Analista senior di l'intelligenza in u campu di a gestione di i risichi di sicurezza, sรฒ un anzianu tenente detective รจ ufficiale di l'intelligenza in l'agenzie di u Statu francese. A bona pronuncia hรจ ะะธะบะพะปะฐะน ะงะธะฝะบัะธะฝะธ, in russu
The first time I learned about Kent McLellan “Boneface” was through the investigation of Vasily Prozorov a former employee of the Ukrainian Security Services now uncovering the hidden truths of Ukraine on his channel UKRLEAKS [on Telegram].
Then Boneface himself contacted my colleague Truthseeker77 wanting to challenge some of the reports I have made on my channel about him. We decided to ask Boneface for an interview, we would laid the questions together, and Truthseeker77 would conduct all the โinterrogatoryโ to the US Neo Nazi.
The results of this work not only produced the written interview with Mclellan about his time in Ukraine but also videos and information about his past troubles with the American authorities and a insight to the mindset of a US white supremacist thanks to the excellent job of my colleague.
Kent Ryan McLellan, April 22, 1990, St. Cloud (Florida). Son of the front man of neo Nazi rock band Brutal Attack, in high school, he already became a member of the racist organization “The American Front”. He was first arrested at the age of 18 in September 2008 for racist graffiti. In 2010, he served time for vandalism and beating immigrants. In May 2012, the FBI detained McLellan and his accomplices from the “American Front” for preparing a terrorist act against national minorities in Florida.
He joined the ranks of the “Ukrainian Volunteer Corps of the Right Sector” (DUK RS) in 2014 for a number of months going back to the US to keep running Misanthropic Division and its recruitment campaign for Ukraine. In January 2022, returned to Ukraine and joined Azov Battalion.
When did you heard about Ukraine first?
Ukraine as political situation; I’ve always known it existed as a nation. That’s clear. As far as being a skinhead/white nationalist goes, the videos from Tesak, in which he had a huge following in Ukraine, not just Russia.
What organizations did you contact and how?
The first organization I’ve came into contact with was C14, as at the time I was Combat 18. Which is it’s Western equivalent.
I kept contact with them predominantly with vk.com [VKontakte, Russian social networking service], it was difficult and still is difficult to maintain a page on most social media. My original vk.com account was vk.com/kenthate [blocked for violation of VK terms of service].
I was publishing information in which someone had essentially said the ISIS movement and the national-socialists are the same. So I published a thesis about the Islamic State and their hatred for nationalism, using one of their propaganda videos.
After C14 shared it, Francisco got in contact with me. He was Misanthropic Division.
From there I didn’t immediately joined, but I respected a lot of their publishing. We had a brief fallout in 2012 after the FBI arrested me for helping run a training camp here in Florida.
I remember the Kiev protests were just starting. A lot of the guys from C14 and at the time what became Right Sector, (Svoboda, Blue Boys, C14, Blood and Honor, Slavic Union), we’re attending this. It wasn’t long before things got crazy into it. People we’re leaving the protest sites and simply vanishing. It wasn’t long before Vodafone started getting jammed up. So I formed a squad of guys to essentially get around the DNS, and create a patch in network so people could coordinate with one another
Boneface in Ukraine in the ranks of Right Sector. 2014
How did you travel there?
I earned an OSCP [hacking] certification with Offensive Security, got a passport. I got there in 2014. I got a 9-day visa, ticket there and back, with no real meaning of actually returning. That was the first time.
By the time I went I was already running Misanthropic Division in the United States.
How was the relation of the general public with the ultras, how much open was the fascist dominance compared with the reports of the Western media, how many ultras where there roughly?
The public were the ultras, as crazy as it sounds. Everyone was patriotic. Back then, everyone knew what was happening. BBC reported, Americans reported it.
As far as ultra groups went, there wasn’t that many in number of actual organizations. Everyone was pretty much C14 and the title “Pravyi sektor [Right Sector] absorbed everything else.
They hosted events nearly daily in every oblast that wasn’t seeing war.
How many people from foreign countries were there?
Foreign members included a lot from Georgia, Latvia, America, Finland, a lot of skinheads.
In case the world wonders what happened to all the real skinheads. They all went to Ukraine.
What groups in the US support them?
Ukraine doesn’t work very closely anymore with the Americans. There is a American DUK, even Misanthropic Division had its own goals here vs what they had going on there. Ukraine has their shit together.
Just look at Florida, It’s all literal trash. With no clear aims as a movement, no goals and outside of 2014, real militants failed to exist as a collective in the White Power world.
In fact, most militias existing in the United States today are a result of Atom Waffen [Atom Waffen Division, international Nazi group based in the US], and the Misanthropic Division [international Nazi organization based in Ukraine].
What you did while in Ukraine, what people and from where you met there?
I wasn’t by far the first person to go to Ukraine. We sent several others, we kept having hiccups in all this. Dalton; Lane, are noted individuals. We did this entirely on our own, out of our pockets, etc.
I never knew the circumstances of Lane, and what he was running from. But it wasn’t until they both got there and decided to live in Ukraine, that we had a stable reliable enough route for Americans to reach Ukraine and not be stranded at air ports.
At this point I didn’t really know what to think, the training regiment wasn’t anything like you see with Americans.
It wasn’t dehumanizing. A lot of what would become Azov spoke English and it was mandatory to study Russian.
Right Sector controlled nearly everything as far as the militant nationalists went.
How did fellow Azov members accepted you?
They weren’t Azov yet, but yeah they took me well. Ukrainians didn’t really, because of the language barrier. They must’ve thought I was retarded.
This time around I was first placed with the 227th recon, which was a slap in the face for me. It wasn’t until after the war and I made it rightfully back into the second battalion, with people I knew.
How was your deployment time in Mariupol with Azov Battalion?
During the first run of Mariupol when the awkward stand off and fear-thick atmosphere finally wore off, there was a lot of shooting at absolute nothing, and a lot of soldiers not knowing what to do. Myself included at that.
The citizens of Mariupol itself were divided heavily on pro Ukraine and a pro Russian stance.
There were occasional Russian soldiers in the mix of things, this can be attested to a dozen or so pro Russian separatist prisoners
Did the U.S. government entice you or help you in any way?
As far as the government goes. During the Maidan coup, I got caught teaching the UKR guys DNS poisoning (placing false information in a DNS resolver cache on internet).
They wanted to sit in and help. They didn’t want names or anything, but they wanted to monitor the situation. Without this backing I would’ve been charged with violation of American neutrality act. Which is a law written in 1784.
Have you witnessed war crimes committed by any Ukrainian battalions?
Before I was even deployed I remember hearing about a bunch of red anarchists killed in Odessa.
Tornado [Ukrainian Nazi battalion] was by far the most horrifying thing I’ve ever seen or dealt with in my life. I’m in that botched crucifying video I’m not even wearing a mask.
I remember being deployed from Kiev to Mariupol. The dress uniform of what became Azov, was not by any means tactical. We were told to expect the presence of GRU [Russian military intelligence] as-well as militia formed by leftists in Donbass.
I’ve seen some shit with the first go around in Ukraine. I can only really sum up Mariupol with, ” It’s warโ. This is were a lot of heinous shit started.
Interrogation happens. I had a job interrogating a lot. The treatment of such people is the same with the Russians I would guess.
I remember being asked to photograph Aidar [Ukrainian Nazi battalion] and Tornado members posing with the corpses of a lynched pregnant woman and a man they said was her husband.
The video can be found it’s titled “Kikes get the rope” but it literally has nothing to do with Jewish people. I wouldn’t have supported an action like that anyway.
Tornado was a weird bunch of guys. Some of them were of Chechen decent and that’s were I learned the history of Dagestan and the insanity that happened in Grozny.
What is the weapon of your choice?
I was a gunner for the most part. PKM [light machine gun], Kalashnikov.
Why- being a gunner requires a knowledge of all aspects. It’s not simply firing blindly.
You have to understand infantry, you have to understand armor.
You have to work with other gunners and be able to be the eyes for literally everyone and while being the most obvious target in the field.
Without gunners, armored columns are useless.
Areas outside of a chain, that are not visible, you have to reach. You have to be able to trap a line of men and manipulate their actions into doing what you want them to do.
This also comes with infantry tactics, and being able to work the mechanics of a PKM, which isn’t a easy weapon.
Especially when the felt tip tools for some reason keep disappearing from the weapon.
Were you paid to do this? And by whom? Did you get a salary?
I was never paid, I in fact ruined myself economically by going to Ukraine. I couldn’t imagine doing that for any value.
I wasn’t paid. No.
During the time we were in talks with the CIA and the Pentagon, (Mariupol). It is true the Pentagon conducted intelligence operations during the war there.
Why did you return to the U.S.?
I didn’t intend too. I was shipped back on a order after some SBU [Ukrainian State security agency, counter-intelligence] guys got caught cooperating with Russians, they planned on apparently killing me in the SBU hospital in Kiev.
Are Russian and DNR [Donetsk People’s Republic] troops worthy opponents?
Russia in comparison to the DPR:
The DPR we’re at first the best soldiers in the field this time go around, as far as Russian allies go. Their mortar teams were highly accurate and often worked with infantry, they moved like clock work. They generally had no fear for any actions they carried out.
The first waves of Russian soldiers I nearly felt bad for. The air force, is obviously a very skilled endeavor on the Russian team.
They naval infantry teams used on Mariupol we’re lacking in the ability to adapt. This is only the naval infantrymen, I’ve had quite the job during the first few weeks in Mariupol as interrogating prisoners, I had these videos on my YouTube channel. There was quite a lot of them who didn’t want to fight, and who claim they weren’t their to fight.
Then the third guard Spetznaz [Russian special forces] came. Which was a entirely different story.
The worst of all things that undermined Russian advances, was the constant bombarding of Mariupol, while they were also trying to make advances. To understand this, you’ll have to understand how explosives work.
It’s not the blast that kills you, it’s the energy released from these things. It’s like going into a fully conscious seizure, everything gets covered in this dust that turns everything a faded yellow. You can literally taste it. It’s chemical as fuck.
Whereas the Azov Regiment, and The DPR both were native to Mariupol and the Donetsk oblast, in theory. The Russian infantry would often become lost on hostile land.
The DPR and LPR [Lugansk People’s Republic] guys seemed to be the ones who knew how to navigate through Mariupol a lot better. They were fearsome. The second battalion (Azov) and them (Sparta [pro-Russia battalion from Donetsk]) have a historic feud, as you know.
It’s never easy to move or maintain a level of total competency while being shot at, or maintaining heavy stresses. They did. You have got to respect them off the field
Are you in direct contact with your old comrades there?
I talk to a number of them daily.
Frostovik had most of my footage along as his own. David Ruslan as well. That guy’s a fucking beast. I was with him when he lost his leg. The attack killed another Azov member.
Will you go back to fight?
I’m not entirely sure of going back. Depends on my health. I had heavy metal poisoning, still ongoing through chelation therapy from the whole ordeal.
I support Azov, to the fullest. But I don’t support NATO, or the EU, but ultimately I feel as if NATO gets involved there won’t be anything, as far as a nationalist goes, worth or left fighting for.
How do you see the conflict from a geopolitical perspective?
American meddling in Ukraine has caused the Russian invasion.
Ukraine war can be simply placed by two prospectives, the nationalist war, and Zelenski’s war.
Zelenski is the powers which be, and the nationalists are the obvious.
It needs to be noted that;
The Ukrainian Government has tried to bench Azov, and the DUK on three different occasions. Once their usefulness for the NATO regime ran out.
The head of the Right Sector even said before he was assassinated in Kiev: “We’re not finished yet, in the Maidan”.
This is clearly World War three.
I would like to see Russia just go home, and while the government in Kiev is frail another (Maidan) revolution.
I don’t see Russia as the victim here. But I do see Russia as provoked. Beyond all realms of reason, people have to be able to see that not everything is black and white here.
In fact this war only helped us get denied for NATO. No one wants that war with Russia.
I don’t believe that Ukraine has any issues in the future with Russia nuclear capability. Russia can handle a loss to Ukraine, but I don’t for see Russia handling a loss if NATO jumps in this. Does that make sense?
Moscow won’t be Berlin in 1945.
As long as the war stays in Ukraine, I think nuclear war isn’t in the goal post.
What do you think of how Western media reports on it?
There is a ton of liberal white washing when it comes to fascists in Ukraine:
“Nazis don’t exist’ “Azov battalion and Azov regiment are different โ , “They took all the Nazis out of Azovโ.
We know all these to be false, and to a guy who knew and been there; I see it has pure disrespect to tarnish the legacy of a lot of those who died.
Clearly they don’t know what to think of it. I speak out against the white washing of nationalists by the media. Despite the fact they blasted us for years and even the Ukrainians tried to force fully uproot Azov at one point.
I use Twitter to mainly troll the (western) left, as they believe Ukraine military isn’t full of nationalist ideals.
So you actually can grasp whatโs happened. Do you admit that it was a mistake for you to go to Ukraine?
I don’t regret Ukraine. I just can’t make it clear enough that the nationalists in Ukraine are not the same as the nationalists here in the US who are all basically inbred.
I feel the war that the nationalists are fighting is entirely different than the one the state is fighting. I know there was massive celebration when Ukraine was denied for NATO.
I notice a lot of Americans don’t even know nations like Ossetia exist, the Georgian invasion of such places, so on so fourth. They just think Russia decides to bomb the fuck out of places for no reason.
Similar to World War two, everything and every move had a reason. Ukraine unfortunately is stuck in the middle of that.
The butler documentary strikes a chord.
The United States has only been at peace for 22 years of it’s existence.
The right to maintain a navy, (The Marines are owned by the department of the navy, though controlled by the president) has kept us in a state of conflict, which obviously keeps the military at a rate. The Obama administration hurt the American military. Badly. I can hardly tell what losses we will take as a nation if we put troops on the ground there.
Did you have a fascist upbringing? Someone in your family filling your head with that ideology? Just curious. US/CIA media brainwashed Americans to hate Russia. Is that what happened in your case?
Honestly I grew up in the north. When I was a skinhead originally I was a traditional. I didn’t have any say in politics. I was 12.
I didn’t really know how big of a deal my dad was as he lived in England.
Even growing up and eventually getting into third position politics I was asked to not talk about it, as it would piss off people, in the sense of making me look entitled to something. So I didn’t.
I came up under David Lynch, Mark Faella and James Porozzo in the American Front.
Smartest people I knew, they had differing beliefs and forming your own opinion was a big deal to them.
I think James is actually pro Russian for whatever reason. Dave is dead and Mark retired after the FBI arrest [end]
chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Ukraine against Russia
Like dominos, African states are one by one falling outside the shackles of neocolonialism. Chad, Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and now Gabon are saying ‘non’ to France’s longtime domination of African financial, political, economic, and security affairs
(The Cradle)
By adding two new African member-states to its roster, last week’s summit in Johannesburg heralding the expanded BRICS 11 showed once again that Eurasian integration is inextricably linked to the integration of Afro-Eurasia.
Belarus is now proposing to hold a joint summit between BRICS 11, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the Eurasia Economic Union (EAEU). President Aleksandr Lukashenko’s vision for the convergence of these multilateral organizations may, in due time, lead to the Mother of All Multipolarity Summits.
But Afro-Eurasia is a much more complicated proposition. Africa still lags far behind its Eurasian cousins on the road toward breaking the shackles of neocolonialism.
The continent today faces horrendous odds in its fight against the deeply entrenched financial and political institutions of colonization, especially when it comes to smashing French monetary hegemony in the form of the Franc CFA – or the Communautรฉ Financiรจre Africaine (African Financial Community).
Still, one domino is falling after another โ Chad, Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and now Gabon. This process has already turned Burkina Faso’s President Captain Ibrahim Traorรฉ, into a new hero of the multipolar world โ as a dazed and confused collective west canโt even begin to comprehend the blowback represented by its 8 coups in West and Central Africa in less than 3 years.
Bye bye Bongo
Military officers decided to take power in Gabon after hyper pro-France President Ali Bongo won a dodgy election that โlacked credibility.โ Institutions were dissolved. Borders with Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, and the Republic of Congo were closed. All security deals with France were annulled. No one knows what will happen with the French military base.
All that was as popular as it comes: soldiers took to the streets of the capital Libreville in joyful singing, cheered on by onlookers.
Bongo and his father, who preceded him, have ruled Gabon since 1967. He was educated at a French private school and graduated from the Sorbonne. Gabon is a small nation of 2.4 million with a small army of 5,000 personnel that could fit into Donald Trumpโs penthouse. Over 30 percent of the population lives on less than $1 a day, and in over 60 percent of regions have zero access to healthcare and drinking water.
The military qualified Bongoโs 14-year rule as leading to a “deterioration in social cohesionโ that was plunging the country โinto chaos.”
On cue, French mining company Eramet suspended its operations after the coup. Thatโs a near monopoly. Gabon is all about lavish mineral wealth โ in gold, diamonds, manganese, uranium, niobium, iron ore, not to mention oil, natural gas, and hydropower. In OPEC-member Gabon, virtually the whole economy revolves around mining.
The case of Niger is even more complex. France exploits uranium and high-purity petrol as well as other types of mineral wealth. And the Americans are on site, operating three bases in Niger with up to 4,000 military personnel. The key strategic node in their โEmpire of Basesโ is the drone facility in Agadez, known as Niger Air Base 201, the second-largest in Africa after Djibouti.
French and American interests clash, though, when it comes to the saga over the Trans-Sahara gas pipeline. After Washington broke the umbilical steel cord between Russia and Europe by bombing the Nord Streams, the EU, and especially Germany, badly needed an alternative.
Algerian gas supply can barely cover southern Europe. American gas is horribly expensive. The ideal solution for Europeans would be Nigerian gas crossing the Sahara and then the deep Mediterranean.
Nigeria, with 5,7 trillion cubic meters, has even more gas than Algeria and possibly Venezuela. By comparison, Norway has 2 trillion cubic meters. But Nigeriaโs problem is how to pump its gas to distant customers – so Niger becomes an essential transit country.
When it comes to Nigerโs role, energy is actually a much bigger game than the oft-touted uranium โ which in fact is not that strategic either for France or the EU because Niger is only the 5th largest world supplier, way behind Kazakhstan and Canada. Still, the ultimate French nightmare is losing the juicy uranium deals plus a Mali remix: Russia, post-Prighozin, arriving in Niger in full force with a simultaneous expulsion of the French military.
Adding Gabon only makes things dicier. Rising Russian influence could lead to boosting supply lines to rebels in Cameroon and Nigeria, and privileged access to the Central African Republic, where Russian presence is already strong.
It’s no wonder that Francophile Paul Biya, in power for 41 years in Cameroon, has opted for a purge of his Armed Forces after the coup in Gabon. Cameroon may be the next domino to fall.
ECOWAS meets AFRICOM
The Americans, as it stands, are playing Sphynx. Thereโs no evidence so far that Niger’s military wants the Agadez base shut down. The Pentagon has invested a fortune in their bases to spy on a great deal of the Sahel and, most of all, Libya.
About the only thing Paris and Washington agree on is that, under the cover of ECOWAS (the Economic Community of West African States), the hardest possible sanctions should be slapped on one of the worldโs poorest nations (where only 21% of the population has access to electricity) – and they should be much worse than those imposed on the Ivory Coast in 2010.
Then thereโs the threat of war. Imagine the absurdity of ECOWAS invading a country that is already fighting two wars on terror on two separate fronts: Against Boko Haram in the southeast and against ISIS in the Tri-Border region.
ECOWAS, one of 8 African political and economic unions, is a proverbial mess. It packs 15 member nations – Francophone, Anglophone and one Lusophone – in Central and West Africa, and it is rife with internal division.
The French and the Americans first wanted ECOWAS to invade Niger as their โpeacekeepingโ puppet. But that didnโt work because of popular pressure against it. So, they switched to some form of diplomacy. Still, troops remain on stand-by, and a mysterious โD-Dayโ has been set for the invasion.
The role of the African Union (AU) is even murkier. Initially, they stood against the coup and suspended Niger’s membership. Then they turned around and condemned the possible western-backed invasion. Neighbors have closed their borders with Niger.
ECOWAS will implode without US, France, and NATO backing. Already itโs essentially a toothless chihuahua โ especially after Russia and China have demonstrated via the BRICS summit their soft power across Africa.
Western policy in the Sahel maelstrom seems to consist of salvaging anything they can from a possible unmitigated debacle – even as the stoic people in Niger are impervious to whatever narrative the west is trying to concoct.
It’s important to keep in mind that Nigerโs main party, the โNational Movement for the Defense of the Homelandโ represented by General Abdourahamane Tchiani, has been supported by the Pentagon โ complete with military training โ from the beginning.
The Pentagon is deeply implanted in Africa and connected to 53 nations. The main US concept since the early 2000s was always to militarize Africa and turn it into War on Terror fodder. As the Dick Cheney regime spun it in 2002: โAfrica is a strategic priority in fighting terrorism.โ
Thatโs the basis for the US military command AFRICOM and countless โcooperative partnershipsโ set up in bilateral agreements. For all practical purposes, AFRICOM has been occupying large swathes of Africa since 2007.
How sweet is my colonial franc
It is absolutely impossible for anyone across the Global South, Global Majority, or โGlobal Globeโ (copyright Lukashenko) to understand Africa’s current turmoil without understanding the nuts and bolts of French neocolonialism.
The key, of course, is the CFA franc, the โcolonial francโ introduced in 1945 in French Africa, which still survives even after the CFA – with a nifty terminological twist – began to stand for “African Financial Community”.
The whole world remembers that after the 2008 global financial crisis, Libyaโs Leader Muammar Gaddafi called for the establishment of a pan-African currency pegged to gold.
At the time, Libya had about 150 tons of gold, kept at home, and not in London, Paris, or New York banks. With a little more gold, that pan-African currency would have its own independent financial center in Tripoli โ and everything based on a sovereign gold reserve.
For scores of African nations, that was the definitive Plan B to bypass the western financial system.
The whole world also remembers what happened in 2011. The first airstrike on Libya came from a French Mirage fighter jet. France’s bombing campaign started even before the end of emergency talks in Paris between western leaders.
In March 2011, France became the first country in the world to recognize the rebel National Transitional Council as the legitimate government of Libya. In 2015, the notoriously hacked emails of former US secretary of state Hillary Clinton revealed what France was up to in Libya: “The desire to achieve a greater share in Libyan oil production,โ to increase French influence in North Africa, and to block Gaddafi’s plans to create a pan-African currency that would replace the CFA franc printed in France.
It is no wonder the collective west is terrified of Russia in Africa โ and not just because of the changing of the guard in Chad, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and now Gabon: Moscow has never sought to rob or enslave Africa.
Russia treats Africans as sovereign people, does not engage in Forever Wars, and does not drain Africa of resources while paying a pittance for them. Meanwhile, French intel and CIA โforeign policyโ translate into corrupting African leaders to the core and snuffing out those that are incorruptible.
You have the right to no monetary policy
The CFA racket makes the Mafia look like street punks. It means essentially that the monetary policy of several sovereign African nations is controlled by the French Treasury in Paris.
The Central Bank of each African nation was initially required to keep at least 65 percent of their annual foreign exchange reserves in an โoperation accountโ held at the French Treasury, plus another 20 percent to cover financial โliabilities.โ
Even after some mild โreformsโ were enacted since September 2005, these nations were still required to transfer 50 percent of their foreign exchange to Paris, plus 20 percent V.A.T.
And it gets worse. The CFA Central Banks impose a cap on credit to each member country. The French Treasury invests these African foreign reserves in its own name on the Paris bourse and pulls in massive profits on Africa’s dime.
The hard fact is that more than 80 percent of foreign reserves of African nations have been in โoperation accountsโ controlled by the French Treasury since 1961. In a nutshell, none of these states has sovereignty over their monetary policy.
But the theft doesn’t stop there: the French Treasury uses African reserves as if they were French capital, as collateral in pledging assets to French payments to the EU and the ECB.
Across the โFranceAfriqueโ spectrum, France still, today, controls the currency, foreign reserves, the comprador elites, and trade business.
The examples are rife: French conglomerate Bollorรฉ’s control of port and marine transport throughout West Africa; Bouygues/Vinci dominate construction and public works, water, and electricity distribution; Total has huge stakes in oil and gas. And then thereโs France Telecom and big banking – Societe Generale, Credit Lyonnais, BNP-Paribas, AXA (insurance), and so forth.
France de facto controls the overwhelming majority of infrastructure in Francophone Africa. It is a virtual monopoly.
โFranceAfriqueโ is all about hardcore neocolonialism. Policies are issued by the President of the Republic of France and his โAfrican cell.โ They have nothing to do with parliament, or any democratic process, since the times of Charles De Gaulle.
The โAfrican cellโ is a sort of General Command. They use the French military apparatus to install โfriendlyโ comprador leaders and get rid of those that threaten the system. Thereโs no diplomacy involved. Currently, the cell reports exclusively to Le Petit Roi, Emmanuel Macron.
Caravans of drugs, diamonds, and gold
Paris completely supervised the assassination of Burkina Faso’s anti-colonial leader Thomas Sankara, in 1987. Sankara had risen to power via a popular coup in 1983, only to be overthrown and assassinated four years later.
As for the real โwar on terrorโ in the African Sahel, it has nothing to do with the infantile fictions sold in the West. There are no Arab โterroristsโ in the Sahel, as I saw when backpacking across West Africa a few months before 9/11. They are locals who converted to Salafism online, intent on setting up an Islamic State to better control smuggling routes across the Sahel.
Those fabled ancient salt caravans plying the Sahel from Mali to southern Europe and West Asia are now caravans of drugs, diamonds, and gold. This is what funded Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), for instance, then supported by Wahhabi lunatics in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf.
After Libya was destroyed by NATO in early 2011, there was no more โprotection,โ so the western-backed Salafi-jihadis who fought against Gaddafi offered the Sahel smugglers the same protection as before – plus a lot of weapons.
Assorted Mali tribes continue the merry smuggling of anything they fancy. AQIM still extracts illegal taxation. ISIS in Libya is deep into human and narcotics trafficking. And Boko Haram wallows in the cocaine and heroin market.
There is a degree of African cooperation to fight these outfits. There was something called the G5 Sahel, focused on security and development. But after Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali, and Chad went the military route, only Mauritania remains. The new West Africa Junta Belt, of course, wants to destroy terror groups, but most of all, they want to fight FranceAfrique, and the fact that their national interests are always decided in Paris.
France has for decades made sure thereโs very little intra-Africa trade. Landlocked nations badly need neighbors for transit. They mostly produce raw materials for export. There are virtually no decent storage facilities, feeble energy supply, and terrible intra-African transportation infrastructure: thatโs what Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects are bent on addressing in Africa.
In March 2018, 44 heads of state came up with the African Continental Free Trade Area (ACFTA) โ the largest in the world in terms of population (1.3 billion people) and geography. In January 2022, they established the Pan-African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS) โ focused on payments for companies in Africa in local currencies.
So inevitably, they will be going for a common currency further on down the road. Guess whatโs in their way: the Paris-imposed CFA.
A few cosmetic measures still guarantee direct control by the French Treasury on any possible new African currency set up, preference for French companies in bidding processes, monopolies, and the stationing of French troops. The coup in Niger represents a sort of โweโre not gonna take it anymore.โ
All of the above illustrates what the indispensable economist Michael Hudson has been detailing in all his works: the power of the extractivist model. Hudson has shown how the bottom line is control of the worldโs resources; thatโs what defines a global power, and in the case of France, a global mid-ranking power.
France has shown how easy it is to control resources via control of monetary policy and setting up monopolies in these resource-rich nations to extract and export, using virtual slave labor with zero environmental or health regulations.
It’s also essential for exploitative neocolonialism to keep those resource-rich nations from using their own resources to grow their own economies. But now the African dominoes are finally saying, โThe game is over.โ Is true decolonization finally on the horizon? [end]
It has been a while since I published anything long-form commenting on the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War, and I confess that writing this article gave me a modicum of trouble. Ukraineโs much anticipated grand summer counteroffensive has now been underway for about eighty days with little to show for it. The summer has seen fierce fighting in a variety of sectors (to be enumerated below), but the contact line has shifted very little. I have been reluctant to publish a discussion of the Ukrainian campaign simply because they have continued to hold assets in reserve, and I did not want to post a premature commentary that went to press right before the Ukrainians showed some new trick or revealed a hidden ace up their sleeve. Sure enough, I wrote the bulk of this article last week, right before Ukraine launched yet another major attempt to force a breach in the Orikhiv sector.
At this point, however, the appearance of some of Ukraineโs last remaining premier brigades, which had previously been held in reserve, confirms that the axes of Ukraineโs attack are concretized. Only time will tell if these precious reserves manage to achieve a breach in the Russian lines, but enough time has passed that we can sketch out what exactly Ukraine has been trying to do, why, and why it has failed to this point.
Part of the problem with narrating the war in Ukraine is the positional and attritional nature of the fighting. People continue to look for bold operational maneuver to break the deadlock, but the reality seems to be that for now some combination of capability and reticence has turned this war into a positional struggle with a plodding offensive pace, which far more resembles the first world war than the second.
Ukraine had aspirations of breaking open this grinding front and reopening mobile operations – escaping the attritional struggle and driving on operationally meaningful targets – but these efforts have so far come to naught. For all the lofty boasts of demonstrating the superior art of maneuver, Ukraine still finds itself trapped in a siege, painfully trying to break open a calcified Russian position without success.
Ukraine may not be interested in a war of attrition, but attrition is certainly interested in Ukraine.
Ukraineโs Strategic Paradigm
For those that have been following the war closely, what follows will probably not be new information, but I think it is worth thinking holistically about Ukraineโs war and the factors that drive their strategic decision making.
For Ukraine, the conduct of the war is shaped by a variety of disturbing strategic asymmetries.
Some of these are obvious, like Russiaโs much larger population and military industrial plant, or the fact that Russiaโs war economy is indigenous, while Ukraine is entirely reliant on western deliveries of equipment and munitions. Russia can autonomously ramp up armaments production and there are abundant signs from the battlefield that the Russian war economy is beginning to find its groove, with new systems like the Lancet present in increasing abundance, and western sources now admitting that Russia has successfully serialized a domestic version of the Iranian Shahed Drone. Furthermore, Russia has the asymmetrical capacity to strike Ukrainian rear areas to an extent that Ukraine cannot reciprocate, even if they are given the dreaded ATACMs (these will give Ukraine the range to strike operational depth targets in the theater, but they canโt hit facilities in Moscow and Tula the way Russian missiles can strike anywhere in Ukraine)
Medvedev inspects a tank production run
With significant Russian asymmetries in population size, industrial capacity, strike capability, and – let us be blunt – sovereignty and decision-making freedom, an attritional-positional struggle is simply bad math for Ukraine, and yet that is precisely the sort of war in which it has become trapped.
What is important for us to understand, however, is that the strategic asymmetry goes beyond physical capacities like population base, industrial plant, and missile technology, and extends into the realm of strategic objectives and timelines.
Russiaโs war has been deliberately framed in a fairly open-ended way, with goals largely tied to the idea of โdemilitarizingโ Ukraine. In fact, Russiaโs territorial objectives remain rather nebulous beyond the 4 annexed oblasts (though it is safe to say that Moscow would like to acquire far more than just these). All that to say, Putinโs government has deliberately framed the war as a military-technical enterprise focused on destroying the Ukrainian armed forces, and has shown itself to be perfectly free to give up territory in the name of operational prudentia.
In contrast, Ukraine has maximalist goals that are explicitly territorial in nature. The Zelensky government has been open about the fact that it aims – however fanciful this may be – to restore the entirety of its 1991 territories, including not just the four mainland oblasts but also Crimea.
The confluence of these two factors – Ukrainian territorial maximalism combined with asymmetrical Russian advantages in a positional-attritional struggle – forces Ukraine to seek a way to break open the front and restore a state of operational fluidity. Remaining locked in a positional struggle is unworkable for Kiev, partially because Russiaโs material advantages will inevitably shine through (in a fight between two big guys swinging big bats at each other, bet on the bigger guy with the bigger bat), and partially because a positional war (which amounts essentially to a massive siege) is simply not an efficient way to retake territory.
This leaves Ukraine with no choice but to unfreeze the front and try to restore mobile operations, with an eye towards creating some asymmetry of their own. The only feasible way to accomplish this is to launch an offensive aimed at severing critical lines of Russian communication and supply. Contrary to some suggestions that were popular this spring, a large Ukrainian offensive against Bakhmut or Donetsk simply did not fit the bill.
Frankly, there are only two suitable operational targets for Ukraine. One is Starobilsโk – the beating heart at the center of Russiaโs Lugansk front. Capturing or screening Svatove and then Starobilsโk would create a genuine operational catastrophe for Russia in the north, with cascading effects all the way down to Bakhmut. The second possible target was the land bridge to Crimea, which could be cut by a thrust across lower Zaporizhia towards the Azov coast.
It was probably inevitable that Ukraine would select the Azov option, for a few reasons. The land bridge to Crimea is a more self-contained battlespace – an offensive in Lugansk would occur under the shadow of the Belgorod and Voronezh regions of Russia, making it relatively more difficult to put significant Russian forces out of supply. Perhaps even more significant, however, is Kievโs complete obsession with Crimea and the Kerch Bridge – targets that hold hypnotic sway in a way that Starobilsโk never could.
Again, this may sound like fairly intuitive review, but itโs worth contemplating how and why Ukraine ended up launching an offensive that was widely telegraphed and expected. There was no strategic surprise whatsoever – a definitely real video of GUR chief Budanov smirking didnโt fool anyone. The Russian armed forces certainly werenโt fooled, as they spent months saturating the front with minefields, trenches, firing emplacements, and obstacles. Everyone knew that Ukraine was going to attack toward the Azov Coast, specifically with an eye towards Tokmak and Melitopol, and thatโs exactly what they did. A frontal attack against a prepared defense without the element of surprise is generally considered a poor choice, but here is Ukraine not only attempting such an attack but even launching it against a backdrop of global celebration and phantasmagorical expectations
Ukraine’s infantile plea for OPSEC
Itโs impossible to make sense of this without understanding the way that Ukraine is shackled by a particular interpretation of the war to this point. Ukraine and its supporters point to two successes in 2022 where Ukraine was able to retake a substantial swathe of territory, in Kharkov and Kherson oblasts. The problem is that neither of these situations is portable to Zaporizhia.
In the case of the Kharkov offensive, Ukraine identified a sector of the Russian front that had been hollowed out and was defended only by a thin screening force. They were able to stage a force and achieve a measure of strategic surprise, due to the thick forests and general paucity of Russian ISR in the area. This is not to mitigate the scale of Ukraineโs success there; it was certainly the best uses of forces available to them and they did exploit a weak section of front. This success is hardly relevant to circumstances in the south today; mobilization has ameliorated Russiaโs force generation problems so that they now longer have to make hard choices about what to defend, and the heavily fortified Zaporizhia frontline is nothing like the thinly held front in Kharkov.
The second case study – the Kherson counteroffensive – is even less germane. In this case, Ukrainian leadership is rewriting history in record time. The AFU banged its head on Russian defenses in Kherson for months throughout the summer and autumn last year and took atrocious losses. An entire grouping of AFU brigades was mauled in Kherson without achieving a breakthrough, and this even with Russian forces in a uniquely difficult operational disposition where they had their backs to a river. Kherson was only abandoned months later due to concerns that the Kakhovka dam might fail or be sabotaged (for those keeping score, it did in fact end up failing), and due to Russiaโs need at the time to economize forces.
Again, this can easily be misconstrued as arguing that Russiaโs withdrawal from Kherson did not matter. Obviously, abandoning a hard-earned bridgehead is a major setback, and retaking west-bank Kherson was a boon for Kiev. But we need to be honest about why it happened, and it plainly did not happen because of Ukraineโs summer counteroffensive – to underscore this, recall that Ukrainian officials openly wondered if the Russian withdrawal was a trickor a trap. The question is simply whether Ukraineโs Kherson offensive is predictive of future offensive success. It is not.
So, we have one case where Ukraine identified a lightly defended section of front and ran through it, and another where Russian troops abandoned a bridgehead due to logistical and force allocation concerns. Neither is particularly relevant to the situation on the Azov coast, and in fact an honest reflection of the AFUโs Kherson Counteroffensive might have given Ukraine second thoughts about a frontal assault on prepared Russian defenses.
Instead, Kharkov and Kherson have both been presented as proof positive that Ukraine can shatter Russian defenses in a straight up fight – in fact, we still have no examples from this war of the AFU defeating strongly held Russian positions, particularly post-mobilization when Russia finally began to resolve its manpower deficiencies. But Ukraine is caught in the grip of its own particular story about this war, which has imparted unearned confidence in its ability to conduct offensive operations. Tragically for mobilized Ukrainian Mykolas, this has dovetailed with a second swagger-producing mythology.
A major selling point for the Ukrainian counteroffensive has been the assessed superiority of the AFUโs big-ticket donations from the west – the main battle tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. Since the first deliveries were announced, there has been no shortage of boasting about the many superior qualities of western models like the Leopards and Challengers. The suggestion has essentially been that skilled Ukrainian tankers are only waiting to be unleashed once they get behind the wheel of superlative western builds. My personal favorite motif has been the practice of dismissing Russian tanks as โSoviet Eraโ – neglecting to note that the Abrams (designed 1975) and the Leopard 2 (1979) are also Cold War models
A burn out Leopard in Syria
It must be stated, again, that there is nothing wrong with western tanks. The Abrams and the Leopard are fine vehicles, but confidence in their game-changing capabilities stems from a mistaken assumption about the role of armor. It must be appreciated that tanks always have been and always will be mass-consumption items. Tanks blow up. They are disabled. They break down and are captured. Tank forces attrit – much faster than people expect. Given that the brigades prepared for Ukraineโs assault on the Zapo line were significantly understrength in vehicles, it was simply irrational to expect them to have an oversized impact. This is not to say that tanks arenโt important – armor remains critical to modern combat – but in a peer conflict one should always expect to lose armor at a steady clip, especially when the enemy retains fires superiority.
One can see, then how a measure of hubris can easily creep in to Ukrainian thinking, fueled by a healthy dose of desperation and strategic need. Reasoning from a distorted understanding of its successes in Kharkov and Kherson, emboldened by their shiny new toys, and guided by an overriding strategic animus that requires them to unlock the front somehow, the idea of a frontal attack without strategic surprise against a prepared defense really could seem like a good idea. Add in the good old fashioned trope about Russian incompetenceand disorder, and you have all the recipes for an imprudent roll of the dice by Ukraine.
The Misfire
So now we come to the operational minutia. For a variety of reasons, Ukraine has chosen to attempt a frontal assault on Russiaโs fortified Zaporizhia front, with the intention of breaching towards the sea of Azov. How can this be accomplished?
We had a few clues early on, accruing from a variety of geographic features and alleged intelligence leaks. In May, the Dreizin Report published what was purported to be a Russian synthesis of Ukraineโs OPORD (Operational Order). An OPORD functions as a broad sketch of an operationโs intended progression, and the document shared by Dreizin was billed as a summary of Russiaโs expectation for Ukraineโs offensive (that is, it is not a leak of Ukraineโs internal planning documents, but a leak of Russiaโs best guess at Ukraineโs plans).
In any case, in a vacuum it was anybodyโs guess as to whether Dreizinโs OPORD was authentic, but weโve subsequently been able to cross-check it. This is because of the other, even more infamous leak from earlier this spring, which included the Pentagonโs combat power build plan for Ukraine.
NATO was very generous and built Ukraine a mechanized strike package from scratch. However, because this mechanized force was cobbled together with a variety of different systems from all corners of the NATO Cinematic Universe, Ukraine formations are uniquely identifiable by their particular combination of vehicles and equipment. So, for example, the presence of Strykers, Marders, and Challengers indicates the presence of the 82nd Brigade in the field, and so forth.
Thus, despite Ukrainian pretensions of operational security, itโs actually been trivially easy for observers to know which Ukrainian formations are in the field. There have been a few deviations from the script – for example, the 47th Brigade was supposed to field the Frankenstein Slovenian M55 tanks, but in the end the decision was made to send the underpowered M55โs to the northern front and the 47th was deployed with a contingent of Leopard Tanks originally operated by the 33rd Brigade. But these are minor details, and on the whole weโve had a good sense of when and where specific AFU formations get on the field.
Based on identifiable units, the Dreizin OPORD looks very close to what we actually saw at the onset of the Ukrainian offensive. The Dreizin OPORD called for an assault by the 47th and 65th Brigades on the Russian lines south or Orikhiv, in the sector bounded by Nesterianka and Novoprokopivka. Directly in the middle of this sector is the town of Robotyne, and sure enough thatโs where the first big AFU assault came overnight on June 7-8, spearheaded by the 47th Brigade.
Now, from this point it becomes difficult to evaluate the Dreizin OPORD simply because Ukraineโs attack became instantaneously derailed, but one thing we can say is that Dreizinโs source was correct about the order that Ukrainian units would be introduced into battle. Based on this, we can flesh out the OPORD and feel pretty safe wagering that this is what the Ukrainians were hoping to achieve:
Ukraine’s Dream: The Drive to the Sea
The intention seems to have been to force a breach in the Russian line using a concentrated armored assault by the 47th and 65th Brigades, after which a follow on force of the 116th, 117th, and 118th would begin the exploitation phase, driving for the Azov Coast and the towns of Mikhailivka and Vesele to the west. The objective was clearly not to get bogged down in urban fighting attempting to capture places like Tokmak, Berdyansk, or Melitopol, but to bypass them and cut them off by taking up blocking positions on the main roads.
Simultaneously, a lesser – but no less critical – thrust would come out of the Gulyaipole area and drive along the Bilmak axis. This would have the effect of both screening the main advance to the west and wedging the Russian front open, splintering the integrity of the Russian forces caught in the middle. Overall, this is a fairly sensible, if ambitious and uncreative plan. In many ways, this was really the only option.
So what went wrong? Well, conceptually itโs easy. There is no breach. The bulk of the maneuver scheme is dedicated to exploitation – reaching such and such a line, taking up this blocking position, masking that city, and so forth. But what happens when thereโs no breach at all? How can such a catastrophe occur, and how can the operation be salvaged when it comes untracked in the opening phase?
Indeed, this is precisely what has happened. Ukraine finds itself stuck on the edge of Russiaโs outermost screening line, spending substantial resources trying to capture the small village of Robotyne, and/or bypass it to the east by infiltrating the gap between it and the neighboring village of Verbove. So instead of that rapid breach and turning maneuver towards Melitopol, we get something like this:
Ukrainian Counteroffensive with Mapped Russian Defensive Lines
We could be generous and say that Robotyne is the last village before the Ukrainian attack reaches the main Russian defensive belt, but weโd be lying – they will also have to clear the larger town of Novoprokopivka, two kilometers to the south. Just for reference, hereโs a closer look at the mapped Russian defenses in the battlespace, based on the excellent work of Brady Africk
Russian defenses in the Robotyne Sector
The discussion about these emplacements can get a little muddled, simply because itโs not always clear what is meant by that popular phrase โfirst line of defense.โ Clearly there are some defensive works around and in Robotyne, and the Russians chose to fight for the village, so in some sense Robotyne is part of the โfirst lineโ – but it is more proper to speak of it as part of what we would call a โscreening lineโ. The first line of continuous fortifications across the front is several kilometers further south, and this is the belt that Ukraine has yet to even reach, let alone breach.
As of this moment, it appears that Russian troops have lost total control of Robotyne but continue to hold the southern half of the village, while Ukrainian troops in the northern half of the village remain subject to heavy Russian shelling. We should probably at this point consider the village to be continuously contested and a feature of the gray zone
Robotyne, in all its glory
Now, a quick note about Robotyne itself and why both sides are so determined to fight for it. It seems rather odd on the surface, given that the Russian preference in 2022 was to make tactical withdrawals under their fires umbrella. This time though, they are fiercely counterattacking to contest Robotyne. The value of the village lies not only in its location on the T-0408 Highway, but also its excellent perch on top of a ridge. Both Robotyne and Novoprokopivka lie on a ridge of elevated ground which is as much as 70 meters higher than the low-lying plain to the east.
What this means is fairly simple; if the AFU presses forward in attempts to bypass the Robotyne-Novoprokopivka position by pushing into the gap between Robotyne and Verbove, it will be vulnerable to fire on the flanks (particularly by ATGMs) by Russian troops on the high ground. We already have seen footage of this, with Ukrainian vehicles being taken in the flank by fire from Robotyne. I am highly skeptical that Ukraine can even attempt an earnest assault on the first defensive belt until they have captured both Robotyne and Novoprokopivka.
This would all be a tough nut to crack under ideal circumstances, with a variety of engineering problems to mediate, obstacles designed to funnel the attacker into firing lanes, perpendicular trenches to allow enfilade fire on advancing Ukrainian columns, and robust defenses on all the major roadways. But these are not the best of circumstances. This is a tired force that has exhausted much of its indigenous combat power, which is attempting to organize the attack using a piecemeal and understrength assault package.
Several factors conspired against the Ukrainian offensive, and synergistically they have created a bona fide military catastrophe for Kiev. Let us enumerate them.
Problem 1: The Hidden Defensive Layer
At this point, we need to acknowledge something that everybody missed about Russiaโs defense. I previously expressed high confidence that Ukraineโs forces would be unable to breach the Russian defenses, but I mistakenly believed that the Russian defense would function according to the classic Soviet defense-in-depth principles (elucidated in great detail by the writings of David Glantz, for example)
Idealized Defense in Depth by a Motor Rifle Brigade
Such a defense, put simply, is open to the idea that the enemy will breach the first or even second lines of defense. The purpose of the multilayered (or โechelonedโ in the classic terminology) defense is to ensure that the enemy force gets stuck as it tries to break through. It may penetrate the first layer, but as it goes it is continually chewed up by the subsequent belts. The classic example is the Battle of Kursk, where powerful German panzers broke into the Soviet defensive belts but subsequently became stuck as they were ground down. You can think of this as being analogically similar to a Kevlar vest, which uses a web of fibers to stop projectiles: rather than bouncing off, the bullet is caught and its energy is absorbed by the layered fibers.
I was actually quite open to the idea that Ukraine would generate some penetration, but I anticipated them getting stuck in the subsequent belts and sputtering out.
What was missing from this picture – and this is a credit to Russian planning – was an unseen defensive belt forward of the proper trenches and fortifications. This forward belt consisted of extremely dense minefields and strongly held forward positions in the screening line, which the Russians evidently intended to fight for fiercely. Rather than breaking through the first belt and getting stuck in the interstitial areas, the Ukrainians have been repeatedly mauled in the security zone, and the Russians have consistently counterattacked to knock them back when they do manage to get footholds.
In other words, while we expected Russia to fight a defense in depth that absorbed the Ukrainian spearheads and shredded them in the heart of the defense, the Russians have actually shown a strong commitment to defending their forwardmost positions, of which Robotyne is the most famous.
On paper, Robotyne was expected to function as part of a so-called โcrumple zoneโ, or โsecurity zoneโ – a sort of lightly held buffer that puts the enemy through pre-registered fires before they bump into the first belt of continuous and strongly held defenses. Indeed, a variety of aerial and satellite surveys of the area taken before Ukraine went on the attack showed Robotyne laying well forward of the first solid and continuous Russian fortification belt.
What was missed, it seemed, was the extent to which the Russian defenders had mined the areas on the approach to Robotyne and were committed to defending within the security zone. The scale of the mining certainly seems to have surprised the Ukrainians, and creates a strain on Ukraineโs limited combat engineering capabilities. Even more importantly, the dense mines have created predictable avenues of approach for the Ukrainian forces, which force them to repeatedly run through the same gauntlet of fires and Russian standoff weaponry.
Problem 2: Insufficient Suppression
The signature image of the first great assaults on the Zapo Line has been columns of unsupported maneuver assets, being raked with Russian fires, both ground based (rocketry, ATGMs, and tube artillery) and from air platforms like the Ka-52 Alligator attack helicopter. One of the more startling aspects of these scenes was the way Ukrainian forces would come under heavy fire while still in their marching columns, taking losses before they ever deployed into firing lines to begin their assault proper.
There are myriad reasons for this. One is the now blasรฉ issue of Ukrainian munition shortages. Consider the following items of interest. In the runup to Ukraineโs counteroffensive, Russia waged a heavy counter-preparatory air campaign that knocked out large AFU ammunition dumps. Ukraineโs initial assaults collapse in the face of heavy and unsuppressed Russian fires. The United States decides to transfer cluster munitions to Ukraine because, in the words of the president, โtheyโre running out of ammunition.โ Add in the degradation of Ukrainian air defense, which allows Russian helicopters to operate with great effect along the contact line, and you have a recipe for disaster. Lacking the tubes to suppress Russian fires or the air defense to chase away Russian aircraft, the AFU opened their offensive by disastrously pushing forward unsupported maneuver elements into a hail of fire.
Problem 3: Russian Standoff Weapons
Itโs crucial to understand that the Russian toolbox is fundamentally different than it was during the battle for Kherson last year, due to the rapidly expanding production of a variety of Russian standoff weapons – most notably the Lancet and the UMPK glide modifications for gravity bombs.
The proliferation of the Lancet and similar systems means, in a nutshell, that nothing within 30km of the contact line is safe, and this in turn disrupts the AFUโs deployment of critical support assets like air defense and engineering, magnifying their vulnerability to Russian mines and fires. In fact, weโve increasingly seen Ukrainian artillery use decline in the Robotyne area due to the threat of lancets (they seem to be transferring tubes to other fronts), and the AFU is favoring the use of HIMARS in the suppressive role.
Problem 4: Repetitive Lines of Approach
Because the AFU failed to breach the Robotyne sector on their first attempt, theyโve been forced to continually move up additional units and resources to hammer on the position. This has particular implications, both in the sense that AFU forces must continually traverse the same lines of approach to contact, and in the fact that they are using the same rear area to assemble and stage their assault forces.
This makes the burden on Russian ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) significantly easier, since the AFU has no effective way to disperse or hide the assets that they are bringing forward to the assault. Staged Ukrainian forces and material have been hid repeatedly in the villages immediately behind Orikhiv, like Tavriiske and Omelnโyk, and Russia is able to strike rear area infrastructure like ammunition depots because – to put it simply – there are only so many places these these assets can be staged when you are repeatedly assaulting the same 20km wide sector of front.
We recently had Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Defense Hanna Malair complaining that the 82nd Brigade – newly deployed to the Orikhiv sector – had been hit with a series of Russian airstrikes in its staging areas. According to her, this was because of poor OPSEC revealing the brigadeโs location to the Russians. But this really makes very little sense; the entire area of operations around Orikhiv is perhaps 25km deep (from Kopani to Tavriiske) and 20 km wide (from Kopani to Verbove). This is a small area that has seen a huge amount of military traffic along the same roads throughout the summer. The idea that Russia needs insider information to know that they ought to surveil and attack targets in this area is absurd.
Problem 5: Fragile Brigades
It actually takes significantly less damage to โdestroyโ an operational level unit than people think. A unit can become a combat scratch off at 30% losses (with some variance depending on how those are allocated). This is because when people hear the term โdestructionโ, they think that means total losses. Sometimes thatโs how the word is used in colloquial conversation, but what matters for officers trying to manage an operation is whether or not a formation is combat capable of the tasks being asked of it – and those capabilities can vanish much more quickly than people realize.
This is particularly the case for the Ukrainian mech package, for a variety of reasons. For one, as we discussed in previous articles, these brigades started the fight well understrength (remember, for example, that the Ukrainian 82nd Brigade has only 90 Stryker AFVs, while an American Strkyer Brigade is supposed to have 300). Additionally, the cobbled together nature of these brigades – and the total lack of indigenous sustainment systems like repair and maintenance – means that the Ukrainians will naturally have to cannibalize these vehicles. Theyโve already started designating โdonorโ vehicles that are written off completely to be stripped down for parts. The nexus of these two facts is that Ukraineโs mechanized brigades are understrength on vehicles to begin with, and will have an abysmally poor recovery rate, with hidden attrition behind the scenes due to cannibalization.
What this means is that when we heard admissions by mid-July that Ukraine had already lost 20% of its maneuver assets, there is an associated catastrophic decline in combat capability. The lead brigades – which chewed through 50% or more of their maneuver vehicles – can no longer shoulder combat tasks appropriate for a brigade, and the Ukrainians are forced to feed in their second echelon units prematurely.
At this point, partial elements of at least ten different brigades have been deployed in the Robotyne sector, with the 82nd likely to join them soon. Given that the NATO combat power build plan only included 9 NATO trained brigades, plus a few reconstituted Ukrainian formations, itโs safe to say that blooding all of them over a 71 day fight just to break into the screening line was not in the plan.
Staring at the Abyss
Iโve seen a variety of analysts and writers lately arguing that the insertion of additional Ukrainian units into the Robotyne sector signals the next phase of the operation.
This is nonsense. Ukraine is still mired in the first phase. What has happened is instead that the attrition of their first echelon brigades has forced them to commit their second (and third) wave to complete the tasks of the opening phase. The initial attack, led by the 47th Brigade, was intended to create a breach in the Russian screening line around Robotyne and advance to the main Russian belt further to the south. They failed, and the additional brigades earmarked for exploitation – the 116th, 117th, 118th, 82nd, 33rd, and more – are now being systematically fed in to keep the pressure on.
These brigades have not been destroyed, of course, simply because they are not being committed in their entirety, but rather as subunits. Nevertheless, at this point Ukrainian losses make up the better part of a whole brigade, distributed around the broader package, and over 300 maneuver elements (tanks, IFVs, APCs, etc) have been scratched off.
We need to say this very explicitly. Ukraine has not moved on to the next phase of their operation. They are stuck in the first phase, and have been forced to prematurely commit portions of the second echelon that was earmarked for later action. They are slowly but surely burning through the entire operational grouping, and so far they have not breached Russiaโs screening line. The great counteroffensive is turning into a military catastrophe
Now, this does not mean that the operation has failed, simply because it is still ongoing. History teaches us that it is unwise to make definitive pronouncements. Luck and human factors (bravery and intelligence, cowardice and stupidity) always have something to say. However, the trajectory is undeniably towards abject failure at the current moment.
So far, the AFU has shown some adaptability. In particular, weโve recently seen them shift away from pushing forward unsupported columns of mechanized assets – instead theyโve been leaning on small dismounted units, trying to slowly push forward into the space between Robotyne and Verbove. The move towards dispersal is intended to reduce loss rates, but it also reduces the probability of a dramatic breakthrough even further and marks the temporary abandonment of decisive breaching action in favor of – once again – creeping positional warfare.
We would be remiss if we failed to note that there have been meaningful Russian losses in all of this. We know that the Russian forces in the Robotyne sector have required rotation and reinforcement, including with elite VDV and Naval Infantry units. Russia has taken counterbattery losses, it has lost vehicles in counterattacking action, and men have been killed holding their trenches. The initial assault groups that the Ukrainians threw in had a lot of combat power, and the fighting was very bloody for both sides. Itโs not a one-sided shooting gallery, but a high intensity war.
But therein is the crux of the matter – Ukraine seems unable to escape the attritional and positional war that it finds itself in. It sounds all well and good to proclaim a return to โmaneuverโ warfare, but if there is an inability to breach enemy defenses, this is only an empty boast, and the nature of the struggle remains attritional. When the question becomes โwill we breach before we run out of combat powerโ, you are not maneuvering. You are attriting.
In my series of articles on military history, weโve looked at a variety of cases where armies tried desperately to unlock the front and restore a state of operational maneuver, but when there is no technical capacity to do so, these intentions do not matter one bit. Nobody wants to be trapped on the wrong side of attritional mathematics, but sometimes what you want does not matter at all. Sometimes attrition is imposed on you.
In the absence of the capabilities required to successfully breach Russiaโs prodigious defenses – more ranged fires, more air defense, more ISR, more EW, more combat engineering, more more more – Ukraine is trapped in a rock fight. Two fighters are swinging bats at each other, and Russia is a bigger man with a bigger bat.
Two Bad Copes
Amid a clear misfire and growing strategic disappointment, two new suggestions have increasingly crept into the conversation – โcopesโ, if you will, that are utilized as a narrative comfort to explain why the Ukrainian operation is actually going just fine (despite nearly universal acknowledgment in the west that the results have been lackluster at best). I would like to briefly address each of these in turn.
Cope 1: โThe first stage is the hardestโ
You frequently see it argued that all the AFU has to do is break open the Russian screening line, and the remainder of the defenses will fall like dominos. The general thrust of this argument is that the Russians lack reserves and that the subsequent defensive lines are not adequately manned – just break open the first line, and the rest will fall apart.
This is probably a comforting thing to tell oneself, but itโs rather irrational. We could talk, for example, about Russiaโs doctrinal schema for defense in depth, which prescribes liberal allocation of reserves at all depths of the defensive system, but itโs probably more fruitful to point at more immediate evidence.
Let us simply consider Russiaโs behavior over the last six months. They have spent a tremendous amount of effort constructing echeloned defenses – are we really to believe that they did all this only to waste all their combat power fighting in front of these defenses? Nor is there any evidence that Russia is having trouble supplying the front with manpower at the present moment. Weโve seen continued rotations and redeployments amid an overall process of military enlargement in Russia. Indeed, of the two belligerents, it is Ukraine that seems to be scraping the barrel for manpower.
Cope 2: โGet within firing rangeโ
This is the more fantastical story, and it represents a radical ad-hoc shift of the goalposts. The argument is that Ukraine doesnโt actually need to advance to the sea and physically cut the land bridge, all it has to do is get the Russian supply routes within firing range to cut off Russian troops. This theory has been advance liberally on Twitter X and by personalities like Peter Zeihan (a man who knows nothing about military affairs).
There are many problems with this line of thought, most of which stem from an inflated notion of โfire control.โ To put it simply, being โin rangeโ of artillery fire does not imply effective area denial or severed supply lines. If that were the case, Ukraine would be unable to attack out of Orikhiv at all, since the entire axis of approach is within Russian firing range. In Bakhmut, the AFU continued to fight long after their main supply routes came under Russian shelling.
The simple fact is that most military tasks are conducted within range of at least some of the enemyโs ranged fires, and the idea that Russia will collapse if the AFU manages to put a shell on the Azov coastal highway is fairly ridiculous. In fact, Russiaโs main rail line is already within range of Ukrainian HIMARS, and the Ukrainians have successfully launched strikes on coastal cities like Berdyansk. Meanwhile, Russia strikes at Ukrainian sustainment infrastructure with regularity – yet neither army has collapsed yet. This is because ranged fires are a tool to improve attritional calculus and further operational goals – they do not magically win wars just by tagging the enemyโs supply roads.
Letโs be charitable though, and indulge this line of thinking. Suppose the Ukrainians managed to advance – not all the way to the coast, but far enough to bring Russiaโs main supply routes within range of artillery. What would they do? Wheel up a battery of howitzers, park them at the very front line, and begin firing nonstop at the road? What do you think would happen to those howitzers? Counterbattery systems would surely set upon them. The idea that you can just haul up a big gun and start taking potshots at Russian supply trucks is really quite childish. Putting enemy forces out of supply has always required physically blocking transit, and thatโs what Ukraine will have to do if they want to cut Russiaโs land bridge.
The Distraction
I am cognizant of the fact that I would be raked over the coals if I failed to discuss a secondary area of Ukrainian effort, farther to the east in Donestk oblast. Here, the Ukrainians have worked their way a good distance up the highway out of the town of Velyka Novosilka capturing several settlements.
The problem with this โotherโ Ukrainian attack is that it is, in a word, inconsequential. This axis of advance is operationally sterile in a very fundamental way, as it involves pushing groups up a narrow corridor of road that doesnโt lead anywhere important. As in the Robotyne sector, the AFU is still quite some distance from any of the serious Russian fortifications, and to make matters worse the road and settlements on this axis lay along a small river. Rivers, as we know, flow along the floor of the terrain, which means the roadway sits at the bottom of a wadis/embakement/glacis, choose your terminology. In fact, the road network as such consists of nothing except a single-lane roadway on either side of the river
The Sideshow in the East
My reading of this axis is essentially that it was intended as a feint to create some semblance of operational confusion, but when the primary effort on the Orikhiv axis turned into a colossal misfire, the decision was made to continue to press here simply for narrative purposes. Ultimately, this is simply not an axis of advance that can exert a meaningful influence on the wider war. The forces deployed here are relatively miniscule in the grand scope of things, and they arenโt going anywhere important. Certainly, a thin, needlelike penetration is not going to drive more than 80 kilometers down a single lane road to the sea and win the war.
Conclusion: Finger Pointing
One of the surest signs that Ukraineโs counteroffensive has taken a cataclysmic turn is the way Kiev and Washington have already begun to blame each other, conducting a postmortem while the body is still warm. Zelensky has blamed the west for being too slow to deliver the requisite equipment and ammunition, arguing that unacceptable delays allowed the Russians to improve their defenses. This strikes me as rather obscene and ungrateful. NATO built Ukraine a new army from scratch in a process that already required greatly truncating the training times.
On the other hand, western experts have begun to blame Ukraine for supposedly being unable to adopt โcombined arms warfareโ. This is really a very nonsensical attempt to use jargon (incorrectly) to explain away problems. Combined arms simply means the integration and simultaneous use of various arms like armor, infantry, artillery, and air assets. Claiming that Ukraine and Russia are somehow cognitively or institutionally incapable of this is extremely silly. The Red Army had a complex and extremely thorough doctrine of combined arms operation. One professor at the US Arms School of Advanced Military Studies said: โThe single most coherent core of theoretical writings on operational art is still found among the Soviet writers.โ The idea that combined arms is some foreign and novel concept to Soviet officers (a caste that includes the Russian and Ukrainian high command) is ridiculous.
This issue is not some sort of Ukrainian doctrinal obstinacy, but a combination of structural factors rooted in the insufficiency of Ukrainian combat power and the changing face of warfare.
Itโs frankly a little silly to say that Ukraine needs to learn about โcombined armsโ when they are very simply lacking important capabilities that would make a successful maneuver campaign possible – namely, adequate ranged fires, a functioning air force (and no, F-16โs will not fix this), engineering, and electronic warfare. The issue very fundamentally is not one of doctrinal flexibility, but of capability. By way of analogy, this is a bit like sending a boxer out to fight with a broken arm, and then critiquing his technique. The problem is not his technique – the problem is that heโs injured and materially weaker than his opponent. So too, the problem for Ukraine is not that they are incapable of coordinating arms, the problem is that their arms are shattered.
Secondly – and this, I admit, is rather shocking to me – western observers do not seem open to the possibility that the accuracy of modern ranged fires (be it Lancet drones, guided artillery shells, or GMLRS rockets) combined with the density of ISR systems may simply make it impossible to conduct sweeping mobile operations, except in very specific circumstances. When the enemy has the capacity to surveil staging areas, strike rear area infrastructure with cruise missiles and drones, precisely saturate approach lines with artillery fire, and soak the earth in mines, how exactly can it be possible to maneuver?
Combined arms and maneuver are predicated on the ability to rapidly concentrate enormous fighting power and attack with great violence at narrow points. This is probably impossible given the density of Russian surveillance, firepower, and the many obstacles they have put up to deny Ukrainian freedom of movement and scleroticize their activity. The main examples of maneuver in recent western memory – the campaigns in Iraq – have only tenuous relevance to circumstances in Zaporizhia.
Ultimately, we have returned to a war of mass – particularly massed ISR assets and fires. The only way Ukraine can maneuver the way they want is to break open the front, and they can only do this with more of everything – more mine clearing equipment, more shells and tubes, more rocketry, more armor. Only mass can crack open a suitable breach in the Russian lines. Otherwise, they are stuck in a positional creep through the dense Russian defenses, and criticizing them for being unable to grasp some sort of magical western notion of โcombined armsโ is the strangest sort of finger pointing.
So, whence goes the war from here? Well, the obvious question to ask is whether we believe Ukraine will ever have a more potent assault package than the one they started the summer with. The answer clearly seems to be no. It was like pulling teeth to scrape together these understrength brigades – the idea that, following on a defeat in the Battle of Zaporizhia, NATO will somehow put together a more powerful package seems like a stretch. More to the point, we have American officials saying fairly explicitly that this was the best mechanized package Ukraine was going to get.
It does not seem controversial to say that this was Ukraineโs best shot at some sort of genuine operational victory, which at this point seems to be slowly trickling away into modest but materially costly tactical advances. The ultimate implication of this is that Ukraine is unable to escape a war of industrial attrition, which is precisely the sort of war that it cannot win, due to all the asymmetries that we mentioned earlier.
In particular, however, Ukraine cannot win a positional-attritional war because of its own maximalist definition of โwinning.โ Since Kiev has insisted that it will not give up until it returns its 1991 borders, an inability to dislodge Russian forces poses a particularly nasty problem – Kiev will either need to admit defeat and acknowledge Russian control over the annexed areas, or it will continue to fight obstinately until it is a failed state with nothing left in the tank.
Trapped in a bat fight, with attempts to unlock the front with maneuver coming to naught, what Ukraine needs most is a much bigger bat. The alternative is a totalizing strategic disaster [end]
Heureux sans abonnement ร lโExpress, je nโai pas accรจs ร lโarticle, seulement un titre et un chapรด, qui ร eux seuls, sont une joyeuse source d’inspiration
Avec ou sans faux-nez, ils cherchent ร dynamiter lโunitรฉ occidentale face ร la folie destructrice de Vladimir Poutine. Par anti-amรฉricanisme, par haine de notre dรฉmocratie libรฉrale, ceux que lโon surnomme les prorusses et les ยซidiots utiles ยป du Kremlin sโactivent sur les rรฉseaux sociaux et dans les sphรจres politiques. On les croyait condamnรฉs au silence depuis lโinvasion russe, ils nโont jamais รฉtรฉ aussi dangereux
Comme ils sont mรฉchants, comme ils nous font peur, ces vilains pro-russes. Comment pourrait on [on est un con, m’a t on appris quand j’รฉtais tout petit] les condamner au silence ? Par lโaccentuation de la censure sur les rรฉseaux sociaux ? Commandement bureaucratique dโun espace libre-รฉchangiste subordonnรฉ ร lโOTAN, lโUnion europรฉenne y songe pour ce mois dโaoรปt.
Afin de conjurer son angoisse, lโExpress a entrepris dโรฉtiqueter les diffรฉrents canaux pro-russes, de ficher leurs tรชtes de gondole : Henri Guaino, Jean-Luc Mรฉlenchon, Marine le Pen, Sรฉgolรจne Royalโฆ etc Anti-amรฉricains, militaires, covido-sceptiques, hommes dโaffaire, russophiles, pacifistes, extrรชme-droiteโฆ, les oeils de Moscou sont partout, cโest effrayant. Sans dรฉsemparer, les employรฉs de presse se sont saisis de leur clavier pour attรฉnuer les malheurs de l’Occident.
Les envolรฉes lyriques partisanes me font rire et l’hilaritรฉ me permet de surmonter mon dรฉgoรปt pour l’excrรฉtion des รฉtats d’รขme franchouillards. Aussi cruels qu’ils puissent รชtre, les faits sont plus intรฉressants sans fioriture littรฉraire. Contrairement aux personnalitรฉs politiques citรฉes plus haut, mon analyse n’est pas polluรฉe par le patriotisme, forme thรฉorisรฉe de lโinstinct grรฉgaire. La justice est ma seule patrie.
Plutรดt que de contribuer ร dรฉsamorcer la crise, l’OTAN y vit lโopportunitรฉ stratรฉgique dโune guerre par procuration contre la Russie. Son fantasme รฉtait de la dรฉmembrer, pour amรฉliorer son rapport de force ร la Chine. Alors que l’hypocrisie occidentale ne laissait pas d’autre solution, lโopรฉration militaire spรฉciale est devenue une nรฉcessitรฉ technique en fรฉvrier 2022. La Russie a relevรฉ le dรฉfi, s’est portรฉe au secours de la population russophone du Donbass.
La paix รฉtait enfin possible en mars, aprรจs quelques semaines seulement de combat, mais les Anglo-รtats-uniens y opposรจrent leur veto. Le champ de bataille se dresse dรฉsormais entre la rรฉalitรฉ et les fantasmes de mรฉdiocres politiciens occidentaux.
ร l’instar de la rรฉdaction de l’Express, les jeunes Franรงais me paraissent en gรฉnรฉral peu รฉquipรฉs pour y briller. Alors que l’OTAN perd cette guerre et accรฉlรจre l’inรฉluctable dรฉclin de l’hรฉgรฉmonie occidentale, les employรฉs de lโExpress semblent peu pressรฉs de remplacer fusil en main la chair ร canon ukrainienne hachรฉe en vain pour attรฉnuer leurs angoisses. Ils font le choix ancrรฉ dans une tradition bien franรงaise dโรฉtablir le fichier de leurs concitoyens pro-russes. Ils donnent leur sang, donnez votre voisin. Puisque son champ d’action demeure derriรจre le clavier, jโai hรขte que la rรฉdaction sโintรฉresse aux nazis franรงais partis en Ukraine dรฉfendre lโEurope, la dรฉmocratie et la libertรฉ.
Je suis assez vieux pour avoir observรฉ les prรฉcรฉdentes entreprises criminelles et catastrophiques des รtats-unis et de leurs alliรฉs, tentatives de prรฉserver leur hรฉgรฉmonie d’un dรฉclin mรฉcanique et inรฉluctable. Je suis de ceux que les couveuses koweรฏtiennes et autres armes de destruction massive ont รฉchaudรฉs.
ร lโรฉpoque indรฉpendante, la France sโopposa en 2003 ร lโinvasion de lโIrak. Plus tard hรฉlas, Nicolas Sarkozy fut le complice de la destruction de la Libye. Folie destructrice ? De loin le plus crรฉtin, Franรงois Hollande paya la note et quelques Franรงais avec lui, quand le 13 novembre 2015, une opรฉration djihadiste fut lโanecdotique dommage collatรฉral ร Paris du soutien occidental ร l’insurrection sunnite radicale contre le gouvernement laรฏc de Syrie. Au train oรน vont les choses en Ukraine, ces dรฉsagrรฉments ne sont pas finis
Selfie en septembre 2022 de volontaires franรงais dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine (rรฉseaux sociaux nazis)
Par mon รขge et mon expรฉrience professionnelle, je me targue dโune culture historique et politique supรฉrieure ร celle de lโauteur de romans policiers Charles Haquet ou de lโรฉtudiante en affaires internationales Emma Collet, qui ont commis cet article d’anthologie.
Au dรฉclenchement de lโopรฉration militaire spรฉciale, voilร plus dโun an, mes sentiments รฉtaient plus neutres. Mais ร la faรงon dont les mรชmes pressetituรฉs ont encore une fois dรฉversรฉ des torrents de boue -mensonges, propagande ukrainienne pour demeurรฉs et autre fantรดme de Kiev– ont cherchรฉ sans vergogne ร blanchir le nazisme endรฉmique ukrainien et ses crimes, jโai vite compris oรน รฉtaient dans cette affaire le droit et la justice. D’ailleurs, l’immense majoritรฉ des vastes restes du monde est arrivรฉe aux mรชmes conclusions
Charles Haquet & Emma Collet (rรฉseaux sociaux)
Cet article est aussi lโauthentique expression dโun pays dont le courage nโest pas la premiรจre qualitรฉ qui vient ร lโesprit, quand il est รฉvoquรฉ ร l’รฉtranger. Dโune presse ร ce point servile et caricaturale, quโun Philippe Henriot ne la renierait pas. Dโun peuple froussard ร l’arrogance rurale, dont la comprรฉhension des questions internationales est aussi miรจvre que chauvine. Car enfin, comme il faut รชtre lรขche et rompu aux petits arrangements d’alcรดve, pour encencer en qualitรฉ de Franรงais, un rรฉgiment Azov qui arbore fiรจrement l’emblรจme de la 2. SS-Panzer-Division, Das Reich, qui le 10 juin 1944, massacra 643 habitants d’Oradour sur Glane. Impensable ร l’รฉtranger.
Je vous laisse votre dรฉmocratie libรฉrale -quand votre libรฉralisme ne rรฉsiste pas ร la premiรจre รฉraflure sur la carosserie de votre automobile ร crรฉdit- votre chef d’รtat รฉlu par 25% du corps รฉlectoral, ses Gilets jaunes mutilรฉs, son 49.3 et sa presse subventionnรฉe. Elle ne m’intรฉresse plus, mais fait encore plier de rire une large majoritรฉ du globe. Elle est digne de vous, employรฉs de l’Express, petits bourgeois du blรชme Hexagone, racaille macroniste. Vous avez au moins compris une chose : votre dรฉfaite par procuration au Donbass est le dรฉbut de votre fin.
Oleg Gazmanov – composer, 2022, vocals Alexander Marshal – vocals
She was not a glamorous diva Yes, and not very pedigree And I didnโt think how to be happy for her – Worked day and night She took care of everything and us Raised us young fools How could she feed and clothe gave the last We turned up our noses And she always taught us to think Sometimes gave jeans and chewing gum Only we wanted more and more And we thought she was wrong
They talked about her embarrassingly And she silently looked into our eyes And, sighing, then left for good Motherland, my mother Motherland My Soviet Motherland My mom is sorry… Motherland, my mother Motherland My Soviet Motherland My mom is sorry…
Did not feed truffle with Parmesan- Only what is, but there were books We were escorted to music and sports – Tired, but helped in everything Sent to the sea and into the ranks of the detachments In institutes, space, Olympiads And taught us to achieve everything Set goals and boldly strive for them And we thought she was wrong
They talked about her embarrassingly And she silently looked into our eyes And, sighing, then left for good Motherland, my mother Motherland My Soviet Motherland My mom is sorry… Motherland, my mother Motherland My Soviet Motherland My mom is sorry… Motherland, my mother Motherland My Soviet Motherland My mom is sorry… Motherland, my mother Motherland My Soviet Motherland My mom is sorry…
Friends, today the premiere of my new song “Motherland” took place – this is a short emotional story – mine and my country. With this song, I apologize to my mother for the fact that I was “led” to the propaganda of perestroika and believed that her generation was wrong. I was wrong, and my mother is gone. Take care of your parents and your Motherland!
Five major trends illustrate how the world is changing, and that the West must grapple with the reality that it can no longer impose its โleadershipโ on the world as it once did.
[my illustration : on June 12, 2023, Burj Khalifa tower, in Dubai, celebrates the Day of Russia (screenshots)]
The post-Western, multipolar international order is coming to pass. As the world grapples with the implications of this shift in power, the foundations of a great reckoning are taking shape. This reckoning will challenge the long-held beliefs and structures that have sustained Western dominance of the world for the past few hundred years, exposing along the way the nature of the Westโs perceived entitlement to lead the global pecking order. The end result will be a significant re-evaluation of international relations as we know it.
This great reckoning will be driven by five major trends, which are compelling Western nations to confront and adapt to a future where power must be shared with the rest in a multipolar world. A failure to recognize, or attempting to strongly resist, these trends could pose significant risks not only to the West itself but also to global stability. Yet future conflicts can be avoided if this period of change is viewed as an opportunity to build a more equitable world, rather than as a crisis that threatens preferred and entrenched privileges.
Five Trends to Consider
What future awaits the Westโa smooth transition toward multipolarity or a period of instability and potential conflictโwill largely depend on how policymakers respond to the following five trends.
First is the unravelling of the hitherto telling of history. The West, across its colonial history, has practiced and perfected the selective interpretation and telling of events, choosing to portray itself as the originator of modern civilization and a benevolent guiding force. This is now changing; information technologies, such as the Internet and social media, have broken the monopoly over information and history once held by Western gatekeeping institutions (media companies, universities, book publishers, and more). As a consequence, people around the world are recognizing that history is no longer confined to Western interpretationโincluding its projection of benevolence.
A significant component of this has been the Westโs frequent failure to acknowledge its own imperfect past. Despite amplifying the perceived wrongdoings of others, it has been silent about its own unsavory moments, such as early American pioneersโ destruction of First Nation cultures, European exploitation of the African continent, or Australiaโs treatment of aboriginal peoples. Addressing these historical episodes matters all the more because they affect current behavior; Western nations also have problems admitting to contemporary mistakes and intentions.
Non-Western nations can now make clear that their own countries and communities have long histories that not only exist despite Western interpretation, but these histories need to be explored, understood, and told. The West must grapple with this trend and its implications, rather than continue to obscure it in denial. Consider the ongoing diplomatic efforts of the Indian government to compel Great Britain to return the treasure stolen from India, including some of the crown jewels.
The second trend is the re-evaluation of theโ rules-basedโ international order. Policymakers in Washington may not like hearing it, but the concept is the subject of much derision around the world and is widely regarded as a tool used by the West to control global affairs and maintain hegemony. There is ample resentment growing against Western nations given the repeated breaching of their own rules, meaning that the legitimacy of this order is being questioned despite its positive aspects.
Coinciding with this growing frustration is the reality that the distribution of power across more nations is transforming the current world order and creating new opportunities and challenges. China has assumed a more prominent position, offering global public goods such as peacemaking and addressing climate change in a manner Western nations are not willing, or able, to do. Similarly, India is beginning to assert itself, as are other smaller nations, like the UAE and Indonesia.
As more countries determine their own trajectories in the twenty-first century, the West must recognize that the international balance of power has shifted. It cannot continue to impose its will on othersโthe rise of China and other nations is evidence of such. The West must come to terms with this new reality and recognize that a new, more pragmatic, and multipolar approach is needed, where nations pursue foreign policies committed to co-existence, driven by their own best interests rather than aligning themselves with โone sideโ or the other.
Third is the unmasking of Western โpeacekeeping.โ Despite portraying itself as the guarantor of global security, much of the world now views the United Statesโ and Europe to a lesser extent, as profiting from war rather than being interested in promoting authentic peace. The Western military-industrial complexโparticularly the United Statesโโis so powerful that it is now well-known to drive U.S. foreign policy to the extent that it perpetuates conflicts to thus profit from war.
The rest of the world has realized that the West alone cannot be trusted to lead global peace efforts, especially if a significant portion of their economies are geared to profit from conflict. In light of this, a positive change is occurring, with China brokering ground-breaking peace agreementsโbetween Saudi Arabia and Iran, for exampleโwhile world leaders like Indonesiaโs Joko Widodo, Indiaโs Narendra Modi, and Brazilโs Luiz Inรกcio Lula da Silva pitchpeacefulresolutions to modern conflicts.
The fourth trend underway is the dethroning of the Western financial superstructure. That the West makes ample use of its financial might for geopolitical advantage and purposes is no great secretโpolicymakers and experts openly talk about the โweaponization of financeโ and applying sanctions on countries that do not comply with Western intentions. Likewise, the ability of the United States and its allies to freeze and even confiscate the reserves of sovereign statesโAfghanistan, Venezuela, Russiaโsent shock waves across the world.
Because of this and the Westโs own track record of financial greed and improprietyโwhich resulted in devastating crises such as the 2007โ2008 financial crisis and the recent collapse of Silicon Valley Bank, which has had global reverberationsโdistrust in and a rejection of Western financial structures is growing.
Efforts are now underway to dismantle the exorbitant privilege bestowed on the United States via its currency. De-dollarization is very much happening, with the currencyโs share of global reserves falling to 47 percent last year, down from 73 percent in 2001. Additionally, countries are seeking alternatives to the SWIFT system, which also has been used in aid of Western-based sanctions and thus alarmed the global majority. As countries with stable currencies gain influence, a more multipolar economic order emerges, reshaping geopolitical alliances, economic diplomacy, and the balance of power within international institutions. This change may grant developing nations greater flexibility in managing their currencies and monetary policies and limit the Westโs capacity to unilaterally impose sanctions. Moreover, BRICS nations have recently surpassed the G7 in terms of GDP, signaling a redistribution of economic power and hinting at a future of cooperation in trade, investment, infrastructure, and development assistance.
Fifth and finally, there is the notable collapse of the Western pressโ credibility. This comes at a critical juncture, as repeated shortcomings in the last few years have heightened global awareness of Western mediaโs role in perpetuating the Westโs preferred aspects of the current world orderโoften to the detriment of other countries.
For instance, persistent China-bashing in Western headlines has perpetuated an unproductive and fear-mongering narrative of Beijing as a threat to its own citizens and the world at large. The geopolitical contexts of Hong Kong and Taiwan, though complicated affairs, have been particularly and selectively drummed up to push an โus vs. themโ narrative, rather than encouraging understanding between the West and China.
Similarly, overwhelmingly one-sided coverage of the Ukrainian conflict regularly overlooks national and regional geopolitical complexities in the long-standing Russian-Ukrainian relationship and the history of NATO expansion in Europe. A lack of reporting on the Nord Stream bombing, which many believe was perpetrated by a Western nationโwith reporting to back this claim upโis a glaring hole that has contributed to the lack of trust in Western media from both non-Western and Western readers alike. Only months later is the Western press quietly admitting potential Western culpability, or at the very least, knowledge.
Moreover, inadequate, and biased coverage of non-Western conflicts, such as those in Yemen, Myanmar, and Palestine, has led to global accusations of neglect, bias, and even racism.
The Writing on the Wall
Western governments operating in an echo chamber of denial need to reach out to their friends across the world and realize what is obvious to everyone except to themselves: that the world is not like what it was in the post-Cold War era. The old ways are finished, and the West simply does not have the political and financial power, not to mention the international legitimacy, it once did. Western nations must adapt to this changing international environment, rather than stubbornly insisting upon business as usual. Failure to do so will make the world a more dangerous place and erode the credibility and influence of the West even further [end]
On May 20th, PMC Wagner forced Ukrainian troops out of their last remaining position within the city limits of Bakhmut, consequentially bringing about the nominal end of the largest battle of the 21st century (so far). Bakhmut has been the most substantial locus of military operations in Ukraine for most of the past nine months. Combat there took on a frustrating tempo, with progress often measured in single city blocks. This was a battle that was extremely violent and bloody, but at times agonizingly slow and seemingly indecisive. After countless updates in which nothing of note seemed to have happen, many people were surely beginning to roll their eyes at the very mention of Bakhmut. Consequentially, the abrupt capture of the city by Wagner in May (rather predictably, the final 25% of the city fell very quickly relative to the rest) seemed a bit surreal. To many it likely seemed that Bakhmut would never end – and then, suddenly, it did.
Bakhmut, like most high-intensity urban battles, exemplifies the apocalyptic potential of modern combat. Intense bombardment reduced large portions of the city to rubble, lending the impression that Wagner and the AFU were not so much fighting over the city as its carcass.
The slow pace and extreme destruction has made this battle a rather difficult one to parse out. It all seems so senseless – even within the unique paradigm of war-making. In the absence of an obvious operational logic, observers on both sides have been eager to construct theories of how the battle was actually a brilliant example of four-dimensional chess. In particular, you can easily find arguments from both pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian commentators claiming that Bakhmut was used as a trap to draw in the other sideโs manpower and material for destruction, while buying time to accumulate fighting power
Pro-Ukrainian sources are adamant that a huge amount of Russian combat power was destroyed in Bakhmut, while the AFU received western armor and training to build out a mechanized package to go back on the offensive. Pro-Russian writers similarly seem convinced that the AFU burned a huge amount of manpower, while the Russian army preserved its strength by letting Wagner do most of the fighting.
Clearly, they cannot both be correct.
In this article, I would like to take a holistic survey of the Battle of Bakhmut and adjudicate the evidence. Which army was really destroyed in this โstrategically insignificantโ city? Which army was being profligately wasteful of its manpower? And most importantly – why did this middling city become the site of the largest battle of the century? Homicide was committed, but nobody can agree on who murdered whom. So, let us conduct an autopsy.
The Road to the Death Pit
The Battle of Bakhmut lasted for so long that it can be easy to forget how the front ended up there, and how Bakhmut fits into the operations in the summer of 2022. Russian operations in the summer were focused on the reduction of the Ukrainian salient around Lysychansk and Severodonetsk, and came to a climactic head when Russian forces broke open the heavy defended Ukrainian stronghold of Popasna, encircled a pocket of Ukrainian forces around Zolote, and approached the Bakhmut-Lysychansk highway. The actual fall of the Lysychansk-Severodonetsk urban agglomeration came relatively quickly, with Russian forces threatening to encircle the entire bag and forcing a Ukrainian withdrawal.
Just for reference, here is what the frontline in the central Donbas looked like on May 1, 2022, courtesy of MilitaryLand
In this context, Bakhmut already threatened to become a major battleground. It lay at a literal crossroad directly in the center of the Ukrainian salient. As Ukrainian positions in Lysychansk, Popasna, and Svitlodarsk were broken open, the axes of Russian advance converged on Bakhmut.
Ukrainian forces greatly needed to stabilize the front, and establish a stable blocking position, and there was really nowhere else to do this except at Bakhmut. Between Lysychansk and Bakhmut there are no sufficiently robust urban areas to anchor the defense, and there was absolutely no question of failing to adequately defend Bakhmut, for a few reasons that we can enumerate:
Bakhmut is in the central position in this sector of front, and its loss would both threaten Siversk with envelopment and allow Russian forces to bypass the well fortified and strongly held defenses at Toretsk.
The Russian strategic objective at Slavyansk-Kramatorsk cannot be successfully defended if the Russian army controls both the heights to the east (in the Bakhmut area) and Izyum.
Bakhmut itself, meanwhile, was a defensible urban area with dominating heights in its rear, multiple routes of supply, good linkages to other sectors of front, and a peripheral belt of smaller urban areas protecting its flanks.
This set up a rather obvious operational decision for Ukrainian forces. The choice was, all things considered, to either commit reserves to stabilize the front at Bakhmut (a strong and operational vital defensive anchor) or risk letting Russia bypass and sweep away an entire belt of defenses in places like Siversk and Toretsk. Asked to choose between a reasonably good option and an extremely bad option, there was no great controversy in the deciding.
Falling back from the loss of their eastern defensive belt, Ukraine needed to stabilize the front somewhere, and the only suitable place was Bakhmut – so this is where Ukrainian reserves were sent in force, and the AFU chose to fight. Operational logic, indifferent to those things that normally recommend cities to us as โimportantโ, decreed that the Styx should flow through Bakhmut.
Russia came to meet this challenge – bringing as their spearhead a mercenary group, staffed by convicts, wielding shovels, run by a bald caterer. What could go wrong?
Operational Progression
Because the general impression of Bakhmut is characterized by urban combat, it can be easy to forget that most of the battle took place outside the city itself, in the exurbs and fields around the urban center. The approach to Bakhmut is cluttered with a ring of smaller villages (places like Klynove, Pokrovsโke, and Zaitseve) from which the AFU was able to fight a tenacious defense with the support of artillery in the city itself.
While Russian forces nominally reached the approach to Bakhmut late in June (even before Lysychansk was captured) and the city came under the extremes of shelling range, they did not immediately begin a concerted push to reach it. On August 1, the first assaults on the outer belt of villages began, and the Russian Ministry of Defense stated in its briefings that โbattles for Bakhmutโ had begun. This date is the most logical starting date for historiographical purposes, so we may firmly say that the Battle of Bakhmut was fought from August 1, 2022 to May 20, 2023 – a total of 293 days.
The first two months of the battle saw the Russian capture of most of the settlements east of the T0513 highway south of the city and the T1302 highway to the north, stripping Bakhmut and Soledar of most of their eastern buffer zones and pushing the line of contact right up to the edge of the urban areas proper
Phase 1: The Outer Belt
At this point, the frontlines largely froze up for the remainder of the year, before Wagner set the stage for further advances with the capture of the small village of Yakovlivka, to the north of Soledar. This success can be construed as the first domino in a chain of events which led to Ukrainian defeat in Bakhmut.
Soledar itself serves a unique and critical role in the operational geography of Bakhmut. Laid out in a relatively long and thin strip, Soledar and its suburbs form a continuous urban shield stretching from the T0513 highway (which runs north to Siversk) all the way to the T0504 road (running east to Popasna). This makes Soledar a natural satellite stronghold which defends Bakhmut across nearly ninety degrees of approach. Soledar is also liberally gifted with industrial build, including the salt mine for which it is named, which makes it a relatively friendly place to wage a static defense, full of deep places and strong walls.
Wagnerโs capture of Yakovlivka on December 16, however, marked the first sign that the defense of Soledar was in trouble. Yakovlikva sits on an elevated position to the northeast of Soledar, and its capture gave Wagner a powerful position atop Soledarโs flank. The Ukrainians recognized this, and Soledar was powerfully reinforced in response to the loss of Yakovlivka and the anticipated oncoming assault. The capture of Bakhmutske on December 27 (a suburb of Soledar directly on its southern approach) set the stage for a successful assault.
The attack on Soledar ended up being relatively fast and extremely violent, characterized by intense levels of Russian artillery support. The assault began almost immediately after the loss of Bakhmutske on December 27th, and by January 10th Ukraineโs cohesive defense had been shattered. Ukrainian leadership, of course, denied losing the town and wove a story about glorious counterattacks, but even the Institute for the Study of War (a propaganda arm of the US State Department) later admitted that Russia had captured Soledar by January 11th.
The loss of Soledar, in combination with the early January capture of Klischiivka to the south, put Wagner in a position to begin a partial envelopment of Bakhmut
Phase 2: Clearing the Flanks
It was at this point that the discussion shifted towards a potential Russian encirclement of Bakhmut. To be sure, the Russian wings did expand rapidly around the city, placing it in a firebag, but there was never a concerted effort to take the city into a proper encirclement. The Russian advance subsided on the approach to Ivanivske in the south, and over the vital M03 highway in the north.
A genuine encirclement was probably never in the cards, mainly because of the complication of Chasiv Yar – a strongly held rear area stronghold. To fully encircle Bakhmut, Russian forces would have been forced to choose between two difficult options: either blockade the road from Chasiv Yar to Bakhmut, or flare the envelopment wide enough to take Chasiv Yar into the pocket as well. Either option would have greatly complicated the operation, and so Bakhmut was never genuinely encircled.
What the Russians did succeed in doing, however, was establish dominant position on the flanks which accrued three significant advantages. First, they were able to direct fire on Bakhmutโs remaining supply lines. Secondly, they were able to pummel Bakhmut itself with intense artillery fire from a variety of axes. Third – and perhaps most importantly – they were able to assault the Bakhmut urban center itself from three different directions. This, in the end, greatly hastened the fall of the city. By April, it was clear that the focus had shifted from expanding the envelopment on the flanks to assaulting Bakhmut itself, and it was reported that Russian regular units had taken custody of the flanks so that Wagner could clear the city
Phase 3: Flaring the Wings
Fighting throughout April and early May at last shifted to the struggle in the urban center. AFU units in the city ultimately proved incapable of stopping Wagnerโs advance, largely due to tight Russian fires coordination and the cramped confines of the Ukrainian defense – with Wagner advancing into the city from three axes, the firing grids for Russian artillery became very narrow, and the AFUโs static defense – while bravely contested – was slowly ground down.
By early May, it was clear that the city would fall soon, with the AFU desperately holding on to the western edge of the city. Attention soon shifted, however, to a Ukrainian counterattack on the flanks.
This became a rather classic instance of events on the ground being outrun by the narrative. There had been rumors of an impending Ukrainian counterattack circulating for quite some time, advanced by both Ukrainian and Russian sources. Ukrainian channels were predicated on the idea that General Oleksandr Syrskyi (commander of AFU ground forces) had hatched a scheme to draw the Russians into Bakhmut before launching a counterattack on the wings. This idea was seemingly corroborated frantic warnings from Wagner head Yevgeny Prigozhin that the Ukrainians had massed enormous forces in the rear areas behind Bakhmut which would be unleashed to counter-encircle the city.
In any case, the spring months came and went without any astonishing AFU counterattack, and all manner of material shortages and weather delays were blamed. Then, on May 15, all hell seemed to be breaking loose. The AFU finally attacked, and Prigozhin screeched that the situation on the flanks was approaching the worst case scenario.
In fact, what happened was rather anticlimactic. The AFU did bring a hefty grouping of units to play, including several of their best and most veteran formations. These included units from:
The 56th Brigade
The 57th Mechanized Brigade
The 67th Mechanized Brigade
The 92nd Mechanized Brigade
The 3rd Assault Brigade (Azov)
The 80th Air Assault Brigade
The 5th Assault Brigade
This sizeable strike package attacked a handful of mediocre Russian Motor Rifle brigades, achieved a bit of initial success, and culminated with heavy losses. Despite Prigozhinโs assertion that the Russian regulars abandoned their posts and left the Russian wings undefended, we later learned that these forces – including mobilized motor rifle units – doggedly defended their positions and only withdrew under orders from above. These withdrawals (distances of a few hundred meters at most) brought the Russian defensive line to strongly held positions along a series of canals and reservoirs, which the AFU was unable to push through.
Now, this is not to say that Russia did not suffer losses defending against a tenacious Ukrainian attack. The 4th Motor Rifle Brigade, which was largely responsible for the successful defense outside Klishchiivka, was badly chewed up, its commander was killed, and it had to be promptly rotated out. However, the offensive potential of the Ukrainian assault package was exhausted, and there have been no follow on attempts in the past two weeks
The Final Act: Ukraineโs Counterattack
In the end, the vaunted Syrskyi plan looked rather lame. The counterattack did successfully unblock a few key roads out of Bakhmut, but it did nothing to prevent Wagner from finalizing the capture of the city, it burned through the combat power of several premier brigades, and on May 20th the last Ukrainian positions in the city were liquidated.
So. This was a strange battle. An agonizingly slow creep around the flanks of the city, a materializing threat of encirclement, and a sudden concentration of Wagnerโs combat energy in the city itself – all taking place under threats of an enormous counteroffensive by the AFU, which turned out to be ineffective and ephemeral.
Itโs not obvious, then, how this battle suited the operational logic of either army, nor that anyone would come away fully satisfied. Ukraine obviously lost the battle in nominal terms, but the Russian advance seemed so slow and Bakhmut so strategically random (at least superficially) that Wagnerโs success can be portrayed as a pyrrhic victory. To fully adjudicate the Battle of Bakhmut, we need to contemplate relative losses and expenditure of combat power.
The Butcherโs Bill
Estimating combat losses in Ukraine is a difficult task, largely because โofficialโ casualty estimates are often patently absurd. This leaves us with a need to fumble for reasonable figures using proxies and ancillary information. One such important source of knowledge is deployments data – we can get a general sense of the burn rate by the scale and frequency of unit allocation. In this particular case, however, we find that unit deployments are somewhat difficult to work with. Letโs parse through this.
First and foremost, we need to grapple with the incontrovertible fact that a huge share of the Ukrainian military was deployed at Bakhmut at one point or another. The Telegram Channel Grey Zone compiled a list of all the Ukrainian units that were positively identified (usually by social media posts or AFU updates) as being deployed in Bakhmut throughout the nine month battle (that is, they were not there all at once)
This is an absolutely enormous commitment (37 brigades, 2 regiments, and 18 separate battalions (plus irregular formations like the Georgian Legion) which indicates obviously severe losses (for what itโs worth, the pro-Ukrainian MilitaryLand Deployment Map admits a similarly titanic Ukrainian deployment in Bakhmut). However, this does not really get us close to accurately assessing losses, largely because Ukraineโs Order of Battle (ORBAT) is a bit confused. Ukraine frequently parcels out units below the brigade level (for example, their artillery brigades never deploy as such) and they have a bad habit of unit cannibalization.
Doing some extremely rough back of the envelop math, minimal scratching off of just the 37 brigades could easily have pushed Ukraine past 25,000 casualties, but there are all manner of shaky assumptions here. First, this assumes that Ukraine withdraws its brigades when they reach combat ineffective loss levels (15% would be a placeholder number here), which isnโt necessarily true – there is precedent for the AFU leaving troops in place to die, especially from lower quality units like Territorial Defense. In fact, an Australian volunteer (interview linked later on) claimed that the 24th mechanized brigade suffered 80% casualties in Bakhmut, so itโs possible that a great many of these brigades were chewed up beyond task ineffectiveness levels (that is, they were not correctly rotated out) but were instead destroyed entirely. A recent article in the New Yorker, for example, interviewed survivors of a battalion that was almost entirely wiped out. In another instance, a retired Marine Colonel said that units at the frontline routinely suffer 70% casualties.
We can say a few things for certain. First, that Ukraine had an extremely high burn rate which forced it to commit nearly a third of its total ORBAT. Secondly, we know that at least some of these formations were left at the front until they were destroyed. Finally, we can definitively say that pro-Ukrainian accounts are incorrect (or maybe lying) when they say that the defense at Bakhmut was conducted to buy time for Ukraine to build up strength in the rear. We know this first and foremost because Bakhmut insatiably sucked in additional units, and secondly because this burn included a large number of Ukraineโs premier and veteran forces, including fully a dozen assault, airborne, and armored brigades.
Thereโs another problem with the ORBAT approach to casualties, however, and this concerns Wagner. You see, one of our objectives here is to try to get a sense of the comparative rates of loss, and ORBAT simply isnโt a good way to do this in the particular case of Bakhmut. This is because the battle was mostly fought from the Russian side by the Wagner Group, which is a huge formation with an opaque internal structure.
Whereas on the Ukrainian side we can enumerate a long list of formations that fought at Bakhmut, on the Russian side we just put the 50,000 strong Wagner Group. Wagner of course has internal sub-formations and rotations, but these are not visible to those of us on the outside, and so we cannot get a sense of Wagnerโs internal ORBAT or force commitment. We understand generally that Wagner has a structure of assault detachments (probably a battalion equivalent), platoons, and squads, but we do not have a sense of where these units are deployed in real time or how quickly they are rotated or burned through. Sadly, when Prigozhin went in front of cameras he brought maps without unit dispositions on them, leaving ORBAT nerds squinting in vain trying to extract useful information. So, lacking good insight into Wagnerโs deployments, we are unable to make an adequate comparison to the bloated Ukrainian ORBAT in Bakhmut.
There are other ways that we can get at the casualties, however. The Russian dissident (that is, anti-Putin) organization Mediazona tracks Russian losses by tabulating obituaries, death announcements on social media, and official announcements. For the entire period of the Battle of Bakhmut (August 1 – May 20), they counted 6,184 total deaths among PMC personnel, inmates, and airborne forces (these three categories accounting for most of the Russian force in Bakhmut).
Meanwhile, Prigozhin claimed that Wagner had suffered 20,000 KIA in Bakhmut while inflicting 50,000 KIA on the Ukrainians. Concerning the first number – the context of this claim was an interview in which he was lambasting the Russian Ministry of Defense (as is his habit), and he has an incentive to overstate Wagnerโs losses (since he is trying to play up Wagnerโs sacrifice for the Russian people).
So, here is where we are at with Wagner losses. We have a โfloorโ, or absolute minimum of a little over 6,000 KIA (these being positively identified by name) with a significant upward margin of error , and something like a ceiling of 20,000. The number that I have been working with is approximately 17,000 total Wagner KIA in the Bakhmut operation (with a min-max range of 14,000 and 20,000, respectively)
However, something we need to consider is the composition of these forces. Among the positively identified KIA, convicts outnumber professional PMC operators by about 2.6 to 1 (that is, Wagnerโs dead would be about 73% convicts). According to the Pentagon, however (taken with a large grain of salt), nearly 90% of Wagnerโs losses are convicts. Taking a conservative 75/25 split and rounding the numbers to make them pretty, my estimate is that Wagner lost about 13,000 convicts and 4,000 professional operators. Adding in VDV losses and motorized rifle units fighting on the flanks, and total Russian KIA in Bakhmut are likely on the order of 20-22,000.
So, what about Ukrainian losses? The major outstanding question remains: who is on the right end of the loss ratios?
Ukrainian commentators consistently ask us to believe that Russian losses were far worse due to their use of โhuman waveโ attacks. There are several reasons why this can be dismissed.
First, we have to acknowledge that after nine months of combat we have not yet seen a single video showing one of these purported human waves (that is, Wagner convicts attacking in a massed formation). Keeping in mind that Ukraine loves to share footage of embarrassing Russian mistakes, that they have no qualms about sharing gory war porn, and that this is a war being fought with thousands of eyes in the sky in the form of reconnaissance drones, it must strike us as curious that not one of these alleged human wave attacks has yet been caught on camera. When videos are shared purporting to show human waves, they invariably show small groups of 6-8 infantry (we call this a squad, not a human wave).
However, the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. That being said, the โhuman waveโ narrative has been contradicted on multiple occasions. Just for starters, General Syrskyi himself contradicted the human wave narrative and said that Wagnerโs methodology is to push small assault groups forward under intense artillery cover. Witnesses from the front concur. An Australian Army Veteran volunteering in Ukraine gave a very interesting interview in which he downplayed Wagner casualties and instead emphasized that โUkraine is taking way too many casualtiesโ – he later adds that the 24th brigade suffered 80% casualties in Bakhmut. He also notes that Wagner favors infiltration groups and small units – the veritable opposite of massed human waves.
I found this article from the Wall Street Journal to be nicely emblematic of the human wave issue. It contains the obligatory claim of human wave tactics – โThe enemy pays no attention to huge losses of its personnel and continues the active assault. The approaches to our positions are simply littered with the bodies of the adversaryโs dead soldiers.โ This description, however, comes from the bureaucratic apparatus at the Ministry of Defense. What about people on the ground? A Ukrainian officer at the front says: โSo far, the exchange rate of trading our lives for theirs favors the Russians. If this goes on like this, we could run out.โ
Ultimately, itโs difficult to believe that the kill ratio favors Ukraine for the simple reason that the Russians have enjoyed a tremendous advantage in firepower. Ukrainian soldiers speak freely about Russiaโs enormous superiority in artillery, and at one point it was suggested that the AFU was outgunned by ten to one. The New Yorkerโs interview subjects claimed that their battalionโs mortar section had a ration of a mere five shells per day!
The enormous Russian advantage in artillery and standoff weaponry suggests the a-priori assumption that the AFU would be taking horrific casualties, and indeed thatโs what we hear from myriad sources at the front. Then, of course, there was the shocking February claim by a former US Marine in Bakhmut that the life expectancy at the front line was a mere four hours.
All of this is really ancillary to the larger point. The enormous inventory of AFU units that were churned through Bakhmut included something on the order of 160,000 total personnel. Taking loss rates of between 25 and 30% (roughly on par with Wagnerโs burn rate), itโs clear that Ukraineโs losses were extreme. I believe total irretrievable losses for Ukraine in Bakhmut were approximately 45,000, with some +/- 7,000 margin of error.
So, my current working estimates for losses in the Battle of Bakhmut are some 45,000 for Ukraine, 17,0000 for Wagner, and 5,000 for other Russian forces.
But perhaps even this misses the point.
Ukraine was losing its army, Russia was losing its prison population.
Adjudicating the Battle of Bakhmut is relatively easy when one looks at what units were brought to the table. Bakhmut burned through an enormous portion of the AFUโs inventory, including many of its veteran assault brigades, while virtually none of Russiaโs conventional forces were damaged (with the notable exception of the Motor Rifle brigades that defeated the Ukrainian counterattack). Even the Pentagon has admitted that the vast majority of Russian casualties in Ukraine were convicts.
Now, this is all rather cynical – nobody can deny it. But from the unsentimental calculus of strategic logic, Russia churned through its single most disposable military asset, leaving its regular ORBAT not only completely intact, but actually larger than it was last year.
Meanwhile, Ukraine was left with virtually no indigenous offensive power – the only way it can conduct offensive operations is with a mechanized package built from scratch by NATO. For all Ukraineโs bluster, the force commitment at Bakhmut left it unable to undertake any proactive operations all through the winter and spring, its multi-brigade counterattack at Bakhmut lamely fizzled out, and it left its supporters grasping at straws about an immanent counteroffensive to encircle Wagner by a reserve army that doesnโt exist. It was even reduced to sending small flying columns into Belgorod Oblast to launch terror raids, only to have them blown up – discovering that the Russian border is in fact crawling with forces of the very much intact Russian army.
I think that ultimately, neither army anticipated that Bakhmut would become the focal point of such high intensity combat, but the arrival of Ukrainian reserves in force created a unique situation. Russia was beginning a process of major force generation (with mobilization beginning in September), and the gridlocked, slow moving, Verdun-like environs of Bakhmut offered a good place for Wagner to bear the combat load while much of the regular Russian forces underwent expansion and refitting.
Ukraine, meanwhile, fell into the sunk cost fallacy and began to believe its own propaganda about โFortress Bakhmutโ, and allowed brigade after brigade to be sucked in, turning the city and its environs into a killing zone.
Now that Bakhmut is lost (or as Zelensky put it, exists โonly in our heartsโ), Ukraine faces an operational impasse. Bakhmut was after all a very good place to fight a static defense. If the AFU could not hold it, or even produce a favorable loss exchange, can a strategy of holding static fortified belts really be deemed viable? Meanwhile, the failure of the Syrskyi plan and the defeat of a multi-brigade counterattack by Russian motor rifle brigades casts serious doubt on Ukraineโs ability to advance on strongly held Russian positions.
Ultimately, both Ukraine and Russia traded for time in Bakhmut, but whereas Russia put up a PMC which primarily lost convicts, Ukraine bought time by chewing up a significant amount of its combat power. They bought time – but time to do what? Can Ukraine do anything that will be worth the lives it spent in Bakhmut, or was it all just blood for the blood god? [end]
Though Musk is still playing at being NATOโs token non-conformist, the EU is essentially telling him and all of us that any dissent from its Russophobic, Slavophobic and Sinophobic narratives will be severely punished
(Strategic Culture Foundation)
The European Unionโs enforcers have told Twitter owner Elon Musk that the EUโs voluntary information code is not voluntary and that the EU will fine the pants off Twitter if Musk does not play by NATOโs self-serving rules. Though Musk is still playing at being NATOโs token non-conformist, the EU is essentially telling him and all of us that any dissent from its Russophobic, Slavophobic and Sinophobic narratives will be severely punished.
From the point of view of von der Leyen and NATOโs other EU puppets, that makes absolutely perfect sense. As legacy mediaโs active shelf life is fast expiring, that just leaves the EU with alternative media to kill off with massive fines in Twitterโs case or, more generally, by crowding out and muzzling any and all truth tellers.
Look at the treatment being meted out to Pink Floydโs Roger Waters, a life-long anti-fascist, whose father was killed in action fighting the Nazis but which the usual suspects, led as always by the BBC and the Guardian, are trying to ban for supposedly being a Jew-hating Nazi simply because of his support for Palestinian rights, for Julian Assange and for being stupid enough to still be doing live concerts with those unreconstructed views, as he touches 80 years of age.
The EUโs code Waters and Musk are falling foul of โaims to prevent profiteering from disinformation and fake news, as well as increasing transparency and curbing the spread of bots and fake accountsโ.
By disinformation, in addition to Waters, von der Leyenโs thugs mean the work of folk like our own excellent Stephen Karganovic, who is not only a quality thinker and writer, but is on every EU and NATO hit list imaginable because he speaks his truths to their power. And others like Fyodor Lukyanov and Timur Fomenko, who file excellent analytical copy for Russia Today which, with this site, is subject to a string of sanctions and name-calling that are as libellous and ignorant as those these EU and NATO morons throw at Waters or any other of their betters.
The objective in labelling SCF, Russia Today, Waters and even Masha and Mishka as dis-information is to control the common space and not to give the ideas of heretics like Jeremy Corbyn, Robert F Kennedy Junior or their type space to survive.
With fake news, the EU is primarily concerned with folk who expose their crimes, family folk like Roger Waters and Julian Assange, who has now done the equivalent of a life tariff for exposing the tiniest fraction of the war crimes the Yanks committed in Iraq, crimes which, remember, included the gang rape of little girls by these harbingers of US-style democracy.
And then there is Gonzalo Lira, who is in the worst of all places, in Ukraine, whose soldiers rape corpses, and whose politicians ban all opposition parties, all opposition media and all religions that do not worship their utterly corrupt system but yet, as the corpse rapists do God knows what to Gonzalo Lira in God knows where, Ukraine has seen its ranking in NATOโs Press Freedom and Transparency Indexes soar like an American bald eagle that is oblivious to the stench below. The Nazi rump Reich is, the EUโs disinformation experts proclaim, the land of the free and the land of the brave, even as it is hell on earth for Lira and millions of Zelenskyโs other victims.
The torture of Assange and Lira has silenced countless others and thereby made way for NATOโs own quack journalists to fill the void with their own fake news, which was presented to us up till recently by sexual predators like Philip Schofield, ITVโs equivalent of the BBCโs Jimmy Savile.
As regards bots and fake accounts, that smear should have died a death with the end of Russiagate, one of a number of massive CIA/EU efforts to disseminate fake news and opaqueness through their own bots and fake accounts.
But why, the Clinton, Biden, Obama and other organised crime families would ask, re-invent the wheel, when the old smears NATOโs media spin work as well as ever?
What we have with all these rafts of EU laws, fines, sanctions, bluster and bluff is a sort of NATO Cosplay, where von der Leyen and her fellow Cosplay conspirators get to moralise, whilst the Biden, Kerry and Pelosi families get to sprinkle Ukraine with enough bio labs to take out half of Europeโs population, and the New York Post, the only media outlet that reported on the crimes Hunter Bidenโs laptop revealed, gets banned and harassed by the FBI goon squads.
Von der Leyenโs Digital Services Act will further criminalise offensive humour such as comparing French dictator Macron to Hitler (though Waters will remain fair game). Some 19 companies, including Alphabetโs Google Maps, Google Play, Google Search, Google Shopping, YouTube, Metaโs Facebook and Instagram, Amazonโs Marketplace, Appleโs App Store, Twitter, Microsoftโs two units LinkedIn and Bing, booking.com, Pinterest, Snap Incโs Snapchat, TikTok, Wikipedia, Zalando, and Alibabaโs AliExpress will all have to obey von der Leyenโs diktats โto make the internet saferโ by erasing so-called disinformation in whatever way von der Leyen and her fellow plagiarists decide to define it from one moment to the next.
Not that war is their only earner needing the censorโs protection. Over 3,400 peer-reviewed papers questioning NATOโs Covid narrative have also been sidelined and ignored. Fake news, Russian propaganda, dis-information or some such stuff. I am one of many who did not take the vaccine von der Leyenโs husband made a fortune pimping. And I am glad I didnโt fall for their dancing nurses and their relentless marketing, irrespective of whether they were peddling fake news with their fake vaccines or not. I have no idea whether those vaccines are effective or not. I am not qualified to opine.
But what I do know is this. There are large groups of American and European politicians, like American fugitive Lindsey Graham who have been promoted because, thick as bricks though they are, they are sufficiently spineless to pimp the wars, vaccines and other societal wrecking balls those who fund and control them are selling.
Speaking of war, NATO and KFOR mercenaries have just slaughtered a bunch of Serbs in Zvecan (northern Kosovo). Though I look forward with interest to getting a proper analysis of this latest NATO war crime from Fyodor Lukyanov, Timur Fomenko and our own excellent Stephen Karganovic, I do know that not only will their take be totally at odds with that of the EUโs semi-literate fact-checkers but that Russia Today and Karganovic will be much nearer to the truth than any of von der Leyenโs minions could ever be because those EU yellow packs are groomed to paint over and hide the crimes against Serbs and Palestinians this article and a thousand others on this site draw attention to [end]
chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Ukraine against Russia
Situation map in the evening of May 10, 2023 (RYBAR)
May 12, 2023
The fighting is going on in Bakhmut and in the evening, Yevgeny Prigozhin, head of Wagner private military company (PMC), states that the Atlanticist forces are controlling less than two square km
In Khmelnytskyi, western Ukraine, about 325 km southwest of Kiev, Russian cruise missiles or/and drones destroy an ammunition depot. Secondary explosions and blaze are tremendous. At 4:52 am, local time, the European Mediterranean Seismological Centre (EMSC) records 3.4 magnitude shocks northwest of the city
(CCTV screenshot, despite the Ukrainian censorship)
When will we finally stop putting all the eggs in one basket ?
comments Yuri Kasyanov, a former Ukrainian official. The targeted facility was concealing a huge amount of ammunition and high-tech military equipment from NATO countries.
May 14, 2023
The day after the raid, the firefighters are still using robots to extinguish the destroyed ammunition depot
(Social networks, despite the Ukrainian censorship)
If Russia had used nuclear ammunition, the radiation would have started rising on May 13, not on May 12. Ukrainian journalist and member of Svoboda [liberty], a Nazi political party, Ihor Mosiychuk sounds the alarm, advises to take children away from the epicenters of the explosions.
A dirty bomb is combining radioactive material with conventional explosive, in order to disperse the former. Through the stockpile in Khmelnytskyi of the British depleted uranium (DU) armor piercing (DUAP) shells, Ukraine has likely and unintentionally made its own dirty bomb
(The Daily Mail on March 22, 2023)
May 16, 2022
In the previous night, Russia conducted a raid in Kiev, where the US had delivered a Patriot air defense system, which launched at least 20 SAMs (surface-to-air missiles), as shown in Ukrainian CCTV footage. Each SAM is costing โฌ5,275,000, for a โฌ105,500,000 total. But at the end, a Russian Kinzhal [dagger] hypersonic missile demilitarized the US air defense system, which is costing $1.1 billion
(Screenshots)
In the morning, some US SAMs are found in Kiev. This one has not hit a building
(Social networks)
May 17, 2023
The Russian defense ministry details that the raid in Kiev the day before has managed to destroy one radar station and five SAMs launchers. Over a month, the shares of Raytheon Technologies Coporation, the manufacturer, have lost 7%.
A damaged and abandoned British Spartan APC on May 18 (Photo Sketches, screenshot)
Except some armored personnel carriers (APCs), mostly destroyed or seized, no other Western armored vehicles, no Panzekampfwagen, have been involved so far on the battlefield. At 3:50 pm, local time, one year after another liberation, the surrender in Mariupol of Nazi Azov regiment, Yevgeny Prigozhin announces that the Russian forces have achieved a complete victory in Bakhmut, Donetsk Peopleโs Republic, Donbass, Russia. No Atlanticist fighter remains alive in the city
(Screenshot)
I do not think that a few dozen Western tanks would turn the tide in Donbass or Ukraine. But the spectacle of their combustion may have a larger psychological and political impact than their military influence. That is the reason why failing a real counter-offensive so far, they have not been involved. Because the way the Atlanticist forces have been bled since August 2022, in the trap of Bakhmut meat grinder, may have ruined the opportunities for such a counter-offensive.
May 22, 2023
In order to ward off the psychological impact of the humiliating defeat in Bakhmut two days earlier, Ukraine is raiding border villages in Russia. A few motorized/mechanized platoons are involved. Noise and panic are the goals. Fake alarming messages are simultaneously addressed to the Russian citizens through social networks. That is a psychological operation (PSYOP).
The targets are in Grayvoron district, Belgorod region
(Ukrainian social networks)
about 80 km northwest of Kharkov
(Google Maps)
The assaillants are members of Svoboda Rossii [Freedom of Russia] and the Russian Volunteer Corps (Russkiy dobrovolโcheskiy korpus, RDK), a bunch of Nazi defectors, who have deserted recently or settled in Ukraine for years, are usually working for the psychological department of the Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR), which confirms the operation as its own
Their vehicles are mostly US, MaxxPros and Humvees
Here is a US MaxxPro in a Ukrainian video near Grayvoron on May 22. But the fighter at the forefront is not Russian, is displaying the chevron of a Ukrainian Nazi paramilitary organization, Tradytsiya ta poryadok [tradition and order] (screenshot)
As usual after enough noise, the assailants are endeavoring to avoid direct confrontation with the Russian forces (border guards, FSB, national guard, army) and to retreat to Ukraine.
May 23, 2023
In the morning, the Russian defense ministry claims scores of dead militants in Belgorod region, releases a video which is showing air strikes
(Screenshot)
Journalists share other documents, which are disclosing enemy corpses, destroyed Humvees and one of the seized MaxxPros
Since September 2022, all Atlanticist military vehicles in Ukraine are displaying the Balkenkreuz, German thick white cross during WW2
More than half of the assailants may have been killed. That is a carnage for a psychological operation, that Kiev does not comment further. Ukraine has usually no problem with the sacrifice of fighters. As usual, the commando may have let numerous mines behind
(Official)
Meanwhile, Volodymyr Zelenskyy visits the armed forces in the area of Ugledar and Maryinka, still occupied part of Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR), where Kiev is reinforcing its positions but the Russian army is still advancing.
May 24, 2023
Four days after the Ukrainian defeat in Bakhmut, the Russian navy manages to destroy three unmanned surface vessels (USVs) and their explosive payloads, which race toward a military ship
(Russian defense ministry, screenshots)
The attack occurs about 140 km northeast of Bosphorus. Where the drones operate from ? Probably not Bulgaria nor Turkey, rather another ship. Ukraine is unable to carry out such operation alone, has at least received air intelligence from abroad. Once more, NATO attacks Russia through the Black sea grain initiative corridor
(Google Maps)
The victorious ship is Ivan Khurs, a signals intelligence (SIGINT) vessel, Yury Ivanov-class, which is ensuring the security of the Turkish Stream and Blue Stream gas pipelines in the exclusive economic zone of Turkey
Ivan Khurs transits Bosphorus on August 30, 2021 (Yรถrรผk Iลฤฑk)
These Ukrainian USVs are already known, are boarding some Canadian-made navigation modules
A run aground Ukrainian USV near Sevastopol on September 21, 2022 (social networks)
Russia already blamed United Kingdom for its involvement when on October 29, 2022, nine drones and seven torpedoes attacked Sevastopol harbor, Crimea, were destroyed before reaching the base of the Russian Black sea fleet.
Meanwhile, the Ukrainian defense minister, Oleksii Reznikov shares on Twitter a photo that his UK counterpart, Ben Wallace, has dedicated
A Su-24 tactical bomber is carrying a British Storm Shadow cruise missile. The postcard is also identifying the 7th tactical aviation brigade, which is based in Starokonstantinov. A gift to the Russian intelligence.
May 25, 2023
The video surfaces on Ukrainian social networks. The dialogue between the protagonists is explaining what has happened a few second before : a company leader, who was disagreeing, has shot his battalion commander, who was endeavoring to send his men to the slaughter
I have blurred the face of the victim (screenshot)
The incident may not be the first one. The context is harsh for the Ukrainian cannon fodder of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine. Many amateur videos have already shown that men who have escaped mobilization, are abducted in the streets or even at home, in order to replenish the ranks. Excluding Wagner losses in Bakhmut, the Ukrainian military casualties are likely ten times the Russian ones. Women are demonstrating in the cities for news about their alleged missing relatives.
War is a simple art, all execution
said Corsican general Napoleone Buonaparte. Through their support, NATO countries are depleting their own stocks, but with more guns and more ammunition, the Russian fire power is far higher. Moreover, airstrikes and missiles are targeting the Atlanticist forces in the deep of the Ukrainian territory. The current Ukrainian military fatalities may be over 250,000.
May 26, 2023
Despite the claims of the Ukrainian propaganda and its lackeys in the West, victorious Ivan Khurs docks without damage in Sevastopol
(Screenshot)
May 27, 2023
Strike in Mariupol on May 26, 2023 (screenshot)
For several days, the Atlanticist forces are shelling with US rockets and British Storm Shadow cruise missiles in the deep of the Russian territory. The strikes are spread along and around a line from Vasilyevka, on the left bank of Dnieper river, to Berdyansk, on the Black Sea, about 140 km to southeast, also in Zaporojie region. If successful, an offensive along the same axis may isolate Crimea from mainland Russia
(Google Maps)
May 28, 2023
The situation is improving in Ukraine. Three days ago, a company leader shot a battalion commander, in an amateur video which was the first evidence of a mutiny. Today, another document is showing that young people have beaten a recruitment sergeant and enabled the escape of who would have been sent to the meat grinder
(Screenshot)
For about a year, we have seen the evidences of recruits violent abductions in Ukraine. I was wondering how long it would last before the first cases of legitimate and collective rebellion.
May 29, 2022
Russia is conducting a new wave of strategic strikes all over Ukraine, aimed at military targets on airfields. In Starokonstantinov for example, about 250 km southwest of Kiev, a stock of British Storm Shadow cruise missiles is hit, as well as planes supposed to launch them, thanks to Oleksii Reznikov (cf. supra, May 24). In the capital, people are seeking refuge in the subway
(Social networks)
The actual threat is not Russian. The Atlanticist air defense is launching volleys of US SAMs, which are later raining on the city
(Social networks)
President of Ukraine in June, after the right-wing coup in Kiev, late February 2014, Petro Poroshenko disowned and threatened the people who were demanding autonomy in Russian-speaking Donbass
our children will go to schools and kindergartens, their children will sit in basements. Because they can do nothing. This is how we will win this war
That was the beginning of the Ukrainian terrorism. History is cruel and today, Poroshenko is sitting in a cellar
(Social networks)
The raid is a success because Kyrylo Budanov is angry. The head of the GUR threatens to make Russia pay, what may mean new terrorist operations
(Screenshot)
May 30, 2023
As retaliation for the successful strikes of military facilities the day before, Ukraine targets Moscow with drones. Three ones are jammed, the air defense shoots five others down, according to the Russian authorities, all fall in western suburb. Three ones hit however residential buildings but fortunately, nobody is injured
(Screenshots)
June 1, 2023
In the vein of the whole British press, the Guardian publishes a complacent article about the training of new recruits who west of Bakhmut, have replaced the severe losses in the 3rd Ukrainian assault brigade, which was formed in November 2022, with the depot of Azov regiment, a Nazi formation within the Ukrainian national guard
(Emre รaylak / The Guardian)
Like ourselves, the subjects are waiting for the Atlanticist counter-offensive. They are aspiring to seize back the city.
A few days before, Yevgeny Prigozhin detailed the human cost of the first leg. Wagner lost 20,000 fighters killed in action. Ukraine consumed 31 brigades. The Atlanticist military fatalities were 55,000, including 6,500 foreigners. And the Russians were the assailants.
June 2, 2023
Due to the greater Russian firepower, strategic strikes on lines of communication and ammunition depots, a Ukrainian strategy focused on politics and propaganda, huge Atlanticist losses, the sacrifice of dozens brigades in Bakhmut, Ukraine appears unable to conduct a successful counteroffensive, despite the depletion among its Western sponsors of their military resources
Destruction in Shebekino, a Russian town at the border, about 100 km northeast of Kharkov (social networks)
Rather than drawing the political conclusions, but as a result of the incitement from NATO and its free-trade area, the European Union, historical hotbed of Nazism, Ukraine is relying once more on terrorism. For about a week, after a PSYOP (cf. supra, May 22) in the same Belgorod region, the Atlanticist artillery is heavily shelling civilian areas at the border. The same terrorist strategy is enforced in Donbass for nine years, was one of the reasons for the Russian special military operation.
June 3, 2023
Ihor Zhovkva is deputy head of the presidency office. In an interview for the Times, amid usual Ukrainian lies for a complacent press, he states
if you want to start a successful counter-offensive you need everything at your disposal, including artillery, armoured vehicles and tanks, so probably we donโt have enough
That confirms that the Russian strategic strikes on ammunition depots are efficient, are exempting the Ukrainian cannon fodder from a new carnage, because Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his NATO sponsors have no conscience.
June 4, 2023
Maybe the first test of the Russian defenses at the border between Zaporojie region and DNR, about 130 km north of Berdyansk, where an Atlanticist mechanized battalion is attacking throughout the day
In order to thwart the attack, over a width of 20 km, from Novodaryevka, Zaporojie region, to Neskuchnoye, DNR, the Russian air forces take also action, on the front line and in the deep, against several other battalions in reserve.
June 5, 2023
I think that the counteroffensive will be when and where NATO Panzerkampfwagen will be committed. In a region about 140 km north of Berdyansk, where Ukrainian formations have already tested the Russian defenses the day before, a few Leopard 2 are spotted in Novodonetskoye, a village that the assailants manage to seize, about 80 km southwest of Donetsk
As expected, the Atlanticist losses are already significant and the first photos of abandoned, likely damaged Western AFVs, surface on social networks. These are French AMX-10 recce vehicles
In the night, the Russian defense ministry counts 137 enemy armored vehicles, including 25 tanks, all destroyed that day in the same region. The Atlanticist forces would have lost eight Leopards and three AMXs.
June 6, 2023
(Screenshot)
Terrible news, an explosion blows up the dam of the hydroelectric power plant in Novaya Kakhovka, on Dnieper left bank, 80 km upstream of Kherson. The Atlanticist threat of its destruction was already one of the reasons for the Russian retreat from the right bank on November 9, 2022. Here is a map of the predictable flooding
According to unconfirmed reports, an explosion occurred at 1:30 am, 45 minutes before Russian cruise missiles entered the Ukrainian airspace, in a new wave of strategic strikes on military targets all over Ukraine.
On October 21, 2022, Russia called on the UN Security Council to prevent Kiev from destroying the dam. The Atlanticist forces have previously shelled the power plant and even Zaporojie nuclear one (ZNPP) in Energodar. Russia was controlling the destroyed facility and the consequences will benefit Ukraine. Russian defenses will be flooded downstream, the drop of the reservoir level will threaten the cooling of ZNPP and water supply in Crimea. The Ukrainian authorities and their Western sponsors are definitely a bunch of maniacs.
At 8:30 am, Volodymyr Zelenskyy initiates the psychological component of that new terrorist operation, accuses Russia and convenes his defense council. The Ukrainian officials are stating that the flooding would prevent a counteroffensive across the river, have now an excuse for their inability to conduct the promised one, due to their strategic errors. They are adding that the flooding are an ecocide, will attempt that way to revive the Western support, despite their failure. Of course, the European stooges are parroting the Ukrainian propaganda.
Meanwhile, 300 km to northeast, the Russian forces regain Novodonetskoye, Donetsk People’s Republic, that the Atlanticist forces have seized the day before at a heavy price.
June 8, 2023
On social networks, some members of Azov regiment are bragging
tonight is the night of the nights
At 1:30 am, an attack begins south of Orekhov, Zaporojie region, about 100 km southwest of the failure on June 6
The assault on the front line is synchronized with shelling in Tokmak, 40 km further south, 60 km north of Melitopol, which could be a new goal, in order to isolate Crimea from mainland Russia. The ammunition are US made GMLRS rockets, that HIMARS are launching
(Screenshots)
In the evening, the Russian defense ministry releases a splendid video from Orekhov vicinity. An Atlanticist mechanized column is entangled in minefields and shelled, a platoon of Leopards 2 in front, US made M113 behind. At least one Leopard is burning, more seem disabled.
June 9, 2023
At midnight, the Atlanticist attack resumes south of Orekhov. One mechanized battalion is committed, according to journalist Alexander Sladkov. The assailants do not succeed and for the first time, Russian sources are reporting the destruction of several US made Bradley infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs)
(Screenshot)
The outcome appears in the afternoon, through a video which has surfaced on social networks. One German made Leopard 2 and several Bradleys are burnt along a trail. The analysis of the whole document shows, in that sole section of the battlefield, the wrecks of 5 Leopards, 6 Bradleys, 3 MaxxPro mine-resistant ambush protected vehicles (MRAP), one French VAB [vรฉhicule de lโavant blindรฉ] armored personnel carrier (APC) and several others
[Ach, mein Fรผhrer, wir hรคtten den Donbass verlassen sollen]
Based on the work of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, through satellite intelligence, here is a map of the Russian defenses in Zaporojie region
A third time in a row, the Atlanticist forces attack the same positions, south of Orekhov, of the 42nd -Evpatoriyskaya Red Banner- guards motorized division. Minefield, artillery, kamikaze drones and anti tank guided missiles (ATGM) repel the mechanized columns. The offensive is losing steam and that time, the Russian defenders do not even need air support
1943
On June 7, Olaf Scholz has stated
we are at war for so many weeks and now, it is important that we take decisive steps forward
Seid ihr ? But the situation has worsened for the German Panzerkampfwagen, since the battle around Kursk, in July 1943. Nowadays, the Nazis are unable to break the first Russian defense line
(Screenshot)
New Bradleys have agglomerated at the site spotted the day before. Such a traffic jam of wrecked armored fighting vehicles is rare in history
[Ach, mein Fรผhrer, wir hรคtten den Donbass verlassen sollen]
June 11, 2023
After the repeated failures, for one week, of their mechanized attacks in the same region and one hundred km southwest, near Orekhov, the Atlanticist forces have displaced once more their focus, are now using Stosstruppen tactics, the infiltration of infantry small formations, south of Velyka Novosyolka, at the border between Zaporojie region and DNR
They have managed to temporarily seize outposts, villages like Novodonetskoye, Neskuchnoye or Blagodatnoye, where they are however easy targets for the Russian artillery. Propaganda is the goal of these new attacks, in order to raise Ukrainian flags in battered villages.
NATO also resumes its asymmetric operations. What a propaganda victory if a Russian vessel was sunk in the Black Sea
Priazovye on September 24, 2018 (Andrey Brichevsky)
But Priazovye, a Vishnya-class SIGINT ship, manages to destroy six more Ukrainian USVs, which are attacking in partnership with one US Global Hawk surveillance drone
(Screenshot)
In Strasbourg on September 14, 2022, Ursula von der Leyen, the German president of the European Commission, stated
Russian military is taking chips from dishwashers and refrigerators to fix their military hardware, because there are no semiconductors anymore. Russiaโs industry is in tatters
Let us have fun
June 12, 2023
In Donetsk People’s Republic, south of Velyka Novosyolka, the 127th -Red Banner Order of Kutuzov- motorized division is stabilizing the front
According to GOP senator Dick Black, Ukraine has lost in one week 7,000 killed in action (KIA), 160 tanks and 360 other armored vehicles
Ukraineโs offensive hit a steel wall. 7,000 KIA, 160 tanks and 360 armored vehicles destroyed in just one week with trivial gains. It is a pointless bloodbath. Charred Leopard tanks and Bradley vehicles lie everywhere. Telling Ukraine to fight โfor as long as it takesโ is inhuman. End this tragic war now
June 15, 2023
An alleged plan of the Ukrainian offensive surfaces on social networks. The operation would have begun on June 4, with a feint south of Velyka Novosyolka, Donetsk People’s Republic. A limited attack indeed occurred there. The breakthrough should have been achieved toward Tokmak on June 6. Kakhovka dam was blown up that day and the attack in Zaporojie region, on June 8, was actually a bloody failure for the spearhead of the Ukrainian armed forces, their Western Panzerkampfwagen. The main goal would have been Berdyansk, in order to isolate Crimea from mainland Russia.
June 16, 2023
The Atlanticist forces are attacking in vain Pyatikhatki, a village 15 km northeast of Vasilyevka, on the left bank of Dnieper river, in Zaporojie region
The 19th -Red Banner of Labor- motorized division is defending the area, has been reinforced with T-62 tanks, which are used as assault guns
(Screenshot)
Along the front line, Russian special forces (SSO) are hunting the Western Panzerhampfwagen with ATGMs, sometimes onboard customized civilian vehicles
(Screenshot)
June 20, 2023
Kyrylo Budanov speaks about the dam in Novaya Kakhovka, accuses Russia of having destroyed it
He adds that Russia would have also mined Zaporojie nuclear power plant (ZNPP), in Energodar, when actually, Ukraine has previously shelled both Russian controlled facilities, the hydroelectric power plant and the nuclear one. Russia has even alerted the United Nations to prevent the attacks against both sites. Anyway, the Ukrainian propaganda jumps at the opportunity, in order to trigger fear
That is the usual strategy of exacerbating the situation. That is how Ukraine has been able to perpetrate false flag war crimes and has destroyed the dam. The head of the Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR) resurfaces and plays that card while the counter-offensive is a bloody failure.
In my mind, the threat is that the Ukrainian authorities and the Nazi deep State are fanatical enough to attempt to ward off defeat through a deliberate nuclear incident in Energodar. Moreover, I suspect that somehow, some governments of NATO countries may be already hostages of these fanatics.
June 22, 2023
Today is an anniversary. 82 years ago, on June 22, 1941, the European Nazi armies from Bulgaria, Croatia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Romania, Slovakia and Spain attacked Soviet Union
At 5:00 am, with four British Storm Shadow cruise missiles, the Atlanticist forces conduct a strategic strike on Russian lines of communication between Crimea and Kherson region, in Chongar (45ยฐ59โ16.9โณN 34ยฐ33โ10.1โณE), about 160 km southeast of the current front line
where the bridge is damaged
(CCTV screenshots)
The weather has improved in Zaporojie region and once more, the Atlanticist forces are striving to advance south of Orekhov, toward Rabotino. Several attacks are carried out at 4:00 am and thereafter during the day, waves of infantry that tanks are supporting. A tragic video surfaces from the Russian side. A Ukrainian BMP infantry fighting vehicle comes from the rear, in order to evacuate a squad of infantrymen under fire. Able-bodied and injured ones get in, but on the way to a safer place, a few hundred meters later, an antitank mine blows up the vehicle.
Ukraine needs more cannon fodder. Several categories are usually considered for mobilization
men between 18 and 60, with military experience,
men between 25 and 60, without military experience,
men not too much disabled.
250,000, according to a scrupulous Russian mathematical model, have already been killed since February 24, 2022, more are injured or disabled, other ones are already in the ranks, others have received summons but did not obey, the last were so far more lucky
SLAVA UKRAYINI !!! – translation at right
The order has been signed on June 19, is now public in Kiev region. Those still civilian and well should all pass under the yoke of the recruitment centers within 10 days.
June 23, 2023
Ukrainian channels are sharing on June 17 that photo of a US Bradley IFV which has lost its turret in Zaporojie region
CNN has interviewed two western officials and a senior US military official, who have conceded that the Atlanticist offensive is not meeting expectations on any front. The US and its allies are likely to wait until at least July for a fuller assessment of the results. After the Western Panzerkampfwagen have been bogged down, the assailants are carrying out more dismounted operations, which means waves of cannon fodder. The Blitzkrieg is over. And in this screenshot, south of Velyka Novosyolka, Donetsk People’s Republic, the Russian servicemen are holding the line
June 24, 2023
Yevgeny Prigozhin has freaked out. In his personal feud against the Russian defense minister, Sergey Shoigu, the head of Wagner private military company (PMC) has claimed that the Russian forces were retreating, which is an obvious lie and Ukrainian propaganda, while they are breaking the Atlanticist attacks for three weeks. In the evening of June 23, he has even called for an armed uprising. The judiciary authorities have opened a criminal case against him and the State security agency (FSB) has asked Wagner fighters to arrest him
Salammbรด, La crucifiction des mercenaires, Victor-Armand Poirson, 1890
In Gustave Flaubertโs novel, the mercenaries wanted money, Prigozhin is seeking power. My opinion is that he is either insane or a player of the Atlanticist hybrid counteroffensive. A joke is trending on social networks
Objection ! The defendant could not organize an armed rebellion because the defense minister has not provided him with enough ammo !
I think now that during the battle for Bakhmut, Sergey Shoigu was pretty right. More seriously, the dispute over ammunition supply was then the result of Wagner tactics on the battlefield. The private fighters are attacking with a huge artillery support, are using far more shells than their counterparts. At the scale of the whole Russian special military operation, Wagner was an abyss for ammunition.
Fomer US intelligence officer within the US Marines Corps (USMC), then United Nations inspector in Iraq, Scott Ritter has written a must-read article. MISE (Money, Ideology, Sex, Ego) is the matrix that the intelligence agencies are using worldwide, in order to recruit agents. Ritter tells us how the oversized ego of Yevegeny Prigozhin may have enabled the Ukrainian and Western intelligence agencies to make him the ultimate and pathetic tool of their hybrid strategy, in order to dismantle Russia.
The defense ministry is henceforth requiring that all volunteer military formations sign a contract which is subordinating them to the general staff. All have accepted, except Wagner. But that contract is now a prerequisite for the financial and material support from the ministry. Failing that, Prigozhin will be unable to find more glory on the battlefield.
At about 3:30 am, on June 24, the first fighting breaks out in the vicinity of Rostov, where Prigozhinโs gunmen shoot down a Russian helicopter. But the federal authorities appear weak and no airstrike targets on the highway the column of insurgents, who around 5:00 am, seize control of the administrative buildings in the city, including the headquarters of the southern military command
(Erik Romanenko / TASS)
Later, around 7:00 am, the Russian forces manage to destroy two vehicles in the vicinity of Voronej, 600 km north of Rostov, 600 south of Moscow. That is a second column
(The West Australian)
After a serious delay, I think, the FSB starts at about 9:00 am searching the headquarters of Wagner in Saint Petersburg. At 10:00 am, at last, Vladimir Putin addresses the country, states that the traitors will be punished and Rostov, pacified
(Screenshot)
From Ukraine, Nazi militant Denis Kapustin, commander of the Russian Volunteer Corps (Russkiy dobrovolโcheskiy korpus, RDK), a bunch of Nazi defectors and a combat formation of the Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR), is supporting Prigozhin. The rebels have officially become the vanguard in Russia of the Atlanticist forces.
From the front line of the proxy war that NATO is waging in Donbass and Ukraine, among many others, servicemen of the 155th naval infantry brigade, Pacific fleet, are expressing their support to Russia and Vladimir Putin
(Screenshot)
President of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko is acting as broker between Vladimir Putin and the rebels, who start leaving Rostov after 9:00 pm. The Kremlin states that the charges will be dropped if Prigozhin leaves Russia, that Belarus is ready to host him. In consideration of their military feats, the rank and file will not be sued. Members of Wagner who have refused to participate in the uprising will be allowed to sign a contract with the defense ministry. Prigozhin has miserably failed, but due to his vanity and the stupidity of his followers, 15 Russian service members have died. The rebels have shot down seven aircraft.
June 26, 2023
Three days after the armed rebellion of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s followers, Russian defense minister Sergey Shoigu visits the headquarters of Zapad [west] Group of Forces
(Screenshot)
June 27, 2023
In the evening, a missile targets a pizzeria in Kramatorsk, Donetsk People’s Republic, about 45 km northwest of the current front line on the western outskirts of Bakhmut. The emergency relief are still working on the site hours later
(Ukrainian national police)
Volodymyr Zelenskyy is denouncing a terrorist attack. At first glance, the strike could be a war crime against civilians, but an amateur video on Ukrainian social networks is showing that on the site, several protagonists, one injured, are speaking English. One is bearing a tattoo of the US 3rd Ranger battalion. These victims are foreign fighters
Jesus christ… this is where we always ate our dinners. It is nothing even remotely close to a military target
does not understand why his fellows were the target. In another amateur video amid the rubble in the night, Peter, an affected South African, says
Look what these bastards are doing to this country. Thereโs soldiers under this rubble all over
(Screenshot)
Some victims are unfortunately real civilians. Before midnight, the official provisional toll is 4 dead and 42 injured victims, but I suspect that Ukrainian and foreign military personnel is not counted.
June 28, 2023
In the morning, the Russian defense ministry specifies that the target in Kramatorsk, the day before, was a staff meeting of the 56th motorized brigade. Confirmation, the Ukrainian State security agency (SBU) states that a suspected agent of the Russian military intelligence (GRU) has been arrested in the vicinity of the pizzeria.
July 1, 2023
The Russian strike on June 27, in Kramatorsk, Donetsk People’s Republic, likely an Iskander ballistic missile, has indeed hit a military meeting in a pizzeria. At least two generals, dozens other Ukrainian and foreign service members have been killed. US media confirm so far one death, former marine Ian Tortorici, from California
(Screenshot)
July 4, 2023
In Zaporojie region, the Russian air defense has managed to shoot down a French-made British Storm Shadow cruise missile
(Social networks)
After their sabotage of Novaya Kakhovka dam (cf supra, June 6, 2023), the Ukrainian authorities have started accusing Russia of having mined Zaporojie nuclear power plant (ZNPP), in Energodar, the most powerful (6,000 MW) one in Europe. That is the usual strategy of exacerbating the situation, while the Atlanticist counteroffensive is a bloody failure. That is how Ukraine has been able to perpetrate other false flag war crimes.
Facts are not the friends of Ukraine and its allies, said Scott Ritter, former US intelligence officer, on April 4, 2022, after the Ukrainian false flag war crimes in Bucha. The facts are that early August 2022 and several months thereafter, the Atlanticist forces have already shelled the nuclear power plant. Moreover, these attacks have activated the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). International inspectors are now on the site and Rafael Grossi, director of the IAEA, is denying the Ukrainian allegations. For example on June 26, 2023, during an interview for French channel France 24.
[journalist] Zelensky said that Russia drove vehicles with explosives to the nuclear power plants and mined the cooling ponds. Did you see it ? [Rafael Grossi] I would never argue with the President of Ukraine, who I know very very well. I can only say that I was there and did not see it. Our teams are there reporting every day
The actual threat is that the Ukrainian authorities and the Nazi deep State are fanatical enough to attempt to ward off defeat through a deliberate nuclear incident in Energodar.
Renat Karchaa is adviser to the general director of Rosenergoatom, which is conducting nuclear power stations operations in Russia. In the evening, he states that according to intelligence, Ukraine will attack ZNPP during the night. Why now ? The next NATO summit will begin in Vilnius on July 11.
Later, the Ukrainian health ministry releases flyers on the actions to be taken in case of incident and Volodymyr Zelenskyy repeats the same blatant lies
Now we have information from our intelligence that the Russian troops have placed objects resembling explosives on the roof of several power units of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. Perhaps to simulate an attack on the plant. Perhaps they have some other scenario. But in any case, the world sees โ can’t but see โ that the only source of danger to the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant is Russia and no one else
July 7, 2023
The Western leaders have so far prevented Volodymyr Zelenskyy from triggering a nuclear disaster in Energodar, but like in a deal, US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan announces that the US will deliver cluster munitions to Ukraine. That is a new escalation
Due to the large spreading area of bomblets, cluster bombs are a threat of collateral damage among civilians. Entered into force on 1 August 2010, the international Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) is forbidding their produce, use or transfer, but China, Russia or the US have not even signed it. 111 countries have ratified it, mostly in Africa and Europe, including France, Germany and the UK.
July 12, 2023
(Screenshot)
After the bloody failure of the Atlanticist counteroffensive that NATO project management has dictated to the Ukrainian cannon fodder, some Anglo-Saxon mercenaries are fleeing the battlefield, in a Sky News report
When the first foreign fighters arrived in March 2022, the word safari was arrogantly spoken. Maybe, but the prey is not Russian. Donbass is not Afghanistan, Iraq or Sahel, a real war is so tough against a real army which is also using artillery.
July 17, 2023
(Google in October 2022)
At about 3:00 am, the Atlanticist forces attack and damage Kerch bridge, between Taman peninsula and continental Russia, to southeast, Crimea peninsula, to northwest, which is a major Russian line of communication, for military and civilians, has been completed in June 2020. Two civilian travelers are killed in their car, their daughter is hospitalized
(Screenshot)
The weapons are two unmanned surface vessels (USVs), that Ukraine is often using at sea and in amphibious environment (cf. supra, May 24, 2023), may have triggered on June 6 the collapse of Novaya Kakhovka dam (cf. supra). On October 8, 2022, the Atlanticist secret services already detonated on the bridge a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED).
Once more, the naval drones have been likely launched from a ship which was sailing in the UN-brokered grain corridor for the export from Ukraine of agricultural products. In the afternoon, Russia suspends definitively its participation in the implementation of that agreement
(Maxar)
After examination of the structure, a passengers train crosses the bridge in the afternoon.
July 18, 2023
(Official)
The Ukrainian propaganda claims that 38 Russian air objects have been destroyed during the night. The statement is pretty right. 24 hours after Atlanticist USVs have targeted Kerch bridge, large volleys of cruise missiles and kamikaze drones have stricken military facilities in Nikolaev and Odessa, including fuel storage, where British operatives are involved in the Ukrainian launches of naval drones. Local witnesses are reporting detonations and blazes on the ground. The targeted facilities are hit and de facto, the successful Russian weapons are also destroyed.
In the afternoon, due to Russia withdraw the day before from the UN-brokered grain agreement, British Ascot company and other insurers suspend their cover for naval shipments via the Black sea corridor, from Odessa to the Bosphorus.
July 19, 2023
During the night, a new wave of cruise missiles and kamikaze drones, at least as large as the previous one, strikes facilities in Odessa and vicinity
(Screenshot, amateur video)
The Russian defense ministry states in the afternoon
Due to the termination of the Black Sea Initiative and its humanitarian maritime corridor, from 12 am Moscow time on July 20, 2023, all vessels sailing in the Black Sea to the ports of Ukraine will be regarded as potential carriers of military cargo. Therefore, the countries of such vessels will be considered to be involved in the Ukrainian conflict on the side of the Kiev regime
As retaliation for the Atlanticist naval attack against Kerch bridge on July 17, Ukraine is now under naval blockade.
July 22, 2023
The Atlanticist forces have started firing the cluster munitions that NATO is now delivering (cf. supra, July 7)
(Social networks)
At about noon, a group of journalists is spotted with drone and shelled in Zaporojie region, far from any military target. Bomblets injure four of them. Rostislav Zhuravlev, RIA Novosti, later dies.
July 23, 2023
As usual, the Atlanticist air defense has managed to shoot down a civilian building, this time in Odessa, while it was attempting at night to intercept Onyx cruise missiles, aimed at military value targets
(Ukrainian social networks)
As usual, the Ukrainian propaganda is claiming that a Russian projectile would have hit the cathedral of the Saviour Transfiguration. Once again, the weight of the warhead resolves the enigma. With 300 kg of high explosive, an Onyx would have flattened the religious building.
July 26, 2023
In order to protract the myth of a possible success, despite failure for seven weeks and debates through western media on the reasons for that failure, the Pentagon announces that the main thrust has begun. Several attacks have indeed resumed in the morning, in Zaporijie region and Donetsk People’s Republic, but fail once more. The British press is daily more hysterical and in a twilight zone, a tabloid imagines a huge breakthrough south of Bakhmut. The carnage must go on.
In the evening Russia conducts a major wave of strategic strikes in western Ukraine, where the targets are headquarters and airbases. The Ukrainian State security agency (SBU) is usually arresting the witnesses and the authorities remind the ban on broadcasting of strikes footage. No video surfaces today and Kiev falsely claims that all missiles, more than 30, would have been shot down. We already know through experience that all missiles indeed fell, mostly on their targets.
July 28, 2023
As usual, when the Atlanticist forces are defeated on the battlefield, their deliberate shelling of cities increases, where no troops nor military value facilities are set. That is terrorism. They use today a S-200 long range air defense system as a surface weapon and target downtown Taganrog, in Rostov region, about 280 km southeast of Zaporojie
(Screenshots)
The missile falls near the museum. Several victims are injured but fortunately, nobody is killed.
Later, one Russian Iskander ballistic missile, up to 700 kg of high explosive, flattens the headquarters of the regional counterintelligence (SBU) in Dnieper city. The Russian intelligence may have heard that a meeting is held there
(Official Ukrainian channels)
The Ukrainian propaganda claims that the building was empty, but the hospitals are calling for blood donors.
July 30, 2023
(Social networks)
Among daily terrorist attacks against civilians in Donbass, Crimea and other border areas, three Atlanticist drones target Moscow in the night. One is shot down in the suburb, two are jammed and fall in the business district. Nobody is injured.
August 3, 2023
The so-called Defence Intelligence, British, writes
The predominantly arable land in the combat zone has now been left fallow for 18 months, with the return of weeds and shrubs accelerating under the warm, damp summer conditions. The extra cover helps camouflage Russian defensive positions and makes defensive mine fields harder to clear
A propaganda victory for NATO, especially UK and Ukraine, when in the night, for the first time after several failures (cf. supra), a USV has managed to damage a Russian warship in the Black Sea. The Olenegorsky Gornyak is a Ropucha-class landing ship, docks for reparation in Novorossiysk, Krasnodar region, continental Russia
in Kiev on August 3, 2023 (Jae C. Hong / AP)
According to the Russian defense ministry, since the beginning early June of their counteroffensive, the Atlanticist forces have lost
43,000 killed fighters, excluding the casualties of strategic strikes in the deep.
26 jets,
9 helicopters.
1,831 armored vehicles, including
25 German Leopard Panzerkampfwagen,
7 French AMX-10 wheeled tanks, actually armored recce vehicles,
21 US Bradley infantry fighting vehicles.
747 artillery pieces and mortars, including
84 NATO self-propelled howitzers,
76 US M777 howitzers.
As ever, war is a simple art, all execution [Corsican general Napoleone Buonaparte], the Russian forces are well entrenched, are developing a greater fire power, their own losses are far lesser. According to a well known Russian mathematical model, Ukraine, only Ukraine, has lost 245,823 killed in action fighters since February 24, 2022, beginning of the Russian special military operation. Negotiations could have stopped the fighting in March 2022, but the US and UK vetoed peace
August 5, 2023
In the night, a USV has attacked the Sig, a civilian tanker, near Kerch strait. The ship remains afloat, is repaired
(Embedded camera screenshot)
In the afternoon, Russia conducts strategic strikes. An aeronautical factory in Zaporojie and Starokonstantinov military airfield, where Ukrainian jets are taking off with NATO cruise missiles (cf. supra, May 24), are heavily hit
(Komsomolskaya Pravda)
As retaliation in the evening, the Atlanticist forces attack once more downtown Donetsk, where no troops nor military value facilities are set. Half a dozen NATO 155 mm cluster shells cause blazes in the city. The roof of the University of Economics and Trade is on fire.
August 6, 2023
After midnight, Russia replies to the terrorist shelling of downtown Donetsk with a massive wave of strategic strikes. 40 cruise missiles, 3 Kinzhal hypersonic ones and 27 Geran kamikaze drones hit several military airbases. The Ukrainian authorities release later a set of pictures from Starokonstantinov airbase
(Screenshot)
In the afternoon, Volodymyr Zelenskyy visits an undisclosed base, where one French SCALP cruise missile is displayed with an awful heraldry : an Eiffel tower is mating with a Ukrainian trident. SCALP is the French name for Storm Shadow, that UK is shipping to Ukraine since May
(Social networks)
Later, the Atlanticist forces target once more bridges between Kherson region and Crimea peninsula, in Chongar and Genichesk. According to the Russian authorities, the air defense manages to shoot down nine Storm Shadows / SCALPs, but three others damage their targets
(Social networks)
August 7, 2023
In Pokrovsk (Krasnoarmeysk until 2016), Ukraine-occupied part of Donetsk People’s Republic, about 75 km northwest of downtown Donetsk, two Iskander ballistic missiles target in the evening a hotel and a restaurant where Atlanticist service members and mercenaries are meeting
(Ukrainian social networks)
As usual, the Ukrainian officials and journalists are focusing on minor collateral damage in the vicinity, where civilians are injured, are enforcing a gag order about the real target.
August 10, 2023
(Wikipedia)
The first notable territorial change of the Ukrainian counteroffensive is that the Russian forces are threatening Kupyansk, Kharkov region, in the north, while the Atlanticist forces are attacking in vain, in the south, since early June
(Screenshots)
In Zaporojie, several Russian cruise missiles strike a former hotel, which is used as barracks for foreign mercenaries. According later to Turkish sources, which are usually supposed to leak information from the Israeli intelligence, 45 foreigners have been killed, including NATO regular soldiers, 70 are injured. The day after, Google will report that Reikartz Zaporojie is temporarily closed.
August 12, 2023
(Social networks)
Two successive S-200 missiles target Kerch bridge, the Russian air defense shoots both down. The white smoke may be a defensive screen.
August 13, 2023
Can our super weapon decide the war ?
Bild is a tabloid for West German rednecks, whose elders have not been enough cracked down for their Nazism during WW2, is dreaming once more about the impact of a new Wunder Vergeltungswaffe [miracle weapon of revenge], after HIMARS, Leopard and Storm Shadow. The German authorities seem undecided about the delivery to Ukraine of Taurus cruise missiles
a WW2 inspired alternative history French comic strip series
That is endless. Bild is a popular expression of the fanaticism among Western leaders. The caprices of hysterical spoiled children, arrogant and insensitive to the carnage and suffering they are spreading, in vain.
August 16, 2023
For the first time, the Atlanticist forces commit US Stryker armored personnel carriers (APCs), which later burn near Rabotino, Zaporojie region. According to Western media, a single Ukrainian formation is equipped with Strykers, the 82nd air assault brigade, which was kept within the strategic reserve. That suggests that the Atlanticist command is about to launch its last fresh troops against the Russian defenses in the south
(official)
Ukrainian chief of staff Valerii Zaluzhnyi (6th from left) attends a technical meeting with US and UK military representatives. Here are Kyrylo Budanov (3rd), head of the Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR), US general Christopher Cavoli (5th), head of the United States European Command (USEC) and UK admiral Anthony Radakin (7th), head of the Defence Staff.
August 18, 2023
Three civilians are killed in Donetsk city, when a ticking time bomblet explodes in a tree above them. As usual, the Atlanticist forces are shelling residential areas, now with cluster munitions (cf. supra, July 7) that the US, maybe other NATO countries, are delivering since July
(Screenshot)
Vladimir Putin holds a meeting with the command staff of the special military operation in Rostov.
August 19, 2023
An Atlanticist drone manages to break through the Russian air defense, reaches Soltsy air base, 650 km north of the Ukrainian border, Novgorod region, where one Tu-22M strategic bomber is destroyed
(Social networks)
The retaliation is prompt
Ukrainian drone manufacturers, representatives of flight schools and military personnel who are using drones on the front line
are expected in Chernigov theater, about 140 km north of Kiev. For security reasons, the site is disclosed 4 hours before the event
After the opening, a Russian cruise missile closes the drones fair
(amateur video, screenshots)
August 22, 2023
In Zaporojie region, after 75 days of almost daily attacks from Orekhov to the south, exhaustion of the formations which were supposed to breakthrough, involvement of the 82nd air assault brigade from the strategic reserve, the Atlanticist forces are still in the Russian cover area. They are tackling 15 km south of Orekhov, in Rabotino village, the first of three successive defensive lines, still 80 km from Melitopol, which was their goal in June
A US Stryker APC is burning in the vicinity of Rabotino (screenshot)
The drittes Reich performed better 80 years ago. Despite their own defeat in July-August 1943, in a similar battle around Kursk, Soviet Union, the German Nazis managed to advance deeper than the Atlanticist forces, today in Zaporojie region.
August 23, 2023
While Ukraine is celebrating the Day of the National Flag, Vladimir Putin attends a ceremony for the 80th anniversary of the Soviet victory at Kursk, the largest tank battle in history, against the Nazi armies.
The news will go round the world in the evening, a private plane crashes in Tver region, during a flight for Saint Petersburg from Moscow. Ten crew members and passengers die, including Yevgeny Prigozhin and Dmitry Utkin, co-founders of Wagner PMC in 2014, liberators of Bakhmut in May 2023 but leaders of a coup attempt on June 24 (cf. supra)
People are laying flowers near the headquarters of the company, in Saint Petersburg
According to witnesses and amateur videos, the plane may have been blown up. An investigation begins
Russian airstrikes in Rabotino vicinity (Ukrainian amateur video, screenshot)
Despite their redoubled efforts for two weeks, heavy casualties and the Ukrainian propaganda, which is claiming that Rabotino has been seized, when the ongoing fighting have already leveled the village (less than 500 inhabitants in peacetime), the Atlanticist forces have not yet managed to break through the first Russian line of defense in Zaporojie region.
August 29, 2023
August 29 is in Ukraine the Day of Remembrance of the Defenders, a tribute to the fallen. Kyivstar is the main mobile network, broadcasts an advert, later erased, which discloses that 400,000 Ukrainian service members have died since February 24, 2022
(Screenshots)
In the night, the Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR) and its allies conduct an air raid in Pskov, almost 700 km from Ukraine but close to the Baltic States. Their goal is more psychological than military
A swarm of drones targets the airport, where at least one Ilyushin 76 airlift plane is destroyed, several others damaged
(Screenshot)
September 1, 2023
A video surfaces, is showing the wreck of a demilitarized French-made CAESAR 155 mm self-propelled howitzer (screenshot)
The main phone operator in Ukraine has leaked on August 29 that about 400,000 Atlanticist fighters have been killed since February 24, 2022. The butchers need more cannon fodder. Representatives of Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s party start demanding the extradition of the Ukrainian refugees abroad
Hand over the deserters to US !
According to German tabloid Bild, 160,000 potential fighters are living in Germany alone.
September 3, 2023
Ukraine needs a new batch of cannon fodder. Henceforth, these illnesses are no more inappropriate for military service at the front line
clinically cured tuberculosis,
viral hepatitis with minor dysfunction,
asymptomatic HIV,
chronic diseases of the blood and blood organs,
diseases of the endocrine system with minor dysfunctions,
mild short-term painful manifestations of mental disorders,
neurotic, stress-related and somatoform disorders (phobic, anxiety, adaptive, somatoform and other neurotic disorders, neurasthenia, reactions to severe stress) with moderate, short-term manifestations,
slowly progressive diseases of the central nervous system,
episodic and paroxysmal disorders
Nazi Germany mobilizes the Volkssturm in October 1944
Except the children of the plutocracy leaders, a broader percentage of males is eligible to die for the US interests in Donbass and Ukraine. In the evening, Volodymyr Zelenskyy announces the dismissal of the defense minister
I have decided to replace the Minister of Defense of Ukraine. Oleksiy Reznikov has gone through more than 550 days of full-scale war. I believe that the Ministry needs new approaches and other formats of interaction with both the military and society at large. Now Rustem Umerov should lead the Ministry
Less than 500 inhabitants in peacetime, the village has been flattened. The Russian forces are holding high grounds in its southern outskirts. 92 days after the beginning of their attacks in Zaporojie region, southward to Tokmak and Melitopol, the Atlanticist forces have not broken through the first of three Russian lines of defense. Rabotino is the bonfire of the Western arrogance.
While US Secretary of State Antony Blinken is visiting Ukraine, the Atlanticist forces, in order to stimulate the Western support, commit a new false flag war crime, the slaughter of civilians in Konstantinovka, Donetsk Peopleโs Republic
(Official)
Blinken and his Ukraininian counterpart Dmitro Kuleba visit a cemetery in Kiev. The counter-offensive is a bloody failure and the whole proxy war is a carnage for the Ukrainian cannon fodder.
September 8, 2023
(Screenshots)
In the morning, a Russian missile levels the police headquarters in Krivoy Rog, about 160 km west of Zaporojie, when a military meeting is held, likely with NATO representatives. The toll would be almost null, according to the Ukrainian authorities, which are usually hiding the military casualties after Russian strategic strikes. But according to anonymous sources via Turkish media, dozens service members and foreigners are killed. The pets are unhurt
Today is an anniversary in Russia. 80 years ago, the Red Army drove the Nazi troops out of Stalino, today Donetsk city, completed the liberation of Donbass. The legislative elections begin in the four new Russian region, Kherson, Donetsk, Lugansk and Zaporojie, will end on September 10.
September 13, 2023
(Social networks)
In the night, the Atlanticist forces saturate Sevastopol air defense with a volley of ten British Storm Shadow cruise missiles. Seven are shot down but three hit Ordzhonikidze shipyard, where two vessels under repair are damaged
(Social networks)
September 15, 2023
A splendid illustration of the Ukrainian propaganda, that most Western media are parroting. The counter-offensive would not be a three-month bloody failure, because the 3rd assault brigade, one of the military formations within Nazi Azov organization, would have liberated Andreevka, about 10 km south of Bakhmut
That photo is taken on September 6 (Evgeniy Maloletka/AP)
Actually, 71 people were living in the hamlet, which does not exist anymore.
September 17, 2023
As usual, despite failure, the various Ukrainian authorities are eager to claim success, in order to protract Western support, but they are lacking coordination. Kleshcheevka is a village (512 inhabitants in peacetime), about 10 km southwest of downtown Bakhmut, Donetsk People’s Republic. In the ambition to seize back the city, the Atlanticist forces are attacking the village for three months.
On September 14 already, Ukrainian deputy defense minister Hanna Maliar announced the conquest of Kleshcheevka, but while operating in the area, the 3rd assault brigade, branch of Nazi Azov organization within the regular army, denied the gain
The flags of 3 other brigades (80th air assault, 5th assault and assault of the national police) are displayed today (screenshot)
A video surfaces today, is showing Atlanticist fighters with flags, near a church, at the center of the former village, now in ruins. Nice picture, but the Ukrainian staff does not confirm its control. Volodymyr Zelenskyy claims it later, but is always lying. Kleshcheevka is still a battlefield.
September 18, 2023
Ukrainian deputy defense minister Hanna Maliar is sacked
on April 19, 2023 (screenshot)
Arrived in New York for a general assembly of the United Nations, Volodymyr Zelenskyy visits injured Ukrainian servicemen who are undergoing rehabilitation in Staten Island
(Official)
September 20, 2023
A video surfaces on September 20, 2023, from the Russian military. In Donbass or Ukraine, one Atlanticist squad surrenders. Before their move, the deserters have used a radio frequency, 149.200, that the Russian forces are devoting to the enemy surrender. Volga is the call sign of the Russian contact
September 21, 2023
After midnight, the Atlanticist forces attempt once more to saturate the Russian air defense, which manages to shoot down 19 drones, mostly above Black sea and Crimea. Later, the other way around, 43 cruise missiles, according to the Ukrainian authorities, strike all over Ukraine. In Cherkasy, a garrison of foreign mercenaries is hit
(Ukrainian official video / screenshot)
September 22, 2023
In the afternoon, while a NATO Poseidon reconnaissance aircraft is gathering intelligence from the Black sea, off Romania, 300 km from the Russian port, a new strategic and psychological attack targets Sevastopol, a volley of Storm Shadows and likely their French version, SCALPs
The white smoke is a Russian screen
According to the synthesis of several reports, the air defense manages to shoot down 5 cruise missiles. Two others hit the historical, not operational, headquarters of the Black sea fleet, in downtown Sevastopol
(Social networks)
September 28, 2023
The New York Times publishes this map, which is showing the change in control, since January 1, in Donbass and Ukraine, while the Atlanticist counter-offensive has begun on June 4
October 5, 2023
At about 1:25 pm, scores of civilians are killed in a cafe and vicinity in Groza [thunderstorm], a village that the Atlanticist forces are controlling in Kharkov region, about 35 km west of Kupyansk, a little further from the front line. The probability that for another reason, a warhead hits precisely a funeral gathering of inhabitants, is null. The civilian target is deliberate
I have blurred here the faces of the victims (Ukrainian social networks)
Kramatork, Donetsk Peopleโs Republic, on April 8, 2022, where a Ukrainian Tochka-U ballistic missile killed dozens civilians at the railway station, after Russian cruise missiles had destroyed military targets at other railway stations in the region, while Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, was visiting Kiev,
Konstantinovka, Donetsk Peopleโs Republic, on September 6, 2023, where a strike ravaged the market place, while US State Secretary Antony Blinken was visiting Kiev, when the CCTV footage that Volodymyr Zelenkyy clumsily shared on social networks proved actually that the missile had arrived from the west, was therefore Ukrainian,
the Western mainstream media and crooked politicians are still parroting the Ukrainian statement, which blames Russia. Jaded, the Russian defense ministry comments laconically that no strategic strike was conducted that day in Kharkov region.
Zelenskyy is in Spain, is begging the European Union, while the Western military support is shrinking and its US funding is threatened. Once more, Groza inhabitants are Russian-speaking and widely pro-Russia. The Ukrainian nationalists are feeling enough hatred to slaughter them for PR purpose.
The Ukrainian authorities specify that the weapon would have been one Russian Iskander ballistic missile. Interesting. Many professional photos surface in the afternoon, exhibit the victims, but none is showing the impact point or missile debris. Bastards.
October 6, 2023
(Screenshot)
The day after, a video is showing the whole site. The building has absorbed the blast, no crater is visible. The strike was extremely precise. Where are the debris of the alleged Iskander ? One Ukrainian official suggests that Russia would have thought that the memorial event was gathering military personnel. Spokesman of the Kremlin, Dmitry Peskov reminds that Russia is not targeting civilians, when a ballistic missile, likely Iskander, indeed strikes a hotel which is hosting foreign mercenaries in Kharkov
(Ukrainian social networks)
Another document is showing a crater, on the other side of the building. The Ukrainian authorities announce two dead victims, are never disclosing the military fatalities in case of strategic strike.
October 10, 2023
Photo from Donetsk city (social networks)
At dawn, Russian artillery and air strikes are pounding the entrenchments in Avdeevka, where the Atlanticist artillery is usually targeting Donetsk civilians, 15 km to southeast. Later, concentric stormings are threatening to encircle the garrison. Video surface, are showing that the Atlanticist fighters are fleeing from the first lines of defense
For the first time, the Atlanticist forces use the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), that the US has delivered, a ballistic cluster missile which may carry several hundreds bomblets
Six missiles, GLSDBs (Ground Launched Small Diameter Bombs) and ATACMS, target the airport in Berdyansk, Zaporojie region, a coastal city which was one goal of the failed Atlanticist counter-offensive. The air defense shoots down three of them. An ammunition depot is hit and several helicopters are damaged.
October 21, 2023
In the evening, Russia strikes a road terminal in Korotich, Kharkov western suburb
(Ukrainian officials)
Obviously, the facility was used as a hub for military supply. Previous Western documents have shown how Western armored vehicles are concealed inside heavy-duty trailers. As usual, Volodymyr Zelenskyy is claiming that the attack would be terrorist, against civilians.
October 24, 2023
(Russia Today, screenshots)
Former Vostok brigade, former Donetsk People’s Militia 11th regiment, the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle brigade has seized the slag heap of the Coke and Chemical Plant (AKHZ), 5 km northwest of downtown Avdeevka, a major Atlanticist stronghold, 14 km north of downtown Donetsk city.
October 31, 2023
Joe Bidenโs administration and the Ukrainian authorities are unable to bring themselves to officially end their counter-offensive, which is a failure since early June. Rather the opposite, the Russian forces are advancing, are threatening to encircle in Avdeevka, Donetsk Peopleโs Republic, the Ukrainian troops which since 2014, are deliberately shelling civilians in Donetsk city
German panzer are supposed to stop Russians
Some Atlanticist armored formations have been transferred from the south to Avdeevka area, in an attempt to thwart the Russian advance. In the evening, German tabloid Bild takes us back in time, a leap about 80 years ago.
November 3, 2023
In the night and early morning, during an almost daily wave of Russian strategic strikes all over Ukraine, Geran [geranium] kamikaze drones target in Kharkov a building where foreign mercenaries are garrisoned
(Ukrainian social networks)
Later, the concentration of cell phone signals enables the Russian military intelligence (GRU) to localize a Ukrainian parade in Zaporojie region. About one hundred artillerymen of the 128th mountain assault brigade are gathered
(Ukrainian social networks)
The Russian strike kills about 50 service members, including the deputy commander of the brigade.
November 7, 2023
As usual since 2014, in order to retaliate for their military failure, the Atlanticist forces in Ukraine are deliberately shelling civilian targets in downtown Donetsk city. The weapons are US HIMARS and 6 civilians are killed
(Screenshot)
The Russian actions are always warfare. In many instances, Atlanticist ones are terrorism. While 2000 km to the south, another US trading post, Israel, is acting in Gaza like the German Nazis, in 1943, in Warsaw ghetto.
Still no official end of the Atlanticist counter-offensive, when Russian forces from Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) complete the cleansing of the industrial area, in Avdeevka southeastern suburb.
December 12, 2023
While Volodymyr Zelenskyy is in Washington DC, begging for more support, against the opinion of the US Congress, Russia completes the cleansing of Marinka, where the Atlanticist forces were entrenched since 2014 in Donetsk southwestern suburb
(Screenshot)
No one speaks anymore in the West about the conter-offensive. The perspective of Ukrainian defeat has become the issue.
[my illustration : a Ukrainian trench in the vicinity of Bakhmut, occupied part of Donetsk Peopleโs Republic, on November 26, 2022 (social networks)]
[…] If they [the leaked classified US military intelligence document] are indeed authentic (and it appears that they are), they offer important insight into force generation and combat power in Ukraine – and perhaps even more importantly, into the intelligence framework that the Pentagon is working with. None of the items adduced paint a particularly rosy picture for either the AFU or its benefactors on the Atlantic seaboard […]
Ukrainian Force Generation
The most significant implication of the documents is simple: Ukraineโs combat power is significantly degraded, and in particular their mechanized units and artillery forces are in very rough shape.
The relevant material here in particular is a page entitled โUS Allied & Partner UAF Combat Power Buildโ, which details the force generation, training, and equipment tranches that will create the mechanized package which Ukraine will use in its spring offensive. The plan calls for a force of twelve nominal brigades, nine of which will be equipped by NATO and three internally generated by the Ukrainians. The leak does not offer insight into the three Ukrainian brigades, but the intended complement of the nine NATO brigades is meticulously listed).
All told, the combat power build calls for these brigades to field a total of 253 tanks, 381 Infantry Fighting Vehicles, 480 Armored Personnel Carriers, and 147 artillery pieces. This implies that these will be brigades in name only, and will in fact be far understrength. Parceling these systems out across nine brigades will give an average strength of a mere 28 tanks per brigade, along with some 95 IFVs/APCs and 16 artillery tubes. Compare this to a US Army Armored Brigade Combat Team, which would have almost 90 tanks and almost 200 IFVs/APCs. An American Stryker Brigade (a lighter, rapidly deployable formation) would have about 300 Strykers – the Ukrainian 82nd Brigade is listed to receive only 90.
In combat power terms, therefore, these new brigades are going to be far understrength. Their tank strength, far from being full brigade level, amounts to less than an American armored battalion.
Another key aspect of the force build document is the training schedules. This document dates from the beginning of March, at which point five of the nine brigades were listed at โTraining 0% Completeโ. Only one of the brigades was more than halfway trained, rated at 60% complete. Despite this, six out of nine were scheduled to be ready by the end of March and the remainders by the end of April. This can only be achieved with significantly truncated training times, and these are detailed in the document. Leopard tank training, for example, is listed at only six weeks. Just for context, American tankers can pencil in 22 weeks of training for the Abrams […]
We have known for quite some time that Ukraine is facing a critical shell shortage, but the leaked documents reveal just how acute this issue is. Ukraineโs usage rate is very low right now – the report claims only 1,104 shells had been expended in the previous 24 hours – compare this to the 20,000 or so shells that the Russian army is firing on a daily basis. Even more alarming for Ukraine is the note that they have only 9,788 shells on hand.
Even with a low burn rate that leaves the AFU massively outgunned, they have enough on hand to sustain combat for a little over a week, and they rely on a trickle of deliveries from the USA to keep these stocks stable. The report noted a shipment of 1,840 shells departing in the next 24 hours. Batches of this size are obviously insufficient for Ukraine to build up its stocks, and can only serve to backstop and replenish daily expenditure. There is no possibility of America quickly ramping up the size of these deliveries, because a mere 14,000 shells are produced per month. US officials hope to get this number up to 20,000 this year, but this is still below Ukraineโs current burn rate […]
The American Analytic Framework
[…] The Pentagon does not seem to have a strong sense of Ukrainian unit strength, location, or activities. They also list their assessed Ukrainian KIA at a mere 16k-17.5k. This is an absurdly low number – where could they have gotten it? In fact, it is a direct copy-paste of the casualty numbers reported publicly by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.
The fact that the Pentagon does not seem to have any independently generated intelligence about the Ukrainian army is shocking. They seem to have be relying on Ukrainian propaganda numbers and publicly available deployments data, like the open source Deployment Map. For the record, this is not a knock on the Deployment Map site – I use this resource frequently and find it very useful. The point, of course, is that the Pentagon, with its nearly unlimited resources, does not seem to have any unique insight or intelligence streams of its own in this regard. They gesture vaguely at the map and mutter, โthereโs probably a brigade or two in this area, maybe 8,000 men. Or 4,000. We donโt really know.โ In fact, all of their axis strength assessments for Ukraine have a 100% margin of error (that is, the upper limit of the range is double the lower limit).
One can only conclude that the tail is wagging the dog. The Ukrainians are able to extract material, training, and cash from the west, but there is little accountability or honest information flow in return. There were hints of this earlier in the war – that Ukraine is a sort of black box which sucks in resources but does not communicate honestly in return; American officials have complained (and Ukrainian leaders have confirmed) that Kiev simply does not tell DC all that much. Apparently this remains an issue well over a year into the conflict. One particularly alarming footnote in the leaked documents states:
“We have low confidence in Russian (RUS) And Ukrainian (UKR) attrition rates and inventories because of information gaps, OPSEC and IO efforts, and potential bias in UKR information sharing.“
Good grief […]
Air Defense at the Brink
One last major revelation from the leak is the greatly degraded state of Ukrainian air defense. Very simply, Ukraine is quickly running out of munitions, especially for its critical S-300 and BUK systems, and it can only endure two or three more wave strikes before breaking completely.
Air defense systems can be complicated to talk about for people who arenโt familiar with the nomenclature. This is because there are a large number of different systems required for a modern air defense, which must be โlayeredโ with different systems that intercept targets at various altitudes, phases of flight, and trajectories. The conversation can quickly become even more muddled because the launch systems have both a Russian designation and a NATO designation, and their munitions have different designations still – just for example, the air defense system which the Russians call the S-300 is designated the SA-10 by NATO, and it fires a variety of different interceptor missiles which have their own names, like the 9M83. Multiply this by the many different types of air defense systems currently in use in Ukraine, and you can see how it can easily decay into a morass of acronyms and serial numbers.
In any case, the key thing to understand about air defense systems is the layering aspect – if one node in the layer fails, not only does one lose full spectrum coverage, but the burn rate on the remaining systems increases because they are now bearing an undue load. Ukraine is now almost completely out of interceptors for the S-300 and BUK systems, which comprise almost all of its medium to long range defense. At the current burn rate, they are projected to run out by the first week of May and have had to make hard choices about where and what to defend. There is no prospect of acquiring more interceptors for these systems because they are manufactured in Russia […]
Conclusion: Asleep at the Wheel
[…] There does not seem to be any long term plan to sustain Ukraineโs war. The Pentagonโs procurement plans do not indicate any real intent to ramp up production of key systems. For FY2024, they have ordered a modest 5,016 GMLRS – the missiles launched by the famous HIMARS system. Ukraine has already fired nearly 10,000 GMLRS, making this yet another system where Ukrainian expenditures vastly exceed supply.
To salvage the situation, Kiev must place its hopes on one desperate dice roll with a mechanized attack package comprised of half-strength brigades wielding a disparate inventory of different vehicles and systems. This Frankensteinโs monster of armies – sewn together with a bevy of different tanks, IFVs, APCs, and artillery systems drawn from all corners of the NATO alliance, will likely be asked to smash through the heavily fortified and robustly manned Russian lines in the south, where it will be pulverized and become only so much more mulch for the Pontic Steppe [end]