Analista senior di l'intelligenza in u campu di a gestione di i risichi di sicurezza, sรฒ un anzianu tenente detective รจ ufficiale di l'intelligenza in l'agenzie di u Statu francese. A bona pronuncia hรจ ะะธะบะพะปะฐะน ะงะธะฝะบัะธะฝะธ, in russu
est militant du GUD ร Paris et ร l’instar de Cรฉsar Aujard, cogneur de Jeunesse Boulogne, les hooligans du Paris Saint Germain
(Rรฉseaux sociaux)
Fin juin, dรฉbut juillet 2023, sous le pseudonyme du Pushka [pistolet, en Russe], il s’affiche dans le bataillon Revansh, branche militaire de lโorganisation nazie Tradytsiya ta poryadok [Tradition et ordre], aux cรดtรฉs du Parisien Aujard et du Lyonnais Delange. Croix celtique sur l’รฉpaule droite, il porte aussi dans le dos un tatouage qui dit en Ukrainien
Quandu Allan Duchรฉzeau gode di l’ospitalitร corsa (rete suciale)
Des sources sรปres nous apprennent qu’il a รฉtรฉ briรจvement militaire du 2e REP (rรฉgiment รฉtranger de parachutistes), qui tient garnison ร Calvi, Corsica. รtait il insatisfait de l’hospitalitรฉ corse ou rรฉfractaire ร la discipline imposรฉe par ses caporaux russes ? Le fait est qu’il dรฉserta.
Le 25 octobre 2023, StreetPress publie un article au sujet des petits camarades de Cรฉsar, le premier de la presse franรงaise, aprรจs ce blog, qui rรฉvรจle son patronyme : Aujard. Nous y apprenons que Duchรฉzeau รฉtait surnommรฉ Dox, quand il secondait ร Paris le leader nazi Marc de Cacqueray Valmรฉnier
Le 20 fรฉvrier 2024, le GUD parisien publie la photographie de deux militants dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine
(Rรฉseaux sociaux)
Duchรฉzeau nous apparaรฎt, premier ร gauche, le 25 octobre 2024, dans un groupe international du bataillon Revansh, dont lโรฉtendard exprime visiblement de lโanimositรฉ pour le communisme
Richard Schermann (TrackANaziMerc)
Parmi ses camarades, lโAutrichien Richard Schermann, qui perpรฉtue lโidรฉologie dโun cรฉlรจbre artiste peintre, sera dรฉnazifiรฉ dans la rรฉgion de Zaporojie le 20 janvier 2025
(Rรฉseaux sociaux)
Le Franรงais continue de bien se porter et figure ร gauche, sur cette image diffusรฉe le 4 septembre par le Toulousain Cafard Misanthrope, un pseudonyme. On ne le prรฉsente plus, Gwendal Delange est ร droite.
chronique alphabรฉtique et nรฉcrologique de lโengagement franรงais dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas
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chronique en Anglais, censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia
une saga franรงaise, entre Ukraine et Lyon, oรน apparaissent aussi des morceaux de SS de la division Charlemagne et plus rรฉcemment, Alice Kerviel, dite Cordier. L’affaire Deranque rรฉvรจle comme la France est infectรฉe par le pรฉtainisme, en particulier parmi les soutiens d’Israรซl ou de l’Ukraine, deux thรฉรขtres d’opรฉrations oรน l’Occident tente de ralentir son dรฉclin
En 2025, une nouvelle unitรฉ de Franรงais combattant pour lโUkraine sโest structurรฉe autour dโun noyau de nรฉonazis, ayant pour objectif dโattirer des recrues. Parmi ces volontaires, dโanciens militaires. StreetPress les a identifiรฉs
En Ukraine, les volontaires franรงais pro-ukrainiens et pro-russes se partagent lโimaginaire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Les premiers se revendiquent des collabos de lโAllemagne nazie, les seconds de lโescadrille mythique ยซ Normandie โ Niรฉmen ยป
deux jours aprรจs le 10e anniversaire de la dรฉbรขcle politique et sรฉcuritaire du 13 novembre 2015, une messe cรฉlรจbre ร Verdun lโancien dirigeant fasciste de lโรtat franรงais
ce 11 novembre 2025 est lโoccasion de souligner comme la faรงon dont lโEurope sacrifie les conscrits ukrainiens mobilisรฉs de force rappelle le spectaculaire carnage de la 1รจre guerre mondiale
cโest par lโagence cosaque de presse PIKA, depuis la Rรฉpublique populaire de Lougansk, que le 2 avril 2024, lโataman Nikolaรฏ Diakonov lance un message ร destination de la France
ce papier est le premier des grands mรฉdias franรงais qui sโattaque ร la question des militants nazis franรงais dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, le nouveau danger quโils prรฉsenteront ร terme pour la sรปretรฉ intรฉrieure
oรน nous apprenons que le nazi franรงais Allan Duchรฉzeau, camarade de Cรฉsar Aujard dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, รฉtait surnommรฉ Dox, quand il secondait ร Paris le leader nazi Marc de Cacqueray Valmรฉnier
en Anglais, les indices de la prรฉsence dโopรฉrateurs occidentaux, en particulier Franรงais, pris au piรจge en mars 2022 ร Marioupol, dont les forces russes achevรจrent la libรฉration en mai
Dehee, Benjamin, nรฉ le 13 novembre 2003, dit Benson,
est blessรฉ ร la tรชte, hospitalisรฉ, quand il surgit le 26 octobre 2024 dans le chat de la chaรฎne Telegram TrackANaziMerc. Il ne pouvait pas mieux tomber.
Il est incitรฉ ร y venir dรฉfendre l’honneur de son unitรฉ, quand est publiรฉe l’identitรฉ d’un camarade, le militant nazi turc Eyรผp Gรถrkem Yilmaz, qui a perdu ses papiers sur le champ de bataille
Autoportraits d’un suprรฉmaciste franรงais
Comme preuves de sa bravoure et de sa contribution au rayonnement de la France, il nous envoie quelques images via la messagerie cryptรฉe.
Leur humiliation date du 11 octobre, quand une attaque surprise mis en dรฉroute des volontaires รฉtrangers du 16e bataillon de fusiliers, alors attachรฉ ร la 60e brigade mรฉcanisรฉe, que le commandement ukrainien avait disposรฉs en dรฉfense dans un secteur prรฉsumรฉ calme de la rรฉgion de Zaporojie. Mais des รฉlรฉments de l’infanterie navale russe les assaillirent aprรจs avoir accompli une marche forcรฉe.
Pour leur baptรชme du feu, les รtrangers ont fui en dรฉsordre et abandonnรฉ quantitรฉ d’effets personnels. Au moins un autre Franรงais fut blessรฉ dans les mรชmes circonstances, le militant islamophobe Loรฏc Perdriel
Son hommage ร la division SS franรงaise Charlemagne
Nous ne connaissons alors que son indicatif radio : Benson. Ses interventions dรฉvoilent un Franรงais chauvin et suprรฉmaciste blanc, tellement raciste qu’il s’en prend mรชme ร ses camarades colombiens
Eyรผp Gรถrkem Yilmaz est ร gauche, fait le signe des Bozkurtlar [Loups gris]
Il apparaรฎt sur une image sans doute antรฉrieure ร leur dรฉfaite du 11 octobre, quand tous deux furent blessรฉs, que son camarade nazi turc publie le 7 novembre
Benson รฉcrit le 17 que les tranchรฉes lui manquent et ses photos rรฉtrospectives illustrent sa grande culture nazie, avec les insignes Idel-Ural [Volga-Oural, en Tatar, supplรฉtifs des SS de 1942 ร 1945] et Russkaya osvoboditelnaya armiya [Armรฉe de libรฉration russe, ROA, auxiliaires russes de la Wehrmacht entre 1943 et 1945].
Le second est souvent portรฉ aujourdโhui par les membres du RDK, des militants nazis russes rรฉfugiรฉs en Ukraine aprรจs le coup dโรtat de 2014, qui opรฉrent sous commandement du renseignement militaire ukrainien (HUR)
Un drapeau aux couleurs nationales ukrainiennes affiche aussi lโinsigne de la division SS Galizien (1943-1945) et la mention manuscrite du 16e bataillon de fusiliers.
Dรฉcidรฉment nostalgique, il partage la vidรฉo du discours ร Paris, le 5 mars 1944, du Hauptsturmfรผhrer [capitaine SS] belge Lรฉon Degrelle. En matiรจre artistique, il est fan de Death in June, groupe britannique dโapocalyptic folk, dont la figure de proue, Douglas Pearce, homosexuel passionnรฉ dโoccultisme, est fascinรฉe par lโiconographie nazie
(Death in June)
De l’aveu mรชme de Pearce, Death in June est un hommage ร Ernst Rรถhm, chef homosexuel du Sturmabteilung [dรฉtachement dโassaut, formation paramilitaire des dรฉbuts du nazisme en Allemagne], jusquโร sa dรฉnazification par les SS, lors de la purge dรฉclenchรฉe au matin du 30 juin 1934. Car c’est bien connu, Adolf Hitler a trahi le national-socialisme [un militant du GUD dans les annรฉes 80]
La caduta degli dei [Les Damnรฉs], Luchino Visconti, 1969
Sur les rรฉseaux sociaux, Benson suit Cyrille Amoursky, chroniqueur de LCI. Et pas Xavier Tytelman ? Il semble รชtre arrivรฉ en Ukraine en juin 2024. Y est il pour dรฉfendre la LibERtร et la dรmoCRatIe ? Ich frag mich, warum ?
Le 6 fรฉvrier 2025, toujours trรจs proche du militant nazi turc Eyรผp Gรถrkem Yilmaz, il me fait parvenir cette image et un message tropโฆ personnel, pour รชtre publiรฉ ici, exprime son dรฉsir de me faire subir des outrages de caractรจreโฆ sexuel
Le militant nazi franรงais dรฉploie ici le drapeau blanc ร bande bleue (belo-sine-belyy flag), conรงu ร Berlin en fรฉvrier 2022 par des opposants en exil, dont le militantisme est bien ingrat, car en Russie, le taux d’approbation de Vladimir Poutine est de l’ordre de 80%
Mes craintes sont dโun autre ordre. En marge de cette posture, je le soupรงonne dโรชtre aussi dotรฉ de capacitรฉs hรฉtรฉrosexuelles. ร cet รฉgard, je garde mon sang-froid et traite la problรฉmatique sur le ton adoptรฉ par des employรฉs de presse franรงaise, quand ils abordent le projet de Donald Trump de nettoyage ethnique ร Gaza : stรฉriliser Benson ? Pourquoi pas ?
Le club OSINT TrackANaziMerc doit dรฉployer des trรฉsors d’ingรฉniositรฉ pour l’identifier. Nous sommes enfin rรฉcompensรฉs par la dรฉcouverte d’un document d’une grande richesse, en terme de renseignement. Coucou, Benjamin, nul ne suscite ma curiositรฉ en vain
Il s’appelle Dehee, Benjamin Dehee, รฉtait รขgรฉ de seulement 18 ans, quand il apparut dans une vidรฉo que l’influenceur Hayssam Hoballah publia le 12 mai 2022, dans la sรฉrie Et maintenant on fait quoi ? Le synopsis disait
Nous sommes en colรจre. Et ร juste titre: notre belle France est devenue rance et ce qu’il en reste est bradรฉ au bรฉnรฉfice d’intรฉrรชts supra-nationaux
(Capture d’รฉcran)
Dehee รฉtait prรฉsentรฉ comme
jeune citoyen tรฉmoin de la misรจre dans les campagnes en Bretagne
https://youtu.be/BzLwXSfXaKs
Interlude musical : chanson รฉcrite par Pascal Sevran
Breton, vivant et travaillant alors ร Paris, il tรฉmoigna en particulier de ce qu’il avait dรฉjร vรฉcu dans l’est de la France, Bas-Rhin, Meuse et Argonne. Disparition des services publics, rarรฉfaction des emplois, l’ancien Gilet Jaune รฉtait rรฉvoltรฉ par la prรฉcaritรฉ et la misรจre qu’il y avait observรฉes, causรฉes en effet par des politiques nรฉo-libรฉrales dictรฉes par des pouvoirs supra-nationaux. Bigre, voila qui me le rend sympathique. Hรฉlas, sa personnalitรฉ รฉtait dรฉjร plus compliquรฉe
(Capture d’รฉcran)
Au travers de son intervention, il me rappelle un autre nazi breton de ce panthรฉon : Karel Cherel Salzburg. En Allemagne des annรฉes 30, Dehee aurait en effet intรฉgrรฉ le Sturmabteilung. Il affirma que les deux tiers des habitants de ces campagnes vivent de la criminalitรฉ, notamment ceux d’origine immigrรฉe. Les mรฉchants y รฉtaient Turcs ou Hells Angels allemands. Il en concluait
il faut commencer ร se dรฉbrouiller sans le rรฉgime rรฉpublicain, tout seul, ร se communautariser
Je pense qu’en rรฉalitรฉ, le contexte social lui offrait l’opportunitรฉ d’exprimer des pulsions politiques plus ou moins antรฉrieures ร ces douloureuses expรฉriences.
Par anticipation, il ajouta en ce mois de mai 2022 que la misรจre poussait de jeunes Bretons, Alsaciens ou Lorrains ร devenir mercenaires, ร se battre contre les Russes pour seulement โฌ800 par mois. Sublimation.
Il est encore en vie le 29 juin 2025, aprรจs le partage sur des rรฉseaux sociaux de la mise ร jour ci-dessus, se signale sur Telegram. Verbatim
รa manque de mise a jour tout รงa je suis arrivรฉ bien avant. Vos petits amis n’รฉtait pas si vaillant courant 2022. J’attends toujours un combat รฉquitable de la part des katsap [boucs, Russes]
(Capture d’รฉcran)
Il dit vrai, fut interrogรฉ par LCI au soir du 26 aoรปt 2022. Il รฉtait alors ร Kharkov et sa formation militaire allait commencer le lendemain.
Sur ses motivations, il voulait gagner de l’expรฉrience. Nous avons bien compris que les fascistes franรงais cherchent en Ukraine l’expรฉrience du combat avec armes de guerre.
Un combat รฉquitable ? Dehee devra commencer par apprendre qu’en cas de guerre, lร bas ou ici, le combat efficace, plutรดt qu’รฉquitable, est l’objectif de toute pensรฉe stratรฉgique ou tactique. Interlude musical
https://youtu.be/t847b97PgN8
Commรฉmoration ร Moscou le 9 mai 2025 de la victoire de lโUnion soviรฉtique sur les armรฉes fascistes europรฉennes
Sa derniรจre publication sur les rรฉseaux sociaux date du 1er novembre 2025, oรน il prรฉsente aussi un dernier autoportrait
Membres divers de lโorganisation nazie Azov, des camarades ukrainiens รฉcrivent son รฉpitaphe le 7 et partagent cette autre image
(Rรฉseaux sociaux)
Selon la photographie quโil publia lui-mรชme en octobre dโune liste dโattente pour le Valhalla, il aurait รฉtรฉ alors dans les rangs du 1er bataillon de la 4e brigade de garde nationale, Rubizh [Frontiรจre]
Il aurait donc รฉtรฉ tuรฉ en Rรฉpublique populaire de Donetsk, dans le secteur de Dobropolie, au nord de Krasnoarmeรฏsk, que les Ukrainiens appellent Pokrovsk mais que les Russes sont sur le point de libรฉrer
(2e corps d’armรฉe, Khartiia)
Volodymyr Zelenskyy visita le 4 novembre le quartier gรฉnรฉral des troupes atlantistes engagรฉes dans ce secteur et dรฉcora des soldats du 4e bataillon de la mรชme brigade, dont lโinsigne perpรฉtue lโhรฉritage des SS.
La mort de Benjamin Dehee suscite les jours suivants une rafale dโhommages dโanciens camarades, dont le nazi turc Eyรผp Gรถrkem Yilmaz, alors affectรฉ ร la 3e brigade dโassaut, รฉmanation de lโorganisation nazie Azov dans lโarmรฉe rรฉguliรจre ukrainienne
(Rรฉseaux sociaux)
Ces images montrent encore une fois lโรฉpanouissement des militants nazis franรงais dans une Ukraine qui par lโentremise de la Russie, constitue aussi une plateforme dโaccรจs prรฉmaturรฉ au Valhalla.
Dehee fut bien tuรฉ en Rรฉpublique populaire de Donetsk, dans le secteur de Krasnoarmeรฏsk. Mais il opรฉrait dans les rangs du bataillon nazi ukrainien Revansh
(Captures d’รฉcran)
Son image nous apparaรฎt en janvier 2026 sur le mรฉmorial mural du bataillon. Deux autres Franรงais, Arnaud Ghizzo et Hippolyte Payen, y sont aussi honorรฉs.
chronique alphabรฉtique et nรฉcrologique de lโengagement franรงais dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas
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Pruvate ร truvร me, canaglia di lโOTAN, pruvate solu
chronique en Anglais, its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine
chronique en Anglais, censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia
une saga franรงaise, entre Ukraine et Lyon, oรน apparaissent aussi des morceaux de SS de la division Charlemagne et plus rรฉcemment, Alice Kerviel, dite Cordier. L’affaire Deranque rรฉvรจle comme la France est infectรฉe par le pรฉtainisme, en particulier parmi les soutiens d’Israรซl ou de l’Ukraine, deux thรฉรขtres d’opรฉrations oรน l’Occident tente de ralentir son dรฉclin
En 2025, une nouvelle unitรฉ de Franรงais combattant pour lโUkraine sโest structurรฉe autour dโun noyau de nรฉonazis, ayant pour objectif dโattirer des recrues. Parmi ces volontaires, dโanciens militaires. StreetPress les a identifiรฉs
En Ukraine, les volontaires franรงais pro-ukrainiens et pro-russes se partagent lโimaginaire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Les premiers se revendiquent des collabos de lโAllemagne nazie, les seconds de lโescadrille mythique ยซ Normandie โ Niรฉmen ยป
deux jours aprรจs le 10e anniversaire de la dรฉbรขcle politique et sรฉcuritaire du 13 novembre 2015, une messe cรฉlรจbre ร Verdun lโancien dirigeant fasciste de lโรtat franรงais
ce 11 novembre 2025 est lโoccasion de souligner comme la faรงon dont lโEurope sacrifie les conscrits ukrainiens mobilisรฉs de force rappelle le spectaculaire carnage de la 1รจre guerre mondiale
cโest par lโagence cosaque de presse PIKA, depuis la Rรฉpublique populaire de Lougansk, que le 2 avril 2024, lโataman Nikolaรฏ Diakonov lance un message ร destination de la France
ce papier est le premier des grands mรฉdias franรงais qui sโattaque ร la question des militants nazis franรงais dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, le nouveau danger quโils prรฉsenteront ร terme pour la sรปretรฉ intรฉrieure
oรน nous apprenons que le nazi franรงais Allan Duchรฉzeau, camarade de Cรฉsar Aujard dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, รฉtait surnommรฉ Dox, quand il secondait ร Paris le leader nazi Marc de Cacqueray Valmรฉnier
en Anglais, les indices de la prรฉsence dโopรฉrateurs occidentaux, en particulier Franรงais, pris au piรจge en mars 2022 ร Marioupol, dont les forces russes achevรจrent la libรฉration en mai
a รฉtรฉ surnommรฉ ainsi par ses camarades en raison de la taille de son nez, se prรฉnomme en rรฉalitรฉ Noรซl. Il est originaire de lโouest de la France, est installรฉ en Ukraine depuis 2015, vers la fin de ses รฉtudes
(Captures d’รฉcran)
Il sโest engagรฉ en 2025 et lโarmรฉe ukrainienne le prรฉsente dans une vidรฉo publiรฉe le 5 janvier 2026, pour stimuler lโenrรดlement de volontaires รฉtrangers dans le 423e bataillon de drones, Skifski hryfony [Griffons scythes], qui opรจre dans la rรฉgion de Zaporojie, alors que lโarmรฉe russe se rapproche inexorablement de la ville. Les รchos parlent de lui le 6 et la propagandiste ukrainienne Alla Poedie (cf. David Piguet) lโinterroge longuement le 10. Cโest elle qui dรฉvoile involontairement son prรฉnom. Il nโest pas pilote au front mais ingรฉnieur, ร la base du bataillon.
chronique alphabรฉtique et nรฉcrologique de lโengagement franรงais dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas
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chronique en Anglais, its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine
chronique en Anglais, censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia
une saga franรงaise, entre Ukraine et Lyon, oรน apparaissent aussi des morceaux de SS de la division Charlemagne et plus rรฉcemment, Alice Kerviel, dite Cordier. L’affaire Deranque rรฉvรจle comme la France est infectรฉe par le pรฉtainisme, en particulier parmi les soutiens d’Israรซl ou de l’Ukraine, deux thรฉรขtres d’opรฉrations oรน l’Occident tente de ralentir son dรฉclin
En 2025, une nouvelle unitรฉ de Franรงais combattant pour lโUkraine sโest structurรฉe autour dโun noyau de nรฉonazis, ayant pour objectif dโattirer des recrues. Parmi ces volontaires, dโanciens militaires. StreetPress les a identifiรฉs
En Ukraine, les volontaires franรงais pro-ukrainiens et pro-russes se partagent lโimaginaire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Les premiers se revendiquent des collabos de lโAllemagne nazie, les seconds de lโescadrille mythique ยซ Normandie โ Niรฉmen ยป
deux jours aprรจs le 10e anniversaire de la dรฉbรขcle politique et sรฉcuritaire du 13 novembre 2015, une messe cรฉlรจbre ร Verdun lโancien dirigeant fasciste de lโรtat franรงais
ce 11 novembre 2025 est lโoccasion de souligner comme la faรงon dont lโEurope sacrifie les conscrits ukrainiens mobilisรฉs de force rappelle le spectaculaire carnage de la 1รจre guerre mondiale
cโest par lโagence cosaque de presse PIKA, depuis la Rรฉpublique populaire de Lougansk, que le 2 avril 2024, lโataman Nikolaรฏ Diakonov lance un message ร destination de la France
ce papier est le premier des grands mรฉdias franรงais qui sโattaque ร la question des militants nazis franรงais dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, le nouveau danger quโils prรฉsenteront ร terme pour la sรปretรฉ intรฉrieure
oรน nous apprenons que le nazi franรงais Allan Duchรฉzeau, camarade de Cรฉsar Aujard dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, รฉtait surnommรฉ Dox, quand il secondait ร Paris le leader nazi Marc de Cacqueray Valmรฉnier
en Anglais, les indices de la prรฉsence dโopรฉrateurs occidentaux, en particulier Franรงais, pris au piรจge en mars 2022 ร Marioupol, dont les forces russes achevรจrent la libรฉration en mai
Boris Crouzette est ici ร droite, au 21 avenue de Saxe, Paris, adresse de l’ambassade d’Ukraine. Juan Sanchez Da Silva est ร gauche (rรฉseaux sociaux)
est un ancien fusilier marin, qui fut radiรฉ en raison d’un comportement indigne, demeure entre Corrรจze et Thaรฏlande, quand il gagne lโUkraine, au plus tard en juin 2022
(Rรฉseaux sociaux)
Il commence par participer au secours de victimes civiles des combats, prend les armes au plus tard en janvier 2023. Membre dโune escouade dโinfanterie constituรฉe de Franรงais, il apparaรฎt polyvalent au front, alterne les activitรฉs d’infirmier militaire et moins humaniste, de tireur de prรฉcision
(Capture d’รฉcran)
Alors qu’il souffre visiblement du pilonnage incessant de l’artillerie russe, il accentue le 22 mai 2023 son expression politique, a remplacรฉ les couleurs nationales franรงaises ou ukrainiennes par celles, rouge et noir, des nazis ukrainiens de la 2de guerre mondiale, l’Armรฉe des insurgรฉs (UPA), qui entre 1943 et 1945, ont massacrรฉ au moins 50 000, peut รชtre 100 000 civils polonais. Elles sont aujourd’hui encore le drapeau de l’organisation nazie Pravyi sektor [Secteur droit]
https://youtu.be/Mu3o1t9a-fg
Le 1er juillet, il partage une vidรฉo spendide. Il n’en est pas l’auteur, mais nous savons dรฉjร qu’il connaรฎt bien l’artillerie russe.
En permission dรฉbut juillet, il se repose, non pas ร Kiev, mais ร Lviv, berceau dans l’ouest du nazisme ukrainien. Le 23, il m’adresse un message personnel dans une vidรฉo de son compte TikTok
Donc tu vois mon petit Nicolas, quand tu dis que la ville de Lviv est un repรจre de nazis, et bien je t’envoie bien te faire foutre et je pense que d’ici peu de temps, vu le nombre de conneries que tu dรฉbites sur ton blog, trรจs peu de gens peuvent te prendre au sรฉrieux au final, mais รฉnormรฉment de gens lisent bien en tous cas tes articles et en prennent bien note. Et je pense que tu auras un droit de rรฉponse trรจs prochainement, mais je ne garantis pas la rรฉponse. Je ne sais pas si ce sera par รฉcrit ou par autre chose. Je te rassure, รงa ne viendra pas de moi, j’ai autre chose ร foutre que de m’occuper de la merde. Donc voilร , mais j’espรจre qu’on s’occupera de toi, parce que tu es quand mรชme une sacrรฉ merde, il faut l’avouer
Nous allons donc nous tutoyer, trรจs utile Boris. Ton รฉducation compte au moins une lacune, nul ne t’a enseignรฉ une rรจgle รฉlรฉmentaire de la civilisation urbaine : on est un con. Tu dรฉlรจgues ร tes camarades nazis la besogne dont tu te juges indigne ? Cela leur fera plaisir, dis moi. Prรฉcise leur bien que j’ai passรฉ environ 30 ans de ma vie ร traiter des criminels de Droit commun, terroristes d’extrรชme-droite ou djihadistes. Ma conclusion est sans appel : les droitards franรงais sont de loin les plus fragiles. Mon blog te dรฉplaรฎt et je sais pourquoi. Mais tu en es un lecteur assidu et j’espรจre que ce paradoxe ne va pas te causer de dรฉpression. Je visionne toutes tes vidรฉos, mรชme les derniรจres ร Lviv, qui m’ont rappelรฉ La petite maison dans la prairie. Merci en tous cas de confirmer le succรจs de mes articles
Le 1er janvier 2023, les autoritรฉs locales cรฉlรจbrent ร Lviv l’anniversaire du criminel de guerre nazi Stepan Bandera (officiel)
Sur le fond, mon mignon, Lviv est en effet le berceau historique du nazisme endรฉmique ukrainien, la ville oรน certains de tes camarades nazis font des pรจlerinages au monument qu’elle a รฉrigรฉ en 2017 ร la mรฉmoire du criminel de guerre Stepan Bandera (cf. Cรฉsar Aujard). Pourtant blasรฉ, mรชme le militant lyonnais Gwendal Delange abonde dans mon sens. Cette rรฉalitรฉ te fait peut รชtre souffrir, mais pour me contredire, il te faudra te muscler les mรฉninges. Car l’administration des faits et de la preuve est plus particuliรจrement mon mรฉtier. Alors bon MacDo et ร bientรดt ici mรชme.
Sauf รฉlรฉments vraiment nouveaux par la suite, je clos ce 26 juillet 2023 le volet des รฉchanges personnels avec quelques individus de ce panthรฉon. Maxime Bronchain me relance sur Telegram. Lui et ses camarades s’efforcent en vain de me localiser prรฉcisรฉment. Continuer ร publier leurs propos redondants nuirait ร la qualitรฉ de cette chronique
Bronchain et Crouzette sont de mรชme gรฉnรฉration, tous deux anciens militaires. Ils diffรจrent par leur idรฉologie. Le premier se rรชve en grand guerrier nazi, aujourd’hui amputรฉ, Crouzette se construit plutรดt un personnage de dรฉfenseur de la veuve et l’orphelin, alibi d’une guerre qui lui fait frissonner la prostate. Tรชte de droite farcie de mythes nationaux, il est intolรฉrant ร l’รฉvocation de son environnement nazi, ukrainien ou parmi ses propres camarades franรงais, prรฉtend qu’il n’existe pas, si aucun drapeau ร swastika ne pend dans les rues, car il nuit ร son image. Tous deux voudraient รชtre reconnus en hรฉros, plus encore que de gagner cette guerre. Aucun n’est un aigle de culture gรฉnรฉrale ou historique.
Je les vois presque comme un problรจme de gรฉnรฉration. Une vanitรฉ et une vacuitรฉ, une mise en scรจne encouragรฉe par les rรฉseaux sociaux et la propagande de la presse occidentale, qui me rappellent beaucoup les nouvelles recrues de la Police nationale, dont le niveau a commencรฉ ร s’effondrer au dรฉbut des annรฉes 2000 et oรน un ancien militaire ร peine plus รขgรฉ, Florian Menesplier, s’estime dans son bon droit quand il commet un meurtre en service.
Le 11 septembre 2023, il rend hommage aux victimes des opรฉrations djihadistes de 2001, aux USA. L’occasion d’รฉvoquer la conclusion d’une analyse que je ne dรฉvelopperai pas ici. S’il savait ร quel point les actions d’al Qaeda et aussi du Califat, ร Paris le 13 novembre 2015, furent les consรฉquences, les dommages collatรฉraux, des politiques atlantistes pour lesquelles il est aujourd’hui dans les tranchรฉes ukrainiennes. Quelle ironie
Le 6 dรฉcembre 1993, le quotidien britannique The Independent, social-dรฉmocrate et pro-Europe, rendit un vibrant hommage ร Oussama ben Laden. Cet article est cultissime, me fait toujours รฉclater de rire
Le 24 septembre, il participe sur TikTok ร un live au sommet avec Franck Malandain. Ses griefs sont nombreux, la guerre est hard, plus dure pour lui et ses camarades qu’elle ne l’aurait รฉtรฉ pour les combattants de la 1รจre guerre mondiale, la nourriture dรฉtestable, un sujet qui le taraude souvent. Il est au fait des informations diffusรฉes en France, peste contre
les pro-Russes et enculรฉs de gauchistes
qui en propageraient de fausses. Il semble pourtant convaincu qu’au terme de 112 jours d’รฉchec sanglant pour la chair ร canon ukrainienne, les forces atlantistes auraient enfin percรฉ au sud [rรฉgion de Zaporojie, secteur de Rabotino]. Mรชme en France, ร part LCI, peu de mรฉdias diffusent encore une pareille propagande. Ses motivations seraient idรฉologiques, humanitaires, mais pour les souligner, il รฉvoque les anciens compte-rendus d’atrocitรฉs russes ร Boutcha, quand tout observateur sensรฉ admet aujourd’hui qu’elles ont รฉtรฉ au mieux une mise en scรจne sordide, au pire des crimes de guerre ukrainiens sous faux drapeau, un mรฉlange des deux en rรฉalitรฉ. Il n’est clairement pas engagรฉ dans le secteur dรฉcisif de Rabotino, oรน son expรฉrience serait sans doute plus hard, mais semble bon public de certains mรฉdias franรงais. Il me rappelle Fabrice del Dongo ร Waterloo
Le 8 avril 2022, la gynรฉcologue Ursula von der Leyen, trรจs mรฉdiocre ministre allemande de la dรฉfense, suspecte de corruption, puis prรฉsidente de la Commission europรฉenne, le temple de l’intรฉgritรฉ et du suffrage universel, fait son cinรฉma ร Boutcha
Le 24 octobre, sous le titre Pour la libertรฉ d’un peuple, il rend hommage ร Gaston Besson. La date ne semble pas anniversaire, car le suprรฉmaciste franรงais est dรฉcรฉdรฉ en Croatie le 12 novembre 2022, semble t il d’une maladie ou faiblesse due ร l’abus d’alcool. Mais elle pourrait รชtre le premier anniversaire d’une blessure au Donbass, qui aurait nรฉcessitรฉ l’รฉvacuation de Besson vers la Croatie. Crouzette mentionne l’annรฉe 2014 dans son รฉloge. Dรฉjร coauteur assumรฉ de crimes de guerre en ex-Yougoslavie, son hรฉros fut membre fondateur cette annรฉe lร du bataillon nazi ukrainien Azov. Crouzette confirme qu’il connaรฎt de grandes difficultรฉs pour identifier le nazisme dans son environnement.
Le 6 juin 2024, il est sur les plages de Normandie pour le 80e anniversaire du D-Day. Son engagement en Ukraine est apparemment terminรฉ.
chronique alphabรฉtique et nรฉcrologique de lโengagement franรงais dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas
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Pruvate ร truvร me, canaglia di lโOTAN, pruvate solu
chronique en Anglais, its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine
chronique en Anglais, censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia
une saga franรงaise, entre Ukraine et Lyon, oรน apparaissent aussi des morceaux de SS de la division Charlemagne et plus rรฉcemment, Alice Kerviel, dite Cordier. L’affaire Deranque rรฉvรจle comme la France est infectรฉe par le pรฉtainisme, en particulier parmi les soutiens d’Israรซl ou de l’Ukraine, deux thรฉรขtres d’opรฉrations oรน l’Occident tente de ralentir son dรฉclin
En 2025, une nouvelle unitรฉ de Franรงais combattant pour lโUkraine sโest structurรฉe autour dโun noyau de nรฉonazis, ayant pour objectif dโattirer des recrues. Parmi ces volontaires, dโanciens militaires. StreetPress les a identifiรฉs
En Ukraine, les volontaires franรงais pro-ukrainiens et pro-russes se partagent lโimaginaire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Les premiers se revendiquent des collabos de lโAllemagne nazie, les seconds de lโescadrille mythique ยซ Normandie โ Niรฉmen ยป
deux jours aprรจs le 10e anniversaire de la dรฉbรขcle politique et sรฉcuritaire du 13 novembre 2015, une messe cรฉlรจbre ร Verdun lโancien dirigeant fasciste de lโรtat franรงais
ce 11 novembre 2025 est lโoccasion de souligner comme la faรงon dont lโEurope sacrifie les conscrits ukrainiens mobilisรฉs de force rappelle le spectaculaire carnage de la 1รจre guerre mondiale
cโest par lโagence cosaque de presse PIKA, depuis la Rรฉpublique populaire de Lougansk, que le 2 avril 2024, lโataman Nikolaรฏ Diakonov lance un message ร destination de la France
ce papier est le premier des grands mรฉdias franรงais qui sโattaque ร la question des militants nazis franรงais dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, le nouveau danger quโils prรฉsenteront ร terme pour la sรปretรฉ intรฉrieure
oรน nous apprenons que le nazi franรงais Allan Duchรฉzeau, camarade de Cรฉsar Aujard dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, รฉtait surnommรฉ Dox, quand il secondait ร Paris le leader nazi Marc de Cacqueray Valmรฉnier
en Anglais, les indices de la prรฉsence dโopรฉrateurs occidentaux, en particulier Franรงais, pris au piรจge en mars 2022 ร Marioupol, dont les forces russes achevรจrent la libรฉration en mai
est mรฉcanicien, ancien militaire du 40e RA (rรฉgiment d’artillerie) ร Suippes, chef de VAB, vรฉhicule de l’avant blindรฉ que la France livre en nombre aux autoritรฉs de Kiev, quand il intรจgre en avril 2023 les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine
(Rรฉseaux sociaux)
SANTร !
(Rรฉseaux sociaux)
ร l’instar de sa famille, je suis heureux de le savoir rapatriรฉ sain et sauf quelques semaines plus tard. Et je ne dirais pas cela pour tous ici. Dans un document en septembre 2023 de la bureaucratie ukrainienne, que des as russes de l’informatique parviennent ร se procurer, il est considรฉrรฉ comme dรฉserteur. La vie est souvent faite de choix, celui-ci est excellent, mais rend furieux Dylan Mordant, qui m’en fait part sur Telegram en Octobre. Mauvaise ambiance
Je ne le rรฉpรฉterai jamais assez : on est un con
Il est ร nouveau en Ukraine, quand la neige commence ร tomber en Novembre. Est ce ร l’insu de son plein grรฉ que le Reichsadler [aigle impรฉrial] ukrainien a รฉtรฉ tatouรฉ entre ses omoplates, lorsqu’il se rรฉveille le 28 dรฉcembre ?
(Rรฉseaux sociaux)
Le Reichsadler nazi allemand figurait sur les uniformes des combattants du III. Reich. Aprรจs les authentiques symboles nazis, aujourd’hui rรฉglementaires dans des formations paramilitaires ukrainiennes et portรฉs aussi ร titre personnel par de nombreux combattants de l’armรฉe rรฉguliรจre, aprรจs le choix officiel, en septembre 2022, de la Balkenkreuz de la 2de guerre mondiale, pour marquer tous les vรฉhicules militaires atlantistes (cf. Ken Kaneki), un nouvel insigne, non officiel, s’est rรฉpandu dans les rangs ukrainiens au plus tard en avril 2023 : un Reichsadler nazi dont le swastika a รฉtรฉ remplacรฉe par le trident ukrainien
Le Reichsadler nazi allemand est en bas. En haut, sa version ukrainienne apparaรฎt le 12 avril 2023 sur les uniformes de gardes territoriaux ukrainiens, dans la rรฉgion de Zaporojie (rรฉseaux sociaux)
Mais en matiรจre de tatouages, Caupin reste pour l’instant un petit Franรงais, en comparaison de l’oeuvre d’art bipรจde qu’รฉtait Alexandre Kratsov, dit Medved [ours], officier d’Azov dans la garde nationale ukrainienne, quand il se rendit aux Russes en mai 2022, ร Marioupol
Le Monsieur a l’air rรฉsignรฉ de celui qui pense qu’il va prendre des baffes (rรฉseaux sociaux russes)
14 signifie les quatorze mots du slogan suprรฉmaciste dont la version originale est en Anglais
we must secure the existence of our people and a future for white children
88 signifie HH, pour Heil Hitler. Et nous retrouvons sur sa nuque, dรฉjร en mai 2022, le Reichsadler ukrainien. Caupin ne rรฉpond pas ร ma question, efface plus tard l’image en ligne.
Comme dโautres, il est un lecteur assidu de cette page et ressent le besoin le 13 fรฉvrier de me donner la rรฉplique dans le chat de la chaรฎne Telegram internationale TrackANaziMerc, ce qui nous permet de mieux cerner ses pulsions politiques. Il est hostile aux bolcheviques, sensible ร la thรฉorie raciste du grand remplacement, exprime du mรฉpris pour la population des citรฉs de banlieues franรงaises. Je le taquine par lโรฉvocation des incidents du 25 novembre 2023 ร Romans sur Isรจre, oรน de jeunes provocateurs nazis se firent administrer une fessรฉe par les habitants. Sa rรฉaction est intรฉressante, car il nโen discute pas sur le fond, mais souligne quโil ne pouvait sโy trouver dans les rangs des militants nazis, puisquโil est ร lโest [sur le front en Ukraine], pas ร l’ouest [le front intรฉrieur]. En guise de vaines attaques personnelles, il revient constamment sur ma rรฉvocation en 2020, alors capitaine dans la Police nationale, quand cet รฉvรฉnement fait ma fiertรฉ. Caupin rรฉvรจle lร un pilier de la nรฉvrose fasciste franรงaise, lโadmiration en toutes circonstances, le respect profond de l’autoritรฉ administrative et de ses sbires, le dรฉsir souvent frustrรฉ dโen intรฉgrer les rangs.
Avec lโacuitรฉ dโun esprit affรปtรฉ, le journaliste Sรฉbastien-Roch Nicolas de Chamfort รฉnonรงa ร la fin du XVIIIe siรจcle une rรฉalitรฉ cristalline et inoxydable, contraire ร lโimage que beaucoup de Franรงais prรฉtendent avoir dโeux-mรชmes
L’Anglais respecte la loi et repousse ou mรฉprise l’autoritรฉ. Le Franรงais, au contraire, respecte l’autoritรฉ et mรฉprise la loi
Le 16 mars, Caupin publie sur les rรฉseaux sociaux les images de deux รฉcussons susceptibles d’illustrer son affectation, celui de la 67e brigade mรฉcanisรฉe (gauche), branche militaire du parti nazi Pravyi sektor [Secteur droit], prรฉcรจde dans le montage vidรฉo celui d’une organisation scout (droite) de Kherson, oรน nous le savions dรฉjร
(Dylan Devaux)
ร l’instar du nazi Dylan Devaux le mรชme jour, il partage le 11 mai 2024 une image de l’รฉcusson de l’obscur 16e bataillon de fusiliers, une formation de lโarmรฉe rรฉguliรจre dont les recrues ukrainiennes sont originaires de Ternopil, haut lieu dans lโouest lointain du nazisme endรฉmique ukrainien, berceau du criminel de guerre Iaroslav Stetsko (1912-1986), adjoint du criminel de guerre Stepan Bandera (1909-1959, cf. David Piguet)
Le 19 janvier 2024, les autoritรฉs locales et des reprรฉsentants du gouvernement de Kiev cรฉlรจbrent ร Ternopil le 112e anniversaire de Iaroslav Stetsko (photo officielle)
Ce bataillon semble dรฉployรฉ dans un rรดle dรฉfensif au sud, quelque part entre Kherson et Zaporojie. Rien de trรจs neuf pour Caupin, qui nโa pas encore tirรฉ le moindre coup de feu, sauf bien sรปr ร lโexercice. Probable nouvelle affectation de Devaux, aprรจs quelques mois de formation militaire et idรฉologique parmi les Loups de Da Vinci. ร ce stade, lโexpรฉrience du combat est un risque peu pregnant pour les deux Franรงais.
La guerre est pleine de surprises et la 16e bataillon de fusiliers est รฉtrillรฉ en octobre (cf. Loรฏc Perdriel), lors de lโattaque brutale du secteur prรฉsumรฉ calme de la rรฉgion de Zaporojie oรน il avait รฉtรฉ disposรฉ. Par la suite, la 60e brigade mรฉcanisรฉe, dont il dรฉpend, est transfรฉrรฉe en rรฉpublique populaire de Donetsk. Fin Mars 2025, dans le secteur de Novoye, sa hiรฉrarchie militaire perd tout contact avec Sylvain Caupin, dont le corps n’est pas retrouvรฉ
(Rรฉseaux sociaux)
Informรฉs dรฉbut avril, ses proches partagent en hommage cette image du 27 mai 2024.
chronique alphabรฉtique et nรฉcrologique de lโengagement franรงais dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas
Articles connexes
Pruvate ร truvร me, canaglia di lโOTAN, pruvate solu
chronique en Anglais, its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine
chronique en Anglais, censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia
une saga franรงaise, entre Ukraine et Lyon, oรน apparaissent aussi des morceaux de SS de la division Charlemagne et plus rรฉcemment, Alice Kerviel, dite Cordier. L’affaire Deranque rรฉvรจle comme la France est infectรฉe par le pรฉtainisme, en particulier parmi les soutiens d’Israรซl ou de l’Ukraine, deux thรฉรขtres d’opรฉrations oรน l’Occident tente de ralentir son dรฉclin
En 2025, une nouvelle unitรฉ de Franรงais combattant pour lโUkraine sโest structurรฉe autour dโun noyau de nรฉonazis, ayant pour objectif dโattirer des recrues. Parmi ces volontaires, dโanciens militaires. StreetPress les a identifiรฉs
En Ukraine, les volontaires franรงais pro-ukrainiens et pro-russes se partagent lโimaginaire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Les premiers se revendiquent des collabos de lโAllemagne nazie, les seconds de lโescadrille mythique ยซ Normandie โ Niรฉmen ยป
deux jours aprรจs le 10e anniversaire de la dรฉbรขcle politique et sรฉcuritaire du 13 novembre 2015, une messe cรฉlรจbre ร Verdun lโancien dirigeant fasciste de lโรtat franรงais
ce 11 novembre 2025 est lโoccasion de souligner comme la faรงon dont lโEurope sacrifie les conscrits ukrainiens mobilisรฉs de force rappelle le spectaculaire carnage de la 1รจre guerre mondiale
cโest par lโagence cosaque de presse PIKA, depuis la Rรฉpublique populaire de Lougansk, que le 2 avril 2024, lโataman Nikolaรฏ Diakonov lance un message ร destination de la France
ce papier est le premier des grands mรฉdias franรงais qui sโattaque ร la question des militants nazis franรงais dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, le nouveau danger quโils prรฉsenteront ร terme pour la sรปretรฉ intรฉrieure
oรน nous apprenons que le nazi franรงais Allan Duchรฉzeau, camarade de Cรฉsar Aujard dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, รฉtait surnommรฉ Dox, quand il secondait ร Paris le leader nazi Marc de Cacqueray Valmรฉnier
en Anglais, les indices de la prรฉsence dโopรฉrateurs occidentaux, en particulier Franรงais, pris au piรจge en mars 2022 ร Marioupol, dont les forces russes achevรจrent la libรฉration en mai
Zaporizhzhia Region, near the settlement of Stepnohorsk. Mid-December 2025. A combat mission becomes a true test of endurance for the young paratrooper Grant. When his partner Sam is seriously wounded and out of action, Grant decides not to retreat, but to storm the enemy “strongpoint” alone.
For headquarters, it looks like pure madness: the soldier has no experience, no reinforcements, and no right to make a mistake. But war rarely goes according to plan. When routine tactics fail, it’s such “crazy” decisions that turn the impossible into reality
Ukraine has struck the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant using a Flamingo cruise missile. The ramifications of this event could reverberate globally
The launch of a Flamingo cruise missile by Ukraine
On the night of February 20-21, 2026, Ukraine launched an intermediate-range missile at the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, a strategic defense industrial facility located in the Republic of Udmurtia, some 1,300 kilometers from the Russian-Ukrainian border. The missile, equipped with a 1,000-kilogram warhead, struck a building housing Workshop 19, which houses a critical electroplating and stamping workshop. It is here that Russian technicians carry out the metal stamping and forming processes related to the manufacture of missile body elements, as well as the galvanic processing of parts, including the application of protective and functional coatings and surface preparation for further assembly. Workshop 19 plays a critical role in the manufacture of some of Russiaโs most strategically vital ballistic missiles. The Flamingoโs warhead blasted a 30-by-24-meterhole in the roof of the structure, setting its interior on fire. At least 11 workers were wounded in the attack.
It is not known the extent to which the attack on Workshop 19 has impacted Russiaโs ability to produce strategically important missiles such as the Topol-M and Yars intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), the Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missile. The Iskander and Oreshnik missiles are manufactured at the Votkinsk plant, as well as research and development on follow-on strategic delivery systems like the Kedr ICBM.
What is known is that the Ukrainianโs have struck at the very heart of Russiaโs strategic defense industry, delivering a blow which is not just politically damaging in terms of the image it creates regarding the status of Russiaโs war with Ukraine, which is entering its 5th year, but also potentially crippling Russiaโs ability to keep pace with any increase in strategic nuclear delivery systems now that the last remaining arms control treaty between the US and RussiaโNew STARTโhas expired
Russian President Putin meets with the Russian Security Council to discuss an draft agreement of strategic stability in Europe
Russia has long been alerted to this very possibility. Back in December 2021, Russia sent a clear signal to both the United States and NATO that it viewed the stationing of intermediate- or short-range missiles on the territory of Ukraine was a red line which, if crossed, presented an unacceptable threat to the security of Russia. In draft treaties addressed to both parties, Russia defined one of the bedrock conditions needed to be met for stability in Europe. Article 6 of the US treaty stated that โThe Parties shall undertake not to deploy ground-launched intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles outside their national territories, as well as in the areas of their national territories, from which such weapons can attack targets in the national territory of the other Party.โ Article 5 of the draft NATO treaty likewise stated that โThe Parties shall not deploy land-based intermediate- and short-range missiles in areas allowing them to reach the territory of the other Parties.โ
In the weeks prior to the Russian initiation of the Special Military Operation, the Russians went out of their way to communicate to the Biden administration the seriousness to which they attached this issue. Senior Biden administration officials acknowledge that Russian President Vladimir Putin had specifically accused the United States of seeking to place missiles inside Ukraine, something the Biden administration assured Russia it had no intention of doing. While the US declared that it was open to โdiscussing the future of certain missile systems in Europe, along the lines of the INF treaty, which Russia violated and the previous U.S. administration withdrew from,โ little movement in that direction took place when US Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov met for more than seven hours in Geneva, Switzerland on January 10, 2022. The two sides talked cross purposes, with Russia looking for a concrete response to its December draft treaties, and the US indicating there could be no agreement without additional consultation with allies, including Ukraine
US Secretary of State Tony Blinken shakes hands with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, January 21, 2022
A follow-on meeting between US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov held on January 21 produced no results, other than a pledge by the United States to provide a written response to the Russian draft treaties โsoon.โ On January 26, the US and NATO did just that, rejecting outright Russiaโs conditions for European stability and security, including a rejection of Russiaโs concerns about the stationing of intermediate- and short-range missiles on Ukrainian soil. A follow-on meeting between Sergei Ryabkov and US Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller in Berlin on February 9 yielded no results.
Since the SMO began, Russia has made it clear that the provision of long-range strike capability to Ukraine by the US and NATO represented a serious threat to Russian national security. The use by Ukraine of British-made Storm Shadow missiles and their French analog, the SCALP, together with US-provided ATACMS missiles, were permitted by the providing nations only on the conditions that these weapons not be used to strike targets inside the boundaries of the Russian Federation as recognized in 1991. Russian threats about holding Germany accountable helped convince the German government not to provide the Taurus cruise missile to Ukraine (the Storm Shadow/SCALP missiles possess a range of 250 kilometers, while the ATACMS possesses a range of up to 300 kilometers; the Taurus, with a range of up to 500 kilometers, would have represented a major upgrade to Ukraineโs ability to strike targets inside Russia).
In September 2024 the US and UK governments were actively considering authorizing Ukraine to use Storm Shadow and ATACMS missiles to strike targets inside Russia proper. Russian President Vladimir Putin warned that if Western countries authorize Ukraineโs use of long-range missiles in Russian territory, they will become directly involved in the war. โIt will mean nothing less than the direct involvement of NATO countries, the United States and European countries in the war in Ukraine,โ Putin said. โThis will be their direct participation, and this, of course, will significantly change the very essence, the very nature of the conflict.โ Based on such threats, Putin warned, Russia would be forced to take โappropriate actions.โ Putinโs threats came at a time when Russia had issued a new nuclear doctrine which allowed Russia to use nuclear weapons in retaliation for the very kind of attacks the US and UK were considering
Rear Admiral Thomas Buchanan addresses CSIS, November 2024
The danger of nuclear conflict was very high. In November, the head of plans for Strategic Command, Rear Admiral Thomas Buchanan, told a Washington, DC think-tank that the Biden administration was ready to fight and win a nuclear exchange with Russia, and in early December 2024 the CIA, responding to an announcement by the administration that it would greenlight the use by Ukraine of ATACMS missiles to strike targets inside Russia, briefed members of Congress that there was a greater than 50% chance there would be a nuclear war between Russia and the US before years end.
While President-elect Trump helped lower tensions by pledging that he would reverse the Biden administrationโs decision once he came into office (something he did, in fact, do), his inability to follow through on his pledge to bring a rapid end to the Russian-Ukraine conflict led to increasing frustration and resentment toward Russia and its leadership, prompting President Trump to announce that he was considering providing Ukraine with the Tomahawk cruise missileโthe very weapons system Russia had declared would never be permitted to be stationed on Ukrainian soil.
The threats to provide Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles were more of a negotiating ploy than real threat, however. The real threat came from elsewhereโa missile designed by the British using indigenous Ukrainian parts and manufacturing infrastructure known as the FP-5 Flamingo.
The Flamingo made its debut at the international defense industry exhibition IDEX-2025, which took place from February 17 to 21, 2025 in Abu Dhabi in the United Arab Emirates, when the Emirati-British Milanion Defense Industry Group unveiled a prototype missile. Built around the Ivchenko AI-25 turbo-fan jet engine, which had been developed in the 1950s by the Ivchenko Design Bureau in the Soviet Union, and produced at the Motor Sich aircraft factory in Zaparozhia, the Flamingo was a derivative of the Soviet-era Tu-141and Tu-143 reconnaissance drones, which had been repurposed by Ukraine into ground-attack cruise missiles. The warhead appeared to be based upon Ukrainian gravity bombs. The goal behind the Milanion design was to provide Ukraine with an affordable indigenous long-range strike capability which bypassed the Russian restrictions on foreign weapons
The Milanion-designed FP-5 Flamingo
This subterfuge, however, is shallow. Fire Point, the company which oversees the manufacture of the FP-5 Flamingo, is little more than a shell company overseen by a CEO, Iryna Terekh, who has zero education or experience which would lend itself to missile production. The task of coordinating Ukrainian defense manufacturing with foreign suppliers is well above her paygrade. The FP-5 Flamingo is exactly what it portends to beโa British-made weapon designed to get around the legalities, and consequences, of Russian red lines regarding the use of long-range missiles based in Ukraine against Russia targets.
Moreover, Russian military strikes have severely disrupted Ukraineโs ability to assemble the FP-5 on Ukrainian soilโthe near complete destruction of the Motor Sich factory earlier this year stands as a harsh example. Fire Point has opened a Flamingo production facility in Denmark, near Skrydstrup Air Base and the town of Vojens in Southern Jutland, that will produce solid rocket propellant used to boost the FP-5 into flight during ground operations. The Danish defense minister, when asked whether establishing Ukrainian arms production in Denmark would make the country a target for Russian attacks, noted that Denmark was not at war and that an open Russian attack on Denmark would constitute an attack on a NATO country.
No mention was made about the role Denmark was playing in helping Ukraine produce a missile which has now been used to strike one of the most important strategic missile production facilities in Russiaโthe Votkinsk Machine Building Plant
Sergei Karaganov (right) with Russian President Vladimir Putin (left)
Sergei Karaganov, the head of Russiaโs Council for Foreign and Defense Policy, has been warning about the use of Ukraine as a dagger to wound Russia on behalf of the collective West, writing in mid-June 2023 that Russia needed to lower the threshold for use of nuclear weapons to break Western support for Ukraine. If the West did not back down, Karaganov stated, then โwe will have to hit [with nuclear weapons] a group of targets in a number of countries,โ adding that if Russia failed to do this, โnot only may Russia perish, but most likely the whole of human civilization will end.โ
At the time, Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected the Karaganov Doctrine, stating that โwe see no need to use it [a tactical nuclear strike]; and second, considering this, even as a possibility, factors into lowering the threshold for the use of such weapons.โ
Such โfactorsโ included the use by Russia of the Oreshnik intermediate range ballistic missile twice against targets inside Ukraineโboth times to send a signal to Ukraine and its supporters in the West about the dangers inherent in any escalation of the conflict.
But much has transpired since President Putin downplayed the rhetoric of Karaganovโthe nuclear war scare of September-December 2024, and the US threat to provide Ukraine with Tomahawks stand out as examples.
And now the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant has been attacked by a missile designed by the British to replicate the strategic impact of the Tomahawk missile.
Votkinsk is the heart and soul of Russiaโs strategic defense industry.
And now it has been attacked by a British-designed weapon using intelligence provided by the CIA.
This attack is as close to an act of war by both the United States and the United Kingdom as one can imagine.
Suddenly Karaganovโs June 2023 nuclear posturing doesnโt seem so far-fetched.
Russia is at a crossroads.
In the short term, Russia needs to find a solution to the Flamingo threat to Votkinsk and other strategic defense industries located in the Ural regions that are now under threat of attack (a solid rocket motor production facility in Perm, for example.) Given the role played by Europe in designing, funding, and manufacturing the Flamingo, a response limited to striking targets inside Ukraine would achieve no fundamental change.
Missiles would still be built, and these missiles would continue to be launched at strategic targets deep inside Russia.
If Europe is not deterred once and for all from delivering this kind of military assistance to Ukraine, then Russia will be at risk of dying a death by a thousand cuts.
But then there is the larger issue of what to do with Ukraine itself. Russia is currently engaged in a drawn out โpeaceโ negotiation with Ukraine, overseen by the United States, which has now been exposedโthanks to the attack on Votkinskโas little more than a cover for Ukraine to develop the military capacity to strike Russiaโs strategic interior in an effort to pressure Russia into ending the conflict on terms less than those previously set forth by President Putin.
If the Russian-Ukrainian conflict ends on such terms, then Russia will have conceded the very thing it said was a red line back in December 2021โthe deployment of NATO-affiliated intermediate-range missiles on the soil of Ukraine.
It will represent a strategic defeat for Russia in every sense of the term
Kiril Dmitriev (left) with Steve Witkoff (right)
It is well past time for Russia to stop participating in such a self-defeating exercise. The United States is not a trustworthy negotiating partner in this regardโthe attempted assassination of President Putin on December 29, 2025, by 91 Ukrainian drones guided to their target by CIA intelligence should underscore this reality. The continued use by President Trump of sanctions designed to cripple the Russian economy should be viewed not in the light of โbusiness as usualโ, but rather from the perspective of its current author, Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent, who envisions such sanctions as โbringing Russia to its kneesโ, a literal overt act of surrender. And the 7-point economic plan being promulgated by Kiril Dmitriev at the behest of Steve Witkoff is nothing more than a re-working of the economic domination plans of the US employed in the 1990โs and attempted to foist on Russia during the regime change-disguised-as-reset policies promoted under the Obama administration.
The Trump administration is not looking for a mutually beneficial peace with Russia, but rather to achieve a strategic victory over Russia, just like the Biden administration before.
If this wasnโt clear before the Flamingo attack on Votkinsk, there is no excuse for it not being painfully so now.
Simply put, the Votkinsk attack underscores the reality that Ukraine as it is currently configured cannot be allowed to exist once the conflict is ended. As former Russian President Dmitri Medvedev has pointed out, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is a โgreen bugโ that needs to be โswatted.โ
The same holds for the totality of the existing Ukrainian government. There is no election that can cure the ills of Ukraine under the existing formulaโGeneral Valerii Zaluzhny, the United Kingdomโs favored candidate to replace Zelensky, is a Banderist, and Kirylo BudanovโAmericaโs anointed replacementโis a terrorist with Russian blood on his hands.
If Ukraine survives intact, so, too, does the FP-5 Flamingo missile program, meaning Russia will never again go to sleep at night without the fear of a Ukrainian attack.
The FP-5 Flamingo must be eradicated in totality.
And to do that, Ukraine in its current configuration must likewise be eradicated.
This is the very definition of an existential issue for Russia.
One that demands an adequate response to Europe as well.
Anything less will be interpreted as nothing less than a Russian surrender [end]
64-year-old Scott Ritter is a former intelligence officer within the US Marine Corps (USMC), then inspector of the United Nations in Iraq. When in 2003, the US and their British minions were about to invade the country under this false pretext, Ritter was claiming that there was no weapon of mass destruction (WMD) there. He was right.
In the Jacques Baud case, the EU is sanctioning, for the first time, an analyst not for spreading disinformation but for expressing a politically inconvenient truth, all while admitting he has broken no law. Will it have the courage to go after an American citizen?
Operation enters the second week of Ukraineโs long-awaited and highly touted counteroffensive, some basic conclusions can be drawn even though the fighting continues, and will continue to rage, for some time to come
Guards reconnaissance troops from the Vostok group liberated the village of Varvarivka in the Zaporizhia region during a decisive offensive, taking control of a major enemy defensive stronghold. As a result, significant Ukrainian Armed Forces forces and equipment were destroyed, marking a crucial step in clearing the eastern bank of the Gaichur River.
A group of assault troops, entrenched in a captured fortification on the outskirts of Varvarivka, found themselves in a critical situation, practically without water.
To save the situation, two men โan experienced veteran named Okhotnik and a young contract soldier named Raccoonโ head to a lone water pump in the “gray zone.” How will this foray for water end?
The Russo-Ukrainian War seems to have been engineered in a laboratory to frustrate people with repetition and analytic paralysis. Headlines appear to be circulating on a choreographed loop, all the way down to the place names. Kaja Kallas at the European Commission recently announced, without a hint of irony, that Europeโs new sanctions package – the 19th one – is the toughest yet. Ukraineโs supporters are insisting that Tomahawk missiles are the weapons system that will finally change the game and break the war decisively in Kievโs favor – reiterating the same grandiose claims that they made about GMLRS, and Leopards, and Abrams, and F-16s, and Storm Shadows, and ATACMS, and virtually every other piece of military hardware in NATOโs inventories. On the ground, Russia is attacking settlements named Pokrovsk and Pokrovsโke; it recently captured Toretsk and Torsโke and is now attacking Toretsโke. The more things change, the more things stay the same.
The analytic frameworks applied to the war have also changed relatively little, buried and obfuscated by the nebulous concept of attrition. On the Ukrainian side, there is continued insistence that Russia is suffering exorbitant losses and straining under the pressure of Ukrainian deep strikes, while Ukrainian setbacks are blamed in large part on the failure of the United States to expand its largesse and give Ukraine everything it needs. Many pro-Russian lines of thinking mirror this and suppose that the AFU is on the verge of disintegration, while the Kremlin is accused of failing to โtake the gloves offโ, particularly in regards to the Ukrainian energy grid, Dnieper bridges, and dams.
The result is a very strange sort of war. This is an extraordinarily high-intensity ground war. Both armies remain in the field, holding hundreds of miles of continuous front after years of bloody fighting. Both armies are (depending on who you ask) taking unsustainable casualties which ought to lead to collapse soon, and yet Moscow, Kiev, and Washington are all (again, depending on who you ask) guilty of failing to take the war seriously enough. All of this is maddeningly repetitive, and one could be forgiven for tuning out entirely. Even the diplomatic tango between Trump, Zelensky, and Putin, after delivering a few entertaining moments, failed to really move the needle in any discernable direction.
Few would argue that the trajectory of the war changed in an obviously dramatic way in 2025, and it is important to avoid the worn out and clichรฉd language about โturning pointsโ or โcollapseโ or any such silly thing. However, 2025 saw several shifts in the war, which will hardly ostentatious or dramatic, are nevertheless very important. 2025 has been the first year of the war in which Ukraine launched no ground offensives or proactive operations of its own. This fact is not only a hint at the threadbare state of Ukraineโs ground forces, but also a testament to the way Russian forces transformed โattritionโ from a buzzword into a method of persistent pressure across a variety of axes this year.
In lieu of initiative on the ground, and facing a slow but relentless rollback of their defenses in the Donbas, the theory of Ukrainian victory has shifted in an unacknowledged but dramatic way. After years of insisting that it would achieve maximal territorial integrity – an outcome which would require the total and decisive defeat of Russiaโs ground forces – Ukraine has reframed its path to victory mainly as a process of inflicting strategic costs on Russia that mount until the Kremlin agrees to a ceasefire. Consequentially, the debate about arming Ukraine has shifted from a conversation about armor and artillery – equipment useful for retaking lost territories – to a discussion about deep striking weapons like Tomahawks, which can be used to shoot at Russian oil refineries and energy infrastructure. In short, rather than move to prevent Russian from achieving immediate operational objectives in the Donbas, Ukraine and its sponsors are now seeking ways to make Russia pay a price such that victory on the ground is no longer worth it. It is unclear whether they have thought about what price Ukraine will pay in the exchange. Perhaps they do not care.
About Tomahawks
Notwithstanding Ukraineโs attempts to jumpstart indigenous production, it is inevitable that Ukrainian capabilities will be largely determined by the largesse of western sponsors. This aspect of the war took a sudden turn at the beginning of the October when fresh reporting began to circulate that Tomahawk missiles might be on the table for Ukraine. Tomahawks have always been on Ukraineโs wish list (given that the Ukrainian wish list as such consists of essentially all the military equipment in NATOโs combined inventories) but this was the first reporting that they might be under serious consideration.
As is frequently the case, the discussion spiraled away from realistic grounding, with some suggesting that the Tomahawk would be a โgame changerโ for Ukraine (where have we heard that before?) and the pro-Russian sphere dismissing it as an irrelevant distraction. Thereโs a tendency to focus on the quality of American weapons systems, casting them as either unrivaled technological marvels or overhyped and overpriced baubles, but this is generally not productive and largely irrelevant to the matter at hand. The Tomahawk, broadly speaking, is exactly as advertised, and provides proven and reliable strike capability at strategic depths in excess of 1,000 miles. In role, range, and payload it is essentially an analog to Russiaโs Kalibr missiles (I am begging the enthusiasts to note the phrase โessentially an analogโ rather than rake me over the coals over the different guidance systems and other technical minutia). Such a system will always be valuable and would obviously improve Ukraineโs deep strike capabilities.
The โproblemโ with Tomahawks does not relate to any โproblemโ with the missile itself, but with its availability and Ukraineโs technical capability to launch them. The Tomahawk is conventionally a ship-launched missile (there is no extant air-launched variant) with a few novel options for ground launch. Ukraine, obviously, would require ground launch systems, and the problem is that these systems are essentially brand new and available in very limited quantities: more importantly, American service branches are in the process of trying to build out these capabilities throughout the decade. Providing ground-launchable Tomahawks to Ukraine in any meaningful numbers would therefore essentially require the US Army and Marines to scrap their own force buildout plans.
There are two basic options for ground launching Tomahawks. One of these is the US Armyโs MRC (Mid-Range Capability) Launcher, dubbed the Typhon. This is an enormous tractor-trailer launcher with four launch tubes, first delivered in 2023. It has an enormous footprint – so large, apparently, that the Army is already asking for a smaller replacement – and is intended to give the Army an organic fires component in the gap between the shorter range Precision Strike Missile and hypersonic systems (which do not yet exist). The critical fact is this: the Army intends to field a total of five Typhon batteries by 2028, of which two have been delivered so far. Each battery consists in turn of four launchers, implying that eight out of a planned twenty launchers have been delivered. Even more importantly, both of the currently operational batteries are already deployed, with one in the Philippines and one in Japan. These systems are being actively used in exercises and trials, including an exercise this summer in Australia
The Typhon system gives ground launch capability to the Tomahawk but brings a massive footprint
The situation with the Marine Corpsโ launch system is quite similar, although the launch platforms themselves could not be more different. Unlike the lumbering Typhon tractor trailer, the Marines are fielding a significantly more lithe and compact LMSL system, with the tradeoff of a single launch tube compared to the Typhonโs four. What matters is not so much the technical differences, as the fact that the Marines – like the Army – only received their first deliveries in 2023, and they are currently in the process of building out the force. In the case of the marines, the goal is to have a Tomahawk battalion built out by 2030. In fact, the production contract came into effect as recently as 2025.
What does all of that mean? It means that, although the Tomahawk itself is a fine missile, the systems for ground launch are so new and available in such limited quantities that equipping Ukraine with Tomahawks would require either the US Army or the Marines to materially alter their force structure in the near term (through 2030, essentially). These are essentially the opposite of much of the gear thatโs been given to Ukraine to this point: far from being inventories of older systems that can be earmarked as surplus or tabbed for replacement, Tomahawk ground launch is a brand new capability that is in the middle of deployment and buildout for the first time.
This is, of course, a layered complication on top of Tomahawk quantities in and of themselves. The issue of Tomahawk availability is both over and under emphasized, depending on the context. The United States has something like 4,000 Tomahawks in its inventories (although half of these are currently inside their cells on American ships), so it is not quite correct to say (as some have) that America is running out of these critical weapons. The issue is that production rates are relatively anemic (generally between 55 and 90 per year) and are fail to replenish the expenditure from even relatively brief strike campaigns, such as the repeated strikes on Yemen. Broadly speaking, then, the issue is not so much that the United States is in immediate danger of running out of Tomahawks, but that procurement schedules are so slow that even relatively minor expenditures can erase multiple years worth of deliveries.
It may be useful, then, to consider Tomahawks in comparison to the ATACMS missiles which have already been provided to Ukraine. Unlike the Tomahawk, the ATACMS is a system which has already been tabbed for replacement, with the Precision Strike Missile in the early phases of its rollout. ATACMS were also compatible with launch systems that Ukraine already had. In comparison to Tomahawks, then, ATACMS are both vastly more strategically expendable, produced in larger numbers, and easier to deploy. Despite all these points in their favor, the United States provided Ukraine with just 40 ATACMS. Even if the Army could be pressured into handing over one or two of its brand new Typhon launchers, it is difficult to imagine that more than few dozen Tomahawks could be spared for Ukraine: a token inventory far too small to wage a sustained strike campaign in the Russian heartland
Peace, Sponsored by Raytheon
Given that Tomahawks for Ukraine would be measured in the dozens, rather than the hundreds, itโs worth asking whether this could actually change anything for the AFU at the front. The answer is clearly no in the long run, but it would be unwise to dismiss the possibility that even a limited tranche of Tomahawks (letโs say 40 to 50 missiles) could help alleviate pressure on Ukrainian forces at the front, provided they were used appropriately. A short term boost to Ukrainian strike capabilities, if deployed against Russian rear areas, could force further dispersal and rationing of Russian assets and temporarily stall Russiaโs emerging multi-axis offensive. This could defer the loss of key positions until early 2026. This presumes, however, that the Ukrainians would be content to use Tomahawks against operational targets. In reality, Ukraine can never seem to resist lobbing missiles at targets that have little bearing on the front, like the Kerch Bridge. Indeed, a failure to synergize strikes at depth with operations on the ground is a major reason why the ATACMS achieved so little.
On the other side of this equation, it is a common complaint from the Russian perspective that Moscow has done too little to โdeterโ the United States from empowering Ukraineโs strike campaign – both by directly providing munitions and supplying the planning, ISR, and guidance systems. This, however, rather misses the point. Russia has done nothing of note to deter the United States because both Moscow and Washington understand fully that there is essentially no appetite (on either side) for a direct confrontation. In the (sensible) absence of a willingness to strike back at NATO targets, there is really nothing Russia can do to deter beyond maintaining its own retaliatory capabilities. The issue is not that Russia has failed to actively deter, but that there is nothing they could do even if they wanted to.
The basic pattern here is well established. The United States has done what it can to backstop Ukrainian strike capabilities, but it has held them at a level where Ukraineโs damage output falls far short of decisive levels. So long as that is the case, Russia has clearly demonstrated that it will simply eat the punches and retaliate against *Ukraine*. Hence, when the United States helps Ukraine target Russian oil facilities, it is Ukraine that receives the reprisal, and it is Ukraine which has its natural gas production annihilated as the winter approaches. In a sense, neither side is really trying to deter the other at all. The United States has raised the cost of this war for Russia, but not enough to create any real pressure for Moscow to end the conflict; in response, Russia punishes Ukraine, which is something the United States does not really care about. The result is a sort of geostrategic Picture of Dorian Gray, where the United States vicariously inflicts cathartic damage on Russia, but Ukraine accrues all the soul damage.
In the case of Tomahawks, the risk-reward calculus is just not there. Tomahawks are a strategically invaluable asset that the United States cannot afford to hand out like candy. Even if the launch systems could be provided (highly doubtful), the missiles could not be made available in sufficient quantities to make a difference. The range of the missiles, however, significantly raises the probability of miscalculation or uncontrolled escalation. Ukraine shooting American missiles at energy infrastructure in Belgorod or Rostov is one thing; shooting them at the Kremlin is another thing entirely.
There is, however, another aspect of this which seems to be garnering little attention. The biggest risk of sending Tomahawks is not that the Ukrainians will blow up the Kremlin and start World War Three. The bigger risk is that the Tomahawks are used, and Russia simply moves on after eating the strikes. Tomahawks are arguably one of the last – if not *the* last – rung in the escalation ladder for the USA. We have rapidly run through the chain of systems that can be given to the AFU, and little remains except a few strike systems like the Tomahawk or the JASSM. Ukraine has generally received everything it has asked for. In the case of Tomahawks, however, the United States is running the most serious risk of all: what if the Russians simply shoot down some of the missiles and eat the rest of the strikes? Itโs immaterial whether the Tomahawks damage Russian powerplants or oil refineries. If Tomahawks are delivered and consumed without seriously jarring Russian nerves, the last escalatory card will have been played. If Russia perceives that America has reached the limits of its ability to raise the costs of the war for Russia, it undercuts the entire premise of negotiations. More simply put, Tomahawks are most valuable as an asset to threaten with.
Reading between the lines of President Trumpโs public statements recently, it seems likely that he has rationally weighed these considerations. Publicly, he used the threat of Tomahawks to try and force Russia to keep negotiating, and heโs received a commitment for another meeting with Putin for his trouble (more on that later). He has now, for the time being, shelved the Tomahawk plan, commenting that โwe need themโ and applying the usual Trumpian linguistic style to the broadly accepted issue of inventories which I have outlined here. Tomahawks are simply more valuable to the United States as a tool to threaten escalation, rather than as an actual kinetic asset in Ukrainian hands, and so long as Trump keeps his powder dry he can re-raise the issue later.
Ultimately, perhaps, this discussion is not about Tomahawks at all. These missiles, rather, are simply a totem which demonstrate two important dovetailing points. First, that American resources are not infinite, and as the United States reaches deeper into its bag to help Ukraine, it begins to grab at strategically critical assets that the US military simply cannot spare. Secondly, we must remember that Americaโs policy in Ukraine is a game of titration, with Washington probing the limits of Russiaโs willingness to โeat the strikesโ without allowing the reprisal violence to spill out of Ukraine.
The Big Banana: Russiaโs Operational Schema
At this point, itโs becoming increasingly difficult to say anything meaningful about the actual operational progression on the ground. There are several reasons for this. First and foremost, the war has now gone on so long and is consistently moving at such an apparently glacial pace that most people simply do not care at this point whether Russia holds Yampil or not, or whether they have advanced past the rail line in Pokrovsk. There is severe fatigue (or perhaps boredom is the better word) with the status of an interminable sequence of apparently small settlements, industrial complexes, and forestry plantations, and as a result most people have essentially checked out. Not the least among these must surely be President Trump, who apparently chucked Zelenskyโs map of the frontline and complained that he was tired of being shown the same maps over and over again.
On the other hand, we have the true obsessives who continue to dutifully follow the frontlines regularly and are voluntarily intaking daily updates. We end up with a bifurcated system where some people are still highly plugged in to the micro movements on the battlefield, but most people just donโt care, and we can hardly blame the latter. I think it would be profitable, then, to think about the broader Russian operational scheme, what it has achieved, and what it aims to achieve in the coming year. This is probably more interesting and less repetitious than fixating on the exact positioning within Pokrovsk or Kupyansk.
There are two larger points that I think are worth making before we look at some specifics.
First and foremost, much of the battlefield analysis that comes out (particularly from western analysts) makes firm pronouncements as to what constitutes Russiaโs โprimaryโ and โsecondaryโ efforts, but these are essentially interpolated and frequently incorrect. For example, itโs become a fairly mainstream conception that Russiaโs โprimaryโ point of effort right now is the capture of Pokrovsk, but this does not actually seem supported by Russian actions. There is no particular advantage to be gained for Russia by pushing to capture Pokrovsk as soon as possible – the city is already in a stranglehold partial encirclement. To be sure, Pokrovsk *was* a major logistic hub for Ukrainian forces, but it can no longer serve that role and was sterilized as a transit hub months ago, once it became a frontline city. The opposite side of this coin is that other Russian axes of advance, particularly in southern Donetsk and the bend of the Donets River, are dismissed as โsecondaryโ efforts. This is a major mistake, and I will attempt to show that these are critical advances where Russia is shaping the battlefield to its advantage for follow on operations.
Secondly, it should be understood and appreciated that Ukraine has lost essentially all battlefield initiative. In 2024, the AFU was able to assembled a mechanized reserve and launch their operation into Kursk. This operation ultimately failed and resulted in severe Ukrainian losses, but this is unrelated to the fact that Ukraine was still able to accumulate forces and pursue offensive operations on its own initiative. In 2025, however, Ukraine has been in a permanent state of reactivity. This was the first year of the war in which Ukraine did not launch any proactive operations or counteroffensives of its own, and Ukrainian hopes have instead pivoted to their strategic strike campaign against Russian oil facilities.
In a larger sense, the effect of attrition can be seen year by year with the shrinking scope of Ukraineโs proactive operations. In 2022, Ukraine was able to launch a pair of widely separated offensives which yielded modest successes: an offensive out of Kharkov rolled the front back over the Oskil River (though it failed to collapse the Lugansk shoulder), meanwhile, a series of battles outside of Kherson failed to break through the Russian lines, but they did play a role in persuading the Russians to abandon their bridgehead over the Dnieper. The point of course is not to once again autopsy these offensives, but to point out that there were two of them, that they were meaningful in scale, and they did result in important territorial gains for Ukraine. In 2023, by contrast, Ukraine launched a single theater-level offensive in the south, which failed. In 2024, we got the Kursk operation: smaller and less lavishly equipped than 2023โs Zaoprizhia offensive, and aimed at a peripheral theater. This year, there were no proactive Ukrainian operations at all. There is a very clear pattern at play here, with Ukraineโs offensive punch progressively shrinking before disappearing entirely in 2025. This was a year of essentially uninterrupted Russian initiative
Putting Ukraine permanently on the backfoot is a significant Russian achievement, and it is owed to a few converging factors. Obviously, the attrition of Ukrainian forces is a major factor. Weโve gone through the flailing Ukrainian mobilization, the cannibalization of its forces, and the general lack of reserves in detail on several occasions, and thereโs no need to retread that ground here. Suffice it to say, Ukraineโs ability to husband forces for offensive operations appears to be severely degraded. Russia has exacerbated this problem by pressing steadily on a variety of different axes. At the moment, there are no fewer than seven Russian axes of attack, pressuring a slew of cities all along the line. This creates a series of defensive emergencies, maintains the burn rate on Ukrainian forces, and fixes them on the line. Finally, in a point to be detailed shortly, Russian advances have begun unraveling Ukraineโs logistic connectivity, which puts strain on supply and prevents the concentration and accumulation of forces
Eastern Ukraine: Approximate Situation and Axes of Russian Advance
Now, for the development of the front and the premise of the Russian offensive scheme. The main point that I want to impress is essentially as follows: rather than fixating on Pokrovsk, Russiaโs advances across Southern Donetsk and on the inner bend of the Donets River ought to be thought of as vital operations which have severely disrupted the coherence of both the Ukrainian front and their logistics. This has the triple effect of preventing the Ukrainians from launching offensives of their own, accelerating the attrition of Ukrainian forces, and shaping the front for the coming operation to capture the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration.
To begin, letโs consider the progress that Russia has made in southern Donetsk, both in raw territorial terms and its implications for Ukrainian logistic connectivity. To demonstrate this, Iโve pulled maps from DeepState (again, a Ukrainian mapping enterprise) for August 2023 (when Ukraine was attempting its counterattack out of Orikhiv) and for October 20th, the week of this writing. I have noted both the length of the southern front (obviously a linear approximate, as the actual front has many bends and bulges) and highlighted the key highways that Ukraine uses to run the backbone of its logistics
The Southern Front: 2023 vs 2025
Now, one thing that is worth noting is that the Russians are currently positioned to roll up this front even further. Ukrainian defensive lines are primarily oriented towards on a north-south axis. Once Russian forces cleared Kurakhove, they entered the seams in these defensive lines – that is to say, they are advancing laterally along the face of the prepared defenses, rather than trying to bash through them from the front. This is one reason why their progress has been relatively steady and uninterrupted. Now approaching the โelbowโ in the lines, where they pivot southward, and having crossed the Yanchur River, the Russians are entering a substantial space that lacks meaningful prepared defenses. Using the Military Summary map (Ukrainian fortifications are mapped with yellow dots), the void in the defense is fairly obvious as the Russians work their way into the elbow of the line
Apart from the obvious development of note here – that Russian forces have, to this point, rolled up roughly half the length of the southern front and are positioned to roll up another ten to fifteen miles – we want to note two things which are emblematic of the way the war is going for Ukraine, but curiously receive little attention. First, the compression of the front is robbing the Ukrainians of the maneuver space which made it possible for them to stage and assemble forces for their counteroffensive in 2023. Two years ago, there was a wide, lateral buffer zone around the Ukrainian staging area in Orikhiv, and Ukrainian forces had access to multiple highways where they could disperse forces in their marching columns and run their logistics.
Today, that buffer zone is gone, as is the easy access to several of the branch highways. The Russian advance, which started with the breakthrough at Ugledar and Kurakhove last year and which has now rolled up some 50 miles of front, has essentially sterilized Ukraineโs capacity to attack in the south, because they have neither the space nor the roads to safely accumulate forces here. It has also shattered the interconnectivity of Ukrainian logistics: rather than having several highways to shuttle troops and material to the east, Ukraine now has to support several disconnected logistic fronts with individual highways. More to the point, there is no longer a single Donetsk โfrontโ to speak of, but rather a series of logistic fronts: one in the south, around Orikhiv, another at Pokrovsk, and the largest one in the Slovyansk Banana. These are lacking lateral connectivity to each other for the Ukrainians due to the wedges that the Russians have forced in the front, particularly in the south, funneling logistics and reinforcements down individuated corridors.
The bigger issue, however, lies farther north on the Pokrovsk and Donets axes, and in the way that they synergize. People who are focusing, to the exclusion of all else, on when and how Russia will capture Pokrovsk are failing to see the bigger picture, and indeed are not even trying to understand it.
The ultimate Russian operational objective (in this phase of the war, at least) is the belt of cities which runs in an arc from Slovyansk to Kostyantinivka, which I affectionately call โthe Slovyansk Bananaโ due to its curved shape. A cursory look at the map shows us why the very operations that are being dismissed as secondary efforts are in fact critical axes of Russian effort which are shaping the battlefield for the attack on the Banana
There are two very important facts about the Banana, from the perspective of operational geography. The first is that, although the combined mass of the agglomeration is far larger than any of the urban areas that have been fought over to this point, the Banana is relatively difficult to defend because it sits on the floor of a river valley: the Kazennyi Torets flows through all the cities in the Banana before it flows into the Donets. Russian forces approaching the city from the southwest, the east, and the north will all be advancing along the high ground that overlooks the cities on the floor.
The second important fact about the Banana is that, despite its size, it is supported by just two highways which approach from the southwest and northwest respectively, funneling into the Banana like a wedge. Taking the northern highway/MSR (the E40 highway) as an example, we see that Russiaโs operations inside the Donets bend are hardly secondary efforts: they are vital shaping operations linked to the integrity of the Banana. The E40 highway tracks the Donets bend very closely (it generally stays within five miles of the river. If the Russians sustain their progress north of the Donets and reach the river at Bogorodychne or Svyatogirsk, it will not only put E40 under persistent drone attack but also curl the defensive line behind the Banana, to say nothing of the enormous pressure on the Siversk salient.
On the Pokrovsk front as well, Russiaโs progress is being misinterpreted. After their breakthrough at the end of the summer, Russian forces have consolidated the bulge north of Pokrovsk (despite weeks of Ukrainian counterattacks) and are steadily working their way towards Raisโke and Sergiivka. This is not about Pokrovsk at all – reaching Raisโke would put Russian forces directly in the backfield of Kostyantinivka, on the supply lines to the underside of the Banana.
I am not suggesting at all that Russian forces are on the verge of some great offensive surge that will carry them into the heart of the Banana instantly. However, there is a fairly well established Russian operational methodology in this war, which involves working their way methodically into Ukraineโs logistical lanes and seams, segmenting the front and strangulating their strongpoints, forcing them to supply frontline strongholds with single file logistics and dirt roads. They did it in Bakhmut, and Avdiivka, they are doing it in Pokrovsk, and they are shaping the front to attempt this on a large scale in the Banana
Assault on the Banana: Coming 2026
The general point that we are trying to make here is that dismissing Russian advances in the Serebryanka Forest, the emerging bulge north of Pokrovsk, and their move into the Donets Bend as โsecondary effortsโ is mistaken. Zooming out to the appropriate scale shows that these are concentric operations, shaping the front for a 2026 assault on the Banana – moving towards the E40 road from the north, bending the defensive shield around Siversk, and working into the underbelly of the Banana through Raisโke.
This is, perhaps, a long way to go for a short drink of water, but there are a few basic points here that get completely missed when the view of the front is preoccupied with the fighting inside Pokrovsk and Kupyansk:
Russiaโs advance out of Kurakhove across the southern front is not a secondary axis. They have rolled up half of the southern front, condensing Ukrainian forces into a compact space which sterilizes their ability to attack in the south.
Broad Russian pressure across a half-dozen axes maintained a steady burn rate on Ukrainian forces and prevented the accumulation of forces for proactive operations. 2025 has been the first year of the war in which Ukraine has not launched any offensive operations on its own initiative.
Advances in the Donets bend and the interstitial space between Pokrovsk and Kostyantinivka are not subsidiary or secondary operations: they are critical shaping operations that are moving concentrically toward the Banana.
To be frank, the general mood of optimism in the Ukrainian infosphere, which lasted for much of the summer, struck me as remarkably odd. The frontline has yielded no real good news for Ukraine at any point this year. Beyond the broader strategic point, that Ukraine has lost the initiative and does not seem capable of getting it back, Russia is in the process of capturing two important urban centers (Russian troops are in the city centers of Pokrovsk and Kupyansk), it has begun the assault on at leas two more (Lyman and Kostyantinivka), it has rolled up half of the southern front, and cleared most of the inner Donets-Oskil bend. The Banana is on deck for 2026.
Ukraineโs Cost Theory of Victory
One thing that has become apparent over the last year is that Kiev has abandoned previous notions of outright victory on the battlefield and adopted a new strategic framework predicated on imposing unacceptable costs on Russia, so that Moscow will agree to freeze the conflict.
This is a subtle and unspoken yet extremely important distinction. It is easy to miss, because both Ukrainian leadership and Ukraineโs western backers continue to speak of Ukrainian โvictoryโ and the possibility of Ukraine โwinningโ the war. What is crucial to understand is that the โvictoryโ that they speak of now is categorically different than the victory of 2022 and 2023. In the first years of the war, it was possible to at least speak of Ukraine taking the initiative to advance on the ground and retake territory. There were concrete examples of Ukrainian offensives in 2022, and the battle in Zaporizhia – although unsuccessful – showed that it was at least possible for Ukraine to attempt a proper mechanized offensive.
Therefore, in the first years of the war, when leaders in Kiev and Brussels and London and Washington spoke of Ukrainian victory, they essentially meant the defeat of the Russian ground forces and the reconquest of much (or all) of the Donbas. The Kursk Operation of 2024 began to split the difference: Ukraine still had some resources to mount proactive operations, but these operations were no longer aimed at the dense eastern front and instead aimed at relatively soft subsidiary fronts with an eye to out-levering the Russians.
Today, with the Ukrainian army stuck in a permanent state of reactivity and slowly receding defense, it no longer makes any sense to speak of Ukrainian victory in the most straightforward sense, which is to say victory on the battlefield – no matter how tenaciously or bravely the Ukrainian rank and file continues to fight in essentially intolerable circumstances. Instead, Ukrainian โvictoryโ has been transmogrified to mean essentially that Russia absorbs such exorbitant costs that it agrees to some sort of ceasefire without preconditions.
The costs to be imposed on Russia are implicitly assumed to be a mixture of battlefield casualties and damage to strategic assets inflicted by Ukrainian air strikes, and in regards to the latter Ukraine seems to be particularly placing its hopes in a strategic strike campaign against Russian oil. Ukraineโs attempts to disable Russian oil production and refining have dovetailed with ever more aggressive sanctions from the United States against Russian fossil fuel exports – although it is worth noting that the limited price response to these sanctions indicates that markets expect that Russian oil will continue to flow.
Trumpโs suggestion that Tomahawks may be on the table for Ukraine must be seen as a constituent element of this new strategy and theory of victory. And this, ultimately, is very important to understand. Tomahawks are not being bandied about because anybody (in Kiev or Washington) believes that 50 cruise missiles will allow Ukraine to defeat the Russian Army and recapture the Donbas. Tomahawks were mentioned because the Ukrainian alliance is threatening to cripple the Russian fossil fuels industry (through a mixture of sanctions and kinetic strikes on production facilities) unless Putin agrees to a ceasefire.
This is why it is wrong to be surprised that Trump abruptly cancelled his meeting with Putin and instead announced more sanctions. Thereโs nothing abrupt or erratic about this. Threats to Russian oil are now, without exaggeration, the main lever that the Ukrainian bloc has against Russia. It certainly should not have been a surprise that the Kremlin, which has reiterated the same fundamental war aims since day one, was not excited about coming to Budapest to freeze the conflict, and neither should it surprise us that Trump would instead prefer to pull harder on the oil lever. The two powers are playing entirely different games: Russia is slow-walking negotiations while it advances on the ground, and the United States is playing a pain game designed to raise the costs for Russia
We have fundamentally reached an impasse when it comes to negotiations. For Moscow, negotiations with the United States are essentially a way to string Washington along. Moscow feels that it is winning on the ground, therefore a diplomatic impasse suits Russian interests. When western leadership complains that Russia does not seem interested in ending the war, they are correct, but they are missing the point. Russia is not interested in ending the war right now because doing so would not serve Russian interests. The Banana is in the crosshairs, and a ceasefire now would be an egregious compromise when victory on the ground is in sight.
The sense of urgency that Washington feels to end the war – mainly by yanking furiously on the oil lever until the Kremlin cries uncle – stems from the fact that this is now the only sort of victory that Ukraine can hope to win. The ground war has been written off as a total loss, and all that remains is to lob missiles and drones at Russian refineries, sanction Russian firms and banks, and harass shadow tankers until the costs become intolerable. The longer the Ukrainian ground forces can hold the line the better, but this is merely a matter of limiting the downside. The fact that Russia can retaliate disproportionately against Ukraine barely factors into this thinking.
The key point here, however, is that the concept of Ukrainian victory has been completely transformed. There is now no real discussion of how Ukraine can win on the ground. For the Ukrainian bloc, the war is no longer a contest against the Russian Army, but a more abstract contest against Russiaโs willingness to incur strategic costs. Rather than preventing Russian capture of the Donbas, the west is testing how much Putin is willing to pay for it. If history is any guide, a game predicated on outlasting Russiaโs strategic endurance and willingness to fight is a very bad game to play indeed [end]
Near Zaporozhye, heavy fighting has raged for months. Russian forces push forward – slowly, stubbornly. The enemy fights back just as fiercely.
For soldiers to advance, they need constant supplies – ammo, food, medicine. That’s the job of supply groups. Their work isn’t seen on the front line, but without them, victory wouldn’t move an inch.
Among those soldiers – Toyota. Not long ago, he was a taxi driver who loved books. Now he’s here, at war. Can an ordinary cabbie become a soldier?