Analista senior di l'intelligenza in u campu di a gestione di i risichi di sicurezza, sรฒ un anzianu tenente detective รจ ufficiale di l'intelligenza in l'agenzie di u Statu francese. A bona pronuncia hรจ ะะธะบะพะปะฐะน ะงะธะฝะบัะธะฝะธ, in russu
If the door that Moscow says is open is actually closed, itโs closed on this side โ and it wasnโt Rome that closed it of its own accord
A Valdai summit off-site
What Iโm going to share in this article is less technical and more personal than usual. It concerns the information gathered over several days of dialogue, discussion, and, apparently, a โscandalousโ question that became a media sensation in Europe โ because I asked the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, what will become of Europe.
You can find the full video of Vladimir Putinโs speech at the Valdai Forum here.
You can find my remarks and Putinโs responses here.
This year, the Valdai Forum did not meet in Sochi. Invitations sent out in the summer still listed the Black Sea city as the venue, but then, in late August, the organizers announced the move to the Moscow region. According to FT, the Federal Protective Service demanded the relocation, concerned about the threat of Ukrainian drones following a summer of attacks on coastal refineries. This logistical detail carries its own weight. The war โ which at Valdai is always discussed in the language of the international system โ is now also influencing the practical organization of the forum.
The 23rd Annual Meeting took place from September 28 to October 1 under a title that to a European sounds almost like a personal question: โResponsibility for the Future: The Limits of the Possible or Limitless Possibilities?โ The opening featured the Clubโs annual report, Keep Calm. The State and Responsibility for the Future, which the authors present โ with a nod to Kubrick โ as a manual for stopping worrying and learning to love chaos. This was followed by nine thematic sessions, a special session, and, on the final day, the plenary session with the President.
I arrived as an Italian and a European, knowing that in those halls, the two identities carry different weight. Over the course of the week, I spoke, in particular, with four high-level interlocutors: Sergey Karaganov, Maksim Oreshkin, Sergey Lavrov, and, during the plenary session, Vladimir Putin. The first three conversations took place on the sidelines of the sessions, and Iโm recounting them from my notes โ in essence, not word for word. The fourth exchange is public and documented by a transcript, from which Iโm quoting directly.
Taken one by one, the four dialogues convey things that anyone following the Russian debate is already familiar with. When viewed in sequence, however, they paint a clearer picture: a shared assessment of Europe and four different ways of drawing conclusions from it. And, above all, a future that is by no means bright.
Karaganov: Europe as the source of evil
Sergei Karaganov is one of the founders of the Valdai Club, honorary chairman of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, and for years has been the most radical voice of Russian realism. With him, the conversation began immediately with the most contentious point. Europe, he said, is the root of all evil. If it were destroyed, no one would mourn it. A tactical nuclear conflict on its territory would not involve other actors. Europeans have had plenty of time to find a solution to their own problems; now that they have chosen to prepare for war against Russia, it is too late to offer them another chance.
I must be honest: Iโve never been a fan of Karaganov; Iโve often found his views too radical and old-fashioned. But starting with an after-lunch coffee together โ and continuing over the course of a week of discussions โ I discovered that we think very similarly and that his views are by no means trivial. Anyone who has read his recent statements will recognize this line of thinking. In June 2023, Karaganov had publicly argued that Russia should lower the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons to restore credibility to its deterrence and induce the West to withdraw from the conflict in Ukraine. Part of that approach was subsequently incorporated into official documents: the Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence, updated in November 2024, treat an attack by a non-nuclear state carried out with the participation or support of a nuclear power as a joint attack.
His words, however, contain three distinct assertions, and it is worth keeping them separate. The first is a historical and civilizational judgment: Europe as the source of modernityโs great catastrophes, from the world wars to colonialism. This is a thesis that Karaganov has long argued and which can be contested, but it belongs to the realm of interpretation. The second โ that no one would mourn Europe โ is a prediction about othersโ reactions; from what I observed during those days, it resonates with a significant portion of the Asian, African, and Latin American participants. The third is a strategic hypothesis that underpins everything else: a nuclear escalation in Europe would remain confined to Europe.
On this point, the literature on deterrence has been debating for seventy years, and โ fortunately โ empirical evidence is lacking. The factor that complicates this hypothesis lies within Europe itself. France and the United Kingdom possess national arsenals, and in March 2025, Paris formally opened the debate on the European dimension of its own deterrence. A โsolely Europeanโ nuclear conflict presupposes that two European nuclear powers would stand idly by. This is the weakest assumption in the entire argument, regardless of how one assesses the other two.
It should also be noted that Karaganov does not speak on behalf of the government. At the Valdai Forum, he represents the wing of the Russian debate that pushes the Kremlin toward more definitive positions, and one of his roles is precisely to push the boundaries of what can be said. Viewed in this light, his โtoo lateโ is an indication of a trend rather than a doctrine.
Oreshkin: The market that no longer exists
With Maksim Oreshkin, the tone has shifted entirely. Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration, former Minister of Economic Development, and later the Presidentโs economic advisor, Oreshkin reasons in terms of cash flows and balance sheets. His assessment was blunt: Europe is finished. There is no longer any viable competition in the energy market, because China and India now occupy the top spots among Russiaโs customers. And there is no reason to invest in a European bailout, since the Europeans, to date, have shown no interest in finding a peaceful and reasonable solution. The question I had posed to him during the meeting with the Valdai participants was: โGiven that the Nord Stream 2 pipeline is no longer available โ because it was sabotaged โ do you intend to find a new energy transportation system, assuming Europe reconciles and the diplomatic situation improves?โ His blunt โ and perhaps brutal โ response is like a dagger of truth plunged into the conscience of every European.
โOverโ should be understood in a technical sense. Oreshkin was not speaking directly about European civilization but about Europe as a trading partner: a market that has ceased to be central to Russia and therefore does not warrant political concessions to win it back. After 2022, Russian crude oil found its main buyers in China and India, while Brussels, through the agreement between the Council and the European Parliament in December 2025, committed to phasing out imports of Russian gas โ including pipeline gas and LNG โ by 2027. The energy interdependence that had kept Europe and Russia connected for half a century โ even during the worst moments of the Cold War โ has been dismantled by both sides. Oreshkinโs reasoning captures the simplest consequence of this: whoever is no longer the main customer no longer has leverage. These are the laws of the market, and neither in London, nor in Berlin, nor in Brussels are there any politicians or power groups left who can tell Russia โwhat to doโ.
The flip side is well known in Moscow, too. A market dominated by two major buyers allows them to demand discounts, and replacing Europe with Asia comes at a cost in terms of price and access to technology. But according to the logic presented to me, the question is no longer whether Europe is in Russiaโs interest. It is how much it would cost to make it beneficial again, and the implicit answer is that Europeans must bear that cost.
Lavrov: the door closed on โthisโ order
With Sergey Lavrov, the discussion shifted from the economy to diplomacy, without changing the conclusion. Europe, he said, had many opportunities to reestablish a dialogue with Russia and chose instead to fuel direct confrontation. Now it is too late to turn back: all limits have been crossed, and with the current European order, there is no way to return to previous relations.
Iโd like us to pause for a moment to consider the weight of these words. Those who know Lavrov know that he is a politician capable of weighing every word with great intelligence, even in more relaxed settings such as the Valdai Summit. โThe limits have been crossed.โ It would be pointless to list these limits, because they are so obvious to the whole world that it would simply be a waste of time. But the look in Lavrovโs eyes as he spoke about Europe โ I will never forget that. I have met him many other times, but on this occasion, there was something different.
The minister has a track record of events that Russian diplomacy regularly references: the Minsk agreements, the draft treaties on security guarantees submitted to the United States and NATO on December 17, 2021, and the Istanbul negotiations in the spring of 2022. The Russian interpretation of each of these developments is controversial, and it is contested in Europe. What interests me here is another element โ a qualification that, upon re-reading after the plenary session, proved to be the key to the entire week. A return is impossible under this European framework. Not with Europe, in its current form โ that is, the EU and NATO. The rejection concerns a ruling class and an institutional architecture, not the countries that are part of it.
I wonder just how much Russian patience has been abused to reach the point of saying such things? Classic Russian literature offers us admirable examples of how Russian politicians are capable of stalling, ignoring, and being patient. And thereโs no denying that this has consistently been the attitude of the Russian ruling class during the recent years of conflict. To go so far as to say that the limit has been crossed โ something Putin would later echo in the summitโs plenary session โ means there are no more resources to waste on patient waiting; it means the Bear has been awakened from its hibernation at the wrong moment; it means the consequences of these actions will be of epochal significance.
Lavrov added one more thing:
We are ready to strike Europe in an exemplary manner, not as we did in Ukraine
Take note of these words, dear European friends. Reread them and reflect on their weight. Nothing more needs to be said.
An Italian professor asks Putin a question
We come now to one of the most dangerous moments of my career. The plenary session took place, as is traditional, with the Russian president in attendance and Fyodor Lukyanov moderating. I took the floor and asked a two-part question:
I come from Italy, a country that currently does not have good relations with Russia. As a European, I would like to ask you: What conditions will Russia set for developing a new security system for European countries? And, if we imagine a post-European Union Europe, will you consider it part of a great Eurasian partnership, or, in your view, will the United States and Russia always be competing for these territories?
Putin began with the second part, and the order is no coincidence:
Italy is, in fact, located in Europe, and I am speaking of a Eurasian partnership: it goes without saying, therefore, that we will consider โ and already do consider โ Italy a Eurasian partner as well
Immediately afterward, he clarified that the fate of the European Union, and Italyโs continued membership in it, โis none of our business.โ Moscow does not even intend to discuss it, because any comment on the matter would be interpreted as an attempt to break up the EU, โwhile we do not want to break up anything at all. We only want to build and cooperate.โ
On the conditions for a new security system, the response was clear: โWe have no preconditions.โ The obstacle, in his view, lies on the other side. Some European politicians consider it unacceptable for a single country to open a dialogue with Russia, and Putin has called this demand a diktat even harsher than that of the Soviet era. The comparison was carefully crafted: the USSR was a unitary and highly centralized state, whose republics were part of a single state structure; the European Union, in theory, is not, but in practice behaves as if it were. โNo one is forbidding us; weโre ready.โ
At that point, Lukyanov interjected with a provocative remark typical of an experienced moderator: since Brussels forbids it, wouldnโt it be better to contribute a little to the disintegration of the EU, so as to make it easier to deal with individual countries? The answer came without hesitation: โBut thereโs no need โ theyโll fall apart on their own.โ
Then Putin addressed me directly. โOur Italian colleague knows this better than we do,โ he said, and began running the numbers: Italian public debt at 140%, the deficit around 3%, and in other European countries close to 5%. The figures were rounded but not far from the truth. According to Istat and Eurostat, at the end of 2024, Italyโs public debt stood at 135.3% of GDP and its net borrowing at 3.4%. The point of the passage, however, wasnโt about the decimal points. All problems start with the economy: living standards fall, unemployment rises, and citizens of the major European economies feel it firsthand โ and this, he said, โalso undermines the very foundations of the European Union. But thatโs not our business; we donโt interfere.โ
He concluded by reiterating the offer in a balanced manner: dialogue with the Union as a whole, if the Union so desires, or with individual countries, without preconditions. โBut there must be no preconditions on the European side either.โ
Trying to grasp the magnitude of these words, the political balance they reveal, and the strength of a statesman who cares not only about the good of his own country but also that of an entire other continent is a true lesson in what politics is all about.
Listen to Putinโs entire speech, and you will understand how, in less than five minutes, it is possible to capture the decline of all of Europe, in all its facets, while at the same time wistfully reiterating that Russia has done everything in its power to offer its assistance. But the choices of Europeans are their own, whatever flag they may fly. Russia respects and will always respect the fundamental principles of its foreign policy and its political tradition. No miraculous messianism, no improvised savior.
Europe โ or rather, the Europeans of this Europe โ what do they intend to do?
Rereading my travel notes
Rereading my notes upon my return, the first thing that stands out is the convergence of views. The strategist, the economist, the foreign minister, and the President have each expressed, in their own words, the same assessment: todayโs Europe has exhausted its credit with Moscow. The second thing that stands out is that each draws a different conclusion from that diagnosis.
For Karaganov, the conclusion is coercive and takes on an almost eschatological tone: Europe has had its chance, and what follows is no longer a matter for diplomacy. For Oreshkin, it is a matter of cold, hard accounting: Europe is not worth the investment needed to win it back. For Lavrov, it is a limited diplomatic withdrawal, focused on the political structure rather than the people. Finally, for Putin, the door remains open โ but toward individual states, not toward Brussels โ accompanied by the expectation that economic erosion will do the rest.
The apparent contradiction between the โtoo lateโ stance of the first three and the โno preconditionsโ stance of the fourth is resolved precisely in Lavrovโs characterization. The result is a coherent line, which I would call โbilateralizationโ: Moscow will not deal with the Union as a political entity as long as its current leadership remains in place; it offers individual member states channels without preconditions and lets Europeโs internal difficulties make those channels attractive. The reference to Italy as a Eurasian partner โalready todayโ must be understood within this framework: it is not a courtesy; it is an indication of which interlocutor Moscow prefers.
I certainly cannot claim that the four exceptional interlocutors had reached an agreement โ that goes without saying โ but I found this convergence truly โprophetic.โ Valdai has always been the venue where the breadth of Russian debate is showcased to a foreign audience. I can say that these perspectives are compatible and mutually reinforcing: Karaganovโs tough stance makes Putinโs offer appear moderate; Oreshkinโs figures lend credibility to the idea that Moscow does not need to make concessions; and Lavrovโs formula balances firmness with openness.
The 2010โ2012 sovereign debt crisis gave rise to the European Stability Mechanism and the banking union; the pandemic led to Next Generation EU and the first large-scale common debt. Within the Union, crises have generated at least as much centralization as fragmentation. โThey will fall apart on their ownโ is therefore a gamble, not an observation โ even if the gamble costs little to those making it: if the EU holds together, Moscow has at least offered dialogue; if it collapses, it already has bilateral channels in place.
The indicators to watch over the next twelve to eighteen months are fairly clear. The first concerns bilateral visits to Moscow by EU heads of government, in addition to the previous visits by Viktor Orbรกn in July 2024 and Robert Fico in May 2025. The second is whether unanimity holds during the semi-annual renewals of sanctions, where a single veto is enough to open a crack. The third concerns national exemptions from the timeline for phasing out Russian gas. The fourth โ and most significant for us โ is the possible opening of a structured channel by a major capital, including Rome.
What do I take away from this? As an Italian, the phrase Iโm taking with me isnโt the one about disintegration; itโs the other one: โWe already consider Italy a Eurasian partner as well.โ It contains both an offer and an observation directed at us. If the door that Moscow says is open is actually closed, itโs closed on this side โ and it wasnโt Rome that closed it of its own accord.
How long can a country with a debt exceeding 135% of GDP afford to leave it up to others to decide who can speak with whom? No one in Moscow asked me that. Itโs a question I brought home with me on my own. And every Italian of good conscience, every European who still has a heart, knows the answer [end]
this article is the product of visits to Russia I made in June and September 2026 where I met with senior Russian leaders, leading academics, and specialists in military and security issues
in French, ce 11 novembre 2025 est lโoccasion de souligner comme la faรงon dont lโEurope sacrifie les conscrits ukrainiens mobilisรฉs de force rappelle le spectaculaire carnage de la 1รจre guerre mondiale
chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia
This article is the product of visits to Russia I made in June and September 2026 where I met with senior Russian leaders, leading academics, and specialists in military and security issues
There has been a spate of irresponsibly aggressive rhetoric from within Europe strongly posturing for a conflict with Russia by the end of the decade. This rhetoric comes in the context of the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine, which is well into its fifth year, a conflict which both Europe and the United States openly acknowledge operates in the form of a proxy war between the collective West and Russia. The Russian response has been to accelerate its military efforts against Ukraine while putting NATO on notice that any effort to threaten Russian territory, and particularly the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, would see Russia responding with the full compliment of military capabilities, including nuclear weapons. The current situation in Europe today in many ways replicates the conditions that existed on the continent in the summer of 1914, where military mobilization and war preparations created a momentum that produced a war no politician was seriously looking to prosecute. The consequences of war in 1914 were a disaster for Europe; the consequences of a war today would be fatal to civilization as we know it.
In examining the geopolitical map of Europe/Eurasia today, one can assess four points of military friction between Russia, the United States and Europe. These are Ukraine, the Arctic, Kaliningrad, and Outer Space. While each represents a physically distinct problem set politically and militarily, they are all four inextricably linked through a common Russophobic mindset in Europe and the United States which treats Russia as a singular security issue. Moreover, both Europe and the US operate from a strategic mindset driven by zero-sum thinking, which postures Russia as being structurally motivated to bring harm to both Europe and the United States, thereby stifling the possibility of cooperation with Russia that could resolve many if not all of the underlying issues which are collectively construed by the West as presenting a threat. For its part, Russia operates from a mindset derived from the psychology of perpetual victimhood dating back centuries, and a historical foundation of resistance to aggression which seeks diplomatic resolution until which point military confrontation becomes the only solution
Ukraine: The (perceived) chink in the Soviet/Russian armor
The current conflict in Ukraine between Russia and the West did not begin in 2022 with the Russian invasion but rather represents the logical conclusion of a posture on the part of the United States and NATO which sought to exploit the ultra-nationalism of Western Ukraine in order to create a framework of instability designed to weaken the Soviet Union, and later Russia, from within. To understand this mindset, one first must delve into the psychology underpinning the concept of Ukrainian nationalism. For Russia, Ukraine represents part of a larger family of Slavic peoples which include the Russians and Belarussians; indeed, this notion is shared by millions of Ukrainians as well. One only need to look at the integration of Ukraine within the cultural and historical roots of Russia over time to understand the reality of this sentiment.
For the West, this reality presents a problem, since it lends itself toward the existence of a singular Slavic state possessing tremendous geographical advantages and unmatched natural resources which in turn creates massive economic penitential that competes with Western notions of global supremacy. Nazi Germany sought to nullify this Slavic potential through the implementation of Generalplan Ost, the literal cultural and physical genocide of the Slavic race. The United States and the United Kingdom (and later, NATO, inclusive of a newly militarized West Germany), continued this policy of Slavic nullification by promoting anti-Soviet resistance on the part of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), including military support of partisans operating in Ukraine loyal to Stepan Bandera, a former ally of Nazi Germany whose forces perpetrated large-scale atrocities against Jews, Poles and Russians during the Second World War. When the war ended, the German intelligence organization responsible for managing the OUN operations was taken over by the US military and later, under the auspices of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), used to direct anti-Soviet armed resistance up until 1954-55. The CIA continued to provide active support for the OUN, using the Ukrainian diaspora, through the 1990โs.
The role of western intelligence, led by the CIA and the British Special Intelligence Service (SIS), in post-Soviet Ukraine was singularly focused on promoting Ukrainian nationalism at the expense of Russia. The political campaign waged against the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine by western intelligence emerged front and center when the two-term President of Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma, stepped down in 2005 after carrying out policies designed to improve Ukraine-Russian relations. Kuchma threw his support behind the Russian-speaking Viktor Yanukovych. For the West, a Yanukovych presidency would undermine their strategic goal of stripping Ukraine away from Russia. The result was the so-called โOrange Revolutionโ, which saw Yanukovych’s electoral victory overturned in favor of Ukrainian nationalists who promoted a distinctly anti-Russian policy which saw Ukraine pivot toward the European Union and seek NATO membership. The latter development was seen by Russia as a red line which, if pursued, would inevitably lead to a military conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Yanukovych’s election in 2010 was deemed a setback to the Western designs on Ukraine, leading to the West supporting a violent coup in February 2014 that saw Yanukovych driven from power, replaced by pro-western Ukrainian nationalists.
It should be clear that a physical confrontation between Ukraine and Russia has always been the goal of the collective West. Efforts to take control of the Russian political space had, by 2014, failed. The so-called โresetโ of 2009 was little more than a political cover for a regime change operation designed to replace Vladimir Putin, who had ruled Russia since taking over from Boris Yeltsin at the end of 1999, and in the intervening decade taken Russia down the road of economic and national recovery that the West, operating in full zero-sum mode, simply could not tolerate. The concerted efforts of President Obama to interfere in the Russian parliamentarian elections of 2011 and the presidential election of 2012 failed to remove Putin from power. The actions in Ukraine in 2014 and afterwards must be viewed in this light; nothing happens in a vacuum.
The Ukraine conflict was never avoidable, despite Russiaโs concerted efforts to engage in diplomacy designed to do just that. The defeat of the Ukrainian army in 2014-15 at the hands of Russian-backed separatists in the Donbas led to the adoption of the Minsk peace accords. It is now established fact that neither Ukraine, its two European partners (France and Germany), nor the United States ever had any intention of following through on the Minsk process. Instead, the Minsk process was designed to buy time for NATO to build a new Ukrainian army capable of holding its own against Russia. Indeed, from 2015-to 2022, the United States and NATO did just that, training over 80,000 Ukrainian forces, including thousands of Ukrainian nationalists labeled as neo-Nazi by the United States Congress, to NATO military standards. The stated purpose of this training was to enable Ukraine to take physical possession of the Donbas and Crimea, which was annexed by Russia in 2014 following the CIA-backed coup in Kiev. When Ukraine began amassing these NATO-trained troops in the Donbas region in early 2022, Russia launched a pre-emptive action which, more than five years later, has become an openly acknowledged proxy war with the collective West, inclusive of the US and NATO.
The stated goal of both the US and Europe in pursuing this proxy conflict with Russia is nothing less than the strategic defeat of Russia. What does this mean in practice? First of all, the proxy war was never intended to result in a Ukrainian military victory against Russia. Rather, the goal was to draw Russia into a conflict which would exhaust its military potential, break its economy, and collapse its society to the point that the government of Vladimir Putin would be removed from power. This entire policy is postulated on the understanding that Vladimir Putin must be removed from power. As such, and solution that does not attain that objective is rejected out of hand, a pattern of behavior reflective of the zero-sum mentality that drives western policy making. As a result, every potential off-ramp that Russia has been willing to consider, from the Istanbul communique of 2022 to the Anchorage compromise of 2025, has been rejected by the West, exposing the reality that for the West diplomacy is just a tool to buy time to further strengthen Ukraine militarily in order to draw the Ukraine-Russian conflict out to its desired conclusionโthe collapse of Russia. In short, Minsk on replay.
Russia has proven to be surprisingly resilient in the face of this concerted western effort designed to collapse it as a viable nation state. The Russia economy not only has survived in the face of western sanctions but, in concert with effective Russian diplomacy that has exploited western diplomatic miscues to build a large and supportive global constituency, thrived as it has found foreign markets in the Global South that have largely replaced the lost European and US markets. Russian society, blindsided by a war it was not prepared for, has rallied solidly behind President Putin, as the results of the recent parliamentarian elections underscored. And far from exhausting Russia militarily, the Ukraine conflict has enabled Russia to fine-tune its defense industrial base, producing significant quantities of advanced military equipment and weaponry that for the most part far exceeds that being produced by the collective West in both quality and quantity. When this material is matched up with a combat-hardened pool of manpower, the result is that Russia today possesses the most combat-capable military force in the world, far exceeding anything either NATO or the United States can put into the field.
In short, the western gambit targeting Russia has failedโthe Russian military is stronger today by an order of magnitude, its economy far more diverse and self-sustaining, and its population far more unified than it was in 2022. Moreover, Russia shows no signs of faltering on any frontโeconomically, diplomatically, socially, or politically.
The same cannot be said for either Europe or the United States. Despite the war-like rhetoric coming out of Germany and Poland and backed up by statements made by US military officers, both active duty and retired, the reality is that the proxy war between the collective West and Russia was always meant to be just thatโa proxy war. There has never been a realistic plan for the conflict to become a direct clash between Russia and NATO, if for no other reason than NATO simply lacks the capacity to generate sufficient forces capable of high-intensity conflict for any sustainable period. NATOโs military power has largely atrophied in the decades since the end of the Cold War, requiring an infusion of investment over time to recover which Europe currently does not seem capable of providing. The United States is itself in a posture of global retrograde, seeking to withdraw from Europe rather than resume a Cold War-like posture that is neither politically or economically viable.
With Russia seemingly closing the door on the possibility of a negotiated settlement with the west over Ukraine, Europe and the United States are confronted with the uncomfortable reality that their strategic objectives in Ukraine will not reach fruition. Russia will continue to press for a military solution which meets all its stated objectives, including the kind of concerted de-Nazification which would make extinct the very virulent Ukrainian nationalism which has always fueled the western efforts in Ukraine against Russia.
In short, there will be no war between Europe and Russia over Ukraine. Europe will support Ukraine until Ukraine has exhausted its resourcesโmanpower and economicโand then watch helplessly as Russia consolidates its position in what is left of the Ukrainian nation. โTo the last Ukrainianโ appears to be a concept that both Ukraine and its western supporters have taken to heart
The Arctic: The economic trigger of potential conflict
In a rational world, the collective West would regroup after its pending defeat in Ukraine and seek to repair its considerable losses. But in a zero-sum world, this is not possible. A Russian victory in Ukraine requires, in the minds of those Russophobes in the west still dreaming of the collapse of Vladimir Putinโs Russia, a โwinโ which will level the geopolitical playing field. Given the reality that one of the consequences of the westโs failed Ukrainian gambit is the economic decimation of Europe, issues of economic import, not surprisingly take on increased importance when configuring a post-Ukraine geopolitical posture in opposition to Russia.
One of the main issues confronting Europe today is discerning a coherent economic and foreign policy when it comes to China. European diplomacy in this regard has been disastrous, resulting in the collapse of critical sectors of the European economy (car manufacturing, for instance) as a result of ill-conceived notions of โde-riskingโ (an American-origin term designed to camouflage the real intent of such policy, which is โde-linking.โ) But one cannot possibly speak of โde-risking/de-linkingโ when there are no viable alternative markets to replace that which oneโs policies seek to vacate.
Europeโs strategic objective of isolating Russia from China has backfiredโtoday it is Europe that is increasingly isolated, and Russia-Chinese relations, including economic, are strong and getting stronger. One of the critical areas of Russia-Chinese cooperation is the development of the Northeast Passage or, as it is often referred to in China, the โIce Silk Roadโ, a 5,500-kilometer stretch of waterway running from the Bering Strait in the east to the Barents Sea in the west. Use of this waterway has become increasingly possibleโand profitableโenabling container ships to make the journey from East China to European ports such as Rotterdam around 20-days faster that the current Suez Canal route used by most shipping companies.
The Northeast Passage operates exclusively in Russian territorial waters. It also transits the Arctic zone, meaning that for much of the year its functionality is dependent upon Russian icebreakers. The passage also operates under the umbrella of Russian security and legal norms. The economic potential of the Arctic used to the sole purview of the Arctic Council, who members used to meet on a regular basis to coordinate policies impacting on the economy, security, and ecology of the Arctic region. However, in 2022, following the invasion of Ukraine, Russia was kicked out of the Arctic Council. And, following the admission of Finland and Sweden to NATO, the Arctic Council has assumed a NATO-only posture, with its policies reflecting the strategic goals and objectives of its collective membership, namely being the strategic defeat of Russia.
Climate change has altered the geopolitical realities of the Arctic region, with melting ice caps not only opening sea lines of communication previously denied and/or restricted because of weather but also making economic exploitation of significant mineral resources exposed by the retreating ice physically possible and fiscally viable. Normally, the Arctic Council would seek to regulate access to the Arctic to balance economic and ecological concerns within a security framework where all partiesโ interests are taken into consideration.
But in the zero-sum world, the Russo-Sino economic penetration of the Arctic space is deemed a threat to the collective West requiring a military response. This reality was underscored during the recently convened European Arctic Summit, hosted by Finland in mid-September. The European Union leadership, citing unsubstantiated claims of โsignificant and long-term threatsโ from Russia to Euro-Atlantic security, committed itself to strengthening its Arctic security postureโi.e., the militarization of the Arctic, focusing on military mobility, cross-border connectivity and necessary infrastructure in the northernmost regions of the Arctic.
The fact is, however, that NATO is non-competitive with Russia when it comes to Arctic security issues. What the European Arctic Summit gave lip service to about the militarization of the Arctic, Russia has already fully implemented and continues to improve. While NATO nations are capable of engaging in acts of provocation, such as the recent seizure of a Russian research vessel off the northern Norwegian island of Svalberg, the rapidity in which the Norwegian government most to ensure similar actions are not undertaken in Norwegian territorial waters underscores the fact that Norway is not keen of provoking any sort of direct confrontation with Russia in the Arctic. The real threat to the West in the Arctic is not Russiaโs capable military forces, but the fact that Russia, together with China, are imposing a new transit-based economic reality which will provide extraordinary leverage going forward by making traditional shipping carriers and routes non-competitive with the new โIce Silk Roadโ Russia and China have already implemented. The ability to sustainably ship containers to Europe at half the cost of the current shipping routes is a game changer in every way and creates a new reality that the West will not be able to catch up to for some time, if ever
Kaliningrad: low-hanging fruit, or impregnable fortress?
The psychosis of the zero-sum trap the West has set for itself when it comes to Russia requires that NATO manufacture a victoryโperceived or otherwiseโcapable of off-setting its failures in Ukraine and impotence in the Arctic. In this regard, the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad has emerged as a perceived Russian Achilles Heel. The former commander of NATO ground forces in Europe, US General Chris Donahue, openly bragged this past July that NATO forces would be able to overwhelm Russian defenses in Kaliningrad in short order. Germany and Poland have argued for intensified NATO military exercises near the borders of Kaliningrad, the goal of which would be to generate sufficient concern within the Russian leadership to cause them to pull troops out from the Special Military Operation zone to Kaliningrad in response. Several western military and security analysts have articulated assessments which indicate that Russiaโs actual military posture in Kaliningrad is much weaker that publicly acknowledged. And numerous western politicians have made declarations indicating that Russia is preparing to carry out acts of aggression against NATO using the Kaliningrad exclave as a base of operations.
But the reality is that while Russia is more than capable of defending Kaliningrad from any NATO aggression, the Russian military is not currently postured in the Kaliningrad exclave to carry out any sustainable offensive operations of any scale against any of its NATO neighborsโany contention to the contrary is simply rhetorical propaganda. Both the Russian 11th Army Corps and the Baltic Marinesโthe core ground combat forces stationed in Kaliningradโhave extensive combat experience in Ukraine and have developed a skill set with combat drones that would most likely disrupt and defeat any NATO offensive operations directed at the Kaliningrad exclave. The Russia military has likewise created an active reserve Rifle Regiment, BARS-39, which draws upon veteran soldiers possessing active-duty combat experience, especially in drone warfare.
But the real threat to Kaliningrad doesnโt come from any potential ground offensive launched by NATO. Rather, it would emerge in the form of a naval blockade of the exclave. Since 2022, the railway lines that connect Kaliningrad with Russia have been subjected to severe restrictions by Lithuania when it comes to the transit of good to and from Russia; the issue of compliance with European Union sanctions of Russia lays at the heart of this matter. Russian-registered vehicles are likewise not permitted to transit Lithuania and Poland. Russia has compensated for this loss of connectivity by increasing the scope and scale of water ferry service between Russia and Saint Petersburg. While Russia has been able to sustain economic growth through this resupply effort, the fact is that this ferry-boat lifeline is very expensive, and many goods, such as gasoline, are subsidized by the Russian government to keep prices under control. If NATO were to impose naval restrictions on shipping into and out of Kaliningrad, as some of its members have suggested, the economic viability of the exclave would be threatened. It is because of this vulnerability that the Russian government put NATO on notice that any effort to subject Kaliningrad to a naval blockade, or any other act of military aggression, would be responded to with the totality of Russiaโs military capability, including nuclear weapons.
This nuclear muscle flexing appears to have dampened the enthusiasm on the part on some of the most vociferous NATO proponents of plucking what they thought would be low-hanging fruit; now that it is clear that any conflict involving a NATO attacks on Kaliningrad would not be treated in isolation, but rather constitute a conflict of existential proportions, the war drums have been muted
Space: The final frontier
The last topic on the list of potential points of conflict-generating friction between Russia and the US-European collective is outer space. Space-based sensors have played a critical role in the collection of intelligence used to support military operations in Ukraine and, in the case of Ukraine, to strike strategic targets in the depth of Russia. Likewise, the US commercial Starlink satellite communications system has assumed an essential role in Ukrainian military communications, to include playing a critical part in enabling Ukrainian long-range drone attacks on Russian energy infrastructure.
The United States has recently announced that it has deployed โon orbit space control weaponsโ in Earthโs orbit. While the technical characteristics of these weapons has not been detailed, evidence suggests that these weapons are non-kinetic in nature, using reversible technology such as electronic warfare to temporarily โblindโ a targeted satellite. US President Donald Trump has alluded to the use of a space-based weapon operating in support of US military strikes on Iranian nuclear-related targets in June 2025.
Russia is in the process of deploying its own Starlink analog satellite constellation, known as Rassvet. When fully functional, Rassvet will provide Russia with satellite-based communications capability on par with Starlink. Ukraine, recognizing that Rassvet will enable Russia to more effectively guide its drones to their targets, has requested the United States to disable the Russian satellite network. Russia has indicated that it would take down the entire Starlink system in retaliation, using kinetic means which could threaten other satellites operating in earth orbit.
The weaponization of space represents a dangerous point of escalation, especially given the US capability of temporarily blinding satellites. In the zero-sum world that the US and Europe reside in, the need to be seen as offsetting a Russian win in Ukraine, and Russiaโs stymying of NATO escalation efforts in the Arctic and against Kaliningrad, may prove too much of a temptation in the minds of western leaders unable to structure a behavioral model in relationship with Russia that isnโt premised on Russophobic goals and objectives requiring Russiaโs strategic defeat.
Conclusion
The United States and Europe have, over the course of the past several decades, built a policy trap centered on using Ukraine as a vehicle for achieving the collapse of Russia and the government of Vladimir Putin. The โtrapโ is the zero-sum mentality which governs implementation of this policy, linking the political and economic viability of those pursuing such policy to its successful implementation. The looming failure in Ukraine has created a need for finding new vectors capable of furthering the policy objective of achieving a strategic victory over Russia, including options to expand the zone of conflict between the US-European collective and Russia into the Arctic, the Baltics, and Outer Space. Russia has effectively countered each one of these efforts which, when viewed in isolation, appear to be manageable problem sets with limited escalation potential. However, when viewed in the aggregate, the potential for a misunderstanding and/or miscalculation driven by domestic political imperatives existent in the nations comprising the US-European collective. Here, nations possessing considerable influence over the decisions being made by the collective, such as the US, France, and Germany, are undergoing political transformations that could alter the existing political posture, including policies related to the strategic defeat of Russia as a desirable outcome. The enemy in all of this is not Russia, but rather the zero-sum thinking of the collective West which leaves them married to a policy model that is incapable of being successfully implemented, and which, if pursued aggressively, will lead to their collective demise.
Note: I was able to visit the Special Military Operation zone, the Arctic region, oil fields, and Kaliningrad, in addition to participating in high level forums and meetings in Moscow and Saint Petersburg. The views expressed here are my personal assessment based upon these meetings, and are not meant as a formal expression of official Russian policy.
This article is the byproduct of the independent journalism I have been undertaking for the past several years, traveling to Russia for the singular purpose of capturing the Russian reality and bringing it to the attention of a western audience held hostage by Russophobic corporate media. I cover all of my expenses, which means that the trips necessary for the production of this article could not have taken place without the generous support of subscribers and followers who have provided donations for that purpose. I will continue to write articles and release videos about these past visits. I will also continue planning and preparing for future visits to Russia, including one scheduled for November where I will attend a conference on humanitarian issues and continue to meet and interview interesting and knowledgeable people. I thank everyone who has contributed to this work, past, present and future [end]
65-year-old Scott Ritter is a former intelligence officer within the US Marine Corps (USMC), then inspector of the United Nations in Iraq. When in 2003, the US and their British minions were about to invade the country under this false pretext, Ritter was claiming that there was no weapon of mass destruction (WMD) there. He was right.
its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine, chronicle
Jacques Baud has been sanctioned by the European Union for speaking truth to power. He deserves the support of all freedom loving people around the world
in the Jacques Baud case, the EU is sanctioning, for the first time, an analyst not for spreading disinformation but for expressing a politically inconvenient truth, all while admitting he has broken no law. Will it have the courage to go after an American citizen?
operation enters the second week of Ukraineโs long-awaited and highly touted counteroffensive, some basic conclusions can be drawn even though the fighting continues, and will continue to rage, for some time to come
est aprรจs Nicolas Sarkozy et Franรงois Hollande, le troisiรจme gouverneur dโune France infรฉodรฉe aux รtats-Unis et ร leurs intรฉrรชts. Et en mรชme temps, que ce soit l’expression de son arrogance ou une faรงon de sรฉduire ses rares รฉlecteurs, il sโagite dans des efforts dรฉsespรฉrรฉs pour apparaรฎtre au dessus de ses moyens
ici ร droite, avec Volodymyr Zelenskyy, le 16 juin 2022 ร Kiev (Ludovic Marin / AFP)
Sa personnalitรฉ infantile, ses caprices, sa vacuitรฉ abyssale de politicien typique de l’Occident de ce dรฉbut de troisiรจme millรฉnaire, de pur communicant, en font sans doute le personnage le moins intรฉressant de ce panthรฉon. Je retiens quand mรชme de Macron qu’il tenta le 11 novembre 2018 de rรฉhabiliter le dirigeant fasciste Philippe Pรฉtain.
Compte tenu des qualitรฉs rรฉelles de l’imposteur, il est heureux que la France soit aujourd’hui vassale des USA, qui au Niger ou en Ukraine, savent calmer d’un sifflet les rodomontades des autoritรฉs franรงaises. Car mรชme les รtats-uniens sont plus compรฉtents et moins nuisibles aux restes de l’humanitรฉ
Capture d’รฉcran d’un film de l’armรฉe franรงaise, qui montre le meurtre habituel d’un civil pendant la guerre de libรฉration de l’Algรฉrie (1954-1962)
Quand des pays comme l’Allemagne ou la France, avec leurs passifs historiques, ont l’insolence de prรฉtendre dรฉfendre, comme des vierges de Delphes, la dรฉmocratie ou la libertรฉ, les vastes restes du monde rigolent doucement. La dรฉcence la plus รฉlรฉmentaire exigerait plus d’humilitรฉ.
La derniรจre action indรฉpendante et dรฉcente de la France sur la scรจne internationale fut pour le bien, en 2003, l’opposition de Jacques Chirac ร l’invasion anglo-รฉtats-unienne de l’Irak
Sarkozy, il faut lui marcher dessus. Et du pied gauche, cela porte bonheur – Jacques Chirac, le 14 juillet 2004 (photo de Charles Platiau / Reuters)
Une invasion qui prรฉcรฉda la destruction en 2011 de la Libye (Sarkozy), cause de l’activitรฉ djihadiste au Sahel, le soutien ร l’insurrection sunnite radicale contre le gouvernement laรฏc de Syrie (Hollande), que les Parisiens payรจrent un vendredi, puis le coup d’รtat d’extrรชme-droite en Ukraine et la guerre au Donbass depuis 2014. Les Occidentaux sont devenus des fous furieux et les Franรงais sont aujourd’hui parmi les pires
Tout vient ร point qui sait attendre. Le 2 janvier 2023, ma rรฉcompense fut la lippe de Bruno Le Maire, qui de son plateau TV, contemplait une frappe russe contre des renforts atlantistes en Rรฉpublique populaire de Donetsk. En mars 2022, le surintendant des finances voulait provoquer l’effondrement de l’รฉconomie russe. Mais ce sont les Franรงais, qui deux ans plus tard, sont dilatรฉs comme jamais
En juin 2023, dรฉjร , la 12e brigade spรฉciale, รฉmanation de l’organisation nazie Azov dans la garde nationale ukrainienne, employait au front l’obusier de 155 mm TRF1, prรฉdรฉcesseur dans l’armรฉe franรงaise du CAESAR
En 1991, lโUnion soviรฉtique sโeffondra et lโOTAN fut confrontรฉe ร une crise existentielle : sa raison dโรชtre nโexistait plus. Mais plutรดt que de se dรฉmanteler, elle sโest donnรฉe une nouvelle mission : sโรฉtendre. Et dans une boucle autorรฉfรฉrentielle, lโexpansion de lโOTAN crรฉerait lโhostilitรฉ nรฉcessaire pour se justifier
Et voila le rรฉsultat, la descente dโune prise de coke qui รฉtait censรฉe apaiser les troubles anxieux de petits bourgeois froussards, que leur lรขchetรฉ fait aujourdโhui immoler des centaines de milliers dโUkrainiens, enrรดlรฉs de force dans les troupes atlantistes. Les incantations sur la dรฉmocratie ou la libertรฉ ne sont quโune bouillie politiquement correcte, le colonialisme du XIXe siรจcle, qui dรฉjร prรฉtendait civiliser, passรฉ au blender. La question se pose encore une fois : qui sont les barbares ?
Un peu d’humour biรฉlorusse le 9 mars 2024
Le 30 mars 2024, deux vrais journalistes, Serge Halimi et Pierre Rimbert, dรฉcrivent enfin dans le Monde diplomatique ce qui se passe dans le microcosme politico-journalistique d’un pays qu’au tout dรฉbut de ce troisiรจme millรฉnaire, la CIA classait dรฉjร parmi les rรฉpubliques bananiรจres
Troupes franรงaises en Ukraine, une gaffe prรฉsidentielle sous escorte mรฉdiatique : les nouveaux chiens de guerre […] ร la fin de lโhiver, les journalistes franรงais se sont รฉvertuรฉs ร transformer une gaffe prรฉsidentielle en un joyau de lโanalyse gรฉopolitique […]
Le phรฉnomรจne est paradoxal, mais plus La France rรฉtrรฉcit, plus elle se prend pour le centre du monde. Dans la rรฉalitรฉ, le camp occidental a aussitรดt rabrouรฉ le fanfaron, qui a donc ratรฉ sa brillante manoeuvre psychologique. Seule la presse bleu horizon ne le trouve pas ridicule et si lโarmรฉe franรงaise devait obรฉir ร lโordre absurde de sโengager seule en Ukraine, les survivants en reviendraient plus traumatisรฉs que ceux de la Bรฉrรฉzina.
Alors que selon la rumeur, Macron serait sur le point dโofficialiser la prรฉsence de militaires franรงais sur le champ de bataille en Ukraine et au Donbass, le vice-prรฉsident du Conseil italien, Matteo Salvini, รฉcrit le 4 juin et illustre sur les rรฉseaux sociaux
Je dirai ร Macron : tu devrais aller en Ukraine pour te battre, mettre un casque et ne pas jouer avec les tรชtes des Italiens
Avec lโinvitation de lโAllemagne depuis 2004 et maintenant celle de lโUkraine, l’anniversaire du dรฉbarquement de Normandie est une vulgaire sauterie atlantiste, un spectacle cringe, qui fait de la peine pour les vรฉtรฉrans qui sโy prรชtent encore. Par sa personnalitรฉ, Macron en accentue la vulgaritรฉ
Son mandat prรฉsidentiel รฉchut le 19 mai et le comรฉdien professionnel ukrainien harangue lโAssemblรฉe nationale le 7 juin 2024 (Julien de Rosa / AFP)
Le spectacle de cabaret ne porte pas chance aux Playmobil et ร leur brigadier Yaรซl Braun Pivet. L’Assemblรฉe nationale est dissoute le 9 juin, ร l’issue d’รฉlections europรฉennes qui sont une dรฉroute pour Macron et tous ceux qui ont ovationnรฉ Zelenskyy
le 11 juin 2024 (The Times)
Le 9 octobre, il partage sur X une jolie vidรฉo de l’entraรฎnement en France de militaires ukrainiens et commente
Jโen avais pris lโengagement : nos militaires forment actuellement 2 300 soldats ukrainiens dans le Grand Est, avec des รฉquipements quโils utiliseront en mission.
La brigade Anne de Kyiv sera formรฉe et รฉquipรฉe grรขce ร la solidaritรฉ de la France
C’est sans doute Gabin Donnio Choupeaux, qui dans un entretien du mois de mars, a soufflรฉ le nom de la brigade ร la propagande bleu horizon. Bravo
Nous partageons une histoire commune avec Anne de Kiev, รฉpouse de Henri Ier et reine des Francs de 1051 ร 1060
(Captures d’รฉcran)
En guise de rรฉfรฉrence, dans un souci de communication, une femme politique รขgรฉe dโenviron 1000 ans est plus commode que beaucoup de personnages franรงais ou ukrainiens de la 2de guerre mondiale. Mais le diable est dans les dรฉtails. Personne ร la cour de sa Vacuitรฉ nโa remarquรฉ lโรฉcusson ? Portรฉ notamment par un instructeur en tenue camouflรฉe franรงaise, il reprend les couleurs rouge et noir, qui nโont rien de nationales mais sont en Ukraine celles des nazis dโhier et dโaujourdโhui
Drapeau de l’organisation politique moderne Pravyi sektor [Secteur droit]
Il est l’insigne de la 155e brigade, formรฉe en juin avec de nouveaux contingents de chair ร canon ukrainienne. L’unitรฉ est d’infanterie ou mรฉcanisรฉe, l’histoire n’est pas encore catรฉgorique sur ce point
Cela dรฉpendra sans doute de la solidaritรฉ du contribuable franรงais. Car comme disait autrefois lโรtat franรงais, ils donnent leur sang, donnez votre travail
Anne de Kiev ou Eva Braun ? L’image a รฉtรฉ dรฉcouverte par des internautes polonais qui la partagent le 4 novembre et s’en offusquent ร juste titre. Des stagiaires ukrainiens de la 155e brigade et probablement aussi leurs instructeurs franรงais, tous en tenue camouflรฉe franรงaise, posent dans l’automne champenois
Le groupe dรฉploie un รฉtendard qui ne reproduit pas l’insigne de la brigade, est une des multiples versions du drapeau que les nazis ukrainiens considรจrent comme un emblรจme national. Les couleurs rouge et noir sont celles de l’Armรฉe des insurgรฉs (UPA), milice nazie ukrainienne qui entre 1943 et 1945, a massacrรฉ au moins 50 000, peut รชtre 100 000 civils polonais. Coquetterie de cette version, le bien connu Reichsadler [aigle impรฉrial] (cf. Sylvain Caupin), oรน le trident ukrainien a remplacรฉ le swastika des nazis allemands de la 2de guerre mondiale.
ร l’instar de l’ex premier ministre, le vraiment trรจs jeune Gabriel Attal, le dรฉpartement commercial de la Misanthropic Division, confrรฉrie nazie internationale, fondรฉe et basรฉe en Ukraine depuis 2013, cรฉlรจbre le 19 novembre le 1000e jour de l’opรฉration militaire spรฉciale russe, dernier chapitre d’une guerre qui fait rage au Donbass depuis 3830 jours, soit 10 ans, 5 mois et 24 jours
1000 days for blood & soil (Misanthropic Division)
Les nazis ukrainiens n’oublient pas la contribution franรงaise ร leur cause. Leur collage comporte l’image d’un militant du GUD parisien et celle partagรฉe le 4 par des internautes polonais, prise en Champagne par des stagiaires miltaires ukrainiens, qui aux frais de la princesse, dรฉployรจrent leur drapeau nazi
(Gabriel Attal)
Pour sa part, le petit Gabriel partage cette image sur X, oรน il clame en Ukrainien ะกะปะฐฬะฒะฐ ะฃะบัะฐัฬะฝั! ะะตัะพัะผ ัะปะฐะฒะฐ! [Gloire ร l’Ukraine ! Gloire aux hรฉros !]. Ses anciennes fonctions le dispensent d’ignorer que le slogan Gloire aux hรฉros fut inaugurรฉ en avril 1941 par les fascistes de l’OUN (Organisation des nationalistes ukrainiens), alors implantรฉs dans le Generalgouvernementfรผr die besetzten polnischen Gebiete [Gouvernement gรฉnรฉral des territoires polonais occupรฉs].
J’ai la conviction que c’est en rรฉfรฉrence ร des individus comme Jean-Noรซl Barrot que les Franรงais sont qualifiรฉs de grandes gueules puantes dans la littรฉrature grecque contemporaine (captures d’รฉcran antรฉrieures)
Quel est le contexte des fanfaronnades du frais รฉmoulu ministre des affaires รฉtrangรจres de la Macronie ? En guise dโavertissement, au petit matin du 21 novembre, la Russie utilisa un missile balistique, pour cette fois ร charge conventionnelle. La cible รฉtait une usine militaire ร Dnipro, oรน la vidรฉosurveillance montre clairement les arrivรฉes de six ogives distinctes
(Captures d’รฉcran)
Dans une allocution en soirรฉe, Vladimir Poutine prรฉcisa que le nouveau systรจme dโarmes est appelรฉ Oreshnik [Noisette]. Le missile balistique hypersonique de portรฉe intermรฉdiaire (IRBM hypersonique) vole ร une vitesse proche de Mach 10. Sa portรฉe de 5 000 km le prรฉdispose au traitement de cibles en Europe
(Voyennaya khronika)
Il ajouta
Nous nous considรฉrons en droit dโutiliser nos armes contre les installations militaires des pays qui autorisent lโutilisation de leurs armes contre nos installations. Et en cas dโescalade des actions agressives, nous rรฉpondrons de maniรจre dรฉcisive et en miroir
Le 30 octobre 1961, la Tsar Bomba รฉtait lโรฉquivalent de 50 mรฉgatonnes de TNT, soit environ 3000 Hiroshima. Une telle puissance correspond aujourdโhui ร la charge militaire totale dโun missile balistique intercontinental (ICBM) Sarmat, en une douzaine de sous-munitions, environ 300 Hiroshima chacune (capture dโรฉcran)
Que justifie les menaces russes de frappes nuclรฉaires ? Depuis le dรฉclenchement en 2014 des opรฉrations militaires, contre les insurgรฉs russophones du Donbass, dโun pouvoir ukrainien issu dโun coup dโรtat dโextrรชme-droite en fรฉvrier de cette annรฉe lร , de faรงon encore plus รฉvidente aprรจs le dรฉbut en 2022 de lโopรฉration militaire spรฉciale russe, les stratรจges occidentaux voient la Russie comme une grenouille plongรฉe dans une eau lentement portรฉe ร รฉbullition. Lโescalade de leur guerre par procuration est graduelle, avec lโambition illusoire de ne pas provoquer de rรฉaction russe symรฉtrique. Point particulier : elle est conduite aujourd’hui avec des armes que l’Ukraine ne pourrait pas employer en territoire russe sans le concours des satellites et techniciens de l’OTAN. Cโest ร cette escalade graduelle que rรฉpondent les menaces de frappes nuclรฉaires. Non pas aux effets rรฉels de quelques missiles tactiques dont la plupart sont abattus par la dรฉfense aรฉrienne avant dโatteindre leur cibles en territoire russe. Car cette variable est essentielle ร lโanalyse de la situation : les tirs de ces munitions occidentales ne changeront pas le rapport de force et nโempรชcheront pas la victoire militaire de la Russie.
Pourquoi ces tirs de missiles de lโOTAN ? Escalade graduelle donc. Mais encore ? Biden les autorisa moins de deux semaines aprรจs la victoire sans appel de Donald Trump et ร deux mois de son retour ร la Maison blanche. Envenimer la situation militaire pour saboter ou compliquer le rรจglement politique ultรฉrieur du conflit ? Cโest bien possible. Lโinaliรฉnable alliance historique entre les USA et le Royaume-Uni est une constante de lโรฉquation. De surcroรฎt, la russophobie รฉpidermique et tout aussi historique des classes dirigeantes dโAlbion explique aussi la position britannique.
Mais pourquoi cette posture franรงaise de supplรฉtif doublรฉ dโune mouche de coche ? Pour galvaniser la masse des innocents qui sโinforment auprรจs de BFMTV, CNews ou LCI ? Sans doute, tant la communication est une prรฉoccupation majeure des gouvernements de la Macronie. Pour satisfaire lโรฉgo puรฉril dโEmmanuel Macron ? Je le crains, mais pas seulement
Humour russe le 20 novembre 2024
Les classes dirigeantes franรงaises sont รฉpouvantรฉes par lโeffondrement de lโhรฉgรฉmonie occidentale, ce que la perte de la Franรงafrique pourrait coรปter ร lโรฉconomie franรงaise
Les tentacules รฉtaient Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso et Rรฉpublique centrafricaine (alarabblog.com, 2023)
Mais plus les Occidentaux et Franรงais feront monter les enchรจres, sans pourtant empรชcher la victoire russe en Ukraine ou les lรฉgitimes aspirations des Africains ร leur libรฉration, plus la dรฉfaite sera finalement humiliante et plus dure sera la chute.
Le drame est รฉvoquรฉ en public le 13 dรฉcembre 2024, par le journaliste ukrainien Iouri Butoussov. Le reconstituer dans son intรฉgralitรฉ est une tรขche aisรฉe pour lโobservateur chevronnรฉ.
Engagรฉe en Rรฉpublique populaire de Donetsk, soumise dans le secteur de Pokrovsk ร lโรฉtreinte puissante des forces russes, la brigade Frรฉnรฉgonde de Pouille [ou quelque chose comme รงa] sโest dรฉsagrรฉgรฉe le 10 dรฉcembre. Au moins un millier dโhommes, prรจs de la moitiรฉ de son effectif thรฉorique total, sont partis en dรฉroute et ont dรฉsertรฉ
La bataille de Pavia est livrรฉe le 24 fรฉvrier 1525 (Joachim Patinir). La victoire du Saint Empire romain germanique sanctionne la bรชtise tactique du roi de France. Vaincu et prisonnier, Franรงois 1er รฉcrit le lendemain ร sa mรจre : tout est perdu, fors lโhonneur
Cโest aux frais de la princesse, que cette 155e brigade mรฉcanisรฉe avait รฉtรฉ รฉquipรฉe de matรฉriel franรงais et entraรฎnรฉe en Champagne. Macron sโen vanta le 9 octobre sur les rรฉseaux sociaux. Mais tout est perdu, mรชme l’honneur.
Le 2 janvier 2025, pour boire le calice jusqu’ร la lie, le Parisien nous rappelle la brigade Frรฉnรฉgonde de Pouille [ou quelque-chose comme รงa], pour nous apprendre que le nombre de dรฉsertions s’รฉlรจverait alors ร 1 700. Soit 74% d’un effectif total de 2 300, que j’ai pris la peine de relever en octobre. Et non pas 4 500, comme le quotidien cocardier le prรฉtend, quand il relaie la propagande atlantiste. 4 500 est l’effectif moyen d’une brigade รฉtats-unienne, mais celles formรฉes en Ukraine sont toujours de petits calibres.
L’article stimule ma curiositรฉ et alors que le rรฉcit de ces dรฉboires fait le tour des rรฉdactions des vastes restes du monde, dont hilares, celles de la perfide Albion, une source peu suspecte de sympathie pour la Russie, Wikipedia, nous prรฉcise le 3 janvier que dรฉbut dรฉcembre, le nombre de dรฉsertions s’รฉlรจvaient dรฉjร ร 1 883, dont 50 en France, soit 82% d’un effectif total de 2 300
Le 30 dรฉcembre 2024, les rรฉseaux sociaux partagent la vidรฉo de la dรฉmilitarisation dans le mรชme secteur d’un char ร roues [presse bleu horizon] franรงais AMX-10RC, en rรฉalitรฉ, un viel engin blindรฉ de reconnaissance (capture dโรฉcran)
Comme nous le savions dรฉjร , le reliquat a รฉtรฉ engagรฉ dans le secteur de Pokrovsk, Rรฉpublique populaire de Donetsk, oรน il s’est fait รฉtriller. La guerre tue, surtout les vaincus, c’est un peu le principe. Mais un animateur de foire comme Emmanuel Macron est si peu รฉquipรฉ pour en saisir le sens ou les vertus.
Le 17 fรฉvrier 2025, veille de lโouverture en Arabie Saoudite de nรฉgociations entre Russie et รtats-Unis au sujet de lโUkraine, il accueille ร Paris une rรฉunion impromptue de dirigeants europรฉens qui sโopposent aux perspectives de paix favorisรฉes par la victoire de Donald Trump. Leur hostilitรฉ ร la fin de la guerre atlantiste par procuration en Ukraine est dโailleurs la raison pour laquelle ces matamores europรฉens ne sont pas invitรฉs ร participer aux nรฉgociations entre les deux grandes puissances. Les รtats-uniens ont beau jeu de rappeler que France et Allemagne รฉtaient censรฉes garantir depuis 2014 le respect par l’Ukraine des accords de Minsk. La presse bleu horizon tรขche de vanter l’รฉvรฉnement, mais la rรฉalitรฉ est sordide
L’image truquรฉe d’Emmanuel Macron et de ses faux muscles, que sa photographe officielle publie sur les rรฉseaux sociaux le 19 mars 2024 (Soazig de La Moissonnieฬre)
Aussi peu performants en gรฉnรฉral ou populaires ร domicile que Macron, le Britannique Keir Starmer et lโAllemand Olaf Scholz sont les vedettes de la rรฉunion. Donald Tusk est aussi prรฉsent, mais la Pologne a dรฉjร dรฉcidรฉ de ne pas engager son armรฉe en Ukraine. Dโautres chefs dโรtats et la bureaucrate teutonne Ursula von der Leyen complรจtent le tableau. Leur tactique immรฉdiate consiste ร quรฉmander une participation europรฉenne aux nรฉgociations et pour lโUkraine, un accรจs ร lโOTAN que Washington refuse dรฉjร . Royaume-Uni et France clament leur volontรฉ de dรฉployer des troupes de maintien dโun รฉventuel cessez-le-feu mais ne disposent plus en volume dโarmรฉes capables de mener une telle opรฉration.
Le mรชme jour, le philosophe Harold Bernat publie un texte fort ร propos, oรน il constate lโeffondrement [intellectel] sidรฉrant dโune bourgeoisie dont Emmanuel Macron est le hรฉraut.
Un autre exemple spectaculaire de ce syndrome est une femme, รฉgalement impliquรฉe dans les mรฉfaits de lโEurope en Ukraine : la ministre allemande des affaires รฉtrangรจres Annalena Baerbock, qui a sidรฉrรฉ depuis 2022 par ses lacunes en gรฉomรฉtrie et gรฉographie. Toujours le 17 fรฉvrier, elle se montre incapable de garder un secret stratรฉgique et rรฉvรจle ร la presse berlinoise le projet europรฉen dโune nouvelle aide financiรจre apportรฉe ร Volodymyr Zelenskyy et ses amis, pour un montant de 700 milliards dโeuros.
Le 20 fรฉvrier, il se prรชte sur les rรฉseaux sociaux ร une confรฉrence citoyenne au sujet de l’Ukraine. Son introduction est une farce, qui s’adresse ร des demeurรฉs, qui n’auraient pas suivi l’actualitรฉ et ne comprendraient rien ร la gรฉopolitique. Il commence par recyler tous les lieux communs de la propagande et dรฉsinformation atlantiste, les mensonges qui avec la nouvelle administration de Donald Trump, ont disparu dans la communication รฉtats-unienne
(Capture d’รฉcran)
Le flot de questions sur les nombreuses plateformes est รฉvidemment filtrรฉ par une รฉquipe d’assistants, qui ignorent celles qui posent vraiment problรจme. J’en retiens deux qui resteront sans rรฉponse, tout d’abord de Jacques [Baud, analyste stratรฉgique suisse] et Aude [Lancelin, journaliste franรงaise]
Bonjour M Le Prรฉsident. Question de Jacques de Genรจve et Aude de Paris. Pourquoi les europรฉens ont ils empรชchรฉ le prรฉsident Zelensky, ร 3 reprises au printemps 22, de signer un accord avec la Russie garantissant lโintรฉgritรฉ territoriale de lโUkraine ?
puis la mienne
Bonjour,
votre stratรฉgie d’engagement militaire franรงais apparaรฎt confuse, vos dรฉclarations, contradictoires.
La possibilitรฉ semble se dรฉgager du stationnement dans l’ouest du pays de militaires franรงais qui permettraient ร l’Ukraine, par translation, d’en envoyer autant au front.
Pensez vous que les Russes se dispenseront de mener des frappes stratรฉgiques contres les militaires franรงais stationnรฉs en Ukraine ?
Pete Hegseth, Secrรฉtaire ร la dรฉfense US, prรฉcisa dรฉjร le 12 fรฉvrier qu’engagรฉes en Ukraine, les troupes europรฉennes ne seraient pas couvertes par l’article 5 de l’OTAN.
Le 22 fรฉvrier, Donald Trump fait longuement patienter Andrzej Duda et ne lui accorde ensuite quโune dizaine de minutes. Le prรฉsident polonais est le premier dโun convoi de dirigeants europรฉens qui se prรฉcipitent ร Washington pour tenter dโinflรฉchir la stratรฉgie en Ukraine de la nouvelle administration US. Lorsquโil sโadressa aux Franรงais le 20, Emmanuel Macron se prรฉvalut dโune familiaritรฉ qui devait lui permettre de faire la leรงon ร son homologue รฉtats-unien, de le convaincre de ne pas se montrer faible ร l’รฉgard de Vladimir Poutine
(Maison Blanche)
Comme lโillustrent ses traits tirรฉs par la fatique sur la photographie prise ร la Maison Blanche le 24 fรฉvrier, il nโobtient rien de Trump. Je suppose au contraire que ses fanfaronnades antรฉrieures, ses familiaritรฉs ร Washington et les questions de fond exaspรจrent le prรฉsident US, trois jours avant qu’ร son tour, le Britannique Keir Starmer ne se prรชte ร l’exercice
[โฆ] on a des moyens de renseignement, dont nous faisons bรฉnรฉficier les Ukrainiens [โฆ]
Dans la foulรฉe de nouveaux mensonges et fanfaronnades tรฉlรฉvisuels dโEmmanuel Macron, il cherche aussi ร stimuler le sens civique de ses concitoyens
[โฆ] placez votre argent de maniรจre patriotique, pour financer la dรฉfense [โฆ]
On [qui est un con] pourrait aussi appeler cela la Banque de lโIndochine, ouโฆ les Emprunts russes. L’inspecteur Clouseau s’en va t’en guerre
(Captures dโรฉcran)
Pendant ce temps, le MEDEF (Mouvement des entreprises de France), qui ne perd pas le nord, la presse bleu horizon ou macroniste, distillent lโidรฉe dโune retraite ร 70 ans, qui serait justifiรฉe par lโopportunitรฉ dโun effort militaire en soutien ร lโUkraine. Car en rรฉalitรฉ, la seule dรฉmarche stratรฉgique cohรฉrente de Macron est trรจs simple ; elle consiste ร casser les acquis sociaux et imposer une sociรฉtรฉ ultra libรฉrale. Si personne ne peut vraiment le qualifier dโhomme intelligent, il est cependant malin comme un singe
(LโOpinion le 6 mars 2025)
Il sait comment faire avaler des couleuvres. Son terrain est facile : il flatte la vanitรฉ nationale des Franรงais. Le philosophe allemand Arthur Schoppenhauer (1788-1860) รฉnonรงa avant 1851
La fiertรฉ nationale est la forme la moins coรปteuse de fiertรฉ. Si un homme est fier de sa nation, cela signifie quโil nโa aucune qualitรฉ dont il puisse รชtre fier. Autrement, il ne pourrait pas faire appel ร celles quโil partage avec des millions de ses concitoyens. Lโhomme qui possรจde des qualitรฉs personnelles importantes ne verra que trop bien dans quels domaines sa propre nation est dรฉficiente, car ses dรฉfauts seront constamment sous ses yeux. Mais tout misรฉrable imbรฉcile qui nโa rien dont il puisse รชtre fier, adopte en dernier recours la fiertรฉ de la nation ร laquelle il appartient ; il est prรชt et heureux de dรฉfendre bec et ongles tous les dรฉfauts et les folies de la nation, se dรฉdommageant ainsi de sa propre infรฉrioritรฉ
Les derniers รฉvรฉnements permettent de clarifier la subordination dโEmmanuel Macron. Il nโest pas fidรจle aux autoritรฉs lรฉgales des รtats-Unis, puisquโil sโoppose ร lโadministration de Donald Trump, qui accomplit une inflexion stratรฉgique majeure, quand Joe Biden et Europรฉens รฉtaient au diapason. Il sโaffirme plutรดt comme lโhรฉriter dโun Franรงois Hollande, qui alors Premier secrรฉtaire du Parti socialiste, protestait contre lโopposition de Jacques Chirac ร lโinvasion anglo-รฉtats-unienne de lโIrak en 2003 et faisait des ronds de jambes ร lโambassade parisienne de lโadministration de George W Bush.
Il ne dรฉfend pas non plus les intรฉrรชts des Franรงais, puisquโil a besoin de leur mentir de faรงon grotesque, quand il prรฉtend quโaprรจs lโUkraine, la Russie pourrait attaquer dโautres pays. Lโidรฉe est farfelue, car une telle agressivitรฉ dรฉclencherait lโarticle 5 de lโOTAN. Leur ment quand il prรฉtend que la Russie nโaurait pas respectรฉ les accords de Minsk, alors que cโรฉtait รฉvidemment lโUkraine qui ne les a pas appliquรฉs et le mรชme Franรงois Hollande qui mentait, quand il prรฉtendait les garantir. Lui-mรชme et Angela Merkel reconnurent fin 2022 et dรฉbut 2023 que dans leur esprit, ces accords รฉtaient une escroquerie pour tromper la Russie, devaient donner ร lโOTAN le temps dโarmer lโUkraine. Non, Macron nโest pas un aigle, mais mรชme lui ne peut croire de telles sornettes
Angela Merkel et Franรงois Hollande se montrent au carnaval de Dรผsseldorf le 3 mars 2014 (Martin Meissner/AP)
Alors de quoi est il le nom ? Comme le montre aussi sa politique intรฉrieure et ร lโinstar du social-dรฉmocrate Keir Starmer comme de la droitarde Ursula von der Leyen, il apparaรฎt comme le soldat dโune collusion puissante entre ploutocrates europรฉens et nรฉoconservateurs US, plus sournois quand ils appartiennent au Parti dรฉmocrate. Trump bouleverse des dรฉcennies de politique รฉtrangรจre des รtats-Unis et Macron est le caniche de von der Leyen. Sa relation aux femmes plus รขgรฉes est compliquรฉe.
Le 23 avril 2025, les divas europรฉennes sabotent les nรฉgociations de paix en Ukraine. Ce jour lร ร Londres, une rรฉunion est prรฉvue entre pays occidentaux. Mais au dernier moment, Volodymyr Zelenskyy prรฉvient par voie de presse quโil refuse dโaccepter la perte de la Crimรฉe, pourtant un moindre mal, vu la situation militaire. Par consรฉquent, le Secrรฉtaire dโรtat Marco Rubio se dรฉcommande, ce qui annule aussi la participation des ministres europรฉens des affaires รฉtrangรจres.
Quel รขme damnรฉe a bien pu inspirer le comรฉdien ukrainien ? Alors en visite ร Madagascar, dans la foulรฉe de la colonie de Mayotte, le porte parole dโUrsula von der Leyen le fait savoir dans la journรฉe par lโรlysรฉe
Lโintรฉgritรฉ territoriale et la vocation europรฉenne de lโUkraine sont des exigences trรจs fortes des Europรฉens
Alors que son Envoyรฉ spรฉcial Keith Kellogg se rendra ร Moscou dans la semaine, Donald Trump รฉcrit sur les rรฉseaux sociaux
[โฆ] La situation de lโUkraine est dรฉsastreuse. Il [Zelenskyy] peut obtenir la paix ou se battre pendant trois ans de plus, avant de perdre tout le pays [โฆ]
Difficile de mieux rรฉsumer la situation militaire, qui par tradition bien ancrรฉe dans une guerre, dicte le sens des nรฉgociations de paix. Son opposition dogmatique ร la paix et son incapacitรฉ ร accepter la rรฉalitรฉ du terrain illustrent ร quel point la corrompue Union europรฉenne nโest plus aujourdโhui que lโautomate des illuminรฉs de lโรtat profond nรฉoconservateur US. Je suis trรจs optimiste car convaincu qu’elle le paiera cher.
Emmanuel Macron subit ร nouveau une spectaculaire humiliation diplomatique au cours du weekend des 10 et 11 mai 2025. Ses partenaires lโont dรฉjร adoubรฉ hรฉraut de lโEurope, alors quโร dรฉfaut de lโestomac nรฉcessaire pour mener ร terme ses projets pacifiques en Ukraine, Donald Trump se dรฉsintรฉresse dรฉsormais du sujet. En consรฉquence, la Russie envisage la possibilitรฉ dโadapter sa stratรฉgie, de rรฉsoudre le conflit en moins de deux mois, par une campagne dรฉcisive de frappes qui liquiderait les dirigeants ukrainiens et dรฉtruirait en totalitรฉ les infrastructures critiques de lโUkraine
Un humoriste russe a immortalisรฉ l’รฉvรฉnement, Emmanuel Macron est adoubรฉ reprรฉsentant de l’Europe : voici de gauche ร droite Kaja Kallas, Ursula von der Leyen, Keir Starmer et Emmanuel Macron
Volodymyr Zelenskyy et les Europรฉens commencent par proposer un cessez le feu dโun mois ร compter du 12 mai. Donald Trump soutient lโidรฉe et voilร que sa Vacuitรฉ explose en plein vol, exige le respect de ce cessez-le-feu par la Russie, quโil menace ร dรฉfaut de nouvelles sanctions รฉconomiques. Effets indรฉsirables, peut รชtre, de l’abus de substances pyschotropes. Son obsession est toujours dโemployer un tel cessez-le-feu ร injecter en Ukraine des troupes franรงaises et britanniques
Une histoire de mouchoirs (capture d’รฉcran d’une fameuse vidรฉo ferroviaire)
Aprรจs minuit, le 11 mai, ร lโissue dโune trรชve unilatรฉrale russe de trois jours, en mรฉmoire de la victoire soviรฉtique, 80 ans plus tรดt, sur les armรฉes fascistes europรฉennes, Vladimir Poutine mรฉprise avec calme lโultimatum de lโarrogant Franรงais. Il propose la reprise ร Istanbul, le 15 mai, des nรฉgociations de paix qui avaient bien commencรฉ en mars 2022, mais que le Royaume-Uni et les รtats-Unis de Joe Biden sabotรจrent, pour poursuivre contre la Russie une guerre par procuration aujourdโhui perdue. Donald Trump lui apporte son soutien dans la journรฉe. Volodymyr Zelenskyy accepte aussi et peut รชtre encore en altitude, รฉcrit sur les rรฉseaux sociaux qu’il pense rencontrer personnellement Vladimir Poutine ร Istanbul.
Lโanecdote illustre mon analyse supra de la subordination dโEmmanuel Macron. Aprรจs la rรฉception ร lโรlysรฉe le 7 mai du djihadiste Abou Mohammed al Joulani, dictateur dโune Syrie dรฉsormais saignรฉe par les persรฉcutions religieuses, Jean-Noรซl Barrot, erreur de casting au ministรจre des affaires รฉtrangรจres, est le 15 ร Istanbul, oรน il prรฉsente ses ronds de jambe ร la plus grotesque figure nรฉoconservatrice, lโimmonde sรฉnateur sudiste rรฉpublicain Lindsey Graham
(Jean-Noรซl Barrot, soi-mรชme, sur les rรฉseaux sociaux)
Sur le fond, la Russie ignore les gesticulations franรงaises et europรฉennes. Dans la mรชme ville, le lendemain, ses plรฉnipotentiaires prรฉsentent ร une dรฉlรฉgation ukrainienne leurs conditions pour un cessez-le-feu : le retrait des troupes atlantistes des positions quโelles occupent encore dans les rรฉgions de Donetsk, Kherson, Lugansk et Zaporojie
(Rรฉseaux sociaux)
Heureusement, pour notre dรฉtente, Emmanuel Macron et ses pรฉrรฉgrinations internationales, comme le 25 mai 2025 ร Hanoรฏ, sont aussi une source inรฉpuisable de plaisanteries.
Savamment synchronisรฉs, ร deux jours dโintervalle, le chef dโรฉtat-major Thierry Burkhard puis Emmanuel Macron, le 13 juillet, se succรจdent ร la tribune pour galvaniser les crรฉtins qui sโappellent eux-mรชmes patriotes
Prรฉserver un modรจle social hรฉritรฉ du Conseil national de la rรฉsistance (CNR) au lendemain de la 2de guerre mondiale ou doubler* le budget militaire, Macron a choisi, car il veut รชtre craint. Mission dรฉlicate, car depuis huit ans, il passe pour un imbรฉcile auprรจs de ses homologues รฉtrangers. Parmi ses soutiens, le mignon Gabriel Attal veut tenir son rang
Face aux menaces, les plus pressantes sans doute depuis 1945, la France doit impรฉrativement continuer son rรฉarmement. Pour tenir son rang, รชtre respectรฉ, et protรฉger nos intรฉrรชts vitaux [en Franรงafrique]
Maintenant la bonne nouvelle : puisquโils ont choisi lโaffrontement, je prรฉdis que les pinzuti [Franรงais] se feront quand mรชme humilier. Car aucun sacrifice social ne suffira ร empรชcher lโeffondrement de lโhรฉgรฉmonie occidentale. Pas plus que furent victorieuses les guerres anachroniques pour prรฉserver lโempire colonial.
* lโobjectif est de doubler par rapport ร 2017 et avant la fin de son second mandat, un budget militaire en constante augmentation. Il est de โฌ50,5 milliards en 2025, devrait รชtre de โฌ63,4 milliards en 2027
(Gros / L’Humanitรฉ du 16 juillet 2025)
Malheureux concours de circonstances ou bien schizophrรฉnie franรงaise et perversion dโEmmanuel Macron ? Le 15 juillet, le premier ministre Franรงois Bayrou dรฉvoile les grandes lignes du budget 2026 dโune France en redressement judiciaire, aprรจs 18 ans de gouvernement atlantiste. Cette actualitรฉ nationale est riche dโenseignements et dans un article quโil publie le 17 juillet, Emmanuel Todd est contraint de recourir ร la psychiatrie pour comprendre les effets de bord du dรฉclin occidental et franรงais. La conclusion sโimpose : la Russie est la cible des fantasmes รฉrotomanes dโEmmanuel Macron et ses laquais.
Le prix Nobel de la paix est la derniรจre obsession de Donald Trump, qui le 18 aoรปt 2025, trois jours aprรจs sa rencontre avec Vladimir Poutine ร Anchorage, accueille Volodymyr Zelenskyy et un quarteron de dirigeants europรฉens ร la Maison Blanche. La chorรฉgraphie de la rรฉunion des laquais de daddy Trump est un travail psychologique, une catharsis, pour que lโOccident reconnaisse enfin sa dรฉfaite dans le Donbass et en Ukraine
(Aaron Schwartz)
Encore traumatisรฉ par son humiliation ร Washington, Emmanuel Macron accorde le lendemain un entretien aux journalistes de LCI. Lors de cette nouvelle envolรฉe lyrique, il dรฉclare
Ne soyons pas naรฏfs. Y compris pour sa propre survie, il [la Russie oรน Vladimir Poutine ?] a besoin de continuer de manger. C’est un prรฉdateur, un ogre ร nos portes
La sรปretรฉ de lโรtat franรงais a cessรฉ depuis longtemps de mโintรฉresser et au contraire, je suis mรชme rรฉputรฉ lui porter atteinte. Dโautres sont entrรฉs dans la carriรจre, dit la chanson, essuient aujourdโhui un รฉchec cruel. Ce qui arrive mรชme aux meilleurs. Mais ce sont les Alliรฉs qui ne sont pas contents. La France aura beau nier, eux savent que les donnรฉes sont authentiques.
la carte
Membres du groupe Killnet (cf. David Piguet), des as russes de lโinformatique sont parvenus ร recueillir auprรจs de lโadministration franรงaise des informations sensibles : les procรจs-verbaux et autres documents de rรฉunions secrรจtes au sujet de lโUkraine entre France, Pologne, Roumanie et Royaume-Uni. Dont une carte datรฉe du 28 avril 2025, destinรฉe ร lโรฉtat-major des armรฉes franรงaises, qui est rendue publique sur le web le 9 septembre.
En marge du document que chacun peut consulter, les pirates ont rรฉalisรฉ une synthรจse du projet de la Coalition de volontaires, si cher ร Emmanuel Macron. Aux Russes, lโintรฉgralitรฉ du Donbass, ainsi que les rรฉgions de Kherson et Zaporojie, jusquโร la ligne de cessez-le-feu ; aux Franรงais, les ressources minรฉrales de Jytomir, Kharkov et Soumy ; aux Polonais et Roumains, Odessa et les rรฉgions frontaliรจres ; les Britanniques se contenteraient de plateformes logistiques un peu partout ; 50 000 hommes pour emballer le butin occidental
Mais la Russie a dit et rรฉpรจte jusquโร ce jour quโelle ne tolรฉrera pas de troupes de lโOTAN sur le territoire de lโactuelle Ukraine. Notez que depuis le 31 aoรปt, Thierry Burkhard nโest plus Chef dโรฉtat-major.
Dans un entretien que le journal italien de gauche Il Fatto Quotidiano publie le 13 septembre, le prestigieux รฉconomiste Jeffrey Sachs rรฉvรจle une conversation personnelle avec Emmanuel Macron. ร lโรฉpoque oรน le professeur de lโuniversitรฉ Columbia fut fait chevalier de la Lรฉgion dโhonneur, ce qui nous ramรจne en mai 2022, trois mois aprรจs le dรฉbut de lโopรฉration militaire spรฉciale russe, le prรฉsident franรงais lui expliqua que lโOTAN portait lโentiรจre culpabilitรฉ du conflit. Cette information confirme, dans tous les cas de figure, que sa Vacuitรฉ ment comme un arracheur de dent
(Atlantic Council)
ร New York le 24 septembre 2025, ร lโinstar de son grand ami [cโest Emmanuel Macron qui le dit] Javier Milei, catastrophe nรฉo-libรฉrale pour lโรฉconomie de lโArgentine et son peuple, sa Vacuitรฉ est reconnue employรฉ de lโannรฉe par lโAtlantic Council, un think tank militariste dont la mission est de dรฉfendre les intรฉrรชts de lโempire รฉtats-unien.
Il ne tarde pas ร mettre en scรจne une nouvelle farce, car son psychisme est trop faible pour parvenir ร accepter sa dรฉfaite au Donbass et en Ukraine. De dรฉpit le 2 octobre, il compense par une nouvelle envolรฉe lyrique au Sommet de la Communautรฉ politique europรฉenne (EPC) de Copenhague. LโEurope est alors en proie ร une รฉpidรฉmie dโhystรฉrie collective, voit des drones partout. Qui dโautre que des Russes pourraient les piloter ?
Humour biรฉlorusse le 27 septembre 2025
La bulle mรฉdiatique contient surtout paranoรฏa et dรฉsinformation, car la presse bleu horizon est incapable dโenvisager lโhypothรจse la plus probable de plaisantins locaux, aux commandes de quelques inoffensifs aรฉronefs. Au contraire, les mรชmes pressetituรฉs colportent une fable ukrainienne particuliรจrement farfelue : les drones seraient lancรฉs par la flotte dite fantรดme, des navires armรฉs par les vastes restes du monde, qui transportent du pรฉtrole russe et nโont pas le goรปt ou lโenvie de se soumettre aux sanctions administratives occidentales
Un รฉquipage de vaisseau fantรดme (Pirates des Caraรฏbes, 2003)
Sa Vacuitรฉ est incapable de limiter ses gesticulations ร la scรจne danoise et alors que le Droit garantit pourtant le libre passage dans les eaux internationales, il dรฉcide ร 47 ans de se lancer dans la piraterie maritime
Victrix causa diis placuit, sed victa catoni
Ses officiers sont chinois et chargรฉ de pรฉtrole russe, le navire bรฉninois vogue paisiblement vers lโInde, quand le 27 septembre, les corsaires franรงais montent ร lโabordage du Boracay dans les eaux internationales. Mais vaine recherche et choux blanc, pas le moindre indice nโรฉtaye les accusations ukrainiennes de lancement de drones en Scandinavie. Bien quโaux ordres de l’exรฉcutif, le parquet franรงais est contraint au soir du 2 octobre de laisser le pรฉtrolier lever lโancre. Illustration de la mesquinerie atavique des pinzuti, la convocation du commandant ร comparaรฎtre le 23 fรฉvrier 2026 ร Brest pour refus d’obtempรฉrer, quand la piraterie et leurs pitreries en treillis obligeraient plutรดt les autoritรฉs ร prรฉsenter de plates excuses
Bruno Le Maire, le 25 avril 2023 (Florence Brochoire / Libรฉration)
Huit jours aprรจs que des corsaires franรงais soient montรฉs ร lโabordage du pรฉtrolier fantรดme bรฉninois Boracay, le nouveau ministre de la contre-menace-prรฉdatrice-et-existentielle [Macron], Bruno Le Maire, est enfin prรชt le 5 octobre 2025 ร provoquer l’effondrement [Le Maire] de lโarmรฉe Russe, ร la dilater comme jamais [Le Maire]
Le lendemain, les vastes restes du monde ont tort de ricaner, car la Russie tremble. Vladimir Poutine a bien compris que l’implosion de l’รฉphรฉmรจre gouvernement Lecornu est une ruse de guerre.
Vous nโaimez pas votre travail ? Essayez de vous mettre ร la place des pauvres garรงons, le 17 novembre 2025, qui font les jardiniรจres sur la base aรฉrienne de Villacoublay, pendant quโau premier plan, deux divas posent pour Gala
(Emmanuel Macron sur les rรฉseaux sociaux)
On me dit ร lโoreillette que Volodymyr Zelenskyy sโengage ร acheter 100 chasseurs Rafale. Avec quel argent ? Avant ou aprรจs dรฉtournement par son รฉquipe ? Pour en faire quoi et surtout, quand ?
Emmanuel Macron figure parmi les dirigeants europรฉens qui dรฉfilent ร Berlin le 15 dรฉcembre, mettent en scรจne leur vacuitรฉ pour geindre et quรฉmander encore une fois auprรจs des รtats-Unis. Ils semblent ignorer que le rรฉsultat dโune guerre se dรฉcide sur le champ de bataille. Le Donbass sera libรฉrรฉ par la diplomatie ou par la force, que cela leur plaise ou pas. Le mรชme jour, le Conseil de lโEurope impose des sanctions ร plusieurs personnes, dont lโexpert suisse Jacques Baud, qui selon le communiquรฉ
sert de porte-parole ร la propagande pro-russe et propage des thรฉories du complot
Paul (2011)
Lโaccusation est dรฉlirante. Jacques Baud a รฉtรฉ colonel du renseignement suisse, spรฉcialiste de lโEurope de lโEst. Entre 2009 et 2011, il dirigeait ร New York lโรฉquipe Politiques et Doctrine du Bureau des affaires militaires du Dรฉpartement des opรฉrations de maintien de la paix des Nations Unies. Ce fut dans le cadre de lโOTAN quโil participa ร des programmes en Ukraine en 2014 et 2017. Sa rigueur et son travail dโanalyse sont considรฉrables
En 2013, Jacques Baud prรฉsente au chรขteau de Morges sa collection dโobjet du renseignement (VQH)
Alors pourquoi cette punition administrative ? Dรจs la fin 2022, ร lโinstar de votre serviteur et beaucoup dโautres, lโexpert รฉnonรงa la rรฉalitรฉ : lโOccident subit une dรฉfaite humiliante au Donbass et en Ukraine. Washington lโa aussi compris. Elle semble sโimposer aujourdโhui ร des foules, puisquโร croire lโimmense majoritรฉ hystรฉrique des employรฉs de presse franรงaise, les chars russes se rapprochent dangereusement de la place de lโรtoile
Le 10 dรฉcembre 2025, des combattants russes sont accueillis en libรฉrateurs ร Seversk, en Rรฉpublique populaire de Donetsk (capture d’รฉcran)
Radio Free Europe, un organe de la CIA, dรฉvoila dรจs le 10 dรฉcembre sa sanction et lโintรฉressรฉ put la commenter. En lโapprenant, il mโa bien semblรฉ sentir une odeur fรฉtide, un peu comme lโhaleine dโun Philippe Henriot (1889-1944), Secrรฉtaire ร lโinformation et ร la propagande de lโรtat franรงais, une grande voix franรงaise que des rรฉsistants communistes arrachรจrent ร lโaffection des siens. Il porte ร Bruxelles sa tรชte habituelle de dรฉtraquรฉ, quand Jean-Noรซl Barrot confirme que ces sanctions sont prises ร lโinitiative de la France
(Capture d’รฉcran)
Je crois le ministre des affaires รฉtrangรจres assez crรฉtin pour exercer des reprรฉsailles par dรฉpit de sa dรฉfaite par procuration au Donbass et en Ukraine. Car sa punition amplifiera le succรจs des excellentes analyses de Jacques Baud
Si lโobjectif est plutรดt de dissuader la rรฉsistance ร la dรฉsinformation occidentale, alors je crains pour eux que les Franรงais nโaient fait comme souvent une projection de leurs propres carences. Chaque jour qui passe, leur gouvernement alimente de vilains prรฉjugรฉs ร leur sujet : froussards, mesquins, lรขches, incompรฉtents et arrogants
Nicolas Cinquini, journaliste et ancien officier du renseignement (France) [plus exactement Corse, capture d’รฉcran]
Cโรฉtait avec grand plaisir que je me suis entretenu avec une journaliste russe, pour un documentaire que la chaรฎne Russia Today, censurรฉe en Europe mais largement regardรฉe aux รtats-Unis, en Afrique ou en Chine, diffuse le 19 dรฉcembre.
Les premiers jours de 2026 รฉclairent dโune lumiรจre crue la fonction politique de lโemployรฉ de banque Macron et par consรฉquent, sa posture au sujet de lโUkraine. Grouillot de ploutocrates europรฉens et nรฉoconservateurs รฉtats-uniens, il sโillustre comme le plus inconditionnel soutien europรฉen du raid que les porte-flingues de Donald Trump exรฉcutent au Venezuela au petit matin du 3 janvier
Le candidat bolivarien Nicolas Maduro remporte les รฉlections prรฉsidentielles au Venezuela le 29 juillet 2024 (Juan Barreto)
De lโaveu mรชme du prรฉsident des รtats-Unis, son objectif est colonial, pour le pรฉtrole et le bien dโun empire nรฉolibรฉral dotรฉ de deux capitales : Jรฉrusalem et Washington
avec la complicitรฉ d’une intelligence artificielle
Non content dโavoir fait ricaner la terre entiรจre avec ses lunettes de soleil au Forum รฉconomique mondial de Davos le 20 janvier, Emmanuel Macron poursuit ses facรฉties et pour prouver sa virilitรฉ le 22, envoie les corsaires de la Marine nationale ร lโabordage en toute illรฉgalitรฉ en mรฉditerranรฉe du pรฉtrolier comorien Grinch, un parmi les quelques centaines de trรจs sournois navires de la vilaine flotte fantรดme russe.
Sa Vacuitรฉ, vous dis je, faiseur de vent de la catรฉgorie des tempรชtes du grand large. Contrairement ร ce quโassรจnent les posts brouillons et vindicatifs du compte French Response sur X, organe burlesque du quai dโOrsay, rien ne peut justifier la rรฉtention du pรฉtrolier comorien Grinch. Les sanctions occidentales ne sont pas de Droit international ou maritime. Aucune infraction pรฉnale franรงaise nโa รฉtรฉ constatรฉe et finalement, aucune information judiciaire nโest ouverte. Mรชme le parquet, corps de magistrats chargรฉs dโinitier les poursuites pรฉnales et qui en France, sont des laquais du pouvoir exรฉcutif, est frappรฉ de confusion mentale quand il รฉvoque briรจvement une immobilisation administrative. Rien ne va dans cette opรฉration publicitaire de piraterie, une ratatouille juridique oรน un chef dโรtat puรฉril sโaffranchit du Droit national et international
avec la complicitรฉ d’une intelligence artificielle
Abus de substances psychotropes ? Revenu dans le monde rรฉel le 29 janvier, Emmanuel Macron sโentretient au tรฉlรฉphone avec Volodymyr Zelenskyy et piteux, se plaint du Droit franรงais, qui lโoblige ร relรขcher le navire et son รฉquipage indien – il est temps de sโen apercevoir. Ces paroles sont rapportรฉes le lendemain par le journal en ligne ukrainien European Pravda, qui nous apprend aussi que puisquโil a violรฉ la loi, le fanfaron sโengage auprรจs de son homologue kievien ร la faire changer sine die. C’est une autre rรฉforme juridique que l’Europe attend depuis longtemps en France : la sรฉparation du parquet et du pouvoir exรฉcutif
Beaucoup de talent chez le dessinateur franรงais qui le 13 fรฉvrier, sait croquer avec tant de prรฉcision la personnalitรฉ de Jean-Noรซl Barrot, ministre des affaires รฉtrangรจres de la Macronie.
Ce sont probablement des agents implantรฉs en Ukraine qui ont informรฉ le SVR. Lโagence russe de renseignement extรฉrieur dรฉvoile lโaffaire le 24 fรฉvrier 2026, quatriรจme anniversaire du dรฉclenchement de lโopรฉration militaire spรฉciale au Donbass et en Ukraine. Dans le contexte de la dรฉfaite militaire gรฉnรฉrale des troupes atlantistes, la France et le Royaume-Uni projettent de doter en secret lโUkraine de lโarme nuclรฉaire
La dรฉtonation d’une tรชte nuclรฉaire (Nick Bockelman / Scientific American)
Une solution technique envisagรฉe est le transfert de tรชtes franรงaises TN75, que portent les missiles balistiques intercontinentaux en cours de remplacement M51.1. Chacune dรฉlivre une petite charge de 110 kt รฉquivalents de TNT, soit 7,5 Hiroshima. Le vice consiste ร faire croire que lโarme nuclรฉaire ukrainienne serait le rรฉsultat dโun dรฉveloppement national. Le communiquรฉ russe prรฉcise que sollicitรฉe, lโAllemagne a dรฉclinรฉ lโoffre de se joindre ร lโaffaire.
Vice-prรฉsident du Conseil de sรฉcuritรฉ de Russie, Dmitri Medvedev รฉclaire ensuite le public sur les raisons stratรฉgiques de cette rรฉvรฉlation. Elle est un avertissement ; en cas de transfert effectif du matรฉriel, la Russie lancerait pour le moins des frappes nuclรฉaires tactiques sur les sites ukrainiens de destination.
Le projet secret europรฉen est non seulement une violation du traitรฉ de non-prolifรฉration, mais aussi une folie stratรฉgique qui risque de dรฉgรฉnรฉrer en confrontation nuclรฉaire. Le fanatisme affichรฉ depuis quatre ans par les dirigeants europรฉens, les personnalitรฉs retorses et dรฉsรฉquilibrรฉes dโun Emmanuel Macron ou dโun Volodymyr Zelenskyy ne laissent guรจre de doute sur lโauthenticitรฉ des informations que le SVR a exploitรฉes
Le 3 mai 2026, soldats maliens et russes patrouillent ensemble dans un village du Mali (The African Corps)
Dans un article que RTL publie le 8 mai 2026, Georges Malbrunot confirme de sources franรงaises ce quโaffirment depuis longtemps les autoritรฉs du Mali : dans une tentative de restaurer son emprise nรฉocoloniale au Sahel et pour nuire du mรชme coup ร la Russie, la France collabore avec lโUkraine dans leur soutien de groupes djihadistes.
Sous quelque prรฉtexte que ce soit, sa Vacuitรฉ poursuit son projet maniaque dโinjecter des troupes franรงaises en Ukraine. Le 24 juin, le quotidien numรฉrique Intelligence Online rรฉvรจle que sous couvert de formation, des militaires du rรฉgiment de cyberdรฉfense de Saint Jacques de la Lande y opรจrent avec la Sรปretรฉ dโรtat ukrainienne (SBU)
Le rรฉgiment de cyberdรฉfense (ministรจre des Armรฉes)
La Russie a toujours averti quโelle ne tolรจre pas de troupes occidentales en Ukraine. Ne sera pas virtuel, le missile balistique Iskander que ces cyberguerriers risquent de recevoir sur la tรชte.
Les autoritรฉs franรงaises nient, mentent รฉvidemment. Comme dans le cas du soutien franco-ukrainien de groupes djihadistes au Sahel, cette implication aurait du rester secrรจte
Cette belle photographie date du 10 juillet. Elle est ensuite partagรฉe par Lostarmour, un site russe qui documente les vรฉhicules atlantistes dรฉtruits ou capturรฉs. Au cours de leur progression, les combattants russes ont atteint cette รฉpave de canon automoteur franรงais CAESAR.
Convoquรฉs en grande pompe le 18 septembre 2026, des reprรฉsentants de partis politiques se font prรฉsenter ร l’รlysรฉe un รฉtat de la menace, le leurre dโune prรฉtendue guerre hybride russe en Europe. Comme nous le savons dรฉjร , les agences occidentales dites de renseignement nโen font plus guรจre et sont plutรดt payรฉes pour servir la communication dโรฉphรฉmรจres gouvernements dโincompรฉtents.
Bien plus intรฉressant, les autoritรฉs avouent ce que nous avions dรฉjร compris
Les Forces armรฉes franรงaises ont menรฉ des ripostes militaires conventionnelles non rendues publiques contre la Russie ร la suite d’attaques hybrides [Le Monde]
Le commandant Paul Wilks, du renseignement militaire britannique, est tuรฉ en Ukraine le 12 septembre 2026 (gouvernement britannique)
Lโengagement direct des coqs gaulois dans des opรฉrations offensives injustifiรฉes contre la Russie rend sans doute leur dรฉfaite plus amรจre encore. Pour sa part, le Royaume Uni a commencรฉ depuis dรฉcembre 2025 ร rendre publiques des pertes.
chronique alphabรฉtique et nรฉcrologique de lโengagement franรงais dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas
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Ukraine is defenseless in the face of Russian missile attacks. Now is not the time for negotiations. Russia must finish the job
The launch of a Russian Iskander missile
The United States Department of Defense defines the term โdecision pointโ as โA geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving success.โ
Today Russia has reached a decision point in its conflict with the collective West, inclusive of the United States, and their Ukrainian proxy.
The Russian leadership has, in my opinion, been preparing for some time for the confluence of the physical and psychological manifestation of a campaign designed to create an unbridgeable gap between perception and reality which, when exposed through action, will cause the artificially constructed edifice of Ukrainian defensive viability to collapse, and with it the false pillars of Western democracy, industry, and military might which propped it up.
This campaign wasnโt designed from scratch by the Russians, but rather emerged from the lies and deceit of those in the West who postured as peacemakers but in reality served as the promulgators of war.
The Europeans had long proved themselves to be charlatans, with their perfidy regarding Minsk forever exposing them as absolutely unreliable partners for resolving a Ukrainian crisis they themselves orchestrated.
The more curious thing is Russiaโs attitude towards the United States. It was the United States which served as the architect of policies which have been in place for decades designed to weaken Russia and undermine to the point of collapse the government of Russia.
And yet Russia continued to hold out hope that the United States โespecially under the second iteration of the Trump administrationโ could somehow serve as a force of rational stability when it came to managing both Europe and Ukraine.
The Anchorage Summit of August 2025 was the culminating moment of this conceptualization, manifesting itself into the so-called โSpirit of Anchorageโ, the idea that through compromise a solution that addressed in serious fashion Russian concerns could be crafted that would be acceptable to all.
Within months, however, it became clear that the โSpirit of Alaskaโ was as illusory as the โSpirit of Minskโ that preceded it, another perfidious diplomatic ploy designed to buy time to build up Ukrainian military capability by lulling Russia into a false belief that a negotiated peace was possible.
But the United States, like Europe, never intended for the Ukrainian conflict to end in anything other than a strategic Russian defeat.
The Russian leadership has now come to embrace โhowever belatedlyโ this uncomfortable reality.
The ultimate question that now confronts Moscow is how to act on this realization.
Russia finds itself in a situation where it enjoys considerable strategic advantages over Ukraine and its Western partners across a broad spectrum of disciplines โdiplomatic, economic, military, and social.
Russia, despite the concerted efforts of the West, is not isolated. Just the opposite, in fact. In many ways, Russia enjoys a stronger geopolitical posture today that it did before the initiation of the Special Military Operation if for no other reason that the conflict has exposed the nefarious nature of the so-called โrules-based international orderโ and those who conceived and implemented it, and as such breathed viability into the concepts of multilateralism that Russia and other nations, especially China, had been promoting with mixed results.
The Russian economy has withstood the challenges posed by economic sanctions and direct military action, and today is recognized by most of the world as a viable place to do business, as witnessed by the $84 billion in direct investments accrued during the Saint Petersburg International Economic Forum this past June.
Russia today possesses a large, well trained, well equipped, combat hardened military backed by a robust and capable defense industry which is not only prevailing in an extended war of attrition against Ukraine and the collective West, but has positioned itself to defend Russiaโs interests in the Baltic, Arctic, Pacific, and the totality of its periphery, as well as defend and advance Russian interests in the Middle East and Africa. The advances in Russian technology โespecially in ballistic missilesโ has provided a qualitative edge which, when combined with Russiaโs quantitative strengths, makes Russia a very formidable force.
Russian society continues its long and painful divorce with the West. The incomplete nature of this split, which sees small pockets of western liberalism holding on to relevance in the face of a larger societal gravitation toward a new Russian national awareness, has provided the collective West with its only opportunity to dismantle the advantages Russia has accrued diplomatically, economically, and militarily. The western intelligence services have worked with Ukraine to craft a narrative of Ukrainian resistance, resilience, and relevance that is then juxtaposed on the perception of Russian weakness that emerges in the wake of the false hope of negotiated peace that Russia had embraced in Minsk, Istanbul and Anchorage.
This hope was always designed to energize the residual western liberal elites inside Russia into believing everything would be better if Russia simply embraced the spirit of compromise. But the spirit of compromise was nothing more than a wolf in sheepโs clothing, a disguise to blind Russians from the reality that the collective West was seeking Russian surrender instead.
By planting the false hope of compromised-induced peace and prosperity in the minds of the residual Russian western liberal elites, western intelligence was sowing the seeds of a larger Russian societal disruption that was intended when the desired peaceful outcome failed to materialize. The fact that the failure to find a pathway to peace originated in the collective Westโs perfidy didnโt matter in this regard โthe Russian liberal elites were conditioned to blame their leadership for this failure, regardless of the truth.
Having sown the seeds of societal unrest, the western intelligence services themselves embarked on one of the largest information operations ever conducted, flooding the mainstream western press and social media outlets with an endless stream of stories designed to promote the narrative of Ukrainian victory and Russian defeat. This narrative would then be injected into Russian social discourse either through the resonance brought on by the incessant Western echo chamber, or through agents of influence โwitting and unwitting alikeโ whose access to the Russian information market helped magnify a message of Russian weakness, corruption, and indecisiveness designed to collapse Russian public confidence in their leadership.
And now we find ourselves at the Point of Decision.
The information operation against Russia was backed by three supporting campaigns.
The first was the transition by Ukraine and its western supporters away from the traditional battlefield, where Russia was prevailing, to a drone-based war designed to create the perception of Ukrainian strength and, in doing so, the prospect of Ukrainian victory.
This campaign was not just designed to influence the Russian liberal elites, but also to build a foundation of political support within Europe and the United States for increased economic and military support for Ukraine.
The drone campaign served as the fuel that energized the G-7 meeting in June where pledges of economic support were made, as well as the NATO summit in July where similar pledges were made regarding military support.
But rather than constructing a structurally sound foundation upon which a viable Ukrainian counter to Russia could be assembled, the entire Western effort had produced little more than a ghost of what was being sought โa veritable house of cards that could collapse at the slightest of breezes.
The fact is the ability to turn the promises of the G-7 and NATO into reality are as illusory as the drone campaign upon which these promises were promulgated.
The European โBig 3โ โGermany, France and the UKโ are led by leaders who political viability is measured in months.
The United States is distracted by a losing military effort in the Middle East and a genuine lack of goodwill between American President Trump and his European and NATO partners.
The only thing that could coalesce this dysfunctional US-European alliance would be a Russian overreaction to the pressures brought on by the Ukrainian drone campaign.
This, of course, is one of the primary goals of the Western intelligence services through their information operation.
The โRussia must attack Europeโ thematic has taken hold in Russia, promoted by western observers and analysts (I myself have been guilty of this) as well as Russian commentators and influencers.
But it has been resisted by the Russian leadership, simply because to attack Europe would undo all of the advantages Russia has accrued diplomatically, economically and militarily and, in doing so, potentially trigger the very collapse of Russian society the West has long sought.
A Russian attack on Europe would also create a window of viability for both the failing European leadership and the flagging US-NATO alliance.
A Russian attack on Europe is exactly what the Western intelligence seek.
Today Russia finds itself confronted by a confluence of events that has opened up a window of strategic opportunity.
The Ukraine drone campaign has failed. This conclusion has manifested itself in the political turmoil inside Ukraine as President Zelensky fired the person responsible for this campaign โMikhailo Federovโ and instead appeared to favor a reallocation of resources to the Ukrainian ground forces.
The Ukrainian public, which had embraced the narrative of Ukrainian drone dominance as the magic formula to bring an end to the war, have taken to the streets in protest, creating an unprecedented political crisis for Ukrainian President Zelensky.
Meanwhile Europe and the US struggle to follow through on the promises made at the G-7 and NATO Summits.
The gap between the theory of Ukrainian victory and the ability of Ukraine and its Western partners to achieve this has never been greater.
The only thing that could save the Ukraine project is either Russian indecision or Russian overreaction.
It is time, instead, for Russian action.
Russia has initiated a massive bombardment of Ukraine using missiles and drones.
Ukraine has no defense.
Neither Europe nor the US are in a position to change this calculus in the near term.
Every Russian missile attack underscores the false narrative of the Western intelligence information operation.
Every Russian missile attack exposes the impotence of Europe.
Every Russian missile attack underscores the dysfunction of NATO and the US.
And every Russian missile attack shreds the credibility of the residual Russian liberal elite.
This is the Decision Point.
Keep raining missiles down on Ukraine.
Confront the Ukrainian people with the inevitability of their collective demise should they continue to fight.
Confront Europe with the emptiness of their promised support.
Confront the US and NATO with their collective military impotence.
And confront the Russian people with the inevitability and necessity of a decisive Russian victory.
The collective West set itself up for disaster by engaging in perfidy designed to destroy Russia.
Policies based upon lies and deception cannot succeed if the lies and deception are exposed in time for an effective counter to be implemented.
Russia has exposed the lies and deception of the West.
Now it simply needs the courage to act.
This is the Decision Point that will decide the future of Russia.
The vulnerability of Ukraine to Russian missile and drone attack has presented itself.
Russia now needs to exploit this vulnerability with every resource it has.
Ukraine will be defeated.
Europe will collapse.
And the United States will be left holding an empty bag.
Thereโs no need to strike Europe.
Simply darken the skies of Ukraine with Russian missiles and drones [end]
65-year-old Scott Ritter is a former intelligence officer within the US Marine Corps (USMC), then inspector of the United Nations in Iraq. When in 2003, the US and their British minions were about to invade the country under this false pretext, Ritter was claiming that there was no weapon of mass destruction (WMD) there. He was right.
In the Jacques Baud case, the EU is sanctioning, for the first time, an analyst not for spreading disinformation but for expressing a politically inconvenient truth, all while admitting he has broken no law. Will it have the courage to go after an American citizen?
Operation enters the second week of Ukraineโs long-awaited and highly touted counteroffensive, some basic conclusions can be drawn even though the fighting continues, and will continue to rage, for some time to come
Kastner Kysilenko, Pierre, nรฉ le 15 septembre 1983,
vit ร Berlin, oรน il exerce l’activitรฉ de coach
(Rรฉseaux sociaux)
L’Alsacien a failli combattre dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, mais s’est ravisรฉ en mars 2022. Il mรฉrite nรฉanmoins sa place dans ce panthรฉon, car il illustre ร merveille le degrรฉ de complaisance et de falsification historique de la presse occidentale. Plusieurs organes franรงais l’ont interviewรฉ quand il รฉtait basรฉ ร Yavorov, prรจs de la frontiรจre polonaise. Il fut d’abord dรฉรงu par la solde de base dans la Lรฉgion internationale, indexรฉe sur le coรปt de la vie en Ukraine. Seules les primes de combat la rendent intรฉressante. Puis le centre de regroupement des volontaires รฉtrangers fut frappรฉ le 13 mars par des missiles de croisiรจre. Bref, il est rentrรฉ ร Berlin. Le 27 mars, le JDD รฉcrit
Pierre Kastner Kysilenko, alsacien d’origine ukrainienne, a la rรฉsistance dans le sang. Son grand-pรจre, arrivรฉ en France en 1948, s’est battu contre l’occupation nazie puis soviรฉtique en Ukraine
Il faut oser. De nombreux Ukrainiens ont immigrรฉ en Europe et en Amรฉrique du Nord ร la fin des annรฉes 40 et au dรฉbut des annรฉes 50. Le Royaume-Uni, par exemple, a accueilli 8 500 SS ukrainiens aprรจs la guerre. Beaucoup ont demeurรฉ un temps dans des camps de rรฉfugiรฉs en Allemagne de l’Ouest, avant de choisir leur nouvelle patrie. Tous fuyaient la victoire de l’Union soviรฉtique sur l’Allemagne nazie. Nul en Ukraine ne s’est battu contre l’occupation nazie puis soviรฉtique. Si Kastner l’a racontรฉ aux journalistes, il est affabulateur ou rรฉvisionniste. Seuls des Polonais et des Soviรฉtiques convaincus ont rรฉsistรฉ aux nazis sur le territoire de l’actuelle Ukraine. Les nationalistes ukrainiens, ceux rรฉfugiรฉs ร l’ouest aprรจs 1945 et vous allez comprendre pourquoi, avaient plutรดt coutume de parader en son honneur, quand Hans Frank, Generalgouverneurfรผr die besetzten polnischen Gebiete [gouverneur gรฉnรฉral des territoires polonais occupรฉs], les visitait
ร Ivano-Frankivsk, en juillet 1941
La falsification historique est courante aujourd’hui chez les propagandistes ukrainiens, trouve sa justification dans le fait que les Allemands ont internรฉ, entre 1941 et 1944, le chef des nationalistes ukrainiens, Stepan Bandera, qui avait pris la dรฉcision unilatรฉrale, dans les fourgons des armรฉes du Reich qui envahissaient l’Union soviรฉtique, de dรฉclarer une Ukraine fasciste et indรฉpendante. Je dรฉtaille son histoire dans la partie consacrรฉe ร David Piguet. Pendant son internement, les miliciens de l’UPA (Armรฉe des insurgรฉs ukrainiens) n’ont jamais affrontรฉ les occupants allemands. Eux-mรชmes nazis, ils ont massacrรฉ, avec la bienveillance des Allemands, entre 50 000 et 100 000 civils polonais, menรฉ ร partir de 1944 une guรฉrilla contre l’Armรฉe rouge victorieuse
Le Canada nous en offre une illustration grand-guignolesque, dont l’รฉpilogue psychodramatique sera aussi un plaisir de fin gourmet, lorsque le 22 septembre 2023, en prรฉsence de Volodymyr Zelenskyy et du premier ministre Justin Trudeau, le parlement fait une standing ovation ร un hรฉros ukrainien-canadien de la 2de guerre mondiale, qui s’est battu contre les Russes pour l’indรฉpendance de l’Ukraine, c’est-ร -dire Yaroslav Hunka, 98 ans, ancien Waffen SS ukrainien de la 14. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS, Galizien [Galicie, region de Lviv]
ร l’invitation du prรฉsident du parlement, Volodomyr Zelenskyy, Chrystia Freeland et Justin Trudeau applaudissent l’ancien SS Yaroslav Hunka (Patrick Doyle / The Canadian Press)
Justin Trudeau paraรฎt immรฉdiatement circonspect, mais Chrystia Freeland est ravie. Elle est elle-mรชme la petite-fille d’un nazi ukrainien, ce dont bien sรปr elle n’est pas responsable. Son grand-pรจre, Mykhailo Khomiak/Michael Chomiak, รฉtait rรฉdacteur en chef ร Cracovie, capitale du Generalgouvernement fรผr die besetzten polnischen Gebiete [gouvernement gรฉnรฉral des territoires polonais occupรฉs], d’un journal de propagande nazie ร destination de la communautรฉ nationaliste ukrainienne. Il a fui bien sรปr la victoire de l’Union soviรฉtique sur l’Allemagne nazie. Le problรจme est que lorsque ces faits historiques lui sont prรฉsentรฉs, elle ose rรฉpondre qu’ils seraient de la dรฉsinformation russe. Chrystia Freeland est vice-premier ministre du Canada
Le quotidien ะัะฐะบัะฒััะบั ะฒัััั [Krakivsโki Visti, Nouvelles de Cracovie] fut fondรฉ en janvier 1940 en Pologne occupรฉe, publie les traductions ukrainiennes d’articles allemands et des originaux, anti-soviรฉtiques et antisรฉmites. Mykhailo Khomiak en est le rรฉdacteur en chef. Ici en 1942, l’abonnรฉ est ร Lemberg [Lviv]
Volodymyr Zelenskyy n’est pas nรฉcessairement nazi, plutรดt un comรฉdien professionnel. Ses sponsors le firent รฉlire en 2019 sur la promesse de la paix au Donbass. Mais l’opportuniste n’a pas mis en oeuvre les accords de Minsk, n’a pas dissous les formations paramilitaires nazies. Car ceux qui portent les flingues, les Herren [seigneurs en Allemand] de l’รtat profond constituรฉ en 2014, ont clairement expliquรฉ, mรชme en public, que de telles initiatives allaient lui coรปter la vie. Ancien officier de renseignement et inspecteur de l’ONU en Irak, Scott Ritter le raconte fort bien. Et grรขce ร la corruption endรฉmique, Zelenskyy a choisi de profiter de la vie.
L’apothรฉose se produit le 28 septembre, lorsque Yaroslav Hunka, alerte mais amer, explique aux mรฉdias canadiens qu’en raison du scandale national et international, il est contraint de se rรฉfugier chez des amis en Amรฉrique latine.
chronique alphabรฉtique et nรฉcrologique de lโengagement franรงais dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas
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There’s a gaping hole in Kyivโs finances that no amount of tax increases or Western donations will be able to fill
There is no plan in place to fund the Ukrainian budget after 2025.
Even if the war ends by the summer of 2025, it will take some time to reduce military expenditures, leaving European nations on the hook. Itโs not clear that European elites have fully understood the political costs, however much longer the war continues.
With intensive, U.S.-brokered negotiations ongoing in Saudi Arabia involving separate Ukrainian and Russian delegations, hopes are rising that the Trump administration will finally be able to bring an end to the war.
But even if the war ends tomorrow, it would be unwise to assume that Ukraine could reduce military spending close to prewar levels.
Ukraine now has almost 900,000 men and women at arms, a threefold increase from peacetime, and that doesnโt take into account irrecoverable losses through death and injury. Estimates vary widely, but the casualty rate is commonly thought to number in the hundreds of thousands, with compensation provided to the injured and families of the deceased.
The war in Ukraine has therefore come at a vast financial cost to that country. Ukraineโs defense spending has risen tenfold since the 2021 budget was announced, when social welfare payments were the countryโs biggest expenditure.
This has left a gaping hole in Ukraineโs finances that no amount of tax increases or Western donations will be able to fill over a sustained period without political consequences.
Since 2022, Ukraine has run an average budget deficit of over 22% of GDP. Based on the current exchange rate, Ukraineโs budget shortfall in 2025 amounts to around $41.5 billion. And that assumes defense spending falling slightly this year. In the hopefully unlikely event that war continues to the end of the year, the Ukrainian state would need to revise its budget upwards as it did in 2024.
Today, Ukraineโs domestic revenue, including taxes, excise, and duties, just about covers the cost of the defense effort, which in 2024 accounted for 64% of its total budget expenditure. That includes significant tax increases as the war has gone on. Total tax revenue will have risen by more than 100% since the war started and personal income taxes by over 200%. This in a country in which, according to the Wilson Center, 50% of the population lives at a basic subsistence level.
As Ukraine is cut off from international capital markets, it has had to meet the difference through aid and loans from Western nations.
Put simply, Western donations and loans have paid the salaries of Ukrainian state officials and kept the lights on in their buildings. At the start of the war, donations took the form of free financial aid to meet the countryโs budgetary and military needs. According to the Kiel Institute, the United States has provided just above $50 billion in direct budgetary assistance. The European Union provided $51.5 billion in financial assistance โ i.e., budgetary support โ between 2022 and 2024.
However, since the start of 2024, free aid has progressively shifted to lending as Western governments have felt the political and economic cost of unlimited financial assistance.
So, Ukraine has increasingly resorted to borrowing money. In some regards, that is to be expected. Governments tend to borrow heavily at times of war. The UK only settled its World War II war debts to the United States and Canada in 2006.
Ukrainian debt has therefore soared to over 100% of GDP and, critically, the cost of servicing its debt has tripled, and now makes up the second largest line of expenditure in Ukraineโs budget, after military spending. To put that into context, Ukraine will spend more than twice the amount on servicing its debt in 2025 than it spends on the health of its population. That ratio will only widen the longer the war continues.
Ukraine should just about be able to make ends meet in 2025 thanks to the G7 Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration loan agreed in June 2024. As part of a last-ditch compromise by the outgoing Biden Administration, the $20 billion U.S. contribution to the G7 loan was directed through the World Bank to provide specific project-based support โ i.e., to help rebuild power infrastructure – rather than generalized budgetary support.
The crucial point is that Iโve seen no plans for how Ukraineโs budgetary needs will be met from 2026 onward. Even if the war ends tomorrow, Ukraine may still be at risk of running out of money in 2026 if Western donor countries falsely assume that it will be able to return to prewar spending on Day One.
Therefore, the big question is how quickly Ukraine can reduce military spending in 2026 and who will cover the shortfall. To balance the books in 2026, Ukraine would need to reduce its military spending by 80%, or around $41 billion.
But decision-makers in Kyiv may understandably push to maintain a big army against the threat of future Russian aggression. While the huge expenditure in weapons and ammunition from war fighting may fall away, maintaining a standing army, even if its numbers are reduced, would still carry a heavy price. Even if Ukraineโs future budget deficit wasnโt as high as $41 billion, it is easy to imagine that it might be $20 billion.
The International Monetary Fund also doesnโt expect Ukraine to be able to access international lending markets before 2027. That will leave the Ukrainian state reaching out to donor nations for additional funding. With the Trump administration looking to pare back its financial commitments to Ukraine and focus instead on investing, including in minerals, the pressure will be on European states. There is significant political risk here. In the past few days, the Europeans struggled to agree to an additional weapons package of $5 billion for Ukraine. Funding $20 billion in budgetary support to Ukraine in 2026 following a ceasefire this year may still herald a backlash from those on the nationalist left and right who believe the war should have ended in 2022. I assess the UK and Europe would find it economically and politically unsustainable to prop up the war beyond this year without the United States. Thatโs another reason why European leaders should get behind ongoing peace negotiations [end]
Ian Proud was a member of His Britannic Majesty’s Diplomatic Service from 1999 to 2023. He served as the Economic Counsellor at the British Embassy in Moscow from July 2014 to February 2019. Prior to Moscow, he organized the 2013 G8 Summit in Lough Erne, Northern Ireland, working out of 10 Downing Street. He recently published his memoir, “A Misfit in Moscow: How British diplomacy in Russia failed, 2014-2019”
[…] en premier lieu, de nombreux รฉlรฉments conduisent ร penser que les Europรฉens poursuivent la politique des nรฉoconservateurs de lโex-รฉquipe Biden […]
La Realpolitik, caractรฉrisรฉe par la prise en compte rรฉaliste des rapports de force, est de retour ร Washington. On le constate avec la dรฉmarche de Donald Trump qui a repris contact avec Vladimir Poutine. Il a compris que la stratรฉgie dโaffaiblissement de la Russie conรงue par les nรฉoconservateurs de lโรฉquipe Biden รฉtait un รฉchec et que la guerre ne menait ร rien. Trump a intรฉrรชt ร y mettre un terme pour passer ร autre chose. Il veut un deal avec Poutine, car il ne souhaite pas que les hydrocarbures et les terres rares russes partent en Chine. Il se serait mรชme dit prรชt ร participer au dรฉveloppement de la Crimรฉe et du Donbass.
Mais cette รฉvolution nโest pas du goรปt de Zelenski 1 et de son entourage parce que cela remet en cause leur mainmise sur lโUkraine. Ils bรฉnรฉficient รฉtonnamment du soutien des Europรฉens, dont on comprend mal ce quโils ont ร gagner ร la poursuite de la guerre. Leur obstination est dโautant plus funeste que les trois annรฉes รฉcoulรฉes ont montrรฉ que ce conflit รฉtait dรฉvastateur pour lโรฉconomie europรฉenne et que ses รtats membres รฉtaient incapables dโassurer eux-mรชmes leur sรฉcuritรฉ comme de soutenir efficacement Kiev en matiรจre militaire. En rรฉalitรฉ, leur attitude sโinscrit dans le cadre dโune stratรฉgie prรฉcise, conduite ร lโinsu des peuples europรฉens.
Une obstination difficilement comprรฉhensible
Plusieurs raisons peuvent expliquer lโรฉtonnante attitude de va-tโen guerre des dirigeants europรฉens et de leur slogan stupide de ยซ Paix par la force ยป.
โ En premier lieu, de nombreux รฉlรฉments conduisent ร penser que les Europรฉens poursuivent la politique des nรฉoconservateurs de lโex-รฉquipe Biden โ ร lโorigine de ce conflit โ, ร leur instigation. En effet, les Dรฉmocrates, battus ร plate couture lors des derniรจres prรฉsidentielles amรฉricaines sont en pleine dรฉconfiture aux รtats-Unis. Le parti est ร la dรฉrive, se fissure et les chances de redressement ร court terme sont minces. Trump, ayant tirรฉ les leรงons de la maniรจre dont son premier mandat avait รฉtรฉ sabotรฉ par les actions de lโรtat profond amรฉricain pilotรฉ par les familles Clinton et Obama, a, dรจs sa prise de fonctions, lancรฉ toute une sรฉrie dโactions (dissolution de lโUSAID, reprise en mains de lโappareil dโรtat et de lโadministration, recadrage des juges des juges, etc.) qui ne leur permettent pas de perturber efficacement son dรฉbut de mandat โ au moins pas avant les รฉlections de mid term โ comme ils lโavaient fait entre 2016 et 2020. Les Dรฉmocrates sont donc totalement impuissants. En revanche, divers รฉlรฉments laissent entrevoir quโils sโemploient ร saborder sa politique internationale en sโappuyant sur le Royaume-Uni et les รtats de lโUnion europรฉenne.
En effet, depuis 2003, les dirigeants europรฉens ont fait acte de soumission aux รtats-Unis et ร leur bellicisme. Ils ont dโabord appuyรฉ lโinvasion illรฉgale de lโIrak. Puis ils ont acceptรฉ de reconnaitre le rรฉgime ukrainien issu du coup dโรtat de Maรฏdan (2014) et ont fermรฉ les yeux sur la rรฉpression violente dรฉclenchรฉe par Kiev au Donbass. Ensuite, ils se sont laissรฉs entraรฎner, ร leurs frais et ร leur dรฉtriment, dans une guerre voulue par Washington, adoptant parfois des positions plus radicales encore contre Moscou qui nโavait pourtant manifestรฉ contre eux aucune hostilitรฉ.
Tous les dirigeants europรฉens actuels entretiennent les meilleures relations du monde avec lโรฉquipe dรฉmocrate et tous โ ร lโexception de Viktor Orban, Robert Fico et Georgia Meloni โ ont, plus ou moins directement et explicitement, pris parti contre la rรฉรฉlection de Trump. Depuis son entrรฉe ร la Maison-Blanche, ils ne cessent de critiquer la nouvelle politique amรฉricaine. Ils semblent ainsi poursuivre, en vassaux fidรจles, la politique des Dรฉmocrates, que ceux-ci continuent de piloter dans lโombre depuis Washington, partant du principe โ hautement hasardeux โ que lโรฉlection de Trump nโest quโune malheureuse parenthรจse qui prendra fin au plus tard en 2029. Il convient donc de contrer sa politique en attendant leur retour aux affairesโฆ Cela explique la dรฉfiance et le mรฉpris de la nouvelle administration amรฉricaine ร lโรฉgard de ces ยซ leaders ยป europรฉens quโelle juge hostiles, raison pour laquelle elle ne tient aucunement compte de leur avis et de leurs agitations improductives.
โ La seconde explication est que le contexte de crise (militaire et รฉconomique) que traverse actuellement le Vieux continent favorise lโensemble de ces leaders vis-ร -vis de leur รฉlectorat, car la plupart dโentre eux โ en particulier Emmanuel Macron โ se trouvent dans une situation politique difficile. Ils jouent donc sur la peur dโune menace russe imminente โ totalement inventรฉe dans ce but โ pour maintenir les populations dans lโangoisse, faire taire les critiques contre leur politique internationale inconsidรฉrรฉe et retarder lโรฉchรฉance de leur dรฉfaite. En effet, les dirigeants europรฉens doivent dissimuler le fait que leur dรฉcision de rompre avec la Russie a crรฉรฉ lโinflation, les difficultรฉs รฉconomiques et accรฉlรฉrรฉ la dรฉsindustrialisation et la dรฉpendance vis-ร -vis des รtats-Unis (GNL, armes, etc.) 2.
โ Enfin, troisiรจme hypothรจse ร ne pas รฉcarter, cโest le refus de prise en compte du rรฉel des รฉlites europรฉennes, par cรฉcitรฉ ou incompรฉtence gรฉopolitique, et la certitude que leur action est juste, fondรฉe et lรฉgitime, illustration de leur dรฉconnexion complรจte des rรฉalitรฉs de terrain et de lโรฉvolution des rapports de force internationaux.
Faire lโEurope par la crise, lโemprunt et la guerre
Mais en rรฉalitรฉ, il existe une autre explication qui commence seulement ร รชtre perรงue et qui รฉclaire dโun jour nouveau lโintransigeance des dirigeants europรฉens : ils exploitent au maximum cette crise pour faire avancer lโEurope dans une voie fรฉdรฉrale, sans demander lโavis des peuples. Leur but ? Faire lโEurope par la crise, lโemprunt et la guerre.
Cette stratรฉgie machiavรฉlique, vรฉritable manipulation antidรฉmocratique pour imposer une Europe supranationale dont personne ne veut, a รฉtรฉ mise en place ร partir de la seconde moitiรฉ des annรฉes 2010, exploitant divers รฉvรฉnements internationaux : la crise des Subprimes dโabord ; le COVID ensuite ; enfin, la guerre dโUkraine et la menace russe. Il est important de dรฉtailler les รฉtapes de cette dรฉrive organisรฉe.
Rappelons au prรฉalable quโil convient de faire une nette diffรฉrence entre les pays de lโUE membres de la zone euro (20 sur 27 3) et ceux qui nโen sont pas. Si tous dรฉpendent de la Commission, seuls les premiers dรฉpendent en plus de la Banque centrale europรฉenne (BCE). Ils sont donc sous double dรฉpendance de la Commission et de la BCE. Il convient รฉgalement de rappeler que la BCE nโa pas le droit de proposer des emprunts. Cela est interdit par les traitรฉs. Pourtant, il y a eu deux entorses ร cette rรจgle :
โ lors de la crise des Subprimes (2008-2009), Mario Draghi a mis en place le Quantitative Easing, cโest-ร -dire une รฉmission monรฉtaire de la BCE avec possibilitรฉ de racheter des dettes des pays de la zone euro (et non de lโUE) sur le second marchรฉ (auprรจs des banques commerciales auxquelles une partie des dettes ont รฉtรฉ rachetรฉes) ;
โ lors de la crise du COVID, un emprunt de 700 milliards dโeuros a รฉtรฉ รฉmis, garanti par les pays de la zone euro, mais bรฉnรฉficiant aussi ร ceux qui nโen sont pas membresโฆ et qui pourraient dรฉcider de ne pas รชtre solidaires pour son remboursement, car rien ne les y oblige. Ce serait alors aux autres รtats ayant garanti lโemprunt de compenser !
Ainsi, depuis la crise sanitaire et รฉconomique liรฉe au COVID, les รtats de la zone euro sont de plus en plus tenus par la Commission europรฉenne, via la BCE, par le biais de laquelle ils ont empruntรฉ, accroissant leur dette et renforรงant le contrรดle financier de Bruxelles. Ils dรฉpendent dโune monnaie โ lโeuro โ qui ne leur appartient pas, dโoรน la rรฉduction considรฉrable de leur marge de manลuvre รฉconomique et financiรจre. Mais ce nโest encore quโune monnaie ยซ partagรฉe ยป, cโest-ร -dire quโelle nโest pas encore vraiment ยซ commune ยป. Pour le moment, nous sommes tous endettรฉs en euro ยซ national ยป via nos รtats respectifs. Mais si la monnaie devenait vรฉritablement commune โ ce qui est sans doute lโobjectif de lโeuro numรฉrique โ, les รtats se trouveraient totalement sous le pouvoir dโune structure supranationale. Ils nโauraient alors plus aucune maรฎtrise de leur destin et il leur serait extrรชmement difficile de sortir de lโUE.
Le programme de financement du rรฉarmement europรฉen via des prรชts aux รtats et lโautorisation dโaccroรฎtre leur dรฉficit de 1,5% sans sanction 4 va renforcer encore davantage ce phรฉnomรจne 5. Lโindรฉpendance financiรจre, et donc politique, des รtats membres de la zone euro risque ainsi de diminuer rapidement, voire de disparaรฎtre.
Les dรฉrives antidรฉmocratiques et autoritaires de lโUE
Pour arriver ร leurs fins, les dirigeants europรฉens ne reculent devant rien : reniements, propagande, falsifications de la rรฉalitรฉ, abus de pouvoirโฆ contrevenant sans scrupule aux principes dรฉmocratiques quโils sont censรฉs incarner et dรฉfendre.
โ En premier lieu, il convient de rappeler leur soutien au coup dโรtat de Maรฏdan de 2014 orchestrรฉ par Washington, leur non-respect dรฉlibรฉrรฉ des accords de Minsk, leur silence sur la rรฉpression dans le Donbass et leur validation du rejet de lโaccord de paix russo-ukrainien de fin mars 2022. Ces รฉvรฉnements illustrent le fait quโils ne respectent ni leurs engagements ni le droit international et quโils ne souhaitent pas la fin du conflit.
โ En second lieu, ils ont dรฉclenchรฉ, avec lโaide des mรฉdias mainstream quโils contrรดlent, une propagande massive contre Moscou, laquelle se poursuit sans discontinuer, voire sโaccรฉlรจre alors que le sort des armes montre que lโissue de ce conflit est scellรฉe et que les discussions entre Trump et Poutine en sonneront bientรดt la fin. Depuis trois ans, ils dissimulent ร lโopinion les causes vรฉritables de la guerre dโUkraine et la rรฉalitรฉ du rรฉgime de Kiev, gouvernement extrรฉmiste et corrompu ร la tรชte dโun รtat failli, rongรฉ par la criminalitรฉ, et qui a trรจs largement contribuรฉ ร provoquer son voisin.
โ Ensuite, les dirigeants europรฉens diffusent largement, avec lโappui de la majoritรฉ des chefs des armรฉes de leurs รtats, lโidรฉe dโune menace russe ยซ existentielle ยป, dรฉlire qui ne rรฉsiste pas ร lโanalyse des donnรฉes dรฉmographiques et militaires.
โ De plus, ils ont mis en place une autre forme de propagande, plus insidieuse, pour faire avancer lโidรฉe dโune indispensable intรฉgration europรฉenne. Dans un rapport rรฉcent 6, le journaliste Thomas Fazi expose comment la Commission europรฉenne finance des ONG, des mรฉdias, des associations de la sociรฉtรฉ civile pour faire avancer son agenda par le biais de divers programmes visant ร ยซ promouvoir les valeurs de lโUE ยป et ร ยซ rapprocher lโUnion europรฉenne de ses citoyens ยป. En rรฉalitรฉ, ยซ les organisations bรฉnรฉficiaires sont explicitement engagรฉes en faveur du fรฉdรฉralisme europรฉen ou de lโintรฉgration, en alignement avec les propres objectifs politiques de la Commission ยป. Cette manลuvre se fait au dรฉtriment des processus dรฉmocratiques et de la souverainetรฉ des รtats membres et sans que les Europรฉens en soient conscients. De plus, elle vise ร รฉtouffer toute voix dissidente ou qui sโรฉcarte de la doxa officielle : celle dโune UE non seulement intรฉgrรฉe, mais รฉgalement vouรฉe ร lโรฉlargissement (Serbie, Ukraine, etc.). ยซ En amplifiant les voix pro-UE et en marginalisant les perspectives dissidentes, cette stratรฉgie consolide les rรฉcits en faveur de lโintรฉgration tout en discrรฉditant ou en rรฉprimant les points de vue alternatifs. En consรฉquence, les mรฉcanismes de financement de lโUE et les ONG elles-mรชmes sont transformรฉs en outils de propagande institutionnelle visant ร promouvoir une intรฉgration supranationale plus profonde ยป. Cโest donc lร une forme indirecte de censure.
โ Par ailleurs, les dirigeants europรฉens recourent ouvertement ร des actions antidรฉmocratiques dรจs lors que dโautres acteurs politiques sโopposent ร leur stratรฉgie. On connait les difficultรฉs faites ร Orban qui se bat pied ร pied contre les dรฉrives de lโUE. On a vu comment lโex-prรฉsidente gรฉorgienne, battue aux derniรจres รฉlections a tentรฉ, avec le soutien de Bruxelles, de remettre en cause โ sans succรจs โ les รฉlections. On a vu รฉgalement comment une partie des รฉlecteurs de Moldavie installรฉs ร lโรฉtranger nโont pu voter lors du dernier scrutin, car leur vote aurait fait รฉlire un candidat opposรฉ ร cette politique et souhaitant un rapprochement avec la Russie. On vient de voir, enfin, la maniรจre dont les รฉlections roumaines ont รฉtรฉ tout ร fait illรฉgalement annulรฉes et reportรฉes, puis celle dont Georgescu a รฉtรฉ empรชchรฉ de se reprรฉsenter.
โ Enfin, nous sommes en prรฉsence de vรฉritables abus de pouvoir lorsque lโon voit le rรดle jouรฉ par Ursula von der Leyen, simple haut fonctionnaire europรฉen nommรฉ ร la tรชte de la Commission, qui se comporte โ avec le plein accord de dirigeants europรฉens co-responsables de cette dรฉrive โ comme une petite gauleiter, outrepassant allรจgrement son rรดle et se fonctions. Rappelons que la Commission europรฉenne et sa prรฉsidente nโont aucune attribution en matiรจre de dรฉfense. Cette femme et son administration sโarrogent donc des pouvoirs quโelles nโont pas, se livrant une sorte de coup dโรtat permanent au dรฉtriment des souverainetรฉs nationales.
En raison de ces dรฉrives autoritaires et de cette propagande et de ces abus de pouvoir, le terme dโ ยซ UERSS ยป nโest pas inappropriรฉ.
Pour ces diffรฉrentes raisons, les ยซ รฉlites ยป politiques et technocratiques europรฉennes sont dรฉterminรฉes ร soutenir Kiev et ร poursuivre une guerre qui sert leur stratรฉgie. Elles affirment donc que lโUkraine nโest quโune victime, quโelle doit recouvrer son intรฉgritรฉ territoriale, que Poutine est le mal absolu et quโune invasion russe est imminente. Les dirigeants europรฉens semblent ainsi prรชts ร tout pour imposer aux peuples une Europe supranationale, sans tenir compte de leur volontรฉ. Nous sommes clairement en prรฉsence dโune stratรฉgie consistant ร ยซ faire ยป lโEurope par les crises, la monnaie et la guerre, et dโune marche forcรฉe vers le fรฉdรฉralisme, par une politique des petits pas empรชchant tout retour en arriรจre, en plaรงant les peuples devant le fait accompli [fin]
chronique alphabรฉtique et nรฉcrologique de lโengagement franรงais dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas
chronicle, its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine
chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia
Depuis lโallocution dโEmmanuel Macron ร propos de la guerre en Ukraine, le 5 mars, les grands mรฉdias sont en ordre de marche. Rรฉhabilitation du prรฉsident en ยซ chef de guerre ยป, patriotisme exacerbรฉ, concert militariste et glorification des industriels de guerreโฆ Menรฉ tambour battant, le SAV du discours prรฉsidentiel sโaccompagne dโune nouvelle sรฉquence de matraquage patronal contre le ยซ modรจle social ยป et pour ยซ travailler plus ยป au nom, prรฉtendument, de lโยซ effort de guerre ยป : ยซ Pensions ou munitions ? ยป ; ยซ Les canons ou les allocations ? ยป Signรฉs Dominique Seux (Les รchos, 10/03) et รtienne Gernelle (RTL, 10/03), les deux slogans donnent le ton
Une crise sans prรฉcรฉdent de la culture de classe est en train de se dรฉrouler sous nos yeux. Cette crise emporte aujourdโhui aussi bien la gauche que la droite, si lโon veut absolument en revenir ร des repรจres simplistes. La classe sociale dominante jouit, mais ne pense plus, ne crรฉe plus. Elle nโa plus quโun chantage ร proposer au peuple : en dรฉpit de notre nullitรฉ, si nous ne sommes plus lร , que vous restera-t-il? Ce nโest pas que des ยซ populismes ยป aient poussรฉ spontanรฉment pour menacer lโordre social en faisant peser la menace du chaos et de lโanomie. Ces mythes rรฉactionnaires ne sont que des aveux dโimpuissance, et voici pourquoi. Un nouveau grand texte dโHarold Bernat, agrรฉgรฉ de philosophie et collaborateur de ยซ Quartier Populaire ยป, ร lire aujourdโhui sur QG
the Germans have bowed down to the US sabotage by Joe Biden administration of Nord Stream pipelines, only to end up with Donald Trumpโs America First doctrine in economy and defense
This is part 2 of โWhy There Is Still No Peace on Earth: Washingtonโs Folly From The Persian Gulf to Ukraine.โ Read part 1
Dont le mandat a pris fin le 20 mai 2024, mais qui est restรฉ en place et a prorogรฉ la loi martiale. โฉ๏ธ
De tous, ce sont les Allemands dont la soumission aux รtats-Unis a รฉtรฉ la plus frappante et qui ont le plus perduย : ils ont acceptรฉ sans broncher la destruction de leur รฉconomie par Washington qui a sabotรฉ Nordย Stream, les a obligรฉs ร cesser toute relation avec la Russie et ร acheter du GNL au prix fort. Ils se sont littรฉralement couchรฉs devant les injonctions de leur protecteur, sans aucune rรฉaction ni amour-propre. โฉ๏ธ
La zone euro est composรฉe deย 20 paysย (Allemagne, Autriche, Belgique, Chypre, Croatie, Espagne, Estonie, Finlande, France, Grรจce, Irlande, Italie, Lettonie, Lituanie, Luxembourg, Malte, Pays-Bas, Portugal, Slovaquie et Slovรฉnie). Certains รtats de lโUE ont choisi de ne pas y participer (Danemark, Suรจde), les autres ne satisfont pas encore aux critรจres รฉconomiques pour la rejoindre (Bulgarie, Hongrie, Pologne, Rรฉpublique tchรจque, Roumanie). โฉ๏ธ
Le montant de 800 milliards dโeuros proposรฉ par Bruxelles (ร confirmer par une adoption formelle) devrait se rรฉpartir de la maniรจre la suivanteย : โ un peu moins de 200 milliards vont รชtre pris en charge par la Commission via la BCEย ; les รtats membres en bรฉnรฉficieront au prorata de la part de leur PIB au sein du PIB europรฉen (soit environ 40ย milliards)ย ; โ pour le reste, plus de 600 milliards, il sโagit dโune autorisation dโaccroissement de 1,5% du dรฉficit autorisรฉ (qui va donc passer de 3% ร 4,5%), sans quโaucune sanction soit imposรฉe. โฉ๏ธ
A noter que cela nโaura aucun impact pour la France qui dรฉpasse dรฉjร allรจgrement le futur dรฉficit autorisรฉ avec plus de 6% ces deux derniรจres annรฉes. โฉ๏ธ
Ukrainian hitlerites for ceasefire. Struggle between Zelenskyite opportunists and Azovite strategists. Poroshenko, Zaluzhny, Sodol. 100 million dollar bribes. The angry officers movement
[my illustration: on March 4, 2014, after the West-backed right-wing coup in Kiev, US Secretary of State John Kerry meets representatives of the parliament. Leader of Nazi Svoboda party, Oleh Tyahnybok is second from right. Petro Poroshenko, center, will become in June the new president of Ukraine (US Department of State)]
When it comes to hitler-loving military nationalists, youโd think theyโd be lean more towards peace than a former comedian Jewish president who came to government on a peace platform, right? The reality is much more interesting
Enter the fourth reich
Tales of the IV Reich (now renamed Tales of the IV Empire), likely run by an Azov lieutenant, is characterized by more sobriety than other similar channels, which is why I love reading it
Most interestingly, his posts often seem to hint at a sentiment among certain โarmy menโ, that the 1991-borders slogan is unrealistic and is leading to the destruction of Ukraineโs finest nationalists through politically-motivated meat storms. Not without the insinuation, of course, that Zelensky is quite happy to see these dangerous competitors die.
The fear of peace
One of the reasons that Tales is worried about endless war is the political pressure it puts on the broader population, which has always been frustratingly disloyal to the aims of radical nationalism.
Tales has always worried about popular demands for peace. Four days before February 24 2022, he was writing paranoid posts about how the west and Russia are trying to pressure Ukraine into implementing the Minsk peace agreements:
Among the participants in the combat actions, I know many disappointed and disoriented people. Some are tired, some have not seen clear changes, some have started families. Not everyone is ready to take up arms again now. Such tendencies are detrimental in the current situation
The implementation of the “Minsk” agreements into the Constitution of Ukraine is worse for us – the Ukrainian right-wing – than a full-scale war. We are accustomed to fighting the Russians – the thousand-year war of freedom-loving Eastern Europeans against the Tatar horde continues to this day. If the Ukrainian authorities are pressured by the Russians and [western – EIU] “partners”, we will get a “war zone” throughout the country. For us, the military veterans there will be no life in such a Ukraine. We will be under constant pressure from the system, with the possibility of being eliminated by amnestied separatist militants, and living in constant fear is not a life anyone wants
If we fiercely resist the Russian army and unite the nation in the fight against the enemy, we cannot lose. Those who are burnt out and stay at home, in case of our defeat, will rot in prison or be killed. Some Ukrainians already believed the Bolsheviks in the 1920s and laid down their arms – they all either died of hunger or lived out their last years in camps
To arms!
On July 13, Tales published a telegram post in response to the calls by popular Ukrainian bloggers for peace through negotiations and compromise in response to Russian rocket strikes on the capital (see my post on the matter). He was also responding to the parliamentarian Artem Dmytruk, who vigorously supported the bloggers.
Medvedchuk refers to the leader of Ukraineโs โOpposition Platform for Lifeโ party, whose main slogan was an end to the war through negotiations, until it was banned in 2022, along with the arrest and deportation of Medvedchuk.
Hereโs the post:
If the war continues for another year, the population will bring the Dmytruks to power. So far, the Dmytruks are quite marginal. If it lasts two years, Medvedchuk will return here with the Russian flag. It’s simple
Being in the [frontline] Zaporizhzhia steppes or the command posts of the Donetsk region, you become quite detached from the population: you don’t hear what ordinary citizens of Lviv, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia, or Kyiv are talking about and dreaming of. The fact that a huge number of people supported the Instabloggers (and how many were too embarrassed to write words of support?) irritates those who advocate for the continuation of the war. Because real people with open profiles wrote there, not Moscow bots. There are many of these people, and this must be taken into account. According to my observations, this number is increasing exponentially despite the fabricated results of sociological surveys
The population sees corruption scandals. Constant loss of territories. Endless shelling. Inflation. Decline in the standard of living. Hundreds of new graves in cemeteries. Maimed veterans on the streets. Videos from the military registration and enlistment office. The West’s incomprehensible behavior. Now, there are also extremely uncomfortable conditions with power outages in +35ยฐC heat and prospects of water supply cuts. This list can go on
I’m surprised that people with higher education and quite a high level of intelligence do not see the pattern
Hitlerite civil war
In another recent post, he was openly pessimistic about Ukraineโs military prospects and its western allies:
Once again, for a day, calls to “fight to victory” are spreading through social media following the terrorist attacks by Muscovites in Kyiv and Kryvyi Rih. Here are my thoughts in theses:
Mobilization and a massive influx to the military registration and enlistment offices will not produce modern fighters, missile systems, or the latest strike UAVs. It won’t even add Patriot SAM systems and missiles to them. Unfortunately, even the mobilization of 10 million Ukrainians will not stop the takeoff of strategic fighters in Russia, will not destroy existing nuclear weapons, and will not significantly reduce the population of Russia, its natural resources, etc
Strong entities respond to terrorist acts with double the force. Yesterday in Belgorod, in the evening, windows in residential buildings were shattered, one civilian died, two were slightly injured. Such a “response” personally shakes me with despair and hopelessness. I emphasize once again that our military capabilities can destroy everything living within a 100 km radius from the state border. Special thanks to the tactical level commanders who take responsibility for leveling the Shebekino and Rylsky districts of the Russian Federation. These are young officers up to the battalion commander level. In other words, this is the grassroots initiative of a conscious part of the army, there is no political will for such actions.
We will not be invited to the NATO summit to join the alliance. We are not as cool as Albania. The topic of “Ukraine in NATO” will be a bargaining chip for many years, it will be a reason for wars and political crises. Moreover, in the coming days, NATO will solidify its impotence with a series of resolutions that will exclude the actual unilateral power of the United States in the alliance. The Western establishment is afraid of Trump coming to power, fearing that the war will end.
NATO only needs to allocate 10% of its available weapons, which are gathering dust in warehouses since the alliance is not fighting anyone, and we would defeat the Muscovites. However, Western politicians are stretching this aid over the years, while hundreds of the best Ukrainians are dying and becoming disabled, and Ukrainian cities cease to exist because of the war. They have been juggling planes, high-precision MLRS, and missiles in front of the bloodied faces of Ukrainians for years
Note also his praise for โtactical level commandersโ who take initiative in hitting Russian civilian targets. See my recent post about the Sodol drama for more on this emerging caste of young nationalists, which positions itself against the so-called โold corrupt Soviet general casteโ.
Anyway, given such sorry prospects for winning the war, Tales is clearly hinting that a ceasefire to regroup and strengthen defenses (as well as a good old-fashioned domestic purge) is a better idea than staying in the self-destructive meatgrinder.
Iโve discussed on my substack Evgeny Dyky, the corpulent supposed ex-commander of the violent Aidar Batallion. Among his many achievements, he is also in charge of spending sizeable sums of money on Ukraineโs wartime antarctic research project (read about it here). Otherwise, he spends a great deal of time on the Ukrainian talk-show circuit, explaining viewers how Ukraineโs military industry is just getting started while that of Russiaโs has already reached its final peak, and so on and on.
Well, Dykyโs effusive optimism really annoys IV Reich. Yesterday, he posted this:
โก๏ธ An F-16 that managed to reach Ukraine crashed into a high-rise building in Nizhny Tagil (RF). The pilot was identified as Yevhen Dykyi, a military expert and former platoon commander of the Aidar Battalion (in 2015). According to preliminary reports, the fighter jet could not withstand the pilot’s weight. Another version suggests that the pilot’s unkempt homeless-like beard got tangled in the control stick
Talesโ opinion on the 1991 borders slogan came out more clearly in March of this year. It all started in response to a hit-piece against a popular young commander by โthe Centre for Countering of Disinformationโ, a beautifully-named government-funded organ (my bolding). Hereโs the hysterical hit-piece from the CCD:
The CCD logo
Recently, interviews with military personnel have gained immense popularity in the Ukrainian information space, where they talk about the problems they allegedly face at the front: lack of ammunition, incompetent command, mistakes of the country’s leadership, and so on
A striking example of this is a recent interview with the commander of the K2 battalion, Kyrylo Veres, in which he claims that we will not be able to win this war, and his personal victory is when his battalion’s soldiers stop dying. Thus, he is effectively hinting at negotiations and freezing the conflict. Such statements are absolutely unacceptable – they contradict the task set by the Leader of our country: to reach the borders of 1991 at any cost
Obviously, it is high time to move to healthy military censorship – military personnel should be prohibited from giving interviews. Endless whining about the lack of ammunition and “meat assaults” does not bring us any closer to victory but contributes to the spread of defeatist sentiments in society. Moreover, in reality, there are no “meat assaults” in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and the military personnel are fully provided with everything necessary to accomplish the assigned tasks
We remind you that you can always get reliable information about what is happening at the front on the “Unified News” telethon
Commander Veres, the man being criticized. Looks a lot more trustworthy than the angry blue cube
Ah, how times have changed over the past few months. Now even the Great Leader of is indulging in absolutely unacceptable narratives hinting at negotiations and freezing the conflict! But back to the response from Tales:
I have personally known Kyrylo since 2017 to be a decent and dedicated officer, back when he was still a reconnaissance platoon commander in one of the mechanized brigade’s battalions. Over a few years, he rose to become the commander of one of the top battalions in the Armed Forces of Ukraine and received the “Hero’s Star.” We had many joint operations aimed at eliminating the Muscovites and their lackeys while the “defenders against disinformation” were siphoning grants in peaceful Kyiv
Idiots don’t like that the battalion commander wants his personnel to live to see peace in the country and return home alive. This is an absolutely healthy and adequate position for a Ukrainian officer
“What does victory mean to everyone? It’s when my people stop dying. If I said a year ago that victory is when the Russian Federation ends, then I was young and I did not command such a large number of people and did not give orders on who should go into battle and who should not”
The last part is quoting Veres, the lines that made the Center for Countering Disinformation so furious.
The heavyweights
I know some people who regret having voted for Zelensky, who think that previous war-hawk president Petro Poroshenko, with his greater experience dealing with Russia and as a statesman (however reprehensible), wouldnโt have allowed the war to happen in 2022
Poroshenko in his signature black gloves and expensive vyshyvanka (the folk costume no bourgeois nationalist can leave home without)
I think itโs possible that Zelenskyโs curious talent for aggravating everyone imaginable played a special role. Recall Zelenskyโs wise decision to start reminiscing about soviet Ukraineโs nuclear missile capacity on February 19 2022.
But perhaps more importantly, Poroshenko hasnโt gone away either. He and his party certainly constitution the most powerful remaining opposition force in wartime. Could they be getting ready to attack Zelensky for wasting the army in an unwinnable war instead of preserving its fighting core?
Until his early 2024 removal, Zaluzhny was juicing up head of the army Zaluzhny as an anti-Zelensky icebreaker. And Zaluzhny wrote a 2023 article he wrote in the Economist about how Ukraine has no real prospects of victory against Russia and finds itself in a stalemate position. Zelensky was enraged by this violation of his slogan โ1991 borders or bustโ, and it was this article, along with Zaluzhnyโs excessive popularity, that led to his eventual replacement.
It was Poroshenko that signed the Minsk agreements back in 2014 and 2015 to avert Ukraineโs military collapse. Maybe he can do it again, with the help of the โIron Generalโ Zaluzhny.
Kiev mayor Klitchko – a real heavyweight – also said in a recent western interview that Zelensky should conduct a referendum on peace and abandoning some territories. Klitchko is another open critic of Zelenskyโs authoritarianism, and has allied with Poroshenko against Zelensky numerous times in the past. There are rumors he is coordinating actions with him at the moment as well.
The angry officers movement
Opposition heavyweights like Poroshenko, Zaluzhny and Klitchko (donโt laugh about the last one) also have an important base of supporters to draw on – young, confident nationalists in the army.
A crucial fault-line at the moment is that between younger brigade commanders and the generals. The combrigs accuse the generals of sending them on pointless suicide missions because of the political leadershipโs โobsession with mapsโ, rather than real strategic objectives. This โmaps over strategyโ metaphor is often used by Azov spokesmen like Kukharchuk or Krotevych in their interviews with liberal nationalist (anti-Zelensky) media like Ukrainska Pravda.
Indeed, Zelensky must be map-fixated. His key priority is opportunistic – stay in power, keep the aid flowing, desperately showcase small successes. To put off his many days of reckoning.
For instance. with the countless businessmen he has imprisoned, extorted and otherwise enraged. Like the still-jailed Kolomoisky. Or a business partner of Kolomoisky, Bogolyubov, who recently escaped the country and claimed the government tried to extort him of 100 million USD in exchange for legal protection. Or, obviously, the questions society will have towards him after a war that cost the lives of hundreds of thousands, and broughtโฆ what?
The young nationalists in the army launched the opening salvo in this increasingly public battle in late June, against General Sodol, who they accused of murderous graphomania. The battle has been rapidly developing in the past few weeks, a topic for a future post. But for now, Iโd like to draw attention to Bohdan Krotevych, the Azovite who led the charge against General Sodol.
Krotevych said in a July 26 interview that he is โangryโ with Zelensky for apparently never having visited Azovโs headquarters at the frontline, while he does visit other military units. He said he considers this condescension. The interview, titled โI am very angryโ, has already received a million views
Another major topic of discussion is how Lieutenant Colonel Prokopenko, Commander of the Azov Brigade, is a โgeniusโ. This is in turn fairly obviously compared to the stupidity of the generals, who he castigates for wasting human resources in impossible goals, and never learning from their mistakes (unlike the Russians, he stresses). Among other things, Krotevych calls the 2023 counteroffensive โretardedโ.
A peaceful yet stern reich
He also boasts about hanging out with his close friend Zaluzhny while in England recently. They and their wives met, and Krotevych gifted Zaluzhny an antique British army knife (knives are highly beloved among rightwing nationalists).
Best of all, he cryptically promises that people would be hearing much more from Zaluzhny in the future.
And Zaluzhnyโs July 23 speech at the RUSI Land Warfare Conference in London on the topic of โThird World Warโ made it clear that heโs hardly a democrat:
Society must agree to temporarily give up a number of freedoms for the sake of survival,โฆ
Unfortunately, modern wars are total. They require the efforts not only of the army, but of the whole society. Politicians can and should mobilize society. To do so, they use military and other state resources in a comprehensive way. These resources include the economy, finance, the population, and allies. Such actions will, of course, influence the political processes in the country
Any ceasefire of the type that Zaluzhny, Tales, or Krotevych or the rest may want would be a brutal one. On July 30, Commander Romanov of the Azov brigade published a video stating he had given the order to shoot to kill any civilians attempting to destroy Ukrainian military equipment.
With less energy to spend on the foreign enemy, more to spend on purging the internal enemy. The bloggers wonโt be bothering anyone else with their pacifist demands [end]
chronicle: its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine
Ingo Schmidt on how the triumph of liberal democracy and neoliberal globalization became the ideological seed for the AfD
Co-leader of the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party and the partyโs candidate for chancellor, Alice Weidel, features on the cover of a 2023 edition of Stern magazine (conceptphoto.info)
On November 6, 2024 German Chancellor Olaf Scholz fired Finance Minister Christian Lindner. Notwithstanding the broad agreement on policy goals, striking a balance between deficit reduction, support for renewable energy and increased arms spending turned out to be impossible. Lindner, a liberal, opted for social cuts; Scholz, a social democrat, wants to avoid them. They had to part ways. After Scholz lost a no-confidence vote, federal elections were scheduled for February 23, 2025. The question that worries everyone from old-school conservatives to new millennium lefties is: How many votes will go to the hard right (if not neo-Nazi) party Alternative for Germany (Alternative fรผr Deutschland or AfD). In the last federal elections in 2021, the AfD got 10.4 percent of the total vote. Current polls put them at 20 percent, but nobody knows what will happen on election day. In this new age of uncertainty, polls donโt predict election results as reliably as in the past.
Elections in the East German provinces Brandenburg, Saxony and Thuringia have already shown what hard-right success looks like. They also reveal the inability of the political centre to understand how much it contributed to the rise of a new right. Refashioning totalitarianism theory in the New Cold War climate, centrist politicians and pundits typically portray the success of the new right as the outgrowth of the Nazi and Communist dictatorships that ruled East Germany from 1933 to 1990. West Germany, which was spared Communist rule and, allegedly, shook off the burden of its Nazi past, appears as a role model in this democracy-versus-dictatorship story. Totalitarianism theory could possibly explain why the AfD is more successful, so far at least, in East than in West Germany. But it canโt explain right-wing success in other countries, like France, that were never under Communist rule and know Nazi rule only from occupation, which strengthened anti-fascist traditions in those countries. But even these traditions couldnโt stop the rise of the new right there.
This article offers a different explanation for the hard-right surge in Germany. It shows that German unification in 1990, signalling the triumph of liberal democracy and the onset of neoliberal globalization, unleashed a new form of nationalismโDeutschmark nationalismโwhich, after mutating into export nationalism for a while, became the ideological seed for the AfD. West Germany, or, more precisely, the economic miracle that was West Germany in the post-war era, served as a role model during German unification. Promoted by West German elites and eagerly embraced by people in East Germany, it raised the expectation of a new economic miracle materializing in the West and extending to the East. However, these hopes were soon disappointed as political unification caused socioeconomic divisions between East and West Germany and, in the early 2000s, a turn to austerity policies that were highly unpopular in the East and the West. Just when it seemed that Germany would weather the world economic crisis of 2008-9 better than other Western countries, and maybe even become the European hegemon, things started falling apart. The Euro-crisis made clear that it was not only politically united Germany that was plagued by massive socioeconomic and geographical divisions but the European Union, too. Continued economic weakness combined with New Cold War marching orders from Washington fed a nostalgia for a supposedly great pastโsymbolized by the Deutschmark. This nostalgia, I argue, would not have taken root if the left had been able to channel growing discontent into mobilization for a more equitable and less insecure future.
State elections in Brandenburg, Saxony, and Thuringia
State elections donโt typically get international media attention. The September 1, 2024, elections in Thuringia and Saxony did. After all, it was the first time since the downfall of the Nazi-regime that a hard-right party, the AfD, pulled the majority of votes in a German election. It proved a bitter coincidence: The AfD celebrated their victory in Thuringia, obtaining 32.8 percent of the total vote, on the 85th anniversary of the Nazi-invasion of Poland that marked the beginning of the Second World War.
The Conservative Christian Democrats (the Christlich-Demokratische Union or CDU) came in second with 23.6 percent. The parties of the federal government coalition, Social Democrats (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands or SPD), Greens (Bรผndnis 90/Die Grรผnen) and Liberals (Freie Demokratische Partei or FDP) ended up with single-digit results, the FDP reduced to a mere 1.1 percent. At the time of the election, this was the party of the federal minister of finance. The Left Party (Die Linke), which in the previous election had become the strongest party for the first time in any German state, lost almost 18 percent and came in fourth, even trailing the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (Bรผndnis Sahra Wagenknecht or BSW), a breakaway group from the Left Party.
In Saxony, the AfD won 30.6 percent of the votes, just behind the CDUโs 31.9 percent. As in Thuringia, none of the parties of the federal government coalition achieved double-digit results. The Left Party lost more than half of its vote and ended up with a devastating 4.5 percent. The BSW came in a distant third with 11.8 percent.
Just three weeks after their election victories in Thuringia and Saxony, the AfD scored another success in Brandenburg. Narrowly beaten by the SPD that got 30.9 percent of the total vote, the AfD came in second with 29.2 percent, way ahead of the BSWโs 13.1 percent and the CDUโs 12.1 percent. The Left Party and the Greens obtained less than five percent of the vote, which is the minimum threshold for holding seats in provincial or federal parliament under the mixed-member proportional electoral system. The FDP pulled less than one percent.
Mainstream media fails to explain right-wing success
Barely beaten by the Conservatives in Saxony and the Social Democrats in Brandenburg, the AfD was elected by roughly a third of the electorate in three East German states, becoming the strongest party only in Thuringia. If ever there was a right-wing surge, this was it. Most media reports attributed the phenomenon to widespread dissatisfaction with the federal government, particularly regarding migration, climate policies and the war in Ukraine. Accounts of why the AfD is more popular in the East (approval ratings in the west of Germany range from 8.5 percent in Hamburg and the Saarland to 21 percent in Lower Saxony) focus mostly on disappointments caused by German unification, continuing socioeconomic disparities and a widespread feeling among erstwhile East Germans of being second class citizens. Other explanations invoke the authoritarian heritage of communist rule in East Germany, which is often presented as an extension of the Nazi-regime. Against the two dictatorships in the East, West Germany is presented as a role model of liberal democracy. This as if there hadnโt been considerable continuity between Third Reich and West German elites; as if East Germanyโs ruling bureaucracy, despite all its dictatorial wrongs, wasnโt established by antifascists who had been exiled or jailed during the Nazi reign; as if the nationalization of the means of production, despite the wrongs of bureaucratic rule, had not marked a break from the West German capitalism that made West Germany a junior partner in the American Empire; as if West German capitalism had not dictated the terms of unification at the very time that a grassroots movement for democracy unsettled bureaucratic rule in East Germany. The destruction of the East German economy and the integration of the East into existing West German institutions left no room for the aspirations of East Germanyโs civil rights movement. Rather than explaining growing support for the new right, media talk about the โpeculiarities of the Eastโ reinforces existing frustrations thereโfrustrations that help shed light on the relative strength, so far at least, of the right-wing surge in the East.
The โtwo-dictatorshipsโ thesis that pits the East against the liberal democratic West revives the totalitarianism theory that was an integral part of the anti-communist, anti-Soviet consensus during the Cold War. It is now part of the New Cold War ideology that counterposes democracy and authoritarianism. As in the old Cold War, charges of totalitarianism serve to short circuit thinking about alternative economic and political systems, reinforcing the neoliberal creed that there is no alternative to capitalism. The lack of actually existing alternatives is, of course, also one of the reasons for the rise of the new right. Emerging out of an ailing neoliberalism, this right-wing force presents itself as an alternative to the status quo but actually just recasts neoliberalism in a nationalist and racist mould. Replacing neoliberalismโs earlier commitment to corporate globalization in Germany, as elsewhere, neoliberalism is haunted by the spectre of fascism, which, to centrist neoliberals, has everything to do with misled masses unable to understand the virtues of capitalist liberal democracy and nothing to do with capitalist crises that undermine the legitimacy of liberal democracy. Neoliberalism is also haunted by the spectre of communism as ruling classes worry that crisis of legitimacy could extend to capitalism itself. As the neoliberal centre denies the possibility of alternatives and the left generally (not only the Left Party in Germany) appears unable to advance real world alternatives, the growing appetite for change, spurred by recurrent crises wrought by capitalism, settles for right-wing fantasies of a harmonious life in a nation that competes successfully with other countries economically and is freed from job- and welfare-stealing migrants.
The impact of German unification and the rise and decline of neoliberal globalization
Capitalist crises and their exploitation by the right are common phenomena, certainly in the imperialist centres of the world system, but also in the peripheries. But they play out differently in different national contexts. Behind the AfDโs electoral successes in Thuringia and Saxony as well as its broader surge in popularity lie the combined histories of German unification and the rise and decline of neoliberal globalization. The upsurge of the new right is just one of the outcomes of these combined histories. Equally important is the defeat of the federal government coalition and the rout of the FDP, whose leader, former federal Minister of Finance Christian Lindner, promotes austerity policies that stymie government plans to subsidize the transition to non-fossil energies. These policies also lead to a creeping roll-back of social spendingโexcept when it comes to arms spending. Little wonder a government that took office on the promise of something like a Green New Deal lost its credibility almost entirely and called for a federal election scheduled for February 23 of this year.
And then there is the defeat of the Left Party that, despite programmatic commitments to progressive alternatives, is widely seen as the appendage of a lame-duck government in Berlin. At the other end of the political spectrum, the AfD is widely perceived as an oppositional force, even though its program blends austerity, nationalism and militarism in ways that are more extreme but qualitatively not much different from policies advanced by the CDU and the FDP.
In the face of electoral defeat, the federal government, which embraced the USโs New Cold War policies a few weeks after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, also introduced dramatically tougher migration policies. Rather than representing any kind of alternative, as its name purports, the AfD is the black sheep of the establishment family, expressing racist views more radically and bluntly than even the Conservatives. While the Social Democrats, Liberals and Greens are intent on denying such views, they reveal themselves as Western supremacists when it comes to fending off so-called authoritarian threats arising from Russia and China, stirring up longstanding fears in the West that โthe Russians are comingโ or that โAsian hordesโ augur โthe decline of the West,โ in the words of right-wing intellectual Oswald Spengler.
The hypocrisy of the Greens, who advocate a green transition while supporting the purchase of dirty oil and gas (wherever they can get it ever since the Russian invasion of Ukraine ended Russian gas-flows to Germany), make them a prime target of AfD agitation. But in reality the AfD and the Greens share the fear of Western decline. The AfD engage in fearmongering around the replacement of white people by non-white immigrants and accuse the Greens and their coalition partners in the federal government of accelerating Western decline. But while the Greens may be the prime target of the AfDโs culture war, the truth is that despite significant differences in tone, the Greens and the AfD share a basic consensus on the decline of the West.
AfD success in the east: history holds the key
Encouraged by Glasnost in the Soviet Union, many East Germans took to the streets in the fall of 1989. Under the banner โWe Are the Peopleโ they demanded democratic reforms of East Germany. Neither unification with West Germany nor a return to a capitalist economy was on their agendaโat least not initially. As protests grew, and especially after the ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED) had opened the border to the West, โWe Are the Peopleโ was replaced by โWe Are One Peopleโ more and more often. It was supplemented by the slogan โGermany, United Fatherland,โ which is actually a quote from East Germanyโs national anthem, written by the communist poet Johannes R. Becher in 1949, at a time when the leaders of the SED still thought a united Germany could be achievedโnot necessarily socialist but not aligned on either the US or the Soviet Union. Such hopes were buried by the Cold War, for which the Berlin Wall became a symbol, casting a dark shadow over communist East Germany and allowing capitalist West Germany to present itself as a beacon of freedom. It was in a matter of weeks in the winter of 1989-90 that the abstract possibility became a demand, massively fanned by West German politiciansโnotably then chancellor Helmut Kohlโand mainstream media, which hinted at the possibility of East Germany adopting the West German Deutschmark. Many East Germans seized on such hints as an irresistible offer. โIf the D-Mark comes, weโll stay here; if it doesnโt come, weโll go to itโ became the next popular protest slogan. Since the opening of the border, thousands of East Germans had gone to the West, creating conditions reminiscent of the times before the wall was built in 1961. Back then, the East German economy lost so many people, most of them young and well-trained, that a collapse of social reproduction became a real threat. The wall stopped the bleeding of the East German economy but inflicted irreparable damage on the legitimacy of the political system.
Almost 30 years later, the opening of the border by the SED-leadership came as a bit of a surprise to West German elites. Yet, they were quick to grasp the possibilities it created. To them, this meant the integration of East Germany into the West German political and economic system, not coexistence with a somehow reformed but still politically independent East Germany. The โtake over the Eastโ goal of West German elites and the Deutschmark rush of East German masses fed each other. The civil rights movement that wanted to democratize East Germany was sidelined. Some of the groups active in that movement adjusted to the new zeitgeist quickly, some even entered into an electoral alliance with the East German conservative party, despite their having criticized it as a small but integral part of the SED-regime. Angela Merkel, who would later become chancellor, belonged to one of these East German groups that allied with other conservative-turned-civil-rights groups and the East German CDU. This Alliance for Germany easily won the last East German elections and negotiated the integration of East Germany into West Germanyโs institutional structures. On July 1, 1990, the Deutschmark came to the East, three months later the independent state of East Germany vanished into an enlarged West Germany. Most of the Alliance for Germany dissolved into the West German CDU immediately after unification. In December this enlarged CDU won federal elections.
In less than a year the Cold War had come to an end and an entire state had disappeared. However, the hopes pinned on unification, notably the introduction of the Deutschmark, were soon dashed. A year after unification, unemployment, which had existed in communist East Germany primarily in a hidden form, stood at 10.2 percent and rose to over 20 percent in the early 2000s. It didnโt fall below 10 percent until 2014, a quarter of a century after the Berlin Wall fell. Moreover, mass migration from East to West Germany, which the introduction of the Deutschmark was meant to curb, actually accelerated after the arrival of the Deutschmark. From 1990 to 2015, East Germany lost significantly more than one million people, the vast majority during the first two years after unification, and almost all of them of working age. Were it not for this emigration as well as early retirement schemes and retraining schemes for thousands of workers, unemployment in the East would have been even higher than it actually was. Introducing a new form of hidden unemployment, many of the participants in retraining were enrolled in one course after another, often in different fields, until they were old enough for early retirement.
One of the main, if not the main, reasons for the collapse of the East German economy was the Deutschmark. Introduced at a rate of one Mark West for one Mark East, while average productivity of East Germany was estimated to be about a quarter that of West Germany, German monetary union gave private households the boost in purchasing power they so desired. But it made East German firms uncompetitive. Lower wages could not compensate productivity differentials between firms in East Germany and Western countries. The privatization of East Germanyโs state-owned firms facilitated the downfall of the East German economy even further. In some cases, Western companies bought East German firms just to shut them down so that they would not become competitors in the future. In other cases, they wanted patents or certain segments of production that they could integrate into their own supply-chains, leaving everything else to be shut down. The closures and cherry-picking of some more desirable segments destroyed the reproduction process of the East German economy even beyond the damage done by rendering it uncompetitive through monetary union.
The result was that bits and pieces of the East German economy became a periphery of production networks controlled by West German corporations. Ironically, the neoliberal restructuring of production processes went hand in hand with massive fiscal transfers from West to East Germany. A price that had to be paid to sustain some level of social cohesion while disappointment that political unification was followed by economic decline and continued social divisions between East and West instead of an Eastern economic miracle following the example of West Germany from the late 1950s to the early 1970s. At some point, a third of East German incomes came from fiscal transfers. As a result, government debt as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) rose from 41.8 percent in 1989 to 61.2 percent in 1999, which is nothing compared to todayโs numbers. Yet, back then the lesson that had yet to be learned is that neoliberalism, despite its balanced-budget rhetoric, really is a mix of austerity and tax cuts for the rich that produces increasing debt levels at every slowdown or downturn of the economy. In the 1990s, government debt over 60 percent of GDP was a scandal. Not least because, at the urging of the conservative German government, 60 percent had become the benchmark for membership in the European monetary union, for which the roadmap had been laid out in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty.
Budget deficits, accumulating into government debt, werenโt the only deficit scandal in 1990s Germany. The other was in the current account. From a surplus of 4.6 percent in 1989, the current account dropped to a โ1.9 percent deficit in 1991 and remained in deficit territory until 2001. In most other countries, deficits between negative one and negative two percent wouldnโt be a matter of concern. In Germany they were. After all, West German prosperityโthe very model East Germans admired so muchโhad been reliant on export-driven growth, which was always understood as export surpluses. As it turned out, unification in the early 1990s, led to a boom in West Germany as East Germans spent many of their newly acquired Deutschmarks on consumer goods โMade in (West) Germanyโโdespite massive job losses. This boom drove prices up and made German exports less competitive on the world market. At the same time, some of the money from the East German spending spree went to foreign companies. As exports took a hit and imports got a boost, the current account went from positive to negative.
The East was integrated into the West German political system as it existed prior to unification. The Kohl government didnโt agree to any changes suggested by the East German government that formally negotiated unification but really rubberstamped the subordination of East German society to West German institutions. Economic integration was different though. The collapse of the East German economy, triggered by the design of monetary union and privatizations, had a lasting impact on the West German economic model that East Germans had been eager to embrace. The first decade after unification was marked by a twin deficit in government budgets and current accounts. During the unification boom from 1990 to 1993, inflation went up to levels not seen since the oil-price hikes and inflationary struggles between capital and labour from the 1970s to the early 1980s. At that time, however, the West German inflation rate was still below that of other Western countries, whereas in the early 1990s it was amongst the highest
Germanyโs continued economic weakness, combined with New Cold War marching orders from Washington, fed a nostalgia for a supposedly great pastโsymbolized by the Deutschmark
West Germany as a role model
Running continued deficitsโlet alone a twin deficitโwas unthinkable in a country that rebuilt its economy after the Second World War through integration into a world market with rules established and enforced by the US. In this American Empire, West Germany played the role of bulwark against Soviet Communism, including East Germany, and as a showcase of Western capitalism. To succeed in this role, foreign debt, accumulated by the Nazis and inherited by West Germany as legal successor of the Third Reich, was forgiven through the 1953 London Debt Agreement. West Germany also inherited low wages, industrial capacity and new technologies from the Nazi economy that, contrary to widespread assumptions, survived the war largely intact. This gave West German industries a competitive advantage that was further buttressed by favourable exchange rates on which basis West Germany was admitted to the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates in 1952. Reintegration into the world market also allowed West Germany to transition from a coal-based to an oil-based economy. Oil was cheaper than coal but its supplies were controlled by US companies and the American state.
However, being a junior partner in the American Empire turned out to be a much better deal for the German bourgeoisie than its earlier quests for world power. The territory under its direct control was much smaller after two failed power grabs but profits were stellar. Driven by exports, or export surpluses more precisely, the West German economy didnโt require fiscal stimulus and kept growing until the US turned to floating exchange rates, which led to a significant appreciation of the Deutschmark. Further, oil prices exploded in the 1970s. But it was during these turbulences that West Germany consolidated its reputation as a beacon of economic stability. Political management of the crisis, notably codetermination (German lingo for the institutionalized cooperation between unions and employer association), kept wages and inflation lower than in most other Western countries. This helped to sustain export surpluses for much of the 1970s. In turn, export surpluses allowed the government to keep fiscal stimulus and unemployment rates low. Again, this is compared to other Western countries, not compared to the post-war boom.
West Germanyโs relative success in managing the economic crises of the 1970s raised some concerns among its allies, who considered this success a case of beggar-thy-neighbour policies. The US pressured the West German government to increase public spending in order to stimulate the world economy. The West German government couldnโt shrug off these US demands entirely. The social democratic party was led by Helmut Schmidt at the time, and some extra spending also appeased the left wing in his own party as well as some unionists. However, calls for a Keynesian fix of the economic crises never overcame the general preference for fiscal prudence and low inflation that marked West German society after two lost wars, each followed by the introduction of a new currency, one of them also by unprecedented hyperinflation. Not entirely without reason, export success after the Second World War was widely attributed to liberal economic principles, conveniently ignoring the fact that this โliberalism in one countryโ could only work because other economies placed growing demand on the world market.
Export success also created an ersatz-identity that allowed West Germans to repress the horrors of the Nazi regime and the roles most of them had played in these horrors, as perpetrators or bystanders. Social democrats never really fit into this picture. Willy Brandt, who spent the Nazi reign in underground resistance circles and exile and would later become West Germanyโs first social democratic chancellor, was seen by many as a traitor. His successor Helmut Schmidt, who had served in the Nazi air force, opposed many of Brandtโs plans for social reform and applied Keynesian policies only in homeopathic doses. He was successfully branded as the one responsible for rising unemployment and inflation by the Conservatives and Liberals. Crossing the floor from SPD to CDU, the Liberals made Helmut Kohl chancellor. Kohl won two elections before unification on the promise of bringing post-war prosperity back. He won another two after unification on the promise of bringing the prosperity to East Germany.
For a long time, Kohl presented himself successfully as the defender of the West German export model and guarantor of the collective identity tied to that model, despite the fact that 1980s West Germany never saw a return to postwar prosperity. Disappointment with his broken promises for a West German economic miracle 2.0 began spreading towards the end of the 1980s. Yet, the disintegration of the SED regime allowed him to renew and extend his promises to the East. The national euphoria that secured his 1990 election victory also saw a transformation of collective identity. West German pride in being export world champion turned into Deutschmark nationalism. Widely shared in the East, where people were happy to get the Deutschmark, and the West, where people saw it as symbol of their postwar achievements, this was not the pure money, or currency, fetishism Karl Marx wrote about in Capital. It had a distinctive nationalist character that was subdued in West Germanyโs pre-unification export-identity. With unification, the nationalist seed blossomed. Not only did this help Kohl become the โchancellor of unity,โ but it also gave cover to a burst of neo-Nazi attacks on immigrants, leftists and queer people, culminating in arson attacks in Rostock, Mรถlln and Solingen. The latter two killed eight people, while the attack in Rostock laid a four-day siege on an apartment block inhabited by foreign workers who had been employed in East Germanyโs now defunct state-owned economy. The openly neo-Nazi attacks of the early 1990s, later dubbed โbaseball bat years,โ were followed by a series of murders committed by the National Socialist Underground (NSU) that cost nine immigrants and one cop their lives from 2000 to 2007. The role of the German secret service in covering up, or even facilitating, these murders has never been investigated as key documents remain classified until this day. Hans-Georg Maaรen, head of the secret service from 2012 to 2018, was one of the individuals responsible for blocking investigations of the NSU-murders. He also heads up an ultra-conservative circle, initially inside the CDU and now operating in the right-wing space between the CDU und the AfD.
During unification and in the first few years afterwards, nationalism was a mass ideology. It rallied flag-waving masses in the streets, it dominated German politics and inspired Nazi-skinheads to chase people they considered enemies. As it became clear that the hopes for an economic miracle 2.0 would not be realized, street protests receded, most skinheads scaled down their activism and just a few turned to clandestine terrorist attacks. It seemed that nationalism had lost the force it had just recently. However, the entanglements between Nazis and parts of the state apparatuses indicate that while nationalism wasnโt as visible as before, it had not disappeared.
As it turned out, the opening of the Berlin Wall was a key step towards what would later be called neoliberal globalization. As the German bourgeoisie sought its place in a world seemingly governed by the invisible hand of the marketโnot Soviet planners or the milder version of Western government interventionโnationalism also found a new role as mass ideology. The ideological wind blowing from the โreal West,โ that is, the United States, rebranded free trade theory going back to the days of David Ricardo as globalization. Sticking closely to Ricardoโs principles, academic globalists argued that firms, if left alone by the state, would specialize in the production of those goods they can produce more cheaply than firms in another country either because they possess more productive technologies or use input factors more plentiful and cheap than in another country. All countries will be better off if firms in each country specialize according to their comparative advantages.
Globalization practitioners talked about entire countries as if they were firms competing against each other. Competitiveness of nation-states became the lodestar of capitalists, and their political executors, who used it to justify the roll-back of wages and social standards in all countries. Their run-the-country-like-a-business propaganda was so persuasive that even working class people whose wages, pensions and public services were cut fell for it in large numbers, electing and re-electing neoliberal globalizers over and over again. At the same time, fear that the policies just voted for would cause a race to the bottom spread in the rich countries that saw parts of their production outsourced to poor countries, where labour was really cheap, while immigrants from such countries would take on jobs in the burgeoning low-wage sectors of the rich countries. Migration, segmented labour markets and a global reserve army of labour, enabling capitalists to engage in global labour arbitrage, were neither part of academic globalization theory nor did they feature in politiciansโ globalization propaganda. Absent from public debate, these real-life factors created fears that a new right could build on by portraying economic problems as questions of national identity. Translated into policy terms, that meant a program of keeping immigrants out and capital in. This protectionist backlash against neoliberal globalization, coupled with the rise of a new right ranging from populist to neo-Nazi formations, occurred all over the Global North. It began slowly in the late 1990s and early 2000s while globalization was still expanding, and then gathered steam in the wake of the 2008-9 world financial crisis that marked the end of accumulation driven by globalization. It has accelerated again since the COVID-19 recession as well as the escalating great power politics vis-ร -vis Russia and China, which have led to openly imperialist policies couched in the same nationalist ideology which the new right thrives on. The competitive nation-as-corporation ideology and the policies that marked actually unfolding globalization was the breeding ground for todayโs strange bedfellowship of globalizers-turned-great-power-warriors and national supremacists of the new right. Theories of unregulated free trade opening the path towards global prosperity were just an ideological tool that was useful as long the integration of more and more countries into the US-dominated world market fuelled capitalist accumulation, and thereby hopes for the eventual trickle-down. It was replaced with the rhetoric of concern for national security and democracy as accumulation ended in a new phase of stagnation.
The German bourgeoisie had already adopted the logic of the state as business competitor after the Second World War when it traded world power ambitions for a junior partner role in the American Empire. Balanced budgets and tight money formed the core of its policies. That, along with competitive advantages inherited from the Nazis or granted by the US, enabled export-driven growth and, ultimately, export surpluses. Despite verbal commitments to liberalism, these policies were mercantilist in substance. Shattered but not derailed by the crises of the 1970s, West Germanyโs mercantilist regime of accumulation survived until unification led to a twin deficit, slow growth and socioeconomic divisions between East and West. Unified Germanyโs economy stumbled along while the US enjoyed its New Economy boom, even though that turned out to be short-lived, and China attained unprecedented levels of economic growth.
The Kohl government didnโt respond to the bourgeoisieโs growing concerns about economic stagnation in Germany. Neither did it respond to growing dissatisfaction with social conditions among the popular classes. After uniting Germany, Kohl turned to further uniting Europe. Partly, he wanted to demonstrate Germanyโs continued commitment to cooperation in the European Union as some European leadersโnotably British Prime Minister Thatcher and French President Franรงois Mitterrandโhad expressed reservations about German unification and worried about a return of German great power ambitions. European monetary union became Kohlโs preferred route to an โever closer union,โ as EU-parlance had it at the time. However, regarding other countries, notably in the Mediterranean, Kohl successfully pushed for tight fiscal and monetary rulesโthe same kind of rules West German policy makers followed in the postwar period. Under the favourable conditions granted by the US to integrate into the world market, this led to export-driven prosperity. However, other countries didnโt enjoy the same favourable conditions. What would upset governments and people in such countries even more was the fact that Kohl had abandoned the rules he was preaching to other European countries in his very own united Germany
Helmut Kohl at the CDU national party convention in Hamburg, 1973. Photo from Wikimedia Commons
There, European monetary union was widely seen as a top-down capitalist elite project, part of corporate globalization or as a handing over of the beloved Deutschmark to irresponsible Eurocrats and the Club Med, a derogatory term often used in public debates to denounce people in the Mediterranean countries as lazy, spend-thrifty and, worst of all, happily having a good time at the expense of others. Euro-scepticism added to disappointment with the collapse of East Germanyโs economy after unification, growing income polarization and fears of job loss all over Germany and a sense of losing national sovereignty to global capital. Unresponsive to any of these concerns, Kohl and his coalition of Conservatives and Liberals eventually lost the 1998 election to the Social Democrats and Greens who formed a coalition government offering a blend of light Keynesianism, green transition and control of financial markets. This is where the Germanโand internationalโbourgeoisies got really concerned.
The opening ideological salvos to derail the newly elected governmentโs plans came from the British tabloid The Sun, calling Oskar Lafontaine, the new finance minister who proposed the introduction of a Tobin tax, โEuropeโs most dangerous man.โ Next came Madeleine Albright, then US secretary of state, who gave Germanyโs Green Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer the choice of joining the bombing campaign against Yugoslavia or having his country isolated from Western allies. Fischer, and the new Chancellor Gerhard Schrรถder, chose war. Seeing that his opposition to the war wasnโt supported by anyone else in the cabinet, Lafontaine resigned before the bombing began.
A few months later, The Economist called Germany the โSick man of the Euro.โ Coming from the central organ of global capitalism and unrepentant advocate of liberalism since the days when England, not China, was the workshop of the world, this was not just another opinion piece. It was a warning that the international investment communityโexactly the CEOs, bankers, brokers and financiers targeted by the then-emerging movement against corporate globalizationโlost confidence in the German market and expected pro-business measures to boost their propensity to invest.
After a few months in office, Schrรถder had to choose between meeting votersโ expectations (job creation, reduction of job insecurities and income inequality) and capitalistsโ cost-reduction demands. He chose the capitalistsโ side, earning him the nickname Genosse der Bosse (Comrade of the Bosses). In the absence of a social movement from below that could have pushed him to deliver on the election platforms of the SPD and the Greens, this choice might actually better be called caving to capitalist threats of an investment strike. From 2000 to 2005, the Schrรถder government axed corporate tax rates, exempted capital gains from taxation and lowered equity requirements for credits. The other side of the class divide saw drastic reductions in unemployment benefits, essentially slashing them to the level of welfare payment rates after one year of benefits. At the same time, legal obstacles to employing temporary workers were greatly reduced. Capitalists were thrilled. Profits and asset prices shot up, but capital formation declined during the years pro-business laws were passed.
Reorganizing existing production capacities was more important to corporate executives than creating new capacities. This was not surprising as capacity utilization dropped when the New Economy bubble burst, triggering a downturn of the world economy that kept even booming China below double-digit growth. As it turned out, united Germany did not inherit the export successes of pre-unification West Germany, but was certainly heir to its export dependence.
In the early 2000s, Germanyโs current account turned positive againโnot because exports grew so strongly (they actually stagnated due to the world economic downturn), but because imports declined owing to weak domestic demand associated with the Schrรถder governmentโs neoliberal policies. However, as the world economy bounced back (China saw growth rates of 10-14 percent from 2003 to 2006), German exports grew again. Eventually the reorganization of production processes in the aftermath of German unification paid off. West German corporations now controlled production networks linking corporate headquarters controlling finance, research and development, and capital-intensive parts of actual assembly in the centres with labour intensive production in low-wage areas in the peripheries from Eastern Germany all the way to China. In these networks, East Germany occupied the position of a semi-periphery. On the supply side, German export success in the early 2000s relied on continued wage inequality between centres and peripheries, which doesnโt mean that all workers in the centres earned high wages. The threat to relocate production to the East or the South put the brakes on all wages. The lowering of social standards propelled the growth of low-wage employment, notably in the service sector. Well-paying, permanent jobs began to decrease as a share of total employment even in West Germany. As a result, discontent that was widespread in the East since political unification was followed by economic collapse, and social downgrading began to creep into the West.
2010s: Exporting the Euro-crisis
The export surpluses of the early 2000s relied on the same mercantilism that had generated such surpluses during the postwar prosperity. However, during the postwar period, unprecedented growth rates across the Western, and parts of the non-Western, world made it possible to superimpose a welfare state on a mercantilist economy that didnโt squeeze profit rates but operated with capitalโs consent in a way that seemed unthinkable during the age of catastrophe from 1914 to 1945. In the early 2000s, by contrast, successful mercantilism demanded the roll-back of the welfare state. Tragically, the extension of West Germanyโs welfare state institutions to East Germany, where they were superimposed on a collapsing economy, created the profit squeeze that was needed to curtail the material protections granted by the welfare state. To sustain competitive advantages gained by scaling back the welfare state, it was imperative to keep wage-growth low even after surging exports pulled the economy out of the slump. Unlike during the period of postwar prosperity, export surpluses didnโt stimulate domestic demand very much. In fact, current account surpluses in the early 2000s, which surged from -1.8 percent in 2000 to 6.7 percent in 2007, were as much driven by rising exports as by weak growth of imports, a clear indicator of the overall sluggishness of domestic demand. Unemployment rates rose from 9.3 percent in 2000 to 12.1 percent in 2005. After that, unemployment went into long-term decline, briefly interrupted by the 2008/9 Great Recession and slowed down by the 2009/15 Euro-crisis, eventually reaching five percent before the 2020 COVID-19 Recession. However, this job growth occurred almost entirely in low wage occupations.
Paradoxically, it was during the Euro-crisis that a wave of โexport nationalismโ covered up the discontent that was growing, at variable speeds, across Germany. The Deutschmark nationalism that emerged during German unification had taken a hit with the introduction of the Euro. However, when it turned out that the Euro was basically the old Deutschmark under a new name and export surplus levels were reaching unprecedented heights, it almost seemed that the long-awaited return of prosperity was about to materialize. But of course, it wasnโt the same as the postwar prosperity that saw strong growth almost everywhere. The 2010s, by contrast, were a time of stagnation. The rebound after the 2008/9 recession was stronger in Germany than in other countries, but then growth rates fell in line with the one-to-two percent range of other Western countries.
It was during this time of recurrent crises and long-term stagnation that the German government, led by Angela Merkel with the Social Democrats as junior partner, felt compelled to lecture other governments on economic policy. Completely blind to the fact that beggar-thy-neighbour policies are a zero-sum game, the Merkel-government told Southern European countries to impose austerity despite the fact that they were suffering from a sovereign debt crisis due to the end of cheap credit that became available after the creation of the European monetary union, helping to pay for imports from Germany. Merkel also told them that, after a painful but unavoidable period of belt-tightening, they would eventually succeed as export countries like Germany.
The European monetary unionโs contradictory character torn between further integrating Europe and spreading German mercantilism shifted entirely to the latter. Southern Europeans, governments and ordinary people, understood that austerity would further subordinate their economies to Germanyโs economic dominance. The Brits, like the Germans and the โFrugal Fourโ (Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden), although not warm to the idea of bailing out crisis-ridden Southern Europeans, were suspicious that Germanyโs leading role in handling the crisis would turn the countryโs economic dominance into fully-fledged hegemony. Brexit has its origin here. Eastern Europeโs post-communist comprador governments had imposed austerity on their countries in acts of pre-emptive obedience and now felt betrayed as they thought the bailout packages the Merkel government used as a means to impose austerity on the South were actually some sort of welfare package.
Centrifugal forces in the EU were further fuelled when, in face of civil war and foreign interventions in Syria, Merkel unilaterally declared open borders for Syrian refuges and then told EU member states they all had to take their share of refugees. European governments already concerned over Germanyโs domineering role in managing the Euro-crisis were dismayed. Public debate within Germany was sharply divided between liberals and leftists applauding Merkelโs humanist stance and right-wingers, including in her own party, warning of an uncontrolled flow of immigrants. Largely unnoticed was the fact that Merkelโs decision to open borders for Syrian refugees was tied to the anti-Russian turn in German foreign policy following the sharp polarization between pro- and anti-Russian forces in Ukraine during and after the Maidan protests in 2014. Most of the Syrian refugees were fleeing the Russian-backed Assad-regime, which was considered an adversary. Opening borders for these refugees set a precedent for the surge of Ukrainian refugees following Russiaโs invasion of Eastern Ukraine in 2022. At that point, Merkel, who had already retired, told the media that her government saw the Minsk accords, officially meant to reach a settlement between contending political and military forces within Ukraine, as a means of buying time to arm the Zelensky government.
2020s: Sick man of Europe 2.0
As Ukraine, already torn by civil war, became the scene for a proxy war between NATO-countries and Russia, Germany was firmly subordinated to US foreign policy. Post-communist governments in Germany had, more or less enthusiastically, supported deepening trade relations with Russia. Oil and gas imports might have been the most significant part of German-Russian trade but were certainly not the only one. Torn between allegiance to the US and lucrative business deals with Russia, the German government, now headed by Social Democrat Olaf Scholz, cut its economic ties with Russia after the latterโs invasion of Ukraine. The price to be paid was a further spike in energy prices, on top of the increases attendant on the economic recovery from the COVID-19-recession.
As part of current US efforts to contain China, the German government has been pressured to scale down its trade with ChinaโGermanyโs largest trading partner and also a prime outlet for German foreign direct investments. Since Germanyโs economy is as much export-driven as export-dependent, the US turn from neoliberal globalization to escalating sanctions and protectionism in the name of national security has caused high levels of uncertainty within the German bourgeoisie. In addition to the return of secular stagnation after the very short post-COVID recovery in the West and the petering out of the China boom, this uncertainty is driving low levels of investment. Inflation, fuelled by post-COVID recovery and rising energy prices, and lower real incomes leading directly to less consumer spending, but also indirectly, as households build up their savings in anticipation of more economic shocks in the future. Meanwhile the Scholz government boosted arms spending while otherwise imposing austerity.
After two years of recession, Germany is again being branded the โsick man of Europeโ by The Economist. The last time Germany earned this title the neoliberal turn against the welfare state produced massive current account surpluses, meagre general growth rates and massive social and regional inequalities. The export nationalism that concealed the mounting discontent with neoliberalism was shaken by the US turn from neoliberal globalization to protectionism and militarism. Given its high level of export dependence, Germany was ill prepared for the turn against it, which unleashed pent-up disappointments and anxieties into the political sphere. This happened all over Germany but more so in the East than in the West as regional differences in income, wealth and representation in leadership positions had created widespread feelings of being second class citizens in a politically united Germany.
In the absence of socialist imagination, German politics are haunted by the spectres of the past. An insurgent hard-right pins the labels of communism or Marxism on everything that ever came from the left, Social Democrats, the Greens and, of course, the Left Party, no matter how members, activists and supporters of these parties position themselves on the political spectrum. At the same time, the hard-right wants Germany to leave its Nazi past behind. Downplaying Nazi atrocities, accusing liberals and leftists of burdening Germans with a cult of guilt, they propagate the reclaiming of German national pride and sovereignty from allegedly cosmopolitan elites. Between the very real and growing right and a weak and largely imaginary left, centrist parties that proclaimed the end of history in the heyday of neoliberalism are also shifting to the right. The decline of the Left Party is a mirror image of the rise of the AfD.
Alternative fรผr Deutschland: A child of Deutschmark nationalism
Mainstream media and centrist parties view the new right as if it were some external force inexplicably appearing on the political scene and threatening the liberal order. But this is empirically wrong. Almost all leading figures of the AfD come from conservative West German milieus where they previously held positions in public administration or private businesses. Although they present themselves as anti-establishment rebels, they are establishment people who turned from the centre-right to the hard-right. The AfD also includes party activists who come from militant neo-Nazi groups that have existed on the fringes of West German society since the CDU gave many old Nazis a political home after the downfall of the Third Reich. Making small advances into electoral politics in the late 1960s and again in the 1980s, the neo-Nazis remained marginal until they found common ground with disgruntled conservatives. Deutschmark nationalism served as the ideological bonding material for neo-Nazis and right-of-centre conservatives, and became a rallying point for growing numbers of people dissatisfied with the policies of neoliberal globalization advanced by the centrist parties. It emerged in the tumultuous days after the fall of the Berlin wall as a mass ideology that shaped East and West German politics in the direction of unification. After that, it became an ideological point of reference that allowed for the integration of different political ideas and currents into a new right political project, the AfD.
Riding on the wave of Euro-scepticism that accompanied the Euro crisis, the AfD, founded in 2013, promoted a German exit from the EU, which would also have meant exit from the Euro. However, boosting the Deutschmark nostalgia associated with German-style Euro-scepticism got the newly minted party only so far. What really fuelled the AfDโs take-off was the wave of Syrian refugees coming to Germany (and other EU-countries) in 2015. The partyโs approval ratings rose from roughly five percent in its first two years to around 12 percent in the next two years. With the surge in voter approval came a programmatic shift from โneoliberalism in one countryโ to neoliberalism hidden behind ethnonationalist hate propaganda. Despite advocating for a strong state, the AfD also presents itself as a rebellious party of freedom. This paradox is resolved by portraying cosmopolitan elites, represented most notably by the Greens, as a force dominating state apparatuses and misusing them to bring excessive numbers of foreigners into the country with their cultures that allegedly threaten German people, suppress German heritage and push the economy into decay. Therefore a strong state is needed to defend Germany against foreign incursion and revive its inherent strength
Election poster of the AfD in Thuringia supporting remigration. Photo from Wikimedia Commoms
The Scholz government created the conditions in which the AfDโs self-portrayal as freedom fighters gave the party another boost. The modest Green New Deal platforms on which the SPD and Greens ran their 2021 election campaign didnโt gain enough traction to allow them to form a government, despite support from unions and even, more cautiously, employer associations. To obtain a majority in the Bundestag, SPD and Greens formed an ostensibly unlikely coalition with the FDP, a party mostly focused on cutting taxes and limiting public deficits. These commitments to tax breaks for the rich and austerity for the poor stood in the way of effective state-sponsored energy transition programs. Hence, the Scholz-government was perceived as weak from the start. Things went from bad to worse for the government after Russiaโs invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Under pressure from the US, Scholz opted for sanctions against Russia, arms deliveries to Ukraine and a continued increase in arms spending. At a time when the prices of everything from butter to housing were soaring, making it clear that money would still be available for guns but maybe not for butter not only destroyed whatever support the government had before the Ukraine war but also gave the AfD another boost. A year and a half into the war, the SPD was trailing the AfD in federal polls. Picking up widespread, though by no means dominant, unease with arms support for Ukraine and fear of war with Russia, the AfD advocates a negotiated peace settlement between Russia and Ukraine and, more importantly to the AfD, the lifting of sanctions on Russia. For the AfD, urging peace with Russia is not a matter of a principled anti-militarism but a means of reviving German trade with Russia, notably Russian energy imports that are seen as a precondition for economic recovery. To achieve this, Germany has to free itself from the โcosmopolitan sell-out elite.โ Whether everybody now supporting the AfD subscribes to the freedom-for-German-supremacy-view is open to debate. What canโt be denied is the fact that many discontented people, whatever their main grievance, are looking to the right, not the left, for alternatives to a failing political centre. Some are also turning to the CDU, which claims to be different from both the AfD and the federal coalition government, without offering anything other than praise for the good old days. That served the party well at times when the German economy could thrive, to a greater or lesser degree, on US-enabled expansion of world markets. With the US protectionist turn, this is no longer possible and the party is torn between centrism and the new right. Current support for the CDU is highly unstable, which could easily work in the AfDโs favour, especially in the absence of persuasive alternatives from the left, which so far have not materialized.
This wasnโt always the case. Something like a left renewal had once seemed to be in the offing in the most unlikely place: East Germany during the transition from state socialism to a peripheral position in an enlarged capitalist Germany. In West Germany, the nationalist wave that came with unification swept away much of the activist left that had rallied thousandsโsometimes tens or even hundreds of thousandsโ of people in the 1980s against the stationing of US nuclear missiles, nuclear power plants, Nazis, and South Africaโs apartheid regime, among other causes. Left circles within the SPD, the Greens and the labour movement weathered the nationalist storm without leaving a mark on German politics. In this political climate, the Party of Democratic Socialism (Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus or PDS) stood out as a beacon of the left.
Emerging from East Germanyโs ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED), the PDS became the political home of many East Germans who lost their jobs, social status and cultural identity during the transition to capitalism. Quickly establishing a presence in East Germanyโs provincial and municipal parliaments, the party expressed the discomfort of many East Germans who felt like second class citizens under the domination of West German institutions, politicians, corporations and culture. It highlighted East Germanyโs socialist heritage, which encompassed commitments to anti-fascism, peace and international solidarity as much as the dictatorship of the politburo, Stasi-surveillance and an overbearing bureaucracy. The party hung itself up in endless debates between those who downplayed or justified East German communismโs dark sides and others who sought to disown that history by embracing liberal principles. Practically, these disputes didnโt make much difference. Upholding socialist principles didnโt stop the party from pragmatically working within the political and economic confines created by unification. At times, this included voting for privatization of public housing and infrastructure. For decades since the party was founded, the contradiction between socialist principles and the subordination to neoliberal policies imposed by the West German bourgeoisie didnโt stop the PDS or its successor organization Die Linke (the Left Party), from becoming something like a catch-all or peopleโs party in East Germany, a role long held by the CDU und the SPD in West Germany. For years, the PDS/Left Party achieved election results in the mid-20 percent range, peaking at 28 percent in Brandenburg in 2004 and 32 percent in Thuringia in 2019. It was also, and still is, part of various coalition governments in East German states. Until the September 2024 election, the Thuringian government was led by the Left Partyโs Bodo Ramelow.
Despite this overall success and despite the partyโs fidelity to socialist principles, the social group that wasnโt interested in voting PDS consisted of workers, who still voted CDU in large numbers despite g the CDUโs failed to deliver on its big promises of post-unification prosperity. More recently they shifted to the AfD. Meanwhile, in West Germany, the PDS remained marginal throughout its existence, only attracting activists from various left grouplets. What little remained of left protest milieus after unification was still dominated by a mix of environmentalists, antifas and international solidarity activists who might vote Green, or maybe even SPD, but hardly ever PDS. The old working class milieus that were shrinking with the decline of smokestack industries were still dominated by unionists closer to the SPD than the PDS. This started to change when, under chancellor Schrรถder, the SPD implemented neoliberal counter-reforms on a scale his conservative predecessor Kohl had avoided throughout his 16-year tenure, despite his supposed commitment to unleashing market forces. Growing frustrations among left social democrats and unionists fed mass demonstrations against Schrรถderโs SPD and created a social and organizational base (including, most prominently, Schrรถderโs short-time finance minister Lafontaine) that merged with the PDS into the Left Party in 2007. In the federal elections two years later, the Left Party won 11.9 percent of the vote, then 9.2 percent in the 2017 elections, but fell to 4.9 percent in the 2021 elections. This was a worse result than the 5.1 percent the PDS obtained in 1998, an election that also saw an increased vote for the SPD, which allowed Schrรถder to succeed Kohl. It is worth noting that the PDS vote came almost entirely from East Germany, which represents less than a quarter of Germanyโs total population.
While the PDS mostly maintained peaceful coexistence between socialist theory and market-conforming practice, the Left Party continuously debated whether or not it should join centre-left governments, if given the chance. The bitterness with which party activists argued over this question stood in stark contrast to its actual relevance. In states where the party was relegated to opposition status by poor election results, this status didnโt attract additional voters keen on seeing a principled opposition in parliament. In states where the party joined governments, the results were mixed: sometimes it maintained its vote share in the subsequent election; sometimes it suffered losses. A paradoxical result came about in the Thuringian elections in September 2024: The Left Party lost massively, although, had there been direct elections for the minister-president (a position equivalent to provincial premier in Canada), the Left Partyโs Bodo Ramelow would have won the election. This fits into a trend that became visible over the last few years in a number of state elections in East and West Germany. Party loyalties based on shared worldviews wear thin. Elections are often decided based on the media appeal of top politicians, regardless of party affiliation. Remarkably enough, Ramelow, just like Dietmar Woidke, the SPDโs lead candidate in the Brandenburg elections, dropped the name of his party on campaign posters, presenting himself as more of a provincial father figure than a man of the party.
However, rather than signalling the end of ideology, as centrist politicians and postmodern philosophers might have argued before the rise of a very explicitly ideologically committed new right, the focus on limelight politicians pushes democratic debates into the shadows. In the case of the Left Party, it might also have been an attempt to distract from its own image as an organization mired in endless debates not producing any coherent, let alone persuasive, policies. The reasons for permanent internal discord are sociological and ideological. The Left Party was strongest in its early days, when the PDSโs social base still comprised a cross-section of the East German population, although workers remained underrepresented. It also attracted dissident social democrats and unionists from West Germany. To a limited extent, therefore the Left Party had the working class base the PDS never had.
The blend of Keynesian and Marxist ideas around which social democratic dissidents and union leftists organized had been defeated as a significant political current during the crises of the 1970s by the Social Democratic right and corporatist union leaders who put competitiveness of the West German economy over income distribution from profits to wages. In the new millennium, when these currents joined forces with the PDS, they were still sizeable enough to give the newly founded Left Party a boost. But not for long. The smokestack industries around which these left currents were organizing were in continued decline, which made strategies based on that moribund reality obsolete. Moreover, these strategies often stood in the way of mobilizing and organizing the new working classes that emerged in the service sector and, on a much smaller scale, IT, bio tech, and green energy.
As the ranks of the Left Party thinned out with the loss of members coming out of communist East Germany or from West German union and social democratic circles, the party was able to attract new blood mainly in the form of highly educated, often precariously employed, urban dwellers. The shift in membership from old left offspring to the children of neoliberal globalization was paralleled by a geographical shift in electoral support. In urban centres, losses among the partyโs old left supporters could be partially compensated; in rural areas, however, where the PDS and the Left Party had always been weak, the party disappeared almost entirely. Often, there isnโt even anyone to put up election campaign posters
Anti-AfD protest in Germany. Photo by strassenstriche.net/Flickr
Unlike the original base of both the PDS and the Left Party, the urban hipsters who joined the Left Party had no old left reference points. Even when they talked about Marx and class they did so with postmodern accents. However, this did not help them to gain sizeable support among the working classesโsometimes lumped together as the โprecariatโโthat developed in expanding economic sectors. The political offerings of the Left Party seemed to exercise little appeal for both old and potentially new constituencies. The partyโs founding basis of unity was opposition to neoliberalism. In the early days this left room for East German concerns about the outcomes of unificationโarguably a kind of neoliberal restructuringโwith opposition to the neoliberal turn of the Schrรถder-government in East and West Germany. It also left plenty of room for a variety of goals, from resurrecting the Keynesian welfare state to a multitude of vaguely defined socialisms for the future to opposition without a vision for the future. However, what sufficed to form the Left Party wasnโt enough to sustain and grow it, especially not as it became harder to label government policies neoliberal.
The Great Recession, the COVID-19 pandemic, and commitments to ongoing arms production brought state intervention back to the centre of politics, contrary to the 1990s and early 2000s when politics was dominated by advancing capital mobility and free trade. Back then, ruling elites organized consent of the popular classes, more or less successfully, under the banner of โinternational competitiveness.โ The new watchword โnational securityโ is better at rallying the new right than building support for centrist parties. Left Party intellectuals debated the new political conjuncture under the label โpost-neoliberalism,โ a word-monster that hints, perhaps unwittingly, at the partyโs inability to develop a strategy beyond rejecting neoliberalism. In reaction to the imposition of a party line by its predecessor organization, the PDS and the Left Party allowed a wide range of views. However, members of various organized currents, ranging from social-liberal to communist, tended to talk more about each other than with each other.
Postmodernist philosophersโ contention that the days of master narratives are over was wrong with respect to neoliberalismโif there ever was a master narrative, it was neoliberalismโbut it does apply to the Left Party, which could not synthesize different ideas into compelling left policies that could rally growing discontent. Instead, internal debates turned into factional turf wars in a party that resembled an appendix of the Scholz government, costing the Left Party more and more support.
After years of bitter infighting, discontent with declining voter approval and accommodation of government policies led to the split of the federal party caucus and the formation of the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) in January 2024. As its name indicates, the party is entirely built around its frontwoman, who represented the Left Party in the Bundestag from 2009 to 2023. In the BSW, the cacophony that destructively marks the Left Party is replaced by closed-door debates. As in the Communist party of old, membership isnโt open to everyone; applications to join must be approved. Wagenknecht, originally a member of the Communist Platform (one of the organized currents inside the PDS), had shifted to left-Keynesian, pro-welfare state positions. But, years before her split from the Left Party, she began advocating ordoliberal positionsโa branch of neoliberal thinking that stresses the role of the state in allowing businesses to compete without being bogged down by monopolies. This German version of neoliberalism has been the hallmark of economic policy and ideology since the early years of West German world market integration. In Wagenknechtโs current adaptation of ordoliberalism, the state guarantees competition, which, in turn, creates a strong economy capable of providing stable employment, social security and a fairer distribution of incomes. She combines this embrace of free markets plus the welfare state with a critique of the European Union as an institution operating in the interest of big corporations and a critique of NATO and US hegemony. Her condemnation of American hegemony appealed to some members of the Left Party, as did her critique of the EU, although her more recent favourable references to ordoliberalism and policies aiming at stricter migration controls were less popular.
The BSWโs outlook is very much shaped by positive memories of West German postwar prosperity. Yet, the partyโs advocacy of international cooperation, a position going back to 1970s detente policies, contrasts sharply with orientations of the centrist parties and some currents within her own former party. Demand for a negotiated settlement of the Ukraine war overlaps with AfD positions. However, the AfD considers this a matter of Germanyโs national interest that doesnโt preclude support for rearmament and war in other regions, like Gaza most recently. The BSW, on the other hand, sees militarism largely as the USโs last recourse for defending its ailing empire. It remains to be seen how the BSWโs principled opposition to militarism and war can mesh with current negotiations for a coalition government with the CDU and the SPD, both committed to military support for Zelensky in Ukraine and Netanyahu in Israel. Polls suggest that electoral support for the BSW was largely driven by the desire for an anti-war voice in parliament. At the same time, there is considerable support for efforts to keep the AfD out of government, despite all the support the AfD garnered in the fall state elections in East Germany. If this means compromising its anti-militarism, the BSW may, like the Left Party before it, soon be seen as a superfluous appendix of unpopular centrist parties.
After weeks of negotiations, the BSW entered into a coalition government with the SPD in Brandenburg as well as with the CDU and SPD in Thuringia. It also supports a minority government made up of the CDU and the SPD in Saxony. It did all this to keep the AfD out of government positions. Understandable as such efforts are, they have already cost the BSW in the polls. Hovering just above five percent, the BSW may not reach the five-percent threshold for obtaining seats in the upcoming federal elections. The Left Party, standing at 3.5 percent in the polls, will probably fall short. Founded as a project to unify left forces from East and West Germany, its split early last year already signalled the failure of that project. The next election may reduce it to insignificance, leaving lots of room for the AfD [end]
the Germans have bowed down to the US sabotage by Joe Biden administration of Nord Stream pipelines, only to end up with Donald Trumpโs America First doctrine in economy and defense