013 with the question of so-called ‘Euro-integration’. Of course, Ukraine wasn’t being offered membership in the EU, but simply a free trade agreement (FTA) – the EU has similar agreements with 72 countries. Most of the operative agreements are are with poor countries, like Ukraine
The agreement Ukraine eventually signed in 2016, like the EU’s other FTAs, is highly exploitative. I covered its deleterious effects in detail in this series of articles. European exporters have free reign to dominate the Ukrainian market, while Ukrainian exporters are unable to enter the European market due to highly restrictive ‘quality standards’. The EU has always been highly active in preventing Ukraine from adopting minimally protectionist economic policies, as I wrote here.
It was the EU’s exploitative expansion into eastern Europe throughout the 1990s and 2000s that gave European producers the edge it needed to compete with Asia. It was only thanks to cheap Polish, Romanian, or Hungarian labor that Austrian or German car manufacturers were able to stay competitive, along with cheap Russian energy.
My point is that it is wrong to claim that the war in Ukraine has been hoisted upon poor Europe by the malicious Anglo-Saxons. Certainly, I won’t dispute the nefarious intentions of the latter. But the Europeans have their own reasons.
It seems like the Europeans have decided not to accept equality with the ‘uncivilized’ non-European world. Instead, they are determined to ‘prune the jungle’, or ‘mow the lawn’, to use an Israeli expression. Hence their furious support for both Ukraine and Israel.
Instead of trade, Europe has chosen to stake its economic future on war. 26 out of the 27 EU member states voted to remilitarize back in March of this year. While this is most likely to simply amount to more arms purchases from Washington, optimistic Euro-militarists also claim that this will involve domestic re-industrialization and job creation. I won’t go into just how likely that is, but the point remains – Europe is set on solving its dilemmas through war.
It’s worth taking a step back in time to appreciate European culpability.
Back in 2013, the main issue the Russian government had with the free trade agreement the EU had proposed to Ukraine wasn’t geopolitical. It was quite mercantile. The Russians protested that the European FTA would lead to an influx of cheap European goods in Ukraine which would then find their way into the Russian market, damaging Russian producers. Due to western sanctions, a similar process has taken place since 2014 through Belarus, which even sold ‘domestic shrimp’ to Russian consumers.
In late 2013, Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych proposed trilateral negotiations involving Ukraine, Russia, and the EU. But the Europeans rejected the idea. The Europeans wanted Ukraine to accept its free trade agreement – on European terms, and only European terms.
Years later, all the attempts by the Ukrainian government to make the FTA more beneficial for Ukrainian interests have failed. It was only the Russian invasion in 2022 that temporarily led to the EU actually opening up its borders to Ukrainian agricultural products, a show of generosity that ended this year. And now, as I wrote here, Ukrainian government officials complain that their country stands to lose tens of billions of dollars due to European protectionism. Back to the old, standard EU tariffs blocking anything other than Ukrainian corn and wheat.
So much for Ukraine being the dearest ally of Europe. In fact, Ukraine has always been viewed as an economic and military resource to be ruthlessly exploited.
Stilted lovers
Ukrainian nationalists have always seen their war with Russia as a ‘war for Europe’. Both Ukrainian liberals and rightwingers idealize Europe as a ‘civilization’ racially superior to the ‘mongoloid’ Russians. Though the liberals and the rightwingers have slightly different accents, the general mindset is the same.
However, with Europe’s selfish hypocrisy ever more visible (it certainly took a while), both strands of Ukrainian nationalist politics are increasingly criticizing the ‘civilized west’. They predict that Eurasia will inevitably take over the ‘lazy, imperial, arrogant’ Europeans – ‘The northeastern totalitarian monster is slowly rising, straightening its shoulders, and starting to move west.’
Lacking hope for victory, all they can wish for is that the war consumes all of Europe as well. Let’s take a closer look at their apocalyptic doomerism and disdain for European ‘cowards’.
Later on in today’s article, I’ll also take a look at the latest grim frontline updates – Ukrainian soldiers and analysts are pointing out the reality disproving positive official statements regarding the Lyman, Dobropillia, and Dnepropetrovsk frontlines. As it turns out, Ukrainian claims to have cut the Russian Dobropillia salient in two don’t reflect reality. Particularly interesting is the rapidly developing situation around the village of Yampil, where Russian forces have leaped through porous Ukrainian defensive lines and continue to stay, despite official Ukrainian claims otherwise […]
its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine, chronicle
[my illustration: on March 4, 2014, US Secretary of State John Kerry meets in Kiev with grantees of the February coup, including second from right, Nazi Oleh Tyahnybok, leader from Lviv of Svoboda party. Center, Petro Poroshenko will win the presidential election on June 7 (US Department of State)]
It goes without saying that the Donald can never get enough of the limelight. But last Friday in a live Oval Office broadcast seen around the world that thirst for public attention may have actually changed the course of history. And very much for the good – even if the trigger was pulled by a third rate actor who couldn’t even figure out how to properly brown-nose one of the most capacious egos on the planet.
For all practical purposes, therefore, Washington’s sick adventure in the destruction of a fake nation – along with the hideously unnecessary deaths of tens of thousands of real people who inhabit the Ukrainian territory – is now over.
Zelensky will soon be gone to a hideaway in such as Costa Rica or an unmarked grave, as the case may be. Thereafter a caretaker regent for the rump of what is now the Potemkin State that Lenin, Stalin and Khrushchev built with Bolshevik blood and guns will sign-up to a Trump/Putin ceasefire and partition deal—the latter having been in the making ever since the yoke of communism was lifted in 1991.
Indeed, Friday’s final splintering of “Ukraine” in the Oval Office itself will surely soon unmask the rationality-defying farce that has been the Washington/NATO proxy war against Russia in its own “borderlands”. The latter term, of course, being the meaning of the word “ukraine” in Russian.
And we do mean monumental farce. As the most recent desultory chapter has unfolded since February 2022, in fact, the US and EU combined have spent the staggering sum of nearly $400 billion to conduct a Demolition Derby on Russia’s doorstep in order for what?
Apparently, to pleasure the arms merchants of the US and Europe with a grand occasion for the sale of beaucoup new weapons to replenish depleted NATO arsenals. And all in the name of more of the same old baloney about collective security and a “rules based international order”.
But that’s all just beltway bullshit. There has not been an iota of America’s homeland security implicated in the fate of the former Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic after it split off from the expired corpse of the Soviet Union in 1991. And since “Ukraine” was a communist-built simulacrum of a nation, it was not destined to last, anyway – nor would its demise have been even a little bit noted or briefly remembered by the world at large.
That is to say, the wholly artificial state of “Ukraine” embodies the very historical metaphor associated with the borderland territories that Russia had acquired, conquered, populated and developed in the late 18th century under the stewardship of Grigory Potemkin. The latter was the nation’s chief minister, who literally had an intimate relationship with the Russian Empress, Catherine the Great.
After the Catherine’s 1783 acquisition of Crimea from the Ottoman Empire and the liquidation of a small Cossack principality on the lower Dnieper River called the Zaporozhian Sich, which had governed the adjacent territories for upwards of 200 years, Potemkin became governor of the region. He promptly named these new territories Novorossiya or “New Russia” in honor of his paramour/ruler. At length, Russian people, capital and commerce poured into the theretofore largely empty steppes.
Potemkin’s major tasks were to pacify and rebuild what had been a war-torn region by bringing in Russian settlers and laying the ground work for a new flourishing of farms, industry, towns and trade. In 1787, as renewed war was about to break out between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, Catherine II, with her court and several ambassadors, made an unprecedented six month tour of New Russia, navigating down the Dnieper River (blue thread on the map) to inspect her new colonies.
One purpose of this trip was to impress Russia’s allies prior to the war. To help accomplish this, Potemkin was said to have set up “mobile villages” on the banks of the Dnieper River. As soon as the barge carrying the Empress and ambassadors arrived, Potemkin’s men, dressed as peasants, would populate the village. Once the barge left, the village was disassembled, then rebuilt downstream overnight.
Whatever the degree to which the story is apocryphal, the underlying metaphor could not be more apt. To wit, the entire territory from Lugansk and Donetsk (i.e. the Donbass) down through Mariupol on the Sea of Azov and on both banks of he Dnieper, to Odessa on the Black Sea coast, was henceforth known as New Russia and was labeled as such per the 1897 map depicted below.
Moreover, search other maps of the pre-1917 era as you may, but you will find no country called Ukraine because the latter was place name, not a state. And the place name came to life as a organized modern society only as the expanding border region of the Czarist Empire.
Novorossiya As Of The End of The Nineteenth Century
Ukraine became a state, therefore, only upon the WWI induced collapse of the Russian Empire and the seizure of power by Lenin and his brutal heirs. As shown in the map below, the communist administrative unit that became known as the Ukrainian SSR was cobbled together from New Russia (blue area) and other parts and pieces of the Czarist Empire wrested from various neighbors (yellow area) – along with historic Galicia (green area) centered in Lviv, which was seized by Stalin when Poland was dismembered in WWII.
At length, Crimea (purple area), which was thoroughly Russian from the time of its purchase by Catherine the Great in 1783, was seconded to Khrushchev’s Ukrainian compatriots in 1954 as a door prize in return for their support in the struggle for succession after Stalin
The last thing that can be said about the Ukrainian “borders” which outline the five color-coded components shown above, therefore, is that they were sacrosanct in any meaningful sense of the term. They did not represent the organic evolution of peoples, national identities and states, but the iron-fist of the Soviet politburo and the blood-thirsty tyrants who ruled it.
In turn, this meant that when the Soviet Union collapsed into the dustbin of history in 1991, Ukraine’s days as a unitary state were numbered.
Needless to say, there was no common linguistic and religious identity at all. Even 40 years after the Soviet rulers had finished assembling “Ukraine” this 1991 map of language usage tells you all you need to know. That is to say, there were overwhelming Russian-speaking majorities in the Donbass and Black Sea rim (red areas), which in some oblasts including Crimea were more that 75% Russian-speaking. By contrast, the center and west was populated by Ukrainians, Poles, Bulgarians, Hungarians and others, where Russian speakers accounted for as little as 5% of the population.
1990s Linguistic Map Of Ukraine By Percentage of Russian Speakers
And, no, once the communist-ruled entity known as the Ukrainian SSR split away from the corpse of the defunct Soviet Union the happenstance borders it inherited were not “guaranteed” by the US in the so-called Budapest Memorandum of 1994 in return for giving up it nuclear weapons.
In fact, Ukraine never had any nukes! These weapons had been stock-piled on its territory by the Soviets and were still under Moscow’s control when the latter signed the Memorandum along with the US and the United Kingdom. But no borders were “guaranteed” because that would have been a treaty requiring Senate confirmation and support of the American people – something Bill Clinton and his operatives were unwilling to test.
Instead, the new Ukrainian government was given “assurances”. But whatever rubbery definition that term implied was soon made clear enough by Deep State operatives at State, NED and the CIA, who busied themselves fomenting color revolutions in Ukraine not long after Putin ascended to power on January 1, 2000.
In any event, once the machinery of elections and democracy was established after 1991, the resulting electoral maps make one thing abundantly clear: People voted as they spoke.
This is clearly evident in the three maps below. Ukrainian democracy began, matured and ended on the same note. Namely, with an electorate far more sharply divided than even the Red State v. Blue State politics of the US in recent decades.
In 1994 Leonid Kuchma, a former industrial manager from the heavily industrialized, Russian-speaking east (Dnipropetrovsk), campaigned on a platform emphasizing economic ties with Russia and appealed strongly to the Russian-speaking populations in eastern Ukraine and Crimea.
In the second round of that election, Kuchma won about two-thirds of the vote in eastern Ukraine, where ethnic Russians and Russian speakers predominated, and nearly 90% in Crimea, a region with a 70% ethnic Russian population.
On the other side, Leonid Kravchuk, the first president and the incumbent in 1994, was a key figure in Ukraine’s independence movement. He had positioned himself as a guarantor of Ukrainian sovereignty and national identity. He drew his strongest support from western Ukraine, where Ukrainian speakers and nationalist sentiments were dominant, earning 70% to 80% of the vote in those regions
This cavernous split in the electorate never changed. Except unlike the US where a GOP gubernatorial candidate actually made a 47% showing in the deep blue state of New York in 2022, the vote split in the most hard core of the respective regions (dark red and dark blue) was upwards of 90/10 in many localities.
Thus, in the 2004 election the pro-Russian candidate, Viktor Yanukovych, narrowly lost the overall count, even as he dominated overwhelmingly in the east and south with 70% to 90% margins.
2004 Election Results in Ukraine
By contrast, in 2010 Yanukovych retraced the same massive domination of his own Russian-speaking regions in the east and south while striking out in the west. But this time he had sophisticated campaign help from Washington-based election consultants (i.e. the infamous Paul Manafort, who temporarily managed Donald Trump’s red versus blue state campaign in 2016 until he got nailed by the Russophobes in the Deep State). Consequently, the pro-Russian Yanukovych managed to accumulate enough incremental votes to come out on top of the perennial Ukrainian nationalist, Yulia Tymoshenko, in the nation-wide tally.
2010 Election Results in Ukraine
Needless to say, by Washington’s lights the Ukraine election of 2010 had nothing sacrosanct about it because, well, the voters elected the wrong candidate!
In short order, therefore, the neocons led by the detestable Victoria Nuland, who surrounded then Vice-President Joe Biden, fomented the coup against Yanukovych in February 2014. Yet even as they drove him from power and forced him to flee to Moscow, they had no clue as to the tenuous political balance they were upending.
But it didn’t take long to strike the match. In short order the followers of the WWII Hitler ally, Stephan Bandera, who dominated the unelected, Washington-installed government in Kiev, made two destructive moves that amounted to a signal to “let the partition begin”.
The first of these was to abolish Russian as an official language in the Donbass and elsewhere. And the second was the massacre by fire of upwards of 50 pro-Russian trade unionists in a building in Odessa by supporters of the Kiev government.
It was only a matter of time, therefore, before most of the red-colored territories on the maps above declared their independence. It was also in short order that the people of what had been the Russian province of Crimea voted overwhelmingly (80%+) to re-join the Russian Federation. That ended their brief sojourn in the Ukrainian state, which had been Khrushchev’s 1954 gift to the communist thugs in Kiev who had helped him seize power after Stalin’s death.
Also, in short order the new proto-Fascist government in Kiev moved to deeply antagonize its historic neighbor and former fealty overlord in Moscow by seeking to join NATO and launching a brutal, unrelenting war on the breakaway Republics of the Donbas. This onslaught ended up killing upwards of 15,000 civilians during the eight year run-up to Russia’s invasion in February 2022.
Needless to say, Putin was no more interested in having nuclear missiles planted even closer to his own border than was President John Kennedy in October 1962. Nor was he about to countenance the continued slaughter of Russian speakers in the Donbass after Kiev launched a drastically stepped up shelling and bombing campaign on these beleaguered areas one week before the February 24th (2022) invasion.
That is to say, the history was far from black and white. While the Donald frequently does not do his homework—in this case he did know that the “unprovoked” invasion canard is a Deep State prevarication. So last Friday he was not about to be schooled on the matter by the incompetent song and dance man who was sent into the Oval Office by the crowd of UniParty warmongers and GOP RINO’s depicted below for the purpose of shaking-down the current incumbent for another round of weapons and financial wherewithal.
So in response to Zelensky’s Putin-howling, the Donald did not mind blurting out the truth. The Ukraine war had actually been provoked by the Washington war machine and its Senate board of directors pictured below
Of course, now that the truth was let out of the bag on daytime TV there will surely soon be an end to the pointless killing and utterly elicit NATO proxy war on Russia. And with it will come an even more important repudiation of the entire post-1991 neocon perpetuation of an American Empire that should have never been stood up in the first place.
That is to say, the false Uniparty demonization of Putin and Russia will be repudiated even more decisively. That’s because apart from the impending Trump/Putin partition agreement on Ukraine, the map of eastern Europe will not change any time soon.
The whole idea that Putin means to resurrect the old Soviet Empire and that Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Moldova and destinations west are next in line for invasion was made of whole cloth. Its malign purpose was to give NATO a reason for expanding even further east to Russia’s very doorstep and to justify Washington’s call to war in a territory that makes not one damn bit of difference to America’s homeland security.
For crying out loud. The archives of American post-Soviet diplomacy are also crystal clear on this matter. Bush the Elder and his Secretary of State James Baker explicitly promised Gorbachev that in return for the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact and the unification of Germany that NATO would not move “one inch” to the east.
And that pledge was made for screamingly obvious reasons: The Soviet Empire was gone, and the threat of the massive Red Army had vanished. Its troops weren’t even being paid and its tanks and artillery were being melted down and sold for scrap. So ex-paratrooper George HW Bush should have parachuted into Ramstein Air Base in Germany during 1992, declared victory and consigned NATO to a newly created museum of world peace.
Indeed, at the time the very astute “father” of the containment doctrine and the 1949 NATO alliance, Professor George F. Kennan, warned that the perpetuation and expansion of NATO under these circumstances would be folly. When in 1998 the Senate nevertheless voted to extend NATO to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, he clairvoyantly observed,
“I think it is the beginning of a new cold war,” said Mr. Kennan from his Princeton home. “I think the Russians will gradually react quite adversely and it will affect their policies. I think it is a tragic mistake. There was no reason for this whatsoever.” … “It shows so little understanding of Russian history and Soviet history. Of course, there is going to be a bad reaction from Russia, and then [the NATO expanders] will say that we always told you that is how the Russians are – but this is just wrong.“
In a word, risking everything to get Ukraine into an obsolete NATO alliance that was and remains long past its “sell-by” date is surely one of the stupidest acts of foreign policy in all of American history.
And now, on the back of the momentous events of this past weekend, the opportunity has finally come. That is, to name, blame, shame and drive from the seats of power the UniParty wreckers of American democracy, prosperity and liberty who brought the nation to its present parlous estate
So President Trump’s history-changing mission at the present hour is crystal clear. He needs to make War & Peace the preponderant issue on the banks of the Potomac and send the UniParty remnants into spasmodic apoplexy by winning the Nobel Peace Prize for ending this needless war with the same dispatch that Eisenhower did with Korea in 1953.
So doing, he can accomplish the great mission for which is was apparently chosen against all odds by the gods’ of history. That is, to decisively splinter the Uniparty, thereby gathering refugees from both sides of the aisle into a revitalized political force that can enable the the people of Flyover America to reclaim their democracy from the corrupt, self-perpetuating ruling class that arose on the Potomac.
Needless to say, the Donald seems to be on to his mission. When Zelensky issued the following rejoinder to his being cast out of the White House, the Donald was not far behind with a perfectly apt answer.
Ukraine “will never” recognize any Russian annexation of territory it occupies, even if it is to try to secure a peace deal, Zelensky added, and he repeated that he would only accept a ceasefire if it was followed by robust security guarantees that had the confidence of his country’s people.
Though Russia has said it will insist on incorporating territories that it occupies, for Ukraine it would always be “a temporary occupation”, Zelenskyy insisted, even if his country lacks the military muscle to expel Russia from all of the country at the moment.
Zelenskyy said what he wanted “from partners” – a clear reference to the US White House – was for them to remember that Russia launched the full-scale invasion of his country three years ago. He did not want politicians rewriting history, he said, to suggest “that there are two parties in this war and it is vague who the aggressor is”.
Why, yes, there were two parties to this war and the true aggressor was domiciled on the banks of the Potomac, not the Moskva/Oka/Volga.
Trump warned in response with words that have not been heard from the Oval Office since June 1963, when JFK issued his short-lived call to end the Cold War at American University.
“This is the worst statement that could have been made by Zelensky, and America will not put with it for much longer.” He added in reference to Zelensky that “this guy doesn’t want there to be Peace as long as he has America’s backing…”.
“He’s got to say I want to make peace,” Trump said before he departed the White House on Friday. “He doesn’t have to stand there and say about ‘Putin this, Putin that,’ all negative things. He’s got to say I want to make peace. I don’t want to fight a war any longer” [end]
chronicle, its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine
[my illustration: a debris of US ATACMS ballistic missile has fallen on Kursk-Vostochny airfield on November 25, 2023 (Russian defense ministry)]
On March 5, 2022, the wreck of the sailing ship Endurance was found in the depths of the Weddell Sea off the coast of Antarctica. This, of course, was the vessel lost in Ernest Shackelton’s third expedition to Antarctica, which became trapped in the ice and sank in 1915. The story of that expedition is an extraordinary tale of human fortitude – with the Endurance lost to the ice, Shackleton’s crew evacuated to a loose ice flow where they camped for nearly 500 days, drifting about the Antarctic seas, before making a desperate dash across the open ocean in an open 20 foot lifeboat, finally reaching the southern shore of inhospitable and mountainous South Georgia Island, which they then had to cross on foot to reach the safety of a whaling station.
The story itself has an essentially mythic quality to it, with Shackleton’s crew surviving for years on free floating ice floes in the most inhospitable seas on earth. For our purposes, however, it is the story’s coda that is particularly interesting. In Shackleton’s memoirs, he remembered that, upon finally reaching the safety of the Stromness whaling station, one of his first questions was about the war in Europe. When Shackleton first set out on his ill-fated expedition on August 8, 1914, the First World War was less than a week old, and the German Army had just begun its invasion of Belgium. There was little expectation then that the war would proceed as it did, unleashing four years of slaughterous positional warfare that engulfed the continent.
Shackleton, having been adrift at sea for years, clearly did not imagine that the war could still be raging, and asked the commandant of the whaling station “tell me, when was the war over?”
The answer came back: “The war is not over. Millions are being killed. Europe is mad. The world is mad.”
The timing is serendipitous, since the discovery of the Endurance’s wreck, after more than a hundred years, happened to occur only a few weeks after the world again went mad, with the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian War in February 2022. As time continues its inexorable march and the calendar turns yet again, the war is passing through its third full winter. In February, Z-World will be three years old.
Of course, modern communications make it extremely unlikely that anybody could be cut fully out of the loop for years at a time, like Shackleton and his men. Instead of being ignorant as to whether or not the war is over, many of us are exposed on a daily basis to footage of men being killed, buildings being blown up, and vehicles being shredded. Twitter has made it essentially impossible to live under a rock, or on an ice floe, as it were.
If anything, we have the very opposite problem of Shackleton – at least as far as our wartime information infrastructure goes. We are saturated in information, with daily updates tracking advances of a few dozen meters and never ending bombast about new game changing weapons (which seem to change very little), and bluster about “red lines”. This war seems to have an unyielding dynamic on the ground, and no matter how many grand pronouncements we hear that one side or the other is on the verge of collapse, the sprawling front continues to grind up bodies and congeal with bloody positional fighting.
It would seem difficult to believe that a high intensity ground war in Europe with hundreds of miles worth of front could be boring, yet the static and repetitive nature of the conflict is struggling to hold the attention of foreign observers who have little immediately at stake.
My intention here is a radical zoom-out from these demoralizing and fatiguing small scale updates (as valuable as the work of the war mappers is), and consider the aggregate of 2024 – arguing that this year was, in fact, very consequential. Taken as a whole, three very important things happened in 2024 which create a very dismal outlook for Ukraine and the AFU in the new year. More specifically, 2024 brought three important strategic developments:
Russian victory in southern Donetsk which destroyed the AFU’s position on one of the war’s key strategic axes.
The expenditure of carefully husbanded Ukrainian resources on a failed offensive towards Kursk, which accelerated the attrition of critical Ukrainian maneuver assets and substantially dampened their prospects in the Donbas.
The exhaustion of Ukraine’s ability to escalate vis a vis new strike systems from NATO – more broadly, the west has largely run out of options to upgrade Ukrainian capabilities, and the much vaunted delivery of longer range strike systems failed to alter the trajectory of the war on the ground.
Taken together, 2024 revealed a Ukrainian military that is increasingly stretched to the limits, to the point where the Russians were able to largely scratch off an entire sector of front. People continue to wonder where and when the Ukrainian front might begin to break down – I would argue that it *did* break down in the south over the last few months, and 2025 begins with strong Russian momentum that the AFU will be hard pressed to arrest.
Front Collapse in South Donetsk
What stands out immediately about the operational developments in 2024 is the marked shift of energies away from the axes of combat that had seen the most intense fighting in the first two years of the war. In a sense, this war has seen each of its fronts activate in a sequence, one after the other.
After the opening Russian offensive, which boasted as its signature success the capture of the Azov coastline and the linkup of Donetsk and Crimea, the action shifted to the northern front (the Lugansk-Kharkov axis), with Russia fighting a summer offensive which captured Severodonetsk and Lysychansk. This was followed by a pair of Ukrainian counteroffensives in the fall, with a thrust out of Kharkov which pushed the front back over the Oskil, and an operation directed at Kherson which failed to breach Russian defenses but ultimately resulted in a Russian withdrawal in good order over the Dnieper due to concerns over logistical connectivity and an over-extended front. Energies then pivoted yet again to the Central Donbas axis, with the enormous battle around Bakhmut raging through the spring of 2023. This was followed by the failed Ukrainian offensive on Russia’s defenses in Zaporozhia, in the south.
Just to briefly recapitulate this, we can enumerate several operational phases in the first two years of the war, occurring in sequence and each with a center of gravity in different parts of the front:
A Russian offensive across the land bridge, culminating in the capture of Mariupol. (Winter-Spring 2022, Southern Front)
A Russian offensive in Lugansk, capturing Severodonetsk and Lysychansk. (Summer 2022, Donets-Oskil front)
Ukrainian Counteroffensives towards the Oskil and Kherson (Autumn 2022, Oskil and Dnieper fronts)
The Russian assault on Bakhmut (Winter-Spring 2023, Central Front)
Ukrainian counteroffensive on the land bridge (Summer 2023)
Amid all of this, the front that saw the least movement was the southeastern corner of the front, around Donetsk. This was somewhat peculiar. Donetsk is the urban heart of the Donbas – a vast and populous industrial city at the center of a sprawling conurbation, once home to some 2 million people. Even if Russia succeeds in capturing the city of Zaporizhia, Donetsk will be by far the most populous of Ukraine’s former cities to come under Moscow’s control.
In 2014, with the outbreak of the proto-Donbas war, Donetsk was the locus of much of the fighting, with the airport on the city’s northern approach the scene of particularly intense combat. This made it rather strange, then, that at the start of 2024 the Ukrainian Army continued to occupy many of the same positions that they built a decade prior. As intense fighting ebbed and flowed along other sectors of front, Donetsk remained besieged by a web of powerfully held Ukrainian defenses, anchored by heavily fortified urban areas stretching from Toretsk to Ugledar. Early Russian attempts to crack this iron ring open, including an assault on Ugledar in the winter of 2023, met with failure.
The signature operational development of 2024, then, was the re-activation of the Donetsk front, after years of static combat. It is not an exaggeration to say that after years of coagulation, the Russian Army cracked this front wide open in 2024 and Ukraine’s long and strongly held network of urban strongpoints collapsed
Russian Progress on the Donetsk Axis in 2024
The year began with the AFU fighting for its fortress in Avdiivka, where it continued to block the northern approach to Donetsk. At the time, the typical argument that one heard from the Ukrainian side was that the Russian assault on Avdiivka was pyrrhic – that the Russians were capturing the city with exorbitantly costly “meat assaults” that would inevitably sap Russian combat power and exhaust their ability to continue the offensive.
With the full measure of the year behind us, we can definitively say that this is not the case. After the fall of Avdiivka, Russian momentum never seriously slackened, and in fact it was the AFU that appeared to be increasingly exhausted. The Ukrainian breakwater position at Ocheretyne (which had previously been their staging point for counterattacks around Avdiivka) was overrun in a matter of days, and by the early summer the frontline had been pushed out towards the approach to Pokrovsk.
The Russian thrust towards Pokrovsk led many to believe that this city was itself the object of Russian energies, but this was a misread of the operational design. Russia did not need to capture Pokrovsk in 2024 to render it sterile as a logistical hub. Simply by advancing towards the E50 highway, Russian forces were able to cut off Pokrovsk from Ukrainian positions to the south on the Donetsk front, and Pokvrovsk is now a frontline city subject to the full spectrum of overwatch from Russian drones and tube artillery.
By autumn, the Russian advance had put the Ukrainians in a severe salient, creating an unstable chain of positions in Selydove, Kurakhove, Ugledar, and Krasnogorivka. Russia’s advance from Ocheretyne onto the southern approach to Pokrovsk acted like an enormous scythe, isolating the entire southeastern sector of the front and allowing Russian forces to carve through it in the closing months of the year
Russian Operations in 2024, Donetsk Axis
This war has turned the word “collapse” into a devalued buzzword. We are told repeatedly that one side or the other is on the verge of collapse: sanctions will “collapse” the Russian economy, the Wagner uprising of 2023 proved that the Russian political system was “collapsing”, and of course we hear that exorbitant losses have one army or the other on the verge of total failure – which army that may be depends on who you ask.
I would argue, however, that what we saw from October 2024 onward represents a real occurrence of this oft-repeated and discarded word. The AFU suffered a genuine collapse of the southeastern front, with the forces positioned in their strongpoints too attrited and isolated to make a determined defense, Russian fires becoming too heavily concentrated in ever more compressed areas to endure, and no mechanized reserve in the theater available to counterattack or relieve the incessant Russian pressure.
Ukraine does maintain enough drones and concentrated fires to limit a full Russian exploitation – that is, Russia is still not able to maneuver at depth. This gave the Russian advance a particular stop-start quality, leapfrogging from one settlement and fortress to the other. More generally, Russia’s preference to use dispersed small-unit assaults limits the potential for exploitation. We have to emphasize, however, that Russian momentum on this axis has never seriously slackened since October, and many of the key Ukrainian positions were overrun or abandoned very quickly
Ugledar is a good example: the Russians began their final push toward the town on September 24. By September 29, the 72nd Mechanized Brigade began evacuating. By October 1, Ugledar was fully under Russian control. This was a keystone Ukrainian position put in a completely untenable position and it went down in a week. One could argue, of course, that Ugledar held out for years (how then can we say with a straight face that it was captured in a week), but this is precisely the point. In early 2023 Ugledar (with the help of artillery stationed around Kurakhove) successfully repelled a multi-brigade Russian attack in months of heavy fighting. By October 2024, the position was completely untenable and was abandoned almost immediately when attacked.
The Ukrainians did no better trying to hold Kurakhove – previously a critical rear area that served as both a logistical hub and a base of fire for supporting (former) frontline strongpoints like Ugledar and Krasnogorivka. Kurakhove, now under full Russian control, will in turn serve as a base of support for the ongoing Russian push to the west towards Andriivka.
Taking the state of the front holistically, the AFU is currently holding two severe salients at the southernmost end of the line – one around Velyka Novosilka, and another around Andriivka. The former is likely to fall first, as the town has been fully isolated by Russian advances on the flanks. This is not a Bakhmut-like situation, where roads are described as “cut” because they are under Russian fire – in this case, all of the highways into Velyka Novosilka are cut by physical Russian blocking positions, making the loss of the position only a matter of waiting for the Russians to assault it. Further north, a more gentle and less strongly held salient exists between Grodivka and Toretsk. With Toretsk now in the final stages of capture (Ukrainian forces now hold only a small residential neighborhood on the city’s outskirts), the front should level here as well in the coming months.
This leaves the Russians more or less in full control of the approaches to Kostyantinivka and Pokrovsk, which are in many ways the penultimate Ukrainian held positions in Donetsk. Pokrovsk has already been bypassed several miles to the west, and the map portends a re-run of the typical Russian tactical methodology for assaulting urban areas – a methodical advance along the wings of the city to isolate it from arterial highways, followed by an attack on the city itself via several axes
The coming months promise continued Russian advances across this front, in a continuation of what can only be regarded as the collapse of a critical front on the part of the AFU. The Russian Army is advancing to the western border of Donetsk oblast and will ferret the Ukrainians out of their remaining strongpoints at Velyka Novosilka and Andriivka, while pushing into the belly of Pokrovsk. At no point since the fall of Avdiivka have the Ukrainians demonstrated the ability to seriously stymie Russian momentum along this 75 mile front, and the ongoing dissipation of Ukrainian combat resources indicates that little will change in this regard in 2025.
Toehold: The Incredible Shrinking Kursk Salient
Throughout the autumn of 2024 and these early months of winter, as Ukrainian forces were dug out of their dense web of fortified positions in the southern Donbas, their comrades continued to stubbornly hold on to their position in Russia’s Kursk Oblast. The basic shape of Ukraine’s offensive into Kursk is by now well known – billed by Kiev as a gambit to change the psychological trajectory of the war and strike a prestige blow to Russia, the Ukrainian attack had early momentum after achieving initial strategic surprise, but quickly faltered after Ukrainian columns ran into effective Russian blocking positions on the highways out of Sudzha. Efforts to force the roads through Korenovo and Bolshoe Soldatskoe were defeated, and the Ukrainian grouping was left holding on to a modest salient around Sudzha, jutting out into Russia.
Throughout the autumn, Russian counterattacks have focused on chiseling away at the base of the Ukrainian salient – forcing the Ukrainians out of Snagost and pushing them away from Korenovo. The progress here has been incremental, but significant, and by the start of January the “neck” of the Ukrainian salient had been compressed down to a little over nine miles wide, after their initial penetration in the summer had forced a breach of over twenty miles. All told, Ukraine has lost about 50% of the territory that they grabbed in August.
The Russian pressure on the flanks of the salient have amplified many of the qualities that make this position wasteful and dangerous for the AFU. There is limited road connectivity for Ukrainian forces – a problem amplified by the rollback from Snagost, which cost them access to the highway running from Korenovo to Sumy. Apart from a few circuitous side roads, Ukrainian forces only have a single highway – the R200 route – to run material and reinforcements into the pocket, which allows Russian forces to surveil their lines of communication and conduct effective interdiction strikes. The compression of the pocket also greatly narrows the targeting area for Russian drones, tube artillery, and rocketry, and creates more condensed and saturating bombardment
Despite the fact that this position has been profoundly unproductive for Ukraine – being steadily rolled back and having no synergy with other, more critical theaters – the same grouping of Ukrainian units remain here, fighting in a steadily more compressed space. Even more baffling, the Ukrainian grouping consists largely of premiere assets – Mechanized and Air Assault brigades – that could have contributed meaningfully as a reserve in the Donbas over the last three months.
The tactical particulars of the Ukrainian attack are interesting, and there’s ongoing speculation as to its purpose – perhaps it was intended to cover a rotation or withdrawal, to improve tactical positions on the northern edge of the salient, or for inscrutable propaganda purposes. However, these specifics are rather unimportant: attacking out the end of the salient (that is, trying to deepen the penetration into Russia) does nothing to reverse Ukraine’s problems in Kursk. These problems are first, on the tactical level, that the salient has been greatly compressed on the flanks and continues to narrow, and on the strategic level the willful expenditure of valuable mechanized assets on a front that does not impact the critical theaters of the war. More simply, Kursk is a sideshow, and it is a sideshow that has gone wrong even within its own operational logic.
One thing that has been of endless interest, of course, have been the continued rumors of North Korean troops fighting in Kursk. Western intelligence agencies have been adamant about the presence of North Koreans in Kursk. Some people are predisposed to instinctively disbelieve everything that western officialdom says – while I think some skepticism is warranted, I do not automatically assume that they are lying. One recent report lays out what would seem to be a plausible version of this story: that the idea actually originated in Pyongyang, not Moscow, and that a modest number of Korean troops (perhaps 10,000) are embedded with Russian units. The presumption here is that the Koreans hatched the idea as a way to gain combat experience, with the Russians in turn getting auxiliary forces, though of questionable combat effectiveness.
However, it is worth noting that this is not nearly as important as it has been made out to be. Much has been made of the idea that the North Korean presence proves some sort of Russian state of desperation, but this is fairly silly on its face – with more than 1.5 million active personnel in the Russian military, 10,000 Korean troops in Kursk represents a paltry appendage. More importantly, there has been an attempt to portray the North Korean contingent as a major departure point in the war. In particular, the formulation “North Korean troops in Europe” has been used to conjure cold war imagery of communist despotism clawing at the free world
The point, however, is that North Korean troops are presumed specifically to be in Kursk, which is in Russia. This is linked, of course, to the recently concluded mutual defense agreement signed between Moscow and Pyongyang. By attacking into Kursk – widening the front into prewar Russian territory – Ukraine created a defensive combat task for Russia which triggers the possibility of military assistance from North Korea. However much one may wish to link the Korean contingent to Russia’s dreaded “war of aggression”, the force in Kursk is very objectively engaged in the defense of Russian territory, and that makes it possible for Russia to use auxiliary forces – including conscripts and the troops of its allies – to fight there.
Ultimately, then, the presence of North Koreans in Kursk is interesting, but perhaps not very important after all. These troops are not in Ukraine (even under the most maximal definition of the Ukrainian territorial unit), they are not carrying the primary combat load, and they are unequivocally not the problem that the AFU is facing in Kursk. The “big problem” for Ukraine, very simply, is not the presence of some amorphous Korean horde dedicated to spreading Glorious Juche to Europe – it is the loitering of large grouping of their own precious mechanized brigades in a compressed salient, far far away from the Donbas, where they are greatly needed.
Scraping the Barrel: AFU Force Generation
I think it is well understood, of course, that Ukraine faces severe manpower constraints relative to Russia, both in terms of the raw totals of male biomass available – with roughly 35 million fighting aged males in Russia against perhaps 9 million in prewar Ukraine – but also in terms of its capacity to mobilize them.
Ukraine’s mobilization scheme is hampered by both widespread draft evasion (with willingness to serve decreasing as the war has stretched on) and a stubborn unwillingness to draft younger men, aged 18-25. Ukraine is structurally burdened with a deeply imbalanced population structure: there are roughly 60% more Ukrainian men in their 30’s than in their 20’s. Given the relative scarcity of young men, particularly in their early 20’s, the Ukrainian government rightly views this 18-25 year old cohort as a premium demographic cohort that it is loathe to burn away in combat. Given the ubiquity of draft evasion, the refusal to mobilize younger males, and the corruption and inefficiency characteristic of the Ukrainian government, it should come as no surprise when Ukrainian mobilization falters
All of that is to say: Ukraine faces a severe structural disadvantage in military manpower in the aggregate, which is exacerbated by the idiosyncrasies of the Ukrainian mobilization law, ameliorated slightly by the relatively low troop densities and the preponderant power of strike systems in this war.
The argument that I want to make here, however, is that Ukraine’s systemic problems matching Russian manpower have been exacerbated by several developments which specifically became prominent in 2024. In other words, 2024 can and should be marked as the year where Ukrainian manpower constraints became markedly and perhaps irretrievably worse due to specific decisions made in Kiev, and particular developments on the ground.
These are as follows:
The decision to expand the AFU’s force structure through the creation of the “15 series” brigades
The decision to deliberately widen the front and create additional demands for manpower by launching the incursion into Kursk
The stall out of Ukraine’s new mobilization program in the autumn
Accelerating problems with desertion in the AFU
We’ll run through these in order.
An army that is intaking new personnel has to decide between two possible allocations for them. New personnel can be used as replacements to replenish existing frontline units, or they can be used to expand the force structure by creating new units. That much seems fairly obvious, and ideally mobilization will exceed losses and make it possible to do both. Where armies face hard manpower constraints, however – that is, where losses are equal to or greater than intake of men, the decision to expand the force structure can have monumental consequences. The stereotypical example, of course, would be the late-war Wehrmacht, which created premiere new assets in the form of Waffen SS divisions, which received privileged access to recruits and equipment while regular army divisions in the line suffered from a trickle of replacements which could not keep up with losses.
Ukraine, with its garbled force structure, has created a mess through its own attempts to expand its force structure in the face of dwindling strength on the line. Late in 2023, the AFU announced intentions to form an entirely new grouping of brigades – the so-called “15 series”, given their designations as the 150th, 151st, 152nd, 153rd, and 154th Mechanized Brigades. This was followed in 2024 with the appending of the 155th Mechanized Brigade, which was to be trained and equipped in France.
Forming a new grouping of mechanized brigades is essential to the way that Ukraine is presenting its war. Because Ukraine still aims (at least on paper) to recapture all of its Russian held territory, there must always be the illusory possibility of a future offensive, and in order for that illusory possibility to remain, Ukraine must present itself as actively preparing for future offensive operations. Ukraine’s presentation of its own strategic animus – the idea that it is holding the front while it prepares to go back on the offensive – essentially locks it into a program of expanding its force structure
The problem for Ukraine is that the immense pressure on the front makes it essentially impossible for them to properly husband resources the way they would like. Properly training and equipping half a dozen fresh mechanized brigades and holding them in reserve would be very helpful, but they cannot really do this in light of the demands for personnel at the front. These brigades instead become “paper formations” that have a bureaucratic existence, while their organic assets are pulled apart and sucked into the front – stripped down into battalion or company sized elements that can be plugged into sectors of need on the frontline. At the moment, none of the 15 series brigades have seen action as organic units – that is, fighting as themselves.
The decision to allocate personnel to new mechanized brigades (though given stocks of armored vehicles it is questionable whether those designations mean anything) does not necessarily change Ukraine’s manpower balance in the aggregate, but it is certainly an inefficient way to use personnel. To return again to the 155th brigade, one problem noted by Ukrainian analysts was the fact that much of the brigade was formed whole cloth from forcibly mobilized personnel, without a proper cadre of veterans and experienced NCOs – some 75% of the brigade, it turns out, had been mobilized less than two months before arriving in France for training. This fact was certainly instrumental in the mass desertions and the brigade’s poor combat effectiveness.
Given Ukraine’s constraints, the best course of action would undoubtedly be to allocate new personnel and equipment as replacements to build out the depleted veteran brigades on the front lines, plugging in replacements around existing veterans and officers. Kiev, however, prizes the prestige that comes from force expansion and the “shiny new toy” factor of new formations equipped with scarce and valuable equipment like Leopard tanks. These new brigades, though billed as premiere assets, clearly have lower combat effectiveness than existing formations, given their lack of experience, shortage of veteran officers, and low unit cohesion.
In short, Ukraine’s decision to embark on force expansion in the face of significant manpower shortages has exacerbated the problem – both starving veteran units of replacements and concentrating newly mobilized personnel into combat ineffective formations that lack a veteran core, experienced officers, and vital equipment. They have tried, belatedly, to square this circle by parceling out new formations to backstop line brigades, but this is less than ideal – it leads to a patchwork order of battle with lower unit cohesion and a fragmented defense.
Unfortunately, this comes precisely as Ukraine has created additional self-imposed strains on its resources, in particular through its incursion into Kursk. At the moment, elements of at least seven mechanized brigades, two marine infantry brigades, and three air assault brigades are stationed on the Kursk axis. Without going too far into the weeds rehashing Ukraine’s operation here, it’s important to remember that Ukraine – facing extreme pressures on its force generation – voluntarily chose to widen the front into a secondary theater, diverting scarce assets and reducing its own ability to economize forces.
In summary, Ukraine has made deliberate decisions to widen the front and expand its force structure, both of which have been decidedly detrimental to its efforts to economize personnel. This comes precisely as a 2024 effort to ramp up mobilization has come off the rails.
A deadly feedback loop is now at work, with the lack of rotations and the shortage of replacements synergizing to accelerate the burn of Ukrainian personnel. The AFU is unable to regularly rotate units out of combat, and the inadequate flow of replacements causes frontline infantry complements to wear thin. Unable to rotate or reinforce, line brigades resort to cannibalization – scraping support personnel like mortar teams, drivers, and drone operators to fill out frontline positions. This further accelerates losses as brigades fight with thinned out support and fires elements, and makes Ukrainian men more unwilling to enlist – because there is now no guarantee that becoming a drone operator, for example, will save one from being sent to a frontline trench eventually.
Where does this leave us? Ukraine continues to dispose of a very large force, with more than a hundred brigades and hundreds of thousands of men under arms. This force, however, is both substantially outnumbered by the Russian army and in a clear trend of decay. Despite a highly touted attempt to reinvigorate the mobilization apparatus in 2024, the intake of new personnel is clearly too low to offset losses, and the heavy lifting formations in critical sectors of front have seen their strength – particularly in the infantry complements – decline, in some cases to critical levels.
The failure of Ukraine’s 2024 mobilization program has coincided with several strategic choices which have exacerbated manpower concerns – specifically the decision to embark on a program of force expansion even as the AFU voluntarily extended its commitments by opening a new secondary front in Kursk. In other words, Ukraine’s mobilization falls short of its force requirements, and the AFU has also made choices that sabotaged its ability to economize. Units are ground up, replacements come in a paltry trickle, rotations are late or absent, units cannibalize themselves, and angry and weary men desert.
It’s not at all clear that this will lead to a “breaking point”, in the sense that people are anticipating. Ukrainian strike capabilities and the Russian preference for dispersed, leapfrogging assaults limit the potential for grand breakthroughs and exploitation. However, what we saw over the past three months on the southern Donetsk axis offers a preview of what awaits: an exhausted force being steadily rolled back, dug out of its strongpoints, and mauled – covering its retreat with drones but losing position after position. The line holds, until it doesn’t.
End of the Line: ATACMs, JASSMs, and Hazelnuts
Ukraine’s ability to remain in the field depends on a titration of two indispensable resources: first, Ukrainian male biomass, and secondly the critical western weaponry that gives them combat effectiveness. We have evaluated the first: Ukraine is not exactly out of men, but the trends of its mobilization program are poor and personnel shortages are mounting. The trends regarding the second are, if anything, even more foreboding for Kiev.
There are two general dynamics that have emerged, neither of which create an optimistic picture for Ukraine, which we’ll examine in turn. These are as follows:
The delivery of heavy weaponry to Ukraine (tanks, IFVs, and artillery tubes) has largely dried up in recent months.
The west has essentially run out of escalatory weaponry (strike systems) to give, and those systems already given have failed to meaningfully altar the trajectory of the war.
In 2023, building out new mechanized units was the name of the game, with the Pentagon leading a multinational effort to stand up an entire army corps worth of units equipped with Leopards, Challengers, and a whole slew of western IFVs and APCs. When that lovingly assembled grouping bashed its head on a rock in the botched assault on the Zaporizhia line, the United States belatedly and begrudgingly dispatched its own Abrams to backstop the Ukrainian tank force. In 2024, however, deliveries of heavy weapons slowed to a trickle.
The role of the tank in Ukraine has been greatly misunderstood. The vulnerability of tanks to the myriad strike systems of the modern battlefield led some observers to declare that the tank as a weapons system was now obsolete, but this did not really square with the fact that both combatants in this war were eager to deploy as many as possible. Tanks need more critical enablers – more combat engineering, air defense, and electronic warfare support – but they continue to fill an indispensable role and remain an essential item in this war. The failure of Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive showed, if anything, that tanks simply are not “game changing” systems, but mass consumption items – but this has always been the case. The signature quality of iconic tanks like the Sherman and the T34 was that they were numerous
While 2023 was all about building out Ukraine’s mechanized package with tanks, IFVs, and engineering, 2024 has been largely about enhancing Ukraine’s strike capabilities. There have been two separate elements at play – first, the delivery of both air and ground launched systems (most notably the British Storm Shadows and American ATACMs respectively), and secondly the loosening of the rules of engagement to allow Ukraine to strike targets inside pre-war Russia.
This dovetailed, as it turned out, with Ukraine’s operation in Kursk, and in many ways the most direct impact of the Kursk incursion has been to force the west’s hand on the rules of engagement. While Ukraine has long been striking inside Russia with indigenous systems, most notably drones, the White House continued to drag its feet on formal approval for strikes with American systems. By launching a ground assault on Kursk, Ukraine made the decision for them: the United States gave clearance to use ATACMs to support the ground forces in Kursk, and this metastasized into general license to strike Russia with the full range of available systems. This was a poignant reminder that, however we conceive of the proxy-sponsor relationship, Ukraine has some ability to force America’s hand: a classic example of the tail wagging the dog.
In any case, 2024 saw Ukraine and its western backers slowly but surely bash through all the supposed red-lines in this domain: the British breached first with the delivery of Storm Shadows late in 2023, and this was followed by the delivery of ATACMs (with a handful of F16’s to boot), and finally the loosening of the rules of engagement to clear strikes on Russia.
Where does this leave us? There would seem to be three important things to consider.
The west has essentially reached the end of its escalation chain. The only remaining step that they can take would be to supply Ukraine with JASSMs (Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile), which would mark a quantitative but not a meaningful qualitative upgrade to Ukraine’s strike capabilities.
Ukraine’s use of western-supplied strike assets has been dissipated and has not materially improved their situation on the ground.
Russia maintains a dominant strike advantage, both qualitative and quantitative.
Ukraine faces a stark disadvantage in strike capability relative to Russia, in a variety of ways. Russian strike assets are far more numerous and have significant range advantages, but it is also important to take into consideration both Russia’s significantly greater strategic depth and its more dense and relatively unscathed air defense. Unlike Ukraine, which has seen its air defense stretch to the limit with destroyed launchers and a mounting interceptor shortage, Russia’s air defenses have been essentially untouched, as Ukraine has lacked the large numbers of assets required to conduct a proper SEAD/DEAD (Suppression/Destruction of Enemy Air Defense) campaign.
Given this basic calculus, using western strike systems to wage a blow for blow strategic air campaign is bad math for Ukraine. It is generally unwise to engage in a bat fight when your opponent is a bigger man with a much longer bat. Instead, Ukraine’s strike systems should have been leveraged to support ground operations – concentrating strikes spatially and in time to synergize with efforts on the ground. Just as a simple thought experiment, it is not difficult to imagine ATACMs making a difference if they had been available in 2023 and used to saturate Russian rear areas during the assault on the Zaporizhia line – striking in tempo with the mechanized assault to disrupt Russian command and control and prevent reinforcement of critical areas.
Two things need to be noted about the JASSM. First, the JASSM – while offering slightly longer ranges – would essentially serve as a backstop/replacement for the rapidly dwindling ATACMs and particularly the air launched Storm Shadows – instead of Ukraine’s native SU-24s launching Storm Shadows, they would utilize F-16s launching JASSMs. This would not represent a dramatic upgrade in Ukrainian capabilities, but would instead simply serve to maintain a bare minimum Ukrainian strike capability. JASSMs are a replacement for dwindling capabilities, not an augmentation to them.
Secondly, it must be understood that JASSMs are the last stop. We’re now entering the territory, not of artificially constructed red lines, but physical and real limits. Russia has essentially eaten the gifted stocks of ATACMs and Storm Shadows, with little discernable effect on their ability to fight, and JASSMs are the last extant item in the inventories to keep Ukrainian strike capabilities operative. We are at the last rung of the aid ladder.
In the case of JASSMs, however, there are notable downsides for the United States. This is an important case of putting all of one’s eggs in the same technological basket. In 2020, the United States scrapped the development of its conventionally armed Long Range Standoff Missile, making the JASSM – particularly the new extended range variants – the system for the United States, earmarked to play a critical role in future conflicts, particularly in the Pacific. This makes the JASSM an extremely sensitive system, as a centerpiece of American strike capabilities, particularly with the modernization of the Tomahawk system crawling along at a few dozen units per year.
Given the fact that JASSMs are GPS guided, there are real reasons to be reticent about giving Ukraine such a technologically sensitive system. Russian electronic warfare has enjoyed considerable success jamming GPS and disrupting similarly guided American systems. Allowing the Russians to gain familiarity with a keystone American system could wreak havoc on Pentagon war planning – most, if not all of the strike eggs are in this basket, so why let an adversary peek inside?
It’s probable, given what we have seen to this point, that these concerns will ultimately be dismissed and Ukraine will receive a line of JASSMs which will backstop their strike capabilities – but given the size of Ukraine’s F-16 fleet, the scale will be constrained. Furthermore, air launched systems are less optimal for Ukraine, given their dependence on large and easily targeted airfields, in contrast to ground launched systems which are mobile and more easily concealed.
There is also the matter of the new Russian missile system – the now famous Oreshnik, or Hazel Tree. Russia tested the Oreshnik system on a large machining plant in Dnipro on November 21, 2024, which allowed the basic capabilities of the system to be gauged. The Oreshnik is an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile, characterized by its hypersonic capabilities (exceeding Mach-10) and its Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle equipped with six separate warheads, with the potential for submunitions in each. Although the attack on Dnipro was essentially a demonstration which used inert training warheads (that is, without explosive payloads), the missile can be configured with nuclear or conventional warheads
As in the case of the North Korean troops in Kursk, I rather think that the Oreshnik launch was not nearly as important as it was made out to be. The system is expensive and likely impractical for conventional use. I understand the desire to conceive of Oreshnik as a massively powerful conventional weapon – showering its target with half a dozen warheads with the power of an entire flight of Kalibr missiles – but there are several problems with this. The accuracy of the system (the CEP, or “Circular Error Probable” in the technical parlance) is much more consistent with a nuclear delivery system than a conventional one. Furthermore, the problem with using an IRBM for conventional strikes is the danger of miscalculation – foreign adversaries may misinterpret the launch as a nuclear attack and respond appropriately. This is precisely why the Russian government actually alerted the United States to the launch ahead of time – a fine arrangement for a demonstration, but impractical for a weapon that is intended to be used regularly.
We may see another use of the Oreshnik against Ukraine, but ultimately this is unlikely to be a system of consequence in this war. The demonstration in Dnipro was instead likely intended to send a message to Europe – reminding NATO that Russia has the capacity to deliver strikes against European targets that cannot be intercepted. It also serves as a poignant reminder that Europe lacks the equivalent capability, and in essence provides a demonstration of Russia’s ability to launch missiles from far beyond the range of either Ukrainian or European response. The Hazelnut is a tangible reminder of Russia’s strategic depth and strike dominance in Ukraine.
Ultimately, Ukraine will lose the strike game. It’s strike capacity has dwindled, with missiles frittered away in a dissipated air campaign, and though the exhaustion of Storm Shadow and ATACMs stocks can be offset somewhat by JASSMs, Ukraine simply lacks the range or quantities necessary to match Russian capabilities. Needing to do more with less, Ukraine instead diffused its assets and failed to synergize its strikes with ground operations. We are now at the end of the line – after JASSMs, there’s nothing left in western warehouses to upgrade Ukrainian capabilities. Hazelnuts or no, the math on this bat fight is bad for Kiev.
Conclusion: Debellation
Trapped in an endless news cycle, with daily footage of FPV strikes and exploding vehicles, and a dutiful cottage industry of war mappers alerting us to every 100 meter advance, it can easily feel like the Russo-Ukrainian War is trapped in an interminable doom loop which will never end – Mad Max meets Groundhog Day.
What I have endeavored to do here, however, is argue that 2024 actually saw several very important developments which make the coming shape of the war relatively clear. To briefly recapitulate:
Russian forces caved in Ukrainian defenses at depth across an entire critical axis of front. After remaining static for years, Ukraine’s position in Southern Donetsk has been obliterated, with Russian forces advancing through an entire belt of fortified positions, pushing the front into Pokrovsk and Kostayantinivka.
The main Ukrainian gambit on the ground (the incursion into Kursk) failed spectacularly, with the salient being progressively caved in. An entire grouping of critical mechanized formations wasted much of the year fighting on this unproductive and secondary front, leaving Ukrainian positions in the Donbas increasingly threadbare and bereft of reserves.
An attempt by the Ukrainian government to reinvigorate its mobilization program failed, with enlistments quickly trailing off. Decisions to expand the force structure exacerbated the shortage of manpower, and as a result the decay of Ukraine’s frontline brigades has accelerated.
Long awaited western upgrades to Ukraine’s strike capabilities failed to defeat Russian momentum, and stocks of ATACMs and Storm Shadows are nearly exhausted. There are now few options remaining to prop up Ukrainian strike capacity, and no prospect of Ukraine gaining dominance in this dimension of the war.
In short, Ukraine is on the path to debellation – defeat through the total exhaustion of its capacity to resist. They are not exactly out of men and vehicles and missiles, but these lines are all pointing downward. A strategic Ukrainian defeat – once unthinkable to the western foreign policy apparatus and commentariat – is now on the table. Quite interestingly, now that Donald Trump is about to return to the White House, it is suddenly acceptable to speak of Ukrainian defeat. Robert Kagan – a stalwart champion of Ukraine if there ever was one – now says the quiet part out loud:
Ukraine will likely lose the war within the next 12 to 18 months. Ukraine will not lose in a nice, negotiated way, with vital territories sacrificed but an independent Ukraine kept alive, sovereign, and protected by Western security guarantees. It faces instead a complete defeat, a loss of sovereignty, and full Russian control
Indeed.
None of this should be particularly surprising. If anything, it is shocking that my position – that Russia is essentially a very powerful country that was very unlikely to lose a war (which it perceives as existential) right in its own belly – somehow became controversial or fringe. But here we are.
chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia
Abstract: This study analyses the nature and extent of involvement by neo-Nazi and other far-right Ukrainian organisations in the Donbas war (2014-2022) and the Odesa massacre (2014). This issue is highly politicised with contrasting narratives. The Russian and Donbas separatist governments, as well as their media, have contended that Ukraine has been a Nazi or neo-Nazi regime since a fascist coup took place in 2014, while Ukrainian and Western governments and media have maintained that such elements in the Ukrainian far-right were marginal, trivial, even non-existent. The article interrogates the historical record with primary sources in the three most relevant languages—Ukrainian, Russian, and English. The investigation reveals crucial far-right involvement in both the early stages of the war in Donbas and the Odesa massacre. Although the percentage of far-right supporters and fighters in Ukraine was relatively small, they exercised disproportionate influence in the country due to their greater reliance on violence and armed formations. The Russian government, however, exaggerated the role of the neo-Nazis in Ukraine to publicly justify the illegal invasion in February 2022.
Introduction
This study analyses the nature and extent of involvement by neo-Nazi and other far-right Ukrainian organisations during both the Donbas war from its start in April 2014 until the Russian invasion in February 2022 and the Odesa massacre on 2 May 2014. Other than the Maidan massacre in February 2014, these were the most significant and contested cases of political violence in Ukraine from its independence in 1991 to the commencement of the Russia-Ukraine war on 24 February 2022.1 The role of far-right Ukrainian groups during these major episodes of political violence is controversial because they are beset by duelling, self-serving narratives. Russian President Vladimir Putin has claimed that the principal goal of the invasion is to “denazify” Ukraine.2 But well before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, there have been several overt and covert Russian military interventions here, including the annexation of the Crimean peninsula and direct support for pro-Russian insurgencies in the Donbas region, particularly in August 2014 and February 2015. Following the overthrow of the pro-Russian Ukrainian government in February 2014, the United States and other Western governments have consistently opposed Russia’s interventions and backed the current central government of Ukraine. In addition to political support, financial and military assistance has been provided, including training during the Obama presidency.3 To justify this support, the US and other Western governments disputed any real power or even the existence of neo-Nazi armed formations in Ukraine or claimed that they abandoned their far-right elements. Understanding the contested issue of far-right involvement in the Donbas war (2014-2022) and the Odesa massacre (2014) is valuable not only for elucidating intrinsically important historical episodes of political violence but also due to the contemporary relevance given the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war.
This article proceeds in five sections. The first section highlights the contribution of our study by describing the weakness of the extant academic literature and our methodological approach to filling in important lacunae in the research landscape. The second section details the duelling of contemporary narratives over the political violence by the far-right in the war in Donbas and in the Odesa massacre. The third and fourth sections develop qualitative case studies with process tracing to illuminate the role of the far-right in the Donbas war and the Odesa massacre. The fifth section presents the conclusion.
Developing the Extant Literature
Research on the far-right in Ukraine since the Euromaidan has been spotty. Studies on neo-Nazi and other far-right organisations in Ukraine following the Euromaidan have been limited in quantity, quality, and scope. Most studies have been produced by researchers outside academe in partisan think tanks or non-government organisations, as well as by journalists who did not subject their work to peer review.4 Such assessments are more likely to be politically driven and less likely to exhibit methodological rigour, even professionalism. For example, Anton Shekhovtsov, the former leader of the Crimean branch of the pro-Russian far-right Eurasian Youth Union, likened the Trade Union building arson attack during the Odesa massacre on 2 May 2014, to his killing of Colorado potato beetles by collecting them in a box and burning them alive. He directly inferred that this was a massacre with far-right involvement but omitted this in his publications.5 Other works have relied on narrow metrics such as the vote-share of far-right parties in Ukraine, without assessing the violence itself in terms of the perpetrators and effects.6 Some researchers have claimed that the presence of Russian speakers in the Azov regiment and other neo-Nazi-led armed formations is evidence of their relative tolerance and asserted that the Azov regiment had moderated by abandoning its far-right roots.7 Such analyses have tended to uncritically rely on Ukrainian and Western government narratives, accepting their claims at face value.
By contrast, other studies suggest a greater degree of far-right involvement in Ukrainian political violence. One quantitative study found that far-right groups in Ukraine, such as Svoboda and Right Sector, fielded the most violent perpetrators and committed the lion’s share of attacks.8 That study is restricted temporally, however, to the 2014 Maidan protests, which led to the violent overthrow of the relatively pro-Russian government and ultimately spiralled into the civil war in Donbas, the Russian annexation of Crimea, and Russian military interventions in these regions of Ukraine.9 Similarly, qualitative studies have presented evidence in the form of videos, eyewitness testimonies, confessions, and forensic examinations of Svoboda and Right Sector involvement in the Maidan massacre.10 Some other studies have focused on specific aspects of the far-right paramilitary and other armed formations during the war in Donbas.11 One academic publication is specifically devoted to the Odesa massacre, which is called “The Odesa Tragedy,” though it concentrates on the public perceptions rather than the perpetrators and their consequences.12 This list of prior works is intended to be illustrative rather than exhaustive. The research landscape around these issues is growing, but uneven in scope and reliability; a lacuna remains in the literature in terms of evaluating rigorously, comprehensively, and dispassionately the nature and extent of far-right involvement in the Donbas war and Odesa massacre, which matters in terms of our understanding of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and political violence more generally.
To elucidate this understudied topic of the far-right in Ukraine, this study makes substantial use of primary source materials in Ukrainian and Russian—the main languages in Ukraine—as well as in English. This linguistic capability is conducive to a more nuanced, accurate assessment. Methodologically, the two case studies employ qualitative process tracing with the benefit of fluency in all three languages.13 The substantive focus and period of analysis are both tightly bounded; the role of the far-right on the Russian side and in the Russia-Ukraine war since February 2022, as well as during the Euromaidan, are weighty topics explored in our other works but fall outside the scope of this study.
The term “far-right” denotes ultranationalists and both racial and ethnic supremacists in accordance with prior scholarship.14 The term “neo-Nazi” refers to far-right organisations that revamp elements of Nazi ideology, particularly its racial and ethnic supremacism, and use symbols associated with Nazi Germany or their stylised versions. As with Nazis, neo-Nazi organisations represent a form of fascism. Major neo-Nazi organisations in Ukraine during the time period covered by this study include the Social-National Assembly, its paramilitary wing Patriot of Ukraine, the National Corps, the White Hammer, and C14. Also included in the analysis are paramilitary and other armed formations organised and led formally or informally by these neo-Nazi organisations, such as the Azov battalion and regiment. Admittedly, militant groups are known to exhibit ideological heterogeneity.15 Within the political violence literature, a burgeoning area of research emphasises that members of the rank-and-file may be motivated by a variety of factors that diverge from the leadership, leading to a principal-agent problem.16 In this study, we classify organisations as neo-Nazi, or at least neo-Nazi-led, when commanders are neo-Nazi, even if not all members can be presumed to share this exact ideology.
A prominent example is Andriy Biletsky, the leader of Patriot of Ukraine and the Social-National Assembly (SNA), both of which were transformed along with the Azov battalion and regiment veterans into the National Corps Party in 2016. He called the ideology of Patriot of Ukraine and SNA “Social Nationalism.” In a collection of his articles published in 2013, he described that social nationalism, as the name suggests, combines elements of ultranationalism of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists with elements of national socialism and called both radical nationalism and national socialism “great ideas.” He wrote that social nationalism is based on “Sociality, Racism, and Great Power.”17 Specifically, it is based on the ideas that the “white race” is “superior” to other races and is the foundation of the Aryan Ukrainian nation; the Ukrainian nation is a “blood-racial community”; and that “the historical mission of our Nation (…) is to head and lead the White Peoples of the world in the last crusade for their existence, a march against the Semitic-led subhumans.”18 Biletsky openly made antisemitic and racist statements, such as his claim that the Jew is “an economic and political parasite.” He saw “a serious clash of native European peoples with foreign colonisers, mainly of African and Muslim origin” and believed that “an ethnic civil war can be won by the native Europeans only under the banner of the New Right National Revolutions.”19
Biletsky was called the “White Leader” and his writings were published by both SNA and Patriot of Ukraine. He was the first commander of the Azov battalion, which was organised and led by Patriot of Ukraine and SNA in May 2014. Patriot of Ukraine, SNA, and the Azov battalion all used a symbol resembling a stylised swastika and Wolfsangel. Azov commanders and their historian, who himself serves in Azov, called the symbol the “Idea of the Nation” and claimed that it is an ancient Ukrainian symbol, even though it was created in 1992 for the Social National Party of Ukraine (SNPU). The creator of this symbol acknowledged that it was called “Idea of the Nation” to represent the radical nationalist ideas of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). He also admitted that SNPU deliberately chose this symbol with the Latin letter N, instead of the equivalent Ukrainian Cyrillic letter, fully aware of its resemblance to Nazi symbols and association with the swastika for many Ukrainians, in particular in Lviv. As with other extremist groups that rebrand out of political expedience, the Social National Party of Ukraine changed its name to Svoboda in 2014, because the Nazi association was politically inconvenient.20 However, this symbol was retained by the SNA and by Patriot of Ukraine, whose Kharkiv branch split from SNPU because of these changes.21 The Azov battalion and its propaganda magazine, which was named Black Sun, also used the Black Sun symbol, an ideological symbol used by Nazis and various neo-Nazi organisations. In addition, groups and individuals—including Patriot of Ukraine, SNA, National Corps, and Azov battalion and regiment leaders, commanders, and members—have displayed on their uniforms various neo-Nazi and Nazi symbols, such as the swastika, the SS sign, and 88 (Heil Hitler code). These, along with Hitler images, Nazi flags, and Totenkopf have also been seen in the form of patches, photographs, flags, and tattoos.
Although the term far-right incorporates both ultranationalist and neo-Nazi organisations, they are not ideologically identical despite their frequent overlap. This study empirically investigates the role of Ukrainian ultra-nationalist organisations such as Svoboda, the Right Sector, the Ukrainian National Assembly–Ukrainian People’s Self-Defence (UNA-UNSO), and Bratstvo; neo-Nazi organisations such as the Social-National Assembly, Patriot of Ukraine, the White Hammer, and C14; and various other paramilitary formations, special police forces, and National Guard units organised and controlled to various extents by them. These armed units include the Azov battalion and regiment, Dnipro, Donbas, Aidar, Sich, Carpathian Sich, OUN, and St. Mary’s battalions, and the Ukrainian Volunteer Corps. To assess these actors, this study analysed thousands of Russian and Ukrainian primary sources: online recordings of live broadcasts, videos of the armed conflict in Donbas and Odesa, and information posted on websites and social media by far-right organisations, their armed units, and activists. It also analysed media reports in Ukrainian, Russian, and English from diverse outlets such as Ukrainska pravda, Strana, BBC, The Guardian, The Washington Post, The New York Times, YouTube, Telegram, V Kontakte, Facebook, and Twitter. To mitigate bias, the authors analysed the primary source materials rather than relying on secondary interpretations.
The Conflicting Narratives
Assessments of the far-right in Ukraine have been wracked by self-serving and thus unreliable perspectives. Russian and separatist leaders, as well as the media, have described the post-Maidan violence in Ukraine, especially in Donbas and Odesa, as perpetrated by “fascists” and “Nazis” akin to genocidal massacres against Jews, Belarusians, Russians, and Ukrainians during the Holocaust and World War Two.22 They often called the Odesa massacre the “Odesa Khatyn,” a reference to the large-scale massacre of Belarusian villagers in 1943 by the Nazis and an auxiliary police battalion, which was based on a paramilitary formation of the Melnyk faction of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists. Based on this narrative, President Putin and his allies have claimed that invading Ukraine is not only justified, but “inevitable” to counter the “Nazi” or “Neo-Nazi regime” in Kyiv.23 Putin and his government thus declared the “de-Nazification” of Ukraine as a key goal of “the special military operation” launched in February 2022.24 This perspective—in its entirety—is widely assailed in the West.25
By contrast, the Ukrainian and Western governments and the media tend to claim that the far-right—including neo-Nazis—is marginal, even non-existent in Ukraine.26 They argue that since Euromaidan, Ukrainian fighters have almost entirely—if not entirely—shed their far-right elements, particularly neo-Nazi. To this end, it is a common point that the Azov Battalion ceased to be led by the neo-Nazi Patriot of Ukraine, a paramilitary wing of the SNA, since integrating into the National Guard as one of its regiments. Kyiv has stressed that the integration of Azov in November 2014 is proof of its transition to moderation and the absence of extremist fighters post-Maidan.27 Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky awarded “Hero of Ukraine” titles in 2022 to prominent Azov leaders such as regiment commander Denys Prokopenko, deputy commander Sviatoslav Palamar, and senior officer Oleh Khomenko.28 After the commencement of the Russia-Ukraine war in February 2022, many Western media outlets, politicians, government officials, and academics adopted this stance that Azov and other controversial Ukrainian fighters on the far-right had not only abandoned extremist elements, but were heroes against Russia’s illegal invasion.29
The Indexing Theory of political communications emphasises that Western media follow narratives of its governments in covering foreign conflicts, including in post-communist countries.30 In some cases, Western media may have taken their cues directly from the Ukrainian government. After the Odesa massacre on 2 May 2014, the Foreign Ministry of Ukraine blamed the arson attack on provocateurs that were “paid generously by the Russian special services”, and the New York Times immediately adopted the same line that pro-Russia groups may have been responsible for torching the building.31 The Western narrative of the far-right in Ukraine since the Euromaidan is not without controversy. Volodymyr Ishchenko, a Ukrainian sociologist who specialises in the far-right in Ukraine, concludes: “The dominant narrative since Maidan in Ukrainian and much of the Western public spheres has been systematically downplaying the problem” by arguing that “the Ukrainian far-right” is “small and marginal.” He stated that “often, the far-right is just ignored.”32
Notably, Western concerns over far-right fighters in Ukraine were more prevalent before the February 2022 invasion. For example, The Nation described Azov in 2018 as “pro-Nazi, as evidenced by its regalia, slogans, and programmatic statements.”33 In 2019, Radio Free Europe called Azov “far-right.”34 In 2020, The Guardian referred to Azov as a “neo-Nazi extremist movement.”35 Consistent with Indexing Theory, such coverage of the neo-Nazis in Ukraine before the February 2022 Russian invasion overlapped with similar expressions by Western governments. In its 2018 Human Rights report, the US State Department called the political wing of the Azov Regiment “a hate group.”36 In 2019, ambassadors from G7 countries warned against “extreme political movements in Ukraine, whose violent actions are worrying in themselves.” The warnings referred specifically to the Azov movement and its violence during the 2019 presidential elections.37 The US Congress has displayed longstanding ambivalence over its designation of Azov. In 2018, forty Congress members signed a letter to the State Department with the request to designate Azov as a terrorist organisation because of its links to terrorist attacks in multiple countries and its recruitment of neo-Nazis in its ranks.38 A defence appropriations bill amendment was adopted by the entire US Congress in 2018, which banned US government funding and training of the Azov regiment due to concerns over its neo-Nazi views and members. Such concerns had been expressed by American officials for several years after the Euromaidan. The amendment was first unanimously adopted by the US House of Representatives in 2015. Congressman John Conyers put it bluntly, “I am grateful that the House of Representatives unanimously passed my amendments last night to ensure that our military does not train members of the repulsive neo-Nazi Azov Battalion.”39 Under pressure from the Pentagon, however, Congress subsequently removed this first amendment. A similar amendment, proposing a ban on US military assistance to radical nationalist and neo-Nazi organisations, voluntary police, and paramilitary formations under their command, was blocked in Congress in 2014.40
In general, however, American and European governments have been careful not to issue public statements against the far-right in Ukraine or to call attention to it. This hesitancy began after the Euromaidan and became starker following the February 2022 Russian invasion. Indeed, Western governments and media increasingly whitewashed the empirical record to present the Ukrainian far-right formations as categorically moderate in order to boost international support. In June 2024, the US State Department stated that the Azov brigade was eligible to receive US weapons under the “Leahy Law” because it was cleared of human rights violations. It made this determination after claiming that the Azov brigade is a new unit that is not subject to the previous Congressional ban, even though in reality this brigade was created on the basis of the Azov regiment, celebrated the 10th anniversary of the Azov battalion creation as its own anniversary, and is led by original Azov battalion commanders.41 However, a subsequent amendment, which was included in the US defence bill which was passed by the US House of Representatives, specifically stated that “none of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available by this Act may be used to provide arms, training, intelligence, or other assistance to the Azov Battalion, the Third Separate Assault Brigade, or any successor organisation.”42
Such instrumental portrayals of allies are not limited to this conflict. Other recent cases of political violence have also featured public relations campaigns by governments and media to present allies as arguably more moderate than their history and contemporary ideology indicate. For example, in the Syrian war, anti-Assad jihadist organisations allied with the West were euphemistically referred to as “rebels,” sometimes “moderate” ones, even when they fought under the direction of a Foreign Terrorist Organisation, as designated by the US State Department.43 A large body of literature within terrorism studies has found that the labelling of violent perpetrators by governments and media is not value-neutral, but expedient to serve political agendas.44 Particularly in these controversial cases of political violence, academe can play an important role in interrogating the empirical record to adjudicate the truth.45
The Far-Right in the Donbas War
Research within the field of terrorism studies has repeatedly noted the difficulty of determining the ideological beliefs of participants in political violence.46 However, fine-grained knowledge of the organisations can substantially increase confidence. Svoboda and the main organisations that remained within the Right Sector after the Euromaidan were widely understood as far-right for maintaining ultra-nationalist and ethnically supremacist views. They openly described themselves as the natural successors of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), inspired by the notorious OUN leader and Nazi collaborator, Stepan Bandera.47 Along with the UNA-UNSO, these organisations used the “Glory to Ukraine! Glory to the Heroes!” slogan, the official greeting of the Bandera faction of the OUN (OUN-B). This greeting, along with a fascist-style hand salute, was modelled on greetings and salutes of other well-known fascist parties in European history, from the Nazi party in Germany to the Ustashe party in Croatia.48 The Right Sector also adopted its red and black flag from the OUN-B and the UPA, which symbolized Ukrainian blood and soil, which were also pervasive in Nazi ideology and flags.49 But the existence of these symbols alone offers weak evidence of far-right influence in the Donbas war without understanding the cultural and historical context.
The violent overthrow of the Viktor Yanukovych government by means of the Maidan massacre triggered the resurgence of separatism in Donbas.50 After his overthrow in February 2014, far-right parties and organisations in Ukraine expanded and organised their armed formations. Along with Ihor Kolomoisky, an oligarch who became the head of the Dnipropetrovsk regional administration, the Right Sector was instrumental in the formation of the Dnipro battalion in the spring of 2014.51 The Azov battalion, notorious for its use of neo-Nazi symbols in its official insignia, was also organised in the spring of 2014 and led by the SNA and the Patriot of Ukraine with the involvement of the Radical Party. As mentioned, “White Leader” Andrii Biletsky was the first commander of Azov.52 Based in Mariupol, the St. Mary’s battalion was formed in the fall of 2014 and led by the far-right Bratstvo party, which is described by its leader (Dmytro Korchynsky) as the “Christian Taliban.”53 Around this time, the Aidar battalion, nominally subordinated to the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, was formed by the Maidan Self-Defence. One of its platoons was led by the White Hammer, a neo-Nazi organisation belonging to the Right Sector during the Euromaidan. Ilia Kiva, a Right Sector member, was the commander of another volunteer police battalion. A previously convicted criminal with a swastika tattoo became the commander of the Tornado Company, a special police unit. He and seven other members of his company were arrested and convicted for various crimes in the warzone, such as torturing detainees. A Nazi-style flag with a swastika was found in their prison cell.54 These units were all under the formal jurisdiction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the National Guard, or the Ministry of Defence. From the start of their formation, they remained under de facto command of radical nationalist or neo-Nazi organisations. These armed formations sprouted up in the early stages of the conflict in Donbas and were stationed there in an attempt to suppress pro-Russian separatism in the region by force. The Right Sector and the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists actively organised various militia and paramilitary units that were not subordinate to the central government of Ukraine. The Volunteer Ukrainian Corps, the largest paramilitary formation, was formed and led by the Right Sector specifically for the war in Donbas, though it also included battalions in Western Ukraine.55
The paramilitary formations, special police, and National Guard units, organised and led by far-right organisations such as the Right Sector, the Social National Assembly, Patriot of Ukraine, Svoboda, C14, and Bratstvo, constituted a small minority of Ukrainian fighters in the Donbas. Based on reports, we estimate the number of members of radical nationalist and neo-Nazi organisations who served in various far right-led, regular, and other armed formations in the Donbas, at around five thousand. This estimate is conservative and represents just one percent of approximately 400,000 people who participated in this war on the side of the central government.56 Additional metrics of influence, however, are also important to consider.
Despite their relatively small numbers, far-right fighters exercised disproportionate influence in the Donbas civil war, particularly in the early stages before the first direct Russian military intervention in August 2014. Far-right Ukrainian groups proliferated after the Euromaidan because they were eager to fight and were responsible for a disproportionate level of violence, especially against civilians and prisoners of war in Mariupol and Krasnoarmiisk. Far-right organisations and far-right-linked battalions thus played a crucial role in escalating the armed conflict in the Donbas. Svoboda and C14, an avowedly neo-Nazi group affiliated with Svoboda until the summer of 2014, organised and led the Sich battalion from June 2014 onwards.57 Meanwhile, the Right Sector carried out a deadly attack on a separatist checkpoint in Sloviansk on 20 April 2014. While Ukrainian and Western media denied far-right involvement in these events, the evidence to the contrary includes business cards linked to far-right members found after the attack. As well, Ukrainian court proceedings revealed that the weapons used by the Right Sector checkpoint attackers were the same as the snipers from this group who killed and wounded police during the Maidan.58 And two years after the attack on the separatist checkpoint, Dmytro Yarosh—the leader of the Right Sector—admitted his personal involvement in thisattack.59 Oleksandr Turchynov, then acting president of Ukraine, and Kolomoisky’s deputy in the Dnipropetrovsk regional administration, reportedly orchestrated this Right Sector operation, aimed to seize and destroy a television transmitter near Sloviansk, several days after this area was seized by the Strelkov-led armed group of Russian nationalists and Ukrainian separatists.60 This attack by the Right Sector constituted a major escalation of the conflict in Donbas because it broke both the Geneva Agreement signed on 17 April 2014 by Ukraine, Russia, the EU, and the US for a peaceful resolution of the conflict, as well as the Orthodox Easter truce between the Ukrainian government and separatists in Donbas.
Far right-led armed formations were also behind many other violent attacks in the Donbas, further escalating the conflict into a civil war. Videos, media reports, and admissions from commanders and other members of the Azov and Dnipro battalions indicate that they participated in the storming of the district police headquarters in Mariupol on 9 May 2014. Approximately ten people, including at least one protester, were killed.61 Analysis of online video streams, media reports, and Ukrainian government documents, also make clear that Azov played a major role in taking back the city of Mariupol from the control of separatists in June 2014.62 The Dnipro battalion, along with other units, seized civilians in the Donetsk Region to prevent the separatist referendum on 11 May 2014. Videos show them shooting unarmed pro-separatist protesters with Kalashnikovs, killing two locals. The Ukrainian government denied the presence of the Dnipro battalion, but it was confirmed by other credible sources, including admissions by battalion members in videos, like Volodymyr Parasiuk’s statement on social media, who became the People’s Deputy of Ukraine.63
The far-right-led armed formations perpetrated a disproportionate amount of violence in the first few months of the Donbas conflict and thus played a major role in escalating it into a larger civil war because the radical nationalist and neo-Nazi-led groups were far more willing to use force at that time. The Ukrainian armed forces, the security service, police and National Guard units were more reluctant to use force against the separatists in Donbas because their commanders and members were publicly blamed by the new government for attempting to forcefully suppress the Maidan protests—and in particular, for the Maidan massacre. Because the new Maidan government came to power through violence, which included the killing of police and protesters, it lacked legitimacy among many military, police, and SBU members in the Donbas region during this initial period of the conflict. Further, compared to the newly ascendant far-right groups in the aftermath of Euromaidan, the regular Ukrainian armed forces, the security service, the police and National Guard units were known for lower morale and higher desertions. Examples of this included the Donetsk SBU Alfa commander and Luhansk Berkut members, who joined the separatists.64
The relative role of the far-right in the political violence was not constant; it began to decline in the Donbas when newly elected president Petro Poroshenko ordered the Ukrainian military, SBU, police, and National Guard to wield lethal force against the separatists and launch the offensive in June 2014.65 The war was most intense and violent in 2014 and 2015, but the fighting declined significantly following the Minsk Agreements in 2015. However, ultra-nationalist and neo-Nazi fighters continued to exert a non-trivial role, even after the Ukrainian military intensified its operations in Donbas and purported to moderate the far-right fighters. After its formal incorporation into the National Guard of Ukraine, the Azov regiment and its commanders maintained a close organisational and ideological relationship with the neo-Nazi National Corps party. This party was formed by the Azov battalion founder and the first commander on the basis of neo-Nazi SNA and Patriot of Ukraine, and it included many Azov battalion and regiment veterans. The Azov regiment functioned as a military wing of the National Corps, which, in essence, represented overlapping elements of the same Azov movement.66 Indeed, Azov regiment commanders shared a neo-Nazi background and had served in the neo-Nazi-led Azov battalion.67 In other words, the rebranding from “battalion” to “regiment” did not alter the key personnel.68 For example, Azov regiment commander Denys Prokopenko was a member of the neo-Nazi White Boys Club, which was formed by the ultras of the Dynamo Kyiv football club. This group of ultras displayed various Nazi symbols and the Nazi salute on their social media and during football games. His Azov battalion platoon had used the Totenkopf insignia of the Nazi SS.69 Andriy Biletsky became the commander of the Third Assault Brigade, which was created by veterans of the Azov battalion and regiment and activists of his neo-Nazi group, the National Corps.70 In 2023, he stated in an interview with Ukrainian media that the united Azov movement included this Azov brigade under his command along with the Azov regiment and the Kraken unit.71 Such admissions in Ukrainian media highlighting enduring far-right allegiances seldom make their way into the Western press.
Importantly, Azov commanders never publicly renounced their neo-Nazi views, symbols, and organisations. In fact, Azov leaders routinely denied in media interviews that they, their units, and organisations, were neo-Nazi, claiming that the well-documented Nazi symbols were fakes or Russian propaganda. Our research of Ukrainian social media as well as other researchers of the far-right in Ukraine, such as Lev Golinkin and Moss Robeson, have identified over one hundred cases of Nazi and neo-Nazi displays by at least several hundred Azov commanders and other members from 2014 to 2022. This number includes displays on uniforms, patches, photographs, flags, and tattoos of neo-Nazi and Nazi symbols, such as the swastika, SS sign, 88 (Heil Hitler code), Hitler images, Nazi flags, and Totenkopf, and a fascist hand salute.72 The continued relevance of far-right extremism in Azov was evident at the very top. Arsen Avakov, the Minister of Internal Affairs, was personally involved in the Azov battalion formation and its later expansion to a regiment.73 President Petro Poroshenko circulated photographs awarding Ukrainian national medals and commendations to some of the most well-known neo-Nazis in Azov.74 The Nazi connection to Azov was clearly not due to a loss of agency control.
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch reported that Azov was involved in many cases of torture, illegal detention, and disappearances during the war in Donbas.75 The impact of these far-right organisations cannot be measured strictly in terms of the direct physical effects, as terrorism researchers have emphasised in many other contexts.76 Ultra-nationalist and neo-Nazi organisations were instrumental in blocking or “spoiling” a peaceful resolution of the armed conflict in Donbas, another well-established source of leverage for extremists.77 Far-right groups such as the Right Sector, Svoboda, and the Radical Party opposed the adoption by the parliament of Constitutional amendments based on provisions from the Minsk Agreements.78 To this end, Svoboda activists launched a grenade attack on 31 August 2015 in front of the Ukrainian parliament, killing four and wounding dozens of policemen and National Guard troops, which helped to block these amendments, undercutting the logic of implementation.79
Far-right groups also challenged the implementation of President Volodymyr Zelensky’s electoral promise to peacefully resolve the Donbas war.80 In October 2019, Zelensky travelled to a front-line position in Donbas to personally convince the Azov fighters to stop blocking the implementation of the Minsk agreements by withdrawing along with separatist troops from the frontline, as he agreed during the summit with Putin and German and French leaders in Paris. But video of the encounter shows that Zelensky was taunted by activists of this neo-Nazi organisation who flouted his appeal.81 According to the Associated Press, thousands of far-right and nationalist activists shouting the far-right OUN and UPA slogan “Glory to Ukraine. Glory to the Heroes” marched through Kyiv protesting against a peace plan for eastern Ukraine.82
The radical flank threatened Zelensky for implementing Minsk on other occasions as well. In May 2019, Dmytro Yarosh, the former Right Sector leader, publicly threatened to hang the new Ukrainian president on a tree if he fulfilled his election promise of a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Donbas.83 In 2021, Yarosh, the commander of the Ukrainian Volunteer Army organised by the Right Sector, was appointed Adviser to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Valerii Zaluzhnyi.84 In the same year, videos, photos, and Ukrainian media reports show police standing down while neo-Nazi and other far-right protesters attacked the Office of the President of Ukraine and painted swastikas on its walls.85 The Russia scholar Stephen F. Cohen concluded that Zelensky “can’t go forward with peace negotiations” because “crazy fascist movements” in Ukraine “literally threatened his life.”86 Although far-right peace rejectionists posed political problems for Zelensky, they were also known to work closely with him. An activist of the neo-Nazi Patriot of Ukraine and former deputy commander of the Azov regiment was appointed the acting head of the National Police of Ukraine during the Poroshenko presidency and then became a deputy minister of Internal Affairs during the Zelensky presidency.87 Prime Minister Oleksii Honcharuk spoke at a “veterans party” organised by a front organisation for the neo-Nazi C14 with a stylised swastika of a neo-Nazi rock band behind him.88 The advisory council of the Ministry of Veteran Affairs under Zelensky retained activists of this neo-Nazi group, including those charged with assassinating the prominent opposition journalist, Oles Buzyna, in 2015.89
In sum, ultra-nationalist and neo-Nazi militant organisations were deeply involved on the side of the central government throughout the Donbas conflict. Although representing a small fraction of Ukrainian forces throughout the conflict, they committed a disproportionate amount of violence, particularly before President Poroshenko ordered the Ukrainian military to increase its use of force against the separatists in the summer of 2014. The much-touted absorption of Azov and other extreme right-wing militia under the official Ukrainian National Guard, police, and military command did not change either their command or their ideological displays. Many of the fighters worked closely with the Kyiv political leadership across administrations, when not using de facto veto power to block peaceful resolution of the conflict in this region.
This interpretation departs from others that rely strictly on vote-share as the proxy for far-right influence. The influence of the far-right in Ukraine after the Maidan far exceeded its electoral support and membership. Svoboda and Right Sector leaders each won only one percent of the votes in the snap presidential elections in May 2014. In the parliamentary elections of October 2014, Svoboda narrowly failed to clear the five percent threshold, receiving 4.7 percent. The Right Sector fared even worse, receiving only two percent of the votes. Ruslan Koshulynsky, one of Svoboda leaders, who was backed by the Right Sector, OUN, and C14, received only 1.7 percent of the votes in the 2019 presidential elections, while Svoboda won 2.2 percent of the votes in the 2019 parliamentary elections. These weak electoral results indicate the limited national support of the far-right in Ukraine, but not its outsized role in the Donbas conflict.
The Far-Right in the Odesa Massacre
Other than the Donbas war, the Odesa massacre was the most significant and deadly instance of political violence after the Maidan massacre in Ukraine since its independence in 1991 until the Russia-Ukraine war in February 2022. The violence took place on 2 May 2014, between a “United Ukraine” rally and pro-Russian separatists, carried out with petrol bombs, gunfire, and rock-throwing, which ended up killing 48 people, primarily separatist protesters.90 The vast majority of the fatalities took place in the Trade Unions House, where 42 separatist activists and employees (forty men, seven women, and one boy) were killed when the building was set ablaze.91
This massacre contributed to the escalation of the separatist conflict in Donbas into the civil war. As noted, the massacre was presented by separatist and Russian leaders and the media as akin to the Nazi massacre of Khatyn in Belarus, and many Odesa separatists joined the separatist forces in Donbas. Despite the importance of this massacre, the International Advisory Panel of the Council of Europe, among other international authorities, has noted that the Ukrainian government failed to properly investigate and prosecute those responsible.92 To ascertain the role of far-right groups in the Odesa massacre, a broad range of key information resources can be analysed, including videos and recordings of live broadcasts of the political violence (and the lead-up to it); published reports; primary source media in Ukrainian, Russian, and English; statements of responsibility; interviews; and testimonies from participants and eyewitnesses on both sides, as well as police commanders.
On 1 May 2014, the day before the mass violence, separatists protested in Odesa to demand a referendum on the newly installed government in Kyiv, which they blamed on far-right activists and Western interference.93 Based on testimonies from a special parliamentary commission report in the immediate aftermath of the May 2014 massacre, Ukrainian and regional government officials planned to use far-right activists and the Maidan Self-Defence to suppress the separatists in the Odesa region and disperse those who were encamped near the Trade Union building.94 Extensive evidence indicates that the police and firefighters were ordered by their superiors to stand by and not interfere during attacks. For instance, a special plan to deal with mass disturbances launched by the Odesa regional police was not authorised, reportedly because of decisions at the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ top level.95 Similarly, top regional officials of the police and other law enforcement agencies were ordered to attend a meeting with their national counterparts before and during the start of the clashes.96 The presence of Andriy Parubiy and five hundred Maidan Self-Defence members, who deployed from Kyiv to Odesa on the eve of the massacre, further suggests that the violent dispersal of the separatist camp by far-right activists was orchestrated by top government leaders.97 Parubiy was a founder and leader of the neo-Nazi Patriot of Ukraine, a paramilitary wing of the Social National Party of Ukraine in the 1990s. He was the head of the Maidan Self-Defence during the Euromaidan and headed the National Security and Defence Council at the time of the Odesa massacre. The State Bureau of Investigations of Ukraine launched a criminal investigation into Parubiy for the Odesa massacre soon after he was replaced as the ex-head of the Ukrainian parliament following the early parliamentary elections in 2019.98 One of the participants acknowledged in an Israeli documentary that he engaged in “provocations” in the Odesa massacre under the command of Parubiy, who had issued orders to attack the separatists and “burn everything.” We assess this acknowledgement as credible because he was filmed along with Maidan activists in the left wing of the Trade Union building in Odesa when the deadly fire began to burn the central entrance.99 He and five other Georgian ex-military members also stated in American, Italian, and Israeli TV documentaries, Russian media interviews, on Macedonian TV, in depositions to Berkut lawyers for the Maidan massacre trial, and in testimonies to the Prosecutor General Office of Belarus for the Prosecutor General Office of Ukraine investigation that their groups of Georgian, Baltic, and far-right-linked Ukrainian snipers received weapons, payments, and orders from specific Maidan and Georgian politicians, including Parubiy, to engage in a mass killing of police and protesters.100 The Maidan massacre trial subsequently confirmed their identities.101
A march led by the Right Sector and football ultras on 2 May 2014 was used as cover to implement this plan to destroy and burn the separatist tent camp.102 The SBU in the Odesa Region received advanced information about planned “provocations” and violent clashes between football ultras and pro-Russian separatists on game day between the Odesa and Kharkiv teams on 2 May. A special train transported hundreds of football ultras from Kharkiv to Odesa.103 Football ultras in Ukraine were notorious for displaying neo-Nazi symbols and expressing neo-Nazi slogans during games and have historically linked up with the Right Sector and other far-right organisations, as during the Maidan protests.104 Both the Right Sector and football ultras in Odesa and Kharkiv were dominated by the neo-Nazi Social National Assembly/Patriot of Ukraine, which organised the Azov battalion right after the Odesa massacre.
Odeska Druzhyna, a small separatist organisation in Odesa, was present among other separatist activists based on evidence from internet streams, videos, testimonies of participants and eyewitnesses, and special parliamentary commission reports.105 Odeska Druzhyna used identifiable red tape labels, and were not Right Sector agent provocateurs, as the Russian media and separatists claimed. However, the Ukrainian government and media also mischaracterised the involvement of Odeska Druzhyna by overstating its coordination with other separatist activists.106 The balance of forces was asymmetric; the groups of numerically superior activists of the Right Sector from Odesa and Kharkiv led by the neo-Nazi Social National Assembly/Patriot of Ukraine, far-right football ultras, and Maidan Self-Defence units from Odesa and other regions attacked the separatists. Numerically disadvantaged, the latter took cover behind a police cordon.107
An Odeska Druzhyna activist was filmed shooting in the direction of the far-right protesters with an AK-74-type assault rifle.108 The official investigation and the May 2 Group maintained that a Right Sector activist was killed by this separatist group member with a 5.45mm calibre bullet.109 However, leaked forensic medical expert reports describe a 5.65mm calibre bullet extracted from his body.110 This bullet reportedly disappeared and reappeared during the investigation. The fact that it did not match bullet samples of any legally registered firearms, the weak sound of the gunshots, as well as the lack of a recoil observed in the videos of the shooting, also suggest that the far-right protester may not have been killed by this separatist, who maintained that the weapon seen in the video was a movie studio prop.111 The killing of the Right Sector activist was not visible in that video nor in any videos of clashes. The investigation and various videos at the scene did not reveal the exact time or location of his killing, or the direction of the gunshot. An Odesa deputy police chief, who was filmed around the time of this killing before he himself was wounded, stated that he saw snipers in camouflage shooting from the second floor of a hotel there. He relayed that they killed this Right Sector activist and the second protester in order to blame the separatists for their killing and provoke a violent response against the separatists.112 Videos filmed before and after his shooting suggest that the second pro-Maidan activist was killed around the same time in the same area during the violent clashes with separatists and shooting from a Kalashnikov-type weapon by one of the separatists.113 However, the government forensic examination determined that he was killed by a bullet from a pneumatic sport-type weapon. Nobody was charged with his killing, and the moment and other circumstances of his killing remain not publicly known.114
In the clashes that followed the killings of these two pro-government protesters, four separatist protesters were killed and many other separatist protesters, policemen and at least one local journalist were wounded. The forensic examination determined that three separatists were killed with hunting ammunition.115 A pro-government activist was filmed shooting with a hunting rifle in the direction of these separatists.116 This pro-government activist was later identified by the Minister of Internal Affairs as a Right Sector member.117 The government investigation charged him with killing at least one of the separatists. However, he was released from arrest and his trial was suspended indefinitely because of threats by the Right Sector and other far-right activists against judges during his trial.118 Evidence—including a recorded phone call—revealed that the events on May 2nd were coordinated by the Odesa regional administration official in charge of law enforcement agencies, and involved the participation of the Maidan Self-Defence commander, Right Sector activists, football ultras, and Maidan Self-Defence units.119 They attacked and burned the tent camp of various separatist organisations, whose activists and supporters then escaped to the nearby Trade Union building and tried to barricade the main entrance doors. Videos, internet streams, and testimonies of eyewitnesses show that attackers threw Molotov cocktails and burning tyres at the main entrance, set the entrance doors on fire, and blocked other exits. Videos, recorded calls to firefighters, and eyewitness reports reveal that the fire and thick smoke started from those burning tyres and Molotov cocktails thrown at the main entrance.120 The evidence does not support claims that the separatist protesters killed in this incident were Russian citizens, that they burned themselves by throwing Molotov cocktails from the roof of the Trade Union building or inside of the building, or that there was no far-right involvement in their killing.
After initial denials, the May 2 Group admitted that the deadly fire started at the main entrance. The May 2 Group was a nominally independent association of mainly journalists, formed after the massacre supposedly to investigate it. It was created with the involvement of the Governor of the Odesa region who was appointed by Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko within a week of the massacre.121 This governor represented not only the central government, but also the Kolomoisky’s oligarchic network, which financed the Right Sector volunteers from the Volyn Region in the Azov battalion and the Right Sector-led Dnipro battalion.122 The Azov battalion was organised by the neo-Nazi SNA and its paramilitary wing, Patriot of Ukraine, which dominated the Right Sector in Odesa and Kharkiv, a few days after the Odesa massacre. But the May 2 Group still claimed that it was impossible to determine who started the fire because both sides were throwing Molotov cocktails. However, there is no public evidence of Molotov cocktails being thrown by separatists at the main entrance; on the contrary, numerous videos feature the far-right protesters throwing Molotov cocktails and burning tyres into the Trade Union building at that time.123
Within Ukraine, far-right activists—particularly from the Right Sector and the SNA— were notorious for using tyres and Molotov cocktails to burn public buildings. Forensic examinations in the government investigation, recordings of radiocommunications by SBU Alfa group, an unpublished admission by a far-right activist to a French journalist, and an academic study determined that the Trade Union headquarters in Kyiv were burned by Maidan activists, including far-right ones, in order to stop its takeover by the Security Service of Ukraine Alfa unit.124 Far-right protesters also started fires by burning tyres in the Inter TV channel building and threatened to burn down the parliament of Ukraine, the Lutsk City Council, the Sviatoshyn District Court that heard the Maidan massacre case, the Constitutional Court, and Inter and 112 Ukraina TV channels buildings by placing tyres next to their entrances.125 Prior usage of the same tactics by the far-right increases the likelihood of their direct involvement.
Analysis of online video streams, government investigation findings, May 2 Group reports, forensic medical examinations, eyewitness testimonies, and other evidence strongly indicate that 42 people perished as a result of the fire, smoke, and from trying to jump from the upper floors of the Trade Union building with far-right activists beating them on the ground and blocking the exits.. The victims were unarmed and included mainly separatists, their supporters, and several employees, in particular women, who were in the building at the time.126 Some of the strongest evidence of far-right involvement in the arson attack comes from the far-right itself, in the form of credit claiming. A growing body of research within terrorism studies focuses on credit claiming. An important finding is that perpetrators are far more likely to deny responsibility for their attacks than to take credit for ones that they did not perpetrate.127 This is particularly true when the targets are civilians. Nonetheless, many extremist groups do claim credit for civilian attacks.128 Statements posted by the Right Sector, the SNA, and the neo-Nazi Misanthropic Division on their websites and social media sites admitted the involvement of their organisations in the massacre. The Right Sector celebrated on its website the massacre by describing it as “another bright page in our fatherland’s history.” Claiming responsibility for the slaughter, it wrote: “In the first minutes of the battle, the ‘Right Sector’ activist was seriously wounded in the stomach. Several more PS [Right Sector] activists received injuries of varying degrees of severity. However, this did not prevent the rest of the PS fighters, together with football fans, from repelling the attack of pro-Russian provocateurs, and as a result, they successfully countered attempts to seize buildings in Odesa. Standing shoulder to shoulder, Odesa activists, football fans and ‘Right Sector’ fighters defeated the forces of pro-Russian mercenaries. Order has been restored in Odesa.”129 The Right Sector—which was dominated in Odesa and Kharkiv by the Social National Assembly and its paramilitary wing, Patriot of Ukraine—and the neo-Nazi Misanthropic Division (which joined the Azov battalion after the massacre) admitted on the social media platform V Kontakte and in other public statements that the fire was set deliberately.130
The official investigation of the Odesa massacre was a farce. Nobody was found guilty of perpetrating this mass killing. As noted, the Right Sector shooter was initially arrested but then released. Only separatists were among those arrested and tried for the Odesa massacre. The Odesa massacre trial of separatists resulted in their acquittal by a local court. The Ukrainian court based its decision on the lack of evidence in support of prosecution charges. Even the verdict acknowledged both the weakness of the investigation into the perpetrators and the role of Parubiy and other government officials.131 The Council of Europe and the UN Special Commission reports also noted the destruction of evidence.132 A report by the special commission of the Council of Europe found that the Ukrainian government’s investigation of the Odesa Massacre was inadequate, politically selective, and featured the falsification of evidence, despite the existence of video footage showing who threw the Molotov cocktails at the building.133
The Ukrainian media cited SBU sources that a far-right activist, who headed the Right Sector in Odesa during the Odesa Massacre, was a secret agent of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and that he and far-right associates were paid by SBU to attack opposition politicians, threaten judges, and conduct other illegal actions.134 This would be consistent with the fact that the Right Sector was not investigated for the Odesa massacre even though the Right Sector publicly admitted involvement. His secret collaboration with SBU would also be consistent with the fact that SBU and the Prosecutor General Office refused to charge him for killing another person in Odesa in 2018. Moreover, in 2020, the SBU gave this far-right activist the status of a victim in this case, even though he streamed this killing on his social media account and the police investigation determined that he was the killer.135 In this sense, the Odesa massacre was not entirely anomalous; it featured post-Maidan far-right involvement with apparent support from high-level political leaders in a corrupt country where investigations and media have inconsistently followed the evidence.
Conclusion
This study assesses the role of the far-right in post-Maidan Ukraine, specifically, in the Donbas war and the Odesa massacre. These were two of the biggest episodes of political violence in the country leading up to the February 2022 Russian invasion. This area of research is worth close investigation because it represents intrinsically important episodes of political violence that have not attracted objective analysis based on available primary sources in Ukrainian, Russian, and English. Investigating the role of the far-right is also timely because the far-right in Ukraine is riven by duelling, self-serving contemporary narratives.
The predominant narratives propagated by governments and the mainstream media in Ukraine, the West, Russia, and separatist-controlled Donbas, concerning the role of the far-right in the war in Donbas and the Odesa massacre, have evidently been partisan. Contrary to the Russian government, separatists, and associated media, the Ukrainian government and military are not Nazi or even neo-Nazi. There were no neo-Nazis among the upper echelon of the Ukrainian government. President Zelensky is certainly not a Jewish neo-Nazi. He tried to placate and mainstream the far-right for political reasons, but has no observable personal affinity to that extreme ideology.
Neo-Nazis constituted only about one percent of the Ukrainian forces before the Russian invasion in 2022, and there is weak electoral support for neo-Nazi parties throughout the country. Similarly, the policy of glorification of the OUN-UPA, their leaders, such as Stepan Bandera, and the adoption and use of their “Glory to Ukraine! Glory to the Heroes!” greeting by the state and the military, including Zelensky, do not make Ukraine a Nazi state. While the OUN and the UPA were far-right terrorist organisations, which collaborated with Nazi Germany and perpetrated the mass murders of Jews, Poles, and Ukrainians, they were not Nazis. Ukrainians could not join the Nazi party because Hitler and other Nazi leaders regarded Ukrainians as racially inferior and opposed independence of Ukraine while also dismissing the attempt to create even a puppet state by the Bandera faction of the OUN in Lviv shortly after the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union. Thus, Putin cannot credibly justify the illegal invasion in February 2022 as a war to “de-Nazify” the “Nazi regime.”136 The power of the far-right and the glorification of the OUN and the UPA in Ukraine under Poroshenko and Zelensky were exaggerated and exploited by the Russian leaders to justify the invasion.
But the West’s efforts to whitewash the far-right in Ukraine also rests on empirically shaky grounds. Despite their relatively small numbers militarily and politically, the far-right in Ukraine exercised outsized power. The far-right organisations, volunteer battalions, and paramilitary units organised and led by them played, along with separatists and Russian nationalists, a significant role in starting and escalating the incipient civil war in the Donbas and then impeding its peaceful resolution. Even after technically integrated into the official Ukrainian forces, Azov and other far-right groups continued to harbour extremist views. Often brandishing the same extremist symbols, the core leaders and members remained and even ascended within the police, military, and security services during the Donbas war. Western media accounts have drawn heavily from biased Ukrainian sources, including “official” investigations and the May 2 Group. Across numerous primary sources in Ukrainian, Russian, and English, we find evidence that the Right Sector, Social-National Assembly, its paramilitary wing Patriot of Ukraine, and groups of far-right football ultras from Odesa and Kharkiv played a critical role in the Odesa massacre against separatist protesters on 2 May 2014. Neo-Nazi SNA/Patriot of Ukraine, which dominated the Right Sector in Odesa and Kharkiv, organised the Azov battalion right after this massacre.
Despite the lack of international consensus over the definition of terrorism, a common interpretation is the use of violence by non-state actors aimed at creating fear for political ends, particularly when the targets are civilians.137 Depending on one’s definition, some attacks within the episodes of political violence covered in this study, such as the Odesa massacre, could, therefore, arguably be classified as terrorism. What is clear is that neither of the duelling narratives accurately captures the role of the far-right. This study has helped to fill that research lacuna by making use of substantial primary source materials in Ukrainian, Russian, and English. Besides the Maidan massacre, the Donbas war and the Odesa massacre are the two most substantial episodes of political violence from the independence of Ukraine in 1991 to the February 2022 illegal Russian invasion [end]
Ivan Katchanovski is a Ukrainian and Canadian political scientist. He teaches at the School of Political Studies and the Conflict Studies and Human Rights Program at the University of Ottawa in Canada. He specialises primarily in politics, conflicts, political violence, and the far right in Ukraine. His academic publications include five books, 21 articles in peer-reviewed journals, and twelve book chapters.
Max Abrahms is a professor of public policy and political science at Northeastern University, where he specialises in international security. Abrahms has published extensively in leading academic and popular outlets such as International Organization, International Security, International Studies Quarterly, Security Studies, Comparative Political Studies, Harvard Business Review, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, New York Times, Washington Post, USA Today, Newsweek, The Atlantic, and Los Angeles Times.
I disagree with the authors on two points
Stepan Bandera & friends were Nazis. How can the authors identify some neo-Nazis in modern Ukraine, while not regarding their historical mentors as Nazis ? Before WW2, they were praising either Adolf Hitler or Benito Mussolini. Their political project was authoritarian, racist and criminal. They were dreaming of ethnic cleansing. De facto during WW2, they committed mass killing of Jews and Poles.
Terrorism is not restricted to non-state actors. Terrorism is violent action to terror civilians, in order to achieve a common political goal. This is not even a value judgement, but Hiroshima bombing was terrorism. The Israeli targeting and mass killing of civilians, in the prospect of ethnic cleansing in Gaza, is terrorism.
chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia
Endnotes
Arel, Dominique and Jesse Driscoll. 2023. Ukraine’s Unnamed War. Before the Russian Invasion of 2022. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Black, J.L. and Michael Johns (Eds.). 2016. The Return of the Cold War: Ukraine, the West and Russia. Abingdon: Routledge; Hahn, Gordon M. 2018. Ukraine Over the Edge: Russia, the West and the “New Cold War.” Jefferson, NC: McFarland Books; Katchanovski, Ivan. 2016a. “The Separatist War in Donbas: A Violent Break-up of Ukraine?” European Politics and Society, 17 (4), 473-489; Kudelia, Serhiy. 2016. “The Donbas Rift.” Russian Politics & Law, 54 (1), 5-27; Pikulicka-Wilczewska, Agnieszka and Richard Sakwa (Eds.). 2015. Ukraine and Russia: People, Politics, Propaganda and Perspectives. Bristol: E-International Relations; Sakwa, Richard. 2015. Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands. London: I.B.Tauris. ↩︎
Danciu, Gabriela-Cătălina. 2023. “A Perspective on Justifying the Ukraine–Russia War. Elements Of Propaganda.” International Journal of Social and Educational Innovation, 10 (19), 224-239; “Address by the President of the Russian Federation” (2022, February 24) http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843. ↩︎
Black, J.L. and Michael Johns (Eds.). 2016. The Return of the Cold War: Ukraine, the West and Russia. Abingdon: Routledge; Katchanovski, Ivan. 2023a. “The Maidan Massacre Trial and Investigation Revelations and Their Implications for the Ukraine-Russia War and Relations.” Russian Politics, 8 (2),181-205. ↩︎
See, for example, Colborne, Michael. 2022. From the Fires of War: Ukraine’s Azov Movement and the Global Far Right, Stuttgart: Ibidem; Davidzon, Vladislav. 2023. “The Search for Neo-Nazis Under the Bedsheets Reflects American Progressive Hysteria, Not Ukrainian Reality.” Tablet Magazine, July. ↩︎
Umland, Andreas. 2019. “Irregular Militias and Radical Nationalism in PostEuromaydan Ukraine: The Prehistory and Emergence of the “Azov” Battalion in 2014.” Terrorism and Political Violence, 31 (1), 105- 131. ↩︎
Umland, Andreas. 2020. ‘The Far Right in Pre- and Post-Euromaidan Ukraine: From Ultra-Nationalist Party Politics to Ethno-Centric Uncivil Society.’ Demokratizatsiya, 28 (2), 247-268. ↩︎
Ishchenko, Volodymyr. 2016. “Far right participation in the Ukrainian Maidan protests: an attempt of systematic estimation.” European Politics and Society, 17 (4), 453-472. ↩︎
Hahn, Gordon M. 2018. Ukraine Over the Edge: Russia, the West and the “New Cold War.” Jefferson, NC: McFarland Books; Katchanovski, Ivan. 2016b. “The Maidan Massacre in Ukraine: A Summary of Analysis, Evidence, and Findings.” In The Return of the Cold War: Ukraine, the West and Russia, eds. J.L. Black and Michael Johns. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 220-224; Katchanovski, Ivan. 2020. “The far right, the Euromaidan, and the Maidan massacre in Ukraine.” Journal of Labor and Society, 23 (1), 5-29; Katchanovski, 2023a; Katchanovski, Ivan. 2023b. “The “Snipers’ Massacre” on the Maidan in Ukraine.” Cogent Social Sciences, 9 (2); Katchanovski, Ivan. 2024. The Maidan Massacre in Ukraine. London: Palgrave Macmillan. ↩︎
Khalil Mutallimzada and Kristian Steiner, (2022), Fighters’ motivations for joining extremist groups: Investigating the attractiveness of the Right Sector’s Volunteer Ukrainian Corps. European Journal of International Security, 1–23. Ilmari Käihkö, (2018), A nation-in-the-making, in arms: control of force, strategy and the Ukrainian Volunteer Battalions. Defence Studies 18:2, 147–166; Tetyana Malyarenko and David J. Galbreath, (2016), Paramilitary motivation in Ukraine: beyond integration and abolition, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 16:1, 113–138. ↩︎
Hale, Henry E., Oxana Shevel and Olga Onuch. 2018. “Believing Facts in the Fog of War: Identity, Media and Hot Cognition in Ukraine’s 2014 Odesa Tragedy.” Geopolitics, 23 (4), 851-881. A poll commissioned for that study found that 44% of Ukrainians believed that this mass killing was committed by provocateurs from Russia, while 11% blamed pro-Russian residents of Odesa. Ten percent of the respondents said that the Odesa massacre was perpetrated by “Ukrainian nationalists from Odesa” and 3% by “pro-Ukrainian” residents of Odesa. ↩︎
Van Evera, Stephen. 1997. Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. ↩︎
Griffin, Roger with Matthew Feldman (Eds.). 2003. Fascism: Critical Concepts in Political Science. London: Routledge. ↩︎
Brahimi, Alia. “Ideology and terrorism.” The Oxford handbook of terrorism (2019): 298. ↩︎
See, for example, Jadoon, Amira, Andrew Mines, and Daniel Milton. “Targeting quality or quantity? The divergent effects of targeting upper verses lower tier leaders of militant organizations.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 67, no. 5 (2023): 1007-1031; Schram, Peter. “Self-managing terror: Resolving agency problems with diverse teams.” Games and Economic Behavior 130 (2021): 240-257; Abrahms, Max, and Philip BK Potter. “Explaining terrorism: Leadership deficits and militant group tactics.” International Organization 69, no. 2 (2015): 311-342; Popovic, Milos. “The perils of weak organization: Explaining loyalty and defection of militant organizations toward Pakistan.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 38, no. 11 (2015): 919-937. ↩︎
Biletsky 2013; Biletsky, Andriy. “Nedochytanyi Franko.” Patriot Ukrainy, (2008). https://web.archive.org/web/20101120085407/http://patriotukr.org.ua/index.php?rub=stat&id=409. Also, please note that the ADL has adopted the spelling of “antisemitism” instead of “anti-Semitism.” After reviewing the history and consulting with other leading experts, they determined that this is the best way to refer to hatred toward Jews, so we have adopted the same spelling convention here. ↩︎
Clarke, Colin P. “The Terrorist Diaspora.” Testimony, House Homeland Security Committee Task Force on Denying Terrorists Entry into the United States (2017). ↩︎
Boyd-Barrett, Oliver. 2016. Western Mainstream Media and the Ukraine Crisis: A Study in Conflict Propaganda. New York: Routledge. ↩︎
Some researchers and Zelensky have cited the presence of Russian-speakers in the Azov regiment and other neo-Nazi-led armed formations as evidence of their relative tolerance and moderation and argued that the Azov regiment distanced itself from its far-right roots. (See Umland 2019; “Zelensky refutes Russian propaganda claim that Azov Regiment is ‘neo-Nazi.’” The New Voice of Ukraine (2022, May 2), https://news.yahoo.com/zelensky-refutes-russian-propaganda-claim-131100438.html. However, these formations were organized and led by neo-Nazi organizations, which had a racist ideology and cast themselves as defenders of the White race. For this reason, they included not only large numbers of Russian speakers from Ukraine but also neo-Nazis from Russia, Belarus, and the Western countries, such as Australia, Sweden, and the US. ↩︎
“Ukraine war: Ros Atkins on… Putin’s false ‘Nazi’ claims.” BBC, (2022, March 26) https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-europe-60853404; Five Azovstal defenders were awarded the title of Heroes of Ukraine. Svidomi, (2022, October 3). https://svidomi.in.ua/en/page/five-azovstal-defenders-were-awarded-the-title-of-heroes-of-ukraine. Loyd, Anthony. “‘Nonsense’: Heroes of Mariupol Denied US Weapons Over neo-Nazi Past.” Times, (2024 May 2). https://www.thetimes.com/world/russia-ukraine-war/article/nonsense-heroes-of-mariupol-denied-us-weapons-over-neo-nazi-past-kwnr0r0pw; “Boris Johnson Praises Nazi Azov Battalion,” YouTube. (2024, May 23). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_6g7i-4wswk. There was similar systematic and politically motivated whitewashing of the far-right in Ukraine in Wikipedia, especially, after the Russian invasion. A small number of Wikipedia editors systematically whitewashed neo-Nazi and other far-right parties, organizations, and their leaders, such as Azov regiment, Patriot of Ukraine, Svoboda, National Corps, the OUN, the UPA, Stepan Bandera, Roman Shukhevych, etc. They removed or deliberately excluded scholarly studies and other evidence of the extremist ideology and involvement in mass murder of the far-right, such as the Maidan and Odesa massacres, the Holocaust, and the Lviv pogrom in Ukraine and smeared in biographical entries scholars and other experts whose studies show such ideology and political violence by the far-right in Ukraine. (See, for example, Azov Brigade, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Azov_Brigade; Patriot of Ukraine, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patriot_of_Ukraine; 2014 Odesa clashes, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014_Odesa_clashes; Far-right politics in Ukraine, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Far-right_politics_in_Ukraine. They included editors who misrepresented the Holocaust in Poland using similar tactics in Wikipedia, which is unreliable but widely accessed source, compared to academic studies (Grabowski, Jan, and Shira Klein. 2023. “Wikipedia’s Intentional Distortion of the History of the Holocaust.” Journal of Holocaust Research 37 (2): 133–90). ↩︎
Katchanovski, Ivan and Alicen Morley. 2012. “Politics of US Television Coverage of Post-Communist Countries.” Problems of Post-Communism, 59 (1), 15-30. ↩︎
Bhatia, Michael. 2008. “Fighting words: naming terrorists, bandits, rebels and other violent actors, ”Third World Quarterly, 26 (1), 5-22; Schmid, Alex P. 2012. “The revised academic consensus definition of terrorism.” Perspectives on Terrorism, 6 (2), 158-159; Ganor, Boaz. 2002. “Defining terrorism: Is one man’s terrorist another man’s freedom fighter?” Police Practice and Research, 3 (4), 287-304. ↩︎
Although the focus of this analysis is on the portrayal of the far-right in Ukraine, a related narrative dispute has been over whether to characterise the conflict in the Donbas as a civil war. The Ukrainian and Western governments and the media described the war in Donbas as an interstate war between Russia and Ukraine or a hybrid war while denying that there was a civil war. By contrast, the Russian and Donbas separatist governments and associated media denied any Russian military involvement in the war and called it a purely civil war. The majority of scholars and datasets such as the Correlates of War Project and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program classified it as a civil war or an intrastate conflict, while also noting the Russian military interventions in Donbas prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in See, for example, Arel and Driscoll 2023; Black and Johns 2016; Hahn 2018; Katchanovski 2016a; Kudelia 2016. ↩︎
Abrahms, Max. “What terrorists really want: Terrorist motives and counterterrorism strategy.” International Security 32, no. 4 (2008): 78-105. ↩︎
Rossolinski-Liebe, Grzegorz. 2014. Stepan Bandera: The life and afterlife of a Ukrainian nationalist. Stuttgart: Ibidem. ↩︎
Yeomans, Rory, (Ed.). 2016. The Utopia of Terror: Life and Death in Wartime Croatia. Rochester: University of Rochester Press; Katchanovski, Ivan. 2015. “Terrorists or National Heroes? Politics and Perceptions of the OUN and the UPA in Ukraine.” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 48 (2-3), 217-228. ↩︎
Rudling, Per Anders. 2011. “The OUN, the UPA and the Holocaust. A Study in the Manufacturing of Historical Myths.” Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies, #2107, Center for Russian and East European Studies, Pittsburgh University. ↩︎
See Katchanovski, 2016a; Katchanovski, Ivan. 2006. Cleft Countries: Regional Political Divisions and Cultures in Post-Soviet Ukraine and Moldova. Stuttgart: Ibidem. ↩︎
Umland, Andreas. 2019. “Irregular Militias and Radical Nationalism in PostEuromaydan Ukraine: The Prehistory and Emergence of the “Azov” Battalion in 2014.” Terrorism and Political Violence, 31 (1), 105-131. ↩︎
Mueller, John E. 2006. Overblown: How politicians and the terrorism industry inflate national security threats, and why we believe them. New York: Simon and Schuster; Abrahms, Max. 2006. “Why terrorism does not work.” International Security, 31 (2), 42-78. ↩︎
Kydd, Andrew, and Barbara F. Walter. 2002. “Sabotaging the peace: The politics of extremist violence.” International Organization, 56 (2), 263-296. ↩︎
“Zvit tymchasovoi slidchoi komisii Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy z pytan rozsliduvannia faktiv zahybeli hromadian u mistakh Odesi, Nariupoli, a takozh inshykh mistakh Donetskoi ta Luhanskoi oblastei Ukrainy.” (2014, September 5). Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy. http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=52134↩︎
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