Analista senior di l'intelligenza in u campu di a gestione di i risichi di sicurezza, sรฒ un anzianu tenente detective รจ ufficiale di l'intelligenza in l'agenzie di u Statu francese. A bona pronuncia hรจ ะะธะบะพะปะฐะน ะงะธะฝะบัะธะฝะธ, in russu
The mainstreaming of Olena Semenyaka, organizer of the โWhite Reconquistaโ
Semenyaka (second from left) at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv, November 2026
Olena Semenyaka, the international secretary of the Azov movement, and its main advocate for a โWhite Reconquistaโ in Europe, has made serious inroads over the past year, culminating in her invitation to the U.S. embassy in Kyiv on Monday to celebrate the 251st birthday of the Marine Corps. โWe are trying to become mainstream without compromising some of our core ideas,โ Semenyaka said years ago, explaining that โitโs possible for far-right leaders to come to power nowโ in Europe, and she โwants a position at the front of this movement.โ
In 2020, a French researcher dubbed Semenyaka โThe โFirst Ladyโ of Ukrainian Nationalism.โ This is a woman who once posed with a Nazi flag, extending her right arm above her head, and admitted that she hopes โto create our own Right International,โ and has even praised the neo-Nazi accelerationist โMisanthropic Divisionโ as being among โthe best of the modern Right.โ In 2019, she apparently told the U.S. neo-Nazi website โCounter-Currentsโ that โwe are striving for power and are ready to implement different scenarios,โ boasting that the Azov movement had a โmilitary wing unseen since the times of WW2.โ There is, of course, no evidence that Semenyaka has moderated her extremist views or ambitions. In 2024, for example, she attended a pan-European neo-Nazi conference in Lviv, which she may have organized herself, supported by several Ukrainian military intelligence units
Earlier this year, the Ukrainian online newspaper Left Bank apparently searched far and wide for a decent picture of Semenyaka, landing on this one. She is sitting at a table adorned with the Black Sun, a notorious neo-Nazi symbol
Almost a year ago, Olena Semenyaka attended (and helped to organize) the annual youth conference of the Kyiv Security Forum (KSF), โUkraineโs Premier International Platform on War, Peace, and Security,โ which is partnered with NATO. According to Semenyaka, โI had the honor to contribute to the even greater involvement of the 3rd Army Corps,โ in other words, the Azov movement. As a result, the head of research and development for the 3rd Army Corpsโ anti-aircraft regiment (โBocheโ) shared the stage with the managing director of Quantum Systems, a German military technology company based in Munich. One of the organizers even thanked Semenyaka for making โan invaluable contribution to the preparation and implementation of the 11th KSF for young people! Iโm sure we have many more joint projects ahead of us!โ
Olena Semenyaka posted these pictures of herself with Kateryna Sychova, the โultra-productive representativeโ of the KSF that involved her in organizing the event
Some weeks before the KSF youth event, Semenyaka appears to have dined with Jannis George and Annie Hunecke, a pair of Germans associated with the AfDโs youth organization and the European white nationalist โIdentitarianโ movement. Earlier this year, George and Hunecke interviewed Greg Bovino, the former commander of Donald Trumpโs U.S. Border Patrol, at the 2026 โRemigration Summitโ in Portugal, which was hosted by a group called โReconquistaโ to advocate for ethnic cleansing Europe via mass deportations
Days before the 2026 Remigration Summit, Jannis George published a video featuring Semenyaka from his 2025 trip to Ukraine with Annie Hunecke
At the start of 2026, Olena Semenyaka sat down for a podcast interview conducted by Hanna Hopko, a famous โanti-corruption activistโ and former โliberal nationalistโ politician who chaired the foreign affairs committee of the Verkhovna Rada (2014-19), during which time she all but lived in Washington and indulged her fantasy of breaking up Russia into numerous states. In 2014, Hopko gave Vice President Joe Biden a tour of Independence Square (the famous โMaidanโ) in Kyiv, and he introduced her at a โDemocracy Award Dinnerโ back in Washington.
Hopko introduced Semenyaka to her small audience as a โphilosopherโ who โresearches various right-wing radical movements.โ The episode is titled, โEurope on the brink of collapse. Ukraine โ the last shield against the Kremlin.โ The video starts with Hopko commenting, โWe must do everything we can to ensure that Russia repeats the fate of the Soviet Union,โ and Semenyaka says, โWe are truly on the verge of a possible third world war, redivision of the world, new totalitarian tendencies.โ The thumbnail of the video declares, โOn the Doorstep. Third World Warโ
According to Olena Semenyaka, she was invited to the 2026 Kyiv Security Forum by its executive director, Ramina Shut. This is apparently the right-hand woman to Arseniy Yatsenyuk, the former Prime Minister of Ukraine (2014-16) who founded the KSF. At this yearโs event, Semenyaka took a group picture with Steven Pifer, a former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine (1998-2000) who is affiliated with the Freeman Spogli Institute at Stanford University, and Hannah Thoburn, a senior fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis in Washington and former staffer of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (2019-24). Semenyaka also met Andrzej Duda, the former President of Poland (2015-25). In the following days, she attended an event organized by the Polish embassy
Semenyaka with Duda, Thoburn, and Pifer at the 2026 Kyiv Security Forum
During the summer of 2026, Olena Semenyaka and other Azovites (including Andriy Holubev, deputy chief of staff of the 3rd Army Corps) completed a โleadership courseโ sponsored by the Ukrainian Freedom Fund (UFF), a 501(c)(3) charity established in 2014 and headquartered in a small town in Wyoming. In September, Ukraineโs new commander-in-chief Mykhailo Drapaty addressed one of these โUFF-supported courses.โ The UFF says that it has a โclose and trusted relationship with the leadership of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.โ What about the U.S. military or intelligence community?
Olena Semenyaka at the โUFF-supported courseโ
UFF founder Andrew Bain is a U.S. Marine Corps veteran who is credited as โone of the early founders of the advertising and media industries in Ukraine.โ In 2022, he co-founded the โMozart Group,โ a private military company for western volunteers to counter the Russian โWagner Groupโ in Ukraine. He did so with Andrew Milburn, who (according to the Middle East Institute) โretired from the Marine Corps in 2019 as the Deputy Commander of Special Operations Command Central, the headquarters responsible for all US special operations in the Middle East.โ
The Mozart Group imploded by January 2023, not long after Milburn drunkenly rambled on a podcast about Ukraine killing Russian prisoners of war and having a โcorrupt, fucked-up society.โ As for Bain, he remains the CEO of the Ukrainian Freedom Fund and a โtraining company,โ Sonata Holding LLC, also based in Afton, Wyoming, that appears to be a successor to the Mozart Group. Representatives of โSonataโ recently celebrated the 251st birthday of the Marine Corps with Olena Semenyaka
The reported address of Sonata Holding LLC is occupied by a tax accountant
In 2023-24, Sonata Holding signed a memorandum of cooperation with the Kyiv Polytechnic Institute and conducted a โMilitary Decision Making Process Courseโ for staff members of Ukraineโs National Army Academy. Aside from sharing a CEO, there seems to be significant overlap between โSonataโ and the UFF, such as Trent Gibson, seen in the photo below standing on the far right. Gibson, a Marine Corps veteran, is the โTraining and Operations Directorโ at Sonata, which he says is โone of the few private firms conducting in-country training with the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense for officers and staff.โ Shortly before attending the event at the U.S. embassy, Sonata โexpertโ Andriy Ryzhenko (also seen below) joined a UFF delegation that traveled to Texas and met with the Dallas mayorโs office. Ryzhenko is a Ukrainian Navy veteran and former NATO staff officer who writes for the Eurasia Daily Monitor, which is published by the Jamestown Foundation, a conservative think thank founded in 1984 with the support of Ronald Reaganโs CIA director
From left to right: unidentified, Olena Semenyaka, unidentified, Andriy Ryzhenko (Sonata LLC), Anastasia Polishchuk, and Trent Gibson (Sonata LLC)
Olena Semenyaka now describes herself as an analyst at the โInstitute for Cognitive Defense,โ which Mykhailo Basarab, a senior fellow of the Kyiv Security Forum, launched in September 2026. In the summer of 2019, after Volodymyr Zelensky was elected in a landslide promising to end the war in eastern Ukraine, Basarab speculated on TV that Zelenskyโs presidency was a โRussian special operation.โ He subsequently joined the leadership of the far-right โCapitulation Resistance Movement,โ which threatened Zelensky with a potentially far bloodier โMaidanโ uprising if he negotiated with Russia. At the end of 2019, Zelensky and Putin met face to face in Paris, but there was no diplomatic breakthrough. With Andriy Biletsky, leader of the Azov movement, standing on stage behind him, Mykhailo Basarab assured anti-peace protesters that night in Kyiv that โZelensky did not cross red lines.โ At some point, Basarab became friends with Semenyaka.
For now, the โInstitute of Cognitive Defenceโ has launched a small Youtube show. Semenyaka has appeared in two of its panel discussions since late October, titled โEuropeโs Protests: What Russia Wants You to Believe?โ and โThe Ukrainians Putin Fears Most: Why Russia Targets Azov and the Third Assault Corps.โ For the first one, she was joined by Mykhailo Basarab and Serhiy Kvit, another former leader of the Capitulation Resistance Movement, and the president of Semenyakaโs Azov-friendly alma mater, the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy (NaUKMA). Earlier this year at the NaUKMA museum, Kvit and Semenyaka introduced an essay contest for โconservativeโ students
Kvit and Semenyaka at the NaUKMA museum
Just days ago, Semenyaka and Basarab tackled the recent exposure of a secret detention facility run by the 1st Azov Corps in the Kyiv region, mainly by discussing the years long โRussian propagandaโ about neo-Nazis in Ukraine. Olena Semenyaka singled out Le Monde, Bellingcat, and the U.S.-funded RFE/RL for spreading lies about her and the Azov movement, for example that she spent years trying to cultivate a โright-wing extremist international.โ She concluded that the Ukrainian military (read: Azov units) should โcommunicate more actively with our Western partners to influence them,โ and suggested there needs to be โaccountability for spreading all these toxic narratives,โ whether it be for Ukrainian civilians resisting mobilization, or western journalists
One day after the Institute for Cognitive Defense published its latest episode with Semenyaka, the Marine Corps turned 251 years old, and El Pais reported that the Spanish neo-Nazi group Nรบcleo Nacional (โNational Coreโ) received paramilitary training from the 1st Azov Corps in order to โcarry out an armed uprisingโ back home in Spain. However, I suspect that they actually trained with the 3rd Army Corps, and eventually we will learn that Semenyaka had something to do with it
Nรบcleo Nacional published this image of its members in Ukraine, overlaid with the symbol of their group, which is reminiscent of the Azovite โIdea of the Nationโ wolfsangel. Some of their sweatshirts say โStorm Front,โ referencing one of the oldest neo-Nazi internet forums, founded in the 1990s by a former KKK leader, but they also include the symbol of the 3rd Assault Brigade and 3rd Army Corps.
Marco Rubioโs speeches invoking a shared Western civilization are part of the ideological consolidation of fascism, mobilizing white racial solidarity to defend a declining capitalist order
its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine, chronicle
chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia
se fait appeler Professeur Didier Ragoรปt sur Twitter, est conseiller en gestion de patrimoine ร Besanรงon, lorsqu’en mars 2022, sans expรฉrience militaire, il se prรฉcipite en Ukraine
Sur la photo du haut, Nicolas Yahmi et Dmytro Iarosh sont enlacรฉs le 6 mai 2022 (rรฉseaux sociaux)
Il semble surtout passionnรฉ par les femmes ukrainiennes. L’Amour rend aveugle et le 6 mai 2022, il ne rรฉalise pas qu’il est photographiรฉ au cรดtรฉ de Dmytro Iarosh, fondateur et dirigeant jusqu’en novembre 2015 du parti nazi Pravyi sektor [Secteur droit], commandant depuis de l’Armรฉe des volontaires ukrainiens (Ukrayinska dobrovolcha armiya, UDA), une formation paramilitaire de mรชme inspiration
(Capture d’รฉcran)
C’est en plus charmante compagnie que le 13 juin, le joli coeur entonne gaiement Zrodylysสน my z velykoyi hodyny [Nous sommes nรฉs ร une grande รฉpoque], l’hymne pendant la 2de guerre mondiale de l’UPA, formation paramilitaire nazie ukrainienne.
Aux derniรจres nouvelles, il est bien au front, opรฉrateur de drones. Yahmi est Looping, l’un des deux personnages ร l’รฉtรฉ 2023 du cirque animรฉ par le propagandiste Xavier Tytelman. L’autre est Franck Malandain, le sniper.
Sur Twitter le 11 septembre, il rรฉpond en Anglais, que je traduis ici, ร un message ancien du ministรจre russe des affaires รฉtrangรจres, le 8 juin 2022, qui fit mention dโune base publique de donnรฉes sur les mercenaires et volontaires รฉtrangers dans les rangs atlantistes
Tous les Russes doivent mourir : je suis vraiment fier dโapparaรฎtre sur votre siteโฆ ordures !
Le gรฉnocide russe est un fantasme historique et rรฉcurrent chez les nationalistes ukrainiens. Il nโa pas รฉtรฉ nรฉcessaire de beaucoup gratter le vernis du cรฉlibataire en bonne situation professionnelle [Yahmi, selon Tytelman].
Le propagandiste l’interviewe le 7 janvier 2024. Nul besoin de s’attarder sur leurs mรฉdiocres analyses. Le document est mรฉmorable, car les traits tirรฉs, Tytelman se dรฉvoile depuis Kiev sur des questions plus gรฉnรฉrales. La Russie nous fait du mal, disent ils tous deux. En quoi fait elle du mal ? L’expert de LCI l’explique avec sincรฉritรฉ, dirait le commandant Thรฉobald Dromard
Les Black Lives Matter [BLM, mouvement de protestation contre les violences policiรจres dont sont plus particuliรจrement victimes les gens de couleur], aux รtats Unis, sont financรฉes par la Russie. Les ONG de soutien, woke et tout ces trucs lร , sont soutenues. La famille Traore [celle d’Adama, tuรฉ par des gendarmes en 2016], vous connaissez l’histoire de la famille Traore, est soutenue financiรจrement, l’ONG qui la soutient, a รฉtรฉ crรฉรฉe par Wagner
(Capture d’รฉcran)
Voilร donc les angoisses existentielles qui dรฉterminent lโengagement de ces deux petits bourgeois rรฉactionnaires. Voilร pourquoi Yahmi, ร son arrivรฉe en Ukraine, intรฉgra une formation paramilitaire nazie. Il ose mรชme brandir sa judaรฏcitรฉ comme une certificat dโantifascisme, alors que le ghetto palestinien de Gaza est ร feu et ร sang
Situation le 7 janvier 2024 de la rรฉsistance dans le ghetto palestinien de Gaza (Islamic World News) : plus de 20 000 civils y ont dรฉjร รฉtรฉ tuรฉs par les Israรฉliens depuis le 7 octobre, quelques 60 000 autres blessรฉs. Plus de 40% sont des enfants
Le petit bourgeois rรฉactionnaire a รฉtรฉ et sera toujours lโengrais du fascisme, dans une Europe qui en restera le ventre fรฉcond
Quelques uns des patches que depuis l’Ukraine, la confrรฉrie nazie internationale Misanthropic Division, fondรฉe et basรฉe en Ukraine depuis 2013, vend ร travers les sociรฉtรฉs occidentales (Telegram)
Le 7 octobre 2024, la tรฉlรฉvision ukrainienne diffuse un entretien avec Yahmi. Aprรจs une blessure six mois plus tรดt, fin mars ou dรฉbut avril, il a quittรฉ les forces armรฉes et participe ร la conception dโun nouveau modรจle de drone
(Capture d’รฉcran)
Le journaliste arbore un t-shirt ร la gloire de l’organisation nazie Azov et le Franรงais sโautorise ร blรขmer les rรฉfractaires, les Ukrainiens qui ne vont pas se battre
ร la sortie d’un concert ร Kiev, le soir du 11 octobre 2024, des sergents recruteurs et leurs renforts policiers orientent des volontaires enthousiastes pour le casse pipe (capture d’รฉcran de vidรฉo amateur)
Quelques centaines de milliers ont dรฉjร รฉtรฉ immolรฉs, aprรจs leur mobilisation de force dans une guerre par procuration de lโOTAN. Le fat rรฉclame aussi un affrontement direct entre lโEurope et la Russie. Je lโencourage vivement ร y retourner, pour donner lโexemple.
Dans une vidรฉo quโil publie le 31 janvier 2025, il taquine un poste frontalier de la rรฉgion russe de Belgorod, quand la sanction atteint le bรขtiment qui lui sert de poste de pilotage, peut รชtre un tir direct de char. Son camarade Micha semble plus particuliรจrement blessรฉ. Jโimagine que leurs moyens de guerre รฉlectronique ont permis aux Russes de localiser les opรฉrateurs. Les images datent du 12 mars 2024, illustrent donc sa propre blessure
(Captures dโรฉcran)
Petite remarque dรฉontologique : il nโest pas trรจs honnรชte, pour faire croire au succรจs de son propre travail de rรฉglage dโartillerie, dโavoir mixรฉ des images russes -avec logo tchรฉtchรจne- de frappes sur le mรชme poste frontalier de Belgorod, lors de lโincursion ukrainienne de mai 2023.
fabricant de premier plan de drones plรฉbiscitรฉs par les services rรฉgaliens des dรฉmocraties les plus exigeantes
rien de moins, qui le congรฉdia le 31 janvier 2025, jour de la publication de la vidรฉo de sa blessure. L’ex consultant rรฉclame aujourdโhui 110 millions dโeuros, dont 100 pour frais mรฉdicaux, se rรฉserve le droit de rรฉvรฉler aux vastes restes du monde ce quโil sait de la juteuse collaboration entre Parrot, services de renseignement ukrainien (HUR) et DGSE.
Je serai toujours du cรดtรฉ des forรงats de la faim, lance ici un appel solennel ร Henri Jรฉrรดme Seydoux Fornier de Clausonne et ร la finance occidentale. Payez donc le pourboire que vous devez ร votre porte-flingue malheureux Nicolas Yahmi
https://youtu.be/wKVMupmQ7eE
Je suggรจre au lanceur dโalerte dโรชtre trรจs attentif dans les prochains jours aux risques que prรฉsentent les tirs amis, car il รฉvolue quand mรชme dans un environnement oรน les gens sont presque aussi armรฉs quโen Corse.
Il a sans doute aussi menacรฉ un peu de sโen prendre ร lโintรฉgritรฉ physique des trous du cul [c’est moi qui le dis] qui peuplent les couloirs de Parrot. Arrรชtรฉ en France le 26 aoรปt 2025, il est dโabord placรฉ en dรฉtention provisoire ร Fresnes
le 19 octobre 2025 (journaliste marseillais Frรฉdรฉric Munsch)
Le 19 octobre, dans une dรฉcision qui rappelle le bon vieux temps de la Cour de sรปretรฉ de lโรtat, le tribunal correctionnel condamne le gueux Yahmi ร deux ans de prison, dont quatre mois ferme, pour menaces et tentative dโextorsion. Dormez sur vos deux oreilles, les pinzuti ; votre justice veille tout particuliรจrement ร la sรฉrรฉnitรฉ du marchand d’armes Henri Seydoux.
chronique alphabรฉtique et nรฉcrologique de lโengagement franรงais dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas
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chronique en Anglais, its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine
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En 2025, une nouvelle unitรฉ de Franรงais combattant pour lโUkraine sโest structurรฉe autour dโun noyau de nรฉonazis, ayant pour objectif dโattirer des recrues. Parmi ces volontaires, dโanciens militaires. StreetPress les a identifiรฉs
En Ukraine, les volontaires franรงais pro-ukrainiens et pro-russes se partagent lโimaginaire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Les premiers se revendiquent des collabos de lโAllemagne nazie, les seconds de lโescadrille mythique ยซ Normandie โ Niรฉmen ยป
deux jours aprรจs le 10e anniversaire de la dรฉbรขcle politique et sรฉcuritaire du 13 novembre 2015, une messe cรฉlรจbre ร Verdun lโancien dirigeant fasciste de lโรtat franรงais
ce 11 novembre 2025 est lโoccasion de souligner comme la faรงon dont lโEurope sacrifie les conscrits ukrainiens mobilisรฉs de force rappelle le spectaculaire carnage de la 1รจre guerre mondiale
cโest par lโagence cosaque de presse PIKA, depuis la Rรฉpublique populaire de Lougansk, que le 2 avril 2024, lโataman Nikolaรฏ Diakonov lance un message ร destination de la France
ce papier est le premier des grands mรฉdias franรงais qui sโattaque ร la question des militants nazis franรงais dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, le nouveau danger quโils prรฉsenteront ร terme pour la sรปretรฉ intรฉrieure
oรน nous apprenons que le nazi franรงais Allan Duchรฉzeau, camarade de Cรฉsar Aujard dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, รฉtait surnommรฉ Dox, quand il secondait ร Paris le leader nazi Marc de Cacqueray Valmรฉnier
en Anglais, les indices de la prรฉsence dโopรฉrateurs occidentaux, en particulier Franรงais, pris au piรจge en mars 2022 ร Marioupol, dont les forces russes achevรจrent la libรฉration en mai
Le 24 aoรปt 2024, Jour de l’indรฉpendance en Ukraine, Xavier Tytelman publie ce selfie sur X. Il porte un t-shirt qui reproduit l’insigne de la 14. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS, Galizien [Galicie, rรฉgion de Lviv], la division SS ukrainienne entre 1943 et 1945
a รฉtรฉ souvent รฉvoquรฉ dans cette chronique par le passรฉ, au travers des entretiens avec des volontaires franรงais qu’il publie habituellement sur YouTube. Le propagandiste mรฉrite son propre chapitre, car il sรฉjourne souvent en Ukraine, recueille en France des dons pour ces volontaires franรงais et apparaรฎt rรฉguliรจrement sur le plateau de la chaรฎne de propagande LCI, oรน il s’illustre par une objectivitรฉ qui fait passer Joseph Goebbels pour un honnรชte journaliste.
Sa technique consiste ร choisir et documenter des anecdotes tactiques pour alimenter son discours. Ou peut รชtre que sa connaissance et sa pratique de l’univers militaire ne lui permettent vraiment pas de comprendre les contextes opรฉrationnel et stratรฉgique. Il est animรฉ en rรฉalitรฉ par une russophobie obsessionnelle et de faรงon plus large, une idรฉologie profondรฉment rรฉactionnaire (cf. Nicolas Yahmi).
Le 24 aoรปt 2024 est le Jour de l’indรฉpendance en Ukraine. Il publie sur X un selfie qui le montre sur le site d’une borne qui marque la frontiรจre entre rรฉgion de Kharkov et Rรฉpublique populaire de Donetsk, dont une partie est toujours occupรฉe par l’Ukraine.
Il a l’habitude de s’exprimer au travers de ses t-shirts, arbore parfois le logo du film Top Gun, illustration de son bagage culturel et de ses fantasmes. Celui d’aujourd’hui affiche plutรดt l’insigne de la 14. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS, Galizien [Galicie, rรฉgion de Lviv], la division SS ukrainienne entre 1943 et 1945
Cรฉrรฉmonie de prestation de serment de SS ukrainiens en 1943
Son Histoire rรฉcente est intรฉressante, car elle illustre ร quel point l’รtat ukrainien est infectรฉ par l’idรฉologie nazie. ร l’origine, le seul lion รฉtait l’emblรจme de la Principautรฉ de Galicie-Volhynie, ร l’extrรฉmitรฉ ouest de l’actuelle Ukraine, qui fut absorbรฉe par la Pologne au XIVe siรจcle. Sept siรจcles plus tard, ce lion peut toujours reprรฉsenter la rรฉgion de Lviv, berceau du nazisme endรฉmique ukrainien, mais pas l’ensemble de l’Ukraine, encore moins les rรฉgions russophones du Donbass, enjeu d’une guerre depuis 2014
Anniversaire ร Kiev, le 28 avril 2021, de la fondation en 1943 de la division SS ukrainienne
Agrรฉmentรฉ de trois couronnes, ce mรชme lion devint en 1943 l’insigne de la division SS que les autoritรฉs allemandes recrutaient dans la rรฉgion de Lviv, considรฉrรฉe par elles comme la partie orientale de la Pologne occupรฉe. Le 5 dรฉcembre 2022, aprรจs cinq annรฉes de dรฉbats juridiques, la Cour suprรชme de l’Ukraine dรฉclara que l’insigne SS n’รฉtait pas seulement un symbole nazi et qu’il n’รฉtait pas illรฉgal de l’afficher. Plus illรฉgal mais brandit habituellement par les militants nazis ukrainiens lors de leurs hommages ร la division SS
Un point de dรฉtail
Je ne voudrais pas paraรฎtre pointilleux mais ce dรฉtail m’est signalรฉ par un camarade sur Telegram : qu’exprime t’il par le Mjรถllnir [marteau de Thor, dieu scandinave de la foudre], quโil porte aussi au cou ? Un symbole pas trรจs catholique, qui en Pologne du XIVe siรจcle, aurait envoyรฉ Tytelman au bรปcher. Cโest visiblement lโรฉclate, quand il sโรฉloigne des studios de LCI et se rapproche du Donbass. Goebbels dรฉplorait lโinfluence chrรฉtienne et considรฉrait les slaves comme des animaux primitifs venus de la toundra sibรฉrienne. Jโaimerais connaรฎtre ร ce sujet la pensรฉe profonde de l’expert de chaรฎne franรงaise d’information
Puis je reprends mes esprits et me demande : quel message nous envoie la chaรฎne franรงaise d’information, quand son expert Tytelman arbore en direct l’insigne de la 14. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS ?
Le 21 novembre 2024, cโest avec stupeur que jโapprends par un article du Canard enchaรฎnรฉ que le taux dโaudience de la chaรฎne franรงaise d’information LCI sโest effondrรฉ au mois dโoctobre, loin derriรจre CNews et BFMTV, car elle se montre de moins en moins regardante sur la compรฉtence de ses consultants. Les experts รฉtaient donc des vessies, percรฉs, les tuyaux d’Alla Poedie, Xavier Tytelman ou Michel Yakovleff. Bigre. Voilร des nouvelles qui pourraient nous faire douter de la supรฉrioritรฉ tactique et de la victoire du camp occidental au Donbass et en Ukraine.
Le 30 novembre 2025 et jours suivants anรฉantissent les derniรจres chances de Xavier Tytelman de paraรฎtre un jour respectable. Il prรฉsente sur LCI deux tรฉmoins franรงais de la 12e brigade spรฉciale, รฉmanation de l’organisation nazie Azov dans la garde nationale ukrainienne. Son projet est de faire croire au public innocent de la chaรฎne de propagande que lโarmรฉe atlantiste tiendrait bon au Donbass. Comme dโhabitude, il veille tel un ventriloque ร la bonne restitution de son script par ses acolytes
(Capture d’รฉcran)
Et comme toujours, la rรฉalitรฉ nโa aucun รฉgard pour ses allรฉgations. Krasnoarmeรฏsk, que les Ukrainiens appellent Pokrovsk, est prise par lโarmรฉe russe depuis le 23 novembre et cette libรฉration scelle lโencerclement de la garnison voisine de Myrnograd.
L’opรฉration de dรฉsinformation suscite de vifs dรฉbats sur les rรฉseaux sociaux et Tytelman tente de prendre sa revanche quand il partage le lendemain sur YouTube la vidรฉo de lโรฉmission. Je manque de mโรฉvanouir ร la lecture de la lรฉgende. Il รฉcrit
[โฆ] cette vidรฉo dรฉmonte au passage la propagande russe d’une Ukraine pleine de nazis [โฆ]
au motif que Mohamed Boukhris est Maghrรฉbin. J’en suis รฉmu, tant le fan dโEric Zemmour me rapproche du sublime
sur Twitter le 4 juillet 2019
Il nโest pas seulement raciste ร lโรฉgard des peuples du sud, souffre aussi dโune russophobie pathologique, dรฉclara par exemple le 7 janvier 2024, sur sa propre chaรฎne YouTube (cf. Nicolas Yahmi)
Les Black Lives Matter [BLM, mouvement de protestation contre les violences policiรจres dont sont plus particuliรจrement victimes les gens de couleur], aux รtats Unis, sont financรฉes par la Russie. Les ONG de soutien, woke et tout ces trucs lร , sont soutenues. La famille Traore [celle dโAdama, tuรฉ par des gendarmes en 2016], vous connaissez lโhistoire de la famille Traore, est soutenue financiรจrement, lโONG qui la soutient, a รฉtรฉ crรฉรฉe par Wagner
Sa principale carence est qu’il est dotรฉ de la culture gรฉnรฉrale d’une huรฎtre, donc raccord avec LCI. Il devra apprendre que par exemple en 1944, la Gestapo franรงaise de la rue Lauriston employait dรฉjร une Lรฉgion nord-africaine (LNA)
Les reprรฉsailles de Tytelman sont dโune grande cruautรฉ le 3 dรฉcembre. Alors que je me torture pour savoir sโil me faut suivre ses publications, ou pas, il mโinterdit de mโabonner ร son compte sur X.
Un bonheur nโarrive jamais seul et dans un article qui tombe ร point nommรฉ le 2 dรฉcembre, sous le titre Comment la France s’est lancรฉe dans la riposte aux trolls -ce dont il se rรฉjouit- le magazine hebdomadaire atlantiste et nรฉolibรฉral LโExpress rรฉpond : par la dรฉsinformation
Lโancien chefaillon entre 2013 et 2017 de la Cellule mรฉdias sociaux en gestion de lโurgence du ministรจre de l’Intรฉrieur, Xavier Tytelman, figure parmi des influenceurs qui opรจrent ร la solde du quai dโOrsay et du ministรจre des Armรฉes.
chronique alphabรฉtique et nรฉcrologique de lโengagement franรงais dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas
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une saga franรงaise, entre Ukraine et Lyon, oรน apparaissent aussi des morceaux de SS de la division Charlemagne et plus rรฉcemment, Alice Kerviel, dite Cordier. L’affaire Deranque rรฉvรจle comme la France est infectรฉe par le pรฉtainisme, en particulier parmi les soutiens d’Israรซl ou de l’Ukraine, deux thรฉรขtres d’opรฉrations oรน l’Occident tente de ralentir son dรฉclin
En 2025, une nouvelle unitรฉ de Franรงais combattant pour lโUkraine sโest structurรฉe autour dโun noyau de nรฉonazis, ayant pour objectif dโattirer des recrues. Parmi ces volontaires, dโanciens militaires. StreetPress les a identifiรฉs
En Ukraine, les volontaires franรงais pro-ukrainiens et pro-russes se partagent lโimaginaire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Les premiers se revendiquent des collabos de lโAllemagne nazie, les seconds de lโescadrille mythique ยซ Normandie โ Niรฉmen ยป
deux jours aprรจs le 10e anniversaire de la dรฉbรขcle politique et sรฉcuritaire du 13 novembre 2015, une messe cรฉlรจbre ร Verdun lโancien dirigeant fasciste de lโรtat franรงais
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cโest par lโagence cosaque de presse PIKA, depuis la Rรฉpublique populaire de Lougansk, que le 2 avril 2024, lโataman Nikolaรฏ Diakonov lance un message ร destination de la France
ce papier est le premier des grands mรฉdias franรงais qui sโattaque ร la question des militants nazis franรงais dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, le nouveau danger quโils prรฉsenteront ร terme pour la sรปretรฉ intรฉrieure
oรน nous apprenons que le nazi franรงais Allan Duchรฉzeau, camarade de Cรฉsar Aujard dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, รฉtait surnommรฉ Dox, quand il secondait ร Paris le leader nazi Marc de Cacqueray Valmรฉnier
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[my illustration: on May 3, 2026, Malian and Russian soldiers are patrolling together in a village (The African Corps)]
On May 13th, French outlet RTL published an explosive report, entirely unremarked upon by English language media. It exposed how Ukrainian military and intelligence units are covertly operating in Mali on Franceโs behalf, in coordination with both ethnic Tuareg rebels and Al Qaeda-linked forces determined to crush the countryโs revolutionary government. Furthermore, Kiev is keen to expand and escalate its African operations yet further, and destabilise neighbouring countries. Ukrainian militancy, long-encouraged by the CIA and MI6, has now decisively developed into an international threat.
In August 2020, elements of Maliโs military staged a coup, overthrowing Ibrahim Boubacar Keรฏta. Ever since, its government has sought to neutralise Western influence locally, while pursuingradical economic policies for the good of the population. French forces were booted out in 2022 after almost a decade of occupation. Mali has instead looked to China and Russia for economic, military and political assistance, while founding the revolutionary Alliance of Sahel States (AES) with neighbouring Burkina Faso and Niger.
Polling showsMalians almost universally embrace their government, and its close alliance with Moscow. However, Bamakoโs military administration has throughout its lifetime battled incursions from ethnic Tuareg rebels, backed by murderous extremist groups. Since late April, they have conducted combined offensives, capturingseveral towns, executing deadly strikes on major cities, attacking state buildings, and murdering Defense Minister Sadio Camara via car bomb. Moreover, government forces backed by Russiaโs Africa Corps have been ejected from several key areas.
Tuareg rebels gather in occupied Kidal, Mali, April 26th 2026
Bamako and Moscow characterise the bloody upheaval as a thwarted coup attempt. Nonetheless, the situation remains volatile, and potentially grave. RTL now reveals the Al Qaeda-linked unrest has been orchestrated and practically supported all along by โUkrainian soldiers on the ground, who are cooperating with the Tuareg rebels.โ In turn, France can โcontinue to operateโ in Mali โindirectlyโ. Through Kievโs cutouts, Paris provides โoperational supportโ to the unpopular and savage local counter-revolutionary insurgency, in the absence of her own occupying army.
Per RTL, โFrance relies in particular on numerous French-speaking Ukrainian soldiers who served in the Foreign Legion.โ Itโs not just French-sponsored Ukrainian soldiers attempting to foment civil war and regime change via brute force in Mali. Units of Kievโs fearsome CIA and MI6-constructed military intelligence agency, the GUR, are also present in profusion. By โlimiting its operational support to these Ukrainian proxies, France is thus avoiding direct cooperation with jihadists linked to Al-Qaedaโ into the bargain:
The Tuareg separatist rebels are seeking to weaken the junta in power in Bamako, while France and Ukraine want to overthrow the juntaโs Russian backers, the former Wagner militia members (renamed the Afrika Korps) who did everything they could to drive France out of Africa. A sharing of interestsโฆthe Tuareg rebels have a longstanding relationship with French intelligence services in the Sahel
โSyrian Scenarioโ
RTL reports how โa Franco-Ukrainian allianceโ to crush troublesome anti-imperial governments in Africa has been long in the making. Strikingly, Kiev took the lead. At the start of 2025, Ukrainian intelligence proposed a โdetailed planโ to their French counterparts, โto dislodge the juntas from the Sahel region, and push back the Russian enemyโ from the continent altogether. Paris reportedly โdid not follow up on this proposal, particularly due to security concerns.โ Yet, โthe lock has now been lifted.โ
To date, a fusion of battle strategies โseems to favor the jihadists, who are currently allied with Tuareg separatistsโ – not merely in Mali, but potentially wherever in the region Russian forces are present. As RTL notes, several Sahel countries harshly condemned Ukraineโs involvement in a brutal July 2024 rebel ambush, which allegedly killed 84 Wagner fighters, and 47 Malian soldiers. At the time, a GUR spokesperson boasted how Kievโs support to the rebels โenabled a successful military operation against Russian war criminalsโ
Al Qaeda-linked fighters in Mali supported by Ukraine, July 2024
Ukraineโs centrality to the bloodshed was openly advertised, prompting West African governments to issue statements making clear Kievโs local โinterferenceโ was highly unwelcome. Several summoned their respective Ukrainian ambassadors for verbal drubbings. Such was the opprobrium, the BBC contemporaneously enquired whether the operation represented an โown goal in Africa,โ threatening to wreck โpeaceful Ukrainian diplomacy.โ Undeterred, Kievโs military and intelligence conniving in the Sahel has only ratcheted since. RTL reports that Paris sees this counter-revolutionary activity as โproving its worth in the region.โ
The Ukrainian-enabled capture of โmajorโ cities by Maliโs local Al Qaeda affiliate has reportedly โcaused a stir between the ruling junta and its Russian ally.โ Moreover, Defense Minister Sadio Camaraโs assassination was โanother blowโ directly aimed at Russiaโs presence in Mali. Described as โnumber two in the juntaโ and โMoscowโs manโ, Camara โhad been trained in Russia.โ Whether his death will be militarily or politically impactful is an open question. But there are ominous indications Ukraine foresees a long engagement in the Sahel.
Alengthy essay published April 29th by Militarnyi, Ukraineโsmost prominentmilitary news site, lays bare Kievโs brutal cloak-and-dagger strategy in Mali and beyond. Headlined Islamist Offensive in Mali: The Prospect of a Syrian Scenario, it details how the successes of Ukraineโs Al Qaeda army in Mali – including Camaraโs assassination – are part of a wider military and intelligence operation concerned with โdislodging Russian-Chinese influence from the regionโ altogether. Damascusbeing overwhelmed by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in mere days in December 2024 is cited as inspiration.
โThe fall of Assad in Syria and the ascent of the radical Islamist [HTS] demonstrate that the radical wingโs transition to a moderate format occurs at the moment it takes power, assumes responsibility, and requires legitimization from the international community,โ Militarnyi remarks. Kievโs Mali machinations work in tandem with disruption of Moscowโs supply of food and agrochemicals to Sahelโs revolutionary governments, via โsystemic Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian refining and chemical production.โ These attacks aim to degrade โthe capacity of Russiaโs leading fertilizer firms.โ
Militarnyi promises, โthe intensity of Ukrainian strikes against Russian chemical sites will continue to climb.โ Meanwhile, Kiev has significantly contributed to the โintensified Islamist offensiveโ in Mali, dispatching instructors โdisseminating FPV drone tactics among insurgent forcesโ locally. โRebel battlefield effectivenessโ has therefore been โmaterially boostedโ. Beijing is also in the crosshairs of Ukraineโs Sahel offensive, as Moscowโs โhard-power backingโ of AES governments – and the โpopular loyaltyโ they enjoy among their populations due to grain and fertilizer deliveries – provides a โsecurity umbrella for Chinese investments.โ
โClandestine Maneuversโ
An October 2023, Washington Post investigation shed shocking light on the โraging shadow warโ waged by Ukrainian intelligence, throughout the Westโs proxy conflict with Russia. It documented how many of Kievโs high-profile foreign operations, including targeted assassinations of figures such as Daria Dugin, were the work of โelite teams of Ukrainian operatives drawn from directoratesโฆformed, trained and equipped in close partnership with the CIA.โ From 2015 onwards, US spies โforged deep new bondsโ with Ukrainian security and intelligence services, almost rebuilding them โfrom scratchโ entirely.
Notwithstanding the CIAโs separate effective takeover of the SBU, the Agencyโs โextensive transformation of the GURโ alone extended to spending many millions of dollars creating new headquarters for the GURโs โparamilitary division and a separate directorate responsible for electronic espionage.โ The CIA has since 2015 variously provided Kiev โwith advanced surveillance systems, trained recruits at sitesโ in Ukraine as well as the US, and much more besides. โThe new capabilities were transformative,โ turning Kievโs spying agencies into โpotent allies against Moscow.โ
In that capacity, the GUR intercepted hundreds of thousands of โseparate communicationsโ from Russian military and FSB units on the CIAโs behalf daily. Strikingly, the GUR also โbegan recruiting operatives for its own new active measures department.โ Already, just over 18 months into the proxy war, the departmentโs activities had reportedly raised significant concerns within the CIA and Ukraine itself. Namely, the GURโs use of โcutthroat tactics that may seem justified nowโฆbut could later prove difficult to rein in.โ
An anonymous former senior CIA official warned the Washington Post, โwe are seeing the birth of a set of intelligence services that are like Mossad in the 1970s.โ They feared Kievโs CIA-enhanced โproficiencyโ at assassinations and other black ops carried โbroader risksโ, if Ukraineโs โintelligence operationsโ against third countries โbecome even bolder.โ With eerily precise foresight, they predicted chaos wrought overseas by Kievโs CIA-trained GUR shadow army โmight cause rifts with partners,โ placing โserious tensionโ on Ukraineโs โbroader strategic goals.โ Just as in Mali now
Despite these anxieties, at sites first on Ukrainian then US soil, โGUR operatives were trained on skills ranging from clandestine maneuvers behind enemy lines to weapons platforms and explosives.โ The military intelligence agency has also launched โdozens of attacksโ on targets in Russia, including buildings and โnoncombatantsโ, using its deadly in-house drone fleet. A senior Ukrainian operative angsted how such operations play into โPutinโs false narrativeโ that Kiev poses โa growing danger to ordinary Russians,โ and โUkrainians are coming for them.โ
Kievโs demonic alliance with Al Qaeda in the Sahel amply demonstrates how her CIA and MI6-assisted military and intelligence capabilities definitively represent a โgrowing dangerโ, to average citizens the world over. Kiev is openly plotting to replicate HTSโ violent takeover of Damascus, first in Mali, then in Burkina Faso and Niger. Extremist-occupied territories are to multiply, while economic warfare impoverishes and enfeebles the military governments, damaging their domestic popularity. Then, they can be brought to heel via forced capitulation, or outright regime change.
Itโs been publicly confirmed Kievโs clandestine assistance was instrumental in toppling Assad. Now, as Militarnyi openly brags, Ukraineโs alliance with Al Qaeda in Mali is helping drive โa revival of contactsโ between AES and the West. This has led to โthe first publicly confirmed US diplomatic engagementโ with all three Alliance members, in March. The CIA and MI6 have built a monster in militarised Ukraine, which is now training its proxy crosshairs globally with devastating effect. A new World War has begun [end]
As panic-inducing travel advisories and doomsaying media reports prophesy the fall of Mali to an Al Qaeda affiliate attacking fuel convoys, the government has re-secured supply routes and hosted Maliโs first international defense expo in a supposedly besieged capital
[the uncomfortable convolutions of CNN presstitutes produce the comic effect of this article, because alongside Qatari channel Al Jazeera and most Western mainstream media, its editorial line was supporting since 2011 the radical Sunni uprising against the secular government of Bashar Assad]
est un vรฉtรฉran de la Lรฉgion รฉtrangรจre des annรฉes 90, 2e REI (rรฉgiment รฉtranger d’infanterie) puis 13e DBLE (demi-brigade de la Lรฉgion รฉtrangรจre), vit en rรฉgion parisienne, a accompli le pรฉlerinage de Saint Jacques de Compostelle ร l’รฉtรฉ 2021.
Il passa le 12 mars 2022 en Ukraine, oรน il pourrait bien avoir รฉtรฉ un tรฉmoin chanceux des frappes russes sur la base de Yavorov, le matin du 13
(Rรฉseaux sociaux)
Il รฉchappa ร la mort dans la rรฉgion de Zaporojie en octobre 2022. Son image -il la revendique ci-dessus, ร droite- est apparue ร l’exploitation par les Russes de la camรฉra GoPro d’un combattant occidental tuรฉ lors de l’รฉlimination d’un groupe de reconnaissance atlantiste
(Captures d’รฉcran)
Aux derniรจres nouvelles, il est tireur de prรฉcision, chef d’une รฉquipe internationale appelรฉe Berlioz
Team Berlioz (rรฉseaux sociaux)
En fรฉvrier 2023, il devient la tรชte de gondole de la petite entreprise de Xavier Tytelman, un ancien rond de cuir du ministรจre de l’intรฉrieur, qui ferait passer Joseph Goebbels pour journaliste
sur le plateau de LCI le 28 mars 2023
Le 28 mars, sur le plateau de LCI, Malandain commence par une pensรฉe pour tous ses frรจres d’armes qui sont morts. Un peu plus tard sur TikTok, il รฉcrit qu’il n’a pas peur de mourir, ce qui bien entendu, signifie le contraire.
ร partir de la mi-2023, aprรจs la libรฉration de Bakhmout par l’armรฉe russe, il passe plus de temps pinte ร la main, face ร une webcam et Tytelman, que sur le front. Au cirque animรฉ par l’expert de LCI, son partenaire est un certain Looping, plus prรฉcisรฉment Nicolas Yahmi. Le duo aurait tout vu et ressasse les lieux communs de la dรฉsinformation ukrainienne.
Les deux comparses prรฉtendent faire un carnage chez l’ennemi, mais en rรฉalitรฉ, les forces atlantistes sont saignรฉes par une mรฉthodique stratรฉgie russe d’attrition. La chair ร canon ukrainienne est victime de ceux qui ont maningancรฉ le conflit depuis 2014
(Capture d’รฉcran)
Son รฉquipe apparaรฎt dans une vidรฉo qu’il publie le 29 aoรปt. Il se rรฉjouit qu’Evgueni Prigojine, dirigeant de la PMC (compagnie militaire privรฉe) Wagner, ait crevรฉ le 23, promet de continuer ร chasser l’orc [les Russes]. Il ne parvient pas ร surmonter son amertume de la dรฉfaite de Bakhmout, oรน les combattants de Wagner ont รฉcrasรฉ des forces atlantistes trรจs supรฉrieures en nombre
Humour russe : la propagande ukrainienne et ses relais mรฉdiatiques ร l’ouest raillaient les combattants de Wagner, parce que chacun portait une pelle. Ceux qui ont lu Im Westen, nichts neues, d’Erich Maria Remarque, savaient dรฉjร que la pelle peut รชtre une arme redoutable en combat rapprochรฉ. ร Bakhmout, les Russes s’en servaient pour s’enterrer au plus prรจs des dรฉfenses atlantistes et guider au mieux les tirs d’une artillerie dรฉvastatrice
Le 16 janvier 2024, la Russie frappe dans la rรฉgion de Kharkov une clinique obstรฉtrique dรฉsaffectรฉe qui a รฉtรฉ transformรฉe en une base pour personnels militaires รฉtrangers. Le communiquรฉ russe prรฉcise que leur noyau รฉtait franรงais et quโau total, une soixantaine furent tuรฉs
(Presse ukrainienne)
La cible paraรฎt plus sรฉrieuse que les volontaires individuels qui sont habituellement rรฉpertoriรฉs ici. Car le 18 janvier, lโambassadeur de France est aussi convoquรฉ ร ce sujet au ministรจre russe des affaires รฉtrangรจres. La frappe รฉtait un message envoyรฉ ร un pays qui malgrรฉ lโรฉchec dโune guerre par procuration contre la Russie, resserre encore ses liens militaires avec lโUkraine.
Ma conviction est que ces Franรงais รฉtaient plus probablement des lรฉgionnaires en disponibilitรฉ, missionnรฉs ร Kharkov par le gouvernement franรงais. Paris joue sur les mots
La France ne dispose pas de mercenaires, ni en Ukraine ni ailleurs [โฆ] La France assiste l’Ukraine en lui fournissant du matรฉriel militaire et en entraรฎnant ses soldats, dans le plein respect du droit international. Ceci afin de l’aider ร dรฉfendre sa souverainetรฉ, son indรฉpendance et son intรฉgritรฉ territoriale
Pourtant dans le mรชme camp, la perfide Albion ne peut rรฉsister au plaisir de brouiller le discours tricolore. Dans un article du 19 janvier, The Times narre les aventures rรฉelles et fantasmรฉes de Malandain, qui nโest certes pas un opรฉrateur du gouvernement franรงais. Les lecteurs britanniques mรฉritent une correction : il nโa jamais รฉtรฉ tireur de prรฉcision dans lโarmรฉe franรงaise. Dans le 2e REI comme la 13e DBLE, voila plus de 20 ans, il รฉtait servant de mortier de 120 mm.
Le mรชme jour, Sรฉbastien Lecornu, ancien camarade dโAlexandre Benalla dans les coursives de la Macronie, colonel dโopรฉrette dans la rรฉserve de la Gendarmerie nationale puis ministre de la dรฉfense, ajoute
la Rรฉpublique ne peut pas interdire ร un Franรงais dโaller se battre en Ukraine
Chacun sait quโil nโa jamais achevรฉ son master de Droit public, car il est mรชme permis de douter quโil ait accompli une premiรจre annรฉe. Certes et cโest heureux, nul organe de la Rรฉpublique nโest habilitรฉ ร empรชcher un Franรงais de devenir mercenaire dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine. En revanche, si tel est son choix souverain, il doit en rรฉpondre devant la justice ร son retour, car telle est la loi. Lโarticle 40 du Code de procรฉdure pรฉnale stipule aussi que
toute autoritรฉ constituรฉe, tout officier public ou fonctionnaire qui, dans lโexercice de ses fonctions, acquiert la connaissance dโun crime ou dโun dรฉlit est tenu dโen donner avis sans dรฉlai au procureur de la Rรฉpublique et de transmettre ร ce magistrat tous les renseignements, procรจs-verbaux et actes qui y sont relatifs
Sur les rรฉseaux sociaux fin janvier, une liste prรฉtend dรฉsigner des Franรงais tuรฉs ร Kharkov le 16. Elle est plus ancienne ; je lโai exploitรฉe en son temps. Elle est authentique, รฉmanait de la bureaucratie ukrainienne, avait รฉtรฉ recueillie par des as russes de lโinformatique. Elle nโa pas รฉtรฉ modifiรฉe dans lโintervalle et affiche toujours les erreurs de transcription commises par les fonctionnaires ukrainiens. รric Dukaris, par exemple, est en rรฉalitรฉ รric Dukaric.
En revanche, elle nโa jamais identifiรฉ des Franรงais tuรฉs en Ukraine, seulement de nouvelles recrues. Et comme je lโexplique plus haut, la frappe russe a traitรฉ ร Kharkov une cible plus sรฉrieuse que ces gaรฎtรฉs de lโescadron, des opรฉrateurs en mission, qui nโรฉtalent pas leur narcissisme sur les rรฉseaux sociaux
Ce canular traumatise des mรฉdias franรงais, qui se plaignent aussi dโรชtre harcelรฉs par des bots russes. Mes pauvres chรฉris. Des fins limiers de lโAFP se lancent alors dans une enquรชte auprรจs de figures de ce panthรฉon, qui dรฉnoncent une propagande bidon pour dรฉcrรฉdibiliserleur engagement. Quel univers impitoyable. Hรฉlas pour eux et je sais bien comme ils en souffrent, cette chronique รฉnonce des faits et dรฉpeint la triste rรฉalitรฉ. Dylan Mordant et Charles Roussel sont bien coauteurs d’un crime de guerre.
Pour continuer un peu dans la mรชme veine, un article de la Dรฉpรชche me fait รฉclater de rire le 29 janvier. Son titre dit
Guerre en Ukraine : la France va tripler ses livraisons et fournir 3 000 obus chaque mois ร Kiev
Cocorico. Une chance que les livraisons soient triplรฉes, parce que dans lโaffrontement dโenviron un million dโhommes et femmes en premiรจre ligne, plusieurs milliers de piรจces dโartillerie, les forces atlantistes vont aller loin, avec 100 obus de 155 mm par jour. Des analystes sรฉrieux estiment qu’ร la mรชme รฉpoque, l’artillerie russe peut tirer jusqu’ร 12 000 coups quotdiens. Selon Kiev, les Ukrainiens consomment au plus 2 000 obus par jour, quand mรชme 20 fois ce que La France s’apprรชte ร livrer, dans un effort exceptionnel
En Indochine, en 1954, le sous-lieutenant Jean-Marie Le Pen, qui nโaura pas le temps dโy connaรฎtre la bataille, rejoue avec ses camarades la scรจne du serment des Horace (collection personnelle des Pen). Une exaltation nรฉo-classsique du patriotisme, un mรจme du cรฉlรจbre tableau de Jacques-Louis David, qui ร la fin du XVIIIe siรจcle, illustrait une scรจne de la Rome antique. Le militant pรฉtainiste ne combattra [Franรงois Bayrou] pas plus en Algรฉrie, oรน ses faits dโarme se limiteront ร la torture de prisonniers. Le geste du serment est aisรฉment interprรฉtรฉ par les adeptes comme un salut fasciste et le 7 janvier 2025, un canal nazi franรงais bien connu partagera cette image
Sans doute chagrinรฉ par le dรฉcรจs la veille de Jean-Marie Le Pen et trรจs รฉnervรฉ par le partage antรฉrieur, dans le chat de la chaรฎne internationale TrackANaziMerc, de la vidรฉo du premier interrogatoire et cour de Russe, le 22 dรฉcembre, du volontaire australien Oscar Jenkins, qui fut pris vivant en Rรฉpublique populaire de Donetsk, Malandain me prรฉsente ses voeux le 8 janvier 2025
Tu as le retour de la petite salope de cinquini. En plus d’รชtre une petite salope son courage tu es vraiment pas intelligent tu as compris je pense prรฉcรฉdemment que รงa ne me fait pas peur que tu mettes mon nom je suis connu et moi je ne me cache pas contrairement ร toi petite pute
Le volontaire australien Oscar Jenkins est capturรฉ en Rรฉpublique populaire de Donetsk le 22 dรฉcembre 2024 (Alexandre Sladkov / capture d’รฉcran)
Je pense รชtre plus utile ร ma cause par ce travail, qu’ร presque 60 ans, djรจve [grenadier-voltigeur] parmi mes camarades antifascistes russes, qui pour notre hygiรจne, accomplissent une grande oeuvre. D’ailleurs, je ne me souviens pas si Malandain a l’habitude de prรฉciser ses propres coordonnรฉes GPS sur les rรฉseaux sociaux. La vie est d’abord un jeu et c’est par respect pour ses hautes compรฉtences en renseignement et reconnaissance, que je ne divulgue pas l’adresse de ma douce rรฉsidence, patrie des sangliers et de la chasse
Hyacinthe Sambroni hร fattu sta fotografia in Chjurlinu u 27 d’aprile di u 2022 (corsenetinfos)
Il a dรฉjร compris, je suppose, que je l’y accueillerai avec joie, de la mรชme faรงon que tout autre pinzutu ou รฉpรฉe du HUR (renseignement militaire ukrainien), par une rรฉception qui fera honneur ร leurs talents.
chronique alphabรฉtique et nรฉcrologique de lโengagement franรงais dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas
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Pruvate ร truvร me, canaglia di lโOTAN, pruvate solu
chronique en Anglais, its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine
chronique en Anglais, censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia
une saga franรงaise, entre Ukraine et Lyon, oรน apparaissent aussi des morceaux de SS de la division Charlemagne et plus rรฉcemment, Alice Kerviel, dite Cordier. L’affaire Deranque rรฉvรจle comme la France est infectรฉe par le pรฉtainisme, en particulier parmi les soutiens d’Israรซl ou de l’Ukraine, deux thรฉรขtres d’opรฉrations oรน l’Occident tente de ralentir son dรฉclin
En 2025, une nouvelle unitรฉ de Franรงais combattant pour lโUkraine sโest structurรฉe autour dโun noyau de nรฉonazis, ayant pour objectif dโattirer des recrues. Parmi ces volontaires, dโanciens militaires. StreetPress les a identifiรฉs
En Ukraine, les volontaires franรงais pro-ukrainiens et pro-russes se partagent lโimaginaire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Les premiers se revendiquent des collabos de lโAllemagne nazie, les seconds de lโescadrille mythique ยซ Normandie โ Niรฉmen ยป
deux jours aprรจs le 10e anniversaire de la dรฉbรขcle politique et sรฉcuritaire du 13 novembre 2015, une messe cรฉlรจbre ร Verdun lโancien dirigeant fasciste de lโรtat franรงais
ce 11 novembre 2025 est lโoccasion de souligner comme la faรงon dont lโEurope sacrifie les conscrits ukrainiens mobilisรฉs de force rappelle le spectaculaire carnage de la 1รจre guerre mondiale
cโest par lโagence cosaque de presse PIKA, depuis la Rรฉpublique populaire de Lougansk, que le 2 avril 2024, lโataman Nikolaรฏ Diakonov lance un message ร destination de la France
ce papier est le premier des grands mรฉdias franรงais qui sโattaque ร la question des militants nazis franรงais dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, le nouveau danger quโils prรฉsenteront ร terme pour la sรปretรฉ intรฉrieure
oรน nous apprenons que le nazi franรงais Allan Duchรฉzeau, camarade de Cรฉsar Aujard dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, รฉtait surnommรฉ Dox, quand il secondait ร Paris le leader nazi Marc de Cacqueray Valmรฉnier
en Anglais, les indices de la prรฉsence dโopรฉrateurs occidentaux, en particulier Franรงais, pris au piรจge en mars 2022 ร Marioupol, dont les forces russes achevรจrent la libรฉration en mai
est un ancien parachutiste de l’armรฉe franรงaise, qu’il quitta sergent en juin 2020, pour s’installer en Colombie Britannique, Canada
(Rรฉseaux sociaux)
Il rejoignit en avril 2022 les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, y intรจgra rapidement une formation de combat du renseignement militaire ukrainien (GUR), engagรฉe dans le secteur de Bakhmout. Avec Denis Mourey, ils animent depuis mai 2022 la Task Force Baguette, une vitrine sur les rรฉseaux sociaux qui leur permet aussi de rรฉcolter des dons et recruter d’anciens militaires
Avec mes camarades internationaux de la chaรฎne Telegram TrackANaziMerc, nous remercions le propagandiste Xavier Tytelman de nous les prรฉsenter dans une vidรฉo publiรฉe le 30 octobre 2023 (capture d’รฉcran en haut, ร gauche), document enregistrรฉ quand tous deux sont en permission en France. Sans son concours, les deux Franรงais nous seraient inconnus.
Avec Mourey (Donny D.), il (Adam K.) commet un bouquin qui sort en librairies le 21 fรฉvrier 2024
Tรฉmoignage exceptionnel : la guerre par ceux qui la font, deux soldats franรงais engagรฉs dix-neuf mois dans une unitรฉ d’รฉlite ukrainienne.
La Task Force Baguette est prรฉsente en Ukraine depuis avril 2022, quelques semaines aprรจs l’invasion russe du 24 fรฉvrier. Derriรจre ce nom qui peut prรชter ร sourire se cache une unitรฉ d’รฉlite composรฉe de Franรงais et d’Amรฉricains placรฉe sous le commandement d’un service de renseignement ukrainien. Ses membres sont d’anciens militaires qui ont tout quittรฉ pour rรฉpondre ร l’appel du prรฉsident Zelensky, au nom des valeurs dรฉmocratiques auxquelles ils croient profondรฉment.
Adam K. et Donny D., respectivement ancien parachutiste et chasseur alpin au sein de l’armรฉe franรงaise, ont participรฉ aux grandes batailles de ce conflit. De la dรฉfense de Kharkiv aux tranchรฉes de Bakhmout, ils ont eu ร affronter aussi bien les assauts des militaires de l’armรฉe rรฉguliรจre russe que ceux des mercenaires de Wagner[en rรฉalitรฉ, Korczak et Mourey correspondent bien plus aux dรฉfinitions lรฉgales et populaire du mercenaire que les combattants russes de Wagner, qui se battent pour leur pays].
Dans ce rรฉcit ร hauteur d’homme, ils confient l’histoire secrรจte de cette unitรฉ dont ils comptent parmi les membres fondateurs. Missions d’infiltration en territoire ennemi, dรฉfense des premiรจres lignes du front, actes hรฉroรฏques et camarades morts au combat, ils racontent leur expรฉrience d’un conflit qui a bouleversรฉ l’ordre international et dรฉjร fait plus d’un demi-million de victimes
Il accorde beaucoup d’entretiens ร la presse franรงaise aprรจs la sortie de son bouquin. Son sรฉjour belliqueux au Donbass a durรฉ 19 mois, il est donc rentrรฉ en octobre 2023, avant que la Russie n’accentue sa victoire par la libรฉration d’Avdeevka.
chronique alphabรฉtique et nรฉcrologique de lโengagement franรงais dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas
Articles connexes
Pruvate ร truvร me, canaglia di lโOTAN, pruvate solu
chronique en Anglais, its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine
chronique en Anglais, censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia
une saga franรงaise, entre Ukraine et Lyon, oรน apparaissent aussi des morceaux de SS de la division Charlemagne et plus rรฉcemment, Alice Kerviel, dite Cordier. L’affaire Deranque rรฉvรจle comme la France est infectรฉe par le pรฉtainisme, en particulier parmi les soutiens d’Israรซl ou de l’Ukraine, deux thรฉรขtres d’opรฉrations oรน l’Occident tente de ralentir son dรฉclin
En 2025, une nouvelle unitรฉ de Franรงais combattant pour lโUkraine sโest structurรฉe autour dโun noyau de nรฉonazis, ayant pour objectif dโattirer des recrues. Parmi ces volontaires, dโanciens militaires. StreetPress les a identifiรฉs
En Ukraine, les volontaires franรงais pro-ukrainiens et pro-russes se partagent lโimaginaire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Les premiers se revendiquent des collabos de lโAllemagne nazie, les seconds de lโescadrille mythique ยซ Normandie โ Niรฉmen ยป
deux jours aprรจs le 10e anniversaire de la dรฉbรขcle politique et sรฉcuritaire du 13 novembre 2015, une messe cรฉlรจbre ร Verdun lโancien dirigeant fasciste de lโรtat franรงais
ce 11 novembre 2025 est lโoccasion de souligner comme la faรงon dont lโEurope sacrifie les conscrits ukrainiens mobilisรฉs de force rappelle le spectaculaire carnage de la 1รจre guerre mondiale
cโest par lโagence cosaque de presse PIKA, depuis la Rรฉpublique populaire de Lougansk, que le 2 avril 2024, lโataman Nikolaรฏ Diakonov lance un message ร destination de la France
ce papier est le premier des grands mรฉdias franรงais qui sโattaque ร la question des militants nazis franรงais dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, le nouveau danger quโils prรฉsenteront ร terme pour la sรปretรฉ intรฉrieure
oรน nous apprenons que le nazi franรงais Allan Duchรฉzeau, camarade de Cรฉsar Aujard dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, รฉtait surnommรฉ Dox, quand il secondait ร Paris le leader nazi Marc de Cacqueray Valmรฉnier
en Anglais, les indices de la prรฉsence dโopรฉrateurs occidentaux, en particulier Franรงais, pris au piรจge en mars 2022 ร Marioupol, dont les forces russes achevรจrent la libรฉration en mai
Georges Malbrunot le confirme dans un article que RTL publie le 8 mai 2026
Le 3 mai 2026, soldats maliens et russes patrouillent ensemble dans un village du Mali (The African Corps)
Le journaliste Georges Malbrunot a recueilli les confidences d’une source franรงaise anonyme, quand dans un article publiรฉ par RTL le 8 mai 2026, il confirme ce qu’affirment depuis longtemps les autoritรฉs du Mali.
Comment la France, chassรฉe du Mali, combat indirectement la junte au pouvoir et ses soutiens russes via des militaires ukrainiens
Si elle a quittรฉ le Mali, la France apporte une aide opรฉrationnelle ร des militaires ukrainiens sur place, passรฉs par la Lรฉgion รฉtrangรจre, et qui coopรจrent avec les rebelles touaregs.
Les forces franรงaises ne sont officiellement plus sur le sol malien, et pourtant elles continuent ร opรฉrer indirectement. Selon une source sรฉcuritaire franรงaise, la France se repose notamment sur de nombreux militaires ukrainiens francophones passรฉs par la Lรฉgion รฉtrangรจre : des unitรฉs du renseignement militaire ukrainien, le GUR, opรจrent ainsi au Mali en coordination avec les rebelles touaregs, lesquels ont dรฉbutรฉ il y a deux semaines une conquรชte de plusieurs villes grรขce ร une alliance avec les djihadistes.
Les rebelles indรฉpendantistes touaregs cherchent ainsi ร affaiblir la junte au pouvoir ร Bamako, tandis que la France et l’Ukraine veulent renverser les soutiens russes de la junte, les anciens de la milice Wagner (renommรฉs l’Afrika Corps) qui ont tout fait pour chasser la France de l’Afrique. Un partage d’intรฉrรชts, alors mรชme que les rebelles touaregs ont une ancienne relation avec les services de renseignements franรงais au Sahel.
Ce n’est pas la premiรจre fois qu’il est question d’une alliance franco-ukrainienne sur ce plan : en dรฉbut d’annรฉe derniรจre, le service de renseignements ukrainien avait proposรฉ aux autoritรฉs franรงaises un plan dรฉtaillรฉ pour dรฉloger les juntes de la rรฉgion du Sahel, et ainsi faire reculer l’ennemi russe. Mais Paris n’avait pas donnรฉ de suites ร cette proposition, en raison notamment de l’aspect sรฉcuritaire.
Une hiรฉrarchisation de l’ennemi
Le verrou est aujourd’hui levรฉ, permettant un jeu de stratรฉgies qui semble favoriser les djihadistes, ces derniers รฉtant actuellement alliรฉs aux indรฉpendantistes touaregs, eux-mรชmes aidรฉs par ces forces ukrainiennes. Une sorte de hiรฉrarchisation de l’ennemi afin d’atteindre un objectif commun, ici de renverser la junte au pouvoir et d’affaiblir les Russes et leurs alliรฉs dans la rรฉgion.
En limitant son aide opรฉrationnelle ร ces relais ukrainiens, la France รฉvite ainsi une coopรฉration directe avec les djihadistes liรฉs ร Al-Qaรฏda. Interrogรฉ, le ministรจre des Armรฉes est toutefois restรฉ vague et a indiquรฉ que si les militaires ukrainiens avaient quittรฉ la Lรฉgion รฉtrangรจre pour servir l’Ukraine de maniรจre qu’ils jugent utile, la France n’a de son cรดtรฉ pas de commentaire ร faire sur le sujet.
Plusieurs pays du Sahel avaient dรฉnoncรฉ l’an dernier ce jeu d’alliances, qui semble toutefois faire ses preuves dans la rรฉgion, avec la reprise rรฉcemment de grandes villes – dont Kidal, reprise fin avril par les djihadistes alliรฉs aux rebelles touaregs. De quoi faire des remous entre la junte au pouvoir et son alliรฉ russe, qu’elle accuse de l’avoir “trahi” alors que les mercenaires russes ont quittรฉ le navire aprรจs avoir passรฉ un accord quelques jours avant l’attaque.
La mort du ministre malien de la Dรฉfense, Sadio Camara, tuรฉ fin avril dans une attaque kamikaze, a รฉgalement marquรฉ un autre coup de la Russie, puisque ce numรฉro deux de la junte, considรฉrรฉ comme l’homme de Moscou, avait รฉtรฉ formรฉ en Russie.
En rรฉalitรฉ, les militaires russes de l’African Corps opรจrent toujours au Mali et n’en dรฉplaise ร une presse bleu horizon revancharde, l’offensive que les djihadistes ont lancรฉe vers le sud le 25 avril n’est pas parvenue ร conquรฉrir le pays. Car avec des attaques de SVBIED (suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device) ร Kati, banlieue de Bamako, pour tuer le ministre de la dรฉfense et aussi le prรฉsident Assimi Goรฏta -la seconde รฉchoua- la prise du pouvoir central รฉtait bien l’objectif
Carte de la situation au Mali le 2 mai 2026 (RYBAR) : l’offensive djihadiste n’a que peu changer les zones de contรดle du pays et les assaillants ont subi des pertes considรฉrables
Par pudeur, Malbrunot limite aux rebelles touaregs la portรฉe du soutien franco-ukrainien. Le sujet mรฉrite d’รชtre approfondi
Drapeau du FLA
Fondรฉ dans le nord du Mali le 30 novembre 2024, par la fusion d’organisations plus anciennes, le Front de libรฉration de l’Azawad (FLA, 4000 hommes) est indรฉpendantiste et aussi islamiste. Son chef est Alghabass Ag Intalla, un ancien d’Ansar Dine [Les Dรฉfenseurs de la religion], pas exactement un laรฏc
Dรฉbut mai 2026, un รฉcusson du renseignement militaire ukrainien (HUR) est retrouvรฉ sur le cadavre d’un djihadiste de JNIM (rรฉseaux sociaux)
De fait, l’offensive รฉtait une opรฉration conjointe du FLA et des djihadistes du Groupe de soutien ร l’islam et aux musulmans (JNIM, 6000 hommes), branche malienne d’al Qaeda, dont le chef est Iyad Ag Ghali, รฉgalement Touareg et fondateur d’Ansar Dine en 2012
Que vous rappellent ces drapeaux de JNIM ?
Bashar Assad รฉnonรงa autrefois
Le terrorisme n’est pas une carte qu’on sort et qu’on range dans sa poche. Comme un scorpion, il peut vous piquer ร tout moment
Dix ans aprรจs la Syrie et la cruelle leรงon de choses du 13 novembre 2015, la France perpรฉtue de scabreux calculs stratรฉgiques et soutient encore une fois des insurgรฉs sunnites radicaux.
As panic-inducing travel advisories and doomsaying media reports prophesy the fall of Mali to an Al Qaeda affiliate attacking fuel convoys, the government has re-secured supply routes and hosted Maliโs first international defense expo in a supposedly besieged capital
[the uncomfortable convolutions of CNN presstitutes produce the comic effect of this article, because alongside Qatari channel Al Jazeera and most Western mainstream media, its editorial line was supporting since 2011 the radical Sunni uprising against the secular government of Bashar Assad]
commentaire du film documentaire Les ombres du Bataclan, mis ร jour aprรจs la dรฉposition devant la cour dโassises spรฉciale, le 17 septembre 2021, du commandant de la Brigade criminelle qui a coordonnรฉ les constatations sur la scรจne de crime de la salle de spectacle, celle, le 22 septembre, du commissaire X, qui y fut primo-intervenant, celle, le 6 octobre, de Jean-Marc, prรฉsent dans la fosse au dรฉbut de lโattaque, celles, le 27 octobre, de plusieurs autres BACqueux
chronique alphabรฉtique et nรฉcrologique de lโengagement franรงais dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas. Oรน le lecteur retrouve des Ukrainiens de la Lรฉgion รฉtrangรจre
En Ukraine, les volontaires franรงais pro-ukrainiens et pro-russes se partagent lโimaginaire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Les premiers se revendiquent des collabos de lโAllemagne nazie, les seconds de lโescadrille mythique ยซ Normandie – Niรฉmen ยป
(Caroline Varon)
ยซย En fรฉvrierย 2022, quand la Russie attaque lโUkraine, je me dis que je ne peux pas louper cette guerre, je pense ร la LVF, ร [Henri] Fenet, ร cette race de guerriers.ย ยป Karel Cherel-Salzburg [son chapitre dans ma chronique], Breton de 30ย ans, explique ainsi son engagement de combattant aux cรดtรฉs des forces armรฉes ukrainiennes. Tรฉmoignant dans un recueil avec dโautres ยซย volontaires franรงaisย ยป, publiรฉ par une obscure maison dโรฉdition dโextrรชme droite, il se compare ร ceux ayant rejoint durant la Seconde Guerre mondiale la Lรฉgion des volontaires franรงais contre le bolchevisme (LVF)ย โย une organisation formรฉe par les partis collaborationnistes et rattachรฉe ร la Wehrmacht. Quant ร Henri Fenet, il รฉtait cadre de la Milice puis officier de la Waffen-SS au sein de la Division Charlemagne
ร droite, Alan V. [Alan Vigneron] rend hommage dans son treillis de lโarmรฉe franรงaise ร ยซ Kapo ยป [Kevin Lazzari], tuรฉ le 14 juillet 2025 en Ukraine, avec une reproduction dโun drapeau de la LVF historique. ร gauche, l’affiche d’รฉpoque de la Lรฉgion (crรฉdits : DR)
Depuis lโinvasion ร grande รฉchelle de lโUkraine, un nombre croissant de nรฉonazis franรงais ont pris les armes du cรดtรฉ de Kyiv avec cet imaginaire bien en tรชte. Cโest le cas dโAlan V., ex-chasseur alpin congรฉdiรฉ de lโarmรฉe franรงaise ร la suite dโune enquรชte de Mediapart en 2020. Il y รฉtait mention du tatouage quโil porte sur lโavant-bras : la devise de la SS en allemand, ยซ mon honneur sโappelle fidรฉlitรฉ ยป. Loin dโavoir reniรฉ ses convictions, il a rejoint lโUkraine en juillet 2022 et a รฉtรฉ parmi les premiers ร se rรฉclamer de cette nouvelle LVF.
ร ses cรดtรฉs parfois, il y a un autre Franรงais, surnommรฉ ยซ Bones ยป [Guillaume Andreoni], qui a รฉcrit sur son gilet tactique ยซ Lรฉgion volontaire franรงais ยป. Une formule รฉgalement tracรฉes par Alan V. sur le sien, au feutre noir, en plus de la formule ยซ 33e division Charlemagne ยป ainsi que lโemblรจme de la SS
ยซ Bones ยป (ร gauche) et Alan V. (ร droite) en Ukraine. Tous deux portent sur leurs gilets tactiques lโinscription au feutre : ยซ Lรฉgion volontaires franรงais ยป (crรฉdits : DR)
Le 1er aoรปt 2025, dans la capitale ukrainienne, tous deux ont rendu hommage ร ยซ Kapo ยป, lโun de leurs compatriotes, tuรฉ quinze jours plus tรดt au combat. Son surnom รฉtait une rรฉfรฉrence au titre attribuรฉ aux hommes en charge de lโencadrement des prisonniers dans les camps de concentration nazis. Il est arrivรฉ en 2025 dans le pays. ร lโaide dโune copie dโun drapeau de la LVF historique, Alan V. a saluรฉ son cercueil.
En รฉcho avec la propagande nazie
Dโautres Franรงais, ayant pris les armes en Ukraine, reprennent un vocabulaire proche de la vision des nazis combattant lโUnion soviรฉtique. Alan V. รฉcrit sur la messagerie Telegram participer ร ยซ lโรฉradication des bolcheviques et communistes de notre belle Europe ยป. Pour sa part, Gwendal D. [Gwendal Delange], un nรฉonazi lyonnais engagรฉ dรจs fin 2022, qualifie le groupe quโil forme avec ses camarades dโยซ Einsatzgruppen ยป โ nom donnรฉ par lโAllemagne nazie aux unitรฉs en charge de lโextermination des Juifs, Tziganes et des opposants politiques sur le front de lโEst.
Il indique au sujet de la prise de la ville dโAvdiivka, en Ukraine, par lโarmรฉe russe en fรฉvrier 2024 que ยซ certains peuples de Sibรฉrie ont payรฉ un lourd tribut ร cette victoire ยป. Un commentaire faisant รฉcho ร la propagande du IIIe Reich assimilant lโArmรฉe rouge ร des ยซ hordes asiatiques ยป sโapprรชtant ร dรฉferler sur lโEurope
Sur Instagram, Gwendal D. fait le parallรจle dans une publication historiquement osรฉe entre sa prรฉsence en Ukraine et le front de lโEst durant la Seconde Guerre mondiale (crรฉdits : DR)
Du cรดtรฉ russe, mรชme imaginaire
Sโils ont choisi de combattre pour le camp opposรฉ, les rares Franรงais engagรฉs au sein des forces russes nโhรฉsitent pas ร invoquer le souvenir de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Au printemps 2024, le nom de ยซ Normandie-Niรฉmen ยป โ rรฉfรฉrence au groupe de chasse des Forces franรงaises libres envoyรฉ en Union soviรฉtique ร partir de 1942 pour y combattre les armรฉes du IIIe Reich โ a ainsi fait son retour sur le champ de bataille. Au XXIe siรจcle, les drones ont remplacรฉ les avions et lโennemi est, cette fois-ci, ยซ lโUnion europรฉenne ยป et ยซ lโรtat profond amรฉricain ยป, selon ยซ Jean ยป, lโun des trois Franรงais que compterait lโunitรฉ dโaprรจs une enquรชte de France 24
Au printemps 2024, cโest le nom et le logo mythique de l’escadrille ยซ Normandie-Niรฉmen ยป, qui a combattu les nazis en Russie dรจs 1942, qui a fait son retour sur le champ de bataille, cรดtรฉ russe (crรฉdits : Telegram)
Parmi eux รฉgalement, un certain Sergei Munier, franco-ukrainien mรฉdiatisรฉ dรจs 2014 pour son engagement aux cรดtรฉs des sรฉparatistes soutenus par Moscou dans le Donbass. Depuis passรฉ par le groupe Wagner, il est rรฉputรฉ proche du renseignement militaire russe, qui pourrait รชtre ร la manลuvre dans cette ยซ rรฉsurrection ยป ayant fait les choux gras de la presse pro-Kremlin.
Contactรฉs, Karel Cherel-Salzburg, Alan V., ยซ Bones ยป et Sergei Munier nโont pas souhaitรฉ rรฉpondre ร nos questions [fin]
chronique alphabรฉtique et nรฉcrologique de lโengagement franรงais dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas
chronique en Anglais, its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine
chronique en Anglais, censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia
deux jours aprรจs le 10e anniversaire de la dรฉbรขcle politique et sรฉcuritaire du 13 novembre 2015, une messe cรฉlรจbre ร Verdun lโancien dirigeant fasciste de lโรtat franรงais
Dans la zone de lโOMS [Opรฉration militaire spรฉciale], des citoyens franรงais se battent aux cรดtรฉs de la Russie. Cโest ce quโa dรฉclarรฉ le prรฉsident russe Vladimir Poutine lors dโune rencontre avec les participants du marathon ยซ Connaissance. Dโabord ยป. Le chef de lโEtat a prรฉcisรฉ que certains de ces Franรงais participant aux opรฉrations militaires aux cรดtรฉs de la Russie ont crรฉรฉ une unitรฉ baptisรฉe ยซ Normandie Niรฉmen ยป. Cette information a provoquรฉ un choc ร Paris. Les autoritรฉs de la Ve Rรฉpublique veulent punir les Franรงais qui combattent pour la Russie
ce papier est le premier des grands mรฉdias franรงais qui sโattaque ร la question des militants nazis franรงais dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, le nouveau danger quโils prรฉsenteront ร terme pour la sรปretรฉ intรฉrieure
oรน nous apprenons que le nazi franรงais Allan Duchรฉzeau, camarade de Cรฉsar Aujard dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, รฉtait surnommรฉ Dox, quand il secondait ร Paris le leader nazi Marc de Cacqueray Valmรฉnier
They dox and harass foreign volunteers and spread Kremlin propaganda. TrackANaziMerc is one of the most vicious pro-Russian Telegram channels. Now, an OSINT group has turned the tables, unmasking the admins and doxxing the doxxers
An open-source intelligence (OSINT) unit, The Unintelligence Agency (TUA), @UnintelAgency on X, has granted UNITED24 Media behind-the-scenes access to their investigation into exposing the administrators of one of the most prolific pro-Russian Telegram channels: โTrackANaziMercโ (TaNM).
TaNM โwill 100% dig up anything โtheyโ can on you, I hope youโre prepared,โ the OSINT team warned when preparing this article.
TaNM has been aggressively pushing disinformation about Russiaโs full-scale invasion of Ukraine since 2022. Its core mission is to dox foreign nationals working in support of Ukraine, mocking and intimidating them, and whenever they get the chance, celebrating their deaths.
Russiaโs โNaziโ narrative is central to its war propaganda. The channelโs name suggests a mission to hunt down so-called โNazi mercenariesโโforeigners fighting for Ukraine and resisting Russian aggression.
When hearing about the TUAโs expose on the group, one of the TaNM administrators [me] wrote on X โNazi sleuths are spending #Yurop-ean tax payers’ money to โidentifyโ people,โ a rather ironic comment, as TaNM do exactly thatโidentify people [not exactly1].
Many suspect that the Russian Security Services (FSB) are behind the channel, but not everything is as it seems. In fact, the information obtained by the OSINT group revealsโsometimes rather humorousโprofiles of the European-wide TaNM group administrators.
Exposing these individuals for what they truly are, and not the lies and fanciful personas that they’ve created for themselves, strips them of whatever credibility they may think they have. These aren’t geopolitical experts, intel analysts, or experts on foreign affairs. They are little more than delusional LARPers and deranged individuals seeking validation online.
Anonymous โBโ
The Unintelligence Agency (TUA)
We interviewed members of The Unintelligence Agency, who requested anonymity due to privacy concerns. Their insightsโlabeled Anonymous A, B, and Cโoffer a rare look into the minds behind TaNM and the wider disinformation ecosystem they operate in.
But first, hereโs what the OSINT team uncovered about TaNMโs ties to Russian media and the people who run the channel.
The TaNM channel grew exponentially in August 2023 after various other pro-Russian platforms and figures amplified it. Among them are Nikolay Valuev, a Russian politician and former heavyweight boxer, and Vladimir Solovyov, one of the Kremlinโs most infamous TV propagandists.
Rybar, owned by Mikhail Zvinchuk and Denis Shchukin, is one of several media channels that amplify TaNMs’ content. Shchukin, a computer programmer with a prior cybercrime charge, renounced his German citizenship in 2021 in favor of a Russian passport, according to reports. Zvinchuk is a former press officer with Russiaโs Defense Ministry. Both men have ties to the Internet Research Agency, the Kremlin-linked troll farm once associated with the Wagner Group, the OSINT group says.
TaNMโs reach is further amplified by UKR Leaks, a pro-Russian outlet operated by Vasily Prozorov, a former officer of Ukraineโs Security Service (SBU) and a known defector. Prozorov, who is currently wanted by Ukrainian authorities, has openly admitted to leaking sensitive information to Russian intelligence beginning in 2014, citing ideological motives. In April 2024, Prozorov was targeted in a car bomb attack in Moscow [indeed, a terrorist attack that the SBU conducted in Moscow on April 12, 2024].
Having lost the honor of an officer due to drunkenness, Prozorov decided to trade his conscience and military oath, finding โworthyโ people in the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation.
Ukrainian Secret Service (SBU)
TaNM has worked in coordination with Russian state media outlets, including Zvezda [my interview, that Zvezda published in April 2024], which is owned by the Russian Defense Ministry, TUA reports. Other pro-Kremlin platforms, such as Komsomolskaya Pravda, War Gonzo, and so-called โwar reportersโ like Alexander Simonov, have also collaborated with the channel, amplifying its campaigns of doxxing, harassment, and targeted intimidation.
Another is Dmitry Astrakhan, a prominent mouthpiece for the so-called โDonetsk Peopleโs Republicโ (DNR). Now a war correspondent for RT Russia, Astrakhan began his career by โtrollingโ on social media. He later styled himself as the editor-in-chief of Pravda DNRโa propaganda outlet where, according to Evocation, the entire editorial board consisted of just one person: Astrakhan himself.
Who are the admins of the TrackANaziMerc group?
Daria Khaltourina
Daria Khaltourina, posting under her alias โEkaterina II,โ is the owner of TaNM and their โde facto ring leader,โ who has close connections to Russia. According to her social media, she is the โHead of Department at Federal Research Institute for Health Organization and Informatization of the Ministry of Health of the Russian Federationโ
Daria Khaltourina (Source Facebook)
When Russiaโs full-scale invasion of Ukraine began, she posted on Facebook, โI condemn the war, I do not approve.โ However, since then, as the owner of TaNM, she has consistently repeated pro-Kremlin narratives, claiming that civilians in the Bucha massacre were killed by Ukrainians [they were2] and that a 1930s Moscow-made famine and genocideโHolodomorโis a โpropaganda lie created by Ukrainian nazisโ
We (TaNM) frame, expose mercs, make them cry and shiver all their lives.
Daria Khaltourina
Khaltourina is a founding member and board member of the International Longevity Alliance and Chair of the Board of the Russian Council for Public Health and Demography. In recent years, the Kremlin has been โcrazy about eternal life,โ making millions of dollars from state funds through anti-aging and genetic projects while promoting several โbizarreโ ideas and conspiracies.
Virgil Hesse
โLove him or hate him, the man is interesting and boring at the same time,โ wrote an Encyclopedia Dramatica user about Virgil Hesse, an Australian, likely from St. Kilda, Melbourne. One of the most active TaNM admins, Hesse has a long history of online trolling under aliases like โLesleybloodโ and now โDigitalfolklore.โ
Once called a โbastion of ridiculousnessโ and โserial fantasist,โ Hesse now mostly posts screenshots of interviews with Ukrainian POWs. For over 15 years, heโs collected, archived, and spread content online. The Unintelligence Agency (TUA) believes “Virgil Hesse” is a nom de plume
Virgil Hesse, who had posted parts of his face on separate occasions, OSINT groups pieced them together to reveal his identity (Source: Encyclopedia Dramatica via The Unintelligence Agency (TUA))
โHe’s (ironically) a privacy advocateโฆand he’s writing to the Australian government, so it seems in character he wouldn’t use his real name when The Man is out to get him,โ TUA said. In the early 2000s, as Lesleyblood, he regularly engaged in chaotic online arguments, which escalated and “turned into these bizarre back-and-forthsโ and led to mocking videos and leaked recordings of him.
Offline, heโs been known to lodge โendless complaints with his local city council for a variety of banal issues,โ like off-leash dog zones and bin removal. TUA found footage and documents of these efforts, along with Hesseโs submissions to Australian government inquiries on crypto and surveillance laws.
He claims to have โhigh-end educationโ but also says he โnever went to high school or brainwashing camps.โ On X, he once told Elon Musk heโd built a โbespoke, handmade… better than yoursโ version of Grok.
Though UA describes him as more of an archiver, Hesse likely sees himself as a hacker. Heโs compiled an enormous collection of leaks, drone videos, and files tied to WikiLeaks, Anonymous, the war in Ukraine, and ISIS. Heโs also filmed and posted drone footage from Melbourne and discussed drone-making in the TaNM chats.
TUA says Hesseโs accounts followโand are followed byโAdam Bennett, aka โLoraxโ CEO of Australian cybersecurity firm Red Piranha. Bennett once ran the Anonymous Australia Twitter and in 2016 received a suspended sentence for hacking government sites. Hesse is an active poster in โBeregini,โ a Telegram group that brands itself as Ukrainian hacktivists, but is actually based in St. Petersburg. The group has pushed fake Ukrainian intel and taken credit for leaks.
As โDigitalfolklore,โ Hesse also leaked a phone call between the FBI and Scotland Yard discussing LulzSecโa hacking group behind attacks on PlayStation Network and the CIA site. The FBI later confirmed Anonymous accessed an email containing the call code, raising further suspicions of Hesseโs links to the group. TUA adds he may have known people in Julian Assangeโs inner circle [impressive].
Nicolas Cinquini
Cinquini is a former French lieutenant detective and intelligence officer, dismissed from duty after his support for the yellow vest protests in France.
On social media, Cinquini portrays an intriguing, multifaceted personality, much like Hesse. Sharing Russian propaganda, videos of cats and dogs, to even arguing with Grok, Elon Musk’s AI chatbot
Nicolas Cinquini (Source: The Unintelligence Agency) [a screenshot from the interview that Zvezda, TV channel of the Russian defense ministry, published in April 2024]
Cinquini disseminates very typical pro-Kremlin narratives, promotes conspiracy theories, and spreads misinformation about Ukraine. He claims to be the intelligence lead for TaNM [no, I have never claimed that] and has been suspected of leaking information about French volunteers, which Russia used to make false claims about their supposed deaths
He didnโt even try to hide โ his ego matched his idiocy [is that a threat ?]. Once sworn to protect France, now cheers terrorists.
The Unintelligence Agency
On May 18, 2025, he was interviewed [that is an excerpt on my YouTube channel, here is rather the complete report on Rossiya 1] by Russian state-media Rossiya 1 where he discussed French fighters serving in the Ukrainian army against Russian aggression. Cinquini, during his interview, furthered his pro-Kremlin narrative and told Russian media that the Frenchmen TrackANaziMerc have identified, โcompeted with each other in fascism, and won their place in the cast through hard work.โ He then went on to dox five servicemen throughout the interview [QED: five French Nazi militants].
There are several more admins of the TaNM channel, some have maintained an anonymous identity.
Other admins behind the channel
Dmitry Levin from Moscow (Source: The Unintelligence Agency)Maxim Bugaev a childrenโs karate intructor (Source: The Unintelligence Agency)
Luico Festa says he is Italian-Croatian and claims to be affiliated with Camorra, an Italian Mafia-type criminal organization. He has openly threatened previous TaNM members, claiming that within Camorra, his purpose is extortion, drug dealing, and money laundering. Following the TUAโs leak, Festa deleted both his Facebook and VKontakte pages.
โBulgARYANโโโFor someone in a group that supposedly hates Nazis they decided to spell their username with the word “Aryan” in all caps instead of the more usual -rian suffixโ TUA said.
Mikhail Yevgenevich Rapoport is a Russian national who has left several reviews about parks and businesses on Google Maps. He is thought to live near Kudrovo, a notorious town where Russia’s largest residential complex, known as the โhuman anthill,โ is located.
โNataliahunterโโ”Natalia is a common nickname Russian soldiers use when referring to Ukrainian women, which makes this individual, who claims to be in the Russian army, particularly disturbing,โ TUA said.
โDrexy babaโ established a reputation of sorts as someone who collected and documented rare combat footage from the war in Afghanistan, always with a pro-Taliban angle, the OSINT team said
It’s clichรฉ that the KGB recruited ‘winners’ who were really losersโbut these guys aren’t even that. The technical term is โuseful idiot
Anonymous A
The Unintelligence Agency
Interviewing The Unintelligence Agency
Why do you want to expose the admins from TaNM?
Anonymous A: Combating channels like TaNM is a stop-gap, a temporary solution. For every group and individual we can ID, there will always be more. What we really need is a change in how we interact with social media, or rather, how social media interacts with us.
This is not to say that this will necessarily stop them from continuing what they’re doing, but the truth matters and does have an impact.
Vote for people who donโt benefit from disinformation. Demand that whoever is in power acts to put an end to its prevalence and popularity on social media. Start petitions calling for action. Organise protests. Donโt askโdemand!
If we do nothing, then we will rapidly find ourselves in an oligarchy of those with the means to run massive disinformation campaigns that will be bowing down to dictators all over the world.
Why is OSINT important in the modern digital world?
Anonymous A: Social media platforms have become central to how the world consumes news, yet they continue to allow, amplify, and even financially reward those who spread disinformation.
By identifying people like the TaNM admins, we help map the architecture of propaganda networks, removing the mystery of where disinformation originates. More often than not, they arenโt listening to a renowned expert or someone with lived experiences in a subject, but a charlatan and a fraud [I have worked 30 years as police detective and intelligence officer in counter-terrorism].
Anonymous C: Russia is using digital media a force multiplier for its soft power and propaganda apparatus, and Western governments haven’t, by and large, figured out how to counter it effectively yet. Nor have they put sufficient resources into it. But Russia, very cheaply, can produce these outsize effects, largely aimed at shaping narratives, disrupting public discourse, and planting the seeds of doubt.
Their big picture goal is to cut Ukraine off from its allies and its support network. Russia goes about this by shaping public opinion in the West. Or in the case of the “Ukraine is overrun by Nazis” narrative, trying to give Westerners the impression that Ukraine is simply unworthy of support.
What do you believe is TaNMโs main goal?
Anonymous A: After more than two years, itโs evident theyโve failed to stop or even slow the number of people choosing to defend freedom and democracy in Ukraine. Today, TaNM seems more like a small online community of socially isolated individuals whoโve found validation in a space that reinforces their fringe views. Their focus on doxxing and harassment appears less about impact and more about maintaining engagement with like-minded followers, creating a feedback loop of radicalisation.
The real danger isnโt their investigative abilitiesโoften resembling little more than basic social media searchesโbut the fact that theyโve become a nexus for disinformation and extremism.
Anonymous B: While they claim to be documenting and tracking the presence of “foreign nazi mercenaries” in Ukraine, the true purpose of their channel is to sow doubt and fear. The doxxing serves as a form of intimidation, with people on their chat openly making violent threats and discussing ways to harass volunteers and their family members. Furthermore, there’s a concerted effort to promote paranoia and suspicion amongst volunteers [poor darlings].
Is there a common theme amongst admins from pro-Russian channels?
Anonymous C: Essentially, every Westerner cheering Russia that we’ve come across has been more or less the same archetypeโan overinflated sense of self-worth with a lack of any real accomplishments, plus an inability to accept any responsibility for personal failings.
Almost without fail, you can guarantee that they’re online lying about accomplishments they never had, that they’ve all failed in their lives in some way, shape, or form, and all feel like something more was owed to them, but that somehow they were thwarted by the system. They all, therefore, resent the West, and at some level fantasize about how well they’d do if society were shaken up and whatever bit of the system it is they blame for not having succeeded were destroyed.
This archetype must be extremely fertile soil for the Russians because it keeps repeating in the people we come across [end]
its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine, chronicle
Norwegian journalists are keen on triggering the censorship of Telegram channels which are identifying international Nazi volunteers and other mercenaries who are fighting in the Atlanticist ranks in Ukraine
[my illustration: a debris of US ATACMS ballistic missile has fallen on Kursk-Vostochny airfield on November 25, 2023 (Russian defense ministry)]
On March 5, 2022, the wreck of the sailing ship Endurance was found in the depths of the Weddell Sea off the coast of Antarctica. This, of course, was the vessel lost in Ernest Shackeltonโs third expedition to Antarctica, which became trapped in the ice and sank in 1915. The story of that expedition is an extraordinary tale of human fortitude – with the Endurance lost to the ice, Shackletonโs crew evacuated to a loose ice flow where they camped for nearly 500 days, drifting about the Antarctic seas, before making a desperate dash across the open ocean in an open 20 foot lifeboat, finally reaching the southern shore of inhospitable and mountainous South Georgia Island, which they then had to cross on foot to reach the safety of a whaling station.
The story itself has an essentially mythic quality to it, with Shackletonโs crew surviving for years on free floating ice floes in the most inhospitable seas on earth. For our purposes, however, it is the storyโs coda that is particularly interesting. In Shackletonโs memoirs, he remembered that, upon finally reaching the safety of the Stromness whaling station, one of his first questions was about the war in Europe. When Shackleton first set out on his ill-fated expedition on August 8, 1914, the First World War was less than a week old, and the German Army had just begun its invasion of Belgium. There was little expectation then that the war would proceed as it did, unleashing four years of slaughterous positional warfare that engulfed the continent.
Shackleton, having been adrift at sea for years, clearly did not imagine that the war could still be raging, and asked the commandant of the whaling station โtell me, when was the war over?โ
The answer came back: โThe war is not over. Millions are being killed. Europe is mad. The world is mad.โ
The timing is serendipitous, since the discovery of the Enduranceโs wreck, after more than a hundred years, happened to occur only a few weeks after the world again went mad, with the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian War in February 2022. As time continues its inexorable march and the calendar turns yet again, the war is passing through its third full winter. In February, Z-World will be three years old.
Of course, modern communications make it extremely unlikely that anybody could be cut fully out of the loop for years at a time, like Shackleton and his men. Instead of being ignorant as to whether or not the war is over, many of us are exposed on a daily basis to footage of men being killed, buildings being blown up, and vehicles being shredded. Twitter has made it essentially impossible to live under a rock, or on an ice floe, as it were.
If anything, we have the very opposite problem of Shackleton – at least as far as our wartime information infrastructure goes. We are saturated in information, with daily updates tracking advances of a few dozen meters and never ending bombast about new game changing weapons (which seem to change very little), and bluster about โred linesโ. This war seems to have an unyielding dynamic on the ground, and no matter how many grand pronouncements we hear that one side or the other is on the verge of collapse, the sprawling front continues to grind up bodies and congeal with bloody positional fighting.
It would seem difficult to believe that a high intensity ground war in Europe with hundreds of miles worth of front could be boring, yet the static and repetitive nature of the conflict is struggling to hold the attention of foreign observers who have little immediately at stake.
My intention here is a radical zoom-out from these demoralizing and fatiguing small scale updates (as valuable as the work of the war mappers is), and consider the aggregate of 2024 – arguing that this year was, in fact, very consequential. Taken as a whole, three very important things happened in 2024 which create a very dismal outlook for Ukraine and the AFU in the new year. More specifically, 2024 brought three important strategic developments:
Russian victory in southern Donetsk which destroyed the AFUโs position on one of the warโs key strategic axes.
The expenditure of carefully husbanded Ukrainian resources on a failed offensive towards Kursk, which accelerated the attrition of critical Ukrainian maneuver assets and substantially dampened their prospects in the Donbas.
The exhaustion of Ukraineโs ability to escalate vis a vis new strike systems from NATO – more broadly, the west has largely run out of options to upgrade Ukrainian capabilities, and the much vaunted delivery of longer range strike systems failed to alter the trajectory of the war on the ground.
Taken together, 2024 revealed a Ukrainian military that is increasingly stretched to the limits, to the point where the Russians were able to largely scratch off an entire sector of front. People continue to wonder where and when the Ukrainian front might begin to break down – I would argue that it *did* break down in the south over the last few months, and 2025 begins with strong Russian momentum that the AFU will be hard pressed to arrest.
Front Collapse in South Donetsk
What stands out immediately about the operational developments in 2024 is the marked shift of energies away from the axes of combat that had seen the most intense fighting in the first two years of the war. In a sense, this war has seen each of its fronts activate in a sequence, one after the other.
After the opening Russian offensive, which boasted as its signature success the capture of the Azov coastline and the linkup of Donetsk and Crimea, the action shifted to the northern front (the Lugansk-Kharkov axis), with Russia fighting a summer offensive which captured Severodonetsk and Lysychansk. This was followed by a pair of Ukrainian counteroffensives in the fall, with a thrust out of Kharkov which pushed the front back over the Oskil, and an operation directed at Kherson which failed to breach Russian defenses but ultimately resulted in a Russian withdrawal in good order over the Dnieper due to concerns over logistical connectivity and an over-extended front. Energies then pivoted yet again to the Central Donbas axis, with the enormous battle around Bakhmut raging through the spring of 2023. This was followed by the failed Ukrainian offensive on Russiaโs defenses in Zaporozhia, in the south.
Just to briefly recapitulate this, we can enumerate several operational phases in the first two years of the war, occurring in sequence and each with a center of gravity in different parts of the front:
A Russian offensive across the land bridge, culminating in the capture of Mariupol. (Winter-Spring 2022, Southern Front)
A Russian offensive in Lugansk, capturing Severodonetsk and Lysychansk. (Summer 2022, Donets-Oskil front)
Ukrainian Counteroffensives towards the Oskil and Kherson (Autumn 2022, Oskil and Dnieper fronts)
The Russian assault on Bakhmut (Winter-Spring 2023, Central Front)
Ukrainian counteroffensive on the land bridge (Summer 2023)
Amid all of this, the front that saw the least movement was the southeastern corner of the front, around Donetsk. This was somewhat peculiar. Donetsk is the urban heart of the Donbas – a vast and populous industrial city at the center of a sprawling conurbation, once home to some 2 million people. Even if Russia succeeds in capturing the city of Zaporizhia, Donetsk will be by far the most populous of Ukraineโs former cities to come under Moscowโs control.
In 2014, with the outbreak of the proto-Donbas war, Donetsk was the locus of much of the fighting, with the airport on the cityโs northern approach the scene of particularly intense combat. This made it rather strange, then, that at the start of 2024 the Ukrainian Army continued to occupy many of the same positions that they built a decade prior. As intense fighting ebbed and flowed along other sectors of front, Donetsk remained besieged by a web of powerfully held Ukrainian defenses, anchored by heavily fortified urban areas stretching from Toretsk to Ugledar. Early Russian attempts to crack this iron ring open, including an assault on Ugledar in the winter of 2023, met with failure.
The signature operational development of 2024, then, was the re-activation of the Donetsk front, after years of static combat. It is not an exaggeration to say that after years of coagulation, the Russian Army cracked this front wide open in 2024 and Ukraineโs long and strongly held network of urban strongpoints collapsed
Russian Progress on the Donetsk Axis in 2024
The year began with the AFU fighting for its fortress in Avdiivka, where it continued to block the northern approach to Donetsk. At the time, the typical argument that one heard from the Ukrainian side was that the Russian assault on Avdiivka was pyrrhic – that the Russians were capturing the city with exorbitantly costly โmeat assaultsโ that would inevitably sap Russian combat power and exhaust their ability to continue the offensive.
With the full measure of the year behind us, we can definitively say that this is not the case. After the fall of Avdiivka, Russian momentum never seriously slackened, and in fact it was the AFU that appeared to be increasingly exhausted. The Ukrainian breakwater position at Ocheretyne (which had previously been their staging point for counterattacks around Avdiivka) was overrun in a matter of days, and by the early summer the frontline had been pushed out towards the approach to Pokrovsk.
The Russian thrust towards Pokrovsk led many to believe that this city was itself the object of Russian energies, but this was a misread of the operational design. Russia did not need to capture Pokrovsk in 2024 to render it sterile as a logistical hub. Simply by advancing towards the E50 highway, Russian forces were able to cut off Pokrovsk from Ukrainian positions to the south on the Donetsk front, and Pokvrovsk is now a frontline city subject to the full spectrum of overwatch from Russian drones and tube artillery.
By autumn, the Russian advance had put the Ukrainians in a severe salient, creating an unstable chain of positions in Selydove, Kurakhove, Ugledar, and Krasnogorivka. Russiaโs advance from Ocheretyne onto the southern approach to Pokrovsk acted like an enormous scythe, isolating the entire southeastern sector of the front and allowing Russian forces to carve through it in the closing months of the year
Russian Operations in 2024, Donetsk Axis
This war has turned the word โcollapseโ into a devalued buzzword. We are told repeatedly that one side or the other is on the verge of collapse: sanctions will โcollapseโ the Russian economy, the Wagner uprising of 2023 proved that the Russian political system was โcollapsingโ, and of course we hear that exorbitant losses have one army or the other on the verge of total failure – which army that may be depends on who you ask.
I would argue, however, that what we saw from October 2024 onward represents a real occurrence of this oft-repeated and discarded word. The AFU suffered a genuine collapse of the southeastern front, with the forces positioned in their strongpoints too attrited and isolated to make a determined defense, Russian fires becoming too heavily concentrated in ever more compressed areas to endure, and no mechanized reserve in the theater available to counterattack or relieve the incessant Russian pressure.
Ukraine does maintain enough drones and concentrated fires to limit a full Russian exploitation – that is, Russia is still not able to maneuver at depth. This gave the Russian advance a particular stop-start quality, leapfrogging from one settlement and fortress to the other. More generally, Russiaโs preference to use dispersed small-unit assaults limits the potential for exploitation. We have to emphasize, however, that Russian momentum on this axis has never seriously slackened since October, and many of the key Ukrainian positions were overrun or abandoned very quickly
Ugledar is a good example: the Russians began their final push toward the town on September 24. By September 29, the 72nd Mechanized Brigade began evacuating. By October 1, Ugledar was fully under Russian control. This was a keystone Ukrainian position put in a completely untenable position and it went down in a week. One could argue, of course, that Ugledar held out for years (how then can we say with a straight face that it was captured in a week), but this is precisely the point. In early 2023 Ugledar (with the help of artillery stationed around Kurakhove) successfully repelled a multi-brigade Russian attack in months of heavy fighting. By October 2024, the position was completely untenable and was abandoned almost immediately when attacked.
The Ukrainians did no better trying to hold Kurakhove – previously a critical rear area that served as both a logistical hub and a base of fire for supporting (former) frontline strongpoints like Ugledar and Krasnogorivka. Kurakhove, now under full Russian control, will in turn serve as a base of support for the ongoing Russian push to the west towards Andriivka.
Taking the state of the front holistically, the AFU is currently holding two severe salients at the southernmost end of the line – one around Velyka Novosilka, and another around Andriivka. The former is likely to fall first, as the town has been fully isolated by Russian advances on the flanks. This is not a Bakhmut-like situation, where roads are described as โcutโ because they are under Russian fire – in this case, all of the highways into Velyka Novosilka are cut by physical Russian blocking positions, making the loss of the position only a matter of waiting for the Russians to assault it. Further north, a more gentle and less strongly held salient exists between Grodivka and Toretsk. With Toretsk now in the final stages of capture (Ukrainian forces now hold only a small residential neighborhood on the cityโs outskirts), the front should level here as well in the coming months.
This leaves the Russians more or less in full control of the approaches to Kostyantinivka and Pokrovsk, which are in many ways the penultimate Ukrainian held positions in Donetsk. Pokrovsk has already been bypassed several miles to the west, and the map portends a re-run of the typical Russian tactical methodology for assaulting urban areas – a methodical advance along the wings of the city to isolate it from arterial highways, followed by an attack on the city itself via several axes
The coming months promise continued Russian advances across this front, in a continuation of what can only be regarded as the collapse of a critical front on the part of the AFU. The Russian Army is advancing to the western border of Donetsk oblast and will ferret the Ukrainians out of their remaining strongpoints at Velyka Novosilka and Andriivka, while pushing into the belly of Pokrovsk. At no point since the fall of Avdiivka have the Ukrainians demonstrated the ability to seriously stymie Russian momentum along this 75 mile front, and the ongoing dissipation of Ukrainian combat resources indicates that little will change in this regard in 2025.
Toehold: The Incredible Shrinking Kursk Salient
Throughout the autumn of 2024 and these early months of winter, as Ukrainian forces were dug out of their dense web of fortified positions in the southern Donbas, their comrades continued to stubbornly hold on to their position in Russiaโs Kursk Oblast. The basic shape of Ukraineโs offensive into Kursk is by now well known – billed by Kiev as a gambit to change the psychological trajectory of the war and strike a prestige blow to Russia, the Ukrainian attack had early momentum after achieving initial strategic surprise, but quickly faltered after Ukrainian columns ran into effective Russian blocking positions on the highways out of Sudzha. Efforts to force the roads through Korenovo and Bolshoe Soldatskoe were defeated, and the Ukrainian grouping was left holding on to a modest salient around Sudzha, jutting out into Russia.
Throughout the autumn, Russian counterattacks have focused on chiseling away at the base of the Ukrainian salient – forcing the Ukrainians out of Snagost and pushing them away from Korenovo. The progress here has been incremental, but significant, and by the start of January the โneckโ of the Ukrainian salient had been compressed down to a little over nine miles wide, after their initial penetration in the summer had forced a breach of over twenty miles. All told, Ukraine has lost about 50% of the territory that they grabbed in August.
The Russian pressure on the flanks of the salient have amplified many of the qualities that make this position wasteful and dangerous for the AFU. There is limited road connectivity for Ukrainian forces – a problem amplified by the rollback from Snagost, which cost them access to the highway running from Korenovo to Sumy. Apart from a few circuitous side roads, Ukrainian forces only have a single highway – the R200 route – to run material and reinforcements into the pocket, which allows Russian forces to surveil their lines of communication and conduct effective interdiction strikes. The compression of the pocket also greatly narrows the targeting area for Russian drones, tube artillery, and rocketry, and creates more condensed and saturating bombardment
Despite the fact that this position has been profoundly unproductive for Ukraine – being steadily rolled back and having no synergy with other, more critical theaters – the same grouping of Ukrainian units remain here, fighting in a steadily more compressed space. Even more baffling, the Ukrainian grouping consists largely of premiere assets – Mechanized and Air Assault brigades – that could have contributed meaningfully as a reserve in the Donbas over the last three months.
The tactical particulars of the Ukrainian attack are interesting, and thereโs ongoing speculation as to its purpose – perhaps it was intended to cover a rotation or withdrawal, to improve tactical positions on the northern edge of the salient, or for inscrutable propaganda purposes. However, these specifics are rather unimportant: attacking out the end of the salient (that is, trying to deepen the penetration into Russia) does nothing to reverse Ukraineโs problems in Kursk. These problems are first, on the tactical level, that the salient has been greatly compressed on the flanks and continues to narrow, and on the strategic level the willful expenditure of valuable mechanized assets on a front that does not impact the critical theaters of the war. More simply, Kursk is a sideshow, and it is a sideshow that has gone wrong even within its own operational logic.
One thing that has been of endless interest, of course, have been the continued rumors of North Korean troops fighting in Kursk. Western intelligence agencies have been adamant about the presence of North Koreans in Kursk. Some people are predisposed to instinctively disbelieve everything that western officialdom says – while I think some skepticism is warranted, I do not automatically assume that they are lying. One recent report lays out what would seem to be a plausible version of this story: that the idea actually originated in Pyongyang, not Moscow, and that a modest number of Korean troops (perhaps 10,000) are embedded with Russian units. The presumption here is that the Koreans hatched the idea as a way to gain combat experience, with the Russians in turn getting auxiliary forces, though of questionable combat effectiveness.
However, it is worth noting that this is not nearly as important as it has been made out to be. Much has been made of the idea that the North Korean presence proves some sort of Russian state of desperation, but this is fairly silly on its face – with more than 1.5 million active personnel in the Russian military, 10,000 Korean troops in Kursk represents a paltry appendage. More importantly, there has been an attempt to portray the North Korean contingent as a major departure point in the war. In particular, the formulation โNorth Korean troops in Europeโ has been used to conjure cold war imagery of communist despotism clawing at the free world
The point, however, is that North Korean troops are presumed specifically to be in Kursk, which is in Russia. This is linked, of course, to the recently concluded mutual defense agreement signed between Moscow and Pyongyang. By attacking into Kursk – widening the front into prewar Russian territory – Ukraine created a defensive combat task for Russia which triggers the possibility of military assistance from North Korea. However much one may wish to link the Korean contingent to Russiaโs dreaded โwar of aggressionโ, the force in Kursk is very objectively engaged in the defense of Russian territory, and that makes it possible for Russia to use auxiliary forces – including conscripts and the troops of its allies – to fight there.
Ultimately, then, the presence of North Koreans in Kursk is interesting, but perhaps not very important after all. These troops are not in Ukraine (even under the most maximal definition of the Ukrainian territorial unit), they are not carrying the primary combat load, and they are unequivocally not the problem that the AFU is facing in Kursk. The โbig problemโ for Ukraine, very simply, is not the presence of some amorphous Korean horde dedicated to spreading Glorious Juche to Europe – it is the loitering of large grouping of their own precious mechanized brigades in a compressed salient, far far away from the Donbas, where they are greatly needed.
Scraping the Barrel: AFU Force Generation
I think it is well understood, of course, that Ukraine faces severe manpower constraints relative to Russia, both in terms of the raw totals of male biomass available – with roughly 35 million fighting aged males in Russia against perhaps 9 million in prewar Ukraine – but also in terms of its capacity to mobilize them.
Ukraineโs mobilization scheme is hampered by both widespread draft evasion (with willingness to serve decreasing as the war has stretched on) and a stubborn unwillingness to draft younger men, aged 18-25. Ukraine is structurally burdened with a deeply imbalanced population structure: there are roughly 60% more Ukrainian men in their 30โs than in their 20โs. Given the relative scarcity of young men, particularly in their early 20’s, the Ukrainian government rightly views this 18-25 year old cohort as a premium demographic cohort that it is loathe to burn away in combat. Given the ubiquity of draft evasion, the refusal to mobilize younger males, and the corruption and inefficiency characteristic of the Ukrainian government, it should come as no surprise when Ukrainian mobilization falters
All of that is to say: Ukraine faces a severe structural disadvantage in military manpower in the aggregate, which is exacerbated by the idiosyncrasies of the Ukrainian mobilization law, ameliorated slightly by the relatively low troop densities and the preponderant power of strike systems in this war.
The argument that I want to make here, however, is that Ukraineโs systemic problems matching Russian manpower have been exacerbated by several developments which specifically became prominent in 2024. In other words, 2024 can and should be marked as the year where Ukrainian manpower constraints became markedly and perhaps irretrievably worse due to specific decisions made in Kiev, and particular developments on the ground.
These are as follows:
The decision to expand the AFUโs force structure through the creation of the โ15 seriesโ brigades
The decision to deliberately widen the front and create additional demands for manpower by launching the incursion into Kursk
The stall out of Ukraineโs new mobilization program in the autumn
Accelerating problems with desertion in the AFU
Weโll run through these in order.
An army that is intaking new personnel has to decide between two possible allocations for them. New personnel can be used as replacements to replenish existing frontline units, or they can be used to expand the force structure by creating new units. That much seems fairly obvious, and ideally mobilization will exceed losses and make it possible to do both. Where armies face hard manpower constraints, however – that is, where losses are equal to or greater than intake of men, the decision to expand the force structure can have monumental consequences. The stereotypical example, of course, would be the late-war Wehrmacht, which created premiere new assets in the form of Waffen SS divisions, which received privileged access to recruits and equipment while regular army divisions in the line suffered from a trickle of replacements which could not keep up with losses.
Ukraine, with its garbled force structure, has created a mess through its own attempts to expand its force structure in the face of dwindling strength on the line. Late in 2023, the AFU announced intentions to form an entirely new grouping of brigades – the so-called โ15 seriesโ, given their designations as the 150th, 151st, 152nd, 153rd, and 154th Mechanized Brigades. This was followed in 2024 with the appending of the 155th Mechanized Brigade, which was to be trained and equipped in France.
Forming a new grouping of mechanized brigades is essential to the way that Ukraine is presenting its war. Because Ukraine still aims (at least on paper) to recapture all of its Russian held territory, there must always be the illusory possibility of a future offensive, and in order for that illusory possibility to remain, Ukraine must present itself as actively preparing for future offensive operations. Ukraineโs presentation of its own strategic animus – the idea that it is holding the front while it prepares to go back on the offensive – essentially locks it into a program of expanding its force structure
The problem for Ukraine is that the immense pressure on the front makes it essentially impossible for them to properly husband resources the way they would like. Properly training and equipping half a dozen fresh mechanized brigades and holding them in reserve would be very helpful, but they cannot really do this in light of the demands for personnel at the front. These brigades instead become โpaper formationsโ that have a bureaucratic existence, while their organic assets are pulled apart and sucked into the front – stripped down into battalion or company sized elements that can be plugged into sectors of need on the frontline. At the moment, none of the 15 series brigades have seen action as organic units – that is, fighting as themselves.
The decision to allocate personnel to new mechanized brigades (though given stocks of armored vehicles it is questionable whether those designations mean anything) does not necessarily change Ukraineโs manpower balance in the aggregate, but it is certainly an inefficient way to use personnel. To return again to the 155th brigade, one problem noted by Ukrainian analysts was the fact that much of the brigade was formed whole cloth from forcibly mobilized personnel, without a proper cadre of veterans and experienced NCOs – some 75% of the brigade, it turns out, had been mobilized less than two months before arriving in France for training. This fact was certainly instrumental in the mass desertions and the brigadeโs poor combat effectiveness.
Given Ukraine’s constraints, the best course of action would undoubtedly be to allocate new personnel and equipment as replacements to build out the depleted veteran brigades on the front lines, plugging in replacements around existing veterans and officers. Kiev, however, prizes the prestige that comes from force expansion and the โshiny new toyโ factor of new formations equipped with scarce and valuable equipment like Leopard tanks. These new brigades, though billed as premiere assets, clearly have lower combat effectiveness than existing formations, given their lack of experience, shortage of veteran officers, and low unit cohesion.
In short, Ukraineโs decision to embark on force expansion in the face of significant manpower shortages has exacerbated the problem – both starving veteran units of replacements and concentrating newly mobilized personnel into combat ineffective formations that lack a veteran core, experienced officers, and vital equipment. They have tried, belatedly, to square this circle by parceling out new formations to backstop line brigades, but this is less than ideal – it leads to a patchwork order of battle with lower unit cohesion and a fragmented defense.
Unfortunately, this comes precisely as Ukraine has created additional self-imposed strains on its resources, in particular through its incursion into Kursk. At the moment, elements of at least seven mechanized brigades, two marine infantry brigades, and three air assault brigades are stationed on the Kursk axis. Without going too far into the weeds rehashing Ukraineโs operation here, itโs important to remember that Ukraine – facing extreme pressures on its force generation – voluntarily chose to widen the front into a secondary theater, diverting scarce assets and reducing its own ability to economize forces.
In summary, Ukraine has made deliberate decisions to widen the front and expand its force structure, both of which have been decidedly detrimental to its efforts to economize personnel. This comes precisely as a 2024 effort to ramp up mobilization has come off the rails.
A deadly feedback loop is now at work, with the lack of rotations and the shortage of replacements synergizing to accelerate the burn of Ukrainian personnel. The AFU is unable to regularly rotate units out of combat, and the inadequate flow of replacements causes frontline infantry complements to wear thin. Unable to rotate or reinforce, line brigades resort to cannibalization – scraping support personnel like mortar teams, drivers, and drone operators to fill out frontline positions. This further accelerates losses as brigades fight with thinned out support and fires elements, and makes Ukrainian men more unwilling to enlist – because there is now no guarantee that becoming a drone operator, for example, will save one from being sent to a frontline trench eventually.
Where does this leave us? Ukraine continues to dispose of a very large force, with more than a hundred brigades and hundreds of thousands of men under arms. This force, however, is both substantially outnumbered by the Russian army and in a clear trend of decay. Despite a highly touted attempt to reinvigorate the mobilization apparatus in 2024, the intake of new personnel is clearly too low to offset losses, and the heavy lifting formations in critical sectors of front have seen their strength – particularly in the infantry complements – decline, in some cases to critical levels.
The failure of Ukraineโs 2024 mobilization program has coincided with several strategic choices which have exacerbated manpower concerns – specifically the decision to embark on a program of force expansion even as the AFU voluntarily extended its commitments by opening a new secondary front in Kursk. In other words, Ukraineโs mobilization falls short of its force requirements, and the AFU has also made choices that sabotaged its ability to economize. Units are ground up, replacements come in a paltry trickle, rotations are late or absent, units cannibalize themselves, and angry and weary men desert.
Itโs not at all clear that this will lead to a โbreaking pointโ, in the sense that people are anticipating. Ukrainian strike capabilities and the Russian preference for dispersed, leapfrogging assaults limit the potential for grand breakthroughs and exploitation. However, what we saw over the past three months on the southern Donetsk axis offers a preview of what awaits: an exhausted force being steadily rolled back, dug out of its strongpoints, and mauled – covering its retreat with drones but losing position after position. The line holds, until it doesnโt.
End of the Line: ATACMs, JASSMs, and Hazelnuts
Ukraineโs ability to remain in the field depends on a titration of two indispensable resources: first, Ukrainian male biomass, and secondly the critical western weaponry that gives them combat effectiveness. We have evaluated the first: Ukraine is not exactly out of men, but the trends of its mobilization program are poor and personnel shortages are mounting. The trends regarding the second are, if anything, even more foreboding for Kiev.
There are two general dynamics that have emerged, neither of which create an optimistic picture for Ukraine, which weโll examine in turn. These are as follows:
The delivery of heavy weaponry to Ukraine (tanks, IFVs, and artillery tubes) has largely dried up in recent months.
The west has essentially run out of escalatory weaponry (strike systems) to give, and those systems already given have failed to meaningfully altar the trajectory of the war.
In 2023, building out new mechanized units was the name of the game, with the Pentagon leading a multinational effort to stand up an entire army corps worth of units equipped with Leopards, Challengers, and a whole slew of western IFVs and APCs. When that lovingly assembled grouping bashed its head on a rock in the botched assault on the Zaporizhia line, the United States belatedly and begrudgingly dispatched its own Abrams to backstop the Ukrainian tank force. In 2024, however, deliveries of heavy weapons slowed to a trickle.
The role of the tank in Ukraine has been greatly misunderstood. The vulnerability of tanks to the myriad strike systems of the modern battlefield led some observers to declare that the tank as a weapons system was now obsolete, but this did not really square with the fact that both combatants in this war were eager to deploy as many as possible. Tanks need more critical enablers – more combat engineering, air defense, and electronic warfare support – but they continue to fill an indispensable role and remain an essential item in this war. The failure of Ukraineโs 2023 counteroffensive showed, if anything, that tanks simply are not โgame changingโ systems, but mass consumption items – but this has always been the case. The signature quality of iconic tanks like the Sherman and the T34 was that they were numerous
While 2023 was all about building out Ukraineโs mechanized package with tanks, IFVs, and engineering, 2024 has been largely about enhancing Ukraineโs strike capabilities. There have been two separate elements at play – first, the delivery of both air and ground launched systems (most notably the British Storm Shadows and American ATACMs respectively), and secondly the loosening of the rules of engagement to allow Ukraine to strike targets inside pre-war Russia.
This dovetailed, as it turned out, with Ukraineโs operation in Kursk, and in many ways the most direct impact of the Kursk incursion has been to force the westโs hand on the rules of engagement. While Ukraine has long been striking inside Russia with indigenous systems, most notably drones, the White House continued to drag its feet on formal approval for strikes with American systems. By launching a ground assault on Kursk, Ukraine made the decision for them: the United States gave clearance to use ATACMs to support the ground forces in Kursk, and this metastasized into general license to strike Russia with the full range of available systems. This was a poignant reminder that, however we conceive of the proxy-sponsor relationship, Ukraine has some ability to force Americaโs hand: a classic example of the tail wagging the dog.
In any case, 2024 saw Ukraine and its western backers slowly but surely bash through all the supposed red-lines in this domain: the British breached first with the delivery of Storm Shadows late in 2023, and this was followed by the delivery of ATACMs (with a handful of F16โs to boot), and finally the loosening of the rules of engagement to clear strikes on Russia.
Where does this leave us? There would seem to be three important things to consider.
The west has essentially reached the end of its escalation chain. The only remaining step that they can take would be to supply Ukraine with JASSMs (Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile), which would mark a quantitative but not a meaningful qualitative upgrade to Ukraineโs strike capabilities.
Ukraineโs use of western-supplied strike assets has been dissipated and has not materially improved their situation on the ground.
Russia maintains a dominant strike advantage, both qualitative and quantitative.
Ukraine faces a stark disadvantage in strike capability relative to Russia, in a variety of ways. Russian strike assets are far more numerous and have significant range advantages, but it is also important to take into consideration both Russiaโs significantly greater strategic depth and its more dense and relatively unscathed air defense. Unlike Ukraine, which has seen its air defense stretch to the limit with destroyed launchers and a mounting interceptor shortage, Russiaโs air defenses have been essentially untouched, as Ukraine has lacked the large numbers of assets required to conduct a proper SEAD/DEAD (Suppression/Destruction of Enemy Air Defense) campaign.
Given this basic calculus, using western strike systems to wage a blow for blow strategic air campaign is bad math for Ukraine. It is generally unwise to engage in a bat fight when your opponent is a bigger man with a much longer bat. Instead, Ukraineโs strike systems should have been leveraged to support ground operations – concentrating strikes spatially and in time to synergize with efforts on the ground. Just as a simple thought experiment, it is not difficult to imagine ATACMs making a difference if they had been available in 2023 and used to saturate Russian rear areas during the assault on the Zaporizhia line – striking in tempo with the mechanized assault to disrupt Russian command and control and prevent reinforcement of critical areas.
Two things need to be noted about the JASSM. First, the JASSM – while offering slightly longer ranges – would essentially serve as a backstop/replacement for the rapidly dwindling ATACMs and particularly the air launched Storm Shadows – instead of Ukraineโs native SU-24s launching Storm Shadows, they would utilize F-16s launching JASSMs. This would not represent a dramatic upgrade in Ukrainian capabilities, but would instead simply serve to maintain a bare minimum Ukrainian strike capability. JASSMs are a replacement for dwindling capabilities, not an augmentation to them.
Secondly, it must be understood that JASSMs are the last stop. Weโre now entering the territory, not of artificially constructed red lines, but physical and real limits. Russia has essentially eaten the gifted stocks of ATACMs and Storm Shadows, with little discernable effect on their ability to fight, and JASSMs are the last extant item in the inventories to keep Ukrainian strike capabilities operative. We are at the last rung of the aid ladder.
In the case of JASSMs, however, there are notable downsides for the United States. This is an important case of putting all of oneโs eggs in the same technological basket. In 2020, the United States scrapped the development of its conventionally armed Long Range Standoff Missile, making the JASSM – particularly the new extended range variants – the system for the United States, earmarked to play a critical role in future conflicts, particularly in the Pacific. This makes the JASSM an extremely sensitive system, as a centerpiece of American strike capabilities, particularly with the modernization of the Tomahawk system crawling along at a few dozen units per year.
Given the fact that JASSMs are GPS guided, there are real reasons to be reticent about giving Ukraine such a technologically sensitive system. Russian electronic warfare has enjoyed considerable success jamming GPS and disrupting similarly guided American systems. Allowing the Russians to gain familiarity with a keystone American system could wreak havoc on Pentagon war planning – most, if not all of the strike eggs are in this basket, so why let an adversary peek inside?
Itโs probable, given what we have seen to this point, that these concerns will ultimately be dismissed and Ukraine will receive a line of JASSMs which will backstop their strike capabilities – but given the size of Ukraineโs F-16 fleet, the scale will be constrained. Furthermore, air launched systems are less optimal for Ukraine, given their dependence on large and easily targeted airfields, in contrast to ground launched systems which are mobile and more easily concealed.
There is also the matter of the new Russian missile system – the now famous Oreshnik, or Hazel Tree. Russia tested the Oreshnik system on a large machining plant in Dnipro on November 21, 2024, which allowed the basic capabilities of the system to be gauged. The Oreshnik is an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile, characterized by its hypersonic capabilities (exceeding Mach-10) and its Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle equipped with six separate warheads, with the potential for submunitions in each. Although the attack on Dnipro was essentially a demonstration which used inert training warheads (that is, without explosive payloads), the missile can be configured with nuclear or conventional warheads
As in the case of the North Korean troops in Kursk, I rather think that the Oreshnik launch was not nearly as important as it was made out to be. The system is expensive and likely impractical for conventional use. I understand the desire to conceive of Oreshnik as a massively powerful conventional weapon – showering its target with half a dozen warheads with the power of an entire flight of Kalibr missiles – but there are several problems with this. The accuracy of the system (the CEP, or โCircular Error Probableโ in the technical parlance) is much more consistent with a nuclear delivery system than a conventional one. Furthermore, the problem with using an IRBM for conventional strikes is the danger of miscalculation – foreign adversaries may misinterpret the launch as a nuclear attack and respond appropriately. This is precisely why the Russian government actually alerted the United States to the launch ahead of time – a fine arrangement for a demonstration, but impractical for a weapon that is intended to be used regularly.
We may see another use of the Oreshnik against Ukraine, but ultimately this is unlikely to be a system of consequence in this war. The demonstration in Dnipro was instead likely intended to send a message to Europe – reminding NATO that Russia has the capacity to deliver strikes against European targets that cannot be intercepted. It also serves as a poignant reminder that Europe lacks the equivalent capability, and in essence provides a demonstration of Russiaโs ability to launch missiles from far beyond the range of either Ukrainian or European response. The Hazelnut is a tangible reminder of Russiaโs strategic depth and strike dominance in Ukraine.
Ultimately, Ukraine will lose the strike game. Itโs strike capacity has dwindled, with missiles frittered away in a dissipated air campaign, and though the exhaustion of Storm Shadow and ATACMs stocks can be offset somewhat by JASSMs, Ukraine simply lacks the range or quantities necessary to match Russian capabilities. Needing to do more with less, Ukraine instead diffused its assets and failed to synergize its strikes with ground operations. We are now at the end of the line – after JASSMs, thereโs nothing left in western warehouses to upgrade Ukrainian capabilities. Hazelnuts or no, the math on this bat fight is bad for Kiev.
Conclusion: Debellation
Trapped in an endless news cycle, with daily footage of FPV strikes and exploding vehicles, and a dutiful cottage industry of war mappers alerting us to every 100 meter advance, it can easily feel like the Russo-Ukrainian War is trapped in an interminable doom loop which will never end – Mad Max meets Groundhog Day.
What I have endeavored to do here, however, is argue that 2024 actually saw several very important developments which make the coming shape of the war relatively clear. To briefly recapitulate:
Russian forces caved in Ukrainian defenses at depth across an entire critical axis of front. After remaining static for years, Ukraineโs position in Southern Donetsk has been obliterated, with Russian forces advancing through an entire belt of fortified positions, pushing the front into Pokrovsk and Kostayantinivka.
The main Ukrainian gambit on the ground (the incursion into Kursk) failed spectacularly, with the salient being progressively caved in. An entire grouping of critical mechanized formations wasted much of the year fighting on this unproductive and secondary front, leaving Ukrainian positions in the Donbas increasingly threadbare and bereft of reserves.
An attempt by the Ukrainian government to reinvigorate its mobilization program failed, with enlistments quickly trailing off. Decisions to expand the force structure exacerbated the shortage of manpower, and as a result the decay of Ukraineโs frontline brigades has accelerated.
Long awaited western upgrades to Ukraineโs strike capabilities failed to defeat Russian momentum, and stocks of ATACMs and Storm Shadows are nearly exhausted. There are now few options remaining to prop up Ukrainian strike capacity, and no prospect of Ukraine gaining dominance in this dimension of the war.
In short, Ukraine is on the path to debellation – defeat through the total exhaustion of its capacity to resist. They are not exactly out of men and vehicles and missiles, but these lines are all pointing downward. A strategic Ukrainian defeat – once unthinkable to the western foreign policy apparatus and commentariat – is now on the table. Quite interestingly, now that Donald Trump is about to return to the White House, it is suddenly acceptable to speak of Ukrainian defeat. Robert Kagan – a stalwart champion of Ukraine if there ever was one – now says the quiet part out loud:
Ukraine will likely lose the war within the next 12 to 18 months. Ukraine will not lose in a nice, negotiated way, with vital territories sacrificed but an independent Ukraine kept alive, sovereign, and protected by Western security guarantees. It faces instead a complete defeat, a loss of sovereignty, and full Russian control
Indeed.
None of this should be particularly surprising. If anything, it is shocking that my position – that Russia is essentially a very powerful country that was very unlikely to lose a war (which it perceives as existential) right in its own belly – somehow became controversial or fringe. But here we are.
chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia