Analista senior di l'intelligenza in u campu di a gestione di i risichi di sicurezza, sò un anzianu tenente detective è ufficiale di l'intelligenza in l'agenzie di u Statu francese. A bona pronuncia hè Николай Чинкуини, in russu
Read on to learn how Nazis turned NATO into the organization it is today
The largest peacetime military alliance in the world has a dubious history of employing some of Hitler’s most renowned officers
The names Hans Speidel and Adolf Heusinger, among others, are unknown to most. But these persons were key figures in Hitler’s Nazi war machine who would later go on to hold some of the highest positions in NATO
43 year-old Hüseyin Doğru is a German journalist and documentary filmmaker based in Berlin. Early 2023, he founded Red., a revolutionary English-language website. But at the instigation of Germany, in May 2025, the European Union sanctioned both journalist and media, over alleged links to Russia
Jacques Baud has been sanctioned by the European Union for speaking truth to power. He deserves the support of all freedom loving people around the world
its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine, chronicle
chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine against Russia
[my illustration: a Teutonic knight in Alexander Nevsky, by Sergei Eisenstein, 1938]
The fate of Central and Eastern Europe after the People’s Democracies’ post-1989 fall cannot be fully appreciated without reference to the EU as an extension of German imperialism. Berlin’s drive to ensure the region remains composed of weak, frequently mutually-resentful microstates has endured for well-over a century. Over time, battlefield conquest and occupation has been supplanted by economic and monetary union, and ever-rising military, security and intelligence “interoperability” and “cooperation”, all conducted under “internationalist” auspices.
Comprehending this process and the consistent needs of German imperialism provides a typically absent, critical lens through which to view events such as Yugoslavia’s destruction, the rise and recent demise of Hungary’s Viktor Orban, and seen and unseen political machinations throughout the Balkans old and new. German imperialism is a potent, dangerous force frequently overlooked due to its nigh-invisible operation. With US global hegemony irreversibly faltering, it is vital to truly understand the phenomenon as it threatens to emerge in its own militarised right again.
Today, German imperialism is little-understood even in countries and regions intimately shaped if not outright created by Berlin’s colonial meddling and concomitant hegemonic expansion. Its historic apotheosis was the 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The terms and consequences provide an eerily precise blueprint for the EU’s modern day role as German empire via other means. Despite Brest-Litovsk’s seismic import, mainstream English language accounts are comparatively rare. A highly compelling, informative synthesis is nonetheless provided by Adam Tooze’s much-overlooked 2014 workThe Deluge.
Tooze writes of how “Brest gave birth to the precursors to the Baltic states in their modern form,” and an “independent Ukraine” for the very first time in history. Resource-rich territory that over prior centuries comprised much larger dynastic land empires was broken up into easily exploitable chunks. The newly-formed nations, and corresponding nationalisms, spread throughout ethnically, linguistically and religiously diverse swaths of Central and Eastern Europe constituted a formidable stronghold. Self-determination facilitated Germany’s untrammelled economic, military, and political penetration.
Commenting on Eurasia’s 21st century map, Tooze observes how since the Soviet Union’s 1991 dissolution, all Brest-Litovsk’s “creations” have “come to be regarded as legitimate members of the family of nations.” Moreover, states such as the Baltics and Poland then as now “look to protectors in the West,” being “keen members of an American-dominated NATO and the European Union, in which Germany is the dominant force.” Via Brest-Litovsk, “all of these polities fell willy-nilly under the ‘protection’ of Imperial Germany”
Brest-Litovsk delegates negotiate, early 1918
The Treaty was signed between Moscow and Austro-Hungary, Bulgaria, Germany and the Ottoman Empire in March 1918, following months of tense negotiations produced the previous December by revolutionary Russia signing an armistice with Berlin. At Brest-Litvosk, both sides had advanced their respective visions of “self-determination” for the Central and Eastern European components of the Tsar’s collapsed empire. Vladimir Lenin hoped newly-independent states in the region would be free to turn Bolshevik. Yet, Imperial Germany had no intention of letting that happen.
Instead, the country’s “more intelligent strategic thinkers” realised “there was no better means to dynamite the Tsarist Empire than for Berlin to espouse the demand for self-determination” at Brest-Litovsk. This “manipulative ruse” would allow Germany to extend her hegemony imperceptibly throughout enormously profitable territories. It was “a vision of negotiated sovereignty in which economic and military independence was pooled by smaller states with larger states.” Tooze reports how German imperialists argued “full, unfettered sovereignty” was “always a chimera” – “the real choice was one between hegemons”:
Germany would secure power on a continental scale not through annexation, but through the formation of an economic and military bloc of smaller Eastern European states…The autonomous Polish entity carved by Germany and Austria out of Russian territory in the autumn of 1916 was a start. While in economic and military terms the new Poland would be bound tightly and irrevocably to Germany, in the social and cultural sphere it would be given the freedom ‘to express itself nationally’
‘Military Protection’
From the Central Powers’ perspective, self-determination’s colonial windfall was immense. In territorial terms, Moscow lost control of today’s Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine. This prime former Tsarist real estate accounted for 34% of the fallen empire’s population, 54% of its industrial land, 89% of its coalfields, and 26% of its railways. Berlin well-knew the regional treasure trove would be hotly contested, and could easily “fall into the orbit of another great power” – “if not Germany or Russia, then Britain”.
Hence, Brest-Litovsk’s terms exclusively allowed for ‘independence’ under formal “German military protection.” This transformed millions of people throughout the region into potential proxy warriors arrayed against Russia, or other major powers threatening Berlin’s local hegemony, in the manner of NATO today. Rapidly collapsing into civil war, with Franco-British intervention to reverse the Revolution impending, the incipient Soviet Union acquiesced to the Treaty’s harsh stipulations. Lenin believed the Bolsheviks would eventually recapture the lost territories, by sheer force of radical gravity
Contemporary map of Central and Eastern European states created by Brest-Litovsk
Brest-Litovsk was torn up by the June 1919 Treaty of Versailles, compelling Berlin to grant independence to assorted German-conquered protectorates that had been established throughout the region. Chaotic, violent struggles unfolded over the next three years between Red Army-assisted local revolutionary elements and ‘independent’ states led by collaborationist puppets. Belarus and Ukraine were successfully absorbed as republics, while the Baltics and Poland remained autonomous. Meanwhile, the seed of German hegemony via self-determination had been decisively sown throughout Central and Eastern Europe.
German colonialism particularly left its mark post-Brest-Litovsk via the emergence of nationalisms and according national creation myths throughout the region, which were innately and rabidly antagonistic toward Moscow. In Poland in 1916, Berlin’s invading forces had successfully portrayed themselves as liberators. In the Baltics, Russians represented a large proportion of the country’s urban, land-owning elite. They were easily framed by German propagandists, and in ultranationalist imaginations, as parasitic overlords of largely illiterate ethnic Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian peasantry, who overwhelmingly resided in rural steppes.
Convincing Ukraine’s multiethnic population to embrace an anti-Russian ‘independence’ was considerably more difficult, given their similar backgrounds, customs and languages, and the substantial influence of each others’ culture in both directions since Kiev’s 1654 union with Moscow. Ukraine’s contemporaneous veneration of genocidal fascists, and indeed the wider ongoing proxy war, are direct upshots of efforts by German imperialists to promote enmity and antagonism between Russians and Ukrainians. This strategy was maintained throughout the Cold War by the CIA and MI6, with Nazi-riddled West Berlin’s assistance.
‘Civilising Mission’
Another enduring legacy of Brest-Litovsk was the transformation of “self-determination” from a liberal German imperialist crusade, to a fundamental principle of Anglo-American-dominated international relations. The cause was eagerly and cynically seized upon first by British Prime Minister Lloyd George, then US President Woodrow Wilson. The right to minority self-determination globally became absolutely central to the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. The world over, anti-colonial and nationalist movements saw an opportunity to achieve independence from foreign subjugation.
At the Conference, Austro-Hungary brutally fell victim to this self-determination push, with Britain successfully ordering its constituent territories be “liberated” via the empire’s total breakup. This created the independent states of Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. The latter pair were entirely new countries, with Yugoslavia forged from Austro-Hungary’s southern Slavic regions – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia – and the revolutionary kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro. In a bitter irony, Austro-Hungary herself had previously encouraged self-determination regionally à la Brest-Litovsk, to entrench her imperial rule.
In June 1878, the little-known Congress of Berlin was convened. Major European powers sought to reorganise the Balkans, in the wake of Russia’s victory over the Ottoman Empire three months earlier. The conflict ended with Moscow asserting hegemony over Constantinople’s remaining holdings in Southeastern Europe, via an allied Greater Bulgaria, and the newly-formed, independent states of Montenegro, Romania, and Serbia. However, Austria-Hungary, Britain, France, rapidly expanding host empire Germany, and Italy, wished for these terms to be revised
While the Congress recognised the three new Balkan states’ independence, attendees demanded Bosnia and Herzegovina become an Austro-Hungarian protectorate into the bargain, much to Serbia’s chagrin. Vienna’s resultant takeover of Sarajevo sent tens of thousands of Muslim inhabitants fleeing to Turkey. This exodus intensified in 1881, after the imposition of military conscription. The move was inspired by Serbia and Montenegro supporting local anti-imperial elements. It was just one Austro-Hungarian connivance intended to transform harmoniously multiethnic, multifaith Bosnia and Herzegovina into a fractious powder keg.
In service of this goal, Sarajevo’s Austro-Hungarian occupation authorities actively nurtured a nationhood centred exclusively on Bosniak – Bosnian Muslim – identity. The local Serbo-Croatian dialect was proclaimed a separate Bosnian language, Cyrillic text got suppressed, while Serbian books and newspapers were banned. Vienna’s meddling failed to incite violent, separatist division between Bosnia’s diverse peoples. It nonetheless created a vast army of conscripts for any future regional war, while providing Austro-Hungary with an imperial public relations victory. Per historian Maximilian Georg:
[Vienna’s] objects were to teach the population their supposed Bosnian, pro-Habsburg identity, legitimise the Austro-Hungarian rulers as the new Romans, and demonstrate to Europe and the world the success of Austro-Hungary’s ‘civilising mission’ in an ‘oriental’ country. This ‘civilising mission’ under military occupation was the strongest indicator of an Austro-Hungarian colonialism
‘Yugoslav Nationalist’
Austro-Hungary and Germany alike considered independent Serbia’s mere existence a permanent irritant to their Eastern European supremacy, in need of eventual neutralisation. Tensions constantly mounted after the turn of the century, leading in 1908 to Bosnia’s formal annexation by Vienna. All along, imperialists in Berlin were spectating Austro-Hungary’s colonial machinations with intense interest. In 1888, Chancellor Otto von Bismarck prophetically foresaw “some damned foolish thing in the Balkans” upsetting Europe’s delicate balance of power, and precipitating a major global conflict.
Serbia and Montenegro’s October 1912 invasion of Albania, in the wake of her declaration of independence from Ottoman rule, almost proved that “damned foolish thing.” Serb and Montenegrin forces sought to permanently capture territory, but retreated a year later under threat of Austro-Hungarian intervention. In the aftermath, Kaiser Wilhelm II visited Vienna, declaring to colonial officials “war between East and West was in the long run inevitable.” As Slavs “were born not to rule but to obey,” their anti-imperialist tendencies couldn’t be tolerated much longer.
Wilhelm II moreover pledged to “back” Austro-Hungary in any future conflict in Eastern Europe, assuring his Viennese counterparts Berlin was “ready to draw the saber any time your action makes it necessary.” Bosnian Serb Gavrilo Princip’s June 1914 assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo provided an ideal pretext for the Kaiser’s long-desired showdown between Slavs and Teutons. Pressured by Austro-Hungarian authorities to implicate Belgrade directly in his actions while on trial, Princip instead insisted he was ideologically motivated:
I am a Yugoslav nationalist, aiming for the unification of all Yugoslavs, and I do not care what form of state, but it must be free from Austria…The plan was to unite all South Slavs. It was understood that Serbia as the free part of the South Slavs had the moral duty to help in the unification, to be to the South Slavs as the Piedmont was to Italy…In my opinion every Serb, Croat and Slovene should be an enemy of Austria
In post-World War I Yugoslavia, Princip was elevated to national hero. In early 1930, a plaque was erected on the site of Ferdinand’s assassination, celebrating a foundational event in the new country’s creation. It was the sole trophy claimed by the Nazis following the Axis invasion of Yugoslavia, presented to Adolf Hitler at a formal ceremony on his 52nd birthday in April 1941, two days after Belgrade’s surrender. A potent totem of German embarrassment expunged, it was now time to erase Yugoslavia permanently
Adolf Hitler inspects the plundered plaque commemorating Archduke Ferdinand’s assassination by Gavrilo Princip
Carving up the country relied heavily on constructing genocidal, ethnonationalist puppet entities. Painful memories of these attempts to exert hegemony over the Balkans under the banner of “self-determination” remained visceral for many residents of Yugoslavia in December 1991. Then, newly-reunified Germany unilaterally recognised federation members Croatia and Slovenia as ‘independent’ states, while encouraging other republics comprising the collapsing country to follow the pair’s secessionist lead. It was widely predicted Yugoslavia’s demise would produce bloodshed, on a grand scale.
‘Fundamental Subordination’
Dissolving Yugoslavia began waging war on Croat and Slovene secessionists six months earlier. The latter conflict lasted just 10 days, but the former was still simmering. The European Community and UN futilely struggled all along to achieve peaceful settlements to Yugoslavia’s gravely worsening crisis, while formally committed to preserving the country in some form. Berlin’s recognition summarily sabotaged those efforts, removing any incentive for Yugoslav republics to negotiate their futures with Belgrade, while emboldening nationalists in every republic.
Fears of Berlin’s resurgent imperialism were not confined to Yugoslavia. As TIMEcontemporaneously observed, “it used to be a given of European political life Germany…would not take a leading or controversial role in world affairs,” which “suited its neighbors very well indeed.” While occupied West Germany operated throughout the Cold War as “an economic giant and a political dwarf,” unified Berlin’s “unexpected show of diplomatic muscle” in recognising Croatia and Slovenia as ‘independent’ countries was now causing “discomfort” throughout Western capitals.
In Britain’s parliament, then-Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd explicitly evoked the World Wars as disquieting precedents for Germany’s modern-day “self-determination” push in the soon-to-be former Yugoslavia. “There is a tradition of the main states of Western Europe splitting in rivalry on these Balkan questions, and this all ending up on the battlefield. I don’t think that tradition is a good one,” Hurd cautioned. Washington, immensely irritated by Berlin belligerently “getting out ahead of the US,” duly assumed management of the Yugoslav crisis, with disastrous consequences.
Fratricidal conflicts that subsequently engulfed Yugoslavia forged a highly invasive beachhead, via which German economic and political hegemony throughout the region surged, without direct military engagement. While Berlin framed her support for Croat and Slovene ‘independence’ in terms of human rights, the rich financial rewards of shattering the federation were plain. As by far the two wealthiest republics, Germany effectively granted herself access to “the best productive assets” in the soon-to-be former country by kickstarting its practical and physical collapse, per a 2008 academic paper.
The authors write of how Berlin’s “hegemonic relationship” with Yugoslav successor nations was thereafter writ considerably larger than even Germany’s imperial infiltration of “smaller states” elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe. This is due to the “specific dependence” of Balkan countries on Berlin’s “structural power”. In economic terms, this means vast national trade deficits with Germany across the region, with “Balkan pre-products and raw materials” flowing in vast, constant profusion to Berlin, while German corporations and products dominate many commercial, financial and industrial sectors locally.
Undergirding this extraordinary economic colonisation was adoption by Yugoslavia’s successor states of ‘independent’ currencies, pegged first to the former Deutschmark, now Euro. This proved pivotal to the “fundamental subordination of the political economies of the region to the ideological and operational norms” of the EU – or German empire, via other means. New national and private banking systems of post-Yugoslav countries were structured specifically according to Berlin’s own, with German banks ascendant, as elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe. That’s not all:
[Deutschmark/Euro pegging] was an essential precondition for the shaping of the macro-economic policies of these (and other transition) states, for their foreign economic relationships, for the further development of their capital markets and the programmes of liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation which ensued
‘European Continent’
Berlin’s Balkan banking takeover moreover fundamentally “facilitates the penetration of all German enterprises into the commercial life of the Balkan economies.” Berlin has gluttonously feasted on local resources and industry alike ever since, its investment regionally “characterised by takeovers.” For example, throughout Central and Eastern Europe German supermarkets are a near-monopoly, with prices of goods frequently higher than back home, despite meagre local purchasing power. Low wages, vast structural unemployment, and mass brain drain are all interlinked, ruinous inheritances.
The Balkans’ Western “transition” has been far more destructive than even the horrors unleashed upon the former Warsaw Pact in the 1990s. Heavily influenced “by prescriptive programmes emanating from the EU and from the World Bank,” Brussels has since 1999 also been “actively involved” in advising and guiding every country in the region towards bloc membership. After so much imposed impoverishment, it isn’t precisely clear what meaningful benefits Balkan states or populations will reap from their vassalage under German imperialism becoming formalised.
In late 2019, a Balkan liberal who once eagerly supported their country joining the EU wrote a sorrowful ode to “the process of so-called integration” Yugoslav successor states suffered by adopting “measures”, “instruments”, and “reforms” dictated by “Western technocrats”. Freshly ‘independent’ countries “were expected to build a fully developed Western liberal democracy from scratch…upon the ruins of a different yet fully developed system…while dragging behind us the burden of deepening poverty and trauma.” Several were and remain deeply scarred by Berlin and Brussels-encouraged ‘independence’ wars.
However, “this excruciating process of destroying and building anew a whole system…went neither fast enough nor successfully enough” for the new German empire. What’s more, “competition was not fair” – “opening our markets to the developed capitalism of the West and undertaking neoliberal reforms drained our human and economic resources while we kept trying to stay apace.” Socialism’s vestiges were eradicated, state industries sold off, and social spending slashed. The op-ed mysteriously failed to mention how Germany’s contemporary Balkan economic assault has a “strong security dimension”
Kosovo’s original KFOR occupation map, June 1999
The 2008 paper notes Berlin exerts direct colonial-style control across the region, for example via Bosnia and Herzegovina’s EU-chosen Office of the High Representative, which traditionally serves as Germany’s imperial viceroy in Sarajevo. Moreover, Berlin has always been a key contributor to NATO’s Kosovo peacekeeping force KFOR, sustaining a military occupation under which Pristina controversially declared independence from Serbia in February 2008. This summer, Washington’s KFOR contingent began departing Kosovo after 27 years.
Meanwhile, the Americans are openly signalling Bosnia’s abandonment, raising potentially urgent questions about the unified country’s future. In April, EU Commission Ursula von der Leyen made clear the EU and she personally intend to “[complete] the European continent so it does not fall under Russian, Turkish or Chinese influence,” in explicit reference to the former Yugoslavia. History shows us such declarations by German imperialists frequently result in world-threatening catastrophe. Meanwhile, “some damned foolish thing in the Balkans” could evidently today yet again trigger war [end]
this article is the product of visits to Russia I made in June and September 2026 where I met with senior Russian leaders, leading academics, and specialists in military and security issues
ce 11 novembre 2025 est l’occasion de souligner comme la façon dont l’Europe sacrifie les conscrits ukrainiens mobilisés de force rappelle le spectaculaire carnage de la 1ère guerre mondiale
leaked files show top UK military figures conspired to carry out the Kerch bridge bombing, covertly train “Gladio”-style stay-behind forces in Ukraine, and groom the British public for a drop in living standards caused by the proxy war against Russia
the Germans have bowed down to the US sabotage by Joe Biden administration of Nord Stream pipelines, only to end up with Donald Trump’s America First doctrine in economy and defense
est un morceau de choix. Je suis heureux de l’avoir découvert. Le Dauphinois a été éduqué à Vienne, Isère, puis Sciences Po Lyon et Saint Cyr, spécialité transmissions, à Rennes. Il a développé une carrière intéressante, jusqu’au grade de commandant, détaché observateur de l’ONU, l’OTAN et l’OSCE, officier de renseignement en Afghanistan, avocat militaire, pas un combattant mais néanmoins un homme de terrain. Il est par son expérience très proche des États-uniens, continue sans doute de fournir des rapports au renseignement français
sur Twitter le 30 mai 2023
Il vit déjà en Ukraine et fin février 2022, intègre une ONG, le Fonds ukrainien pour les volontaires internationaux (FUVI), comme consultant et chef des opérations
Au matin du 24 février 2022, par un assaut aéroporté, les parachutistes russes s’emparent de l’aéroport Antonov, à Gostomel, banlieue nord ouest de Kiev
Sur un plan plus personnel, Piguet serait de religion juive, car il brandit régulièrement l’argument ultime de sa propre judaïcité pour tenter de blanchir les organisations ukrainiennes clairement nazies, procédé trivial et fallacieux, qui s’adresse à des crétins. Sa propre pensée est fasciste, même délirante. Voici des extraits de sa prose sur LinkedIn, en février 2023
Les bolcheviks russes ont toujours persécuté les croyants en Dieu ainsi que les démocrates laïcs. Les Russes sont des païens issus de hordes impies qui adoraient la mort et pratiquaient le cannibalisme […] L’Ukraine, carrefour de nombreuses civilisations et influences brillantes […] C’est pourquoi les Ukrainiens sont beaux et ingénieux […] Honte aux barbares «Moskals»
Vous l’avez compris, ce partisan d’Emmanuel Macron est lui-même un crétin, comme le sont souvent les partisans d’Emmanuel Macron. Avec ce personnage, nous réalisons mieux comment l’OSCE, sous couvert de mission internationale impartiale, a pu contribuer au réglage de bombardements terroristes ukrainiens de la population du Donbass.
Il récidive le 16 mai par un tweet cosmique, pour encencer le criminel de guerre nazi ukrainien Stepan Bandera (1909-1959). Un tel révisionnisme relève du mensonge ou d’une inculture crasse, peut être des deux
Né dans l’empire austro-hongrois, Bandera était un militant nationaliste ukrainien, en territoire polonais après la 1ère guerre mondiale, lorsqu’il commandita l’assassinat en 1934 du premier ministre. Ce fut l’invasion allemande de septembre 1939 qui le libéra de prison. Il était le chef de la faction radicale et dominante de l’Organisation des nationalistes ukrainiens (OUN). Les plus modérés admiraient Benito Mussolini, les partisans de Bandera lui préféraient Adolf Hitler. Fasciste et raciste, partisan d’un État autoritaire, il ordonnait aussi
Moscovites [Russes], Polonais, Hongrois et Juifs sont vos ennemis, détruisez les !
En 2009, pour le 100e anniversaire de sa naissance, Stepan Bandera est honoré par un timbre. Depuis la révolution orange de 2005 et avant la victoire démocratique de Viktor Ianoukovytch en 2010, le président de l’Ukraine est alors Viktor Iouchtchenko, pro-Occident
Son organisation a travaillé avec l’Abwehr [renseignement militaire allemand], pour fournir des bataillons de supplétifs ukrainiens aux armées du Reich, dans la perspective de l’invasion de l’Union soviétique en juin 1941
Affiche de propagande française en 1941
Ses partisans ont accueilli les envahisseurs en libérateurs et pour célébrer l’événement, massacré début juillet quelques 4 000 civils juifs dans la région de Lviv
Une victime juive des nationalistes ukrainiens à Lviv le 1er juillet 1941
Il demanda personnellement à Adolf Hitler de lui accorder l’indépendance d’un État fasciste ukrainien, allié de l’Allemagne nazie, qu’il déclara unilatéralement la semaine suivante. Cette initiative déplut et les Allemands ont temporairement interné Bandera, d’abord en résidence surveillée à Berlin, puis dans les quartiers VIP du camp de Sachsenhausen, où ses conditions de détention auraient fait rêver les travailleurs forcés. Piquet insulte les 84 000 victimes du camp de travail.
L’Armée insurgée ukrainienne (UPA), branche militaire de l’OUN, fut formée en octobre 1942. Contrairement à ce que suggèrent les propagandistes ukrainiens, elle n’a jamais affronté les forces d’occupation, mais conduit un nettoyage ethnique, avec la bienveillance des Allemands, le massacre entre 1943 et 1945 d’au moins 50 000, peut être 100 000 civils polonais
Depuis 2015, après Maïdan, l’État ukrainien célèbre chaque année, ici en 2022, l’anniversaire de la fondation en 1942 de la formation paramilitaire nazie UPA
Après la victoire soviétique à Stalingrad, l’OUN participa en novembre 1943, aux côtés d’autres organisations fascistes, hongroise et roumaine, à la fondation à Jytomyr du Comité des nations subjuguées (AUN), sous l’égide du Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete [ministère impérial des territoires orientaux occupés] d’Alfred Rosenberg. En Avril 1944, l’adjoint de Bandera, Yaroslav Stetsko, rencontra l’Obersturmbannführer [lieutenant colonel SS] Otto Skorzeny, pour organiser la guérilla que l’UPA commençait à conduire derrière les lignes de l’Armée rouge victorieuse, que libre en septembre, Bandera appelait à combattre
à Berlin le 2 mai 1945 (Evgueni Khaldeï)
Après la victoire alliée, dans laquelle l’Union soviétique a contribué à hauteur de 80% de toutes les pertes militaires allemandes de la 2de guerre mondiale, il s’est réfugié en Allemagne de l’ouest, sous la protection de groupes nazis clandestins et des services secrets anglo-états-uniens, car dorénavant sous leur houlette, l’UPA continuait à opérer en Ukraine soviétique. Le KGB parvint à le liquider à Munich en 1959. Ès-qualités, son ancien adjoint Yaroslav Stetsko, alors président du Bloc anti-bolchevique des nations (ABN), recyclage atlantiste de l’AUN nazi de 1943, fut reçu en 1983 par Ronald Reagan
GLOIRE AUX HÉROS, slogan inauguré en avril 1941, parmi les fascistes ukrainiens de l’OUN, alors implantés dans le Generalgouvernementfür die besetzten polnischen Gebiete [Gouvernement général des territoires polonais occupés]. Cette image est le bandeau du compte Twitter de David Piguet
En qualité d’adversaire de hordes impies [les Russes], Piguet affiche, en bandeau de son compte Twitter, les couleurs rouge et noir de Pravyi sektor [Secteur droit], organisation nazie contemporaine, qui revendique son héritage de l’UPA, les bourreaux entre 1943 et 1945 d’au moins 50 000, peut être 100 000 civils polonais. Je m’intéresse toujours à l’essence historique des choses. Voici qui représente ce qu’il est profondément, par atavisme ou sinon, héritage génétique
Affiches de propagande à partir de 1941 de la Légion des volontaires français contre le bolchevisme (LVF), un régiment de supplétifs français de la Wehrmacht
À l’approche début juin de la tant attendue contre-offensive, que la MOA occidentale impose à la chair à canon ukrainienne, il est le relais servile de la propagande la plus médiocre, partage fréquemment les élucubrations d’une certaine Alla Poedie, agitatrice ukrainienne hystérique, une sorte de Joseph Goebbels en jupons et aussi plus âgée, qui fait chauffeuse de salle sur LCI. Mais certains cordonniers sont les plus mal chaussés et je pense que le militaire est réellement surpris et déçu que la contre-offensive n’atteigne pas les objectifs annoncés par la cantinière d’Azov, car le débit de sa page Twitter se réduit à la mi-juin
Dans le secteur de Rabotino, région de Zaporojie, un drone russe filme le 9 juin 2023 les carcasses de véhicules blindés atlantistes : un char allemand Leopard 2A6 et plusieurs véhicules de combat d’infanterie états-uniens Bradley (capture d’écran)
Les événements dans l’hexagone sont d’excellents tests pour évaluer le QI et le bagage culturel des individus répertoriés ici, mieux cerner leur idéologie. Piguet ne déçoit pas, les commente le 30 juin comme un specimen rare de beauf atavique, sinon congétinal, par un tweet grand-guignolesque, à l’inspiration cocardière tellement hilarante, qu’il n’est pas facile de se convaincre qu’il est au premier degré
Lui le commandant, con de militaire disait on autrefois, nie le caractère criminel d’un meurtre commis deux jours avant à Nanterre, par un archer du guet trop représentatif d’une Police nationale recrutée au rabais, formée à l’avenant et rongée par l’extrême-droite, qui s’illustre plus par ses bavures que par sa capacité à déjouer ou affronter des attaques terroristes. Il nous laisse quelque peu sur notre faim, ne précise pas qui ils sont ni contre quoi ou qui sert le rempart. Le courage n’est pas la qualité première du beauf.
En De quoi Sarkozy est il le nom, Alain Badiou écrivit en 2007 que le vichysme existait en France bien avant Philippe Pétain. Piguet est une splendide incarnation de cette France pétainiste, affiche comme couverture l’iconographie d’un gaullisme défunt, bosse pour l’OTAN, que Charles de Gaulle avait expulsée mais que Nicolas Sarkozy, fossoyeur du gaullisme, a réintégrée.
Dans un article du Figaro, le 24 juillet 2023, il fait l’intermédiaire entre les journalistes et le DUK (Dobrovolʹchyy ukrayinsʹkyy korpus, Corps des volontaires ukrainiens), branche armée du parti nazi Pravyi sektor [Secteur droit]. Il s’affiche en général le représentant international de la formation paramilitaire, qui en novembre 2022, est devenue la 67e brigade mécanisée de l’armée régulière.
Une telle accointance couronne son racisme, sa russophobie, son iconographie et son révisionnisme pour le criminel de guerre Stepan Bandera. Je fais le pari que si Volodomyr Zelenskyy n’avait pas interdit les partis de gauche et qu’ils avaient mobilisé un corps de volontaires, nous n’y aurions pas retrouvé Piguet
Le 28 janvier 2022, moins d’un mois avant le déclenchement de l’opération militaire spéciale russe, le chef d’état-major ukrainien, Valeri Zaloujny, troisième par la gauche, visite une garnison du DUK. Le bureau de son hôte est truffé d’hommages aux criminels de guerre nazis Stepan Bandera et Roman Choukhevytch. À la droite de Zaloujny, le commandant du 1er bataillon, Dmytro Kotsioubaïlo, sera dénazifié dans le secteur de Bakhmout le 7 mars 2023 (Valeri Zaloujny)
Son état ne s’améliore pas. Quelle peut en être la raison ? La défaite de l’OTAN en Ukraine ? L’alcool ? Avant 11:00 du matin, heure ukrainienne ?
Voilà que depuis son Ostgebiet [territoire oriental] ukrainien, le demi-solde veut réprimer l’anti-France. État d’exception, arrestation des cadres de la France insoumise, sont les fantasmes d’un individu qui ne déroge pas à l’héritage de son engeance pétainiste. Et aussi les Sections spéciales ?
Il apparaît incontestablement comme l’intellectuel de ce panthéon, BHL mis à part. Deux messages consécutifs du 24 septembre 2023 sont tellement riches de mots clés, d’angoisses et de convictions, qu’ils réduisent à de la littérature les précédents paragraphes à son sujet. La conclusion s’impose, il est parfaitement à sa place dans les bagages de la 67e brigade mécanisée ukrainienne, ex DUK, branche militaire du parti nazi Pravyi sektor.
J’encourage tous les pétainistes à l’y rejoindre et à combattre pour l’Occident, jusqu’à la victoire ou la mort. Lui exalté, aime se photographier en treillis camouflé, mais planqué, quand des Ukrainiens encore plus âgés sont expédiés au casse-pipe, souvent contre leur volonté, il alimente sur Facebook, depuis le début de la folle contre-offensive, un mémorial très incomplet de personnels ukrainiens et étrangers qui ont été tués dans les rangs atlantistes. Et à moins de changer de cap à 360°, dirait Annalena Baerbock, il n’a pas fini de compter.
Je guettais avec impatience les premières réactions des gaîtés de l’escadron à l’attaque terroriste du 22 mars 2024, à Krasnogorsk, que les services secrets ukrainiens ont sous-traitée auprès de débris du Califat. C’est bien sûr David Piguet qui s’y colle et comme d’habitude, ne déçoit pas. Il ose partager le 25 un message sur X de l’hystérique Alla Poedie, qui prétend que les quatre individus présentés aux magistrats, après avoir été interpellés à la frontière de l’Ukraine, où ils tentaient de se réfugier, ne seraient pas les terroristes mais de pauvres boucs émissaires
Alla Poedie (Saby Maviel, pour LCI et Lyon People)
Piguet a quand même écrit sur son CV qu’il a été officier de renseignement pour l’OTAN. Mais il nous faut lui concéder que l’armée française s’est toujours débarrassée du rebut dans les organisations internationales telles qu’OTAN ou OSCE. À noter que Poedie était invitée à l’ambassade d’Ukraine le 16 janvier, lorsque BHL y reçut l’insigne local de Chevalier de l’Ordre du Mérite.
Pour combler ses lacunes, je signale à David Piguet que le 26 mars, Nikolaï Patrouchev, secrétaire du Conseil de sécurité de la fédération de Russie, répond Bien sûr l’Ukraine, aux journalistes qui lui demandent EI ou Ukraine ?
Directeur du FSB, Alexandre Bortnikov ajoute que Kyrylo Boudanov, chef du renseignement militaire ukrainien (HUR), est une cible légitime.
Le dossier s’enrichit encore en soirée. Un nouvel indice corrobore ma connaissance générale du sujet : les dirigeants occidentaux sont aujourd’hui d’une engeance de lâches canailles, rarement égalée dans l’Histoire de l’humanité. Et par leur arrogance atavique, les Français sont les pires. En outre, ils sont assez crétins pour commettre des boulettes telles que celle-ci. Depuis Moscou, le journaliste Laurent Brayard rapporte que dans l’après-midi du 22 mars, environ cinq heures avant le début de l’attaque terroriste à Krasnogorsk, une autorité administrative française fit annuler pour raisons de sécurité les cours du lendemain en présentiel au lycée Alexandre Dumas, qui dépend de l’Alliance française et du quai d’Orsay
Le 5 avril, Piguet partage le portrait d’un héros, encore une référence, Roman Choukhevytch (1907-1950), militant fasciste ukrainien, commandant en 1941 du bataillon de supplétifs Nachtigall [Rossignol], dont l’activité militaire principale fut le massacre de civils juifs ; capitaine plus tard dans la Schutzmannschaft [police auxiliaire], contre les partisans antinazis ; qui devint chef en 1943 de la milice ukrainienne UPA, les bourreaux d’au moins 50 000, peut être 100 000 civils polonais. Les services de sûreté soviétiques eurent le bon goût de le coincer et dénazifier à Lviv, le 5 mars 1950
Cela n’était qu’un nazi. La guerre se joue souvent avec les Russes et à la fin, les nazis perdent
Après le limogeage en février 2024 du chef d’état-major Valeri Zaloujny, les autorités ukrainiennes craignaient une réaction des éléments les plus fascistes au sein des forces armées. Émanation du parti nazi Pravyi sektor [Secteur droit], la 67e brigade mécanisée a été lentement dissoute, son personnel dispersé dans d’autres brigades. Le processus fut achevé en avril 2024 et son ancien commandant, Andriy Stempitkyi (cf. Dylan Devaux), se retrouva à la tête du seul DUK (Dobrovolʹchyy ukrayinsʹkyy korpus, Corps des volontaires ukrainiens), la formation paramilitaire originale de Pravyi sektor
Arrière-plan photographique de miliciens nazis de l’UPA pendant la 2de guerre mondiale, écusson du DUK à l’épaule, le 29 avril 2025, David Piguet est adoubé représentant à l’étranger de la formation paramilitaire (Andriy Stempitkyi)
Dans l’intervalle, David Piguet n’a pas ménagé sa peine en matière de propagande sur les réseaux sociaux. Et comme vous l’imaginez, il s’est également illustré comme un fervent soutien de l’État suprémaciste israélien, ses crimes de masse et sa stratégie de nettoyage ethnique à Gaza et ailleurs, en Palestine. Crimes de masse et nettoyage ethnique furent aussi les faits d’arme de l’UPA pendant la 2de guerre mondiale et c’est très officiellement que le 29 avril 2025, Andriy Stempitkyi l’adoube représentant à l’étranger du DUK, titre revendiqué depuis longtemps par le Français.
En partenariat avec d’autres groupes de hackers, Killnet a mené une campagne d’extraction qui a largement employé une solution virale appelée Nyuans [Nuance]
Killnet
Le 20 août, les as de l’informatique revendiquent la collecte de téraoctets auprès de de l’état-major ukrainien : pertes militaires et autres données sensibles. Ils divulguent des listes vérifiables de pertes ukrainiennes. Le total dépasse toutes les attentes. Depuis février 2022, l’Ukraine aurait subi plus de 1,7 million de morts et disparus. Piguet a encore beaucoup de travail sur Facebook
Les annales de Charlie Kirk
Avec toujours la même ardeur sur les réseaux sociaux, il continue de supporter l’Ukraine et la politique en Palestine de Benjamin Mileikowsky, dit Netanyahou. L’actualité passe et le 16 septembre 2025, il exprime aussi sa sympathie pour feu le suprémaciste états-unien Charlie Kirk, qui selon le message qu’il partage, n’aurait pas été d’extrême-droite.
Le 25 mai 2026, il me salue sur les réseaux sociaux
Chez les Corses, normalement, Cinquini, il n’y a jamais eu de collabo. Un peuple qui défend sa terre, sa langue, son identité et son indépendance, ça te dit quelque chose, Cinquini? À mon avis tu appartiens plus à la «Carlingue [la Gestapo pinzutu (1941-1944) de la rue Lauriston ; il connaît bien l’Histoire de son pays] qu’à l’Ile de Beauté et ses gens d’Honneur
Je m’empresse de lui répondre
C’est exact, la Corse tue les fascistes depuis 1943. Voila pourquoi, contrairement à toi, je ne vénère pas les criminels de guerre nazis ukrainiens Choukhevytch et Bandera, ne soutiens pas l’État génocidaire d’Israel. I Francesi fora
et pour son édification, joins le lien de mon article sur la reconnaissance de l’État de Palestine par l’Assemblée de Corse, le 27 juin 2025, avant la France. J’ajoute enfin
Donbass, Alexandre Novoselov, 2017
Quant aux autres peuples qui défendent leur terre et leur langue -en l’espèce, le Russe- je suis convaincu que le Donbass sera libéré et dénazifié en totalité
En 2016 déjà, alors que la guerre faisait rage au Donbass depuis 2 ans, un reportage de Paul Moreira visita un camp dans la région de Kiev et présenta un autre volontaire français dans les rangs du DUK. Il se faisait appeler Mussolini.
Raciste, hostile à l’immigration, aux syndicats et aux partis de gauche, Piguet adore poser en tenue camouflée ukrainienne, mais rechigne à gagner un champ de bataille où environ 2 millions d’Ukrainiens, souvent mobilisés de force, ont été tués depuis 2022.
Mise à part sa nostalgie adolescente de programmes télévisés des années 80, son expression sur les réseaux sociaux, où il célèbre aussi les criminels ukrainiens de la 2de guerre mondiale Stepan Bandera (1909-1959) et Roman Choukhevytch (1907-1950), est la caricature de ce qui dans une France encore saine, était désigné autrefois par con de militaire, celui qui avait été rossé en Indochine puis Algérie.
Point particulier : il a coutume aussi de brandir sa religion juive pour tenter de blanchir ses accointances nazies. Ce procédé fallacieux est destiné à convaincre les crétins. Il est aussi une groupie de Benjamin Mileikowsky, dit Netanyahu, de l’État suprémaciste d’Israël, ses crimes de masse et sa stratégie de nettoyage ethnique en Palestine. Je ne crois pas à une coïncidence : de telles atrocités ont aussi été les faits d’armes de l’UPA, milice nazie ukrainienne de la 2de guerre mondiale, dont Piguet est l’héritier dans les rangs du DUK.
À partir du mois de mai 2026, son activité martiale consiste à animer un compte appelé Все буде Україна! [Tout sera ukrainien !] sur les réseaux sociaux. Son bellicisme de clavier le fait clamer que son pays d’origine, la France, est aussi en guerre contre le Russie. Lorsque je le confronte aux pedigrees de ses compatriotes combattant dans les rangs atlantistes, dont à ce jour 51% cumulés de militants fascistes, voire nazis assumés, il me répond le 15 juin 2026
Je comprends que ce soit dur pour vous, qui oeuvrez tant contre la France, de voir de vrais hommes défendre leur convictions
Il partage en effet leur exaltation fasciste mais sa frayeur des armes à feu empêche encore ce pinzutu [Français, en Corse] de devenir un vrai homme
Un hommage sur les réseaux sociaux à Roger Degueldre (David Piguet)
Le 7 juillet 2026, entre autres faire-parts ukrainiens ou israéliens, il partage l’image publiée par un autre compte, qui pour le 64e anniversaire de sa mort, rend hommage à Roger Degueldre
Le 3 juillet 1962, le peuple algérien fête son indépendance (Keystone)
Ce fut sous une fausse identité suisse que l’ex Waffen SS belge Degueldre s’engagea en 1945 dans la Légion étrangère. Naturalisé français en Indochine, il était en Algérie, lieutenant du 1er REP (régiment étranger de parachutistes), quand il prit la tête en 1961 des commandos Delta, qui réunissaient les tueurs de l’organisation terroriste OAS (Organisation armée secrète). Arrêté puis condamné en 1962, il fut fusillé au fort d’Ivry le 6 juillet
Stepan Bandera (réseaux sociaux)
Le 23 octobre 2026, par le partage de cette image sur les réseaux sociaux, le con de militaire -un raciste qui se prétend de religion juive et célèbre l’OAS- rend un nouvel hommage au criminel nazi ukrainien de la 2de guerre mondiale Stepan Bandera (1909-1959), dont les autres groupies, en application de son programme politique
Moscovites [Russes], Polonais, Hongrois et Juifs sont vos ennemis, détruisez les !
chronique alphabétique et nécrologique de l’engagement français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas
Articles connexes
Pruvate à truvà me, canaglia di l’OTAN, pruvate solu
chronique en Anglais, its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine
chronique en Anglais, censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia
une saga française, entre Ukraine et Lyon, où apparaissent aussi des morceaux de SS de la division Charlemagne et plus récemment, Alice Kerviel, dite Cordier. L’affaire Deranque révèle comme la France est infectée par le pétainisme, en particulier parmi les soutiens d’Israël ou de l’Ukraine, deux théâtres d’opérations où l’Occident tente de ralentir son déclin
En 2025, une nouvelle unité de Français combattant pour l’Ukraine s’est structurée autour d’un noyau de néonazis, ayant pour objectif d’attirer des recrues. Parmi ces volontaires, d’anciens militaires. StreetPress les a identifiés
En Ukraine, les volontaires français pro-ukrainiens et pro-russes se partagent l’imaginaire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Les premiers se revendiquent des collabos de l’Allemagne nazie, les seconds de l’escadrille mythique « Normandie – Niémen »
deux jours après le 10e anniversaire de la débâcle politique et sécuritaire du 13 novembre 2015, une messe célèbre à Verdun l’ancien dirigeant fasciste de l’État français
ce 11 novembre 2025 est l’occasion de souligner comme la façon dont l’Europe sacrifie les conscrits ukrainiens mobilisés de force rappelle le spectaculaire carnage de la 1ère guerre mondiale
c’est par l’agence cosaque de presse PIKA, depuis la République populaire de Lougansk, que le 2 avril 2024, l’ataman Nikolaï Diakonov lance un message à destination de la France
ce papier est le premier des grands médias français qui s’attaque à la question des militants nazis français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, le nouveau danger qu’ils présenteront à terme pour la sûreté intérieure
où nous apprenons que le nazi français Allan Duchézeau, camarade de César Aujard dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, était surnommé Dox, quand il secondait à Paris le leader nazi Marc de Cacqueray Valménier
en Anglais, les indices de la présence d’opérateurs occidentaux, en particulier Français, pris au piège en mars 2022 à Marioupol, dont les forces russes achevèrent la libération en mai
This article is the product of visits to Russia I made in June and September 2026 where I met with senior Russian leaders, leading academics, and specialists in military and security issues
There has been a spate of irresponsibly aggressive rhetoric from within Europe strongly posturing for a conflict with Russia by the end of the decade. This rhetoric comes in the context of the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine, which is well into its fifth year, a conflict which both Europe and the United States openly acknowledge operates in the form of a proxy war between the collective West and Russia. The Russian response has been to accelerate its military efforts against Ukraine while putting NATO on notice that any effort to threaten Russian territory, and particularly the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, would see Russia responding with the full compliment of military capabilities, including nuclear weapons. The current situation in Europe today in many ways replicates the conditions that existed on the continent in the summer of 1914, where military mobilization and war preparations created a momentum that produced a war no politician was seriously looking to prosecute. The consequences of war in 1914 were a disaster for Europe; the consequences of a war today would be fatal to civilization as we know it.
In examining the geopolitical map of Europe/Eurasia today, one can assess four points of military friction between Russia, the United States and Europe. These are Ukraine, the Arctic, Kaliningrad, and Outer Space. While each represents a physically distinct problem set politically and militarily, they are all four inextricably linked through a common Russophobic mindset in Europe and the United States which treats Russia as a singular security issue. Moreover, both Europe and the US operate from a strategic mindset driven by zero-sum thinking, which postures Russia as being structurally motivated to bring harm to both Europe and the United States, thereby stifling the possibility of cooperation with Russia that could resolve many if not all of the underlying issues which are collectively construed by the West as presenting a threat. For its part, Russia operates from a mindset derived from the psychology of perpetual victimhood dating back centuries, and a historical foundation of resistance to aggression which seeks diplomatic resolution until which point military confrontation becomes the only solution
Ukraine: The (perceived) chink in the Soviet/Russian armor
The current conflict in Ukraine between Russia and the West did not begin in 2022 with the Russian invasion but rather represents the logical conclusion of a posture on the part of the United States and NATO which sought to exploit the ultra-nationalism of Western Ukraine in order to create a framework of instability designed to weaken the Soviet Union, and later Russia, from within. To understand this mindset, one first must delve into the psychology underpinning the concept of Ukrainian nationalism. For Russia, Ukraine represents part of a larger family of Slavic peoples which include the Russians and Belarussians; indeed, this notion is shared by millions of Ukrainians as well. One only need to look at the integration of Ukraine within the cultural and historical roots of Russia over time to understand the reality of this sentiment.
For the West, this reality presents a problem, since it lends itself toward the existence of a singular Slavic state possessing tremendous geographical advantages and unmatched natural resources which in turn creates massive economic penitential that competes with Western notions of global supremacy. Nazi Germany sought to nullify this Slavic potential through the implementation of Generalplan Ost, the literal cultural and physical genocide of the Slavic race. The United States and the United Kingdom (and later, NATO, inclusive of a newly militarized West Germany), continued this policy of Slavic nullification by promoting anti-Soviet resistance on the part of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), including military support of partisans operating in Ukraine loyal to Stepan Bandera, a former ally of Nazi Germany whose forces perpetrated large-scale atrocities against Jews, Poles and Russians during the Second World War. When the war ended, the German intelligence organization responsible for managing the OUN operations was taken over by the US military and later, under the auspices of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), used to direct anti-Soviet armed resistance up until 1954-55. The CIA continued to provide active support for the OUN, using the Ukrainian diaspora, through the 1990’s.
The role of western intelligence, led by the CIA and the British Special Intelligence Service (SIS), in post-Soviet Ukraine was singularly focused on promoting Ukrainian nationalism at the expense of Russia. The political campaign waged against the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine by western intelligence emerged front and center when the two-term President of Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma, stepped down in 2005 after carrying out policies designed to improve Ukraine-Russian relations. Kuchma threw his support behind the Russian-speaking Viktor Yanukovych. For the West, a Yanukovych presidency would undermine their strategic goal of stripping Ukraine away from Russia. The result was the so-called “Orange Revolution”, which saw Yanukovych’s electoral victory overturned in favor of Ukrainian nationalists who promoted a distinctly anti-Russian policy which saw Ukraine pivot toward the European Union and seek NATO membership. The latter development was seen by Russia as a red line which, if pursued, would inevitably lead to a military conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Yanukovych’s election in 2010 was deemed a setback to the Western designs on Ukraine, leading to the West supporting a violent coup in February 2014 that saw Yanukovych driven from power, replaced by pro-western Ukrainian nationalists.
It should be clear that a physical confrontation between Ukraine and Russia has always been the goal of the collective West. Efforts to take control of the Russian political space had, by 2014, failed. The so-called “reset” of 2009 was little more than a political cover for a regime change operation designed to replace Vladimir Putin, who had ruled Russia since taking over from Boris Yeltsin at the end of 1999, and in the intervening decade taken Russia down the road of economic and national recovery that the West, operating in full zero-sum mode, simply could not tolerate. The concerted efforts of President Obama to interfere in the Russian parliamentarian elections of 2011 and the presidential election of 2012 failed to remove Putin from power. The actions in Ukraine in 2014 and afterwards must be viewed in this light; nothing happens in a vacuum.
The Ukraine conflict was never avoidable, despite Russia’s concerted efforts to engage in diplomacy designed to do just that. The defeat of the Ukrainian army in 2014-15 at the hands of Russian-backed separatists in the Donbas led to the adoption of the Minsk peace accords. It is now established fact that neither Ukraine, its two European partners (France and Germany), nor the United States ever had any intention of following through on the Minsk process. Instead, the Minsk process was designed to buy time for NATO to build a new Ukrainian army capable of holding its own against Russia. Indeed, from 2015-to 2022, the United States and NATO did just that, training over 80,000 Ukrainian forces, including thousands of Ukrainian nationalists labeled as neo-Nazi by the United States Congress, to NATO military standards. The stated purpose of this training was to enable Ukraine to take physical possession of the Donbas and Crimea, which was annexed by Russia in 2014 following the CIA-backed coup in Kiev. When Ukraine began amassing these NATO-trained troops in the Donbas region in early 2022, Russia launched a pre-emptive action which, more than five years later, has become an openly acknowledged proxy war with the collective West, inclusive of the US and NATO.
The stated goal of both the US and Europe in pursuing this proxy conflict with Russia is nothing less than the strategic defeat of Russia. What does this mean in practice? First of all, the proxy war was never intended to result in a Ukrainian military victory against Russia. Rather, the goal was to draw Russia into a conflict which would exhaust its military potential, break its economy, and collapse its society to the point that the government of Vladimir Putin would be removed from power. This entire policy is postulated on the understanding that Vladimir Putin must be removed from power. As such, and solution that does not attain that objective is rejected out of hand, a pattern of behavior reflective of the zero-sum mentality that drives western policy making. As a result, every potential off-ramp that Russia has been willing to consider, from the Istanbul communique of 2022 to the Anchorage compromise of 2025, has been rejected by the West, exposing the reality that for the West diplomacy is just a tool to buy time to further strengthen Ukraine militarily in order to draw the Ukraine-Russian conflict out to its desired conclusion—the collapse of Russia. In short, Minsk on replay.
Russia has proven to be surprisingly resilient in the face of this concerted western effort designed to collapse it as a viable nation state. The Russia economy not only has survived in the face of western sanctions but, in concert with effective Russian diplomacy that has exploited western diplomatic miscues to build a large and supportive global constituency, thrived as it has found foreign markets in the Global South that have largely replaced the lost European and US markets. Russian society, blindsided by a war it was not prepared for, has rallied solidly behind President Putin, as the results of the recent parliamentarian elections underscored. And far from exhausting Russia militarily, the Ukraine conflict has enabled Russia to fine-tune its defense industrial base, producing significant quantities of advanced military equipment and weaponry that for the most part far exceeds that being produced by the collective West in both quality and quantity. When this material is matched up with a combat-hardened pool of manpower, the result is that Russia today possesses the most combat-capable military force in the world, far exceeding anything either NATO or the United States can put into the field.
In short, the western gambit targeting Russia has failed—the Russian military is stronger today by an order of magnitude, its economy far more diverse and self-sustaining, and its population far more unified than it was in 2022. Moreover, Russia shows no signs of faltering on any front—economically, diplomatically, socially, or politically.
The same cannot be said for either Europe or the United States. Despite the war-like rhetoric coming out of Germany and Poland and backed up by statements made by US military officers, both active duty and retired, the reality is that the proxy war between the collective West and Russia was always meant to be just that—a proxy war. There has never been a realistic plan for the conflict to become a direct clash between Russia and NATO, if for no other reason than NATO simply lacks the capacity to generate sufficient forces capable of high-intensity conflict for any sustainable period. NATO’s military power has largely atrophied in the decades since the end of the Cold War, requiring an infusion of investment over time to recover which Europe currently does not seem capable of providing. The United States is itself in a posture of global retrograde, seeking to withdraw from Europe rather than resume a Cold War-like posture that is neither politically or economically viable.
With Russia seemingly closing the door on the possibility of a negotiated settlement with the west over Ukraine, Europe and the United States are confronted with the uncomfortable reality that their strategic objectives in Ukraine will not reach fruition. Russia will continue to press for a military solution which meets all its stated objectives, including the kind of concerted de-Nazification which would make extinct the very virulent Ukrainian nationalism which has always fueled the western efforts in Ukraine against Russia.
In short, there will be no war between Europe and Russia over Ukraine. Europe will support Ukraine until Ukraine has exhausted its resources—manpower and economic—and then watch helplessly as Russia consolidates its position in what is left of the Ukrainian nation. “To the last Ukrainian” appears to be a concept that both Ukraine and its western supporters have taken to heart
The Arctic: The economic trigger of potential conflict
In a rational world, the collective West would regroup after its pending defeat in Ukraine and seek to repair its considerable losses. But in a zero-sum world, this is not possible. A Russian victory in Ukraine requires, in the minds of those Russophobes in the west still dreaming of the collapse of Vladimir Putin’s Russia, a “win” which will level the geopolitical playing field. Given the reality that one of the consequences of the west’s failed Ukrainian gambit is the economic decimation of Europe, issues of economic import, not surprisingly take on increased importance when configuring a post-Ukraine geopolitical posture in opposition to Russia.
One of the main issues confronting Europe today is discerning a coherent economic and foreign policy when it comes to China. European diplomacy in this regard has been disastrous, resulting in the collapse of critical sectors of the European economy (car manufacturing, for instance) as a result of ill-conceived notions of “de-risking” (an American-origin term designed to camouflage the real intent of such policy, which is “de-linking.”) But one cannot possibly speak of “de-risking/de-linking” when there are no viable alternative markets to replace that which one’s policies seek to vacate.
Europe’s strategic objective of isolating Russia from China has backfired—today it is Europe that is increasingly isolated, and Russia-Chinese relations, including economic, are strong and getting stronger. One of the critical areas of Russia-Chinese cooperation is the development of the Northeast Passage or, as it is often referred to in China, the “Ice Silk Road”, a 5,500-kilometer stretch of waterway running from the Bering Strait in the east to the Barents Sea in the west. Use of this waterway has become increasingly possible—and profitable—enabling container ships to make the journey from East China to European ports such as Rotterdam around 20-days faster that the current Suez Canal route used by most shipping companies.
The Northeast Passage operates exclusively in Russian territorial waters. It also transits the Arctic zone, meaning that for much of the year its functionality is dependent upon Russian icebreakers. The passage also operates under the umbrella of Russian security and legal norms. The economic potential of the Arctic used to the sole purview of the Arctic Council, who members used to meet on a regular basis to coordinate policies impacting on the economy, security, and ecology of the Arctic region. However, in 2022, following the invasion of Ukraine, Russia was kicked out of the Arctic Council. And, following the admission of Finland and Sweden to NATO, the Arctic Council has assumed a NATO-only posture, with its policies reflecting the strategic goals and objectives of its collective membership, namely being the strategic defeat of Russia.
Climate change has altered the geopolitical realities of the Arctic region, with melting ice caps not only opening sea lines of communication previously denied and/or restricted because of weather but also making economic exploitation of significant mineral resources exposed by the retreating ice physically possible and fiscally viable. Normally, the Arctic Council would seek to regulate access to the Arctic to balance economic and ecological concerns within a security framework where all parties’ interests are taken into consideration.
But in the zero-sum world, the Russo-Sino economic penetration of the Arctic space is deemed a threat to the collective West requiring a military response. This reality was underscored during the recently convened European Arctic Summit, hosted by Finland in mid-September. The European Union leadership, citing unsubstantiated claims of “significant and long-term threats” from Russia to Euro-Atlantic security, committed itself to strengthening its Arctic security posture—i.e., the militarization of the Arctic, focusing on military mobility, cross-border connectivity and necessary infrastructure in the northernmost regions of the Arctic.
The fact is, however, that NATO is non-competitive with Russia when it comes to Arctic security issues. What the European Arctic Summit gave lip service to about the militarization of the Arctic, Russia has already fully implemented and continues to improve. While NATO nations are capable of engaging in acts of provocation, such as the recent seizure of a Russian research vessel off the northern Norwegian island of Svalberg, the rapidity in which the Norwegian government most to ensure similar actions are not undertaken in Norwegian territorial waters underscores the fact that Norway is not keen of provoking any sort of direct confrontation with Russia in the Arctic. The real threat to the West in the Arctic is not Russia’s capable military forces, but the fact that Russia, together with China, are imposing a new transit-based economic reality which will provide extraordinary leverage going forward by making traditional shipping carriers and routes non-competitive with the new “Ice Silk Road” Russia and China have already implemented. The ability to sustainably ship containers to Europe at half the cost of the current shipping routes is a game changer in every way and creates a new reality that the West will not be able to catch up to for some time, if ever
Kaliningrad: low-hanging fruit, or impregnable fortress?
The psychosis of the zero-sum trap the West has set for itself when it comes to Russia requires that NATO manufacture a victory—perceived or otherwise—capable of off-setting its failures in Ukraine and impotence in the Arctic. In this regard, the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad has emerged as a perceived Russian Achilles Heel. The former commander of NATO ground forces in Europe, US General Chris Donahue, openly bragged this past July that NATO forces would be able to overwhelm Russian defenses in Kaliningrad in short order. Germany and Poland have argued for intensified NATO military exercises near the borders of Kaliningrad, the goal of which would be to generate sufficient concern within the Russian leadership to cause them to pull troops out from the Special Military Operation zone to Kaliningrad in response. Several western military and security analysts have articulated assessments which indicate that Russia’s actual military posture in Kaliningrad is much weaker that publicly acknowledged. And numerous western politicians have made declarations indicating that Russia is preparing to carry out acts of aggression against NATO using the Kaliningrad exclave as a base of operations.
But the reality is that while Russia is more than capable of defending Kaliningrad from any NATO aggression, the Russian military is not currently postured in the Kaliningrad exclave to carry out any sustainable offensive operations of any scale against any of its NATO neighbors—any contention to the contrary is simply rhetorical propaganda. Both the Russian 11th Army Corps and the Baltic Marines—the core ground combat forces stationed in Kaliningrad—have extensive combat experience in Ukraine and have developed a skill set with combat drones that would most likely disrupt and defeat any NATO offensive operations directed at the Kaliningrad exclave. The Russia military has likewise created an active reserve Rifle Regiment, BARS-39, which draws upon veteran soldiers possessing active-duty combat experience, especially in drone warfare.
But the real threat to Kaliningrad doesn’t come from any potential ground offensive launched by NATO. Rather, it would emerge in the form of a naval blockade of the exclave. Since 2022, the railway lines that connect Kaliningrad with Russia have been subjected to severe restrictions by Lithuania when it comes to the transit of good to and from Russia; the issue of compliance with European Union sanctions of Russia lays at the heart of this matter. Russian-registered vehicles are likewise not permitted to transit Lithuania and Poland. Russia has compensated for this loss of connectivity by increasing the scope and scale of water ferry service between Russia and Saint Petersburg. While Russia has been able to sustain economic growth through this resupply effort, the fact is that this ferry-boat lifeline is very expensive, and many goods, such as gasoline, are subsidized by the Russian government to keep prices under control. If NATO were to impose naval restrictions on shipping into and out of Kaliningrad, as some of its members have suggested, the economic viability of the exclave would be threatened. It is because of this vulnerability that the Russian government put NATO on notice that any effort to subject Kaliningrad to a naval blockade, or any other act of military aggression, would be responded to with the totality of Russia’s military capability, including nuclear weapons.
This nuclear muscle flexing appears to have dampened the enthusiasm on the part on some of the most vociferous NATO proponents of plucking what they thought would be low-hanging fruit; now that it is clear that any conflict involving a NATO attacks on Kaliningrad would not be treated in isolation, but rather constitute a conflict of existential proportions, the war drums have been muted
Space: The final frontier
The last topic on the list of potential points of conflict-generating friction between Russia and the US-European collective is outer space. Space-based sensors have played a critical role in the collection of intelligence used to support military operations in Ukraine and, in the case of Ukraine, to strike strategic targets in the depth of Russia. Likewise, the US commercial Starlink satellite communications system has assumed an essential role in Ukrainian military communications, to include playing a critical part in enabling Ukrainian long-range drone attacks on Russian energy infrastructure.
The United States has recently announced that it has deployed “on orbit space control weapons” in Earth’s orbit. While the technical characteristics of these weapons has not been detailed, evidence suggests that these weapons are non-kinetic in nature, using reversible technology such as electronic warfare to temporarily “blind” a targeted satellite. US President Donald Trump has alluded to the use of a space-based weapon operating in support of US military strikes on Iranian nuclear-related targets in June 2025.
Russia is in the process of deploying its own Starlink analog satellite constellation, known as Rassvet. When fully functional, Rassvet will provide Russia with satellite-based communications capability on par with Starlink. Ukraine, recognizing that Rassvet will enable Russia to more effectively guide its drones to their targets, has requested the United States to disable the Russian satellite network. Russia has indicated that it would take down the entire Starlink system in retaliation, using kinetic means which could threaten other satellites operating in earth orbit.
The weaponization of space represents a dangerous point of escalation, especially given the US capability of temporarily blinding satellites. In the zero-sum world that the US and Europe reside in, the need to be seen as offsetting a Russian win in Ukraine, and Russia’s stymying of NATO escalation efforts in the Arctic and against Kaliningrad, may prove too much of a temptation in the minds of western leaders unable to structure a behavioral model in relationship with Russia that isn’t premised on Russophobic goals and objectives requiring Russia’s strategic defeat.
Conclusion
The United States and Europe have, over the course of the past several decades, built a policy trap centered on using Ukraine as a vehicle for achieving the collapse of Russia and the government of Vladimir Putin. The “trap” is the zero-sum mentality which governs implementation of this policy, linking the political and economic viability of those pursuing such policy to its successful implementation. The looming failure in Ukraine has created a need for finding new vectors capable of furthering the policy objective of achieving a strategic victory over Russia, including options to expand the zone of conflict between the US-European collective and Russia into the Arctic, the Baltics, and Outer Space. Russia has effectively countered each one of these efforts which, when viewed in isolation, appear to be manageable problem sets with limited escalation potential. However, when viewed in the aggregate, the potential for a misunderstanding and/or miscalculation driven by domestic political imperatives existent in the nations comprising the US-European collective. Here, nations possessing considerable influence over the decisions being made by the collective, such as the US, France, and Germany, are undergoing political transformations that could alter the existing political posture, including policies related to the strategic defeat of Russia as a desirable outcome. The enemy in all of this is not Russia, but rather the zero-sum thinking of the collective West which leaves them married to a policy model that is incapable of being successfully implemented, and which, if pursued aggressively, will lead to their collective demise.
Note: I was able to visit the Special Military Operation zone, the Arctic region, oil fields, and Kaliningrad, in addition to participating in high level forums and meetings in Moscow and Saint Petersburg. The views expressed here are my personal assessment based upon these meetings, and are not meant as a formal expression of official Russian policy.
This article is the byproduct of the independent journalism I have been undertaking for the past several years, traveling to Russia for the singular purpose of capturing the Russian reality and bringing it to the attention of a western audience held hostage by Russophobic corporate media. I cover all of my expenses, which means that the trips necessary for the production of this article could not have taken place without the generous support of subscribers and followers who have provided donations for that purpose. I will continue to write articles and release videos about these past visits. I will also continue planning and preparing for future visits to Russia, including one scheduled for November where I will attend a conference on humanitarian issues and continue to meet and interview interesting and knowledgeable people. I thank everyone who has contributed to this work, past, present and future [end]
65-year-old Scott Ritter is a former intelligence officer within the US Marine Corps (USMC), then inspector of the United Nations in Iraq. When in 2003, the US and their British minions were about to invade the country under this false pretext, Ritter was claiming that there was no weapon of mass destruction (WMD) there. He was right.
its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine, chronicle
Jacques Baud has been sanctioned by the European Union for speaking truth to power. He deserves the support of all freedom loving people around the world
in the Jacques Baud case, the EU is sanctioning, for the first time, an analyst not for spreading disinformation but for expressing a politically inconvenient truth, all while admitting he has broken no law. Will it have the courage to go after an American citizen?
operation enters the second week of Ukraine’s long-awaited and highly touted counteroffensive, some basic conclusions can be drawn even though the fighting continues, and will continue to rage, for some time to come
Kastner Kysilenko, Pierre, né le 15 septembre 1983,
vit à Berlin, où il exerce l’activité de coach
(Réseaux sociaux)
L’Alsacien a failli combattre dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, mais s’est ravisé en mars 2022. Il mérite néanmoins sa place dans ce panthéon, car il illustre à merveille le degré de complaisance et de falsification historique de la presse occidentale. Plusieurs organes français l’ont interviewé quand il était basé à Yavorov, près de la frontière polonaise. Il fut d’abord déçu par la solde de base dans la Légion internationale, indexée sur le coût de la vie en Ukraine. Seules les primes de combat la rendent intéressante. Puis le centre de regroupement des volontaires étrangers fut frappé le 13 mars par des missiles de croisière. Bref, il est rentré à Berlin. Le 27 mars, le JDD écrit
Pierre Kastner Kysilenko, alsacien d’origine ukrainienne, a la résistance dans le sang. Son grand-père, arrivé en France en 1948, s’est battu contre l’occupation nazie puis soviétique en Ukraine
Il faut oser. De nombreux Ukrainiens ont immigré en Europe et en Amérique du Nord à la fin des années 40 et au début des années 50. Le Royaume-Uni, par exemple, a accueilli 8 500 SS ukrainiens après la guerre. Beaucoup ont demeuré un temps dans des camps de réfugiés en Allemagne de l’Ouest, avant de choisir leur nouvelle patrie. Tous fuyaient la victoire de l’Union soviétique sur l’Allemagne nazie. Nul en Ukraine ne s’est battu contre l’occupation nazie puis soviétique. Si Kastner l’a raconté aux journalistes, il est affabulateur ou révisionniste. Seuls des Polonais et des Soviétiques convaincus ont résisté aux nazis sur le territoire de l’actuelle Ukraine. Les nationalistes ukrainiens, ceux réfugiés à l’ouest après 1945 et vous allez comprendre pourquoi, avaient plutôt coutume de parader en son honneur, quand Hans Frank, Generalgouverneurfür die besetzten polnischen Gebiete [gouverneur général des territoires polonais occupés], les visitait
à Ivano-Frankivsk, en juillet 1941
La falsification historique est courante aujourd’hui chez les propagandistes ukrainiens, trouve sa justification dans le fait que les Allemands ont interné, entre 1941 et 1944, le chef des nationalistes ukrainiens, Stepan Bandera, qui avait pris la décision unilatérale, dans les fourgons des armées du Reich qui envahissaient l’Union soviétique, de déclarer une Ukraine fasciste et indépendante. Je détaille son histoire dans la partie consacrée à David Piguet. Pendant son internement, les miliciens de l’UPA (Armée des insurgés ukrainiens) n’ont jamais affronté les occupants allemands. Eux-mêmes nazis, ils ont massacré, avec la bienveillance des Allemands, entre 50 000 et 100 000 civils polonais, mené à partir de 1944 une guérilla contre l’Armée rouge victorieuse
Le Canada nous en offre une illustration grand-guignolesque, dont l’épilogue psychodramatique sera aussi un plaisir de fin gourmet, lorsque le 22 septembre 2023, en présence de Volodymyr Zelenskyy et du premier ministre Justin Trudeau, le parlement fait une standing ovation à un héros ukrainien-canadien de la 2de guerre mondiale, qui s’est battu contre les Russes pour l’indépendance de l’Ukraine, c’est-à-dire Yaroslav Hunka, 98 ans, ancien Waffen SS ukrainien de la 14. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS, Galizien [Galicie, region de Lviv]
À l’invitation du président du parlement, Volodomyr Zelenskyy, Chrystia Freeland et Justin Trudeau applaudissent l’ancien SS Yaroslav Hunka (Patrick Doyle / The Canadian Press)
Justin Trudeau paraît immédiatement circonspect, mais Chrystia Freeland est ravie. Elle est elle-même la petite-fille d’un nazi ukrainien, ce dont bien sûr elle n’est pas responsable. Son grand-père, Mykhailo Khomiak/Michael Chomiak, était rédacteur en chef à Cracovie, capitale du Generalgouvernement für die besetzten polnischen Gebiete [gouvernement général des territoires polonais occupés], d’un journal de propagande nazie à destination de la communauté nationaliste ukrainienne. Il a fui bien sûr la victoire de l’Union soviétique sur l’Allemagne nazie. Le problème est que lorsque ces faits historiques lui sont présentés, elle ose répondre qu’ils seraient de la désinformation russe. Chrystia Freeland est vice-premier ministre du Canada
Le quotidien Краківські вісті [Krakivs’ki Visti, Nouvelles de Cracovie] fut fondé en janvier 1940 en Pologne occupée, publie les traductions ukrainiennes d’articles allemands et des originaux, anti-soviétiques et antisémites. Mykhailo Khomiak en est le rédacteur en chef. Ici en 1942, l’abonné est à Lemberg [Lviv]
Volodymyr Zelenskyy n’est pas nécessairement nazi, plutôt un comédien professionnel. Ses sponsors le firent élire en 2019 sur la promesse de la paix au Donbass. Mais l’opportuniste n’a pas mis en oeuvre les accords de Minsk, n’a pas dissous les formations paramilitaires nazies. Car ceux qui portent les flingues, les Herren [seigneurs en Allemand] de l’État profond constitué en 2014, ont clairement expliqué, même en public, que de telles initiatives allaient lui coûter la vie. Ancien officier de renseignement et inspecteur de l’ONU en Irak, Scott Ritter le raconte fort bien. Et grâce à la corruption endémique, Zelenskyy a choisi de profiter de la vie.
L’apothéose se produit le 28 septembre, lorsque Yaroslav Hunka, alerte mais amer, explique aux médias canadiens qu’en raison du scandale national et international, il est contraint de se réfugier chez des amis en Amérique latine.
chronique alphabétique et nécrologique de l’engagement français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas
Articles connexes
Pruvate à truvà me, canaglia di l’OTAN, pruvate solu
chronique en Anglais, its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine
chronique en Anglais, censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia
une saga française, entre Ukraine et Lyon, où apparaissent aussi des morceaux de SS de la division Charlemagne et plus récemment, Alice Kerviel, dite Cordier. L’affaire Deranque révèle comme la France est infectée par le pétainisme, en particulier parmi les soutiens d’Israël ou de l’Ukraine, deux théâtres d’opérations où l’Occident tente de ralentir son déclin
En 2025, une nouvelle unité de Français combattant pour l’Ukraine s’est structurée autour d’un noyau de néonazis, ayant pour objectif d’attirer des recrues. Parmi ces volontaires, d’anciens militaires. StreetPress les a identifiés
En Ukraine, les volontaires français pro-ukrainiens et pro-russes se partagent l’imaginaire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Les premiers se revendiquent des collabos de l’Allemagne nazie, les seconds de l’escadrille mythique « Normandie – Niémen »
deux jours après le 10e anniversaire de la débâcle politique et sécuritaire du 13 novembre 2015, une messe célèbre à Verdun l’ancien dirigeant fasciste de l’État français
ce 11 novembre 2025 est l’occasion de souligner comme la façon dont l’Europe sacrifie les conscrits ukrainiens mobilisés de force rappelle le spectaculaire carnage de la 1ère guerre mondiale
c’est par l’agence cosaque de presse PIKA, depuis la République populaire de Lougansk, que le 2 avril 2024, l’ataman Nikolaï Diakonov lance un message à destination de la France
ce papier est le premier des grands médias français qui s’attaque à la question des militants nazis français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, le nouveau danger qu’ils présenteront à terme pour la sûreté intérieure
où nous apprenons que le nazi français Allan Duchézeau, camarade de César Aujard dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, était surnommé Dox, quand il secondait à Paris le leader nazi Marc de Cacqueray Valménier
en Anglais, les indices de la présence d’opérateurs occidentaux, en particulier Français, pris au piège en mars 2022 à Marioupol, dont les forces russes achevèrent la libération en mai
Azov paramilitaries are aiming to debunk Kremlin « myths ». In doing so, they are solidifying their Nazi tradition and reducing German normalization narratives to absurdity
Azov military ceremony in Kiev on July 28, 2024
Azov is being gradually integrated into the Western European security architecture. Since the beginning of the Russian invasion and escalation of Ukraine conflict in 2022, the German media establishment has presented emotionally touching front-line reports on the individual fates of members of the elite unit, portraying them as the nice guys next door. Springer’s Welt TV channel has now even served its viewers the first home story of a volunteer from Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and his proud father, a former Gepard tank driver in the Bundeswehr. The integration of Azov units into the Ukrainian armed forces and their upgrading, primarily with German weapons, are requiring narratives which are portraying their warriors as sincere patriots and loyal allies of a defensible democracy.
Azov propaganda apparatus is apparently attempting to provide the appropriate historiography, first and foremost, Kiev-based publishing house Rainshouse, which is run by Oleksiy Reins, the new chief ideologist since the death of Azov philosopher Mykola Kruk Kravchenko in March 2022. Reins, who is also serving in the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade, Azov, which is forming the backbone of the 3rd Army Corps, is steadily intensifying efforts to whitewash the troubled past—historical predecessor organizations, their leaders, worldviews, theories, symbols, rituals, and actions.
In his book What Is Azov from Ukraine? Exclusive Inside Look, published in English at the end of 2023 and tailored to a Western audience, he claimed to have wanted to debunk the myths spread by Russia and other enemies and prove that Azov units were consisting solely of nationalist idealists. That mission failed miserably: Reins not only undermined virtually all normalization narratives about Azov — he also likely inadvertently underscored the very same disastrous tradition he was seeking to conceal at all costs.
In the OUN spirit
That insider profile first traces the origins of Azov groups and highlights that it was no coincidence that their paramilitary nucleus, also known as the little black men, was formed in Kharkov in 2014. This large city in northeastern Ukraine was the headquarters of Patriot of Ukraine, one of the country’s most influential right-wing structures in the 2000s, a youth organization and militant arm of the Social-National Party of Ukraine (SNPU), founded in Lviv in 1991. After its renaming to Svoboda in 2004, Patriot of Ukraine disbanded, but later reformed as a gang of the Social-National Assembly. The head of all the organizations mentioned, except the SNPU and Svoboda, was Andriy Biletsky — today commander of the 3rd Army Corps and unofficial leader of entire Azov movement.
Reins cites Yaroslav Stetsko as the historical mentor of Azov. He was deputy to Stepan Bandera, leader of the radical wing of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN-B), succeeded him after his death in 1959. Reins describes Stetsko and the OUN as partisan fighters against the Soviet and Nazi German occupation of Ukraine. Stetsko, he claims, refused to cooperate with Adolf Hitler’s regime, for which he was imprisoned in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp.
Almost none of this corresponds to historical reality: apart from the fact that Ukraine had been a republic of the Soviet Union since 1922 and therefore could not have been occupied by it, Yaroslav Stetsko explicitly welcomed the German invasion
Full of sincere gratitude and admiration for your heroic army, which has once again won new glory on the battlefields in the clash with the greatest enemy of Europe, Muscovite Bolshevism, we send you, the great leader, in the name of the Ukrainian people and its government, which has been formed in liberated Lviv, our heartfelt congratulations for crowning the struggle with final victory
he wrote to Adolf Hitler on 3 July 1941.
Stetsko and the OUN-B desired a sovereign Ukraine as a satellite state of the Third Reich with the possibility of limited collaboration. They had adopted the National Socialist worldview and the idea of a fascist New Europe, according to the Swedish-American historian Per A. Rudling. That was by no means a passive act, emphasizes his German-Polish colleague Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe. But rather, the OUN had created a Ukrainian variant of fascism. Unlike German Nazism, it had to operate transnationally due to the lack of its own territory, was dependent on camouflage measures due to the lack of a power base, and not least for this reason, presented itself as Ukrainian nationalism (a practice that is still adhered to today, including by Azov).
Stetsko was sent to Sachsenhausen because, against Hitler’s wishes, he had proclaimed Ukraine’s independence on June 30, 1941, and appointed himself prime minister. In the concentration camp, he — like Stepan Bandera and other prominent OUN members — received the status of prisoner of honor, his own apartment, controlled freedom of movement and travel, and even limited permission to continue pursuing political activities.
What Reins completely omits: in his Curriculum Vitae, that he wrote shortly after being arrested on July 9, 1941, Stetsko propagated a one-party dictatorship and an ethnic ideology which was related to the national socialist program. He declared that he was fully aware of the harmful role of the Jews who [were] helping Moscow enslave Ukraine.
I am therefore supporting the extermination of the Jews and considering it expedient to bring German methods of exterminating Jewry to Ukraine in order to prevent their assimilation and the like
Stetsko had already expressed similar views in May 1939 in a guide entitled Battles and Activities of the OUN in Wartime, when he was not yet under German surveillance. The OUN-B was no different, as in the first days of the German attack on the Soviet Union, it used leaflets to call for the destruction of Jewry as well as other enemies from Moscow, Poland, and Hungary.
Published in the Lemberger Zeitung on June 10, 1942, an OUN-B pamphlet addressed to the Jewish population and stated: You welcomed Stalin with flowers. We will lay your heads at Hitler’s feet in greeting. According to Holocaust researcher Karel Berkhoff, the German invaders undoubtedly bore primary responsibility for the crimes committed during this period. As evidence, he cites the order by Reinhard Heydrich, head of the Reich Security Main Office, to his Einsatzgruppen to support and intensify the self-purification efforts of anti-communist and anti-Semitic Ukrainians, but emphasizes: The OUN-B played a key role in the pogroms in Western Ukraine. Quite a few Ukrainian fascists also collaborated with Nazi Germany by joining the Wehrmacht-raised battalions Nachtigall and Roland and the SS division Galizien – as well as, for a time, with the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) of the OUN-B.
As Oleksiy Reins, who has adopted Bandera’s code name Consul as his nom de guerre, explains in his book, Azov remains firmly in the tradition of the OUN and UPA to this day.
« Social nationalism »
According to Reins, the theoretical foundation of Azov’s worldview can be found in a political science work by Yaroslav Stetsko entitled Two Revolutions. It was published in 1951, at a time when the OUN-B was already collaborating with the British, US, and West German secret services — the UPA continued to fight against the USSR as a stay-behind army on their behalf until 1953 — and five years after Stetsko founded the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations in Munich, the most powerful umbrella organization of Hitler collaborators worldwide. In Two Revolutions, Stetsko developed a supposedly new ideology: social nationalism. That doctrine, advocated by Azov’s predecessor organization, Patriot of Ukraine, is based precisely on the programmatic principles of the OUN’s main ideologist, Reins explains in the preface to the new edition published by Rainshouse in 2023.
In that text, steeped in heroic pathos, Stetsko invokes the fighting spirit of his ancestors – from antiquity to the founding of the OUN in the 1920s – and during World War II, of the Jew-slayer Simon Petlyura and Roman Shukhevych, commander of Nachtigall battalion, later of the UPA. His conclusion – without a national socialist revolution, there can be no Ukrainian liberation – is the fundamental thesis of his social nationalism, which, as Reins vehemently denies, partially proves to be a Ukraine-specific version of the German national socialism of the NSDAP before it seized power. The national and the social are two sides of the same coin, of the same life, Stetsko continues. Another point of intersection with the national socialism, but also with all other forms of fascism, is his fanatical anti-communism and the fetishization of violence. Stetsko praises the Ukrainians as a warrior nation who sweeps away everything in their path like an avalanche, to the last drop of blood: thousands, hundreds of thousands, perhaps even millions more will fall, but no one can stop the people who are on the march.
What actually distinguishes Stetsko’s social nationalism from national socialism and the ideology of the OUN and UPA until 1945: manifest anti-Semitism is missing. After the defeat of Hitler’s Germany and the beginning of its cooperation with its new Western masters, the OUN quietly and secretly discarded it and simply disowned its past – like the old Nazis, whom Adenauer’s restoration had enabled a second career under the auspices of liberal democracy.
The social nationalism of Patriot of Ukraine is different. Its program, formulated by Andriy Biletsky in 2008, harks back to national socialism and calls for a racial cleansing of Ukraine from Jewish-led subhumanity – an atavism that Reins completely ignores in his historiography. Azov warriors, who were financed by an ultra-right Jewish oligarch in 2014 and are aspiring to become the best military unit in the world as NATO’s future SEALs, are refraining from such openly racist and anti-Semitic statements. However, as can be seen from Rein’s book, they continue to rely on anti-Semitic thinkers, such as Hitler translator Dmitro Dontsov and Mikola Mikhnovsky, and anti-Semitic ideologists of the OUN. Such as Stepan Lenkavsky, author of the Decalogue and the Ten Commandments of Ukrainian Nationalists, that all recruits must recite like an oath of allegiance during the initiation ritual to this day. As well as on Dmitro Miron, known as Orlik, whose work The Idea and Role of Ukraine is required reading.
« The Black Corps »
Azov continues to adhere to the OUN’s Greater Ukraine idea, modeled on Nazi Germany
The nationalist movement is so powerful that we will soon see the emergence of a great Ukrainian state stretching from the Caspian Sea to the Tatra Mountains
OUN official Roman Sushko prophesied as early as 1939. Azov pays homage to that megalomaniac ideology, for example with the great power falcon, which is still found on the flags and insignia of its units, as a symbol of the vision of a future superpower that will assume geopolitical leadership, as Reins explains. Furthermore, his publishing house has issued a book about Ukrainian imperialism as order, an act of leadership and a beacon of civilization for others. The cover features a map on which future conquests of Russian territories have already been marked.
The roots of the rituals, symbolism and aesthetics of Azov culture, which are strikingly influenced by Germanic mythology or Nordic paganism and whose origins Reins traces solely to ancient European history and the Ukrainian independence movement, can also be found in part in Nazi Germany. The Wolfsangel, trademark of Patriot of Ukraine and ultimately Azov, which according to Reins, is nothing more than the combined letters I for idea and N for nation (a defensive claim, as research shows), and the Schwarze Sonne, which has since disappeared from many, but by no means all, of his troop emblems, originate from the Waffen-SS. Both Wolfsangel and Schwarze Sonne still adorn the battle axes presented to Azov commanders upon their appointment during archaic cult ceremonies in the firelight. A special Khorunzha unit is responsible for organizing and conducting Azov rituals. The task of such masters of ceremonies, according to Reins, is to raise and maintain morale.
Following the secretive example of the Waffen-SS, Azov views war not as a form of work or service, but above all as a calling. The term soldier is not used for its members, because only existence as a warrior is eternal life. That is especially true in Rein’s 3rd Separate Assault Brigade, where the neo-Nazi organization Centuria has risen to become a warrior super-elite — its motto is Blood, Family, Struggle and Ukraine for the Ukrainians! — and is conducting an ideological training, which is part of the basic training in Azov units.
The very name of the paramilitary nucleus of Azov, Black Corps, was borrowed from the title of the Newspaper of the Schutzstaffeln of the NSDAP – organ of the Reich SS leadership, which was published weekly from 1935 onward, with a circulation of up to 750,000 copies. Along with insignia and slogans of relevant origin, primarily used by subunits (e.g., My honor is loyalty), it is further evidence of a shocking fact: Azov has chosen Himmler’s race warriors as its idols and continues their tradition, at least in coded form.
« Brother in Arms » of the West
That continuity, which is objectively attested by Azov chief ideologist, is posing a new challenge for the Western community of values, a dilemma. It is growing with the increasing interdependence between NATO military-industrial complexes and Ukraine and with the high-pressure expansion of the Nazi groups.
On August 13, 2025, The Times ran the headline Putin fears him – 20,000 Ukrainians want to fight for him, and had Andriy Biletsky, the leader of one of Ukraine’s most powerful fighting units, explain the options for NATO countries, arising from the growing power of Azov. We are granting unrestricted access, he reported on the opening of the Izyum front sector, controlled by his troops, to Western arms companies
Our great advantage is that we provide debriefings, test results, and actual data from the battlefield
Without the Azovization of the desertion-plagued Ukrainian armed forces, the permanently militarized society Biletsky is envisioning, modeled on Israel, effectively becoming the army and arsenal of a Europe that has proven alarmingly slow in building its own armed forces, is not feasible. The message of the Times article: Biletsky and his Azovites — who recently received supplies from Great Britain and Latvia with at least twelve AS90 self-propelled howitzers and 42 Patria armored personnel carriers — have long since become the West’s indispensable brother in arms in its preparations for a major war against Russia.
Fighters of the past
The German Ministry of Defense is also aware of that. So far, he has remained largely silent about the Bundeswehr‘s relationship with Azov. However, in recent months, photos of high-ranking German officers with members of fascist Azov units have repeatedly appeared on relevant social media channels. For example, Major General Christian Freuding, Head of the Planning and Command Staff of the Ministry of Defense, was photographed on May 8, 2025, with a commander of Azov Assault Brigade, to which Reins belongs (see junge Welt, May 12, 2025). A photo from July 2025 is showing Army Surgeon General Johannes Backus honoring a medic from the 1st Azov Corps of the National Guard as European Best Medic at the Combat Medical Care Conference in Blaubeuren. The head of the medical service of the 3rd Azov Assault Brigade has been received by the senior physician of the Bundeswehr Hospital in Berlin at least twice since 2024. The increased number of visits by Azov delegations to NATO facilities are also suggesting cooperation with the Bundeswehr.
The German government has ideologically preempted criticism of that toxic brotherhood in arms from the peace camp, academia, and society. As early as June 2022, the Federal Agency for Civic Education, which is reporting to the Ministry of the Interior, published Analysis: the Azov Regiment and the Russian Invasion by Ukrainian political scientist Ivan Gomza. While the establishment of another Azov special regiment, including members of Centuria and the neo-Nazi party National Corps, was already in full swing, from which the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade emerged a few months later, Gomza claimed that most right-wing extremist fighters had already left Azov in 2014 when it was integrated into the National Guard. Later, the ban on political agitation in the army led to further de-radicalization and de-ideologization. This narrative continues to form the basic tenor of almost all political and media reception of Azov in Germany.
Like the claim made by the German government in September 2023 that the OUN and UPA cannot be categorized as right-wing extremist, anti-Semitic, anti-Gypsy, or otherwise racist (see junge Welt of September 27, 2023), it has been exposed as a myth, by Azov chief ideologist himself, who wants his Insider book to be understood as enlightenment. Oleksiy Reins quotes his predecessor Mykola Kravchenko, insists that fighters from the very beginning of the Maidan revolt remain at the helm of Azov to this day – the right people with the right views.
For Reins, that is including living by the imperative Ukraine above all! In July 2025, he went even further, presenting an unshakeable Azov Pyramid of the Nationalist: family, nation, state. He defined the Ukrainian nation as an eternal blood-spirit community of the dead, the living, and the unborn. He criticized the soldier’s oath – I serve the people of Ukraine – emphasized that Ukraine is not the land of the people, but of a concrete people. The war is not being fought for abstractions. Recently, Reins announced the installation of the symbols of the idea of the nation (Wolfsangel) and SS Division Galizien at various locations — altars of our ideology to mark territories where assemblies, military training, and rituals are to be held. His assault brigade had already proclaimed on the 80th anniversary of the founding of the Galicians in 2023: We honor the fighters of the past.
Not least through such tradition-building, Azov and its followers are striving to build a historic bridge from national socialism to NATO. Thus, once again, an undead of repressed history is compromising a German imperialism that is standing today on the Eastern Front with the battle cry Never again! [end]
its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine, chronicle
chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia
Eight decades ago, communist prisoners organised and liberated the Nazi concentration camp Buchenwald, where they were held. As the far right of a special type rises across Europe, these heroic victories of anti-fascist resistance are under attack
Boris Taslitzky (France), Insurrection à Buchenwald 11 avril 1945 (Insurrection at Buchenwald 11 April 1945), 1964
Eighty years ago, on 11 April 1945, units of General George S. Patton’s 4th Armoured Division of the US armed forces drove toward the city of Weimar, Germany, where the Buchenwald concentration camp was located. Patton’s troops eventually took control of the camp, but soldiers’ statements, which were collected later by historians, suggest that the US tanks were not what liberated Buchenwald: the camp had already been seized by the organisation and courage of the prisoners who took advantage of the flight of German soldiers in the face of the Allied advance.
Political prisoners in the Buchenwald concentration camp had formed themselves into combat groups (Kampfgruppen), which used their hidden cache of arms to foment an uprising within the camp, disarm the Nazi guards, and seize the tower at the camp’s entrance. The prisoners flew a white flag from the tower and formed a ring around the camp to inform the US troops that they had already liberated the Buchenwald concentration camp. ‘Das Lager hatte sich selbst befreit’, they said; ‘the camp liberated itself’.
It was not only at Buchenwald that the prisoners rebelled. In August 1943, Treblinka prisoners rose up in an armed rebellion and, despite being gunned down, forced the Nazis to shut down this repulsive extermination camp (the Nazis murdered almost a million Jews in this camp alone).
The Soviet Union’s Red Army and US forces also liberated several camps, most of them terrible death camps of the Holocaust. US troops liberated Dachau in April 1945, but it was the Red Army that opened the doors to most of the worst camps, such as Majdanek (July 1944), Auschwitz (January 1945) in Poland and Sachsenhausen (April 1945) and Ravensbrück (April 1945) in Germany
Dominik Černý (Czechoslovakia), K.L. Dora: Bydlení ve štole (K. L. Dora: Living in the Tunnel), 1953
In July 1937, the Nazi regime brought prisoners from Sachsenhausen to an area near Weimar (home to Johann Wolfgang von Goethe and Friedrich Schiller as well as the site where the 1919 German Constitution was signed). The prisoners cleared nearly 400 acres of forest to build a concentration camp to hold 8,000 people, who Nazi camp commander Hermann Pister (1942–1945) used for medical experimentation and forced labour. By the camp’s closure eight years later, it held almost 280,000 prisoners (mostly Communists, Social Democrats, Roma and Sinti, Jews, and Christian dissidents). In late 1943, the Nazis shot to death nearly 8,500 Soviet prisoners of war in the camp and killed many Communists and Social Democrats. The Nazis killed an estimated total of 56,000 prisoners in this camp, including Communist Party of Germany (KPD) leader Ernst Thälmann, who was shot to death on 18 August 1944 after eleven years in solitary confinement. But Buchenwald was not an extermination camp like Majdanek and Auschwitz. It was not directly part of Adolf Hitler’s hideous ‘final solution to the Jewish question’ (Endlösung der Judenfrage).
Within Buchenwald, the Communists and Social Democrats set up the International Camp Committee to organise their lives in the camp and to conduct acts of sabotage and rebellion (including, remarkably, against the nearby armament factories). Eventually, the organisation matured into the Popular Front Committee, set up in 1944, with four leaders: Hermann Brill (German People’s Front), Werner Hilpert (Christian Democrats), Ernst Thape (Social Democrats), and Walter Wolf (Communist Party of Germany). What was remarkable about this initiative was that despite being prisoners, the committee had already begun to discuss the possible future of a new Germany that had been de-Nazified from top to bottom and would be based on a cooperative economy. While in Buchenwald, Wolf wrote ACritique of Unreason: On the Analysis of National Socialist Pseudo-Philosophy
Nachum Bandel (Ukraine), Block 51. Buchenwald. Small Camp, 1947
A week after the prisoners liberated Buchenwald, they placed a wooden sculpture near the camp as a symbol of their anti-fascist resistance. They wanted to remember the camp not for the killings, but for their resilience during their incarceration and in their self-liberation. In 1945, the prisoners had already shaped the Buchenwald Oath, which became their credo: ‘We will only give up the fight when the last guilty has been judged by the tribunal of all nations. The absolute destruction of Nazism, down to its roots, is our device. The building of a new world of peace and freedom is our ideal’.
The camp, then in the German Democratic Republic (DDR or East Germany), was converted into a prison for Nazis who awaited their trials. Some Nazis were shot for their crimes, including Weimar’s mayor, Karl Otto Koch, who had organised the arrest of Jews in the city in 1941. Meanwhile, across the Iron Curtain, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) rapidly incorporated former Nazis into the state bureaucracy, with two thirds of the senior staff of the Bundeskriminalamt (the federal criminal police) made up of former Nazis. As the process of trials and punishment for the Nazis came to an end, the remnants of Buchenwald became part of the project of public memorialisation in the DDR
Ilse Häfner-Mode (Germany), Portrait of a Woman in Front of a Wooden Door, n.d.
In 1958, Otto Grotewohl, a social democrat who was the first prime minister of the DDR, opened the camp to hundreds of thousands of workers and school children to visit the buildings, listen to the stories of both the atrocities and the resistance, and commit themselves to anti-fascism. That same year, former prisoner Bruno Apitz published Nackt unter Wölfen (Naked Among Wolves), which told the story of how the resistance movement in the camp hid a little boy at great risk to the movement itself, and then how the movement captured the camp in 1945. The novel was made into a film in the DDR by Frank Beyer in 1963. The story was based on the actual account of Stefan Jerzy Zweig, a boy who was hidden by the prisoners in order to spare him from being sent to Auschwitz. Zweig survived the ordeal and died at the age of 81 in Vienna in 2024.
The DDR shaped its national culture around the theme of anti-fascism. In 1949, the Ministry of People’s Education urged schools to build a calendar of events that highlighted the anti-fascist struggle rather than religious holidays, such as World Peace Day instead of Fasching (Mardi Gras). The old Jugendweihe (youth initiation ceremony) was reshaped from being merely a rite of passage to an affirmation for young people to commit themselves to anti-fascism. Schools would take their students on field trips to visit Buchenwald, Ravensbrück, and Sachsenhausen to learn about the hideousness of fascism and to cultivate humanist and socialist values. This was a powerful exercise in social transformation for a culture that had been swept into Nazism
Herbert Sandberg (Germany), We Didn’t Know, 1964
When West Germany annexed the east in 1990, a process began to undermine the advances of anti-fascism developed in the DDR. Buchenwald was ground zero for this exercise. First, leadership at Buchenwald became a controversy. Dr. Irmgard Seidel, who took over from former KPD prisoner Klaus Trostorff in 1988, found out that she had been sacked through a newspaper article (by investigating SS records, Dr. Seidel had discovered that there were 28,000 women prisoners at Buchenwald who worked as slave labourers, largely in the armaments factories). She was replaced by Ulrich Schneider, who was then removed when it was revealed that he had been a member of the communist party in West Germany. Schneider was followed by Thomas Hofmann, who was sufficiently anti-communist to please the new political leaders. Second, the anti-fascist orientation of public memory had to be altered to encourage anti-communism, such as by downplaying the memorial to Thälmann. A new emphasis was placed on the Soviets’ use of Buchenwald to imprison the Nazis.
Historians from Germany’s west began to write accounts saying that it was Patton’s soldiers, not the prisoners, who liberated the camp (this was the interpretation, for instance, of Manfred Overesch’s influential Buchenwald und die DDR. Oder die Suche nach Selbstlegitimation [Buchenwald and the DDR. Or, the Search for Self-Legitimisation], 1995). In June 1991, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl presided over a ceremony to install six large crosses for the victims of ‘the communist terror dictatorship’ and spoke of the Nazi crimes as if they were identical to the actions of the Soviet Union. Between 1991 and 1992, the German historian Eberhard Jäckel led a commission to rewrite the history of Buchenwald, including accusing the communist prisoners of collaborating with the Nazis and commemorating the ‘victims’ of the anti-fascist prison. This was an official reordering of historical facts to elevate fascists and undermine the antifascists. Such historical revisionism has reached new heights in recent years. Diplomatic representatives from Russia and Belarus – two former Soviet Republics – have been uninvited from the annual commemoration events. In speeches held at the memorial, speakers have equated Nazi concentration camps with Soviet work camps. And while Israeli flags have been openly displayed in Buchenwald, visitors wearing the keffiyeh have been banned from the premises and any mention of the genocide in Palestine has been reprimanded
In the 1950s, communist artists joined together to build a set of memorials at Buchenwald commemorating the fight against fascism. Sculptors René Graetz, Waldemar Grzimek, and Hans Kies created relief steles with a poem by the DDR’s first culture minister Johannes R. Becher etched on the back:
Thälmann saw what happened one day: They dug up the weapons that had been hidden away From the grave the doomed men rose See their arms stretched out wide See a memorial in many a guise Evoking our struggles present and past The dead admonish: Remember Buchenwald!
In this newsletter, the paintings are by former Buchenwald prisoners and the photograph depicts ‘Revolt of the Prisoners’, a large bronze sculpture of the prisoners liberating themselves made by Fritz Cremer, who joined the KPD in 1929.
Warmly,
Vijay
PS: in June, the Zetkin Forum for Social Research will convene a conference against fascism in Berlin, to which you are all invited [end]
Ingo Schmidt on how the triumph of liberal democracy and neoliberal globalization became the ideological seed for the AfD
Co-leader of the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party and the party’s candidate for chancellor, Alice Weidel, features on the cover of a 2023 edition of Stern magazine (conceptphoto.info)
On November 6, 2024 German Chancellor Olaf Scholz fired Finance Minister Christian Lindner. Notwithstanding the broad agreement on policy goals, striking a balance between deficit reduction, support for renewable energy and increased arms spending turned out to be impossible. Lindner, a liberal, opted for social cuts; Scholz, a social democrat, wants to avoid them. They had to part ways. After Scholz lost a no-confidence vote, federal elections were scheduled for February 23, 2025. The question that worries everyone from old-school conservatives to new millennium lefties is: How many votes will go to the hard right (if not neo-Nazi) party Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland or AfD). In the last federal elections in 2021, the AfD got 10.4 percent of the total vote. Current polls put them at 20 percent, but nobody knows what will happen on election day. In this new age of uncertainty, polls don’t predict election results as reliably as in the past.
Elections in the East German provinces Brandenburg, Saxony and Thuringia have already shown what hard-right success looks like. They also reveal the inability of the political centre to understand how much it contributed to the rise of a new right. Refashioning totalitarianism theory in the New Cold War climate, centrist politicians and pundits typically portray the success of the new right as the outgrowth of the Nazi and Communist dictatorships that ruled East Germany from 1933 to 1990. West Germany, which was spared Communist rule and, allegedly, shook off the burden of its Nazi past, appears as a role model in this democracy-versus-dictatorship story. Totalitarianism theory could possibly explain why the AfD is more successful, so far at least, in East than in West Germany. But it can’t explain right-wing success in other countries, like France, that were never under Communist rule and know Nazi rule only from occupation, which strengthened anti-fascist traditions in those countries. But even these traditions couldn’t stop the rise of the new right there.
This article offers a different explanation for the hard-right surge in Germany. It shows that German unification in 1990, signalling the triumph of liberal democracy and the onset of neoliberal globalization, unleashed a new form of nationalism—Deutschmark nationalism—which, after mutating into export nationalism for a while, became the ideological seed for the AfD. West Germany, or, more precisely, the economic miracle that was West Germany in the post-war era, served as a role model during German unification. Promoted by West German elites and eagerly embraced by people in East Germany, it raised the expectation of a new economic miracle materializing in the West and extending to the East. However, these hopes were soon disappointed as political unification caused socioeconomic divisions between East and West Germany and, in the early 2000s, a turn to austerity policies that were highly unpopular in the East and the West. Just when it seemed that Germany would weather the world economic crisis of 2008-9 better than other Western countries, and maybe even become the European hegemon, things started falling apart. The Euro-crisis made clear that it was not only politically united Germany that was plagued by massive socioeconomic and geographical divisions but the European Union, too. Continued economic weakness combined with New Cold War marching orders from Washington fed a nostalgia for a supposedly great past—symbolized by the Deutschmark. This nostalgia, I argue, would not have taken root if the left had been able to channel growing discontent into mobilization for a more equitable and less insecure future.
State elections in Brandenburg, Saxony, and Thuringia
State elections don’t typically get international media attention. The September 1, 2024, elections in Thuringia and Saxony did. After all, it was the first time since the downfall of the Nazi-regime that a hard-right party, the AfD, pulled the majority of votes in a German election. It proved a bitter coincidence: The AfD celebrated their victory in Thuringia, obtaining 32.8 percent of the total vote, on the 85th anniversary of the Nazi-invasion of Poland that marked the beginning of the Second World War.
The Conservative Christian Democrats (the Christlich-Demokratische Union or CDU) came in second with 23.6 percent. The parties of the federal government coalition, Social Democrats (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands or SPD), Greens (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) and Liberals (Freie Demokratische Partei or FDP) ended up with single-digit results, the FDP reduced to a mere 1.1 percent. At the time of the election, this was the party of the federal minister of finance. The Left Party (Die Linke), which in the previous election had become the strongest party for the first time in any German state, lost almost 18 percent and came in fourth, even trailing the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht or BSW), a breakaway group from the Left Party.
In Saxony, the AfD won 30.6 percent of the votes, just behind the CDU’s 31.9 percent. As in Thuringia, none of the parties of the federal government coalition achieved double-digit results. The Left Party lost more than half of its vote and ended up with a devastating 4.5 percent. The BSW came in a distant third with 11.8 percent.
Just three weeks after their election victories in Thuringia and Saxony, the AfD scored another success in Brandenburg. Narrowly beaten by the SPD that got 30.9 percent of the total vote, the AfD came in second with 29.2 percent, way ahead of the BSW’s 13.1 percent and the CDU’s 12.1 percent. The Left Party and the Greens obtained less than five percent of the vote, which is the minimum threshold for holding seats in provincial or federal parliament under the mixed-member proportional electoral system. The FDP pulled less than one percent.
Mainstream media fails to explain right-wing success
Barely beaten by the Conservatives in Saxony and the Social Democrats in Brandenburg, the AfD was elected by roughly a third of the electorate in three East German states, becoming the strongest party only in Thuringia. If ever there was a right-wing surge, this was it. Most media reports attributed the phenomenon to widespread dissatisfaction with the federal government, particularly regarding migration, climate policies and the war in Ukraine. Accounts of why the AfD is more popular in the East (approval ratings in the west of Germany range from 8.5 percent in Hamburg and the Saarland to 21 percent in Lower Saxony) focus mostly on disappointments caused by German unification, continuing socioeconomic disparities and a widespread feeling among erstwhile East Germans of being second class citizens. Other explanations invoke the authoritarian heritage of communist rule in East Germany, which is often presented as an extension of the Nazi-regime. Against the two dictatorships in the East, West Germany is presented as a role model of liberal democracy. This as if there hadn’t been considerable continuity between Third Reich and West German elites; as if East Germany’s ruling bureaucracy, despite all its dictatorial wrongs, wasn’t established by antifascists who had been exiled or jailed during the Nazi reign; as if the nationalization of the means of production, despite the wrongs of bureaucratic rule, had not marked a break from the West German capitalism that made West Germany a junior partner in the American Empire; as if West German capitalism had not dictated the terms of unification at the very time that a grassroots movement for democracy unsettled bureaucratic rule in East Germany. The destruction of the East German economy and the integration of the East into existing West German institutions left no room for the aspirations of East Germany’s civil rights movement. Rather than explaining growing support for the new right, media talk about the “peculiarities of the East” reinforces existing frustrations there—frustrations that help shed light on the relative strength, so far at least, of the right-wing surge in the East.
The ‘two-dictatorships’ thesis that pits the East against the liberal democratic West revives the totalitarianism theory that was an integral part of the anti-communist, anti-Soviet consensus during the Cold War. It is now part of the New Cold War ideology that counterposes democracy and authoritarianism. As in the old Cold War, charges of totalitarianism serve to short circuit thinking about alternative economic and political systems, reinforcing the neoliberal creed that there is no alternative to capitalism. The lack of actually existing alternatives is, of course, also one of the reasons for the rise of the new right. Emerging out of an ailing neoliberalism, this right-wing force presents itself as an alternative to the status quo but actually just recasts neoliberalism in a nationalist and racist mould. Replacing neoliberalism’s earlier commitment to corporate globalization in Germany, as elsewhere, neoliberalism is haunted by the spectre of fascism, which, to centrist neoliberals, has everything to do with misled masses unable to understand the virtues of capitalist liberal democracy and nothing to do with capitalist crises that undermine the legitimacy of liberal democracy. Neoliberalism is also haunted by the spectre of communism as ruling classes worry that crisis of legitimacy could extend to capitalism itself. As the neoliberal centre denies the possibility of alternatives and the left generally (not only the Left Party in Germany) appears unable to advance real world alternatives, the growing appetite for change, spurred by recurrent crises wrought by capitalism, settles for right-wing fantasies of a harmonious life in a nation that competes successfully with other countries economically and is freed from job- and welfare-stealing migrants.
The impact of German unification and the rise and decline of neoliberal globalization
Capitalist crises and their exploitation by the right are common phenomena, certainly in the imperialist centres of the world system, but also in the peripheries. But they play out differently in different national contexts. Behind the AfD’s electoral successes in Thuringia and Saxony as well as its broader surge in popularity lie the combined histories of German unification and the rise and decline of neoliberal globalization. The upsurge of the new right is just one of the outcomes of these combined histories. Equally important is the defeat of the federal government coalition and the rout of the FDP, whose leader, former federal Minister of Finance Christian Lindner, promotes austerity policies that stymie government plans to subsidize the transition to non-fossil energies. These policies also lead to a creeping roll-back of social spending—except when it comes to arms spending. Little wonder a government that took office on the promise of something like a Green New Deal lost its credibility almost entirely and called for a federal election scheduled for February 23 of this year.
And then there is the defeat of the Left Party that, despite programmatic commitments to progressive alternatives, is widely seen as the appendage of a lame-duck government in Berlin. At the other end of the political spectrum, the AfD is widely perceived as an oppositional force, even though its program blends austerity, nationalism and militarism in ways that are more extreme but qualitatively not much different from policies advanced by the CDU and the FDP.
In the face of electoral defeat, the federal government, which embraced the US’s New Cold War policies a few weeks after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, also introduced dramatically tougher migration policies. Rather than representing any kind of alternative, as its name purports, the AfD is the black sheep of the establishment family, expressing racist views more radically and bluntly than even the Conservatives. While the Social Democrats, Liberals and Greens are intent on denying such views, they reveal themselves as Western supremacists when it comes to fending off so-called authoritarian threats arising from Russia and China, stirring up longstanding fears in the West that ‘the Russians are coming’ or that ‘Asian hordes’ augur “the decline of the West,” in the words of right-wing intellectual Oswald Spengler.
The hypocrisy of the Greens, who advocate a green transition while supporting the purchase of dirty oil and gas (wherever they can get it ever since the Russian invasion of Ukraine ended Russian gas-flows to Germany), make them a prime target of AfD agitation. But in reality the AfD and the Greens share the fear of Western decline. The AfD engage in fearmongering around the replacement of white people by non-white immigrants and accuse the Greens and their coalition partners in the federal government of accelerating Western decline. But while the Greens may be the prime target of the AfD’s culture war, the truth is that despite significant differences in tone, the Greens and the AfD share a basic consensus on the decline of the West.
AfD success in the east: history holds the key
Encouraged by Glasnost in the Soviet Union, many East Germans took to the streets in the fall of 1989. Under the banner “We Are the People” they demanded democratic reforms of East Germany. Neither unification with West Germany nor a return to a capitalist economy was on their agenda—at least not initially. As protests grew, and especially after the ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED) had opened the border to the West, “We Are the People” was replaced by “We Are One People” more and more often. It was supplemented by the slogan “Germany, United Fatherland,” which is actually a quote from East Germany’s national anthem, written by the communist poet Johannes R. Becher in 1949, at a time when the leaders of the SED still thought a united Germany could be achieved—not necessarily socialist but not aligned on either the US or the Soviet Union. Such hopes were buried by the Cold War, for which the Berlin Wall became a symbol, casting a dark shadow over communist East Germany and allowing capitalist West Germany to present itself as a beacon of freedom. It was in a matter of weeks in the winter of 1989-90 that the abstract possibility became a demand, massively fanned by West German politicians—notably then chancellor Helmut Kohl—and mainstream media, which hinted at the possibility of East Germany adopting the West German Deutschmark. Many East Germans seized on such hints as an irresistible offer. “If the D-Mark comes, we’ll stay here; if it doesn’t come, we’ll go to it” became the next popular protest slogan. Since the opening of the border, thousands of East Germans had gone to the West, creating conditions reminiscent of the times before the wall was built in 1961. Back then, the East German economy lost so many people, most of them young and well-trained, that a collapse of social reproduction became a real threat. The wall stopped the bleeding of the East German economy but inflicted irreparable damage on the legitimacy of the political system.
Almost 30 years later, the opening of the border by the SED-leadership came as a bit of a surprise to West German elites. Yet, they were quick to grasp the possibilities it created. To them, this meant the integration of East Germany into the West German political and economic system, not coexistence with a somehow reformed but still politically independent East Germany. The ‘take over the East’ goal of West German elites and the Deutschmark rush of East German masses fed each other. The civil rights movement that wanted to democratize East Germany was sidelined. Some of the groups active in that movement adjusted to the new zeitgeist quickly, some even entered into an electoral alliance with the East German conservative party, despite their having criticized it as a small but integral part of the SED-regime. Angela Merkel, who would later become chancellor, belonged to one of these East German groups that allied with other conservative-turned-civil-rights groups and the East German CDU. This Alliance for Germany easily won the last East German elections and negotiated the integration of East Germany into West Germany’s institutional structures. On July 1, 1990, the Deutschmark came to the East, three months later the independent state of East Germany vanished into an enlarged West Germany. Most of the Alliance for Germany dissolved into the West German CDU immediately after unification. In December this enlarged CDU won federal elections.
In less than a year the Cold War had come to an end and an entire state had disappeared. However, the hopes pinned on unification, notably the introduction of the Deutschmark, were soon dashed. A year after unification, unemployment, which had existed in communist East Germany primarily in a hidden form, stood at 10.2 percent and rose to over 20 percent in the early 2000s. It didn’t fall below 10 percent until 2014, a quarter of a century after the Berlin Wall fell. Moreover, mass migration from East to West Germany, which the introduction of the Deutschmark was meant to curb, actually accelerated after the arrival of the Deutschmark. From 1990 to 2015, East Germany lost significantly more than one million people, the vast majority during the first two years after unification, and almost all of them of working age. Were it not for this emigration as well as early retirement schemes and retraining schemes for thousands of workers, unemployment in the East would have been even higher than it actually was. Introducing a new form of hidden unemployment, many of the participants in retraining were enrolled in one course after another, often in different fields, until they were old enough for early retirement.
One of the main, if not the main, reasons for the collapse of the East German economy was the Deutschmark. Introduced at a rate of one Mark West for one Mark East, while average productivity of East Germany was estimated to be about a quarter that of West Germany, German monetary union gave private households the boost in purchasing power they so desired. But it made East German firms uncompetitive. Lower wages could not compensate productivity differentials between firms in East Germany and Western countries. The privatization of East Germany’s state-owned firms facilitated the downfall of the East German economy even further. In some cases, Western companies bought East German firms just to shut them down so that they would not become competitors in the future. In other cases, they wanted patents or certain segments of production that they could integrate into their own supply-chains, leaving everything else to be shut down. The closures and cherry-picking of some more desirable segments destroyed the reproduction process of the East German economy even beyond the damage done by rendering it uncompetitive through monetary union.
The result was that bits and pieces of the East German economy became a periphery of production networks controlled by West German corporations. Ironically, the neoliberal restructuring of production processes went hand in hand with massive fiscal transfers from West to East Germany. A price that had to be paid to sustain some level of social cohesion while disappointment that political unification was followed by economic decline and continued social divisions between East and West instead of an Eastern economic miracle following the example of West Germany from the late 1950s to the early 1970s. At some point, a third of East German incomes came from fiscal transfers. As a result, government debt as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) rose from 41.8 percent in 1989 to 61.2 percent in 1999, which is nothing compared to today’s numbers. Yet, back then the lesson that had yet to be learned is that neoliberalism, despite its balanced-budget rhetoric, really is a mix of austerity and tax cuts for the rich that produces increasing debt levels at every slowdown or downturn of the economy. In the 1990s, government debt over 60 percent of GDP was a scandal. Not least because, at the urging of the conservative German government, 60 percent had become the benchmark for membership in the European monetary union, for which the roadmap had been laid out in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty.
Budget deficits, accumulating into government debt, weren’t the only deficit scandal in 1990s Germany. The other was in the current account. From a surplus of 4.6 percent in 1989, the current account dropped to a –1.9 percent deficit in 1991 and remained in deficit territory until 2001. In most other countries, deficits between negative one and negative two percent wouldn’t be a matter of concern. In Germany they were. After all, West German prosperity—the very model East Germans admired so much—had been reliant on export-driven growth, which was always understood as export surpluses. As it turned out, unification in the early 1990s, led to a boom in West Germany as East Germans spent many of their newly acquired Deutschmarks on consumer goods ‘Made in (West) Germany’—despite massive job losses. This boom drove prices up and made German exports less competitive on the world market. At the same time, some of the money from the East German spending spree went to foreign companies. As exports took a hit and imports got a boost, the current account went from positive to negative.
The East was integrated into the West German political system as it existed prior to unification. The Kohl government didn’t agree to any changes suggested by the East German government that formally negotiated unification but really rubberstamped the subordination of East German society to West German institutions. Economic integration was different though. The collapse of the East German economy, triggered by the design of monetary union and privatizations, had a lasting impact on the West German economic model that East Germans had been eager to embrace. The first decade after unification was marked by a twin deficit in government budgets and current accounts. During the unification boom from 1990 to 1993, inflation went up to levels not seen since the oil-price hikes and inflationary struggles between capital and labour from the 1970s to the early 1980s. At that time, however, the West German inflation rate was still below that of other Western countries, whereas in the early 1990s it was amongst the highest
Germany’s continued economic weakness, combined with New Cold War marching orders from Washington, fed a nostalgia for a supposedly great past—symbolized by the Deutschmark
West Germany as a role model
Running continued deficits—let alone a twin deficit—was unthinkable in a country that rebuilt its economy after the Second World War through integration into a world market with rules established and enforced by the US. In this American Empire, West Germany played the role of bulwark against Soviet Communism, including East Germany, and as a showcase of Western capitalism. To succeed in this role, foreign debt, accumulated by the Nazis and inherited by West Germany as legal successor of the Third Reich, was forgiven through the 1953 London Debt Agreement. West Germany also inherited low wages, industrial capacity and new technologies from the Nazi economy that, contrary to widespread assumptions, survived the war largely intact. This gave West German industries a competitive advantage that was further buttressed by favourable exchange rates on which basis West Germany was admitted to the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates in 1952. Reintegration into the world market also allowed West Germany to transition from a coal-based to an oil-based economy. Oil was cheaper than coal but its supplies were controlled by US companies and the American state.
However, being a junior partner in the American Empire turned out to be a much better deal for the German bourgeoisie than its earlier quests for world power. The territory under its direct control was much smaller after two failed power grabs but profits were stellar. Driven by exports, or export surpluses more precisely, the West German economy didn’t require fiscal stimulus and kept growing until the US turned to floating exchange rates, which led to a significant appreciation of the Deutschmark. Further, oil prices exploded in the 1970s. But it was during these turbulences that West Germany consolidated its reputation as a beacon of economic stability. Political management of the crisis, notably codetermination (German lingo for the institutionalized cooperation between unions and employer association), kept wages and inflation lower than in most other Western countries. This helped to sustain export surpluses for much of the 1970s. In turn, export surpluses allowed the government to keep fiscal stimulus and unemployment rates low. Again, this is compared to other Western countries, not compared to the post-war boom.
West Germany’s relative success in managing the economic crises of the 1970s raised some concerns among its allies, who considered this success a case of beggar-thy-neighbour policies. The US pressured the West German government to increase public spending in order to stimulate the world economy. The West German government couldn’t shrug off these US demands entirely. The social democratic party was led by Helmut Schmidt at the time, and some extra spending also appeased the left wing in his own party as well as some unionists. However, calls for a Keynesian fix of the economic crises never overcame the general preference for fiscal prudence and low inflation that marked West German society after two lost wars, each followed by the introduction of a new currency, one of them also by unprecedented hyperinflation. Not entirely without reason, export success after the Second World War was widely attributed to liberal economic principles, conveniently ignoring the fact that this ‘liberalism in one country’ could only work because other economies placed growing demand on the world market.
Export success also created an ersatz-identity that allowed West Germans to repress the horrors of the Nazi regime and the roles most of them had played in these horrors, as perpetrators or bystanders. Social democrats never really fit into this picture. Willy Brandt, who spent the Nazi reign in underground resistance circles and exile and would later become West Germany’s first social democratic chancellor, was seen by many as a traitor. His successor Helmut Schmidt, who had served in the Nazi air force, opposed many of Brandt’s plans for social reform and applied Keynesian policies only in homeopathic doses. He was successfully branded as the one responsible for rising unemployment and inflation by the Conservatives and Liberals. Crossing the floor from SPD to CDU, the Liberals made Helmut Kohl chancellor. Kohl won two elections before unification on the promise of bringing post-war prosperity back. He won another two after unification on the promise of bringing the prosperity to East Germany.
For a long time, Kohl presented himself successfully as the defender of the West German export model and guarantor of the collective identity tied to that model, despite the fact that 1980s West Germany never saw a return to postwar prosperity. Disappointment with his broken promises for a West German economic miracle 2.0 began spreading towards the end of the 1980s. Yet, the disintegration of the SED regime allowed him to renew and extend his promises to the East. The national euphoria that secured his 1990 election victory also saw a transformation of collective identity. West German pride in being export world champion turned into Deutschmark nationalism. Widely shared in the East, where people were happy to get the Deutschmark, and the West, where people saw it as symbol of their postwar achievements, this was not the pure money, or currency, fetishism Karl Marx wrote about in Capital. It had a distinctive nationalist character that was subdued in West Germany’s pre-unification export-identity. With unification, the nationalist seed blossomed. Not only did this help Kohl become the ‘chancellor of unity,’ but it also gave cover to a burst of neo-Nazi attacks on immigrants, leftists and queer people, culminating in arson attacks in Rostock, Mölln and Solingen. The latter two killed eight people, while the attack in Rostock laid a four-day siege on an apartment block inhabited by foreign workers who had been employed in East Germany’s now defunct state-owned economy. The openly neo-Nazi attacks of the early 1990s, later dubbed “baseball bat years,” were followed by a series of murders committed by the National Socialist Underground (NSU) that cost nine immigrants and one cop their lives from 2000 to 2007. The role of the German secret service in covering up, or even facilitating, these murders has never been investigated as key documents remain classified until this day. Hans-Georg Maaßen, head of the secret service from 2012 to 2018, was one of the individuals responsible for blocking investigations of the NSU-murders. He also heads up an ultra-conservative circle, initially inside the CDU and now operating in the right-wing space between the CDU und the AfD.
Exports über alles: Eastern peripheries boost corporate profits
During unification and in the first few years afterwards, nationalism was a mass ideology. It rallied flag-waving masses in the streets, it dominated German politics and inspired Nazi-skinheads to chase people they considered enemies. As it became clear that the hopes for an economic miracle 2.0 would not be realized, street protests receded, most skinheads scaled down their activism and just a few turned to clandestine terrorist attacks. It seemed that nationalism had lost the force it had just recently. However, the entanglements between Nazis and parts of the state apparatuses indicate that while nationalism wasn’t as visible as before, it had not disappeared.
As it turned out, the opening of the Berlin Wall was a key step towards what would later be called neoliberal globalization. As the German bourgeoisie sought its place in a world seemingly governed by the invisible hand of the market—not Soviet planners or the milder version of Western government intervention—nationalism also found a new role as mass ideology. The ideological wind blowing from the ‘real West,’ that is, the United States, rebranded free trade theory going back to the days of David Ricardo as globalization. Sticking closely to Ricardo’s principles, academic globalists argued that firms, if left alone by the state, would specialize in the production of those goods they can produce more cheaply than firms in another country either because they possess more productive technologies or use input factors more plentiful and cheap than in another country. All countries will be better off if firms in each country specialize according to their comparative advantages.
Globalization practitioners talked about entire countries as if they were firms competing against each other. Competitiveness of nation-states became the lodestar of capitalists, and their political executors, who used it to justify the roll-back of wages and social standards in all countries. Their run-the-country-like-a-business propaganda was so persuasive that even working class people whose wages, pensions and public services were cut fell for it in large numbers, electing and re-electing neoliberal globalizers over and over again. At the same time, fear that the policies just voted for would cause a race to the bottom spread in the rich countries that saw parts of their production outsourced to poor countries, where labour was really cheap, while immigrants from such countries would take on jobs in the burgeoning low-wage sectors of the rich countries. Migration, segmented labour markets and a global reserve army of labour, enabling capitalists to engage in global labour arbitrage, were neither part of academic globalization theory nor did they feature in politicians’ globalization propaganda. Absent from public debate, these real-life factors created fears that a new right could build on by portraying economic problems as questions of national identity. Translated into policy terms, that meant a program of keeping immigrants out and capital in. This protectionist backlash against neoliberal globalization, coupled with the rise of a new right ranging from populist to neo-Nazi formations, occurred all over the Global North. It began slowly in the late 1990s and early 2000s while globalization was still expanding, and then gathered steam in the wake of the 2008-9 world financial crisis that marked the end of accumulation driven by globalization. It has accelerated again since the COVID-19 recession as well as the escalating great power politics vis-à-vis Russia and China, which have led to openly imperialist policies couched in the same nationalist ideology which the new right thrives on. The competitive nation-as-corporation ideology and the policies that marked actually unfolding globalization was the breeding ground for today’s strange bedfellowship of globalizers-turned-great-power-warriors and national supremacists of the new right. Theories of unregulated free trade opening the path towards global prosperity were just an ideological tool that was useful as long the integration of more and more countries into the US-dominated world market fuelled capitalist accumulation, and thereby hopes for the eventual trickle-down. It was replaced with the rhetoric of concern for national security and democracy as accumulation ended in a new phase of stagnation.
The German bourgeoisie had already adopted the logic of the state as business competitor after the Second World War when it traded world power ambitions for a junior partner role in the American Empire. Balanced budgets and tight money formed the core of its policies. That, along with competitive advantages inherited from the Nazis or granted by the US, enabled export-driven growth and, ultimately, export surpluses. Despite verbal commitments to liberalism, these policies were mercantilist in substance. Shattered but not derailed by the crises of the 1970s, West Germany’s mercantilist regime of accumulation survived until unification led to a twin deficit, slow growth and socioeconomic divisions between East and West. Unified Germany’s economy stumbled along while the US enjoyed its New Economy boom, even though that turned out to be short-lived, and China attained unprecedented levels of economic growth.
The Kohl government didn’t respond to the bourgeoisie’s growing concerns about economic stagnation in Germany. Neither did it respond to growing dissatisfaction with social conditions among the popular classes. After uniting Germany, Kohl turned to further uniting Europe. Partly, he wanted to demonstrate Germany’s continued commitment to cooperation in the European Union as some European leaders—notably British Prime Minister Thatcher and French President François Mitterrand—had expressed reservations about German unification and worried about a return of German great power ambitions. European monetary union became Kohl’s preferred route to an “ever closer union,” as EU-parlance had it at the time. However, regarding other countries, notably in the Mediterranean, Kohl successfully pushed for tight fiscal and monetary rules—the same kind of rules West German policy makers followed in the postwar period. Under the favourable conditions granted by the US to integrate into the world market, this led to export-driven prosperity. However, other countries didn’t enjoy the same favourable conditions. What would upset governments and people in such countries even more was the fact that Kohl had abandoned the rules he was preaching to other European countries in his very own united Germany
Helmut Kohl at the CDU national party convention in Hamburg, 1973. Photo from Wikimedia Commons
There, European monetary union was widely seen as a top-down capitalist elite project, part of corporate globalization or as a handing over of the beloved Deutschmark to irresponsible Eurocrats and the Club Med, a derogatory term often used in public debates to denounce people in the Mediterranean countries as lazy, spend-thrifty and, worst of all, happily having a good time at the expense of others. Euro-scepticism added to disappointment with the collapse of East Germany’s economy after unification, growing income polarization and fears of job loss all over Germany and a sense of losing national sovereignty to global capital. Unresponsive to any of these concerns, Kohl and his coalition of Conservatives and Liberals eventually lost the 1998 election to the Social Democrats and Greens who formed a coalition government offering a blend of light Keynesianism, green transition and control of financial markets. This is where the German—and international—bourgeoisies got really concerned.
The opening ideological salvos to derail the newly elected government’s plans came from the British tabloid The Sun, calling Oskar Lafontaine, the new finance minister who proposed the introduction of a Tobin tax, “Europe’s most dangerous man.” Next came Madeleine Albright, then US secretary of state, who gave Germany’s Green Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer the choice of joining the bombing campaign against Yugoslavia or having his country isolated from Western allies. Fischer, and the new Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, chose war. Seeing that his opposition to the war wasn’t supported by anyone else in the cabinet, Lafontaine resigned before the bombing began.
A few months later, The Economist called Germany the “Sick man of the Euro.” Coming from the central organ of global capitalism and unrepentant advocate of liberalism since the days when England, not China, was the workshop of the world, this was not just another opinion piece. It was a warning that the international investment community—exactly the CEOs, bankers, brokers and financiers targeted by the then-emerging movement against corporate globalization—lost confidence in the German market and expected pro-business measures to boost their propensity to invest.
After a few months in office, Schröder had to choose between meeting voters’ expectations (job creation, reduction of job insecurities and income inequality) and capitalists’ cost-reduction demands. He chose the capitalists’ side, earning him the nickname Genosse der Bosse (Comrade of the Bosses). In the absence of a social movement from below that could have pushed him to deliver on the election platforms of the SPD and the Greens, this choice might actually better be called caving to capitalist threats of an investment strike. From 2000 to 2005, the Schröder government axed corporate tax rates, exempted capital gains from taxation and lowered equity requirements for credits. The other side of the class divide saw drastic reductions in unemployment benefits, essentially slashing them to the level of welfare payment rates after one year of benefits. At the same time, legal obstacles to employing temporary workers were greatly reduced. Capitalists were thrilled. Profits and asset prices shot up, but capital formation declined during the years pro-business laws were passed.
Reorganizing existing production capacities was more important to corporate executives than creating new capacities. This was not surprising as capacity utilization dropped when the New Economy bubble burst, triggering a downturn of the world economy that kept even booming China below double-digit growth. As it turned out, united Germany did not inherit the export successes of pre-unification West Germany, but was certainly heir to its export dependence.
In the early 2000s, Germany’s current account turned positive again—not because exports grew so strongly (they actually stagnated due to the world economic downturn), but because imports declined owing to weak domestic demand associated with the Schröder government’s neoliberal policies. However, as the world economy bounced back (China saw growth rates of 10-14 percent from 2003 to 2006), German exports grew again. Eventually the reorganization of production processes in the aftermath of German unification paid off. West German corporations now controlled production networks linking corporate headquarters controlling finance, research and development, and capital-intensive parts of actual assembly in the centres with labour intensive production in low-wage areas in the peripheries from Eastern Germany all the way to China. In these networks, East Germany occupied the position of a semi-periphery. On the supply side, German export success in the early 2000s relied on continued wage inequality between centres and peripheries, which doesn’t mean that all workers in the centres earned high wages. The threat to relocate production to the East or the South put the brakes on all wages. The lowering of social standards propelled the growth of low-wage employment, notably in the service sector. Well-paying, permanent jobs began to decrease as a share of total employment even in West Germany. As a result, discontent that was widespread in the East since political unification was followed by economic collapse, and social downgrading began to creep into the West.
2010s: Exporting the Euro-crisis
The export surpluses of the early 2000s relied on the same mercantilism that had generated such surpluses during the postwar prosperity. However, during the postwar period, unprecedented growth rates across the Western, and parts of the non-Western, world made it possible to superimpose a welfare state on a mercantilist economy that didn’t squeeze profit rates but operated with capital’s consent in a way that seemed unthinkable during the age of catastrophe from 1914 to 1945. In the early 2000s, by contrast, successful mercantilism demanded the roll-back of the welfare state. Tragically, the extension of West Germany’s welfare state institutions to East Germany, where they were superimposed on a collapsing economy, created the profit squeeze that was needed to curtail the material protections granted by the welfare state. To sustain competitive advantages gained by scaling back the welfare state, it was imperative to keep wage-growth low even after surging exports pulled the economy out of the slump. Unlike during the period of postwar prosperity, export surpluses didn’t stimulate domestic demand very much. In fact, current account surpluses in the early 2000s, which surged from -1.8 percent in 2000 to 6.7 percent in 2007, were as much driven by rising exports as by weak growth of imports, a clear indicator of the overall sluggishness of domestic demand. Unemployment rates rose from 9.3 percent in 2000 to 12.1 percent in 2005. After that, unemployment went into long-term decline, briefly interrupted by the 2008/9 Great Recession and slowed down by the 2009/15 Euro-crisis, eventually reaching five percent before the 2020 COVID-19 Recession. However, this job growth occurred almost entirely in low wage occupations.
Paradoxically, it was during the Euro-crisis that a wave of “export nationalism” covered up the discontent that was growing, at variable speeds, across Germany. The Deutschmark nationalism that emerged during German unification had taken a hit with the introduction of the Euro. However, when it turned out that the Euro was basically the old Deutschmark under a new name and export surplus levels were reaching unprecedented heights, it almost seemed that the long-awaited return of prosperity was about to materialize. But of course, it wasn’t the same as the postwar prosperity that saw strong growth almost everywhere. The 2010s, by contrast, were a time of stagnation. The rebound after the 2008/9 recession was stronger in Germany than in other countries, but then growth rates fell in line with the one-to-two percent range of other Western countries.
It was during this time of recurrent crises and long-term stagnation that the German government, led by Angela Merkel with the Social Democrats as junior partner, felt compelled to lecture other governments on economic policy. Completely blind to the fact that beggar-thy-neighbour policies are a zero-sum game, the Merkel-government told Southern European countries to impose austerity despite the fact that they were suffering from a sovereign debt crisis due to the end of cheap credit that became available after the creation of the European monetary union, helping to pay for imports from Germany. Merkel also told them that, after a painful but unavoidable period of belt-tightening, they would eventually succeed as export countries like Germany.
The European monetary union’s contradictory character torn between further integrating Europe and spreading German mercantilism shifted entirely to the latter. Southern Europeans, governments and ordinary people, understood that austerity would further subordinate their economies to Germany’s economic dominance. The Brits, like the Germans and the “Frugal Four” (Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden), although not warm to the idea of bailing out crisis-ridden Southern Europeans, were suspicious that Germany’s leading role in handling the crisis would turn the country’s economic dominance into fully-fledged hegemony. Brexit has its origin here. Eastern Europe’s post-communist comprador governments had imposed austerity on their countries in acts of pre-emptive obedience and now felt betrayed as they thought the bailout packages the Merkel government used as a means to impose austerity on the South were actually some sort of welfare package.
Centrifugal forces in the EU were further fuelled when, in face of civil war and foreign interventions in Syria, Merkel unilaterally declared open borders for Syrian refuges and then told EU member states they all had to take their share of refugees. European governments already concerned over Germany’s domineering role in managing the Euro-crisis were dismayed. Public debate within Germany was sharply divided between liberals and leftists applauding Merkel’s humanist stance and right-wingers, including in her own party, warning of an uncontrolled flow of immigrants. Largely unnoticed was the fact that Merkel’s decision to open borders for Syrian refugees was tied to the anti-Russian turn in German foreign policy following the sharp polarization between pro- and anti-Russian forces in Ukraine during and after the Maidan protests in 2014. Most of the Syrian refugees were fleeing the Russian-backed Assad-regime, which was considered an adversary. Opening borders for these refugees set a precedent for the surge of Ukrainian refugees following Russia’s invasion of Eastern Ukraine in 2022. At that point, Merkel, who had already retired, told the media that her government saw the Minsk accords, officially meant to reach a settlement between contending political and military forces within Ukraine, as a means of buying time to arm the Zelensky government.
2020s: Sick man of Europe 2.0
As Ukraine, already torn by civil war, became the scene for a proxy war between NATO-countries and Russia, Germany was firmly subordinated to US foreign policy. Post-communist governments in Germany had, more or less enthusiastically, supported deepening trade relations with Russia. Oil and gas imports might have been the most significant part of German-Russian trade but were certainly not the only one. Torn between allegiance to the US and lucrative business deals with Russia, the German government, now headed by Social Democrat Olaf Scholz, cut its economic ties with Russia after the latter’s invasion of Ukraine. The price to be paid was a further spike in energy prices, on top of the increases attendant on the economic recovery from the COVID-19-recession.
As part of current US efforts to contain China, the German government has been pressured to scale down its trade with China—Germany’s largest trading partner and also a prime outlet for German foreign direct investments. Since Germany’s economy is as much export-driven as export-dependent, the US turn from neoliberal globalization to escalating sanctions and protectionism in the name of national security has caused high levels of uncertainty within the German bourgeoisie. In addition to the return of secular stagnation after the very short post-COVID recovery in the West and the petering out of the China boom, this uncertainty is driving low levels of investment. Inflation, fuelled by post-COVID recovery and rising energy prices, and lower real incomes leading directly to less consumer spending, but also indirectly, as households build up their savings in anticipation of more economic shocks in the future. Meanwhile the Scholz government boosted arms spending while otherwise imposing austerity.
After two years of recession, Germany is again being branded the “sick man of Europe” by The Economist. The last time Germany earned this title the neoliberal turn against the welfare state produced massive current account surpluses, meagre general growth rates and massive social and regional inequalities. The export nationalism that concealed the mounting discontent with neoliberalism was shaken by the US turn from neoliberal globalization to protectionism and militarism. Given its high level of export dependence, Germany was ill prepared for the turn against it, which unleashed pent-up disappointments and anxieties into the political sphere. This happened all over Germany but more so in the East than in the West as regional differences in income, wealth and representation in leadership positions had created widespread feelings of being second class citizens in a politically united Germany.
In the absence of socialist imagination, German politics are haunted by the spectres of the past. An insurgent hard-right pins the labels of communism or Marxism on everything that ever came from the left, Social Democrats, the Greens and, of course, the Left Party, no matter how members, activists and supporters of these parties position themselves on the political spectrum. At the same time, the hard-right wants Germany to leave its Nazi past behind. Downplaying Nazi atrocities, accusing liberals and leftists of burdening Germans with a cult of guilt, they propagate the reclaiming of German national pride and sovereignty from allegedly cosmopolitan elites. Between the very real and growing right and a weak and largely imaginary left, centrist parties that proclaimed the end of history in the heyday of neoliberalism are also shifting to the right. The decline of the Left Party is a mirror image of the rise of the AfD.
Alternative für Deutschland: A child of Deutschmark nationalism
Mainstream media and centrist parties view the new right as if it were some external force inexplicably appearing on the political scene and threatening the liberal order. But this is empirically wrong. Almost all leading figures of the AfD come from conservative West German milieus where they previously held positions in public administration or private businesses. Although they present themselves as anti-establishment rebels, they are establishment people who turned from the centre-right to the hard-right. The AfD also includes party activists who come from militant neo-Nazi groups that have existed on the fringes of West German society since the CDU gave many old Nazis a political home after the downfall of the Third Reich. Making small advances into electoral politics in the late 1960s and again in the 1980s, the neo-Nazis remained marginal until they found common ground with disgruntled conservatives. Deutschmark nationalism served as the ideological bonding material for neo-Nazis and right-of-centre conservatives, and became a rallying point for growing numbers of people dissatisfied with the policies of neoliberal globalization advanced by the centrist parties. It emerged in the tumultuous days after the fall of the Berlin wall as a mass ideology that shaped East and West German politics in the direction of unification. After that, it became an ideological point of reference that allowed for the integration of different political ideas and currents into a new right political project, the AfD.
Riding on the wave of Euro-scepticism that accompanied the Euro crisis, the AfD, founded in 2013, promoted a German exit from the EU, which would also have meant exit from the Euro. However, boosting the Deutschmark nostalgia associated with German-style Euro-scepticism got the newly minted party only so far. What really fuelled the AfD’s take-off was the wave of Syrian refugees coming to Germany (and other EU-countries) in 2015. The party’s approval ratings rose from roughly five percent in its first two years to around 12 percent in the next two years. With the surge in voter approval came a programmatic shift from ‘neoliberalism in one country’ to neoliberalism hidden behind ethnonationalist hate propaganda. Despite advocating for a strong state, the AfD also presents itself as a rebellious party of freedom. This paradox is resolved by portraying cosmopolitan elites, represented most notably by the Greens, as a force dominating state apparatuses and misusing them to bring excessive numbers of foreigners into the country with their cultures that allegedly threaten German people, suppress German heritage and push the economy into decay. Therefore a strong state is needed to defend Germany against foreign incursion and revive its inherent strength
Election poster of the AfD in Thuringia supporting remigration. Photo from Wikimedia Commoms
The Scholz government created the conditions in which the AfD’s self-portrayal as freedom fighters gave the party another boost. The modest Green New Deal platforms on which the SPD and Greens ran their 2021 election campaign didn’t gain enough traction to allow them to form a government, despite support from unions and even, more cautiously, employer associations. To obtain a majority in the Bundestag, SPD and Greens formed an ostensibly unlikely coalition with the FDP, a party mostly focused on cutting taxes and limiting public deficits. These commitments to tax breaks for the rich and austerity for the poor stood in the way of effective state-sponsored energy transition programs. Hence, the Scholz-government was perceived as weak from the start. Things went from bad to worse for the government after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Under pressure from the US, Scholz opted for sanctions against Russia, arms deliveries to Ukraine and a continued increase in arms spending. At a time when the prices of everything from butter to housing were soaring, making it clear that money would still be available for guns but maybe not for butter not only destroyed whatever support the government had before the Ukraine war but also gave the AfD another boost. A year and a half into the war, the SPD was trailing the AfD in federal polls. Picking up widespread, though by no means dominant, unease with arms support for Ukraine and fear of war with Russia, the AfD advocates a negotiated peace settlement between Russia and Ukraine and, more importantly to the AfD, the lifting of sanctions on Russia. For the AfD, urging peace with Russia is not a matter of a principled anti-militarism but a means of reviving German trade with Russia, notably Russian energy imports that are seen as a precondition for economic recovery. To achieve this, Germany has to free itself from the ‘cosmopolitan sell-out elite.’ Whether everybody now supporting the AfD subscribes to the freedom-for-German-supremacy-view is open to debate. What can’t be denied is the fact that many discontented people, whatever their main grievance, are looking to the right, not the left, for alternatives to a failing political centre. Some are also turning to the CDU, which claims to be different from both the AfD and the federal coalition government, without offering anything other than praise for the good old days. That served the party well at times when the German economy could thrive, to a greater or lesser degree, on US-enabled expansion of world markets. With the US protectionist turn, this is no longer possible and the party is torn between centrism and the new right. Current support for the CDU is highly unstable, which could easily work in the AfD’s favour, especially in the absence of persuasive alternatives from the left, which so far have not materialized.
This wasn’t always the case. Something like a left renewal had once seemed to be in the offing in the most unlikely place: East Germany during the transition from state socialism to a peripheral position in an enlarged capitalist Germany. In West Germany, the nationalist wave that came with unification swept away much of the activist left that had rallied thousands—sometimes tens or even hundreds of thousands— of people in the 1980s against the stationing of US nuclear missiles, nuclear power plants, Nazis, and South Africa’s apartheid regime, among other causes. Left circles within the SPD, the Greens and the labour movement weathered the nationalist storm without leaving a mark on German politics. In this political climate, the Party of Democratic Socialism (Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus or PDS) stood out as a beacon of the left.
Emerging from East Germany’s ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED), the PDS became the political home of many East Germans who lost their jobs, social status and cultural identity during the transition to capitalism. Quickly establishing a presence in East Germany’s provincial and municipal parliaments, the party expressed the discomfort of many East Germans who felt like second class citizens under the domination of West German institutions, politicians, corporations and culture. It highlighted East Germany’s socialist heritage, which encompassed commitments to anti-fascism, peace and international solidarity as much as the dictatorship of the politburo, Stasi-surveillance and an overbearing bureaucracy. The party hung itself up in endless debates between those who downplayed or justified East German communism’s dark sides and others who sought to disown that history by embracing liberal principles. Practically, these disputes didn’t make much difference. Upholding socialist principles didn’t stop the party from pragmatically working within the political and economic confines created by unification. At times, this included voting for privatization of public housing and infrastructure. For decades since the party was founded, the contradiction between socialist principles and the subordination to neoliberal policies imposed by the West German bourgeoisie didn’t stop the PDS or its successor organization Die Linke (the Left Party), from becoming something like a catch-all or people’s party in East Germany, a role long held by the CDU und the SPD in West Germany. For years, the PDS/Left Party achieved election results in the mid-20 percent range, peaking at 28 percent in Brandenburg in 2004 and 32 percent in Thuringia in 2019. It was also, and still is, part of various coalition governments in East German states. Until the September 2024 election, the Thuringian government was led by the Left Party’s Bodo Ramelow.
Despite this overall success and despite the party’s fidelity to socialist principles, the social group that wasn’t interested in voting PDS consisted of workers, who still voted CDU in large numbers despite g the CDU’s failed to deliver on its big promises of post-unification prosperity. More recently they shifted to the AfD. Meanwhile, in West Germany, the PDS remained marginal throughout its existence, only attracting activists from various left grouplets. What little remained of left protest milieus after unification was still dominated by a mix of environmentalists, antifas and international solidarity activists who might vote Green, or maybe even SPD, but hardly ever PDS. The old working class milieus that were shrinking with the decline of smokestack industries were still dominated by unionists closer to the SPD than the PDS. This started to change when, under chancellor Schröder, the SPD implemented neoliberal counter-reforms on a scale his conservative predecessor Kohl had avoided throughout his 16-year tenure, despite his supposed commitment to unleashing market forces. Growing frustrations among left social democrats and unionists fed mass demonstrations against Schröder’s SPD and created a social and organizational base (including, most prominently, Schröder’s short-time finance minister Lafontaine) that merged with the PDS into the Left Party in 2007. In the federal elections two years later, the Left Party won 11.9 percent of the vote, then 9.2 percent in the 2017 elections, but fell to 4.9 percent in the 2021 elections. This was a worse result than the 5.1 percent the PDS obtained in 1998, an election that also saw an increased vote for the SPD, which allowed Schröder to succeed Kohl. It is worth noting that the PDS vote came almost entirely from East Germany, which represents less than a quarter of Germany’s total population.
While the PDS mostly maintained peaceful coexistence between socialist theory and market-conforming practice, the Left Party continuously debated whether or not it should join centre-left governments, if given the chance. The bitterness with which party activists argued over this question stood in stark contrast to its actual relevance. In states where the party was relegated to opposition status by poor election results, this status didn’t attract additional voters keen on seeing a principled opposition in parliament. In states where the party joined governments, the results were mixed: sometimes it maintained its vote share in the subsequent election; sometimes it suffered losses. A paradoxical result came about in the Thuringian elections in September 2024: The Left Party lost massively, although, had there been direct elections for the minister-president (a position equivalent to provincial premier in Canada), the Left Party’s Bodo Ramelow would have won the election. This fits into a trend that became visible over the last few years in a number of state elections in East and West Germany. Party loyalties based on shared worldviews wear thin. Elections are often decided based on the media appeal of top politicians, regardless of party affiliation. Remarkably enough, Ramelow, just like Dietmar Woidke, the SPD’s lead candidate in the Brandenburg elections, dropped the name of his party on campaign posters, presenting himself as more of a provincial father figure than a man of the party.
However, rather than signalling the end of ideology, as centrist politicians and postmodern philosophers might have argued before the rise of a very explicitly ideologically committed new right, the focus on limelight politicians pushes democratic debates into the shadows. In the case of the Left Party, it might also have been an attempt to distract from its own image as an organization mired in endless debates not producing any coherent, let alone persuasive, policies. The reasons for permanent internal discord are sociological and ideological. The Left Party was strongest in its early days, when the PDS’s social base still comprised a cross-section of the East German population, although workers remained underrepresented. It also attracted dissident social democrats and unionists from West Germany. To a limited extent, therefore the Left Party had the working class base the PDS never had.
The blend of Keynesian and Marxist ideas around which social democratic dissidents and union leftists organized had been defeated as a significant political current during the crises of the 1970s by the Social Democratic right and corporatist union leaders who put competitiveness of the West German economy over income distribution from profits to wages. In the new millennium, when these currents joined forces with the PDS, they were still sizeable enough to give the newly founded Left Party a boost. But not for long. The smokestack industries around which these left currents were organizing were in continued decline, which made strategies based on that moribund reality obsolete. Moreover, these strategies often stood in the way of mobilizing and organizing the new working classes that emerged in the service sector and, on a much smaller scale, IT, bio tech, and green energy.
As the ranks of the Left Party thinned out with the loss of members coming out of communist East Germany or from West German union and social democratic circles, the party was able to attract new blood mainly in the form of highly educated, often precariously employed, urban dwellers. The shift in membership from old left offspring to the children of neoliberal globalization was paralleled by a geographical shift in electoral support. In urban centres, losses among the party’s old left supporters could be partially compensated; in rural areas, however, where the PDS and the Left Party had always been weak, the party disappeared almost entirely. Often, there isn’t even anyone to put up election campaign posters
Anti-AfD protest in Germany. Photo by strassenstriche.net/Flickr
Unlike the original base of both the PDS and the Left Party, the urban hipsters who joined the Left Party had no old left reference points. Even when they talked about Marx and class they did so with postmodern accents. However, this did not help them to gain sizeable support among the working classes—sometimes lumped together as the “precariat”—that developed in expanding economic sectors. The political offerings of the Left Party seemed to exercise little appeal for both old and potentially new constituencies. The party’s founding basis of unity was opposition to neoliberalism. In the early days this left room for East German concerns about the outcomes of unification—arguably a kind of neoliberal restructuring—with opposition to the neoliberal turn of the Schröder-government in East and West Germany. It also left plenty of room for a variety of goals, from resurrecting the Keynesian welfare state to a multitude of vaguely defined socialisms for the future to opposition without a vision for the future. However, what sufficed to form the Left Party wasn’t enough to sustain and grow it, especially not as it became harder to label government policies neoliberal.
The Great Recession, the COVID-19 pandemic, and commitments to ongoing arms production brought state intervention back to the centre of politics, contrary to the 1990s and early 2000s when politics was dominated by advancing capital mobility and free trade. Back then, ruling elites organized consent of the popular classes, more or less successfully, under the banner of “international competitiveness.” The new watchword “national security” is better at rallying the new right than building support for centrist parties. Left Party intellectuals debated the new political conjuncture under the label “post-neoliberalism,” a word-monster that hints, perhaps unwittingly, at the party’s inability to develop a strategy beyond rejecting neoliberalism. In reaction to the imposition of a party line by its predecessor organization, the PDS and the Left Party allowed a wide range of views. However, members of various organized currents, ranging from social-liberal to communist, tended to talk more about each other than with each other.
Postmodernist philosophers’ contention that the days of master narratives are over was wrong with respect to neoliberalism—if there ever was a master narrative, it was neoliberalism—but it does apply to the Left Party, which could not synthesize different ideas into compelling left policies that could rally growing discontent. Instead, internal debates turned into factional turf wars in a party that resembled an appendix of the Scholz government, costing the Left Party more and more support.
After years of bitter infighting, discontent with declining voter approval and accommodation of government policies led to the split of the federal party caucus and the formation of the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) in January 2024. As its name indicates, the party is entirely built around its frontwoman, who represented the Left Party in the Bundestag from 2009 to 2023. In the BSW, the cacophony that destructively marks the Left Party is replaced by closed-door debates. As in the Communist party of old, membership isn’t open to everyone; applications to join must be approved. Wagenknecht, originally a member of the Communist Platform (one of the organized currents inside the PDS), had shifted to left-Keynesian, pro-welfare state positions. But, years before her split from the Left Party, she began advocating ordoliberal positions—a branch of neoliberal thinking that stresses the role of the state in allowing businesses to compete without being bogged down by monopolies. This German version of neoliberalism has been the hallmark of economic policy and ideology since the early years of West German world market integration. In Wagenknecht’s current adaptation of ordoliberalism, the state guarantees competition, which, in turn, creates a strong economy capable of providing stable employment, social security and a fairer distribution of incomes. She combines this embrace of free markets plus the welfare state with a critique of the European Union as an institution operating in the interest of big corporations and a critique of NATO and US hegemony. Her condemnation of American hegemony appealed to some members of the Left Party, as did her critique of the EU, although her more recent favourable references to ordoliberalism and policies aiming at stricter migration controls were less popular.
The BSW’s outlook is very much shaped by positive memories of West German postwar prosperity. Yet, the party’s advocacy of international cooperation, a position going back to 1970s detente policies, contrasts sharply with orientations of the centrist parties and some currents within her own former party. Demand for a negotiated settlement of the Ukraine war overlaps with AfD positions. However, the AfD considers this a matter of Germany’s national interest that doesn’t preclude support for rearmament and war in other regions, like Gaza most recently. The BSW, on the other hand, sees militarism largely as the US’s last recourse for defending its ailing empire. It remains to be seen how the BSW’s principled opposition to militarism and war can mesh with current negotiations for a coalition government with the CDU and the SPD, both committed to military support for Zelensky in Ukraine and Netanyahu in Israel. Polls suggest that electoral support for the BSW was largely driven by the desire for an anti-war voice in parliament. At the same time, there is considerable support for efforts to keep the AfD out of government, despite all the support the AfD garnered in the fall state elections in East Germany. If this means compromising its anti-militarism, the BSW may, like the Left Party before it, soon be seen as a superfluous appendix of unpopular centrist parties.
After weeks of negotiations, the BSW entered into a coalition government with the SPD in Brandenburg as well as with the CDU and SPD in Thuringia. It also supports a minority government made up of the CDU and the SPD in Saxony. It did all this to keep the AfD out of government positions. Understandable as such efforts are, they have already cost the BSW in the polls. Hovering just above five percent, the BSW may not reach the five-percent threshold for obtaining seats in the upcoming federal elections. The Left Party, standing at 3.5 percent in the polls, will probably fall short. Founded as a project to unify left forces from East and West Germany, its split early last year already signalled the failure of that project. The next election may reduce it to insignificance, leaving lots of room for the AfD [end]
the Germans have bowed down to the US sabotage by Joe Biden administration of Nord Stream pipelines, only to end up with Donald Trump’s America First doctrine in economy and defense
In the previous days, a placard has appeared in Kiev, that the German Nazi forces have seized on September 19, 1941, after 45 days of Soviet resistance
All Yids of the city of Kiev and its vicinity must appear on Monday, September 29, by 8 o’clock in the morning at the corner of Mel’nikova and Dokterivskaya streets. Bring documents, money, valuables and also warm clothing, linen etc. Any Yids who do not follow this order and are found elsewhere will be shot. Any civilians who enter the dwellings left by Yids and appropriate the things in them will be shot
On September 29, these families are led to Babi Yar ravine, Kiev northwestern suburb, where more than 30,000 victims are shot. The executioners are Ukrainian auxiliaries and mainly, the German Einsatzgruppe C, in charge of the Jewish genocide in northern and central Ukraine
On January 1, 2009, after the orange revolution early 2005, right-wing, pro-West and pro-Europe, the Ukrainian philately pays tribute for his 100th Birthday to Stepan Bandera
The auxiliaries are Ukrainian nationalist militants, whose leader is Stepan Bandera (1909-1959). Within the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), the moderate ones are fan of Benito Mussolini. Bandera’s followers are rather praising Adolf Hitler. The leader is usually prescribing
Muscovites [Russians], Poles, Hungarians and Jews are your enemies, destroy them !
Lviv, July 1941
That is why early July in Lviv, western Ukraine, the nationalist militants already slaughtered 4,000 Jewish civilians, in order to celebrate the Nazi invasion of Soviet Union
In Miropol vicinity, on October 13, 1941, a woman and her son are assassinated. The killers are two German custom officers and in the foreground, two Ukrainian police auxiliaries (Lubomir Skrovina, historical collection of the State Security Service, Prague)
The Ukrainian Schutzmannschaft [auxiliary police] carries on, alongside Germans, with the Holocaust by bullet. In the case of Miropol and that famous photo, the custom officers, although reported in the 60s, are not sued in West Germany where the denazification has been very flawed. But in Soviet Union, the KGB identifies the Ukrainians, who are sentenced to death in 1987
June 30, 2022
Another popular hero in Voldodymyr Zelenskyy’s Ukraine is Roman Shukhevych (1907-1950). Thanks to the KGB and its great memory, the Ukrainian Nazis, especially leaders, were not always living long. Shukhevych was captain within the Schutzmannschaft, became in 1943 the leader of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), military branch of the OUN, which slaughtered at least 50,000, might be 100,000 Polish civilians, with the benevolent detachment of the German occupiers, carried out later a guerilla against the victorious Red Army, with the support of the SS intelligence (SD), then Anglo-American intelligence agencies
Some Ukrainian nationalist militants have assassinated and fought under regular German command. Yaroslav Hunka was Waffen-SS within the 14. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS, Galizien [Galicia, Lviv region]. On September 22, 2023, in the presence of Volodymyr Zelenskyy and prime minister Justin Trudeau, at the invitation of the speaker, the whole Canadian parliament gives a standing ovation to the Ukrainian-Canadian WW2 hero, who fought for Ukrainian independence against the Russians [speaker]
Volodomyr Zelenskyy, Chrystia Freeland and Justin Trudeau cheer former Waffen-SS Yaroslav Hunka (Patrick Doyle / The Canadian Press)
Chrystia Freeland is deputy prime minister of Canada. Her grandfather was a Ukrainian Nazi and here is the point, when asked about these historical facts, she is usually replying that they would be Russian propaganda. Mykhailo Khomiak/Michael Chomiak was a Nazi propagandist, fled the victory of Soviet Union against Nazi Germany and settled in Canada after WW2. More broadly, UK, Canada and the US welcomed 8,500 Ukrainian SS.
Floor to the defence. Hunka comments on September 28. Brisk but resentful, the 98 year-old alt Kamerad complains that due to the Canadian and international outrage, he is forced to seek refuge with friends in South America.
Le fils de Pépin le Bref s’est retourné deux fois dans sa tombe. Tout d’abord en septembre 1944, lorsqu’une unité de SS français fut nommée Waffen-Grenadier-Brigade der SS Charlemagne [en Français dans le texte]. Ce fut par un décret paru au Journal officiel du 22 juillet 1943 que l’État français permit les engagements dans la Schutzstaffel (SS). Mais pourquoi donc ? Pour la défense de l’Europe
Affiche française de recrutement en 1943
Une anecdote de cette époque : un gamin éminent de la branche alsacienne de la famille en croisa qui faisaient du tourisme dans les rues de Strassburg [Strasbourg en Français, alors territoire allemand], s’exclama en Français Regarde, maman, des boches qui parlent Français. Un SS s’approcha et lui dit Non, mon garçon, nous sommes des Français qui nous battons pour l’Europe nouvelle. Pétrifiée sur le moment, la maman passa plus tard à la maison ses nerfs sur le garçon. À la même époque, la branche corse de la famille a tendu des embuscades aux Allemands de la brigade Reichsführer SS, alors que des troupes marocaines allaient débarquer pour libérer l’île
Des combattants marocains du 73e goum patrouillent dans les rues de Bastia le 4 octobre 1943 (ECPAD)
La formation SS française fut engagée au combat pour la première fois le 9 août 1944, contre l’Armée rouge en Pologne. Nommée brigade Charlemagne en septembre, elle devint 33. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS Charlemagne en février 1945, comptait alors un peu plus de 7000 hommes, majoritairement des miliciens de Joseph Darnand et des vétérans de la Légion des volontaires français contre le bolchevisme (LVF)
À lire sur la Milice, qui jusqu’à l’effondrement en 1944 de l’État français, fait la chasse aux résistantsAffiches de recrutement de la LVF, un régiment de supplétifs français de la Wehrmacht sur le front de l’est, qui constitué en 1941, étrillé par l’Armée rouge en hiver, est ensuite relégué à des missions anti-partisans
Les Allemands raclaient depuis un certain temps les fonds de tiroir et début mars 1945, les Soviétiques détruisirent en Poméranie la division SS française, dont le commandant allemand confia auparavant qu’il aurait préféré disposer de la Handschar, leurs homologues bosniaques. Quelques 300 survivants ont participé en avril à la défense de Berlin, capitale du Reich. Une douzaine d’autres se rendirent début mai aux Alliés occidentaux en Bavière. Mauvaise pioche, le général Philippe Leclerc les fit fusiller à Bad Reichenhall
Bad Reichenhall
En signe de contrition, Charles le Magne [grand] se résout même à raser sa barbe fleurie le 14 mai 2023, lorsque Volodymyr Zelenskyy reçoit le Internationaler Karlspreis zu Aachen [Prix international Charlemagne à Aix-la-Chapelle], que son ancienne capitale, aujourd’hui en Allemagne, aux frontières des Pays-Bas et de la Belgique, décerne chaque année, depuis 1950,pour unengagement en faveur de l’unification européenne. Le communiqué explique que depuis le 24 février 2022, début de l’opération militaire spéciale [appellation russe], Volodymyr Zelenskyy et le peuple d’Ukraine défendent l’Europe et ses valeurs
Une association de malfaiteurs (Federico Gambarini / dpa)
À noter que les récipiendaires de 2022 comptaient Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, une opposante biélorusse, qui après sa défaite à l’élection présidentielle de 2020, s’est exilée en Pologne, parle devant le parlement européen et visite Joe Biden à Washington, exhorte tout le monde à imposer des sanctions économiques contre son propre pays, la Biélorussie. Vous voyez le genre, je parle de l’hystérie, voire le bellicisme, du comité qui décerne le prix.
Valeurs, qu’ils disent. Le 9 décembre 2022 déjà, l’anthropologue et historien Emmanuel Todd a soulevé que les valeurs, c’est comme la culture ou la confiture. Vous connaissez la suite, moins on en a, plus on les étale
https://youtu.be/mCVsoYjihdE
Volodymyr Zelenskyy n’est pas nécessairement nazi. Je le vois plutôt comme un comédien cocaïnomane et opportuniste, que ses sponsors ont fait élire président le 20 mai 2019, avec la promesse de faire la paix dans le Donbass, région russophone de l’est de l’Ukraine, qui réclamait l’autonomie, quand les nationalistes ukrainiens commencèrent à la bombarder fin mai 2014. Les événements sont bien décrits par Scott Ritter (entretien en Anglais), ancien officier de renseignement de l’US Marine Corps, puis inspecteur de l’ONU en Irak, une référence qui eut par exemple la sagacité de comprendre et d’alerter en 2003, tel Roland au col de Roncevaux, que le pays ne disposait pas d’armes de destruction massive, que l’affirmation de leur existence n’était que le faux prétexte de l’invasion anglo-américaine
https://youtu.be/WPc8SRmSSMo
Depuis le coup d’État de droite sur la place Maïdan, en février 2014, les organisations paramilitaires nazies (texte en Anglais) décident de beaucoup de choses en Ukraine. Le Donbass en est une. Volodymyr Zelenskyy a vite compris qu’il ne devait pas appliquer son programme pacifique s’il tenait à la vie. Aux oubliettes donc, l’espoir des accords de Minsk, qui de toute manière, dans l’esprit de leurs premiers garants européens, Angela Merkel et le tristement célèbre François Hollande, n’étaient qu’une escroquerie pour berner la Russie. Porté par des événements qu’il ne contrôle pas vraiment, Zelenskyy est devenu ce qu’il est aujourd’hui, le porte-étendard de la guerre par procuration que l’OTAN mène en Ukraine contre la Russie. Une sorte de satrape des marches de l’empire, qui profite en effet de la vie. La corruption endémique lui a permis de gagner plusieurs centaines de millions de dollars, au bas mot, depuis son élection.
Les SS ukrainiens appartenaient à la 14. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SSGalizien, formée en avril 1943. Ils ont donc droit d’ainesse sur leurs homologues français. Bien que les autorités de l’ouest de l’Ukraine le réclament, le gouvernement central à Kiev n’a pas formellement reconnu leurs mérites. Leur célébration annuelle, le 28 avril, reste une manifestation autorisée mais non officielle
Le 28 avril 2021, Kiev célèbre le 78ème anniversaire de la division SS ukrainienne
L’État se contente d’émettre des timbres à leur effigie, ici pour le 75ème anniversaire
C’est à titre personnel que de nombreux combattants ukrainiens arborent l’insigne historique de la 14. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SSGalizien
La photo de droite est publiée sur le compte Telegram de Volodymyr Zelenskyy le 24 août 2022. Le sergent Mykhailo Malyuk appartient au bataillon volontaire de police spéciale Sich, émanation du parti nazi Svoboda, rattaché à la 93ème brigade d’infanterie mécanisée
D’autres écussons leur permettent d’afficher leur héritage idéologique. La version modernisée de la Totenkopf est très répandue parmi les militaires ukrainiens
La Totenkopf originale (gauche) était l’emblême de la 3. SS-Panzerdivision. Le casque de la version modernisée présente également une clef, qui était l’emblème de la 1. SS-Panzer-Division, Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler (droite). Cet écusson est commercialié par l’entreprise ukrainienne R3ich
Le problème de la 14. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SSGalizien est qu’elle était sous commandement allemand, pas assez nationale. Mais l’Ukraine ne manque pas de héros historiques nazis. Chaque année depuis 2015, le 14 octobre, le pays célèbre officiellement le Jour des défenseurs. La date correspond à la fondation en 1942 de l’UPA, Armée insurrectionnelle ukrainienne
Elle était la branche militaire de l’OUN, Organisation des nationalistes ukrainiens du criminel de guerre nazi Stepan Bandera
Elle fut formée dans la clandestinité, quand les nationalistes eurent compris qu’Adolf Hitler ne leur accorderait pas un État fasciste ukrainien, allié de l’Allemagne nazie. Elle n’a pas affronté les forces allemandes mais opéré un nettoyage ethnique, le massacre d’au moins 50 000, peut être 100 000 civils polonais. Puis en 1944, quand l’Armée rouge victorieuse est parvenue dans ses zones d’opération, l’UPA a commencé, en collaboration avec les services secrets SS, à mener une guérilla contre les libérateurs. Après la guerre, l’organisation a été prise en main dès 1946 par le renseignement britannique, qui s’en est servi pour conduire des opération de sabotage en Ukraine soviétique. Stepan Bandera avait trouvé refuge en Allemagne fédérale, où le KGB parvint à le liquider en 1959.
Et rebelote, voilà ce que Charlemagne doit encore se coltiner. D’ailleurs, le prix n’est pas décerné à proprement parler par l’Europe, mais par l’Union européenne. Nicolas Sarkozy a imposé aux Français cette organisation bureaucratique supranationale en 2008. Elle est doté d’un exécutif, la Commission, dont la présidente est actuellement une allemande, Frau Ursula von der Leyen. Les masques sont aujourd’hui tombés, l’Union européenne apparaît comme un espace libre-échangiste sur le territoire de l’OTAN, dont elle defend scrupuleusement les intérêts militaro-politiques. Sa puissance dominante est l’Allemagne, dont la soumission aux États-Unis est telle, qu’elle a accepté sans broncher le sabotage de Nord Stream (attention, ce lien pointe sur un véritable travail de journaliste) par ses maîtres. Charlemagne est encore compromis, à l’insu de son plein gré, pour l’Europe et contre les Russes.
L’Allemagne était coupée en deux, en 1964, quand France Gall chantait Sacré Charlemagne, le meilleur hommage qui lui a été rendu jusqu’à présent