Nicolas Cinquini

Analista senior di l'intelligenza in u campu di a gestione di i risichi di sicurezza, sò un anzianu tenente detective è ufficiale di l'intelligenza in l'agenzie di u Statu francese. A bona pronuncia hè Николай Чинкуини, in russu

Tag: PMC

  • La France soutient al Qaeda au Mali

    Georges Malbrunot le confirme dans un article que RTL publie le 8 mai 2026

    Le journaliste Georges Malbrunot a recueilli les confidences d’une source française anonyme, quand dans un article publié par RTL le 8 mai 2026, il confirme ce qu’affirment depuis longtemps les autorités du Mali.


    Comment la France, chassée du Mali, combat indirectement la junte au pouvoir et ses soutiens russes via des militaires ukrainiens

    Si elle a quitté le Mali, la France apporte une aide opérationnelle à des militaires ukrainiens sur place, passés par la Légion étrangère, et qui coopèrent avec les rebelles touaregs.

    Les forces françaises ne sont officiellement plus sur le sol malien, et pourtant elles continuent à opérer indirectement. Selon une source sécuritaire française, la France se repose notamment sur de nombreux militaires ukrainiens francophones passés par la Légion étrangère : des unités du renseignement militaire ukrainien, le GUR, opèrent ainsi au Mali en coordination avec les rebelles touaregs, lesquels ont débuté il y a deux semaines une conquête de plusieurs villes grâce à une alliance avec les djihadistes.

    Les rebelles indépendantistes touaregs cherchent ainsi à affaiblir la junte au pouvoir à Bamako, tandis que la France et l’Ukraine veulent renverser les soutiens russes de la junte, les anciens de la milice Wagner (renommés l’Afrika Corps) qui ont tout fait pour chasser la France de l’Afrique. Un partage d’intérêts, alors même que les rebelles touaregs ont une ancienne relation avec les services de renseignements français au Sahel.

    Ce n’est pas la première fois qu’il est question d’une alliance franco-ukrainienne sur ce plan : en début d’année dernière, le service de renseignements ukrainien avait proposé aux autorités françaises un plan détaillé pour déloger les juntes de la région du Sahel, et ainsi faire reculer l’ennemi russe. Mais Paris n’avait pas donné de suites à cette proposition, en raison notamment de l’aspect sécuritaire.

    Une hiérarchisation de l’ennemi

    Le verrou est aujourd’hui levé, permettant un jeu de stratégies qui semble favoriser les djihadistes, ces derniers étant actuellement alliés aux indépendantistes touaregs, eux-mêmes aidés par ces forces ukrainiennes. Une sorte de hiérarchisation de l’ennemi afin d’atteindre un objectif commun, ici de renverser la junte au pouvoir et d’affaiblir les Russes et leurs alliés dans la région.

    En limitant son aide opérationnelle à ces relais ukrainiens, la France évite ainsi une coopération directe avec les djihadistes liés à Al-Qaïda. Interrogé, le ministère des Armées est toutefois resté vague et a indiqué que si les militaires ukrainiens avaient quitté la Légion étrangère pour servir l’Ukraine de manière qu’ils jugent utile, la France n’a de son côté pas de commentaire à faire sur le sujet.

    Plusieurs pays du Sahel avaient dénoncé l’an dernier ce jeu d’alliances, qui semble toutefois faire ses preuves dans la région, avec la reprise récemment de grandes villes – dont Kidal, reprise fin avril par les djihadistes alliés aux rebelles touaregs. De quoi faire des remous entre la junte au pouvoir et son allié russe, qu’elle accuse de l’avoir “trahi” alors que les mercenaires russes ont quitté le navire après avoir passé un accord quelques jours avant l’attaque.

    La mort du ministre malien de la Défense, Sadio Camara, tué fin avril dans une attaque kamikaze, a également marqué un autre coup de la Russie, puisque ce numéro deux de la junte, considéré comme l’homme de Moscou, avait été formé en Russie.


    En réalité, les militaires russes de l’African Corps opèrent toujours au Mali et n’en déplaise à une presse bleu horizon revancharde, l’offensive que les djihadistes ont lancée vers le sud le 25 avril n’est pas parvenue à conquérir le pays. Car avec des attaques de SVBIED (suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device) à Kati, banlieue de Bamako, pour tuer le ministre de la défense et aussi le président Assimi Goïta -la seconde échoua- la prise du pouvoir central était bien l’objectif

    Par pudeur, Malbrunot limite aux rebelles touaregs la portée du soutien franco-ukrainien. Le sujet mérite d’être approfondi

    Fondé dans le nord du Mali le 30 novembre 2024, par la fusion d’organisations plus anciennes, le Front de libération de l’Azawad (FLA, 4000 hommes) est indépendantiste et aussi islamiste. Son chef est Alghabass Ag Intalla, un ancien d’Ansar Dine [Les Défenseurs de la religion], pas exactement un laïc

    De fait, l’offensive était une opération conjointe du FLA et des djihadistes du Groupe de soutien à l’islam et aux musulmans (JNIM, 6000 hommes), branche malienne d’al Qaeda, dont le chef est Iyad Ag Ghali, également Touareg et fondateur d’Ansar Dine en 2012

    Bashar Assad énonça autrefois

    Le terrorisme n’est pas une carte qu’on sort et qu’on range dans sa poche. Comme un scorpion, il peut vous piquer à tout moment

    Dix ans après la Syrie et la cruelle leçon de choses du 13 novembre 2015, la France perpétue de scabreux calculs stratégiques et soutient encore une fois des insurgés sunnites radicaux.

    Articles connexes

    15 février 2026 : Rubio gives green light to new era of US-European colonialism – Roger McKenzie, Morning Star

    19 novembre 2025 : Mali Defends Sovereignty Against a Western-Backed “Proxy War” – Pavan Kulkarni, Internationalist 360°

    As panic-inducing travel advisories and doomsaying media reports prophesy the fall of Mali to an Al Qaeda affiliate attacking fuel convoys, the government has re-secured supply routes and hosted Mali’s first international defense expo in a supposedly besieged capital

    7 mai 2025 : Un djihadiste à Paris

    dirigée et interprétée par Emmanuel Macron, sa dernière romance

    17 mars 2025 : ‘Ethnic cleansing!’ Videos show Syrian government-aligned forces [HTS Jihadists] reveling in massacre of minorities in coastal town – CNN

    [the uncomfortable convolutions of CNN presstitutes produce the comic effect of this article, because alongside Qatari channel Al Jazeera and most Western mainstream media, its editorial line was supporting since 2011 the radical Sunni uprising against the secular government of Bashar Assad]

    11 décembre 2024 : Report: Ukraine Sent Drones and Drone Operators to HTS Before Offensive That Ousted Assad – Dave DeCamp, Antiwar.com

    HTS, an offshoot of al-Qaeda, is designated by the US as a terror organization

    10 octobre 2023 : African revolution

    France is expelled from its former colonies in West Africa

    5 septembre 2023 : Le grand-guignol, une tradition française

    Abaya contre Samuel Paty

    13 novembre 2022 : The French debacle on November 13, 2015

    2 août 2022 : Gone with the wind

    30 août 2021 : La débâcle du 13 novembre 2015

    commentaire du film documentaire Les ombres du Bataclan, mis à jour après la déposition devant la cour d’assises spéciale, le 17 septembre 2021, du commandant de la Brigade criminelle qui a coordonné les constatations sur la scène de crime de la salle de spectacle, celle, le 22 septembre, du commissaire X, qui y fut primo-intervenant, celle, le 6 octobre, de Jean-Marc, présent dans la fosse au début de l’attaque, celles, le 27 octobre, de plusieurs autres BACqueux

    13 novembre 2020 : The path to November 13, 2015

    L’engagement français dans les rangs ukrainiens

    chronique alphabétique et nécrologique de l’engagement français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas. Où le lecteur retrouve des Ukrainiens de la Légion étrangère

  • L’engagement français dans les rangs ukrainiens

    • Benoist, Pierre-Alexandre, né le 11 octobre 1970, dit Orwell,

    est un vétéran de la guerre en ex Yougoslavie, dans les rangs croates, où il a certainement connu l’ultra-nationaliste [selon lui-même] Gaston Besson, qui plus tard, en 2014, fut un membre fondateur du bataillon nazi ukrainien Azov

    Benoist pourrait avoir ensuite vécu en Afrique. En octobre 2022, il retourna pour la première fois en Croatie, pour participer à une commémoration militaire

    Comme un autre français, Eirik Coursier, mais à 54 ans, c’est en République populaire de Lougansk, dans les rangs de la 3e brigade d’assaut, émanation de l’organisation nazie Azov dans l’armée régulière ukrainienne, qu’il est tué fin mai 2025.

    in L’engagement français dans les rangs ukrainiens

    chronique alphabétique et nécrologique de l’engagement français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas

    Articles connexes

    The Atlanticist defeat in Donbass and Ukraine

    en Anglais, chronicle of a new catastrophic NATO venture

    Nazism in Ukraine

    chronique en Anglais, its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine

    The footprint of the Ukrainian Nazism in the West

    chronique en Anglais, interactions between Ukrainian Nazi organizations and Western supremacist militants

    The Western disinformation about Ukraine

    chronique en Anglais, censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia

    14 novembre 2026 : Tombés pour l’Allemagne et l’OTAN

    la liste non exhaustive mais certifiée des Français tués dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine

    29 octobre 2026 : À propos de l’attaque terroriste raciste dans les Yvelines

    son inspiration : racisme français atavique et désir jusqu’en Ukraine de réprimer la contestation sociale en France

    5 août 2026 : Ylian Fort « chique » comme le dernier des voleurs à la tire

    le volontaire français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine souffre de ne pas parvenir à assumer son idéologie fasciste

    1er août 2026 : Censure de la journaliste pacifiste Xenia Fedorova

    loi visant à prévenir les ingérences étrangères en France

    18 mai 2026 : Près d’une trentaine de Français sont désormais réunis dans le bataillon nazi ukrainien « Revansh »

    de quoi faire trembler le microcosme politico-médiatique parisien

    11 mai 2026 : Ma réponse au Canard enchaîné

    qui pleure les jeunes français tués dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine et n’aime pas mon travail

    25 avril 2026 : De Philippe Pétain à Quentin Deranque

    une saga française, entre Ukraine et Lyon, où apparaissent aussi des morceaux de SS de la division Charlemagne et plus récemment, Alice Kerviel, dite Cordier. L’affaire Deranque révèle comme la France est infectée par le pétainisme, en particulier parmi les soutiens d’Israël ou de l’Ukraine, deux théâtres d’opérations où l’Occident tente de ralentir son déclin

    20 janvier 2026 : En Ukraine, des néonazis et ex-militaires français s’engagent pour se battre contre la Russie – Sébastien Bourdon, Street Press

    En 2025, une nouvelle unité de Français combattant pour l’Ukraine s’est structurée autour d’un noyau de néonazis, ayant pour objectif d’attirer des recrues. Parmi ces volontaires, d’anciens militaires. StreetPress les a identifiés

    20 janvier 2026 : En Ukraine, les Français des deux camps s’affrontent sur fond d’imaginaire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale – Sébastien Bourdon, Street Press

    En Ukraine, les volontaires français pro-ukrainiens et pro-russes se partagent l’imaginaire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Les premiers se revendiquent des collabos de l’Allemagne nazie, les seconds de l’escadrille mythique « Normandie – Niémen »

    15 novembre 2025 : « Gardez votre confiance en la France éternelle »

    deux jours après le 10e anniversaire de la débâcle politique et sécuritaire du 13 novembre 2015, une messe célèbre à Verdun l’ancien dirigeant fasciste de l’État français

    11 novembre 2025 : Der Krieg

    ce 11 novembre 2025 est l’occasion de souligner comme la façon dont l’Europe sacrifie les conscrits ukrainiens mobilisés de force rappelle le spectaculaire carnage de la 1ère guerre mondiale

    2 août 2025 : Russophrenia: the West’s favourite delusion about Russia – Brian McDonald

    Ten years after I coined the term, the media’s still convinced Russia is both collapsing, and conquering the world

    9 mai 2025 : Victory Day

    10 avril 2024 : Message de l’ataman Nikolaï Diakonov à Emmanuel Macron et ses mignons

    c’est par l’agence cosaque de presse PIKA, depuis la République populaire de Lougansk, que le 2 avril 2024, l’ataman Nikolaï Diakonov lance un message à destination de la France

    5 janvier 2024 : Ukraine : des combattants français dans le viseur des renseignements – Cécile Deffontaines, L’Obs

    ce papier est le premier des grands médias français qui s’attaque à la question des militants nazis français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, le nouveau danger qu’ils présenteront à terme pour la sûreté intérieure

    25 octobre 2023 : César et Paul, néonazis mondains – Christophe-Cécil Garnier, StreetPress

    où nous apprenons que le nazi français Allan Duchézeau, camarade de César Aujard dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, était surnommé Dox, quand il secondait à Paris le leader nazi Marc de Cacqueray Valménier

    21 juillet 2023 : Les oeils de Moscou

    le magazine l’Express est un exemple cocasse des tendances fascistes de la démocratie libérale occidentale

    19 juin 2023 : David Piguet, un commissaire aux questions russes

    son révisionnisme, en détails

    30 mai 2023 : Fils de Pétain

    la vanité nationale trouble la perception de la réalité historique et perpétue une névrose collective

    14 mai 2023 : Pauvre Sacré Charlemagne

    la mythologie européiste

    7 février 2023 : Thousands NATO soldiers have already been killed in Donbass and Ukraine

    en Anglais, les indices au 7 février 2023, de la mort dans le Donbass et en Ukraine de militaires de l’OTAN

    31 janvier 2023 : the European fascist armies lose WW2

    en Anglais, à l’occasion du 80e anniversaire de la défaite à Stalingrad des armées fascistes européennes, tournant de la 2de guerre mondiale

    21 septembre 2022 : The Western operatives in Mariupol

    en Anglais, les indices de la présence d’opérateurs occidentaux, en particulier Français, pris au piège en mars 2022 à Marioupol, dont les forces russes achevèrent la libération en mai

  • L’engagement français dans les rangs ukrainiens

    • Barrié, Guillaume, né le 11 janvier 1994,

    est né à Toulouse, où il fut diplômé en 2017, a eu peut être des activités paramilitaires et aime arborer une épingle des forces spéciales US. Il vivait à Perpignan quand au printemps 2025, il intégra l’armée ukrainienne

    Il fut d’abord fusilier du 1er bataillon de Légion international. Son engagement au front est certain. Il a pu opérer entre République populaire de Lougansk et region de Kharkov, notamment dans les rangs de la 40e brigade d’artillerie.

    in L’engagement français dans les rangs ukrainiens

    chronique alphabétique et nécrologique de l’engagement français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas

    Articles connexes

    The Atlanticist defeat in Donbass and Ukraine

    en Anglais, chronicle of a new catastrophic NATO venture

    Nazism in Ukraine

    chronique en Anglais, its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine

    The footprint of the Ukrainian Nazism in the West

    chronique en Anglais, interactions between Ukrainian Nazi organizations and Western supremacist militants

    The Western disinformation about Ukraine

    chronique en Anglais, censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia

    14 novembre 2026 : Tombés pour l’Allemagne et l’OTAN

    la liste non exhaustive mais certifiée des Français tués dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine

    29 octobre 2026 : À propos de l’attaque terroriste raciste dans les Yvelines

    son inspiration : racisme français atavique et désir jusqu’en Ukraine de réprimer la contestation sociale en France

    5 août 2026 : Ylian Fort « chique » comme le dernier des voleurs à la tire

    le volontaire français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine souffre de ne pas parvenir à assumer son idéologie fasciste

    1er août 2026 : Censure de la journaliste pacifiste Xenia Fedorova

    loi visant à prévenir les ingérences étrangères en France

    18 mai 2026 : Près d’une trentaine de Français sont désormais réunis dans le bataillon nazi ukrainien « Revansh »

    de quoi faire trembler le microcosme politico-médiatique parisien

    11 mai 2026 : Ma réponse au Canard enchaîné

    qui pleure les jeunes français tués dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine et n’aime pas mon travail

    25 avril 2026 : De Philippe Pétain à Quentin Deranque

    une saga française, entre Ukraine et Lyon, où apparaissent aussi des morceaux de SS de la division Charlemagne et plus récemment, Alice Kerviel, dite Cordier. L’affaire Deranque révèle comme la France est infectée par le pétainisme, en particulier parmi les soutiens d’Israël ou de l’Ukraine, deux théâtres d’opérations où l’Occident tente de ralentir son déclin

    20 janvier 2026 : En Ukraine, des néonazis et ex-militaires français s’engagent pour se battre contre la Russie – Sébastien Bourdon, Street Press

    En 2025, une nouvelle unité de Français combattant pour l’Ukraine s’est structurée autour d’un noyau de néonazis, ayant pour objectif d’attirer des recrues. Parmi ces volontaires, d’anciens militaires. StreetPress les a identifiés

    20 janvier 2026 : En Ukraine, les Français des deux camps s’affrontent sur fond d’imaginaire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale – Sébastien Bourdon, Street Press

    En Ukraine, les volontaires français pro-ukrainiens et pro-russes se partagent l’imaginaire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Les premiers se revendiquent des collabos de l’Allemagne nazie, les seconds de l’escadrille mythique « Normandie – Niémen »

    15 novembre 2025 : « Gardez votre confiance en la France éternelle »

    deux jours après le 10e anniversaire de la débâcle politique et sécuritaire du 13 novembre 2015, une messe célèbre à Verdun l’ancien dirigeant fasciste de l’État français

    11 novembre 2025 : Der Krieg

    ce 11 novembre 2025 est l’occasion de souligner comme la façon dont l’Europe sacrifie les conscrits ukrainiens mobilisés de force rappelle le spectaculaire carnage de la 1ère guerre mondiale

    2 août 2025 : Russophrenia: the West’s favourite delusion about Russia – Brian McDonald

    Ten years after I coined the term, the media’s still convinced Russia is both collapsing, and conquering the world

    9 mai 2025 : Victory Day

    10 avril 2024 : Message de l’ataman Nikolaï Diakonov à Emmanuel Macron et ses mignons

    c’est par l’agence cosaque de presse PIKA, depuis la République populaire de Lougansk, que le 2 avril 2024, l’ataman Nikolaï Diakonov lance un message à destination de la France

    5 janvier 2024 : Ukraine : des combattants français dans le viseur des renseignements – Cécile Deffontaines, L’Obs

    ce papier est le premier des grands médias français qui s’attaque à la question des militants nazis français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, le nouveau danger qu’ils présenteront à terme pour la sûreté intérieure

    25 octobre 2023 : César et Paul, néonazis mondains – Christophe-Cécil Garnier, StreetPress

    où nous apprenons que le nazi français Allan Duchézeau, camarade de César Aujard dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, était surnommé Dox, quand il secondait à Paris le leader nazi Marc de Cacqueray Valménier

    21 juillet 2023 : Les oeils de Moscou

    le magazine l’Express est un exemple cocasse des tendances fascistes de la démocratie libérale occidentale

    19 juin 2023 : David Piguet, un commissaire aux questions russes

    son révisionnisme, en détails

    30 mai 2023 : Fils de Pétain

    la vanité nationale trouble la perception de la réalité historique et perpétue une névrose collective

    14 mai 2023 : Pauvre Sacré Charlemagne

    la mythologie européiste

    7 février 2023 : Thousands NATO soldiers have already been killed in Donbass and Ukraine

    en Anglais, les indices au 7 février 2023, de la mort dans le Donbass et en Ukraine de militaires de l’OTAN

    31 janvier 2023 : the European fascist armies lose WW2

    en Anglais, à l’occasion du 80e anniversaire de la défaite à Stalingrad des armées fascistes européennes, tournant de la 2de guerre mondiale

    21 septembre 2022 : The Western operatives in Mariupol

    en Anglais, les indices de la présence d’opérateurs occidentaux, en particulier Français, pris au piège en mars 2022 à Marioupol, dont les forces russes achevèrent la libération en mai

  • [Sharing] “Casualty Cover-Up”: The Pentagon Is Hiding U.S. Losses Under Trump in the Middle East – Nick Turse, The Intercept

    Almost 750 U.S. troops have been wounded or killed in the Middle East since October 2023, an analysis by The Intercept has found. But the Pentagon won’t acknowledge it

    U.S. Central Command, or CENTCOM, which oversees military operations in the Middle East, appears to be engaged in what a defense official called a “casualty cover-up,” offering The Intercept low-ball and outdated figures and failing to provide clarifications on military deaths and injuries.

    At least 15 U.S. troops were wounded Friday [March 27, 2026] in an Iranian attack on a Saudi air base that hosts American troops, according to two government officials who spoke with The Intercept. Hundreds of U.S. personnel have been killed or injured in the region since the U.S. launched a war on Iran just over a month ago.

    President Donald Trump — who wore a blue suit, red tie, and a ball cap to the dignified transfer of the first Americans killed in the war — said casualties were inevitable. “When you have conflicts like this, you always have death,” he said afterward. “I met the parents and they were unbelievable people. They were unbelievable people, but they all had one thing in common. They said to me, one thing, every single one: Finish the job, sir. Please finish the job.”

    On Tuesday [March 31, 2026], Trump teased that he would wind down the war with Iran in as little as two weeks despite not achieving many of his stated aims, such as “freedom for the people” of Iran, “tak[ing] the oil in Iran,” and forcing Iran’s “unconditional surrender.” At one point, the president even declared that the war would last “as long as necessary to achieve our objective of PEACE THROUGHOUT THE MIDDLE EAST AND, INDEED, THE WORLD!”

    “When you have conflicts like this, you always have death”

    CENTCOM has sent outdated statements on casualty numbers, meanwhile, resulting in undercounts, including a statement sent Monday [March 30, 2026] from spokesperson Capt. Tim Hawkins noting that “Since the start of Operation Epic Fury, approximately 303 U.S. service members have been wounded.” The comment was three days old and excluded at least 15 wounded in the Friday attack on Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia. The command did not reply to repeated requests for updated figures.

    CENTCOM also would not provide a count of troops who have died in the region since the start of the war. An Intercept analysis puts the number at no less than 15.

    “This is, quite obviously, a subject that [War Secretary Pete] Hegseth and the White House want to keep under major wraps,” said the defense official who spoke on the condition of anonymity in order to speak frankly.

    In 2024, during the Biden administration, the Pentagon provided The Intercept with detailed chronologies of attacks on U.S. bases in the Middle East that listed the specific outpost that was attacked, the type of strike, and whether — or how many — casualties resulted, along with an aggregate count of attacks by country.

    The Trump administration’s numbers, by comparison, lack detail and clarity. The current CENTCOM casualty figures do not appear to include more than 200 sailors treated for smoke inhalation or otherwise injured due to a fire that raged aboard the USS Gerald R. Ford before it limped off to Souda Bay, Greece, for repairs. CENTCOM did not reply to close to a dozen requests for clarification on the casualty count and related information sent this week.

    “CENTCOM and the White House should be providing accurate and timely information on the costs and casualties involved in this war. After all, it is American taxpayers who are funding it and U.S. economic prosperity and economic wellbeing that is being undermined by it,” Jennifer Kavanagh, the director of military analysis at Defense Priorities, a think tank that advocates for measured U.S. foreign policy, told The Intercept.

    “CENTCOM and the White House should be providing accurate and timely information on the costs and casualties involved in this war”

    As the U.S. has relentlessly bombed Iran, that country has responded with attacks on U.S. bases across the Middle East using ballistic missiles and drones. CENTCOM refuses to even offer a simple count of U.S. bases that have been attacked during the war. “We have nothing for you,” a spokesperson told The Intercept. An analysis by The Intercept, however, finds that bases in Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates have been targeted.  

    On Tuesday, Hegseth said that Iran retained the ability to retaliate for U.S. strikes but that their attacks would be ineffectual. “Yes, they will still shoot some missiles,” he said, “but we will shoot them down.” On Wednesday morning [April 1, 2026], officials in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar all reported missile or drone attacks from Iran.

    Iranian strikes have forced U.S. troops to retreat from their bases to hotels and office buildings across the region, according to the two government officials. The defense official was livid about the Pentagon’s failure to adequately harden the bases and ridiculed Hegseth’s Tuesday prayer at a Pentagon press conference. “May god watch over all of them, each day and each night. May his almighty and eternal arms of providence stretch over them and protect them,” said Hegseth.

    “Why didn’t Hegseth protect them?” the defense official asked. “Anyone with a brain knew these attacks were coming.”

    Pentagon spokesperson Kingsley Wilson did not respond to multiple requests for comment.

    Retired Gen. Joseph Votel, a former head of Central Command, recalled that U.S. troops in the region have faced drone attacks for at least a decade. “At that time we identified a need to protect against this threat, and it has taken far too long for the DoD to respond and provide adequate protection for our deployed troops,” he told The Intercept, referencing drone attacks during the campaign against ISIS in the spring of 2016. “It was a known expectation that, if attacked, Iran would retaliate against our bases, installations, and forces, and I agree that we should have anticipated and been prepared for this inevitability.”

    Kavanagh, who previously called attention to the vulnerability of U.S. outposts in the Middle East, echoed Votel. “It has been clear for years that the rapid proliferation of drones and cheap missiles would put U.S. bases and U.S. early detection radars in the region at risk, yet the Pentagon did little to protect them,” she said. “The failure to invest in hardened infrastructure was a choice. Congress should see this failure as evidence that simply giving the Pentagon more money is not a path to national security.”  

    “We would be better off if bases across the region were closed for good,” she added.

    “We would be better off if bases across the region were closed for good”

    In public statements, Iran’s foreign minister Seyed Abbas Araghchi called out the U.S. for using civilians in nearby Arab monarchies of the Gulf Cooperative Council states as human shields. “U.S. soldiers fled military bases in GCC to hide in hotels and offices,” he wrote on X last week. “Hotels in U.S. deny bookings to officers who may endanger customers. GCC hotels should do same.”

    Votel also expressed concern about troops using hotels and offices, noting it “could turn normal civilian infrastructure into military targets for the regime.”

    Last month, an Iranian drone strike on a hotel in Bahrain wounded two War Department employees, according to a State Department cable reviewed by the Washington Post. CENTCOM did not respond to a request to confirm to The Intercept that those injuries stem from a March 2 attack on the Crowne Plaza hotel, a luxury property in Manama, Bahrain’s capital, but one official indicated this was likely.

    Votel said that a failure to provide troops with adequate protection may handcuff U.S. operations. “I think this really complicates command and control and could affect unit cohesion and effectiveness,” he told The Intercept, referring to the transfer of troops to hotels and office buildings. “That said, we may not have many options if we cannot protect the military bases where they would normally be bedded down.” 

    At least 15 U.S. troops in the Middle East have died since the beginning of the Iran War, including six personnel who were killed in a drone strike on Port Shuaiba, Kuwait, and a soldier who died due to an “enemy attack on March 1, 2026, at Prince Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia.” More than 520 U.S. personnel have also been injured, including those who suffered smoke inhalation on the Ford.

    Prior to the current war with Iran, U.S. bases in the Middle East were increasingly targeted by a mix of one-way attack drones, rockets, mortars, and close-range ballistic missiles after Israel’s war in Gaza began in October 2023, most of the attacks occurring in the year following the outset of the conflict. At least 175 troops were killed or wounded in those attacks, including three service members who died in a January 2024 strike on Tower 22, a facility in Jordan. Other attacks targeted al-Asad Air Base, the Baghdad Diplomatic Support Center, Camp Victory, Union III, Erbil Air Base, and Bashur Air Base in Iraq and Al-Tanf garrison, Deir ez-Zor Air Base, Mission Support Site Euphrates, Mission Support Site Green Village, Patrol Base Shaddadi, Rumalyn Landing Zone, Tell Baydar, and Tal Tamir in Syria.

    The casualty statistics do not include contractors, most of them foreigners who suffered non-combat injuries. Official U.S. statistics show that there were almost 12,900 cases of injuries to contractors in the CENTCOM area of operations during 2024 alone. More than 3,700 were the most serious non-fatal injuries, including traumatic brain injuries, requiring more than seven days away from work. Eighteen contractors were also killed, all of them in Iraq. The numbers are likely significant undercounts, but if even the fractional number of known contractor injuries is added to the tally, the casualty count for Americans and those on U.S. bases may top 13,600 [end]

    The original article

    Related

    Operation Epstein Files

    once more, the US and Israel attack Iran, chronicle

    March 16, 2026: Just Get Out! Now! – Ron Paul

    March 15, 2026: Israel is running critically low on interceptors, US officials say – Shelby Talcott, Semafor

    March 7, 2026: Blinded giant: How Iran crippled America’s multi-billion dollar THAAD network in days – Ivan Kesic, Press TV

    In the first week of the US-Israeli aggression on Iran, the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) conducted a series of precision strikes that systematically degraded the much-hyped US integrated air and missile defense architecture across the region

    March 6, 2026: STOP THE IRAN WAR! – Eisenhower Media Network

    Eisenhower Media Network is an organization of expert former military, intelligence, and civilian national security officials who have an independent, alternative story to tell

    March 6, 2026: « The operation failed in the first hours»: The Iranians trapped the US military – Arguments & Facts

    Story: Escalation of the conflict between Israel, the US, and Iran in 2026

    February 15, 2026: Rubio gives green light to new era of US-European colonialism – Roger McKenzie, Morning Star

    January 29, 2026: Manufacturing martyrdom: The west’s cynical use of Iranian protest figures – Robert Inlakesh, The Cradle

    The US-funded ecosystem of Iranian ‘rights groups,’ Israeli operatives, and monarchist activists has become a revolving door of unverifiable statistics and atrocity propaganda

    January 12, 2026: Western Media Whitewashes Deadly Riots in Iran – Max Blumenthal & Wyatt Reed, Internationalist 360°

    As deadly riots burn Iranian cities, Western media ignores the shocking wave of violence, turning instead to US government-funded NGOs for data. The one-sided portrayal has helped push Trump to the brink of authorizing renewed US attacks

    January 3, 2026: Make Israel great again

    July 9, 2025: Israel is the Middle Eastern boil of Western imperialism

    the novelty is that the corrupt West is showing signs of sepsis

    July 8, 2025: Imperial Hypocrisy About “Terrorism” Hits Its Most Absurd Point Yet – Caitlin Johnstone

    July 2, 2025: Sudden acceleration of the Western decline

    the failure of the infamous Israeli attack against Iran

    June 30, 2025: 以色列上空的煙 Fireworks over Israel

    英之子樂隊 innokids

    June 13, 2025: Israel attacks Iran

    as thanks to the West, the rogue State gets away with its genocide in Gaza

    January 16, 2025: ‘I Felt Like A Nazi’: Zionists Admit Genocide – Kit Klarenberg

  • [Partage] En Ukraine, les Français des deux camps s’affrontent sur fond d’imaginaire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale – Sébastien Bourdon, Street Press

    En Ukraine, les volontaires français pro-ukrainiens et pro-russes se partagent l’imaginaire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Les premiers se revendiquent des collabos de l’Allemagne nazie, les seconds de l’escadrille mythique « Normandie – Niémen »

    « En février 2022, quand la Russie attaque l’Ukraine, je me dis que je ne peux pas louper cette guerre, je pense à la LVF, à [Henri] Fenet, à cette race de guerriers. » Karel Cherel-Salzburg [son chapitre dans ma chronique], Breton de 30 ans, explique ainsi son engagement de combattant aux côtés des forces armées ukrainiennes. Témoignant dans un recueil avec d’autres « volontaires français », publié par une obscure maison d’édition d’extrême droite, il se compare à ceux ayant rejoint durant la Seconde Guerre mondiale la Légion des volontaires français contre le bolchevisme (LVF) — une organisation formée par les partis collaborationnistes et rattachée à la Wehrmacht. Quant à Henri Fenet, il était cadre de la Milice puis officier de la Waffen-SS au sein de la Division Charlemagne

    Depuis l’invasion à grande échelle de l’Ukraine, un nombre croissant de néonazis français ont pris les armes du côté de Kyiv avec cet imaginaire bien en tête. C’est le cas d’Alan V., ex-chasseur alpin congédié de l’armée française à la suite d’une enquête de Mediapart en 2020. Il y était mention du tatouage qu’il porte sur l’avant-bras : la devise de la SS en allemand, « mon honneur s’appelle fidélité ». Loin d’avoir renié ses convictions, il a rejoint l’Ukraine en juillet 2022 et a été parmi les premiers à se réclamer de cette nouvelle LVF.

    À ses côtés parfois, il y a un autre Français, surnommé « Bones » [Guillaume Andreoni], qui a écrit sur son gilet tactique « Légion volontaire français ». Une formule également tracées par Alan V. sur le sien, au feutre noir, en plus de la formule « 33e division Charlemagne » ainsi que l’emblème de la SS

    Le 1er août 2025, dans la capitale ukrainienne, tous deux ont rendu hommage à « Kapo », l’un de leurs compatriotes, tué quinze jours plus tôt au combat. Son surnom était une référence au titre attribué aux hommes en charge de l’encadrement des prisonniers dans les camps de concentration nazis. Il est arrivé en 2025 dans le pays. À l’aide d’une copie d’un drapeau de la LVF historique, Alan V. a salué son cercueil.

    En écho avec la propagande nazie

    D’autres Français, ayant pris les armes en Ukraine, reprennent un vocabulaire proche de la vision des nazis combattant l’Union soviétique. Alan V. écrit sur la messagerie Telegram participer à « l’éradication des bolcheviques et communistes de notre belle Europe ». Pour sa part, Gwendal D. [Gwendal Delange], un néonazi lyonnais engagé dès fin 2022, qualifie le groupe qu’il forme avec ses camarades d’« Einsatzgruppen » — nom donné par l’Allemagne nazie aux unités en charge de l’extermination des Juifs, Tziganes et des opposants politiques sur le front de l’Est.

    Il indique au sujet de la prise de la ville d’Avdiivka, en Ukraine, par l’armée russe en février 2024 que « certains peuples de Sibérie ont payé un lourd tribut à cette victoire ». Un commentaire faisant écho à la propagande du IIIe Reich assimilant l’Armée rouge à des « hordes asiatiques » s’apprêtant à déferler sur l’Europe

    Du côté russe, même imaginaire

    S’ils ont choisi de combattre pour le camp opposé, les rares Français engagés au sein des forces russes n’hésitent pas à invoquer le souvenir de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Au printemps 2024, le nom de « Normandie-Niémen » — référence au groupe de chasse des Forces françaises libres envoyé en Union soviétique à partir de 1942 pour y combattre les armées du IIIe Reich — a ainsi fait son retour sur le champ de bataille. Au XXIe siècle, les drones ont remplacé les avions et l’ennemi est, cette fois-ci, « l’Union européenne » et « l’État profond américain », selon « Jean », l’un des trois Français que compterait l’unité d’après une enquête de France 24

    Parmi eux également, un certain Sergei Munier, franco-ukrainien médiatisé dès 2014 pour son engagement aux côtés des séparatistes soutenus par Moscou dans le Donbass. Depuis passé par le groupe Wagner, il est réputé proche du renseignement militaire russe, qui pourrait être à la manœuvre dans cette « résurrection » ayant fait les choux gras de la presse pro-Kremlin.

    Contactés, Karel Cherel-Salzburg, Alan V., « Bones » et Sergei Munier n’ont pas souhaité répondre à nos questions [fin]

    L’article original

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    15 novembre 2025 : « Gardez votre confiance en la France éternelle »

    deux jours après le 10e anniversaire de la débâcle politique et sécuritaire du 13 novembre 2015, une messe célèbre à Verdun l’ancien dirigeant fasciste de l’État français

    8 novembre 2025 : Tombés pour l’Allemagne et l’OTAN

    la liste non exhaustive mais certifiée des Français tués dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine

    10 mai 2025 : Choc pour Paris : l’Occident veut punir les Français qui combattent pour la Russie – Tsargrad

    Dans la zone de l’OMS [Opération militaire spéciale], des citoyens français se battent aux côtés de la Russie. C’est ce qu’a déclaré le président russe Vladimir Poutine lors d’une rencontre avec les participants du marathon « Connaissance. D’abord ». Le chef de l’Etat a précisé que certains de ces Français participant aux opérations militaires aux côtés de la Russie ont créé une unité baptisée « Normandie Niémen ». Cette information a provoqué un choc à Paris. Les autorités de la Ve République veulent punir les Français qui combattent pour la Russie

    9 mai 2025 : Victory Day

    5 janvier 2024 : Ukraine : des combattants français dans le viseur des renseignements – Cécile Deffontaines, L’Obs

    ce papier est le premier des grands médias français qui s’attaque à la question des militants nazis français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, le nouveau danger qu’ils présenteront à terme pour la sûreté intérieure

    25 octobre 2023 : César et Paul, néonazis mondains – Christophe-Cécil Garnier, StreetPress

    où nous apprenons que le nazi français Allan Duchézeau, camarade de César Aujard dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, était surnommé Dox, quand il secondait à Paris le leader nazi Marc de Cacqueray Valménier

    30 mai 2023 : Fils de Pétain

    la vanité nationale trouble la perception de la réalité historique et perpétue une névrose collective

    14 mai 2023 : Pauvre Sacré Charlemagne

    la mythologie européiste

  • [Sharing] Drug cartel operatives snuck into Ukraine for drone training: report – Linus Höller, DefenseNews

    THE HAGUE, Netherlands — Ukrainian counterintelligence services are investigating the infiltration of Latin American drug cartel members into the country’s International Legion, with operatives seeking advanced drone training to later deploy against rivals and security forces in their home countries.

    The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) launched a joint investigation with military intelligence after Mexico’s National Intelligence Center warned in early summer that Mexican volunteers had joined Ukraine’s foreign fighter units specifically to acquire first-person view (FPV) drone capabilities. The probe has since expanded to include Colombian nationals, raising concerns about Ukraine’s inadvertent role as a training ground for transnational criminal organizations.

    French outlet Intelligence Online was the first to report the story on Tuesday.

    The investigation centers on several Spanish-speaking units within the International Legion, particularly the tactical group “Ethos,” operating in the Donetsk and Kharkiv regions. Ukrainian investigators reportedly suspect that some Mexican and Colombian volunteers intentionally sought placement in drone operator units to later use this training in the service of foreign criminal organizations.

    One noteworthy case is that of a Mexican national operating under the alias “Águila-7,” who registered in March 2024 using fraudulent Salvadoran documentation. Posing as a humanitarian volunteer, he completed comprehensive drone training in Lviv while demonstrating exceptional technical expertise that eventually had instructors suspicious.

    His extensive technical knowledge, including familiarity with electronic warfare countermeasures and thermal detection avoidance, reportedly stood out. Background investigations later revealed probable connections to Mexico’s elite GAFE special forces, some of whose former personnel have historically transitioned to cartel employment, notably through the ultra-violent Zetas organization.

    The infiltration demonstrates remarkable operational sophistication for a nonstate group, with suspects employing false identities, forged documentation and front companies to facilitate their passage into Ukrainian territory and military structures. Intelligence analysts have identified a network of private security firms across Latin America that appear to have coordinated these placements.

    Additional cases have emerged involving former FARC guerrillas who infiltrated the system using Panamanian and Venezuelan identity documents. At least three former FARC fighters passed through the International Legion using forged documents, with their relocation reportedly organized by cartel-linked entities.

    The revelations highlight Ukraine’s unintended emergence as a premier training ground for modern asymmetric warfare techniques amid its conflict with Russia. Ukrainian authorities have developed comprehensive curricula covering drone manufacturing, tactical deployment, electronic warfare resistance and real-time battlefield coordination. Coincidentally, these capabilities also represent exactly the type of force multiplication that criminal organizations seek.

    Mexican cartels are already conducting drone attacks against rivals and security forces domestically, making the acquisition of Ukrainian battlefield-tested tactics particularly concerning for regional security.

    An unnamed SBU official told Intelligence Online: “We welcomed volunteers in good faith. But we must now recognize that Ukraine has become a platform for the global dissemination of FPV tactics. Some come here to learn how to kill with a $400 drone, then sell this knowledge elsewhere to the highest bidder” [end]

    The original article

    Related

    February 7, 2025: Volodymyr Zelenskyy signs a law banning organ harvesting from dead soldiers

    that new law is addressing a fact: in the context of war, Ukraine is a platform for organ trafficking

    April 9, 2024: Secret list of a French intelligence officer: how NATO soldiers end up in Ukraine – Zvezda

    How are “death travel agencies” organized for those who like to hunt people in foreign lands, and who want to send regular French and Polish units to Ukraine?

    November 20, 2023: Travel agency “Death”. Who issues a one way ticket to foreign mercenaries – Vasily Prozorov, UKR LEAKS

    Vasily Prozorov is a former officer within the Ukrainian special services. He is currently leading UKR LEAKS investigation centre

    L’engagement français dans les rangs ukrainiens

    in French, an alphabetical obituary chronicle of the French involvement in the Atlanticist ranks in Ukraine, what servile journalists will not tell you

  • [Enemy media] We Tracked the Trackers: Who’s Behind Russia’s TaNM Doxing Channel? An Interview with the OSINT Team – United24

    They dox and harass foreign volunteers and spread Kremlin propaganda. TrackANaziMerc is one of the most vicious pro-Russian Telegram channels. Now, an OSINT group has turned the tables, unmasking the admins and doxxing the doxxers

    An open-source intelligence (OSINT) unit, The Unintelligence Agency (TUA), @UnintelAgency on X, has granted UNITED24 Media behind-the-scenes access to their investigation into exposing the administrators of one of the most prolific pro-Russian Telegram channels: “TrackANaziMerc” (TaNM).

    TaNM “will 100% dig up anything ‘they’ can on you, I hope you’re prepared,” the OSINT team warned when preparing this article. 

    TaNM has been aggressively pushing disinformation about Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine since 2022. Its core mission is to dox foreign nationals working in support of Ukraine, mocking and intimidating them, and whenever they get the chance, celebrating their deaths. 

    Russia’s “Nazi” narrative is central to its war propaganda. The channel’s name suggests a mission to hunt down so-called “Nazi mercenaries”—foreigners fighting for Ukraine and resisting Russian aggression.

    When hearing about the TUA’s expose on the group, one of the TaNM administrators [me] wrote on X “Nazi sleuths are spending #Yurop-ean tax payers’ money to ‘identify’ people,” a rather ironic comment, as TaNM do exactly that—identify people [not exactly 1]. 

    Many suspect that the Russian Security Services (FSB) are behind the channel, but not everything is as it seems. In fact, the information obtained by the OSINT group reveals—sometimes rather humorous—profiles of the European-wide TaNM group administrators. 

    Exposing these individuals for what they truly are, and not the lies and fanciful personas that they’ve created for themselves, strips them of whatever credibility they may think they have. These aren’t geopolitical experts, intel analysts, or experts on foreign affairs. They are little more than delusional LARPers and deranged individuals seeking validation online.

    Anonymous “B”

    The Unintelligence Agency (TUA)

    We interviewed members of The Unintelligence Agency, who requested anonymity due to privacy concerns. Their insights—labeled Anonymous A, B, and C—offer a rare look into the minds behind TaNM and the wider disinformation ecosystem they operate in.

    But first, here’s what the OSINT team uncovered about TaNM’s ties to Russian media and the people who run the channel.

    TaNM’s connections to Russian state media and political assets [United24 is a Ukrainian government-run platform]

    The TaNM channel grew exponentially in August 2023 after various other pro-Russian platforms and figures amplified it. Among them are Nikolay Valuev, a Russian politician and former heavyweight boxer, and Vladimir Solovyov, one of the Kremlin’s most infamous TV propagandists.

    Rybar, owned by Mikhail Zvinchuk and Denis Shchukin, is one of several media channels that amplify TaNMs’ content. Shchukin, a computer programmer with a prior cybercrime charge, renounced his German citizenship in 2021 in favor of a Russian passport, according to reports. Zvinchuk is a former press officer with Russia’s Defense Ministry. Both men have ties to the Internet Research Agency, the Kremlin-linked troll farm once associated with the Wagner Group, the OSINT group says.

    TaNM’s reach is further amplified by UKR Leaks, a pro-Russian outlet operated by Vasily Prozorov, a former officer of Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) and a known defector. Prozorov, who is currently wanted by Ukrainian authorities, has openly admitted to leaking sensitive information to Russian intelligence beginning in 2014, citing ideological motives. In April 2024, Prozorov was targeted in a car bomb attack in Moscow [indeed, a terrorist attack that the SBU conducted in Moscow on April 12, 2024].

    Having lost the honor of an officer due to drunkenness, Prozorov decided to trade his conscience and military oath, finding ‘worthy’ people in the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation.

    Ukrainian Secret Service (SBU)

    TaNM has worked in coordination with Russian state media outlets, including Zvezda [my interview, that Zvezda published in April 2024], which is owned by the Russian Defense Ministry, TUA reports. Other pro-Kremlin platforms, such as Komsomolskaya Pravda, War Gonzo, and so-called “war reporters” like Alexander Simonov, have also collaborated with the channel, amplifying its campaigns of doxxing, harassment, and targeted intimidation.

    Another is Dmitry Astrakhan, a prominent mouthpiece for the so-called “Donetsk People’s Republic” (DNR). Now a war correspondent for RT Russia, Astrakhan began his career by “trolling” on social media. He later styled himself as the editor-in-chief of Pravda DNR—a propaganda outlet where, according to Evocation, the entire editorial board consisted of just one person: Astrakhan himself.

    Who are the admins of the TrackANaziMerc group?

    Daria Khaltourina

    Daria Khaltourina, posting under her alias “Ekaterina II,” is the owner of TaNM and their “de facto ring leader,” who has close connections to Russia. According to her social media, she is the “Head of Department at Federal Research Institute for Health Organization and Informatization of the Ministry of Health of the Russian Federation”

    Daria Khaltourina (Source Facebook)
    Daria Khaltourina (Source Facebook)

    When Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began, she posted on Facebook, “I condemn the war, I do not approve.” However, since then, as the owner of TaNM, she has consistently repeated pro-Kremlin narratives, claiming that civilians in the Bucha massacre were killed by Ukrainians [they were 2] and that a 1930s Moscow-made famine and genocide—Holodomor—is a “propaganda lie created by Ukrainian nazis”

    We (TaNM) frame, expose mercs, make them cry and shiver all their lives.

    Daria Khaltourina

    Khaltourina is a founding member and board member of the International Longevity Alliance and Chair of the Board of the Russian Council for Public Health and Demography. In recent years, the Kremlin has been “crazy about eternal life,” making millions of dollars from state funds through anti-aging and genetic projects while promoting several “bizarre” ideas and conspiracies.

    Virgil Hesse

    “Love him or hate him, the man is interesting and boring at the same time,” wrote an Encyclopedia Dramatica user about Virgil Hesse, an Australian, likely from St. Kilda, Melbourne. One of the most active TaNM admins, Hesse has a long history of online trolling under aliases like “Lesleyblood” and now “Digitalfolklore.”

    Once called a “bastion of ridiculousness” and “serial fantasist,” Hesse now mostly posts screenshots of interviews with Ukrainian POWs. For over 15 years, he’s collected, archived, and spread content online. The Unintelligence Agency (TUA) believes “Virgil Hesse” is a nom de plume

    Virgil Hesse, who had posted parts of his face on separate occasions, OSINT groups pieced them together to reveal his identity. (Source: Encyclopedia Dramatica via The Unintelligence Agency (TUA) )
    Virgil Hesse, who had posted parts of his face on separate occasions, OSINT groups pieced them together to reveal his identity (Source: Encyclopedia Dramatica via The Unintelligence Agency (TUA))

    “He’s (ironically) a privacy advocate…and he’s writing to the Australian government, so it seems in character he wouldn’t use his real name when The Man is out to get him,” TUA said. In the early 2000s, as Lesleyblood, he regularly engaged in chaotic online arguments, which escalated and “turned into these bizarre back-and-forths” and led to mocking videos and leaked recordings of him. 

    Offline, he’s been known to lodge “endless complaints with his local city council for a variety of banal issues,” like off-leash dog zones and bin removal. TUA found footage and documents of these efforts, along with Hesse’s submissions to Australian government inquiries on crypto and surveillance laws.

    He claims to have “high-end education” but also says he “never went to high school or brainwashing camps.” On X, he once told Elon Musk he’d built a “bespoke, handmade… better than yours” version of Grok.

    Though UA describes him as more of an archiver, Hesse likely sees himself as a hacker. He’s compiled an enormous collection of leaks, drone videos, and files tied to WikiLeaks, Anonymous, the war in Ukraine, and ISIS. He’s also filmed and posted drone footage from Melbourne and discussed drone-making in the TaNM chats.

    TUA says Hesse’s accounts follow—and are followed by—Adam Bennett, aka “Lorax” CEO of Australian cybersecurity firm Red Piranha. Bennett once ran the Anonymous Australia Twitter and in 2016 received a suspended sentence for hacking government sites. Hesse is an active poster in “Beregini,” a Telegram group that brands itself as Ukrainian hacktivists, but is actually based in St. Petersburg. The group has pushed fake Ukrainian intel and taken credit for leaks.

    As “Digitalfolklore,” Hesse also leaked a phone call between the FBI and Scotland Yard discussing LulzSec—a hacking group behind attacks on PlayStation Network and the CIA site. The FBI later confirmed Anonymous accessed an email containing the call code, raising further suspicions of Hesse’s links to the group. TUA adds he may have known people in Julian Assange’s inner circle [impressive].

    Nicolas Cinquini

    Cinquini is a former French lieutenant detective and intelligence officer, dismissed from duty after his support for the yellow vest protests in France. 

    On social media, Cinquini portrays an intriguing, multifaceted personality, much like Hesse. Sharing Russian propaganda, videos of cats and dogs, to even arguing with Grok, Elon Musk’s AI chatbot 

    Nicolas Cinquini (Source: The Unintelligence Agency)
    Nicolas Cinquini (Source: The Unintelligence Agency) [a screenshot from the interview that Zvezda, TV channel of the Russian defense ministry, published in April 2024]

    Cinquini disseminates very typical pro-Kremlin narratives, promotes conspiracy theories, and spreads misinformation about Ukraine. He claims to be the intelligence lead for TaNM [no, I have never claimed that] and has been suspected of leaking information about French volunteers, which Russia used to make false claims about their supposed deaths

    He didn’t even try to hide – his ego matched his idiocy [is that a threat ?]. Once sworn to protect France, now cheers terrorists.

    The Unintelligence Agency

    On May 18, 2025, he was interviewed [that is an excerpt on my YouTube channel, here is rather the complete report on Rossiya 1] by Russian state-media Rossiya 1 where he discussed French fighters serving in the Ukrainian army against Russian aggression. Cinquini, during his interview, furthered his pro-Kremlin narrative and told Russian media that the Frenchmen TrackANaziMerc have identified, “competed with each other in fascism, and won their place in the cast through hard work.” He then went on to dox five servicemen throughout the interview [QED: five French Nazi militants].

    There are several more admins of the TaNM channel, some have maintained an anonymous identity. 

    Other admins behind the channel

    Dmitry Levin from Moscow (Source: The Unintelligence Agency)
    Dmitry Levin from Moscow (Source: The Unintelligence Agency)
    Maxim Bugaev a children’s karate intructor (Source: The Unintelligence Agency)
    Maxim Bugaev a children’s karate intructor (Source: The Unintelligence Agency)

    Luico Festa says he is Italian-Croatian and claims to be affiliated with Camorra, an Italian Mafia-type criminal organization. He has openly threatened previous TaNM members, claiming that within Camorra, his purpose is extortion, drug dealing, and money laundering. Following the TUA’s leak, Festa deleted both his Facebook and VKontakte pages.

    “BulgARYAN”—“For someone in a group that supposedly hates Nazis they decided to spell their username with the word “Aryan” in all caps instead of the more usual -rian suffix” TUA said. 

    Mikhail Yevgenevich Rapoport is a Russian national who has left several reviews about parks and businesses on Google Maps. He is thought to live near Kudrovo, a notorious town where Russia’s largest residential complex, known as the “human anthill,” is located.

    “Nataliahunter”—”Natalia is a common nickname Russian soldiers use when referring to Ukrainian women, which makes this individual, who claims to be in the Russian army, particularly disturbing,” TUA said. 

    “Drexy baba” established a reputation of sorts as someone who collected and documented rare combat footage from the war in Afghanistan, always with a pro-Taliban angle, the OSINT team said

    It’s cliché that the KGB recruited ‘winners’ who were really losers—but these guys aren’t even that. The technical term is ‘useful idiot

    Anonymous A

    The Unintelligence Agency

    Interviewing The Unintelligence Agency

    Why do you want to expose the admins from TaNM?

    Anonymous A: Combating channels like TaNM is a stop-gap, a temporary solution. For every group and individual we can ID, there will always be more. What we really need is a change in how we interact with social media, or rather, how social media interacts with us.

    This is not to say that this will necessarily stop them from continuing what they’re doing, but the truth matters and does have an impact.

    Vote for people who don’t benefit from disinformation. Demand that whoever is in power acts to put an end to its prevalence and popularity on social media. Start petitions calling for action. Organise protests. Don’t ask—demand!

    If we do nothing, then we will rapidly find ourselves in an oligarchy of those with the means to run massive disinformation campaigns that will be bowing down to dictators all over the world. 

    Why is OSINT important in the modern digital world?

    Anonymous A: Social media platforms have become central to how the world consumes news, yet they continue to allow, amplify, and even financially reward those who spread disinformation. 

    By identifying people like the TaNM admins, we help map the architecture of propaganda networks, removing the mystery of where disinformation originates. More often than not, they aren’t listening to a renowned expert or someone with lived experiences in a subject, but a charlatan and a fraud [I have worked 30 years as police detective and intelligence officer in counter-terrorism]. 

    Anonymous C: Russia is using digital media a force multiplier for its soft power and propaganda apparatus, and Western governments haven’t, by and large, figured out how to counter it effectively yet. Nor have they put sufficient resources into it. But Russia, very cheaply, can produce these outsize effects, largely aimed at shaping narratives, disrupting public discourse, and planting the seeds of doubt.

    Their big picture goal is to cut Ukraine off from its allies and its support network. Russia goes about this by shaping public opinion in the West. Or in the case of the “Ukraine is overrun by Nazis” narrative, trying to give Westerners the impression that Ukraine is simply unworthy of support. 

    What do you believe is TaNM’s main goal?

    Anonymous A: After more than two years, it’s evident they’ve failed to stop or even slow the number of people choosing to defend freedom and democracy in Ukraine. Today, TaNM seems more like a small online community of socially isolated individuals who’ve found validation in a space that reinforces their fringe views. Their focus on doxxing and harassment appears less about impact and more about maintaining engagement with like-minded followers, creating a feedback loop of radicalisation.

    The real danger isn’t their investigative abilities—often resembling little more than basic social media searches—but the fact that they’ve become a nexus for disinformation and extremism.

    Anonymous B: While they claim to be documenting and tracking the presence of “foreign nazi mercenaries” in Ukraine, the true purpose of their channel is to sow doubt and fear. The doxxing serves as a form of intimidation, with people on their chat openly making violent threats and discussing ways to harass volunteers and their family members. Furthermore, there’s a concerted effort to promote paranoia and suspicion amongst volunteers [poor darlings]. 

    Is there a common theme amongst admins from pro-Russian channels?

    Anonymous C: Essentially, every Westerner cheering Russia that we’ve come across has been more or less the same archetype–an overinflated sense of self-worth with a lack of any real accomplishments, plus an inability to accept any responsibility for personal failings. 

    Almost without fail, you can guarantee that they’re online lying about accomplishments they never had, that they’ve all failed in their lives in some way, shape, or form, and all feel like something more was owed to them, but that somehow they were thwarted by the system. They all, therefore, resent the West, and at some level fantasize about how well they’d do if society were shaken up and whatever bit of the system it is they blame for not having succeeded were destroyed.

    This archetype must be extremely fertile soil for the Russians because it keeps repeating in the people we come across [end]

    The original article

    United24 is a Ukrainian government-run platform

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  • [Sharing] Total Kievan Debellation – Big Serge

    The Russo-Ukrainian War: Year 3

    On March 5, 2022, the wreck of the sailing ship Endurance was found in the depths of the Weddell Sea off the coast of Antarctica. This, of course, was the vessel lost in Ernest Shackelton’s third expedition to Antarctica, which became trapped in the ice and sank in 1915. The story of that expedition is an extraordinary tale of human fortitude – with the Endurance lost to the ice, Shackleton’s crew evacuated to a loose ice flow where they camped for nearly 500 days, drifting about the Antarctic seas, before making a desperate dash across the open ocean in an open 20 foot lifeboat, finally reaching the southern shore of inhospitable and mountainous South Georgia Island, which they then had to cross on foot to reach the safety of a whaling station.

    The story itself has an essentially mythic quality to it, with Shackleton’s crew surviving for years on free floating ice floes in the most inhospitable seas on earth. For our purposes, however, it is the story’s coda that is particularly interesting. In Shackleton’s memoirs, he remembered that, upon finally reaching the safety of the Stromness whaling station, one of his first questions was about the war in Europe. When Shackleton first set out on his ill-fated expedition on August 8, 1914, the First World War was less than a week old, and the German Army had just begun its invasion of Belgium. There was little expectation then that the war would proceed as it did, unleashing four years of slaughterous positional warfare that engulfed the continent.

    Shackleton, having been adrift at sea for years, clearly did not imagine that the war could still be raging, and asked the commandant of the whaling station “tell me, when was the war over?”

    The answer came back: “The war is not over. Millions are being killed. Europe is mad. The world is mad.”

    The timing is serendipitous, since the discovery of the Endurance’s wreck, after more than a hundred years, happened to occur only a few weeks after the world again went mad, with the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian War in February 2022. As time continues its inexorable march and the calendar turns yet again, the war is passing through its third full winter. In February, Z-World will be three years old.

    Of course, modern communications make it extremely unlikely that anybody could be cut fully out of the loop for years at a time, like Shackleton and his men. Instead of being ignorant as to whether or not the war is over, many of us are exposed on a daily basis to footage of men being killed, buildings being blown up, and vehicles being shredded. Twitter has made it essentially impossible to live under a rock, or on an ice floe, as it were.

    If anything, we have the very opposite problem of Shackleton – at least as far as our wartime information infrastructure goes. We are saturated in information, with daily updates tracking advances of a few dozen meters and never ending bombast about new game changing weapons (which seem to change very little), and bluster about “red lines”. This war seems to have an unyielding dynamic on the ground, and no matter how many grand pronouncements we hear that one side or the other is on the verge of collapse, the sprawling front continues to grind up bodies and congeal with bloody positional fighting.

    It would seem difficult to believe that a high intensity ground war in Europe with hundreds of miles worth of front could be boring, yet the static and repetitive nature of the conflict is struggling to hold the attention of foreign observers who have little immediately at stake.

    My intention here is a radical zoom-out from these demoralizing and fatiguing small scale updates (as valuable as the work of the war mappers is), and consider the aggregate of 2024 – arguing that this year was, in fact, very consequential. Taken as a whole, three very important things happened in 2024 which create a very dismal outlook for Ukraine and the AFU in the new year. More specifically, 2024 brought three important strategic developments:

    1. Russian victory in southern Donetsk which destroyed the AFU’s position on one of the war’s key strategic axes.
    2. The expenditure of carefully husbanded Ukrainian resources on a failed offensive towards Kursk, which accelerated the attrition of critical Ukrainian maneuver assets and substantially dampened their prospects in the Donbas.
    3. The exhaustion of Ukraine’s ability to escalate vis a vis new strike systems from NATO – more broadly, the west has largely run out of options to upgrade Ukrainian capabilities, and the much vaunted delivery of longer range strike systems failed to alter the trajectory of the war on the ground.

    Taken together, 2024 revealed a Ukrainian military that is increasingly stretched to the limits, to the point where the Russians were able to largely scratch off an entire sector of front. People continue to wonder where and when the Ukrainian front might begin to break down – I would argue that it *did* break down in the south over the last few months, and 2025 begins with strong Russian momentum that the AFU will be hard pressed to arrest.

    Front Collapse in South Donetsk

    What stands out immediately about the operational developments in 2024 is the marked shift of energies away from the axes of combat that had seen the most intense fighting in the first two years of the war. In a sense, this war has seen each of its fronts activate in a sequence, one after the other.

    After the opening Russian offensive, which boasted as its signature success the capture of the Azov coastline and the linkup of Donetsk and Crimea, the action shifted to the northern front (the Lugansk-Kharkov axis), with Russia fighting a summer offensive which captured Severodonetsk and Lysychansk. This was followed by a pair of Ukrainian counteroffensives in the fall, with a thrust out of Kharkov which pushed the front back over the Oskil, and an operation directed at Kherson which failed to breach Russian defenses but ultimately resulted in a Russian withdrawal in good order over the Dnieper due to concerns over logistical connectivity and an over-extended front. Energies then pivoted yet again to the Central Donbas axis, with the enormous battle around Bakhmut raging through the spring of 2023. This was followed by the failed Ukrainian offensive on Russia’s defenses in Zaporozhia, in the south.

    Just to briefly recapitulate this, we can enumerate several operational phases in the first two years of the war, occurring in sequence and each with a center of gravity in different parts of the front:

    • A Russian offensive across the land bridge, culminating in the capture of Mariupol. (Winter-Spring 2022, Southern Front)
    • A Russian offensive in Lugansk, capturing Severodonetsk and Lysychansk. (Summer 2022, Donets-Oskil front)
    • Ukrainian Counteroffensives towards the Oskil and Kherson (Autumn 2022, Oskil and Dnieper fronts)
    • The Russian assault on Bakhmut (Winter-Spring 2023, Central Front)
    • Ukrainian counteroffensive on the land bridge (Summer 2023)

    Amid all of this, the front that saw the least movement was the southeastern corner of the front, around Donetsk. This was somewhat peculiar. Donetsk is the urban heart of the Donbas – a vast and populous industrial city at the center of a sprawling conurbation, once home to some 2 million people. Even if Russia succeeds in capturing the city of Zaporizhia, Donetsk will be by far the most populous of Ukraine’s former cities to come under Moscow’s control.

    In 2014, with the outbreak of the proto-Donbas war, Donetsk was the locus of much of the fighting, with the airport on the city’s northern approach the scene of particularly intense combat. This made it rather strange, then, that at the start of 2024 the Ukrainian Army continued to occupy many of the same positions that they built a decade prior. As intense fighting ebbed and flowed along other sectors of front, Donetsk remained besieged by a web of powerfully held Ukrainian defenses, anchored by heavily fortified urban areas stretching from Toretsk to Ugledar. Early Russian attempts to crack this iron ring open, including an assault on Ugledar in the winter of 2023, met with failure.

    The signature operational development of 2024, then, was the re-activation of the Donetsk front, after years of static combat. It is not an exaggeration to say that after years of coagulation, the Russian Army cracked this front wide open in 2024 and Ukraine’s long and strongly held network of urban strongpoints collapsed

    Russian Progress on the Donetsk Axis in 2024

    The year began with the AFU fighting for its fortress in Avdiivka, where it continued to block the northern approach to Donetsk. At the time, the typical argument that one heard from the Ukrainian side was that the Russian assault on Avdiivka was pyrrhic – that the Russians were capturing the city with exorbitantly costly “meat assaults” that would inevitably sap Russian combat power and exhaust their ability to continue the offensive.

    With the full measure of the year behind us, we can definitively say that this is not the case. After the fall of Avdiivka, Russian momentum never seriously slackened, and in fact it was the AFU that appeared to be increasingly exhausted. The Ukrainian breakwater position at Ocheretyne (which had previously been their staging point for counterattacks around Avdiivka) was overrun in a matter of days, and by the early summer the frontline had been pushed out towards the approach to Pokrovsk.

    The Russian thrust towards Pokrovsk led many to believe that this city was itself the object of Russian energies, but this was a misread of the operational design. Russia did not need to capture Pokrovsk in 2024 to render it sterile as a logistical hub. Simply by advancing towards the E50 highway, Russian forces were able to cut off Pokrovsk from Ukrainian positions to the south on the Donetsk front, and Pokvrovsk is now a frontline city subject to the full spectrum of overwatch from Russian drones and tube artillery.

    By autumn, the Russian advance had put the Ukrainians in a severe salient, creating an unstable chain of positions in Selydove, Kurakhove, Ugledar, and Krasnogorivka. Russia’s advance from Ocheretyne onto the southern approach to Pokrovsk acted like an enormous scythe, isolating the entire southeastern sector of the front and allowing Russian forces to carve through it in the closing months of the year

    Russian Operations in 2024, Donetsk Axis

    This war has turned the word “collapse” into a devalued buzzword. We are told repeatedly that one side or the other is on the verge of collapse: sanctions will “collapse” the Russian economy, the Wagner uprising of 2023 proved that the Russian political system was “collapsing”, and of course we hear that exorbitant losses have one army or the other on the verge of total failure – which army that may be depends on who you ask.

    I would argue, however, that what we saw from October 2024 onward represents a real occurrence of this oft-repeated and discarded word. The AFU suffered a genuine collapse of the southeastern front, with the forces positioned in their strongpoints too attrited and isolated to make a determined defense, Russian fires becoming too heavily concentrated in ever more compressed areas to endure, and no mechanized reserve in the theater available to counterattack or relieve the incessant Russian pressure.

    Ukraine does maintain enough drones and concentrated fires to limit a full Russian exploitation – that is, Russia is still not able to maneuver at depth. This gave the Russian advance a particular stop-start quality, leapfrogging from one settlement and fortress to the other. More generally, Russia’s preference to use dispersed small-unit assaults limits the potential for exploitation. We have to emphasize, however, that Russian momentum on this axis has never seriously slackened since October, and many of the key Ukrainian positions were overrun or abandoned very quickly

    Ugledar is a good example: the Russians began their final push toward the town on September 24. By September 29, the 72nd Mechanized Brigade began evacuating. By October 1, Ugledar was fully under Russian control. This was a keystone Ukrainian position put in a completely untenable position and it went down in a week. One could argue, of course, that Ugledar held out for years (how then can we say with a straight face that it was captured in a week), but this is precisely the point. In early 2023 Ugledar (with the help of artillery stationed around Kurakhove) successfully repelled a multi-brigade Russian attack in months of heavy fighting. By October 2024, the position was completely untenable and was abandoned almost immediately when attacked.

    The Ukrainians did no better trying to hold Kurakhove – previously a critical rear area that served as both a logistical hub and a base of fire for supporting (former) frontline strongpoints like Ugledar and Krasnogorivka. Kurakhove, now under full Russian control, will in turn serve as a base of support for the ongoing Russian push to the west towards Andriivka.

    Taking the state of the front holistically, the AFU is currently holding two severe salients at the southernmost end of the line – one around Velyka Novosilka, and another around Andriivka. The former is likely to fall first, as the town has been fully isolated by Russian advances on the flanks. This is not a Bakhmut-like situation, where roads are described as “cut” because they are under Russian fire – in this case, all of the highways into Velyka Novosilka are cut by physical Russian blocking positions, making the loss of the position only a matter of waiting for the Russians to assault it. Further north, a more gentle and less strongly held salient exists between Grodivka and Toretsk. With Toretsk now in the final stages of capture (Ukrainian forces now hold only a small residential neighborhood on the city’s outskirts), the front should level here as well in the coming months.

    This leaves the Russians more or less in full control of the approaches to Kostyantinivka and Pokrovsk, which are in many ways the penultimate Ukrainian held positions in Donetsk. Pokrovsk has already been bypassed several miles to the west, and the map portends a re-run of the typical Russian tactical methodology for assaulting urban areas – a methodical advance along the wings of the city to isolate it from arterial highways, followed by an attack on the city itself via several axes

    The coming months promise continued Russian advances across this front, in a continuation of what can only be regarded as the collapse of a critical front on the part of the AFU. The Russian Army is advancing to the western border of Donetsk oblast and will ferret the Ukrainians out of their remaining strongpoints at Velyka Novosilka and Andriivka, while pushing into the belly of Pokrovsk. At no point since the fall of Avdiivka have the Ukrainians demonstrated the ability to seriously stymie Russian momentum along this 75 mile front, and the ongoing dissipation of Ukrainian combat resources indicates that little will change in this regard in 2025.

    Toehold: The Incredible Shrinking Kursk Salient

    Throughout the autumn of 2024 and these early months of winter, as Ukrainian forces were dug out of their dense web of fortified positions in the southern Donbas, their comrades continued to stubbornly hold on to their position in Russia’s Kursk Oblast. The basic shape of Ukraine’s offensive into Kursk is by now well known – billed by Kiev as a gambit to change the psychological trajectory of the war and strike a prestige blow to Russia, the Ukrainian attack had early momentum after achieving initial strategic surprise, but quickly faltered after Ukrainian columns ran into effective Russian blocking positions on the highways out of Sudzha. Efforts to force the roads through Korenovo and Bolshoe Soldatskoe were defeated, and the Ukrainian grouping was left holding on to a modest salient around Sudzha, jutting out into Russia.

    Throughout the autumn, Russian counterattacks have focused on chiseling away at the base of the Ukrainian salient – forcing the Ukrainians out of Snagost and pushing them away from Korenovo. The progress here has been incremental, but significant, and by the start of January the “neck” of the Ukrainian salient had been compressed down to a little over nine miles wide, after their initial penetration in the summer had forced a breach of over twenty miles. All told, Ukraine has lost about 50% of the territory that they grabbed in August.

    The Russian pressure on the flanks of the salient have amplified many of the qualities that make this position wasteful and dangerous for the AFU. There is limited road connectivity for Ukrainian forces – a problem amplified by the rollback from Snagost, which cost them access to the highway running from Korenovo to Sumy. Apart from a few circuitous side roads, Ukrainian forces only have a single highway – the R200 route – to run material and reinforcements into the pocket, which allows Russian forces to surveil their lines of communication and conduct effective interdiction strikes. The compression of the pocket also greatly narrows the targeting area for Russian drones, tube artillery, and rocketry, and creates more condensed and saturating bombardment

    Despite the fact that this position has been profoundly unproductive for Ukraine – being steadily rolled back and having no synergy with other, more critical theaters – the same grouping of Ukrainian units remain here, fighting in a steadily more compressed space. Even more baffling, the Ukrainian grouping consists largely of premiere assets – Mechanized and Air Assault brigades – that could have contributed meaningfully as a reserve in the Donbas over the last three months.

    On January 5, there was a surprise in the form of a renewed Ukrainian attack out of the salient. The internet of course jumped to the conclusion that the AFU was going back over to some sort of general offensive posture in Kursk, but the reality was very underwhelming – something like a battalion sized assault up the axis towards Bolshoe Soldaskoe, which got a few kilometers up the road before it ran out of steam. Ukrainian efforts to jam Russian drones were stymied by the increasing ubiquity of fiber-optic systems, and the Ukrainian attack collapsed within a day

    Kursk Salient – General Situation, January 2025

    The tactical particulars of the Ukrainian attack are interesting, and there’s ongoing speculation as to its purpose – perhaps it was intended to cover a rotation or withdrawal, to improve tactical positions on the northern edge of the salient, or for inscrutable propaganda purposes. However, these specifics are rather unimportant: attacking out the end of the salient (that is, trying to deepen the penetration into Russia) does nothing to reverse Ukraine’s problems in Kursk. These problems are first, on the tactical level, that the salient has been greatly compressed on the flanks and continues to narrow, and on the strategic level the willful expenditure of valuable mechanized assets on a front that does not impact the critical theaters of the war. More simply, Kursk is a sideshow, and it is a sideshow that has gone wrong even within its own operational logic.

    One thing that has been of endless interest, of course, have been the continued rumors of North Korean troops fighting in Kursk. Western intelligence agencies have been adamant about the presence of North Koreans in Kursk. Some people are predisposed to instinctively disbelieve everything that western officialdom says – while I think some skepticism is warranted, I do not automatically assume that they are lying. One recent report lays out what would seem to be a plausible version of this story: that the idea actually originated in Pyongyang, not Moscow, and that a modest number of Korean troops (perhaps 10,000) are embedded with Russian units. The presumption here is that the Koreans hatched the idea as a way to gain combat experience, with the Russians in turn getting auxiliary forces, though of questionable combat effectiveness.

    However, it is worth noting that this is not nearly as important as it has been made out to be. Much has been made of the idea that the North Korean presence proves some sort of Russian state of desperation, but this is fairly silly on its face – with more than 1.5 million active personnel in the Russian military, 10,000 Korean troops in Kursk represents a paltry appendage. More importantly, there has been an attempt to portray the North Korean contingent as a major departure point in the war. In particular, the formulation “North Korean troops in Europe” has been used to conjure cold war imagery of communist despotism clawing at the free world

    The point, however, is that North Korean troops are presumed specifically to be in Kursk, which is in Russia. This is linked, of course, to the recently concluded mutual defense agreement signed between Moscow and Pyongyang. By attacking into Kursk – widening the front into prewar Russian territory – Ukraine created a defensive combat task for Russia which triggers the possibility of military assistance from North Korea. However much one may wish to link the Korean contingent to Russia’s dreaded “war of aggression”, the force in Kursk is very objectively engaged in the defense of Russian territory, and that makes it possible for Russia to use auxiliary forces – including conscripts and the troops of its allies – to fight there.

    Ultimately, then, the presence of North Koreans in Kursk is interesting, but perhaps not very important after all. These troops are not in Ukraine (even under the most maximal definition of the Ukrainian territorial unit), they are not carrying the primary combat load, and they are unequivocally not the problem that the AFU is facing in Kursk. The “big problem” for Ukraine, very simply, is not the presence of some amorphous Korean horde dedicated to spreading Glorious Juche to Europe – it is the loitering of large grouping of their own precious mechanized brigades in a compressed salient, far far away from the Donbas, where they are greatly needed.

    Scraping the Barrel: AFU Force Generation

    I think it is well understood, of course, that Ukraine faces severe manpower constraints relative to Russia, both in terms of the raw totals of male biomass available – with roughly 35 million fighting aged males in Russia against perhaps 9 million in prewar Ukraine – but also in terms of its capacity to mobilize them.

    Ukraine’s mobilization scheme is hampered by both widespread draft evasion (with willingness to serve decreasing as the war has stretched on) and a stubborn unwillingness to draft younger men, aged 18-25. Ukraine is structurally burdened with a deeply imbalanced population structure: there are roughly 60% more Ukrainian men in their 30’s than in their 20’s. Given the relative scarcity of young men, particularly in their early 20’s, the Ukrainian government rightly views this 18-25 year old cohort as a premium demographic cohort that it is loathe to burn away in combat. Given the ubiquity of draft evasion, the refusal to mobilize younger males, and the corruption and inefficiency characteristic of the Ukrainian government, it should come as no surprise when Ukrainian mobilization falters

    Russia, in contrast, has both a much larger pool of potential recruits and a more efficient apparatus for mobilization. In contrast to Ukraine’s scheme of compulsory conscription, Russia has relied on generous sign-on bonuses to solicit volunteers. Russia’s incentive system, to this point, has provided a steady stream of enlistments that has been more than enough to offset Russian losses. Without going too far into the various speculative estimates of Russian casualties, it is widely acknowledged by western military leadership that Russia has significantly more personnel now than it did at the start of the war.

    All of that is to say: Ukraine faces a severe structural disadvantage in military manpower in the aggregate, which is exacerbated by the idiosyncrasies of the Ukrainian mobilization law, ameliorated slightly by the relatively low troop densities and the preponderant power of strike systems in this war.

    The argument that I want to make here, however, is that Ukraine’s systemic problems matching Russian manpower have been exacerbated by several developments which specifically became prominent in 2024. In other words, 2024 can and should be marked as the year where Ukrainian manpower constraints became markedly and perhaps irretrievably worse due to specific decisions made in Kiev, and particular developments on the ground.

    These are as follows:

    1. The decision to expand the AFU’s force structure through the creation of the “15 series” brigades
    2. The decision to deliberately widen the front and create additional demands for manpower by launching the incursion into Kursk
    3. The stall out of Ukraine’s new mobilization program in the autumn
    4. Accelerating problems with desertion in the AFU

    We’ll run through these in order.

    An army that is intaking new personnel has to decide between two possible allocations for them. New personnel can be used as replacements to replenish existing frontline units, or they can be used to expand the force structure by creating new units. That much seems fairly obvious, and ideally mobilization will exceed losses and make it possible to do both. Where armies face hard manpower constraints, however – that is, where losses are equal to or greater than intake of men, the decision to expand the force structure can have monumental consequences. The stereotypical example, of course, would be the late-war Wehrmacht, which created premiere new assets in the form of Waffen SS divisions, which received privileged access to recruits and equipment while regular army divisions in the line suffered from a trickle of replacements which could not keep up with losses.

    Ukraine, with its garbled force structure, has created a mess through its own attempts to expand its force structure in the face of dwindling strength on the line. Late in 2023, the AFU announced intentions to form an entirely new grouping of brigades – the so-called “15 series”, given their designations as the 150th, 151st, 152nd, 153rd, and 154th Mechanized Brigades. This was followed in 2024 with the appending of the 155th Mechanized Brigade, which was to be trained and equipped in France.

    Forming a new grouping of mechanized brigades is essential to the way that Ukraine is presenting its war. Because Ukraine still aims (at least on paper) to recapture all of its Russian held territory, there must always be the illusory possibility of a future offensive, and in order for that illusory possibility to remain, Ukraine must present itself as actively preparing for future offensive operations. Ukraine’s presentation of its own strategic animus – the idea that it is holding the front while it prepares to go back on the offensive – essentially locks it into a program of expanding its force structure

    The problem for Ukraine is that the immense pressure on the front makes it essentially impossible for them to properly husband resources the way they would like. Properly training and equipping half a dozen fresh mechanized brigades and holding them in reserve would be very helpful, but they cannot really do this in light of the demands for personnel at the front. These brigades instead become “paper formations” that have a bureaucratic existence, while their organic assets are pulled apart and sucked into the front – stripped down into battalion or company sized elements that can be plugged into sectors of need on the frontline. At the moment, none of the 15 series brigades have seen action as organic units – that is, fighting as themselves.

    The French-trained 155th brigade forms a useful example. Originally designed as an overweight formation of some 5800 men, equipped with premiere European equipment, the brigade was hemorrhaging personnel from the start, with Ukrainian sources reporting that some 1700 men – many of them forcibly conscripted off the streets of Ukraine – deserted the unit during training and formation. A collapse in the brigade’s leadership – with its commander resigning – made matters even more complicated, and the formation’s first action around Pokrovsk went badly. Now, the brigade is being dismembered, if not formally disbanded, with personnel and vehicles being stripped down and parceled out to bolster neighbor units.

    The decision to allocate personnel to new mechanized brigades (though given stocks of armored vehicles it is questionable whether those designations mean anything) does not necessarily change Ukraine’s manpower balance in the aggregate, but it is certainly an inefficient way to use personnel. To return again to the 155th brigade, one problem noted by Ukrainian analysts was the fact that much of the brigade was formed whole cloth from forcibly mobilized personnel, without a proper cadre of veterans and experienced NCOs – some 75% of the brigade, it turns out, had been mobilized less than two months before arriving in France for training. This fact was certainly instrumental in the mass desertions and the brigade’s poor combat effectiveness.

    Given Ukraine’s constraints, the best course of action would undoubtedly be to allocate new personnel and equipment as replacements to build out the depleted veteran brigades on the front lines, plugging in replacements around existing veterans and officers. Kiev, however, prizes the prestige that comes from force expansion and the “shiny new toy” factor of new formations equipped with scarce and valuable equipment like Leopard tanks. These new brigades, though billed as premiere assets, clearly have lower combat effectiveness than existing formations, given their lack of experience, shortage of veteran officers, and low unit cohesion.

    The simple reality, however, is that replacements for existing brigades are nowhere close to keeping up with burn rates. Frontline units have complained of increasingly dire infantry shortages for months, with some brigades on the Pokrovsk axis reporting that they are down to less than 40% of their allocated infantry complements.

    In short, Ukraine’s decision to embark on force expansion in the face of significant manpower shortages has exacerbated the problem – both starving veteran units of replacements and concentrating newly mobilized personnel into combat ineffective formations that lack a veteran core, experienced officers, and vital equipment. They have tried, belatedly, to square this circle by parceling out new formations to backstop line brigades, but this is less than ideal – it leads to a patchwork order of battle with lower unit cohesion and a fragmented defense.

    Unfortunately, this comes precisely as Ukraine has created additional self-imposed strains on its resources, in particular through its incursion into Kursk. At the moment, elements of at least seven mechanized brigades, two marine infantry brigades, and three air assault brigades are stationed on the Kursk axis. Without going too far into the weeds rehashing Ukraine’s operation here, it’s important to remember that Ukraine – facing extreme pressures on its force generation – voluntarily chose to widen the front into a secondary theater, diverting scarce assets and reducing its own ability to economize forces.

    In summary, Ukraine has made deliberate decisions to widen the front and expand its force structure, both of which have been decidedly detrimental to its efforts to economize personnel. This comes precisely as a 2024 effort to ramp up mobilization has come off the rails.

    Ukraine’s mobilization program suffered from a variety of defects, including gaps and errors in its databases and endemic corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency. Laws passed in 2024 aimed to rectify many of these problems, including through the rollout of an app that would allow draft-eligible men to register and check their status without having to visit recruitment offices. It appeared that matters had come to a head when Zelensky fired several recruitment chiefs in 2023, and there was a real sense of urgency. After some signs of initial promise, it is clear that this intensified mobilization drive has faltered over the autumn and early winter

    There were initially signs of optimism for Ukraine – in the first month after the new mobilization law was passed, there was a surge and the army enlisted 30,000 new personnel. However, by the end of the summer this initial burst of enlistments had faded, and mobilization was again running behind the AFU’s losses. An October briefing from the Ukrainian General Staff confirmed that enlistments had already declined by 40% after the brief surge brought on by the new mobilization law. Around the same time, officials in Odessa (Ukraine’s third largest city) admitted that they were running at only 20% of their mobilization quota.

    The problems are myriad. The new mobilization law led to some initial improvements but has ultimately failed to resolve problems with draft evasion, bureaucratic miscues remain endemic, and employers desperate to retain workers filed an avalanche of employment related draft deferments. Unable to sustain the initial surge of enlistments, Ukraine faces a looming manpower crisis.

    Furthermore, Ukraine’s continued inability to provide either demobilization or timely rotations means that mobilized personnel face the prospect of indefinite service on the frontlines. This is obviously bad for morale, with soldiers contemplating the possibility of years of uninterrupted service, and this in turn drives the desertions that are becoming a mounting problem for the AFU. Some reports indicate that as many as 100,000 Ukrainian troops have deserted by this point, many no doubt driven by the psychological and physical strains of endless combat with no prospect of rotation.

    A deadly feedback loop is now at work, with the lack of rotations and the shortage of replacements synergizing to accelerate the burn of Ukrainian personnel. The AFU is unable to regularly rotate units out of combat, and the inadequate flow of replacements causes frontline infantry complements to wear thin. Unable to rotate or reinforce, line brigades resort to cannibalization – scraping support personnel like mortar teams, drivers, and drone operators to fill out frontline positions. This further accelerates losses as brigades fight with thinned out support and fires elements, and makes Ukrainian men more unwilling to enlist – because there is now no guarantee that becoming a drone operator, for example, will save one from being sent to a frontline trench eventually.

    Where does this leave us? Ukraine continues to dispose of a very large force, with more than a hundred brigades and hundreds of thousands of men under arms. This force, however, is both substantially outnumbered by the Russian army and in a clear trend of decay. Despite a highly touted attempt to reinvigorate the mobilization apparatus in 2024, the intake of new personnel is clearly too low to offset losses, and the heavy lifting formations in critical sectors of front have seen their strength – particularly in the infantry complements – decline, in some cases to critical levels.

    The failure of Ukraine’s 2024 mobilization program has coincided with several strategic choices which have exacerbated manpower concerns – specifically the decision to embark on a program of force expansion even as the AFU voluntarily extended its commitments by opening a new secondary front in Kursk. In other words, Ukraine’s mobilization falls short of its force requirements, and the AFU has also made choices that sabotaged its ability to economize. Units are ground up, replacements come in a paltry trickle, rotations are late or absent, units cannibalize themselves, and angry and weary men desert.

    It’s not at all clear that this will lead to a “breaking point”, in the sense that people are anticipating. Ukrainian strike capabilities and the Russian preference for dispersed, leapfrogging assaults limit the potential for grand breakthroughs and exploitation. However, what we saw over the past three months on the southern Donetsk axis offers a preview of what awaits: an exhausted force being steadily rolled back, dug out of its strongpoints, and mauled – covering its retreat with drones but losing position after position. The line holds, until it doesn’t.

    End of the Line: ATACMs, JASSMs, and Hazelnuts

    Ukraine’s ability to remain in the field depends on a titration of two indispensable resources: first, Ukrainian male biomass, and secondly the critical western weaponry that gives them combat effectiveness. We have evaluated the first: Ukraine is not exactly out of men, but the trends of its mobilization program are poor and personnel shortages are mounting. The trends regarding the second are, if anything, even more foreboding for Kiev.

    There are two general dynamics that have emerged, neither of which create an optimistic picture for Ukraine, which we’ll examine in turn. These are as follows:

    1. The delivery of heavy weaponry to Ukraine (tanks, IFVs, and artillery tubes) has largely dried up in recent months.
    2. The west has essentially run out of escalatory weaponry (strike systems) to give, and those systems already given have failed to meaningfully altar the trajectory of the war.

    In 2023, building out new mechanized units was the name of the game, with the Pentagon leading a multinational effort to stand up an entire army corps worth of units equipped with Leopards, Challengers, and a whole slew of western IFVs and APCs. When that lovingly assembled grouping bashed its head on a rock in the botched assault on the Zaporizhia line, the United States belatedly and begrudgingly dispatched its own Abrams to backstop the Ukrainian tank force. In 2024, however, deliveries of heavy weapons slowed to a trickle.

    The role of the tank in Ukraine has been greatly misunderstood. The vulnerability of tanks to the myriad strike systems of the modern battlefield led some observers to declare that the tank as a weapons system was now obsolete, but this did not really square with the fact that both combatants in this war were eager to deploy as many as possible. Tanks need more critical enablers – more combat engineering, air defense, and electronic warfare support – but they continue to fill an indispensable role and remain an essential item in this war. The failure of Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive showed, if anything, that tanks simply are not “game changing” systems, but mass consumption items – but this has always been the case. The signature quality of iconic tanks like the Sherman and the T34 was that they were numerous

    Unfortunately for Ukraine, deliveries of tanks have dropped off dramatically after the failures of 2023. America’s drawdowns for Ukraine in 2024 were almost entirely devoid of armored vehicles of any kind. Data from the Kiel Institute, which has been meticulous tracking weaponry commitments and deliveries, confirms a sharp dropoff in heavy weapons in 2024. In 2023, Ukraine’s backers pledged 384 tanks. This dropped to just 98 in 2024 – which explains why the new Ukrainian mechanized brigades are perilously light on the equipment indicative of their designations.

    While 2023 was all about building out Ukraine’s mechanized package with tanks, IFVs, and engineering, 2024 has been largely about enhancing Ukraine’s strike capabilities. There have been two separate elements at play – first, the delivery of both air and ground launched systems (most notably the British Storm Shadows and American ATACMs respectively), and secondly the loosening of the rules of engagement to allow Ukraine to strike targets inside pre-war Russia.

    This dovetailed, as it turned out, with Ukraine’s operation in Kursk, and in many ways the most direct impact of the Kursk incursion has been to force the west’s hand on the rules of engagement. While Ukraine has long been striking inside Russia with indigenous systems, most notably drones, the White House continued to drag its feet on formal approval for strikes with American systems. By launching a ground assault on Kursk, Ukraine made the decision for them: the United States gave clearance to use ATACMs to support the ground forces in Kursk, and this metastasized into general license to strike Russia with the full range of available systems. This was a poignant reminder that, however we conceive of the proxy-sponsor relationship, Ukraine has some ability to force America’s hand: a classic example of the tail wagging the dog.

    In any case, 2024 saw Ukraine and its western backers slowly but surely bash through all the supposed red-lines in this domain: the British breached first with the delivery of Storm Shadows late in 2023, and this was followed by the delivery of ATACMs (with a handful of F16’s to boot), and finally the loosening of the rules of engagement to clear strikes on Russia.

    Where does this leave us? There would seem to be three important things to consider.

    1. The west has essentially reached the end of its escalation chain. The only remaining step that they can take would be to supply Ukraine with JASSMs (Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile), which would mark a quantitative but not a meaningful qualitative upgrade to Ukraine’s strike capabilities.
    2. Ukraine’s use of western-supplied strike assets has been dissipated and has not materially improved their situation on the ground.
    3. Russia maintains a dominant strike advantage, both qualitative and quantitative.

    Ukraine faces a stark disadvantage in strike capability relative to Russia, in a variety of ways. Russian strike assets are far more numerous and have significant range advantages, but it is also important to take into consideration both Russia’s significantly greater strategic depth and its more dense and relatively unscathed air defense. Unlike Ukraine, which has seen its air defense stretch to the limit with destroyed launchers and a mounting interceptor shortage, Russia’s air defenses have been essentially untouched, as Ukraine has lacked the large numbers of assets required to conduct a proper SEAD/DEAD (Suppression/Destruction of Enemy Air Defense) campaign.

    Given this basic calculus, using western strike systems to wage a blow for blow strategic air campaign is bad math for Ukraine. It is generally unwise to engage in a bat fight when your opponent is a bigger man with a much longer bat. Instead, Ukraine’s strike systems should have been leveraged to support ground operations – concentrating strikes spatially and in time to synergize with efforts on the ground. Just as a simple thought experiment, it is not difficult to imagine ATACMs making a difference if they had been available in 2023 and used to saturate Russian rear areas during the assault on the Zaporizhia line – striking in tempo with the mechanized assault to disrupt Russian command and control and prevent reinforcement of critical areas.

    Instead, Ukraine’s strike capacity has been largely dissipated in attacks that sometimes achieve success hitting Russian installations but fail to directly support successful operations on the ground. The result is a diffusion of Ukrainian striking power that is less than the sum of its parts. Now, Ukraine has essentially run dry on missiles – of the 500 ATACMs sent by the United States, perhaps 50 are left in Kiev’s stockpiles. Stocks of air launched Storm Shadow missiles are similarly low, and Britain’s commitment to resupply is limited to “a few dozen”

    The last option for the west to backstop Ukrainian strike capability are American JASSMs. While there is a longer-range variant in production (the JASSM-ER, or Extended Range), these are relatively new and expensive and are earmarked for American stocks – it is therefore presumed that the Ukrainians would receive the standard variant. The standard JASSM has slight range advantages over Storm Shadows and ATACMs, at roughly 230 miles. In the event that JASSMs are not given, there is a shorter range system called the SLAM (Standoff Land Attack Missile) with a range of some 170 miles. Both JASSMs and SLAMs would be compatible with Ukrainian F-16s.

    Two things need to be noted about the JASSM. First, the JASSM – while offering slightly longer ranges – would essentially serve as a backstop/replacement for the rapidly dwindling ATACMs and particularly the air launched Storm Shadows – instead of Ukraine’s native SU-24s launching Storm Shadows, they would utilize F-16s launching JASSMs. This would not represent a dramatic upgrade in Ukrainian capabilities, but would instead simply serve to maintain a bare minimum Ukrainian strike capability. JASSMs are a replacement for dwindling capabilities, not an augmentation to them.

    Secondly, it must be understood that JASSMs are the last stop. We’re now entering the territory, not of artificially constructed red lines, but physical and real limits. Russia has essentially eaten the gifted stocks of ATACMs and Storm Shadows, with little discernable effect on their ability to fight, and JASSMs are the last extant item in the inventories to keep Ukrainian strike capabilities operative. We are at the last rung of the aid ladder.

    In the case of JASSMs, however, there are notable downsides for the United States. This is an important case of putting all of one’s eggs in the same technological basket. In 2020, the United States scrapped the development of its conventionally armed Long Range Standoff Missile, making the JASSM – particularly the new extended range variants – the system for the United States, earmarked to play a critical role in future conflicts, particularly in the Pacific. This makes the JASSM an extremely sensitive system, as a centerpiece of American strike capabilities, particularly with the modernization of the Tomahawk system crawling along at a few dozen units per year.

    Given the fact that JASSMs are GPS guided, there are real reasons to be reticent about giving Ukraine such a technologically sensitive system. Russian electronic warfare has enjoyed considerable success jamming GPS and disrupting similarly guided American systems. Allowing the Russians to gain familiarity with a keystone American system could wreak havoc on Pentagon war planning – most, if not all of the strike eggs are in this basket, so why let an adversary peek inside?

    It’s probable, given what we have seen to this point, that these concerns will ultimately be dismissed and Ukraine will receive a line of JASSMs which will backstop their strike capabilities – but given the size of Ukraine’s F-16 fleet, the scale will be constrained. Furthermore, air launched systems are less optimal for Ukraine, given their dependence on large and easily targeted airfields, in contrast to ground launched systems which are mobile and more easily concealed.

    Certainly, JASSMs will never give Ukraine the ability to match Russia’s own strike capacity. After hearing endlessly about how Russia is running out of missiles, it has at last been concluded that this is simply not true, and indeed never was. Recently, Ukrainian defense intelligence admitted that per their own estimates Russia retains about 1,400 long range missiles in its reserves, with a monthly production of roughly 150 units. Russian production of inexpensive Geran drones has also skyrocketed, with Ukrainian intelligence estimating a ceiling as high as 2,000 drones per month.

    There is also the matter of the new Russian missile system – the now famous Oreshnik, or Hazel Tree. Russia tested the Oreshnik system on a large machining plant in Dnipro on November 21, 2024, which allowed the basic capabilities of the system to be gauged. The Oreshnik is an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile, characterized by its hypersonic capabilities (exceeding Mach-10) and its Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle equipped with six separate warheads, with the potential for submunitions in each. Although the attack on Dnipro was essentially a demonstration which used inert training warheads (that is, without explosive payloads), the missile can be configured with nuclear or conventional warheads

    As in the case of the North Korean troops in Kursk, I rather think that the Oreshnik launch was not nearly as important as it was made out to be. The system is expensive and likely impractical for conventional use. I understand the desire to conceive of Oreshnik as a massively powerful conventional weapon – showering its target with half a dozen warheads with the power of an entire flight of Kalibr missiles – but there are several problems with this. The accuracy of the system (the CEP, or “Circular Error Probable” in the technical parlance) is much more consistent with a nuclear delivery system than a conventional one. Furthermore, the problem with using an IRBM for conventional strikes is the danger of miscalculation – foreign adversaries may misinterpret the launch as a nuclear attack and respond appropriately. This is precisely why the Russian government actually alerted the United States to the launch ahead of time – a fine arrangement for a demonstration, but impractical for a weapon that is intended to be used regularly.

    We may see another use of the Oreshnik against Ukraine, but ultimately this is unlikely to be a system of consequence in this war. The demonstration in Dnipro was instead likely intended to send a message to Europe – reminding NATO that Russia has the capacity to deliver strikes against European targets that cannot be intercepted. It also serves as a poignant reminder that Europe lacks the equivalent capability, and in essence provides a demonstration of Russia’s ability to launch missiles from far beyond the range of either Ukrainian or European response. The Hazelnut is a tangible reminder of Russia’s strategic depth and strike dominance in Ukraine.

    Ultimately, Ukraine will lose the strike game. It’s strike capacity has dwindled, with missiles frittered away in a dissipated air campaign, and though the exhaustion of Storm Shadow and ATACMs stocks can be offset somewhat by JASSMs, Ukraine simply lacks the range or quantities necessary to match Russian capabilities. Needing to do more with less, Ukraine instead diffused its assets and failed to synergize its strikes with ground operations. We are now at the end of the line – after JASSMs, there’s nothing left in western warehouses to upgrade Ukrainian capabilities. Hazelnuts or no, the math on this bat fight is bad for Kiev.

    Conclusion: Debellation

    Trapped in an endless news cycle, with daily footage of FPV strikes and exploding vehicles, and a dutiful cottage industry of war mappers alerting us to every 100 meter advance, it can easily feel like the Russo-Ukrainian War is trapped in an interminable doom loop which will never end – Mad Max meets Groundhog Day.

    What I have endeavored to do here, however, is argue that 2024 actually saw several very important developments which make the coming shape of the war relatively clear. To briefly recapitulate:

    1. Russian forces caved in Ukrainian defenses at depth across an entire critical axis of front. After remaining static for years, Ukraine’s position in Southern Donetsk has been obliterated, with Russian forces advancing through an entire belt of fortified positions, pushing the front into Pokrovsk and Kostayantinivka.
    2. The main Ukrainian gambit on the ground (the incursion into Kursk) failed spectacularly, with the salient being progressively caved in. An entire grouping of critical mechanized formations wasted much of the year fighting on this unproductive and secondary front, leaving Ukrainian positions in the Donbas increasingly threadbare and bereft of reserves.
    3. An attempt by the Ukrainian government to reinvigorate its mobilization program failed, with enlistments quickly trailing off. Decisions to expand the force structure exacerbated the shortage of manpower, and as a result the decay of Ukraine’s frontline brigades has accelerated.
    4. Long awaited western upgrades to Ukraine’s strike capabilities failed to defeat Russian momentum, and stocks of ATACMs and Storm Shadows are nearly exhausted. There are now few options remaining to prop up Ukrainian strike capacity, and no prospect of Ukraine gaining dominance in this dimension of the war.

    In short, Ukraine is on the path to debellation – defeat through the total exhaustion of its capacity to resist. They are not exactly out of men and vehicles and missiles, but these lines are all pointing downward. A strategic Ukrainian defeat – once unthinkable to the western foreign policy apparatus and commentariat – is now on the table. Quite interestingly, now that Donald Trump is about to return to the White House, it is suddenly acceptable to speak of Ukrainian defeat. Robert Kagan – a stalwart champion of Ukraine if there ever was one – now says the quiet part out loud:

    Ukraine will likely lose the war within the next 12 to 18 months. Ukraine will not lose in a nice, negotiated way, with vital territories sacrificed but an independent Ukraine kept alive, sovereign, and protected by Western security guarantees. It faces instead a complete defeat, a loss of sovereignty, and full Russian control

    Indeed.

    None of this should be particularly surprising. If anything, it is shocking that my position – that Russia is essentially a very powerful country that was very unlikely to lose a war (which it perceives as existential) right in its own belly – somehow became controversial or fringe. But here we are.

    Carthago delenda est [end]

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  • [Sharing] Report: Ukraine Sent Drones and Drone Operators to HTS Before Offensive That Ousted Assad – Dave DeCamp, Antiwar.com

    HTS, an offshoot of al-Qaeda, is designated by the US as a terror organization

    Ukrainian intelligence had provided Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an offshoot of al-Qaeda, with drone support weeks before the group launched the offensive in Syria that ousted former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, The Washington Post reported Tuesday.

    “Ukrainian intelligence sent about 20 experienced drone operators and about 150 first-person-view drones to the rebel headquarters in Idlib, Syria, four to five weeks ago,” wrote Washington Post columnist David Ignatius.

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    The GUR has received significant support from the US over the years. The Washington Post reported last year that the CIA helped build up the GUR and the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) following the 2014 coup that ousted former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych. “GUR was our little baby. We gave them all new equipment and training,” a former US intelligence official who worked in Ukraine told the Post.

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  • [Sharing] Leaks expose secret British military cell plotting to ‘keep Ukraine fighting’ – Kit Klarenberg, The Grayzone

    Leaked files show top UK military figures conspired to carry out the Kerch bridge bombing, covertly train “Gladio”-style stay-behind forces in Ukraine, and groom the British public for a drop in living standards caused by the proxy war against Russia

    Emails and internal documents reviewed by The Grayzone reveal details of a cabal of British military and intelligence veterans which plotted to escalate and prolong the Ukraine proxy war “at all costs.” Convened under the direction of the British Ministry of Defense in the immediate aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the cell referred to itself as Project Alchemy. As British leadership sabotaged peace talks between Kiev and Moscow, the cell put forward an array of plans “to keep Ukraine fighting” by imposing “strategic dilemmas, costs and frictions upon Russia.”

    The leaks obtained by The Grayzone expose a hidden hand behind Britain’s policy in Ukraine, showing in unusually granular detail how it aimed to engineer a long, grinding war through covert operations that stretched the bounds of legality.

    Project Alchemy’s proposed schemes spanned every conceivable field of warfare, from cyber attacks to “discreet operations” to outright terrorism. The secret cell even put forward a plan to “aggressively pursue” and “dismantle” independent media outlets – including The Grayzone – through an aggressive campaign of legal harassment and online censorship, so they “would be forced to close.” The incendiary blueprints were fed to the highest levels of the British state and national security structure, where they were apparently well-received.

    Founded by a senior British Ministry of Defence official, Project Alchemy is composed of veteran military and intelligence operatives united by a desire for all-out war between the West and Russia. Some have trained Ukrainian forces in clandestine sabotage tactics. 

    Members of the national security cabal tacitly acknowledged that their proposed operations stretched the bounds of British law. Thus they suggested that London should be “prepared to creatively use the law” to meet its goals, and even be willing to erase “legal restrictions on UK deniable ops” against Russia. 

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    It appears the British premier, Keir Starmer, fell under the influence of the Project Alchemy cabal soon after his election in July, when he eagerly embraced the role of “wartime prime minister.” After pledging to support Ukraine “as long as it takes,” however, Starmer is quietly backing away from the maximalist policy. In Kiev, Ukrainians are left to ponder how their “friends” in London got them into this mess, and why they can not, or will not get them out of it.

    The British spooks who gathered around Project Alchemy reasoned that the longer the proxy war continued, the more Russian president Vladimir Putin’s “credibility at home and abroad drops, and his ability to fight NATO is degraded.” Today, Project Alchemy’s gambit has clearly backfired, as Putin remains popular within Russia, while a crumbling Ukrainian army loses territory by the day despite constant re-arming by the West. But the war planners in London remain staunchly committed to escalation, refusing to shelve their diabolical proposals.

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    In an email to British military apparatchiks dated March 3 2022, Stickland described Alchemy’s paper as the result of “some mischief I’ve been up to” with “a group of ‘sideways thinkers.’” He expressed satisfaction that “this has been seen by all sorts of people,” including senior British government and military officials, “and landed well”

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    ‘Ukraine’s Next Chapter – Elders Grand Strategy Options Paper’

    Within Project Alchemy’s covert war room, the obsession with a long war quickly took hold. Members of the cell took their cues from a policy paper Stickland attributed to “The Elders,” which he described as “a group of Fusion players,” referring to the strata of academics and defense industry figures with strong ties to the British military.

    An Alchemy document composed under Stickland’s watch and titled, “Ukraine’s Next Chapter – Elders Grand Strategy Options Paper,” suggests that members of the cabal had convinced themselves a “palace coup” inside the Kremlin was inevitable. So long as Russia struggled inside Ukraine, they believed, British intelligence would be granted “the opportunity to challenge” Moscow’s ever-growing “stature as a competent international actor” on the world stage. 

    “A long war against a small state makes [Putin] look a fool,” the Alchemy paper asserted. “He is obsessed by the end of Ghaddafi – he will want to avoid that… Pressure will pile on from oligarchs as a long war drags on – he will not want to give them excuses to threaten his authority.” The group reasoned that “a long war will affect [Putin’s] international credibility,” as “a failure to quickly defeat Ukraine will seriously… reduce his credibility with new rich friends in Belarus, Hungary, China, India, Middle East, Brazil etc.

    “Most importantly,” protracted Russian involvement in Ukraine “will embolden NATO,” Alchemy argued. Convinced that Putin would fail in the eastern Donbas region, triggering a collapse of his government, Project Alchemy members openly fantasized about absorbing Russia into the Western-dominated financial order afterwards under the guise of a “Post Putin Marshall Plan.” Of particular interest was London’s “re-engagement” with Moscow “in global energy and commodity markets,” a seeming reference to the West’s desire for cheap Russian gas and wheat. 

    “Discreet operations”: reviving ‘Operation Gladio’ terror ops in Ukraine

    To accomplish the balkanization of Russia, Project Alchemy’s plotters took inspiration from Operation Gladio, a CIA and NATO-orchestrated covert operation that saw fascist paramilitaries carry out false flag terrorist attacks across Western Europe after World War II in a bid to prevent communism from taking root.

    A section detailing potential “discreet operations” in Alchemy’s strategy paper, which stressed the “need to intervene in every way except ‘official,’” explicitly recommended “Stay-behind Gladio handbooks/ Partisan Pamphlets” which would be “updated for Information Age” 

    Another move Alchemy proposed was to deploy Britain’s “strong” private military [PMC] industry “to out Wagner, Wagner.” In other words, the group aimed to establish a British rival to the Russian mercenary force founded by the now-deceased commander Yevgeny Prigozhin. This objective required the formulation of “a new doctrine, operating concept, and legal framework, for effectively integrating the activities of PMCs and other [non-military] actors.” Under these guidelines, British mercenary firms capable of using “sophisticated weaponry like SAMS, cyber, combat air, drones” would be employed to “operate and train and accompany Ukraine formations.” 

    These operations were all intended to ultimately be “sponsored and commanded” by the UK government, “using discreet cover” to avoid triggering NATO’s Article 5. 

    Following the production of their grand strategy paper, Stickland invited his team of “sideways thinkers” at Project Alchemy to submit further proposals for Gladio-style operations. Among the pitches that arrived was a “mission” to “disable the Kerch Bridge in a way that is audacious, and disrupts road and rail access to Crimea and maritime access to the Sea of Azov.” The blueprints of this highly provocative plot were exposed by The Grayzone in October 2022, in the immediate aftermath of the truck bomb attack that crippled the Kerch Bridge. 

    Alchemy’s team also produced a PowerPoint presentation entitled, “Training a Ukrainian Commando Force to restore Maritime Sovereignty – Elders,” outlining plans to construct a 1,000-strong Ukrainian commando force “trained in Britain by military veterans equipped with British equipment” to “degrade the Russian Navy and open another flank in the fight for Kherson and the south of Ukraine”

    Alchemy’s team had been working on the plan for at least three months by the time of the presentation’s submission. “Ukrainians abroad and volunteers inside Ukraine” had already been recruited, in advance of 12 weeks basic training “in the use of all troop weapons including mortars, anti-tank missiles, sniper craft, cliff assault, small craft training, demolitions,” the proposal stated

    The plan called for formally integrating the commandos into the Ukrainian Navy. Alchemy boasted that the prospective force “will be a force multiplier and highly mobile,” while Russia’s “outdated doctrine will struggle with a highly motivated and well-equipped naval force conducting hit and run operations and targeting Crimea.”

    Moreover, “individuals who are fluent Russian speakers and deemed suitable for covert undercover operations,” including “female operators,” would be “inserted into southern occupied Ukraine and Crimea for intelligence gathering and sabotage of key infrastructure targets.” They would be trained by MI6 officers. For this, Alchemy asked the British government for a total of £73.5 million. “The program is at a high state of readiness. We are ready to go,” the presentation forcefully declared. 

    The enormous sum was to be paid to Elders Services Ltd that was founded by Alchemy members and registered to an address just 15 miles from Fort Monckton, which was described by former MI6 officer Richard Tomlinson as “the SIS’s field operations training centre.” It is unknown how much money, if any, the firm received from the British government for resuscitating Operation Gladio in Ukraine. Elders Services Ltd shuttered in March 2023 after less than a year of operation, without filing financial accounts.

    British spies call for ‘action’ against The Grayzone

    Behind the Project Alchemy team’s bravado was a sense that Western hegemony was crumbling on the icy borderlands separating Ukraine from Russia. Referring to the rising BRICS alliance, which gathered in Kazan, Russia this October to challenge the US-dominated financial order, Alchemy planners urged British leadership to “prepare for SWIFT II,” as SWIFT was “going to be destroyed” by the West’s anti-Russia sanctions, “slowly, but inevitably.” 

    According to Alchemy’s analysts, countries across the globe would naturally “see the need for a non-US alternative” means of safely parking their cash and trading. In a rare show of political sobriety, the British spooks predicted that sanctions on Russia combined with the Ukraine proxy war would impose higher prices on consumer goods and “hit British voters in the pocket.”

    This posed “a threat to public support” for the British government’s “hard line” on Ukraine, they warned. “Domestic UK public opinion” would understandably get “fed up” paying more for everyday goods, meaning “pressure grows for a compromise.”

    To prepare the British public for the coming storm, Project Alchemy’s plotters proposed what they blandly described as “information operations,” but which could be more accurately described as a blend of domestic state propaganda and malign attacks on disruptive media outlets.

    The task they outlined not only included “[dismantling] Russian disinformation infrastructure” by pressuring social media to ban RT and Sputnik, but also targeting critical independent media like The Grayzone.

    “A number of actions can be undertaken against these outlets. The most obvious is legal since the content of these media outriders is frequently in contravention of media law in the UK, US and EU,” Alchemy insisted. 

    “Aggrieved parties currently tend to ignore libel/defamation by these outlets. Were they to aggressively pursue these outlets, it is likely they would be forced to close.”

    The Grayzone, it was claimed, had thus far “managed to obscure” its funding – a suggestion that this outlet is covertly funded by Russia or some other enemy state, which is completely false. The paranoid fantasies of British intelligence may explain why this journalist was quizzed on the subject by British counter-terror police when they detained and interrogated him at Luton International Airport in May 2023

    Alchemy plotters seek to place Britain at lead of war with Russia

    In addition to playing a leading role in media manipulation, Alchemy sought to place Britain at the forefront of the International Criminal Court’s agenda to investigate and prosecute the Russian government for alleged war crimes in Ukraine. 

    Alchemy suggested London “set international conditions, collection mechanisms and funding for collection of data and evidence” in the proxy conflict, and “provide all possible support, including intelligence” to the ICC “in its efforts to investigate war crimes,” just as British spies did for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). 

    Though not named in the document, high-profile British lawyers, including celebrity Amal Clooney, have since emerged at the forefront of efforts to prosecute Russian officials for war crimes, and establish an ICTY analog. As The Grayzone’s Max Blumenthal reported, Britain played a critical role in the appointment of Amal Clooney’s mentor, Karim Khan, as ICC prosecutor. 

    Project Alchemy’s provocative proposals appear to have reached the desk of PM Keir Starmer in some form. At NATO’s 75th anniversary summit, Starmer issued his full-throated endorsement of deep strikes by the Ukrainian military into Russia. Echoing the aggressive language found in Alchemy documents, he pledged to “deliver £3 billion worth of support to Ukraine each year… for as long as it takes.” 

    But as the Ukrainian military’s offensive in Russia’s Kursk region falters, the Biden administration has distanced itself from the calls for striking into the Russian heartland. Fortunately for British leaders hellbent on taking the fight to Moscow, Project Alchemy has ensured that a platter of off-the-books options remains handy.

    As Alchemy noted in its grand strategy paper, “The UK seeks always to act multilaterally, but is prepared to take a unilateral lead where achieving multilateral consensus might prove time-consuming or difficult.” Among the war’s covert sponsors, who were safely ensconced over 1,000 miles away from the front lines, it was firmly agreed: “we should attempt at all costs to keep Ukraine fighting” [end]

    The original article

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