Nicolas Cinquini

Analista senior di l'intelligenza in u campu di a gestione di i risichi di sicurezza, sò un anzianu tenente detective è ufficiale di l'intelligenza in l'agenzie di u Statu francese. A bona pronuncia hè Николай Чинкуини, in russu

Tag: strategy

  • [Partage] Ukraine, face à la défaite qui s’annonce, la propagande entre mensonges et bêtise – Regis de Castelnau

    « Poutine n’est qu’un gamin capricieux », voilà donc l’explication du conflit en Ukraine que désormais, on nous sert pour tenter de commencer à gérer la défaite militaire et politique qui se profile pour l’Occident.

    Chacun à son poste !

    Chacun est à son poste. Sur les réseaux on a les bricolos, aux CV désertiques mais spécialistes autoproclamés, on se demande bien de quoi. Qui vous affirment que pas du tout, Prokorsk n’est pas encerclé. Que sous les coups des drones ukrainiens l’industrie pétrolière russe est à genoux avec des queues de 1000 km devant les stations-service. Qu’avec les tomahawks (?) ça va pas s’arranger. Que l’armée russe a perdu au minimum 10 millions d’hommes. L’un de ces « spécialistes » n’hésitant pas à nous expliquer qu’il a eu un pote de l’armée ukrainienne au téléphone et que celui-ci lui a dit qu’il tuait 200 Russes par jour, sans une égratignure pour lui. Si c’est pas une preuve ça ! Dans cette catégorie des guignols, on n’hésitera pas à ranger le ministre des Affaires étrangères de la République française qui, complètement halluciné, nous annonce l’effondrement politique, économique, militaire imminent de la Russie.

    Sur les chaînes d’info la cohorte habituelle des tapins continue à radoter ses inepties, en s’efforçant d’y ajouter un maximum de confusion pour tenter de masquer le désastre qui s’annonce. Malgré ces inflexions, force est de constater que la constance dans la désinformation est assortie désormais d’une forme de désenchantement.

    Mais on voit désormais monter au front de la guerre de communication des gens ayant une certaine crédibilité médiatique. Un mélange de véritables spécialistes et d’imposteurs dont le vernis est parfois difficile à craqueler. Face à l’inéluctable, ils remplissent une mission particulière. Avec eux, pas de puces de machine à laver, pas d’assaut avec des pelles, pas de chars russes en plastique envoyé au combat, là c’est du sérieux. Donc ils sont chargés de vendre un récit concernant l’origine du conflit et les suites prévisibles de la défaite occidentale en Ukraine. La question de la responsabilité de cette guerre fait l’objet y compris en Occident d’un débat furieux depuis l’origine.

    Les réalistes, parmi lesquels on pourrait placer Donald Trump, considèrent que ce conflit est le fruit d’une provocation occidentale ayant poussé la Russie à bout. Élargissement de l’OTAN et coup d’État américain du Maïdan, accompagné de la guerre civile infligée aux russophones de l’Est ukrainien, tous ces éléments ayant abouti à l’intervention russe. Dont l’objectif premier était d’imposer à l’Ukraine un certain nombre de contraintes permettant d’assurer sa neutralité. Au passage on notera que cet objectif était atteint sans perte territoriale avec « le Traité d’Istanbul » accepté par Kiev dans un premier temps.

    De l’autre côté les tenants de la thèse portée par Joe Biden le prédécesseur de Donald Trump qualifiant le conflit de : « agression militaire non provoquée de l’Ukraine par la Russie ». Position des pays occidentaux, qui ont proposé au régime de Kiev de jouer le rôle du proxy militaire pour lancer contre la Russie une guerre globale visant à son effondrement économique, à y provoquer un changement politique, pour aboutir ensuite à son démantèlement en tant qu’État unitaire. C’est ce qui explique l’intervention de Boris Johnson alors premier ministre de Grande-Bretagne pour empêcher l’application du « Traité d’Istanbul ». Le fait que cet infect personnage ait été corrompu pour le faire, n’empêche pas la réalité de cette motivation.

    Caramba, encore raté !

    On sait ce qu’il est advenu des prévisions de Bruno Lemaire, de l’inutilité du soutien financier et militaire d’une quarantaine de pays occidentaux, de l’ampleur de la tragédie imposée à l’Ukraine, mais le réel s’impose. La Russie est solide. Devenue la première puissance militaire du monde, elle est alliée avec la première puissance économique, et la planète constate le tournant historique que constitue la sortie de l’Histoire de « l’Occident collectif ». Joli bilan que les dirigeants occidentaux vont devoir assumer, et cela ne pourra pas se réaliser grâce a ces rodomontades militaires ineptes, dont les dirigeants européens, Macron en tête, se sont faits une spécialité. Alors, pour tous ces incapables et pour certains criminels comme Boris Johnson, il devient difficile d’assumer la contradiction qui les amène à affirmer que la Russie s’effondre mais qu’elle va nous envahir. Demain matin, nous dit d’ailleurs le chef d’état-major de l’Armée de terre descendues en treillis sur un plateau pour l’occasion. Plus personne ne peut donc soutenir que la Russie va s’effondrer. Alors pour justifier leur maintien au pouvoir, la mise en place de régimes autoritaires, la soumission ruineuse au maître américain, il faut prétendre aujourd’hui qu’il ne s’agit là que d’une posture défensive. De nos « démocraties », de nos « valeurs », voire de notre « civilisation »… Le problème étant qu’il faut quand même expliquer pourquoi la Russie veut nous envahir et pourquoi il est indispensable de conserver notre président 11 % à la tête de l’État.

    Parmi ceux qui s’y collent on ne retiendra que deux petits exemples assez significatifs des volontaires qui se chargent monter front de la communication et de la propagande. L’un d’entre eux correspond au profil de l’expert en tout habitué des plateaux et dont on se demande d’où sort sa compétence. Et l’autre est un véritable diplomate professionnel pratiquant habituellement la nuance, mais qui l’abandonne au profit d’un récit mensonger.

    Vladimir Vladimirovitch Poutine est un gamin capricieux et obtus

    Darius Rochebin affichant comme d’habitude cet air niais qui lui est propre, a décidé d’inviter Alain Bauer, dont on se demande ce qu’il fout là. Pour lui demander pourquoi la Russie n’accepte pas le cessez-le-feu exigé par la fameuse « coalition des chihuahuas ». Alors Bauer, ancien chef franc-maçon, autoproclamé criminologue, charlatan à la probité notoirement approximative, vient nous expliquer que Vladimir Poutine n’est rien qu’un enfant capricieux. Dans une séquence absolument grotesque il affirme que le président russe poursuit la guerre pour récupérer le petit bout d’une ville du Donbass qui n’a aucun intérêt. Épicétou, un caprice. Un gamin ce Poutine. Mais dangereux gamin. Par ce qu’ensuite Bauer nous explique qu’après Donetsk, il va vouloir récupérer Kaliningrad. Incroyable ce Poutine ! Il veut récupérer quelque chose qui appartient déjà à la Russie. Avant ça s’appelait Kœnigsberg et c’est revenu aux russes après la deuxième guerre mondiale.

    Bauer s’arrête là, mais on imagine qu’il aurait pu continuer sur cette voie royale : « vous vous rendez compte ce gamin capricieux de Poutine il va bientôt exiger que Moscou et Saint-Pétersbourg soient aussi en Russie. Où s’arrêtera-t-il ! »

    Et naturellement Rochebin en bon journaliste, bardé de son ignorance crasse, ne pipe pas un mot devant cette énormité

    Gérard Araud, c’est différent. Ancien ambassadeur de France, et quoique occidentaliste indécrottable, il lui arrive d’être critique et de ne pas relayer systématiquement la propagande du système. C’est pour cela qu’il est toujours intéressant de l’écouter. Mais le voilà qui patrouille sur les réseaux pour y apporter la bonne parole et nous servir la sentence suivante

    Alors comme ça, la ligne rouge fixée par la Russie d’une adhésion de l’Ukraine à l’OTAN n’est qu’un prétexte bidon ? Désolé Excellence, mais vous vous foutez du monde. Au moment de la réunification allemande, les États-Unis s’étaient engagés à ne pas étendre l’OTAN vers l’est c’est-à-dire aux pays de l’ancienne Union soviétique et ceux de l’ancien glacis. Ça c’est pour le contexte. Mais de déclarations officielles des présidents américains (George w Bush, Joe Biden) en communiqués multiples tout aussi officiels de l’OTAN, en déclarations des dirigeants occidentaux selon lesquels « la Russie n’avait pas son mot à dire », en déclarations des dirigeants ukrainiens post Maïdan, c’est une véritable litanie de prises de position officielles qui établissent que la décision occidentale était prise. Ce fut d’ailleurs une des raisons du coup d’État organisé par la CIA en en Ukraine. L’exemple le plus amusant pour caractériser le mensonge de Monsieur Araud est « l’accord entre la France et l’Ukraine » qui, pourquoi se gêner, commence par les termes : « L’accord, d’une durée de 10 ans, est valable tant que l’Ukraine n’aura pas rejoint l’OTAN » (!!!). Cet accord est destiné à créer immédiatement des obligations entre l’Ukraine et la France du type de celles qui existent au sein de l’OTAN. Et ce sans attendre l’adhésion ! Dites-nous excellence, vous arrive-t-il de prendre connaissance des textes officiels du gouvernement dont vous dépendez ?

    Alors si l’on comprend bien, pour l’un Poutine fait la guerre en Ukraine parce qu’il veut récupérer un petit quartier d’une ville sans intérêt et conquérir un territoire qui lui appartient déjà. Et pour l’autre, c’est pour s’opposer à l’adhésion de l’Ukraine à l’OTAN, alors qu’il n’en a jamais été question et qu’en vrai en Occident tout le monde s’en fout. En février 2022, on nous a expliqué que le président russe était un satrape oriental qui mangeait des petits-enfants. Désormais qu’il fait la guerre sans raison ou pour assouvir ses caprices.

    Impressionnant de constater comment vouloir servilement relayer la propagande du système, implique nécessairement de prendre ses auditeurs pour des imbéciles [fin]

    L’article original

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    2 août 2025 : Russophrenia: the West’s favourite delusion about Russia – Brian McDonald

    Ten years after I coined the term, the media’s still convinced Russia is both collapsing, and conquering the world

    17 février 2025 : La bourgeoisie n’a plus les moyens intellectuels, ni culturels, de sa domination de classe – Harold Bernat, Quartier Général

    The Atlanticist defeat in Donbass and Ukraine

    chronicle of a new catastrophic NATO venture

    The Western disinformation about Ukraine

    chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia

  • [Sharing] Once upon a time near Hnativka – RYBAR 62

    adventures in country-404

    May 2025. Heavy battles rage on the approaches to Dzerzhinsk. Russian forces continue to advance, trying to seize the strategic initiative in the area. Ukrainian units have built a dense defensive line here.

    The 104th Separate Battalion of the 109th Territorial Defense Brigade of the UAF covers the Arkhangelsk-Kalinovo road, holding back the actions of the 242nd regiment.

    After several failed frontal assaults, Russian command decides to strike the enemy flank – with the 1436th Motorized Rifle Regiment leading the move.

    The success of the whole operation now depends on two mobilized soldiers. In a critical situation, they must make a choice: What they choose will decide more than just their fate


    ©️ RYBAR

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  • [Sharing] Living Dangerously – Big Serge

    Russo-Ukrainian War: Autumn 2025

    The Russo-Ukrainian War seems to have been engineered in a laboratory to frustrate people with repetition and analytic paralysis. Headlines appear to be circulating on a choreographed loop, all the way down to the place names. Kaja Kallas at the European Commission recently announced, without a hint of irony, that Europe’s new sanctions package – the 19th one – is the toughest yet. Ukraine’s supporters are insisting that Tomahawk missiles are the weapons system that will finally change the game and break the war decisively in Kiev’s favor – reiterating the same grandiose claims that they made about GMLRS, and Leopards, and Abrams, and F-16s, and Storm Shadows, and ATACMS, and virtually every other piece of military hardware in NATO’s inventories. On the ground, Russia is attacking settlements named Pokrovsk and Pokrovs’ke; it recently captured Toretsk and Tors’ke and is now attacking Torets’ke. The more things change, the more things stay the same.

    The analytic frameworks applied to the war have also changed relatively little, buried and obfuscated by the nebulous concept of attrition. On the Ukrainian side, there is continued insistence that Russia is suffering exorbitant losses and straining under the pressure of Ukrainian deep strikes, while Ukrainian setbacks are blamed in large part on the failure of the United States to expand its largesse and give Ukraine everything it needs. Many pro-Russian lines of thinking mirror this and suppose that the AFU is on the verge of disintegration, while the Kremlin is accused of failing to “take the gloves off”, particularly in regards to the Ukrainian energy grid, Dnieper bridges, and dams.

    The result is a very strange sort of war. This is an extraordinarily high-intensity ground war. Both armies remain in the field, holding hundreds of miles of continuous front after years of bloody fighting. Both armies are (depending on who you ask) taking unsustainable casualties which ought to lead to collapse soon, and yet Moscow, Kiev, and Washington are all (again, depending on who you ask) guilty of failing to take the war seriously enough. All of this is maddeningly repetitive, and one could be forgiven for tuning out entirely. Even the diplomatic tango between Trump, Zelensky, and Putin, after delivering a few entertaining moments, failed to really move the needle in any discernable direction.

    Few would argue that the trajectory of the war changed in an obviously dramatic way in 2025, and it is important to avoid the worn out and clichéd language about “turning points” or “collapse” or any such silly thing. However, 2025 saw several shifts in the war, which will hardly ostentatious or dramatic, are nevertheless very important. 2025 has been the first year of the war in which Ukraine launched no ground offensives or proactive operations of its own. This fact is not only a hint at the threadbare state of Ukraine’s ground forces, but also a testament to the way Russian forces transformed “attrition” from a buzzword into a method of persistent pressure across a variety of axes this year.

    In lieu of initiative on the ground, and facing a slow but relentless rollback of their defenses in the Donbas, the theory of Ukrainian victory has shifted in an unacknowledged but dramatic way. After years of insisting that it would achieve maximal territorial integrity – an outcome which would require the total and decisive defeat of Russia’s ground forces – Ukraine has reframed its path to victory mainly as a process of inflicting strategic costs on Russia that mount until the Kremlin agrees to a ceasefire. Consequentially, the debate about arming Ukraine has shifted from a conversation about armor and artillery – equipment useful for retaking lost territories – to a discussion about deep striking weapons like Tomahawks, which can be used to shoot at Russian oil refineries and energy infrastructure. In short, rather than move to prevent Russian from achieving immediate operational objectives in the Donbas, Ukraine and its sponsors are now seeking ways to make Russia pay a price such that victory on the ground is no longer worth it. It is unclear whether they have thought about what price Ukraine will pay in the exchange. Perhaps they do not care.

    About Tomahawks

    Notwithstanding Ukraine’s attempts to jumpstart indigenous production, it is inevitable that Ukrainian capabilities will be largely determined by the largesse of western sponsors. This aspect of the war took a sudden turn at the beginning of the October when fresh reporting began to circulate that Tomahawk missiles might be on the table for Ukraine. Tomahawks have always been on Ukraine’s wish list (given that the Ukrainian wish list as such consists of essentially all the military equipment in NATO’s combined inventories) but this was the first reporting that they might be under serious consideration.

    As is frequently the case, the discussion spiraled away from realistic grounding, with some suggesting that the Tomahawk would be a “game changer” for Ukraine (where have we heard that before?) and the pro-Russian sphere dismissing it as an irrelevant distraction. There’s a tendency to focus on the quality of American weapons systems, casting them as either unrivaled technological marvels or overhyped and overpriced baubles, but this is generally not productive and largely irrelevant to the matter at hand. The Tomahawk, broadly speaking, is exactly as advertised, and provides proven and reliable strike capability at strategic depths in excess of 1,000 miles. In role, range, and payload it is essentially an analog to Russia’s Kalibr missiles (I am begging the enthusiasts to note the phrase “essentially an analog” rather than rake me over the coals over the different guidance systems and other technical minutia). Such a system will always be valuable and would obviously improve Ukraine’s deep strike capabilities.

    The “problem” with Tomahawks does not relate to any “problem” with the missile itself, but with its availability and Ukraine’s technical capability to launch them. The Tomahawk is conventionally a ship-launched missile (there is no extant air-launched variant) with a few novel options for ground launch. Ukraine, obviously, would require ground launch systems, and the problem is that these systems are essentially brand new and available in very limited quantities: more importantly, American service branches are in the process of trying to build out these capabilities throughout the decade. Providing ground-launchable Tomahawks to Ukraine in any meaningful numbers would therefore essentially require the US Army and Marines to scrap their own force buildout plans.

    There are two basic options for ground launching Tomahawks. One of these is the US Army’s MRC (Mid-Range Capability) Launcher, dubbed the Typhon. This is an enormous tractor-trailer launcher with four launch tubes, first delivered in 2023. It has an enormous footprint – so large, apparently, that the Army is already asking for a smaller replacement – and is intended to give the Army an organic fires component in the gap between the shorter range Precision Strike Missile and hypersonic systems (which do not yet exist). The critical fact is this: the Army intends to field a total of five Typhon batteries by 2028, of which two have been delivered so far. Each battery consists in turn of four launchers, implying that eight out of a planned twenty launchers have been delivered. Even more importantly, both of the currently operational batteries are already deployed, with one in the Philippines and one in Japan. These systems are being actively used in exercises and trials, including an exercise this summer in Australia

    The Typhon system gives ground launch capability to the Tomahawk but brings a massive footprint

    The situation with the Marine Corps’ launch system is quite similar, although the launch platforms themselves could not be more different. Unlike the lumbering Typhon tractor trailer, the Marines are fielding a significantly more lithe and compact LMSL system, with the tradeoff of a single launch tube compared to the Typhon’s four. What matters is not so much the technical differences, as the fact that the Marines – like the Army – only received their first deliveries in 2023, and they are currently in the process of building out the force. In the case of the marines, the goal is to have a Tomahawk battalion built out by 2030. In fact, the production contract came into effect as recently as 2025.

    What does all of that mean? It means that, although the Tomahawk itself is a fine missile, the systems for ground launch are so new and available in such limited quantities that equipping Ukraine with Tomahawks would require either the US Army or the Marines to materially alter their force structure in the near term (through 2030, essentially). These are essentially the opposite of much of the gear that’s been given to Ukraine to this point: far from being inventories of older systems that can be earmarked as surplus or tabbed for replacement, Tomahawk ground launch is a brand new capability that is in the middle of deployment and buildout for the first time.

    This is, of course, a layered complication on top of Tomahawk quantities in and of themselves. The issue of Tomahawk availability is both over and under emphasized, depending on the context. The United States has something like 4,000 Tomahawks in its inventories (although half of these are currently inside their cells on American ships), so it is not quite correct to say (as some have) that America is running out of these critical weapons. The issue is that production rates are relatively anemic (generally between 55 and 90 per year) and are fail to replenish the expenditure from even relatively brief strike campaigns, such as the repeated strikes on Yemen. Broadly speaking, then, the issue is not so much that the United States is in immediate danger of running out of Tomahawks, but that procurement schedules are so slow that even relatively minor expenditures can erase multiple years worth of deliveries.

    It may be useful, then, to consider Tomahawks in comparison to the ATACMS missiles which have already been provided to Ukraine. Unlike the Tomahawk, the ATACMS is a system which has already been tabbed for replacement, with the Precision Strike Missile in the early phases of its rollout. ATACMS were also compatible with launch systems that Ukraine already had. In comparison to Tomahawks, then, ATACMS are both vastly more strategically expendable, produced in larger numbers, and easier to deploy. Despite all these points in their favor, the United States provided Ukraine with just 40 ATACMS. Even if the Army could be pressured into handing over one or two of its brand new Typhon launchers, it is difficult to imagine that more than few dozen Tomahawks could be spared for Ukraine: a token inventory far too small to wage a sustained strike campaign in the Russian heartland

    Peace, Sponsored by Raytheon

    Given that Tomahawks for Ukraine would be measured in the dozens, rather than the hundreds, it’s worth asking whether this could actually change anything for the AFU at the front. The answer is clearly no in the long run, but it would be unwise to dismiss the possibility that even a limited tranche of Tomahawks (let’s say 40 to 50 missiles) could help alleviate pressure on Ukrainian forces at the front, provided they were used appropriately. A short term boost to Ukrainian strike capabilities, if deployed against Russian rear areas, could force further dispersal and rationing of Russian assets and temporarily stall Russia’s emerging multi-axis offensive. This could defer the loss of key positions until early 2026. This presumes, however, that the Ukrainians would be content to use Tomahawks against operational targets. In reality, Ukraine can never seem to resist lobbing missiles at targets that have little bearing on the front, like the Kerch Bridge. Indeed, a failure to synergize strikes at depth with operations on the ground is a major reason why the ATACMS achieved so little.

    On the other side of this equation, it is a common complaint from the Russian perspective that Moscow has done too little to “deter” the United States from empowering Ukraine’s strike campaign – both by directly providing munitions and supplying the planning, ISR, and guidance systems. This, however, rather misses the point. Russia has done nothing of note to deter the United States because both Moscow and Washington understand fully that there is essentially no appetite (on either side) for a direct confrontation. In the (sensible) absence of a willingness to strike back at NATO targets, there is really nothing Russia can do to deter beyond maintaining its own retaliatory capabilities. The issue is not that Russia has failed to actively deter, but that there is nothing they could do even if they wanted to.

    The basic pattern here is well established. The United States has done what it can to backstop Ukrainian strike capabilities, but it has held them at a level where Ukraine’s damage output falls far short of decisive levels. So long as that is the case, Russia has clearly demonstrated that it will simply eat the punches and retaliate against *Ukraine*. Hence, when the United States helps Ukraine target Russian oil facilities, it is Ukraine that receives the reprisal, and it is Ukraine which has its natural gas production annihilated as the winter approaches. In a sense, neither side is really trying to deter the other at all. The United States has raised the cost of this war for Russia, but not enough to create any real pressure for Moscow to end the conflict; in response, Russia punishes Ukraine, which is something the United States does not really care about. The result is a sort of geostrategic Picture of Dorian Gray, where the United States vicariously inflicts cathartic damage on Russia, but Ukraine accrues all the soul damage.

    In the case of Tomahawks, the risk-reward calculus is just not there. Tomahawks are a strategically invaluable asset that the United States cannot afford to hand out like candy. Even if the launch systems could be provided (highly doubtful), the missiles could not be made available in sufficient quantities to make a difference. The range of the missiles, however, significantly raises the probability of miscalculation or uncontrolled escalation. Ukraine shooting American missiles at energy infrastructure in Belgorod or Rostov is one thing; shooting them at the Kremlin is another thing entirely.

    There is, however, another aspect of this which seems to be garnering little attention. The biggest risk of sending Tomahawks is not that the Ukrainians will blow up the Kremlin and start World War Three. The bigger risk is that the Tomahawks are used, and Russia simply moves on after eating the strikes. Tomahawks are arguably one of the last – if not *the* last – rung in the escalation ladder for the USA. We have rapidly run through the chain of systems that can be given to the AFU, and little remains except a few strike systems like the Tomahawk or the JASSM. Ukraine has generally received everything it has asked for. In the case of Tomahawks, however, the United States is running the most serious risk of all: what if the Russians simply shoot down some of the missiles and eat the rest of the strikes? It’s immaterial whether the Tomahawks damage Russian powerplants or oil refineries. If Tomahawks are delivered and consumed without seriously jarring Russian nerves, the last escalatory card will have been played. If Russia perceives that America has reached the limits of its ability to raise the costs of the war for Russia, it undercuts the entire premise of negotiations. More simply put, Tomahawks are most valuable as an asset to threaten with.

    Reading between the lines of President Trump’s public statements recently, it seems likely that he has rationally weighed these considerations. Publicly, he used the threat of Tomahawks to try and force Russia to keep negotiating, and he’s received a commitment for another meeting with Putin for his trouble (more on that later). He has now, for the time being, shelved the Tomahawk plan, commenting that “we need them” and applying the usual Trumpian linguistic style to the broadly accepted issue of inventories which I have outlined here. Tomahawks are simply more valuable to the United States as a tool to threaten escalation, rather than as an actual kinetic asset in Ukrainian hands, and so long as Trump keeps his powder dry he can re-raise the issue later.

    Ultimately, perhaps, this discussion is not about Tomahawks at all. These missiles, rather, are simply a totem which demonstrate two important dovetailing points. First, that American resources are not infinite, and as the United States reaches deeper into its bag to help Ukraine, it begins to grab at strategically critical assets that the US military simply cannot spare. Secondly, we must remember that America’s policy in Ukraine is a game of titration, with Washington probing the limits of Russia’s willingness to “eat the strikes” without allowing the reprisal violence to spill out of Ukraine.

    The Big Banana: Russia’s Operational Schema

    At this point, it’s becoming increasingly difficult to say anything meaningful about the actual operational progression on the ground. There are several reasons for this. First and foremost, the war has now gone on so long and is consistently moving at such an apparently glacial pace that most people simply do not care at this point whether Russia holds Yampil or not, or whether they have advanced past the rail line in Pokrovsk. There is severe fatigue (or perhaps boredom is the better word) with the status of an interminable sequence of apparently small settlements, industrial complexes, and forestry plantations, and as a result most people have essentially checked out. Not the least among these must surely be President Trump, who apparently chucked Zelensky’s map of the frontline and complained that he was tired of being shown the same maps over and over again.

    On the other hand, we have the true obsessives who continue to dutifully follow the frontlines regularly and are voluntarily intaking daily updates. We end up with a bifurcated system where some people are still highly plugged in to the micro movements on the battlefield, but most people just don’t care, and we can hardly blame the latter. I think it would be profitable, then, to think about the broader Russian operational scheme, what it has achieved, and what it aims to achieve in the coming year. This is probably more interesting and less repetitious than fixating on the exact positioning within Pokrovsk or Kupyansk.

    There are two larger points that I think are worth making before we look at some specifics.

    First and foremost, much of the battlefield analysis that comes out (particularly from western analysts) makes firm pronouncements as to what constitutes Russia’s “primary” and “secondary” efforts, but these are essentially interpolated and frequently incorrect. For example, it’s become a fairly mainstream conception that Russia’s “primary” point of effort right now is the capture of Pokrovsk, but this does not actually seem supported by Russian actions. There is no particular advantage to be gained for Russia by pushing to capture Pokrovsk as soon as possible – the city is already in a stranglehold partial encirclement. To be sure, Pokrovsk *was* a major logistic hub for Ukrainian forces, but it can no longer serve that role and was sterilized as a transit hub months ago, once it became a frontline city. The opposite side of this coin is that other Russian axes of advance, particularly in southern Donetsk and the bend of the Donets River, are dismissed as “secondary” efforts. This is a major mistake, and I will attempt to show that these are critical advances where Russia is shaping the battlefield to its advantage for follow on operations.

    Secondly, it should be understood and appreciated that Ukraine has lost essentially all battlefield initiative. In 2024, the AFU was able to assembled a mechanized reserve and launch their operation into Kursk. This operation ultimately failed and resulted in severe Ukrainian losses, but this is unrelated to the fact that Ukraine was still able to accumulate forces and pursue offensive operations on its own initiative. In 2025, however, Ukraine has been in a permanent state of reactivity. This was the first year of the war in which Ukraine did not launch any proactive operations or counteroffensives of its own, and Ukrainian hopes have instead pivoted to their strategic strike campaign against Russian oil facilities.

    In a larger sense, the effect of attrition can be seen year by year with the shrinking scope of Ukraine’s proactive operations. In 2022, Ukraine was able to launch a pair of widely separated offensives which yielded modest successes: an offensive out of Kharkov rolled the front back over the Oskil River (though it failed to collapse the Lugansk shoulder), meanwhile, a series of battles outside of Kherson failed to break through the Russian lines, but they did play a role in persuading the Russians to abandon their bridgehead over the Dnieper. The point of course is not to once again autopsy these offensives, but to point out that there were two of them, that they were meaningful in scale, and they did result in important territorial gains for Ukraine. In 2023, by contrast, Ukraine launched a single theater-level offensive in the south, which failed. In 2024, we got the Kursk operation: smaller and less lavishly equipped than 2023’s Zaoprizhia offensive, and aimed at a peripheral theater. This year, there were no proactive Ukrainian operations at all. There is a very clear pattern at play here, with Ukraine’s offensive punch progressively shrinking before disappearing entirely in 2025. This was a year of essentially uninterrupted Russian initiative

    Putting Ukraine permanently on the backfoot is a significant Russian achievement, and it is owed to a few converging factors. Obviously, the attrition of Ukrainian forces is a major factor. We’ve gone through the flailing Ukrainian mobilization, the cannibalization of its forces, and the general lack of reserves in detail on several occasions, and there’s no need to retread that ground here. Suffice it to say, Ukraine’s ability to husband forces for offensive operations appears to be severely degraded. Russia has exacerbated this problem by pressing steadily on a variety of different axes. At the moment, there are no fewer than seven Russian axes of attack, pressuring a slew of cities all along the line. This creates a series of defensive emergencies, maintains the burn rate on Ukrainian forces, and fixes them on the line. Finally, in a point to be detailed shortly, Russian advances have begun unraveling Ukraine’s logistic connectivity, which puts strain on supply and prevents the concentration and accumulation of forces

    Eastern Ukraine: Approximate Situation and Axes of Russian Advance

    Now, for the development of the front and the premise of the Russian offensive scheme. The main point that I want to impress is essentially as follows: rather than fixating on Pokrovsk, Russia’s advances across Southern Donetsk and on the inner bend of the Donets River ought to be thought of as vital operations which have severely disrupted the coherence of both the Ukrainian front and their logistics. This has the triple effect of preventing the Ukrainians from launching offensives of their own, accelerating the attrition of Ukrainian forces, and shaping the front for the coming operation to capture the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration.

    To begin, let’s consider the progress that Russia has made in southern Donetsk, both in raw territorial terms and its implications for Ukrainian logistic connectivity. To demonstrate this, I’ve pulled maps from DeepState (again, a Ukrainian mapping enterprise) for August 2023 (when Ukraine was attempting its counterattack out of Orikhiv) and for October 20th, the week of this writing. I have noted both the length of the southern front (obviously a linear approximate, as the actual front has many bends and bulges) and highlighted the key highways that Ukraine uses to run the backbone of its logistics

    The Southern Front: 2023 vs 2025

    Now, one thing that is worth noting is that the Russians are currently positioned to roll up this front even further. Ukrainian defensive lines are primarily oriented towards on a north-south axis. Once Russian forces cleared Kurakhove, they entered the seams in these defensive lines – that is to say, they are advancing laterally along the face of the prepared defenses, rather than trying to bash through them from the front. This is one reason why their progress has been relatively steady and uninterrupted. Now approaching the “elbow” in the lines, where they pivot southward, and having crossed the Yanchur River, the Russians are entering a substantial space that lacks meaningful prepared defenses. Using the Military Summary map (Ukrainian fortifications are mapped with yellow dots), the void in the defense is fairly obvious as the Russians work their way into the elbow of the line

    Apart from the obvious development of note here – that Russian forces have, to this point, rolled up roughly half the length of the southern front and are positioned to roll up another ten to fifteen miles – we want to note two things which are emblematic of the way the war is going for Ukraine, but curiously receive little attention. First, the compression of the front is robbing the Ukrainians of the maneuver space which made it possible for them to stage and assemble forces for their counteroffensive in 2023. Two years ago, there was a wide, lateral buffer zone around the Ukrainian staging area in Orikhiv, and Ukrainian forces had access to multiple highways where they could disperse forces in their marching columns and run their logistics.

    Today, that buffer zone is gone, as is the easy access to several of the branch highways. The Russian advance, which started with the breakthrough at Ugledar and Kurakhove last year and which has now rolled up some 50 miles of front, has essentially sterilized Ukraine’s capacity to attack in the south, because they have neither the space nor the roads to safely accumulate forces here. It has also shattered the interconnectivity of Ukrainian logistics: rather than having several highways to shuttle troops and material to the east, Ukraine now has to support several disconnected logistic fronts with individual highways. More to the point, there is no longer a single Donetsk “front” to speak of, but rather a series of logistic fronts: one in the south, around Orikhiv, another at Pokrovsk, and the largest one in the Slovyansk Banana. These are lacking lateral connectivity to each other for the Ukrainians due to the wedges that the Russians have forced in the front, particularly in the south, funneling logistics and reinforcements down individuated corridors.

    The bigger issue, however, lies farther north on the Pokrovsk and Donets axes, and in the way that they synergize. People who are focusing, to the exclusion of all else, on when and how Russia will capture Pokrovsk are failing to see the bigger picture, and indeed are not even trying to understand it.

    The ultimate Russian operational objective (in this phase of the war, at least) is the belt of cities which runs in an arc from Slovyansk to Kostyantinivka, which I affectionately call “the Slovyansk Banana” due to its curved shape. A cursory look at the map shows us why the very operations that are being dismissed as secondary efforts are in fact critical axes of Russian effort which are shaping the battlefield for the attack on the Banana

    There are two very important facts about the Banana, from the perspective of operational geography. The first is that, although the combined mass of the agglomeration is far larger than any of the urban areas that have been fought over to this point, the Banana is relatively difficult to defend because it sits on the floor of a river valley: the Kazennyi Torets flows through all the cities in the Banana before it flows into the Donets. Russian forces approaching the city from the southwest, the east, and the north will all be advancing along the high ground that overlooks the cities on the floor.

    The second important fact about the Banana is that, despite its size, it is supported by just two highways which approach from the southwest and northwest respectively, funneling into the Banana like a wedge. Taking the northern highway/MSR (the E40 highway) as an example, we see that Russia’s operations inside the Donets bend are hardly secondary efforts: they are vital shaping operations linked to the integrity of the Banana. The E40 highway tracks the Donets bend very closely (it generally stays within five miles of the river. If the Russians sustain their progress north of the Donets and reach the river at Bogorodychne or Svyatogirsk, it will not only put E40 under persistent drone attack but also curl the defensive line behind the Banana, to say nothing of the enormous pressure on the Siversk salient.

    On the Pokrovsk front as well, Russia’s progress is being misinterpreted. After their breakthrough at the end of the summer, Russian forces have consolidated the bulge north of Pokrovsk (despite weeks of Ukrainian counterattacks) and are steadily working their way towards Rais’ke and Sergiivka. This is not about Pokrovsk at all – reaching Rais’ke would put Russian forces directly in the backfield of Kostyantinivka, on the supply lines to the underside of the Banana.

    I am not suggesting at all that Russian forces are on the verge of some great offensive surge that will carry them into the heart of the Banana instantly. However, there is a fairly well established Russian operational methodology in this war, which involves working their way methodically into Ukraine’s logistical lanes and seams, segmenting the front and strangulating their strongpoints, forcing them to supply frontline strongholds with single file logistics and dirt roads. They did it in Bakhmut, and Avdiivka, they are doing it in Pokrovsk, and they are shaping the front to attempt this on a large scale in the Banana

    Assault on the Banana: Coming 2026

    The general point that we are trying to make here is that dismissing Russian advances in the Serebryanka Forest, the emerging bulge north of Pokrovsk, and their move into the Donets Bend as “secondary efforts” is mistaken. Zooming out to the appropriate scale shows that these are concentric operations, shaping the front for a 2026 assault on the Banana – moving towards the E40 road from the north, bending the defensive shield around Siversk, and working into the underbelly of the Banana through Rais’ke.

    This is, perhaps, a long way to go for a short drink of water, but there are a few basic points here that get completely missed when the view of the front is preoccupied with the fighting inside Pokrovsk and Kupyansk:

    1. Russia’s advance out of Kurakhove across the southern front is not a secondary axis. They have rolled up half of the southern front, condensing Ukrainian forces into a compact space which sterilizes their ability to attack in the south.
    2. Broad Russian pressure across a half-dozen axes maintained a steady burn rate on Ukrainian forces and prevented the accumulation of forces for proactive operations. 2025 has been the first year of the war in which Ukraine has not launched any offensive operations on its own initiative.
    3. Advances in the Donets bend and the interstitial space between Pokrovsk and Kostyantinivka are not subsidiary or secondary operations: they are critical shaping operations that are moving concentrically toward the Banana.

    To be frank, the general mood of optimism in the Ukrainian infosphere, which lasted for much of the summer, struck me as remarkably odd. The frontline has yielded no real good news for Ukraine at any point this year. Beyond the broader strategic point, that Ukraine has lost the initiative and does not seem capable of getting it back, Russia is in the process of capturing two important urban centers (Russian troops are in the city centers of Pokrovsk and Kupyansk), it has begun the assault on at leas two more (Lyman and Kostyantinivka), it has rolled up half of the southern front, and cleared most of the inner Donets-Oskil bend. The Banana is on deck for 2026.

    Ukraine’s Cost Theory of Victory

    One thing that has become apparent over the last year is that Kiev has abandoned previous notions of outright victory on the battlefield and adopted a new strategic framework predicated on imposing unacceptable costs on Russia, so that Moscow will agree to freeze the conflict.

    This is a subtle and unspoken yet extremely important distinction. It is easy to miss, because both Ukrainian leadership and Ukraine’s western backers continue to speak of Ukrainian “victory” and the possibility of Ukraine “winning” the war. What is crucial to understand is that the “victory” that they speak of now is categorically different than the victory of 2022 and 2023. In the first years of the war, it was possible to at least speak of Ukraine taking the initiative to advance on the ground and retake territory. There were concrete examples of Ukrainian offensives in 2022, and the battle in Zaporizhia – although unsuccessful – showed that it was at least possible for Ukraine to attempt a proper mechanized offensive.

    Therefore, in the first years of the war, when leaders in Kiev and Brussels and London and Washington spoke of Ukrainian victory, they essentially meant the defeat of the Russian ground forces and the reconquest of much (or all) of the Donbas. The Kursk Operation of 2024 began to split the difference: Ukraine still had some resources to mount proactive operations, but these operations were no longer aimed at the dense eastern front and instead aimed at relatively soft subsidiary fronts with an eye to out-levering the Russians.

    Today, with the Ukrainian army stuck in a permanent state of reactivity and slowly receding defense, it no longer makes any sense to speak of Ukrainian victory in the most straightforward sense, which is to say victory on the battlefield – no matter how tenaciously or bravely the Ukrainian rank and file continues to fight in essentially intolerable circumstances. Instead, Ukrainian “victory” has been transmogrified to mean essentially that Russia absorbs such exorbitant costs that it agrees to some sort of ceasefire without preconditions.

    The costs to be imposed on Russia are implicitly assumed to be a mixture of battlefield casualties and damage to strategic assets inflicted by Ukrainian air strikes, and in regards to the latter Ukraine seems to be particularly placing its hopes in a strategic strike campaign against Russian oil. Ukraine’s attempts to disable Russian oil production and refining have dovetailed with ever more aggressive sanctions from the United States against Russian fossil fuel exports – although it is worth noting that the limited price response to these sanctions indicates that markets expect that Russian oil will continue to flow.

    Trump’s suggestion that Tomahawks may be on the table for Ukraine must be seen as a constituent element of this new strategy and theory of victory. And this, ultimately, is very important to understand. Tomahawks are not being bandied about because anybody (in Kiev or Washington) believes that 50 cruise missiles will allow Ukraine to defeat the Russian Army and recapture the Donbas. Tomahawks were mentioned because the Ukrainian alliance is threatening to cripple the Russian fossil fuels industry (through a mixture of sanctions and kinetic strikes on production facilities) unless Putin agrees to a ceasefire.

    This is why it is wrong to be surprised that Trump abruptly cancelled his meeting with Putin and instead announced more sanctions. There’s nothing abrupt or erratic about this. Threats to Russian oil are now, without exaggeration, the main lever that the Ukrainian bloc has against Russia. It certainly should not have been a surprise that the Kremlin, which has reiterated the same fundamental war aims since day one, was not excited about coming to Budapest to freeze the conflict, and neither should it surprise us that Trump would instead prefer to pull harder on the oil lever. The two powers are playing entirely different games: Russia is slow-walking negotiations while it advances on the ground, and the United States is playing a pain game designed to raise the costs for Russia

    We have fundamentally reached an impasse when it comes to negotiations. For Moscow, negotiations with the United States are essentially a way to string Washington along. Moscow feels that it is winning on the ground, therefore a diplomatic impasse suits Russian interests. When western leadership complains that Russia does not seem interested in ending the war, they are correct, but they are missing the point. Russia is not interested in ending the war right now because doing so would not serve Russian interests. The Banana is in the crosshairs, and a ceasefire now would be an egregious compromise when victory on the ground is in sight.

    The sense of urgency that Washington feels to end the war – mainly by yanking furiously on the oil lever until the Kremlin cries uncle – stems from the fact that this is now the only sort of victory that Ukraine can hope to win. The ground war has been written off as a total loss, and all that remains is to lob missiles and drones at Russian refineries, sanction Russian firms and banks, and harass shadow tankers until the costs become intolerable. The longer the Ukrainian ground forces can hold the line the better, but this is merely a matter of limiting the downside. The fact that Russia can retaliate disproportionately against Ukraine barely factors into this thinking.

    The key point here, however, is that the concept of Ukrainian victory has been completely transformed. There is now no real discussion of how Ukraine can win on the ground. For the Ukrainian bloc, the war is no longer a contest against the Russian Army, but a more abstract contest against Russia’s willingness to incur strategic costs. Rather than preventing Russian capture of the Donbas, the west is testing how much Putin is willing to pay for it. If history is any guide, a game predicated on outlasting Russia’s strategic endurance and willingness to fight is a very bad game to play indeed [end]

    The original article

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    Gradually, and then Suddenly

  • [Partage] Dislocation de l’Occident : les menaces – Emmanuel Todd

    La perversité de Trump se déploie au Moyen-Orient, le bellicisme de l’OTAN en Europe

    Je viens d’écrire à la demande de mon éditeur slovène une nouvelle préface à La Défaite de l’Occident, qu’il m’apparaît nécessaire de publier sur Substack immédiatement. La menace d’une aggravation de tous les conflits se précise. On trouvera dans ce texte une interprétation schématique et provisoire, mais actualisée du développement de la crise que nous vivons. Ce texte est de fait la conclusion de mon dernier entretien avec Diane Lagrange sur Fréquence Populaire : « Victoire de la Russie, enfermement et fracturation de la France et de l’Occident ».

    Préface à l’édition slovène

    De la défaite à la dislocation

    Moins de deux ans après la publication en français de La Défaite de l’Occident, en janvier 2024, les principales prédictions du livre sont vérifiées. La Russie a militairement et économiquement tenu le choc. L’industrie militaire américaine est épuisée. Les économies et les sociétés européennes sont au bord de l’implosion. Avant même que s’effondre l’armée ukrainienne, le stade suivant de la dislocation de l’Occident est atteint.

    Je suis depuis toujours hostile à la politique russophobe des États-Unis et de l’Europe mais, en tant qu’occidental attaché à la démocratie libérale, Français formé à la recherche en Angleterre, enfant d’une mère réfugiée aux États-Unis pendant la deuxième guerre mondiale, je suis catastrophé par les conséquences pour nous, Occidentaux, de la guerre menée sans intelligence contre la Russie.

    Nous ne sommes qu’au début de la catastrophe. Un point de bascule approche au-delà duquel se développeront les conséquences ultimes de la défaite.

    Le « Reste du monde » (ou Sud global, ou Majorité globale), qui s’était contenté de soutenir la Russie en refusant de boycotter son économie, affiche désormais ouvertement son soutien à Vladimir Poutine. Les BRICS s’élargissent en acceptant de nouveaux adhérents, ils accroissent leur cohésion. Sommée par les États-Unis de choisir son camp, l’Inde a choisi l’indépendance : les photos de Poutine, Xi et Modi réunis à l’occasion de la réunion d’aout 2025 de l’Organisation de Coopération de Shanghai resteront comme le symbole de ce moment clef. Les médias occidentaux ne cessent pourtant de nous représenter Poutine comme un monstre et les Russes comme des serfs. Ces médias avaient déjà été incapables d’imaginer que le Reste du monde les voit comme un dirigeant et des êtres humains ordinaires, porteurs d’une culture russe spécifique et d’une volonté de souveraineté. J’ai peur désormais que nos médias n’aggravent notre aveuglement en étant incapables d’imaginer le regain de prestige de la Russie dans ce Reste du monde, exploité économiquement et traité avec arrogance par l’Occident durant des siècles. Les Russes ont osé. Ils ont défié l’Empire et ils ont gagné.

    L’ironie de l’histoire, c’est que les Russes, peuple européen et blanc, de langue slave, sont devenus le bouclier militaire du Reste du monde parce que l’Occident a refusé de les intégrer après la chute du communisme. J’imagine les Slovènes particulièrement bien placés culturellement pour apprécier cette ironie même si ce que je sais bien, en tant qu’anthropologue de la famille et de la religion, que, malgré sa langue slave, la Slovénie est beaucoup plus proche socialement et idéologiquement de la Suisse que de la Russie.

    Je peux ébaucher ici un modèle de la dislocation de l’Occident, malgré les incohérences de la politique de Donald Trump, président américain de la défaite. Ces incohérences ne résultent pas, je pense, d’une personnalité instable, et sans doute perverse, mais d’un dilemme insoluble pour les États-Unis. D’une part, leurs dirigeants, au Pentagone comme à la Maison blanche, savent que la guerre est perdue et que l’Ukraine devra être abandonnée. Le bon sens les conduit donc à vouloir sortir de la guerre. Mais d’autre part, le même bon sens leur fait pressentir que le retrait d’Ukraine aura pour l’Empire des conséquences dramatiques que n’avaient pas eu ceux du Vietnam, d’Irak ou d’Afghanistan. Il s’agit en effet de la première défaite stratégique américaine d’échelle planétaire, dans un contexte de désindustrialisation massive des États-Unis et de réindustrialisation difficile. La Chine est devenue l’atelier du monde ; sa très faible fécondité, certes, lui interdira de remplacer les Etats-Unis, mais il est déjà trop tard pour la concurrencer industriellement.

    La dédollarisation de l’économie mondiale a commencé. Trump et ses conseillers n’arrivent pas à l’accepter car ce serait la fin de l’Empire. Un âge post-impérial pourtant devrait être le but du projet MAGA, Make America Great Again, qui cherche un retour de l’état-nation américain. Mais pour une Amérique dont la capacité productive en biens réels est aujourd’hui très faible (voir chapitre 9 sur la vraie nature de l’économie américaine), il est impossible de renoncer à vivre à crédit comme elle le fait en produisant des dollars. Un tel retrait impérial-monétaire impliquerait une chute brutale de son niveau de vie, y compris pour les électeurs populaires de Trump. Le premier budget de la deuxième présidence Trump, le « One Big Beautiful Bill Act », reste donc impérial malgré les protections tarifaires qui incarnent le projet ou rêve protectionniste. L’ OBBBA relance les dépenses militaires et le déficit. Qui dit déficit budgétaire aux États-Unis dit, inévitablement, production de dollars et déficit commercial. La dynamique impériale, l’inertie impériale plutôt, n’en finit pas de miner le rêve d’un retour à l’état-nation productif.

    En Europe, la défaite militaire reste mal comprise des dirigeants. Ils n’ont pas dirigé les opérations. C’est le Pentagone qui avait mis au point les plans de la contre-offensive ukrainienne de l’été 2023 (durant laquelle j’avais écrit La Défaite de l’Occident). Les militaires américains, même s’ils ont fait mener la guerre par leur proxy ukrainien, savent qu’ils se sont brisés sur la défense russe – parce qu’ils ne pouvaient produire assez d’armes et parce que les militaires russes ont été plus intelligents qu’eux. Les dirigeants européens n’ont fourni que des systèmes d’armes et pas les plus importants. Inconscients de l’ampleur de la défaite militaire, ils savent en revanche que leurs propres économies ont été paralysées par la politique de sanctions, tout spécialement par la rupture de leur approvisionnement en énergie russe bon marché. Couper en deux économiquement le continent européen fut un acte de folie suicidaire. L’économie allemande stagne. Partout à l’ouest, la pauvreté et les inégalités augmentent. Le Royaume-Uni est au bord du gouffre. La France le suit de près. Sociétés et systèmes politiques sont bloquées.

    Une dynamique économique et sociale négative préexistait à la guerre et mettait déjà l’Occident sous tension. Elle était visible, à des degrés divers, dans toute l’Europe de l’Ouest. Le libre-échange y mine la base industrielle. L’immigration y développe un syndrome identitaire, particulièrement dans les classes populaires privées d’emplois sûrs et correctement payés.

    Plus en profondeur, la dynamique négative de fragmentation est culturelle : l’éducation supérieure de masse crée des sociétés stratifiées dans lesquelles les éduqués supérieurs – 20%, 30%, 40% de la population – se mettent à vivre entre eux, à se penser supérieurs, à mépriser les milieux populaires, à rejeter le travail manuel et l’industrie. L’éducation primaire pour tous (l’alphabétisation universelle) avait nourri la démocratie, créant une société homogène dont le subconscient était égalitaire. L’éducation supérieure a engendré des oligarchies, et parfois des ploutocraties, sociétés stratifiées envahies par un subconscient inégalitaire. Paradoxe ultime : le développement de l’éducation supérieure a fini par produire dans ces oligarchies ou ploutocraties une baisse du niveau intellectuel ! J’avais décrit cette séquence il y a plus d’un quart de siècle dans L’Illusion économique, publiée en 1997. L’industrie occidentale s’en est allée dans le Reste du monde et aussi, bien sûr, dans les anciennes démocraties populaires d’Europe de l’Est qui, libérées de leur sujétion à la Russie soviétique, ont désormais retrouvé leur statut pluriséculaire de périphérie dominée par l’Europe de l’Ouest. Je parle en détail au chapitre 3 de cette espèce de Chine intérieure où les ouvriers d’industrie restent nombreux. Partout cependant en Europe l’élitisme des éduqués supérieurs a engendré le « populisme ».

    La guerre a fait monter d’un cran la tension européenne. Elle appauvrit le continent. Mais surtout, échec stratégique majeur, elle délégitime des dirigeants incapables de mener leurs pays à la victoire. Le développement de mouvements populaires conservateurs (habituellement désigné par les élites journalistiques par des termes comme « populistes » ou « d’extrême droite » ou « nationalistes ») s’accélère. Reform UK au Royaume-Uni. AfD en Allemagne, Rassemblement national en France… Ironie toujours : les sanctions économiques dont l’OTAN attendait un « regime change » en Russie sont sur le point d’apporter à l’Europe occidentale une cascade de « regime changes ». Les classes dirigeantes occidentales sont délégitimées par la défaite au moment même où la démocratie autoritaire russe est relégitimée par la victoire, ou plutôt, surlégitimée puisque le retour de la Russie à la stabilité sous Poutine lui assurait au départ une légitimité incontestée.

    Tel est notre monde à l’approche de 2026.

    La dislocation de l’Occident prend la forme d’une « fracturation hiérarchique »

    Les États-Unis renoncent au contrôle de la Russie, et je le pense de plus en plus, de la Chine. Mis sous blocus chinois pour leurs importations de samarium, cette terre rare indispensable à l’aéronautique militaire, les États-Unis ne peuvent plus rêver d’affronter la Chine militairement. Le Reste du monde – Inde, Brésil, monde arabe, Afrique – en profite et leur échappe. Mais les États-Unis se retournent vigoureusement contre leurs « alliés » européens et est-asiatiques, dans un effort ultime de surexploitation, et aussi, il faut l’admettre, par pur et simple dépit. Pour échapper à leur humiliation, pour cacher au monde et à eux-mêmes leur faiblesse, ils punissent l’Europe. L’Empire se dévore lui-même. C’est le sens des tariffs et investissements forcés imposés par Trump aux Européens, devenus sujets coloniaux dans un empire rétréci plutôt que partenaires. Le temps des démocraties libérales solidaires est fini.

    Le trumpisme est un « conservatisme populaire blanc ». Ce qui émerge en Occident n’est pas une solidarité des conservatismes populaires mais une rupture des solidarités internes. La rage qui résulte de la défaite conduit chaque pays, pour éponger son ressentiment, à se retourner contre plus faible que lui. Les États-Unis se retournent contre l’Europe ou le Japon. La France réactive son conflit avec l’Algérie, ancienne colonie. Nul doute que l’Allemagne, qui, de Scholz à Merz, a accepté d’obéir aux Etats-Unis, ne retourne son humiliation contre ses partenaires européens plus faibles. Mon propre pays, la France, me semble le plus menacé.

    L’un des concepts fondamentaux de la défaite de l’Occident est le nihilisme. J’explique comment « l’état zéro » de la religion protestante – la sécularisation arrivée à son terme – n’explique pas seulement l’effondrement éducatif et industriel américain. L’état zéro ouvre aussi un vide métaphysique. Je ne suis pas personnellement croyant et je ne milite pour aucun retour du religieux (je ne le crois pas possible) mais je dois, en tant qu’historien, constater que la disparition des valeurs sociales d’origine religieuse mène à une crise morale, à une pulsion de destruction des choses et des hommes (la guerre) et ultimement à une tentative d’abolition de la réalité (le phénomène transgenre pour les démocrates américains et la négation du réchauffement climatique pour les républicains par exemple). La crise existe pour tous les pays complètement sécularisés mais elle est pire dans ceux dont la religion était le protestantisme ou le judaïsme, religions absolutistes dans leur recherche du transcendant, plutôt que le catholicisme, plus ouvert à la beauté du monde et de la vie terrestre. C’est bien en aux États-Unis et en Israël que l’on voit se développer des formes parodiques des religions traditionnelles, parodies d’essence selon moi nihiliste.

    Cette dimension irrationnelle est au cœur de la défaite. Celle-ci n’est donc pas seulement une perte « technique » de puissance mais aussi un épuisement moral, une absence de but existentiel positif qui mène au nihilisme.

    Ce nihilisme est derrière la volonté des dirigeants européens, particulièrement sur les bords protestants de la Baltique, d’élargir la guerre contre la Russie par des provocations incessantes. Ce nihilisme est aussi derrière la déstabilisation américaine du Proche-Orient, lieu par excellence d’expression de la rage qui résulte de la défaite américaine face à la Russie. Surtout, ne cédons pas à l’évidence trop facile d’une autonomie guerrière du régime Netanyahu en Israël dans le génocide de Gaza ou dans l’attaque contre l’Iran. Protestantisme-zéro et judaïsme-zéro mêlent certes tragiquement leurs effets nihilistes dans ces accès de violence. Mais partout au Moyen-Orient ce sont bien les États-Unis qui, en fournissant les armes et parfois en attaquant eux-mêmes, sont en dernière instance les décideurs du chaos. Ils poussent Israël à l’action comme ils ont poussé les Ukrainiens. La première présidence Trump avait établi l’ambassade des États-Unis à Jérusalem et c’est bien Trump qui le premier a imaginé Gaza transformé en station balnéaire. Je suis conscient qu’il faudrait un livre pour démontrer cette thèse, un livre qui démonterait une à une les interactions entre les acteurs. Mais, historien de métier, et faisant de la géopolitique depuis un-demi-siècle, je sens que, comme l’Europe otanienne, Israël a cessé d’être un état indépendant. Le problème de l’Occident est bien la mort programmée de l’état-nation.

    L’Empire est vaste et il se décompose dans le bruit et la fureur. Cet Empire est déjà polycentrique, divisé sur ses buts, schizophrène. Mais aucune de ses parties n’est indépendante du tout. Trump est son « centre » actuel ; il est aussi sa meilleure expression idéologico-pratique en ce qu’il mêle une volonté rationnelle de repliement sur sa sphère de domination immédiate (l’Europe et Israël) à des impulsions nihilistes de préférence pour la guerre. Ces tendances – repliement et violence – s’expriment aussi à l’intérieur du cœur américain de l’Empire où le principe de fracturation hiérarchique fonctionne en interne. Des auteurs anglo-américains de plus en plus nombreux évoquent la venue d’une guerre civile.

    La ploutocratie américaine est pluraliste. Il y a celle des financiers, celle des pétroliers, celle de la Silicon Valley. Les ploutocrates trumpistes, pétroliers texans ou ralliés récent de la Silicon Valley, méprisent les élites éduquées démocrates de la côte Est, qui méprisent elles-mêmes les petits-blancs trumpistes du heartland, qui méprisent eux-mêmes les Noirs démocrates, etc…

    L’une des particularités intéressantes de l’Amérique actuelle est que ses dirigeants ont de plus en plus de mal à distinguer l’interne de l’externe, malgré la tentative MAGA d’arrêter par un mur l’immigration venue du sud. L’armée tire sur des bateaux qui sortent du Vénézuéla, elle bombarde l’Iran, elle entre dans le centre des villes démocrates des États-Unis, elle commandite l’aviation israélienne pour une attaque sur le Qatar où se trouve une immense base américaine. Tout lecteur de science-fiction reconnaîtra dans cette énumération inquiétante l’amorce d’une entrée en dystopie, c’est-à-dire dans un monde négatif où se mêlent puissance, fragmentation, hiérarchie, violence, pauvreté et perversité.

    Restons donc nous-mêmes, hors de l’Amérique. Gardons notre perception de l’intérieur et de l’extérieur, notre sens de la mesure, notre contact avec la réalité, notre conception de ce qui est juste et beau. Ne nous laissons pas non plus entraîner dans une fuite en avant guerrière par nos propres dirigeants européens, ces privilégiés égarés dans l’histoire, désespérés d’avoir été vaincus, terrorisés à l’idée d’être un jour jugés par leurs peuples. Et surtout, surtout, continuons de réfléchir au sens des choses.

    Paris, le 28 septembre 2025 [fin]

    L’article original

    voici la synthèse de Grok, l’outil US d’intelligence artificielle de X

    A blog preface to the Slovenian edition of Emmanuel Todd’s 2024 book La Défaite de l’Occident, updating his analysis of Western geopolitical failures, including Russia’s resilience in Ukraine and Global South alignment against U.S. dominance.

    Todd critiques Trump’s Middle East policies as extensions of U.S. imperial nihilism, linking them to actions like arming Israel for Gaza operations, while highlighting NATO’s bellicose Ukraine strategy as a catalyst for European economic stagnation and rising populist movements.

    Amid de-dollarization and China’s industrial ascent, Todd warns of deepening Western internal fractures, such as U.S. tariffs on allies and moral exhaustion from Protestant secularization, potentially eroding liberal democracies without viable paths to recovery.

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  • [Sharing] How U.S. Support for Ukraine’s Neo-Nazis Imperils Diplomacy – Harrison Berger, The American Conservative

    Since the Cold War, Washington has empowered violent anti-Russian extremists

    As a negotiated settlement of the Russia–Ukraine war becomes more likely, President Volodymyr Zelensky faces a major obstacle to peace that comes not from Moscow, but from ultranationalist and neo-Nazi forces inside his own country.

    In a recent interview with the Sunday Times, Serhii Sternenko — a leader of the paramilitary group Right Sector, which was founded by neo-Nazis — warned Zelensky that if he ceded any territory to Russia in a peace deal, “he would be a corpse — politically, and then for real.”

    Though the Times presents him merely as a “civil activist,” Sternenko served as the head of Right Sector’s Odessa branch, where he oversaw the extremist group’s 2014 crime spree that culminated in the Odessa trade union hall massacre in which militants used Molotov cocktails to burn alive more than 40 antigovernment protestors.

    The Times characterizes the Odessa trade union hall massacre as mere “clashes” and fails to attribute the violence to any one particular side, despite the fact that the Right Sector proudly claimed responsibility for it.

    Whitewashing Ukraine’s ultra-nationalist right is neither new nor accidental. As the late Stephen Cohen, an eminent scholar of U.S.–Russia relations, warned nearly a decade ago, Western journalists and officials, by downplaying Ukraine’s right-wing militant groups and parroting Kiev’s official claims about them, empowered violent extremists.

    The resurgence of Ukraine’s right-wing extremist forces is inseparable from U.S. policy since 2014, when the U.S. facilitated the overthrow of a democratically elected government in Kiev. While Ukrainian liberals participated in the “Maidan Revolution,” the muscle was provided by right-wing extremist groups, which the West bestowed with legitimacy and, eventually, access to arms and funding. What began as the whitewashing of neo-Nazi vigilantes became the normalization of neo-Nazi battalions, which are now embedded in Ukraine’s security elite.

    That those same right-wing extremist forces, nurtured by the United States and NATO, now threaten to sabotage a peace deal and overthrow the Zelensky government reveals a bizarre paradox at the heart of our involvement in Ukraine that has yet to be confronted:

    Washington interfered in Ukrainian domestic politics and helped finance a proxy war with Russia ostensibly to save Ukrainian democracy from tyranny. But under U.S. tutelage — and in service of proxy war aims — Ukraine has rapidly descended into a more authoritarian state.

    Western whitewashing of Ukrainian Nazis is not an aberration of the past decade. Rather, it is consistent with a U.S. strategy that began during the Cold War of recruiting, laundering, and weaponizing extremist forces.

    One of the earliest and clearest cases of this strategy was the CIA’s decision to protect rather than prosecute Ukraine’s wartime nationalists, who had openly collaborated with Nazi Germany and perpetrated the mass murder of Jews and Poles. Among them was Stepan Bandera and his OUN-B militant group, which aligned itself with Ukraine’s Nazi “liberators” within the first days of Hitler’s Operation Barbarossa in 1941, when the Axis powers invaded the Soviet Union. 

    America’s nascent post-war national security state, despite its awareness of Bandera’s Nazi crimes and his organization’s status as “primarily a terrorist organization,” protected Bandera from extradition to the Soviet Union, recruiting him and other known OUN-B Nazi collaborators through programs like the CIA’s Project AERODYNAMIC, aimed at “exploitation and expansion of the anti-Soviet Ukrainian resistance for cold war and hot war purposes.”

    Rather than being a source of national shame for Ukraine, its Nazi collaborators are the core icons of Ukrainian nationalism and a source of pride.

    Along with Bandera, historical war criminals like Roman Shukhevych — the commander of the OUN-B’s paramilitary wing — have been posthumously venerated by various Ukrainian governments. Both figures were awarded the official title “Hero of Ukraine” in 2007 and 2010, respectively. Bandera’s birthday continues to be celebrated with annual torchlight marches across the country.

    During the Maidan uprising in 2014, neo-Nazi militias inspired by Stepan Bandera and associated with Ukraine’s right-wing extremist Svoboda party used sniper rifles to massacre protestors — both pro- and antigovernment — as well as police. 

    Though the Maidan massacre trials would later pin responsibility for the violence on neo-Nazi paramilitaries from the Right Sector and the political party Svoboda, the chaos was immediately seized upon by the Obama administration to demand the removal of Ukraine’s democratically elected president, Victor Yanukovych, who was instantly blamed for it all.

    A leaked U.S. State Department call arguably reveals how career diplomat Victoria Nuland arranged for Svododa leader Oleh Tyahnybok to have a position of influence in Kiev’s post-revolution government, saying her handpicked Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk should “be on the phone” with the Svoboda leader “four times a week.” The notorious call, along with other evidence of U.S. support for anti-Yanykovych forces, has led many to conclude the “Maidan Revolution” was in fact a U.S.-backed coup.

    Washington’s decision in 2014 to protect and empower the extremist groups which perpetrated the Maidan massacre would entrench an ultranationalist and neo-Nazi element within Ukrainian politics that would later sabotage efforts for peace with Russia.

    When Zelensky came to power on a promise to resolve the conflict with Russia in Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region, Cohen predicted that the new president’s peace efforts would likely face heavy and possibly violent resistance from the ultranationalist factions that Washington had recently empowered. “His life is being threatened by a quasi-fascist movement,” Cohen warned. 

    The Biden administration did not look the other way in the face of those extremist forces threatening Zelensky — it looked directly at them and in June 2024 decided to remove State Department restrictions on funding the Azov Battalion, allowing the U.S. government to lavish the neo-Nazi group with weapons. 

    Under the patronage of President Joe Biden and NATO, Azov — whose members often openly wore Nazi insignia—metastasized from a battalion into an entire brigade integrated into Ukraine’s National Guard.

    Biden’s policy was at least consistent, conforming with a decades-long policy of protecting, retooling, and empowering violent extremist groups whenever they served the interests of unelected national security state elites, in this case, anti-Russian neocons.

    Earlier this year, Azov further consolidated its influence within Ukraine’s national security apparatus by expanding into multiple corps. Its political reach grew in parallel, with members appointed to key government positions, including Oleksandr Alferov as Director of the Institute of National Memory, giving the neo-Nazi group direct influence over both security policy and the framing of Ukraine’s historical narrative.

    Violent Ukrainian nationalist forces like Right Sector, Azov, and Sternenko’s militants have become indispensable foot soldiers in Washington’s project, and therefore their lengthy record of violence and terrorism has been obscured. Even as Zelensky now faces threats to his life from these same forces, they are still celebrated in Western media as heroes of democracy.

    The paradox is revealing: The very groups hailed as Ukraine’s “defenders of democracy” are also those eroding it from within, threatening to assassinate the president if he pursues peace. Though an unintended consequence, this perilous dynamic flows from U.S. policy and reveals its true aims.

    The U.S. strategy in Ukraine was never about protecting Ukrainian democracy. It was — as Biden’s Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin admitted — about sustaining a proxy war to “weaken Russia.” The emergence of violent antidemocratic forces in Kiev has not been a casualty of that strategy, but its central instrument [end]

    The original article

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  • [Translation] « Ukraine über alles! » – Susann Witt-Stahl, junge Welt

    Azov paramilitaries are aiming to debunk Kremlin « myths ». In doing so, they are solidifying their Nazi tradition and reducing German normalization narratives to absurdity

    Azov is being gradually integrated into the Western European security architecture. Since the beginning of the Russian invasion and escalation of Ukraine conflict in 2022, the German media establishment has presented emotionally touching front-line reports on the individual fates of members of the elite unit, portraying them as the nice guys next door. Springer’s Welt TV channel has now even served its viewers the first home story of a volunteer from Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and his proud father, a former Gepard tank driver in the Bundeswehr. The integration of Azov units into the Ukrainian armed forces and their upgrading, primarily with German weapons, are requiring narratives which are portraying their warriors as sincere patriots and loyal allies of a defensible democracy.

    Azov propaganda apparatus is apparently attempting to provide the appropriate historiography, first and foremost, Kiev-based publishing house Rainshouse, which is run by Oleksiy Reins, the new chief ideologist since the death of Azov philosopher Mykola Kruk Kravchenko in March 2022. Reins, who is also serving in the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade, Azov, which is forming the backbone of the 3rd Army Corps, is steadily intensifying efforts to whitewash the troubled past—historical predecessor organizations, their leaders, worldviews, theories, symbols, rituals, and actions.

    In his book What Is Azov from Ukraine? Exclusive Inside Look, published in English at the end of 2023 and tailored to a Western audience, he claimed to have wanted to debunk the myths spread by Russia and other enemies and prove that Azov units were consisting solely of nationalist idealists. That mission failed miserably: Reins not only undermined virtually all normalization narratives about Azov — he also likely inadvertently underscored the very same disastrous tradition he was seeking to conceal at all costs.

    In the OUN spirit

    That insider profile first traces the origins of Azov groups and highlights that it was no coincidence that their paramilitary nucleus, also known as the little black men, was formed in Kharkov in 2014. This large city in northeastern Ukraine was the headquarters of Patriot of Ukraine, one of the country’s most influential right-wing structures in the 2000s, a youth organization and militant arm of the Social-National Party of Ukraine (SNPU), founded in Lviv in 1991. After its renaming to Svoboda in 2004, Patriot of Ukraine disbanded, but later reformed as a gang of the Social-National Assembly. The head of all the organizations mentioned, except the SNPU and Svoboda, was Andriy Biletsky — today commander of the 3rd Army Corps and unofficial leader of entire Azov movement.

    Reins cites Yaroslav Stetsko as the historical mentor of Azov. He was deputy to Stepan Bandera, leader of the radical wing of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN-B), succeeded him after his death in 1959. Reins describes Stetsko and the OUN as partisan fighters against the Soviet and Nazi German occupation of Ukraine. Stetsko, he claims, refused to cooperate with Adolf Hitler’s regime, for which he was imprisoned in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp.

    Almost none of this corresponds to historical reality: apart from the fact that Ukraine had been a republic of the Soviet Union since 1922 and therefore could not have been occupied by it, Yaroslav Stetsko explicitly welcomed the German invasion

    Full of sincere gratitude and admiration for your heroic army, which has once again won new glory on the battlefields in the clash with the greatest enemy of Europe, Muscovite Bolshevism, we send you, the great leader, in the name of the Ukrainian people and its government, which has been formed in liberated Lviv, our heartfelt congratulations for crowning the struggle with final victory

    he wrote to Adolf Hitler on 3 July 1941.

    Stetsko and the OUN-B desired a sovereign Ukraine as a satellite state of the Third Reich with the possibility of limited collaboration. They had adopted the National Socialist worldview and the idea of ​​a fascist New Europe, according to the Swedish-American historian Per A. Rudling. That was by no means a passive act, emphasizes his German-Polish colleague Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe. But rather, the OUN had created a Ukrainian variant of fascism. Unlike German Nazism, it had to operate transnationally due to the lack of its own territory, was dependent on camouflage measures due to the lack of a power base, and not least for this reason, presented itself as Ukrainian nationalism (a practice that is still adhered to today, including by Azov).

    Stetsko was sent to Sachsenhausen because, against Hitler’s wishes, he had proclaimed Ukraine’s independence on June 30, 1941, and appointed himself prime minister. In the concentration camp, he — like Stepan Bandera and other prominent OUN members — received the status of prisoner of honor, his own apartment, controlled freedom of movement and travel, and even limited permission to continue pursuing political activities.

    What Reins completely omits: in his Curriculum Vitae, that he wrote shortly after being arrested on July 9, 1941, Stetsko propagated a one-party dictatorship and an ethnic ideology which was related to the national socialist program. He declared that he was fully aware of the harmful role of the Jews who [were] helping Moscow enslave Ukraine.

    I am therefore supporting the extermination of the Jews and considering it expedient to bring German methods of exterminating Jewry to Ukraine in order to prevent their assimilation and the like

    Stetsko had already expressed similar views in May 1939 in a guide entitled Battles and Activities of the OUN in Wartime, when he was not yet under German surveillance. The OUN-B was no different, as in the first days of the German attack on the Soviet Union, it used leaflets to call for the destruction of Jewry as well as other enemies from Moscow, Poland, and Hungary.

    Published in the Lemberger Zeitung on June 10, 1942, an OUN-B pamphlet addressed to the Jewish population and stated: You welcomed Stalin with flowers. We will lay your heads at Hitler’s feet in greeting. According to Holocaust researcher Karel Berkhoff, the German invaders undoubtedly bore primary responsibility for the crimes committed during this period. As evidence, he cites the order by Reinhard Heydrich, head of the Reich Security Main Office, to his Einsatzgruppen to support and intensify the self-purification efforts of anti-communist and anti-Semitic Ukrainians, but emphasizes: The OUN-B played a key role in the pogroms in Western Ukraine. Quite a few Ukrainian fascists also collaborated with Nazi Germany by joining the Wehrmacht-raised battalions Nachtigall and Roland and the SS division Galizien – as well as, for a time, with the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) of the OUN-B.

    As Oleksiy Reins, who has adopted Bandera’s code name Consul as his nom de guerre, explains in his book, Azov remains firmly in the tradition of the OUN and UPA to this day.

    « Social nationalism »

    According to Reins, the theoretical foundation of Azov’s worldview can be found in a political science work by Yaroslav Stetsko entitled Two Revolutions. It was published in 1951, at a time when the OUN-B was already collaborating with the British, US, and West German secret services — the UPA continued to fight against the USSR as a stay-behind army on their behalf until 1953 — and five years after Stetsko founded the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations in Munich, the most powerful umbrella organization of Hitler collaborators worldwide. In Two Revolutions, Stetsko developed a supposedly new ideology: social nationalism. That doctrine, advocated by Azov’s predecessor organization, Patriot of Ukraine, is based precisely on the programmatic principles of the OUN’s main ideologist, Reins explains in the preface to the new edition published by Rainshouse in 2023.

    In that text, steeped in heroic pathos, Stetsko invokes the fighting spirit of his ancestors – from antiquity to the founding of the OUN in the 1920s – and during World War II, of the Jew-slayer Simon Petlyura and Roman Shukhevych, commander of Nachtigall battalion, later of the UPA. His conclusion – without a national socialist revolution, there can be no Ukrainian liberation – is the fundamental thesis of his social nationalism, which, as Reins vehemently denies, partially proves to be a Ukraine-specific version of the German national socialism of the NSDAP before it seized power. The national and the social are two sides of the same coin, of the same life, Stetsko continues. Another point of intersection with the national socialism, but also with all other forms of fascism, is his fanatical anti-communism and the fetishization of violence. Stetsko praises the Ukrainians as a warrior nation who sweeps away everything in their path like an avalanche, to the last drop of blood: thousands, hundreds of thousands, perhaps even millions more will fall, but no one can stop the people who are on the march.

    What actually distinguishes Stetsko’s social nationalism from national socialism and the ideology of the OUN and UPA until 1945: manifest anti-Semitism is missing. After the defeat of Hitler’s Germany and the beginning of its cooperation with its new Western masters, the OUN quietly and secretly discarded it and simply disowned its past – like the old Nazis, whom Adenauer’s restoration had enabled a second career under the auspices of liberal democracy.

    The social nationalism of Patriot of Ukraine is different. Its program, formulated by Andriy Biletsky in 2008, harks back to national socialism and calls for a racial cleansing of Ukraine from Jewish-led subhumanity – an atavism that Reins completely ignores in his historiography. Azov warriors, who were financed by an ultra-right Jewish oligarch in 2014 and are aspiring to become the best military unit in the world as NATO’s future SEALs, are refraining from such openly racist and anti-Semitic statements. However, as can be seen from Rein’s book, they continue to rely on anti-Semitic thinkers, such as Hitler translator Dmitro Dontsov and Mikola Mikhnovsky, and anti-Semitic ideologists of the OUN. Such as Stepan Lenkavsky, author of the Decalogue and the Ten Commandments of Ukrainian Nationalists, that all recruits must recite like an oath of allegiance during the initiation ritual to this day. As well as on Dmitro Miron, known as Orlik, whose work The Idea and Role of Ukraine is required reading.

    « The Black Corps »

    Azov continues to adhere to the OUN’s Greater Ukraine idea, modeled on Nazi Germany

    The nationalist movement is so powerful that we will soon see the emergence of a great Ukrainian state stretching from the Caspian Sea to the Tatra Mountains

    OUN official Roman Sushko prophesied as early as 1939. Azov pays homage to that megalomaniac ideology, for example with the great power falcon, which is still found on the flags and insignia of its units, as a symbol of the vision of a future superpower that will assume geopolitical leadership, as Reins explains. Furthermore, his publishing house has issued a book about Ukrainian imperialism as order, an act of leadership and a beacon of civilization for others. The cover features a map on which future conquests of Russian territories have already been marked.

    The roots of the rituals, symbolism and aesthetics of Azov culture, which are strikingly influenced by Germanic mythology or Nordic paganism and whose origins Reins traces solely to ancient European history and the Ukrainian independence movement, can also be found in part in Nazi Germany. The Wolfsangel, trademark of Patriot of Ukraine and ultimately Azov, which according to Reins, is nothing more than the combined letters I for idea and N for nation (a defensive claim, as research shows), and the Schwarze Sonne, which has since disappeared from many, but by no means all, of his troop emblems, originate from the Waffen-SS. Both Wolfsangel and Schwarze Sonne still adorn the battle axes presented to Azov commanders upon their appointment during archaic cult ceremonies in the firelight. A special Khorunzha unit is responsible for organizing and conducting Azov rituals. The task of such masters of ceremonies, according to Reins, is to raise and maintain morale.

    Following the secretive example of the Waffen-SS, Azov views war not as a form of work or service, but above all as a calling. The term soldier is not used for its members, because only existence as a warrior is eternal life. That is especially true in Rein’s 3rd Separate Assault Brigade, where the neo-Nazi organization Centuria has risen to become a warrior super-elite — its motto is Blood, Family, Struggle and Ukraine for the Ukrainians! — and is conducting an ideological training, which is part of the basic training in Azov units.

    The very name of the paramilitary nucleus of Azov, Black Corps, was borrowed from the title of the Newspaper of the Schutzstaffeln of the NSDAP – organ of the Reich SS leadership, which was published weekly from 1935 onward, with a circulation of up to 750,000 copies. Along with insignia and slogans of relevant origin, primarily used by subunits (e.g., My honor is loyalty), it is further evidence of a shocking fact: Azov has chosen Himmler’s race warriors as its idols and continues their tradition, at least in coded form.

    « Brother in Arms » of the West

    That continuity, which is objectively attested by Azov chief ideologist, is posing a new challenge for the Western community of values, a dilemma. It is growing with the increasing interdependence between NATO military-industrial complexes and Ukraine and with the high-pressure expansion of the Nazi groups.

    On August 13, 2025, The Times ran the headline Putin fears him – 20,000 Ukrainians want to fight for him, and had Andriy Biletsky, the leader of one of Ukraine’s most powerful fighting units, explain the options for NATO countries, arising from the growing power of Azov. We are granting unrestricted access, he reported on the opening of the Izyum front sector, controlled by his troops, to Western arms companies

    Our great advantage is that we provide debriefings, test results, and actual data from the battlefield

    Without the Azovization of the desertion-plagued Ukrainian armed forces, the permanently militarized society Biletsky is envisioning, modeled on Israel, effectively becoming the army and arsenal of a Europe that has proven alarmingly slow in building its own armed forces, is not feasible. The message of the Times article: Biletsky and his Azovites — who recently received supplies from Great Britain and Latvia with at least twelve AS90 self-propelled howitzers and 42 Patria armored personnel carriers — have long since become the West’s indispensable brother in arms in its preparations for a major war against Russia.

    Fighters of the past

    The German Ministry of Defense is also aware of that. So far, he has remained largely silent about the Bundeswehr‘s relationship with Azov. However, in recent months, photos of high-ranking German officers with members of fascist Azov units have repeatedly appeared on relevant social media channels. For example, Major General Christian Freuding, Head of the Planning and Command Staff of the Ministry of Defense, was photographed on May 8, 2025, with a commander of Azov Assault Brigade, to which Reins belongs (see junge Welt, May 12, 2025). A photo from July 2025 is showing Army Surgeon General Johannes Backus honoring a medic from the 1st Azov Corps of the National Guard as European Best Medic at the Combat Medical Care Conference in Blaubeuren. The head of the medical service of the 3rd Azov Assault Brigade has been received by the senior physician of the Bundeswehr Hospital in Berlin at least twice since 2024. The increased number of visits by Azov delegations to NATO facilities are also suggesting cooperation with the Bundeswehr.

    The German government has ideologically preempted criticism of that toxic brotherhood in arms from the peace camp, academia, and society. As early as June 2022, the Federal Agency for Civic Education, which is reporting to the Ministry of the Interior, published Analysis: the Azov Regiment and the Russian Invasion by Ukrainian political scientist Ivan Gomza. While the establishment of another Azov special regiment, including members of Centuria and the neo-Nazi party National Corps, was already in full swing, from which the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade emerged a few months later, Gomza claimed that most right-wing extremist fighters had already left Azov in 2014 when it was integrated into the National Guard. Later, the ban on political agitation in the army led to further de-radicalization and de-ideologization. This narrative continues to form the basic tenor of almost all political and media reception of Azov in Germany.

    Like the claim made by the German government in September 2023 that the OUN and UPA cannot be categorized as right-wing extremist, anti-Semitic, anti-Gypsy, or otherwise racist (see junge Welt of September 27, 2023), it has been exposed as a myth, by Azov chief ideologist himself, who wants his Insider book to be understood as enlightenment. Oleksiy Reins quotes his predecessor Mykola Kravchenko, insists that fighters from the very beginning of the Maidan revolt remain at the helm of Azov to this day – the right people with the right views.

    For Reins, that is including living by the imperative Ukraine above all! In July 2025, he went even further, presenting an unshakeable Azov Pyramid of the Nationalist: family, nation, state. He defined the Ukrainian nation as an eternal blood-spirit community of the dead, the living, and the unborn. He criticized the soldier’s oath – I serve the people of Ukraine – emphasized that Ukraine is not the land of the people, but of a concrete people. The war is not being fought for abstractions. Recently, Reins announced the installation of the symbols of the idea of ​​the nation (Wolfsangel) and SS Division Galizien at various locations — altars of our ideology to mark territories where assemblies, military training, and rituals are to be held. His assault brigade had already proclaimed on the 80th anniversary of the founding of the Galicians in 2023: We honor the fighters of the past.

    Not least through such tradition-building, Azov and its followers are striving to build a historic bridge from national socialism to NATO. Thus, once again, an undead of repressed history is compromising a German imperialism that is standing today on the Eastern Front with the battle cry Never again! [end]

    The original article

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    August 24, 2025: Une Allemande présidente de la Commission Européenne qui finit un post par un slogan banderiste ! – Édouard Husson

    le retour du refoulé

    August 18, 2025: Die deutsche Frage

    les boches, en quelques mots

  • [Partage] Une Allemande présidente de la Commission Européenne qui finit un post par un slogan banderiste ! – Édouard Husson

    le retour du refoulé

    Dans les années 1990, l’Allemagne réunifiée a consciencieusement détruit la Yougoslavie pour faire payer aux Serbes les défaites de 1918 et 1945.

    Cela ne suffisait pas. En 2022 s’est produite l’occasion inespérée. On allait enfin faire payer aux Russes l’abominable défaite de 1945 !

    Et que je t’envoie des panzers en Ukraine. Et que je rêve de Taurus s’écrasant sur le Kremlin !

    La perspective de défiler sur la place Rouge derrière l’armée américaine…

    Las ! La Russie est une puissance nucléaire, redevenue la première armée du monde. Elle mène une guerre lente, de très moyenne intensité, qui sert surtout à vider les stocks militaires des pays désindustrialisés de l’OTAN.

    L’Allemagne est tombée dans le piège. Elle a cru pouvoir renoncer au gaz russe bon marché pour quelques mois. Dès la défaite militaire de la Russie on se servirait à des conditions plus favorables… Cela fait 3 ans que ça dure. Et l’industrie allemande se casse la figure.

    Il y a bien l’idée d’une reconversion dans le secteur de la défense. On va même installer des sites de production en Ukraine, que les Russes aiment bien cibler.

    Depuis le début, les Russes sont perplexes. Moscou a été d’une générosité certaine après 1945. Malgré les 27 millions de morts causés par l’État le plus civilisé d’Europe, les représailles sont restées limitées. Malgré la Guerre froide et le maintien en activité, par les Américains, d’une partie des élites fascistes européennes sous prétexte de combattre le communisme, Moscou a signé les traités de l’Ostpolitik.

    En 1990, Moscou a accepté la réunification. Un peu naïf, Gorbatchev a même accepté que l’Allemagne réunifiée soit dans l’OTAN qui ne servait plus à rien… sauf à empêcher la réunification de cette Europe européenne que De Gaulle avait appelée de ses voeux.

    Dans les années 1990, les mauvaises habitudes allemandes ont vite été retrouvées. Destruction de la Yougoslavie, division du travail en Europe centrale, occidentalisation forcenée de l’Ukraine pour que les chaînes d’approvisionnement de l’industrie allemande disposent d’une main d’œuvre éduquée corvéable à merci…

    Le Generalplan Ost sans les dérapages adolfiens. Un fascisme à visage humain ?

    Je suis les affaires allemandes depuis 35 ans et je peux vous dire que l’Allemagne est autant responsable de la tragédie ukrainienne que les Etats-Unis.

    Et puis, qu’il soit doux ou dur, le fascisme, ça finit toujours mal : Berlin est, avec Washington, la première responsable des pertes militaires ukrainiennes abyssales…

    Au total, Ursula peut bien s’envelopper de tous les drapeaux ukrainiens qu’elle veut, Merz peut développer tous les discours martiaux possibles, l’Allemagne va buter sur la dure réalité.

    Les Russes avaient tourné la page de la Première Guerre mondiale malgré l’envoi irresponsable de Lénine en Russie par l’Allemagne wilhelmienne. Ils avaient tendu la main malgré les crimes de la Wehrmacht, en particulier le siège de Leningrad. Mais le comportement d’Angela Merkel, Olaf Scholz, Friedrich Merz, Ursula von der Leyen, lui, ne sera pas oublié [fin]

    Le post original

    Édoouard Husson est historien

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  • [Sharing] Declassified: CIA’s Covert Ukraine Invasion Plan – Kit Klarenberg

    On August 7th, US polling giant Gallup published the remarkable results of a survey of Ukrainians. Public support for Kiev “fighting until victory” has plummeted to a record low “across all segments” of the population, “regardless of region or demographic group.” In a “nearly complete reversal from public opinion in 2022,” 69% of citizens “favor a negotiated end to the war as soon as possible.” Just 24% wish to keep fighting.  However, vanishingly few believe the proxy war will end anytime soon.

    The reasons for Ukrainian pessimism on this point are unstated, but an obvious explanation is the intransigence of President Volodymyr Zelensky, encouraged by his overseas backers – Britain in particular. London’s reverie of breaking up Russia into readily-exploitable chunks dates back centuries, and became turbocharged in the wake of the February 2014 Maidan coup. In July that year, a precise blueprint for the current proxy conflict was published by the Institute for Statecraft, a NATO/MI6 cutout founded by veteran British military intelligence apparatchik Chris Donnelly, who now oversees London’s management of the proxy conflict

    In response to the Donbass civil war, Statecraft advocated targeting Moscow with a variety of “anti-subversive measures”. This included “economic boycott, breach of diplomatic relations,” as well as “propaganda and counter-propaganda, pressure on neutrals.” The objective was to produce “armed conflict of the old-fashioned sort” with Russia, which “Britain and the West could win.” While we are now witnessing in real-time the brutal unravelling of Donnelly’s monstrous plot, Anglo-American designs of using Ukraine as a beachhead for all-out war with Moscow date back far further.

    In August 1957, the CIA secretly drew up elaborate plans for an invasion of Ukraine by US special forces. It was hoped neighbourhood anti-Communist agitators would be mobilized as footsoldiers to assist in the effort. A detailed 200-page report, Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas, set out demographic, economic, geographical, historical and political factors throughout the then-Soviet Socialist Republic that could facilitate, or impede, Washington’s quest to ignite local insurrection, and in turn the USSR’s ultimate collapse

    The mission was forecast to be a delicate and difficult balancing act, as much of Ukraine’s population held “few grievances” against Russians or Communist rule, which could be exploited to foment an armed uprising. Just as problematically, “the long history of union between Russia and Ukraine, which stretches in an almost unbroken line from 1654 to the present day,” resulted in “many Ukrainians” having “adopted the Russian way of life”. Problematically, there was thus a pronounced lack of “resistance to Soviet rule” among the population.

    The “great influence” of Russian culture over Ukrainians, “many influential positions” in local government being held “by Russians or Ukrainians sympathetic to [Communist] rule, and “relative similarity” of their “languages, customs, and backgrounds”, meant there were “fewer points of conflict between the Ukrainians and Russians” than in Warsaw Pact nations. Throughout those satellite states, the CIA had to varying success already recruited clandestine networks of “freedom fighters” as anti-Communist Fifth Columnists. Yet, the Agency remained keen to identify potential “resistance” actors in Ukraine:

    Some Ukrainians are apparently only slightly aware of the differences which set them apart from Russians and feel little national antagonism. Nevertheless, important grievances exist, and among other Ukrainians there is opposition to Soviet authority which often has assumed a nationalist form. Under favorable conditions, these people might be expected to assist American Special Forces in fighting against the regime

    ‘Nationalist Activity’

    A CIA map split Ukraine into 12 separate zones, ranked on “resistance” potential, and how “favorable population attitudes [are] toward the Soviet regime.” South and eastern regions, particularly Crimea and Donbass, rated poorly. Their populations were judged “strongly loyal” to Moscow, having never “displayed nationalist feelings or indicated any hostility to the regime,” while viewing themselves as “a Russian island in the Ukrainian sea.” In fact, as the study recorded, during and after World War I, when Germany created a fascist puppet state in Ukraine:

    Inhabitants of Donbass strongly resisted Ukrainian nationalists and at one point created a separate republic, independent of the rest of Ukraine. In the following years, they defended Soviet rule and Russian interests, often attacking the Ukrainian nationalists with more zeal than the Russian leaders themselves. During the German occupation in the Second World War, there was not a single recorded case of support for the Ukrainian nationalists or Germans

    Still, invading and occupying Crimea was considered of paramount importance. On top of its strategic significance, the peninsula’s landscape was forecast as ideal for guerrilla warfare. The terrain offered “excellent opportunities for concealment and evasion,” the CIA report noted. While “troops operating in these sectors must be specially trained and equipped,” it was forecast the local Tatar population, “which fought so fiercely” against the Soviets in World War II, “would probably be willing to help” invading US forces.

    Areas of western Ukraine, including former regions of Poland such as Lviv, Rivne, Transcarpathia and Volyn, which were heavily under control of “Ukrainian insurgents” – adherents of MI6-supported Stepan Bandera – during World War II, were judged most fruitful “resistance” launchpads. There, “nationalist activity was extensive” during World War II, with armed militias opposing “pro-Soviet partisans with some success.” Conveniently too, mass extermination of Jews, Poles and Russians by Banderites in these regions meant there was virtually no non-ethnic Ukrainian population left.

    Furthermore, in the post-war period, “resistance to Soviet rule” had been “expressed on a great scale” in western Ukraine. Despite “extensive deportations”, “many nationalists” remained in Lviv et al, and “nationalist cells” created by Bandera’s “task forces” remained dotted around the country. For example, anti-Communist “partisan bands” had taken up residence in the Carpathian Mountains. The review concluded, “it is in this region [US] Special Forces could expect considerable support from the local Ukrainian population, including active participation in measures directed against the Soviet regime.”

    It was also determined that “Ukrainian nationalist, anti-Soviet sentiment” in Kiev was “apparently moderately strong,” and elements of the population “might be expected to provide active assistance to Special Forces.” The capital’s “large Ukrainian population” was reportedly “little affected by Russian influence,” and during the Russian Revolution “provided greater support than any other region for Ukrainian, nationalist, anti-Soviet forces.” Resultantly, “uncertainty about the attitudes of the local population” prompted Moscow to designate the Ukrainian SSR’s capital, which it remained until 1934.

    The CIA document further offered highly detailed assessments of Ukrainian territory, based on their utility for warfare. For example, “generally forbidding” Polesia – near Belarus – was noted to be “almost impossible” to traverse during spring. Conversely, winter provided “most favorable to movement, depending on the depth to which the ground freezes.” Overall, the area had “proved its worth as an excellent refuge and evasion area by supporting large-scale guerilla activities in the past.” Meanwhile, “swampy valleys of the Dnieper and Desna rivers” were of particular interest:

    The area is densely forested in its north-western part, where there are excellent opportunities for concealment and manoeuvre…There are extensive swamps, interspersed with patches of forest, which also provide good hiding places for the Special Forces. Conditions in the Volyno-Podolskaya Highlands are less suitable, although small groups may find temporary shelter in the sparse forests

    ‘Strongly Anti-Nationalist’

    The CIA’s invasion plan never formally came to pass. Yet, areas of Ukraine forecast by the Agency to be most welcoming of US special forces were precisely where support for the Maidan coup was highest. Moreover, in a largely unknown chapter of the Maidan saga, fascist Right Sector militants were bussed en masse to Crimea prior to Moscow’s seizure of the peninsula. Had they succeeded in overrunning the territory, Right Sector would’ve fulfilled the CIA’s objective, as outlined in Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas

    A civilian defence barricade constructed to prevent Right Sector entering Crimea, February 2014

    Given what transpired elsewhere in Ukraine following February 2014, other sections of the CIA report take on a distinctly eerie character. For instance, despite its strategic position facing the Black Sea, the Agency warned against attempting to foment anti-Soviet rebellion in Odessa. The agency noted the city is “the most cosmopolitan area in Ukraine, with a heterogeneous population including significant numbers of Greeks, Moldovans and Bulgarians, as well as Russians and Jews.” As such:

    Odessa…has developed a less nationalistic character. Historically, it has been considered more Russian than Ukrainian territory. There was little evidence of nationalist or anti-Russian sentiment here during the Second World War, and the city…was in fact controlled by a strongly anti-nationalist local administration [during the conflict]

    Odessa became a key battleground between pro- and anti-Maidan elements, from the moment the Maidan protests erupted in November 2013. By March the next year, Russophone Ukrainians had occupied the city’s historic Kulykove Pole Square, and were calling for a referendum on the establishment of an “Odessa Autonomous Republic”. Tensions came to a head on May 2nd, when fascist football ultras – who subsequently formed Azov Battalion – flooded Odessa and forced dozens of anti-Maidan activists into the Trade Unions House, before setting it ablaze.

    In all, 42 people were killed and hundreds injured, while Odessa’s anti-Maidan movement was comprehensively neutralised. In March this year, the European Court of Human Rights issued a damning ruling against Kiev over the massacre. It concluded local police and fire services “deliberately” failed to respond appropriately to the inferno, and authorities insulated culpable officials and perpetrators from prosecution despite possessing incontrovertible evidence. Lethal “negligence” by officials on the day, and ever after, was found to go far “beyond an error of judgment or carelessness.”

    The ECHR was apparently unwilling to consider that the lethal incineration of anti-Maidan activists was an intentional and premeditated act of mass murder, conceived and directed by Kiev’s US-installed fascist government. However, the findings of a Ukrainian parliamentary commission point ineluctably towards this conclusion. Whether, in turn, the Odessa massacre was intended to trigger Russian intervention in Ukraine, thus precipitating “armed conflict of the old-fashioned sort” with Moscow that “Britain and the West could win” is a matter of speculation [end]

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    June 11, 2025: Secret British plans to ‘defeat entire Russian Black Fleet’ revealed in leaks – Kit Klarenberg, The Grayzone

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  • [Sharing] Russophrenia: the West’s favourite delusion about Russia – Brian McDonald

    Ten years after I coined the term, the media’s still convinced Russia is both collapsing, and conquering the world

    There’s a peculiar affliction that’s gripped the Western commentariat for decades now. I first diagnosed it in June 2015 and gave it a name: Russophrenia. The tell-tale sign? That deep-set conviction that Russia’s about to keel over economically—then somehow rise from the wreckage to take Brussels by breakfast. In those ten years, the condition’s only become more widespread—like a political variant of Covid, except there’s no PCR tests, and the worst sufferers have column inches.

    Back in 2015, it was already clear. Read any English-language piece on Russia and you’d find the same breathless contradictions. “The ruble is in freefall”… followed two paragraphs later by “Russian ‘oligarchs’ (sic) are buying up half of France.” Russia, we were told, was a “gas station with nukes,” a “mafia state,” “on the brink of collapse.” That was just before the same experts warned it could manipulate every Western election, hack every NATO server, and brainwash half of Ohio.

    So let’s rummage through the old press clippings, shall we? Some of them haven’t aged as well as their writers hoped.

    In 2001, The Atlantic boldly declared “Russia Is Finished.” Spoiler: as we know, it wasn’t. Nearly a quarter century on, that headline now looks more like a cry for help.

    In 2008, the Guardian’s Luke Harding—who’s always good for a prediction—declared Russia “close to economic collapse” due to falling oil prices. Within a year, the economy had bounced back and Harding was warning of a “new arms race.” Later, he authored an extensively debunked book built around the mirage of “RussiaGate”—now widely discredited thanks to U.S. intelligence disclosures.

    Julia Ioffe joined in 2014 with her own “Russia is falling apart” prophecy—echoing Masha Gessen’s 2011 forecast that “Putin’s world is falling apart.” Over a decade later, Putin’s still at the desk, and those takes have aged like unrefrigerated milk.

    And then there was Mark Galeotti, who warned in 2015 that Putin’s brief disappearance might trigger “succession wars.” He reappeared days later looking mildly bored. Leaving a lot of ridiculous-looking tweets.

    But perhaps the finest specimen of advanced-stage Russophrenia was the late US Senator John McCain, who famously called Russia “a gas station masquerading as a country.” This from a man who once took a break from posing with Islamist rebels to compare Putin to Hitler. The irony? Russia’s economy—gas station or not— is now the largest in Europe. After passing out Germany a few years ago on PPP rankings. And McCain’s rhetorical gas ran out long before Russia’s did.

    Of course, none of this means Russia is a utopia. Far from it. The economy has structural problems. The political system is more fortress than forum. And yes, the Ukraine conflict has triggered enormous costs. But facts are stubborn things. Despite the most aggressive sanctions regime in history, Russia hasn’t imploded. The Moscow stock exchange, after being written off in early 2022, was at 2,727 points on Friday. Far off its all time high (4,292), but hardly on its knees. Agricultural exports have soared. The birth rate, albeit not great, is still better than much of Europe. And those American-made “devastating sanctions”? India, China, Turkey, and most of the Global South didn’t get the memo.

    The Western media, however, hasn’t changed its tune. They’ve just layered it. Now it’s: yes, Russia is collapsing… but it’s also exporting authoritarianism, destabilising Africa, puppeteering Hungary, and might invade the Baltics on Tuesday. Russophrenia 2.0.

    And what drives it all? Familiarity’s absence. Sanctions, the forced closure of consulates, shuttered news bureaus—it’s never been harder for a Westerner to visit Russia. And the fewer people who go, the more powerful the myths become. Russia becomes a Rorschach test—some see Mordor, others a 1980s cartoon villain. Almost no one sees it as it is: complex, contradictory, sometimes maddening, sometimes magnificent. In short, a real country, not a narrative prop.

    Back in Ireland, when I mention Russia, I often get two reactions: one, that Russia’s economy is in ruins; two, that it’s plotting world domination. The contradiction passes without comment. That’s the thing about Russophrenia—you don’t notice the absurdity when you’re living inside it.

    Meanwhile, most coverage of Russia isn’t even produced from inside Russia anymore. It’s written from Riga, or Warsaw, or Zoom calls with the same four exiled pundits. The actual country is missing. And with it, any chance of nuance.

    Of course, Russia’s no tidy postcard. It sprawls out like it means to confuse you. One minute it’s throwing you a smile over breakfast, and by tea it’s broken your heart. You touch down thinking you’ve got the place half-sussed, and by the time you hit passport control, you’re not so sure of anything. That’s not some bug in the system—it’s the system. And for all its mess and mischief, it’s still real. Real enough to deserve being seen on its own terms, not squeezed to fit the shape of someone’s word count.

    It’s been ten years since I first gave a name to this fever, and still it burns. The same old phantoms—maps from another century, clichés with the ink worn thin—held up as gospel. The patient isn’t getting better. Just louder.

    So here’s my prescription: less punditry, more plane tickets. Less projection, more proximity. And above all, less fear.

    You don’t have to toast the place or take its side. Just stop seeing ghosts. Wipe your lens, look again. That’s where recovery begins [end]

    The original article

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