Nicolas Cinquini

Analista senior di l'intelligenza in u campu di a gestione di i risichi di sicurezza, sรฒ un anzianu tenente detective รจ ufficiale di l'intelligenza in l'agenzie di u Statu francese. A bona pronuncia hรจ ะะธะบะพะปะฐะน ะงะธะฝะบัƒะธะฝะธ, in russu

Tag: sumy

  • Lโ€™engagement franรงais dans les rangsย ukrainiens

    • Kaneki, Ken, 24 ans au 14 juin 2023

    a d’abord commis une usurpation caractรฉrisรฉe d’identitรฉ, car le seul, le vrai Ken Kaneki, est sujet de l’empereur Naruhito et n’a pas quittรฉ Tokyo, oรน des manipulations gรฉnรฉtiques l’ont transformรฉ en goule transgenre

    Notre Ken est titulaire d’un compte Facebook sous couverture du vrai Ken Kaneki, n’est pas fils du soleil levant, mais franรงais.

    Il serait selon ses nombreuses et nombreux thurifรฉraires ukrainiens, un ancien de la Lรฉgion รฉtrangรจre. Il parait en effet professionnel, mais ne porte pas le bรฉret vert, pourrait avoir acquis son expรฉrience dans un autre corps.

    Dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, il a frรฉquentรฉ, avant leur retour et interpellation en France, Guillaume Andreoni et Alan Vigneron, c’est ร  dire la 92e brigade mรฉcanisรฉe de l’armรฉe rรฉguliรจre. Il connaรฎt รฉgalement Boris Crouzette, avec qui il mange de la pizza. Tous ces Franรงais semblent avoir appartenu ou appartenir ร  la mรชme escouade

    Ken arbore les couleurs nationales, franรงaises et ukrainiennes, plus discrรจtement, le rouge et noir des nazis ukrainiens de la 2de guerre mondiale. L’immense Totenkopf SS de la photo de gauche, en bas, est alors accrochรฉe semble t il au-dessus de la couchette d’Andreoni, qui y est assis ร  droite.

    Le 8 mai 2023, Ken s’adresse en Anglais ร  son public de groupies ukrainiennes, pour dรฉfendre ses deux camarades de chambrรฉe, qui ont รฉtรฉ arrรชtรฉs ร  Paris le 22 avril

    Il รฉvoque la libertรฉ, qui semble se limiter dans son esprit ร  celle d’exprimer sa bรชtise. Car en vertu du principe de la sรฉparation des pouvoirs, le gouvernement n’est pas impliquรฉ dans la condamnation des deux individus. De plus, mรชme si Andreoni et Vigneron sont deux nazis de la pire espรจce, ce vice mental n’est pas en soi un dรฉlit. Ils ont รฉtรฉ arrรชtรฉs pour infraction ร  la lรฉgislation sur les armes, comme quiconque l’aurait รฉtรฉ.

    Selon les confidences qu’il a faites ร  un photo-journaliste ukrainien, son engagement en Ukraine est un sujet de conflit dans sa famille et seule sa soeur communique avec lui rรฉguliรจrement. Pour le moment, il ne souhaite pas revenir en France, compte rester au moins jusqu’ร  la victoire de l’Ukraine et espรจre que le pays lui accordera ensuite la nationalitรฉ pour le sang versรฉ. C’est ce qu’il explique ร  une รฉquipe internationale de journalistes, dont le Franรงais Joseph Roche, dans un entretien publiรฉ le 14 juin 2023

    Au terme d’une permission, il prend alors en gare de Kiev un train pour Kharkov. Nous en apprenons plus : Ken est d’origine sud-corรฉenne, a passรฉ six ans dans l’armรฉe franรงaise, arriva en Ukraine en janvier 2023. L’entretien coรฏncide avec le dรฉbut de la contre-offensive, dont nous savons depuis le 10 juin au moins qu’elle n’a pas รฉtรฉ lancรฉe dans la rรฉgion de Kharkov mais au sud, est un รฉchec sanglant dans la rรฉgion de Zaporojie.

    Ainsi s’รฉloigne la victoire et de dรฉpit, alors qu’a รฉtรฉ tuรฉ son supรฉrieur hiรฉrarchique moldave, probablement chef d’escouade, il s’exclame sur les rรฉseaux sociaux le 14 septembre

    Slava Ukrainiy [gloire ร  l’Ukraine], Fuck Russian Pederaste

    Je le mets au dรฉfi de le rรฉpรฉter en face d’un Tchรฉtchรจne en รฉtat de taper.

    Une tricoche [financement clandestin] de perdue avec le dรฉcรจs de Brutus, le prรฉcรฉdent chef d’escouade ? Le 19 septembre, moins d’une semaine aprรจs la triste nouvelle, Ken en appelle ร  votre bon coeur sur les rรฉseaux sociaux

    Please help us to continue our missions
    Paypal in description

    La misรจre des combattants atlantistes en Ukraine me fait presque de la peine. Oรน vont donc les sommes colossales que les gouvernements occidentaux y injectent ?

    Des nouvelles nous parviennent le 1er novembre, des photos prises dans la rรฉgion de Zaporojie par le journaliste Joseph Roche, partisan sans รฉquivoque des causes atlantistes, qui l’a dรฉjร  interviewรฉ dรฉbut juin

    Le Franรงais participe ร  un exercice de tir. Il dissimule son visage mais l’oeil expรฉrimentรฉ le reconnaรฎt. Son vรฉhicule est marquรฉ de la Balkenkreuz, signe de reconnaissance des forces atlantistes en Ukraine depuis septembre 2022, qui identifiait aussi ceux des armรฉes du III. Reich pendant la 2de guerre mondiale

    Le 3 janvier 2024, le propagandiste Xavier Tytelman annonce la bonne nouvelle sur X

    Kan, combattant franรงais en Ukraine, vous remercie dโ€™avoir financรฉ un 4×4, des tenues thermiques pour sa team ainsi que des drones FPV infrarouge [โ€ฆ] Cโ€™est via Berlioz team [cf. Franck Malandain], mais la collecte profite aussi ร  Baguette [cf. Quentin Korczak], il sโ€™agit dโ€™une collecte gรฉnรฉrale qui bรฉnรฉficie ร  tous les francophones selon les besoins

    Gรฉnial ! Ken va pouvoir y peindre la Balkenkreuz. Il est alors dans la rรฉgion de Zaporojie, secteur de Rabotino, รฉpicentre de l’รฉchec de la contre-offensive atlantiste, dans une escouade internationale appelรฉe Recon Team Kilo [ร‰quipe de reconnaissance Kilo], en hommage ร  Paul Kim, dit Kilo, combattant US tuรฉ le 5 octobre 2022.

    Dans une vidรฉo publiรฉe le 14 juin 2024, Tytelman l’a interviewรฉ ร  Kiev. Nous apprenons que Ken a รฉtรฉ dans l’Armรฉe de l’air, probablement cocoye [fusilier-commando de l’air]. En Ukraine, il est devenu opรฉrateur de drone en novembre 2023.

    Avec l’opรฉration militaire spรฉciale russe, les hordes asiatiques [cf. Wilfried Blรฉriot] sont ร  leurs portes, pas loin d’รฉgorger leurs fils et leurs compagnes. Selon les agences occidentales de renseignement, des soldats Nord-Corรฉens combattent dans les rangs asiatiques. Engagรฉs dans la rรฉgion russe de Koursk, ils appliqueraient en effet le Traitรฉ de partenariat stratรฉgique global entre les deux pays

    C’est pour parer cette trรจs officielle menace, ce Pรฉril jaune, qu’en novembre 2024, l’OTAN lance des frappes stratรฉgiques en territoire russe, quitte ร  dรฉclencher une 3e guerre mondiale (cf. Emmanuel Macron)

    Je ne comprend pas pourquoi le taux dโ€™audience de LCI sโ€™est effondrรฉ en octobre (cf. Xavier Tytelman). Car toujours en pointe de l’information, le 24 novembre, la chaรฎne franรงaise et son expert militaire -que des gens mรฉchants surnomment l’hรดtesse de l’air– sont en mesure de nous apporter les premiรจres images d’un Corรฉen sur le champ de bataille, quelque part au Donbass ou en Ukraine. Bigre, il parle mรชme Francais. Ils sont trop forts, ces Corรฉens

    Pour l’anecdote, Ken est camarade du volontaire britannique Alexander Garms-Rizzi, qu’un drone russe dรฉmilitarise le 27 janvier 2025 dans le secteur de Koupiansk, rรฉgion de Kharkov.

    Le 3 juillet, il pleure un camarade รฉtranger tuรฉ le 29 juin dans la rรฉgion de Soumy. Il accable leur pilote ukrainien, qui par carence en topographie, aurait conduit leur transport de troupes M113 en pleine guerre, sous le feu de lโ€™artillerie russe.

    Mon service militaire dans un escadron de reconnaissance, mon chauffeur ร  ma gauche, m’a pourtant appris que la topographie relรจve du chef d’escouade. Lโ€™ancien gardien de base aรฉrienne franรงaise est de ces innombrables troufignons parmi les volontaires รฉtrangers, qui se bercent de lโ€™illusion que leurs talents auraient mรฉritรฉ une victoire, dont lโ€™incompรฉtence de leurs camarades ukrainiens les priveraient

    Plus intรฉressante est lโ€™identitรฉ politique de feu son bras droit [รฉcrit Ken sur X]. Le volontaire nazi US Daniel Woods Reese arborait un Schwarze Sonne [soleil noir, hรฉritage du Reichsfรผhrer SS Heinrich Himmler], tatouรฉ sur son รฉpaule gauche, รฉtait aussi fan de Peste noire, un groupe franรงais de National Socialist Black Metal (NSBM)

    La qualitรฉ que je concรจde ร  mes sujets dโ€™รฉtude est quโ€™ils me dรฉรงoivent rarement. En rรฉponse au tweet de Ken, le militant pรฉtainiste, russophobe compulsif et propagandiste sur LCI Xavier Tytelman, rend hommage ร  feu Daniel Woods Reese

    Reconnaissante par ma plume, lโ€™humanitรฉ rend ici hommage ร  la glorieuse armรฉe russe, digne hรฉritiรจre de la glorieuse Armรฉe rouge, pour son oeuvre considรฉrable de dรฉmilitarisation de nazis occidentaux

    Je comprends enfin le 13 octobre que Ken nโ€™a pas dรฉcidรฉ de son itinรฉraire le 29 juin. Le journal en ligne Kyiv Independent publie lโ€™excellent reportage dโ€™une rotation au front entre deux รฉquipes de pilotes de drones. Le personnel montant reste une quinzaine de jours sur des positions dรฉfensives prรฉparรฉes

    Les sujets sont des volontaires รฉtrangers : un Canadien peut รชtre dโ€™origines ukrainiennes, un Japonais, un Allemand de Namibie aux tatouages identitairesโ€ฆ etc Tous intรฉressent dรฉsormais les enquรชteurs de TrackANaziMerc

    Lโ€™escouade nโ€™est pas mรฉcanisรฉe, ni mรชme motorisรฉe, car son vรฉhicule serait dรฉtruit sโ€™il restait sur place. Elle est dรฉposรฉe au front par un blindรฉ ukrainien dont lโ€™รฉquipage est maรฎtre ร  bord

    Le 27 octobre, Ken publie sur les rรฉseaux sociaux la premiรจre image dโ€™une blessure rรฉcente, dont il devrait garder une jolie cicatrice ร  la jambe gauche

    ร€ partir de la mi-octobre 2026, ses publications confirment ce que nous supposions depuis son hospitalisation un an plus tรดt. Il est mutilรฉ, a perdu main et jambe droites.

    in Lโ€™engagement franรงais dans les rangs ukrainiens

    chronique alphabรฉtique et nรฉcrologique de lโ€™engagement franรงais dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas

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  • Lโ€™engagement franรงais dans les rangsย ukrainiens

    • Macron, Emmanuel, nรฉ le 21 dรฉcembre 1977,

    est aprรจs Nicolas Sarkozy et Franรงois Hollande, le troisiรจme gouverneur dโ€™une France infรฉodรฉe aux ร‰tats-Unis et ร  leurs intรฉrรชts. Et en mรชme temps, que ce soit l’expression de son arrogance ou une faรงon de sรฉduire ses rares รฉlecteurs, il sโ€™agite dans des efforts dรฉsespรฉrรฉs pour apparaรฎtre au dessus de ses moyens

    Sa personnalitรฉ infantile, ses caprices, sa vacuitรฉ abyssale de politicien typique de l’Occident de ce dรฉbut de troisiรจme millรฉnaire, de pur communicant, en font sans doute le personnage le moins intรฉressant de ce panthรฉon. Je retiens quand mรชme de Macron qu’il tenta le 11 novembre 2018 de rรฉhabiliter le dirigeant fasciste Philippe Pรฉtain.

    Compte tenu des qualitรฉs rรฉelles de l’imposteur, il est heureux que la France soit aujourd’hui vassale des USA, qui au Niger ou en Ukraine, savent calmer d’un sifflet les rodomontades des autoritรฉs franรงaises. Car mรชme les ร‰tats-uniens sont plus compรฉtents et moins nuisibles aux restes de l’humanitรฉ

    Quand des pays comme l’Allemagne ou la France, avec leurs passifs historiques, ont l’insolence de prรฉtendre dรฉfendre, comme des vierges de Delphes, la dรฉmocratie ou la libertรฉ, les vastes restes du monde rigolent doucement. La dรฉcence la plus รฉlรฉmentaire exigerait plus d’humilitรฉ.

    La derniรจre action indรฉpendante et dรฉcente de la France sur la scรจne internationale fut pour le bien, en 2003, l’opposition de Jacques Chirac ร  l’invasion anglo-รฉtats-unienne de l’Irak

    Une invasion qui prรฉcรฉda la destruction en 2011 de la Libye (Sarkozy), cause de l’activitรฉ djihadiste au Sahel, le soutien ร  l’insurrection sunnite radicale contre le gouvernement laรฏc de Syrie (Hollande), que les Parisiens payรจrent un vendredi, puis le coup d’ร‰tat d’extrรชme-droite en Ukraine et la guerre au Donbass depuis 2014. Les Occidentaux sont devenus des fous furieux et les Franรงais sont aujourd’hui parmi les pires

    En juin 2023, dรฉjร , la 12e brigade spรฉciale, รฉmanation de l’organisation nazie Azov dans la garde nationale ukrainienne, employait au front l’obusier de 155 mm TRF1, prรฉdรฉcesseur dans l’armรฉe franรงaise du CAESAR

    Le 2 mars 2024, lโ€™entrepreneur libertarien David Sacks dรฉfinit fort bien la nature actuelle de lโ€™OTAN, dans un tweet que je traduis ici en Franรงais

    En 1991, lโ€™Union soviรฉtique sโ€™effondra et lโ€™OTAN fut confrontรฉe ร  une crise existentielle : sa raison dโ€™รชtre nโ€™existait plus. Mais plutรดt que de se dรฉmanteler, elle sโ€™est donnรฉe une nouvelle mission : sโ€™รฉtendre. Et dans une boucle autorรฉfรฉrentielle, lโ€™expansion de lโ€™OTAN crรฉerait lโ€™hostilitรฉ nรฉcessaire pour se justifier

    Et voila le rรฉsultat, la descente dโ€™une prise de coke qui รฉtait censรฉe apaiser les troubles anxieux de petits bourgeois froussards, que leur lรขchetรฉ fait aujourdโ€™hui immoler des centaines de milliers dโ€™Ukrainiens, enrรดlรฉs de force dans les troupes atlantistes. Les incantations sur la dรฉmocratie ou la libertรฉ ne sont quโ€™une bouillie politiquement correcte, le colonialisme du XIXe siรจcle, qui dรฉjร  prรฉtendait civiliser, passรฉ au blender. La question se pose encore une fois : qui sont les barbares ?

    Le 30 mars 2024, deux vrais journalistes, Serge Halimi et Pierre Rimbert, dรฉcrivent enfin dans le Monde diplomatique ce qui se passe dans le microcosme politico-journalistique d’un pays qu’au tout dรฉbut de ce troisiรจme millรฉnaire, la CIA classait dรฉjร  parmi les rรฉpubliques bananiรจres

    Troupes franรงaises en Ukraine, une gaffe prรฉsidentielle sous escorte mรฉdiatique : les nouveaux chiens de guerre […] ร€ la fin de lโ€™hiver, les journalistes franรงais se sont รฉvertuรฉs ร  transformer une gaffe prรฉsidentielle en un joyau de lโ€™analyse gรฉopolitique […]

    Le phรฉnomรจne est paradoxal, mais plus La France rรฉtrรฉcit, plus elle se prend pour le centre du monde. Dans la rรฉalitรฉ, le camp occidental a aussitรดt rabrouรฉ le fanfaron, qui a donc ratรฉ sa brillante manoeuvre psychologique. Seule la presse bleu horizon ne le trouve pas ridicule et si lโ€™armรฉe franรงaise devait obรฉir ร  lโ€™ordre absurde de sโ€™engager seule en Ukraine, les survivants en reviendraient plus traumatisรฉs que ceux de la Bรฉrรฉzina.

    Alors que selon la rumeur, Macron serait sur le point dโ€™officialiser la prรฉsence de militaires franรงais sur le champ de bataille en Ukraine et au Donbass, le vice-prรฉsident du Conseil italien, Matteo Salvini, รฉcrit le 4 juin et illustre sur les rรฉseaux sociaux

    Je dirai ร  Macron : tu devrais aller en Ukraine pour te battre, mettre un casque et ne pas jouer avec les tรชtes des Italiens

    ร€ la cรฉlรฉbration du 80e anniversaire du dรฉbarquement de Normandie, Macron a eu le mauvais goรปt d’inviter Volodymyr Zelenskyy, reprรฉsentant d’un pays en guerre ethnique depuis le coup d’ร‰tat d’extrรชme-droite en 2014, qui contrairement ร  ses promesses รฉlectorales mais sous la pression d’un ร‰tat profond nazi, n’a pas mis fin au conflit, un pays rรฉvisionniste qui cรฉlรจbre le souvenir des fascistes qui ont combattu dans les rangs du III. Reich

    Avec lโ€™invitation de lโ€™Allemagne depuis 2004 et maintenant celle de lโ€™Ukraine, l’anniversaire du dรฉbarquement de Normandie est une vulgaire sauterie atlantiste, un spectacle cringe, qui fait de la peine pour les vรฉtรฉrans qui sโ€™y prรชtent encore. Par sa personnalitรฉ, Macron en accentue la vulgaritรฉ

    Le spectacle de cabaret ne porte pas chance aux Playmobil et ร  leur brigadier Yaรซl Braun Pivet. L’Assemblรฉe nationale est dissoute le 9 juin, ร  l’issue d’รฉlections europรฉennes qui sont une dรฉroute pour Macron et tous ceux qui ont ovationnรฉ Zelenskyy

    Le 9 octobre, il partage sur X une jolie vidรฉo de l’entraรฎnement en France de militaires ukrainiens et commente

    Jโ€™en avais pris lโ€™engagement : nos militaires forment actuellement 2 300 soldats ukrainiens dans le Grand Est, avec des รฉquipements quโ€™ils utiliseront en mission.

    La brigade Anne de Kyiv sera formรฉe et รฉquipรฉe grรขce ร  la solidaritรฉ de la France

    C’est sans doute Gabin Donnio Choupeaux, qui dans un entretien du mois de mars, a soufflรฉ le nom de la brigade ร  la propagande bleu horizon. Bravo

    Nous partageons une histoire commune avec Anne de Kiev, รฉpouse de Henri Ier et reine des Francs de 1051 ร  1060

    En guise de rรฉfรฉrence, dans un souci de communication, une femme politique รขgรฉe dโ€™environ 1000 ans est plus commode que beaucoup de personnages franรงais ou ukrainiens de la 2de guerre mondiale. Mais le diable est dans les dรฉtails. Personne ร  la cour de sa Vacuitรฉ nโ€™a remarquรฉ lโ€™รฉcusson ? Portรฉ notamment par un instructeur en tenue camouflรฉe franรงaise, il reprend les couleurs rouge et noir, qui nโ€™ont rien de nationales mais sont en Ukraine celles des nazis dโ€™hier et dโ€™aujourdโ€™hui

    Il est l’insigne de la 155e brigade, formรฉe en juin avec de nouveaux contingents de chair ร  canon ukrainienne. L’unitรฉ est d’infanterie ou mรฉcanisรฉe, l’histoire n’est pas encore catรฉgorique sur ce point

    Cela dรฉpendra sans doute de la solidaritรฉ du contribuable franรงais. Car comme disait autrefois lโ€™ร‰tat franรงais, ils donnent leur sang, donnez votre travail

    Anne de Kiev ou Eva Braun ? L’image a รฉtรฉ dรฉcouverte par des internautes polonais qui la partagent le 4 novembre et s’en offusquent ร  juste titre. Des stagiaires ukrainiens de la 155e brigade et probablement aussi leurs instructeurs franรงais, tous en tenue camouflรฉe franรงaise, posent dans l’automne champenois

    Le groupe dรฉploie un รฉtendard qui ne reproduit pas l’insigne de la brigade, est une des multiples versions du drapeau que les nazis ukrainiens considรจrent comme un emblรจme national. Les couleurs rouge et noir sont celles de l’Armรฉe des insurgรฉs (UPA), milice nazie ukrainienne qui entre 1943 et 1945, a massacrรฉ au moins 50 000, peut รชtre 100 000 civils polonais. Coquetterie de cette version, le bien connu Reichsadler [aigle impรฉrial] (cf. Sylvain Caupin), oรน le trident ukrainien a remplacรฉ le swastika des nazis allemands de la 2de guerre mondiale.

    ร€ l’instar de l’ex premier ministre, le vraiment trรจs jeune Gabriel Attal, le dรฉpartement commercial de la Misanthropic Division, confrรฉrie nazie internationale, fondรฉe et basรฉe en Ukraine depuis 2013, cรฉlรจbre le 19 novembre le 1000e jour de l’opรฉration militaire spรฉciale russe, dernier chapitre d’une guerre qui fait rage au Donbass depuis 3830 jours, soit 10 ans, 5 mois et 24 jours

    Les nazis ukrainiens n’oublient pas la contribution franรงaise ร  leur cause. Leur collage comporte l’image d’un militant du GUD parisien et celle partagรฉe le 4 par des internautes polonais, prise en Champagne par des stagiaires miltaires ukrainiens, qui aux frais de la princesse, dรฉployรจrent leur drapeau nazi

    Pour sa part, le petit Gabriel partage cette image sur X, oรน il clame en Ukrainien ะกะปะฐฬะฒะฐ ะฃะบั€ะฐั—ฬะฝั–! ะ“ะตั€ะพัะผ ัะปะฐะฒะฐ! [Gloire ร  l’Ukraine ! Gloire aux hรฉros !]. Ses anciennes fonctions le dispensent d’ignorer que le slogan Gloire aux hรฉros fut inaugurรฉ en avril 1941 par les fascistes de l’OUN (Organisation des nationalistes ukrainiens), alors implantรฉs dans le Generalgouvernement fรผr die besetzten polnischen Gebiete [Gouvernement gรฉnรฉral des territoires polonais occupรฉs].

    Dans un entretien que la BBC publie le 23 novembre 2024, Jean-Noรซl Barrot dรฉclare quโ€™il nโ€™y a pas de ligne rouge quand il est question de soutenir lโ€™Ukraine, que La France autorise ร  lancer en territoire russe ses missiles franรงais de longue portรฉe (SCALP, le nom franรงais du missile de croisiรจre que les Britanniques appellent Storm Shadow)

    Quel est le contexte des fanfaronnades du frais รฉmoulu ministre des affaires รฉtrangรจres de la Macronie ? En guise dโ€™avertissement, au petit matin du 21 novembre, la Russie utilisa un missile balistique, pour cette fois ร  charge conventionnelle. La cible รฉtait une usine militaire ร  Dnipro, oรน la vidรฉosurveillance montre clairement les arrivรฉes de six ogives distinctes

    Dans une allocution en soirรฉe, Vladimir Poutine prรฉcisa que le nouveau systรจme dโ€™armes est appelรฉ Oreshnik [Noisette]. Le missile balistique hypersonique de portรฉe intermรฉdiaire (IRBM hypersonique) vole ร  une vitesse proche de Mach 10. Sa portรฉe de 5 000 km le prรฉdispose au traitement de cibles en Europe

    Il ajouta

    Nous nous considรฉrons en droit dโ€™utiliser nos armes contre les installations militaires des pays qui autorisent lโ€™utilisation de leurs armes contre nos installations. Et en cas dโ€™escalade des actions agressives, nous rรฉpondrons de maniรจre dรฉcisive et en miroir

    Cette dรฉmonstration รฉtait une riposte ร  plusieurs attaques avec des missiles de lโ€™OTAN, que les forces atlantistes avaient menรฉes sur le territoire russe depuis que Joe Biden les autorisa le 17 novembre

    Que justifie les menaces russes de frappes nuclรฉaires ? Depuis le dรฉclenchement en 2014 des opรฉrations militaires, contre les insurgรฉs russophones du Donbass, dโ€™un pouvoir ukrainien issu dโ€™un coup dโ€™ร‰tat dโ€™extrรชme-droite en fรฉvrier de cette annรฉe lร , de faรงon encore plus รฉvidente aprรจs le dรฉbut en 2022 de lโ€™opรฉration militaire spรฉciale russe, les stratรจges occidentaux voient la Russie comme une grenouille plongรฉe dans une eau lentement portรฉe ร  รฉbullition. Lโ€™escalade de leur guerre par procuration est graduelle, avec lโ€™ambition illusoire de ne pas provoquer de rรฉaction russe symรฉtrique. Point particulier : elle est conduite aujourd’hui avec des armes que l’Ukraine ne pourrait pas employer en territoire russe sans le concours des satellites et techniciens de l’OTAN. Cโ€™est ร  cette escalade graduelle que rรฉpondent les menaces de frappes nuclรฉaires. Non pas aux effets rรฉels de quelques missiles tactiques dont la plupart sont abattus par la dรฉfense aรฉrienne avant dโ€™atteindre leur cibles en territoire russe. Car cette variable est essentielle ร  lโ€™analyse de la situation : les tirs de ces munitions occidentales ne changeront pas le rapport de force et nโ€™empรชcheront pas la victoire militaire de la Russie.

    Pourquoi ces tirs de missiles de lโ€™OTAN ? Escalade graduelle donc. Mais encore ? Biden les autorisa moins de deux semaines aprรจs la victoire sans appel de Donald Trump et ร  deux mois de son retour ร  la Maison blanche. Envenimer la situation militaire pour saboter ou compliquer le rรจglement politique ultรฉrieur du conflit ? Cโ€™est bien possible. Lโ€™inaliรฉnable alliance historique entre les USA et le Royaume-Uni est une constante de lโ€™รฉquation. De surcroรฎt, la russophobie รฉpidermique et tout aussi historique des classes dirigeantes dโ€™Albion explique aussi la position britannique.

    Mais pourquoi cette posture franรงaise de supplรฉtif doublรฉ dโ€™une mouche de coche ? Pour galvaniser la masse des innocents qui sโ€™informent auprรจs de BFMTV, CNews ou LCI ? Sans doute, tant la communication est une prรฉoccupation majeure des gouvernements de la Macronie. Pour satisfaire lโ€™รฉgo puรฉril dโ€™Emmanuel Macron ? Je le crains, mais pas seulement

    Les classes dirigeantes franรงaises sont รฉpouvantรฉes par lโ€™effondrement de lโ€™hรฉgรฉmonie occidentale, ce que la perte de la Franรงafrique pourrait coรปter ร  lโ€™รฉconomie franรงaise

    Mais plus les Occidentaux et Franรงais feront monter les enchรจres, sans pourtant empรชcher la victoire russe en Ukraine ou les lรฉgitimes aspirations des Africains ร  leur libรฉration, plus la dรฉfaite sera finalement humiliante et plus dure sera la chute.

    Le drame est รฉvoquรฉ en public le 13 dรฉcembre 2024, par le journaliste ukrainien Iouri Butoussov. Le reconstituer dans son intรฉgralitรฉ est une tรขche aisรฉe pour lโ€™observateur chevronnรฉ.

    Engagรฉe en Rรฉpublique populaire de Donetsk, soumise dans le secteur de Pokrovsk ร  lโ€™รฉtreinte puissante des forces russes, la brigade Frรฉnรฉgonde de Pouille [ou quelque chose comme รงa] sโ€™est dรฉsagrรฉgรฉe le 10 dรฉcembre. Au moins un millier dโ€™hommes, prรจs de la moitiรฉ de son effectif thรฉorique total, sont partis en dรฉroute et ont dรฉsertรฉ

    Cโ€™est aux frais de la princesse, que cette 155e brigade mรฉcanisรฉe avait รฉtรฉ รฉquipรฉe de matรฉriel franรงais et entraรฎnรฉe en Champagne. Macron sโ€™en vanta le 9 octobre sur les rรฉseaux sociaux. Mais tout est perdu, mรชme l’honneur.

    Le 2 janvier 2025, pour boire le calice jusqu’ร  la lie, le Parisien nous rappelle la brigade Frรฉnรฉgonde de Pouille [ou quelque-chose comme รงa], pour nous apprendre que le nombre de dรฉsertions s’รฉlรจverait alors ร  1 700. Soit 74% d’un effectif total de 2 300, que j’ai pris la peine de relever en octobre. Et non pas 4 500, comme le quotidien cocardier le prรฉtend, quand il relaie la propagande atlantiste. 4 500 est l’effectif moyen d’une brigade รฉtats-unienne, mais celles formรฉes en Ukraine sont toujours de petits calibres.

    L’article stimule ma curiositรฉ et alors que le rรฉcit de ces dรฉboires fait le tour des rรฉdactions des vastes restes du monde, dont hilares, celles de la perfide Albion, une source peu suspecte de sympathie pour la Russie, Wikipedia, nous prรฉcise le 3 janvier que dรฉbut dรฉcembre, le nombre de dรฉsertions s’รฉlรจvaient dรฉjร  ร  1 883, dont 50 en France, soit 82% d’un effectif total de 2 300

    Comme nous le savions dรฉjร , le reliquat a รฉtรฉ engagรฉ dans le secteur de Pokrovsk, Rรฉpublique populaire de Donetsk, oรน il s’est fait รฉtriller. La guerre tue, surtout les vaincus, c’est un peu le principe. Mais un animateur de foire comme Emmanuel Macron est si peu รฉquipรฉ pour en saisir le sens ou les vertus.

    Le 17 fรฉvrier 2025, veille de lโ€™ouverture en Arabie Saoudite de nรฉgociations entre Russie et ร‰tats-Unis au sujet de lโ€™Ukraine, il accueille ร  Paris une rรฉunion impromptue de dirigeants europรฉens qui sโ€™opposent aux perspectives de paix favorisรฉes par la victoire de Donald Trump. Leur hostilitรฉ ร  la fin de la guerre atlantiste par procuration en Ukraine est dโ€™ailleurs la raison pour laquelle ces matamores europรฉens ne sont pas invitรฉs ร  participer aux nรฉgociations entre les deux grandes puissances. Les ร‰tats-uniens ont beau jeu de rappeler que France et Allemagne รฉtaient censรฉes garantir depuis 2014 le respect par l’Ukraine des accords de Minsk. La presse bleu horizon tรขche de vanter l’รฉvรฉnement, mais la rรฉalitรฉ est sordide

    Aussi peu performants en gรฉnรฉral ou populaires ร  domicile que Macron, le Britannique Keir Starmer et lโ€™Allemand Olaf Scholz sont les vedettes de la rรฉunion. Donald Tusk est aussi prรฉsent, mais la Pologne a dรฉjร  dรฉcidรฉ de ne pas engager son armรฉe en Ukraine. Dโ€™autres chefs dโ€˜ร‰tats et la bureaucrate teutonne Ursula von der Leyen complรจtent le tableau. Leur tactique immรฉdiate consiste ร  quรฉmander une participation europรฉenne aux nรฉgociations et pour lโ€™Ukraine, un accรจs ร  lโ€™OTAN que Washington refuse dรฉjร . Royaume-Uni et France clament leur volontรฉ de dรฉployer des troupes de maintien dโ€™un รฉventuel cessez-le-feu mais ne disposent plus en volume dโ€™armรฉes capables de mener une telle opรฉration.

    Le mรชme jour, le philosophe Harold Bernat publie un texte fort ร  propos, oรน il constate lโ€™effondrement [intellectel] sidรฉrant dโ€™une bourgeoisie dont Emmanuel Macron est le hรฉraut.

    Un autre exemple spectaculaire de ce syndrome est une femme, รฉgalement impliquรฉe dans les mรฉfaits de lโ€™Europe en Ukraine : la ministre allemande des affaires รฉtrangรจres Annalena Baerbock, qui a sidรฉrรฉ depuis 2022 par ses lacunes en gรฉomรฉtrie et gรฉographie. Toujours le 17 fรฉvrier, elle se montre incapable de garder un secret stratรฉgique et rรฉvรจle ร  la presse berlinoise le projet europรฉen dโ€™une nouvelle aide financiรจre apportรฉe ร  Volodymyr Zelenskyy et ses amis, pour un montant de 700 milliards dโ€™euros.

    Le 20 fรฉvrier, il se prรชte sur les rรฉseaux sociaux ร  une confรฉrence citoyenne au sujet de l’Ukraine. Son introduction est une farce, qui s’adresse ร  des demeurรฉs, qui n’auraient pas suivi l’actualitรฉ et ne comprendraient rien ร  la gรฉopolitique. Il commence par recyler tous les lieux communs de la propagande et dรฉsinformation atlantiste, les mensonges qui avec la nouvelle administration de Donald Trump, ont disparu dans la communication รฉtats-unienne

    Le flot de questions sur les nombreuses plateformes est รฉvidemment filtrรฉ par une รฉquipe d’assistants, qui ignorent celles qui posent vraiment problรจme. J’en retiens deux qui resteront sans rรฉponse, tout d’abord de Jacques [Baud, analyste stratรฉgique suisse] et Aude [Lancelin, journaliste franรงaise]

    Bonjour M Le Prรฉsident. Question de Jacques de Genรจve et Aude de Paris. Pourquoi les europรฉens ont ils empรชchรฉ le prรฉsident Zelensky, ร  3 reprises au printemps 22, de signer un accord avec la Russie garantissant lโ€™intรฉgritรฉ territoriale de lโ€™Ukraine ?

    puis la mienne

    Bonjour,

    votre stratรฉgie d’engagement militaire franรงais apparaรฎt confuse, vos dรฉclarations, contradictoires.

    La possibilitรฉ semble se dรฉgager du stationnement dans l’ouest du pays de militaires franรงais qui permettraient ร  l’Ukraine, par translation, d’en envoyer autant au front.

    Pensez vous que les Russes se dispenseront de mener des frappes stratรฉgiques contres les militaires franรงais stationnรฉs en Ukraine ?

    Pete Hegseth, Secrรฉtaire ร  la dรฉfense US, prรฉcisa dรฉjร  le 12 fรฉvrier qu’engagรฉes en Ukraine, les troupes europรฉennes ne seraient pas couvertes par l’article 5 de l’OTAN.

    Le 22 fรฉvrier, Donald Trump fait longuement patienter Andrzej Duda et ne lui accorde ensuite quโ€™une dizaine de minutes. Le prรฉsident polonais est le premier dโ€™un convoi de dirigeants europรฉens qui se prรฉcipitent ร  Washington pour tenter dโ€™inflรฉchir la stratรฉgie en Ukraine de la nouvelle administration US. Lorsquโ€™il sโ€™adressa aux Franรงais le 20, Emmanuel Macron se prรฉvalut dโ€™une familiaritรฉ qui devait lui permettre de faire la leรงon ร  son homologue รฉtats-unien, de le convaincre de ne pas se montrer faible ร  l’รฉgard de Vladimir Poutine

    Comme lโ€™illustrent ses traits tirรฉs par la fatique sur la photographie prise ร  la Maison Blanche le 24 fรฉvrier, il nโ€™obtient rien de Trump. Je suppose au contraire que ses fanfaronnades antรฉrieures, ses familiaritรฉs ร  Washington et les questions de fond exaspรจrent le prรฉsident US, trois jours avant qu’ร  son tour, le Britannique Keir Starmer ne se prรชte ร  l’exercice

    His name is Lecornu, Sรฉbastien Lecornu. Le 6 mars 2025, au lendemain de la confirmation de la suspension des รฉchanges du renseignement รฉtats-unien avec lโ€™Ukraine, le ministre des armรฉes annonce au micro de France Inter

    [โ€ฆ] on a des moyens de renseignement, dont nous faisons bรฉnรฉficier les Ukrainiens [โ€ฆ]

    Dans la foulรฉe de nouveaux mensonges et fanfaronnades tรฉlรฉvisuels dโ€™Emmanuel Macron, il cherche aussi ร  stimuler le sens civique de ses concitoyens

    [โ€ฆ] placez votre argent de maniรจre patriotique, pour financer la dรฉfense [โ€ฆ]

    On [qui est un con] pourrait aussi appeler cela la Banque de lโ€™Indochine, ouโ€ฆ les Emprunts russes. L’inspecteur Clouseau s’en va t’en guerre

    Pendant ce temps, le MEDEF (Mouvement des entreprises de France), qui ne perd pas le nord, la presse bleu horizon ou macroniste, distillent lโ€™idรฉe dโ€™une retraite ร  70 ans, qui serait justifiรฉe par lโ€™opportunitรฉ dโ€™un effort militaire en soutien ร  lโ€™Ukraine. Car en rรฉalitรฉ, la seule dรฉmarche stratรฉgique cohรฉrente de Macron est trรจs simple ; elle consiste ร  casser les acquis sociaux et imposer une sociรฉtรฉ ultra libรฉrale. Si personne ne peut vraiment le qualifier dโ€™homme intelligent, il est cependant malin comme un singe

    Il sait comment faire avaler des couleuvres. Son terrain est facile : il flatte la vanitรฉ nationale des Franรงais. Le philosophe allemand Arthur Schoppenhauer (1788-1860) รฉnonรงa avant 1851

    La fiertรฉ nationale est la forme la moins coรปteuse de fiertรฉ. Si un homme est fier de sa nation, cela signifie quโ€™il nโ€™a aucune qualitรฉ dont il puisse รชtre fier. Autrement, il ne pourrait pas faire appel ร  celles quโ€™il partage avec des millions de ses concitoyens. Lโ€™homme qui possรจde des qualitรฉs personnelles importantes ne verra que trop bien dans quels domaines sa propre nation est dรฉficiente, car ses dรฉfauts seront constamment sous ses yeux. Mais tout misรฉrable imbรฉcile qui nโ€™a rien dont il puisse รชtre fier, adopte en dernier recours la fiertรฉ de la nation ร  laquelle il appartient ; il est prรชt et heureux de dรฉfendre bec et ongles tous les dรฉfauts et les folies de la nation, se dรฉdommageant ainsi de sa propre infรฉrioritรฉ

    Les derniers รฉvรฉnements permettent de clarifier la subordination dโ€™Emmanuel Macron. Il nโ€™est pas fidรจle aux autoritรฉs lรฉgales des ร‰tats-Unis, puisquโ€™il sโ€™oppose ร  lโ€™administration de Donald Trump, qui accomplit une inflexion stratรฉgique majeure, quand Joe Biden et Europรฉens รฉtaient au diapason. Il sโ€™affirme plutรดt comme lโ€™hรฉriter dโ€™un Franรงois Hollande, qui alors Premier secrรฉtaire du Parti socialiste, protestait contre lโ€™opposition de Jacques Chirac ร  lโ€™invasion anglo-รฉtats-unienne de lโ€™Irak en 2003 et faisait des ronds de jambes ร  lโ€™ambassade parisienne de lโ€™administration de George W Bush.

    Il ne dรฉfend pas non plus les intรฉrรชts des Franรงais, puisquโ€™il a besoin de leur mentir de faรงon grotesque, quand il prรฉtend quโ€™aprรจs lโ€™Ukraine, la Russie pourrait attaquer dโ€™autres pays. Lโ€™idรฉe est farfelue, car une telle agressivitรฉ dรฉclencherait lโ€™article 5 de lโ€™OTAN. Leur ment quand il prรฉtend que la Russie nโ€™aurait pas respectรฉ les accords de Minsk, alors que cโ€™รฉtait รฉvidemment lโ€™Ukraine qui ne les a pas appliquรฉs et le mรชme Franรงois Hollande qui mentait, quand il prรฉtendait les garantir. Lui-mรชme et Angela Merkel reconnurent fin 2022 et dรฉbut 2023 que dans leur esprit, ces accords รฉtaient une escroquerie pour tromper la Russie, devaient donner ร  lโ€™OTAN le temps dโ€™armer lโ€™Ukraine. Non, Macron nโ€™est pas un aigle, mais mรชme lui ne peut croire de telles sornettes

    Alors de quoi est il le nom ? Comme le montre aussi sa politique intรฉrieure et ร  lโ€™instar du social-dรฉmocrate Keir Starmer comme de la droitarde Ursula von der Leyen, il apparaรฎt comme le soldat dโ€™une collusion puissante entre ploutocrates europรฉens et nรฉoconservateurs US, plus sournois quand ils appartiennent au Parti dรฉmocrate. Trump bouleverse des dรฉcennies de politique รฉtrangรจre des ร‰tats-Unis et Macron est le caniche de von der Leyen. Sa relation aux femmes plus รขgรฉes est compliquรฉe.

    Le 23 avril 2025, les divas europรฉennes sabotent les nรฉgociations de paix en Ukraine. Ce jour lร  ร  Londres, une rรฉunion est prรฉvue entre pays occidentaux. Mais au dernier moment, Volodymyr Zelenskyy prรฉvient par voie de presse quโ€™il refuse dโ€™accepter la perte de la Crimรฉe, pourtant un moindre mal, vu la situation militaire. Par consรฉquent, le Secrรฉtaire dโ€™ร‰tat Marco Rubio se dรฉcommande, ce qui annule aussi la participation des ministres europรฉens des affaires รฉtrangรจres.

    Quel รขme damnรฉe a bien pu inspirer le comรฉdien ukrainien ? Alors en visite ร  Madagascar, dans la foulรฉe de la colonie de Mayotte, le porte parole dโ€™Ursula von der Leyen le fait savoir dans la journรฉe par lโ€™ร‰lysรฉe

    Lโ€™intรฉgritรฉ territoriale et la vocation europรฉenne de lโ€™Ukraine sont des exigences trรจs fortes des Europรฉens

    Alors que son Envoyรฉ spรฉcial Keith Kellogg se rendra ร  Moscou dans la semaine, Donald Trump รฉcrit sur les rรฉseaux sociaux

    [โ€ฆ] La situation de lโ€™Ukraine est dรฉsastreuse. Il [Zelenskyy] peut obtenir la paix ou se battre pendant trois ans de plus, avant de perdre tout le pays [โ€ฆ]

    Difficile de mieux rรฉsumer la situation militaire, qui par tradition bien ancrรฉe dans une guerre, dicte le sens des nรฉgociations de paix. Son opposition dogmatique ร  la paix et son incapacitรฉ ร  accepter la rรฉalitรฉ du terrain illustrent ร  quel point la corrompue Union europรฉenne nโ€™est plus aujourdโ€™hui que lโ€™automate des illuminรฉs de lโ€™ร‰tat profond nรฉoconservateur US. Je suis trรจs optimiste car convaincu qu’elle le paiera cher.

    Emmanuel Macron subit ร  nouveau une spectaculaire humiliation diplomatique au cours du weekend des 10 et 11 mai 2025. Ses partenaires lโ€™ont dรฉjร  adoubรฉ hรฉraut de lโ€™Europe, alors quโ€™ร  dรฉfaut de lโ€™estomac nรฉcessaire pour mener ร  terme ses projets pacifiques en Ukraine, Donald Trump se dรฉsintรฉresse dรฉsormais du sujet. En consรฉquence, la Russie envisage la possibilitรฉ dโ€™adapter sa stratรฉgie, de rรฉsoudre le conflit en moins de deux mois, par une campagne dรฉcisive de frappes qui liquiderait les dirigeants ukrainiens et dรฉtruirait en totalitรฉ les infrastructures critiques de lโ€™Ukraine

    Volodymyr Zelenskyy et les Europรฉens commencent par proposer un cessez le feu dโ€™un mois ร  compter du 12 mai. Donald Trump soutient lโ€™idรฉe et voilร  que sa Vacuitรฉ explose en plein vol, exige le respect de ce cessez-le-feu par la Russie, quโ€™il menace ร  dรฉfaut de nouvelles sanctions รฉconomiques. Effets indรฉsirables, peut รชtre, de l’abus de substances pyschotropes. Son obsession est toujours dโ€™employer un tel cessez-le-feu ร  injecter en Ukraine des troupes franรงaises et britanniques

    Aprรจs minuit, le 11 mai, ร  lโ€™issue dโ€™une trรชve unilatรฉrale russe de trois jours, en mรฉmoire de la victoire soviรฉtique, 80 ans plus tรดt, sur les armรฉes fascistes europรฉennes, Vladimir Poutine mรฉprise avec calme lโ€™ultimatum de lโ€™arrogant Franรงais. Il propose la reprise ร  Istanbul, le 15 mai, des nรฉgociations de paix qui avaient bien commencรฉ en mars 2022, mais que le Royaume-Uni et les ร‰tats-Unis de Joe Biden sabotรจrent, pour poursuivre contre la Russie une guerre par procuration aujourdโ€™hui perdue. Donald Trump lui apporte son soutien dans la journรฉe. Volodymyr Zelenskyy accepte aussi et peut รชtre encore en altitude, รฉcrit sur les rรฉseaux sociaux qu’il pense rencontrer personnellement Vladimir Poutine ร  Istanbul.

    Lโ€™anecdote illustre mon analyse supra de la subordination dโ€™Emmanuel Macron. Aprรจs la rรฉception ร  lโ€™ร‰lysรฉe le 7 mai du djihadiste Abou Mohammed al Joulani, dictateur dโ€™une Syrie dรฉsormais saignรฉe par les persรฉcutions religieuses, Jean-Noรซl Barrot, erreur de casting au ministรจre des affaires รฉtrangรจres, est le 15 ร  Istanbul, oรน il prรฉsente ses ronds de jambe ร  la plus grotesque figure nรฉoconservatrice, lโ€™immonde sรฉnateur sudiste rรฉpublicain Lindsey Graham

    Sur le fond, la Russie ignore les gesticulations franรงaises et europรฉennes. Dans la mรชme ville, le lendemain, ses plรฉnipotentiaires prรฉsentent ร  une dรฉlรฉgation ukrainienne leurs conditions pour un cessez-le-feu : le retrait des troupes atlantistes des positions quโ€™elles occupent encore dans les rรฉgions de Donetsk, Kherson, Lugansk et Zaporojie

    Heureusement, pour notre dรฉtente, Emmanuel Macron et ses pรฉrรฉgrinations internationales, comme le 25 mai 2025 ร  Hanoรฏ, sont aussi une source inรฉpuisable de plaisanteries.

    Savamment synchronisรฉs, ร  deux jours dโ€™intervalle, le chef dโ€™รฉtat-major Thierry Burkhard puis Emmanuel Macron, le 13 juillet, se succรจdent ร  la tribune pour galvaniser les crรฉtins qui sโ€™appellent eux-mรชmes patriotes

    Prรฉserver un modรจle social hรฉritรฉ du Conseil national de la rรฉsistance (CNR) au lendemain de la 2de guerre mondiale ou doubler* le budget militaire, Macron a choisi, car il veut รชtre craint. Mission dรฉlicate, car depuis huit ans, il passe pour un imbรฉcile auprรจs de ses homologues รฉtrangers. Parmi ses soutiens, le mignon Gabriel Attal veut tenir son rang

    Face aux menaces, les plus pressantes sans doute depuis 1945, la France doit impรฉrativement continuer son rรฉarmement. Pour tenir son rang, รชtre respectรฉ, et protรฉger nos intรฉrรชts vitaux [en Franรงafrique]

    Maintenant la bonne nouvelle : puisquโ€™ils ont choisi lโ€™affrontement, je prรฉdis que les pinzuti [Franรงais] se feront quand mรชme humilier. Car aucun sacrifice social ne suffira ร  empรชcher lโ€™effondrement de lโ€™hรฉgรฉmonie occidentale. Pas plus que furent victorieuses les guerres anachroniques pour prรฉserver lโ€™empire colonial.

    * lโ€™objectif est de doubler par rapport ร  2017 et avant la fin de son second mandat, un budget militaire en constante augmentation. Il est de โ‚ฌ50,5 milliards en 2025, devrait รชtre de โ‚ฌ63,4 milliards en 2027

    Malheureux concours de circonstances ou bien schizophrรฉnie franรงaise et perversion dโ€™Emmanuel Macron ? Le 15 juillet, le premier ministre Franรงois Bayrou dรฉvoile les grandes lignes du budget 2026 dโ€™une France en redressement judiciaire, aprรจs 18 ans de gouvernement atlantiste. Cette actualitรฉ nationale est riche dโ€™enseignements et dans un article quโ€™il publie le 17 juillet, Emmanuel Todd est contraint de recourir ร  la psychiatrie pour comprendre les effets de bord du dรฉclin occidental et franรงais. La conclusion sโ€™impose : la Russie est la cible des fantasmes รฉrotomanes dโ€™Emmanuel Macron et ses laquais.

    Le prix Nobel de la paix est la derniรจre obsession de Donald Trump, qui le 18 aoรปt 2025, trois jours aprรจs sa rencontre avec Vladimir Poutine ร  Anchorage, accueille Volodymyr Zelenskyy et un quarteron de dirigeants europรฉens ร  la Maison Blanche. La chorรฉgraphie de la rรฉunion des laquais de daddy Trump est un travail psychologique, une catharsis, pour que lโ€™Occident reconnaisse enfin sa dรฉfaite dans le Donbass et en Ukraine

    Encore traumatisรฉ par son humiliation ร  Washington, Emmanuel Macron accorde le lendemain un entretien aux journalistes de LCI. Lors de cette nouvelle envolรฉe lyrique, il dรฉclare

    Ne soyons pas naรฏfs. Y compris pour sa propre survie, il [la Russie oรน Vladimir Poutine ?] a besoin de continuer de manger. C’est un prรฉdateur, un ogre ร  nos portes

    illustre le diagnostic antรฉrieur d’Emmanuel Todd. Le prรฉsident franรงais souffre d’รฉrotomanie.

    La sรปretรฉ de lโ€™ร‰tat franรงais a cessรฉ depuis longtemps de mโ€™intรฉresser et au contraire, je suis mรชme rรฉputรฉ lui porter atteinte. Dโ€™autres sont entrรฉs dans la carriรจre, dit la chanson, essuient aujourdโ€™hui un รฉchec cruel. Ce qui arrive mรชme aux meilleurs. Mais ce sont les Alliรฉs qui ne sont pas contents. La France aura beau nier, eux savent que les donnรฉes sont authentiques.

    Membres du groupe Killnet (cf. David Piguet), des as russes de lโ€™informatique sont parvenus ร  recueillir auprรจs de lโ€™administration franรงaise des informations sensibles : les procรจs-verbaux et autres documents de rรฉunions secrรจtes au sujet de lโ€™Ukraine entre France, Pologne, Roumanie et Royaume-Uni. Dont une carte datรฉe du 28 avril 2025, destinรฉe ร  lโ€™รฉtat-major des armรฉes franรงaises, qui est rendue publique sur le web le 9 septembre.

    En marge du document que chacun peut consulter, les pirates ont rรฉalisรฉ une synthรจse du projet de la Coalition de volontaires, si cher ร  Emmanuel Macron. Aux Russes, lโ€™intรฉgralitรฉ du Donbass, ainsi que les rรฉgions de Kherson et Zaporojie, jusquโ€™ร  la ligne de cessez-le-feu ; aux Franรงais, les ressources minรฉrales de Jytomir, Kharkov et Soumy ; aux Polonais et Roumains, Odessa et les rรฉgions frontaliรจres ; les Britanniques se contenteraient de plateformes logistiques un peu partout ; 50 000 hommes pour emballer le butin occidental

    Mais la Russie a dit et rรฉpรจte jusquโ€™ร  ce jour quโ€™elle ne tolรฉrera pas de troupes de lโ€™OTAN sur le territoire de lโ€™actuelle Ukraine. Notez que depuis le 31 aoรปt, Thierry Burkhard nโ€™est plus Chef dโ€™รฉtat-major.

    Dans un entretien que le journal italien de gauche Il Fatto Quotidiano publie le 13 septembre, le prestigieux รฉconomiste Jeffrey Sachs rรฉvรจle une conversation personnelle avec Emmanuel Macron. ร€ lโ€™รฉpoque oรน le professeur de lโ€™universitรฉ Columbia fut fait chevalier de la Lรฉgion dโ€™honneur, ce qui nous ramรจne en mai 2022, trois mois aprรจs le dรฉbut de lโ€™opรฉration militaire spรฉciale russe, le prรฉsident franรงais lui expliqua que lโ€™OTAN portait lโ€™entiรจre culpabilitรฉ du conflit. Cette information confirme, dans tous les cas de figure, que sa Vacuitรฉ ment comme un arracheur de dent

    ร€ New York le 24 septembre 2025, ร  lโ€™instar de son grand ami [cโ€™est Emmanuel Macron qui le dit] Javier Milei, catastrophe nรฉo-libรฉrale pour lโ€™รฉconomie de lโ€™Argentine et son peuple, sa Vacuitรฉ est reconnue employรฉ de lโ€™annรฉe par lโ€™Atlantic Council, un think tank militariste dont la mission est de dรฉfendre les intรฉrรชts de lโ€™empire รฉtats-unien.

    Il ne tarde pas ร  mettre en scรจne une nouvelle farce, car son psychisme est trop faible pour parvenir ร  accepter sa dรฉfaite au Donbass et en Ukraine. De dรฉpit le 2 octobre, il compense par une nouvelle envolรฉe lyrique au Sommet de la Communautรฉ politique europรฉenne (EPC) de Copenhague. Lโ€™Europe est alors en proie ร  une รฉpidรฉmie dโ€™hystรฉrie collective, voit des drones partout. Qui dโ€™autre que des Russes pourraient les piloter ?

    La bulle mรฉdiatique contient surtout paranoรฏa et dรฉsinformation, car la presse bleu horizon est incapable dโ€™envisager lโ€™hypothรจse la plus probable de plaisantins locaux, aux commandes de quelques inoffensifs aรฉronefs. Au contraire, les mรชmes pressetituรฉs colportent une fable ukrainienne particuliรจrement farfelue : les drones seraient lancรฉs par la flotte dite fantรดme, des navires armรฉs par les vastes restes du monde, qui transportent du pรฉtrole russe et nโ€™ont pas le goรปt ou lโ€™envie de se soumettre aux sanctions administratives occidentales

    Sa Vacuitรฉ est incapable de limiter ses gesticulations ร  la scรจne danoise et alors que le Droit garantit pourtant le libre passage dans les eaux internationales, il dรฉcide ร  47 ans de se lancer dans la piraterie maritime

    Ses officiers sont chinois et chargรฉ de pรฉtrole russe, le navire bรฉninois vogue paisiblement vers lโ€™Inde, quand le 27 septembre, les corsaires franรงais montent ร  lโ€™abordage du Boracay dans les eaux internationales. Mais vaine recherche et choux blanc, pas le moindre indice nโ€™รฉtaye les accusations ukrainiennes de lancement de drones en Scandinavie. Bien quโ€™aux ordres de l’exรฉcutif, le parquet franรงais est contraint au soir du 2 octobre de laisser le pรฉtrolier lever lโ€™ancre. Illustration de la mesquinerie atavique des pinzuti, la convocation du commandant ร  comparaรฎtre le 23 fรฉvrier 2026 ร  Brest pour refus d’obtempรฉrer, quand la piraterie et leurs pitreries en treillis obligeraient plutรดt les autoritรฉs ร  prรฉsenter de plates excuses

    Huit jours aprรจs que des corsaires franรงais soient montรฉs ร  lโ€™abordage du pรฉtrolier fantรดme bรฉninois Boracay, le nouveau ministre de la contre-menace-prรฉdatrice-et-existentielle [Macron], Bruno Le Maire, est enfin prรชt le 5 octobre 2025 ร  provoquer l’effondrement [Le Maire] de lโ€™armรฉe Russe, ร  la dilater comme jamais [Le Maire]

    Le lendemain, les vastes restes du monde ont tort de ricaner, car la Russie tremble. Vladimir Poutine a bien compris que l’implosion de l’รฉphรฉmรจre gouvernement Lecornu est une ruse de guerre.

    Vous nโ€™aimez pas votre travail ? Essayez de vous mettre ร  la place des pauvres garรงons, le 17 novembre 2025, qui font les jardiniรจres sur la base aรฉrienne de Villacoublay, pendant quโ€™au premier plan, deux divas posent pour Gala

    On me dit ร  lโ€™oreillette que Volodymyr Zelenskyy sโ€™engage ร  acheter 100 chasseurs Rafale. Avec quel argent ? Avant ou aprรจs dรฉtournement par son รฉquipe ? Pour en faire quoi et surtout, quand ?

    Emmanuel Macron figure parmi les dirigeants europรฉens qui dรฉfilent ร  Berlin le 15 dรฉcembre, mettent en scรจne leur vacuitรฉ pour geindre et quรฉmander encore une fois auprรจs des ร‰tats-Unis. Ils semblent ignorer que le rรฉsultat dโ€™une guerre se dรฉcide sur le champ de bataille. Le Donbass sera libรฉrรฉ par la diplomatie ou par la force, que cela leur plaise ou pas. Le mรชme jour, le Conseil de lโ€™Europe impose des sanctions ร  plusieurs personnes, dont lโ€™expert suisse Jacques Baud, qui selon le communiquรฉ

    sert de porte-parole ร  la propagande pro-russe et propage des thรฉories du complot

    Lโ€™accusation est dรฉlirante. Jacques Baud a รฉtรฉ colonel du renseignement suisse, spรฉcialiste de lโ€™Europe de lโ€™Est. Entre 2009 et 2011, il dirigeait ร  New York lโ€™รฉquipe Politiques et Doctrine du Bureau des affaires militaires du Dรฉpartement des opรฉrations de maintien de la paix des Nations Unies. Ce fut dans le cadre de lโ€™OTAN quโ€™il participa ร  des programmes en Ukraine en 2014 et 2017. Sa rigueur et son travail dโ€™analyse sont considรฉrables

    Alors pourquoi cette punition administrative ? Dรจs la fin 2022, ร  lโ€™instar de votre serviteur et beaucoup dโ€™autres, lโ€™expert รฉnonรงa la rรฉalitรฉ : lโ€™Occident subit une dรฉfaite humiliante au Donbass et en Ukraine. Washington lโ€™a aussi compris. Elle semble sโ€™imposer aujourdโ€™hui ร  des foules, puisquโ€™ร  croire lโ€™immense majoritรฉ hystรฉrique des employรฉs de presse franรงaise, les chars russes se rapprochent dangereusement de la place de lโ€™ร‰toile

    Radio Free Europe, un organe de la CIA, dรฉvoila dรจs le 10 dรฉcembre sa sanction et lโ€™intรฉressรฉ put la commenter. En lโ€™apprenant, il mโ€™a bien semblรฉ sentir une odeur fรฉtide, un peu comme lโ€™haleine dโ€™un Philippe Henriot (1889-1944), Secrรฉtaire ร  lโ€™information et ร  la propagande de lโ€™ร‰tat franรงais, une grande voix franรงaise que des rรฉsistants communistes arrachรจrent ร  lโ€™affection des siens. Il porte ร  Bruxelles sa tรชte habituelle de dรฉtraquรฉ, quand Jean-Noรซl Barrot confirme que ces sanctions sont prises ร  lโ€™initiative de la France

    Je crois le ministre des affaires รฉtrangรจres assez crรฉtin pour exercer des reprรฉsailles par dรฉpit de sa dรฉfaite par procuration au Donbass et en Ukraine. Car sa punition amplifiera le succรจs des excellentes analyses de Jacques Baud

    Si lโ€™objectif est plutรดt de dissuader la rรฉsistance ร  la dรฉsinformation occidentale, alors je crains pour eux que les Franรงais nโ€™aient fait comme souvent une projection de leurs propres carences. Chaque jour qui passe, leur gouvernement alimente de vilains prรฉjugรฉs ร  leur sujet : froussards, mesquins, lรขches, incompรฉtents et arrogants

    Cโ€™รฉtait avec grand plaisir que je me suis entretenu avec une journaliste russe, pour un documentaire que la chaรฎne Russia Today, censurรฉe en Europe mais largement regardรฉe aux ร‰tats-Unis, en Afrique ou en Chine, diffuse le 19 dรฉcembre.

    Les premiers jours de 2026 รฉclairent dโ€™une lumiรจre crue la fonction politique de lโ€™employรฉ de banque Macron et par consรฉquent, sa posture au sujet de lโ€™Ukraine. Grouillot de ploutocrates europรฉens et nรฉoconservateurs รฉtats-uniens, il sโ€™illustre comme le plus inconditionnel soutien europรฉen du raid que les porte-flingues de Donald Trump exรฉcutent au Venezuela au petit matin du 3 janvier

    De lโ€™aveu mรชme du prรฉsident des ร‰tats-Unis, son objectif est colonial, pour le pรฉtrole et le bien dโ€™un empire nรฉolibรฉral dotรฉ de deux capitales : Jรฉrusalem et Washington

    Non content dโ€™avoir fait ricaner la terre entiรจre avec ses lunettes de soleil au Forum รฉconomique mondial de Davos le 20 janvier, Emmanuel Macron poursuit ses facรฉties et pour prouver sa virilitรฉ le 22, envoie les corsaires de la Marine nationale ร  lโ€™abordage en toute illรฉgalitรฉ en mรฉditerranรฉe du pรฉtrolier comorien Grinch, un parmi les quelques centaines de trรจs sournois navires de la vilaine flotte fantรดme russe.

    Sa Vacuitรฉ, vous dis je, faiseur de vent de la catรฉgorie des tempรชtes du grand large. Contrairement ร  ce quโ€™assรจnent les posts brouillons et vindicatifs du compte French Response sur X, organe burlesque du quai dโ€™Orsay, rien ne peut justifier la rรฉtention du pรฉtrolier comorien Grinch. Les sanctions occidentales ne sont pas de Droit international ou maritime. Aucune infraction pรฉnale franรงaise nโ€™a รฉtรฉ constatรฉe et finalement, aucune information judiciaire nโ€™est ouverte. Mรชme le parquet, corps de magistrats chargรฉs dโ€™initier les poursuites pรฉnales et qui en France, sont des laquais du pouvoir exรฉcutif, est frappรฉ de confusion mentale quand il รฉvoque briรจvement une immobilisation administrative. Rien ne va dans cette opรฉration publicitaire de piraterie, une ratatouille juridique oรน un chef dโ€™ร‰tat puรฉril sโ€™affranchit du Droit national et international

    Abus de substances psychotropes ? Revenu dans le monde rรฉel le 29 janvier, Emmanuel Macron sโ€™entretient au tรฉlรฉphone avec Volodymyr Zelenskyy et piteux, se plaint du Droit franรงais, qui lโ€™oblige ร  relรขcher le navire et son รฉquipage indien – il est temps de sโ€™en apercevoir. Ces paroles sont rapportรฉes le lendemain par le journal en ligne ukrainien European Pravda, qui nous apprend aussi que puisquโ€™il a violรฉ la loi, le fanfaron sโ€™engage auprรจs de son homologue kievien ร  la faire changer sine die. C’est une autre rรฉforme juridique que l’Europe attend depuis longtemps en France : la sรฉparation du parquet et du pouvoir exรฉcutif

    Beaucoup de talent chez le dessinateur franรงais qui le 13 fรฉvrier, sait croquer avec tant de prรฉcision la personnalitรฉ de Jean-Noรซl Barrot, ministre des affaires รฉtrangรจres de la Macronie.

    Ce sont probablement des agents implantรฉs en Ukraine qui ont informรฉ le SVR. Lโ€™agence russe de renseignement extรฉrieur dรฉvoile lโ€™affaire le 24 fรฉvrier 2026, quatriรจme anniversaire du dรฉclenchement de lโ€™opรฉration militaire spรฉciale au Donbass et en Ukraine. Dans le contexte de la dรฉfaite militaire gรฉnรฉrale des troupes atlantistes, la France et le Royaume-Uni projettent de doter en secret lโ€™Ukraine de lโ€™arme nuclรฉaire

    Une solution technique envisagรฉe est le transfert de tรชtes franรงaises TN75, que portent les missiles balistiques intercontinentaux en cours de remplacement M51.1. Chacune dรฉlivre une petite charge de 110 kt รฉquivalents de TNT, soit 7,5 Hiroshima. Le vice consiste ร  faire croire que lโ€™arme nuclรฉaire ukrainienne serait le rรฉsultat dโ€™un dรฉveloppement national. Le communiquรฉ russe prรฉcise que sollicitรฉe, lโ€™Allemagne a dรฉclinรฉ lโ€™offre de se joindre ร  lโ€™affaire.

    Vice-prรฉsident du Conseil de sรฉcuritรฉ de Russie, Dmitri Medvedev รฉclaire ensuite le public sur les raisons stratรฉgiques de cette rรฉvรฉlation. Elle est un avertissement ; en cas de transfert effectif du matรฉriel, la Russie lancerait pour le moins des frappes nuclรฉaires tactiques sur les sites ukrainiens de destination.

    Le projet secret europรฉen est non seulement une violation du traitรฉ de non-prolifรฉration, mais aussi une folie stratรฉgique qui risque de dรฉgรฉnรฉrer en confrontation nuclรฉaire. Le fanatisme affichรฉ depuis quatre ans par les dirigeants europรฉens, les personnalitรฉs retorses et dรฉsรฉquilibrรฉes dโ€™un Emmanuel Macron ou dโ€™un Volodymyr Zelenskyy ne laissent guรจre de doute sur lโ€™authenticitรฉ des informations que le SVR a exploitรฉes

    Dans un article que RTL publie le 8 mai 2026, Georges Malbrunot confirme de sources franรงaises ce quโ€™affirment depuis longtemps les autoritรฉs du Mali : dans une tentative de restaurer son emprise nรฉocoloniale au Sahel et pour nuire du mรชme coup ร  la Russie, la France collabore avec lโ€™Ukraine dans leur soutien de groupes djihadistes.

    Sous quelque prรฉtexte que ce soit, sa Vacuitรฉ poursuit son projet maniaque dโ€™injecter des troupes franรงaises en Ukraine. Le 24 juin, le quotidien numรฉrique Intelligence Online rรฉvรจle que sous couvert de formation, des militaires du rรฉgiment de cyberdรฉfense de Saint Jacques de la Lande y opรจrent avec la Sรปretรฉ dโ€™ร‰tat ukrainienne (SBU)

    La Russie a toujours averti quโ€™elle ne tolรจre pas de troupes occidentales en Ukraine. Ne sera pas virtuel, le missile balistique Iskander que ces cyberguerriers risquent de recevoir sur la tรชte.

    Les autoritรฉs franรงaises nient, mentent รฉvidemment. Comme dans le cas du soutien franco-ukrainien de groupes djihadistes au Sahel, cette implication aurait du rester secrรจte

    Cette belle photographie date du 10 juillet. Elle est ensuite partagรฉe par Lostarmour, un site russe qui documente les vรฉhicules atlantistes dรฉtruits ou capturรฉs. Au cours de leur progression, les combattants russes ont atteint cette รฉpave de canon automoteur franรงais CAESAR.

    Comme ร  son habitude, en guise de parade politicienne ร  une augmentation des prix du carburant causรฉe par les conflits dans le Golfe et en Ukraine -oรน il refuse toujours de reconnaรฎtre son humiliante dรฉfaite par procuration– Emmanuel Macron fait de la fumรฉe

    Convoquรฉs en grande pompe le 18 septembre 2026, des reprรฉsentants de partis politiques se font prรฉsenter ร  l’ร‰lysรฉe un รฉtat de la menace, le leurre dโ€™une prรฉtendue guerre hybride russe en Europe. Comme nous le savons dรฉjร , les agences occidentales dites de renseignement nโ€™en font plus guรจre et sont plutรดt payรฉes pour servir la communication dโ€™รฉphรฉmรจres gouvernements dโ€™incompรฉtents.

    Bien plus intรฉressant, les autoritรฉs avouent ce que nous avions dรฉjร  compris

    Les Forces armรฉes franรงaises ont menรฉ des ripostes militaires conventionnelles non rendues publiques contre la Russie ร  la suite d’attaques hybrides [Le Monde]

    Lโ€™engagement direct des coqs gaulois dans des opรฉrations offensives injustifiรฉes contre la Russie rend sans doute leur dรฉfaite plus amรจre encore. Pour sa part, le Royaume Uni a commencรฉ depuis dรฉcembre 2025 ร  rendre publiques des pertes.

    in Lโ€™engagement franรงais dans les rangs ukrainiens

    chronique alphabรฉtique et nรฉcrologique de lโ€™engagement franรงais dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas

    Articles connexes

    The Atlanticist defeat in Donbass and Ukraine

    en Anglais, chronicle of a new catastrophic NATO venture

    Nazism in Ukraine

    chronique en Anglais, its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine

    The footprint of the Ukrainian Nazism in the West

    chronique en Anglais, interactions between Ukrainian Nazi organizations and Western supremacist militants

    The Western disinformation about Ukraine

    chronique en Anglais, censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia

    14 novembre 2026 : Tombรฉs pour lโ€™Allemagne et lโ€™OTAN

    la liste non exhaustive mais certifiรฉe des Franรงais tuรฉs dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine

    29 octobre 2026 : ร€ propos de lโ€™attaque terroriste raciste dans les Yvelines

    son inspiration : racisme franรงais atavique et dรฉsir jusquโ€™en Ukraine de rรฉprimer la contestation sociale en France

    5 aoรปt 2026 : Ylian Fort ยซ chique ยป comme le dernier des voleurs ร  la tire

    le volontaire franรงais dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine souffre de ne pas parvenir ร  assumer son idรฉologie fasciste

    1er aoรปt 2026 : Censure de la journaliste pacifiste Xenia Fedorova

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    18 mai 2026 : Prรจs dโ€™une trentaine de Franรงais sont dรฉsormais rรฉunis dans le bataillon nazi ukrainien ยซ Revansh ยป

    de quoi faire trembler le microcosme politico-mรฉdiatique parisien

    11 mai 2026 : Ma rรฉponse au Canard enchaรฎnรฉ

    qui pleure les jeunes franรงais tuรฉs dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine et nโ€™aime pas mon travail

    25 avril 2026 : De Philippe Pรฉtain ร  Quentin Deranque

    une saga franรงaise, entre Ukraine et Lyon, oรน apparaissent aussi des morceaux de SS de la division Charlemagne et plus rรฉcemment, Alice Kerviel, dite Cordier. L’affaire Deranque rรฉvรจle comme la France est infectรฉe par le pรฉtainisme, en particulier parmi les soutiens d’Israรซl ou de l’Ukraine, deux thรฉรขtres d’opรฉrations oรน l’Occident tente de ralentir son dรฉclin

    20 janvier 2026 : En Ukraine, des nรฉonazis et ex-militaires franรงais sโ€™engagent pour se battre contre la Russie โ€“ Sรฉbastien Bourdon, Street Press

    En 2025, une nouvelle unitรฉ de Franรงais combattant pour lโ€™Ukraine sโ€™est structurรฉe autour dโ€™un noyau de nรฉonazis, ayant pour objectif dโ€™attirer des recrues. Parmi ces volontaires, dโ€™anciens militaires. StreetPress les a identifiรฉs

    20 janvier 2026 : En Ukraine, les Franรงais des deux camps sโ€™affrontent sur fond dโ€™imaginaire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale โ€“ Sรฉbastien Bourdon, Street Press

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    15 novembre 2025 : ยซ Gardez votre confiance en la France รฉternelle ยป

    deux jours aprรจs le 10e anniversaire de la dรฉbรขcle politique et sรฉcuritaire du 13 novembre 2015, une messe cรฉlรจbre ร  Verdun lโ€™ancien dirigeant fasciste de lโ€™ร‰tat franรงais

    11 novembre 2025 : Der Krieg

    ce 11 novembre 2025 est lโ€™occasion de souligner comme la faรงon dont lโ€™Europe sacrifie les conscrits ukrainiens mobilisรฉs de force rappelle le spectaculaire carnage de la 1รจre guerre mondiale

    2 aoรปt 2025 : Russophrenia: the Westโ€™s favourite delusion about Russia โ€“ Brian McDonald

    Ten years after I coined the term, the mediaโ€™s still convinced Russia is both collapsing, and conquering the world

    9 mai 2025 : Victory Day

    10 avril 2024 : Message de lโ€™ataman Nikolaรฏ Diakonov ร  Emmanuel Macron et ses mignons

    cโ€™est par lโ€™agence cosaque de presse PIKA, depuis la Rรฉpublique populaire de Lougansk, que le 2 avril 2024, lโ€™ataman Nikolaรฏ Diakonov lance un message ร  destination de la France

    5 janvier 2024 : Ukraine : des combattants franรงais dans le viseur des renseignements โ€“ Cรฉcile Deffontaines, Lโ€™Obs

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    25 octobre 2023 : Cรฉsar et Paul, nรฉonazis mondains โ€“ Christophe-Cรฉcil Garnier, StreetPress

    oรน nous apprenons que le nazi franรงais Allan Duchรฉzeau, camarade de Cรฉsar Aujard dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, รฉtait surnommรฉ Dox, quand il secondait ร  Paris le leader nazi Marc de Cacqueray Valmรฉnier

    21 juillet 2023 : Les oeils de Moscou

    le magazine lโ€™Express est un exemple cocasse des tendances fascistes de la dรฉmocratie libรฉrale occidentale

    19 juin 2023 : David Piguet, un commissaire aux questions russes

    son rรฉvisionnisme, en dรฉtails

    30 mai 2023 : Fils de Pรฉtain

    la vanitรฉ nationale trouble la perception de la rรฉalitรฉ historique et perpรฉtue une nรฉvrose collective

    14 mai 2023 : Pauvre Sacrรฉ Charlemagne

    la mythologie europรฉiste

    7 fรฉvrier 2023 : Thousands NATO soldiers have already been killed in Donbass and Ukraine

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    31 janvier 2023 : the European fascist armies lose WW2

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    21 septembre 2022 : The Western operatives in Mariupol

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  • Lโ€™engagement franรงais dans les rangsย ukrainiens

    • Laffitte, Sylvain, dit Skahl,

    devint parachutiste de lโ€™armรฉe franรงaise en 2013, probablement au 3e RPIMa (rรฉgiment parachutiste dโ€™infanterie de marine) de Carcassonne. Il fit en 2015 une rotation au Mali

    Peut รชtre pour des raisons affectives, le Lot-et-Garonnais commenรงa ร  sโ€™intรฉresser ร  lโ€™Ukraine en 2017. En 2021, il frรฉquentait ร  Kiev des sociรฉtรฉs privรฉs de sรปretรฉ

    En 2023, il entraรฎnait des policiers et militaires ukrainiens ร  Kharkov et Soumy. De lโ€™instruction combat & medic ร  la pratique, a t il sautรฉ le pas, un peu tiraillรฉ aussi ? Possible en 2024, en compagnie par exemple du mercenaire รฉcossais Lewis Donaldson

    Publiรฉ le 27 fรฉvrier 2026, un article du Figaro nous confirme qu’il est bien devenu combattant

    Son bataillon de Lรฉgion internationale, le 3e, a รฉtรฉ dissous fin dรฉcembre et quand il rencontre la journaliste, Sylvain Laffitte ronge son frein dans la rรฉgion de Dnipro, oรน il attend sa rรฉaffectation dans l’armรฉe rรฉguliรจre ukrainienne.

    in Lโ€™engagement franรงais dans les rangs ukrainiens

    chronique alphabรฉtique et nรฉcrologique de lโ€™engagement franรงais dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas

    Articles connexes

    The Atlanticist defeat in Donbass and Ukraine

    en Anglais, chronicle of a new catastrophic NATO venture

    Nazism in Ukraine

    chronique en Anglais, its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine

    The footprint of the Ukrainian Nazism in the West

    chronique en Anglais, interactions between Ukrainian Nazi organizations and Western supremacist militants

    The Western disinformation about Ukraine

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    14 novembre 2026 : Tombรฉs pour lโ€™Allemagne et lโ€™OTAN

    la liste non exhaustive mais certifiรฉe des Franรงais tuรฉs dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine

    29 octobre 2026 : ร€ propos de lโ€™attaque terroriste raciste dans les Yvelines

    son inspiration : racisme franรงais atavique et dรฉsir jusquโ€™en Ukraine de rรฉprimer la contestation sociale en France

    5 aoรปt 2026 : Ylian Fort ยซ chique ยป comme le dernier des voleurs ร  la tire

    le volontaire franรงais dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine souffre de ne pas parvenir ร  assumer son idรฉologie fasciste

    1er aoรปt 2026 : Censure de la journaliste pacifiste Xenia Fedorova

    loi visant ร  prรฉvenir les ingรฉrences รฉtrangรจres en France

    18 mai 2026 : Prรจs dโ€™une trentaine de Franรงais sont dรฉsormais rรฉunis dans le bataillon nazi ukrainien ยซ Revansh ยป

    de quoi faire trembler le microcosme politico-mรฉdiatique parisien

    11 mai 2026 : Ma rรฉponse au Canard enchaรฎnรฉ

    qui pleure les jeunes franรงais tuรฉs dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine et nโ€™aime pas mon travail

    25 avril 2026 : De Philippe Pรฉtain ร  Quentin Deranque

    une saga franรงaise, entre Ukraine et Lyon, oรน apparaissent aussi des morceaux de SS de la division Charlemagne et plus rรฉcemment, Alice Kerviel, dite Cordier. L’affaire Deranque rรฉvรจle comme la France est infectรฉe par le pรฉtainisme, en particulier parmi les soutiens d’Israรซl ou de l’Ukraine, deux thรฉรขtres d’opรฉrations oรน l’Occident tente de ralentir son dรฉclin

    20 janvier 2026 : En Ukraine, des nรฉonazis et ex-militaires franรงais sโ€™engagent pour se battre contre la Russie โ€“ Sรฉbastien Bourdon, Street Press

    En 2025, une nouvelle unitรฉ de Franรงais combattant pour lโ€™Ukraine sโ€™est structurรฉe autour dโ€™un noyau de nรฉonazis, ayant pour objectif dโ€™attirer des recrues. Parmi ces volontaires, dโ€™anciens militaires. StreetPress les a identifiรฉs

    20 janvier 2026 : En Ukraine, les Franรงais des deux camps sโ€™affrontent sur fond dโ€™imaginaire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale โ€“ Sรฉbastien Bourdon, Street Press

    En Ukraine, les volontaires franรงais pro-ukrainiens et pro-russes se partagent lโ€™imaginaire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Les premiers se revendiquent des collabos de lโ€™Allemagne nazie, les seconds de lโ€™escadrille mythique ยซ Normandie โ€“ Niรฉmen ยป

    15 novembre 2025 : ยซ Gardez votre confiance en la France รฉternelle ยป

    deux jours aprรจs le 10e anniversaire de la dรฉbรขcle politique et sรฉcuritaire du 13 novembre 2015, une messe cรฉlรจbre ร  Verdun lโ€™ancien dirigeant fasciste de lโ€™ร‰tat franรงais

    11 novembre 2025 : Der Krieg

    ce 11 novembre 2025 est lโ€™occasion de souligner comme la faรงon dont lโ€™Europe sacrifie les conscrits ukrainiens mobilisรฉs de force rappelle le spectaculaire carnage de la 1รจre guerre mondiale

    2 aoรปt 2025 : Russophrenia: the Westโ€™s favourite delusion about Russia โ€“ Brian McDonald

    Ten years after I coined the term, the mediaโ€™s still convinced Russia is both collapsing, and conquering the world

    9 mai 2025 : Victory Day

    10 avril 2024 : Message de lโ€™ataman Nikolaรฏ Diakonov ร  Emmanuel Macron et ses mignons

    cโ€™est par lโ€™agence cosaque de presse PIKA, depuis la Rรฉpublique populaire de Lougansk, que le 2 avril 2024, lโ€™ataman Nikolaรฏ Diakonov lance un message ร  destination de la France

    5 janvier 2024 : Ukraine : des combattants franรงais dans le viseur des renseignements โ€“ Cรฉcile Deffontaines, Lโ€™Obs

    ce papier est le premier des grands mรฉdias franรงais qui sโ€™attaque ร  la question des militants nazis franรงais dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, le nouveau danger quโ€™ils prรฉsenteront ร  terme pour la sรปretรฉ intรฉrieure

    25 octobre 2023 : Cรฉsar et Paul, nรฉonazis mondains โ€“ Christophe-Cรฉcil Garnier, StreetPress

    oรน nous apprenons que le nazi franรงais Allan Duchรฉzeau, camarade de Cรฉsar Aujard dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, รฉtait surnommรฉ Dox, quand il secondait ร  Paris le leader nazi Marc de Cacqueray Valmรฉnier

    21 juillet 2023 : Les oeils de Moscou

    le magazine lโ€™Express est un exemple cocasse des tendances fascistes de la dรฉmocratie libรฉrale occidentale

    19 juin 2023 : David Piguet, un commissaire aux questions russes

    son rรฉvisionnisme, en dรฉtails

    30 mai 2023 : Fils de Pรฉtain

    la vanitรฉ nationale trouble la perception de la rรฉalitรฉ historique et perpรฉtue une nรฉvrose collective

    14 mai 2023 : Pauvre Sacrรฉ Charlemagne

    la mythologie europรฉiste

    7 fรฉvrier 2023 : Thousands NATO soldiers have already been killed in Donbass and Ukraine

    en Anglais, les indices au 7 fรฉvrier 2023, de la mort dans le Donbass et en Ukraine de militaires de lโ€™OTAN

    31 janvier 2023 : the European fascist armies lose WW2

    en Anglais, ร  l’occasion du 80e anniversaire de la dรฉfaite ร  Stalingrad des armรฉes fascistes europรฉennes, tournant de la 2de guerre mondiale

    21 septembre 2022 : The Western operatives in Mariupol

    en Anglais, les indices de la prรฉsence dโ€™opรฉrateurs occidentaux, en particulier Franรงais, pris au piรจge en mars 2022 ร  Marioupol, dont les forces russes achevรจrent la libรฉration en mai

  • [Sharing] The Price of Life – RYBAR 73

    the only chance for survival

    January 2026. Sumy Oblast. In a frozen, snow-covered abandoned school, three wounded Ukrainian soldiers find themselves trapped. One is missing a leg and rapidly bleeding. A short, cold order comes over the radio: there will be no evacuation. Any attempt to surrender will result in death. A security detachment is controlling the perimeter, and drones are patrolling the sky.

    A chance for survival appears unexpectedly. Russian drone operators spot the wounded through a window and drop leaflets with the communication frequency and terms of surrender. This is not an ultimatum โ€” it is a real chance. Inside, fear and doubt are lingering, and next to them the rapidly fading life of a comrade. When the seriously wounded man dies, there is no longer any doubt. The two survivors realize they are expendable to their own troops, and decide to surrender. In exchange for safe passage, they transmit to the Russian Armed Forces the coordinates of the enemy drone’s control center. With the help of Russian soldiers, the security barrier is destroyed. The skies are cleared, and a safe corridor for the prisoners is opened.

    Walking six kilometers through open snow along a forest belt, through a corridor provided by the Russian military, the wounded make their way to new positions, saving their lives from mortal danger. But if they survive, will they be able to maintain their faith in justice, in the legitimacy of orders, in their so-called “friends”? Or will they have to change their beliefs and cross the moral line beyond which “friends” and “foes” will switch places?


    ยฉ๏ธ RYBAR

    Related

    Five to One โ€“ RYBAR 83

    a reward shared by all

    Autumn near Bakhmut โ€“ RYBAR 82

    the balance between command and trust

    Ribbon on the Helmet โ€“ RYBAR 81

    how one symbol divided us and them

    The Grey Sky of Hostomel โ€“ RYBAR 80

    the way to our guys through fire and smoke

    Half a Meter from Death โ€“ RYBAR 79

    under the sights of an enemy drone

    We Donโ€™t Abandon Our Own โ€“ RYBAR 78

    battle for Snake Island

    Easter Ceasefire โ€“ RYBAR 77

    silence regime or dangerous mercy

    The Road Back โ€“ RYBAR 76

    donโ€™t give up your own and return home

    Survive Underground โ€“ RYBAR 75

    rescue at the risk of life

    Life on the Front Lines โ€“ RYBAR 74

    the moment that divides into before and after

    Combat Cheburashka โ€“ RYBAR 72

    the story of a toy

    Call Sign Yan โ€“ RYBAR 71

    loyalty that cost a life

    Once upon a time between the lines โ€“ RYBAR 70

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time near Stepnohirsk โ€“ RYBAR 69

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in Varvarovka โ€“ RYBAR 68

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in Pokrovsk โ€“ RYBAR 67

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time near Kostyantynivka โ€“ RYBAR 66

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in Cherkasy โ€“ RYBAR 65

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in Aleksandro-Kalinovo โ€“ RYBAR 64

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in Novohryhorivka โ€“ RYBAR 63

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time near Hnativka โ€“ RYBAR 62

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in Mala Tokmachka โ€“ RYBAR 61

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in the borderland โ€“ RYBAR 60

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time near Filiya โ€“ RYBAR 59

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in Pavlohrad โ€“ RYBAR 58

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in Crimea โ€“ RYBAR 57

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in the Serebryanskyi forest โ€“ RYBAR 56

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time on the AFUโ€™s positions โ€“ RYBAR 55

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in Voronezh โ€“ RYBAR 54

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in a tank brigade โ€“ RYBAR 53

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in Toretsk โ€“ RYBAR 52

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time near Tykhe โ€“ RYBAR 51

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time near Skudne โ€“ RYBAR 50

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time near Staromayorske โ€“ RYBAR 49

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in the basements โ€“ RYBAR 48

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in the gray zone โ€“ RYBAR 47

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in the flow โ€“ RYBAR 46

    adventures in country-404

    Once on the Platform โ€“ RYBAR 45

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, on the way home โ€“ RYBAR 44

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Ukrainsk โ€“ RYBAR 43

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in hard times โ€“ RYBAR 42

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, it couldnโ€™t be otherwise โ€“ RYBAR 41

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Vesyoloye โ€“ RYBAR 40

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in Trudovoe โ€“ RYBAR 39

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Kurakhove โ€“ RYBAR 38

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Vuhledar โ€“ RYBAR 37

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in captivity โ€“ RYBAR 36

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in Poltava โ€“ RYBAR 35

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in Krasnohorivka โ€“ RYBAR 34

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in Verkhnya Syrovatka โ€“ RYBAR 33

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in Pervomaisโ€™ke โ€“ RYBAR 32

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, while fleeing from the 404 country โ€“ RYBAR 31

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, at sea โ€“ RYBAR 30

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, on that very street โ€“ RYBAR 29

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, during a surrender โ€“ RYBAR 28

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Artemivka โ€“ RYBAR 27

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Umanske โ€“ RYBAR 26

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Novoselivka Persha โ€“ RYBAR 25

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Ostroverkhivka โ€“ RYBAR 24

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Krasnohorivka โ€“ RYBAR 23

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Chasiv Yar โ€“ RYBAR 22

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in Kharkiw โ€“ RYBAR 21

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in Spain โ€“ RYBAR 20

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, on the election day โ€“ RYBAR 19

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near Berdychi โ€“ RYBAR 18

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near Kostyantynivka โ€“ RYBAR 17

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Oleshky โ€“ RYBAR 16

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, on February 24 โ€“ RYBAR 15

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near Bakhmut โ€“ RYBAR 14

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near Robotyne โ€“ RYBAR 13

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near Kreminna โ€“ RYBAR 12

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Lugansk โ€“ RYBAR 11

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Krynky โ€“ RYBAR 10

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Marโ€™inka โ€“ RYBAR 9

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Avdiivka โ€“ RYBAR 8

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Nova Kakhovka โ€“ RYBAR 7

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in the Azovets camp โ€“ RYBAR 6

    adventures in country -404

    Once upon a time, in Klishchiivka โ€“ RYBAR 5

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near the Russia-Ukraine border โ€“ RYBAR 4

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near Novodarivka โ€“ RYBAR 3

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, on Independence Day in country 404 โ€“ RYBAR 2

    the tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Urozhaine โ€“ RYBAR 1

    A tale of a failed counter-attack

  • [Sharing] The Fourth Reich demands peace and purges – Events in Ukraine, August 2, 2024

    Ukrainian hitlerites for ceasefire. Struggle between Zelenskyite opportunists and Azovite strategists. Poroshenko, Zaluzhny, Sodol. 100 million dollar bribes. The angry officers movement

    When it comes to hitler-loving military nationalists, youโ€™d think theyโ€™d be lean more towards peace than a former comedian Jewish president who came to government on a peace platform, right? The reality is much more interesting

    Enter the fourth reich

    Tales of the IV Reich (now renamed Tales of the IV Empire), likely run by an Azov lieutenant, is characterized by more sobriety than other similar channels, which is why I love reading it

    Most interestingly, his posts often seem to hint at a sentiment among certain โ€˜army menโ€™, that the 1991-borders slogan is unrealistic and is leading to the destruction of Ukraineโ€™s finest nationalists through politically-motivated meat storms. Not without the insinuation, of course, that Zelensky is quite happy to see these dangerous competitors die.

    The fear of peace

    One of the reasons that Tales is worried about endless war is the political pressure it puts on the broader population, which has always been frustratingly disloyal to the aims of radical nationalism.

    Tales has always worried about popular demands for peace. Four days before February 24 2022, he was writing paranoid posts about how the west and Russia are trying to pressure Ukraine into implementing the Minsk peace agreements:

    Among the participants in the combat actions, I know many disappointed and disoriented people. Some are tired, some have not seen clear changes, some have started families. Not everyone is ready to take up arms again now. Such tendencies are detrimental in the current situation

    The implementation of the “Minsk” agreements into the Constitution of Ukraine is worse for us – the Ukrainian right-wing – than a full-scale war. We are accustomed to fighting the Russians – the thousand-year war of freedom-loving Eastern Europeans against the Tatar horde continues to this day. If the Ukrainian authorities are pressured by the Russians and [western – EIU] “partners”, we will get a “war zone” throughout the country. For us, the military veterans there will be no life in such a Ukraine. We will be under constant pressure from the system, with the possibility of being eliminated by amnestied separatist militants, and living in constant fear is not a life anyone wants

    If we fiercely resist the Russian army and unite the nation in the fight against the enemy, we cannot lose. Those who are burnt out and stay at home, in case of our defeat, will rot in prison or be killed. Some Ukrainians already believed the Bolsheviks in the 1920s and laid down their arms – they all either died of hunger or lived out their last years in camps

    To arms!

    On July 13, Tales published a telegram post in response to the calls by popular Ukrainian bloggers for peace through negotiations and compromise in response to Russian rocket strikes on the capital (see my post on the matter). He was also responding to the parliamentarian Artem Dmytruk, who vigorously supported the bloggers.

    Medvedchuk refers to the leader of Ukraineโ€™s โ€˜Opposition Platform for Lifeโ€™ party, whose main slogan was an end to the war through negotiations, until it was banned in 2022, along with the arrest and deportation of Medvedchuk.

    Hereโ€™s the post:

    If the war continues for another year, the population will bring the Dmytruks to power. So far, the Dmytruks are quite marginal. If it lasts two years, Medvedchuk will return here with the Russian flag. It’s simple

    Being in the [frontline] Zaporizhzhia steppes or the command posts of the Donetsk region, you become quite detached from the population: you don’t hear what ordinary citizens of Lviv, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia, or Kyiv are talking about and dreaming of. The fact that a huge number of people supported the Instabloggers (and how many were too embarrassed to write words of support?) irritates those who advocate for the continuation of the war. Because real people with open profiles wrote there, not Moscow bots. There are many of these people, and this must be taken into account. According to my observations, this number is increasing exponentially despite the fabricated results of sociological surveys

    The population sees corruption scandals. Constant loss of territories. Endless shelling. Inflation. Decline in the standard of living. Hundreds of new graves in cemeteries. Maimed veterans on the streets. Videos from the military registration and enlistment office. The West’s incomprehensible behavior. Now, there are also extremely uncomfortable conditions with power outages in +35ยฐC heat and prospects of water supply cuts. This list can go on

    I’m surprised that people with higher education and quite a high level of intelligence do not see the pattern

    Hitlerite civil war

    In another recent post, he was openly pessimistic about Ukraineโ€™s military prospects and its western allies:

    Once again, for a day, calls to “fight to victory” are spreading through social media following the terrorist attacks by Muscovites in Kyiv and Kryvyi Rih. Here are my thoughts in theses:

    1. Mobilization and a massive influx to the military registration and enlistment offices will not produce modern fighters, missile systems, or the latest strike UAVs. It won’t even add Patriot SAM systems and missiles to them. Unfortunately, even the mobilization of 10 million Ukrainians will not stop the takeoff of strategic fighters in Russia, will not destroy existing nuclear weapons, and will not significantly reduce the population of Russia, its natural resources, etc
    2. Strong entities respond to terrorist acts with double the force. Yesterday in Belgorod, in the evening, windows in residential buildings were shattered, one civilian died, two were slightly injured. Such a “response” personally shakes me with despair and hopelessness. I emphasize once again that our military capabilities can destroy everything living within a 100 km radius from the state border. Special thanks to the tactical level commanders who take responsibility for leveling the Shebekino and Rylsky districts of the Russian Federation. These are young officers up to the battalion commander level. In other words, this is the grassroots initiative of a conscious part of the army, there is no political will for such actions.
    3. We will not be invited to the NATO summit to join the alliance. We are not as cool as Albania. The topic of “Ukraine in NATO” will be a bargaining chip for many years, it will be a reason for wars and political crises. Moreover, in the coming days, NATO will solidify its impotence with a series of resolutions that will exclude the actual unilateral power of the United States in the alliance. The Western establishment is afraid of Trump coming to power, fearing that the war will end.
    4. NATO only needs to allocate 10% of its available weapons, which are gathering dust in warehouses since the alliance is not fighting anyone, and we would defeat the Muscovites. However, Western politicians are stretching this aid over the years, while hundreds of the best Ukrainians are dying and becoming disabled, and Ukrainian cities cease to exist because of the war. They have been juggling planes, high-precision MLRS, and missiles in front of the bloodied faces of Ukrainians for years

    Note also his praise for โ€˜tactical level commandersโ€™ who take initiative in hitting Russian civilian targets. See my recent post about the Sodol drama for more on this emerging caste of young nationalists, which positions itself against the so-called โ€˜old corrupt Soviet general casteโ€™.

    Anyway, given such sorry prospects for winning the war, Tales is clearly hinting that a ceasefire to regroup and strengthen defenses (as well as a good old-fashioned domestic purge) is a better idea than staying in the self-destructive meatgrinder.

    Iโ€™ve discussed on my substack Evgeny Dyky, the corpulent supposed ex-commander of the violent Aidar Batallion. Among his many achievements, he is also in charge of spending sizeable sums of money on Ukraineโ€™s wartime antarctic research project (read about it here). Otherwise, he spends a great deal of time on the Ukrainian talk-show circuit, explaining viewers how Ukraineโ€™s military industry is just getting started while that of Russiaโ€™s has already reached its final peak, and so on and on.

    Well, Dykyโ€™s effusive optimism really annoys IV Reich. Yesterday, he posted this:

    โšก๏ธ An F-16 that managed to reach Ukraine crashed into a high-rise building in Nizhny Tagil (RF). The pilot was identified as Yevhen Dykyi, a military expert and former platoon commander of the Aidar Battalion (in 2015). According to preliminary reports, the fighter jet could not withstand the pilot’s weight. Another version suggests that the pilot’s unkempt homeless-like beard got tangled in the control stick

    Talesโ€™ opinion on the 1991 borders slogan came out more clearly in March of this year. It all started in response to a hit-piece against a popular young commander by โ€˜the Centre for Countering of Disinformationโ€™, a beautifully-named government-funded organ (my bolding). Hereโ€™s the hysterical hit-piece from the CCD:

    Center for Countering Disinformation - Wikipedia
    The CCD logo

    Recently, interviews with military personnel have gained immense popularity in the Ukrainian information space, where they talk about the problems they allegedly face at the front: lack of ammunition, incompetent command, mistakes of the country’s leadership, and so on

    A striking example of this is a recent interview with the commander of the K2 battalion, Kyrylo Veres, in which he claims that we will not be able to win this war, and his personal victory is when his battalion’s soldiers stop dying. Thus, he is effectively hinting at negotiations and freezing the conflict. Such statements are absolutely unacceptable – they contradict the task set by the Leader of our country: to reach the borders of 1991 at any cost

    Obviously, it is high time to move to healthy military censorship – military personnel should be prohibited from giving interviews. Endless whining about the lack of ammunition and “meat assaults” does not bring us any closer to victory but contributes to the spread of defeatist sentiments in society. Moreover, in reality, there are no “meat assaults” in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and the military personnel are fully provided with everything necessary to accomplish the assigned tasks

    We remind you that you can always get reliable information about what is happening at the front on the “Unified News” telethon

    ะ‘ะพะธ ะทะฐ ะ”ะพะฝะฑะฐัั, ะทัะบะธ ะธะท ะงะ’ะš, ะทะธะผะฐ ะฝะฐ ั„ั€ะพะฝั‚ะต ะธ ั€ะฐะบะตั‚ั‹ ะฟะพ ะšั€ะตะผะปัŽ โ€“ ะธะฝั‚ะตั€ะฒัŒัŽ ั  ะบะพะผะฐะฝะดะธั€ะพะผ ะฟะพะดั€ะฐะทะดะตะปะตะฝะธั ะš2 ะšะธั€ะธะปะปะพะผ ะ’ะตั€ะตัะพะผ | ะฃะบั€ะฐะธะฝัะบะฐั ะฟั€ะฐะฒะดะฐ
    Commander Veres, the man being criticized. Looks a lot more trustworthy than the angry blue cube

    Ah, how times have changed over the past few months. Now even the Great Leader of is indulging in absolutely unacceptable narratives hinting at negotiations and freezing the conflict! But back to the response from Tales:

    I have personally known Kyrylo since 2017 to be a decent and dedicated officer, back when he was still a reconnaissance platoon commander in one of the mechanized brigade’s battalions. Over a few years, he rose to become the commander of one of the top battalions in the Armed Forces of Ukraine and received the “Hero’s Star.” We had many joint operations aimed at eliminating the Muscovites and their lackeys while the “defenders against disinformation” were siphoning grants in peaceful Kyiv

    Idiots don’t like that the battalion commander wants his personnel to live to see peace in the country and return home alive. This is an absolutely healthy and adequate position for a Ukrainian officer

    “What does victory mean to everyone? It’s when my people stop dying. If I said a year ago that victory is when the Russian Federation ends, then I was young and I did not command such a large number of people and did not give orders on who should go into battle and who should not”

    The last part is quoting Veres, the lines that made the Center for Countering Disinformation so furious.

    The heavyweights

    I know some people who regret having voted for Zelensky, who think that previous war-hawk president Petro Poroshenko, with his greater experience dealing with Russia and as a statesman (however reprehensible), wouldnโ€™t have allowed the war to happen in 2022

    Ukraine accuses former president Poroshenko of treason
    Poroshenko in his signature black gloves and expensive vyshyvanka (the folk costume no bourgeois nationalist can leave home without)

    I think itโ€™s possible that Zelenskyโ€™s curious talent for aggravating everyone imaginable played a special role. Recall Zelenskyโ€™s wise decision to start reminiscing about soviet Ukraineโ€™s nuclear missile capacity on February 19 2022.

    But perhaps more importantly, Poroshenko hasnโ€™t gone away either. He and his party certainly constitution the most powerful remaining opposition force in wartime. Could they be getting ready to attack Zelensky for wasting the army in an unwinnable war instead of preserving its fighting core?

    Until his early 2024 removal, Zaluzhny was juicing up head of the army Zaluzhny as an anti-Zelensky icebreaker. And Zaluzhny wrote a 2023 article he wrote in the Economist about how Ukraine has no real prospects of victory against Russia and finds itself in a stalemate position. Zelensky was enraged by this violation of his slogan โ€˜1991 borders or bustโ€™, and it was this article, along with Zaluzhnyโ€™s excessive popularity, that led to his eventual replacement.

    It was Poroshenko that signed the Minsk agreements back in 2014 and 2015 to avert Ukraineโ€™s military collapse. Maybe he can do it again, with the help of the โ€˜Iron Generalโ€™ Zaluzhny.

    Kiev mayor Klitchko – a real heavyweight – also said in a recent western interview that Zelensky should conduct a referendum on peace and abandoning some territories. Klitchko is another open critic of Zelenskyโ€™s authoritarianism, and has allied with Poroshenko against Zelensky numerous times in the past. There are rumors he is coordinating actions with him at the moment as well.

    The angry officers movement

    Opposition heavyweights like Poroshenko, Zaluzhny and Klitchko (donโ€™t laugh about the last one) also have an important base of supporters to draw on – young, confident nationalists in the army.

    A crucial fault-line at the moment is that between younger brigade commanders and the generals. The combrigs accuse the generals of sending them on pointless suicide missions because of the political leadershipโ€™s โ€˜obsession with mapsโ€™, rather than real strategic objectives. This โ€˜maps over strategyโ€™ metaphor is often used by Azov spokesmen like Kukharchuk or Krotevych in their interviews with liberal nationalist (anti-Zelensky) media like Ukrainska Pravda.

    Indeed, Zelensky must be map-fixated. His key priority is opportunistic – stay in power, keep the aid flowing, desperately showcase small successes. To put off his many days of reckoning.

    For instance. with the countless businessmen he has imprisoned, extorted and otherwise enraged. Like the still-jailed Kolomoisky. Or a business partner of Kolomoisky, Bogolyubov, who recently escaped the country and claimed the government tried to extort him of 100 million USD in exchange for legal protection. Or, obviously, the questions society will have towards him after a war that cost the lives of hundreds of thousands, and broughtโ€ฆ what?

    The young nationalists in the army launched the opening salvo in this increasingly public battle in late June, against General Sodol, who they accused of murderous graphomania. The battle has been rapidly developing in the past few weeks, a topic for a future post. But for now, Iโ€™d like to draw attention to Bohdan Krotevych, the Azovite who led the charge against General Sodol.

    Krotevych said in a July 26 interview that he is โ€˜angryโ€™ with Zelensky for apparently never having visited Azovโ€™s headquarters at the frontline, while he does visit other military units. He said he considers this condescension. The interview, titled โ€˜I am very angryโ€™, has already received a million views

    Another major topic of discussion is how Lieutenant Colonel Prokopenko, Commander of the Azov Brigade, is a โ€˜geniusโ€™. This is in turn fairly obviously compared to the stupidity of the generals, who he castigates for wasting human resources in impossible goals, and never learning from their mistakes (unlike the Russians, he stresses). Among other things, Krotevych calls the 2023 counteroffensive โ€˜retardedโ€™.

    A peaceful yet stern reich

    He also boasts about hanging out with his close friend Zaluzhny while in England recently. They and their wives met, and Krotevych gifted Zaluzhny an antique British army knife (knives are highly beloved among rightwing nationalists).

    Best of all, he cryptically promises that people would be hearing much more from Zaluzhny in the future.

    And Zaluzhnyโ€™s July 23 speech at the RUSI Land Warfare Conference in London on the topic of โ€˜Third World Warโ€™ made it clear that heโ€™s hardly a democrat:

    Society must agree to temporarily give up a number of freedoms for the sake of survival,โ€ฆ

    Unfortunately, modern wars are total. They require the efforts not only of the army, but of the whole society. Politicians can and should mobilize society. To do so, they use military and other state resources in a comprehensive way. These resources include the economy, finance, the population, and allies. Such actions will, of course, influence the political processes in the country

    Any ceasefire of the type that Zaluzhny, Tales, or Krotevych or the rest may want would be a brutal one. On July 30, Commander Romanov of the Azov brigade published a video stating he had given the order to shoot to kill any civilians attempting to destroy Ukrainian military equipment.

    With less energy to spend on the foreign enemy, more to spend on purging the internal enemy. The bloggers wonโ€™t be bothering anyone else with their pacifist demands [end]

    The original article

    Related

    Nazism in Ukraine

    chronicle: its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine

    February 12, 2025: Donald Trump throws Volodymyr Zelenskyy under theย bus

    in the chronicle of the Atlanticist defeat in Donbass and Ukraine

  • Volodymyr Zelenskyy signs a law banning organ harvesting from dead soldiers

    that new law is addressing a fact: in the context of war, Ukraine is a platform for organ trafficking

    On February 6, 2025, Volodymyr Zelenskyy signs a new law, that the parliament passed in January, which is banning the removal of organs for transplantation from fallen soldiers and victims of armed aggression.

    The Western propaganda is denying organ trafficking in Ukraine

    The trafficking of organs from killed Ukrainian service members is a well known issue, that even Ukrainian journalists have documented. Because these information are dehumanizing Ukrainians to damage their public support in the West, Western propaganda media are usually slamming them as disinformation. On January 24, in an article which regarded its readers as fools, Voice of America described the Ukrainian legal arsenal as a shield which would be preventing the issue, while the last law is rather addressing the reality of organ trafficking. Of course, that criminal activity is not official, but corrupt service members and medical professionals are conducting it, with complicity of corrupt civil servants, at all hierarchical levels. Here is the translation in English of my report, on October 5, 2024, while a Polish company was transporting biomaterial between the war zone and Warsaw.

    The carnage in Ukraine is a great opportunity for organ trafficking

    In Ukraine and other parts of the world, the trade in human organs is a lucrative cross-border activity, usually illegal when conducted outside national medical systems. The demand for organs is greater than supply and the buyer can pay, for example, up to $160,000 for a kidney. 10% of kidney transplants in the world are currently based on trafficking. Donors are most often people in poverty, who consent to the removal while they are still alive. This is not the only pattern.

    In July 2024, the Ukrainian press reported on a judicial investigation which was targeting a dozen doctors for fraud with the electronic system for registering and selling places in the transplant queue, illegal removal of anatomical materials from people who are in a helpless state. One of the suspects was Mykhailo Zagreychuk, former deputy minister of health. A Ukrainian page is offering since July 31 an excellent summary of the case. The characters are the gruesome representatives of a Ukrainian society and State that corruption is ravaging. Journalists are assuming ramifications as far as a clinic in the United Kingdom. The official investigation seems to have stalled now. No one has been formally jailed in pretrial detention or charged. Zagreychuk is free to move

    In August, as part of my usual work on French involvement in the Atlanticist ranks in Ukraine, I noted incidentally that suspected by Russian justice, for well-established facts in a criminal case of another kind, French volunteer Maxime Barrat, in a very clumsy defense, complained on social networks of having been victim in 2023 of the rumor of his involvement in trafficking organs from killed comrades. Which I was unaware of.

    Nothing conclusive so far, but through experience, I know how opportunities are making thugs when regulation of the scoundrel is deficient. There is much money at stake, the opportunity of appreciable additional incomes for a wide range of actors: the corrupt military who is supplying the corpses, the corrupt doctor who is removing organs, the steering body which is organizing collect, packaging and transport of a finished product, the local official who is turning a blind eye, the carrier who is delivering to the final medical structure.

    In order to add another brick to the bastion and confirm my suspicions, I have requested the assistance of confidential but reliable sources, who tell me and prove that in August 2024, despite public indictment in July of Mykhailo Zagreychuk, the private sector is still daring to recruit staff for dubious jobs in Ukraine. What can be the added value of a courier driver when he is paid up to โ‚ฌ6,500, eighteen times the average Ukrainian monthly salary?

    Respect of the most absolute confidentiality over the transport between war zone and Warsaw, Poland, of suitably packaged biomaterial, by the courier driver who is also bearing all documents necessary for crossing borders and other checkpoints

    The company is Polish Sabinex LLC, whose main activity is direct sales. The recruitment campaign is conducted in Sumy region, rear base of the offensive that Ukraine started on August 6 in Kursk Russian region. Who can experience a more characteristic state of helplessness than the fighter freshly killed in Kursk region?

    The video

    Here is an extract from the video recording of an application interview of my human source by a courier recruiter for the transport of biomaterial from the Ukrainian war zone to Warsaw

    For investigation guidance, in October 2024, I forwarded the complete video to the Russian Military-Civil Administration in Kharkov Region, which released later that extract on October 31.

  • [Sharing] Total Kievan Debellation – Big Serge

    The Russo-Ukrainian War: Year 3

    On March 5, 2022, the wreck of the sailing ship Endurance was found in the depths of the Weddell Sea off the coast of Antarctica. This, of course, was the vessel lost in Ernest Shackeltonโ€™s third expedition to Antarctica, which became trapped in the ice and sank in 1915. The story of that expedition is an extraordinary tale of human fortitude – with the Endurance lost to the ice, Shackletonโ€™s crew evacuated to a loose ice flow where they camped for nearly 500 days, drifting about the Antarctic seas, before making a desperate dash across the open ocean in an open 20 foot lifeboat, finally reaching the southern shore of inhospitable and mountainous South Georgia Island, which they then had to cross on foot to reach the safety of a whaling station.

    The story itself has an essentially mythic quality to it, with Shackletonโ€™s crew surviving for years on free floating ice floes in the most inhospitable seas on earth. For our purposes, however, it is the storyโ€™s coda that is particularly interesting. In Shackletonโ€™s memoirs, he remembered that, upon finally reaching the safety of the Stromness whaling station, one of his first questions was about the war in Europe. When Shackleton first set out on his ill-fated expedition on August 8, 1914, the First World War was less than a week old, and the German Army had just begun its invasion of Belgium. There was little expectation then that the war would proceed as it did, unleashing four years of slaughterous positional warfare that engulfed the continent.

    Shackleton, having been adrift at sea for years, clearly did not imagine that the war could still be raging, and asked the commandant of the whaling station โ€œtell me, when was the war over?โ€

    The answer came back: โ€œThe war is not over. Millions are being killed. Europe is mad. The world is mad.โ€

    The timing is serendipitous, since the discovery of the Enduranceโ€™s wreck, after more than a hundred years, happened to occur only a few weeks after the world again went mad, with the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian War in February 2022. As time continues its inexorable march and the calendar turns yet again, the war is passing through its third full winter. In February, Z-World will be three years old.

    Of course, modern communications make it extremely unlikely that anybody could be cut fully out of the loop for years at a time, like Shackleton and his men. Instead of being ignorant as to whether or not the war is over, many of us are exposed on a daily basis to footage of men being killed, buildings being blown up, and vehicles being shredded. Twitter has made it essentially impossible to live under a rock, or on an ice floe, as it were.

    If anything, we have the very opposite problem of Shackleton – at least as far as our wartime information infrastructure goes. We are saturated in information, with daily updates tracking advances of a few dozen meters and never ending bombast about new game changing weapons (which seem to change very little), and bluster about โ€œred linesโ€. This war seems to have an unyielding dynamic on the ground, and no matter how many grand pronouncements we hear that one side or the other is on the verge of collapse, the sprawling front continues to grind up bodies and congeal with bloody positional fighting.

    It would seem difficult to believe that a high intensity ground war in Europe with hundreds of miles worth of front could be boring, yet the static and repetitive nature of the conflict is struggling to hold the attention of foreign observers who have little immediately at stake.

    My intention here is a radical zoom-out from these demoralizing and fatiguing small scale updates (as valuable as the work of the war mappers is), and consider the aggregate of 2024 – arguing that this year was, in fact, very consequential. Taken as a whole, three very important things happened in 2024 which create a very dismal outlook for Ukraine and the AFU in the new year. More specifically, 2024 brought three important strategic developments:

    1. Russian victory in southern Donetsk which destroyed the AFUโ€™s position on one of the warโ€™s key strategic axes.
    2. The expenditure of carefully husbanded Ukrainian resources on a failed offensive towards Kursk, which accelerated the attrition of critical Ukrainian maneuver assets and substantially dampened their prospects in the Donbas.
    3. The exhaustion of Ukraineโ€™s ability to escalate vis a vis new strike systems from NATO – more broadly, the west has largely run out of options to upgrade Ukrainian capabilities, and the much vaunted delivery of longer range strike systems failed to alter the trajectory of the war on the ground.

    Taken together, 2024 revealed a Ukrainian military that is increasingly stretched to the limits, to the point where the Russians were able to largely scratch off an entire sector of front. People continue to wonder where and when the Ukrainian front might begin to break down – I would argue that it *did* break down in the south over the last few months, and 2025 begins with strong Russian momentum that the AFU will be hard pressed to arrest.

    Front Collapse in South Donetsk

    What stands out immediately about the operational developments in 2024 is the marked shift of energies away from the axes of combat that had seen the most intense fighting in the first two years of the war. In a sense, this war has seen each of its fronts activate in a sequence, one after the other.

    After the opening Russian offensive, which boasted as its signature success the capture of the Azov coastline and the linkup of Donetsk and Crimea, the action shifted to the northern front (the Lugansk-Kharkov axis), with Russia fighting a summer offensive which captured Severodonetsk and Lysychansk. This was followed by a pair of Ukrainian counteroffensives in the fall, with a thrust out of Kharkov which pushed the front back over the Oskil, and an operation directed at Kherson which failed to breach Russian defenses but ultimately resulted in a Russian withdrawal in good order over the Dnieper due to concerns over logistical connectivity and an over-extended front. Energies then pivoted yet again to the Central Donbas axis, with the enormous battle around Bakhmut raging through the spring of 2023. This was followed by the failed Ukrainian offensive on Russiaโ€™s defenses in Zaporozhia, in the south.

    Just to briefly recapitulate this, we can enumerate several operational phases in the first two years of the war, occurring in sequence and each with a center of gravity in different parts of the front:

    • A Russian offensive across the land bridge, culminating in the capture of Mariupol. (Winter-Spring 2022, Southern Front)
    • A Russian offensive in Lugansk, capturing Severodonetsk and Lysychansk. (Summer 2022, Donets-Oskil front)
    • Ukrainian Counteroffensives towards the Oskil and Kherson (Autumn 2022, Oskil and Dnieper fronts)
    • The Russian assault on Bakhmut (Winter-Spring 2023, Central Front)
    • Ukrainian counteroffensive on the land bridge (Summer 2023)

    Amid all of this, the front that saw the least movement was the southeastern corner of the front, around Donetsk. This was somewhat peculiar. Donetsk is the urban heart of the Donbas – a vast and populous industrial city at the center of a sprawling conurbation, once home to some 2 million people. Even if Russia succeeds in capturing the city of Zaporizhia, Donetsk will be by far the most populous of Ukraineโ€™s former cities to come under Moscowโ€™s control.

    In 2014, with the outbreak of the proto-Donbas war, Donetsk was the locus of much of the fighting, with the airport on the cityโ€™s northern approach the scene of particularly intense combat. This made it rather strange, then, that at the start of 2024 the Ukrainian Army continued to occupy many of the same positions that they built a decade prior. As intense fighting ebbed and flowed along other sectors of front, Donetsk remained besieged by a web of powerfully held Ukrainian defenses, anchored by heavily fortified urban areas stretching from Toretsk to Ugledar. Early Russian attempts to crack this iron ring open, including an assault on Ugledar in the winter of 2023, met with failure.

    The signature operational development of 2024, then, was the re-activation of the Donetsk front, after years of static combat. It is not an exaggeration to say that after years of coagulation, the Russian Army cracked this front wide open in 2024 and Ukraineโ€™s long and strongly held network of urban strongpoints collapsed

    Russian Progress on the Donetsk Axis in 2024

    The year began with the AFU fighting for its fortress in Avdiivka, where it continued to block the northern approach to Donetsk. At the time, the typical argument that one heard from the Ukrainian side was that the Russian assault on Avdiivka was pyrrhic – that the Russians were capturing the city with exorbitantly costly โ€œmeat assaultsโ€ that would inevitably sap Russian combat power and exhaust their ability to continue the offensive.

    With the full measure of the year behind us, we can definitively say that this is not the case. After the fall of Avdiivka, Russian momentum never seriously slackened, and in fact it was the AFU that appeared to be increasingly exhausted. The Ukrainian breakwater position at Ocheretyne (which had previously been their staging point for counterattacks around Avdiivka) was overrun in a matter of days, and by the early summer the frontline had been pushed out towards the approach to Pokrovsk.

    The Russian thrust towards Pokrovsk led many to believe that this city was itself the object of Russian energies, but this was a misread of the operational design. Russia did not need to capture Pokrovsk in 2024 to render it sterile as a logistical hub. Simply by advancing towards the E50 highway, Russian forces were able to cut off Pokrovsk from Ukrainian positions to the south on the Donetsk front, and Pokvrovsk is now a frontline city subject to the full spectrum of overwatch from Russian drones and tube artillery.

    By autumn, the Russian advance had put the Ukrainians in a severe salient, creating an unstable chain of positions in Selydove, Kurakhove, Ugledar, and Krasnogorivka. Russiaโ€™s advance from Ocheretyne onto the southern approach to Pokrovsk acted like an enormous scythe, isolating the entire southeastern sector of the front and allowing Russian forces to carve through it in the closing months of the year

    Russian Operations in 2024, Donetsk Axis

    This war has turned the word โ€œcollapseโ€ into a devalued buzzword. We are told repeatedly that one side or the other is on the verge of collapse: sanctions will โ€œcollapseโ€ the Russian economy, the Wagner uprising of 2023 proved that the Russian political system was โ€œcollapsingโ€, and of course we hear that exorbitant losses have one army or the other on the verge of total failure – which army that may be depends on who you ask.

    I would argue, however, that what we saw from October 2024 onward represents a real occurrence of this oft-repeated and discarded word. The AFU suffered a genuine collapse of the southeastern front, with the forces positioned in their strongpoints too attrited and isolated to make a determined defense, Russian fires becoming too heavily concentrated in ever more compressed areas to endure, and no mechanized reserve in the theater available to counterattack or relieve the incessant Russian pressure.

    Ukraine does maintain enough drones and concentrated fires to limit a full Russian exploitation – that is, Russia is still not able to maneuver at depth. This gave the Russian advance a particular stop-start quality, leapfrogging from one settlement and fortress to the other. More generally, Russiaโ€™s preference to use dispersed small-unit assaults limits the potential for exploitation. We have to emphasize, however, that Russian momentum on this axis has never seriously slackened since October, and many of the key Ukrainian positions were overrun or abandoned very quickly

    Ugledar is a good example: the Russians began their final push toward the town on September 24. By September 29, the 72nd Mechanized Brigade began evacuating. By October 1, Ugledar was fully under Russian control. This was a keystone Ukrainian position put in a completely untenable position and it went down in a week. One could argue, of course, that Ugledar held out for years (how then can we say with a straight face that it was captured in a week), but this is precisely the point. In early 2023 Ugledar (with the help of artillery stationed around Kurakhove) successfully repelled a multi-brigade Russian attack in months of heavy fighting. By October 2024, the position was completely untenable and was abandoned almost immediately when attacked.

    The Ukrainians did no better trying to hold Kurakhove – previously a critical rear area that served as both a logistical hub and a base of fire for supporting (former) frontline strongpoints like Ugledar and Krasnogorivka. Kurakhove, now under full Russian control, will in turn serve as a base of support for the ongoing Russian push to the west towards Andriivka.

    Taking the state of the front holistically, the AFU is currently holding two severe salients at the southernmost end of the line – one around Velyka Novosilka, and another around Andriivka. The former is likely to fall first, as the town has been fully isolated by Russian advances on the flanks. This is not a Bakhmut-like situation, where roads are described as โ€œcutโ€ because they are under Russian fire – in this case, all of the highways into Velyka Novosilka are cut by physical Russian blocking positions, making the loss of the position only a matter of waiting for the Russians to assault it. Further north, a more gentle and less strongly held salient exists between Grodivka and Toretsk. With Toretsk now in the final stages of capture (Ukrainian forces now hold only a small residential neighborhood on the cityโ€™s outskirts), the front should level here as well in the coming months.

    This leaves the Russians more or less in full control of the approaches to Kostyantinivka and Pokrovsk, which are in many ways the penultimate Ukrainian held positions in Donetsk. Pokrovsk has already been bypassed several miles to the west, and the map portends a re-run of the typical Russian tactical methodology for assaulting urban areas – a methodical advance along the wings of the city to isolate it from arterial highways, followed by an attack on the city itself via several axes

    The coming months promise continued Russian advances across this front, in a continuation of what can only be regarded as the collapse of a critical front on the part of the AFU. The Russian Army is advancing to the western border of Donetsk oblast and will ferret the Ukrainians out of their remaining strongpoints at Velyka Novosilka and Andriivka, while pushing into the belly of Pokrovsk. At no point since the fall of Avdiivka have the Ukrainians demonstrated the ability to seriously stymie Russian momentum along this 75 mile front, and the ongoing dissipation of Ukrainian combat resources indicates that little will change in this regard in 2025.

    Toehold: The Incredible Shrinking Kursk Salient

    Throughout the autumn of 2024 and these early months of winter, as Ukrainian forces were dug out of their dense web of fortified positions in the southern Donbas, their comrades continued to stubbornly hold on to their position in Russiaโ€™s Kursk Oblast. The basic shape of Ukraineโ€™s offensive into Kursk is by now well known – billed by Kiev as a gambit to change the psychological trajectory of the war and strike a prestige blow to Russia, the Ukrainian attack had early momentum after achieving initial strategic surprise, but quickly faltered after Ukrainian columns ran into effective Russian blocking positions on the highways out of Sudzha. Efforts to force the roads through Korenovo and Bolshoe Soldatskoe were defeated, and the Ukrainian grouping was left holding on to a modest salient around Sudzha, jutting out into Russia.

    Throughout the autumn, Russian counterattacks have focused on chiseling away at the base of the Ukrainian salient – forcing the Ukrainians out of Snagost and pushing them away from Korenovo. The progress here has been incremental, but significant, and by the start of January the โ€œneckโ€ of the Ukrainian salient had been compressed down to a little over nine miles wide, after their initial penetration in the summer had forced a breach of over twenty miles. All told, Ukraine has lost about 50% of the territory that they grabbed in August.

    The Russian pressure on the flanks of the salient have amplified many of the qualities that make this position wasteful and dangerous for the AFU. There is limited road connectivity for Ukrainian forces – a problem amplified by the rollback from Snagost, which cost them access to the highway running from Korenovo to Sumy. Apart from a few circuitous side roads, Ukrainian forces only have a single highway – the R200 route – to run material and reinforcements into the pocket, which allows Russian forces to surveil their lines of communication and conduct effective interdiction strikes. The compression of the pocket also greatly narrows the targeting area for Russian drones, tube artillery, and rocketry, and creates more condensed and saturating bombardment

    Despite the fact that this position has been profoundly unproductive for Ukraine – being steadily rolled back and having no synergy with other, more critical theaters – the same grouping of Ukrainian units remain here, fighting in a steadily more compressed space. Even more baffling, the Ukrainian grouping consists largely of premiere assets – Mechanized and Air Assault brigades – that could have contributed meaningfully as a reserve in the Donbas over the last three months.

    On January 5, there was a surprise in the form of a renewed Ukrainian attack out of the salient. The internet of course jumped to the conclusion that the AFU was going back over to some sort of general offensive posture in Kursk, but the reality was very underwhelming – something like a battalion sized assault up the axis towards Bolshoe Soldaskoe, which got a few kilometers up the road before it ran out of steam. Ukrainian efforts to jam Russian drones were stymied by the increasing ubiquity of fiber-optic systems, and the Ukrainian attack collapsed within a day

    Kursk Salient – General Situation, January 2025

    The tactical particulars of the Ukrainian attack are interesting, and thereโ€™s ongoing speculation as to its purpose – perhaps it was intended to cover a rotation or withdrawal, to improve tactical positions on the northern edge of the salient, or for inscrutable propaganda purposes. However, these specifics are rather unimportant: attacking out the end of the salient (that is, trying to deepen the penetration into Russia) does nothing to reverse Ukraineโ€™s problems in Kursk. These problems are first, on the tactical level, that the salient has been greatly compressed on the flanks and continues to narrow, and on the strategic level the willful expenditure of valuable mechanized assets on a front that does not impact the critical theaters of the war. More simply, Kursk is a sideshow, and it is a sideshow that has gone wrong even within its own operational logic.

    One thing that has been of endless interest, of course, have been the continued rumors of North Korean troops fighting in Kursk. Western intelligence agencies have been adamant about the presence of North Koreans in Kursk. Some people are predisposed to instinctively disbelieve everything that western officialdom says – while I think some skepticism is warranted, I do not automatically assume that they are lying. One recent report lays out what would seem to be a plausible version of this story: that the idea actually originated in Pyongyang, not Moscow, and that a modest number of Korean troops (perhaps 10,000) are embedded with Russian units. The presumption here is that the Koreans hatched the idea as a way to gain combat experience, with the Russians in turn getting auxiliary forces, though of questionable combat effectiveness.

    However, it is worth noting that this is not nearly as important as it has been made out to be. Much has been made of the idea that the North Korean presence proves some sort of Russian state of desperation, but this is fairly silly on its face – with more than 1.5 million active personnel in the Russian military, 10,000 Korean troops in Kursk represents a paltry appendage. More importantly, there has been an attempt to portray the North Korean contingent as a major departure point in the war. In particular, the formulation โ€œNorth Korean troops in Europeโ€ has been used to conjure cold war imagery of communist despotism clawing at the free world

    The point, however, is that North Korean troops are presumed specifically to be in Kursk, which is in Russia. This is linked, of course, to the recently concluded mutual defense agreement signed between Moscow and Pyongyang. By attacking into Kursk – widening the front into prewar Russian territory – Ukraine created a defensive combat task for Russia which triggers the possibility of military assistance from North Korea. However much one may wish to link the Korean contingent to Russiaโ€™s dreaded โ€œwar of aggressionโ€, the force in Kursk is very objectively engaged in the defense of Russian territory, and that makes it possible for Russia to use auxiliary forces – including conscripts and the troops of its allies – to fight there.

    Ultimately, then, the presence of North Koreans in Kursk is interesting, but perhaps not very important after all. These troops are not in Ukraine (even under the most maximal definition of the Ukrainian territorial unit), they are not carrying the primary combat load, and they are unequivocally not the problem that the AFU is facing in Kursk. The โ€œbig problemโ€ for Ukraine, very simply, is not the presence of some amorphous Korean horde dedicated to spreading Glorious Juche to Europe – it is the loitering of large grouping of their own precious mechanized brigades in a compressed salient, far far away from the Donbas, where they are greatly needed.

    Scraping the Barrel: AFU Force Generation

    I think it is well understood, of course, that Ukraine faces severe manpower constraints relative to Russia, both in terms of the raw totals of male biomass available – with roughly 35 million fighting aged males in Russia against perhaps 9 million in prewar Ukraine – but also in terms of its capacity to mobilize them.

    Ukraineโ€™s mobilization scheme is hampered by both widespread draft evasion (with willingness to serve decreasing as the war has stretched on) and a stubborn unwillingness to draft younger men, aged 18-25. Ukraine is structurally burdened with a deeply imbalanced population structure: there are roughly 60% more Ukrainian men in their 30โ€™s than in their 20โ€™s. Given the relative scarcity of young men, particularly in their early 20’s, the Ukrainian government rightly views this 18-25 year old cohort as a premium demographic cohort that it is loathe to burn away in combat. Given the ubiquity of draft evasion, the refusal to mobilize younger males, and the corruption and inefficiency characteristic of the Ukrainian government, it should come as no surprise when Ukrainian mobilization falters

    Russia, in contrast, has both a much larger pool of potential recruits and a more efficient apparatus for mobilization. In contrast to Ukraineโ€™s scheme of compulsory conscription, Russia has relied on generous sign-on bonuses to solicit volunteers. Russiaโ€™s incentive system, to this point, has provided a steady stream of enlistments that has been more than enough to offset Russian losses. Without going too far into the various speculative estimates of Russian casualties, it is widely acknowledged by western military leadership that Russia has significantly more personnel now than it did at the start of the war.

    All of that is to say: Ukraine faces a severe structural disadvantage in military manpower in the aggregate, which is exacerbated by the idiosyncrasies of the Ukrainian mobilization law, ameliorated slightly by the relatively low troop densities and the preponderant power of strike systems in this war.

    The argument that I want to make here, however, is that Ukraineโ€™s systemic problems matching Russian manpower have been exacerbated by several developments which specifically became prominent in 2024. In other words, 2024 can and should be marked as the year where Ukrainian manpower constraints became markedly and perhaps irretrievably worse due to specific decisions made in Kiev, and particular developments on the ground.

    These are as follows:

    1. The decision to expand the AFUโ€™s force structure through the creation of the โ€œ15 seriesโ€ brigades
    2. The decision to deliberately widen the front and create additional demands for manpower by launching the incursion into Kursk
    3. The stall out of Ukraineโ€™s new mobilization program in the autumn
    4. Accelerating problems with desertion in the AFU

    Weโ€™ll run through these in order.

    An army that is intaking new personnel has to decide between two possible allocations for them. New personnel can be used as replacements to replenish existing frontline units, or they can be used to expand the force structure by creating new units. That much seems fairly obvious, and ideally mobilization will exceed losses and make it possible to do both. Where armies face hard manpower constraints, however – that is, where losses are equal to or greater than intake of men, the decision to expand the force structure can have monumental consequences. The stereotypical example, of course, would be the late-war Wehrmacht, which created premiere new assets in the form of Waffen SS divisions, which received privileged access to recruits and equipment while regular army divisions in the line suffered from a trickle of replacements which could not keep up with losses.

    Ukraine, with its garbled force structure, has created a mess through its own attempts to expand its force structure in the face of dwindling strength on the line. Late in 2023, the AFU announced intentions to form an entirely new grouping of brigades – the so-called โ€œ15 seriesโ€, given their designations as the 150th, 151st, 152nd, 153rd, and 154th Mechanized Brigades. This was followed in 2024 with the appending of the 155th Mechanized Brigade, which was to be trained and equipped in France.

    Forming a new grouping of mechanized brigades is essential to the way that Ukraine is presenting its war. Because Ukraine still aims (at least on paper) to recapture all of its Russian held territory, there must always be the illusory possibility of a future offensive, and in order for that illusory possibility to remain, Ukraine must present itself as actively preparing for future offensive operations. Ukraineโ€™s presentation of its own strategic animus – the idea that it is holding the front while it prepares to go back on the offensive – essentially locks it into a program of expanding its force structure

    The problem for Ukraine is that the immense pressure on the front makes it essentially impossible for them to properly husband resources the way they would like. Properly training and equipping half a dozen fresh mechanized brigades and holding them in reserve would be very helpful, but they cannot really do this in light of the demands for personnel at the front. These brigades instead become โ€œpaper formationsโ€ that have a bureaucratic existence, while their organic assets are pulled apart and sucked into the front – stripped down into battalion or company sized elements that can be plugged into sectors of need on the frontline. At the moment, none of the 15 series brigades have seen action as organic units – that is, fighting as themselves.

    The French-trained 155th brigade forms a useful example. Originally designed as an overweight formation of some 5800 men, equipped with premiere European equipment, the brigade was hemorrhaging personnel from the start, with Ukrainian sources reporting that some 1700 men – many of them forcibly conscripted off the streets of Ukraine – deserted the unit during training and formation. A collapse in the brigadeโ€™s leadership – with its commander resigning – made matters even more complicated, and the formationโ€™s first action around Pokrovsk went badly. Now, the brigade is being dismembered, if not formally disbanded, with personnel and vehicles being stripped down and parceled out to bolster neighbor units.

    The decision to allocate personnel to new mechanized brigades (though given stocks of armored vehicles it is questionable whether those designations mean anything) does not necessarily change Ukraineโ€™s manpower balance in the aggregate, but it is certainly an inefficient way to use personnel. To return again to the 155th brigade, one problem noted by Ukrainian analysts was the fact that much of the brigade was formed whole cloth from forcibly mobilized personnel, without a proper cadre of veterans and experienced NCOs – some 75% of the brigade, it turns out, had been mobilized less than two months before arriving in France for training. This fact was certainly instrumental in the mass desertions and the brigadeโ€™s poor combat effectiveness.

    Given Ukraine’s constraints, the best course of action would undoubtedly be to allocate new personnel and equipment as replacements to build out the depleted veteran brigades on the front lines, plugging in replacements around existing veterans and officers. Kiev, however, prizes the prestige that comes from force expansion and the โ€œshiny new toyโ€ factor of new formations equipped with scarce and valuable equipment like Leopard tanks. These new brigades, though billed as premiere assets, clearly have lower combat effectiveness than existing formations, given their lack of experience, shortage of veteran officers, and low unit cohesion.

    The simple reality, however, is that replacements for existing brigades are nowhere close to keeping up with burn rates. Frontline units have complained of increasingly dire infantry shortages for months, with some brigades on the Pokrovsk axis reporting that they are down to less than 40% of their allocated infantry complements.

    In short, Ukraineโ€™s decision to embark on force expansion in the face of significant manpower shortages has exacerbated the problem – both starving veteran units of replacements and concentrating newly mobilized personnel into combat ineffective formations that lack a veteran core, experienced officers, and vital equipment. They have tried, belatedly, to square this circle by parceling out new formations to backstop line brigades, but this is less than ideal – it leads to a patchwork order of battle with lower unit cohesion and a fragmented defense.

    Unfortunately, this comes precisely as Ukraine has created additional self-imposed strains on its resources, in particular through its incursion into Kursk. At the moment, elements of at least seven mechanized brigades, two marine infantry brigades, and three air assault brigades are stationed on the Kursk axis. Without going too far into the weeds rehashing Ukraineโ€™s operation here, itโ€™s important to remember that Ukraine – facing extreme pressures on its force generation – voluntarily chose to widen the front into a secondary theater, diverting scarce assets and reducing its own ability to economize forces.

    In summary, Ukraine has made deliberate decisions to widen the front and expand its force structure, both of which have been decidedly detrimental to its efforts to economize personnel. This comes precisely as a 2024 effort to ramp up mobilization has come off the rails.

    Ukraineโ€™s mobilization program suffered from a variety of defects, including gaps and errors in its databases and endemic corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency. Laws passed in 2024 aimed to rectify many of these problems, including through the rollout of an app that would allow draft-eligible men to register and check their status without having to visit recruitment offices. It appeared that matters had come to a head when Zelensky fired several recruitment chiefs in 2023, and there was a real sense of urgency. After some signs of initial promise, it is clear that this intensified mobilization drive has faltered over the autumn and early winter

    There were initially signs of optimism for Ukraine – in the first month after the new mobilization law was passed, there was a surge and the army enlisted 30,000 new personnel. However, by the end of the summer this initial burst of enlistments had faded, and mobilization was again running behind the AFUโ€™s losses. An October briefing from the Ukrainian General Staff confirmed that enlistments had already declined by 40% after the brief surge brought on by the new mobilization law. Around the same time, officials in Odessa (Ukraineโ€™s third largest city) admitted that they were running at only 20% of their mobilization quota.

    The problems are myriad. The new mobilization law led to some initial improvements but has ultimately failed to resolve problems with draft evasion, bureaucratic miscues remain endemic, and employers desperate to retain workers filed an avalanche of employment related draft deferments. Unable to sustain the initial surge of enlistments, Ukraine faces a looming manpower crisis.

    Furthermore, Ukraineโ€™s continued inability to provide either demobilization or timely rotations means that mobilized personnel face the prospect of indefinite service on the frontlines. This is obviously bad for morale, with soldiers contemplating the possibility of years of uninterrupted service, and this in turn drives the desertions that are becoming a mounting problem for the AFU. Some reports indicate that as many as 100,000 Ukrainian troops have deserted by this point, many no doubt driven by the psychological and physical strains of endless combat with no prospect of rotation.

    A deadly feedback loop is now at work, with the lack of rotations and the shortage of replacements synergizing to accelerate the burn of Ukrainian personnel. The AFU is unable to regularly rotate units out of combat, and the inadequate flow of replacements causes frontline infantry complements to wear thin. Unable to rotate or reinforce, line brigades resort to cannibalization – scraping support personnel like mortar teams, drivers, and drone operators to fill out frontline positions. This further accelerates losses as brigades fight with thinned out support and fires elements, and makes Ukrainian men more unwilling to enlist – because there is now no guarantee that becoming a drone operator, for example, will save one from being sent to a frontline trench eventually.

    Where does this leave us? Ukraine continues to dispose of a very large force, with more than a hundred brigades and hundreds of thousands of men under arms. This force, however, is both substantially outnumbered by the Russian army and in a clear trend of decay. Despite a highly touted attempt to reinvigorate the mobilization apparatus in 2024, the intake of new personnel is clearly too low to offset losses, and the heavy lifting formations in critical sectors of front have seen their strength – particularly in the infantry complements – decline, in some cases to critical levels.

    The failure of Ukraineโ€™s 2024 mobilization program has coincided with several strategic choices which have exacerbated manpower concerns – specifically the decision to embark on a program of force expansion even as the AFU voluntarily extended its commitments by opening a new secondary front in Kursk. In other words, Ukraineโ€™s mobilization falls short of its force requirements, and the AFU has also made choices that sabotaged its ability to economize. Units are ground up, replacements come in a paltry trickle, rotations are late or absent, units cannibalize themselves, and angry and weary men desert.

    Itโ€™s not at all clear that this will lead to a โ€œbreaking pointโ€, in the sense that people are anticipating. Ukrainian strike capabilities and the Russian preference for dispersed, leapfrogging assaults limit the potential for grand breakthroughs and exploitation. However, what we saw over the past three months on the southern Donetsk axis offers a preview of what awaits: an exhausted force being steadily rolled back, dug out of its strongpoints, and mauled – covering its retreat with drones but losing position after position. The line holds, until it doesnโ€™t.

    End of the Line: ATACMs, JASSMs, and Hazelnuts

    Ukraineโ€™s ability to remain in the field depends on a titration of two indispensable resources: first, Ukrainian male biomass, and secondly the critical western weaponry that gives them combat effectiveness. We have evaluated the first: Ukraine is not exactly out of men, but the trends of its mobilization program are poor and personnel shortages are mounting. The trends regarding the second are, if anything, even more foreboding for Kiev.

    There are two general dynamics that have emerged, neither of which create an optimistic picture for Ukraine, which weโ€™ll examine in turn. These are as follows:

    1. The delivery of heavy weaponry to Ukraine (tanks, IFVs, and artillery tubes) has largely dried up in recent months.
    2. The west has essentially run out of escalatory weaponry (strike systems) to give, and those systems already given have failed to meaningfully altar the trajectory of the war.

    In 2023, building out new mechanized units was the name of the game, with the Pentagon leading a multinational effort to stand up an entire army corps worth of units equipped with Leopards, Challengers, and a whole slew of western IFVs and APCs. When that lovingly assembled grouping bashed its head on a rock in the botched assault on the Zaporizhia line, the United States belatedly and begrudgingly dispatched its own Abrams to backstop the Ukrainian tank force. In 2024, however, deliveries of heavy weapons slowed to a trickle.

    The role of the tank in Ukraine has been greatly misunderstood. The vulnerability of tanks to the myriad strike systems of the modern battlefield led some observers to declare that the tank as a weapons system was now obsolete, but this did not really square with the fact that both combatants in this war were eager to deploy as many as possible. Tanks need more critical enablers – more combat engineering, air defense, and electronic warfare support – but they continue to fill an indispensable role and remain an essential item in this war. The failure of Ukraineโ€™s 2023 counteroffensive showed, if anything, that tanks simply are not โ€œgame changingโ€ systems, but mass consumption items – but this has always been the case. The signature quality of iconic tanks like the Sherman and the T34 was that they were numerous

    Unfortunately for Ukraine, deliveries of tanks have dropped off dramatically after the failures of 2023. Americaโ€™s drawdowns for Ukraine in 2024 were almost entirely devoid of armored vehicles of any kind. Data from the Kiel Institute, which has been meticulous tracking weaponry commitments and deliveries, confirms a sharp dropoff in heavy weapons in 2024. In 2023, Ukraineโ€™s backers pledged 384 tanks. This dropped to just 98 in 2024 – which explains why the new Ukrainian mechanized brigades are perilously light on the equipment indicative of their designations.

    While 2023 was all about building out Ukraineโ€™s mechanized package with tanks, IFVs, and engineering, 2024 has been largely about enhancing Ukraineโ€™s strike capabilities. There have been two separate elements at play – first, the delivery of both air and ground launched systems (most notably the British Storm Shadows and American ATACMs respectively), and secondly the loosening of the rules of engagement to allow Ukraine to strike targets inside pre-war Russia.

    This dovetailed, as it turned out, with Ukraineโ€™s operation in Kursk, and in many ways the most direct impact of the Kursk incursion has been to force the westโ€™s hand on the rules of engagement. While Ukraine has long been striking inside Russia with indigenous systems, most notably drones, the White House continued to drag its feet on formal approval for strikes with American systems. By launching a ground assault on Kursk, Ukraine made the decision for them: the United States gave clearance to use ATACMs to support the ground forces in Kursk, and this metastasized into general license to strike Russia with the full range of available systems. This was a poignant reminder that, however we conceive of the proxy-sponsor relationship, Ukraine has some ability to force Americaโ€™s hand: a classic example of the tail wagging the dog.

    In any case, 2024 saw Ukraine and its western backers slowly but surely bash through all the supposed red-lines in this domain: the British breached first with the delivery of Storm Shadows late in 2023, and this was followed by the delivery of ATACMs (with a handful of F16โ€™s to boot), and finally the loosening of the rules of engagement to clear strikes on Russia.

    Where does this leave us? There would seem to be three important things to consider.

    1. The west has essentially reached the end of its escalation chain. The only remaining step that they can take would be to supply Ukraine with JASSMs (Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile), which would mark a quantitative but not a meaningful qualitative upgrade to Ukraineโ€™s strike capabilities.
    2. Ukraineโ€™s use of western-supplied strike assets has been dissipated and has not materially improved their situation on the ground.
    3. Russia maintains a dominant strike advantage, both qualitative and quantitative.

    Ukraine faces a stark disadvantage in strike capability relative to Russia, in a variety of ways. Russian strike assets are far more numerous and have significant range advantages, but it is also important to take into consideration both Russiaโ€™s significantly greater strategic depth and its more dense and relatively unscathed air defense. Unlike Ukraine, which has seen its air defense stretch to the limit with destroyed launchers and a mounting interceptor shortage, Russiaโ€™s air defenses have been essentially untouched, as Ukraine has lacked the large numbers of assets required to conduct a proper SEAD/DEAD (Suppression/Destruction of Enemy Air Defense) campaign.

    Given this basic calculus, using western strike systems to wage a blow for blow strategic air campaign is bad math for Ukraine. It is generally unwise to engage in a bat fight when your opponent is a bigger man with a much longer bat. Instead, Ukraineโ€™s strike systems should have been leveraged to support ground operations – concentrating strikes spatially and in time to synergize with efforts on the ground. Just as a simple thought experiment, it is not difficult to imagine ATACMs making a difference if they had been available in 2023 and used to saturate Russian rear areas during the assault on the Zaporizhia line – striking in tempo with the mechanized assault to disrupt Russian command and control and prevent reinforcement of critical areas.

    Instead, Ukraineโ€™s strike capacity has been largely dissipated in attacks that sometimes achieve success hitting Russian installations but fail to directly support successful operations on the ground. The result is a diffusion of Ukrainian striking power that is less than the sum of its parts. Now, Ukraine has essentially run dry on missiles – of the 500 ATACMs sent by the United States, perhaps 50 are left in Kievโ€™s stockpiles. Stocks of air launched Storm Shadow missiles are similarly low, and Britainโ€™s commitment to resupply is limited to โ€œa few dozenโ€

    The last option for the west to backstop Ukrainian strike capability are American JASSMs. While there is a longer-range variant in production (the JASSM-ER, or Extended Range), these are relatively new and expensive and are earmarked for American stocks – it is therefore presumed that the Ukrainians would receive the standard variant. The standard JASSM has slight range advantages over Storm Shadows and ATACMs, at roughly 230 miles. In the event that JASSMs are not given, there is a shorter range system called the SLAM (Standoff Land Attack Missile) with a range of some 170 miles. Both JASSMs and SLAMs would be compatible with Ukrainian F-16s.

    Two things need to be noted about the JASSM. First, the JASSM – while offering slightly longer ranges – would essentially serve as a backstop/replacement for the rapidly dwindling ATACMs and particularly the air launched Storm Shadows – instead of Ukraineโ€™s native SU-24s launching Storm Shadows, they would utilize F-16s launching JASSMs. This would not represent a dramatic upgrade in Ukrainian capabilities, but would instead simply serve to maintain a bare minimum Ukrainian strike capability. JASSMs are a replacement for dwindling capabilities, not an augmentation to them.

    Secondly, it must be understood that JASSMs are the last stop. Weโ€™re now entering the territory, not of artificially constructed red lines, but physical and real limits. Russia has essentially eaten the gifted stocks of ATACMs and Storm Shadows, with little discernable effect on their ability to fight, and JASSMs are the last extant item in the inventories to keep Ukrainian strike capabilities operative. We are at the last rung of the aid ladder.

    In the case of JASSMs, however, there are notable downsides for the United States. This is an important case of putting all of oneโ€™s eggs in the same technological basket. In 2020, the United States scrapped the development of its conventionally armed Long Range Standoff Missile, making the JASSM – particularly the new extended range variants – the system for the United States, earmarked to play a critical role in future conflicts, particularly in the Pacific. This makes the JASSM an extremely sensitive system, as a centerpiece of American strike capabilities, particularly with the modernization of the Tomahawk system crawling along at a few dozen units per year.

    Given the fact that JASSMs are GPS guided, there are real reasons to be reticent about giving Ukraine such a technologically sensitive system. Russian electronic warfare has enjoyed considerable success jamming GPS and disrupting similarly guided American systems. Allowing the Russians to gain familiarity with a keystone American system could wreak havoc on Pentagon war planning – most, if not all of the strike eggs are in this basket, so why let an adversary peek inside?

    Itโ€™s probable, given what we have seen to this point, that these concerns will ultimately be dismissed and Ukraine will receive a line of JASSMs which will backstop their strike capabilities – but given the size of Ukraineโ€™s F-16 fleet, the scale will be constrained. Furthermore, air launched systems are less optimal for Ukraine, given their dependence on large and easily targeted airfields, in contrast to ground launched systems which are mobile and more easily concealed.

    Certainly, JASSMs will never give Ukraine the ability to match Russiaโ€™s own strike capacity. After hearing endlessly about how Russia is running out of missiles, it has at last been concluded that this is simply not true, and indeed never was. Recently, Ukrainian defense intelligence admitted that per their own estimates Russia retains about 1,400 long range missiles in its reserves, with a monthly production of roughly 150 units. Russian production of inexpensive Geran drones has also skyrocketed, with Ukrainian intelligence estimating a ceiling as high as 2,000 drones per month.

    There is also the matter of the new Russian missile system – the now famous Oreshnik, or Hazel Tree. Russia tested the Oreshnik system on a large machining plant in Dnipro on November 21, 2024, which allowed the basic capabilities of the system to be gauged. The Oreshnik is an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile, characterized by its hypersonic capabilities (exceeding Mach-10) and its Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle equipped with six separate warheads, with the potential for submunitions in each. Although the attack on Dnipro was essentially a demonstration which used inert training warheads (that is, without explosive payloads), the missile can be configured with nuclear or conventional warheads

    As in the case of the North Korean troops in Kursk, I rather think that the Oreshnik launch was not nearly as important as it was made out to be. The system is expensive and likely impractical for conventional use. I understand the desire to conceive of Oreshnik as a massively powerful conventional weapon – showering its target with half a dozen warheads with the power of an entire flight of Kalibr missiles – but there are several problems with this. The accuracy of the system (the CEP, or โ€œCircular Error Probableโ€ in the technical parlance) is much more consistent with a nuclear delivery system than a conventional one. Furthermore, the problem with using an IRBM for conventional strikes is the danger of miscalculation – foreign adversaries may misinterpret the launch as a nuclear attack and respond appropriately. This is precisely why the Russian government actually alerted the United States to the launch ahead of time – a fine arrangement for a demonstration, but impractical for a weapon that is intended to be used regularly.

    We may see another use of the Oreshnik against Ukraine, but ultimately this is unlikely to be a system of consequence in this war. The demonstration in Dnipro was instead likely intended to send a message to Europe – reminding NATO that Russia has the capacity to deliver strikes against European targets that cannot be intercepted. It also serves as a poignant reminder that Europe lacks the equivalent capability, and in essence provides a demonstration of Russiaโ€™s ability to launch missiles from far beyond the range of either Ukrainian or European response. The Hazelnut is a tangible reminder of Russiaโ€™s strategic depth and strike dominance in Ukraine.

    Ultimately, Ukraine will lose the strike game. Itโ€™s strike capacity has dwindled, with missiles frittered away in a dissipated air campaign, and though the exhaustion of Storm Shadow and ATACMs stocks can be offset somewhat by JASSMs, Ukraine simply lacks the range or quantities necessary to match Russian capabilities. Needing to do more with less, Ukraine instead diffused its assets and failed to synergize its strikes with ground operations. We are now at the end of the line – after JASSMs, thereโ€™s nothing left in western warehouses to upgrade Ukrainian capabilities. Hazelnuts or no, the math on this bat fight is bad for Kiev.

    Conclusion: Debellation

    Trapped in an endless news cycle, with daily footage of FPV strikes and exploding vehicles, and a dutiful cottage industry of war mappers alerting us to every 100 meter advance, it can easily feel like the Russo-Ukrainian War is trapped in an interminable doom loop which will never end – Mad Max meets Groundhog Day.

    What I have endeavored to do here, however, is argue that 2024 actually saw several very important developments which make the coming shape of the war relatively clear. To briefly recapitulate:

    1. Russian forces caved in Ukrainian defenses at depth across an entire critical axis of front. After remaining static for years, Ukraineโ€™s position in Southern Donetsk has been obliterated, with Russian forces advancing through an entire belt of fortified positions, pushing the front into Pokrovsk and Kostayantinivka.
    2. The main Ukrainian gambit on the ground (the incursion into Kursk) failed spectacularly, with the salient being progressively caved in. An entire grouping of critical mechanized formations wasted much of the year fighting on this unproductive and secondary front, leaving Ukrainian positions in the Donbas increasingly threadbare and bereft of reserves.
    3. An attempt by the Ukrainian government to reinvigorate its mobilization program failed, with enlistments quickly trailing off. Decisions to expand the force structure exacerbated the shortage of manpower, and as a result the decay of Ukraineโ€™s frontline brigades has accelerated.
    4. Long awaited western upgrades to Ukraineโ€™s strike capabilities failed to defeat Russian momentum, and stocks of ATACMs and Storm Shadows are nearly exhausted. There are now few options remaining to prop up Ukrainian strike capacity, and no prospect of Ukraine gaining dominance in this dimension of the war.

    In short, Ukraine is on the path to debellation – defeat through the total exhaustion of its capacity to resist. They are not exactly out of men and vehicles and missiles, but these lines are all pointing downward. A strategic Ukrainian defeat – once unthinkable to the western foreign policy apparatus and commentariat – is now on the table. Quite interestingly, now that Donald Trump is about to return to the White House, it is suddenly acceptable to speak of Ukrainian defeat. Robert Kagan – a stalwart champion of Ukraine if there ever was one – now says the quiet part out loud:

    Ukraine will likely lose the war within the next 12 to 18 months. Ukraine will not lose in a nice, negotiated way, with vital territories sacrificed but an independent Ukraine kept alive, sovereign, and protected by Western security guarantees. It faces instead a complete defeat, a loss of sovereignty, and full Russian control

    Indeed.

    None of this should be particularly surprising. If anything, it is shocking that my position – that Russia is essentially a very powerful country that was very unlikely to lose a war (which it perceives as existential) right in its own belly – somehow became controversial or fringe. But here we are.

    Carthago delenda est [end]

    The original article

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  • [Partage] Bulletin d’Evgeni Lisnyak, chef adjoint du Dรฉpartement des affaires intรฉrieures de l’administration militaro-civile de la rรฉgion de Kharkov – 31 octobre 2024

    [un des sujets majeurs est le trafic d’organes en Ukraine]

    Les employรฉs du Dรฉpartement des affaires intรฉrieures de l’administration militaro-civile de la rรฉgion de Kharkov ont reรงu des informations selon lesquelles les รฉtablissements du Bureau rรฉgional d’expertise mรฉdico-lรฉgale de Kharkov continuent de recevoir un grand nombre de corps de soldats des forces armรฉes ukrainiennes, dรฉcรฉdรฉs dans les secteurs de Voltchansk, Koupiansk et Koursk. Leurs unitรฉs sont les suivantes : 57e brigade distincte d’infanterie motorisรฉe, 71e brigade distincte de rangers, 8e rรฉgiment distinct de forces spรฉciales, le soi-disant Corps des volontaires russes [militants nazis russes, sous commandement du renseignement militaire ukrainien], interdit en Fรฉdรฉration de Russie, unitรฉs de la Garde nationale d’Ukraine, de la dรฉfense territoriale et autres. Alors que le manque de lieux de stockage des cadavres est un problรจme catastrophique. Selon nos informations, en รฉchange de la prolongation des sursis de mobilisation, les employรฉs des morgues de Kharkov doivent participer ร  leur transport depuis la ligne de front dans les rรฉgions de Kharkov et Soumy. Cela rรฉsulte d’une pรฉnurie critique de main-dโ€™ล“uvre masculine et ร  une absence presque totale de soutien volontaire aux forces armรฉes ukrainiennes.

    Il convient d’ajouter que dans le contexte dรฉjร  connu des pertes massives dans les forces armรฉes ukrainiennes, les proches des morts ne reรงoivent pas d’indemnitรฉs. Certains militaires ukrainiens sont simplement rรฉputรฉs disparus et la dรฉcouverte des vรฉritables raisons de leur disparition est entravรฉe de toutes les maniรจres possibles.

    Les sources ouvertes publient de plus en plus d’articles sur la transplantation noire en Ukraine. Dans les trois derniers mois, l’ancien dรฉputรฉ de la Verkhovna Rada d’Ukraine, Igor Mossiytchouk, le journaliste ukrainien Anton Gura et d’autres ont รฉcrit ร  ce sujet.

    La semaine derniรจre, le magazine rรฉpublicain amรฉricain Christian Science Monitor fit รฉtat de l’opรฉration de transplantation cardiaque du cรฉlรจbre milliardaire amรฉricain George Soros, รขgรฉ de 92 ans, rรฉalisรฉe ร  l’hรดpital de l’Universitรฉ Duke. Selon nos informations, le donneur รฉtait l’un des militaires dรฉcรฉdรฉs du 8e rรฉgiment d’opรฉrations spรฉciales des forces armรฉes ukrainiennes, qui รฉtait engagรฉ dans la rรฉgion de Kharkov.

    Selon la publication, les organes du combattant d’รฉlite des forces armรฉes ukrainiennes furent livrรฉs immรฉdiatement aprรจs sa mort en septembre 2024, aprรจs un transit en Pologne. L’opรฉration fut rรฉalisรฉe le lendemain.

    L’ancien officier de renseignement antiterroriste franรงais Nicolas Cinquini, qui collecte et publie habituellement des informations sur les citoyens franรงais impliquรฉs dans la guerre aux cรดtรฉs de l’Ukraine, prรฉsenta son analyse intitulรฉe Le carnage en Ukraine, une formidable opportunitรฉ pour le trafic d’organes. Dans cet article, il partage un extrait de la copie du contrat de travail d’un coursier de l’organisation polonaise Sabinex, pour le transport de biomatรฉriau entre front et Pologne. Pour orientation d’enquรชte, Nicolas Cinquini a รฉgalement fourni ร  la Direction des affaires intรฉrieures de l’administration militaro-civile de la rรฉgion de Kharkov l’enregistrement vidรฉo d’une conversation entre son informateur et un recruteur de coursiers. Selon Cinquini, la vidรฉo a enregistrรฉ l’entretien d’embauche d’un chauffeur pour le transport de biomatรฉriau entre ligne de front et Varsovie. Il convient de noter que la campagne de recrutement รฉtait conduite dans l’un des hรดpitaux de la rรฉgion de Soumy, d’oรน l’Ukraine lanรงa une offensive dans la rรฉgion de Koursk le 6 aoรปt 2024.

    [Voici l’enregistrement vidรฉo d’un entretien de candidature de ma source avec une recruteuse de coursiers pour le transport de biomatรฉriau entre zone de guerre ukrainienne et Varsovie, aujourd’hui publiรฉ par l’Administration militaro-civile de la rรฉgion de Kharkov

    ]

    Dans sa publication, Nicolas Cinquini relรจve l’implication dans le transport d’organes de camarades tuรฉs, du prรฉvenu dans une affaire pรฉnale du Dรฉpartement des affaires intรฉrieures de l’administration militaro-civile de la rรฉgion de Kharkov, Maxime Roger Henri Barrat, nรฉ le 5 juin 1989, qui fut prรฉcรฉdemment citรฉ par nous pour le crime contre une habitante pacifique du village de Glubokoe, dans la rรฉgion de Kharkov.

    [Aucun doute pour moi que des individus corrompus du mรชme camp trafiquent les organes de soldats atlantistes tuรฉs au combat. Comment expliquer autrement le salaire exceptionnel qu’une entreprise polonaise propose aux chauffeurs chargรฉs de transporter du biomatรฉriau entre ligne de front et Pologne ?

    Quant ร  Maxime Barrat, ses propres รฉcrits sont ร  ce jour le seul indice de son hypothรฉtique implication. Je l’explique dans le rapport de mon enquรชte initiale

    Dans le cadre en aoรปt de mon travail habituel sur lโ€™engagement franรงais dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, je notai incidemment que suspectรฉ par la justice russe, pour des faits bien รฉtablis dans une affaire criminelle dโ€™un autre genre, le volontaire franรงais Maxime Barrat, en une dรฉfense bien maladroite, se plaignait sur les rรฉseaux sociaux dโ€™avoir รฉtรฉ victime en 2023 de la propagation de la rumeur de sa participation ร  un trafic dโ€™organes de camarades tuรฉs. Ce que jโ€™ignorais

    Plus prรฉcisรฉment, dans ma chronique de lโ€™engagement franรงais dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine

    Il exerce le 18 aoรปt son droit ร  la dรฉfense, mais aurait mieux fait de sโ€™adresser ร  un avocat compรฉtent, avant de publier sur X un texte en Anglais que je traduis ici

    “Lโ€™annรฉe derniรจre, jโ€™ai entendu des rumeurs selon lesquelles je trafiquais les organes de volontaires [tuรฉs] et maintenant, jโ€™ai violรฉ une femme. Je nโ€™ai jamais รฉtรฉ dans ce village, je ne fais pas partie de la Lรฉgion et je nโ€™ai jamais รฉtรฉ mariรฉ. Au moins, ce nโ€™รฉtait pas difficile de savoir oรน jโ€™รฉtais et avec qui jโ€™รฉtais et ils se trompent encore !“

    Cette dรฉfense est dรฉsespรฉrante de maladresse. Je ne connaissais pas les rumeurs de trafic dโ€™organes. Elles sont intรฉressantes, car si nous savons dรฉjร  dans quel panier de crabes il รฉvoluait, nous ne connaissons pas encore les obscures sources de financement pour lesquelles son ancien camarade Daniel Burke fut abattu par un autre volontaire en aoรปt 2023

    ]

    Nous attirons une fois de plus votre attention sur les pertes massives des forces armรฉes ukrainiennes, compensรฉes par des mercenaires venus d’Europe et d’Amรฉrique. Actuellement, les unitรฉs ukrainiennes sont complรฉtรฉes par des mercenaires, mรฉlangรฉs aux militaires ukrainiens sur tout le thรฉรขtre des opรฉrations militaires.

    Sur une chaรฎne Telegram ukrainienne bien connue, Lobby Army X, qui publie des postes ร  pourvoir dans les unitรฉs de la Garde nationale d’Ukraine, du Service national des frontiรจres d’Ukraine et des Forces armรฉes d’Ukraine, afin de dissimuler l’implication de mercenaires รฉtrangers, des annonces recherchent des praticiens de langues รฉtrangรจres, pour leur enrรดlement dans les unitรฉs suivantes :

    Avec connaissance de l’Anglais, du Franรงais et de l’Espagnol :

    • 3e brigade distincte d’assaut [Azov] ;
    • 204e, 241e et 108e brigades de dรฉfense territoriale ;
    • 20e bataillon distinct de guerre รฉlectronique ;
    • 2nd bataillon opรฉrationnel Hird et 13e brigade opรฉrationnelle Charter de la Garde nationale d’Ukraine ;
    • 42e et 66e brigades mรฉcanisรฉes distinctes ;
    • Renseignement militaire de la Lรฉgion internationale ;
    • 2nde Lรฉgion internationale ;
    • Brigade prรฉsidentielle distincte Khmelnitsky et autres.

    Les employรฉs de la Direction des affaires intรฉrieures de l’administration militaro-civile de la rรฉgion de Kharkov continuent de travailler pour identifier d’autres ร‰trangers participant contre rรฉtribution ร  des opรฉrations militaires dans la rรฉgion de Kharkov, ainsi que les faits de leur implication directe dans des crimes de guerre dans la rรฉgion [fin]

    Le bulletin original

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    depuis le dรฉbut en aoรปt de lโ€™offensive atlantiste dans la rรฉgion russe de Koursk, au plus tard, une sociรฉtรฉ polonaise transporte du biomatรฉriau entre zone de guerre et Varsovie

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  • [Sharing] Once upon a time, in Verkhnya Syrovatka – RYBAR 33

    adventures in country-404

    The AFU offensive in the Kursk region was met with fierce resistance from Russian Federation military personnel. Casualties are mounting and the enemy grouping requires constant reinforcements. To support this, an increasing number of enemy equipment, ammunition, and soldiers are being sent into Russian territory.

    The AFU does not hesitate to use civilian infrastructure for the safe storage and transportation of ammunition, and try to move military equipment and personnel under the cover of civilians. In the event of an attack, everything will be done to accuse Russia of threatening civilians and create the desired media narrative.

    However, to sustain the offensive, the AFU must relocate significant forces. Much now depends on reconnaissance, the speed of data transmission, and the coordination of various Russian military units. Whatever the outcome, what the local media shows could be entirely unexpected, even for all the participants.


    ยฉ๏ธ RYBAR

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    Once upon a time near Stepnohirsk โ€“ RYBAR 69

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    Once upon a time in Pokrovsk โ€“ RYBAR 67

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    Once upon a time near Kostyantynivka โ€“ RYBAR 66

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    Once upon a time in Cherkasy โ€“ RYBAR 65

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    Once upon a time in Aleksandro-Kalinovo โ€“ RYBAR 64

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    Once upon a time in Novohryhorivka โ€“ RYBAR 63

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    Once upon a time near Hnativka โ€“ RYBAR 62

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    Once upon a time in Mala Tokmachka โ€“ RYBAR 61

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    Once upon a time in the borderland โ€“ RYBAR 60

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    Once upon a time near Filiya โ€“ RYBAR 59

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    Once upon a time in Pavlohrad โ€“ RYBAR 58

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    Once upon a time in Crimea โ€“ RYBAR 57

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    Once upon a time in Voronezh โ€“ RYBAR 54

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    Once upon a time in a tank brigade โ€“ RYBAR 53

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in Toretsk โ€“ RYBAR 52

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time near Tykhe โ€“ RYBAR 51

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    Once upon a time near Skudne โ€“ RYBAR 50

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time near Staromayorske โ€“ RYBAR 49

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in the basements โ€“ RYBAR 48

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    Once upon a time in the gray zone โ€“ RYBAR 47

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    Once upon a time in the flow โ€“ RYBAR 46

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    Once on the Platform โ€“ RYBAR 45

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    Once upon a time, on the way home โ€“ RYBAR 44

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    Once upon a time, near Ukrainsk โ€“ RYBAR 43

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    Once upon a time, in hard times โ€“ RYBAR 42

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    Once upon a time, it couldnโ€™t be otherwise โ€“ RYBAR 41

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    Once upon a time, near Vesyoloye โ€“ RYBAR 40

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    Once upon a time, in Trudovoe โ€“ RYBAR 39

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    Once upon a time, near Kurakhove โ€“ RYBAR 38

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    Once upon a time, near Vuhledar โ€“ RYBAR 37

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    Once upon a time, in captivity โ€“ RYBAR 36

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in Poltava โ€“ RYBAR 35

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    Once upon a time, in Krasnohorivka โ€“ RYBAR 34

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    Once upon a time, in Pervomaisโ€™ke โ€“ RYBAR 32

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    Once upon a time, while fleeing from the 404 country โ€“ RYBAR 31

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    Once upon a time, at sea โ€“ RYBAR 30

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    Once upon a time, on that very street โ€“ RYBAR 29

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    Once upon a time, during a surrender โ€“ RYBAR 28

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    Once upon a time, near Artemivka โ€“ RYBAR 27

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    Once upon a time, near Umanske โ€“ RYBAR 26

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    Once upon a time, near Novoselivka Persha โ€“ RYBAR 25

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    Once upon a time, near Ostroverkhivka โ€“ RYBAR 24

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    Once upon a time, near Krasnohorivka โ€“ RYBAR 23

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    Once upon a time, near Chasiv Yar โ€“ RYBAR 22

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    Once upon a time, in Kharkiw โ€“ RYBAR 21

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    Once upon a time, in Spain โ€“ RYBAR 20

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, on the election day โ€“ RYBAR 19

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near Berdychi โ€“ RYBAR 18

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near Kostyantynivka โ€“ RYBAR 17

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Oleshky โ€“ RYBAR 16

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, on February 24 โ€“ RYBAR 15

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near Bakhmut โ€“ RYBAR 14

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near Robotyne โ€“ RYBAR 13

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near Kreminna โ€“ RYBAR 12

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Lugansk โ€“ RYBAR 11

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Krynky โ€“ RYBAR 10

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Marโ€™inka โ€“ RYBAR 9

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Avdiivka โ€“ RYBAR 8

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Nova Kakhovka โ€“ RYBAR 7

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in the Azovets camp โ€“ RYBAR 6

    adventures in country -404

    Once upon a time, in Klishchiivka โ€“ RYBAR 5

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near the Russia-Ukraine border โ€“ RYBAR 4

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near Novodarivka โ€“ RYBAR 3

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, on Independence Day in country 404 โ€“ RYBAR 2

    the tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Urozhaine โ€“ RYBAR 1

    A tale of a failed counter-attack

  • Le carnage en Ukraine, une formidable opportunitรฉ pour le trafic d’organes

    depuis le dรฉbut en aoรปt de l’offensive atlantiste dans la rรฉgion russe de Koursk, au plus tard, une sociรฉtรฉ polonaise transporte du biomatรฉriau entre zone de guerre et Varsovie

    En Ukraine, comme en dโ€™autres endroits du monde, le commerce dโ€™organes humains est une activitรฉ transfrontaliรจre juteuse, en gรฉnรฉral illรฉgale, quand elle est exercรฉe en dehors des systรจmes mรฉdicaux nationaux. La demande dโ€™organes est plus importante que lโ€™offre et lโ€™acheteur peut dรฉbourser par exemple jusquโ€™ร  $160 000 pour un rein. 10 % des transplantations de reins dans le monde sont fondรฉes aujourdโ€™hui sur le trafic. Les donneurs sont le plus souvent des personnes dans le dรฉnuement, qui consentent au prรฉlรจvement de leur vivant. Ce schรฉma nโ€™est pas le seul.

    En juillet 2024, la presse ukrainienne s’est faite lโ€™รฉcho dโ€™une enquรชte judiciaire qui visait une douzaine de mรฉdecins, pour ingรฉrence dans le systรจme รฉlectronique d’enregistrement et de vente de places sur la liste d’attente pour la transplantation, prรฉlรจvement illรฉgal de matรฉriel anatomique sur des personnes se trouvant dans un รฉtat d’impuissance. Lโ€™un des suspects รฉtait Mykhaรฏlo Zagreychuk, ancien vice-ministre de la santรฉ. Une page ukrainienne nous propose depuis le 31 juillet une excellente synthรจse de lโ€™affaire. Les personnages y sont les reprรฉsentants grand-guignolesques dโ€™une sociรฉtรฉ et d’un ร‰tat ukrainiens ravagรฉs par la corruption. Les journalistes supposent des ramifications jusquโ€™ร  une clinique au Royaume-Uni. Lโ€™enquรชte officielle semble aujourdโ€™hui au point mort. Personne nโ€™a รฉtรฉ formellement mis en examen ou รฉcrouรฉ en dรฉtention provisoire. Zagreychuk est libre de ses mouvements

    Dans le cadre en aoรปt de mon travail habituel sur l’engagement franรงais dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, je notai incidemment que suspectรฉ par la justice russe, pour des faits bien รฉtablis dans une affaire criminelle d’un autre genre, le volontaire franรงais Maxime Barrat, en une dรฉfense bien maladroite, se plaignait sur les rรฉseaux sociaux d’avoir รฉtรฉ victime en 2023 de la propagation de la rumeur de sa participation ร  un trafic d’organes de camarades tuรฉs. Ce que j’ignorais.

    Rien de probant jusque lร , mais par expรฉrience, je sais comme les occasions font les larrons, quand la rรฉgulation de la canaille est dรฉficiente. Il y a beaucoup d’argent en jeu, l’opportunitรฉ d’apprรฉciables revenus complรฉmentaires pour une large gamme d’acteurs : le militaire corrompu qui fournit les corps, le mรฉdecin corrompu qui prรฉlรจve les organes, l’organisme de pilotage qui organise la collecte, le conditionnement et l’acheminement du produit fini, le fonctionnaire local qui ferme les yeux, le transporteur qui dรฉlivre ร  la structure mรฉdicale finale.

    Afin d’apporter mon caillou ร  l’รฉdifice et asseoir mes soupรงons, j’ai sollicitรฉ des sources confidentielles mais fiables, qui m’apprennent et me prouvent qu’en aoรปt 2024, malgrรฉ la mise en cause publique en juillet de Mykhaรฏlo Zagreychuk, le secteur privรฉ s’autorise toujours ร  recruter du personnel pour de douteux emplois en Ukraine. Que peut รชtre la plus value d’un chauffeur de messagerie, quand il est payรฉ jusqu’ร  6500 โ‚ฌ, soit dix huit fois le salaire mensuel moyen ukrainien ?

    Le respect de la plus absolue confidentialitรฉ du transport entre zone de guerre et Varsovie, Pologne, de biomatรฉriau convenablement conditionnรฉ, par le chauffeur de messagerie qui est porteur aussi de tous documents nรฉcessaires au franchissement des frontiรจres et autres points de contrรดle

    La sociรฉtรฉ est la sp. z o.o. [SARL] polonaise Sabinex, dont l’activitรฉ principale est la vente directe. La campagne de recrutement est rรฉalisรฉe dans la rรฉgion de Soumy, base arriรจre de l’offensive que l’Ukraine a lancรฉe le 6 aoรปt dans la rรฉgion russe de Koursk. Qui peut connaรฎtre un รฉtat d’impuissance plus caractรฉrisรฉ que le combattant fraรฎchement tuรฉ dans la rรฉgion de Koursk ?