Analista senior di l'intelligenza in u campu di a gestione di i risichi di sicurezza, sรฒ un anzianu tenente detective รจ ufficiale di l'intelligenza in l'agenzie di u Statu francese. A bona pronuncia hรจ ะะธะบะพะปะฐะน ะงะธะฝะบัะธะฝะธ, in russu
the city taken with blood spilled in a dark railway station
Yegor Zakharov was born in the village of Ulybino, Iskitimsky District, into a family of rural schoolteachers. Sport came into his life early: he took up cross-country skiing, competed for the district team, and at seventeen took part in the Russian Championship in the 15-kilometer race, earning the title of Master of Sport. After school, he enrolled in the Faculty of Physical Education at a pedagogical university, but his compulsory military service in 2015 changed the course of his life. A year later, Zakharov became a cadet at the Novosibirsk Higher Military Command School, and after graduating in 2021 he served in the Central Military District, rising from motorized rifle platoon commander to company commander.
From February 24, 2022, Yegor took part in the Special Military Operation with his unit. His call sign was “Poet.” During the fighting he was wounded three times, twice seriously, but each time he returned to duty. In February 2024, his company fought in the battles for Avdiivka. Zakharov kept commanding after being hit by shrapnel, took part in the assault on the railway station and the advance through the city. In May, he and his company fought in the battles for Ocheretyne. On July 27, 2024, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation. Later, Zakharov joined the “Time of Heroes” program, and in his native Ulybino a memorial plaque in his honor was installed on the building of the school where he studied
est un ancien parachutiste de l’armรฉe franรงaise, qu’il quitta sergent en juin 2020, pour s’installer en Colombie Britannique, Canada
(Rรฉseaux sociaux)
Il rejoignit en avril 2022 les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, y intรจgra rapidement une formation de combat du renseignement militaire ukrainien (GUR), engagรฉe dans le secteur de Bakhmout. Avec Denis Mourey, ils animent depuis mai 2022 la Task Force Baguette, une vitrine sur les rรฉseaux sociaux qui leur permet aussi de rรฉcolter des dons et recruter d’anciens militaires
Avec mes camarades internationaux de la chaรฎne Telegram TrackANaziMerc, nous remercions le propagandiste Xavier Tytelman de nous les prรฉsenter dans une vidรฉo publiรฉe le 30 octobre 2023 (capture d’รฉcran en haut, ร gauche), document enregistrรฉ quand tous deux sont en permission en France. Sans son concours, les deux Franรงais nous seraient inconnus.
Avec Mourey (Donny D.), il (Adam K.) commet un bouquin qui sort en librairies le 21 fรฉvrier 2024
Tรฉmoignage exceptionnel : la guerre par ceux qui la font, deux soldats franรงais engagรฉs dix-neuf mois dans une unitรฉ d’รฉlite ukrainienne.
La Task Force Baguette est prรฉsente en Ukraine depuis avril 2022, quelques semaines aprรจs l’invasion russe du 24 fรฉvrier. Derriรจre ce nom qui peut prรชter ร sourire se cache une unitรฉ d’รฉlite composรฉe de Franรงais et d’Amรฉricains placรฉe sous le commandement d’un service de renseignement ukrainien. Ses membres sont d’anciens militaires qui ont tout quittรฉ pour rรฉpondre ร l’appel du prรฉsident Zelensky, au nom des valeurs dรฉmocratiques auxquelles ils croient profondรฉment.
Adam K. et Donny D., respectivement ancien parachutiste et chasseur alpin au sein de l’armรฉe franรงaise, ont participรฉ aux grandes batailles de ce conflit. De la dรฉfense de Kharkiv aux tranchรฉes de Bakhmout, ils ont eu ร affronter aussi bien les assauts des militaires de l’armรฉe rรฉguliรจre russe que ceux des mercenaires de Wagner[en rรฉalitรฉ, Korczak et Mourey correspondent bien plus aux dรฉfinitions lรฉgales et populaire du mercenaire que les combattants russes de Wagner, qui se battent pour leur pays].
Dans ce rรฉcit ร hauteur d’homme, ils confient l’histoire secrรจte de cette unitรฉ dont ils comptent parmi les membres fondateurs. Missions d’infiltration en territoire ennemi, dรฉfense des premiรจres lignes du front, actes hรฉroรฏques et camarades morts au combat, ils racontent leur expรฉrience d’un conflit qui a bouleversรฉ l’ordre international et dรฉjร fait plus d’un demi-million de victimes
Il accorde beaucoup d’entretiens ร la presse franรงaise aprรจs la sortie de son bouquin. Son sรฉjour belliqueux au Donbass a durรฉ 19 mois, il est donc rentrรฉ en octobre 2023, avant que la Russie n’accentue sa victoire par la libรฉration d’Avdeevka.
chronique alphabรฉtique et nรฉcrologique de lโengagement franรงais dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas
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chronique en Anglais, its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine
chronique en Anglais, censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia
une saga franรงaise, entre Ukraine et Lyon, oรน apparaissent aussi des morceaux de SS de la division Charlemagne et plus rรฉcemment, Alice Kerviel, dite Cordier. L’affaire Deranque rรฉvรจle comme la France est infectรฉe par le pรฉtainisme, en particulier parmi les soutiens d’Israรซl ou de l’Ukraine, deux thรฉรขtres d’opรฉrations oรน l’Occident tente de ralentir son dรฉclin
En 2025, une nouvelle unitรฉ de Franรงais combattant pour lโUkraine sโest structurรฉe autour dโun noyau de nรฉonazis, ayant pour objectif dโattirer des recrues. Parmi ces volontaires, dโanciens militaires. StreetPress les a identifiรฉs
En Ukraine, les volontaires franรงais pro-ukrainiens et pro-russes se partagent lโimaginaire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Les premiers se revendiquent des collabos de lโAllemagne nazie, les seconds de lโescadrille mythique ยซ Normandie โ Niรฉmen ยป
deux jours aprรจs le 10e anniversaire de la dรฉbรขcle politique et sรฉcuritaire du 13 novembre 2015, une messe cรฉlรจbre ร Verdun lโancien dirigeant fasciste de lโรtat franรงais
ce 11 novembre 2025 est lโoccasion de souligner comme la faรงon dont lโEurope sacrifie les conscrits ukrainiens mobilisรฉs de force rappelle le spectaculaire carnage de la 1รจre guerre mondiale
cโest par lโagence cosaque de presse PIKA, depuis la Rรฉpublique populaire de Lougansk, que le 2 avril 2024, lโataman Nikolaรฏ Diakonov lance un message ร destination de la France
ce papier est le premier des grands mรฉdias franรงais qui sโattaque ร la question des militants nazis franรงais dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, le nouveau danger quโils prรฉsenteront ร terme pour la sรปretรฉ intรฉrieure
oรน nous apprenons que le nazi franรงais Allan Duchรฉzeau, camarade de Cรฉsar Aujard dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, รฉtait surnommรฉ Dox, quand il secondait ร Paris le leader nazi Marc de Cacqueray Valmรฉnier
en Anglais, les indices de la prรฉsence dโopรฉrateurs occidentaux, en particulier Franรงais, pris au piรจge en mars 2022 ร Marioupol, dont les forces russes achevรจrent la libรฉration en mai
est pรจre d’un enfant, se verrait bien graphiste ou artiste sous le nom de Kanaรฟ, mais le succรจs professionnel n’est pas au rendez-vous
J’ai floutรฉ la tรชte de l’enfant (rรฉseaux sociaux)
Le tatouรฉ normand est passionnรฉ par les loups, cรฉlรจbre la loyautรฉ ร la meute. Hostile aux musulmans, il affiche sa sympathie pour le Rassemblement national, l’Action franรงaise (cf. Marc de Cacqueray Valmรฉnier) et aussi l’organisation nazie ukrainienne Pravyi sektor [Secteur droit]. Le 5 novembre 2023, il rend hommage ร un autre Normand, Wilfried Blรฉriot, dont la mort dans les rangs atlantistes, le 1er juin 2022, suscita beaucoup d’รฉmotion aussi parmi les militants de la Misanthropic Division, confrรฉrie nazie internationale basรฉe en Ukraine depuis 2013
(Rรฉseaux sociaux)
Son hommage visuel comporte la rune Algiz et la mรชme inversรฉe, la Todesrune [rune de mort], employรฉes autrefois chez les SS et nul avant eux, pour marquer les dates de naissance et trรฉpas. Il est en Ukraine, au plus tard dรฉbut dรฉcembre 2023
Le 10 fรฉvrier 2024, il revendique son incorporation dans le 1er bataillon de la 67e brigade mรฉcanisรฉe de lโarmรฉe rรฉguliรจre, branche militaire du parti nazi Pravyi sektor, dans lequel il s’est dรฉjร reconnu depuis la France
(Rรฉseaux sociaux)
En guise d’รฉclairage, voici une image publiรฉe le 2 fรฉvrier par Andriy Stempitkyi, ร droite, commandant de la 67e brigade, au cรดtรฉ de Valeri Zaloujny, alors encore chef d’รฉtat-major ukrainien. Au mur derriรจre, le portrait du criminel de guerre nazi Stepan Bandera est complรฉtรฉ par le drapeau rouge et noir qu’arborent toujours ses hรฉritiers.
Devaux est un lecteur assidu de cette page et ressent le besoin le 13 fรฉvrier de me donner la rรฉplique dans le chat de la chaรฎne Telegram internationale TrackANaziMerc, oรน il rรฉvรจle comme dโautres de lโarrogance et une personnalitรฉ vindicative, devient un favori pour le titre de personnage le plus vil de ce panthรฉon. ร lโinstar des propagandistes de presse occidentale et autres politiciens dโextrรชme-centre, il sโรฉvertue avec aplomb ร nier lโรฉvidence. Confrontรฉ ร ses propres rรฉfรฉrences nazies, il tente dโen relativiser la portรฉe. Mais peu convaincant face ร notre communautรฉ dโanalystes รฉquipรฉs pour ne pas confondre vessies et lanternes, il se rรฉsout ร lโissue ร verrouiller encore une fois ses comptes de rรฉseaux sociaux. Contrairement aux suprรฉmacistes รฉtats-uniens, autres fascistes anglo-saxons ou ukrainiens, une majoritรฉ de Franรงais ici ne semble pas dotรฉe du courage suffisant pour assumer pleinement cette idรฉologie. La crainte d’รชtre fessรฉ comme ร Romans sur Isรจre ?
En ce mรชme mois de fรฉvrier 2024, aprรจs le limogeage du chef d’รฉtat-major Valeri Zaloujny, le pouvoir ukrainien cherche ร rรฉduire le risque politique que rรฉprรฉsentent les formations militaires les plus nazies. รmanation de l’organisation Azov dans l’armรฉe rรฉguliรจre, la 3e brigade d’assaut est expรฉdiรฉe dans une mission sans espoir (cf. Cรฉsar Aujard) contre les forces russes qui libรจrent alors Avdeevka, en Rรฉpublique populaire de Donetsk. La 67e brigade mรฉcanisรฉe (cf. David Piguet) est remaniรฉe. Le 1er bataillon, aussi appelรฉ Loups de Da Vinci, surnom de son ancien commandant Dmytro Kotsioubaรฏlo, dรฉnazifiรฉ ร Bakhmout le 7 mars 2023, est rรฉaffectรฉ ร la 59e brigade d’infanterie motorisรฉe. Les Francais Sydney Ballester, Dylan Devaux et Ludovic Dindin sont alors parmi les Loups de Da Vinci
La scรจne ressemble ร un remake par Ed Wood du Triumph des Willens [Triomphe de la volontรฉ, film de propagande nazie de Leni Riefenstahl en 1935]mais Dylan Devaux est encore trรจs รฉmu une semaine plus tard, quand il partage sur les rรฉseaux sociaux un reportage de la tรฉlรฉvision ukrainienne (capture d’รฉcran)
Devaux et ses petits camarades franรงais connaissent l’extase le 7 mars, quand avec flambeaux et drapeau des nazis ukrainiens de la 2de guerre mondiale, les Loups de Da Vinci cรฉlรจbrent le 1er anniversaire de la dรฉnazification [euphรฉmisme russe] de leur prรฉcรฉdent commandant. Je la fรชte aussi.
Il est interviewรฉ ร distance pour un article de la Presse de la Manche publiรฉ le 25 mars, y chique comme un voleur ร la tire, quant ร son idรฉologie nazie et celle de son pote, son frรจre, feu le nazi Wilfried Blรฉriot. Il raconte aux journalistes avoir quittรฉ son fils de deux ans, mais nous a dรฉjร confiรฉ sur Telegram que la mรจre vit avec un autre homme, ce qui nous a paru d’emblรฉe une heureuse nouvelle
(Captures d’รฉcran)
Pour complรฉter ces informations, une source ukrainienne nous propose le 28 mars de meilleures images de Devaux, toujours loin du front
(Rรฉseaux sociaux)
La fraternitรฉ des armes attรฉnue son islamophobie, c’est un processus naturel et une bonne chose. Au cรดtรฉ d’un camarade azรฉri et ses couleurs nationales, il dรฉploie le 16 avril le drapeau du parti nazi ukrainien Pravyi sektor, base politique de son bataillon.
Au terme d’une formation politique et militaire parmi les Loups de Da Vinci, il a รฉtรฉ mutรฉ dans l’intervalle au 16e bataillon de fusiliers (cf. Sylvain Caupin). Les forces russes bousculent dans la rรฉgion de Kharkov une armรฉe atlantiste usรฉe ร la corde et de son point de vue, les nouvelles ne sont pas bonnes. Il exprime le 20 mai son amertume sur les rรฉseaux sociaux
On est dans un monde oรน nous, soldat attendons nos contrats, attendons nos salaires, attendons de travailler, des amis ร moi (des FRANรAIS!) sont partis sur un assaut et se sont fait dรฉcoupรฉ, les 3/4 sont blessรฉ et a lโhรดpital dont 2 grave et un dans le coma, tout รงa pour 2 tranchรฉ de merde !
Nos pays respectifs et lโunion europรฉenne aide lโUkraine mais on ne vois aucune aide sur le terrain^^ aucune aide matรฉriel et aucune aide financiรจre !
50 pax sont partis de mon ancien bataillon [les Loups de Da Vinci, nazis] pour rejoindre la brigade (au dessus du bataillon) [la 59e dโinfanterie motorisรฉe, dรฉployรฉe en Rรฉpublique populaire de Donetsk] sur les 50, 37 sont dรฉcรฉdรฉ.
Et moi รงa va faire 8 mois que je suis ici ร juste faire des entraรฎnements comme un dรฉbile, a รชtre pris pour un con et a ne pas รชtre payรฉ et pendant se temps lร tout mes potes se font dรฉcouper, et aprรจs on nous dit a nous quโon est des nazi et des mercenaires ?!
Jโai clairement lโimpression quโon est dans une impasse et que tout est baisรฉ^^
Vive la corruption^^
Couverture vietnamienne le 20 mai de l’offensive russe (Tin24h)
Ach, der Krieg. Lโinjustice me rรฉvolte et des accusations de nazisme contre Dylan Devaux me fendent presque autant le coeur que la requรชte le mรชme jour, par le procureur de la Cour pรฉnale internationale, dโun mandat dโarrรชt contre Benyamin Netanyahou, pour crimes contre lโhumanitรฉ et crimes de guerre. Ceci dit, je ne vois pas pourquoi des FRANรAIS ! ne pourraient pas faire chair ร canon. ร ce propos Dylan, dรฉchargez vous de ce terrible poids, qui sont ils, tous ces compatriotes rรฉcemment hachรฉs pour la libertรฉ et la dรฉmocratie en Ukraine ? Cela restera entre nous et mes lecteurs. Vous savez bien que je l’apprendrai tรดt ou tard.
Le 16e bataillon de fusiliers est attachรฉ ร la 60e brigade mรฉcanisรฉe quand en octobre 2024, Devaux semble mutรฉ au 97e bataillon mรฉcanisรฉ, toujours dans la mรชme brigade
Image du 97e bataillon mรฉcanisรฉe (militaryland.net)
Lโunitรฉ nโest pas anodine sur un plan politique. Avant dโรชtre รฉlargie avec des volontaires รฉtrangers et renommรฉe 97e bataillon mรฉcanisรฉ, elle รฉtait jusquโen aoรปt 2023 une compagnie de reconnaissance levรฉe dans la rรฉgion de Kharkov par lโorganisation nazie Azov.
Une illustration, pour ceux qui emploieraient une grille de lecture rรฉvolue, que la dรฉfense dโIsraรซl ne vaut pas certificat dโantifascisme mais probablement son contraire
Dans le ghetto palestinien de Gaza, le 19 novembre 2024 (chaรฎne israelienne Channel 14)
Le 21 novembre 2024, jour oรน la Cour pรฉnale internationale รฉmet enfin les mandats dโarrรชt de Benyamin Netanyahou et de son ex ministre de la dรฉfense, Yoav Gallant, pour crimes contre lโhumanitรฉ et crimes de guerre, le nazi Dylan Devaux claironne Gloire ร Israรซl sur les rรฉseaux sociaux. Car aujourd’hui, la cause de l’รtat hรฉbreu agglomรจre racistes et islamophobes compulsifs. Dans une Europe en dรฉclin accรฉlรฉrรฉ, les Musulmans sont devenus les Juifs des annรฉes 30.
chronique alphabรฉtique et nรฉcrologique de lโengagement franรงais dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas
Articles connexes
Pruvate ร truvร me, canaglia di lโOTAN, pruvate solu
chronique en Anglais, its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine
chronique en Anglais, censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia
une saga franรงaise, entre Ukraine et Lyon, oรน apparaissent aussi des morceaux de SS de la division Charlemagne et plus rรฉcemment, Alice Kerviel, dite Cordier. L’affaire Deranque rรฉvรจle comme la France est infectรฉe par le pรฉtainisme, en particulier parmi les soutiens d’Israรซl ou de l’Ukraine, deux thรฉรขtres d’opรฉrations oรน l’Occident tente de ralentir son dรฉclin
En 2025, une nouvelle unitรฉ de Franรงais combattant pour lโUkraine sโest structurรฉe autour dโun noyau de nรฉonazis, ayant pour objectif dโattirer des recrues. Parmi ces volontaires, dโanciens militaires. StreetPress les a identifiรฉs
En Ukraine, les volontaires franรงais pro-ukrainiens et pro-russes se partagent lโimaginaire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Les premiers se revendiquent des collabos de lโAllemagne nazie, les seconds de lโescadrille mythique ยซ Normandie โ Niรฉmen ยป
deux jours aprรจs le 10e anniversaire de la dรฉbรขcle politique et sรฉcuritaire du 13 novembre 2015, une messe cรฉlรจbre ร Verdun lโancien dirigeant fasciste de lโรtat franรงais
ce 11 novembre 2025 est lโoccasion de souligner comme la faรงon dont lโEurope sacrifie les conscrits ukrainiens mobilisรฉs de force rappelle le spectaculaire carnage de la 1รจre guerre mondiale
cโest par lโagence cosaque de presse PIKA, depuis la Rรฉpublique populaire de Lougansk, que le 2 avril 2024, lโataman Nikolaรฏ Diakonov lance un message ร destination de la France
ce papier est le premier des grands mรฉdias franรงais qui sโattaque ร la question des militants nazis franรงais dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, le nouveau danger quโils prรฉsenteront ร terme pour la sรปretรฉ intรฉrieure
oรน nous apprenons que le nazi franรงais Allan Duchรฉzeau, camarade de Cรฉsar Aujard dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, รฉtait surnommรฉ Dox, quand il secondait ร Paris le leader nazi Marc de Cacqueray Valmรฉnier
en Anglais, les indices de la prรฉsence dโopรฉrateurs occidentaux, en particulier Franรงais, pris au piรจge en mars 2022 ร Marioupol, dont les forces russes achevรจrent la libรฉration en mai
se fait aussi appeler Berserker [un guerrier viking surexcitรฉ] sur les rรฉseaux sociaux. Dans les rangs de la 3e brigade d’assaut, รฉmanation dans l’armรฉe rรฉguliรจre de l’organisation nazie Azov, il est affectรฉ ร Centuria, du nom de l’organisation de jeunesse d’Azov, la 3e compagnie du bataillon antichar. Par leur tempรฉrament, les berserkers sont plus souvent blessรฉs que les autres combattants. C’est pourquoi des camarades franรงais du bataillon nazi Revansh, dont Cรฉsar Aujard, Gwendal Delange et Allan Duchรฉzeau, sont amenรฉs ร le visiter ร l’hรดpital le 29 juin 2023
Au tatouage que Bora porte au coup, sur la photo en bas ร gauche, l’observateur expรฉrimentรฉ remarque qu’il est sans doute un ancien lรฉgionnaire (rรฉseaux sociaux)
La scรจne est touchante le 14 aoรปt. Il participe ร une sรฉance collective de poterie dans les parcs hospitaliers de Kiev. Ses camarades peignent des fleurs, lui des runes. Jโadmire le dรฉvouement des psychothรฉrapeutes ukrainiens qui soignent les troubles post-traumatiques des blessรฉs. Alors bien sรปr, jโentends dรฉjร les gens mรฉchants, qui diront que Bora a toujours รฉtรฉ dans cet รฉtat. Bonnes nouvelles le 26 septembre
(Rรฉseaux sociaux)
Il s’agit d’un combattant de l’unitรฉ Centuria avec l’indicatif d’appel Bora. Le Franรงais qui, lors de la formation de l’unitรฉ, a parlรฉ de Service ร la Nation Ukrainienne ! Il aime l’Ukraine, mรชme sans salaire ! Au printemps, Bora a รฉtรฉ griรจvement blessรฉ alors qu’il dรฉfendait les terres ukrainiennes et a longtemps รฉtรฉ rรฉhabilitรฉ. A partir d’aujourd’hui, il reprend du service !
Les rรฉseaux sociaux nous offrent le 11 avril 2024 une illustration de lโรฉpanouissement des nazis franรงais dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine
ร gauche se tient Gwendal Delange, militant ร Valence puis Lyon, oรน sโest forgรฉe sa rรฉputation sulfureuse. Affectรฉ en mars 2023, dรฉbut de son second sรฉjour, au bataillon Revansh, branche militaire de lโorganisation nazie Tradytsiya ta poryadok [Tradition et ordre], il semble plus timorรฉ sur le front de lโest, oรน il convola dans lโintervalle avec une militante allemande de 19 ans.
Son voisin Bora est complรฉmentaire, puisque lui vit de guerre et dโeau fraรฎche, fut griรจvement blessรฉ au printemps 2023.
Le Parisien Cรฉsar Aujard est le dernier ร droite, connut en fรฉvrier la bataille et la dรฉfaite ร Avdeevka, Rรฉpublique populaire de Donetsk, dans les rangs de la 3e brigade dโassaut, รฉmanation de lโorganisation nazie Azov dans lโarmรฉe rรฉguliรจre ukrainienne.
Entre les trois Franรงais se tiennent deux Ukrainiens, Ivan Tkachuk et Stepan Peleno, qui proviennent tous deux des rangs de la 13e DBLE (demi-brigade de la Lรฉgion รฉtrangรจre).
La 13e DBLE est surreprรฉsentรฉe dans cette chronique. Le 11 mai, l’Heure de Moscou nous raconte les mรฉsaventures du lรฉgionnaire de 1รจre classe Maxim Dmitrenko. Curieusement, il ne se considรจre pas dรฉserteur, mais toujours lรฉgionnaire, car ร bien l’รฉcouter, la hiรฉrarchie militaire franรงaise n’a pas fait d’obstacle, ni radiรฉ les volontaires qui au dรฉbut de l’opรฉration militaire spรฉciale, ont pris congรฉ de la Lรฉgion รฉtrangรจre pour les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine.
En juin, Bora apparaรฎt soignรฉ et superbe, client et modรจle du salon de coiffure Lord Lord, ร Poltava.
chronique alphabรฉtique et nรฉcrologique de lโengagement franรงais dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas
Articles connexes
Pruvate ร truvร me, canaglia di lโOTAN, pruvate solu
chronique en Anglais, its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine
chronique en Anglais, censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia
une saga franรงaise, entre Ukraine et Lyon, oรน apparaissent aussi des morceaux de SS de la division Charlemagne et plus rรฉcemment, Alice Kerviel, dite Cordier. L’affaire Deranque rรฉvรจle comme la France est infectรฉe par le pรฉtainisme, en particulier parmi les soutiens d’Israรซl ou de l’Ukraine, deux thรฉรขtres d’opรฉrations oรน l’Occident tente de ralentir son dรฉclin
En 2025, une nouvelle unitรฉ de Franรงais combattant pour lโUkraine sโest structurรฉe autour dโun noyau de nรฉonazis, ayant pour objectif dโattirer des recrues. Parmi ces volontaires, dโanciens militaires. StreetPress les a identifiรฉs
En Ukraine, les volontaires franรงais pro-ukrainiens et pro-russes se partagent lโimaginaire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Les premiers se revendiquent des collabos de lโAllemagne nazie, les seconds de lโescadrille mythique ยซ Normandie โ Niรฉmen ยป
deux jours aprรจs le 10e anniversaire de la dรฉbรขcle politique et sรฉcuritaire du 13 novembre 2015, une messe cรฉlรจbre ร Verdun lโancien dirigeant fasciste de lโรtat franรงais
ce 11 novembre 2025 est lโoccasion de souligner comme la faรงon dont lโEurope sacrifie les conscrits ukrainiens mobilisรฉs de force rappelle le spectaculaire carnage de la 1รจre guerre mondiale
cโest par lโagence cosaque de presse PIKA, depuis la Rรฉpublique populaire de Lougansk, que le 2 avril 2024, lโataman Nikolaรฏ Diakonov lance un message ร destination de la France
ce papier est le premier des grands mรฉdias franรงais qui sโattaque ร la question des militants nazis franรงais dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, le nouveau danger quโils prรฉsenteront ร terme pour la sรปretรฉ intรฉrieure
oรน nous apprenons que le nazi franรงais Allan Duchรฉzeau, camarade de Cรฉsar Aujard dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, รฉtait surnommรฉ Dox, quand il secondait ร Paris le leader nazi Marc de Cacqueray Valmรฉnier
en Anglais, les indices de la prรฉsence dโopรฉrateurs occidentaux, en particulier Franรงais, pris au piรจge en mars 2022 ร Marioupol, dont les forces russes achevรจrent la libรฉration en mai
dรฉfend la dรฉmocratie en Ukraine depuis le mois de mai 2023
(Rรฉseaux sociaux)
Dans le style
a rejoint la Lรฉgion internationale pour se battre au cรดtรฉ des Ukrainiens et tรฉmoigne de son engagement hรฉroรฏque au service de la libertรฉ
la presse bleu horizon a coutume de porter aux nues les militants nazis partis combattre dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine. Aujard ne devrait pourtant pas bรฉnรฉficier du mรชme traitement, car il a commis un impair.
ร la pรฉriphรฉrie des ex Zouaves, groupe nazi que le ministรจre de lโintรฉrieur dissolut en janvier 2022, le Parisien aime le football et exprime ses opinions, comme ร lโoccasion de la finale de la Coupe de France, le 29 avril 2023, par un Kรผhnengruss, le salut nazi mais trois doigts รฉcartรฉs, un subterfuge pour รฉchapper aux poursuites en Allemagne moderne. Jusque lร , tout allait bien. Dans le mรฉtro avant le match, lui et ses camarades ont aussi molestรฉ des personnes dont la couleur de peau nโรฉtait pas assez claire ou les vรชtements, trop exotiques. Qui le rรฉprouve vraiment dans la France de 2023, dont le ministre de lโintรฉrieur est un opposant farouche aux rayons communautaires dans les magasins ? Rien nโaurait du le priver des louanges ultรฉrieures de la presse. Mais le hรฉros en devenir a aussi battu un attachรฉ parlementaire qui filmait la scรจne avec son smartphone, dรฉchรฉance.
Cโest alors seulement quโil sโest portรฉ volontaire pour dรฉfendre lโEurope en Ukraine, oรน en armes dรฉbut mai, il arbore les couleurs rouge et noir que portaient pendant la 2de guerre mondiale les nazis ukrainiens de Stepan Bandera. Il a rejoint les rangs de la branche militaire de lโorganisation nazie Tradytsiya ta poryadok [Tradition et ordre], oรน il a retrouvรฉ Gwendal Delange
(Rรฉseaux sociaux nazis)
Le FAF [la France aux Franรงais] est terriblement ritualiste et je soupรงonne Aujard dโรชtre lโauteur de cette carte postale de Lviv, face au momument en hommage ร Stepan Bandera, qui nous parvient le 13 mai
Sous le titre Jeunesse Boulogne, KOB youth hooligans, un rรฉseau nazi anglophone partage le 18 juin une nouvelle photographie. Aujard se tient ร gauche, au cรดtรฉ d’un militant du GUD qui pourrait รชtre Allan Duchรฉzeau
Il nous donne de ses nouvelles le 1er aoรปt 2023. Va t il expรฉrimenter cette solution tactique contre les dรฉfenses russes ?
Le 31 octobre, il apparaรฎt enfin dans les tranchรฉes. Son pectoral est un Schwarze Sonne [soleil noir], hรฉritage du Reichsfรผhrer SS Heinrich Himmler. Une autre photographie, le 29 novembre, illustre la fraternitรฉ et la porositรฉ entre les diffรฉrentes formations nazies ukrainiennes
L’anniversaire de Yeshoua ben Yosef approche et Aujard fait dรฉjร la fรชte dans la journรฉe du 24 dรฉcembre. C’est avec de gais compagnons de la 3e brigade d’assaut, รฉmanation de l’organisation nazie Azov dans l’armรฉe rรฉguliรจre ukrainienne, qu’il lรขche avec รฉmotion sa premiรจre rafale de mitrailleuse de calibre .50, du matรฉriel occidental.
Dรฉbut 2024, la 110e brigade mรฉcanisรฉe agonise dans sa forteresse dโAvdeevka, que les Ukrainiens occupent depuis 2014, 15 km au nord du centre de Donetsk, lorsque le nouveau chef dโรฉtat-major, Oleksandr Syrsky, pour tenter de desserrer lโรฉtau, y engage en fรฉvrier lโรฉlite de ses forces, la 3e brigade dโassaut, รฉmanation dans lโarmรฉe rรฉguliรจre de lโorganisation nazie Azov
ร Avdeevka, le 17 fรฉvrier 2024, les combattants de Pyatnashka [Les Quinze], un bataillon de la Rรฉpublique populaire de Donetsk, ont รฉcrit vous avez coupรฉ l’eau pour nous et nous avons coupรฉ Avdeevka pour vous. La forteresse รฉtait aussi depuis 2014 une des plateformes du bombardement dรฉlibรฉrรฉ des civils de Donetsk
Le 4 mars, Thibault Far รฉvoque sur les rรฉseaux sociaux la mort en Ukraine d’un camarade prรฉnommรฉ Cรฉsar. Mais le 11, Aujard nous salue et abrรจge mon inquiรฉtude. Reste un Franรงais de plus, qui n’a pas รฉtรฉ identifiรฉ et dont la mort n’a pas รฉtรฉ rendue publique dans l’hexagone
Il arbore le Schwarze Sonne, l’insigne de la brigade et ร droite, celui de Centuria, du nom de l’organisation de jeunesse d’Azov, 3e compagnie du bataillon antichar
(Rรฉseaux sociaux)
Il s’est rasรฉ le lendemain, quand il montre ร ceux qui ont prรฉmaturรฉment annoncรฉ son dรฉcรจs comme il est heureux d’รชtre toujours en vie
(Rรฉseaux sociaux)
Une chaรฎne Telegram de footeux nazis ukrainiens nous apporte enfin de ses nouvelles le 18 aoรปt 2024. Il dรฉfend sur le ring les couleurs de la 3e brigade dโassaut. Dans l’intervalle, le Wolfsangel a รฉtรฉ tatouรฉ sur son sein gauche. ADRIAN !
(Capture d’รฉcran)
Il remporte une victoire, dans une vidรฉo que son fight club prรฉfรฉrรฉ diffuse le 21 octobre. Le 23 dรฉcembre, un mรฉdia nazi europรฉen bien connu partage cette autre image et commente en Anglais, que je traduis ici
En permission, des volontaires franรงais de la 3e brigade sรฉparรฉe d’assaut ont participรฉ au nouveau tournoi de combat clandestin Klanfighting ร Kiev
Le 12 mai 2025, Cรฉsar Aujard apparaรฎt dans une vidรฉo pour stimuler les enrรดlements de volontaires รฉtrangers dans le bataillon Revansh, branche militaire de lโorganisation nazie ukrainienne Tradytsiya ta poryadok [Tradition et ordre]. ร lโinstar des rรฉfugiรฉs nazis russes du RDK, la formation paramilitaire opรจre sous commandement du renseignement militaire ukrainien (HUR)
Comme ce pauvre petit bras droit aimerait pouvoir se dรฉplier. Cรฉsar Aujard exรฉcute ici le salut en vigueur dans les formations militaires dโAzov. Gwendal Delange est ร droite. La vidรฉo affiche les insignes du bataillon Revansh et du renseignement militaire ukrainien (capture dโรฉcran)
Lui et Gwendal Delange sont dรฉjร passรฉs dans ses rangs en 2023. Cette campagne de promotion du bataillon nazi est relayรฉe le 27 mai (cf. Bravo 1) par un reportage franรงais dโAgathe Mahuet, une employรฉe de Radio France, autrefois appelรฉe Radio Paris, qui se garde bien de soumettre ร lโapprรฉciation de ses auditeurs lโidentitรฉ politique de ces dรฉfenseurs de lโEurope
En aoรปt 1941, l’รtat franรงais publie cette affiche de recrutement de volontaires, pour l’Europe et contre l’Union soviรฉtique
Dรฉbut juillet 2025, il s’entraรฎne au nettoyage de tranchรฉe. Son groupe est francophone, s’appelle War Aggressive Rota [en Anglais dans le texte, rotation agressive de guerre, WAR], arbore fleur de lys et Totenkopf SS
Les rรฉseaux sociaux nous offrent le 10 septembre une scรจne mรฉmorable. Quand Aujard se dรฉtend vraiment, il laisse s’exprimer son inconscient malien. On a tous quelque chose en nous de malien
https://youtu.be/Z4B9Bo_l3mU
Aprรจs Aymeric Albert, qui lanรงa lโidรฉe, puis Gwendal Delange le 2 septembre, il montre aussi le 12 comme il est fier de son รฉvolution dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, depuis le militantisme nazi ร Paris. Tout cela ne nous rajeunit pas.
Renommรฉ dans l’intervalle Lรฉgion pirates, le groupe franรงais รฉclate en dรฉcembre 2025 (cf. Lucas Barraud). Pour une question de discipline, Gwendal Delange est expulsรฉ du bataillon
le 26 janvier 2026 (capture d’รฉcran)
D’autres partent, mais la plupart restent. Sur ce, Cรฉsar Aujard quitte l’Ukraine pour les tropiques.
chronique alphabรฉtique et nรฉcrologique de lโengagement franรงais dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas
Articles connexes
Pruvate ร truvร me, canaglia di lโOTAN, pruvate solu
chronique en Anglais, its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine
chronique en Anglais, censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia
une saga franรงaise, entre Ukraine et Lyon, oรน apparaissent aussi des morceaux de SS de la division Charlemagne et plus rรฉcemment, Alice Kerviel, dite Cordier. L’affaire Deranque rรฉvรจle comme la France est infectรฉe par le pรฉtainisme, en particulier parmi les soutiens d’Israรซl ou de l’Ukraine, deux thรฉรขtres d’opรฉrations oรน l’Occident tente de ralentir son dรฉclin
En 2025, une nouvelle unitรฉ de Franรงais combattant pour lโUkraine sโest structurรฉe autour dโun noyau de nรฉonazis, ayant pour objectif dโattirer des recrues. Parmi ces volontaires, dโanciens militaires. StreetPress les a identifiรฉs
En Ukraine, les volontaires franรงais pro-ukrainiens et pro-russes se partagent lโimaginaire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Les premiers se revendiquent des collabos de lโAllemagne nazie, les seconds de lโescadrille mythique ยซ Normandie โ Niรฉmen ยป
deux jours aprรจs le 10e anniversaire de la dรฉbรขcle politique et sรฉcuritaire du 13 novembre 2015, une messe cรฉlรจbre ร Verdun lโancien dirigeant fasciste de lโรtat franรงais
ce 11 novembre 2025 est lโoccasion de souligner comme la faรงon dont lโEurope sacrifie les conscrits ukrainiens mobilisรฉs de force rappelle le spectaculaire carnage de la 1รจre guerre mondiale
cโest par lโagence cosaque de presse PIKA, depuis la Rรฉpublique populaire de Lougansk, que le 2 avril 2024, lโataman Nikolaรฏ Diakonov lance un message ร destination de la France
ce papier est le premier des grands mรฉdias franรงais qui sโattaque ร la question des militants nazis franรงais dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, le nouveau danger quโils prรฉsenteront ร terme pour la sรปretรฉ intรฉrieure
oรน nous apprenons que le nazi franรงais Allan Duchรฉzeau, camarade de Cรฉsar Aujard dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, รฉtait surnommรฉ Dox, quand il secondait ร Paris le leader nazi Marc de Cacqueray Valmรฉnier
en Anglais, les indices de la prรฉsence dโopรฉrateurs occidentaux, en particulier Franรงais, pris au piรจge en mars 2022 ร Marioupol, dont les forces russes achevรจrent la libรฉration en mai
En Ukraine, les volontaires franรงais pro-ukrainiens et pro-russes se partagent lโimaginaire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Les premiers se revendiquent des collabos de lโAllemagne nazie, les seconds de lโescadrille mythique ยซ Normandie – Niรฉmen ยป
(Caroline Varon)
ยซย En fรฉvrierย 2022, quand la Russie attaque lโUkraine, je me dis que je ne peux pas louper cette guerre, je pense ร la LVF, ร [Henri] Fenet, ร cette race de guerriers.ย ยป Karel Cherel-Salzburg [son chapitre dans ma chronique], Breton de 30ย ans, explique ainsi son engagement de combattant aux cรดtรฉs des forces armรฉes ukrainiennes. Tรฉmoignant dans un recueil avec dโautres ยซย volontaires franรงaisย ยป, publiรฉ par une obscure maison dโรฉdition dโextrรชme droite, il se compare ร ceux ayant rejoint durant la Seconde Guerre mondiale la Lรฉgion des volontaires franรงais contre le bolchevisme (LVF)ย โย une organisation formรฉe par les partis collaborationnistes et rattachรฉe ร la Wehrmacht. Quant ร Henri Fenet, il รฉtait cadre de la Milice puis officier de la Waffen-SS au sein de la Division Charlemagne
ร droite, Alan V. [Alan Vigneron] rend hommage dans son treillis de lโarmรฉe franรงaise ร ยซ Kapo ยป [Kevin Lazzari], tuรฉ le 14 juillet 2025 en Ukraine, avec une reproduction dโun drapeau de la LVF historique. ร gauche, l’affiche d’รฉpoque de la Lรฉgion (crรฉdits : DR)
Depuis lโinvasion ร grande รฉchelle de lโUkraine, un nombre croissant de nรฉonazis franรงais ont pris les armes du cรดtรฉ de Kyiv avec cet imaginaire bien en tรชte. Cโest le cas dโAlan V., ex-chasseur alpin congรฉdiรฉ de lโarmรฉe franรงaise ร la suite dโune enquรชte de Mediapart en 2020. Il y รฉtait mention du tatouage quโil porte sur lโavant-bras : la devise de la SS en allemand, ยซ mon honneur sโappelle fidรฉlitรฉ ยป. Loin dโavoir reniรฉ ses convictions, il a rejoint lโUkraine en juillet 2022 et a รฉtรฉ parmi les premiers ร se rรฉclamer de cette nouvelle LVF.
ร ses cรดtรฉs parfois, il y a un autre Franรงais, surnommรฉ ยซ Bones ยป [Guillaume Andreoni], qui a รฉcrit sur son gilet tactique ยซ Lรฉgion volontaire franรงais ยป. Une formule รฉgalement tracรฉes par Alan V. sur le sien, au feutre noir, en plus de la formule ยซ 33e division Charlemagne ยป ainsi que lโemblรจme de la SS
ยซ Bones ยป (ร gauche) et Alan V. (ร droite) en Ukraine. Tous deux portent sur leurs gilets tactiques lโinscription au feutre : ยซ Lรฉgion volontaires franรงais ยป (crรฉdits : DR)
Le 1er aoรปt 2025, dans la capitale ukrainienne, tous deux ont rendu hommage ร ยซ Kapo ยป, lโun de leurs compatriotes, tuรฉ quinze jours plus tรดt au combat. Son surnom รฉtait une rรฉfรฉrence au titre attribuรฉ aux hommes en charge de lโencadrement des prisonniers dans les camps de concentration nazis. Il est arrivรฉ en 2025 dans le pays. ร lโaide dโune copie dโun drapeau de la LVF historique, Alan V. a saluรฉ son cercueil.
En รฉcho avec la propagande nazie
Dโautres Franรงais, ayant pris les armes en Ukraine, reprennent un vocabulaire proche de la vision des nazis combattant lโUnion soviรฉtique. Alan V. รฉcrit sur la messagerie Telegram participer ร ยซ lโรฉradication des bolcheviques et communistes de notre belle Europe ยป. Pour sa part, Gwendal D. [Gwendal Delange], un nรฉonazi lyonnais engagรฉ dรจs fin 2022, qualifie le groupe quโil forme avec ses camarades dโยซ Einsatzgruppen ยป โ nom donnรฉ par lโAllemagne nazie aux unitรฉs en charge de lโextermination des Juifs, Tziganes et des opposants politiques sur le front de lโEst.
Il indique au sujet de la prise de la ville dโAvdiivka, en Ukraine, par lโarmรฉe russe en fรฉvrier 2024 que ยซ certains peuples de Sibรฉrie ont payรฉ un lourd tribut ร cette victoire ยป. Un commentaire faisant รฉcho ร la propagande du IIIe Reich assimilant lโArmรฉe rouge ร des ยซ hordes asiatiques ยป sโapprรชtant ร dรฉferler sur lโEurope
Sur Instagram, Gwendal D. fait le parallรจle dans une publication historiquement osรฉe entre sa prรฉsence en Ukraine et le front de lโEst durant la Seconde Guerre mondiale (crรฉdits : DR)
Du cรดtรฉ russe, mรชme imaginaire
Sโils ont choisi de combattre pour le camp opposรฉ, les rares Franรงais engagรฉs au sein des forces russes nโhรฉsitent pas ร invoquer le souvenir de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Au printemps 2024, le nom de ยซ Normandie-Niรฉmen ยป โ rรฉfรฉrence au groupe de chasse des Forces franรงaises libres envoyรฉ en Union soviรฉtique ร partir de 1942 pour y combattre les armรฉes du IIIe Reich โ a ainsi fait son retour sur le champ de bataille. Au XXIe siรจcle, les drones ont remplacรฉ les avions et lโennemi est, cette fois-ci, ยซ lโUnion europรฉenne ยป et ยซ lโรtat profond amรฉricain ยป, selon ยซ Jean ยป, lโun des trois Franรงais que compterait lโunitรฉ dโaprรจs une enquรชte de France 24
Au printemps 2024, cโest le nom et le logo mythique de l’escadrille ยซ Normandie-Niรฉmen ยป, qui a combattu les nazis en Russie dรจs 1942, qui a fait son retour sur le champ de bataille, cรดtรฉ russe (crรฉdits : Telegram)
Parmi eux รฉgalement, un certain Sergei Munier, franco-ukrainien mรฉdiatisรฉ dรจs 2014 pour son engagement aux cรดtรฉs des sรฉparatistes soutenus par Moscou dans le Donbass. Depuis passรฉ par le groupe Wagner, il est rรฉputรฉ proche du renseignement militaire russe, qui pourrait รชtre ร la manลuvre dans cette ยซ rรฉsurrection ยป ayant fait les choux gras de la presse pro-Kremlin.
Contactรฉs, Karel Cherel-Salzburg, Alan V., ยซ Bones ยป et Sergei Munier nโont pas souhaitรฉ rรฉpondre ร nos questions [fin]
chronique alphabรฉtique et nรฉcrologique de lโengagement franรงais dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas
chronique en Anglais, its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine
chronique en Anglais, censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia
deux jours aprรจs le 10e anniversaire de la dรฉbรขcle politique et sรฉcuritaire du 13 novembre 2015, une messe cรฉlรจbre ร Verdun lโancien dirigeant fasciste de lโรtat franรงais
Dans la zone de lโOMS [Opรฉration militaire spรฉciale], des citoyens franรงais se battent aux cรดtรฉs de la Russie. Cโest ce quโa dรฉclarรฉ le prรฉsident russe Vladimir Poutine lors dโune rencontre avec les participants du marathon ยซ Connaissance. Dโabord ยป. Le chef de lโEtat a prรฉcisรฉ que certains de ces Franรงais participant aux opรฉrations militaires aux cรดtรฉs de la Russie ont crรฉรฉ une unitรฉ baptisรฉe ยซ Normandie Niรฉmen ยป. Cette information a provoquรฉ un choc ร Paris. Les autoritรฉs de la Ve Rรฉpublique veulent punir les Franรงais qui combattent pour la Russie
ce papier est le premier des grands mรฉdias franรงais qui sโattaque ร la question des militants nazis franรงais dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, le nouveau danger quโils prรฉsenteront ร terme pour la sรปretรฉ intรฉrieure
oรน nous apprenons que le nazi franรงais Allan Duchรฉzeau, camarade de Cรฉsar Aujard dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, รฉtait surnommรฉ Dox, quand il secondait ร Paris le leader nazi Marc de Cacqueray Valmรฉnier
The Russo-Ukrainian War seems to have been engineered in a laboratory to frustrate people with repetition and analytic paralysis. Headlines appear to be circulating on a choreographed loop, all the way down to the place names. Kaja Kallas at the European Commission recently announced, without a hint of irony, that Europeโs new sanctions package – the 19th one – is the toughest yet. Ukraineโs supporters are insisting that Tomahawk missiles are the weapons system that will finally change the game and break the war decisively in Kievโs favor – reiterating the same grandiose claims that they made about GMLRS, and Leopards, and Abrams, and F-16s, and Storm Shadows, and ATACMS, and virtually every other piece of military hardware in NATOโs inventories. On the ground, Russia is attacking settlements named Pokrovsk and Pokrovsโke; it recently captured Toretsk and Torsโke and is now attacking Toretsโke. The more things change, the more things stay the same.
The analytic frameworks applied to the war have also changed relatively little, buried and obfuscated by the nebulous concept of attrition. On the Ukrainian side, there is continued insistence that Russia is suffering exorbitant losses and straining under the pressure of Ukrainian deep strikes, while Ukrainian setbacks are blamed in large part on the failure of the United States to expand its largesse and give Ukraine everything it needs. Many pro-Russian lines of thinking mirror this and suppose that the AFU is on the verge of disintegration, while the Kremlin is accused of failing to โtake the gloves offโ, particularly in regards to the Ukrainian energy grid, Dnieper bridges, and dams.
The result is a very strange sort of war. This is an extraordinarily high-intensity ground war. Both armies remain in the field, holding hundreds of miles of continuous front after years of bloody fighting. Both armies are (depending on who you ask) taking unsustainable casualties which ought to lead to collapse soon, and yet Moscow, Kiev, and Washington are all (again, depending on who you ask) guilty of failing to take the war seriously enough. All of this is maddeningly repetitive, and one could be forgiven for tuning out entirely. Even the diplomatic tango between Trump, Zelensky, and Putin, after delivering a few entertaining moments, failed to really move the needle in any discernable direction.
Few would argue that the trajectory of the war changed in an obviously dramatic way in 2025, and it is important to avoid the worn out and clichรฉd language about โturning pointsโ or โcollapseโ or any such silly thing. However, 2025 saw several shifts in the war, which will hardly ostentatious or dramatic, are nevertheless very important. 2025 has been the first year of the war in which Ukraine launched no ground offensives or proactive operations of its own. This fact is not only a hint at the threadbare state of Ukraineโs ground forces, but also a testament to the way Russian forces transformed โattritionโ from a buzzword into a method of persistent pressure across a variety of axes this year.
In lieu of initiative on the ground, and facing a slow but relentless rollback of their defenses in the Donbas, the theory of Ukrainian victory has shifted in an unacknowledged but dramatic way. After years of insisting that it would achieve maximal territorial integrity – an outcome which would require the total and decisive defeat of Russiaโs ground forces – Ukraine has reframed its path to victory mainly as a process of inflicting strategic costs on Russia that mount until the Kremlin agrees to a ceasefire. Consequentially, the debate about arming Ukraine has shifted from a conversation about armor and artillery – equipment useful for retaking lost territories – to a discussion about deep striking weapons like Tomahawks, which can be used to shoot at Russian oil refineries and energy infrastructure. In short, rather than move to prevent Russian from achieving immediate operational objectives in the Donbas, Ukraine and its sponsors are now seeking ways to make Russia pay a price such that victory on the ground is no longer worth it. It is unclear whether they have thought about what price Ukraine will pay in the exchange. Perhaps they do not care.
About Tomahawks
Notwithstanding Ukraineโs attempts to jumpstart indigenous production, it is inevitable that Ukrainian capabilities will be largely determined by the largesse of western sponsors. This aspect of the war took a sudden turn at the beginning of the October when fresh reporting began to circulate that Tomahawk missiles might be on the table for Ukraine. Tomahawks have always been on Ukraineโs wish list (given that the Ukrainian wish list as such consists of essentially all the military equipment in NATOโs combined inventories) but this was the first reporting that they might be under serious consideration.
As is frequently the case, the discussion spiraled away from realistic grounding, with some suggesting that the Tomahawk would be a โgame changerโ for Ukraine (where have we heard that before?) and the pro-Russian sphere dismissing it as an irrelevant distraction. Thereโs a tendency to focus on the quality of American weapons systems, casting them as either unrivaled technological marvels or overhyped and overpriced baubles, but this is generally not productive and largely irrelevant to the matter at hand. The Tomahawk, broadly speaking, is exactly as advertised, and provides proven and reliable strike capability at strategic depths in excess of 1,000 miles. In role, range, and payload it is essentially an analog to Russiaโs Kalibr missiles (I am begging the enthusiasts to note the phrase โessentially an analogโ rather than rake me over the coals over the different guidance systems and other technical minutia). Such a system will always be valuable and would obviously improve Ukraineโs deep strike capabilities.
The โproblemโ with Tomahawks does not relate to any โproblemโ with the missile itself, but with its availability and Ukraineโs technical capability to launch them. The Tomahawk is conventionally a ship-launched missile (there is no extant air-launched variant) with a few novel options for ground launch. Ukraine, obviously, would require ground launch systems, and the problem is that these systems are essentially brand new and available in very limited quantities: more importantly, American service branches are in the process of trying to build out these capabilities throughout the decade. Providing ground-launchable Tomahawks to Ukraine in any meaningful numbers would therefore essentially require the US Army and Marines to scrap their own force buildout plans.
There are two basic options for ground launching Tomahawks. One of these is the US Armyโs MRC (Mid-Range Capability) Launcher, dubbed the Typhon. This is an enormous tractor-trailer launcher with four launch tubes, first delivered in 2023. It has an enormous footprint – so large, apparently, that the Army is already asking for a smaller replacement – and is intended to give the Army an organic fires component in the gap between the shorter range Precision Strike Missile and hypersonic systems (which do not yet exist). The critical fact is this: the Army intends to field a total of five Typhon batteries by 2028, of which two have been delivered so far. Each battery consists in turn of four launchers, implying that eight out of a planned twenty launchers have been delivered. Even more importantly, both of the currently operational batteries are already deployed, with one in the Philippines and one in Japan. These systems are being actively used in exercises and trials, including an exercise this summer in Australia
The Typhon system gives ground launch capability to the Tomahawk but brings a massive footprint
The situation with the Marine Corpsโ launch system is quite similar, although the launch platforms themselves could not be more different. Unlike the lumbering Typhon tractor trailer, the Marines are fielding a significantly more lithe and compact LMSL system, with the tradeoff of a single launch tube compared to the Typhonโs four. What matters is not so much the technical differences, as the fact that the Marines – like the Army – only received their first deliveries in 2023, and they are currently in the process of building out the force. In the case of the marines, the goal is to have a Tomahawk battalion built out by 2030. In fact, the production contract came into effect as recently as 2025.
What does all of that mean? It means that, although the Tomahawk itself is a fine missile, the systems for ground launch are so new and available in such limited quantities that equipping Ukraine with Tomahawks would require either the US Army or the Marines to materially alter their force structure in the near term (through 2030, essentially). These are essentially the opposite of much of the gear thatโs been given to Ukraine to this point: far from being inventories of older systems that can be earmarked as surplus or tabbed for replacement, Tomahawk ground launch is a brand new capability that is in the middle of deployment and buildout for the first time.
This is, of course, a layered complication on top of Tomahawk quantities in and of themselves. The issue of Tomahawk availability is both over and under emphasized, depending on the context. The United States has something like 4,000 Tomahawks in its inventories (although half of these are currently inside their cells on American ships), so it is not quite correct to say (as some have) that America is running out of these critical weapons. The issue is that production rates are relatively anemic (generally between 55 and 90 per year) and are fail to replenish the expenditure from even relatively brief strike campaigns, such as the repeated strikes on Yemen. Broadly speaking, then, the issue is not so much that the United States is in immediate danger of running out of Tomahawks, but that procurement schedules are so slow that even relatively minor expenditures can erase multiple years worth of deliveries.
It may be useful, then, to consider Tomahawks in comparison to the ATACMS missiles which have already been provided to Ukraine. Unlike the Tomahawk, the ATACMS is a system which has already been tabbed for replacement, with the Precision Strike Missile in the early phases of its rollout. ATACMS were also compatible with launch systems that Ukraine already had. In comparison to Tomahawks, then, ATACMS are both vastly more strategically expendable, produced in larger numbers, and easier to deploy. Despite all these points in their favor, the United States provided Ukraine with just 40 ATACMS. Even if the Army could be pressured into handing over one or two of its brand new Typhon launchers, it is difficult to imagine that more than few dozen Tomahawks could be spared for Ukraine: a token inventory far too small to wage a sustained strike campaign in the Russian heartland
Peace, Sponsored by Raytheon
Given that Tomahawks for Ukraine would be measured in the dozens, rather than the hundreds, itโs worth asking whether this could actually change anything for the AFU at the front. The answer is clearly no in the long run, but it would be unwise to dismiss the possibility that even a limited tranche of Tomahawks (letโs say 40 to 50 missiles) could help alleviate pressure on Ukrainian forces at the front, provided they were used appropriately. A short term boost to Ukrainian strike capabilities, if deployed against Russian rear areas, could force further dispersal and rationing of Russian assets and temporarily stall Russiaโs emerging multi-axis offensive. This could defer the loss of key positions until early 2026. This presumes, however, that the Ukrainians would be content to use Tomahawks against operational targets. In reality, Ukraine can never seem to resist lobbing missiles at targets that have little bearing on the front, like the Kerch Bridge. Indeed, a failure to synergize strikes at depth with operations on the ground is a major reason why the ATACMS achieved so little.
On the other side of this equation, it is a common complaint from the Russian perspective that Moscow has done too little to โdeterโ the United States from empowering Ukraineโs strike campaign – both by directly providing munitions and supplying the planning, ISR, and guidance systems. This, however, rather misses the point. Russia has done nothing of note to deter the United States because both Moscow and Washington understand fully that there is essentially no appetite (on either side) for a direct confrontation. In the (sensible) absence of a willingness to strike back at NATO targets, there is really nothing Russia can do to deter beyond maintaining its own retaliatory capabilities. The issue is not that Russia has failed to actively deter, but that there is nothing they could do even if they wanted to.
The basic pattern here is well established. The United States has done what it can to backstop Ukrainian strike capabilities, but it has held them at a level where Ukraineโs damage output falls far short of decisive levels. So long as that is the case, Russia has clearly demonstrated that it will simply eat the punches and retaliate against *Ukraine*. Hence, when the United States helps Ukraine target Russian oil facilities, it is Ukraine that receives the reprisal, and it is Ukraine which has its natural gas production annihilated as the winter approaches. In a sense, neither side is really trying to deter the other at all. The United States has raised the cost of this war for Russia, but not enough to create any real pressure for Moscow to end the conflict; in response, Russia punishes Ukraine, which is something the United States does not really care about. The result is a sort of geostrategic Picture of Dorian Gray, where the United States vicariously inflicts cathartic damage on Russia, but Ukraine accrues all the soul damage.
In the case of Tomahawks, the risk-reward calculus is just not there. Tomahawks are a strategically invaluable asset that the United States cannot afford to hand out like candy. Even if the launch systems could be provided (highly doubtful), the missiles could not be made available in sufficient quantities to make a difference. The range of the missiles, however, significantly raises the probability of miscalculation or uncontrolled escalation. Ukraine shooting American missiles at energy infrastructure in Belgorod or Rostov is one thing; shooting them at the Kremlin is another thing entirely.
There is, however, another aspect of this which seems to be garnering little attention. The biggest risk of sending Tomahawks is not that the Ukrainians will blow up the Kremlin and start World War Three. The bigger risk is that the Tomahawks are used, and Russia simply moves on after eating the strikes. Tomahawks are arguably one of the last – if not *the* last – rung in the escalation ladder for the USA. We have rapidly run through the chain of systems that can be given to the AFU, and little remains except a few strike systems like the Tomahawk or the JASSM. Ukraine has generally received everything it has asked for. In the case of Tomahawks, however, the United States is running the most serious risk of all: what if the Russians simply shoot down some of the missiles and eat the rest of the strikes? Itโs immaterial whether the Tomahawks damage Russian powerplants or oil refineries. If Tomahawks are delivered and consumed without seriously jarring Russian nerves, the last escalatory card will have been played. If Russia perceives that America has reached the limits of its ability to raise the costs of the war for Russia, it undercuts the entire premise of negotiations. More simply put, Tomahawks are most valuable as an asset to threaten with.
Reading between the lines of President Trumpโs public statements recently, it seems likely that he has rationally weighed these considerations. Publicly, he used the threat of Tomahawks to try and force Russia to keep negotiating, and heโs received a commitment for another meeting with Putin for his trouble (more on that later). He has now, for the time being, shelved the Tomahawk plan, commenting that โwe need themโ and applying the usual Trumpian linguistic style to the broadly accepted issue of inventories which I have outlined here. Tomahawks are simply more valuable to the United States as a tool to threaten escalation, rather than as an actual kinetic asset in Ukrainian hands, and so long as Trump keeps his powder dry he can re-raise the issue later.
Ultimately, perhaps, this discussion is not about Tomahawks at all. These missiles, rather, are simply a totem which demonstrate two important dovetailing points. First, that American resources are not infinite, and as the United States reaches deeper into its bag to help Ukraine, it begins to grab at strategically critical assets that the US military simply cannot spare. Secondly, we must remember that Americaโs policy in Ukraine is a game of titration, with Washington probing the limits of Russiaโs willingness to โeat the strikesโ without allowing the reprisal violence to spill out of Ukraine.
The Big Banana: Russiaโs Operational Schema
At this point, itโs becoming increasingly difficult to say anything meaningful about the actual operational progression on the ground. There are several reasons for this. First and foremost, the war has now gone on so long and is consistently moving at such an apparently glacial pace that most people simply do not care at this point whether Russia holds Yampil or not, or whether they have advanced past the rail line in Pokrovsk. There is severe fatigue (or perhaps boredom is the better word) with the status of an interminable sequence of apparently small settlements, industrial complexes, and forestry plantations, and as a result most people have essentially checked out. Not the least among these must surely be President Trump, who apparently chucked Zelenskyโs map of the frontline and complained that he was tired of being shown the same maps over and over again.
On the other hand, we have the true obsessives who continue to dutifully follow the frontlines regularly and are voluntarily intaking daily updates. We end up with a bifurcated system where some people are still highly plugged in to the micro movements on the battlefield, but most people just donโt care, and we can hardly blame the latter. I think it would be profitable, then, to think about the broader Russian operational scheme, what it has achieved, and what it aims to achieve in the coming year. This is probably more interesting and less repetitious than fixating on the exact positioning within Pokrovsk or Kupyansk.
There are two larger points that I think are worth making before we look at some specifics.
First and foremost, much of the battlefield analysis that comes out (particularly from western analysts) makes firm pronouncements as to what constitutes Russiaโs โprimaryโ and โsecondaryโ efforts, but these are essentially interpolated and frequently incorrect. For example, itโs become a fairly mainstream conception that Russiaโs โprimaryโ point of effort right now is the capture of Pokrovsk, but this does not actually seem supported by Russian actions. There is no particular advantage to be gained for Russia by pushing to capture Pokrovsk as soon as possible – the city is already in a stranglehold partial encirclement. To be sure, Pokrovsk *was* a major logistic hub for Ukrainian forces, but it can no longer serve that role and was sterilized as a transit hub months ago, once it became a frontline city. The opposite side of this coin is that other Russian axes of advance, particularly in southern Donetsk and the bend of the Donets River, are dismissed as โsecondaryโ efforts. This is a major mistake, and I will attempt to show that these are critical advances where Russia is shaping the battlefield to its advantage for follow on operations.
Secondly, it should be understood and appreciated that Ukraine has lost essentially all battlefield initiative. In 2024, the AFU was able to assembled a mechanized reserve and launch their operation into Kursk. This operation ultimately failed and resulted in severe Ukrainian losses, but this is unrelated to the fact that Ukraine was still able to accumulate forces and pursue offensive operations on its own initiative. In 2025, however, Ukraine has been in a permanent state of reactivity. This was the first year of the war in which Ukraine did not launch any proactive operations or counteroffensives of its own, and Ukrainian hopes have instead pivoted to their strategic strike campaign against Russian oil facilities.
In a larger sense, the effect of attrition can be seen year by year with the shrinking scope of Ukraineโs proactive operations. In 2022, Ukraine was able to launch a pair of widely separated offensives which yielded modest successes: an offensive out of Kharkov rolled the front back over the Oskil River (though it failed to collapse the Lugansk shoulder), meanwhile, a series of battles outside of Kherson failed to break through the Russian lines, but they did play a role in persuading the Russians to abandon their bridgehead over the Dnieper. The point of course is not to once again autopsy these offensives, but to point out that there were two of them, that they were meaningful in scale, and they did result in important territorial gains for Ukraine. In 2023, by contrast, Ukraine launched a single theater-level offensive in the south, which failed. In 2024, we got the Kursk operation: smaller and less lavishly equipped than 2023โs Zaoprizhia offensive, and aimed at a peripheral theater. This year, there were no proactive Ukrainian operations at all. There is a very clear pattern at play here, with Ukraineโs offensive punch progressively shrinking before disappearing entirely in 2025. This was a year of essentially uninterrupted Russian initiative
Putting Ukraine permanently on the backfoot is a significant Russian achievement, and it is owed to a few converging factors. Obviously, the attrition of Ukrainian forces is a major factor. Weโve gone through the flailing Ukrainian mobilization, the cannibalization of its forces, and the general lack of reserves in detail on several occasions, and thereโs no need to retread that ground here. Suffice it to say, Ukraineโs ability to husband forces for offensive operations appears to be severely degraded. Russia has exacerbated this problem by pressing steadily on a variety of different axes. At the moment, there are no fewer than seven Russian axes of attack, pressuring a slew of cities all along the line. This creates a series of defensive emergencies, maintains the burn rate on Ukrainian forces, and fixes them on the line. Finally, in a point to be detailed shortly, Russian advances have begun unraveling Ukraineโs logistic connectivity, which puts strain on supply and prevents the concentration and accumulation of forces
Eastern Ukraine: Approximate Situation and Axes of Russian Advance
Now, for the development of the front and the premise of the Russian offensive scheme. The main point that I want to impress is essentially as follows: rather than fixating on Pokrovsk, Russiaโs advances across Southern Donetsk and on the inner bend of the Donets River ought to be thought of as vital operations which have severely disrupted the coherence of both the Ukrainian front and their logistics. This has the triple effect of preventing the Ukrainians from launching offensives of their own, accelerating the attrition of Ukrainian forces, and shaping the front for the coming operation to capture the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration.
To begin, letโs consider the progress that Russia has made in southern Donetsk, both in raw territorial terms and its implications for Ukrainian logistic connectivity. To demonstrate this, Iโve pulled maps from DeepState (again, a Ukrainian mapping enterprise) for August 2023 (when Ukraine was attempting its counterattack out of Orikhiv) and for October 20th, the week of this writing. I have noted both the length of the southern front (obviously a linear approximate, as the actual front has many bends and bulges) and highlighted the key highways that Ukraine uses to run the backbone of its logistics
The Southern Front: 2023 vs 2025
Now, one thing that is worth noting is that the Russians are currently positioned to roll up this front even further. Ukrainian defensive lines are primarily oriented towards on a north-south axis. Once Russian forces cleared Kurakhove, they entered the seams in these defensive lines – that is to say, they are advancing laterally along the face of the prepared defenses, rather than trying to bash through them from the front. This is one reason why their progress has been relatively steady and uninterrupted. Now approaching the โelbowโ in the lines, where they pivot southward, and having crossed the Yanchur River, the Russians are entering a substantial space that lacks meaningful prepared defenses. Using the Military Summary map (Ukrainian fortifications are mapped with yellow dots), the void in the defense is fairly obvious as the Russians work their way into the elbow of the line
Apart from the obvious development of note here – that Russian forces have, to this point, rolled up roughly half the length of the southern front and are positioned to roll up another ten to fifteen miles – we want to note two things which are emblematic of the way the war is going for Ukraine, but curiously receive little attention. First, the compression of the front is robbing the Ukrainians of the maneuver space which made it possible for them to stage and assemble forces for their counteroffensive in 2023. Two years ago, there was a wide, lateral buffer zone around the Ukrainian staging area in Orikhiv, and Ukrainian forces had access to multiple highways where they could disperse forces in their marching columns and run their logistics.
Today, that buffer zone is gone, as is the easy access to several of the branch highways. The Russian advance, which started with the breakthrough at Ugledar and Kurakhove last year and which has now rolled up some 50 miles of front, has essentially sterilized Ukraineโs capacity to attack in the south, because they have neither the space nor the roads to safely accumulate forces here. It has also shattered the interconnectivity of Ukrainian logistics: rather than having several highways to shuttle troops and material to the east, Ukraine now has to support several disconnected logistic fronts with individual highways. More to the point, there is no longer a single Donetsk โfrontโ to speak of, but rather a series of logistic fronts: one in the south, around Orikhiv, another at Pokrovsk, and the largest one in the Slovyansk Banana. These are lacking lateral connectivity to each other for the Ukrainians due to the wedges that the Russians have forced in the front, particularly in the south, funneling logistics and reinforcements down individuated corridors.
The bigger issue, however, lies farther north on the Pokrovsk and Donets axes, and in the way that they synergize. People who are focusing, to the exclusion of all else, on when and how Russia will capture Pokrovsk are failing to see the bigger picture, and indeed are not even trying to understand it.
The ultimate Russian operational objective (in this phase of the war, at least) is the belt of cities which runs in an arc from Slovyansk to Kostyantinivka, which I affectionately call โthe Slovyansk Bananaโ due to its curved shape. A cursory look at the map shows us why the very operations that are being dismissed as secondary efforts are in fact critical axes of Russian effort which are shaping the battlefield for the attack on the Banana
There are two very important facts about the Banana, from the perspective of operational geography. The first is that, although the combined mass of the agglomeration is far larger than any of the urban areas that have been fought over to this point, the Banana is relatively difficult to defend because it sits on the floor of a river valley: the Kazennyi Torets flows through all the cities in the Banana before it flows into the Donets. Russian forces approaching the city from the southwest, the east, and the north will all be advancing along the high ground that overlooks the cities on the floor.
The second important fact about the Banana is that, despite its size, it is supported by just two highways which approach from the southwest and northwest respectively, funneling into the Banana like a wedge. Taking the northern highway/MSR (the E40 highway) as an example, we see that Russiaโs operations inside the Donets bend are hardly secondary efforts: they are vital shaping operations linked to the integrity of the Banana. The E40 highway tracks the Donets bend very closely (it generally stays within five miles of the river. If the Russians sustain their progress north of the Donets and reach the river at Bogorodychne or Svyatogirsk, it will not only put E40 under persistent drone attack but also curl the defensive line behind the Banana, to say nothing of the enormous pressure on the Siversk salient.
On the Pokrovsk front as well, Russiaโs progress is being misinterpreted. After their breakthrough at the end of the summer, Russian forces have consolidated the bulge north of Pokrovsk (despite weeks of Ukrainian counterattacks) and are steadily working their way towards Raisโke and Sergiivka. This is not about Pokrovsk at all – reaching Raisโke would put Russian forces directly in the backfield of Kostyantinivka, on the supply lines to the underside of the Banana.
I am not suggesting at all that Russian forces are on the verge of some great offensive surge that will carry them into the heart of the Banana instantly. However, there is a fairly well established Russian operational methodology in this war, which involves working their way methodically into Ukraineโs logistical lanes and seams, segmenting the front and strangulating their strongpoints, forcing them to supply frontline strongholds with single file logistics and dirt roads. They did it in Bakhmut, and Avdiivka, they are doing it in Pokrovsk, and they are shaping the front to attempt this on a large scale in the Banana
Assault on the Banana: Coming 2026
The general point that we are trying to make here is that dismissing Russian advances in the Serebryanka Forest, the emerging bulge north of Pokrovsk, and their move into the Donets Bend as โsecondary effortsโ is mistaken. Zooming out to the appropriate scale shows that these are concentric operations, shaping the front for a 2026 assault on the Banana – moving towards the E40 road from the north, bending the defensive shield around Siversk, and working into the underbelly of the Banana through Raisโke.
This is, perhaps, a long way to go for a short drink of water, but there are a few basic points here that get completely missed when the view of the front is preoccupied with the fighting inside Pokrovsk and Kupyansk:
Russiaโs advance out of Kurakhove across the southern front is not a secondary axis. They have rolled up half of the southern front, condensing Ukrainian forces into a compact space which sterilizes their ability to attack in the south.
Broad Russian pressure across a half-dozen axes maintained a steady burn rate on Ukrainian forces and prevented the accumulation of forces for proactive operations. 2025 has been the first year of the war in which Ukraine has not launched any offensive operations on its own initiative.
Advances in the Donets bend and the interstitial space between Pokrovsk and Kostyantinivka are not subsidiary or secondary operations: they are critical shaping operations that are moving concentrically toward the Banana.
To be frank, the general mood of optimism in the Ukrainian infosphere, which lasted for much of the summer, struck me as remarkably odd. The frontline has yielded no real good news for Ukraine at any point this year. Beyond the broader strategic point, that Ukraine has lost the initiative and does not seem capable of getting it back, Russia is in the process of capturing two important urban centers (Russian troops are in the city centers of Pokrovsk and Kupyansk), it has begun the assault on at leas two more (Lyman and Kostyantinivka), it has rolled up half of the southern front, and cleared most of the inner Donets-Oskil bend. The Banana is on deck for 2026.
Ukraineโs Cost Theory of Victory
One thing that has become apparent over the last year is that Kiev has abandoned previous notions of outright victory on the battlefield and adopted a new strategic framework predicated on imposing unacceptable costs on Russia, so that Moscow will agree to freeze the conflict.
This is a subtle and unspoken yet extremely important distinction. It is easy to miss, because both Ukrainian leadership and Ukraineโs western backers continue to speak of Ukrainian โvictoryโ and the possibility of Ukraine โwinningโ the war. What is crucial to understand is that the โvictoryโ that they speak of now is categorically different than the victory of 2022 and 2023. In the first years of the war, it was possible to at least speak of Ukraine taking the initiative to advance on the ground and retake territory. There were concrete examples of Ukrainian offensives in 2022, and the battle in Zaporizhia – although unsuccessful – showed that it was at least possible for Ukraine to attempt a proper mechanized offensive.
Therefore, in the first years of the war, when leaders in Kiev and Brussels and London and Washington spoke of Ukrainian victory, they essentially meant the defeat of the Russian ground forces and the reconquest of much (or all) of the Donbas. The Kursk Operation of 2024 began to split the difference: Ukraine still had some resources to mount proactive operations, but these operations were no longer aimed at the dense eastern front and instead aimed at relatively soft subsidiary fronts with an eye to out-levering the Russians.
Today, with the Ukrainian army stuck in a permanent state of reactivity and slowly receding defense, it no longer makes any sense to speak of Ukrainian victory in the most straightforward sense, which is to say victory on the battlefield – no matter how tenaciously or bravely the Ukrainian rank and file continues to fight in essentially intolerable circumstances. Instead, Ukrainian โvictoryโ has been transmogrified to mean essentially that Russia absorbs such exorbitant costs that it agrees to some sort of ceasefire without preconditions.
The costs to be imposed on Russia are implicitly assumed to be a mixture of battlefield casualties and damage to strategic assets inflicted by Ukrainian air strikes, and in regards to the latter Ukraine seems to be particularly placing its hopes in a strategic strike campaign against Russian oil. Ukraineโs attempts to disable Russian oil production and refining have dovetailed with ever more aggressive sanctions from the United States against Russian fossil fuel exports – although it is worth noting that the limited price response to these sanctions indicates that markets expect that Russian oil will continue to flow.
Trumpโs suggestion that Tomahawks may be on the table for Ukraine must be seen as a constituent element of this new strategy and theory of victory. And this, ultimately, is very important to understand. Tomahawks are not being bandied about because anybody (in Kiev or Washington) believes that 50 cruise missiles will allow Ukraine to defeat the Russian Army and recapture the Donbas. Tomahawks were mentioned because the Ukrainian alliance is threatening to cripple the Russian fossil fuels industry (through a mixture of sanctions and kinetic strikes on production facilities) unless Putin agrees to a ceasefire.
This is why it is wrong to be surprised that Trump abruptly cancelled his meeting with Putin and instead announced more sanctions. Thereโs nothing abrupt or erratic about this. Threats to Russian oil are now, without exaggeration, the main lever that the Ukrainian bloc has against Russia. It certainly should not have been a surprise that the Kremlin, which has reiterated the same fundamental war aims since day one, was not excited about coming to Budapest to freeze the conflict, and neither should it surprise us that Trump would instead prefer to pull harder on the oil lever. The two powers are playing entirely different games: Russia is slow-walking negotiations while it advances on the ground, and the United States is playing a pain game designed to raise the costs for Russia
We have fundamentally reached an impasse when it comes to negotiations. For Moscow, negotiations with the United States are essentially a way to string Washington along. Moscow feels that it is winning on the ground, therefore a diplomatic impasse suits Russian interests. When western leadership complains that Russia does not seem interested in ending the war, they are correct, but they are missing the point. Russia is not interested in ending the war right now because doing so would not serve Russian interests. The Banana is in the crosshairs, and a ceasefire now would be an egregious compromise when victory on the ground is in sight.
The sense of urgency that Washington feels to end the war – mainly by yanking furiously on the oil lever until the Kremlin cries uncle – stems from the fact that this is now the only sort of victory that Ukraine can hope to win. The ground war has been written off as a total loss, and all that remains is to lob missiles and drones at Russian refineries, sanction Russian firms and banks, and harass shadow tankers until the costs become intolerable. The longer the Ukrainian ground forces can hold the line the better, but this is merely a matter of limiting the downside. The fact that Russia can retaliate disproportionately against Ukraine barely factors into this thinking.
The key point here, however, is that the concept of Ukrainian victory has been completely transformed. There is now no real discussion of how Ukraine can win on the ground. For the Ukrainian bloc, the war is no longer a contest against the Russian Army, but a more abstract contest against Russiaโs willingness to incur strategic costs. Rather than preventing Russian capture of the Donbas, the west is testing how much Putin is willing to pay for it. If history is any guide, a game predicated on outlasting Russiaโs strategic endurance and willingness to fight is a very bad game to play indeed [end]
Antonio Toni Herceg รฉtait un membre de l’armรฉe franรงaise
(X.com)
Antonio Toni Herceg, fils du scientifique Zdenko Herceg et neveu de l’ancien Premier ministre du comtรฉ d’Herzรฉgovine-Neretva, Nevenko Herceg, a รฉtรฉ tuรฉ le 6 mai 2025 sur le champ de bataille dans l’est de l’Ukraine. La nouvelle a รฉtรฉ rapportรฉe par le portail Mostar.live, citant une source proche de la famille.
Toni Herceg, issu d’une importante famille herzรฉgovine installรฉe ร Lyon, en France, depuis les annรฉes de guerre en Bosnie-Herzรฉgovine, รฉtait un soldat professionnel dans l’armรฉe franรงaise. On ne prรฉcise pas s’il s’agit de la Lรฉgion รฉtrangรจre, mais on sait qu’il a ensuite rejoint la 3e brigade d’assaut de l’armรฉe ukrainienne
[๐คฉ niouzes about #pinzuti ๐ mercs in #Ukraine ๐ช๐บ ๐ ๐บ๐ฆ]
Selon les informations publiรฉes par l’ancien officier de renseignement franรงais Nicolas Cinquini, Herceg a รฉtรฉ tuรฉ lors des combats dans la rรฉgion de Lougansk. Cinquini, connu pour sa rhรฉtorique pro-russe, affirme qu’il s’agit d’une ยซ contre-attaque futile ยป et qualifie la brigade de ยซ ramification d’Azov ยป – une affirmation qui n’a pas รฉtรฉ confirmรฉe par des sources indรฉpendantes. Ni les institutions de Bosnie-Herzรฉgovine ni l’armรฉe franรงaise n’ont encore publiรฉ de dรฉclarations officielles
Qui sont les combattants de la 3e brigade d’assaut ?
La 3e brigade d’assaut distincte des forces armรฉes ukrainiennes a รฉtรฉ crรฉรฉe en 2022 dans le cadre d’une rรฉorganisation plus large des unitรฉs de volontaires en une armรฉe rรฉguliรจre. La brigade est devenue cรฉlรจbre pour son rรดle dans les batailles les plus intenses โ de Bakhmut et Avdijivka ร la rรฉgion de Louhansk. Ses membres sont formรฉs au combat urbain, au nettoyage des tranchรฉes et aux manลuvres rapides en premiรจre ligne.
Bien que formellement sous le commandement de l’armรฉe ukrainienne, la brigade a hรฉritรฉ d’une partie de la structure et du personnel du bataillon Azov, qui est devenu une partie de la Garde nationale. En raison de ce lien, notamment dans la propagande russe, la brigade est souvent qualifiรฉe de ยซ nazie ยป, bien quโen Ukraine et parmi ses alliรฉs, elle jouisse de la rรฉputation dโune unitรฉ offensive dโรฉlite.
La brigade est dirigรฉe par Andriy Biletsky, l’ancien commandant d’Azov, connu pour ses opinions nationalistes.
De plus en plus de combattants รฉtrangers en Ukraine
Depuis le dรฉbut de lโinvasion, lโUkraine a ouvertement appelรฉ des volontaires รฉtrangers ร se joindre ร elle pour dรฉfendre son territoire. Parmi les milliers de combattants รฉtrangers qui ont rejoint la Lรฉgion internationale de dรฉfense de l’Ukraine, on a รฉgalement recensรฉ un certain nombre de citoyens franรงais, dont d’anciens militaires et membres des forces spรฉciales.
La France n’a pas officiellement dรฉployรฉ de troupes en Ukraine, mais le prรฉsident Emmanuel Macron n’exclut pas la possibilitรฉ d’envoyer des instructeurs et des conseillers militaires, ce qui a suscitรฉ de vifs dรฉbats politiques au sein de l’UE et de l’OTAN
Les volontaires franรงais rejoignent le plus souvent des unitรฉs d’รฉlite ukrainiennes, comme la 3e brigade d’assaut, mais l’รtat franรงais ne les reconnaรฎt pas officiellement comme ses soldats, et ne commente donc pas leur dรฉcรจs [fin]
chronique alphabรฉtique et nรฉcrologique de lโengagement franรงais dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas
chronique en Anglais, its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine
Sometimes the way home runs through frontline territories, through the fields of not so long ago battles, through places remembered as peaceful and quiet. This was the case with the hero of our comic book – a simple guy born in Avdiivka.
Even before the outbreak of hostilities, he moved to Kyiv, where he worked as a courier until recently. However, at the beginning of the year, raids by military officers became so frequent that order deliveries could be forgotten.
There was nothing to do in the city without earning money, and he decided to return to Avdiivka, assuming that he could make his way from Pokrosvk to Avdiivka on foot. But whether it was so easy in reality was yet to be seen.
[my illustration: a debris of US ATACMS ballistic missile has fallen on Kursk-Vostochny airfield on November 25, 2023 (Russian defense ministry)]
On March 5, 2022, the wreck of the sailing ship Endurance was found in the depths of the Weddell Sea off the coast of Antarctica. This, of course, was the vessel lost in Ernest Shackeltonโs third expedition to Antarctica, which became trapped in the ice and sank in 1915. The story of that expedition is an extraordinary tale of human fortitude – with the Endurance lost to the ice, Shackletonโs crew evacuated to a loose ice flow where they camped for nearly 500 days, drifting about the Antarctic seas, before making a desperate dash across the open ocean in an open 20 foot lifeboat, finally reaching the southern shore of inhospitable and mountainous South Georgia Island, which they then had to cross on foot to reach the safety of a whaling station.
The story itself has an essentially mythic quality to it, with Shackletonโs crew surviving for years on free floating ice floes in the most inhospitable seas on earth. For our purposes, however, it is the storyโs coda that is particularly interesting. In Shackletonโs memoirs, he remembered that, upon finally reaching the safety of the Stromness whaling station, one of his first questions was about the war in Europe. When Shackleton first set out on his ill-fated expedition on August 8, 1914, the First World War was less than a week old, and the German Army had just begun its invasion of Belgium. There was little expectation then that the war would proceed as it did, unleashing four years of slaughterous positional warfare that engulfed the continent.
Shackleton, having been adrift at sea for years, clearly did not imagine that the war could still be raging, and asked the commandant of the whaling station โtell me, when was the war over?โ
The answer came back: โThe war is not over. Millions are being killed. Europe is mad. The world is mad.โ
The timing is serendipitous, since the discovery of the Enduranceโs wreck, after more than a hundred years, happened to occur only a few weeks after the world again went mad, with the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian War in February 2022. As time continues its inexorable march and the calendar turns yet again, the war is passing through its third full winter. In February, Z-World will be three years old.
Of course, modern communications make it extremely unlikely that anybody could be cut fully out of the loop for years at a time, like Shackleton and his men. Instead of being ignorant as to whether or not the war is over, many of us are exposed on a daily basis to footage of men being killed, buildings being blown up, and vehicles being shredded. Twitter has made it essentially impossible to live under a rock, or on an ice floe, as it were.
If anything, we have the very opposite problem of Shackleton – at least as far as our wartime information infrastructure goes. We are saturated in information, with daily updates tracking advances of a few dozen meters and never ending bombast about new game changing weapons (which seem to change very little), and bluster about โred linesโ. This war seems to have an unyielding dynamic on the ground, and no matter how many grand pronouncements we hear that one side or the other is on the verge of collapse, the sprawling front continues to grind up bodies and congeal with bloody positional fighting.
It would seem difficult to believe that a high intensity ground war in Europe with hundreds of miles worth of front could be boring, yet the static and repetitive nature of the conflict is struggling to hold the attention of foreign observers who have little immediately at stake.
My intention here is a radical zoom-out from these demoralizing and fatiguing small scale updates (as valuable as the work of the war mappers is), and consider the aggregate of 2024 – arguing that this year was, in fact, very consequential. Taken as a whole, three very important things happened in 2024 which create a very dismal outlook for Ukraine and the AFU in the new year. More specifically, 2024 brought three important strategic developments:
Russian victory in southern Donetsk which destroyed the AFUโs position on one of the warโs key strategic axes.
The expenditure of carefully husbanded Ukrainian resources on a failed offensive towards Kursk, which accelerated the attrition of critical Ukrainian maneuver assets and substantially dampened their prospects in the Donbas.
The exhaustion of Ukraineโs ability to escalate vis a vis new strike systems from NATO – more broadly, the west has largely run out of options to upgrade Ukrainian capabilities, and the much vaunted delivery of longer range strike systems failed to alter the trajectory of the war on the ground.
Taken together, 2024 revealed a Ukrainian military that is increasingly stretched to the limits, to the point where the Russians were able to largely scratch off an entire sector of front. People continue to wonder where and when the Ukrainian front might begin to break down – I would argue that it *did* break down in the south over the last few months, and 2025 begins with strong Russian momentum that the AFU will be hard pressed to arrest.
Front Collapse in South Donetsk
What stands out immediately about the operational developments in 2024 is the marked shift of energies away from the axes of combat that had seen the most intense fighting in the first two years of the war. In a sense, this war has seen each of its fronts activate in a sequence, one after the other.
After the opening Russian offensive, which boasted as its signature success the capture of the Azov coastline and the linkup of Donetsk and Crimea, the action shifted to the northern front (the Lugansk-Kharkov axis), with Russia fighting a summer offensive which captured Severodonetsk and Lysychansk. This was followed by a pair of Ukrainian counteroffensives in the fall, with a thrust out of Kharkov which pushed the front back over the Oskil, and an operation directed at Kherson which failed to breach Russian defenses but ultimately resulted in a Russian withdrawal in good order over the Dnieper due to concerns over logistical connectivity and an over-extended front. Energies then pivoted yet again to the Central Donbas axis, with the enormous battle around Bakhmut raging through the spring of 2023. This was followed by the failed Ukrainian offensive on Russiaโs defenses in Zaporozhia, in the south.
Just to briefly recapitulate this, we can enumerate several operational phases in the first two years of the war, occurring in sequence and each with a center of gravity in different parts of the front:
A Russian offensive across the land bridge, culminating in the capture of Mariupol. (Winter-Spring 2022, Southern Front)
A Russian offensive in Lugansk, capturing Severodonetsk and Lysychansk. (Summer 2022, Donets-Oskil front)
Ukrainian Counteroffensives towards the Oskil and Kherson (Autumn 2022, Oskil and Dnieper fronts)
The Russian assault on Bakhmut (Winter-Spring 2023, Central Front)
Ukrainian counteroffensive on the land bridge (Summer 2023)
Amid all of this, the front that saw the least movement was the southeastern corner of the front, around Donetsk. This was somewhat peculiar. Donetsk is the urban heart of the Donbas – a vast and populous industrial city at the center of a sprawling conurbation, once home to some 2 million people. Even if Russia succeeds in capturing the city of Zaporizhia, Donetsk will be by far the most populous of Ukraineโs former cities to come under Moscowโs control.
In 2014, with the outbreak of the proto-Donbas war, Donetsk was the locus of much of the fighting, with the airport on the cityโs northern approach the scene of particularly intense combat. This made it rather strange, then, that at the start of 2024 the Ukrainian Army continued to occupy many of the same positions that they built a decade prior. As intense fighting ebbed and flowed along other sectors of front, Donetsk remained besieged by a web of powerfully held Ukrainian defenses, anchored by heavily fortified urban areas stretching from Toretsk to Ugledar. Early Russian attempts to crack this iron ring open, including an assault on Ugledar in the winter of 2023, met with failure.
The signature operational development of 2024, then, was the re-activation of the Donetsk front, after years of static combat. It is not an exaggeration to say that after years of coagulation, the Russian Army cracked this front wide open in 2024 and Ukraineโs long and strongly held network of urban strongpoints collapsed
Russian Progress on the Donetsk Axis in 2024
The year began with the AFU fighting for its fortress in Avdiivka, where it continued to block the northern approach to Donetsk. At the time, the typical argument that one heard from the Ukrainian side was that the Russian assault on Avdiivka was pyrrhic – that the Russians were capturing the city with exorbitantly costly โmeat assaultsโ that would inevitably sap Russian combat power and exhaust their ability to continue the offensive.
With the full measure of the year behind us, we can definitively say that this is not the case. After the fall of Avdiivka, Russian momentum never seriously slackened, and in fact it was the AFU that appeared to be increasingly exhausted. The Ukrainian breakwater position at Ocheretyne (which had previously been their staging point for counterattacks around Avdiivka) was overrun in a matter of days, and by the early summer the frontline had been pushed out towards the approach to Pokrovsk.
The Russian thrust towards Pokrovsk led many to believe that this city was itself the object of Russian energies, but this was a misread of the operational design. Russia did not need to capture Pokrovsk in 2024 to render it sterile as a logistical hub. Simply by advancing towards the E50 highway, Russian forces were able to cut off Pokrovsk from Ukrainian positions to the south on the Donetsk front, and Pokvrovsk is now a frontline city subject to the full spectrum of overwatch from Russian drones and tube artillery.
By autumn, the Russian advance had put the Ukrainians in a severe salient, creating an unstable chain of positions in Selydove, Kurakhove, Ugledar, and Krasnogorivka. Russiaโs advance from Ocheretyne onto the southern approach to Pokrovsk acted like an enormous scythe, isolating the entire southeastern sector of the front and allowing Russian forces to carve through it in the closing months of the year
Russian Operations in 2024, Donetsk Axis
This war has turned the word โcollapseโ into a devalued buzzword. We are told repeatedly that one side or the other is on the verge of collapse: sanctions will โcollapseโ the Russian economy, the Wagner uprising of 2023 proved that the Russian political system was โcollapsingโ, and of course we hear that exorbitant losses have one army or the other on the verge of total failure – which army that may be depends on who you ask.
I would argue, however, that what we saw from October 2024 onward represents a real occurrence of this oft-repeated and discarded word. The AFU suffered a genuine collapse of the southeastern front, with the forces positioned in their strongpoints too attrited and isolated to make a determined defense, Russian fires becoming too heavily concentrated in ever more compressed areas to endure, and no mechanized reserve in the theater available to counterattack or relieve the incessant Russian pressure.
Ukraine does maintain enough drones and concentrated fires to limit a full Russian exploitation – that is, Russia is still not able to maneuver at depth. This gave the Russian advance a particular stop-start quality, leapfrogging from one settlement and fortress to the other. More generally, Russiaโs preference to use dispersed small-unit assaults limits the potential for exploitation. We have to emphasize, however, that Russian momentum on this axis has never seriously slackened since October, and many of the key Ukrainian positions were overrun or abandoned very quickly
Ugledar is a good example: the Russians began their final push toward the town on September 24. By September 29, the 72nd Mechanized Brigade began evacuating. By October 1, Ugledar was fully under Russian control. This was a keystone Ukrainian position put in a completely untenable position and it went down in a week. One could argue, of course, that Ugledar held out for years (how then can we say with a straight face that it was captured in a week), but this is precisely the point. In early 2023 Ugledar (with the help of artillery stationed around Kurakhove) successfully repelled a multi-brigade Russian attack in months of heavy fighting. By October 2024, the position was completely untenable and was abandoned almost immediately when attacked.
The Ukrainians did no better trying to hold Kurakhove – previously a critical rear area that served as both a logistical hub and a base of fire for supporting (former) frontline strongpoints like Ugledar and Krasnogorivka. Kurakhove, now under full Russian control, will in turn serve as a base of support for the ongoing Russian push to the west towards Andriivka.
Taking the state of the front holistically, the AFU is currently holding two severe salients at the southernmost end of the line – one around Velyka Novosilka, and another around Andriivka. The former is likely to fall first, as the town has been fully isolated by Russian advances on the flanks. This is not a Bakhmut-like situation, where roads are described as โcutโ because they are under Russian fire – in this case, all of the highways into Velyka Novosilka are cut by physical Russian blocking positions, making the loss of the position only a matter of waiting for the Russians to assault it. Further north, a more gentle and less strongly held salient exists between Grodivka and Toretsk. With Toretsk now in the final stages of capture (Ukrainian forces now hold only a small residential neighborhood on the cityโs outskirts), the front should level here as well in the coming months.
This leaves the Russians more or less in full control of the approaches to Kostyantinivka and Pokrovsk, which are in many ways the penultimate Ukrainian held positions in Donetsk. Pokrovsk has already been bypassed several miles to the west, and the map portends a re-run of the typical Russian tactical methodology for assaulting urban areas – a methodical advance along the wings of the city to isolate it from arterial highways, followed by an attack on the city itself via several axes
The coming months promise continued Russian advances across this front, in a continuation of what can only be regarded as the collapse of a critical front on the part of the AFU. The Russian Army is advancing to the western border of Donetsk oblast and will ferret the Ukrainians out of their remaining strongpoints at Velyka Novosilka and Andriivka, while pushing into the belly of Pokrovsk. At no point since the fall of Avdiivka have the Ukrainians demonstrated the ability to seriously stymie Russian momentum along this 75 mile front, and the ongoing dissipation of Ukrainian combat resources indicates that little will change in this regard in 2025.
Toehold: The Incredible Shrinking Kursk Salient
Throughout the autumn of 2024 and these early months of winter, as Ukrainian forces were dug out of their dense web of fortified positions in the southern Donbas, their comrades continued to stubbornly hold on to their position in Russiaโs Kursk Oblast. The basic shape of Ukraineโs offensive into Kursk is by now well known – billed by Kiev as a gambit to change the psychological trajectory of the war and strike a prestige blow to Russia, the Ukrainian attack had early momentum after achieving initial strategic surprise, but quickly faltered after Ukrainian columns ran into effective Russian blocking positions on the highways out of Sudzha. Efforts to force the roads through Korenovo and Bolshoe Soldatskoe were defeated, and the Ukrainian grouping was left holding on to a modest salient around Sudzha, jutting out into Russia.
Throughout the autumn, Russian counterattacks have focused on chiseling away at the base of the Ukrainian salient – forcing the Ukrainians out of Snagost and pushing them away from Korenovo. The progress here has been incremental, but significant, and by the start of January the โneckโ of the Ukrainian salient had been compressed down to a little over nine miles wide, after their initial penetration in the summer had forced a breach of over twenty miles. All told, Ukraine has lost about 50% of the territory that they grabbed in August.
The Russian pressure on the flanks of the salient have amplified many of the qualities that make this position wasteful and dangerous for the AFU. There is limited road connectivity for Ukrainian forces – a problem amplified by the rollback from Snagost, which cost them access to the highway running from Korenovo to Sumy. Apart from a few circuitous side roads, Ukrainian forces only have a single highway – the R200 route – to run material and reinforcements into the pocket, which allows Russian forces to surveil their lines of communication and conduct effective interdiction strikes. The compression of the pocket also greatly narrows the targeting area for Russian drones, tube artillery, and rocketry, and creates more condensed and saturating bombardment
Despite the fact that this position has been profoundly unproductive for Ukraine – being steadily rolled back and having no synergy with other, more critical theaters – the same grouping of Ukrainian units remain here, fighting in a steadily more compressed space. Even more baffling, the Ukrainian grouping consists largely of premiere assets – Mechanized and Air Assault brigades – that could have contributed meaningfully as a reserve in the Donbas over the last three months.
The tactical particulars of the Ukrainian attack are interesting, and thereโs ongoing speculation as to its purpose – perhaps it was intended to cover a rotation or withdrawal, to improve tactical positions on the northern edge of the salient, or for inscrutable propaganda purposes. However, these specifics are rather unimportant: attacking out the end of the salient (that is, trying to deepen the penetration into Russia) does nothing to reverse Ukraineโs problems in Kursk. These problems are first, on the tactical level, that the salient has been greatly compressed on the flanks and continues to narrow, and on the strategic level the willful expenditure of valuable mechanized assets on a front that does not impact the critical theaters of the war. More simply, Kursk is a sideshow, and it is a sideshow that has gone wrong even within its own operational logic.
One thing that has been of endless interest, of course, have been the continued rumors of North Korean troops fighting in Kursk. Western intelligence agencies have been adamant about the presence of North Koreans in Kursk. Some people are predisposed to instinctively disbelieve everything that western officialdom says – while I think some skepticism is warranted, I do not automatically assume that they are lying. One recent report lays out what would seem to be a plausible version of this story: that the idea actually originated in Pyongyang, not Moscow, and that a modest number of Korean troops (perhaps 10,000) are embedded with Russian units. The presumption here is that the Koreans hatched the idea as a way to gain combat experience, with the Russians in turn getting auxiliary forces, though of questionable combat effectiveness.
However, it is worth noting that this is not nearly as important as it has been made out to be. Much has been made of the idea that the North Korean presence proves some sort of Russian state of desperation, but this is fairly silly on its face – with more than 1.5 million active personnel in the Russian military, 10,000 Korean troops in Kursk represents a paltry appendage. More importantly, there has been an attempt to portray the North Korean contingent as a major departure point in the war. In particular, the formulation โNorth Korean troops in Europeโ has been used to conjure cold war imagery of communist despotism clawing at the free world
The point, however, is that North Korean troops are presumed specifically to be in Kursk, which is in Russia. This is linked, of course, to the recently concluded mutual defense agreement signed between Moscow and Pyongyang. By attacking into Kursk – widening the front into prewar Russian territory – Ukraine created a defensive combat task for Russia which triggers the possibility of military assistance from North Korea. However much one may wish to link the Korean contingent to Russiaโs dreaded โwar of aggressionโ, the force in Kursk is very objectively engaged in the defense of Russian territory, and that makes it possible for Russia to use auxiliary forces – including conscripts and the troops of its allies – to fight there.
Ultimately, then, the presence of North Koreans in Kursk is interesting, but perhaps not very important after all. These troops are not in Ukraine (even under the most maximal definition of the Ukrainian territorial unit), they are not carrying the primary combat load, and they are unequivocally not the problem that the AFU is facing in Kursk. The โbig problemโ for Ukraine, very simply, is not the presence of some amorphous Korean horde dedicated to spreading Glorious Juche to Europe – it is the loitering of large grouping of their own precious mechanized brigades in a compressed salient, far far away from the Donbas, where they are greatly needed.
Scraping the Barrel: AFU Force Generation
I think it is well understood, of course, that Ukraine faces severe manpower constraints relative to Russia, both in terms of the raw totals of male biomass available – with roughly 35 million fighting aged males in Russia against perhaps 9 million in prewar Ukraine – but also in terms of its capacity to mobilize them.
Ukraineโs mobilization scheme is hampered by both widespread draft evasion (with willingness to serve decreasing as the war has stretched on) and a stubborn unwillingness to draft younger men, aged 18-25. Ukraine is structurally burdened with a deeply imbalanced population structure: there are roughly 60% more Ukrainian men in their 30โs than in their 20โs. Given the relative scarcity of young men, particularly in their early 20’s, the Ukrainian government rightly views this 18-25 year old cohort as a premium demographic cohort that it is loathe to burn away in combat. Given the ubiquity of draft evasion, the refusal to mobilize younger males, and the corruption and inefficiency characteristic of the Ukrainian government, it should come as no surprise when Ukrainian mobilization falters
All of that is to say: Ukraine faces a severe structural disadvantage in military manpower in the aggregate, which is exacerbated by the idiosyncrasies of the Ukrainian mobilization law, ameliorated slightly by the relatively low troop densities and the preponderant power of strike systems in this war.
The argument that I want to make here, however, is that Ukraineโs systemic problems matching Russian manpower have been exacerbated by several developments which specifically became prominent in 2024. In other words, 2024 can and should be marked as the year where Ukrainian manpower constraints became markedly and perhaps irretrievably worse due to specific decisions made in Kiev, and particular developments on the ground.
These are as follows:
The decision to expand the AFUโs force structure through the creation of the โ15 seriesโ brigades
The decision to deliberately widen the front and create additional demands for manpower by launching the incursion into Kursk
The stall out of Ukraineโs new mobilization program in the autumn
Accelerating problems with desertion in the AFU
Weโll run through these in order.
An army that is intaking new personnel has to decide between two possible allocations for them. New personnel can be used as replacements to replenish existing frontline units, or they can be used to expand the force structure by creating new units. That much seems fairly obvious, and ideally mobilization will exceed losses and make it possible to do both. Where armies face hard manpower constraints, however – that is, where losses are equal to or greater than intake of men, the decision to expand the force structure can have monumental consequences. The stereotypical example, of course, would be the late-war Wehrmacht, which created premiere new assets in the form of Waffen SS divisions, which received privileged access to recruits and equipment while regular army divisions in the line suffered from a trickle of replacements which could not keep up with losses.
Ukraine, with its garbled force structure, has created a mess through its own attempts to expand its force structure in the face of dwindling strength on the line. Late in 2023, the AFU announced intentions to form an entirely new grouping of brigades – the so-called โ15 seriesโ, given their designations as the 150th, 151st, 152nd, 153rd, and 154th Mechanized Brigades. This was followed in 2024 with the appending of the 155th Mechanized Brigade, which was to be trained and equipped in France.
Forming a new grouping of mechanized brigades is essential to the way that Ukraine is presenting its war. Because Ukraine still aims (at least on paper) to recapture all of its Russian held territory, there must always be the illusory possibility of a future offensive, and in order for that illusory possibility to remain, Ukraine must present itself as actively preparing for future offensive operations. Ukraineโs presentation of its own strategic animus – the idea that it is holding the front while it prepares to go back on the offensive – essentially locks it into a program of expanding its force structure
The problem for Ukraine is that the immense pressure on the front makes it essentially impossible for them to properly husband resources the way they would like. Properly training and equipping half a dozen fresh mechanized brigades and holding them in reserve would be very helpful, but they cannot really do this in light of the demands for personnel at the front. These brigades instead become โpaper formationsโ that have a bureaucratic existence, while their organic assets are pulled apart and sucked into the front – stripped down into battalion or company sized elements that can be plugged into sectors of need on the frontline. At the moment, none of the 15 series brigades have seen action as organic units – that is, fighting as themselves.
The decision to allocate personnel to new mechanized brigades (though given stocks of armored vehicles it is questionable whether those designations mean anything) does not necessarily change Ukraineโs manpower balance in the aggregate, but it is certainly an inefficient way to use personnel. To return again to the 155th brigade, one problem noted by Ukrainian analysts was the fact that much of the brigade was formed whole cloth from forcibly mobilized personnel, without a proper cadre of veterans and experienced NCOs – some 75% of the brigade, it turns out, had been mobilized less than two months before arriving in France for training. This fact was certainly instrumental in the mass desertions and the brigadeโs poor combat effectiveness.
Given Ukraine’s constraints, the best course of action would undoubtedly be to allocate new personnel and equipment as replacements to build out the depleted veteran brigades on the front lines, plugging in replacements around existing veterans and officers. Kiev, however, prizes the prestige that comes from force expansion and the โshiny new toyโ factor of new formations equipped with scarce and valuable equipment like Leopard tanks. These new brigades, though billed as premiere assets, clearly have lower combat effectiveness than existing formations, given their lack of experience, shortage of veteran officers, and low unit cohesion.
In short, Ukraineโs decision to embark on force expansion in the face of significant manpower shortages has exacerbated the problem – both starving veteran units of replacements and concentrating newly mobilized personnel into combat ineffective formations that lack a veteran core, experienced officers, and vital equipment. They have tried, belatedly, to square this circle by parceling out new formations to backstop line brigades, but this is less than ideal – it leads to a patchwork order of battle with lower unit cohesion and a fragmented defense.
Unfortunately, this comes precisely as Ukraine has created additional self-imposed strains on its resources, in particular through its incursion into Kursk. At the moment, elements of at least seven mechanized brigades, two marine infantry brigades, and three air assault brigades are stationed on the Kursk axis. Without going too far into the weeds rehashing Ukraineโs operation here, itโs important to remember that Ukraine – facing extreme pressures on its force generation – voluntarily chose to widen the front into a secondary theater, diverting scarce assets and reducing its own ability to economize forces.
In summary, Ukraine has made deliberate decisions to widen the front and expand its force structure, both of which have been decidedly detrimental to its efforts to economize personnel. This comes precisely as a 2024 effort to ramp up mobilization has come off the rails.
A deadly feedback loop is now at work, with the lack of rotations and the shortage of replacements synergizing to accelerate the burn of Ukrainian personnel. The AFU is unable to regularly rotate units out of combat, and the inadequate flow of replacements causes frontline infantry complements to wear thin. Unable to rotate or reinforce, line brigades resort to cannibalization – scraping support personnel like mortar teams, drivers, and drone operators to fill out frontline positions. This further accelerates losses as brigades fight with thinned out support and fires elements, and makes Ukrainian men more unwilling to enlist – because there is now no guarantee that becoming a drone operator, for example, will save one from being sent to a frontline trench eventually.
Where does this leave us? Ukraine continues to dispose of a very large force, with more than a hundred brigades and hundreds of thousands of men under arms. This force, however, is both substantially outnumbered by the Russian army and in a clear trend of decay. Despite a highly touted attempt to reinvigorate the mobilization apparatus in 2024, the intake of new personnel is clearly too low to offset losses, and the heavy lifting formations in critical sectors of front have seen their strength – particularly in the infantry complements – decline, in some cases to critical levels.
The failure of Ukraineโs 2024 mobilization program has coincided with several strategic choices which have exacerbated manpower concerns – specifically the decision to embark on a program of force expansion even as the AFU voluntarily extended its commitments by opening a new secondary front in Kursk. In other words, Ukraineโs mobilization falls short of its force requirements, and the AFU has also made choices that sabotaged its ability to economize. Units are ground up, replacements come in a paltry trickle, rotations are late or absent, units cannibalize themselves, and angry and weary men desert.
Itโs not at all clear that this will lead to a โbreaking pointโ, in the sense that people are anticipating. Ukrainian strike capabilities and the Russian preference for dispersed, leapfrogging assaults limit the potential for grand breakthroughs and exploitation. However, what we saw over the past three months on the southern Donetsk axis offers a preview of what awaits: an exhausted force being steadily rolled back, dug out of its strongpoints, and mauled – covering its retreat with drones but losing position after position. The line holds, until it doesnโt.
End of the Line: ATACMs, JASSMs, and Hazelnuts
Ukraineโs ability to remain in the field depends on a titration of two indispensable resources: first, Ukrainian male biomass, and secondly the critical western weaponry that gives them combat effectiveness. We have evaluated the first: Ukraine is not exactly out of men, but the trends of its mobilization program are poor and personnel shortages are mounting. The trends regarding the second are, if anything, even more foreboding for Kiev.
There are two general dynamics that have emerged, neither of which create an optimistic picture for Ukraine, which weโll examine in turn. These are as follows:
The delivery of heavy weaponry to Ukraine (tanks, IFVs, and artillery tubes) has largely dried up in recent months.
The west has essentially run out of escalatory weaponry (strike systems) to give, and those systems already given have failed to meaningfully altar the trajectory of the war.
In 2023, building out new mechanized units was the name of the game, with the Pentagon leading a multinational effort to stand up an entire army corps worth of units equipped with Leopards, Challengers, and a whole slew of western IFVs and APCs. When that lovingly assembled grouping bashed its head on a rock in the botched assault on the Zaporizhia line, the United States belatedly and begrudgingly dispatched its own Abrams to backstop the Ukrainian tank force. In 2024, however, deliveries of heavy weapons slowed to a trickle.
The role of the tank in Ukraine has been greatly misunderstood. The vulnerability of tanks to the myriad strike systems of the modern battlefield led some observers to declare that the tank as a weapons system was now obsolete, but this did not really square with the fact that both combatants in this war were eager to deploy as many as possible. Tanks need more critical enablers – more combat engineering, air defense, and electronic warfare support – but they continue to fill an indispensable role and remain an essential item in this war. The failure of Ukraineโs 2023 counteroffensive showed, if anything, that tanks simply are not โgame changingโ systems, but mass consumption items – but this has always been the case. The signature quality of iconic tanks like the Sherman and the T34 was that they were numerous
While 2023 was all about building out Ukraineโs mechanized package with tanks, IFVs, and engineering, 2024 has been largely about enhancing Ukraineโs strike capabilities. There have been two separate elements at play – first, the delivery of both air and ground launched systems (most notably the British Storm Shadows and American ATACMs respectively), and secondly the loosening of the rules of engagement to allow Ukraine to strike targets inside pre-war Russia.
This dovetailed, as it turned out, with Ukraineโs operation in Kursk, and in many ways the most direct impact of the Kursk incursion has been to force the westโs hand on the rules of engagement. While Ukraine has long been striking inside Russia with indigenous systems, most notably drones, the White House continued to drag its feet on formal approval for strikes with American systems. By launching a ground assault on Kursk, Ukraine made the decision for them: the United States gave clearance to use ATACMs to support the ground forces in Kursk, and this metastasized into general license to strike Russia with the full range of available systems. This was a poignant reminder that, however we conceive of the proxy-sponsor relationship, Ukraine has some ability to force Americaโs hand: a classic example of the tail wagging the dog.
In any case, 2024 saw Ukraine and its western backers slowly but surely bash through all the supposed red-lines in this domain: the British breached first with the delivery of Storm Shadows late in 2023, and this was followed by the delivery of ATACMs (with a handful of F16โs to boot), and finally the loosening of the rules of engagement to clear strikes on Russia.
Where does this leave us? There would seem to be three important things to consider.
The west has essentially reached the end of its escalation chain. The only remaining step that they can take would be to supply Ukraine with JASSMs (Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile), which would mark a quantitative but not a meaningful qualitative upgrade to Ukraineโs strike capabilities.
Ukraineโs use of western-supplied strike assets has been dissipated and has not materially improved their situation on the ground.
Russia maintains a dominant strike advantage, both qualitative and quantitative.
Ukraine faces a stark disadvantage in strike capability relative to Russia, in a variety of ways. Russian strike assets are far more numerous and have significant range advantages, but it is also important to take into consideration both Russiaโs significantly greater strategic depth and its more dense and relatively unscathed air defense. Unlike Ukraine, which has seen its air defense stretch to the limit with destroyed launchers and a mounting interceptor shortage, Russiaโs air defenses have been essentially untouched, as Ukraine has lacked the large numbers of assets required to conduct a proper SEAD/DEAD (Suppression/Destruction of Enemy Air Defense) campaign.
Given this basic calculus, using western strike systems to wage a blow for blow strategic air campaign is bad math for Ukraine. It is generally unwise to engage in a bat fight when your opponent is a bigger man with a much longer bat. Instead, Ukraineโs strike systems should have been leveraged to support ground operations – concentrating strikes spatially and in time to synergize with efforts on the ground. Just as a simple thought experiment, it is not difficult to imagine ATACMs making a difference if they had been available in 2023 and used to saturate Russian rear areas during the assault on the Zaporizhia line – striking in tempo with the mechanized assault to disrupt Russian command and control and prevent reinforcement of critical areas.
Two things need to be noted about the JASSM. First, the JASSM – while offering slightly longer ranges – would essentially serve as a backstop/replacement for the rapidly dwindling ATACMs and particularly the air launched Storm Shadows – instead of Ukraineโs native SU-24s launching Storm Shadows, they would utilize F-16s launching JASSMs. This would not represent a dramatic upgrade in Ukrainian capabilities, but would instead simply serve to maintain a bare minimum Ukrainian strike capability. JASSMs are a replacement for dwindling capabilities, not an augmentation to them.
Secondly, it must be understood that JASSMs are the last stop. Weโre now entering the territory, not of artificially constructed red lines, but physical and real limits. Russia has essentially eaten the gifted stocks of ATACMs and Storm Shadows, with little discernable effect on their ability to fight, and JASSMs are the last extant item in the inventories to keep Ukrainian strike capabilities operative. We are at the last rung of the aid ladder.
In the case of JASSMs, however, there are notable downsides for the United States. This is an important case of putting all of oneโs eggs in the same technological basket. In 2020, the United States scrapped the development of its conventionally armed Long Range Standoff Missile, making the JASSM – particularly the new extended range variants – the system for the United States, earmarked to play a critical role in future conflicts, particularly in the Pacific. This makes the JASSM an extremely sensitive system, as a centerpiece of American strike capabilities, particularly with the modernization of the Tomahawk system crawling along at a few dozen units per year.
Given the fact that JASSMs are GPS guided, there are real reasons to be reticent about giving Ukraine such a technologically sensitive system. Russian electronic warfare has enjoyed considerable success jamming GPS and disrupting similarly guided American systems. Allowing the Russians to gain familiarity with a keystone American system could wreak havoc on Pentagon war planning – most, if not all of the strike eggs are in this basket, so why let an adversary peek inside?
Itโs probable, given what we have seen to this point, that these concerns will ultimately be dismissed and Ukraine will receive a line of JASSMs which will backstop their strike capabilities – but given the size of Ukraineโs F-16 fleet, the scale will be constrained. Furthermore, air launched systems are less optimal for Ukraine, given their dependence on large and easily targeted airfields, in contrast to ground launched systems which are mobile and more easily concealed.
There is also the matter of the new Russian missile system – the now famous Oreshnik, or Hazel Tree. Russia tested the Oreshnik system on a large machining plant in Dnipro on November 21, 2024, which allowed the basic capabilities of the system to be gauged. The Oreshnik is an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile, characterized by its hypersonic capabilities (exceeding Mach-10) and its Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle equipped with six separate warheads, with the potential for submunitions in each. Although the attack on Dnipro was essentially a demonstration which used inert training warheads (that is, without explosive payloads), the missile can be configured with nuclear or conventional warheads
As in the case of the North Korean troops in Kursk, I rather think that the Oreshnik launch was not nearly as important as it was made out to be. The system is expensive and likely impractical for conventional use. I understand the desire to conceive of Oreshnik as a massively powerful conventional weapon – showering its target with half a dozen warheads with the power of an entire flight of Kalibr missiles – but there are several problems with this. The accuracy of the system (the CEP, or โCircular Error Probableโ in the technical parlance) is much more consistent with a nuclear delivery system than a conventional one. Furthermore, the problem with using an IRBM for conventional strikes is the danger of miscalculation – foreign adversaries may misinterpret the launch as a nuclear attack and respond appropriately. This is precisely why the Russian government actually alerted the United States to the launch ahead of time – a fine arrangement for a demonstration, but impractical for a weapon that is intended to be used regularly.
We may see another use of the Oreshnik against Ukraine, but ultimately this is unlikely to be a system of consequence in this war. The demonstration in Dnipro was instead likely intended to send a message to Europe – reminding NATO that Russia has the capacity to deliver strikes against European targets that cannot be intercepted. It also serves as a poignant reminder that Europe lacks the equivalent capability, and in essence provides a demonstration of Russiaโs ability to launch missiles from far beyond the range of either Ukrainian or European response. The Hazelnut is a tangible reminder of Russiaโs strategic depth and strike dominance in Ukraine.
Ultimately, Ukraine will lose the strike game. Itโs strike capacity has dwindled, with missiles frittered away in a dissipated air campaign, and though the exhaustion of Storm Shadow and ATACMs stocks can be offset somewhat by JASSMs, Ukraine simply lacks the range or quantities necessary to match Russian capabilities. Needing to do more with less, Ukraine instead diffused its assets and failed to synergize its strikes with ground operations. We are now at the end of the line – after JASSMs, thereโs nothing left in western warehouses to upgrade Ukrainian capabilities. Hazelnuts or no, the math on this bat fight is bad for Kiev.
Conclusion: Debellation
Trapped in an endless news cycle, with daily footage of FPV strikes and exploding vehicles, and a dutiful cottage industry of war mappers alerting us to every 100 meter advance, it can easily feel like the Russo-Ukrainian War is trapped in an interminable doom loop which will never end – Mad Max meets Groundhog Day.
What I have endeavored to do here, however, is argue that 2024 actually saw several very important developments which make the coming shape of the war relatively clear. To briefly recapitulate:
Russian forces caved in Ukrainian defenses at depth across an entire critical axis of front. After remaining static for years, Ukraineโs position in Southern Donetsk has been obliterated, with Russian forces advancing through an entire belt of fortified positions, pushing the front into Pokrovsk and Kostayantinivka.
The main Ukrainian gambit on the ground (the incursion into Kursk) failed spectacularly, with the salient being progressively caved in. An entire grouping of critical mechanized formations wasted much of the year fighting on this unproductive and secondary front, leaving Ukrainian positions in the Donbas increasingly threadbare and bereft of reserves.
An attempt by the Ukrainian government to reinvigorate its mobilization program failed, with enlistments quickly trailing off. Decisions to expand the force structure exacerbated the shortage of manpower, and as a result the decay of Ukraineโs frontline brigades has accelerated.
Long awaited western upgrades to Ukraineโs strike capabilities failed to defeat Russian momentum, and stocks of ATACMs and Storm Shadows are nearly exhausted. There are now few options remaining to prop up Ukrainian strike capacity, and no prospect of Ukraine gaining dominance in this dimension of the war.
In short, Ukraine is on the path to debellation – defeat through the total exhaustion of its capacity to resist. They are not exactly out of men and vehicles and missiles, but these lines are all pointing downward. A strategic Ukrainian defeat – once unthinkable to the western foreign policy apparatus and commentariat – is now on the table. Quite interestingly, now that Donald Trump is about to return to the White House, it is suddenly acceptable to speak of Ukrainian defeat. Robert Kagan – a stalwart champion of Ukraine if there ever was one – now says the quiet part out loud:
Ukraine will likely lose the war within the next 12 to 18 months. Ukraine will not lose in a nice, negotiated way, with vital territories sacrificed but an independent Ukraine kept alive, sovereign, and protected by Western security guarantees. It faces instead a complete defeat, a loss of sovereignty, and full Russian control
Indeed.
None of this should be particularly surprising. If anything, it is shocking that my position – that Russia is essentially a very powerful country that was very unlikely to lose a war (which it perceives as existential) right in its own belly – somehow became controversial or fringe. But here we are.
chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia