Analista senior di l'intelligenza in u campu di a gestione di i risichi di sicurezza, sò un anzianu tenente detective è ufficiale di l'intelligenza in l'agenzie di u Statu francese. A bona pronuncia hè Николай Чинкуини, in russu
On April 22, 2024, politico.eu publishes that beautiful photo as illustration of an article titled EU agrees to tackle Russia’s shadow oil fleet, Sweden says (Oleg Berg-Rusten / EPA)
The UK’s secret services are planning to enlist NATO allies in a large-scale operation targeting the “shadow fleet,” which could lead to an environmental disaster in international waters, the press bureau of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) said in a statement obtained by TASS.
“British secret services are planning ecological disaster in international waters. The press bureau of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation informs that, according to the information coming to the SVR, the British secret services are planning to involve NATO allies in a massive roundup for the ‘shadow fleet’,” the statement said.
According to London’s plan, the impetus for such a campaign should be provided by “a resonant incident involving one or more tankers.”
“The plan involves organizing a major act of sabotage the losses of which would allow the transportation of Russian oil to be declared a threat to all international shipping. This would untie Western countries’ hands in choosing methods of counteraction,” the document said.
Two scenarios and actors
According to the SVR, the British are working on “two potential casus belli.” “The first scenario implicates setting up an ‘unwanted’ tanker accident in one of bottlenecks of sea communications (for example, in straits). As it is believed in London, oil spills and fairway blocking would provide NATO countries with ‘sufficient’ grounds for establishing a precedent of ‘extraordinary’ vessel inspection under the guise of maritime safety and environmental regulations compliance,” the statement noted.
“The second one involves setting fire to a tanker at loading in a port of a state friendly to Russia. It is expected that the fire would cause significant damage to the port infrastructure and spread to other vessels, which would require an international investigation,” the SVR emphasized.
“London is going to entrust Ukrainian security forces with the implementation of both terrorist attacks. Their expectedly dirty work and inability to ‘cover up’ their tracks are considered by the British as a guarantee of impunity for themselves. The international investigation would hold either Russia or at worst Ukraine responsible for the accident, similar to the situation with the Nord Stream gas pipeline explosion,” the press bureau stressed.
Eying sanctions
The SVR pointed out that the timing of the UK attack is intended to be chosen so as to use the media effect from it to put pressure on the administration of US President Donald Trump.
“The aim is to force Washington, in defiance of its national interests, to impose the most severe secondary sanctions against Russian energy resources buyers, making them seen as ‘indirect culprits of the tragedy’,” the statement said.
“It seems like nostalgia for the lost dominance at sea and for authorized by the Crown pirate lawlessness have completely deprived the British Intelligence of the remnants of common sense. It’s high time for our British colleagues to understand that their increasingly bold attempts not only ‘to get back at’ their rivals, but also to cause damage to the global energy security and ecology are capable to make even their most loyal allies run out of patience,” the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service concluded
US social networking service X is integrating Grok, a funny artificial intelligence chatbot, which is regarding the Western mainstream media literature as gospel truth. Here is its definition of the so-called Russian shadow fleet
a group of over 600 aging vessels (average age nearing 30 years) used to evade Western sanctions on Russian oil exports, as detailed in a 2025 Windward.ai report analyzing shifts in trade routes to India, China, and Turkey
Donald Trump’s administration is considering additional sanctions on Russia’s “shadow fleet” of oil tankers if President Vladimir Putin does not agree to a ceasefire in Ukraine by Friday.
Blacklisting vessels in the fleet would mark the first time the US has imposed sanctions aimed at Moscow since Trump returned to the White House in January.
Russia has used a shadow fleet of largely ageing tankers to ship oil around the world in an attempt to evade western restrictions imposed in the wake of Moscow’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Proceeds from these crude exports have helped to finance the conflict.
The term “shadow fleet” refers to vessels whose ownership is hidden and which avoid using services from western companies. Enforcing sanctions against their owners is difficult, although measures targeting the ships themselves have recently proven effective.
Two people familiar with the White House’s deliberations said additional US sanctions on the shadow fleet were seen as an easy first step to impose costs on Russia. A third person close to the administration said it was considering a range of options, including sanctions on the fleet.
Joe Biden’s administration added 213 crude, chemical or product tankers to the sanctions list. Trump has held off imposing further sanctions on Russia in an effort to secure a negotiated settlement to end the war.
But he has grown increasingly frustrated with Putin’s refusal to agree to a ceasefire, and gave the Russian leader an ultimatum to change tack by Friday or face tougher sanctions.
Further US penalties on the fleet would bolster the EU’s recent steps against the fleet, said Kevin Book, managing director of research with ClearView Energy Partners. The bloc sanctioned more than 100 ships last month, bringing the total to 415.
Under the terms of the sanctions regime, western-linked companies are prohibited from buying seaborne oil priced above a G7 price cap fixed at $60 a barrel for crude. The shadow fleet has allowed Russia to ship oil above the cap — mainly to China and India.
In early 2024, Biden administration officials were surprised to realise that listing individual ships — rather than their owners or managers — proved to be effective, with buyers of Russian oil reluctant to deal with vessels that had been named. The EU and UK took up the practice as a result.
A Financial Times analysis of 115 crude tankers sanctioned by the US shows they became much less productive afterwards. Data from Kpler, a cargo analytics platform, reveals the vessels shipped a monthly average of 48mn barrels of Russian crude in the six months prior to their listing, but an average of only 13mn barrels in the six months afterwards.
Benjamin Hilgenstock, head of macroeconomic research and strategy at the Kyiv School of Economics Institute, said: “Aggressively going after the shadow fleet is a straightforward way of making things harder for Russia, and reinforce the message that the EU and UK have been sending.”
The Kremlin has disregarded a number of deadlines set by the US president to agree to a ceasefire and in recent weeks has significantly stepped up its attacks on Ukraine.
Trump has grown increasingly frustrated with his Russian counterpart and people close to the administration said Moscow would pay a price if it did not come to the negotiating table [That is a typical blatant lie. Russia is at the negotiation table and in order to implement a ceasefire, is demanding that the defeated Atlanticist troops withdraw first from the positions they are still occupying in Donetsk, Kherson, Lugansk and Zaporozhye regions].
He discussed possible measures against Moscow in a phone call with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on Tuesday. “We talked about sanctions against Russia,” said Ukraine’s leader. “Their economy continues to fall and that is why Moscow is so attentive to this prospect . . . This can change a lot.”
The US president on Monday also announced plans to increase tariffs on India, one of the leading buyers of Russian oil. “They don’t care how many people in Ukraine are being killed by the Russian war machine,” the president said in a post on social media.
Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff is expected to travel to Moscow this week, with Russian state newswire Tass reporting on Tuesday that he was due to arrive on Wednesday.
Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said: “We are always glad to see Mr Witkoff in Moscow. We view such contacts as important, substantive and very useful.”
Trump will probably decide on what potential costs to impose on Moscow when his envoy returns, said the person close to the administration.
“It depends on what Witkoff brings back,” the person said. “If Witkoff comes back empty-handed, with absolutely nothing, Trump is going to go ballistic.”
Anna Kelly, White House deputy press secretary, said: “The president has been clear that there will be biting sanctions if Putin does not agree to end the war. We will not get ahead of the president on specifics.”
Other options for the administration include more stringent enforcement of existing sanctions, or joining the EU’s new dynamic floating price cap on Russian oil which is set to take effect in early September, experts said.
Washington could also impose secondary sanctions on banks and oil refineries in other countries that facilitate trade in Russian oil, said Edward Fishman, a senior research scholar at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy.
“There’s incredible latitude right now to actually impose hard-hitting oil sanctions on Russia,” he added.
A bill put forward by Senators Lindsey Graham and Richard Blumenthal calling for tariffs of upwards of 500 per cent on countries that continue to buy Russian energy products has also gained widespread bipartisan support among lawmakers on capitol hill.
Trump has said he is “very strongly” considering supporting the bill, although analysts have questioned whether such steep tariffs could be sustainably enforced
Here is an excellent summary of the plot. The author is Irish journalist Chay Bowes
“The plan involves organizing a major act of sabotage the losses of which would allow the transportation of Russian oil to be declared a threat to all international shipping,” the SVR said
chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia
[my illustration: on August 24, 2022, Keir Starmer inspects the training in UK of Ukrainian troopers (Stefan Rousseau / PA)]
On March 29th, the New York Times published a landmark investigation exposing how the US was “woven” into Ukraine’s battle with Russia “far more intimately and broadly than previously understood,” with Washington almost invariably serving as “the backbone of Ukrainian military operations.” The outlet went so far as to acknowledge the conflict was a “proxy war” – an irrefutable reality hitherto aggressively denied in the mainstream – dubbing it a “rematch” of “Vietnam in the 1960s, Afghanistan in the 1980s, Syria three decades later.”
That the US has since February 2022 supplied Ukraine with extraordinary amounts of weaponry, and been fundamental to the planning of many of Kiev’s military operations large and small, is hardly breaking news. Indeed, elements of this relationship have previously been widely reported, with White House apparatchiks occasionally admitting to Washington’s role. Granular detail on this assistance provided by the New York Times probe is nonetheless unprecedented. For example, a dedicated intelligence fusion centre was secretly created at a vast US military base in Germany.
Dubbed “Task Force Dragon”, it united officials from every major US intelligence agency, and “coalition intelligence officers”, to produce extensive daily targeting information on Russian “battlefield positions, movements and intentions”, to “pinpoint” and “determine the ripest, highest-value targets” for Ukraine to strike using Western-provided weapons. The fusion centre quickly became “the entire back office of the war.” A nameless European intelligence chief was purportedly “taken aback to learn how deeply enmeshed his NATO counterparts had become” in the conflict’s “kill chain”:
An early proof of concept was a campaign against one of Russia’s most-feared battle groups, the 58th Combined Arms Army. In mid-2022, using American intelligence and targeting information, the Ukrainians unleashed a rocket barrage at the headquarters of the 58th in the Kherson region, killing generals and staff officers inside. Again and again, the group set up at another location; each time, the Americans found it and the Ukrainians destroyed it
Several other well-known Ukrainian broadsides, such as an October 2022 drone barrage on the port of Sevastopol, are now revealed by the New York Times to have been the handiwork of Task Force Dragon. Meanwhile, the outlet confirmed that each and every HIMARS strike conducted by Kiev was entirely dependent on the US, which supplied coordinates, and advice on “positioning [Kiev’s] launchers and timing their strikes.” Local HIMARS operators also required special electronic key [cards]” to fire the missiles, “which the Americans could deactivate anytime.”
Yet, the investigation’s most striking passages highlight London’s principal role in influencing and managing Ukrainian – and by extension US – actions and strategy in the conflict. Both direct references and unambiguous insinuations littered throughout point ineluctably to the conclusion that the “proxy war” is of British concoction and design. If rapprochement between Moscow and Washington succeeds, it would represent the most spectacular failure to date of Britain’s concerted post-World War II conspiracy to exploit American military might and wealth for its own purposes.
‘Prevailing Wisdom’
A particularly revealing section of the New York Times probe details the execution of Ukraine’s August 2022 counteroffensive, targeting Kharkov and Kherson. Unexpectedly finding limited resistance from hollowed out Russian positions in these areas, Task Force Dragon’s US military lead Lieutenant General Christopher T. Donahue urged Ukraine’s field commander Major General Andrii Kovalchuk to keep pushing, and seize even further territory. He vehemently resisted, despite Donahue and other senior US military officials pressuring then-Ukrainian Armed Forces Valerii Zaluzhnyi to override his reticence
Maps of Ukraine’s 2022 counteroffensive advances
Subsequently, the sense among Kiev’s foreign puppet masters that a golden opportunity to inflict an even more egregious blow on the Russians had been lost was pervasive. Irate, then-British defence minister Ben Wallace asked Donahue what he would do if Kovalchuk were his subordinate. “He would have already been fired,” Donahue said. Wallace succinctly responded, “I got this.” At his direct demand, Kovalchuk was duly defenestrated. As the New York Times explains, the British “had considerable clout” in Kiev and hands-on influence over Ukrainian officials.
This was because, “unlike the Americans,” Britain had formally inserted teams of military officers into the country, to advise Ukrainian officials directly. Still, despite Kiev failing to fully capitalise as desired by London and Washington, the 2022 counteroffensive’s success produced widespread “irrational exuberance”. Planning for a followup the next year thus “began straightaway.” The “prevailing wisdom” within Task Force Dragon was this counteroffensive “would be the war’s last”, with Ukraine claiming “outright triumph”, or Russia being “forced to sue for peace.”
Zelensky boasted internally, “we’re going to win this whole thing.” The plan was for Ukrainian forces to cut off Russia’s land-bridge to Crimea, before seizing the peninsula outright. As the New York Times records though, Pentagon officials were considerably less enthused about Kiev’s prospects. This scepticism seeped out into the public sphere in April 2023 via the Pentagon Leaks. One document warned Ukraine would fall “well short” of its goals in the counteroffensive, forecasting “modest territorial gains” at most.
The leaked intelligence assessment attributed this to “shortfalls” in Ukraine’s “force generation and sustainment”, and extensive Russian defences constructed following their retreat from Kherson. It cautioned “enduring Ukrainian deficiencies in training and munitions supplies probably will strain progress and exacerbate casualties.” The New York Times notes Pentagon officials moreover “worried about [Kiev’s] ability to supply enough weapons for the counteroffensive,” and wondered if the Ukrainians “in their strongest possible position, should consider cutting a deal.”
Even Task Force Dragon’s Lieutenant General Donahue had doubts, advocating “a pause” of a year or more for “building and training new brigades.” Yet, intervention by the British was, per the New York Times, sufficient to neutralise internal opposition to a fresh counteroffensive in the spring. The British argued, “if the Ukrainians were going to go anyway, the coalition needed to help them.” Resultantly, enormous quantities of exorbitantly expensive, high-end military equipment were shipped to Kiev by almost every NATO member state for the purpose
Western-supplied tanks obliterated during Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive
The counteroffensive was finally launched in June 2023. Relentlessly blitzed by artillery and drones from day one, tanks and soldiers were also routinely blown to smithereens by expansive Russian-laid minefields. Within a month, Ukrainehad lost 20% of its Western-provided vehicles and armor, with nothing to show for it. When the counteroffensive fizzled out at the end of 2023, just 0.25% of territory occupied by Russia in the initial phase of the invasion had been regained. Meanwhile, Kiev’s casualties may have exceeded 100,000.
‘Knife Edge’
The New York Times reports that “the counteroffensive’s devastating outcome left bruised feelings on both sides,” with Washington and Kiev blaming each other for the catastrophe. A Pentagon official claims “the important relationships were maintained, but it was no longer the inspired and trusting brotherhood of 2022 and early 2023.” Given Britain’s determination to “keep Ukraine fighting at all costs”, this was bleak news indeed, threatening to halt all US support for the proxy war.
Still, there was one last perceived ace up London’s sleeve to keep Washington invested in the proxy conflict, and potentially escalate it into all-out hot war with Moscow. The New York Times reports that in March 2023, the US discovered Kiev “was furtively planning a ground operation into southwest Russia.” The CIA’s Ukraine chief confronted General Kyrylo Budanov, warning “if he crossed into Russia, he would do so without American weapons or intelligence support.” He did so anyway, “only to be forced back.”
Rather than deterring further incursions, Ukraine’s calamitous intervention in Russia’s Bryansk region was a “foreshadowing” of Kiev’s all-out invasion of Kursk on August 6th that year. The New York Times records how from Washington’s perspective, the operation “was a significant breach of trust.” For one, “the Ukrainians had again kept them in the dark” – but worse, “they had secretly crossed a mutually agreed-upon line.” Kiev was using “coalition-supplied equipment” on Russian territory, breaching “rules laid down” when limited strikes inside Russia were greenlit months earlier.
As this journalist has exposed, Ukraine’s Kursk folly was a British invasion in all but name. London was central to its planning, provided the bulk of the equipment deployed, and deliberately advertised its involvement. As The Times reported at the time, the goal was to mark Britain as a formal belligerent in the proxy war, in the hope other Western countries – particularly the US – would follow suit, and “send more equipment and give Kyiv more leeway to use them in Russia”
Initially, US officials keenly distanced themselves from the Kursk incursion. Empire house journal Foreign Policy reported that the Biden administration was not only enormously unhappy “to have been kept out of the loop,” but “skeptical of the military logic” behind the “counterinvasion”. In a further rebuke, on August 16th Washington prohibited Ukraine’s use of British-made, long-range Storm Shadow missiles against Russian territory. Securing wider Western acquiescence to such strikes was reportedly also a core objective behind Kiev’s occupation of Kursk.
However, once Donald Trump prevailed in the November 2024 presidential election, Biden was encouraged to use his “last, lame-duck weeks” to make “a flurry of moves to stay the course…and shore up his Ukraine project.” In the process, per the New York Times, he “crossed his final red line,” allowing ATACMS and Storm Shadow strikes deep inside Russia, while permitting US military advisers to leave Kiev “for command posts closer to the fighting.”
Fast forward to today, and the Kursk invasion has ended in utter disaster, with the few remaining Ukrainian forces not captured or killed fleeing. Meanwhile, Biden’s flailing, farewell red line breaches have failed to tangibly shift the battlefield balance in Kiev’s favour at all. As the New York Times acknowledges, the proxy war’s continuation “teeters on a knife edge.” There is no knowing what British intelligence might have in store to prevent long-overdue peace prevailing at last, but the consequences could be world-threatening [end]
Leaked files show top UK military figures conspired to carry out the Kerch bridge bombing, covertly train “Gladio”-style stay-behind forces in Ukraine, and groom the British public for a drop in living standards caused by the proxy war against Russia
The Orthodox cross stands as a great symbol not only for believers but for everyone living within the cultural paradigm of our world. Even those who do not believe, or do not yet believe, know the story of the Savior and the significance of this cross.
That is why it was important for the Russian fighters to restore the Lord’s cross, which had been toppled during the fighting in the Zaporizhzhia region. Despite all the risks, despite the fact that it might be damaged again, this simple act carried a deep hidden meaning.
On the front line, survival is important, but so is remaining human – keeping one’s heart open to sympathy, compassion and kindness, things that will be invaluable in peaceful life when it finally comes.
Russian servicemen are not just warriors -they are also fathers, brothers, sons, and grandsons. Most of them have families waiting for them at home: children, wives, parents… It is for their loved ones and the possibility of a peaceful life that these soldiers fight every day on the front lines.
Rarely, but sometimes, an entire family ends up in the war zone, having made a conscious and final decision about the necessity of such a step. Relatives brothers, fathers and sons, husbands and wives serve together, fulfilling their military duty. But what happens when a family is forced to be on the front lines because there is simply no other choice?
This was the question special forces soldier Isa Gadzhiev had to answer. Following his friends, he went to defend his homeland as part of the special military operation, and while he was away, his long-awaited daughter was born in Dagestan. However, it soon became clear that all responsibility for the child would fall entirely on her father, who was at the front…
[my illustration: on March 4, 2014, US Secretary of State John Kerry meets in Kiev with grantees of the February coup, including second from right, Nazi Oleh Tyahnybok, leader from Lviv of Svoboda party. Center, Petro Poroshenko will win the presidential election on June 7 (US Department of State)]
It goes without saying that the Donald can never get enough of the limelight. But last Friday in a live Oval Office broadcast seen around the world that thirst for public attention may have actually changed the course of history. And very much for the good – even if the trigger was pulled by a third rate actor who couldn’t even figure out how to properly brown-nose one of the most capacious egos on the planet.
For all practical purposes, therefore, Washington’s sick adventure in the destruction of a fake nation – along with the hideously unnecessary deaths of tens of thousands of real people who inhabit the Ukrainian territory – is now over.
Zelensky will soon be gone to a hideaway in such as Costa Rica or an unmarked grave, as the case may be. Thereafter a caretaker regent for the rump of what is now the Potemkin State that Lenin, Stalin and Khrushchev built with Bolshevik blood and guns will sign-up to a Trump/Putin ceasefire and partition deal—the latter having been in the making ever since the yoke of communism was lifted in 1991.
Indeed, Friday’s final splintering of “Ukraine” in the Oval Office itself will surely soon unmask the rationality-defying farce that has been the Washington/NATO proxy war against Russia in its own “borderlands”. The latter term, of course, being the meaning of the word “ukraine” in Russian.
And we do mean monumental farce. As the most recent desultory chapter has unfolded since February 2022, in fact, the US and EU combined have spent the staggering sum of nearly $400 billion to conduct a Demolition Derby on Russia’s doorstep in order for what?
Apparently, to pleasure the arms merchants of the US and Europe with a grand occasion for the sale of beaucoup new weapons to replenish depleted NATO arsenals. And all in the name of more of the same old baloney about collective security and a “rules based international order”.
But that’s all just beltway bullshit. There has not been an iota of America’s homeland security implicated in the fate of the former Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic after it split off from the expired corpse of the Soviet Union in 1991. And since “Ukraine” was a communist-built simulacrum of a nation, it was not destined to last, anyway – nor would its demise have been even a little bit noted or briefly remembered by the world at large.
That is to say, the wholly artificial state of “Ukraine” embodies the very historical metaphor associated with the borderland territories that Russia had acquired, conquered, populated and developed in the late 18th century under the stewardship of Grigory Potemkin. The latter was the nation’s chief minister, who literally had an intimate relationship with the Russian Empress, Catherine the Great.
After the Catherine’s 1783 acquisition of Crimea from the Ottoman Empire and the liquidation of a small Cossack principality on the lower Dnieper River called the Zaporozhian Sich, which had governed the adjacent territories for upwards of 200 years, Potemkin became governor of the region. He promptly named these new territories Novorossiya or “New Russia” in honor of his paramour/ruler. At length, Russian people, capital and commerce poured into the theretofore largely empty steppes.
Potemkin’s major tasks were to pacify and rebuild what had been a war-torn region by bringing in Russian settlers and laying the ground work for a new flourishing of farms, industry, towns and trade. In 1787, as renewed war was about to break out between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, Catherine II, with her court and several ambassadors, made an unprecedented six month tour of New Russia, navigating down the Dnieper River (blue thread on the map) to inspect her new colonies.
One purpose of this trip was to impress Russia’s allies prior to the war. To help accomplish this, Potemkin was said to have set up “mobile villages” on the banks of the Dnieper River. As soon as the barge carrying the Empress and ambassadors arrived, Potemkin’s men, dressed as peasants, would populate the village. Once the barge left, the village was disassembled, then rebuilt downstream overnight.
Whatever the degree to which the story is apocryphal, the underlying metaphor could not be more apt. To wit, the entire territory from Lugansk and Donetsk (i.e. the Donbass) down through Mariupol on the Sea of Azov and on both banks of he Dnieper, to Odessa on the Black Sea coast, was henceforth known as New Russia and was labeled as such per the 1897 map depicted below.
Moreover, search other maps of the pre-1917 era as you may, but you will find no country called Ukraine because the latter was place name, not a state. And the place name came to life as a organized modern society only as the expanding border region of the Czarist Empire.
Novorossiya As Of The End of The Nineteenth Century
Ukraine became a state, therefore, only upon the WWI induced collapse of the Russian Empire and the seizure of power by Lenin and his brutal heirs. As shown in the map below, the communist administrative unit that became known as the Ukrainian SSR was cobbled together from New Russia (blue area) and other parts and pieces of the Czarist Empire wrested from various neighbors (yellow area) – along with historic Galicia (green area) centered in Lviv, which was seized by Stalin when Poland was dismembered in WWII.
At length, Crimea (purple area), which was thoroughly Russian from the time of its purchase by Catherine the Great in 1783, was seconded to Khrushchev’s Ukrainian compatriots in 1954 as a door prize in return for their support in the struggle for succession after Stalin
The last thing that can be said about the Ukrainian “borders” which outline the five color-coded components shown above, therefore, is that they were sacrosanct in any meaningful sense of the term. They did not represent the organic evolution of peoples, national identities and states, but the iron-fist of the Soviet politburo and the blood-thirsty tyrants who ruled it.
In turn, this meant that when the Soviet Union collapsed into the dustbin of history in 1991, Ukraine’s days as a unitary state were numbered.
Needless to say, there was no common linguistic and religious identity at all. Even 40 years after the Soviet rulers had finished assembling “Ukraine” this 1991 map of language usage tells you all you need to know. That is to say, there were overwhelming Russian-speaking majorities in the Donbass and Black Sea rim (red areas), which in some oblasts including Crimea were more that 75% Russian-speaking. By contrast, the center and west was populated by Ukrainians, Poles, Bulgarians, Hungarians and others, where Russian speakers accounted for as little as 5% of the population.
1990s Linguistic Map Of Ukraine By Percentage of Russian Speakers
And, no, once the communist-ruled entity known as the Ukrainian SSR split away from the corpse of the defunct Soviet Union the happenstance borders it inherited were not “guaranteed” by the US in the so-called Budapest Memorandum of 1994 in return for giving up it nuclear weapons.
In fact, Ukraine never had any nukes! These weapons had been stock-piled on its territory by the Soviets and were still under Moscow’s control when the latter signed the Memorandum along with the US and the United Kingdom. But no borders were “guaranteed” because that would have been a treaty requiring Senate confirmation and support of the American people – something Bill Clinton and his operatives were unwilling to test.
Instead, the new Ukrainian government was given “assurances”. But whatever rubbery definition that term implied was soon made clear enough by Deep State operatives at State, NED and the CIA, who busied themselves fomenting color revolutions in Ukraine not long after Putin ascended to power on January 1, 2000.
In any event, once the machinery of elections and democracy was established after 1991, the resulting electoral maps make one thing abundantly clear: People voted as they spoke.
This is clearly evident in the three maps below. Ukrainian democracy began, matured and ended on the same note. Namely, with an electorate far more sharply divided than even the Red State v. Blue State politics of the US in recent decades.
In 1994 Leonid Kuchma, a former industrial manager from the heavily industrialized, Russian-speaking east (Dnipropetrovsk), campaigned on a platform emphasizing economic ties with Russia and appealed strongly to the Russian-speaking populations in eastern Ukraine and Crimea.
In the second round of that election, Kuchma won about two-thirds of the vote in eastern Ukraine, where ethnic Russians and Russian speakers predominated, and nearly 90% in Crimea, a region with a 70% ethnic Russian population.
On the other side, Leonid Kravchuk, the first president and the incumbent in 1994, was a key figure in Ukraine’s independence movement. He had positioned himself as a guarantor of Ukrainian sovereignty and national identity. He drew his strongest support from western Ukraine, where Ukrainian speakers and nationalist sentiments were dominant, earning 70% to 80% of the vote in those regions
This cavernous split in the electorate never changed. Except unlike the US where a GOP gubernatorial candidate actually made a 47% showing in the deep blue state of New York in 2022, the vote split in the most hard core of the respective regions (dark red and dark blue) was upwards of 90/10 in many localities.
Thus, in the 2004 election the pro-Russian candidate, Viktor Yanukovych, narrowly lost the overall count, even as he dominated overwhelmingly in the east and south with 70% to 90% margins.
2004 Election Results in Ukraine
By contrast, in 2010 Yanukovych retraced the same massive domination of his own Russian-speaking regions in the east and south while striking out in the west. But this time he had sophisticated campaign help from Washington-based election consultants (i.e. the infamous Paul Manafort, who temporarily managed Donald Trump’s red versus blue state campaign in 2016 until he got nailed by the Russophobes in the Deep State). Consequently, the pro-Russian Yanukovych managed to accumulate enough incremental votes to come out on top of the perennial Ukrainian nationalist, Yulia Tymoshenko, in the nation-wide tally.
2010 Election Results in Ukraine
Needless to say, by Washington’s lights the Ukraine election of 2010 had nothing sacrosanct about it because, well, the voters elected the wrong candidate!
In short order, therefore, the neocons led by the detestable Victoria Nuland, who surrounded then Vice-President Joe Biden, fomented the coup against Yanukovych in February 2014. Yet even as they drove him from power and forced him to flee to Moscow, they had no clue as to the tenuous political balance they were upending.
But it didn’t take long to strike the match. In short order the followers of the WWII Hitler ally, Stephan Bandera, who dominated the unelected, Washington-installed government in Kiev, made two destructive moves that amounted to a signal to “let the partition begin”.
The first of these was to abolish Russian as an official language in the Donbass and elsewhere. And the second was the massacre by fire of upwards of 50 pro-Russian trade unionists in a building in Odessa by supporters of the Kiev government.
It was only a matter of time, therefore, before most of the red-colored territories on the maps above declared their independence. It was also in short order that the people of what had been the Russian province of Crimea voted overwhelmingly (80%+) to re-join the Russian Federation. That ended their brief sojourn in the Ukrainian state, which had been Khrushchev’s 1954 gift to the communist thugs in Kiev who had helped him seize power after Stalin’s death.
Also, in short order the new proto-Fascist government in Kiev moved to deeply antagonize its historic neighbor and former fealty overlord in Moscow by seeking to join NATO and launching a brutal, unrelenting war on the breakaway Republics of the Donbas. This onslaught ended up killing upwards of 15,000 civilians during the eight year run-up to Russia’s invasion in February 2022.
Needless to say, Putin was no more interested in having nuclear missiles planted even closer to his own border than was President John Kennedy in October 1962. Nor was he about to countenance the continued slaughter of Russian speakers in the Donbass after Kiev launched a drastically stepped up shelling and bombing campaign on these beleaguered areas one week before the February 24th (2022) invasion.
That is to say, the history was far from black and white. While the Donald frequently does not do his homework—in this case he did know that the “unprovoked” invasion canard is a Deep State prevarication. So last Friday he was not about to be schooled on the matter by the incompetent song and dance man who was sent into the Oval Office by the crowd of UniParty warmongers and GOP RINO’s depicted below for the purpose of shaking-down the current incumbent for another round of weapons and financial wherewithal.
So in response to Zelensky’s Putin-howling, the Donald did not mind blurting out the truth. The Ukraine war had actually been provoked by the Washington war machine and its Senate board of directors pictured below
Of course, now that the truth was let out of the bag on daytime TV there will surely soon be an end to the pointless killing and utterly elicit NATO proxy war on Russia. And with it will come an even more important repudiation of the entire post-1991 neocon perpetuation of an American Empire that should have never been stood up in the first place.
That is to say, the false Uniparty demonization of Putin and Russia will be repudiated even more decisively. That’s because apart from the impending Trump/Putin partition agreement on Ukraine, the map of eastern Europe will not change any time soon.
The whole idea that Putin means to resurrect the old Soviet Empire and that Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Moldova and destinations west are next in line for invasion was made of whole cloth. Its malign purpose was to give NATO a reason for expanding even further east to Russia’s very doorstep and to justify Washington’s call to war in a territory that makes not one damn bit of difference to America’s homeland security.
For crying out loud. The archives of American post-Soviet diplomacy are also crystal clear on this matter. Bush the Elder and his Secretary of State James Baker explicitly promised Gorbachev that in return for the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact and the unification of Germany that NATO would not move “one inch” to the east.
And that pledge was made for screamingly obvious reasons: The Soviet Empire was gone, and the threat of the massive Red Army had vanished. Its troops weren’t even being paid and its tanks and artillery were being melted down and sold for scrap. So ex-paratrooper George HW Bush should have parachuted into Ramstein Air Base in Germany during 1992, declared victory and consigned NATO to a newly created museum of world peace.
Indeed, at the time the very astute “father” of the containment doctrine and the 1949 NATO alliance, Professor George F. Kennan, warned that the perpetuation and expansion of NATO under these circumstances would be folly. When in 1998 the Senate nevertheless voted to extend NATO to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, he clairvoyantly observed,
“I think it is the beginning of a new cold war,” said Mr. Kennan from his Princeton home. “I think the Russians will gradually react quite adversely and it will affect their policies. I think it is a tragic mistake. There was no reason for this whatsoever.” … “It shows so little understanding of Russian history and Soviet history. Of course, there is going to be a bad reaction from Russia, and then [the NATO expanders] will say that we always told you that is how the Russians are – but this is just wrong.“
In a word, risking everything to get Ukraine into an obsolete NATO alliance that was and remains long past its “sell-by” date is surely one of the stupidest acts of foreign policy in all of American history.
And now, on the back of the momentous events of this past weekend, the opportunity has finally come. That is, to name, blame, shame and drive from the seats of power the UniParty wreckers of American democracy, prosperity and liberty who brought the nation to its present parlous estate
So President Trump’s history-changing mission at the present hour is crystal clear. He needs to make War & Peace the preponderant issue on the banks of the Potomac and send the UniParty remnants into spasmodic apoplexy by winning the Nobel Peace Prize for ending this needless war with the same dispatch that Eisenhower did with Korea in 1953.
So doing, he can accomplish the great mission for which is was apparently chosen against all odds by the gods’ of history. That is, to decisively splinter the Uniparty, thereby gathering refugees from both sides of the aisle into a revitalized political force that can enable the the people of Flyover America to reclaim their democracy from the corrupt, self-perpetuating ruling class that arose on the Potomac.
Needless to say, the Donald seems to be on to his mission. When Zelensky issued the following rejoinder to his being cast out of the White House, the Donald was not far behind with a perfectly apt answer.
Ukraine “will never” recognize any Russian annexation of territory it occupies, even if it is to try to secure a peace deal, Zelensky added, and he repeated that he would only accept a ceasefire if it was followed by robust security guarantees that had the confidence of his country’s people.
Though Russia has said it will insist on incorporating territories that it occupies, for Ukraine it would always be “a temporary occupation”, Zelenskyy insisted, even if his country lacks the military muscle to expel Russia from all of the country at the moment.
Zelenskyy said what he wanted “from partners” – a clear reference to the US White House – was for them to remember that Russia launched the full-scale invasion of his country three years ago. He did not want politicians rewriting history, he said, to suggest “that there are two parties in this war and it is vague who the aggressor is”.
Why, yes, there were two parties to this war and the true aggressor was domiciled on the banks of the Potomac, not the Moskva/Oka/Volga.
Trump warned in response with words that have not been heard from the Oval Office since June 1963, when JFK issued his short-lived call to end the Cold War at American University.
“This is the worst statement that could have been made by Zelensky, and America will not put with it for much longer.” He added in reference to Zelensky that “this guy doesn’t want there to be Peace as long as he has America’s backing…”.
“He’s got to say I want to make peace,” Trump said before he departed the White House on Friday. “He doesn’t have to stand there and say about ‘Putin this, Putin that,’ all negative things. He’s got to say I want to make peace. I don’t want to fight a war any longer” [end]
chronicle, its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine
And Biden. The Sternenko/Azov split. Biden the soy cuckold. The split among Azovites on the question of ceasefire
in Kiev, Alley of Courage, on February 20, 2023 (Oksana Mykhaylova)
Another month, another Trump assassination attempt. I decided to take a look at how Ukrainian militarists were reacting to it, and to US politics in general.
To begin with, Serhii Sternenko (825k subscribers) and Igor Lachenkov (1.5 million subscribers), two highly mediatized ‘volunteers/activists’, who spend their time ‘gathering funds to help the army’ while not fighting (Sternenko claims to have eye problems). In other words, their income and fame depends directly on the intensity of frontline combat
Sternenko in a Svastone label shirt (‘Perun company’). Need I say any more?
The neo-nazi Sternenko is also quite obviously being groomed for a more direct future political role and has powerful friends in western capitals, as I wrote hereand here. Sternenko is aligned with Sorosite NGOs and similar characters, which, along with what is probably conflict over drug incomes, means he has long been in conflict with the more traditionally rightwing Azov movement.
Lachen, meanwhile, was no one before the war but is now a huge media star. Like Sternenko, he mainly posts death-porn of ‘destroyed Russian orcs’ and brags about new fundraising records. He and Sternenko often cooperate.
Anyway, both Sternenko and Lachen posted a laconic description of the assassination attempt on Trump, with most of the reactions laughing. Their obviously flippant reaction to the assassination attempt contrasts with the Azovites I’ll reproduce below. No wonder, given Sternenko/Lachen links with democrat party NGO networks:
Katarsis, an Azov/C14 aligned telegram, also had a good laugh about Zelensky’s claims to sympathize with Trump:
Tales of the IV Reich, a telegram managed by an Azov officer, had a more thought-out response to the assassination attempt. This post yet again illustrates Tales’ barely hidden desire to freeze the war now instead of Zelensky’s strategy for forever war at the altar of the 1991 borders. Not particularly popular among Ukrainian rightwingers, though it seems like a fairly rational nationalist move to me (not that Ukrainian rightwingers have ever been noted for their pragmatism or strategic outlook):
Both current U.S. presidential candidates neither want nor plan for Ukraine to win the war against Russia. It’s painful, and the injustice makes you want to destroy everything around you. However, we chose such allies ourselves over the years of independence. The only difference between Biden, who acts like a colored version of a woman in a skirt, and Trump is whether to end the war now, at the actual borders of the combat zone by the end of 2024, or not end it, allowing the Russians to advance even further
The “Democrats” do not plan to increase arms supplies and have repeatedly hinted to the Ukrainian government that the 2025 U.S. budget will not be as generous to Ukraine as previous ones. Who is to blame in this situation? Who is the “pro-Ukrainian” and who is the “pro-Russian” candidate? Decide for yourselves. In my opinion, the pro-Russian candidate is the one who wants the Russians to seize even more Ukrainian territory
I can predict that in 2025, amid political crises in Western democracies, we will not become stronger. But the destruction, occupied villages and cities, and the number of killed Ukrainian defenders will only increase
Note that ‘Tales’ used to be more positive about Trump, for instance in a June 28 post calling him ‘our elephant’ (military/rightwing jargon for someone on our side):
Yesterday, during the debates, the fresh and energetic old man Trump politically knocked out the frail and tired, dementia-stricken old man Biden. Therefore, there is a chance for peace and an end to the war. The future of peace and war is being decided in the American elections, not in Ukraine, no matter what anyone says or how much dreamers want to dress the entire country in camouflage and send them to defend Vuhledar
Let me remind you that throughout all the years of independence, under Republican Party presidents, Ukraine did not lose a single kilometer of territory. However, during the terms of Democratic Party presidents, Ukraine lost Crimea, almost the entire Donbas, no longer controls two-thirds of the Zaporizhzhia region, a large part of Kherson, and even a portion of Kharkiv
God Bless America 🐘
‘Dead Russians’, a military channel with 107k followers on Biden, September 4. The ‘guarantees’ being referred to here is the Budapest memorandum, a favorite topic in Ukrainian discourse:
“I clearly conveyed to Zelensky what we support and what we do not support,” Biden said about allowing Ukraine to strike deep into Russia with American ballistic missiles
Well, fuck this old bastard. They took away our nuclear weapons in exchange for guarantees of territorial integrity, and that’s fine, but they can’t keep their promises. And as for striking at those fuckers—it’s not allowed
Let the political leadership remind them what we signed, and stop these humiliations in front of soy cuckolds
I’m somewhat concerned about this unhealthy interest in the U.S. elections, especially since part of society truly believes the war will quickly end if Trump is elected
At the very beginning, we already made an important mistake that has led to today’s issues with mobilization and the overall moral and psychological state of society: when people started believing that everything would end soon
Instead, we should have immediately told the truth—that it will be hard, long, but the entire society needs to mobilize. Had we done that, we wouldn’t be in the current situation where we have to search for people, detain them, and focus on punishments. We would have had a proper accounting of the male population and selected those needed in the military today—based on age, profession, experience, etc
Under the circumstances Ukraine is in, the most appropriate approach for society is as follows: everyone should be prepared, but only those who are needed should fight. Regardless of who will be the U.S. president or whether we get enough F-16s, and so on
My thoughts
The most interesting thing here is the split between the pure grifters like Sternenko and the actual fighters in Azov. Sternenko and the like are totally against any ceasefire whatsoever, war is a business for them, but not something they ever plan to die in. Tales of the IV Reich, along with being ideologically more committed to Trump’s message (plenty of posts on Tales, Katarsis and similar Azovite channels praising Trump’s anti-immigrant rhetoric), is also more concerned about long-term military strategy than Lachen/Sternenko.
On the other hand, Tales certainly isn’t a dominant voice among the Azovites. Zhorin is far more influential, with his standard anti-ceasefire rhetoric. Time will tell if that’s just a politically correct front for his real desire to see a ceasefire that would stave off a large-scale collapse of the army/massive territorial losses [end]
chronicle: its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine
Ukrainian hitlerites for ceasefire. Struggle between Zelenskyite opportunists and Azovite strategists. Poroshenko, Zaluzhny, Sodol. 100 million dollar bribes. The angry officers movement
Ukrainian hitlerites for ceasefire. Struggle between Zelenskyite opportunists and Azovite strategists. Poroshenko, Zaluzhny, Sodol. 100 million dollar bribes. The angry officers movement
[my illustration: on March 4, 2014, after the West-backed right-wing coup in Kiev, US Secretary of State John Kerry meets representatives of the parliament. Leader of Nazi Svoboda party, Oleh Tyahnybok is second from right. Petro Poroshenko, center, will become in June the new president of Ukraine (US Department of State)]
When it comes to hitler-loving military nationalists, you’d think they’d be lean more towards peace than a former comedian Jewish president who came to government on a peace platform, right? The reality is much more interesting
Enter the fourth reich
Tales of the IV Reich (now renamed Tales of the IV Empire), likely run by an Azov lieutenant, is characterized by more sobriety than other similar channels, which is why I love reading it
Most interestingly, his posts often seem to hint at a sentiment among certain ‘army men’, that the 1991-borders slogan is unrealistic and is leading to the destruction of Ukraine’s finest nationalists through politically-motivated meat storms. Not without the insinuation, of course, that Zelensky is quite happy to see these dangerous competitors die.
The fear of peace
One of the reasons that Tales is worried about endless war is the political pressure it puts on the broader population, which has always been frustratingly disloyal to the aims of radical nationalism.
Tales has always worried about popular demands for peace. Four days before February 24 2022, he was writing paranoid posts about how the west and Russia are trying to pressure Ukraine into implementing the Minsk peace agreements:
Among the participants in the combat actions, I know many disappointed and disoriented people. Some are tired, some have not seen clear changes, some have started families. Not everyone is ready to take up arms again now. Such tendencies are detrimental in the current situation
The implementation of the “Minsk” agreements into the Constitution of Ukraine is worse for us – the Ukrainian right-wing – than a full-scale war. We are accustomed to fighting the Russians – the thousand-year war of freedom-loving Eastern Europeans against the Tatar horde continues to this day. If the Ukrainian authorities are pressured by the Russians and [western – EIU] “partners”, we will get a “war zone” throughout the country. For us, the military veterans there will be no life in such a Ukraine. We will be under constant pressure from the system, with the possibility of being eliminated by amnestied separatist militants, and living in constant fear is not a life anyone wants
If we fiercely resist the Russian army and unite the nation in the fight against the enemy, we cannot lose. Those who are burnt out and stay at home, in case of our defeat, will rot in prison or be killed. Some Ukrainians already believed the Bolsheviks in the 1920s and laid down their arms – they all either died of hunger or lived out their last years in camps
To arms!
On July 13, Tales published a telegram post in response to the calls by popular Ukrainian bloggers for peace through negotiations and compromise in response to Russian rocket strikes on the capital (see my post on the matter). He was also responding to the parliamentarian Artem Dmytruk, who vigorously supported the bloggers.
Medvedchuk refers to the leader of Ukraine’s ‘Opposition Platform for Life’ party, whose main slogan was an end to the war through negotiations, until it was banned in 2022, along with the arrest and deportation of Medvedchuk.
Here’s the post:
If the war continues for another year, the population will bring the Dmytruks to power. So far, the Dmytruks are quite marginal. If it lasts two years, Medvedchuk will return here with the Russian flag. It’s simple
Being in the [frontline] Zaporizhzhia steppes or the command posts of the Donetsk region, you become quite detached from the population: you don’t hear what ordinary citizens of Lviv, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia, or Kyiv are talking about and dreaming of. The fact that a huge number of people supported the Instabloggers (and how many were too embarrassed to write words of support?) irritates those who advocate for the continuation of the war. Because real people with open profiles wrote there, not Moscow bots. There are many of these people, and this must be taken into account. According to my observations, this number is increasing exponentially despite the fabricated results of sociological surveys
The population sees corruption scandals. Constant loss of territories. Endless shelling. Inflation. Decline in the standard of living. Hundreds of new graves in cemeteries. Maimed veterans on the streets. Videos from the military registration and enlistment office. The West’s incomprehensible behavior. Now, there are also extremely uncomfortable conditions with power outages in +35°C heat and prospects of water supply cuts. This list can go on
I’m surprised that people with higher education and quite a high level of intelligence do not see the pattern
Hitlerite civil war
In another recent post, he was openly pessimistic about Ukraine’s military prospects and its western allies:
Once again, for a day, calls to “fight to victory” are spreading through social media following the terrorist attacks by Muscovites in Kyiv and Kryvyi Rih. Here are my thoughts in theses:
Mobilization and a massive influx to the military registration and enlistment offices will not produce modern fighters, missile systems, or the latest strike UAVs. It won’t even add Patriot SAM systems and missiles to them. Unfortunately, even the mobilization of 10 million Ukrainians will not stop the takeoff of strategic fighters in Russia, will not destroy existing nuclear weapons, and will not significantly reduce the population of Russia, its natural resources, etc
Strong entities respond to terrorist acts with double the force. Yesterday in Belgorod, in the evening, windows in residential buildings were shattered, one civilian died, two were slightly injured. Such a “response” personally shakes me with despair and hopelessness. I emphasize once again that our military capabilities can destroy everything living within a 100 km radius from the state border. Special thanks to the tactical level commanders who take responsibility for leveling the Shebekino and Rylsky districts of the Russian Federation. These are young officers up to the battalion commander level. In other words, this is the grassroots initiative of a conscious part of the army, there is no political will for such actions.
We will not be invited to the NATO summit to join the alliance. We are not as cool as Albania. The topic of “Ukraine in NATO” will be a bargaining chip for many years, it will be a reason for wars and political crises. Moreover, in the coming days, NATO will solidify its impotence with a series of resolutions that will exclude the actual unilateral power of the United States in the alliance. The Western establishment is afraid of Trump coming to power, fearing that the war will end.
NATO only needs to allocate 10% of its available weapons, which are gathering dust in warehouses since the alliance is not fighting anyone, and we would defeat the Muscovites. However, Western politicians are stretching this aid over the years, while hundreds of the best Ukrainians are dying and becoming disabled, and Ukrainian cities cease to exist because of the war. They have been juggling planes, high-precision MLRS, and missiles in front of the bloodied faces of Ukrainians for years
Note also his praise for ‘tactical level commanders’ who take initiative in hitting Russian civilian targets. See my recent post about the Sodol drama for more on this emerging caste of young nationalists, which positions itself against the so-called ‘old corrupt Soviet general caste’.
Anyway, given such sorry prospects for winning the war, Tales is clearly hinting that a ceasefire to regroup and strengthen defenses (as well as a good old-fashioned domestic purge) is a better idea than staying in the self-destructive meatgrinder.
I’ve discussed on my substack Evgeny Dyky, the corpulent supposed ex-commander of the violent Aidar Batallion. Among his many achievements, he is also in charge of spending sizeable sums of money on Ukraine’s wartime antarctic research project (read about it here). Otherwise, he spends a great deal of time on the Ukrainian talk-show circuit, explaining viewers how Ukraine’s military industry is just getting started while that of Russia’s has already reached its final peak, and so on and on.
Well, Dyky’s effusive optimism really annoys IV Reich. Yesterday, he posted this:
⚡️ An F-16 that managed to reach Ukraine crashed into a high-rise building in Nizhny Tagil (RF). The pilot was identified as Yevhen Dykyi, a military expert and former platoon commander of the Aidar Battalion (in 2015). According to preliminary reports, the fighter jet could not withstand the pilot’s weight. Another version suggests that the pilot’s unkempt homeless-like beard got tangled in the control stick
Tales’ opinion on the 1991 borders slogan came out more clearly in March of this year. It all started in response to a hit-piece against a popular young commander by ‘the Centre for Countering of Disinformation’, a beautifully-named government-funded organ (my bolding). Here’s the hysterical hit-piece from the CCD:
The CCD logo
Recently, interviews with military personnel have gained immense popularity in the Ukrainian information space, where they talk about the problems they allegedly face at the front: lack of ammunition, incompetent command, mistakes of the country’s leadership, and so on
A striking example of this is a recent interview with the commander of the K2 battalion, Kyrylo Veres, in which he claims that we will not be able to win this war, and his personal victory is when his battalion’s soldiers stop dying. Thus, he is effectively hinting at negotiations and freezing the conflict. Such statements are absolutely unacceptable – they contradict the task set by the Leader of our country: to reach the borders of 1991 at any cost
Obviously, it is high time to move to healthy military censorship – military personnel should be prohibited from giving interviews. Endless whining about the lack of ammunition and “meat assaults” does not bring us any closer to victory but contributes to the spread of defeatist sentiments in society. Moreover, in reality, there are no “meat assaults” in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and the military personnel are fully provided with everything necessary to accomplish the assigned tasks
We remind you that you can always get reliable information about what is happening at the front on the “Unified News” telethon
Commander Veres, the man being criticized. Looks a lot more trustworthy than the angry blue cube
Ah, how times have changed over the past few months. Now even the Great Leader of is indulging in absolutely unacceptable narratives hinting at negotiations and freezing the conflict! But back to the response from Tales:
I have personally known Kyrylo since 2017 to be a decent and dedicated officer, back when he was still a reconnaissance platoon commander in one of the mechanized brigade’s battalions. Over a few years, he rose to become the commander of one of the top battalions in the Armed Forces of Ukraine and received the “Hero’s Star.” We had many joint operations aimed at eliminating the Muscovites and their lackeys while the “defenders against disinformation” were siphoning grants in peaceful Kyiv
Idiots don’t like that the battalion commander wants his personnel to live to see peace in the country and return home alive. This is an absolutely healthy and adequate position for a Ukrainian officer
“What does victory mean to everyone? It’s when my people stop dying. If I said a year ago that victory is when the Russian Federation ends, then I was young and I did not command such a large number of people and did not give orders on who should go into battle and who should not”
The last part is quoting Veres, the lines that made the Center for Countering Disinformation so furious.
The heavyweights
I know some people who regret having voted for Zelensky, who think that previous war-hawk president Petro Poroshenko, with his greater experience dealing with Russia and as a statesman (however reprehensible), wouldn’t have allowed the war to happen in 2022
Poroshenko in his signature black gloves and expensive vyshyvanka (the folk costume no bourgeois nationalist can leave home without)
I think it’s possible that Zelensky’s curious talent for aggravating everyone imaginable played a special role. Recall Zelensky’s wise decision to start reminiscing about soviet Ukraine’s nuclear missile capacity on February 19 2022.
But perhaps more importantly, Poroshenko hasn’t gone away either. He and his party certainly constitution the most powerful remaining opposition force in wartime. Could they be getting ready to attack Zelensky for wasting the army in an unwinnable war instead of preserving its fighting core?
Until his early 2024 removal, Zaluzhny was juicing up head of the army Zaluzhny as an anti-Zelensky icebreaker. And Zaluzhny wrote a 2023 article he wrote in the Economist about how Ukraine has no real prospects of victory against Russia and finds itself in a stalemate position. Zelensky was enraged by this violation of his slogan ‘1991 borders or bust’, and it was this article, along with Zaluzhny’s excessive popularity, that led to his eventual replacement.
It was Poroshenko that signed the Minsk agreements back in 2014 and 2015 to avert Ukraine’s military collapse. Maybe he can do it again, with the help of the ‘Iron General’ Zaluzhny.
Kiev mayor Klitchko – a real heavyweight – also said in a recent western interview that Zelensky should conduct a referendum on peace and abandoning some territories. Klitchko is another open critic of Zelensky’s authoritarianism, and has allied with Poroshenko against Zelensky numerous times in the past. There are rumors he is coordinating actions with him at the moment as well.
The angry officers movement
Opposition heavyweights like Poroshenko, Zaluzhny and Klitchko (don’t laugh about the last one) also have an important base of supporters to draw on – young, confident nationalists in the army.
A crucial fault-line at the moment is that between younger brigade commanders and the generals. The combrigs accuse the generals of sending them on pointless suicide missions because of the political leadership’s ‘obsession with maps’, rather than real strategic objectives. This ‘maps over strategy’ metaphor is often used by Azov spokesmen like Kukharchuk or Krotevych in their interviews with liberal nationalist (anti-Zelensky) media like Ukrainska Pravda.
Indeed, Zelensky must be map-fixated. His key priority is opportunistic – stay in power, keep the aid flowing, desperately showcase small successes. To put off his many days of reckoning.
For instance. with the countless businessmen he has imprisoned, extorted and otherwise enraged. Like the still-jailed Kolomoisky. Or a business partner of Kolomoisky, Bogolyubov, who recently escaped the country and claimed the government tried to extort him of 100 million USD in exchange for legal protection. Or, obviously, the questions society will have towards him after a war that cost the lives of hundreds of thousands, and brought… what?
The young nationalists in the army launched the opening salvo in this increasingly public battle in late June, against General Sodol, who they accused of murderous graphomania. The battle has been rapidly developing in the past few weeks, a topic for a future post. But for now, I’d like to draw attention to Bohdan Krotevych, the Azovite who led the charge against General Sodol.
Krotevych said in a July 26 interview that he is ‘angry’ with Zelensky for apparently never having visited Azov’s headquarters at the frontline, while he does visit other military units. He said he considers this condescension. The interview, titled ‘I am very angry’, has already received a million views
Another major topic of discussion is how Lieutenant Colonel Prokopenko, Commander of the Azov Brigade, is a ‘genius’. This is in turn fairly obviously compared to the stupidity of the generals, who he castigates for wasting human resources in impossible goals, and never learning from their mistakes (unlike the Russians, he stresses). Among other things, Krotevych calls the 2023 counteroffensive ‘retarded’.
A peaceful yet stern reich
He also boasts about hanging out with his close friend Zaluzhny while in England recently. They and their wives met, and Krotevych gifted Zaluzhny an antique British army knife (knives are highly beloved among rightwing nationalists).
Best of all, he cryptically promises that people would be hearing much more from Zaluzhny in the future.
And Zaluzhny’s July 23 speech at the RUSI Land Warfare Conference in London on the topic of ‘Third World War’ made it clear that he’s hardly a democrat:
Society must agree to temporarily give up a number of freedoms for the sake of survival,…
Unfortunately, modern wars are total. They require the efforts not only of the army, but of the whole society. Politicians can and should mobilize society. To do so, they use military and other state resources in a comprehensive way. These resources include the economy, finance, the population, and allies. Such actions will, of course, influence the political processes in the country
Any ceasefire of the type that Zaluzhny, Tales, or Krotevych or the rest may want would be a brutal one. On July 30, Commander Romanov of the Azov brigade published a video stating he had given the order to shoot to kill any civilians attempting to destroy Ukrainian military equipment.
With less energy to spend on the foreign enemy, more to spend on purging the internal enemy. The bloggers won’t be bothering anyone else with their pacifist demands [end]
chronicle: its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine
[my illustration: a debris of US ATACMS ballistic missile has fallen on Kursk-Vostochny airfield on November 25, 2023 (Russian defense ministry)]
On March 5, 2022, the wreck of the sailing ship Endurance was found in the depths of the Weddell Sea off the coast of Antarctica. This, of course, was the vessel lost in Ernest Shackelton’s third expedition to Antarctica, which became trapped in the ice and sank in 1915. The story of that expedition is an extraordinary tale of human fortitude – with the Endurance lost to the ice, Shackleton’s crew evacuated to a loose ice flow where they camped for nearly 500 days, drifting about the Antarctic seas, before making a desperate dash across the open ocean in an open 20 foot lifeboat, finally reaching the southern shore of inhospitable and mountainous South Georgia Island, which they then had to cross on foot to reach the safety of a whaling station.
The story itself has an essentially mythic quality to it, with Shackleton’s crew surviving for years on free floating ice floes in the most inhospitable seas on earth. For our purposes, however, it is the story’s coda that is particularly interesting. In Shackleton’s memoirs, he remembered that, upon finally reaching the safety of the Stromness whaling station, one of his first questions was about the war in Europe. When Shackleton first set out on his ill-fated expedition on August 8, 1914, the First World War was less than a week old, and the German Army had just begun its invasion of Belgium. There was little expectation then that the war would proceed as it did, unleashing four years of slaughterous positional warfare that engulfed the continent.
Shackleton, having been adrift at sea for years, clearly did not imagine that the war could still be raging, and asked the commandant of the whaling station “tell me, when was the war over?”
The answer came back: “The war is not over. Millions are being killed. Europe is mad. The world is mad.”
The timing is serendipitous, since the discovery of the Endurance’s wreck, after more than a hundred years, happened to occur only a few weeks after the world again went mad, with the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian War in February 2022. As time continues its inexorable march and the calendar turns yet again, the war is passing through its third full winter. In February, Z-World will be three years old.
Of course, modern communications make it extremely unlikely that anybody could be cut fully out of the loop for years at a time, like Shackleton and his men. Instead of being ignorant as to whether or not the war is over, many of us are exposed on a daily basis to footage of men being killed, buildings being blown up, and vehicles being shredded. Twitter has made it essentially impossible to live under a rock, or on an ice floe, as it were.
If anything, we have the very opposite problem of Shackleton – at least as far as our wartime information infrastructure goes. We are saturated in information, with daily updates tracking advances of a few dozen meters and never ending bombast about new game changing weapons (which seem to change very little), and bluster about “red lines”. This war seems to have an unyielding dynamic on the ground, and no matter how many grand pronouncements we hear that one side or the other is on the verge of collapse, the sprawling front continues to grind up bodies and congeal with bloody positional fighting.
It would seem difficult to believe that a high intensity ground war in Europe with hundreds of miles worth of front could be boring, yet the static and repetitive nature of the conflict is struggling to hold the attention of foreign observers who have little immediately at stake.
My intention here is a radical zoom-out from these demoralizing and fatiguing small scale updates (as valuable as the work of the war mappers is), and consider the aggregate of 2024 – arguing that this year was, in fact, very consequential. Taken as a whole, three very important things happened in 2024 which create a very dismal outlook for Ukraine and the AFU in the new year. More specifically, 2024 brought three important strategic developments:
Russian victory in southern Donetsk which destroyed the AFU’s position on one of the war’s key strategic axes.
The expenditure of carefully husbanded Ukrainian resources on a failed offensive towards Kursk, which accelerated the attrition of critical Ukrainian maneuver assets and substantially dampened their prospects in the Donbas.
The exhaustion of Ukraine’s ability to escalate vis a vis new strike systems from NATO – more broadly, the west has largely run out of options to upgrade Ukrainian capabilities, and the much vaunted delivery of longer range strike systems failed to alter the trajectory of the war on the ground.
Taken together, 2024 revealed a Ukrainian military that is increasingly stretched to the limits, to the point where the Russians were able to largely scratch off an entire sector of front. People continue to wonder where and when the Ukrainian front might begin to break down – I would argue that it *did* break down in the south over the last few months, and 2025 begins with strong Russian momentum that the AFU will be hard pressed to arrest.
Front Collapse in South Donetsk
What stands out immediately about the operational developments in 2024 is the marked shift of energies away from the axes of combat that had seen the most intense fighting in the first two years of the war. In a sense, this war has seen each of its fronts activate in a sequence, one after the other.
After the opening Russian offensive, which boasted as its signature success the capture of the Azov coastline and the linkup of Donetsk and Crimea, the action shifted to the northern front (the Lugansk-Kharkov axis), with Russia fighting a summer offensive which captured Severodonetsk and Lysychansk. This was followed by a pair of Ukrainian counteroffensives in the fall, with a thrust out of Kharkov which pushed the front back over the Oskil, and an operation directed at Kherson which failed to breach Russian defenses but ultimately resulted in a Russian withdrawal in good order over the Dnieper due to concerns over logistical connectivity and an over-extended front. Energies then pivoted yet again to the Central Donbas axis, with the enormous battle around Bakhmut raging through the spring of 2023. This was followed by the failed Ukrainian offensive on Russia’s defenses in Zaporozhia, in the south.
Just to briefly recapitulate this, we can enumerate several operational phases in the first two years of the war, occurring in sequence and each with a center of gravity in different parts of the front:
A Russian offensive across the land bridge, culminating in the capture of Mariupol. (Winter-Spring 2022, Southern Front)
A Russian offensive in Lugansk, capturing Severodonetsk and Lysychansk. (Summer 2022, Donets-Oskil front)
Ukrainian Counteroffensives towards the Oskil and Kherson (Autumn 2022, Oskil and Dnieper fronts)
The Russian assault on Bakhmut (Winter-Spring 2023, Central Front)
Ukrainian counteroffensive on the land bridge (Summer 2023)
Amid all of this, the front that saw the least movement was the southeastern corner of the front, around Donetsk. This was somewhat peculiar. Donetsk is the urban heart of the Donbas – a vast and populous industrial city at the center of a sprawling conurbation, once home to some 2 million people. Even if Russia succeeds in capturing the city of Zaporizhia, Donetsk will be by far the most populous of Ukraine’s former cities to come under Moscow’s control.
In 2014, with the outbreak of the proto-Donbas war, Donetsk was the locus of much of the fighting, with the airport on the city’s northern approach the scene of particularly intense combat. This made it rather strange, then, that at the start of 2024 the Ukrainian Army continued to occupy many of the same positions that they built a decade prior. As intense fighting ebbed and flowed along other sectors of front, Donetsk remained besieged by a web of powerfully held Ukrainian defenses, anchored by heavily fortified urban areas stretching from Toretsk to Ugledar. Early Russian attempts to crack this iron ring open, including an assault on Ugledar in the winter of 2023, met with failure.
The signature operational development of 2024, then, was the re-activation of the Donetsk front, after years of static combat. It is not an exaggeration to say that after years of coagulation, the Russian Army cracked this front wide open in 2024 and Ukraine’s long and strongly held network of urban strongpoints collapsed
Russian Progress on the Donetsk Axis in 2024
The year began with the AFU fighting for its fortress in Avdiivka, where it continued to block the northern approach to Donetsk. At the time, the typical argument that one heard from the Ukrainian side was that the Russian assault on Avdiivka was pyrrhic – that the Russians were capturing the city with exorbitantly costly “meat assaults” that would inevitably sap Russian combat power and exhaust their ability to continue the offensive.
With the full measure of the year behind us, we can definitively say that this is not the case. After the fall of Avdiivka, Russian momentum never seriously slackened, and in fact it was the AFU that appeared to be increasingly exhausted. The Ukrainian breakwater position at Ocheretyne (which had previously been their staging point for counterattacks around Avdiivka) was overrun in a matter of days, and by the early summer the frontline had been pushed out towards the approach to Pokrovsk.
The Russian thrust towards Pokrovsk led many to believe that this city was itself the object of Russian energies, but this was a misread of the operational design. Russia did not need to capture Pokrovsk in 2024 to render it sterile as a logistical hub. Simply by advancing towards the E50 highway, Russian forces were able to cut off Pokrovsk from Ukrainian positions to the south on the Donetsk front, and Pokvrovsk is now a frontline city subject to the full spectrum of overwatch from Russian drones and tube artillery.
By autumn, the Russian advance had put the Ukrainians in a severe salient, creating an unstable chain of positions in Selydove, Kurakhove, Ugledar, and Krasnogorivka. Russia’s advance from Ocheretyne onto the southern approach to Pokrovsk acted like an enormous scythe, isolating the entire southeastern sector of the front and allowing Russian forces to carve through it in the closing months of the year
Russian Operations in 2024, Donetsk Axis
This war has turned the word “collapse” into a devalued buzzword. We are told repeatedly that one side or the other is on the verge of collapse: sanctions will “collapse” the Russian economy, the Wagner uprising of 2023 proved that the Russian political system was “collapsing”, and of course we hear that exorbitant losses have one army or the other on the verge of total failure – which army that may be depends on who you ask.
I would argue, however, that what we saw from October 2024 onward represents a real occurrence of this oft-repeated and discarded word. The AFU suffered a genuine collapse of the southeastern front, with the forces positioned in their strongpoints too attrited and isolated to make a determined defense, Russian fires becoming too heavily concentrated in ever more compressed areas to endure, and no mechanized reserve in the theater available to counterattack or relieve the incessant Russian pressure.
Ukraine does maintain enough drones and concentrated fires to limit a full Russian exploitation – that is, Russia is still not able to maneuver at depth. This gave the Russian advance a particular stop-start quality, leapfrogging from one settlement and fortress to the other. More generally, Russia’s preference to use dispersed small-unit assaults limits the potential for exploitation. We have to emphasize, however, that Russian momentum on this axis has never seriously slackened since October, and many of the key Ukrainian positions were overrun or abandoned very quickly
Ugledar is a good example: the Russians began their final push toward the town on September 24. By September 29, the 72nd Mechanized Brigade began evacuating. By October 1, Ugledar was fully under Russian control. This was a keystone Ukrainian position put in a completely untenable position and it went down in a week. One could argue, of course, that Ugledar held out for years (how then can we say with a straight face that it was captured in a week), but this is precisely the point. In early 2023 Ugledar (with the help of artillery stationed around Kurakhove) successfully repelled a multi-brigade Russian attack in months of heavy fighting. By October 2024, the position was completely untenable and was abandoned almost immediately when attacked.
The Ukrainians did no better trying to hold Kurakhove – previously a critical rear area that served as both a logistical hub and a base of fire for supporting (former) frontline strongpoints like Ugledar and Krasnogorivka. Kurakhove, now under full Russian control, will in turn serve as a base of support for the ongoing Russian push to the west towards Andriivka.
Taking the state of the front holistically, the AFU is currently holding two severe salients at the southernmost end of the line – one around Velyka Novosilka, and another around Andriivka. The former is likely to fall first, as the town has been fully isolated by Russian advances on the flanks. This is not a Bakhmut-like situation, where roads are described as “cut” because they are under Russian fire – in this case, all of the highways into Velyka Novosilka are cut by physical Russian blocking positions, making the loss of the position only a matter of waiting for the Russians to assault it. Further north, a more gentle and less strongly held salient exists between Grodivka and Toretsk. With Toretsk now in the final stages of capture (Ukrainian forces now hold only a small residential neighborhood on the city’s outskirts), the front should level here as well in the coming months.
This leaves the Russians more or less in full control of the approaches to Kostyantinivka and Pokrovsk, which are in many ways the penultimate Ukrainian held positions in Donetsk. Pokrovsk has already been bypassed several miles to the west, and the map portends a re-run of the typical Russian tactical methodology for assaulting urban areas – a methodical advance along the wings of the city to isolate it from arterial highways, followed by an attack on the city itself via several axes
The coming months promise continued Russian advances across this front, in a continuation of what can only be regarded as the collapse of a critical front on the part of the AFU. The Russian Army is advancing to the western border of Donetsk oblast and will ferret the Ukrainians out of their remaining strongpoints at Velyka Novosilka and Andriivka, while pushing into the belly of Pokrovsk. At no point since the fall of Avdiivka have the Ukrainians demonstrated the ability to seriously stymie Russian momentum along this 75 mile front, and the ongoing dissipation of Ukrainian combat resources indicates that little will change in this regard in 2025.
Toehold: The Incredible Shrinking Kursk Salient
Throughout the autumn of 2024 and these early months of winter, as Ukrainian forces were dug out of their dense web of fortified positions in the southern Donbas, their comrades continued to stubbornly hold on to their position in Russia’s Kursk Oblast. The basic shape of Ukraine’s offensive into Kursk is by now well known – billed by Kiev as a gambit to change the psychological trajectory of the war and strike a prestige blow to Russia, the Ukrainian attack had early momentum after achieving initial strategic surprise, but quickly faltered after Ukrainian columns ran into effective Russian blocking positions on the highways out of Sudzha. Efforts to force the roads through Korenovo and Bolshoe Soldatskoe were defeated, and the Ukrainian grouping was left holding on to a modest salient around Sudzha, jutting out into Russia.
Throughout the autumn, Russian counterattacks have focused on chiseling away at the base of the Ukrainian salient – forcing the Ukrainians out of Snagost and pushing them away from Korenovo. The progress here has been incremental, but significant, and by the start of January the “neck” of the Ukrainian salient had been compressed down to a little over nine miles wide, after their initial penetration in the summer had forced a breach of over twenty miles. All told, Ukraine has lost about 50% of the territory that they grabbed in August.
The Russian pressure on the flanks of the salient have amplified many of the qualities that make this position wasteful and dangerous for the AFU. There is limited road connectivity for Ukrainian forces – a problem amplified by the rollback from Snagost, which cost them access to the highway running from Korenovo to Sumy. Apart from a few circuitous side roads, Ukrainian forces only have a single highway – the R200 route – to run material and reinforcements into the pocket, which allows Russian forces to surveil their lines of communication and conduct effective interdiction strikes. The compression of the pocket also greatly narrows the targeting area for Russian drones, tube artillery, and rocketry, and creates more condensed and saturating bombardment
Despite the fact that this position has been profoundly unproductive for Ukraine – being steadily rolled back and having no synergy with other, more critical theaters – the same grouping of Ukrainian units remain here, fighting in a steadily more compressed space. Even more baffling, the Ukrainian grouping consists largely of premiere assets – Mechanized and Air Assault brigades – that could have contributed meaningfully as a reserve in the Donbas over the last three months.
The tactical particulars of the Ukrainian attack are interesting, and there’s ongoing speculation as to its purpose – perhaps it was intended to cover a rotation or withdrawal, to improve tactical positions on the northern edge of the salient, or for inscrutable propaganda purposes. However, these specifics are rather unimportant: attacking out the end of the salient (that is, trying to deepen the penetration into Russia) does nothing to reverse Ukraine’s problems in Kursk. These problems are first, on the tactical level, that the salient has been greatly compressed on the flanks and continues to narrow, and on the strategic level the willful expenditure of valuable mechanized assets on a front that does not impact the critical theaters of the war. More simply, Kursk is a sideshow, and it is a sideshow that has gone wrong even within its own operational logic.
One thing that has been of endless interest, of course, have been the continued rumors of North Korean troops fighting in Kursk. Western intelligence agencies have been adamant about the presence of North Koreans in Kursk. Some people are predisposed to instinctively disbelieve everything that western officialdom says – while I think some skepticism is warranted, I do not automatically assume that they are lying. One recent report lays out what would seem to be a plausible version of this story: that the idea actually originated in Pyongyang, not Moscow, and that a modest number of Korean troops (perhaps 10,000) are embedded with Russian units. The presumption here is that the Koreans hatched the idea as a way to gain combat experience, with the Russians in turn getting auxiliary forces, though of questionable combat effectiveness.
However, it is worth noting that this is not nearly as important as it has been made out to be. Much has been made of the idea that the North Korean presence proves some sort of Russian state of desperation, but this is fairly silly on its face – with more than 1.5 million active personnel in the Russian military, 10,000 Korean troops in Kursk represents a paltry appendage. More importantly, there has been an attempt to portray the North Korean contingent as a major departure point in the war. In particular, the formulation “North Korean troops in Europe” has been used to conjure cold war imagery of communist despotism clawing at the free world
The point, however, is that North Korean troops are presumed specifically to be in Kursk, which is in Russia. This is linked, of course, to the recently concluded mutual defense agreement signed between Moscow and Pyongyang. By attacking into Kursk – widening the front into prewar Russian territory – Ukraine created a defensive combat task for Russia which triggers the possibility of military assistance from North Korea. However much one may wish to link the Korean contingent to Russia’s dreaded “war of aggression”, the force in Kursk is very objectively engaged in the defense of Russian territory, and that makes it possible for Russia to use auxiliary forces – including conscripts and the troops of its allies – to fight there.
Ultimately, then, the presence of North Koreans in Kursk is interesting, but perhaps not very important after all. These troops are not in Ukraine (even under the most maximal definition of the Ukrainian territorial unit), they are not carrying the primary combat load, and they are unequivocally not the problem that the AFU is facing in Kursk. The “big problem” for Ukraine, very simply, is not the presence of some amorphous Korean horde dedicated to spreading Glorious Juche to Europe – it is the loitering of large grouping of their own precious mechanized brigades in a compressed salient, far far away from the Donbas, where they are greatly needed.
Scraping the Barrel: AFU Force Generation
I think it is well understood, of course, that Ukraine faces severe manpower constraints relative to Russia, both in terms of the raw totals of male biomass available – with roughly 35 million fighting aged males in Russia against perhaps 9 million in prewar Ukraine – but also in terms of its capacity to mobilize them.
Ukraine’s mobilization scheme is hampered by both widespread draft evasion (with willingness to serve decreasing as the war has stretched on) and a stubborn unwillingness to draft younger men, aged 18-25. Ukraine is structurally burdened with a deeply imbalanced population structure: there are roughly 60% more Ukrainian men in their 30’s than in their 20’s. Given the relative scarcity of young men, particularly in their early 20’s, the Ukrainian government rightly views this 18-25 year old cohort as a premium demographic cohort that it is loathe to burn away in combat. Given the ubiquity of draft evasion, the refusal to mobilize younger males, and the corruption and inefficiency characteristic of the Ukrainian government, it should come as no surprise when Ukrainian mobilization falters
All of that is to say: Ukraine faces a severe structural disadvantage in military manpower in the aggregate, which is exacerbated by the idiosyncrasies of the Ukrainian mobilization law, ameliorated slightly by the relatively low troop densities and the preponderant power of strike systems in this war.
The argument that I want to make here, however, is that Ukraine’s systemic problems matching Russian manpower have been exacerbated by several developments which specifically became prominent in 2024. In other words, 2024 can and should be marked as the year where Ukrainian manpower constraints became markedly and perhaps irretrievably worse due to specific decisions made in Kiev, and particular developments on the ground.
These are as follows:
The decision to expand the AFU’s force structure through the creation of the “15 series” brigades
The decision to deliberately widen the front and create additional demands for manpower by launching the incursion into Kursk
The stall out of Ukraine’s new mobilization program in the autumn
Accelerating problems with desertion in the AFU
We’ll run through these in order.
An army that is intaking new personnel has to decide between two possible allocations for them. New personnel can be used as replacements to replenish existing frontline units, or they can be used to expand the force structure by creating new units. That much seems fairly obvious, and ideally mobilization will exceed losses and make it possible to do both. Where armies face hard manpower constraints, however – that is, where losses are equal to or greater than intake of men, the decision to expand the force structure can have monumental consequences. The stereotypical example, of course, would be the late-war Wehrmacht, which created premiere new assets in the form of Waffen SS divisions, which received privileged access to recruits and equipment while regular army divisions in the line suffered from a trickle of replacements which could not keep up with losses.
Ukraine, with its garbled force structure, has created a mess through its own attempts to expand its force structure in the face of dwindling strength on the line. Late in 2023, the AFU announced intentions to form an entirely new grouping of brigades – the so-called “15 series”, given their designations as the 150th, 151st, 152nd, 153rd, and 154th Mechanized Brigades. This was followed in 2024 with the appending of the 155th Mechanized Brigade, which was to be trained and equipped in France.
Forming a new grouping of mechanized brigades is essential to the way that Ukraine is presenting its war. Because Ukraine still aims (at least on paper) to recapture all of its Russian held territory, there must always be the illusory possibility of a future offensive, and in order for that illusory possibility to remain, Ukraine must present itself as actively preparing for future offensive operations. Ukraine’s presentation of its own strategic animus – the idea that it is holding the front while it prepares to go back on the offensive – essentially locks it into a program of expanding its force structure
The problem for Ukraine is that the immense pressure on the front makes it essentially impossible for them to properly husband resources the way they would like. Properly training and equipping half a dozen fresh mechanized brigades and holding them in reserve would be very helpful, but they cannot really do this in light of the demands for personnel at the front. These brigades instead become “paper formations” that have a bureaucratic existence, while their organic assets are pulled apart and sucked into the front – stripped down into battalion or company sized elements that can be plugged into sectors of need on the frontline. At the moment, none of the 15 series brigades have seen action as organic units – that is, fighting as themselves.
The decision to allocate personnel to new mechanized brigades (though given stocks of armored vehicles it is questionable whether those designations mean anything) does not necessarily change Ukraine’s manpower balance in the aggregate, but it is certainly an inefficient way to use personnel. To return again to the 155th brigade, one problem noted by Ukrainian analysts was the fact that much of the brigade was formed whole cloth from forcibly mobilized personnel, without a proper cadre of veterans and experienced NCOs – some 75% of the brigade, it turns out, had been mobilized less than two months before arriving in France for training. This fact was certainly instrumental in the mass desertions and the brigade’s poor combat effectiveness.
Given Ukraine’s constraints, the best course of action would undoubtedly be to allocate new personnel and equipment as replacements to build out the depleted veteran brigades on the front lines, plugging in replacements around existing veterans and officers. Kiev, however, prizes the prestige that comes from force expansion and the “shiny new toy” factor of new formations equipped with scarce and valuable equipment like Leopard tanks. These new brigades, though billed as premiere assets, clearly have lower combat effectiveness than existing formations, given their lack of experience, shortage of veteran officers, and low unit cohesion.
In short, Ukraine’s decision to embark on force expansion in the face of significant manpower shortages has exacerbated the problem – both starving veteran units of replacements and concentrating newly mobilized personnel into combat ineffective formations that lack a veteran core, experienced officers, and vital equipment. They have tried, belatedly, to square this circle by parceling out new formations to backstop line brigades, but this is less than ideal – it leads to a patchwork order of battle with lower unit cohesion and a fragmented defense.
Unfortunately, this comes precisely as Ukraine has created additional self-imposed strains on its resources, in particular through its incursion into Kursk. At the moment, elements of at least seven mechanized brigades, two marine infantry brigades, and three air assault brigades are stationed on the Kursk axis. Without going too far into the weeds rehashing Ukraine’s operation here, it’s important to remember that Ukraine – facing extreme pressures on its force generation – voluntarily chose to widen the front into a secondary theater, diverting scarce assets and reducing its own ability to economize forces.
In summary, Ukraine has made deliberate decisions to widen the front and expand its force structure, both of which have been decidedly detrimental to its efforts to economize personnel. This comes precisely as a 2024 effort to ramp up mobilization has come off the rails.
A deadly feedback loop is now at work, with the lack of rotations and the shortage of replacements synergizing to accelerate the burn of Ukrainian personnel. The AFU is unable to regularly rotate units out of combat, and the inadequate flow of replacements causes frontline infantry complements to wear thin. Unable to rotate or reinforce, line brigades resort to cannibalization – scraping support personnel like mortar teams, drivers, and drone operators to fill out frontline positions. This further accelerates losses as brigades fight with thinned out support and fires elements, and makes Ukrainian men more unwilling to enlist – because there is now no guarantee that becoming a drone operator, for example, will save one from being sent to a frontline trench eventually.
Where does this leave us? Ukraine continues to dispose of a very large force, with more than a hundred brigades and hundreds of thousands of men under arms. This force, however, is both substantially outnumbered by the Russian army and in a clear trend of decay. Despite a highly touted attempt to reinvigorate the mobilization apparatus in 2024, the intake of new personnel is clearly too low to offset losses, and the heavy lifting formations in critical sectors of front have seen their strength – particularly in the infantry complements – decline, in some cases to critical levels.
The failure of Ukraine’s 2024 mobilization program has coincided with several strategic choices which have exacerbated manpower concerns – specifically the decision to embark on a program of force expansion even as the AFU voluntarily extended its commitments by opening a new secondary front in Kursk. In other words, Ukraine’s mobilization falls short of its force requirements, and the AFU has also made choices that sabotaged its ability to economize. Units are ground up, replacements come in a paltry trickle, rotations are late or absent, units cannibalize themselves, and angry and weary men desert.
It’s not at all clear that this will lead to a “breaking point”, in the sense that people are anticipating. Ukrainian strike capabilities and the Russian preference for dispersed, leapfrogging assaults limit the potential for grand breakthroughs and exploitation. However, what we saw over the past three months on the southern Donetsk axis offers a preview of what awaits: an exhausted force being steadily rolled back, dug out of its strongpoints, and mauled – covering its retreat with drones but losing position after position. The line holds, until it doesn’t.
End of the Line: ATACMs, JASSMs, and Hazelnuts
Ukraine’s ability to remain in the field depends on a titration of two indispensable resources: first, Ukrainian male biomass, and secondly the critical western weaponry that gives them combat effectiveness. We have evaluated the first: Ukraine is not exactly out of men, but the trends of its mobilization program are poor and personnel shortages are mounting. The trends regarding the second are, if anything, even more foreboding for Kiev.
There are two general dynamics that have emerged, neither of which create an optimistic picture for Ukraine, which we’ll examine in turn. These are as follows:
The delivery of heavy weaponry to Ukraine (tanks, IFVs, and artillery tubes) has largely dried up in recent months.
The west has essentially run out of escalatory weaponry (strike systems) to give, and those systems already given have failed to meaningfully altar the trajectory of the war.
In 2023, building out new mechanized units was the name of the game, with the Pentagon leading a multinational effort to stand up an entire army corps worth of units equipped with Leopards, Challengers, and a whole slew of western IFVs and APCs. When that lovingly assembled grouping bashed its head on a rock in the botched assault on the Zaporizhia line, the United States belatedly and begrudgingly dispatched its own Abrams to backstop the Ukrainian tank force. In 2024, however, deliveries of heavy weapons slowed to a trickle.
The role of the tank in Ukraine has been greatly misunderstood. The vulnerability of tanks to the myriad strike systems of the modern battlefield led some observers to declare that the tank as a weapons system was now obsolete, but this did not really square with the fact that both combatants in this war were eager to deploy as many as possible. Tanks need more critical enablers – more combat engineering, air defense, and electronic warfare support – but they continue to fill an indispensable role and remain an essential item in this war. The failure of Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive showed, if anything, that tanks simply are not “game changing” systems, but mass consumption items – but this has always been the case. The signature quality of iconic tanks like the Sherman and the T34 was that they were numerous
While 2023 was all about building out Ukraine’s mechanized package with tanks, IFVs, and engineering, 2024 has been largely about enhancing Ukraine’s strike capabilities. There have been two separate elements at play – first, the delivery of both air and ground launched systems (most notably the British Storm Shadows and American ATACMs respectively), and secondly the loosening of the rules of engagement to allow Ukraine to strike targets inside pre-war Russia.
This dovetailed, as it turned out, with Ukraine’s operation in Kursk, and in many ways the most direct impact of the Kursk incursion has been to force the west’s hand on the rules of engagement. While Ukraine has long been striking inside Russia with indigenous systems, most notably drones, the White House continued to drag its feet on formal approval for strikes with American systems. By launching a ground assault on Kursk, Ukraine made the decision for them: the United States gave clearance to use ATACMs to support the ground forces in Kursk, and this metastasized into general license to strike Russia with the full range of available systems. This was a poignant reminder that, however we conceive of the proxy-sponsor relationship, Ukraine has some ability to force America’s hand: a classic example of the tail wagging the dog.
In any case, 2024 saw Ukraine and its western backers slowly but surely bash through all the supposed red-lines in this domain: the British breached first with the delivery of Storm Shadows late in 2023, and this was followed by the delivery of ATACMs (with a handful of F16’s to boot), and finally the loosening of the rules of engagement to clear strikes on Russia.
Where does this leave us? There would seem to be three important things to consider.
The west has essentially reached the end of its escalation chain. The only remaining step that they can take would be to supply Ukraine with JASSMs (Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile), which would mark a quantitative but not a meaningful qualitative upgrade to Ukraine’s strike capabilities.
Ukraine’s use of western-supplied strike assets has been dissipated and has not materially improved their situation on the ground.
Russia maintains a dominant strike advantage, both qualitative and quantitative.
Ukraine faces a stark disadvantage in strike capability relative to Russia, in a variety of ways. Russian strike assets are far more numerous and have significant range advantages, but it is also important to take into consideration both Russia’s significantly greater strategic depth and its more dense and relatively unscathed air defense. Unlike Ukraine, which has seen its air defense stretch to the limit with destroyed launchers and a mounting interceptor shortage, Russia’s air defenses have been essentially untouched, as Ukraine has lacked the large numbers of assets required to conduct a proper SEAD/DEAD (Suppression/Destruction of Enemy Air Defense) campaign.
Given this basic calculus, using western strike systems to wage a blow for blow strategic air campaign is bad math for Ukraine. It is generally unwise to engage in a bat fight when your opponent is a bigger man with a much longer bat. Instead, Ukraine’s strike systems should have been leveraged to support ground operations – concentrating strikes spatially and in time to synergize with efforts on the ground. Just as a simple thought experiment, it is not difficult to imagine ATACMs making a difference if they had been available in 2023 and used to saturate Russian rear areas during the assault on the Zaporizhia line – striking in tempo with the mechanized assault to disrupt Russian command and control and prevent reinforcement of critical areas.
Two things need to be noted about the JASSM. First, the JASSM – while offering slightly longer ranges – would essentially serve as a backstop/replacement for the rapidly dwindling ATACMs and particularly the air launched Storm Shadows – instead of Ukraine’s native SU-24s launching Storm Shadows, they would utilize F-16s launching JASSMs. This would not represent a dramatic upgrade in Ukrainian capabilities, but would instead simply serve to maintain a bare minimum Ukrainian strike capability. JASSMs are a replacement for dwindling capabilities, not an augmentation to them.
Secondly, it must be understood that JASSMs are the last stop. We’re now entering the territory, not of artificially constructed red lines, but physical and real limits. Russia has essentially eaten the gifted stocks of ATACMs and Storm Shadows, with little discernable effect on their ability to fight, and JASSMs are the last extant item in the inventories to keep Ukrainian strike capabilities operative. We are at the last rung of the aid ladder.
In the case of JASSMs, however, there are notable downsides for the United States. This is an important case of putting all of one’s eggs in the same technological basket. In 2020, the United States scrapped the development of its conventionally armed Long Range Standoff Missile, making the JASSM – particularly the new extended range variants – the system for the United States, earmarked to play a critical role in future conflicts, particularly in the Pacific. This makes the JASSM an extremely sensitive system, as a centerpiece of American strike capabilities, particularly with the modernization of the Tomahawk system crawling along at a few dozen units per year.
Given the fact that JASSMs are GPS guided, there are real reasons to be reticent about giving Ukraine such a technologically sensitive system. Russian electronic warfare has enjoyed considerable success jamming GPS and disrupting similarly guided American systems. Allowing the Russians to gain familiarity with a keystone American system could wreak havoc on Pentagon war planning – most, if not all of the strike eggs are in this basket, so why let an adversary peek inside?
It’s probable, given what we have seen to this point, that these concerns will ultimately be dismissed and Ukraine will receive a line of JASSMs which will backstop their strike capabilities – but given the size of Ukraine’s F-16 fleet, the scale will be constrained. Furthermore, air launched systems are less optimal for Ukraine, given their dependence on large and easily targeted airfields, in contrast to ground launched systems which are mobile and more easily concealed.
There is also the matter of the new Russian missile system – the now famous Oreshnik, or Hazel Tree. Russia tested the Oreshnik system on a large machining plant in Dnipro on November 21, 2024, which allowed the basic capabilities of the system to be gauged. The Oreshnik is an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile, characterized by its hypersonic capabilities (exceeding Mach-10) and its Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle equipped with six separate warheads, with the potential for submunitions in each. Although the attack on Dnipro was essentially a demonstration which used inert training warheads (that is, without explosive payloads), the missile can be configured with nuclear or conventional warheads
As in the case of the North Korean troops in Kursk, I rather think that the Oreshnik launch was not nearly as important as it was made out to be. The system is expensive and likely impractical for conventional use. I understand the desire to conceive of Oreshnik as a massively powerful conventional weapon – showering its target with half a dozen warheads with the power of an entire flight of Kalibr missiles – but there are several problems with this. The accuracy of the system (the CEP, or “Circular Error Probable” in the technical parlance) is much more consistent with a nuclear delivery system than a conventional one. Furthermore, the problem with using an IRBM for conventional strikes is the danger of miscalculation – foreign adversaries may misinterpret the launch as a nuclear attack and respond appropriately. This is precisely why the Russian government actually alerted the United States to the launch ahead of time – a fine arrangement for a demonstration, but impractical for a weapon that is intended to be used regularly.
We may see another use of the Oreshnik against Ukraine, but ultimately this is unlikely to be a system of consequence in this war. The demonstration in Dnipro was instead likely intended to send a message to Europe – reminding NATO that Russia has the capacity to deliver strikes against European targets that cannot be intercepted. It also serves as a poignant reminder that Europe lacks the equivalent capability, and in essence provides a demonstration of Russia’s ability to launch missiles from far beyond the range of either Ukrainian or European response. The Hazelnut is a tangible reminder of Russia’s strategic depth and strike dominance in Ukraine.
Ultimately, Ukraine will lose the strike game. It’s strike capacity has dwindled, with missiles frittered away in a dissipated air campaign, and though the exhaustion of Storm Shadow and ATACMs stocks can be offset somewhat by JASSMs, Ukraine simply lacks the range or quantities necessary to match Russian capabilities. Needing to do more with less, Ukraine instead diffused its assets and failed to synergize its strikes with ground operations. We are now at the end of the line – after JASSMs, there’s nothing left in western warehouses to upgrade Ukrainian capabilities. Hazelnuts or no, the math on this bat fight is bad for Kiev.
Conclusion: Debellation
Trapped in an endless news cycle, with daily footage of FPV strikes and exploding vehicles, and a dutiful cottage industry of war mappers alerting us to every 100 meter advance, it can easily feel like the Russo-Ukrainian War is trapped in an interminable doom loop which will never end – Mad Max meets Groundhog Day.
What I have endeavored to do here, however, is argue that 2024 actually saw several very important developments which make the coming shape of the war relatively clear. To briefly recapitulate:
Russian forces caved in Ukrainian defenses at depth across an entire critical axis of front. After remaining static for years, Ukraine’s position in Southern Donetsk has been obliterated, with Russian forces advancing through an entire belt of fortified positions, pushing the front into Pokrovsk and Kostayantinivka.
The main Ukrainian gambit on the ground (the incursion into Kursk) failed spectacularly, with the salient being progressively caved in. An entire grouping of critical mechanized formations wasted much of the year fighting on this unproductive and secondary front, leaving Ukrainian positions in the Donbas increasingly threadbare and bereft of reserves.
An attempt by the Ukrainian government to reinvigorate its mobilization program failed, with enlistments quickly trailing off. Decisions to expand the force structure exacerbated the shortage of manpower, and as a result the decay of Ukraine’s frontline brigades has accelerated.
Long awaited western upgrades to Ukraine’s strike capabilities failed to defeat Russian momentum, and stocks of ATACMs and Storm Shadows are nearly exhausted. There are now few options remaining to prop up Ukrainian strike capacity, and no prospect of Ukraine gaining dominance in this dimension of the war.
In short, Ukraine is on the path to debellation – defeat through the total exhaustion of its capacity to resist. They are not exactly out of men and vehicles and missiles, but these lines are all pointing downward. A strategic Ukrainian defeat – once unthinkable to the western foreign policy apparatus and commentariat – is now on the table. Quite interestingly, now that Donald Trump is about to return to the White House, it is suddenly acceptable to speak of Ukrainian defeat. Robert Kagan – a stalwart champion of Ukraine if there ever was one – now says the quiet part out loud:
Ukraine will likely lose the war within the next 12 to 18 months. Ukraine will not lose in a nice, negotiated way, with vital territories sacrificed but an independent Ukraine kept alive, sovereign, and protected by Western security guarantees. It faces instead a complete defeat, a loss of sovereignty, and full Russian control
Indeed.
None of this should be particularly surprising. If anything, it is shocking that my position – that Russia is essentially a very powerful country that was very unlikely to lose a war (which it perceives as existential) right in its own belly – somehow became controversial or fringe. But here we are.
chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia
A former French counter-terrorism intelligence officer Nicolas Cinquini is actively pursuing information regarding French citizens participating in the war on Ukraine’s side
A Ukrainian soldier picks up a machine gun after a heavy fight on the front line in the village of Robotyne, Ukraine, Friday, March 1, 2024 (AP)
Nicolas Cinquini, a former French counter-terrorism intelligence officer currently looking into information regarding French citizens participating on Ukraine’s side in the conflict, informed Sputnik on Thursday that approximately 75 French mercenaries in Ukraine have either been killed, injured, or have returned to France since the beginning of the conflict
Including those killed, wounded, and those who have returned, the list I have published as of today includes 75 individuals who have been identified accurately or under pseudonyms, which can already tell us a lot
Cinquini said.
He mentioned that the list also comprises two individuals whom French authorities refer to as “volunteers”
The government presented them as ‘humanitarian workers’, employees of a Swiss NGO, but I am convinced that they were government agents. Their existence was revealed to us with their death on February 1
the former intelligence officer said.
He also indicated possessing information about additional mercenaries who engaged in hostilities on behalf of Kiev
The rest have just been discovered and there is not yet enough information about them to publish
Cinquini stressed.
Simultaneously, the French Foreign Ministry has refuted the existence of French mercenaries within the Ukrainian Armed Forces, attributing such claims to Russian “disinformation”, despite reports in the French media about French citizens killed in Ukraine.
Several statements released ever since the beginning of the Ukraine-Russian conflict show that Kiev’s Western allies have mercenaries fighting in Ukraine.
Dive deeper
In mid-March, the Russian Defense Ministry announced more than 13,387 foreign mercenaries arrived in Ukraine to participate in hostilities against Russia.
Within that timeframe, 5,962 militants were eliminated, according to the ministry. Poland was identified as the leading contributor in terms of the number of slain mercenaries, with 2,960 individuals arriving from there, out of which 1,497 were killed.
Following Poland, Georgia saw 561 casualties out of 1,042 mercenaries, while arrivals from the United States suffered 491 losses out of 1,113 individuals.
Additionally, 422 out of 1,005 Canadian mercenaries, 360 out of 822 British mercenaries, and 349 out of 784 Romanian mercenaries were also killed. Germany contributed 235 mercenaries, with 88 of them perishing.
Not only American troops but also the CIA
According to US Defense Department documents leaked in March 2023, National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby refused to verify the number but validated “a small US military presence” there.
A recent The New York Times report based on interviews with more than 200 current and former officials showed that there were “scores”, at least more than 40, of CIA officers in Ukraine.
In a transcript of a February 19 conversation between senior German Air Force officials, one official stated, “It’s known that there are numerous people there in civilian attire who speak with an American accent.”
It further exposed that there are UK personnel on the ground. One official, amid discussions on how German Taurus long-range missiles could function in Ukraine, revealed that the Germans “know how the English do it. . .. They have several people on-site.”
The British prime minister’s office has verified that the UK has soldiers on the ground saying
Beyond the small number of personnel we do have in the country supporting the armed forces of Ukraine, we haven’t got any plans for large-scale deployment
Russia, since 2022, has repeatedly warned the US and its Western allies, including France, against partaking in the war, emphasizing that it will defend itself in any way possible. It also stressed that the West and NATO have been playing a direct role by continuously aiding Ukraine with advanced weapons and military equipment [end]
As the calendar barrels into another year and we tick away the days of February, notable anniversaries are marked off in sequence. It is now 2/22/2022 +2: two years since Putin’s address on the historic status of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions, followed on 2/24/2022 by the commencement of the Special Military Operation and the spectacular resumption of history.
The nature of the war changed dramatically after a kinetic and mobile opening phase. With the collapse of the negotiation process (whether thanks to Boris Johnson or not), it became clear that the only way out of the conflict would be through the strategic defeat of one party by the other. Thanks to a pipeline of western support (in the form of material, financial aid, and ISR and targeting assistance) which allowed Ukraine to transcend its rapidly evaporating indigenous war economy, it became clear that this would be a war of industrial attrition, rather than rapid maneuver and annihilation. Russia began to mobilize resources for this sort of attritional war in the Autumn of 2022, and since then the war has attained its present quality – that of a firepower intensive but relatively static positional struggle.
The nature of this attritional-positional war lends itself to analytic ambiguity, because it denies the most attractive and obvious signs of victory and defeat in large territorial changes. Instead, a whole host of anecdotal, small scale positional analysis, and foggy data has to suffice, and this can be easily misconstrued or misunderstood. Ukraine’s supporters point to nominally small scale advances to support their notion that Russia is suffering cataclysmic casualties to capture small villages. This suggests that Russia is winning meaningless, pyrrhic victories which will lead to its exhaustion, so long as Ukraine receives everything it asks for from the west. At the same time, the Z-sphere points to these same battles as evidence that Ukraine can no longer hold even its most heavily defended fortress cities.
What I intend to argue here is that 2024 will be highly decisive for the war, as the year in which Ukrainian strategic exhaustion begins to show out at the same time that Russia’s strategic investments begin to pay off on the battlefield. This is the way of such an attritional conflict, which burdens armies with cumulative and constant stressors in a test of their recuperative powers. Wear and tear and the raging of the waters will erode and burden the dike until it bursts. And then the deluge comes.
Avdiivka: Tactical Overmatch
The signature operational development of 2024 is at this point clearly the complete Russian capture of Avdiivka. The strategic significance of Avdiivka has itself been subject to debate, with some dismissing it as little more than a dingy suburb of Donetsk, targeted to give Putin a symbolic victory on the eve of Russian elections.
In fact, Avdiivka is clearly a locale with great operational significance. A Ukrainian fortress since the beginning of the Donbass War in 2014, Avdiivka served as a keystone blocking position for the AFU on the doorstep of Donetsk, sitting on a major supply corridor. Its capture creates space for Russia to begin a multi-pronged advance on next-phase Ukrainian strongholds like Konstantinivka and Pokrovsk (more on that later) and pushes Ukrainian artillery away from Donetsk.
The subject that would seem to be of particular importance, however, was the manner in which Russia captured Avdiivka. The struggle amid the wreckage of an industrial city provided something of a Rorschach test for the war, with some seeing the battle as yet another application of Russian “meat assaults”, overwhelming the AFU defenders with mass amid horrific casualties
This story does not hold up to scrutiny, as I would like to demonstrate from a variety of angles. First, we can try to gauge casualties. This is always difficult to do with a high degree of accuracy, but it would be useful to look for abnormalities or spikes in Russian loss patterns. The most widely accepted source for this would be the Mediazona casualty tracker (an explicitly anti-Putinist media project operated out of the west).
When one goes to examine the Mediazona counts, an interesting discrepancy manifests itself. The summary text notes that a four-month battle for Avdiivka has recently concluded, and Mediazona states: “We are seeing significant growth of Russian casualties since mid-October.” This is actually quite odd, because their data shows the literal opposite. Since October 10 (the day of the first major Russian mechanized assault on Avdiivka), Mediazona has counted an average of 48 Russian casualties per day, which is actually significantly less than the burn rate earlier in the year. In contrast, Mediazona counted 80 casualties per day on average from January 1 to October 9. This period, of course, includes heavy fighting in Bakhmut, so if one takes the period between the end of the Battle of Bakhmut and the beginning of the Battle of Avdiivka (May 20 to October 9) one finds an average of 60 Russian casualties per day. A time series of Mediazona’s weekly confirmed casualties also shows a downward trend, making one wonder how they can feel comfortable claiming that the action in Avdiivka has raised the burn rate
Furthermore, Ukrainian sources on the ground emphasized that the Russian assault in Avdiivka was quite certainly not a mere function of mass, and noted effective Russian small unit tactics with a powerful fire support. One Ukrainian officer told Politico: “That’s how they work in Avdiivka — artillery levels everything to the ground, and then professional landing troops come in small groups.” Another officer described Russian small unit assaults (5 to 7 men) occurring at night. All of this is inconsistent with the trope about Russian “human wave” assaults – which, we should note, have never been caught on camera. Given the Ukrainian fondness for sharing combat footage, oughtn’t we expect to see some alleged evidence of these Russian waves being mowed down?
All this is to say, the claim that Russia (yet again) suffered catastrophic losses in Avdiivka is simply not supported. Like a previous analysis in which I showed that Russian armor losses were not rising or showing abnormal patterns, we yet again have a major Russian assault failing to cause a spike in the loss data. This is not to deny that Russia has suffered casualties. The operation at Avdiivka was a high intensity, four month battle. Men are killed and vehicles are destroyed in such affairs, but there is little evidence that this occurred at abnormal or alarming rates for the Russian Armed Forces.
Now, you’re certainly free to make your own judgements, and I have no doubt that the belief in massive Russian casualties and human wave assaults will endure. However, to believe this, you must make an epistemological leap of faith – believing that the wasteful human waves exist despite Ukrainian fighters testifying to the opposite, and that Russian casualties have risen in a way that is somehow invisible to trackers like Warspotting and Mediazona.
In contrast, Avdiivka stands out as the first major engagement of the war where Ukraine’s growing material shortages have been acutely felt. After burning through much of their accumulated stock (including the large batch of shells purchased from South Korea by the United States), the AFU felt a glaring and painful artillery shortage in Avdiivka. Complaints about “shell hunger” were a motif of the coverage of the battle. Of course, we’ve heard about the growing shell shortage for months (and it is known that Ukraine simply does not have enough tubes to cover the entire front), but Avdiivka stands out as a keystone position, important enough for Ukraine to scramble premier assets to reinforce it, where they simply could not provide an adequate base of fire
Avdiivka
In the absence of adequate artillery, Ukraine has increasingly tried to lean on FPV drones as a substitute. There is a certain strategic logic to this, in that small drones can be manufactured in distributed facilities and do not require the capital intensive production centers (vulnerable to Russian strike systems) that artillery shells do.
However, drones are clearly not a panacea to Ukraine’s problems. In the simple technical sense, the destructive power of an FPV drone (which usually carries the warhead of a rocket propelled grenade) pales in comparison to an artillery shell and is thus unsuitable for suppressive fire or the reduction of strongpoints. Drones are also subject to disruptions from weather and electronic warfare in ways that artillery is not. More importantly, however, Ukraine is simply losing the drone race. Ukraine’s achievements ramping up drone production in wartime are genuinely impressive, but the country’s industrial base is still far smaller and more vulnerable than Russia’s, and Russia’s drone production is starting to widely outstrip Ukraine’s. Ukraine’s weakness in other arms prompted them to be the first party to lean heavily on FPVs, but that early lead has been lost.
So, drones clearly offer a lethal and important battlefield expedient, but they are neither a genuine replacement for artillery nor an arm of clear advantage for Ukraine. The result was a Ukrainian defense in Avdiivka that was substantially outgunned. The problem was compounded by the rapid proliferation of Russian air dropped glide bombs, alongside the degradation of Ukraine’s air defense. This allowed the Russian air force to operate around Avdiivka with something approaching impunity, dropping hundreds of glide bombs with the power to – unlike artillery shells, let alone tiny FPV warheads – level the fortified concrete blocks that normally make Soviet vintage cities so durable in urban fighting.
Thus, Avdiivka unfolded along a pattern that is now becoming very familiar, and indicates the emerging Russian preference for assaulting cities, at least of this mid-sized fortress variety. Once again the operation focused in its preliminary phase on flaring out Russian control over the flanks, beginning with the large mechanized assault in early November which secured positions on the railway line to the north of the city. Again (as in the case of Bakhmut and Lysychansk-Severodonetsk) there was an expectation among some that Russia would attempt to encircle the city, but this still does not look feasible in the current operating environment under the nexus of fires and ISR. Instead, positions on the flank allowed the Russians to launch concentric attacks into the city, entering on multiple axes that compressed the Ukrainian defenders into a tight interior position, where Russian fire could be heavily concentrated
Concentric Attack on Avdiivka: February 7-14 (Base Map courtesy of Kalibrated Maps)
The particular combination of concentric attack and overwhelming Russian fires led to a very rapid end to the battle once the Russian push into the city proper began. While the creep around the flanks occurred in a sequence of on and off pushes through the winter, the concentric crush on the city lasted scarcely more than a week. On February 7-8 the Russians achieved breakthroughs in both the northern and southern suburbs, and by February 14 the Ukrainians were in retreat. A few pockets of resistance would linger for only a few days.
The issue for Ukraine now goes beyond the loss of Avdiivka and the opportunities that this will create for Russia. Ukraine now has proof of failure on both the attack and the defense in operations where they concentrated significant forces. Their counteroffensive on Russia’s Zaporhzia Line was a catastrophic failure, wasting much of the AFU’s carefully husbanded mechanized package, and now they have a failed defense on their hands in Avdiivka, despite fighting out of a well prepared fortress and scrambling reserves into the sector to reinforce the defense.
The question now becomes fairly simple: if Ukraine failed to attack successfully over the summer, if they could not defend Bakhmut, and if they cannot defend in Avdiivka, is there anywhere that they can find a battlefield success? The dam is leaking. Can Ukraine plug it before it collapses?
Russia’s Full Court Press
Ukraine’s force structure is always notoriously difficult to parse out, due to their propensity for ad-hoc battlegroups and their practice of piecemeal allocation of forces to resident brigade commands (turning brigade headquarters into the cups in a shell game). Truth be told, Ukrainian ORBAT and force allocation is in a class all its own – to try and get a handle on it, you can do no better than Matt Davies’ excellent work over on X dot com. This generally makes the AFU’s organization and force generation more opaque and more difficult to parse out than Russia’s, for example. While Russia employs conventional army level groupings, Ukraine does not, and indeed lacks any organic commands above the brigade level.
That being said, the basic picture is one of three Ukrainian “Operational Strategic Groupings”, which are vaguely akin to army groups. These are, from north to south, Operation Strategic Groupings (OSGs) Khortytsia, Tavriya, and Odessa. Against these are arrayed four Russian Army Groups – from north to south, these are Army Groups West, Center, East, and Dnieper. Assessing the total line strength is always difficult, largely because we do not always have good insight into the actual combat rating of these units. However, we can make estimates of paper strength. Based on deployment information from the Project Owl Ukraine Control Map and the Militaryland Deployment Map, we can estimate that the nominal strength in the theater right now is some 33 Division Equivalents for Ukraine against perhaps 50 DEs for Russia – a significant, but not utterly overwhelming Russian advantage. We get a picture something like this (Ukrainian Army level formations are absent because they do not exist)
Ukrainian Theater Army and Group Level Commands (Base Control Map provided by Kalibrated Maps)
At the moment, Russia is grinding slowly forward on almost every axis in the theater. This has both strategic/attritional implications, in that the Ukrainians are forced to continually burn reserves while being denied the ability to rotate and reconstitute units, but there is also a clear operational formulation occurring.
The Russian maneuver scheme must be held in reference to their minimum end state objectives – namely, the capture of the remaining Donbas urban agglomerations around Slovyansk and Kramatorsk (though we should not assume that the war or Russian ambitions end there). At the moment, there are several major axes of advance, which I am labelling as follows
Russian Axes of Attack (Base Control Map provided by Kalibrated Maps)
The intention of these thrusts is fairly obvious. In the center of the front, Russian advances on the Avdiivka and Chasiv Yar axes converge on the critical Ukrainian hub of Konstyantinivka, the capture of which is one of the absolute prerequisites for any serious attempt to move on the Kramatorsk agglomeration. Russian bases of control around Avdiivka and Bakhmut provide the necessary space to begin a two-pronged operation towards Konstyantinivka, bypassing and enveloping the strongly held Ukrainian fortress of Toretsk. (See the map below, which I made in December before the capture of Avdiivka)
Meanwhile, continued Russian pressure on the northern front (via a slow squeeze on the city of Kupyansk, at the top of the Oskil line as well as operations towards Lyman on the Zherebets axis) provide a base of progress towards the other operational perquisite for Kramatorsk, which is the Russian recapture of the north bank of the Donets River, up to the confluence of the Oskil at Izyum
Russia’s North Donetsk Campaign
Meanwhile, on the more southerly axes, Russia continues to expand its zone of control after the capture of Marinka, likely with the aim of developing momentum towards Kurakhove, which would put the Ukrainian fortress of Ugledar in a more severe salient. Ugledar remains a thorn in Russia’s side, in that it lies uncomfortable close to Russian rail lines into the land bridge. Russia is also attacking the Ukrainian held Robotyne salient (the sparse fruits of Ukraine’s counteroffensive). While these attacks have, as we have mentioned, attritional benefits by way of pinning Ukrainian forces in the line, it seems likely that Russia would aim to recapture the Robotyne salient to preempt any Ukrainian designs of using it as a springboard for a future attempt to restart operations towards Tokmak. Thus, these southern operations have both attritive effects and offer the potential of preventatively neutralizing useful Ukrainian staging points
Overall, the broad operational situation suggests that Russia is developing offensive momentum across the entire theater. This will have deleterious effects on Ukrainian combat power by preventing rotation, reconstitution, and lateral troop redeployment, while sucking in the dwindling Ukrainian reserves. Shoigu recently made an uncharacteristically bold statement that the AFU was committing much of its remaining reserves:
“After the collapse of the counteroffensive, the Ukrainian army command has been trying to stabilize the situation at the expense of the remaining reserves and prevent the collapse of the frontline.”
This is, if not totally verifiable, at least notable given his general reticence to make sweeping statements about the state of the war.
In the near term (meaning the spring and summer months) we should expect Russia to progress towards the following intermediate operational goals:
Developing a concentric offensive towards the Ukrainian agglomerations around Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Kontyantinivka
An offensive along the Zherebets-Oskil line towards Lyman, to capture or screen the Donetsk River line as a prerequisite for an operation against Kramatorsk
Continued assaults towards Kurakhove in preparation for the liqudiation of the Ugledar salient
Preventative attacks towards the Orakhiv axis to prevent future Ukrainian attempts to exploit the Robotyne salient
Farwell Zaluzhny
Against the backdrop of Ukraine’s defeat at Avidiivka, President Zelensky began a long expected command overhaul when he fired Commander in Chief Valery Zaluzhny and replaced him the the commander of the ground forces, Oleksandr Syrski.
There a variety of amusing ethnic and political subplots to this, particularly the longstanding tensions between Zelensky and Zaluzhny, the many ridiculous rumors that Zaluzhny had become a political rival to Zelensky and might be the lead figure in a military takeover of the government, and the rather ironic fact that the new top man, Syrski, is a Russian born less than fifty miles outside of Moscow, who ended up in Ukrainian service simply because his unit was posted near Kharkov when the Soviet Union fell, and he opted not to resign his command.
This is all very interesting, of course, and perhaps might help demonstrate that the relationship between these countries is far more convoluted and nuanced that most westerners assume. What matters for our purposes, however, is the military implications
Farewell, Sweet Prince
What we should say about Zaluzhny is that, while he was not really Ukraine’s biggest problem, he did not have the answers. Zaluzhny displayed a bizarre timidity, particularly throughout the Battle of Bakhmut and the Ukrainian Counteroffensive. We constantly heard about Zaluzhny’s reservations and opposition to Ukrainian plans – he was against the costly defense of Bakhmut, skeptical of the attack out of Orikhiv, and so forth. There was even a rumor that Zaluzhny told Zelensky that the counteroffensive had failed already in the opening weeks of the operation.
The problem with all of this is simple: Zaluzhny cannot have it both ways. He seemed to be positioning himself as a voice of caution and reason, distancing himself from operations on the ground, while allowing those operations to go forward anyway. Over the summer, supposedly at the same time that Zaluzhny had concluded that the counteroffensive was failing, he continued to push Ukrainian mechanized forces into the Russian defenses in small, company sized battlegroups.
Ultimately, Zaluzhny strikes one as a non-entity: skeptical of Ukrainian battle plans, but willing to implement them anyway without offering alternatives of his own. In particular, his hesitation led the Ukrainian counteroffensive to devolve into a sequence of wasteful probing attacks which lacked the mass to achieve a decisive result and inevitably spiraled into a slow motion trainwreck. A commander who complains about battleplans while implementing them anyway is begging an obvious question: what is it that you do around here, anyway?
In contrast, Syrski is a man who clearly exerts some will on the battlefield, for good or ill. His preference for commitment and combat has resulted in several of Ukraine’s ugliest defeats – he is, after all, the architect of the Bakhmut defense and the firebag at Lysychansk. But he’s also the showrunner for Ukraine’s signature military success to this point, in the 2022 Kharkov Counteroffensive, where he successfully exploited a badly hollowed out section of Russian front and recaptured important positions over the Oskil
Syrski (2nd from left) checks the situation map
Syrski may very well lead Ukraine to disaster. He has shown a tolerance for casualties that could easily break the AFU’s back, and a preference for generating horrible, grinding positional defense. But Syrski at least has a propensity to look for decision points, unlike Zaluzhny, who seemed content to slowly wither away in positional battle against a superior foe. Aggression could easily cause disaster for Ukraine, but time had clearly run out on Zaluzhny’s way of war.
Outgunned: Ukraine and the Arms Race
The Russo-Ukrainian War is one of industrial attrition. Despite a variety of theories about this or that game changing weapon, clever maneuver scheme, or superior western training, the reality of this war for the last 18 months has been one of grinding and laborious industrial war, battering through fixed defenses in a maelstrom of concrete, steel, and high explosives. The central problem for Ukraine is fairly simple: Russian force generation is reaching the liftoff point, which will interminably shift combat power in Russia’s favor.
As artillery shells have become the totem item in this war, a commentary on the state of the artillery race is certainly warranted. Ukraine managed to build a large inventory of shells in preparation for its 2023 summer offensive, partially through careful husbanding of resources and partially through the United States tapping a few remaining reservoirs, like South Korea. After expending much of that stockpile in high intensity operations through the summer, the artillery advantage has once again swung heavily in favor of Russia, and “shell hunger” has become a ubiquitous complaint for Kiev.
After burning through excess stocks, Ukraine’s long-term supply has increasingly come to hinge on attempts to expand production in Europe and the United States. However, this plan is foundering on three separate rocks: 1) industry has been much slower to ramp up than expected; 2) even the expanded production targets are too low to win the war for Ukraine; and 3) even if adequate ammunition could be procured, Ukraine would quickly run into problems with barrel availability.
Thus far, the United States has been much more successful ramping up production than has Europe. While American targets have been revised several times, it now looks like the United States will produce something like 500,000 shells in 2024, which is a good number given the state of the American industrial plant and issues with labor shortages. The European Union initially hoped to deliver 1 million shells on an annualized basis, but they appear to be far short of this number. Europe faces a variety of problems, like labor shortages, exorbitant energy costs, and a consensus driven decision making culture that is slow to allocate significant resources. The European practice of small orders placed by individual member states also leaves manufacturers hesitant to make large investments in new production lines. Or, as one Belgian general put it: “We’re in deep shit.”
Let’s say that the USA and Europe both fulfill their current targeted deliveries to Ukraine in their entirety. What would that amount to? A recent study from two German analysts at the European Council on Foreign Relations estimated that, in the optimist scenario, the USA and Europe can supply Ukraine with approximately 1.3 million rounds of ammunition on an annualized basis. That would give Ukraine a budget of about 3,600 shells per day – enough to sustain moderate intensity, but far below what they need
The primary means of physical destruction
Last year, Ukrainian Minister of Defense Reznikov said that Ukraine would require nearly 12,000 shells per day to “successfully execute battlefield tasks”, particularly offensive actions. That works out to more than 350,000 shells per month – more than three times what the NATO bloc is hoping to produce. Obviously that large number is unrealistic, but a recent study from the Estonian Ministry of Defense estimated that at minimum Ukraine will need 200,000 shells per month (Roughly 6,600 per day). At the estimated long-run availability of 3,600 per day, Ukraine can have some basic functionality, but they will find it difficult to accumulate a stockpile to allow higher intensity offensive operations.
This runs into an additional, follow on problem, which is that simply pumping shells into Ukraine is not enough. Solving the shell shortage will exacerbate the barrel shortage. Artillery barrels, needless to say, wear out from extended use. Using a rule of thumb number which says that a howitzer barrel has a lifespan of about 2,500 shots, this means that Ukraine would be wearing out somewhere between 125-150 guns per month, assuming they could actually shoot as much as Reznikov wants. This would create yet another sustainment bottleneck, complicated by the fact that Ukraine has at least 17 different platforms in use.
Meanwhile, what of the Russians? It’s clear that Russia’s pool of shells has been vastly underestimated. First we have the news that North Korean deliveries have been far larger than initially expected; instead of 1 million, it’s something more like 3 million with deliveries ongoing. This number is dampened by the fact that some of the North Korean shells are defective (from long stays in depots and cannibalization), but the sheer size of the delivery can’t be ignored. Meanwhile, indigenous Russian production has skyrocketed, with the Estonians estimating some 3.5 million shells produced in 2023 for the Russians, with a figure of 4.5 million expected in 2024. Including North Korean shells, it seems highly likely that Russian can easily sustain a firing rate of up to 12,000 shells per day, with surge capacity in reserve
The upshot of all this is essentially that, even if the European production surge occurs on schedule, there’s at least a 3-1 advantage (potentially 5-1) in Russian artillery fire that’s baked into the calculus of this war, occurring alongside a substantial western acknowledged ramp up in Russian production of strike systems like cruise missiles, Geran drones, Lancets, and glide bombs of both greater power and greater range. A recent publication from the Royal United Services Institute noted that Russia can deliver 1,500 tanks (both new build and retrofitted depot stocks) and 3,000 armored vehicles per year – the report also notes that Russian stocks of Iskander and Kalibr missiles have grown significantly over the last year.
The standard argument – the sort of “Theory of Ukrainian Victory” – rests on the idea of disproportionate, catastrophic Russian casualties, and both sides love to throw around that cherished word “loss ratios.” However, this rather tends to obfuscate the issue. The most important question is simple whether an army’s relative combat power is growing or shrinking over time – that is, whether its ability to generate forces is greater than its rate of burn – can it reconstitute attrited units in a timely manner, generate replacements, recover, repair, and replace broken equipment, and so forth. The prototypical example of this is of course the Nazi-Soviet War. Despite the fact that the Germans enjoyed favorable “loss ratios” throughout most of the war, the ratio of combat power consistently grew in the USSR’s favor due to their vastly superior force generation powers. Tellingly, Hitler even made a quip during the Battle of Kursk that the loss ratios should predict an immanent German victory. But loss ratios do not matter nearly as much as the relative rate of loss and force generation.
Given that Russian casualties are obviously far below the phantasmagorical hundreds of thousands suggested by western Media and Ukrainian propogandists, it has become clear that Russia is generating more force over time. Estonian intelligence estimated that Russia can properly train, equip, and deploy roughly 130,000 additional troops every six months, which is more than adequate to overcome current loss rates. As if to emphasize the point, RUSI notes that the Russian grouping of forces in Ukraine (that is, only those forces deployed in theater at the moment) rose from 360,000 to 470,000 over the last year.
So, here we are. The current Theory of Ukrainian Victory is exhausted, intending as it did to leverage western ISR, training, and surplus equipment to deliver disproportionate casualties on Russia. 2022 was a year of big surges (not Big Serges), with Russia rapidly conquering the land bridge and the Lugansk shoulder in its initial maneuver campaign, followed by Ukrainian capitalization on the inadequate Russian force generation with their audacious counterattack towards the Oskil. But 2023 was different – Ukraine had a significant window of opportunity, flush with western equipment, training, and planning assistance while Russia’s mobilization ground into gear. That strategic window yielded nothing. Instead, Ukraine burned off valuable resources defending Bakhmut and then bashed uselessly against a well shaped and well defended Russian line in the south. Now the window is closed, and Russian force generation is inexorably rising, threatening Ukraine with the deluge of total strategic overmatch.
Ukraine is facing strategic defeat, and the only way out is to go all in – not only for Ukraine, in the form of a more radical and totalizing mobilization plan, but for its partners too, who will have to adopt a quasi-war economy and devote radically more resources to arming and training the AFU.
That leaves the NATO partners. Even if Ukraine adopts a radical mobilization policy, it lacks the indigenous capacity to train them, let alone arm them. Without the NATO training pipeline and robust material support, a Ukrainian total mobilization (even if it were possible with Ukraine’s limited state capacity) would serve only to inflate casualties and burn off what is left of the nation’s demographic base. With even a stable level of Ukraine aid struggling to get through an American congress that is suffering from Ukraine fatigue and a host of domestic crises, it seems unlikely that any by the Baltic States are in the mood to double down and begin sending daily trains full of material to Kiev.
And so, we once again return to the motif of strategic exhaustion. 2022 was the year of wild swings as the front stabilized into a conveniently shaped and easily supplied Russian position, and 2023 was the year of Ukraine’s strategic window of opportunity, frittered away at Bakhmut and Robotyne. 2024 is the year that Russia’s swelling force generation reaches a climax and the war turns in an obvious and irreversible way against Ukraine.
The great German soldier and author Ernst Jünger had the following comment on the prospect of war with Russia:
When Spengler warned against any invasion of Russia for reasons of space, he was, as we have since seen, right. Even more questionable become each of these invasions for metaphysical reasons, insofar as one approaches one of the great sufferers, a titan, a genius of suffering power. In its aura, in its sphere of influence, one will become acquainted with pain in a way that far exceeds any imagination.
Much is always made of Russia’s propensity for “suffering”, with interpretations ranging from a romantic Russian-patriotic notion of sacrifice for the motherland to an anti-Russian criticism of the Russian tolerance for casualties. Perhaps it means both: the individual Russian soldier is more willing to sit in a freezing trench and trade shells than his adversary, and the Russian state and people are able to lose more and last longer in the aggregate.
I rather think, however, that Jünger’s metaphysical “titan of suffering” is not so metaphysical at all. It rather refers to a mundane power of the Russian state, namely its excellence and willingness across the centuries to mobilize huge numbers of men and material for war, at the expense of other social goals. War with Russia sucks. It means mass casualties, cold trenches, scarred earth, and long nights of shelling. The Ukrainians have coped with this as well as anyone (because they are themselves quasi-Russian, however much they deny it), but it is an awful thing to trade shells for years on end. The Russian power of suffering is to willingly fight wars that devolve into bat fights, knowing they have a bigger bat.
The window of strategic opportunity has closed for Ukraine, and now opens wide for Russia. The earth opens wide for the dead [end]