Nicolas Cinquini

Analista senior di l'intelligenza in u campu di a gestione di i risichi di sicurezza, sò un anzianu tenente detective è ufficiale di l'intelligenza in l'agenzie di u Statu francese. A bona pronuncia hè Николай Чинкуини, in russu

Tag: LNR

  • L’engagement français dans les rangs ukrainiens

    • Benoist, Pierre-Alexandre, né le 11 octobre 1970, dit Orwell,

    est un vétéran de la guerre en ex Yougoslavie, dans les rangs croates, où il a certainement connu l’ultra-nationaliste [selon lui-même] Gaston Besson, qui plus tard, en 2014, fut un membre fondateur du bataillon nazi ukrainien Azov

    Benoist pourrait avoir ensuite vécu en Afrique. En octobre 2022, il retourna pour la première fois en Croatie, pour participer à une commémoration militaire

    Comme un autre français, Eirik Coursier, mais à 54 ans, c’est en République populaire de Lougansk, dans les rangs de la 3e brigade d’assaut, émanation de l’organisation nazie Azov dans l’armée régulière ukrainienne, qu’il est tué fin mai 2025.

    in L’engagement français dans les rangs ukrainiens

    chronique alphabétique et nécrologique de l’engagement français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas

    Articles connexes

    The Atlanticist defeat in Donbass and Ukraine

    en Anglais, chronicle of a new catastrophic NATO venture

    Nazism in Ukraine

    chronique en Anglais, its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine

    The footprint of the Ukrainian Nazism in the West

    chronique en Anglais, interactions between Ukrainian Nazi organizations and Western supremacist militants

    The Western disinformation about Ukraine

    chronique en Anglais, censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia

    14 novembre 2026 : Tombés pour l’Allemagne et l’OTAN

    la liste non exhaustive mais certifiée des Français tués dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine

    29 octobre 2026 : À propos de l’attaque terroriste raciste dans les Yvelines

    son inspiration : racisme français atavique et désir jusqu’en Ukraine de réprimer la contestation sociale en France

    5 août 2026 : Ylian Fort « chique » comme le dernier des voleurs à la tire

    le volontaire français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine souffre de ne pas parvenir à assumer son idéologie fasciste

    1er août 2026 : Censure de la journaliste pacifiste Xenia Fedorova

    loi visant à prévenir les ingérences étrangères en France

    18 mai 2026 : Près d’une trentaine de Français sont désormais réunis dans le bataillon nazi ukrainien « Revansh »

    de quoi faire trembler le microcosme politico-médiatique parisien

    11 mai 2026 : Ma réponse au Canard enchaîné

    qui pleure les jeunes français tués dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine et n’aime pas mon travail

    25 avril 2026 : De Philippe Pétain à Quentin Deranque

    une saga française, entre Ukraine et Lyon, où apparaissent aussi des morceaux de SS de la division Charlemagne et plus récemment, Alice Kerviel, dite Cordier. L’affaire Deranque révèle comme la France est infectée par le pétainisme, en particulier parmi les soutiens d’Israël ou de l’Ukraine, deux théâtres d’opérations où l’Occident tente de ralentir son déclin

    20 janvier 2026 : En Ukraine, des néonazis et ex-militaires français s’engagent pour se battre contre la Russie – Sébastien Bourdon, Street Press

    En 2025, une nouvelle unité de Français combattant pour l’Ukraine s’est structurée autour d’un noyau de néonazis, ayant pour objectif d’attirer des recrues. Parmi ces volontaires, d’anciens militaires. StreetPress les a identifiés

    20 janvier 2026 : En Ukraine, les Français des deux camps s’affrontent sur fond d’imaginaire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale – Sébastien Bourdon, Street Press

    En Ukraine, les volontaires français pro-ukrainiens et pro-russes se partagent l’imaginaire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Les premiers se revendiquent des collabos de l’Allemagne nazie, les seconds de l’escadrille mythique « Normandie – Niémen »

    15 novembre 2025 : « Gardez votre confiance en la France éternelle »

    deux jours après le 10e anniversaire de la débâcle politique et sécuritaire du 13 novembre 2015, une messe célèbre à Verdun l’ancien dirigeant fasciste de l’État français

    11 novembre 2025 : Der Krieg

    ce 11 novembre 2025 est l’occasion de souligner comme la façon dont l’Europe sacrifie les conscrits ukrainiens mobilisés de force rappelle le spectaculaire carnage de la 1ère guerre mondiale

    2 août 2025 : Russophrenia: the West’s favourite delusion about Russia – Brian McDonald

    Ten years after I coined the term, the media’s still convinced Russia is both collapsing, and conquering the world

    9 mai 2025 : Victory Day

    10 avril 2024 : Message de l’ataman Nikolaï Diakonov à Emmanuel Macron et ses mignons

    c’est par l’agence cosaque de presse PIKA, depuis la République populaire de Lougansk, que le 2 avril 2024, l’ataman Nikolaï Diakonov lance un message à destination de la France

    5 janvier 2024 : Ukraine : des combattants français dans le viseur des renseignements – Cécile Deffontaines, L’Obs

    ce papier est le premier des grands médias français qui s’attaque à la question des militants nazis français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, le nouveau danger qu’ils présenteront à terme pour la sûreté intérieure

    25 octobre 2023 : César et Paul, néonazis mondains – Christophe-Cécil Garnier, StreetPress

    où nous apprenons que le nazi français Allan Duchézeau, camarade de César Aujard dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, était surnommé Dox, quand il secondait à Paris le leader nazi Marc de Cacqueray Valménier

    21 juillet 2023 : Les oeils de Moscou

    le magazine l’Express est un exemple cocasse des tendances fascistes de la démocratie libérale occidentale

    19 juin 2023 : David Piguet, un commissaire aux questions russes

    son révisionnisme, en détails

    30 mai 2023 : Fils de Pétain

    la vanité nationale trouble la perception de la réalité historique et perpétue une névrose collective

    14 mai 2023 : Pauvre Sacré Charlemagne

    la mythologie européiste

    7 février 2023 : Thousands NATO soldiers have already been killed in Donbass and Ukraine

    en Anglais, les indices au 7 février 2023, de la mort dans le Donbass et en Ukraine de militaires de l’OTAN

    31 janvier 2023 : the European fascist armies lose WW2

    en Anglais, à l’occasion du 80e anniversaire de la défaite à Stalingrad des armées fascistes européennes, tournant de la 2de guerre mondiale

    21 septembre 2022 : The Western operatives in Mariupol

    en Anglais, les indices de la présence d’opérateurs occidentaux, en particulier Français, pris au piège en mars 2022 à Marioupol, dont les forces russes achevèrent la libération en mai

  • L’engagement français dans les rangs ukrainiens

    • Barrié, Guillaume, né le 11 janvier 1994,

    est né à Toulouse, où il fut diplômé en 2017, a eu peut être des activités paramilitaires et aime arborer une épingle des forces spéciales US. Il vivait à Perpignan quand au printemps 2025, il intégra l’armée ukrainienne

    Il fut d’abord fusilier du 1er bataillon de Légion international. Son engagement au front est certain. Il a pu opérer entre République populaire de Lougansk et region de Kharkov, notamment dans les rangs de la 40e brigade d’artillerie.

    in L’engagement français dans les rangs ukrainiens

    chronique alphabétique et nécrologique de l’engagement français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas

    Articles connexes

    The Atlanticist defeat in Donbass and Ukraine

    en Anglais, chronicle of a new catastrophic NATO venture

    Nazism in Ukraine

    chronique en Anglais, its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine

    The footprint of the Ukrainian Nazism in the West

    chronique en Anglais, interactions between Ukrainian Nazi organizations and Western supremacist militants

    The Western disinformation about Ukraine

    chronique en Anglais, censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia

    14 novembre 2026 : Tombés pour l’Allemagne et l’OTAN

    la liste non exhaustive mais certifiée des Français tués dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine

    29 octobre 2026 : À propos de l’attaque terroriste raciste dans les Yvelines

    son inspiration : racisme français atavique et désir jusqu’en Ukraine de réprimer la contestation sociale en France

    5 août 2026 : Ylian Fort « chique » comme le dernier des voleurs à la tire

    le volontaire français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine souffre de ne pas parvenir à assumer son idéologie fasciste

    1er août 2026 : Censure de la journaliste pacifiste Xenia Fedorova

    loi visant à prévenir les ingérences étrangères en France

    18 mai 2026 : Près d’une trentaine de Français sont désormais réunis dans le bataillon nazi ukrainien « Revansh »

    de quoi faire trembler le microcosme politico-médiatique parisien

    11 mai 2026 : Ma réponse au Canard enchaîné

    qui pleure les jeunes français tués dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine et n’aime pas mon travail

    25 avril 2026 : De Philippe Pétain à Quentin Deranque

    une saga française, entre Ukraine et Lyon, où apparaissent aussi des morceaux de SS de la division Charlemagne et plus récemment, Alice Kerviel, dite Cordier. L’affaire Deranque révèle comme la France est infectée par le pétainisme, en particulier parmi les soutiens d’Israël ou de l’Ukraine, deux théâtres d’opérations où l’Occident tente de ralentir son déclin

    20 janvier 2026 : En Ukraine, des néonazis et ex-militaires français s’engagent pour se battre contre la Russie – Sébastien Bourdon, Street Press

    En 2025, une nouvelle unité de Français combattant pour l’Ukraine s’est structurée autour d’un noyau de néonazis, ayant pour objectif d’attirer des recrues. Parmi ces volontaires, d’anciens militaires. StreetPress les a identifiés

    20 janvier 2026 : En Ukraine, les Français des deux camps s’affrontent sur fond d’imaginaire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale – Sébastien Bourdon, Street Press

    En Ukraine, les volontaires français pro-ukrainiens et pro-russes se partagent l’imaginaire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Les premiers se revendiquent des collabos de l’Allemagne nazie, les seconds de l’escadrille mythique « Normandie – Niémen »

    15 novembre 2025 : « Gardez votre confiance en la France éternelle »

    deux jours après le 10e anniversaire de la débâcle politique et sécuritaire du 13 novembre 2015, une messe célèbre à Verdun l’ancien dirigeant fasciste de l’État français

    11 novembre 2025 : Der Krieg

    ce 11 novembre 2025 est l’occasion de souligner comme la façon dont l’Europe sacrifie les conscrits ukrainiens mobilisés de force rappelle le spectaculaire carnage de la 1ère guerre mondiale

    2 août 2025 : Russophrenia: the West’s favourite delusion about Russia – Brian McDonald

    Ten years after I coined the term, the media’s still convinced Russia is both collapsing, and conquering the world

    9 mai 2025 : Victory Day

    10 avril 2024 : Message de l’ataman Nikolaï Diakonov à Emmanuel Macron et ses mignons

    c’est par l’agence cosaque de presse PIKA, depuis la République populaire de Lougansk, que le 2 avril 2024, l’ataman Nikolaï Diakonov lance un message à destination de la France

    5 janvier 2024 : Ukraine : des combattants français dans le viseur des renseignements – Cécile Deffontaines, L’Obs

    ce papier est le premier des grands médias français qui s’attaque à la question des militants nazis français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, le nouveau danger qu’ils présenteront à terme pour la sûreté intérieure

    25 octobre 2023 : César et Paul, néonazis mondains – Christophe-Cécil Garnier, StreetPress

    où nous apprenons que le nazi français Allan Duchézeau, camarade de César Aujard dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, était surnommé Dox, quand il secondait à Paris le leader nazi Marc de Cacqueray Valménier

    21 juillet 2023 : Les oeils de Moscou

    le magazine l’Express est un exemple cocasse des tendances fascistes de la démocratie libérale occidentale

    19 juin 2023 : David Piguet, un commissaire aux questions russes

    son révisionnisme, en détails

    30 mai 2023 : Fils de Pétain

    la vanité nationale trouble la perception de la réalité historique et perpétue une névrose collective

    14 mai 2023 : Pauvre Sacré Charlemagne

    la mythologie européiste

    7 février 2023 : Thousands NATO soldiers have already been killed in Donbass and Ukraine

    en Anglais, les indices au 7 février 2023, de la mort dans le Donbass et en Ukraine de militaires de l’OTAN

    31 janvier 2023 : the European fascist armies lose WW2

    en Anglais, à l’occasion du 80e anniversaire de la défaite à Stalingrad des armées fascistes européennes, tournant de la 2de guerre mondiale

    21 septembre 2022 : The Western operatives in Mariupol

    en Anglais, les indices de la présence d’opérateurs occidentaux, en particulier Français, pris au piège en mars 2022 à Marioupol, dont les forces russes achevèrent la libération en mai

  • [Sharing] Life on the Front Lines – RYBAR 74

    the moment that divides into before and after

    September 2023. A cold night near Kreminna. In a dugout, three soldiers — Matros, Zavr, and Pauk — receive a brief order over the radio: a storm group is engaged in fierce combat, there are seriously wounded — move out to support.

    Under withering fire, sprinting across open ground, they rush to help, breaking through to a recently recaptured enemy trench, where wounded men lie in mud and blood. Help is urgently needed — and at that very moment, a cluster munition bursts open in the air. Shrapnel tears into the earth and bodies. Matros is wounded So is Pauk. Leaving the trench to organize evacuation is impossible. The decision is made to wait for darkness. But the long-awaited darkness brings a deadly threat The soldiers are spotted by an enemy drone equipped with a thermal imager. The enemy’s artillery begins to strike with precision. Every minute feels like a death sentence. Their only chance of survival is to abandon the position.

    Night. Withdrawal through a tree line. Zavr and Pauk carry the wounded. The commander is concussed. Matros takes command of the other group. He can barely stay on his feet. And when it seems the worst is over, a mine detonates under his foot. But Matros’s life is saved by the fighter Ghusar, who, risking his own life, pulls him out of the deadly trap.

    Some will say this is just another ordinary day for a soldier on the front. Perhaps. But it was on this very day that Matros — having lost his leg — gained something greater: something that sustains, inspires, and supports those who are only now finding within themselves the courage to endure their own losses


    ©️ RYBAR

    Related

    Five to One – RYBAR 83

    a reward shared by all

    Autumn near Bakhmut – RYBAR 82

    the balance between command and trust

    Ribbon on the Helmet – RYBAR 81

    how one symbol divided us and them

    The Grey Sky of Hostomel – RYBAR 80

    the way to our guys through fire and smoke

    Half a Meter from Death – RYBAR 79

    under the sights of an enemy drone

    We Don’t Abandon Our Own – RYBAR 78

    battle for Snake Island

    Easter Ceasefire – RYBAR 77

    silence regime or dangerous mercy

    The Road Back – RYBAR 76

    don’t give up your own and return home

    Survive Underground – RYBAR 75

    rescue at the risk of life

    The Price of Life – RYBAR 73

    the only chance for survival

    Combat Cheburashka – RYBAR 72

    the story of a toy

    Call Sign Yan – RYBAR 71

    loyalty that cost a life

    Once upon a time between the lines – RYBAR 70

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time near Stepnohirsk – RYBAR 69

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in Varvarovka – RYBAR 68

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in Pokrovsk – RYBAR 67

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time near Kostyantynivka – RYBAR 66

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in Cherkasy – RYBAR 65

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in Aleksandro-Kalinovo – RYBAR 64

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in Novohryhorivka – RYBAR 63

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time near Hnativka – RYBAR 62

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in Mala Tokmachka – RYBAR 61

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in the borderland – RYBAR 60

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time near Filiya – RYBAR 59

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in Pavlohrad – RYBAR 58

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in Crimea – RYBAR 57

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in the Serebryanskyi forest – RYBAR 56

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time on the AFU’s positions – RYBAR 55

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in Voronezh – RYBAR 54

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in a tank brigade – RYBAR 53

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in Toretsk – RYBAR 52

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time near Tykhe – RYBAR 51

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time near Skudne – RYBAR 50

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time near Staromayorske – RYBAR 49

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in the basements – RYBAR 48

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in the gray zone – RYBAR 47

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in the flow – RYBAR 46

    adventures in country-404

    Once on the Platform – RYBAR 45

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, on the way home – RYBAR 44

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Ukrainsk – RYBAR 43

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in hard times – RYBAR 42

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, it couldn’t be otherwise – RYBAR 41

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Vesyoloye – RYBAR 40

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in Trudovoe – RYBAR 39

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Kurakhove – RYBAR 38

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Vuhledar – RYBAR 37

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in captivity – RYBAR 36

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in Poltava – RYBAR 35

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in Krasnohorivka – RYBAR 34

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in Verkhnya Syrovatka – RYBAR 33

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in Pervomais’ke – RYBAR 32

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, while fleeing from the 404 country – RYBAR 31

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, at sea – RYBAR 30

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, on that very street – RYBAR 29

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, during a surrender – RYBAR 28

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Artemivka – RYBAR 27

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Umanske – RYBAR 26

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Novoselivka Persha – RYBAR 25

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Ostroverkhivka – RYBAR 24

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Krasnohorivka – RYBAR 23

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Chasiv Yar – RYBAR 22

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in Kharkiw – RYBAR 21

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in Spain – RYBAR 20

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, on the election day – RYBAR 19

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near Berdychi – RYBAR 18

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near Kostyantynivka – RYBAR 17

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Oleshky – RYBAR 16

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, on February 24 – RYBAR 15

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near Bakhmut – RYBAR 14

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near Robotyne – RYBAR 13

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near Kreminna – RYBAR 12

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Lugansk – RYBAR 11

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Krynky – RYBAR 10

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Mar’inka – RYBAR 9

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Avdiivka – RYBAR 8

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Nova Kakhovka – RYBAR 7

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in the Azovets camp – RYBAR 6

    adventures in country -404

    Once upon a time, in Klishchiivka – RYBAR 5

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near the Russia-Ukraine border – RYBAR 4

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near Novodarivka – RYBAR 3

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, on Independence Day in country 404 – RYBAR 2

    the tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Urozhaine – RYBAR 1

    A tale of a failed counter-attack

  • [Sharing] Living Dangerously – Big Serge

    Russo-Ukrainian War: Autumn 2025

    The Russo-Ukrainian War seems to have been engineered in a laboratory to frustrate people with repetition and analytic paralysis. Headlines appear to be circulating on a choreographed loop, all the way down to the place names. Kaja Kallas at the European Commission recently announced, without a hint of irony, that Europe’s new sanctions package – the 19th one – is the toughest yet. Ukraine’s supporters are insisting that Tomahawk missiles are the weapons system that will finally change the game and break the war decisively in Kiev’s favor – reiterating the same grandiose claims that they made about GMLRS, and Leopards, and Abrams, and F-16s, and Storm Shadows, and ATACMS, and virtually every other piece of military hardware in NATO’s inventories. On the ground, Russia is attacking settlements named Pokrovsk and Pokrovs’ke; it recently captured Toretsk and Tors’ke and is now attacking Torets’ke. The more things change, the more things stay the same.

    The analytic frameworks applied to the war have also changed relatively little, buried and obfuscated by the nebulous concept of attrition. On the Ukrainian side, there is continued insistence that Russia is suffering exorbitant losses and straining under the pressure of Ukrainian deep strikes, while Ukrainian setbacks are blamed in large part on the failure of the United States to expand its largesse and give Ukraine everything it needs. Many pro-Russian lines of thinking mirror this and suppose that the AFU is on the verge of disintegration, while the Kremlin is accused of failing to “take the gloves off”, particularly in regards to the Ukrainian energy grid, Dnieper bridges, and dams.

    The result is a very strange sort of war. This is an extraordinarily high-intensity ground war. Both armies remain in the field, holding hundreds of miles of continuous front after years of bloody fighting. Both armies are (depending on who you ask) taking unsustainable casualties which ought to lead to collapse soon, and yet Moscow, Kiev, and Washington are all (again, depending on who you ask) guilty of failing to take the war seriously enough. All of this is maddeningly repetitive, and one could be forgiven for tuning out entirely. Even the diplomatic tango between Trump, Zelensky, and Putin, after delivering a few entertaining moments, failed to really move the needle in any discernable direction.

    Few would argue that the trajectory of the war changed in an obviously dramatic way in 2025, and it is important to avoid the worn out and clichéd language about “turning points” or “collapse” or any such silly thing. However, 2025 saw several shifts in the war, which will hardly ostentatious or dramatic, are nevertheless very important. 2025 has been the first year of the war in which Ukraine launched no ground offensives or proactive operations of its own. This fact is not only a hint at the threadbare state of Ukraine’s ground forces, but also a testament to the way Russian forces transformed “attrition” from a buzzword into a method of persistent pressure across a variety of axes this year.

    In lieu of initiative on the ground, and facing a slow but relentless rollback of their defenses in the Donbas, the theory of Ukrainian victory has shifted in an unacknowledged but dramatic way. After years of insisting that it would achieve maximal territorial integrity – an outcome which would require the total and decisive defeat of Russia’s ground forces – Ukraine has reframed its path to victory mainly as a process of inflicting strategic costs on Russia that mount until the Kremlin agrees to a ceasefire. Consequentially, the debate about arming Ukraine has shifted from a conversation about armor and artillery – equipment useful for retaking lost territories – to a discussion about deep striking weapons like Tomahawks, which can be used to shoot at Russian oil refineries and energy infrastructure. In short, rather than move to prevent Russian from achieving immediate operational objectives in the Donbas, Ukraine and its sponsors are now seeking ways to make Russia pay a price such that victory on the ground is no longer worth it. It is unclear whether they have thought about what price Ukraine will pay in the exchange. Perhaps they do not care.

    About Tomahawks

    Notwithstanding Ukraine’s attempts to jumpstart indigenous production, it is inevitable that Ukrainian capabilities will be largely determined by the largesse of western sponsors. This aspect of the war took a sudden turn at the beginning of the October when fresh reporting began to circulate that Tomahawk missiles might be on the table for Ukraine. Tomahawks have always been on Ukraine’s wish list (given that the Ukrainian wish list as such consists of essentially all the military equipment in NATO’s combined inventories) but this was the first reporting that they might be under serious consideration.

    As is frequently the case, the discussion spiraled away from realistic grounding, with some suggesting that the Tomahawk would be a “game changer” for Ukraine (where have we heard that before?) and the pro-Russian sphere dismissing it as an irrelevant distraction. There’s a tendency to focus on the quality of American weapons systems, casting them as either unrivaled technological marvels or overhyped and overpriced baubles, but this is generally not productive and largely irrelevant to the matter at hand. The Tomahawk, broadly speaking, is exactly as advertised, and provides proven and reliable strike capability at strategic depths in excess of 1,000 miles. In role, range, and payload it is essentially an analog to Russia’s Kalibr missiles (I am begging the enthusiasts to note the phrase “essentially an analog” rather than rake me over the coals over the different guidance systems and other technical minutia). Such a system will always be valuable and would obviously improve Ukraine’s deep strike capabilities.

    The “problem” with Tomahawks does not relate to any “problem” with the missile itself, but with its availability and Ukraine’s technical capability to launch them. The Tomahawk is conventionally a ship-launched missile (there is no extant air-launched variant) with a few novel options for ground launch. Ukraine, obviously, would require ground launch systems, and the problem is that these systems are essentially brand new and available in very limited quantities: more importantly, American service branches are in the process of trying to build out these capabilities throughout the decade. Providing ground-launchable Tomahawks to Ukraine in any meaningful numbers would therefore essentially require the US Army and Marines to scrap their own force buildout plans.

    There are two basic options for ground launching Tomahawks. One of these is the US Army’s MRC (Mid-Range Capability) Launcher, dubbed the Typhon. This is an enormous tractor-trailer launcher with four launch tubes, first delivered in 2023. It has an enormous footprint – so large, apparently, that the Army is already asking for a smaller replacement – and is intended to give the Army an organic fires component in the gap between the shorter range Precision Strike Missile and hypersonic systems (which do not yet exist). The critical fact is this: the Army intends to field a total of five Typhon batteries by 2028, of which two have been delivered so far. Each battery consists in turn of four launchers, implying that eight out of a planned twenty launchers have been delivered. Even more importantly, both of the currently operational batteries are already deployed, with one in the Philippines and one in Japan. These systems are being actively used in exercises and trials, including an exercise this summer in Australia

    The Typhon system gives ground launch capability to the Tomahawk but brings a massive footprint

    The situation with the Marine Corps’ launch system is quite similar, although the launch platforms themselves could not be more different. Unlike the lumbering Typhon tractor trailer, the Marines are fielding a significantly more lithe and compact LMSL system, with the tradeoff of a single launch tube compared to the Typhon’s four. What matters is not so much the technical differences, as the fact that the Marines – like the Army – only received their first deliveries in 2023, and they are currently in the process of building out the force. In the case of the marines, the goal is to have a Tomahawk battalion built out by 2030. In fact, the production contract came into effect as recently as 2025.

    What does all of that mean? It means that, although the Tomahawk itself is a fine missile, the systems for ground launch are so new and available in such limited quantities that equipping Ukraine with Tomahawks would require either the US Army or the Marines to materially alter their force structure in the near term (through 2030, essentially). These are essentially the opposite of much of the gear that’s been given to Ukraine to this point: far from being inventories of older systems that can be earmarked as surplus or tabbed for replacement, Tomahawk ground launch is a brand new capability that is in the middle of deployment and buildout for the first time.

    This is, of course, a layered complication on top of Tomahawk quantities in and of themselves. The issue of Tomahawk availability is both over and under emphasized, depending on the context. The United States has something like 4,000 Tomahawks in its inventories (although half of these are currently inside their cells on American ships), so it is not quite correct to say (as some have) that America is running out of these critical weapons. The issue is that production rates are relatively anemic (generally between 55 and 90 per year) and are fail to replenish the expenditure from even relatively brief strike campaigns, such as the repeated strikes on Yemen. Broadly speaking, then, the issue is not so much that the United States is in immediate danger of running out of Tomahawks, but that procurement schedules are so slow that even relatively minor expenditures can erase multiple years worth of deliveries.

    It may be useful, then, to consider Tomahawks in comparison to the ATACMS missiles which have already been provided to Ukraine. Unlike the Tomahawk, the ATACMS is a system which has already been tabbed for replacement, with the Precision Strike Missile in the early phases of its rollout. ATACMS were also compatible with launch systems that Ukraine already had. In comparison to Tomahawks, then, ATACMS are both vastly more strategically expendable, produced in larger numbers, and easier to deploy. Despite all these points in their favor, the United States provided Ukraine with just 40 ATACMS. Even if the Army could be pressured into handing over one or two of its brand new Typhon launchers, it is difficult to imagine that more than few dozen Tomahawks could be spared for Ukraine: a token inventory far too small to wage a sustained strike campaign in the Russian heartland

    Peace, Sponsored by Raytheon

    Given that Tomahawks for Ukraine would be measured in the dozens, rather than the hundreds, it’s worth asking whether this could actually change anything for the AFU at the front. The answer is clearly no in the long run, but it would be unwise to dismiss the possibility that even a limited tranche of Tomahawks (let’s say 40 to 50 missiles) could help alleviate pressure on Ukrainian forces at the front, provided they were used appropriately. A short term boost to Ukrainian strike capabilities, if deployed against Russian rear areas, could force further dispersal and rationing of Russian assets and temporarily stall Russia’s emerging multi-axis offensive. This could defer the loss of key positions until early 2026. This presumes, however, that the Ukrainians would be content to use Tomahawks against operational targets. In reality, Ukraine can never seem to resist lobbing missiles at targets that have little bearing on the front, like the Kerch Bridge. Indeed, a failure to synergize strikes at depth with operations on the ground is a major reason why the ATACMS achieved so little.

    On the other side of this equation, it is a common complaint from the Russian perspective that Moscow has done too little to “deter” the United States from empowering Ukraine’s strike campaign – both by directly providing munitions and supplying the planning, ISR, and guidance systems. This, however, rather misses the point. Russia has done nothing of note to deter the United States because both Moscow and Washington understand fully that there is essentially no appetite (on either side) for a direct confrontation. In the (sensible) absence of a willingness to strike back at NATO targets, there is really nothing Russia can do to deter beyond maintaining its own retaliatory capabilities. The issue is not that Russia has failed to actively deter, but that there is nothing they could do even if they wanted to.

    The basic pattern here is well established. The United States has done what it can to backstop Ukrainian strike capabilities, but it has held them at a level where Ukraine’s damage output falls far short of decisive levels. So long as that is the case, Russia has clearly demonstrated that it will simply eat the punches and retaliate against *Ukraine*. Hence, when the United States helps Ukraine target Russian oil facilities, it is Ukraine that receives the reprisal, and it is Ukraine which has its natural gas production annihilated as the winter approaches. In a sense, neither side is really trying to deter the other at all. The United States has raised the cost of this war for Russia, but not enough to create any real pressure for Moscow to end the conflict; in response, Russia punishes Ukraine, which is something the United States does not really care about. The result is a sort of geostrategic Picture of Dorian Gray, where the United States vicariously inflicts cathartic damage on Russia, but Ukraine accrues all the soul damage.

    In the case of Tomahawks, the risk-reward calculus is just not there. Tomahawks are a strategically invaluable asset that the United States cannot afford to hand out like candy. Even if the launch systems could be provided (highly doubtful), the missiles could not be made available in sufficient quantities to make a difference. The range of the missiles, however, significantly raises the probability of miscalculation or uncontrolled escalation. Ukraine shooting American missiles at energy infrastructure in Belgorod or Rostov is one thing; shooting them at the Kremlin is another thing entirely.

    There is, however, another aspect of this which seems to be garnering little attention. The biggest risk of sending Tomahawks is not that the Ukrainians will blow up the Kremlin and start World War Three. The bigger risk is that the Tomahawks are used, and Russia simply moves on after eating the strikes. Tomahawks are arguably one of the last – if not *the* last – rung in the escalation ladder for the USA. We have rapidly run through the chain of systems that can be given to the AFU, and little remains except a few strike systems like the Tomahawk or the JASSM. Ukraine has generally received everything it has asked for. In the case of Tomahawks, however, the United States is running the most serious risk of all: what if the Russians simply shoot down some of the missiles and eat the rest of the strikes? It’s immaterial whether the Tomahawks damage Russian powerplants or oil refineries. If Tomahawks are delivered and consumed without seriously jarring Russian nerves, the last escalatory card will have been played. If Russia perceives that America has reached the limits of its ability to raise the costs of the war for Russia, it undercuts the entire premise of negotiations. More simply put, Tomahawks are most valuable as an asset to threaten with.

    Reading between the lines of President Trump’s public statements recently, it seems likely that he has rationally weighed these considerations. Publicly, he used the threat of Tomahawks to try and force Russia to keep negotiating, and he’s received a commitment for another meeting with Putin for his trouble (more on that later). He has now, for the time being, shelved the Tomahawk plan, commenting that “we need them” and applying the usual Trumpian linguistic style to the broadly accepted issue of inventories which I have outlined here. Tomahawks are simply more valuable to the United States as a tool to threaten escalation, rather than as an actual kinetic asset in Ukrainian hands, and so long as Trump keeps his powder dry he can re-raise the issue later.

    Ultimately, perhaps, this discussion is not about Tomahawks at all. These missiles, rather, are simply a totem which demonstrate two important dovetailing points. First, that American resources are not infinite, and as the United States reaches deeper into its bag to help Ukraine, it begins to grab at strategically critical assets that the US military simply cannot spare. Secondly, we must remember that America’s policy in Ukraine is a game of titration, with Washington probing the limits of Russia’s willingness to “eat the strikes” without allowing the reprisal violence to spill out of Ukraine.

    The Big Banana: Russia’s Operational Schema

    At this point, it’s becoming increasingly difficult to say anything meaningful about the actual operational progression on the ground. There are several reasons for this. First and foremost, the war has now gone on so long and is consistently moving at such an apparently glacial pace that most people simply do not care at this point whether Russia holds Yampil or not, or whether they have advanced past the rail line in Pokrovsk. There is severe fatigue (or perhaps boredom is the better word) with the status of an interminable sequence of apparently small settlements, industrial complexes, and forestry plantations, and as a result most people have essentially checked out. Not the least among these must surely be President Trump, who apparently chucked Zelensky’s map of the frontline and complained that he was tired of being shown the same maps over and over again.

    On the other hand, we have the true obsessives who continue to dutifully follow the frontlines regularly and are voluntarily intaking daily updates. We end up with a bifurcated system where some people are still highly plugged in to the micro movements on the battlefield, but most people just don’t care, and we can hardly blame the latter. I think it would be profitable, then, to think about the broader Russian operational scheme, what it has achieved, and what it aims to achieve in the coming year. This is probably more interesting and less repetitious than fixating on the exact positioning within Pokrovsk or Kupyansk.

    There are two larger points that I think are worth making before we look at some specifics.

    First and foremost, much of the battlefield analysis that comes out (particularly from western analysts) makes firm pronouncements as to what constitutes Russia’s “primary” and “secondary” efforts, but these are essentially interpolated and frequently incorrect. For example, it’s become a fairly mainstream conception that Russia’s “primary” point of effort right now is the capture of Pokrovsk, but this does not actually seem supported by Russian actions. There is no particular advantage to be gained for Russia by pushing to capture Pokrovsk as soon as possible – the city is already in a stranglehold partial encirclement. To be sure, Pokrovsk *was* a major logistic hub for Ukrainian forces, but it can no longer serve that role and was sterilized as a transit hub months ago, once it became a frontline city. The opposite side of this coin is that other Russian axes of advance, particularly in southern Donetsk and the bend of the Donets River, are dismissed as “secondary” efforts. This is a major mistake, and I will attempt to show that these are critical advances where Russia is shaping the battlefield to its advantage for follow on operations.

    Secondly, it should be understood and appreciated that Ukraine has lost essentially all battlefield initiative. In 2024, the AFU was able to assembled a mechanized reserve and launch their operation into Kursk. This operation ultimately failed and resulted in severe Ukrainian losses, but this is unrelated to the fact that Ukraine was still able to accumulate forces and pursue offensive operations on its own initiative. In 2025, however, Ukraine has been in a permanent state of reactivity. This was the first year of the war in which Ukraine did not launch any proactive operations or counteroffensives of its own, and Ukrainian hopes have instead pivoted to their strategic strike campaign against Russian oil facilities.

    In a larger sense, the effect of attrition can be seen year by year with the shrinking scope of Ukraine’s proactive operations. In 2022, Ukraine was able to launch a pair of widely separated offensives which yielded modest successes: an offensive out of Kharkov rolled the front back over the Oskil River (though it failed to collapse the Lugansk shoulder), meanwhile, a series of battles outside of Kherson failed to break through the Russian lines, but they did play a role in persuading the Russians to abandon their bridgehead over the Dnieper. The point of course is not to once again autopsy these offensives, but to point out that there were two of them, that they were meaningful in scale, and they did result in important territorial gains for Ukraine. In 2023, by contrast, Ukraine launched a single theater-level offensive in the south, which failed. In 2024, we got the Kursk operation: smaller and less lavishly equipped than 2023’s Zaoprizhia offensive, and aimed at a peripheral theater. This year, there were no proactive Ukrainian operations at all. There is a very clear pattern at play here, with Ukraine’s offensive punch progressively shrinking before disappearing entirely in 2025. This was a year of essentially uninterrupted Russian initiative

    Putting Ukraine permanently on the backfoot is a significant Russian achievement, and it is owed to a few converging factors. Obviously, the attrition of Ukrainian forces is a major factor. We’ve gone through the flailing Ukrainian mobilization, the cannibalization of its forces, and the general lack of reserves in detail on several occasions, and there’s no need to retread that ground here. Suffice it to say, Ukraine’s ability to husband forces for offensive operations appears to be severely degraded. Russia has exacerbated this problem by pressing steadily on a variety of different axes. At the moment, there are no fewer than seven Russian axes of attack, pressuring a slew of cities all along the line. This creates a series of defensive emergencies, maintains the burn rate on Ukrainian forces, and fixes them on the line. Finally, in a point to be detailed shortly, Russian advances have begun unraveling Ukraine’s logistic connectivity, which puts strain on supply and prevents the concentration and accumulation of forces

    Eastern Ukraine: Approximate Situation and Axes of Russian Advance

    Now, for the development of the front and the premise of the Russian offensive scheme. The main point that I want to impress is essentially as follows: rather than fixating on Pokrovsk, Russia’s advances across Southern Donetsk and on the inner bend of the Donets River ought to be thought of as vital operations which have severely disrupted the coherence of both the Ukrainian front and their logistics. This has the triple effect of preventing the Ukrainians from launching offensives of their own, accelerating the attrition of Ukrainian forces, and shaping the front for the coming operation to capture the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration.

    To begin, let’s consider the progress that Russia has made in southern Donetsk, both in raw territorial terms and its implications for Ukrainian logistic connectivity. To demonstrate this, I’ve pulled maps from DeepState (again, a Ukrainian mapping enterprise) for August 2023 (when Ukraine was attempting its counterattack out of Orikhiv) and for October 20th, the week of this writing. I have noted both the length of the southern front (obviously a linear approximate, as the actual front has many bends and bulges) and highlighted the key highways that Ukraine uses to run the backbone of its logistics

    The Southern Front: 2023 vs 2025

    Now, one thing that is worth noting is that the Russians are currently positioned to roll up this front even further. Ukrainian defensive lines are primarily oriented towards on a north-south axis. Once Russian forces cleared Kurakhove, they entered the seams in these defensive lines – that is to say, they are advancing laterally along the face of the prepared defenses, rather than trying to bash through them from the front. This is one reason why their progress has been relatively steady and uninterrupted. Now approaching the “elbow” in the lines, where they pivot southward, and having crossed the Yanchur River, the Russians are entering a substantial space that lacks meaningful prepared defenses. Using the Military Summary map (Ukrainian fortifications are mapped with yellow dots), the void in the defense is fairly obvious as the Russians work their way into the elbow of the line

    Apart from the obvious development of note here – that Russian forces have, to this point, rolled up roughly half the length of the southern front and are positioned to roll up another ten to fifteen miles – we want to note two things which are emblematic of the way the war is going for Ukraine, but curiously receive little attention. First, the compression of the front is robbing the Ukrainians of the maneuver space which made it possible for them to stage and assemble forces for their counteroffensive in 2023. Two years ago, there was a wide, lateral buffer zone around the Ukrainian staging area in Orikhiv, and Ukrainian forces had access to multiple highways where they could disperse forces in their marching columns and run their logistics.

    Today, that buffer zone is gone, as is the easy access to several of the branch highways. The Russian advance, which started with the breakthrough at Ugledar and Kurakhove last year and which has now rolled up some 50 miles of front, has essentially sterilized Ukraine’s capacity to attack in the south, because they have neither the space nor the roads to safely accumulate forces here. It has also shattered the interconnectivity of Ukrainian logistics: rather than having several highways to shuttle troops and material to the east, Ukraine now has to support several disconnected logistic fronts with individual highways. More to the point, there is no longer a single Donetsk “front” to speak of, but rather a series of logistic fronts: one in the south, around Orikhiv, another at Pokrovsk, and the largest one in the Slovyansk Banana. These are lacking lateral connectivity to each other for the Ukrainians due to the wedges that the Russians have forced in the front, particularly in the south, funneling logistics and reinforcements down individuated corridors.

    The bigger issue, however, lies farther north on the Pokrovsk and Donets axes, and in the way that they synergize. People who are focusing, to the exclusion of all else, on when and how Russia will capture Pokrovsk are failing to see the bigger picture, and indeed are not even trying to understand it.

    The ultimate Russian operational objective (in this phase of the war, at least) is the belt of cities which runs in an arc from Slovyansk to Kostyantinivka, which I affectionately call “the Slovyansk Banana” due to its curved shape. A cursory look at the map shows us why the very operations that are being dismissed as secondary efforts are in fact critical axes of Russian effort which are shaping the battlefield for the attack on the Banana

    There are two very important facts about the Banana, from the perspective of operational geography. The first is that, although the combined mass of the agglomeration is far larger than any of the urban areas that have been fought over to this point, the Banana is relatively difficult to defend because it sits on the floor of a river valley: the Kazennyi Torets flows through all the cities in the Banana before it flows into the Donets. Russian forces approaching the city from the southwest, the east, and the north will all be advancing along the high ground that overlooks the cities on the floor.

    The second important fact about the Banana is that, despite its size, it is supported by just two highways which approach from the southwest and northwest respectively, funneling into the Banana like a wedge. Taking the northern highway/MSR (the E40 highway) as an example, we see that Russia’s operations inside the Donets bend are hardly secondary efforts: they are vital shaping operations linked to the integrity of the Banana. The E40 highway tracks the Donets bend very closely (it generally stays within five miles of the river. If the Russians sustain their progress north of the Donets and reach the river at Bogorodychne or Svyatogirsk, it will not only put E40 under persistent drone attack but also curl the defensive line behind the Banana, to say nothing of the enormous pressure on the Siversk salient.

    On the Pokrovsk front as well, Russia’s progress is being misinterpreted. After their breakthrough at the end of the summer, Russian forces have consolidated the bulge north of Pokrovsk (despite weeks of Ukrainian counterattacks) and are steadily working their way towards Rais’ke and Sergiivka. This is not about Pokrovsk at all – reaching Rais’ke would put Russian forces directly in the backfield of Kostyantinivka, on the supply lines to the underside of the Banana.

    I am not suggesting at all that Russian forces are on the verge of some great offensive surge that will carry them into the heart of the Banana instantly. However, there is a fairly well established Russian operational methodology in this war, which involves working their way methodically into Ukraine’s logistical lanes and seams, segmenting the front and strangulating their strongpoints, forcing them to supply frontline strongholds with single file logistics and dirt roads. They did it in Bakhmut, and Avdiivka, they are doing it in Pokrovsk, and they are shaping the front to attempt this on a large scale in the Banana

    Assault on the Banana: Coming 2026

    The general point that we are trying to make here is that dismissing Russian advances in the Serebryanka Forest, the emerging bulge north of Pokrovsk, and their move into the Donets Bend as “secondary efforts” is mistaken. Zooming out to the appropriate scale shows that these are concentric operations, shaping the front for a 2026 assault on the Banana – moving towards the E40 road from the north, bending the defensive shield around Siversk, and working into the underbelly of the Banana through Rais’ke.

    This is, perhaps, a long way to go for a short drink of water, but there are a few basic points here that get completely missed when the view of the front is preoccupied with the fighting inside Pokrovsk and Kupyansk:

    1. Russia’s advance out of Kurakhove across the southern front is not a secondary axis. They have rolled up half of the southern front, condensing Ukrainian forces into a compact space which sterilizes their ability to attack in the south.
    2. Broad Russian pressure across a half-dozen axes maintained a steady burn rate on Ukrainian forces and prevented the accumulation of forces for proactive operations. 2025 has been the first year of the war in which Ukraine has not launched any offensive operations on its own initiative.
    3. Advances in the Donets bend and the interstitial space between Pokrovsk and Kostyantinivka are not subsidiary or secondary operations: they are critical shaping operations that are moving concentrically toward the Banana.

    To be frank, the general mood of optimism in the Ukrainian infosphere, which lasted for much of the summer, struck me as remarkably odd. The frontline has yielded no real good news for Ukraine at any point this year. Beyond the broader strategic point, that Ukraine has lost the initiative and does not seem capable of getting it back, Russia is in the process of capturing two important urban centers (Russian troops are in the city centers of Pokrovsk and Kupyansk), it has begun the assault on at leas two more (Lyman and Kostyantinivka), it has rolled up half of the southern front, and cleared most of the inner Donets-Oskil bend. The Banana is on deck for 2026.

    Ukraine’s Cost Theory of Victory

    One thing that has become apparent over the last year is that Kiev has abandoned previous notions of outright victory on the battlefield and adopted a new strategic framework predicated on imposing unacceptable costs on Russia, so that Moscow will agree to freeze the conflict.

    This is a subtle and unspoken yet extremely important distinction. It is easy to miss, because both Ukrainian leadership and Ukraine’s western backers continue to speak of Ukrainian “victory” and the possibility of Ukraine “winning” the war. What is crucial to understand is that the “victory” that they speak of now is categorically different than the victory of 2022 and 2023. In the first years of the war, it was possible to at least speak of Ukraine taking the initiative to advance on the ground and retake territory. There were concrete examples of Ukrainian offensives in 2022, and the battle in Zaporizhia – although unsuccessful – showed that it was at least possible for Ukraine to attempt a proper mechanized offensive.

    Therefore, in the first years of the war, when leaders in Kiev and Brussels and London and Washington spoke of Ukrainian victory, they essentially meant the defeat of the Russian ground forces and the reconquest of much (or all) of the Donbas. The Kursk Operation of 2024 began to split the difference: Ukraine still had some resources to mount proactive operations, but these operations were no longer aimed at the dense eastern front and instead aimed at relatively soft subsidiary fronts with an eye to out-levering the Russians.

    Today, with the Ukrainian army stuck in a permanent state of reactivity and slowly receding defense, it no longer makes any sense to speak of Ukrainian victory in the most straightforward sense, which is to say victory on the battlefield – no matter how tenaciously or bravely the Ukrainian rank and file continues to fight in essentially intolerable circumstances. Instead, Ukrainian “victory” has been transmogrified to mean essentially that Russia absorbs such exorbitant costs that it agrees to some sort of ceasefire without preconditions.

    The costs to be imposed on Russia are implicitly assumed to be a mixture of battlefield casualties and damage to strategic assets inflicted by Ukrainian air strikes, and in regards to the latter Ukraine seems to be particularly placing its hopes in a strategic strike campaign against Russian oil. Ukraine’s attempts to disable Russian oil production and refining have dovetailed with ever more aggressive sanctions from the United States against Russian fossil fuel exports – although it is worth noting that the limited price response to these sanctions indicates that markets expect that Russian oil will continue to flow.

    Trump’s suggestion that Tomahawks may be on the table for Ukraine must be seen as a constituent element of this new strategy and theory of victory. And this, ultimately, is very important to understand. Tomahawks are not being bandied about because anybody (in Kiev or Washington) believes that 50 cruise missiles will allow Ukraine to defeat the Russian Army and recapture the Donbas. Tomahawks were mentioned because the Ukrainian alliance is threatening to cripple the Russian fossil fuels industry (through a mixture of sanctions and kinetic strikes on production facilities) unless Putin agrees to a ceasefire.

    This is why it is wrong to be surprised that Trump abruptly cancelled his meeting with Putin and instead announced more sanctions. There’s nothing abrupt or erratic about this. Threats to Russian oil are now, without exaggeration, the main lever that the Ukrainian bloc has against Russia. It certainly should not have been a surprise that the Kremlin, which has reiterated the same fundamental war aims since day one, was not excited about coming to Budapest to freeze the conflict, and neither should it surprise us that Trump would instead prefer to pull harder on the oil lever. The two powers are playing entirely different games: Russia is slow-walking negotiations while it advances on the ground, and the United States is playing a pain game designed to raise the costs for Russia

    We have fundamentally reached an impasse when it comes to negotiations. For Moscow, negotiations with the United States are essentially a way to string Washington along. Moscow feels that it is winning on the ground, therefore a diplomatic impasse suits Russian interests. When western leadership complains that Russia does not seem interested in ending the war, they are correct, but they are missing the point. Russia is not interested in ending the war right now because doing so would not serve Russian interests. The Banana is in the crosshairs, and a ceasefire now would be an egregious compromise when victory on the ground is in sight.

    The sense of urgency that Washington feels to end the war – mainly by yanking furiously on the oil lever until the Kremlin cries uncle – stems from the fact that this is now the only sort of victory that Ukraine can hope to win. The ground war has been written off as a total loss, and all that remains is to lob missiles and drones at Russian refineries, sanction Russian firms and banks, and harass shadow tankers until the costs become intolerable. The longer the Ukrainian ground forces can hold the line the better, but this is merely a matter of limiting the downside. The fact that Russia can retaliate disproportionately against Ukraine barely factors into this thinking.

    The key point here, however, is that the concept of Ukrainian victory has been completely transformed. There is now no real discussion of how Ukraine can win on the ground. For the Ukrainian bloc, the war is no longer a contest against the Russian Army, but a more abstract contest against Russia’s willingness to incur strategic costs. Rather than preventing Russian capture of the Donbas, the west is testing how much Putin is willing to pay for it. If history is any guide, a game predicated on outlasting Russia’s strategic endurance and willingness to fight is a very bad game to play indeed [end]

    The original article

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    Russian soldiers are fighting the enemy, slowly but surely moving forward. However, the war is not only being waged on the front lines – the enemy is also active in the rear, recruiting teenagers and organizing sabotage.

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    Once upon a time in Cherkasy – RYBAR 65

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in Aleksandro-Kalinovo – RYBAR 64

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in Novohryhorivka – RYBAR 63

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time near Hnativka – RYBAR 62

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in Mala Tokmachka – RYBAR 61

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in the borderland – RYBAR 60

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time near Filiya – RYBAR 59

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in Pavlohrad – RYBAR 58

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in the Serebryanskyi forest – RYBAR 56

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time on the AFU’s positions – RYBAR 55

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in Voronezh – RYBAR 54

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in a tank brigade – RYBAR 53

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in Toretsk – RYBAR 52

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time near Tykhe – RYBAR 51

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time near Skudne – RYBAR 50

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time near Staromayorske – RYBAR 49

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in the basements – RYBAR 48

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in the gray zone – RYBAR 47

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in the flow – RYBAR 46

    adventures in country-404

    Once on the Platform – RYBAR 45

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, on the way home – RYBAR 44

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Ukrainsk – RYBAR 43

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in hard times – RYBAR 42

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, it couldn’t be otherwise – RYBAR 41

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Vesyoloye – RYBAR 40

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in Trudovoe – RYBAR 39

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Kurakhove – RYBAR 38

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Vuhledar – RYBAR 37

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in captivity – RYBAR 36

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in Poltava – RYBAR 35

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in Krasnohorivka – RYBAR 34

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in Verkhnya Syrovatka – RYBAR 33

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in Pervomais’ke – RYBAR 32

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, while fleeing from the 404 country – RYBAR 31

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, at sea – RYBAR 30

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, on that very street – RYBAR 29

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, during a surrender – RYBAR 28

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Artemivka – RYBAR 27

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Umanske – RYBAR 26

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Novoselivka Persha – RYBAR 25

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Ostroverkhivka – RYBAR 24

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Krasnohorivka – RYBAR 23

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Chasiv Yar – RYBAR 22

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in Kharkiw – RYBAR 21

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in Spain – RYBAR 20

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, on the election day – RYBAR 19

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near Berdychi – RYBAR 18

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near Kostyantynivka – RYBAR 17

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Oleshky – RYBAR 16

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, on February 24 – RYBAR 15

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near Bakhmut – RYBAR 14

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near Robotyne – RYBAR 13

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near Kreminna – RYBAR 12

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Lugansk – RYBAR 11

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Krynky – RYBAR 10

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Mar’inka – RYBAR 9

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Avdiivka – RYBAR 8

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Nova Kakhovka – RYBAR 7

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in the Azovets camp – RYBAR 6

    adventures in country -404

    Once upon a time, in Klishchiivka – RYBAR 5

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near the Russia-Ukraine border – RYBAR 4

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near Novodarivka – RYBAR 3

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, on Independence Day in country 404 – RYBAR 2

    the tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Urozhaine – RYBAR 1

    A tale of a failed counter-attack

  • [Sharing] Once upon a time in the Serebryanskyi forest – RYBAR 56

    adventures in country-404

    Serebryanskyi Forest, July 2025. Here, among the century-old pines, brutal battles have raged for the third year in a row. Every meter of forest is stitched with lead, the earth torn open by craters, the air soaked with gunpowder.

    A signalman with the call sign Tishina receives a dangerous mission – restore a severed frontline communications line. Without it, positions go blind: artillery falls silent, the wounded are left without help, orders vanish into the ether. Here, every broken wire means a life.

    Setting off, Tishina is ready to risk his own. But he doesn’t yet know the forest has three unexpected encounters in store for him…


    ©️ RYBAR

    Related

    Five to One – RYBAR 83

    a reward shared by all

    Autumn near Bakhmut – RYBAR 82

    the balance between command and trust

    Ribbon on the Helmet – RYBAR 81

    how one symbol divided us and them

    The Grey Sky of Hostomel – RYBAR 80

    the way to our guys through fire and smoke

    Half a Meter from Death – RYBAR 79

    under the sights of an enemy drone

    We Don’t Abandon Our Own – RYBAR 78

    battle for Snake Island

    Easter Ceasefire – RYBAR 77

    silence regime or dangerous mercy

    The Road Back – RYBAR 76

    don’t give up your own and return home

    Survive Underground – RYBAR 75

    rescue at the risk of life

    Life on the Front Lines – RYBAR 74

    the moment that divides into before and after

    The Price of Life – RYBAR 73

    the only chance for survival

    Combat Cheburashka – RYBAR 72

    the story of a toy

    Call Sign Yan – RYBAR 71

    loyalty that cost a life

    Once upon a time between the lines – RYBAR 70

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time near Stepnohirsk – RYBAR 69

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in Varvarovka – RYBAR 68

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in Pokrovsk – RYBAR 67

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time near Kostyantynivka – RYBAR 66

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in Cherkasy – RYBAR 65

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in Aleksandro-Kalinovo – RYBAR 64

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in Novohryhorivka – RYBAR 63

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time near Hnativka – RYBAR 62

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in Mala Tokmachka – RYBAR 61

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in the borderland – RYBAR 60

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time near Filiya – RYBAR 59

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in Pavlohrad – RYBAR 58

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in Crimea – RYBAR 57

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time on the AFU’s positions – RYBAR 55

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in Voronezh – RYBAR 54

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in a tank brigade – RYBAR 53

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in Toretsk – RYBAR 52

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time near Tykhe – RYBAR 51

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time near Skudne – RYBAR 50

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time near Staromayorske – RYBAR 49

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in the basements – RYBAR 48

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in the gray zone – RYBAR 47

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in the flow – RYBAR 46

    adventures in country-404

    Once on the Platform – RYBAR 45

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, on the way home – RYBAR 44

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Ukrainsk – RYBAR 43

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in hard times – RYBAR 42

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, it couldn’t be otherwise – RYBAR 41

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Vesyoloye – RYBAR 40

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in Trudovoe – RYBAR 39

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Kurakhove – RYBAR 38

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Vuhledar – RYBAR 37

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in captivity – RYBAR 36

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in Poltava – RYBAR 35

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in Krasnohorivka – RYBAR 34

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in Verkhnya Syrovatka – RYBAR 33

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in Pervomais’ke – RYBAR 32

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, while fleeing from the 404 country – RYBAR 31

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, at sea – RYBAR 30

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, on that very street – RYBAR 29

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, during a surrender – RYBAR 28

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Artemivka – RYBAR 27

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Umanske – RYBAR 26

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Novoselivka Persha – RYBAR 25

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Ostroverkhivka – RYBAR 24

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Krasnohorivka – RYBAR 23

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Chasiv Yar – RYBAR 22

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in Kharkiw – RYBAR 21

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in Spain – RYBAR 20

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, on the election day – RYBAR 19

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near Berdychi – RYBAR 18

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near Kostyantynivka – RYBAR 17

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Oleshky – RYBAR 16

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, on February 24 – RYBAR 15

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near Bakhmut – RYBAR 14

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near Robotyne – RYBAR 13

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near Kreminna – RYBAR 12

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Lugansk – RYBAR 11

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Krynky – RYBAR 10

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Mar’inka – RYBAR 9

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Avdiivka – RYBAR 8

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Nova Kakhovka – RYBAR 7

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in the Azovets camp – RYBAR 6

    adventures in country -404

    Once upon a time, in Klishchiivka – RYBAR 5

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near the Russia-Ukraine border – RYBAR 4

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near Novodarivka – RYBAR 3

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, on Independence Day in country 404 – RYBAR 2

    the tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Urozhaine – RYBAR 1

    A tale of a failed counter-attack

  • [Traduction] Le neveu de l’ancien Premier ministre croate tué sur le champ de bataille ukrainien – M. Jurić, Hercegovina.info

    Antonio Toni Herceg était un membre de l’armée française

    Antonio Toni Herceg, fils du scientifique Zdenko Herceg et neveu de l’ancien Premier ministre du comté d’Herzégovine-Neretva, Nevenko Herceg, a été tué le 6 mai 2025 sur le champ de bataille dans l’est de l’Ukraine. La nouvelle a été rapportée par le portail Mostar.live, citant une source proche de la famille.

    Toni Herceg, issu d’une importante famille herzégovine installée à Lyon, en France, depuis les années de guerre en Bosnie-Herzégovine, était un soldat professionnel dans l’armée française. On ne précise pas s’il s’agit de la Légion étrangère, mais on sait qu’il a ensuite rejoint la 3e brigade d’assaut de l’armée ukrainienne

    Selon les informations publiées par l’ancien officier de renseignement français Nicolas Cinquini, Herceg a été tué lors des combats dans la région de Lougansk. Cinquini, connu pour sa rhétorique pro-russe, affirme qu’il s’agit d’une « contre-attaque futile » et qualifie la brigade de « ramification d’Azov » – une affirmation qui n’a pas été confirmée par des sources indépendantes. Ni les institutions de Bosnie-Herzégovine ni l’armée française n’ont encore publié de déclarations officielles

    Qui sont les combattants de la 3e brigade d’assaut ?

    La 3e brigade d’assaut distincte des forces armées ukrainiennes a été créée en 2022 dans le cadre d’une réorganisation plus large des unités de volontaires en une armée régulière. La brigade est devenue célèbre pour son rôle dans les batailles les plus intenses – de Bakhmut et Avdijivka à la région de Louhansk. Ses membres sont formés au combat urbain, au nettoyage des tranchées et aux manœuvres rapides en première ligne.

    Bien que formellement sous le commandement de l’armée ukrainienne, la brigade a hérité d’une partie de la structure et du personnel du bataillon Azov, qui est devenu une partie de la Garde nationale. En raison de ce lien, notamment dans la propagande russe, la brigade est souvent qualifiée de « nazie », bien qu’en Ukraine et parmi ses alliés, elle jouisse de la réputation d’une unité offensive d’élite.

    La brigade est dirigée par Andriy Biletsky, l’ancien commandant d’Azov, connu pour ses opinions nationalistes.

    De plus en plus de combattants étrangers en Ukraine

    Depuis le début de l’invasion, l’Ukraine a ouvertement appelé des volontaires étrangers à se joindre à elle pour défendre son territoire. Parmi les milliers de combattants étrangers qui ont rejoint la Légion internationale de défense de l’Ukraine, on a également recensé un certain nombre de citoyens français, dont d’anciens militaires et membres des forces spéciales.

    La France n’a pas officiellement déployé de troupes en Ukraine, mais le président Emmanuel Macron n’exclut pas la possibilité d’envoyer des instructeurs et des conseillers militaires, ce qui a suscité de vifs débats politiques au sein de l’UE et de l’OTAN

    Les volontaires français rejoignent le plus souvent des unités d’élite ukrainiennes, comme la 3e brigade d’assaut, mais l’État français ne les reconnaît pas officiellement comme ses soldats, et ne commente donc pas leur décès [fin]

    L’article original

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  • [Sharing] Total Kievan Debellation – Big Serge

    The Russo-Ukrainian War: Year 3

    On March 5, 2022, the wreck of the sailing ship Endurance was found in the depths of the Weddell Sea off the coast of Antarctica. This, of course, was the vessel lost in Ernest Shackelton’s third expedition to Antarctica, which became trapped in the ice and sank in 1915. The story of that expedition is an extraordinary tale of human fortitude – with the Endurance lost to the ice, Shackleton’s crew evacuated to a loose ice flow where they camped for nearly 500 days, drifting about the Antarctic seas, before making a desperate dash across the open ocean in an open 20 foot lifeboat, finally reaching the southern shore of inhospitable and mountainous South Georgia Island, which they then had to cross on foot to reach the safety of a whaling station.

    The story itself has an essentially mythic quality to it, with Shackleton’s crew surviving for years on free floating ice floes in the most inhospitable seas on earth. For our purposes, however, it is the story’s coda that is particularly interesting. In Shackleton’s memoirs, he remembered that, upon finally reaching the safety of the Stromness whaling station, one of his first questions was about the war in Europe. When Shackleton first set out on his ill-fated expedition on August 8, 1914, the First World War was less than a week old, and the German Army had just begun its invasion of Belgium. There was little expectation then that the war would proceed as it did, unleashing four years of slaughterous positional warfare that engulfed the continent.

    Shackleton, having been adrift at sea for years, clearly did not imagine that the war could still be raging, and asked the commandant of the whaling station “tell me, when was the war over?”

    The answer came back: “The war is not over. Millions are being killed. Europe is mad. The world is mad.”

    The timing is serendipitous, since the discovery of the Endurance’s wreck, after more than a hundred years, happened to occur only a few weeks after the world again went mad, with the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian War in February 2022. As time continues its inexorable march and the calendar turns yet again, the war is passing through its third full winter. In February, Z-World will be three years old.

    Of course, modern communications make it extremely unlikely that anybody could be cut fully out of the loop for years at a time, like Shackleton and his men. Instead of being ignorant as to whether or not the war is over, many of us are exposed on a daily basis to footage of men being killed, buildings being blown up, and vehicles being shredded. Twitter has made it essentially impossible to live under a rock, or on an ice floe, as it were.

    If anything, we have the very opposite problem of Shackleton – at least as far as our wartime information infrastructure goes. We are saturated in information, with daily updates tracking advances of a few dozen meters and never ending bombast about new game changing weapons (which seem to change very little), and bluster about “red lines”. This war seems to have an unyielding dynamic on the ground, and no matter how many grand pronouncements we hear that one side or the other is on the verge of collapse, the sprawling front continues to grind up bodies and congeal with bloody positional fighting.

    It would seem difficult to believe that a high intensity ground war in Europe with hundreds of miles worth of front could be boring, yet the static and repetitive nature of the conflict is struggling to hold the attention of foreign observers who have little immediately at stake.

    My intention here is a radical zoom-out from these demoralizing and fatiguing small scale updates (as valuable as the work of the war mappers is), and consider the aggregate of 2024 – arguing that this year was, in fact, very consequential. Taken as a whole, three very important things happened in 2024 which create a very dismal outlook for Ukraine and the AFU in the new year. More specifically, 2024 brought three important strategic developments:

    1. Russian victory in southern Donetsk which destroyed the AFU’s position on one of the war’s key strategic axes.
    2. The expenditure of carefully husbanded Ukrainian resources on a failed offensive towards Kursk, which accelerated the attrition of critical Ukrainian maneuver assets and substantially dampened their prospects in the Donbas.
    3. The exhaustion of Ukraine’s ability to escalate vis a vis new strike systems from NATO – more broadly, the west has largely run out of options to upgrade Ukrainian capabilities, and the much vaunted delivery of longer range strike systems failed to alter the trajectory of the war on the ground.

    Taken together, 2024 revealed a Ukrainian military that is increasingly stretched to the limits, to the point where the Russians were able to largely scratch off an entire sector of front. People continue to wonder where and when the Ukrainian front might begin to break down – I would argue that it *did* break down in the south over the last few months, and 2025 begins with strong Russian momentum that the AFU will be hard pressed to arrest.

    Front Collapse in South Donetsk

    What stands out immediately about the operational developments in 2024 is the marked shift of energies away from the axes of combat that had seen the most intense fighting in the first two years of the war. In a sense, this war has seen each of its fronts activate in a sequence, one after the other.

    After the opening Russian offensive, which boasted as its signature success the capture of the Azov coastline and the linkup of Donetsk and Crimea, the action shifted to the northern front (the Lugansk-Kharkov axis), with Russia fighting a summer offensive which captured Severodonetsk and Lysychansk. This was followed by a pair of Ukrainian counteroffensives in the fall, with a thrust out of Kharkov which pushed the front back over the Oskil, and an operation directed at Kherson which failed to breach Russian defenses but ultimately resulted in a Russian withdrawal in good order over the Dnieper due to concerns over logistical connectivity and an over-extended front. Energies then pivoted yet again to the Central Donbas axis, with the enormous battle around Bakhmut raging through the spring of 2023. This was followed by the failed Ukrainian offensive on Russia’s defenses in Zaporozhia, in the south.

    Just to briefly recapitulate this, we can enumerate several operational phases in the first two years of the war, occurring in sequence and each with a center of gravity in different parts of the front:

    • A Russian offensive across the land bridge, culminating in the capture of Mariupol. (Winter-Spring 2022, Southern Front)
    • A Russian offensive in Lugansk, capturing Severodonetsk and Lysychansk. (Summer 2022, Donets-Oskil front)
    • Ukrainian Counteroffensives towards the Oskil and Kherson (Autumn 2022, Oskil and Dnieper fronts)
    • The Russian assault on Bakhmut (Winter-Spring 2023, Central Front)
    • Ukrainian counteroffensive on the land bridge (Summer 2023)

    Amid all of this, the front that saw the least movement was the southeastern corner of the front, around Donetsk. This was somewhat peculiar. Donetsk is the urban heart of the Donbas – a vast and populous industrial city at the center of a sprawling conurbation, once home to some 2 million people. Even if Russia succeeds in capturing the city of Zaporizhia, Donetsk will be by far the most populous of Ukraine’s former cities to come under Moscow’s control.

    In 2014, with the outbreak of the proto-Donbas war, Donetsk was the locus of much of the fighting, with the airport on the city’s northern approach the scene of particularly intense combat. This made it rather strange, then, that at the start of 2024 the Ukrainian Army continued to occupy many of the same positions that they built a decade prior. As intense fighting ebbed and flowed along other sectors of front, Donetsk remained besieged by a web of powerfully held Ukrainian defenses, anchored by heavily fortified urban areas stretching from Toretsk to Ugledar. Early Russian attempts to crack this iron ring open, including an assault on Ugledar in the winter of 2023, met with failure.

    The signature operational development of 2024, then, was the re-activation of the Donetsk front, after years of static combat. It is not an exaggeration to say that after years of coagulation, the Russian Army cracked this front wide open in 2024 and Ukraine’s long and strongly held network of urban strongpoints collapsed

    Russian Progress on the Donetsk Axis in 2024

    The year began with the AFU fighting for its fortress in Avdiivka, where it continued to block the northern approach to Donetsk. At the time, the typical argument that one heard from the Ukrainian side was that the Russian assault on Avdiivka was pyrrhic – that the Russians were capturing the city with exorbitantly costly “meat assaults” that would inevitably sap Russian combat power and exhaust their ability to continue the offensive.

    With the full measure of the year behind us, we can definitively say that this is not the case. After the fall of Avdiivka, Russian momentum never seriously slackened, and in fact it was the AFU that appeared to be increasingly exhausted. The Ukrainian breakwater position at Ocheretyne (which had previously been their staging point for counterattacks around Avdiivka) was overrun in a matter of days, and by the early summer the frontline had been pushed out towards the approach to Pokrovsk.

    The Russian thrust towards Pokrovsk led many to believe that this city was itself the object of Russian energies, but this was a misread of the operational design. Russia did not need to capture Pokrovsk in 2024 to render it sterile as a logistical hub. Simply by advancing towards the E50 highway, Russian forces were able to cut off Pokrovsk from Ukrainian positions to the south on the Donetsk front, and Pokvrovsk is now a frontline city subject to the full spectrum of overwatch from Russian drones and tube artillery.

    By autumn, the Russian advance had put the Ukrainians in a severe salient, creating an unstable chain of positions in Selydove, Kurakhove, Ugledar, and Krasnogorivka. Russia’s advance from Ocheretyne onto the southern approach to Pokrovsk acted like an enormous scythe, isolating the entire southeastern sector of the front and allowing Russian forces to carve through it in the closing months of the year

    Russian Operations in 2024, Donetsk Axis

    This war has turned the word “collapse” into a devalued buzzword. We are told repeatedly that one side or the other is on the verge of collapse: sanctions will “collapse” the Russian economy, the Wagner uprising of 2023 proved that the Russian political system was “collapsing”, and of course we hear that exorbitant losses have one army or the other on the verge of total failure – which army that may be depends on who you ask.

    I would argue, however, that what we saw from October 2024 onward represents a real occurrence of this oft-repeated and discarded word. The AFU suffered a genuine collapse of the southeastern front, with the forces positioned in their strongpoints too attrited and isolated to make a determined defense, Russian fires becoming too heavily concentrated in ever more compressed areas to endure, and no mechanized reserve in the theater available to counterattack or relieve the incessant Russian pressure.

    Ukraine does maintain enough drones and concentrated fires to limit a full Russian exploitation – that is, Russia is still not able to maneuver at depth. This gave the Russian advance a particular stop-start quality, leapfrogging from one settlement and fortress to the other. More generally, Russia’s preference to use dispersed small-unit assaults limits the potential for exploitation. We have to emphasize, however, that Russian momentum on this axis has never seriously slackened since October, and many of the key Ukrainian positions were overrun or abandoned very quickly

    Ugledar is a good example: the Russians began their final push toward the town on September 24. By September 29, the 72nd Mechanized Brigade began evacuating. By October 1, Ugledar was fully under Russian control. This was a keystone Ukrainian position put in a completely untenable position and it went down in a week. One could argue, of course, that Ugledar held out for years (how then can we say with a straight face that it was captured in a week), but this is precisely the point. In early 2023 Ugledar (with the help of artillery stationed around Kurakhove) successfully repelled a multi-brigade Russian attack in months of heavy fighting. By October 2024, the position was completely untenable and was abandoned almost immediately when attacked.

    The Ukrainians did no better trying to hold Kurakhove – previously a critical rear area that served as both a logistical hub and a base of fire for supporting (former) frontline strongpoints like Ugledar and Krasnogorivka. Kurakhove, now under full Russian control, will in turn serve as a base of support for the ongoing Russian push to the west towards Andriivka.

    Taking the state of the front holistically, the AFU is currently holding two severe salients at the southernmost end of the line – one around Velyka Novosilka, and another around Andriivka. The former is likely to fall first, as the town has been fully isolated by Russian advances on the flanks. This is not a Bakhmut-like situation, where roads are described as “cut” because they are under Russian fire – in this case, all of the highways into Velyka Novosilka are cut by physical Russian blocking positions, making the loss of the position only a matter of waiting for the Russians to assault it. Further north, a more gentle and less strongly held salient exists between Grodivka and Toretsk. With Toretsk now in the final stages of capture (Ukrainian forces now hold only a small residential neighborhood on the city’s outskirts), the front should level here as well in the coming months.

    This leaves the Russians more or less in full control of the approaches to Kostyantinivka and Pokrovsk, which are in many ways the penultimate Ukrainian held positions in Donetsk. Pokrovsk has already been bypassed several miles to the west, and the map portends a re-run of the typical Russian tactical methodology for assaulting urban areas – a methodical advance along the wings of the city to isolate it from arterial highways, followed by an attack on the city itself via several axes

    The coming months promise continued Russian advances across this front, in a continuation of what can only be regarded as the collapse of a critical front on the part of the AFU. The Russian Army is advancing to the western border of Donetsk oblast and will ferret the Ukrainians out of their remaining strongpoints at Velyka Novosilka and Andriivka, while pushing into the belly of Pokrovsk. At no point since the fall of Avdiivka have the Ukrainians demonstrated the ability to seriously stymie Russian momentum along this 75 mile front, and the ongoing dissipation of Ukrainian combat resources indicates that little will change in this regard in 2025.

    Toehold: The Incredible Shrinking Kursk Salient

    Throughout the autumn of 2024 and these early months of winter, as Ukrainian forces were dug out of their dense web of fortified positions in the southern Donbas, their comrades continued to stubbornly hold on to their position in Russia’s Kursk Oblast. The basic shape of Ukraine’s offensive into Kursk is by now well known – billed by Kiev as a gambit to change the psychological trajectory of the war and strike a prestige blow to Russia, the Ukrainian attack had early momentum after achieving initial strategic surprise, but quickly faltered after Ukrainian columns ran into effective Russian blocking positions on the highways out of Sudzha. Efforts to force the roads through Korenovo and Bolshoe Soldatskoe were defeated, and the Ukrainian grouping was left holding on to a modest salient around Sudzha, jutting out into Russia.

    Throughout the autumn, Russian counterattacks have focused on chiseling away at the base of the Ukrainian salient – forcing the Ukrainians out of Snagost and pushing them away from Korenovo. The progress here has been incremental, but significant, and by the start of January the “neck” of the Ukrainian salient had been compressed down to a little over nine miles wide, after their initial penetration in the summer had forced a breach of over twenty miles. All told, Ukraine has lost about 50% of the territory that they grabbed in August.

    The Russian pressure on the flanks of the salient have amplified many of the qualities that make this position wasteful and dangerous for the AFU. There is limited road connectivity for Ukrainian forces – a problem amplified by the rollback from Snagost, which cost them access to the highway running from Korenovo to Sumy. Apart from a few circuitous side roads, Ukrainian forces only have a single highway – the R200 route – to run material and reinforcements into the pocket, which allows Russian forces to surveil their lines of communication and conduct effective interdiction strikes. The compression of the pocket also greatly narrows the targeting area for Russian drones, tube artillery, and rocketry, and creates more condensed and saturating bombardment

    Despite the fact that this position has been profoundly unproductive for Ukraine – being steadily rolled back and having no synergy with other, more critical theaters – the same grouping of Ukrainian units remain here, fighting in a steadily more compressed space. Even more baffling, the Ukrainian grouping consists largely of premiere assets – Mechanized and Air Assault brigades – that could have contributed meaningfully as a reserve in the Donbas over the last three months.

    On January 5, there was a surprise in the form of a renewed Ukrainian attack out of the salient. The internet of course jumped to the conclusion that the AFU was going back over to some sort of general offensive posture in Kursk, but the reality was very underwhelming – something like a battalion sized assault up the axis towards Bolshoe Soldaskoe, which got a few kilometers up the road before it ran out of steam. Ukrainian efforts to jam Russian drones were stymied by the increasing ubiquity of fiber-optic systems, and the Ukrainian attack collapsed within a day

    Kursk Salient – General Situation, January 2025

    The tactical particulars of the Ukrainian attack are interesting, and there’s ongoing speculation as to its purpose – perhaps it was intended to cover a rotation or withdrawal, to improve tactical positions on the northern edge of the salient, or for inscrutable propaganda purposes. However, these specifics are rather unimportant: attacking out the end of the salient (that is, trying to deepen the penetration into Russia) does nothing to reverse Ukraine’s problems in Kursk. These problems are first, on the tactical level, that the salient has been greatly compressed on the flanks and continues to narrow, and on the strategic level the willful expenditure of valuable mechanized assets on a front that does not impact the critical theaters of the war. More simply, Kursk is a sideshow, and it is a sideshow that has gone wrong even within its own operational logic.

    One thing that has been of endless interest, of course, have been the continued rumors of North Korean troops fighting in Kursk. Western intelligence agencies have been adamant about the presence of North Koreans in Kursk. Some people are predisposed to instinctively disbelieve everything that western officialdom says – while I think some skepticism is warranted, I do not automatically assume that they are lying. One recent report lays out what would seem to be a plausible version of this story: that the idea actually originated in Pyongyang, not Moscow, and that a modest number of Korean troops (perhaps 10,000) are embedded with Russian units. The presumption here is that the Koreans hatched the idea as a way to gain combat experience, with the Russians in turn getting auxiliary forces, though of questionable combat effectiveness.

    However, it is worth noting that this is not nearly as important as it has been made out to be. Much has been made of the idea that the North Korean presence proves some sort of Russian state of desperation, but this is fairly silly on its face – with more than 1.5 million active personnel in the Russian military, 10,000 Korean troops in Kursk represents a paltry appendage. More importantly, there has been an attempt to portray the North Korean contingent as a major departure point in the war. In particular, the formulation “North Korean troops in Europe” has been used to conjure cold war imagery of communist despotism clawing at the free world

    The point, however, is that North Korean troops are presumed specifically to be in Kursk, which is in Russia. This is linked, of course, to the recently concluded mutual defense agreement signed between Moscow and Pyongyang. By attacking into Kursk – widening the front into prewar Russian territory – Ukraine created a defensive combat task for Russia which triggers the possibility of military assistance from North Korea. However much one may wish to link the Korean contingent to Russia’s dreaded “war of aggression”, the force in Kursk is very objectively engaged in the defense of Russian territory, and that makes it possible for Russia to use auxiliary forces – including conscripts and the troops of its allies – to fight there.

    Ultimately, then, the presence of North Koreans in Kursk is interesting, but perhaps not very important after all. These troops are not in Ukraine (even under the most maximal definition of the Ukrainian territorial unit), they are not carrying the primary combat load, and they are unequivocally not the problem that the AFU is facing in Kursk. The “big problem” for Ukraine, very simply, is not the presence of some amorphous Korean horde dedicated to spreading Glorious Juche to Europe – it is the loitering of large grouping of their own precious mechanized brigades in a compressed salient, far far away from the Donbas, where they are greatly needed.

    Scraping the Barrel: AFU Force Generation

    I think it is well understood, of course, that Ukraine faces severe manpower constraints relative to Russia, both in terms of the raw totals of male biomass available – with roughly 35 million fighting aged males in Russia against perhaps 9 million in prewar Ukraine – but also in terms of its capacity to mobilize them.

    Ukraine’s mobilization scheme is hampered by both widespread draft evasion (with willingness to serve decreasing as the war has stretched on) and a stubborn unwillingness to draft younger men, aged 18-25. Ukraine is structurally burdened with a deeply imbalanced population structure: there are roughly 60% more Ukrainian men in their 30’s than in their 20’s. Given the relative scarcity of young men, particularly in their early 20’s, the Ukrainian government rightly views this 18-25 year old cohort as a premium demographic cohort that it is loathe to burn away in combat. Given the ubiquity of draft evasion, the refusal to mobilize younger males, and the corruption and inefficiency characteristic of the Ukrainian government, it should come as no surprise when Ukrainian mobilization falters

    Russia, in contrast, has both a much larger pool of potential recruits and a more efficient apparatus for mobilization. In contrast to Ukraine’s scheme of compulsory conscription, Russia has relied on generous sign-on bonuses to solicit volunteers. Russia’s incentive system, to this point, has provided a steady stream of enlistments that has been more than enough to offset Russian losses. Without going too far into the various speculative estimates of Russian casualties, it is widely acknowledged by western military leadership that Russia has significantly more personnel now than it did at the start of the war.

    All of that is to say: Ukraine faces a severe structural disadvantage in military manpower in the aggregate, which is exacerbated by the idiosyncrasies of the Ukrainian mobilization law, ameliorated slightly by the relatively low troop densities and the preponderant power of strike systems in this war.

    The argument that I want to make here, however, is that Ukraine’s systemic problems matching Russian manpower have been exacerbated by several developments which specifically became prominent in 2024. In other words, 2024 can and should be marked as the year where Ukrainian manpower constraints became markedly and perhaps irretrievably worse due to specific decisions made in Kiev, and particular developments on the ground.

    These are as follows:

    1. The decision to expand the AFU’s force structure through the creation of the “15 series” brigades
    2. The decision to deliberately widen the front and create additional demands for manpower by launching the incursion into Kursk
    3. The stall out of Ukraine’s new mobilization program in the autumn
    4. Accelerating problems with desertion in the AFU

    We’ll run through these in order.

    An army that is intaking new personnel has to decide between two possible allocations for them. New personnel can be used as replacements to replenish existing frontline units, or they can be used to expand the force structure by creating new units. That much seems fairly obvious, and ideally mobilization will exceed losses and make it possible to do both. Where armies face hard manpower constraints, however – that is, where losses are equal to or greater than intake of men, the decision to expand the force structure can have monumental consequences. The stereotypical example, of course, would be the late-war Wehrmacht, which created premiere new assets in the form of Waffen SS divisions, which received privileged access to recruits and equipment while regular army divisions in the line suffered from a trickle of replacements which could not keep up with losses.

    Ukraine, with its garbled force structure, has created a mess through its own attempts to expand its force structure in the face of dwindling strength on the line. Late in 2023, the AFU announced intentions to form an entirely new grouping of brigades – the so-called “15 series”, given their designations as the 150th, 151st, 152nd, 153rd, and 154th Mechanized Brigades. This was followed in 2024 with the appending of the 155th Mechanized Brigade, which was to be trained and equipped in France.

    Forming a new grouping of mechanized brigades is essential to the way that Ukraine is presenting its war. Because Ukraine still aims (at least on paper) to recapture all of its Russian held territory, there must always be the illusory possibility of a future offensive, and in order for that illusory possibility to remain, Ukraine must present itself as actively preparing for future offensive operations. Ukraine’s presentation of its own strategic animus – the idea that it is holding the front while it prepares to go back on the offensive – essentially locks it into a program of expanding its force structure

    The problem for Ukraine is that the immense pressure on the front makes it essentially impossible for them to properly husband resources the way they would like. Properly training and equipping half a dozen fresh mechanized brigades and holding them in reserve would be very helpful, but they cannot really do this in light of the demands for personnel at the front. These brigades instead become “paper formations” that have a bureaucratic existence, while their organic assets are pulled apart and sucked into the front – stripped down into battalion or company sized elements that can be plugged into sectors of need on the frontline. At the moment, none of the 15 series brigades have seen action as organic units – that is, fighting as themselves.

    The French-trained 155th brigade forms a useful example. Originally designed as an overweight formation of some 5800 men, equipped with premiere European equipment, the brigade was hemorrhaging personnel from the start, with Ukrainian sources reporting that some 1700 men – many of them forcibly conscripted off the streets of Ukraine – deserted the unit during training and formation. A collapse in the brigade’s leadership – with its commander resigning – made matters even more complicated, and the formation’s first action around Pokrovsk went badly. Now, the brigade is being dismembered, if not formally disbanded, with personnel and vehicles being stripped down and parceled out to bolster neighbor units.

    The decision to allocate personnel to new mechanized brigades (though given stocks of armored vehicles it is questionable whether those designations mean anything) does not necessarily change Ukraine’s manpower balance in the aggregate, but it is certainly an inefficient way to use personnel. To return again to the 155th brigade, one problem noted by Ukrainian analysts was the fact that much of the brigade was formed whole cloth from forcibly mobilized personnel, without a proper cadre of veterans and experienced NCOs – some 75% of the brigade, it turns out, had been mobilized less than two months before arriving in France for training. This fact was certainly instrumental in the mass desertions and the brigade’s poor combat effectiveness.

    Given Ukraine’s constraints, the best course of action would undoubtedly be to allocate new personnel and equipment as replacements to build out the depleted veteran brigades on the front lines, plugging in replacements around existing veterans and officers. Kiev, however, prizes the prestige that comes from force expansion and the “shiny new toy” factor of new formations equipped with scarce and valuable equipment like Leopard tanks. These new brigades, though billed as premiere assets, clearly have lower combat effectiveness than existing formations, given their lack of experience, shortage of veteran officers, and low unit cohesion.

    The simple reality, however, is that replacements for existing brigades are nowhere close to keeping up with burn rates. Frontline units have complained of increasingly dire infantry shortages for months, with some brigades on the Pokrovsk axis reporting that they are down to less than 40% of their allocated infantry complements.

    In short, Ukraine’s decision to embark on force expansion in the face of significant manpower shortages has exacerbated the problem – both starving veteran units of replacements and concentrating newly mobilized personnel into combat ineffective formations that lack a veteran core, experienced officers, and vital equipment. They have tried, belatedly, to square this circle by parceling out new formations to backstop line brigades, but this is less than ideal – it leads to a patchwork order of battle with lower unit cohesion and a fragmented defense.

    Unfortunately, this comes precisely as Ukraine has created additional self-imposed strains on its resources, in particular through its incursion into Kursk. At the moment, elements of at least seven mechanized brigades, two marine infantry brigades, and three air assault brigades are stationed on the Kursk axis. Without going too far into the weeds rehashing Ukraine’s operation here, it’s important to remember that Ukraine – facing extreme pressures on its force generation – voluntarily chose to widen the front into a secondary theater, diverting scarce assets and reducing its own ability to economize forces.

    In summary, Ukraine has made deliberate decisions to widen the front and expand its force structure, both of which have been decidedly detrimental to its efforts to economize personnel. This comes precisely as a 2024 effort to ramp up mobilization has come off the rails.

    Ukraine’s mobilization program suffered from a variety of defects, including gaps and errors in its databases and endemic corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency. Laws passed in 2024 aimed to rectify many of these problems, including through the rollout of an app that would allow draft-eligible men to register and check their status without having to visit recruitment offices. It appeared that matters had come to a head when Zelensky fired several recruitment chiefs in 2023, and there was a real sense of urgency. After some signs of initial promise, it is clear that this intensified mobilization drive has faltered over the autumn and early winter

    There were initially signs of optimism for Ukraine – in the first month after the new mobilization law was passed, there was a surge and the army enlisted 30,000 new personnel. However, by the end of the summer this initial burst of enlistments had faded, and mobilization was again running behind the AFU’s losses. An October briefing from the Ukrainian General Staff confirmed that enlistments had already declined by 40% after the brief surge brought on by the new mobilization law. Around the same time, officials in Odessa (Ukraine’s third largest city) admitted that they were running at only 20% of their mobilization quota.

    The problems are myriad. The new mobilization law led to some initial improvements but has ultimately failed to resolve problems with draft evasion, bureaucratic miscues remain endemic, and employers desperate to retain workers filed an avalanche of employment related draft deferments. Unable to sustain the initial surge of enlistments, Ukraine faces a looming manpower crisis.

    Furthermore, Ukraine’s continued inability to provide either demobilization or timely rotations means that mobilized personnel face the prospect of indefinite service on the frontlines. This is obviously bad for morale, with soldiers contemplating the possibility of years of uninterrupted service, and this in turn drives the desertions that are becoming a mounting problem for the AFU. Some reports indicate that as many as 100,000 Ukrainian troops have deserted by this point, many no doubt driven by the psychological and physical strains of endless combat with no prospect of rotation.

    A deadly feedback loop is now at work, with the lack of rotations and the shortage of replacements synergizing to accelerate the burn of Ukrainian personnel. The AFU is unable to regularly rotate units out of combat, and the inadequate flow of replacements causes frontline infantry complements to wear thin. Unable to rotate or reinforce, line brigades resort to cannibalization – scraping support personnel like mortar teams, drivers, and drone operators to fill out frontline positions. This further accelerates losses as brigades fight with thinned out support and fires elements, and makes Ukrainian men more unwilling to enlist – because there is now no guarantee that becoming a drone operator, for example, will save one from being sent to a frontline trench eventually.

    Where does this leave us? Ukraine continues to dispose of a very large force, with more than a hundred brigades and hundreds of thousands of men under arms. This force, however, is both substantially outnumbered by the Russian army and in a clear trend of decay. Despite a highly touted attempt to reinvigorate the mobilization apparatus in 2024, the intake of new personnel is clearly too low to offset losses, and the heavy lifting formations in critical sectors of front have seen their strength – particularly in the infantry complements – decline, in some cases to critical levels.

    The failure of Ukraine’s 2024 mobilization program has coincided with several strategic choices which have exacerbated manpower concerns – specifically the decision to embark on a program of force expansion even as the AFU voluntarily extended its commitments by opening a new secondary front in Kursk. In other words, Ukraine’s mobilization falls short of its force requirements, and the AFU has also made choices that sabotaged its ability to economize. Units are ground up, replacements come in a paltry trickle, rotations are late or absent, units cannibalize themselves, and angry and weary men desert.

    It’s not at all clear that this will lead to a “breaking point”, in the sense that people are anticipating. Ukrainian strike capabilities and the Russian preference for dispersed, leapfrogging assaults limit the potential for grand breakthroughs and exploitation. However, what we saw over the past three months on the southern Donetsk axis offers a preview of what awaits: an exhausted force being steadily rolled back, dug out of its strongpoints, and mauled – covering its retreat with drones but losing position after position. The line holds, until it doesn’t.

    End of the Line: ATACMs, JASSMs, and Hazelnuts

    Ukraine’s ability to remain in the field depends on a titration of two indispensable resources: first, Ukrainian male biomass, and secondly the critical western weaponry that gives them combat effectiveness. We have evaluated the first: Ukraine is not exactly out of men, but the trends of its mobilization program are poor and personnel shortages are mounting. The trends regarding the second are, if anything, even more foreboding for Kiev.

    There are two general dynamics that have emerged, neither of which create an optimistic picture for Ukraine, which we’ll examine in turn. These are as follows:

    1. The delivery of heavy weaponry to Ukraine (tanks, IFVs, and artillery tubes) has largely dried up in recent months.
    2. The west has essentially run out of escalatory weaponry (strike systems) to give, and those systems already given have failed to meaningfully altar the trajectory of the war.

    In 2023, building out new mechanized units was the name of the game, with the Pentagon leading a multinational effort to stand up an entire army corps worth of units equipped with Leopards, Challengers, and a whole slew of western IFVs and APCs. When that lovingly assembled grouping bashed its head on a rock in the botched assault on the Zaporizhia line, the United States belatedly and begrudgingly dispatched its own Abrams to backstop the Ukrainian tank force. In 2024, however, deliveries of heavy weapons slowed to a trickle.

    The role of the tank in Ukraine has been greatly misunderstood. The vulnerability of tanks to the myriad strike systems of the modern battlefield led some observers to declare that the tank as a weapons system was now obsolete, but this did not really square with the fact that both combatants in this war were eager to deploy as many as possible. Tanks need more critical enablers – more combat engineering, air defense, and electronic warfare support – but they continue to fill an indispensable role and remain an essential item in this war. The failure of Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive showed, if anything, that tanks simply are not “game changing” systems, but mass consumption items – but this has always been the case. The signature quality of iconic tanks like the Sherman and the T34 was that they were numerous

    Unfortunately for Ukraine, deliveries of tanks have dropped off dramatically after the failures of 2023. America’s drawdowns for Ukraine in 2024 were almost entirely devoid of armored vehicles of any kind. Data from the Kiel Institute, which has been meticulous tracking weaponry commitments and deliveries, confirms a sharp dropoff in heavy weapons in 2024. In 2023, Ukraine’s backers pledged 384 tanks. This dropped to just 98 in 2024 – which explains why the new Ukrainian mechanized brigades are perilously light on the equipment indicative of their designations.

    While 2023 was all about building out Ukraine’s mechanized package with tanks, IFVs, and engineering, 2024 has been largely about enhancing Ukraine’s strike capabilities. There have been two separate elements at play – first, the delivery of both air and ground launched systems (most notably the British Storm Shadows and American ATACMs respectively), and secondly the loosening of the rules of engagement to allow Ukraine to strike targets inside pre-war Russia.

    This dovetailed, as it turned out, with Ukraine’s operation in Kursk, and in many ways the most direct impact of the Kursk incursion has been to force the west’s hand on the rules of engagement. While Ukraine has long been striking inside Russia with indigenous systems, most notably drones, the White House continued to drag its feet on formal approval for strikes with American systems. By launching a ground assault on Kursk, Ukraine made the decision for them: the United States gave clearance to use ATACMs to support the ground forces in Kursk, and this metastasized into general license to strike Russia with the full range of available systems. This was a poignant reminder that, however we conceive of the proxy-sponsor relationship, Ukraine has some ability to force America’s hand: a classic example of the tail wagging the dog.

    In any case, 2024 saw Ukraine and its western backers slowly but surely bash through all the supposed red-lines in this domain: the British breached first with the delivery of Storm Shadows late in 2023, and this was followed by the delivery of ATACMs (with a handful of F16’s to boot), and finally the loosening of the rules of engagement to clear strikes on Russia.

    Where does this leave us? There would seem to be three important things to consider.

    1. The west has essentially reached the end of its escalation chain. The only remaining step that they can take would be to supply Ukraine with JASSMs (Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile), which would mark a quantitative but not a meaningful qualitative upgrade to Ukraine’s strike capabilities.
    2. Ukraine’s use of western-supplied strike assets has been dissipated and has not materially improved their situation on the ground.
    3. Russia maintains a dominant strike advantage, both qualitative and quantitative.

    Ukraine faces a stark disadvantage in strike capability relative to Russia, in a variety of ways. Russian strike assets are far more numerous and have significant range advantages, but it is also important to take into consideration both Russia’s significantly greater strategic depth and its more dense and relatively unscathed air defense. Unlike Ukraine, which has seen its air defense stretch to the limit with destroyed launchers and a mounting interceptor shortage, Russia’s air defenses have been essentially untouched, as Ukraine has lacked the large numbers of assets required to conduct a proper SEAD/DEAD (Suppression/Destruction of Enemy Air Defense) campaign.

    Given this basic calculus, using western strike systems to wage a blow for blow strategic air campaign is bad math for Ukraine. It is generally unwise to engage in a bat fight when your opponent is a bigger man with a much longer bat. Instead, Ukraine’s strike systems should have been leveraged to support ground operations – concentrating strikes spatially and in time to synergize with efforts on the ground. Just as a simple thought experiment, it is not difficult to imagine ATACMs making a difference if they had been available in 2023 and used to saturate Russian rear areas during the assault on the Zaporizhia line – striking in tempo with the mechanized assault to disrupt Russian command and control and prevent reinforcement of critical areas.

    Instead, Ukraine’s strike capacity has been largely dissipated in attacks that sometimes achieve success hitting Russian installations but fail to directly support successful operations on the ground. The result is a diffusion of Ukrainian striking power that is less than the sum of its parts. Now, Ukraine has essentially run dry on missiles – of the 500 ATACMs sent by the United States, perhaps 50 are left in Kiev’s stockpiles. Stocks of air launched Storm Shadow missiles are similarly low, and Britain’s commitment to resupply is limited to “a few dozen”

    The last option for the west to backstop Ukrainian strike capability are American JASSMs. While there is a longer-range variant in production (the JASSM-ER, or Extended Range), these are relatively new and expensive and are earmarked for American stocks – it is therefore presumed that the Ukrainians would receive the standard variant. The standard JASSM has slight range advantages over Storm Shadows and ATACMs, at roughly 230 miles. In the event that JASSMs are not given, there is a shorter range system called the SLAM (Standoff Land Attack Missile) with a range of some 170 miles. Both JASSMs and SLAMs would be compatible with Ukrainian F-16s.

    Two things need to be noted about the JASSM. First, the JASSM – while offering slightly longer ranges – would essentially serve as a backstop/replacement for the rapidly dwindling ATACMs and particularly the air launched Storm Shadows – instead of Ukraine’s native SU-24s launching Storm Shadows, they would utilize F-16s launching JASSMs. This would not represent a dramatic upgrade in Ukrainian capabilities, but would instead simply serve to maintain a bare minimum Ukrainian strike capability. JASSMs are a replacement for dwindling capabilities, not an augmentation to them.

    Secondly, it must be understood that JASSMs are the last stop. We’re now entering the territory, not of artificially constructed red lines, but physical and real limits. Russia has essentially eaten the gifted stocks of ATACMs and Storm Shadows, with little discernable effect on their ability to fight, and JASSMs are the last extant item in the inventories to keep Ukrainian strike capabilities operative. We are at the last rung of the aid ladder.

    In the case of JASSMs, however, there are notable downsides for the United States. This is an important case of putting all of one’s eggs in the same technological basket. In 2020, the United States scrapped the development of its conventionally armed Long Range Standoff Missile, making the JASSM – particularly the new extended range variants – the system for the United States, earmarked to play a critical role in future conflicts, particularly in the Pacific. This makes the JASSM an extremely sensitive system, as a centerpiece of American strike capabilities, particularly with the modernization of the Tomahawk system crawling along at a few dozen units per year.

    Given the fact that JASSMs are GPS guided, there are real reasons to be reticent about giving Ukraine such a technologically sensitive system. Russian electronic warfare has enjoyed considerable success jamming GPS and disrupting similarly guided American systems. Allowing the Russians to gain familiarity with a keystone American system could wreak havoc on Pentagon war planning – most, if not all of the strike eggs are in this basket, so why let an adversary peek inside?

    It’s probable, given what we have seen to this point, that these concerns will ultimately be dismissed and Ukraine will receive a line of JASSMs which will backstop their strike capabilities – but given the size of Ukraine’s F-16 fleet, the scale will be constrained. Furthermore, air launched systems are less optimal for Ukraine, given their dependence on large and easily targeted airfields, in contrast to ground launched systems which are mobile and more easily concealed.

    Certainly, JASSMs will never give Ukraine the ability to match Russia’s own strike capacity. After hearing endlessly about how Russia is running out of missiles, it has at last been concluded that this is simply not true, and indeed never was. Recently, Ukrainian defense intelligence admitted that per their own estimates Russia retains about 1,400 long range missiles in its reserves, with a monthly production of roughly 150 units. Russian production of inexpensive Geran drones has also skyrocketed, with Ukrainian intelligence estimating a ceiling as high as 2,000 drones per month.

    There is also the matter of the new Russian missile system – the now famous Oreshnik, or Hazel Tree. Russia tested the Oreshnik system on a large machining plant in Dnipro on November 21, 2024, which allowed the basic capabilities of the system to be gauged. The Oreshnik is an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile, characterized by its hypersonic capabilities (exceeding Mach-10) and its Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle equipped with six separate warheads, with the potential for submunitions in each. Although the attack on Dnipro was essentially a demonstration which used inert training warheads (that is, without explosive payloads), the missile can be configured with nuclear or conventional warheads

    As in the case of the North Korean troops in Kursk, I rather think that the Oreshnik launch was not nearly as important as it was made out to be. The system is expensive and likely impractical for conventional use. I understand the desire to conceive of Oreshnik as a massively powerful conventional weapon – showering its target with half a dozen warheads with the power of an entire flight of Kalibr missiles – but there are several problems with this. The accuracy of the system (the CEP, or “Circular Error Probable” in the technical parlance) is much more consistent with a nuclear delivery system than a conventional one. Furthermore, the problem with using an IRBM for conventional strikes is the danger of miscalculation – foreign adversaries may misinterpret the launch as a nuclear attack and respond appropriately. This is precisely why the Russian government actually alerted the United States to the launch ahead of time – a fine arrangement for a demonstration, but impractical for a weapon that is intended to be used regularly.

    We may see another use of the Oreshnik against Ukraine, but ultimately this is unlikely to be a system of consequence in this war. The demonstration in Dnipro was instead likely intended to send a message to Europe – reminding NATO that Russia has the capacity to deliver strikes against European targets that cannot be intercepted. It also serves as a poignant reminder that Europe lacks the equivalent capability, and in essence provides a demonstration of Russia’s ability to launch missiles from far beyond the range of either Ukrainian or European response. The Hazelnut is a tangible reminder of Russia’s strategic depth and strike dominance in Ukraine.

    Ultimately, Ukraine will lose the strike game. It’s strike capacity has dwindled, with missiles frittered away in a dissipated air campaign, and though the exhaustion of Storm Shadow and ATACMs stocks can be offset somewhat by JASSMs, Ukraine simply lacks the range or quantities necessary to match Russian capabilities. Needing to do more with less, Ukraine instead diffused its assets and failed to synergize its strikes with ground operations. We are now at the end of the line – after JASSMs, there’s nothing left in western warehouses to upgrade Ukrainian capabilities. Hazelnuts or no, the math on this bat fight is bad for Kiev.

    Conclusion: Debellation

    Trapped in an endless news cycle, with daily footage of FPV strikes and exploding vehicles, and a dutiful cottage industry of war mappers alerting us to every 100 meter advance, it can easily feel like the Russo-Ukrainian War is trapped in an interminable doom loop which will never end – Mad Max meets Groundhog Day.

    What I have endeavored to do here, however, is argue that 2024 actually saw several very important developments which make the coming shape of the war relatively clear. To briefly recapitulate:

    1. Russian forces caved in Ukrainian defenses at depth across an entire critical axis of front. After remaining static for years, Ukraine’s position in Southern Donetsk has been obliterated, with Russian forces advancing through an entire belt of fortified positions, pushing the front into Pokrovsk and Kostayantinivka.
    2. The main Ukrainian gambit on the ground (the incursion into Kursk) failed spectacularly, with the salient being progressively caved in. An entire grouping of critical mechanized formations wasted much of the year fighting on this unproductive and secondary front, leaving Ukrainian positions in the Donbas increasingly threadbare and bereft of reserves.
    3. An attempt by the Ukrainian government to reinvigorate its mobilization program failed, with enlistments quickly trailing off. Decisions to expand the force structure exacerbated the shortage of manpower, and as a result the decay of Ukraine’s frontline brigades has accelerated.
    4. Long awaited western upgrades to Ukraine’s strike capabilities failed to defeat Russian momentum, and stocks of ATACMs and Storm Shadows are nearly exhausted. There are now few options remaining to prop up Ukrainian strike capacity, and no prospect of Ukraine gaining dominance in this dimension of the war.

    In short, Ukraine is on the path to debellation – defeat through the total exhaustion of its capacity to resist. They are not exactly out of men and vehicles and missiles, but these lines are all pointing downward. A strategic Ukrainian defeat – once unthinkable to the western foreign policy apparatus and commentariat – is now on the table. Quite interestingly, now that Donald Trump is about to return to the White House, it is suddenly acceptable to speak of Ukrainian defeat. Robert Kagan – a stalwart champion of Ukraine if there ever was one – now says the quiet part out loud:

    Ukraine will likely lose the war within the next 12 to 18 months. Ukraine will not lose in a nice, negotiated way, with vital territories sacrificed but an independent Ukraine kept alive, sovereign, and protected by Western security guarantees. It faces instead a complete defeat, a loss of sovereignty, and full Russian control

    Indeed.

    None of this should be particularly surprising. If anything, it is shocking that my position – that Russia is essentially a very powerful country that was very unlikely to lose a war (which it perceives as existential) right in its own belly – somehow became controversial or fringe. But here we are.

    Carthago delenda est [end]

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  • Images du jour : message de l’ataman Nikolaï Diakonov à Emmanuel Macron et ses mignons

    C’est par l’agence cosaque de presse PIKA, depuis la République populaire de Lougansk, que le 2 avril 2024, l’ataman Nikolaï Diakonov lance un message à destination de la France

    Nous sommes les cosaques du Don, voulons lancer un appel à Monsieur Macron et tous les Français.

    Nous sommes ici avec la grande armée du Don à Stanitsa Louganskaïa, République populaire de Lougansk, Fédération de Russie.

    Écoutez attentivement.

    Il y a derrière moi un kouren [maison] construit en 1804. Son propriétaire, le cosaque Nikolaïev, a participé à la Première coalition, puis il a pourchassé les régiments du prince de Beauharnais sur les champs de bataille de Borodino et de toute la Mère Russie, où vos ancêtres ont rampé. Il a éclairé la grande armée du Don jusqu’à la Bérézina et plus tard avec ses camarades, bu le café dans les bistrots parisiens et baigné les chevaux dans la Seine. En 1945, les descendants du cosaque Nikolaïev achevèrent à Berlin la division SS Charlemagne.

    Les descendants du cosaque Nikolaïev ont vécu ici jusqu’en 2014, lorsqu’un obus ukrainien a frappé ce kouren. Messieurs les Français, Monsieur Macron, cet obus a volé ici parce qu’après avoir donné des garanties à Ianoukovitch [président de l’Ukraine, renversé par un coup d’État d’extrême-droite en 2014], vous n’avez pas tenu parole et l’avez trahi. Par votre politique, vous avez permis l’arrivée des nazis au pouvoir à Kiev. Messieurs les Français, votre gouvernement soutient toujours les nazis aujourd’hui. N’est ce pas, Monsieur Macron ?

    Une autre maison se trouve à côté de ces ruines. Elle fut construite pour un Français capturé, qui ne voulait pas rentrer en France et a vécu dans le village avec les cosaques. Il leur cousait des vêtements, raccommodait leurs chaussures. De quelque manière que ce soit, personne ne devrait l’agresser ou se moquer de lui. Cette maison est toujours debout, pour votre édification, Messieurs les Français.

    Nous conserverons la maison du cordonnier français comme un monument. Nous reconstruirons aussi les kouren de Stanitsa Louganskaïa et des fermes voisines. Les cosaques continueront d’y vivre et donneront naissance à des enfants auxquels nous raconterons notre histoire commune. Nous les élèverons pour qu’ils deviennent de vrais guerriers. Nous éduquerons toujours des combattants, soyez en sûrs.

    Mais si vous ne reprenez pas vos esprits, peut être que d’autres kouren apparaîtrons dans toute la Russie pour les prisonniers français. Pensez y. Pensez y bien.

    Monsieur Macron, retirez vos Légionnaires, mercenaires, commandos de notre sainte terre russe. Sinon, nous vous rappellerons ce qu’est la Bérézina.

    J’ai failli oublier : apprendre le Russe vous sera utile. Peut être découvrirez vous la célèbre chansons des cosaques du Don de la guerre de 1812-1814 :

    Nous louons le héros Platov [général Matveï Platov (1753-1818), commandant des troupes cosaques], qui a vaincu nos ennemis.
    Nous n’avons pas peur des Français… etc

    Au revoir [en Français], chers amis.

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  • [Sharing] Russo-Ukrainian war: The Deluge – Big Serge

    Z World Turns Two

    As the calendar barrels into another year and we tick away the days of February, notable anniversaries are marked off in sequence. It is now 2/22/2022 +2: two years since Putin’s address on the historic status of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions, followed on 2/24/2022 by the commencement of the Special Military Operation and the spectacular resumption of history.

    The nature of the war changed dramatically after a kinetic and mobile opening phase. With the collapse of the negotiation process (whether thanks to Boris Johnson or not), it became clear that the only way out of the conflict would be through the strategic defeat of one party by the other. Thanks to a pipeline of western support (in the form of material, financial aid, and ISR and targeting assistance) which allowed Ukraine to transcend its rapidly evaporating indigenous war economy, it became clear that this would be a war of industrial attrition, rather than rapid maneuver and annihilation. Russia began to mobilize resources for this sort of attritional war in the Autumn of 2022, and since then the war has attained its present quality – that of a firepower intensive but relatively static positional struggle.

    The nature of this attritional-positional war lends itself to analytic ambiguity, because it denies the most attractive and obvious signs of victory and defeat in large territorial changes. Instead, a whole host of anecdotal, small scale positional analysis, and foggy data has to suffice, and this can be easily misconstrued or misunderstood. Ukraine’s supporters point to nominally small scale advances to support their notion that Russia is suffering cataclysmic casualties to capture small villages. This suggests that Russia is winning meaningless, pyrrhic victories which will lead to its exhaustion, so long as Ukraine receives everything it asks for from the west. At the same time, the Z-sphere points to these same battles as evidence that Ukraine can no longer hold even its most heavily defended fortress cities.

    What I intend to argue here is that 2024 will be highly decisive for the war, as the year in which Ukrainian strategic exhaustion begins to show out at the same time that Russia’s strategic investments begin to pay off on the battlefield. This is the way of such an attritional conflict, which burdens armies with cumulative and constant stressors in a test of their recuperative powers. Wear and tear and the raging of the waters will erode and burden the dike until it bursts. And then the deluge comes.

    Avdiivka: Tactical Overmatch

    The signature operational development of 2024 is at this point clearly the complete Russian capture of Avdiivka. The strategic significance of Avdiivka has itself been subject to debate, with some dismissing it as little more than a dingy suburb of Donetsk, targeted to give Putin a symbolic victory on the eve of Russian elections.

    In fact, Avdiivka is clearly a locale with great operational significance. A Ukrainian fortress since the beginning of the Donbass War in 2014, Avdiivka served as a keystone blocking position for the AFU on the doorstep of Donetsk, sitting on a major supply corridor. Its capture creates space for Russia to begin a multi-pronged advance on next-phase Ukrainian strongholds like Konstantinivka and Pokrovsk (more on that later) and pushes Ukrainian artillery away from Donetsk.

    The subject that would seem to be of particular importance, however, was the manner in which Russia captured Avdiivka. The struggle amid the wreckage of an industrial city provided something of a Rorschach test for the war, with some seeing the battle as yet another application of Russian “meat assaults”, overwhelming the AFU defenders with mass amid horrific casualties

    This story does not hold up to scrutiny, as I would like to demonstrate from a variety of angles. First, we can try to gauge casualties. This is always difficult to do with a high degree of accuracy, but it would be useful to look for abnormalities or spikes in Russian loss patterns. The most widely accepted source for this would be the Mediazona casualty tracker (an explicitly anti-Putinist media project operated out of the west).

    When one goes to examine the Mediazona counts, an interesting discrepancy manifests itself. The summary text notes that a four-month battle for Avdiivka has recently concluded, and Mediazona states: “We are seeing significant growth of Russian casualties since mid-October.” This is actually quite odd, because their data shows the literal opposite. Since October 10 (the day of the first major Russian mechanized assault on Avdiivka), Mediazona has counted an average of 48 Russian casualties per day, which is actually significantly less than the burn rate earlier in the year. In contrast, Mediazona counted 80 casualties per day on average from January 1 to October 9. This period, of course, includes heavy fighting in Bakhmut, so if one takes the period between the end of the Battle of Bakhmut and the beginning of the Battle of Avdiivka (May 20 to October 9) one finds an average of 60 Russian casualties per day. A time series of Mediazona’s weekly confirmed casualties also shows a downward trend, making one wonder how they can feel comfortable claiming that the action in Avdiivka has raised the burn rate

    Furthermore, Ukrainian sources on the ground emphasized that the Russian assault in Avdiivka was quite certainly not a mere function of mass, and noted effective Russian small unit tactics with a powerful fire support. One Ukrainian officer told Politico: “That’s how they work in Avdiivka — artillery levels everything to the ground, and then professional landing troops come in small groups.” Another officer described Russian small unit assaults (5 to 7 men) occurring at night. All of this is inconsistent with the trope about Russian “human wave” assaults – which, we should note, have never been caught on camera. Given the Ukrainian fondness for sharing combat footage, oughtn’t we expect to see some alleged evidence of these Russian waves being mowed down?

    All this is to say, the claim that Russia (yet again) suffered catastrophic losses in Avdiivka is simply not supported. Like a previous analysis in which I showed that Russian armor losses were not rising or showing abnormal patterns, we yet again have a major Russian assault failing to cause a spike in the loss data. This is not to deny that Russia has suffered casualties. The operation at Avdiivka was a high intensity, four month battle. Men are killed and vehicles are destroyed in such affairs, but there is little evidence that this occurred at abnormal or alarming rates for the Russian Armed Forces.

    Now, you’re certainly free to make your own judgements, and I have no doubt that the belief in massive Russian casualties and human wave assaults will endure. However, to believe this, you must make an epistemological leap of faith – believing that the wasteful human waves exist despite Ukrainian fighters testifying to the opposite, and that Russian casualties have risen in a way that is somehow invisible to trackers like Warspotting and Mediazona.

    In contrast, Avdiivka stands out as the first major engagement of the war where Ukraine’s growing material shortages have been acutely felt. After burning through much of their accumulated stock (including the large batch of shells purchased from South Korea by the United States), the AFU felt a glaring and painful artillery shortage in Avdiivka. Complaints about “shell hunger” were a motif of the coverage of the battle. Of course, we’ve heard about the growing shell shortage for months (and it is known that Ukraine simply does not have enough tubes to cover the entire front), but Avdiivka stands out as a keystone position, important enough for Ukraine to scramble premier assets to reinforce it, where they simply could not provide an adequate base of fire

    Avdiivka

    In the absence of adequate artillery, Ukraine has increasingly tried to lean on FPV drones as a substitute. There is a certain strategic logic to this, in that small drones can be manufactured in distributed facilities and do not require the capital intensive production centers (vulnerable to Russian strike systems) that artillery shells do.

    However, drones are clearly not a panacea to Ukraine’s problems. In the simple technical sense, the destructive power of an FPV drone (which usually carries the warhead of a rocket propelled grenade) pales in comparison to an artillery shell and is thus unsuitable for suppressive fire or the reduction of strongpoints. Drones are also subject to disruptions from weather and electronic warfare in ways that artillery is not. More importantly, however, Ukraine is simply losing the drone race. Ukraine’s achievements ramping up drone production in wartime are genuinely impressive, but the country’s industrial base is still far smaller and more vulnerable than Russia’s, and Russia’s drone production is starting to widely outstrip Ukraine’s. Ukraine’s weakness in other arms prompted them to be the first party to lean heavily on FPVs, but that early lead has been lost.

    So, drones clearly offer a lethal and important battlefield expedient, but they are neither a genuine replacement for artillery nor an arm of clear advantage for Ukraine. The result was a Ukrainian defense in Avdiivka that was substantially outgunned. The problem was compounded by the rapid proliferation of Russian air dropped glide bombs, alongside the degradation of Ukraine’s air defense. This allowed the Russian air force to operate around Avdiivka with something approaching impunity, dropping hundreds of glide bombs with the power to – unlike artillery shells, let alone tiny FPV warheads – level the fortified concrete blocks that normally make Soviet vintage cities so durable in urban fighting.

    Thus, Avdiivka unfolded along a pattern that is now becoming very familiar, and indicates the emerging Russian preference for assaulting cities, at least of this mid-sized fortress variety. Once again the operation focused in its preliminary phase on flaring out Russian control over the flanks, beginning with the large mechanized assault in early November which secured positions on the railway line to the north of the city. Again (as in the case of Bakhmut and Lysychansk-Severodonetsk) there was an expectation among some that Russia would attempt to encircle the city, but this still does not look feasible in the current operating environment under the nexus of fires and ISR. Instead, positions on the flank allowed the Russians to launch concentric attacks into the city, entering on multiple axes that compressed the Ukrainian defenders into a tight interior position, where Russian fire could be heavily concentrated

    Concentric Attack on Avdiivka: February 7-14 (Base Map courtesy of Kalibrated Maps)

    The particular combination of concentric attack and overwhelming Russian fires led to a very rapid end to the battle once the Russian push into the city proper began. While the creep around the flanks occurred in a sequence of on and off pushes through the winter, the concentric crush on the city lasted scarcely more than a week. On February 7-8 the Russians achieved breakthroughs in both the northern and southern suburbs, and by February 14 the Ukrainians were in retreat. A few pockets of resistance would linger for only a few days.

    Despite statements alleging that they had conducted an “orderly withdrawal”, there is abundant evidence that the Ukrainians were taken aback by the tempo of the Russian assault, and the evacuation was hastily organized and only partially completed. A large number of personnel were unable to escape and are now POWs, and it is clear that Ukraine did not have time or energies to evacuate the wounded, instead ordering that they simply be left behind. The general picture is of a chaotic and ad-hoc retreat from the city, not an orderly and pre-planned withdrawal.

    The issue for Ukraine now goes beyond the loss of Avdiivka and the opportunities that this will create for Russia. Ukraine now has proof of failure on both the attack and the defense in operations where they concentrated significant forces. Their counteroffensive on Russia’s Zaporhzia Line was a catastrophic failure, wasting much of the AFU’s carefully husbanded mechanized package, and now they have a failed defense on their hands in Avdiivka, despite fighting out of a well prepared fortress and scrambling reserves into the sector to reinforce the defense.

    The question now becomes fairly simple: if Ukraine failed to attack successfully over the summer, if they could not defend Bakhmut, and if they cannot defend in Avdiivka, is there anywhere that they can find a battlefield success? The dam is leaking. Can Ukraine plug it before it collapses?

    Russia’s Full Court Press

    Ukraine’s force structure is always notoriously difficult to parse out, due to their propensity for ad-hoc battlegroups and their practice of piecemeal allocation of forces to resident brigade commands (turning brigade headquarters into the cups in a shell game). Truth be told, Ukrainian ORBAT and force allocation is in a class all its own – to try and get a handle on it, you can do no better than Matt Davies’ excellent work over on X dot com. This generally makes the AFU’s organization and force generation more opaque and more difficult to parse out than Russia’s, for example. While Russia employs conventional army level groupings, Ukraine does not, and indeed lacks any organic commands above the brigade level.

    That being said, the basic picture is one of three Ukrainian “Operational Strategic Groupings”, which are vaguely akin to army groups. These are, from north to south, Operation Strategic Groupings (OSGs) Khortytsia, Tavriya, and Odessa. Against these are arrayed four Russian Army Groups – from north to south, these are Army Groups West, Center, East, and Dnieper. Assessing the total line strength is always difficult, largely because we do not always have good insight into the actual combat rating of these units. However, we can make estimates of paper strength. Based on deployment information from the Project Owl Ukraine Control Map and the Militaryland Deployment Map, we can estimate that the nominal strength in the theater right now is some 33 Division Equivalents for Ukraine against perhaps 50 DEs for Russia – a significant, but not utterly overwhelming Russian advantage. We get a picture something like this (Ukrainian Army level formations are absent because they do not exist)

    Ukrainian Theater Army and Group Level Commands (Base Control Map provided by Kalibrated Maps)

    At the moment, Russia is grinding slowly forward on almost every axis in the theater. This has both strategic/attritional implications, in that the Ukrainians are forced to continually burn reserves while being denied the ability to rotate and reconstitute units, but there is also a clear operational formulation occurring.

    The Russian maneuver scheme must be held in reference to their minimum end state objectives – namely, the capture of the remaining Donbas urban agglomerations around Slovyansk and Kramatorsk (though we should not assume that the war or Russian ambitions end there). At the moment, there are several major axes of advance, which I am labelling as follows

    Russian Axes of Attack (Base Control Map provided by Kalibrated Maps)

    The intention of these thrusts is fairly obvious. In the center of the front, Russian advances on the Avdiivka and Chasiv Yar axes converge on the critical Ukrainian hub of Konstyantinivka, the capture of which is one of the absolute prerequisites for any serious attempt to move on the Kramatorsk agglomeration. Russian bases of control around Avdiivka and Bakhmut provide the necessary space to begin a two-pronged operation towards Konstyantinivka, bypassing and enveloping the strongly held Ukrainian fortress of Toretsk. (See the map below, which I made in December before the capture of Avdiivka)

    Concentric Operation toward Konstyantinikva (Base map from Suriyak)

    Meanwhile, continued Russian pressure on the northern front (via a slow squeeze on the city of Kupyansk, at the top of the Oskil line as well as operations towards Lyman on the Zherebets axis) provide a base of progress towards the other operational perquisite for Kramatorsk, which is the Russian recapture of the north bank of the Donets River, up to the confluence of the Oskil at Izyum

    Russia’s North Donetsk Campaign

    Meanwhile, on the more southerly axes, Russia continues to expand its zone of control after the capture of Marinka, likely with the aim of developing momentum towards Kurakhove, which would put the Ukrainian fortress of Ugledar in a more severe salient. Ugledar remains a thorn in Russia’s side, in that it lies uncomfortable close to Russian rail lines into the land bridge. Russia is also attacking the Ukrainian held Robotyne salient (the sparse fruits of Ukraine’s counteroffensive). While these attacks have, as we have mentioned, attritional benefits by way of pinning Ukrainian forces in the line, it seems likely that Russia would aim to recapture the Robotyne salient to preempt any Ukrainian designs of using it as a springboard for a future attempt to restart operations towards Tokmak. Thus, these southern operations have both attritive effects and offer the potential of preventatively neutralizing useful Ukrainian staging points

    Overall, the broad operational situation suggests that Russia is developing offensive momentum across the entire theater. This will have deleterious effects on Ukrainian combat power by preventing rotation, reconstitution, and lateral troop redeployment, while sucking in the dwindling Ukrainian reserves. Shoigu recently made an uncharacteristically bold statement that the AFU was committing much of its remaining reserves:

    “After the collapse of the counteroffensive, the Ukrainian army command has been trying to stabilize the situation at the expense of the remaining reserves and prevent the collapse of the frontline.”

    This is, if not totally verifiable, at least notable given his general reticence to make sweeping statements about the state of the war.

    In the near term (meaning the spring and summer months) we should expect Russia to progress towards the following intermediate operational goals:

    • Developing a concentric offensive towards the Ukrainian agglomerations around Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Kontyantinivka
    • An offensive along the Zherebets-Oskil line towards Lyman, to capture or screen the Donetsk River line as a prerequisite for an operation against Kramatorsk
    • Continued assaults towards Kurakhove in preparation for the liqudiation of the Ugledar salient
    • Preventative attacks towards the Orakhiv axis to prevent future Ukrainian attempts to exploit the Robotyne salient

    Farwell Zaluzhny

    Against the backdrop of Ukraine’s defeat at Avidiivka, President Zelensky began a long expected command overhaul when he fired Commander in Chief Valery Zaluzhny and replaced him the the commander of the ground forces, Oleksandr Syrski.

    There a variety of amusing ethnic and political subplots to this, particularly the longstanding tensions between Zelensky and Zaluzhny, the many ridiculous rumors that Zaluzhny had become a political rival to Zelensky and might be the lead figure in a military takeover of the government, and the rather ironic fact that the new top man, Syrski, is a Russian born less than fifty miles outside of Moscow, who ended up in Ukrainian service simply because his unit was posted near Kharkov when the Soviet Union fell, and he opted not to resign his command.

    This is all very interesting, of course, and perhaps might help demonstrate that the relationship between these countries is far more convoluted and nuanced that most westerners assume. What matters for our purposes, however, is the military implications

    Farewell, Sweet Prince

    What we should say about Zaluzhny is that, while he was not really Ukraine’s biggest problem, he did not have the answers. Zaluzhny displayed a bizarre timidity, particularly throughout the Battle of Bakhmut and the Ukrainian Counteroffensive. We constantly heard about Zaluzhny’s reservations and opposition to Ukrainian plans – he was against the costly defense of Bakhmut, skeptical of the attack out of Orikhiv, and so forth. There was even a rumor that Zaluzhny told Zelensky that the counteroffensive had failed already in the opening weeks of the operation.

    The problem with all of this is simple: Zaluzhny cannot have it both ways. He seemed to be positioning himself as a voice of caution and reason, distancing himself from operations on the ground, while allowing those operations to go forward anyway. Over the summer, supposedly at the same time that Zaluzhny had concluded that the counteroffensive was failing, he continued to push Ukrainian mechanized forces into the Russian defenses in small, company sized battlegroups.

    Ultimately, Zaluzhny strikes one as a non-entity: skeptical of Ukrainian battle plans, but willing to implement them anyway without offering alternatives of his own. In particular, his hesitation led the Ukrainian counteroffensive to devolve into a sequence of wasteful probing attacks which lacked the mass to achieve a decisive result and inevitably spiraled into a slow motion trainwreck. A commander who complains about battleplans while implementing them anyway is begging an obvious question: what is it that you do around here, anyway?

    In contrast, Syrski is a man who clearly exerts some will on the battlefield, for good or ill. His preference for commitment and combat has resulted in several of Ukraine’s ugliest defeats – he is, after all, the architect of the Bakhmut defense and the firebag at Lysychansk. But he’s also the showrunner for Ukraine’s signature military success to this point, in the 2022 Kharkov Counteroffensive, where he successfully exploited a badly hollowed out section of Russian front and recaptured important positions over the Oskil

    Syrski (2nd from left) checks the situation map

    Syrski may very well lead Ukraine to disaster. He has shown a tolerance for casualties that could easily break the AFU’s back, and a preference for generating horrible, grinding positional defense. But Syrski at least has a propensity to look for decision points, unlike Zaluzhny, who seemed content to slowly wither away in positional battle against a superior foe. Aggression could easily cause disaster for Ukraine, but time had clearly run out on Zaluzhny’s way of war.

    Outgunned: Ukraine and the Arms Race

    The Russo-Ukrainian War is one of industrial attrition. Despite a variety of theories about this or that game changing weapon, clever maneuver scheme, or superior western training, the reality of this war for the last 18 months has been one of grinding and laborious industrial war, battering through fixed defenses in a maelstrom of concrete, steel, and high explosives. The central problem for Ukraine is fairly simple: Russian force generation is reaching the liftoff point, which will interminably shift combat power in Russia’s favor.

    As artillery shells have become the totem item in this war, a commentary on the state of the artillery race is certainly warranted. Ukraine managed to build a large inventory of shells in preparation for its 2023 summer offensive, partially through careful husbanding of resources and partially through the United States tapping a few remaining reservoirs, like South Korea. After expending much of that stockpile in high intensity operations through the summer, the artillery advantage has once again swung heavily in favor of Russia, and “shell hunger” has become a ubiquitous complaint for Kiev.

    In particular, Zelensky has recently begun to complain of what he calls an “artificial shortage”, blaming the Republican opposition in the US Congress for Ukraine’s supply difficulties. Zelensky is wrong. The shortage is real, and not easily fixed.

    After burning through excess stocks, Ukraine’s long-term supply has increasingly come to hinge on attempts to expand production in Europe and the United States. However, this plan is foundering on three separate rocks: 1) industry has been much slower to ramp up than expected; 2) even the expanded production targets are too low to win the war for Ukraine; and 3) even if adequate ammunition could be procured, Ukraine would quickly run into problems with barrel availability.

    Thus far, the United States has been much more successful ramping up production than has Europe. While American targets have been revised several times, it now looks like the United States will produce something like 500,000 shells in 2024, which is a good number given the state of the American industrial plant and issues with labor shortages. The European Union initially hoped to deliver 1 million shells on an annualized basis, but they appear to be far short of this number. Europe faces a variety of problems, like labor shortages, exorbitant energy costs, and a consensus driven decision making culture that is slow to allocate significant resources. The European practice of small orders placed by individual member states also leaves manufacturers hesitant to make large investments in new production lines. Or, as one Belgian general put it: “We’re in deep shit.”

    Let’s say that the USA and Europe both fulfill their current targeted deliveries to Ukraine in their entirety. What would that amount to? A recent study from two German analysts at the European Council on Foreign Relations estimated that, in the optimist scenario, the USA and Europe can supply Ukraine with approximately 1.3 million rounds of ammunition on an annualized basis. That would give Ukraine a budget of about 3,600 shells per day – enough to sustain moderate intensity, but far below what they need

    The primary means of physical destruction

    Last year, Ukrainian Minister of Defense Reznikov said that Ukraine would require nearly 12,000 shells per day to “successfully execute battlefield tasks”, particularly offensive actions. That works out to more than 350,000 shells per month – more than three times what the NATO bloc is hoping to produce. Obviously that large number is unrealistic, but a recent study from the Estonian Ministry of Defense estimated that at minimum Ukraine will need 200,000 shells per month (Roughly 6,600 per day). At the estimated long-run availability of 3,600 per day, Ukraine can have some basic functionality, but they will find it difficult to accumulate a stockpile to allow higher intensity offensive operations.

    This runs into an additional, follow on problem, which is that simply pumping shells into Ukraine is not enough. Solving the shell shortage will exacerbate the barrel shortage. Artillery barrels, needless to say, wear out from extended use. Using a rule of thumb number which says that a howitzer barrel has a lifespan of about 2,500 shots, this means that Ukraine would be wearing out somewhere between 125-150 guns per month, assuming they could actually shoot as much as Reznikov wants. This would create yet another sustainment bottleneck, complicated by the fact that Ukraine has at least 17 different platforms in use.

    Meanwhile, what of the Russians? It’s clear that Russia’s pool of shells has been vastly underestimated. First we have the news that North Korean deliveries have been far larger than initially expected; instead of 1 million, it’s something more like 3 million with deliveries ongoing. This number is dampened by the fact that some of the North Korean shells are defective (from long stays in depots and cannibalization), but the sheer size of the delivery can’t be ignored. Meanwhile, indigenous Russian production has skyrocketed, with the Estonians estimating some 3.5 million shells produced in 2023 for the Russians, with a figure of 4.5 million expected in 2024. Including North Korean shells, it seems highly likely that Russian can easily sustain a firing rate of up to 12,000 shells per day, with surge capacity in reserve

    The upshot of all this is essentially that, even if the European production surge occurs on schedule, there’s at least a 3-1 advantage (potentially 5-1) in Russian artillery fire that’s baked into the calculus of this war, occurring alongside a substantial western acknowledged ramp up in Russian production of strike systems like cruise missiles, Geran drones, Lancets, and glide bombs of both greater power and greater range. A recent publication from the Royal United Services Institute noted that Russia can deliver 1,500 tanks (both new build and retrofitted depot stocks) and 3,000 armored vehicles per year – the report also notes that Russian stocks of Iskander and Kalibr missiles have grown significantly over the last year.

    The standard argument – the sort of “Theory of Ukrainian Victory” – rests on the idea of disproportionate, catastrophic Russian casualties, and both sides love to throw around that cherished word “loss ratios.” However, this rather tends to obfuscate the issue. The most important question is simple whether an army’s relative combat power is growing or shrinking over time – that is, whether its ability to generate forces is greater than its rate of burn – can it reconstitute attrited units in a timely manner, generate replacements, recover, repair, and replace broken equipment, and so forth. The prototypical example of this is of course the Nazi-Soviet War. Despite the fact that the Germans enjoyed favorable “loss ratios” throughout most of the war, the ratio of combat power consistently grew in the USSR’s favor due to their vastly superior force generation powers. Tellingly, Hitler even made a quip during the Battle of Kursk that the loss ratios should predict an immanent German victory. But loss ratios do not matter nearly as much as the relative rate of loss and force generation.

    Given that Russian casualties are obviously far below the phantasmagorical hundreds of thousands suggested by western Media and Ukrainian propogandists, it has become clear that Russia is generating more force over time. Estonian intelligence estimated that Russia can properly train, equip, and deploy roughly 130,000 additional troops every six months, which is more than adequate to overcome current loss rates. As if to emphasize the point, RUSI notes that the Russian grouping of forces in Ukraine (that is, only those forces deployed in theater at the moment) rose from 360,000 to 470,000 over the last year.

    So, Russian force generation is growing over time, and not simply regenerating losses. Meanwhile, Ukrainian forces are increasingly undermanned, with understrength brigades asked to perform increasingly heavy lift. We know that Ukrainian reserves are running low. This was clearly demonstrated in Avdiivka, when the AFU scrambled brigades from other fronts (like the 47th Mechanized) that had been fighting all summer, indicating that there was a lack of adequate strategic reserves, and then throwing in the elite 3rd Assault Brigade in the closing days of the battle to try and stem the bleeding. Meanwhile, formations like the 110th Mechanized, which had been fighting in Avdiivka for months, were essentially burned off entirely because they could not be rotated out. Russia conducts regular troop rotations, while Ukrainian forces remain on the line due to the lack of replacements.

    So, here we are. The current Theory of Ukrainian Victory is exhausted, intending as it did to leverage western ISR, training, and surplus equipment to deliver disproportionate casualties on Russia. 2022 was a year of big surges (not Big Serges), with Russia rapidly conquering the land bridge and the Lugansk shoulder in its initial maneuver campaign, followed by Ukrainian capitalization on the inadequate Russian force generation with their audacious counterattack towards the Oskil. But 2023 was different – Ukraine had a significant window of opportunity, flush with western equipment, training, and planning assistance while Russia’s mobilization ground into gear. That strategic window yielded nothing. Instead, Ukraine burned off valuable resources defending Bakhmut and then bashed uselessly against a well shaped and well defended Russian line in the south. Now the window is closed, and Russian force generation is inexorably rising, threatening Ukraine with the deluge of total strategic overmatch.

    Ukraine is facing strategic defeat, and the only way out is to go all in – not only for Ukraine, in the form of a more radical and totalizing mobilization plan, but for its partners too, who will have to adopt a quasi-war economy and devote radically more resources to arming and training the AFU.

    There are signs that Ukraine might be ready to take that plunge, from Zelensky’s claim that the army is asking for 500,000 more men, to the ongoing deliberation over an expanded draft, to comments about the need for “total mobilization” and laws against capital flight (to prevent men from fleeing the country with their money). This is only natural; due to Russia’s vastly superior resource base, Ukraine can only hope to match them with a totalizing and far more extractive mobilization policy

    Russia’s Secret Weapon: Bombs

    That leaves the NATO partners. Even if Ukraine adopts a radical mobilization policy, it lacks the indigenous capacity to train them, let alone arm them. Without the NATO training pipeline and robust material support, a Ukrainian total mobilization (even if it were possible with Ukraine’s limited state capacity) would serve only to inflate casualties and burn off what is left of the nation’s demographic base. With even a stable level of Ukraine aid struggling to get through an American congress that is suffering from Ukraine fatigue and a host of domestic crises, it seems unlikely that any by the Baltic States are in the mood to double down and begin sending daily trains full of material to Kiev.

    And so, we once again return to the motif of strategic exhaustion. 2022 was the year of wild swings as the front stabilized into a conveniently shaped and easily supplied Russian position, and 2023 was the year of Ukraine’s strategic window of opportunity, frittered away at Bakhmut and Robotyne. 2024 is the year that Russia’s swelling force generation reaches a climax and the war turns in an obvious and irreversible way against Ukraine.

    The great German soldier and author Ernst Jünger had the following comment on the prospect of war with Russia:

    When Spengler warned against any invasion of Russia for reasons of space, he was, as we have since seen, right. Even more questionable become each of these invasions for metaphysical reasons, insofar as one approaches one of the great sufferers, a titan, a genius of suffering power. In its aura, in its sphere of influence, one will become acquainted with pain in a way that far exceeds any imagination.

    Much is always made of Russia’s propensity for “suffering”, with interpretations ranging from a romantic Russian-patriotic notion of sacrifice for the motherland to an anti-Russian criticism of the Russian tolerance for casualties. Perhaps it means both: the individual Russian soldier is more willing to sit in a freezing trench and trade shells than his adversary, and the Russian state and people are able to lose more and last longer in the aggregate.

    I rather think, however, that Jünger’s metaphysical “titan of suffering” is not so metaphysical at all. It rather refers to a mundane power of the Russian state, namely its excellence and willingness across the centuries to mobilize huge numbers of men and material for war, at the expense of other social goals. War with Russia sucks. It means mass casualties, cold trenches, scarred earth, and long nights of shelling. The Ukrainians have coped with this as well as anyone (because they are themselves quasi-Russian, however much they deny it), but it is an awful thing to trade shells for years on end. The Russian power of suffering is to willingly fight wars that devolve into bat fights, knowing they have a bigger bat.

    The window of strategic opportunity has closed for Ukraine, and now opens wide for Russia. The earth opens wide for the dead [end]

    The original article

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