Nicolas Cinquini

Analista senior di l'intelligenza in u campu di a gestione di i risichi di sicurezza, sò un anzianu tenente detective è ufficiale di l'intelligenza in l'agenzie di u Statu francese. A bona pronuncia hè Николай Чинкуини, in russu

Tag: COVID

  • [Sharing] Germany’s new right: Trading on nostalgia for past prosperity in an age of uncertainty – Ingo Schmidt, Canadian Dimension

    Ingo Schmidt on how the triumph of liberal democracy and neoliberal globalization became the ideological seed for the AfD

    On November 6, 2024 German Chancellor Olaf Scholz fired Finance Minister Christian Lindner. Notwithstanding the broad agreement on policy goals, striking a balance between deficit reduction, support for renewable energy and increased arms spending turned out to be impossible. Lindner, a liberal, opted for social cuts; Scholz, a social democrat, wants to avoid them. They had to part ways. After Scholz lost a no-confidence vote, federal elections were scheduled for February 23, 2025. The question that worries everyone from old-school conservatives to new millennium lefties is: How many votes will go to the hard right (if not neo-Nazi) party Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland or AfD). In the last federal elections in 2021, the AfD got 10.4 percent of the total vote. Current polls put them at 20 percent, but nobody knows what will happen on election day. In this new age of uncertainty, polls don’t predict election results as reliably as in the past.

    Elections in the East German provinces Brandenburg, Saxony and Thuringia have already shown what hard-right success looks like. They also reveal the inability of the political centre to understand how much it contributed to the rise of a new right. Refashioning totalitarianism theory in the New Cold War climate, centrist politicians and pundits typically portray the success of the new right as the outgrowth of the Nazi and Communist dictatorships that ruled East Germany from 1933 to 1990. West Germany, which was spared Communist rule and, allegedly, shook off the burden of its Nazi past, appears as a role model in this democracy-versus-dictatorship story. Totalitarianism theory could possibly explain why the AfD is more successful, so far at least, in East than in West Germany. But it can’t explain right-wing success in other countries, like France, that were never under Communist rule and know Nazi rule only from occupation, which strengthened anti-fascist traditions in those countries. But even these traditions couldn’t stop the rise of the new right there.

    This article offers a different explanation for the hard-right surge in Germany. It shows that German unification in 1990, signalling the triumph of liberal democracy and the onset of neoliberal globalization, unleashed a new form of nationalism—Deutschmark nationalism—which, after mutating into export nationalism for a while, became the ideological seed for the AfD. West Germany, or, more precisely, the economic miracle that was West Germany in the post-war era, served as a role model during German unification. Promoted by West German elites and eagerly embraced by people in East Germany, it raised the expectation of a new economic miracle materializing in the West and extending to the East. However, these hopes were soon disappointed as political unification caused socioeconomic divisions between East and West Germany and, in the early 2000s, a turn to austerity policies that were highly unpopular in the East and the West. Just when it seemed that Germany would weather the world economic crisis of 2008-9 better than other Western countries, and maybe even become the European hegemon, things started falling apart. The Euro-crisis made clear that it was not only politically united Germany that was plagued by massive socioeconomic and geographical divisions but the European Union, too. Continued economic weakness combined with New Cold War marching orders from Washington fed a nostalgia for a supposedly great past—symbolized by the Deutschmark. This nostalgia, I argue, would not have taken root if the left had been able to channel growing discontent into mobilization for a more equitable and less insecure future.

    State elections in Brandenburg, Saxony, and Thuringia

    State elections don’t typically get international media attention. The September 1, 2024, elections in Thuringia and Saxony did. After all, it was the first time since the downfall of the Nazi-regime that a hard-right party, the AfD, pulled the majority of votes in a German election. It proved a bitter coincidence: The AfD celebrated their victory in Thuringia, obtaining 32.8 percent of the total vote, on the 85th anniversary of the Nazi-invasion of Poland that marked the beginning of the Second World War.

    The Conservative Christian Democrats (the Christlich-Demokratische Union or CDU) came in second with 23.6 percent. The parties of the federal government coalition, Social Democrats (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands or SPD), Greens (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) and Liberals (Freie Demokratische Partei or FDP) ended up with single-digit results, the FDP reduced to a mere 1.1 percent. At the time of the election, this was the party of the federal minister of finance. The Left Party (Die Linke), which in the previous election had become the strongest party for the first time in any German state, lost almost 18 percent and came in fourth, even trailing the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht or BSW), a breakaway group from the Left Party.

    In Saxony, the AfD won 30.6 percent of the votes, just behind the CDU’s 31.9 percent. As in Thuringia, none of the parties of the federal government coalition achieved double-digit results. The Left Party lost more than half of its vote and ended up with a devastating 4.5 percent. The BSW came in a distant third with 11.8 percent.

    Just three weeks after their election victories in Thuringia and Saxony, the AfD scored another success in Brandenburg. Narrowly beaten by the SPD that got 30.9 percent of the total vote, the AfD came in second with 29.2 percent, way ahead of the BSW’s 13.1 percent and the CDU’s 12.1 percent. The Left Party and the Greens obtained less than five percent of the vote, which is the minimum threshold for holding seats in provincial or federal parliament under the mixed-member proportional electoral system. The FDP pulled less than one percent.

    Mainstream media fails to explain right-wing success

    Barely beaten by the Conservatives in Saxony and the Social Democrats in Brandenburg, the AfD was elected by roughly a third of the electorate in three East German states, becoming the strongest party only in Thuringia. If ever there was a right-wing surge, this was it. Most media reports attributed the phenomenon to widespread dissatisfaction with the federal government, particularly regarding migration, climate policies and the war in Ukraine. Accounts of why the AfD is more popular in the East (approval ratings in the west of Germany range from 8.5 percent in Hamburg and the Saarland to 21 percent in Lower Saxony) focus mostly on disappointments caused by German unification, continuing socioeconomic disparities and a widespread feeling among erstwhile East Germans of being second class citizens. Other explanations invoke the authoritarian heritage of communist rule in East Germany, which is often presented as an extension of the Nazi-regime. Against the two dictatorships in the East, West Germany is presented as a role model of liberal democracy. This as if there hadn’t been considerable continuity between Third Reich and West German elites; as if East Germany’s ruling bureaucracy, despite all its dictatorial wrongs, wasn’t established by antifascists who had been exiled or jailed during the Nazi reign; as if the nationalization of the means of production, despite the wrongs of bureaucratic rule, had not marked a break from the West German capitalism that made West Germany a junior partner in the American Empire; as if West German capitalism had not dictated the terms of unification at the very time that a grassroots movement for democracy unsettled bureaucratic rule in East Germany. The destruction of the East German economy and the integration of the East into existing West German institutions left no room for the aspirations of East Germany’s civil rights movement. Rather than explaining growing support for the new right, media talk about the “peculiarities of the East” reinforces existing frustrations there—frustrations that help shed light on the relative strength, so far at least, of the right-wing surge in the East.

    The ‘two-dictatorships’ thesis that pits the East against the liberal democratic West revives the totalitarianism theory that was an integral part of the anti-communist, anti-Soviet consensus during the Cold War. It is now part of the New Cold War ideology that counterposes democracy and authoritarianism. As in the old Cold War, charges of totalitarianism serve to short circuit thinking about alternative economic and political systems, reinforcing the neoliberal creed that there is no alternative to capitalism. The lack of actually existing alternatives is, of course, also one of the reasons for the rise of the new right. Emerging out of an ailing neoliberalism, this right-wing force presents itself as an alternative to the status quo but actually just recasts neoliberalism in a nationalist and racist mould. Replacing neoliberalism’s earlier commitment to corporate globalization in Germany, as elsewhere, neoliberalism is haunted by the spectre of fascism, which, to centrist neoliberals, has everything to do with misled masses unable to understand the virtues of capitalist liberal democracy and nothing to do with capitalist crises that undermine the legitimacy of liberal democracy. Neoliberalism is also haunted by the spectre of communism as ruling classes worry that crisis of legitimacy could extend to capitalism itself. As the neoliberal centre denies the possibility of alternatives and the left generally (not only the Left Party in Germany) appears unable to advance real world alternatives, the growing appetite for change, spurred by recurrent crises wrought by capitalism, settles for right-wing fantasies of a harmonious life in a nation that competes successfully with other countries economically and is freed from job- and welfare-stealing migrants.

    The impact of German unification and the rise and decline of neoliberal globalization

    Capitalist crises and their exploitation by the right are common phenomena, certainly in the imperialist centres of the world system, but also in the peripheries. But they play out differently in different national contexts. Behind the AfD’s electoral successes in Thuringia and Saxony as well as its broader surge in popularity lie the combined histories of German unification and the rise and decline of neoliberal globalization. The upsurge of the new right is just one of the outcomes of these combined histories. Equally important is the defeat of the federal government coalition and the rout of the FDP, whose leader, former federal Minister of Finance Christian Lindner, promotes austerity policies that stymie government plans to subsidize the transition to non-fossil energies. These policies also lead to a creeping roll-back of social spending—except when it comes to arms spending. Little wonder a government that took office on the promise of something like a Green New Deal lost its credibility almost entirely and called for a federal election scheduled for February 23 of this year.

    And then there is the defeat of the Left Party that, despite programmatic commitments to progressive alternatives, is widely seen as the appendage of a lame-duck government in Berlin. At the other end of the political spectrum, the AfD is widely perceived as an oppositional force, even though its program blends austerity, nationalism and militarism in ways that are more extreme but qualitatively not much different from policies advanced by the CDU and the FDP.

    In the face of electoral defeat, the federal government, which embraced the US’s New Cold War policies a few weeks after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, also introduced dramatically tougher migration policies. Rather than representing any kind of alternative, as its name purports, the AfD is the black sheep of the establishment family, expressing racist views more radically and bluntly than even the Conservatives. While the Social Democrats, Liberals and Greens are intent on denying such views, they reveal themselves as Western supremacists when it comes to fending off so-called authoritarian threats arising from Russia and China, stirring up longstanding fears in the West that ‘the Russians are coming’ or that ‘Asian hordes’ augur “the decline of the West,” in the words of right-wing intellectual Oswald Spengler.

    The hypocrisy of the Greens, who advocate a green transition while supporting the purchase of dirty oil and gas (wherever they can get it ever since the Russian invasion of Ukraine ended Russian gas-flows to Germany), make them a prime target of AfD agitation. But in reality the AfD and the Greens share the fear of Western decline. The AfD engage in fearmongering around the replacement of white people by non-white immigrants and accuse the Greens and their coalition partners in the federal government of accelerating Western decline. But while the Greens may be the prime target of the AfD’s culture war, the truth is that despite significant differences in tone, the Greens and the AfD share a basic consensus on the decline of the West.

    AfD success in the east: history holds the key

    Encouraged by Glasnost in the Soviet Union, many East Germans took to the streets in the fall of 1989. Under the banner “We Are the People” they demanded democratic reforms of East Germany. Neither unification with West Germany nor a return to a capitalist economy was on their agenda—at least not initially. As protests grew, and especially after the ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED) had opened the border to the West, “We Are the People” was replaced by “We Are One People” more and more often. It was supplemented by the slogan “Germany, United Fatherland,” which is actually a quote from East Germany’s national anthem, written by the communist poet Johannes R. Becher in 1949, at a time when the leaders of the SED still thought a united Germany could be achieved—not necessarily socialist but not aligned on either the US or the Soviet Union. Such hopes were buried by the Cold War, for which the Berlin Wall became a symbol, casting a dark shadow over communist East Germany and allowing capitalist West Germany to present itself as a beacon of freedom. It was in a matter of weeks in the winter of 1989-90 that the abstract possibility became a demand, massively fanned by West German politicians—notably then chancellor Helmut Kohl—and mainstream media, which hinted at the possibility of East Germany adopting the West German Deutschmark. Many East Germans seized on such hints as an irresistible offer. “If the D-Mark comes, we’ll stay here; if it doesn’t come, we’ll go to it” became the next popular protest slogan. Since the opening of the border, thousands of East Germans had gone to the West, creating conditions reminiscent of the times before the wall was built in 1961. Back then, the East German economy lost so many people, most of them young and well-trained, that a collapse of social reproduction became a real threat. The wall stopped the bleeding of the East German economy but inflicted irreparable damage on the legitimacy of the political system.

    Almost 30 years later, the opening of the border by the SED-leadership came as a bit of a surprise to West German elites. Yet, they were quick to grasp the possibilities it created. To them, this meant the integration of East Germany into the West German political and economic system, not coexistence with a somehow reformed but still politically independent East Germany. The ‘take over the East’ goal of West German elites and the Deutschmark rush of East German masses fed each other. The civil rights movement that wanted to democratize East Germany was sidelined. Some of the groups active in that movement adjusted to the new zeitgeist quickly, some even entered into an electoral alliance with the East German conservative party, despite their having criticized it as a small but integral part of the SED-regime. Angela Merkel, who would later become chancellor, belonged to one of these East German groups that allied with other conservative-turned-civil-rights groups and the East German CDU. This Alliance for Germany easily won the last East German elections and negotiated the integration of East Germany into West Germany’s institutional structures. On July 1, 1990, the Deutschmark came to the East, three months later the independent state of East Germany vanished into an enlarged West Germany. Most of the Alliance for Germany dissolved into the West German CDU immediately after unification. In December this enlarged CDU won federal elections.

    In less than a year the Cold War had come to an end and an entire state had disappeared. However, the hopes pinned on unification, notably the introduction of the Deutschmark, were soon dashed. A year after unification, unemployment, which had existed in communist East Germany primarily in a hidden form, stood at 10.2 percent and rose to over 20 percent in the early 2000s. It didn’t fall below 10 percent until 2014, a quarter of a century after the Berlin Wall fell. Moreover, mass migration from East to West Germany, which the introduction of the Deutschmark was meant to curb, actually accelerated after the arrival of the Deutschmark. From 1990 to 2015, East Germany lost significantly more than one million people, the vast majority during the first two years after unification, and almost all of them of working age. Were it not for this emigration as well as early retirement schemes and retraining schemes for thousands of workers, unemployment in the East would have been even higher than it actually was. Introducing a new form of hidden unemployment, many of the participants in retraining were enrolled in one course after another, often in different fields, until they were old enough for early retirement.

    One of the main, if not the main, reasons for the collapse of the East German economy was the Deutschmark. Introduced at a rate of one Mark West for one Mark East, while average productivity of East Germany was estimated to be about a quarter that of West Germany, German monetary union gave private households the boost in purchasing power they so desired. But it made East German firms uncompetitive. Lower wages could not compensate productivity differentials between firms in East Germany and Western countries. The privatization of East Germany’s state-owned firms facilitated the downfall of the East German economy even further. In some cases, Western companies bought East German firms just to shut them down so that they would not become competitors in the future. In other cases, they wanted patents or certain segments of production that they could integrate into their own supply-chains, leaving everything else to be shut down. The closures and cherry-picking of some more desirable segments destroyed the reproduction process of the East German economy even beyond the damage done by rendering it uncompetitive through monetary union.

    The result was that bits and pieces of the East German economy became a periphery of production networks controlled by West German corporations. Ironically, the neoliberal restructuring of production processes went hand in hand with massive fiscal transfers from West to East Germany. A price that had to be paid to sustain some level of social cohesion while disappointment that political unification was followed by economic decline and continued social divisions between East and West instead of an Eastern economic miracle following the example of West Germany from the late 1950s to the early 1970s. At some point, a third of East German incomes came from fiscal transfers. As a result, government debt as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) rose from 41.8 percent in 1989 to 61.2 percent in 1999, which is nothing compared to today’s numbers. Yet, back then the lesson that had yet to be learned is that neoliberalism, despite its balanced-budget rhetoric, really is a mix of austerity and tax cuts for the rich that produces increasing debt levels at every slowdown or downturn of the economy. In the 1990s, government debt over 60 percent of GDP was a scandal. Not least because, at the urging of the conservative German government, 60 percent had become the benchmark for membership in the European monetary union, for which the roadmap had been laid out in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty.

    Budget deficits, accumulating into government debt, weren’t the only deficit scandal in 1990s Germany. The other was in the current account. From a surplus of 4.6 percent in 1989, the current account dropped to a –1.9 percent deficit in 1991 and remained in deficit territory until 2001. In most other countries, deficits between negative one and negative two percent wouldn’t be a matter of concern. In Germany they were. After all, West German prosperity—the very model East Germans admired so much—had been reliant on export-driven growth, which was always understood as export surpluses. As it turned out, unification in the early 1990s, led to a boom in West Germany as East Germans spent many of their newly acquired Deutschmarks on consumer goods ‘Made in (West) Germany’—despite massive job losses. This boom drove prices up and made German exports less competitive on the world market. At the same time, some of the money from the East German spending spree went to foreign companies. As exports took a hit and imports got a boost, the current account went from positive to negative.

    The East was integrated into the West German political system as it existed prior to unification. The Kohl government didn’t agree to any changes suggested by the East German government that formally negotiated unification but really rubberstamped the subordination of East German society to West German institutions. Economic integration was different though. The collapse of the East German economy, triggered by the design of monetary union and privatizations, had a lasting impact on the West German economic model that East Germans had been eager to embrace. The first decade after unification was marked by a twin deficit in government budgets and current accounts. During the unification boom from 1990 to 1993, inflation went up to levels not seen since the oil-price hikes and inflationary struggles between capital and labour from the 1970s to the early 1980s. At that time, however, the West German inflation rate was still below that of other Western countries, whereas in the early 1990s it was amongst the highest

    West Germany as a role model

    Running continued deficits—let alone a twin deficit—was unthinkable in a country that rebuilt its economy after the Second World War through integration into a world market with rules established and enforced by the US. In this American Empire, West Germany played the role of bulwark against Soviet Communism, including East Germany, and as a showcase of Western capitalism. To succeed in this role, foreign debt, accumulated by the Nazis and inherited by West Germany as legal successor of the Third Reich, was forgiven through the 1953 London Debt Agreement. West Germany also inherited low wages, industrial capacity and new technologies from the Nazi economy that, contrary to widespread assumptions, survived the war largely intact. This gave West German industries a competitive advantage that was further buttressed by favourable exchange rates on which basis West Germany was admitted to the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates in 1952. Reintegration into the world market also allowed West Germany to transition from a coal-based to an oil-based economy. Oil was cheaper than coal but its supplies were controlled by US companies and the American state.

    However, being a junior partner in the American Empire turned out to be a much better deal for the German bourgeoisie than its earlier quests for world power. The territory under its direct control was much smaller after two failed power grabs but profits were stellar. Driven by exports, or export surpluses more precisely, the West German economy didn’t require fiscal stimulus and kept growing until the US turned to floating exchange rates, which led to a significant appreciation of the Deutschmark. Further, oil prices exploded in the 1970s. But it was during these turbulences that West Germany consolidated its reputation as a beacon of economic stability. Political management of the crisis, notably codetermination (German lingo for the institutionalized cooperation between unions and employer association), kept wages and inflation lower than in most other Western countries. This helped to sustain export surpluses for much of the 1970s. In turn, export surpluses allowed the government to keep fiscal stimulus and unemployment rates low. Again, this is compared to other Western countries, not compared to the post-war boom.

    West Germany’s relative success in managing the economic crises of the 1970s raised some concerns among its allies, who considered this success a case of beggar-thy-neighbour policies. The US pressured the West German government to increase public spending in order to stimulate the world economy. The West German government couldn’t shrug off these US demands entirely. The social democratic party was led by Helmut Schmidt at the time, and some extra spending also appeased the left wing in his own party as well as some unionists. However, calls for a Keynesian fix of the economic crises never overcame the general preference for fiscal prudence and low inflation that marked West German society after two lost wars, each followed by the introduction of a new currency, one of them also by unprecedented hyperinflation. Not entirely without reason, export success after the Second World War was widely attributed to liberal economic principles, conveniently ignoring the fact that this ‘liberalism in one country’ could only work because other economies placed growing demand on the world market.

    Export success also created an ersatz-identity that allowed West Germans to repress the horrors of the Nazi regime and the roles most of them had played in these horrors, as perpetrators or bystanders. Social democrats never really fit into this picture. Willy Brandt, who spent the Nazi reign in underground resistance circles and exile and would later become West Germany’s first social democratic chancellor, was seen by many as a traitor. His successor Helmut Schmidt, who had served in the Nazi air force, opposed many of Brandt’s plans for social reform and applied Keynesian policies only in homeopathic doses. He was successfully branded as the one responsible for rising unemployment and inflation by the Conservatives and Liberals. Crossing the floor from SPD to CDU, the Liberals made Helmut Kohl chancellor. Kohl won two elections before unification on the promise of bringing post-war prosperity back. He won another two after unification on the promise of bringing the prosperity to East Germany.

    For a long time, Kohl presented himself successfully as the defender of the West German export model and guarantor of the collective identity tied to that model, despite the fact that 1980s West Germany never saw a return to postwar prosperity. Disappointment with his broken promises for a West German economic miracle 2.0 began spreading towards the end of the 1980s. Yet, the disintegration of the SED regime allowed him to renew and extend his promises to the East. The national euphoria that secured his 1990 election victory also saw a transformation of collective identity. West German pride in being export world champion turned into Deutschmark nationalism. Widely shared in the East, where people were happy to get the Deutschmark, and the West, where people saw it as symbol of their postwar achievements, this was not the pure money, or currency, fetishism Karl Marx wrote about in Capital. It had a distinctive nationalist character that was subdued in West Germany’s pre-unification export-identity. With unification, the nationalist seed blossomed. Not only did this help Kohl become the ‘chancellor of unity,’ but it also gave cover to a burst of neo-Nazi attacks on immigrants, leftists and queer people, culminating in arson attacks in Rostock, Mölln and Solingen. The latter two killed eight people, while the attack in Rostock laid a four-day siege on an apartment block inhabited by foreign workers who had been employed in East Germany’s now defunct state-owned economy. The openly neo-Nazi attacks of the early 1990s, later dubbed “baseball bat years,” were followed by a series of murders committed by the National Socialist Underground (NSU) that cost nine immigrants and one cop their lives from 2000 to 2007. The role of the German secret service in covering up, or even facilitating, these murders has never been investigated as key documents remain classified until this day. Hans-Georg Maaßen, head of the secret service from 2012 to 2018, was one of the individuals responsible for blocking investigations of the NSU-murders. He also heads up an ultra-conservative circle, initially inside the CDU and now operating in the right-wing space between the CDU und the AfD.

    Exports über alles: Eastern peripheries boost corporate profits

    During unification and in the first few years afterwards, nationalism was a mass ideology. It rallied flag-waving masses in the streets, it dominated German politics and inspired Nazi-skinheads to chase people they considered enemies. As it became clear that the hopes for an economic miracle 2.0 would not be realized, street protests receded, most skinheads scaled down their activism and just a few turned to clandestine terrorist attacks. It seemed that nationalism had lost the force it had just recently. However, the entanglements between Nazis and parts of the state apparatuses indicate that while nationalism wasn’t as visible as before, it had not disappeared.

    As it turned out, the opening of the Berlin Wall was a key step towards what would later be called neoliberal globalization. As the German bourgeoisie sought its place in a world seemingly governed by the invisible hand of the market—not Soviet planners or the milder version of Western government intervention—nationalism also found a new role as mass ideology. The ideological wind blowing from the ‘real West,’ that is, the United States, rebranded free trade theory going back to the days of David Ricardo as globalization. Sticking closely to Ricardo’s principles, academic globalists argued that firms, if left alone by the state, would specialize in the production of those goods they can produce more cheaply than firms in another country either because they possess more productive technologies or use input factors more plentiful and cheap than in another country. All countries will be better off if firms in each country specialize according to their comparative advantages.

    Globalization practitioners talked about entire countries as if they were firms competing against each other. Competitiveness of nation-states became the lodestar of capitalists, and their political executors, who used it to justify the roll-back of wages and social standards in all countries. Their run-the-country-like-a-business propaganda was so persuasive that even working class people whose wages, pensions and public services were cut fell for it in large numbers, electing and re-electing neoliberal globalizers over and over again. At the same time, fear that the policies just voted for would cause a race to the bottom spread in the rich countries that saw parts of their production outsourced to poor countries, where labour was really cheap, while immigrants from such countries would take on jobs in the burgeoning low-wage sectors of the rich countries. Migration, segmented labour markets and a global reserve army of labour, enabling capitalists to engage in global labour arbitrage, were neither part of academic globalization theory nor did they feature in politicians’ globalization propaganda. Absent from public debate, these real-life factors created fears that a new right could build on by portraying economic problems as questions of national identity. Translated into policy terms, that meant a program of keeping immigrants out and capital in. This protectionist backlash against neoliberal globalization, coupled with the rise of a new right ranging from populist to neo-Nazi formations, occurred all over the Global North. It began slowly in the late 1990s and early 2000s while globalization was still expanding, and then gathered steam in the wake of the 2008-9 world financial crisis that marked the end of accumulation driven by globalization. It has accelerated again since the COVID-19 recession as well as the escalating great power politics vis-à-vis Russia and China, which have led to openly imperialist policies couched in the same nationalist ideology which the new right thrives on. The competitive nation-as-corporation ideology and the policies that marked actually unfolding globalization was the breeding ground for today’s strange bedfellowship of globalizers-turned-great-power-warriors and national supremacists of the new right. Theories of unregulated free trade opening the path towards global prosperity were just an ideological tool that was useful as long the integration of more and more countries into the US-dominated world market fuelled capitalist accumulation, and thereby hopes for the eventual trickle-down. It was replaced with the rhetoric of concern for national security and democracy as accumulation ended in a new phase of stagnation.

    The German bourgeoisie had already adopted the logic of the state as business competitor after the Second World War when it traded world power ambitions for a junior partner role in the American Empire. Balanced budgets and tight money formed the core of its policies. That, along with competitive advantages inherited from the Nazis or granted by the US, enabled export-driven growth and, ultimately, export surpluses. Despite verbal commitments to liberalism, these policies were mercantilist in substance. Shattered but not derailed by the crises of the 1970s, West Germany’s mercantilist regime of accumulation survived until unification led to a twin deficit, slow growth and socioeconomic divisions between East and West. Unified Germany’s economy stumbled along while the US enjoyed its New Economy boom, even though that turned out to be short-lived, and China attained unprecedented levels of economic growth.

    The Kohl government didn’t respond to the bourgeoisie’s growing concerns about economic stagnation in Germany. Neither did it respond to growing dissatisfaction with social conditions among the popular classes. After uniting Germany, Kohl turned to further uniting Europe. Partly, he wanted to demonstrate Germany’s continued commitment to cooperation in the European Union as some European leaders—notably British Prime Minister Thatcher and French President François Mitterrand—had expressed reservations about German unification and worried about a return of German great power ambitions. European monetary union became Kohl’s preferred route to an “ever closer union,” as EU-parlance had it at the time. However, regarding other countries, notably in the Mediterranean, Kohl successfully pushed for tight fiscal and monetary rules—the same kind of rules West German policy makers followed in the postwar period. Under the favourable conditions granted by the US to integrate into the world market, this led to export-driven prosperity. However, other countries didn’t enjoy the same favourable conditions. What would upset governments and people in such countries even more was the fact that Kohl had abandoned the rules he was preaching to other European countries in his very own united Germany

    Helmut Kohl at the CDU national party convention in Hamburg, 1973. Photo from Wikimedia Commons

    There, European monetary union was widely seen as a top-down capitalist elite project, part of corporate globalization or as a handing over of the beloved Deutschmark to irresponsible Eurocrats and the Club Med, a derogatory term often used in public debates to denounce people in the Mediterranean countries as lazy, spend-thrifty and, worst of all, happily having a good time at the expense of others. Euro-scepticism added to disappointment with the collapse of East Germany’s economy after unification, growing income polarization and fears of job loss all over Germany and a sense of losing national sovereignty to global capital. Unresponsive to any of these concerns, Kohl and his coalition of Conservatives and Liberals eventually lost the 1998 election to the Social Democrats and Greens who formed a coalition government offering a blend of light Keynesianism, green transition and control of financial markets. This is where the German—and international—bourgeoisies got really concerned.

    The opening ideological salvos to derail the newly elected government’s plans came from the British tabloid The Sun, calling Oskar Lafontaine, the new finance minister who proposed the introduction of a Tobin tax, “Europe’s most dangerous man.” Next came Madeleine Albright, then US secretary of state, who gave Germany’s Green Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer the choice of joining the bombing campaign against Yugoslavia or having his country isolated from Western allies. Fischer, and the new Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, chose war. Seeing that his opposition to the war wasn’t supported by anyone else in the cabinet, Lafontaine resigned before the bombing began.

    A few months later, The Economist called Germany the “Sick man of the Euro.” Coming from the central organ of global capitalism and unrepentant advocate of liberalism since the days when England, not China, was the workshop of the world, this was not just another opinion piece. It was a warning that the international investment community—exactly the CEOs, bankers, brokers and financiers targeted by the then-emerging movement against corporate globalization—lost confidence in the German market and expected pro-business measures to boost their propensity to invest.

    After a few months in office, Schröder had to choose between meeting voters’ expectations (job creation, reduction of job insecurities and income inequality) and capitalists’ cost-reduction demands. He chose the capitalists’ side, earning him the nickname Genosse der Bosse (Comrade of the Bosses). In the absence of a social movement from below that could have pushed him to deliver on the election platforms of the SPD and the Greens, this choice might actually better be called caving to capitalist threats of an investment strike. From 2000 to 2005, the Schröder government axed corporate tax rates, exempted capital gains from taxation and lowered equity requirements for credits. The other side of the class divide saw drastic reductions in unemployment benefits, essentially slashing them to the level of welfare payment rates after one year of benefits. At the same time, legal obstacles to employing temporary workers were greatly reduced. Capitalists were thrilled. Profits and asset prices shot up, but capital formation declined during the years pro-business laws were passed.

    Reorganizing existing production capacities was more important to corporate executives than creating new capacities. This was not surprising as capacity utilization dropped when the New Economy bubble burst, triggering a downturn of the world economy that kept even booming China below double-digit growth. As it turned out, united Germany did not inherit the export successes of pre-unification West Germany, but was certainly heir to its export dependence.

    In the early 2000s, Germany’s current account turned positive again—not because exports grew so strongly (they actually stagnated due to the world economic downturn), but because imports declined owing to weak domestic demand associated with the Schröder government’s neoliberal policies. However, as the world economy bounced back (China saw growth rates of 10-14 percent from 2003 to 2006), German exports grew again. Eventually the reorganization of production processes in the aftermath of German unification paid off. West German corporations now controlled production networks linking corporate headquarters controlling finance, research and development, and capital-intensive parts of actual assembly in the centres with labour intensive production in low-wage areas in the peripheries from Eastern Germany all the way to China. In these networks, East Germany occupied the position of a semi-periphery. On the supply side, German export success in the early 2000s relied on continued wage inequality between centres and peripheries, which doesn’t mean that all workers in the centres earned high wages. The threat to relocate production to the East or the South put the brakes on all wages. The lowering of social standards propelled the growth of low-wage employment, notably in the service sector. Well-paying, permanent jobs began to decrease as a share of total employment even in West Germany. As a result, discontent that was widespread in the East since political unification was followed by economic collapse, and social downgrading began to creep into the West.

    2010s: Exporting the Euro-crisis

    The export surpluses of the early 2000s relied on the same mercantilism that had generated such surpluses during the postwar prosperity. However, during the postwar period, unprecedented growth rates across the Western, and parts of the non-Western, world made it possible to superimpose a welfare state on a mercantilist economy that didn’t squeeze profit rates but operated with capital’s consent in a way that seemed unthinkable during the age of catastrophe from 1914 to 1945. In the early 2000s, by contrast, successful mercantilism demanded the roll-back of the welfare state. Tragically, the extension of West Germany’s welfare state institutions to East Germany, where they were superimposed on a collapsing economy, created the profit squeeze that was needed to curtail the material protections granted by the welfare state. To sustain competitive advantages gained by scaling back the welfare state, it was imperative to keep wage-growth low even after surging exports pulled the economy out of the slump. Unlike during the period of postwar prosperity, export surpluses didn’t stimulate domestic demand very much. In fact, current account surpluses in the early 2000s, which surged from -1.8 percent in 2000 to 6.7 percent in 2007, were as much driven by rising exports as by weak growth of imports, a clear indicator of the overall sluggishness of domestic demand. Unemployment rates rose from 9.3 percent in 2000 to 12.1 percent in 2005. After that, unemployment went into long-term decline, briefly interrupted by the 2008/9 Great Recession and slowed down by the 2009/15 Euro-crisis, eventually reaching five percent before the 2020 COVID-19 Recession. However, this job growth occurred almost entirely in low wage occupations.

    Paradoxically, it was during the Euro-crisis that a wave of “export nationalism” covered up the discontent that was growing, at variable speeds, across Germany. The Deutschmark nationalism that emerged during German unification had taken a hit with the introduction of the Euro. However, when it turned out that the Euro was basically the old Deutschmark under a new name and export surplus levels were reaching unprecedented heights, it almost seemed that the long-awaited return of prosperity was about to materialize. But of course, it wasn’t the same as the postwar prosperity that saw strong growth almost everywhere. The 2010s, by contrast, were a time of stagnation. The rebound after the 2008/9 recession was stronger in Germany than in other countries, but then growth rates fell in line with the one-to-two percent range of other Western countries.

    It was during this time of recurrent crises and long-term stagnation that the German government, led by Angela Merkel with the Social Democrats as junior partner, felt compelled to lecture other governments on economic policy. Completely blind to the fact that beggar-thy-neighbour policies are a zero-sum game, the Merkel-government told Southern European countries to impose austerity despite the fact that they were suffering from a sovereign debt crisis due to the end of cheap credit that became available after the creation of the European monetary union, helping to pay for imports from Germany. Merkel also told them that, after a painful but unavoidable period of belt-tightening, they would eventually succeed as export countries like Germany.

    The European monetary union’s contradictory character torn between further integrating Europe and spreading German mercantilism shifted entirely to the latter. Southern Europeans, governments and ordinary people, understood that austerity would further subordinate their economies to Germany’s economic dominance. The Brits, like the Germans and the “Frugal Four” (Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden), although not warm to the idea of bailing out crisis-ridden Southern Europeans, were suspicious that Germany’s leading role in handling the crisis would turn the country’s economic dominance into fully-fledged hegemony. Brexit has its origin here. Eastern Europe’s post-communist comprador governments had imposed austerity on their countries in acts of pre-emptive obedience and now felt betrayed as they thought the bailout packages the Merkel government used as a means to impose austerity on the South were actually some sort of welfare package.

    Centrifugal forces in the EU were further fuelled when, in face of civil war and foreign interventions in Syria, Merkel unilaterally declared open borders for Syrian refuges and then told EU member states they all had to take their share of refugees. European governments already concerned over Germany’s domineering role in managing the Euro-crisis were dismayed. Public debate within Germany was sharply divided between liberals and leftists applauding Merkel’s humanist stance and right-wingers, including in her own party, warning of an uncontrolled flow of immigrants. Largely unnoticed was the fact that Merkel’s decision to open borders for Syrian refugees was tied to the anti-Russian turn in German foreign policy following the sharp polarization between pro- and anti-Russian forces in Ukraine during and after the Maidan protests in 2014. Most of the Syrian refugees were fleeing the Russian-backed Assad-regime, which was considered an adversary. Opening borders for these refugees set a precedent for the surge of Ukrainian refugees following Russia’s invasion of Eastern Ukraine in 2022. At that point, Merkel, who had already retired, told the media that her government saw the Minsk accords, officially meant to reach a settlement between contending political and military forces within Ukraine, as a means of buying time to arm the Zelensky government.

    2020s: Sick man of Europe 2.0

    As Ukraine, already torn by civil war, became the scene for a proxy war between NATO-countries and Russia, Germany was firmly subordinated to US foreign policy. Post-communist governments in Germany had, more or less enthusiastically, supported deepening trade relations with Russia. Oil and gas imports might have been the most significant part of German-Russian trade but were certainly not the only one. Torn between allegiance to the US and lucrative business deals with Russia, the German government, now headed by Social Democrat Olaf Scholz, cut its economic ties with Russia after the latter’s invasion of Ukraine. The price to be paid was a further spike in energy prices, on top of the increases attendant on the economic recovery from the COVID-19-recession.

    As part of current US efforts to contain China, the German government has been pressured to scale down its trade with China—Germany’s largest trading partner and also a prime outlet for German foreign direct investments. Since Germany’s economy is as much export-driven as export-dependent, the US turn from neoliberal globalization to escalating sanctions and protectionism in the name of national security has caused high levels of uncertainty within the German bourgeoisie. In addition to the return of secular stagnation after the very short post-COVID recovery in the West and the petering out of the China boom, this uncertainty is driving low levels of investment. Inflation, fuelled by post-COVID recovery and rising energy prices, and lower real incomes leading directly to less consumer spending, but also indirectly, as households build up their savings in anticipation of more economic shocks in the future. Meanwhile the Scholz government boosted arms spending while otherwise imposing austerity.

    After two years of recession, Germany is again being branded the “sick man of Europe” by The Economist. The last time Germany earned this title the neoliberal turn against the welfare state produced massive current account surpluses, meagre general growth rates and massive social and regional inequalities. The export nationalism that concealed the mounting discontent with neoliberalism was shaken by the US turn from neoliberal globalization to protectionism and militarism. Given its high level of export dependence, Germany was ill prepared for the turn against it, which unleashed pent-up disappointments and anxieties into the political sphere. This happened all over Germany but more so in the East than in the West as regional differences in income, wealth and representation in leadership positions had created widespread feelings of being second class citizens in a politically united Germany.

    In the absence of socialist imagination, German politics are haunted by the spectres of the past. An insurgent hard-right pins the labels of communism or Marxism on everything that ever came from the left, Social Democrats, the Greens and, of course, the Left Party, no matter how members, activists and supporters of these parties position themselves on the political spectrum. At the same time, the hard-right wants Germany to leave its Nazi past behind. Downplaying Nazi atrocities, accusing liberals and leftists of burdening Germans with a cult of guilt, they propagate the reclaiming of German national pride and sovereignty from allegedly cosmopolitan elites. Between the very real and growing right and a weak and largely imaginary left, centrist parties that proclaimed the end of history in the heyday of neoliberalism are also shifting to the right. The decline of the Left Party is a mirror image of the rise of the AfD.

    Alternative für Deutschland: A child of Deutschmark nationalism

    Mainstream media and centrist parties view the new right as if it were some external force inexplicably appearing on the political scene and threatening the liberal order. But this is empirically wrong. Almost all leading figures of the AfD come from conservative West German milieus where they previously held positions in public administration or private businesses. Although they present themselves as anti-establishment rebels, they are establishment people who turned from the centre-right to the hard-right. The AfD also includes party activists who come from militant neo-Nazi groups that have existed on the fringes of West German society since the CDU gave many old Nazis a political home after the downfall of the Third Reich. Making small advances into electoral politics in the late 1960s and again in the 1980s, the neo-Nazis remained marginal until they found common ground with disgruntled conservatives. Deutschmark nationalism served as the ideological bonding material for neo-Nazis and right-of-centre conservatives, and became a rallying point for growing numbers of people dissatisfied with the policies of neoliberal globalization advanced by the centrist parties. It emerged in the tumultuous days after the fall of the Berlin wall as a mass ideology that shaped East and West German politics in the direction of unification. After that, it became an ideological point of reference that allowed for the integration of different political ideas and currents into a new right political project, the AfD.

    Riding on the wave of Euro-scepticism that accompanied the Euro crisis, the AfD, founded in 2013, promoted a German exit from the EU, which would also have meant exit from the Euro. However, boosting the Deutschmark nostalgia associated with German-style Euro-scepticism got the newly minted party only so far. What really fuelled the AfD’s take-off was the wave of Syrian refugees coming to Germany (and other EU-countries) in 2015. The party’s approval ratings rose from roughly five percent in its first two years to around 12 percent in the next two years. With the surge in voter approval came a programmatic shift from ‘neoliberalism in one country’ to neoliberalism hidden behind ethnonationalist hate propaganda. Despite advocating for a strong state, the AfD also presents itself as a rebellious party of freedom. This paradox is resolved by portraying cosmopolitan elites, represented most notably by the Greens, as a force dominating state apparatuses and misusing them to bring excessive numbers of foreigners into the country with their cultures that allegedly threaten German people, suppress German heritage and push the economy into decay. Therefore a strong state is needed to defend Germany against foreign incursion and revive its inherent strength

    Election poster of the AfD in Thuringia supporting remigration. Photo from Wikimedia Commoms

    The Scholz government created the conditions in which the AfD’s self-portrayal as freedom fighters gave the party another boost. The modest Green New Deal platforms on which the SPD and Greens ran their 2021 election campaign didn’t gain enough traction to allow them to form a government, despite support from unions and even, more cautiously, employer associations. To obtain a majority in the Bundestag, SPD and Greens formed an ostensibly unlikely coalition with the FDP, a party mostly focused on cutting taxes and limiting public deficits. These commitments to tax breaks for the rich and austerity for the poor stood in the way of effective state-sponsored energy transition programs. Hence, the Scholz-government was perceived as weak from the start. Things went from bad to worse for the government after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Under pressure from the US, Scholz opted for sanctions against Russia, arms deliveries to Ukraine and a continued increase in arms spending. At a time when the prices of everything from butter to housing were soaring, making it clear that money would still be available for guns but maybe not for butter not only destroyed whatever support the government had before the Ukraine war but also gave the AfD another boost. A year and a half into the war, the SPD was trailing the AfD in federal polls. Picking up widespread, though by no means dominant, unease with arms support for Ukraine and fear of war with Russia, the AfD advocates a negotiated peace settlement between Russia and Ukraine and, more importantly to the AfD, the lifting of sanctions on Russia. For the AfD, urging peace with Russia is not a matter of a principled anti-militarism but a means of reviving German trade with Russia, notably Russian energy imports that are seen as a precondition for economic recovery. To achieve this, Germany has to free itself from the ‘cosmopolitan sell-out elite.’ Whether everybody now supporting the AfD subscribes to the freedom-for-German-supremacy-view is open to debate. What can’t be denied is the fact that many discontented people, whatever their main grievance, are looking to the right, not the left, for alternatives to a failing political centre. Some are also turning to the CDU, which claims to be different from both the AfD and the federal coalition government, without offering anything other than praise for the good old days. That served the party well at times when the German economy could thrive, to a greater or lesser degree, on US-enabled expansion of world markets. With the US protectionist turn, this is no longer possible and the party is torn between centrism and the new right. Current support for the CDU is highly unstable, which could easily work in the AfD’s favour, especially in the absence of persuasive alternatives from the left, which so far have not materialized.

    This wasn’t always the case. Something like a left renewal had once seemed to be in the offing in the most unlikely place: East Germany during the transition from state socialism to a peripheral position in an enlarged capitalist Germany. In West Germany, the nationalist wave that came with unification swept away much of the activist left that had rallied thousands—sometimes tens or even hundreds of thousands— of people in the 1980s against the stationing of US nuclear missiles, nuclear power plants, Nazis, and South Africa’s apartheid regime, among other causes. Left circles within the SPD, the Greens and the labour movement weathered the nationalist storm without leaving a mark on German politics. In this political climate, the Party of Democratic Socialism (Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus or PDS) stood out as a beacon of the left.

    Emerging from East Germany’s ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED), the PDS became the political home of many East Germans who lost their jobs, social status and cultural identity during the transition to capitalism. Quickly establishing a presence in East Germany’s provincial and municipal parliaments, the party expressed the discomfort of many East Germans who felt like second class citizens under the domination of West German institutions, politicians, corporations and culture. It highlighted East Germany’s socialist heritage, which encompassed commitments to anti-fascism, peace and international solidarity as much as the dictatorship of the politburo, Stasi-surveillance and an overbearing bureaucracy. The party hung itself up in endless debates between those who downplayed or justified East German communism’s dark sides and others who sought to disown that history by embracing liberal principles. Practically, these disputes didn’t make much difference. Upholding socialist principles didn’t stop the party from pragmatically working within the political and economic confines created by unification. At times, this included voting for privatization of public housing and infrastructure. For decades since the party was founded, the contradiction between socialist principles and the subordination to neoliberal policies imposed by the West German bourgeoisie didn’t stop the PDS or its successor organization Die Linke (the Left Party), from becoming something like a catch-all or people’s party in East Germany, a role long held by the CDU und the SPD in West Germany. For years, the PDS/Left Party achieved election results in the mid-20 percent range, peaking at 28 percent in Brandenburg in 2004 and 32 percent in Thuringia in 2019. It was also, and still is, part of various coalition governments in East German states. Until the September 2024 election, the Thuringian government was led by the Left Party’s Bodo Ramelow.

    Despite this overall success and despite the party’s fidelity to socialist principles, the social group that wasn’t interested in voting PDS consisted of workers, who still voted CDU in large numbers despite g the CDU’s failed to deliver on its big promises of post-unification prosperity. More recently they shifted to the AfD. Meanwhile, in West Germany, the PDS remained marginal throughout its existence, only attracting activists from various left grouplets. What little remained of left protest milieus after unification was still dominated by a mix of environmentalists, antifas and international solidarity activists who might vote Green, or maybe even SPD, but hardly ever PDS. The old working class milieus that were shrinking with the decline of smokestack industries were still dominated by unionists closer to the SPD than the PDS. This started to change when, under chancellor Schröder, the SPD implemented neoliberal counter-reforms on a scale his conservative predecessor Kohl had avoided throughout his 16-year tenure, despite his supposed commitment to unleashing market forces. Growing frustrations among left social democrats and unionists fed mass demonstrations against Schröder’s SPD and created a social and organizational base (including, most prominently, Schröder’s short-time finance minister Lafontaine) that merged with the PDS into the Left Party in 2007. In the federal elections two years later, the Left Party won 11.9 percent of the vote, then 9.2 percent in the 2017 elections, but fell to 4.9 percent in the 2021 elections. This was a worse result than the 5.1 percent the PDS obtained in 1998, an election that also saw an increased vote for the SPD, which allowed Schröder to succeed Kohl. It is worth noting that the PDS vote came almost entirely from East Germany, which represents less than a quarter of Germany’s total population.

    While the PDS mostly maintained peaceful coexistence between socialist theory and market-conforming practice, the Left Party continuously debated whether or not it should join centre-left governments, if given the chance. The bitterness with which party activists argued over this question stood in stark contrast to its actual relevance. In states where the party was relegated to opposition status by poor election results, this status didn’t attract additional voters keen on seeing a principled opposition in parliament. In states where the party joined governments, the results were mixed: sometimes it maintained its vote share in the subsequent election; sometimes it suffered losses. A paradoxical result came about in the Thuringian elections in September 2024: The Left Party lost massively, although, had there been direct elections for the minister-president (a position equivalent to provincial premier in Canada), the Left Party’s Bodo Ramelow would have won the election. This fits into a trend that became visible over the last few years in a number of state elections in East and West Germany. Party loyalties based on shared worldviews wear thin. Elections are often decided based on the media appeal of top politicians, regardless of party affiliation. Remarkably enough, Ramelow, just like Dietmar Woidke, the SPD’s lead candidate in the Brandenburg elections, dropped the name of his party on campaign posters, presenting himself as more of a provincial father figure than a man of the party.

    However, rather than signalling the end of ideology, as centrist politicians and postmodern philosophers might have argued before the rise of a very explicitly ideologically committed new right, the focus on limelight politicians pushes democratic debates into the shadows. In the case of the Left Party, it might also have been an attempt to distract from its own image as an organization mired in endless debates not producing any coherent, let alone persuasive, policies. The reasons for permanent internal discord are sociological and ideological. The Left Party was strongest in its early days, when the PDS’s social base still comprised a cross-section of the East German population, although workers remained underrepresented. It also attracted dissident social democrats and unionists from West Germany. To a limited extent, therefore the Left Party had the working class base the PDS never had.

    The blend of Keynesian and Marxist ideas around which social democratic dissidents and union leftists organized had been defeated as a significant political current during the crises of the 1970s by the Social Democratic right and corporatist union leaders who put competitiveness of the West German economy over income distribution from profits to wages. In the new millennium, when these currents joined forces with the PDS, they were still sizeable enough to give the newly founded Left Party a boost. But not for long. The smokestack industries around which these left currents were organizing were in continued decline, which made strategies based on that moribund reality obsolete. Moreover, these strategies often stood in the way of mobilizing and organizing the new working classes that emerged in the service sector and, on a much smaller scale, IT, bio tech, and green energy.

    As the ranks of the Left Party thinned out with the loss of members coming out of communist East Germany or from West German union and social democratic circles, the party was able to attract new blood mainly in the form of highly educated, often precariously employed, urban dwellers. The shift in membership from old left offspring to the children of neoliberal globalization was paralleled by a geographical shift in electoral support. In urban centres, losses among the party’s old left supporters could be partially compensated; in rural areas, however, where the PDS and the Left Party had always been weak, the party disappeared almost entirely. Often, there isn’t even anyone to put up election campaign posters

    Anti-AfD protest in Germany. Photo by strassenstriche.net/Flickr

    Unlike the original base of both the PDS and the Left Party, the urban hipsters who joined the Left Party had no old left reference points. Even when they talked about Marx and class they did so with postmodern accents. However, this did not help them to gain sizeable support among the working classes—sometimes lumped together as the “precariat”—that developed in expanding economic sectors. The political offerings of the Left Party seemed to exercise little appeal for both old and potentially new constituencies. The party’s founding basis of unity was opposition to neoliberalism. In the early days this left room for East German concerns about the outcomes of unification—arguably a kind of neoliberal restructuring—with opposition to the neoliberal turn of the Schröder-government in East and West Germany. It also left plenty of room for a variety of goals, from resurrecting the Keynesian welfare state to a multitude of vaguely defined socialisms for the future to opposition without a vision for the future. However, what sufficed to form the Left Party wasn’t enough to sustain and grow it, especially not as it became harder to label government policies neoliberal.

    The Great Recession, the COVID-19 pandemic, and commitments to ongoing arms production brought state intervention back to the centre of politics, contrary to the 1990s and early 2000s when politics was dominated by advancing capital mobility and free trade. Back then, ruling elites organized consent of the popular classes, more or less successfully, under the banner of “international competitiveness.” The new watchword “national security” is better at rallying the new right than building support for centrist parties. Left Party intellectuals debated the new political conjuncture under the label “post-neoliberalism,” a word-monster that hints, perhaps unwittingly, at the party’s inability to develop a strategy beyond rejecting neoliberalism. In reaction to the imposition of a party line by its predecessor organization, the PDS and the Left Party allowed a wide range of views. However, members of various organized currents, ranging from social-liberal to communist, tended to talk more about each other than with each other.

    Postmodernist philosophers’ contention that the days of master narratives are over was wrong with respect to neoliberalism—if there ever was a master narrative, it was neoliberalism—but it does apply to the Left Party, which could not synthesize different ideas into compelling left policies that could rally growing discontent. Instead, internal debates turned into factional turf wars in a party that resembled an appendix of the Scholz government, costing the Left Party more and more support.

    After years of bitter infighting, discontent with declining voter approval and accommodation of government policies led to the split of the federal party caucus and the formation of the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) in January 2024. As its name indicates, the party is entirely built around its frontwoman, who represented the Left Party in the Bundestag from 2009 to 2023. In the BSW, the cacophony that destructively marks the Left Party is replaced by closed-door debates. As in the Communist party of old, membership isn’t open to everyone; applications to join must be approved. Wagenknecht, originally a member of the Communist Platform (one of the organized currents inside the PDS), had shifted to left-Keynesian, pro-welfare state positions. But, years before her split from the Left Party, she began advocating ordoliberal positions—a branch of neoliberal thinking that stresses the role of the state in allowing businesses to compete without being bogged down by monopolies. This German version of neoliberalism has been the hallmark of economic policy and ideology since the early years of West German world market integration. In Wagenknecht’s current adaptation of ordoliberalism, the state guarantees competition, which, in turn, creates a strong economy capable of providing stable employment, social security and a fairer distribution of incomes. She combines this embrace of free markets plus the welfare state with a critique of the European Union as an institution operating in the interest of big corporations and a critique of NATO and US hegemony. Her condemnation of American hegemony appealed to some members of the Left Party, as did her critique of the EU, although her more recent favourable references to ordoliberalism and policies aiming at stricter migration controls were less popular.

    The BSW’s outlook is very much shaped by positive memories of West German postwar prosperity. Yet, the party’s advocacy of international cooperation, a position going back to 1970s detente policies, contrasts sharply with orientations of the centrist parties and some currents within her own former party. Demand for a negotiated settlement of the Ukraine war overlaps with AfD positions. However, the AfD considers this a matter of Germany’s national interest that doesn’t preclude support for rearmament and war in other regions, like Gaza most recently. The BSW, on the other hand, sees militarism largely as the US’s last recourse for defending its ailing empire. It remains to be seen how the BSW’s principled opposition to militarism and war can mesh with current negotiations for a coalition government with the CDU and the SPD, both committed to military support for Zelensky in Ukraine and Netanyahu in Israel. Polls suggest that electoral support for the BSW was largely driven by the desire for an anti-war voice in parliament. At the same time, there is considerable support for efforts to keep the AfD out of government, despite all the support the AfD garnered in the fall state elections in East Germany. If this means compromising its anti-militarism, the BSW may, like the Left Party before it, soon be seen as a superfluous appendix of unpopular centrist parties.

    After weeks of negotiations, the BSW entered into a coalition government with the SPD in Brandenburg as well as with the CDU and SPD in Thuringia. It also supports a minority government made up of the CDU and the SPD in Saxony. It did all this to keep the AfD out of government positions. Understandable as such efforts are, they have already cost the BSW in the polls. Hovering just above five percent, the BSW may not reach the five-percent threshold for obtaining seats in the upcoming federal elections. The Left Party, standing at 3.5 percent in the polls, will probably fall short. Founded as a project to unify left forces from East and West Germany, its split early last year already signalled the failure of that project. The next election may reduce it to insignificance, leaving lots of room for the AfD [end]

    The original article

    Ingo Schmidt is an economist and works as the coordinator of the Labour Studies Program at Athabasca University

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    The British spooks who gathered around Project Alchemy reasoned that the longer the proxy war continued, the more Russian president Vladimir Putin’s “credibility at home and abroad drops, and his ability to fight NATO is degraded.” Today, Project Alchemy’s gambit has clearly backfired, as Putin remains popular within Russia, while a crumbling Ukrainian army loses territory by the day despite constant re-arming by the West. But the war planners in London remain staunchly committed to escalation, refusing to shelve their diabolical proposals.

    Britain takes ‘unilateral lead’ on ‘regime change’ in Russia

    Project Alchemy was founded on the personal orders of Lt. General Charlie Stickland, who is charged with “planning, executing and integrating UK led joint and multinational overseas military operations” as the head of Britain’s Permanent Joint Headquarters. Stickland boasts in leaked communications that his family “come from a long line of pirates and buccaneers.” In his email signature, the general identifies himself as an “LGBTQ+ Advocate” in rainbow-colored text.

    Stickland and his assistant, Maj. Ed Harris, did not answer The Grayzone’s calls to their personal phones, nor did they respond to detailed questions submitted to them through WhatsApp

    Stickland convened the first meeting of Project Alchemy’s on February 26, 2022, just days after Russian troops made their initial foray into Ukraine. According to minutes of the gathering, “an assortment of leading academics, authors, strategists, planners, pollsters, comms, data scientists and tech” was on hand to produce a “grand strategy options paper.” 

    The paper consisted of a series of proposals for the British government to “defeat Putin in Ukraine and set the conditions for the reshaping of an open international order of the future.” Throughout the document, the need to “keep Ukraine fighting” was described as London’s “main effort” in the conflict.

    In an email to British military apparatchiks dated March 3 2022, Stickland described Alchemy’s paper as the result of “some mischief I’ve been up to” with “a group of ‘sideways thinkers.’” He expressed satisfaction that “this has been seen by all sorts of people,” including senior British government and military officials, “and landed well”

    An Excel document listing potential and confirmed recruits for the effort, authored by project chief Dom Morris, names a number of individuals from the private sector and academia alongside high-ranking army officials. Currently a fellow at King’s College’s “Centre for Grand Strategy,” Morris was listed in the document as a “civilian leader.” The role of “military leader” was to be carried out by Simon Scott, a brigadier in the British army who was appointed O.B.E. in 2013 for his “gallant and distinguished services” in Afghanistan

    Information operations were to be headed by a still-to-be determined member of Britain’s 77th Psychological Operations Brigade. Also listed as a participant in information operations was longtime British psychological warfare operative Amil Khan, founder of the “counter-disinformation” analysis firm Valent Projects.

    In 2021, The Grayzone revealed how the then-Prince of Wales, King Charles, enlisted Khan’s Valent Projects to astroturf a pseudo-socialist YouTube influencer to attack skeptics of the government’s ham-fisted response to Covid. Previously, Khan participated in the UK Foreign Office’s program to foment regime change in Syria.

    Months after Alchemy put Khan forward as a member of its team, The Grayzone exposed him for plotting with celebrity-left journalist Paul Mason to destroy this publication. One leaked email showed Khan proposing a “full nuclear legal [attack] to squeeze [The Grayzone] financially.” The newly-uncovered documents indicate the decision to assail The Grayzone was met with approval from the highest ranks of the British government.

    ‘Ukraine’s Next Chapter – Elders Grand Strategy Options Paper’

    Within Project Alchemy’s covert war room, the obsession with a long war quickly took hold. Members of the cell took their cues from a policy paper Stickland attributed to “The Elders,” which he described as “a group of Fusion players,” referring to the strata of academics and defense industry figures with strong ties to the British military.

    An Alchemy document composed under Stickland’s watch and titled, “Ukraine’s Next Chapter – Elders Grand Strategy Options Paper,” suggests that members of the cabal had convinced themselves a “palace coup” inside the Kremlin was inevitable. So long as Russia struggled inside Ukraine, they believed, British intelligence would be granted “the opportunity to challenge” Moscow’s ever-growing “stature as a competent international actor” on the world stage. 

    “A long war against a small state makes [Putin] look a fool,” the Alchemy paper asserted. “He is obsessed by the end of Ghaddafi – he will want to avoid that… Pressure will pile on from oligarchs as a long war drags on – he will not want to give them excuses to threaten his authority.” The group reasoned that “a long war will affect [Putin’s] international credibility,” as “a failure to quickly defeat Ukraine will seriously… reduce his credibility with new rich friends in Belarus, Hungary, China, India, Middle East, Brazil etc.

    “Most importantly,” protracted Russian involvement in Ukraine “will embolden NATO,” Alchemy argued. Convinced that Putin would fail in the eastern Donbas region, triggering a collapse of his government, Project Alchemy members openly fantasized about absorbing Russia into the Western-dominated financial order afterwards under the guise of a “Post Putin Marshall Plan.” Of particular interest was London’s “re-engagement” with Moscow “in global energy and commodity markets,” a seeming reference to the West’s desire for cheap Russian gas and wheat. 

    “Discreet operations”: reviving ‘Operation Gladio’ terror ops in Ukraine

    To accomplish the balkanization of Russia, Project Alchemy’s plotters took inspiration from Operation Gladio, a CIA and NATO-orchestrated covert operation that saw fascist paramilitaries carry out false flag terrorist attacks across Western Europe after World War II in a bid to prevent communism from taking root.

    A section detailing potential “discreet operations” in Alchemy’s strategy paper, which stressed the “need to intervene in every way except ‘official,’” explicitly recommended “Stay-behind Gladio handbooks/ Partisan Pamphlets” which would be “updated for Information Age” 

    Another move Alchemy proposed was to deploy Britain’s “strong” private military [PMC] industry “to out Wagner, Wagner.” In other words, the group aimed to establish a British rival to the Russian mercenary force founded by the now-deceased commander Yevgeny Prigozhin. This objective required the formulation of “a new doctrine, operating concept, and legal framework, for effectively integrating the activities of PMCs and other [non-military] actors.” Under these guidelines, British mercenary firms capable of using “sophisticated weaponry like SAMS, cyber, combat air, drones” would be employed to “operate and train and accompany Ukraine formations.” 

    These operations were all intended to ultimately be “sponsored and commanded” by the UK government, “using discreet cover” to avoid triggering NATO’s Article 5. 

    Following the production of their grand strategy paper, Stickland invited his team of “sideways thinkers” at Project Alchemy to submit further proposals for Gladio-style operations. Among the pitches that arrived was a “mission” to “disable the Kerch Bridge in a way that is audacious, and disrupts road and rail access to Crimea and maritime access to the Sea of Azov.” The blueprints of this highly provocative plot were exposed by The Grayzone in October 2022, in the immediate aftermath of the truck bomb attack that crippled the Kerch Bridge. 

    Alchemy’s team also produced a PowerPoint presentation entitled, “Training a Ukrainian Commando Force to restore Maritime Sovereignty – Elders,” outlining plans to construct a 1,000-strong Ukrainian commando force “trained in Britain by military veterans equipped with British equipment” to “degrade the Russian Navy and open another flank in the fight for Kherson and the south of Ukraine”

    Alchemy’s team had been working on the plan for at least three months by the time of the presentation’s submission. “Ukrainians abroad and volunteers inside Ukraine” had already been recruited, in advance of 12 weeks basic training “in the use of all troop weapons including mortars, anti-tank missiles, sniper craft, cliff assault, small craft training, demolitions,” the proposal stated

    The plan called for formally integrating the commandos into the Ukrainian Navy. Alchemy boasted that the prospective force “will be a force multiplier and highly mobile,” while Russia’s “outdated doctrine will struggle with a highly motivated and well-equipped naval force conducting hit and run operations and targeting Crimea.”

    Moreover, “individuals who are fluent Russian speakers and deemed suitable for covert undercover operations,” including “female operators,” would be “inserted into southern occupied Ukraine and Crimea for intelligence gathering and sabotage of key infrastructure targets.” They would be trained by MI6 officers. For this, Alchemy asked the British government for a total of £73.5 million. “The program is at a high state of readiness. We are ready to go,” the presentation forcefully declared. 

    The enormous sum was to be paid to Elders Services Ltd that was founded by Alchemy members and registered to an address just 15 miles from Fort Monckton, which was described by former MI6 officer Richard Tomlinson as “the SIS’s field operations training centre.” It is unknown how much money, if any, the firm received from the British government for resuscitating Operation Gladio in Ukraine. Elders Services Ltd shuttered in March 2023 after less than a year of operation, without filing financial accounts.

    British spies call for ‘action’ against The Grayzone

    Behind the Project Alchemy team’s bravado was a sense that Western hegemony was crumbling on the icy borderlands separating Ukraine from Russia. Referring to the rising BRICS alliance, which gathered in Kazan, Russia this October to challenge the US-dominated financial order, Alchemy planners urged British leadership to “prepare for SWIFT II,” as SWIFT was “going to be destroyed” by the West’s anti-Russia sanctions, “slowly, but inevitably.” 

    According to Alchemy’s analysts, countries across the globe would naturally “see the need for a non-US alternative” means of safely parking their cash and trading. In a rare show of political sobriety, the British spooks predicted that sanctions on Russia combined with the Ukraine proxy war would impose higher prices on consumer goods and “hit British voters in the pocket.”

    This posed “a threat to public support” for the British government’s “hard line” on Ukraine, they warned. “Domestic UK public opinion” would understandably get “fed up” paying more for everyday goods, meaning “pressure grows for a compromise.”

    To prepare the British public for the coming storm, Project Alchemy’s plotters proposed what they blandly described as “information operations,” but which could be more accurately described as a blend of domestic state propaganda and malign attacks on disruptive media outlets.

    The task they outlined not only included “[dismantling] Russian disinformation infrastructure” by pressuring social media to ban RT and Sputnik, but also targeting critical independent media like The Grayzone.

    “A number of actions can be undertaken against these outlets. The most obvious is legal since the content of these media outriders is frequently in contravention of media law in the UK, US and EU,” Alchemy insisted. 

    “Aggrieved parties currently tend to ignore libel/defamation by these outlets. Were they to aggressively pursue these outlets, it is likely they would be forced to close.”

    The Grayzone, it was claimed, had thus far “managed to obscure” its funding – a suggestion that this outlet is covertly funded by Russia or some other enemy state, which is completely false. The paranoid fantasies of British intelligence may explain why this journalist was quizzed on the subject by British counter-terror police when they detained and interrogated him at Luton International Airport in May 2023

    Alchemy plotters seek to place Britain at lead of war with Russia

    In addition to playing a leading role in media manipulation, Alchemy sought to place Britain at the forefront of the International Criminal Court’s agenda to investigate and prosecute the Russian government for alleged war crimes in Ukraine. 

    Alchemy suggested London “set international conditions, collection mechanisms and funding for collection of data and evidence” in the proxy conflict, and “provide all possible support, including intelligence” to the ICC “in its efforts to investigate war crimes,” just as British spies did for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). 

    Though not named in the document, high-profile British lawyers, including celebrity Amal Clooney, have since emerged at the forefront of efforts to prosecute Russian officials for war crimes, and establish an ICTY analog. As The Grayzone’s Max Blumenthal reported, Britain played a critical role in the appointment of Amal Clooney’s mentor, Karim Khan, as ICC prosecutor. 

    Project Alchemy’s provocative proposals appear to have reached the desk of PM Keir Starmer in some form. At NATO’s 75th anniversary summit, Starmer issued his full-throated endorsement of deep strikes by the Ukrainian military into Russia. Echoing the aggressive language found in Alchemy documents, he pledged to “deliver £3 billion worth of support to Ukraine each year… for as long as it takes.” 

    But as the Ukrainian military’s offensive in Russia’s Kursk region falters, the Biden administration has distanced itself from the calls for striking into the Russian heartland. Fortunately for British leaders hellbent on taking the fight to Moscow, Project Alchemy has ensured that a platter of off-the-books options remains handy.

    As Alchemy noted in its grand strategy paper, “The UK seeks always to act multilaterally, but is prepared to take a unilateral lead where achieving multilateral consensus might prove time-consuming or difficult.” Among the war’s covert sponsors, who were safely ensconced over 1,000 miles away from the front lines, it was firmly agreed: “we should attempt at all costs to keep Ukraine fighting” [end]

    The original article

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  • [Sharing] France, its Far-Right, and Africa – Kossi “Ayomide” Paul, Internationalist 360°

    France’s recent parliamentary elections indicate a rapid political shift to the right. Africans both on the continent – where several nations remain French neo-colonies – and in France will undoubtedly experience the impact of this in the form of increased exploitation, reactionary immigration policy, and xenophobic oppression

    Elections for the European Parliament took place on June 9, 2024. These elections are generally shunned by the French electorate, and the latest was no exception with nearly 50% abstaining from voting. This is one of the highest abstention rates in the region – a clear sign of the disconnect between the people and its institutions. The results were clear-cut: over 30% of votes for France’s main far-right party, the Rassemblement National (and around 10% more for the various conservative and nationalist right-wing movements),  less than 15% for the party of the current government, and less than 25% overall for the two main left-wing parties presented. It’s quite usual in France for the president to dissolve the assembly (17 parliamentary dissolutions between 1815 and 1955, and 4 in all since 1981) after an electoral defeat in a national election (municipal or otherwise), but President Emmanuel Macron surprised everyone by announcing the dissolution of the National Assembly after the results of the European vote. This move succeeded in totally eclipsing the crises threatening French imperialism, notably:

    • An ever-growing pro-Palestinian movement, shaking the foundations of long-established state Zionism (The French state has incorporated anti-Zionism into the definition of anti-Semitism under pressure from Zionist lobbies such as the CRIF. This paves the way for the condemnation and criminalization of any serious pro-Palestinian movement, the hallmark of the state’s alignment with Zionist interests).
    • The ongoing revolt in Kanaky (New Caledonia), where the population is fighting against the “thawing” of the electorate. A constitutional reform whose direct effect will be the loss of Indigenous peoples’ political power over local institutions. This was a  power obtained by the natives through struggle. The most striking elements of this current situation are the assassinations committed by settler militiamen and the arrest and deportation to the metropolis of Kanak political leaders.
    • A popular movement to challenge French influence in West Africa was crystallized by military coups and the formation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) in Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, and the election in Senegal of Bassirou Diomaye Faye[7] after a campaign waged on a clearly anti-colonial line.

    Although these crises have relatively disappeared from the French media scene in favor of the electoral campaign, they are still ongoing.

    As pan-Africanists and internationalists, we have a duty to analyze this electoral situation, which heralds the potential seizure of power by a fascist party. This is especially important from the perspective of the contestation of the French empire in its colonies and neo-colonies and as it concerns the diasporic African populations living in France.

    I. The French Far-Right and Africa

    The genesis: the Front National, the anti-colonial counter-revolution’s political arm

    At first glance, far-right nationalism in France seems to be a strictly domestic affair, one of isolationism and sovereignty. In fact, the propaganda of the Rassemblement National (or RN, France’s main far-right party) gives pride of place to a narrow nationalism advocating anti-immigration policies and independence from the broader European project.  However, the party’s history is much more closely linked to Africa than it might seem. Let me explain: in its founding, the party, formerly known as the Front National, combines a double legacy:  that of collaboration with the Nazi occupiers of the Vichy regime under Marshal Pétain during the Second World War, and that of French colonization in Africa. Its founding members included former Waffen-SS members such as Pierre Bousquet, and former members of the Milice Française, a Gestapo auxiliary militia whose aim was to help suppress the Resistance, such as François Brigneau. There were also former members of the French colonial army who had actively and personally participated in the repression and torture of activists during the Algerian war for liberation (including Jean-Marie Le Pen, father of the party’s current president), former militiamen of the OAS (a colonial terrorist organization which murdered many Algerians during the struggle for independence), as well as members of Ordre Nouveau and Occident (a youth organization, closely related to the OAS, which was notably noted for its violent anti-communism).

    The FN, now RN, was born in a particular context, not unlike that of today. Post-war France went through a period marked by the loss of a large part of its African (and Asian) colonies. Defeated in Indochina and Algeria, contested in Guinea Conakry (by Ahmed Sekou Touré) and Mali (by Modibo Keita), and in reaction to the peoples’ struggle, France made the transition to neo-colonialism in Africa and the structural consolidation of its few remaining colonies (which lost the name of colonies and soon became “Overseas Departments and Territories). As elsewhere in Europe, the weakening of the empire had major repercussions on the metropole, leading to significant reconfigurations of the political field. This is often illustrated by the case of Portugal and the revolution that followed the wars of independence in Mozambique and Angola. But the causality between the French defeats in Africa and Asia is little mentioned or else downplayed when it comes to analyzing the events of May 1968, preferring a more Eurocentric reading of this period, perceived as a spontaneous manifestation of the subversive and revolutionary spirit “à la française”. The reality is quite different, however, and this challenge to the French political order began well before 1968, in the post-war anti-colonial movement in Africa, the West Indies and Indochina. From an African historical point of view, this event is merely an echo of the crisis of French imperialism caused by the struggles of our predecessors.

    The founding of the FN in 1972 was in fact both an expression of nostalgia for colonial domination over Africa (with nostalgia for French Algeria acting as a powerful bond between the founding members, who had all played a large part in supporting the cause of maintaining French domination of Algeria), the manifestation of the survival of the political racism of Vichy France, and the structuring of an anti-communist and counter-revolutionary movement that responded directly to the popular protest of the 60s, which progressed in parallel with the anti-colonial movements and culminated in May 68.

    Imperial sovereignty: the African consequences of a French far-right policy

    Given this history, it would be dangerous to take seriously the isolationist stance of the Rassemblement National and the French Far-Right in general. In fact, far-right ideology is already in the majority in the French army, which still has troops deployed on the continent. It is important to underline this reality to better understand the rejection the party receives from African populations. Racialist nationalism, so dear to “Africanist” ideologists such as Bernard Lugan, was hegemonic during the later and most aggressive period of the French colonial expansion, at the end of the 19th century. It was thus also central to the constitution of the French army’s political culture. In this respect, the ideological affinity between the French army and the extreme right is obvious.

    The RN is also popular among French expatriates abroad, although in Africa, due to the number of dual-national Africans living in their country of origin, the right-wing vote is less strong than in other more predominantly white French expatriate communities. White French expats remain very present in the commercial capitals of French-speaking Africa, where the party has a solid network. Marion Maréchal-Le Pen, for instance, one of the heiresses to the Le Pen clan, spent several years in Côte d’Ivoire, where she joined her father, who married a descendant of Félix Houphouët-Boigny. Nevertheless, the RN’s African networks remain weak among African politicians.

    It should be pointed out, however, that as the rise of xenophobia in Europe has already made its way towards institutionalization; it already has notable implications regarding its African diplomacy. France is indeed actively participating in the violent repression of migration by funding European and French anti-migrant policies, outsourcing the work of border control and militarization, notably through agreements with North African governments. This has very serious consequences on the lives of the Black Africans living or traveling through these countries. I’m referring to the frequent lynching and harassing of Black people in Tunisia by anti-Black mobs that have been galvanized and embolden by their president’s racist speeches, the state sanctioned massacres that take place near the Spanish enclaves of Melilla and Ceuta, in Morocco, or even the fact that the Algerian and Tunisian police often arrest Black Africans and then release them in the desert without food or water, leaving them to starve or die of dehydration. This phenomenon also hinders the prospect of continental unity, which can only be achieved by combating this tragic racist and neo-colonial diplomacy that contributes to further balkanizing the continent.

    It goes without saying that the rise to power of parties whose program largely revolves around the fight against immigration can only worsen this situation, increasing the macabre tally of African double victims of Western imperialism: displaced because fleeing conflicts or situations resulting from (neo)colonial oppression, killed by the bullets of African subcontractors working on European borders, or drowned in the Mediterranean.

    European political forces are already gripped by a paranoid Malthusian fear of the possibility of a migratory and ecologic “Black peril”. Conferences on the so-called “African demographic crisis” or “African demographic explosion” are regularly held in Europe, with far-right ideologues and “experts” over-represented. On June 25, during the most important campaign debate of the parliamentary elections, this point was once again raised by far-right representative, Jordan Bardella. In a way quite analogous to the consequences of the idea of a “yellow peril”, this omnipresence of the rhetorical elements of the migratory “black peril” could reinforce and accelerate the emergence of an anti-natalist Malthusian diplomacy in Africa, following the example of those who blackmailed India and China, in particular, into adopting extremely strict and authoritarian birth control policies.

    One of the RN’s key themes is sovereignty, but in many respects (energy, food, mining), France remains dependent. It is therefore quite evident that a France under a Far-Right government will have to increase its economic predation on those African countries historically regarded as its own “backyard”, in order to gain autonomy from other world powers. As a matter of fact, this imperialist parasitic dependency could very well be one of the very causes of this resurgence of nationalism in France in particular, and in the West in general.

    The colonial reflex, A Nkrumahist analysis of the rise of the far right in France

    Rather than the theses on populism and “the affects” popular with Western leftists, Kwame Nkrumah built on Lenin’s investigation of the parasitic relations between the imperialists and its dependencies, offering an anti-colonial analysis of the fluctuations in the political system of colonial metropoles. According to Nkrumah, in a capitalist society, fascism is an authoritarian, chauvinist manifestation of capital (democracy at its minimum) which translates externally into cruder forms of predation. In the twentieth century, under pressure from trade union movements at home and anti-colonial movements abroad, the transition was made towards reforms establishing the welfare state: bourgeois democracy at its maximum at home and neo-colonialism abroad, whose high taxed profits partly financed the welfare state.

    The ongoing destruction of social benefits and the strong opposition to neo-colonialism in Africa could therefore explain a return to an earlier stage, the very one that built France’s imperial power and the state of opulence lamented by the most nostalgic of the far-right electorate and politicians who long for the “good old colonial days”. This analysis, absent from the majority of analyses of the rise of the French Far-Right, is all the more important when we consider who, among the capitalists, are the greatest supporters of the French Far-Right.

    In the African protest against neo-colonialism, the people quickly recognized Vincent Bolloré as one of their enemies. Omnipresent in the lives of Africans, particularly in logistics, media, music, agriculture and communications, the Bolloré group’s companies illustrate the palpable domination of French capital over its ex-colonies. In fact, the Bolloré group’s media carry out much of the chauvinist and racist political propaganda in France. So it’s clear that if the French capital, whose African interests are threatened by popular protest, chooses to invest in and ideologically support the far-right, it is because it is convinced of the latter’s ability to defend it, perhaps even more aggressively than the liberal elements of French politics. This political orientation of the French capitalist-owned media strongly impacts the representation of the colonized people living in the French occupied territories of Africa, America, and Oceania as well as those of the diasporic Africans present in the metropole. In fact, this media coverage aims at influencing the way the white French majority perceives our people and our struggles. Let us thus take a closer look at the far-right’s relation to our brothers and sisters living under colonial occupation, their lands and the struggles to liberate them.

    II. The French Far-Right and the overseas colonies

    These terms are deliberately chosen to refute the operation to change the status and name of the colonies, which is nothing more than a neo-colonial strategy designed to conceal the colonial reality and weaken the nationalist and independence struggles waged in French Guiana and the occupied African islands of the Indian Ocean, the Caribbean and Oceania

    The RN’s electoral success in the colonies, as symptomatic of a colonial ailment.

    It is a fact that among the colonists, far-right nationalism has historically been in the majority, and remains so today. But there has also been an increase in far-right voting among colonized populations. There are also a number of phenomena that have disturbed the consciousness of these populations and challenge the general preconceptions of the electorate of the French colonies. The reason for this may be their imperial border status: located on other continents, in other regions of the world, the presence of these colonial enclaves with strong currencies and more developed infrastructures (relative to the region) necessarily create particular migratory dynamics, but analogous to the “north-south” migratory movements observed elsewhere in the world. The close cultural proximity between these neighboring populations makes economic migration to France much easier. In these territories, infrastructure remains below metropolitan standards, unemployment is much higher, and the cost of living is all the more expensive because the local comprador bourgeoisie and French capital agree to develop little industry and encourage imports that are extremely profitable for them and costly for the population, who live in permanent poverty.

    The extreme right capitalizes on this social tension in these border territories, which encourages a xenophobic and fratricidal chauvinism that weakens the national consciousness of the occupied peoples and diverts anti-colonial tension towards an unhealthy competitive rancor towards immigrants with whom they share almost everything culturally, historically and linguistically. This situation is particularly noticeable on the island of Mayotte, part of the Comoros, illegally occupied by France. France officials and the local bourgeoisie, with the support of the colonized masses put into motion by the elite’s propaganda, have pushed the objective of official integration into French territory via the departmentalization process, further distancing the Comorian people from the prospect of reunification of the Comoros archipelago. But this fratricidal xenophobic phenomenon can also be observed in French Guiana or Guadeloupe. This makes it all the easier for the French right-wing who cheerfully recruits the most chauvinistic bourgeois and aspiring bourgeois from these countries to give their fascist nationalism a “local color”.

    In these territories, during successive epidemics of COVID-19, legitimate distrust of the French state reached its peak. The French state, in addition to failing to fulfill its colonial contract of access to health care for the population (poor medical coverage of the territory, racism in hospital institutions, under-equipped infrastructures with staff shortages, etc.) was also found to have participated in and covered up a health scandal. Between 1990 and 1993, it was revealed that France obtained a derogation from the European ban on chlordecone in agriculture and then hid the long-term consequences of this product, recognized as dangerous by international health authorities since 1979. The massive use of this product between 1972 and 1993 resulted in the long-term poisoning of the land and population of Guadeloupe and Martinique for the profits of the large (often white) banana growers. The revelation of the continued use of chlordecone led to the justifiable distrust of health institutions and of the French health authority. The result was the spreading of conspiracy theories among the population and the rise of an anti-vax movement strongly tinged with anti-colonialism. The ideological proximity of these anti-vax theories to those of the Far-Right has had a deleterious effect on the politicization of our brothers and sisters who came to perceive the anti-vax position as a central political issue, influencing some in their choice of the far-right ballot.

    Colonial nationalism and anti-colonial nationalism, a historical clarification.

    Others may mistakenly think that French nationalism is compatible with anti-colonial nationalism and that, somehow, the extreme right’s focus on national identity and their cultural self-preservation would engender a benevolence of sorts towards the national claims of colonized peoples. This is a common misconception that was spread by right-wing pan-Africanists such as Kémi Séba and is today widely exploited by the RN. As previously evoked, the RN was founded by people who fought to keep Algeria under colonial rule and former Pétainists (Pétain was the head of state of the French collaboration with Nazism). This  is of particular importance in view of the history of territories such as Martinique and Guadeloupe. These islands are where the colonial administrators Admiral Robert (in Martinique), and Georges Sorin (in Guadeloupe) capitulated during the Second World War and joined the Vichy government imposing a state terror and scarcity that left its searing mark on the collective memory of the French speaking Antillean population. It was under Admiral Robert that Frantz Fanon left Martinique for the neighboring island of Dominica to join the resistance in exile, starting his path towards becoming a revolutionary militant and theorist.

    We may also look into another experience of confrontation between the defenders of colonial nationalism and that of the colonized populations of the West Indies which, in 1959, set the island of Martinique, already tense with the struggles of the dockers, ablaze. Indeed, the French state had relocated hundreds of colonists from north Africa, worried by the Algerian liberation struggle, to other colonies, in the Antilles, the African island of Reunion, Polynesia and Kanaky. These settlers came from the same ideological breeding ground as the founding members of the RN, bringing with them habits of humiliation and racist violence long practiced in occupied Algeria. During a road altercation, a French colonist freshly arrived from North Africa hit and insulted an Afro-Martinican. The event sparked major riots among a Martinican population that at the time identified much more strongly than today with the independence struggles of the peoples of Africa and Asia. Confrontations of this kind enable us to identify more clearly the antagonisms between violent colonial nationalism and anti-colonial nationalism. Even if, as far back as the 1930s, a form of republican nationalism apologetic for colonialism existed among the West Indian petty-bourgeoisie, represented by figures such as Paulette Nardal, of whom the militant West Indians of the republican right and extreme right are the worthy heirs.

    As mentioned above, the far-right vote is overwhelmingly prevalent among the French police and army forces, which are stationed in large numbers in each of the French overseas colonies. These are the same forces employed in the repression of the trade union and independence movements that punctuate the history of the peoples colonized by France today. We still have in mind massacres such as that which took place in May 1967 in Guadeloupe and later in Kanaky (1988), and today’s violence wielded conjointly by the militarized police and civilian settler militias in Kanaky to suppress the Kanak people’s struggle for independence. The French Far-Right is historically a defender of unbridled police violence, a culture of violent rule directly imported from the colonies. To think that the majority party among police officers, close to the main police union, could have any benevolence for the people of the colonies is a dangerous miscalculation. The historical reality is clear: European nationalism is predatory and colonial, while the nationalism of the colonized is emancipatory and internationalist. Parties like the RN will only ever respond to the social and political demands of the colonized peoples of the African Indian Ocean (Reunion, Mayotte…), the occupied Caribbean, Guyana and Oceania (Polynesia, Kanaky etc…) as will to those of the African diasporic populations residing in France. Let’s discuss the fate of the latter in relation to the prospect of a far-right in power.

    III. The Far-Right and Africans in France

    The African post-colonial migration, both exploited and oppressed

    African populations in France stem from several migratory movements. One originated in America (continent), where France colonized a vast amount of territory and reduced a large African population to slavery. Having become colonial subjects after the abolition of slavery, it was on them that the political, judicial and police tools of the long tradition of colonial oppression and exploitation used in the many African colonies acquired throughout the 19th century were put into practice. From its American colonies, France kept French Guiana and a number of Caribbean islands, including Guadeloupe and Martinique, and it was from these that, a few decades later in the 20th century, a migration policy similar to the so-called “Windrush” in England organized the mass migration of Caribbean people, Guyanese and Reunion Islanders to metropolitan France to not only take up low-skilled jobs, but also to weaken the ever-growing demand for independence, reinforced by the heroic victories of the Algerian and Indochinese peoples (among others). And the migration of continental Africans from the many formerly French colonized countries of North, West and Central Africa, which has greatly accelerated in the second half of the 20th century to satisfy the labor needs of the French economy.

    Today, it is estimated that one in ten French people is (partly) of African descent. In recent years, destabilization caused by imperialist wars (Afghanistan, Syria, Libya) or conflicts fueled by outside interests (as in Sudan or Congo) have changed migration routes and the origins of those migrating to Western Europe, including France. Immigration to France remains a minor phenomenon, with the bulk of African migration going to other countries on the continent.

    Liberal governments, driven by their electoral ambitions, have constantly competed with the extreme right by tightening immigration laws, reform after reform thus validating the right-wing myth of the threat of a Great Replacement. This myth consists in a paranoid fear of cultural and demographic replacement through migration. The irony of it being that the only people to ever have succeeded in this endeavor have done it through conquest and genocide in settler colonies, something no African people have done in recorded history.

    Neoliberal pseudo-fascism: systemic racism in the neo-liberal state

    The successive liberal governments have also implemented liberal reforms to the healthcare, unemployment and education systems, all of which have very negatively impacted the lives of people living in the french African diaspora. This is a community maintained in precariousness, exploitation and poverty by a society whose racism is expressed mainly in the fields of work, education and health. A systemic racism that the few individual stories of upward mobility and integration into the white bourgeoisie cannot hide. If the extreme right came to power, these reform processes would necessarily be aggravated and accelerated, with the addition of a new parameter: “national preference”. Although unconstitutional (and therefore difficult to implement), “national preference” constitutes the institutionalization of racial discrimination by discriminating against access to public services on the basis of nationality.

    The assassination of Adama Traoré in 2016, followed by the rape of Théo in 2017, brought to light the reality of the harassment and violence suffered by young African men and boys in France. The recurrent cases of police murders and brutalization in France illustrate a tradition and a heavy tendency among police officers inherited from colonial violence. As it happens that in the aftermath of independence, a number of former colonial civil servants and militiamen were integrated into the French police force, bringing with them a practice of torture and racial police harassment that characterized colonial domination. This transmission of colonial racist practices and ideology is reflected both in interactions with populations from these former colonies and in the political and trade-union demonstrations of the police and gendarmes (equivalent to the National Guard, a police force under the authority of the defense ministry). Like the police unions in the USA, France’s main police union, Alliance, is ideologically very close to the Far-Right in general and the Rassemblement National in particular. Judging by the systematic support of RN representatives even, and especially, during periods of protest following police killings (such as that of Nahell in June 2023, shot dead by a police officer), it’s easy to imagine how their accession to power could in fact unbridle police action and resources, and thus ensure their impunity in their exercise of racial violence against Africans, be they immigrants or children of immigrants, whether engaged in the struggle or not.

    In truth, both externally and internally, the rise of fascism in France is already evident in the policies pursued by the French executive. Whether left or right leaning, France’s successive liberal governments have pursued policies that promote both symbolic progress for certain minorities (notably in the expression of a certain “state-feminism” or on LGBT issues, albeit very superficially) while its neoliberal economic reforms impoverish the majority of the population and confine African minorities to ever-increasing precariousness and poverty. Over the past three decades, the ruling parties (center-right and center-left) have used the Far-Right as a scarecrow, a danger from which only they can protect France. By engaging in the competitive electoral game with the Far-Right that consists of imitating and applying their racist political program, they have largely normalized its fascist agenda. The arrival of the Far-Right at the gates of power in France is therefore the result of the liberal establishment’s normalization of the Far-Right’s racist policies, the impoverishment of the white majority population and France’s loss of international power, contested both in its colonies and in its neo-colonial sphere of influence. Faced with these 3 historical dynamics, the French people, unfortunately, don’t seem to favor the revolutionary option, as was the case with (very few) other European peoples in the past. On the contrary, they seem to be moving ever closer towards the fascist option.

    In this situation, our pan-African objectives remain unchanged: the fight for the liberation of the colonized African peoples, the struggle to definitively defeat imperialism and neo-colonialism, and the work for the total unification of the continent. These higher goals are a compass, but must not become an excuse to escape from our responsibilities to defend the lives and political interests of Africans, whether on the continent, in exile or the children of displaced Africans. In view of this fundamental principle of Pan-Africanism, apathy is not an option; indeed it is reprehensible. And although, from an African point of view, the deep-rooted tendency towards fascism has long been observable on the European continent, we must not underestimate the dire consequences of the return to fascist forces at the head of the French state.

    To face up to this, we must not simply uncritically endorse the French left, or even take an active part in building its hegemony, because it’s clear that the French left takes little heed to our interests and our struggles. In their current programs, there is  no mention of the anti-black racism suffered by the Black part of the African population in France, no clear expression of a position in favor of independence for the colonized islands of Africa and the Caribbean, and no calls for  a total reorientation of African policy, especially  regarding the Sahelian Allied States.

    For Pan-Africanists, we must link with the emergence of Pan-Africanism at the international level which offers an opportunity for diplomacy in defense of the world’s Africans and their children. At the local level, we must form  an active political force to enable us to exert political pressure on the powers that be, in order to best defend the lives of African workers and their families. Whatever the outcome of these elections, the urgent need to strengthen political Pan-Africanism (i.e. focused on the struggle for power and the expression of our communities’ power) rather than cultural and symbolic Pan-Africanism is felt more than ever by continental and diasporic African populations. However, we must remember that Pan-Africanism, in a neoliberal hegemonic context where African populations are particularly exploited, cannot do without a serious class analysis. Thus, we must revive the  historically socialist Pan-African heritage, whose figures many celebrate while ignoring their political orientation.

    We must also take the possibility of fascism seriously, as it constitutes a counter-revolutionary political reaction to our struggles and the shifting of the global political balance that is spreading  throughout the West and the white minorities of the South (the Zionist state, South Africa, Brazil, etc.). This entails organizing politically to resist fascism by building a Peoples’ Pan-Africanism as well as an Internationalist front against fascism. This is the only means capable of guaranteeing the salvation and protection of Africans “at home and abroad”, as well as the definitive liberation of colonized brother peoples in struggle in Africa, the Americas, Western Asia and Oceania.

    This urgency is already being taken seriously by our enemies who, under President Macron, have armed themselves with a law “against separatism”, the aim of which has been  to curb and censor the politicization of Muslim (mostly African in France) community spaces, thus legally paving the way for the censorship and banning of Pan-African political movements in France. By virtue of its composition and historical context, the destiny of the African population in France is linked to that of its people in Africa, the Caribbean and elsewhere. And in the face of a France that is making its return to nationalism clearer by the day, African people  still find themselves enjoined to take up the generational challenge posed by Frantz Fanon: our generation must  “discover its mission, fulfill it or betray it” [end]

    The original article

    Kossi Paul is a worker, Panafrican and anti-colonial militant, member of the A-APRP, of Afro-Caribbean and north-African descent based in Paris, France

    Related

    African revolution

    France is expelled from its former colonies in West Africa

  • Les oeils de Moscou

    ils sont partout, ils sont l’anti-France

    Heureux sans abonnement à l’Express, je n’ai pas accès à l’article, seulement un titre et un chapô, qui à eux seuls, sont une joyeuse source d’inspiration

    Avec ou sans faux-nez, ils cherchent à dynamiter l’unité occidentale face à la folie destructrice de Vladimir Poutine. Par anti-américanisme, par haine de notre démocratie libérale, ceux que l’on surnomme les prorusses et les « idiots utiles » du Kremlin s’activent sur les réseaux sociaux et dans les sphères politiques. On les croyait condamnés au silence depuis l’invasion russe, ils n’ont jamais été aussi dangereux

    Comme ils sont méchants, comme ils nous font peur, ces vilains pro-russes. Comment pourrait on [on est un con, m’a t on appris quand j’étais tout petit] les condamner au silence ? Par l’accentuation de la censure sur les réseaux sociaux ? Commandement bureaucratique d’un espace libre-échangiste subordonné à l’OTAN, l’Union européenne y songe pour ce mois d’août.

    Afin de conjurer son angoisse, l’Express a entrepris d’étiqueter les différents canaux pro-russes, de ficher leurs têtes de gondole : Henri Guaino, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, Marine le Pen, Ségolène Royal… etc Anti-américains, militaires, covido-sceptiques, hommes d’affaire, russophiles, pacifistes, extrême-droite…, les oeils de Moscou sont partout, c’est effrayant. Sans désemparer, les employés de presse se sont saisis de leur clavier pour atténuer les malheurs de l’Occident.

    Les envolées lyriques partisanes me font rire et l’hilarité me permet de surmonter mon dégoût pour l’excrétion des états d’âme franchouillards. Aussi cruels qu’ils puissent être, les faits sont plus intéressants sans fioriture littéraire. Contrairement aux personnalités politiques citées plus haut, mon analyse n’est pas polluée par le patriotisme, forme théorisée de l’instinct grégaire. La justice est ma seule patrie.

    La guerre au Donbass éclata en 2014, quand après un coup d‘État fasciste à Kiev, les nouvelles autorités entreprirent d’écraser les aspirations autonomistes de leurs citoyens russophones. En renfort de militaires encore fidèles, elles expédièrent au Donbass des militants nazis légalisés en bataillons nationaux de volontaires.

    Plutôt que de contribuer à désamorcer la crise, l’OTAN y vit l’opportunité stratégique d’une guerre par procuration contre la Russie. Son fantasme était de la démembrer, pour améliorer son rapport de force à la Chine. Alors que l’hypocrisie occidentale ne laissait pas d’autre solution, l’opération militaire spéciale est devenue une nécessité technique en février 2022. La Russie a relevé le défi, s’est portée au secours de la population russophone du Donbass.

    La paix était enfin possible en mars, après quelques semaines seulement de combat, mais les Anglo-États-uniens y opposèrent leur veto. Le champ de bataille se dresse désormais entre la réalité et les fantasmes de médiocres politiciens occidentaux.

    À l’instar de la rédaction de l’Express, les jeunes Français me paraissent en général peu équipés pour y briller. Alors que l’OTAN perd cette guerre et accélère l’inéluctable déclin de l’hégémonie occidentale, les employés de l’Express semblent peu pressés de remplacer fusil en main la chair à canon ukrainienne hachée en vain pour atténuer leurs angoisses. Ils font le choix ancré dans une tradition bien française d’établir le fichier de leurs concitoyens pro-russes. Ils donnent leur sang, donnez votre voisin. Puisque son champ d’action demeure derrière le clavier, j’ai hâte que la rédaction s’intéresse aux nazis français partis en Ukraine défendre l’Europe, la démocratie et la liberté.

    Je suis assez vieux pour avoir observé les précédentes entreprises criminelles et catastrophiques des États-unis et de leurs alliés, tentatives de préserver leur hégémonie d’un déclin mécanique et inéluctable. Je suis de ceux que les couveuses koweïtiennes et autres armes de destruction massive ont échaudés.

    À l’époque indépendante, la France s’opposa en 2003 à l’invasion de l’Irak. Plus tard hélas, Nicolas Sarkozy fut le complice de la destruction de la Libye. Folie destructrice ? De loin le plus crétin, François Hollande paya la note et quelques Français avec lui, quand le 13 novembre 2015, une opération djihadiste fut l’anecdotique dommage collatéral à Paris du soutien occidental à l’insurrection sunnite radicale contre le gouvernement laïc de Syrie. Au train où vont les choses en Ukraine, ces désagréments ne sont pas finis

    Par mon âge et mon expérience professionnelle, je me targue d’une culture historique et politique supérieure à celle de l’auteur de romans policiers Charles Haquet ou de l’étudiante en affaires internationales Emma Collet, qui ont commis cet article d’anthologie.

    Au déclenchement de l’opération militaire spéciale, voilà plus d’un an, mes sentiments étaient plus neutres. Mais à la façon dont les mêmes pressetitués ont encore une fois déversé des torrents de boue -mensonges, propagande ukrainienne pour demeurés et autre fantôme de Kiev– ont cherché sans vergogne à blanchir le nazisme endémique ukrainien et ses crimes, j’ai vite compris où étaient dans cette affaire le droit et la justice. D’ailleurs, l’immense majorité des vastes restes du monde est arrivée aux mêmes conclusions

    Cet article est aussi l’authentique expression d’un pays dont le courage n’est pas la première qualité qui vient à l’esprit, quand il est évoqué à l’étranger. D’une presse à ce point servile et caricaturale, qu’un Philippe Henriot ne la renierait pas. D’un peuple froussard à l’arrogance rurale, dont la compréhension des questions internationales est aussi mièvre que chauvine. Car enfin, comme il faut être lâche et rompu aux petits arrangements d’alcôve, pour encencer en qualité de Français, un régiment Azov qui arbore fièrement l’emblème de la 2. SS-Panzer-Division, Das Reich, qui le 10 juin 1944, massacra 643 habitants d’Oradour sur Glane. Impensable à l’étranger.

    Je vous laisse votre démocratie libérale -quand votre libéralisme ne résiste pas à la première éraflure sur la carosserie de votre automobile à crédit- votre chef d’État élu par 25% du corps électoral, ses Gilets jaunes mutilés, son 49.3 et sa presse subventionnée. Elle ne m’intéresse plus, mais fait encore plier de rire une large majorité du globe. Elle est digne de vous, employés de l’Express, petits bourgeois du blême Hexagone, racaille macroniste. Vous avez au moins compris une chose : votre défaite par procuration au Donbass est le début de votre fin.

  • [Sharing] EU’s Voluntary Disinformation Code Is Compulsory: Obey or Die – Declan Hayes, Strategic Culture Foundation

    Though Musk is still playing at being NATO’s token non-conformist, the EU is essentially telling him and all of us that any dissent from its Russophobic, Slavophobic and Sinophobic narratives will be severely punished

    The European Union’s enforcers have told Twitter owner Elon Musk that the EU’s voluntary information code is not voluntary and that the EU will fine the pants off Twitter if Musk does not play by NATO’s self-serving rules. Though Musk is still playing at being NATO’s token non-conformist, the EU is essentially telling him and all of us that any dissent from its Russophobic, Slavophobic and Sinophobic narratives will be severely punished.

    From the point of view of von der Leyen and NATO’s other EU puppets, that makes absolutely perfect sense. As legacy media’s active shelf life is fast expiring, that just leaves the EU with alternative media to kill off with massive fines in Twitter’s case or, more generally, by crowding out and muzzling any and all truth tellers.

    Look at the treatment being meted out to Pink Floyd’s Roger Waters, a life-long anti-fascist, whose father was killed in action fighting the Nazis but which the usual suspects, led as always by the BBC and the Guardian, are trying to ban for supposedly being a Jew-hating Nazi simply because of his support for Palestinian rights, for Julian Assange and for being stupid enough to still be doing live concerts with those unreconstructed views, as he touches 80 years of age.

    The EU’s code Waters and Musk are falling foul of “aims to prevent profiteering from disinformation and fake news, as well as increasing transparency and curbing the spread of bots and fake accounts”.

    By disinformation, in addition to Waters, von der Leyen’s thugs mean the work of folk like our own excellent Stephen Karganovic, who is not only a quality thinker and writer, but is on every EU and NATO hit list imaginable because he speaks his truths to their power. And others like Fyodor Lukyanov and Timur Fomenko, who file excellent analytical copy for Russia Today which, with this site, is subject to a string of sanctions and name-calling that are as libellous and ignorant as those these EU and NATO morons throw at Waters or any other of their betters.

    The objective in labelling SCF, Russia Today, Waters and even Masha and Mishka as dis-information is to control the common space and not to give the ideas of heretics like Jeremy Corbyn, Robert F Kennedy Junior or their type space to survive.

    With fake news, the EU is primarily concerned with folk who expose their crimes, family folk like Roger Waters and Julian Assange, who has now done the equivalent of a life tariff for exposing the tiniest fraction of the war crimes the Yanks committed in Iraq, crimes which, remember, included the gang rape of little girls by these harbingers of US-style democracy.

    And then there is Gonzalo Lira, who is in the worst of all places, in Ukraine, whose soldiers rape corpses, and whose politicians ban all opposition parties, all opposition media and all religions that do not worship their utterly corrupt system but yet, as the corpse rapists do God knows what to Gonzalo Lira in God knows where, Ukraine has seen its ranking in NATO’s Press Freedom and Transparency Indexes soar like an American bald eagle that is oblivious to the stench below. The Nazi rump Reich is, the EU’s disinformation experts proclaim, the land of the free and the land of the brave, even as it is hell on earth for Lira and millions of Zelensky’s other victims.

    The torture of Assange and Lira has silenced countless others and thereby made way for NATO’s own quack journalists to fill the void with their own fake news, which was presented to us up till recently by sexual predators like Philip Schofield, ITV’s equivalent of the BBC’s Jimmy Savile.

    Not to put too fine a point on it, but corrupt countries and institutions that elevate Jimmy Saville, Philip Schofield, Ghislaine Maxwell, Lord Boothby, Tom Driberg MP, Jeffrey Epstein, Sir Ted Heath, Cyril Smith, Karim Ahmad Khan, Imran Ahmad Khan and Prince Andrew to positions of power and authority are not in a position to lecture to anyone on transparency or to spin their fake news line on their own terrorist attack on Nordstream.

    As regards bots and fake accounts, that smear should have died a death with the end of Russiagate, one of a number of massive CIA/EU efforts to disseminate fake news and opaqueness through their own bots and fake accounts.

    But why, the Clinton, Biden, Obama and other organised crime families would ask, re-invent the wheel, when the old smears NATO’s media spin work as well as ever?

    What we have with all these rafts of EU laws, fines, sanctions, bluster and bluff is a sort of NATO Cosplay, where von der Leyen and her fellow Cosplay conspirators get to moralise, whilst the Biden, Kerry and Pelosi families get to sprinkle Ukraine with enough bio labs to take out half of Europe’s population, and the New York Post, the only media outlet that reported on the crimes Hunter Biden’s laptop revealed, gets banned and harassed by the FBI goon squads.

    Von der Leyen’s Digital Services Act will further criminalise offensive humour such as comparing French dictator Macron to Hitler (though Waters will remain fair game). Some 19 companies, including Alphabet’s Google Maps, Google Play, Google Search, Google Shopping, YouTube, Meta’s Facebook and Instagram, Amazon’s Marketplace, Apple’s App Store, Twitter, Microsoft’s two units LinkedIn and Bing, booking.com, Pinterest, Snap Inc’s Snapchat, TikTok, Wikipedia, Zalando, and Alibaba’s AliExpress will all have to obey von der Leyen’s diktats “to make the internet safer” by erasing so-called disinformation in whatever way von der Leyen and her fellow plagiarists decide to define it from one moment to the next.

    Not that war is their only earner needing the censor’s protection. Over 3,400 peer-reviewed papers questioning NATO’s Covid narrative have also been sidelined and ignored. Fake news, Russian propaganda, dis-information or some such stuff. I am one of many who did not take the vaccine von der Leyen’s husband made a fortune pimping. And I am glad I didn’t fall for their dancing nurses and their relentless marketing, irrespective of whether they were peddling fake news with their fake vaccines or not. I have no idea whether those vaccines are effective or not. I am not qualified to opine.

    But what I do know is this. There are large groups of American and European politicians, like American fugitive Lindsey Graham who have been promoted because, thick as bricks though they are, they are sufficiently spineless to pimp the wars, vaccines and other societal wrecking balls those who fund and control them are selling.

    Speaking of war, NATO and KFOR mercenaries have just slaughtered a bunch of Serbs in Zvecan (northern Kosovo). Though I look forward with interest to getting a proper analysis of this latest NATO war crime from Fyodor Lukyanov, Timur Fomenko and our own excellent Stephen Karganovic, I do know that not only will their take be totally at odds with that of the EU’s semi-literate fact-checkers but that Russia Today and Karganovic will be much nearer to the truth than any of von der Leyen’s minions could ever be because those EU yellow packs are groomed to paint over and hide the crimes against Serbs and Palestinians this article and a thousand others on this site draw attention to [end]

    The original article

    Related

    The Western disinformation about Ukraine

    chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Ukraine against Russia

    Pauvre Sacré Charlemagne

    in French, about the European Union mythology

  • [Sharing] Forging Ahead to Open a New Chapter of China-Russia Friendship, Cooperation and Common Development – Xi Jinping, RIA Novosti

    [Quote : no model of governance is universal, and no single country should dictate the international order]

    At the invitation of President Vladimir Putin, I will soon pay a state visit to the Russian Federation. Russia was the first country I visited after I was elected President 10 years ago. Over the past decade, I have made eight visits to Russia. I came each time with high expectations and returned with fruitful results, opening a new chapter for China-Russia relations together with President Putin.

    China and Russia are each other’s biggest neighbor and comprehensive strategic partner of coordination. We are both major countries in the world and permanent members of the UN Security Council. Both countries uphold an independent foreign policy and see our relationship as a high priority in our diplomacy.

    There is a clear historical logic and strong internal driving force for the growth of China-Russia relations. Over the past 10 years, we have come a long way in our wide-ranging cooperation and made significant strides into the new era.

    — High-level interactions have played a key strategic role in leading China-Russia relations. We have established a whole set of mechanisms for high-level interactions and multi-faceted cooperation which provide important systemic and institutional safeguards for the growth of the bilateral ties. Over the years, I have maintained a close working relationship with President Putin. We have met 40 times on bilateral and international occasions. Together we have drawn the blueprint for the bilateral relations and cooperation in various fields, and have had timely communication on major international and regional issues of mutual interest, providing firm stewardship for the sustained, sound and stable growth of China-Russia relations.

    — Our two sides have cemented political mutual trust and fostered a new model of major-country relations. Guided by a vision of lasting friendship and win-win cooperation, China and Russia are committed to no-alliance, no-confrontation and not targeting any third party in developing our ties. We firmly support each other in following a development path suited to our respective national realities and support each other’s development and rejuvenation. The bilateral relationship has grown more mature and resilient. It is brimming with new dynamism and vitality, setting a fine example for developing a new model of major-country relations featuring mutual trust, peaceful coexistence and win-win cooperation.

    — Our two sides have put in place an all-round and multi-tiered cooperation framework. Thanks to the joint efforts of both sides, China-Russia trade exceeded 190 billion U.S. dollars last year, up by 116 percent from ten years ago. China has been Russia’s largest trading partner for 13 years running. We have seen steady increase in our two-way investment. Our cooperation on major projects in such fields as energy, aviation, space and connectivity is moving forward steadily. Our collaboration in scientific and technological innovation, cross-border e-commerce and other emerging areas is showing a strong momentum. Our cooperation at the sub-national level is also booming. All this has brought tangible benefits to both the Chinese and the Russian peoples and provided unceasing driving force for our respective development and rejuvenation.

    — Our two sides have acted on the vision of lasting friendship and steadily strengthened our traditional friendship. On the occasion of commemorating the 20th anniversary of the China-Russia Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation, President Putin and I announced the extension of the Treaty and added new dimensions to it. Our two sides have held eight “theme years” at the national level and continued to write new chapters for China-Russia friendship and cooperation. Our two peoples have stood by and rooted for each other in the fight against COVID, which once again proves that “a friend in need is a friend indeed.”

    — Our two sides have had close coordination on the international stage and fulfilled our responsibilities as major countries. China and Russia are firmly committed to safeguarding the UN-centered international system, the international order underpinned by international law, and the basic norms of international relations based on the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. We have stayed in close communication and coordination in the UN, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRICS, the G20 and other multilateral mechanisms, and worked together for a multi-polar world and greater democracy in international relations. We have been active in practicing true multilateralism, promoting the common values of humanity, and championing the building of a new type of international relations and a community with a shared future for mankind.

    Looking back on the extraordinary journey of China-Russia relations over the past 70 years and more, we feel strongly that our relationship has not reached easily where it is today, and that our friendship is growing steadily and must be cherished by us all. China and Russia have found a right path of state-to-state interactions. This is essential for the relationship to stand the test of changing international circumstances, a lesson borne out by both history and reality.

    My upcoming visit to Russia will be a journey of friendship, cooperation and peace. I look forward to working with President Putin to jointly adopt a new vision, a new blueprint and new measures for the growth of China-Russia comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination in the years to come.

    To this end, our two sides need to enhance coordination and planning. As we focus on our respective cause of development and rejuvenation, we should get creative in our thinking, create new opportunities and inject new impetus. It is important that we increase mutual trust and bring out the potential of bilateral cooperation to keep China-Russia relations at a high level.

    Our two sides need to raise both the quality and quantity of investment and economic cooperation and step up policy coordination to create favorable conditions for the high-quality development of our investment cooperation. We need to boost two-way trade, foster more convergence of interests and areas of cooperation, and promote the complementary and synchronized development of traditional trade and emerging areas of cooperation. We need to make sustained efforts to synergize the Belt and Road Initiative and the Eurasian Economic Union, so as to provide more institutional support for bilateral and regional cooperation.

    Our two sides need to step up people-to-people and cultural exchanges and ensure the success of China-Russia Years of Sports Exchange. We should make good use of the sub-national cooperation mechanisms to facilitate more interactions between sister provinces/states and cities. We should encourage personnel exchanges and push for the resumption of tourism cooperation. We should make available better summer camps, jointly-run schools and other programs to steadily enhance the mutual understanding and friendship between our peoples, especially between the youth.

    The world today is going through profound changes unseen in a century. The historical trend of peace, development and win-win cooperation is unstoppable. The prevailing trends of world multi-polarity, economic globalization and greater democracy in international relations are irreversible. On the other hand, our world is confronted with complex and intertwined traditional and non-traditional security challenges, damaging acts of hegemony, domination and bullying, and long and tortuous global economic recovery. Countries around the world are deeply concerned and eager to find a cooperative way out of the crisis.

    In March 2013, when speaking at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, I observed that countries are linked with and dependent on one another at a level never seen before, and that mankind, living in the same global village, have increasingly emerged as a community with a shared future in which everyone’s interests are closely entwined. Since then, I have proposed the Belt and Road Initiative, the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, and the Global Civilization Initiative on different occasions. All these have enriched our vision for a community with a shared future for mankind and provided practical pathways toward it. They are part of China’s response to the changes of the world, of our times, and of the historic trajectory.

    Through these ten years, the common values of humanity — peace, development, equity, justice, democracy and freedom — have taken deeper roots in the heart of the people. An open, inclusive, clean and beautiful world with lasting peace, universal security and common prosperity has become the shared aspiration of more and more countries. The international community has recognized that no country is superior to others, no model of governance is universal, and no single country should dictate the international order. The common interest of all humankind is in a world that is united and peaceful, rather than divided and volatile.

    Since last year, there has been an all-round escalation of the Ukraine crisis. China has all along upheld an objective and impartial position based on the merits of the issue, and actively promoted peace talks. I have put forth several proposals, i.e., observing the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, respect of the legitimate security concerns of all countries, supporting all efforts conducive to the peaceful settlement of the crisis, and ensuring the stability of global industrial and supply chains. They have become China’s fundamental principles for addressing the Ukraine crisis.

    Not long ago, we released China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis, which takes into account the legitimate concerns of all parties and reflects the broadest common understanding of the international community on the crisis. It has been constructive in mitigating the spillovers of the crisis and facilitating its political settlement. There is no simple solution to a complex issue. We believe that as long as all parties embrace the vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security, and pursue equal-footed, rational and results-oriented dialogue and consultation, they will find a reasonable way to resolve the crisis as well as a broad path toward a world of lasting peace and common security.

    To run the world’s affairs well, one must first and foremost run its own affairs well. The Chinese people, under the leadership of the Communist Party of China, are striving in unity to advance the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation on all fronts through the Chinese path to modernization. Chinese modernization is characterized by the following features: it is the modernization of a huge population, the modernization of common prosperity for all, the modernization of material and cultural-ethical advancement, the modernization of harmony between humanity and nature, and the modernization of peaceful development. These distinctive Chinese features are the crystallization of our practices and explorations over the years, and reflect our profound understanding of international experience. Going forward, we will steadfastly advance the cause of Chinese modernization, strive to realize high-quality development, and expand high-standard opening up. I believe that this will bring new development opportunities to Russia and all countries in the world.

    Just as every new year starts with spring, every success starts with actions. We have every reason to expect that China and Russia, as fellow travelers on the journey of development and rejuvenation, will make new and greater contributions to human advancement [end]

    The original article

    Related

    The Chinese peace plan for Ukraine

  • [Sharing] How Could Western Intelligence Have Got It Wrong, Again? They Didn’t. They Had Other Purposes – Alastair Crooke, Strategic Culture Foundation

    The West now faces the task of de-fusing the landmine of their own electorate’s conviction of a Ukraine ‘win’, and of Russian humiliation

    Larry Johnson, an ex-CIA analyst, writes “I no longer hold clearances and have not had access to the classified intelligence assessments. However, I have heard that the finished intelligence being supplied to U.S. policymakers continues to declare that Russia is on the ropes – and their economy is crumbling. Also, analysts insist that the Ukrainians are beating the Russians”.

    Johnson responds that – lacking valid human sources – “western agencies are almost wholly dependent today on ‘liaison reporting’” (i.e., from ‘friendly’ foreign intelligence services), without doing ‘due diligence’ by cross-checking discrepancies with other reporting.

    In practice, this largely means western reporting simply replicates Kiev’s PR line. But there does occur a huge problem when marrying Kiev’s output (as Johnson says) to UK reports – for ‘corroboration’.

    The reality is UK reporting itself is also based on what Ukraine is saying. This is known as false collateral – i.e., when that which is used for corroboration and validation actually derives from the same single source. It becomes – deliberately – a propaganda multiplier.

    In plain words however, all these points are ‘red herrings’. Bluntly, so-called western ‘Intelligence’ is no longer the sincere attempt to understand a complex reality, but rather, it has become the tool to falsify a nuanced reality in order to attempt to manipulate the Russian psyche towards a collective defeatism (in respect not just to the Ukraine, but to the idea that Russia should remain as a sovereign whole).

    And – to the extent that ‘lies’ are fabricated to accustom the Russian public to inevitable defeat – the obverse edge clearly is intended to train the western public towards the ‘groupthink’ that victory is inevitable. And that Russia is an ‘unreformed evil Empire’ which threatens all Europe.

    This is no accident. It is highly purposeful. It is behavioural psychology at work. The ‘head-spinning’ disorientation created throughout the Covid pandemic; the constant rain of ‘data-driven’ model analysis, the labelling of anything critical of the ‘uniform messaging’ as anti-social disinformation – enabled western governments to persuade their citizens that ‘lockdown’ was the only rational answer to the virus. It was not true (as we now know), but the ‘pilot’ behavioural nudge-psychology trial worked better – better even than its own architects had imagined.

    Professor of Clinical Psychology, Mattias Desmet, has explained that mass disorientation does not form in a vacuum. It arises, throughout history, from a collective psychosis that has followed a predictable script:

    Just as with lockdown, governments have used behavioural psychology to instil fear and isolation to mass large groups of people into herds, where toxic sneering at any contrariness cold-shoulders all critical thinking or analysis. It is more comfortable being inside the herd, than out.

    The dominant characteristic here is remaining loyal to the group – even when the policy is working badly and its consequences disturb the conscience of members. Loyalty to the group becomes the highest form of morality. That loyalty requires each member to avoid raising controversial issues, questioning weak arguments, or calling a halt to wishful thinking.

    The ‘Groupthink’ allows some self-imagined reality to detach; to drift further and further from any connection to reality, and then to transit into delusion – always drawing on like-minded peer cheerleaders for its validation and extended radicalisation.

    So, it’s ‘goodbye’ to traditional Intelligence! And ‘welcome’ to western Intelligence 101: Geo-Politics no longer revolves around a grasp on Reality. It is about the installation of ideological pseudo-realism – which is the universal installation of a singular groupthink, such that everyone lives passively by it, until it is far too late to change course.

    Superficially, this may seem clever new psyops – even ‘cool’. It is not. It is dangerous. By deliberately working on deeply ingrained fears and trauma (i.e. the Great Patriotic War for Russians (WW2)), it awakens a type of multi-generational existential plight within the collective unconscious – that of total annihilation – which is a danger that America has never faced, and towards which there is zero American empathetic understanding.

    Perhaps, by resurrecting long, collective memories of plague in European countries (such as Italy) western governments have found that they were able to mobilise their citizens around a policy of coercion, that otherwise ran wholly against their own interests. But nations have their own distinct myths and civilisational mores.

    If that were the purpose (to acclimatise Russians to defeat and ultimate Balkanisation), Western propaganda has not only failed, but it has achieved the converse. Russians have coalesced closely together against an existential western threat – and are prepared to ‘go to the wall’, if necessary, in defeating it. (Let those implications sink in.)

    On the other hand, falsely promoting a picture of inevitable success for the West inevitably has raised expectations of a political outcome that is not only not feasible, but which recedes further into the far horizon, as these fantastical claims of Russian setbacks persuade European leaders that Russia can accept an outcome in line with their constructed false reality.

    Another ‘own goal’: The West now faces the task of de-fusing the landmine of their own electorate’s conviction of a Ukraine ‘win’, and of Russian humiliation and decomposition. There will be anger and further distrust for the Élites in the West to follow. Existential risk ensues when people believe nothing the élites say.

    Plainly put, this resort to clever ‘nudge theories’ has succeeded only in toxifying the prospect for political discourse. Neither the U.S. nor Russia can now move directly to pure political discourse:

    Firstly, the parties inevitably must come to some tacit psychological assimilation of two quite dis-connected realities, now hyped into palpable, vital beings through these psychological ‘Intelligence’ techniques. There will be no acceptance by either side of the validity or moral rightness of the Other Reality’s, yet its emotive contents must be acknowledged psychically – together with the traumas underlying them – if politics is to be unlocked.

    In short, this western exaggerated psyops perversely is likely to lengthen the war until facts-on-the ground finally grind the contrasting expectations closer to what may be the ‘new possible’. Ultimately, when perceived realities cannot be ‘matched’ and nuanced, war rubs one or the other into more emollient form.

    The degeneracy in western intelligence did not start with the recent collective ‘excitement’ at the possibilities of ‘nudge-psychology’. The first steps in this direction began with a shift in ethos reaching back to the Clinton/Thatcher era in which the intelligence services were ‘neo-liberalised’.

    No longer was the role of ‘devil’s advocate’ – of bringing ‘bad news’ (i.e. hard-edged Realism) to the relevant political leadership valued; instead what was inserted was a radical shift towards ‘Business School’ practice of services being tasked with ‘adding value’ to existing government policies, and (even) of creating ‘a market’ system in Intelligence!

    The politician-managers demanded ‘good news’. And to make ‘it stick’, funding was tied to the ‘value added’ – with administrators skilled at managing bureaucracy moved into leadership jobs. It marked the end to classical Intelligence – which always was an art, rather than science.

    In short, it was the outset to fixing the intelligence around policies (to add value), rather than the traditional function of shaping policies to sound analysis.

    In the U.S., the politicisation of intelligence reached its apex with Dick Cheney’s initiation of a Team ‘B’ intelligence unit reporting personally to him. It was intended to furnish the anti-intelligence to combat the intelligence service output. Of course, the Team ‘B’ initiative shook confidence amongst the analysts, and by-passed the work of the traditional cadre – just as Cheney had intended. (He had a war (the Iraq war) to justify).

    But there were separately other structural shifts. Firstly, by 2000, woke narcissism had begun to eclipse strategic thought –creating its own novel groupthink. The West just could not shake off the sense of itself at the centre of the Universe (albeit no longer in a racial sense, but via its awakening to ‘victim politics’ – requiring endless redress and reparations – and such woke values serendipitously seemed to anoint the West with a renewed global ‘moral primacy’).

    In a parallel shift, U.S. neo-cons piggy-backed on this new woke universalism to cement the meme of ‘Empire matters primordially’. The unspoken corollary to this, of course, is that original values of the American Republic or of Europe, cannot be re-conceived and brought forward into the present, as long as ‘liberal’ Empire groupthink configures them as a threat to western security. This conundrum and struggle lies at the heart of U.S. politics today.

    Yet the question remains just how can the intelligence being supplied to U.S. policymakers insist that Russia is imploding economically, and that Ukraine is winning – against what can be easily observed facts on the ground?.

    Well, no problem; Washington thinks-tanks have big, big finance from the Military Industrial World, with the preponderance of these funds going to the neo-cons – and their insistence that Russia is a small ‘gas-station’ posing as a state, and not a power to be taken seriously.

    Neo-con claws tear at anyone gain-saying their ‘line’ – and think-tanks employ an army of ‘analysts’ to turn out ‘academic’ reports suggesting that Russia’s industry – to the extent it exists at all – is imploding. Since last March, western military and economic experts have been regularly-as-clockwork, predicting that Russia has run out of missiles, drones, tanks and artillery shells – and is expending its manpower throwing human-waves of untrained troops upon the Ukrainian siege lines.

    The logic is plain, but again flawed. If a combined NATO struggles to supply artillery shells, Russia with the economy the size of a small EU state (logically) must be worse off. And if only we (the U.S.) threaten China hard enough against supplying Russia,then the latter will ultimately run out of munitions – and NATO supported Ukraine ‘will win’.

    The logic then is that a war prolonged (until the money runs out) must deliver a Russia bereft of munitions, and NATO-supplied Ukraine ‘wins’.

    This framing is entirely wrong because of conceptual differences: Russian history is one of Total War that is fought in a long, ‘all-out’, uncompromising engagement against an overwhelming peer force. But inherent to this idea, is its all-important grounding in the conviction that such wars are fought over the course of years, with their outcomes conditioned by the capacity to surge military production.

    Conceptually, the U.S. shifted in the 1980s away from its post-war military-industrial paradigm, to off-shore manufacturing to Asia and to ‘just-in-time’ supply lines. Effectively, the U.S. (and the West) shifted in the opposite direction to ‘surge capacity’, whereas Russia did not: It kept alive the notion of sustainment which had contributed to saving Russia during the Great Patriotic War.

    So, western intelligence services again got it wrong; they misread the reality? No, they didn’t get it ‘wrong’. Their purpose was different.

    The few who got it right were mercilessly caricatured as stooges to make them seem absurd. And Intelligence 101 was re-conceived as the purposeful denialism of all off-Team thinking, whilst the majority of western citizens would live passively in the embrace the groupthink – until too late for them to awaken, and to change the dangerous course on which their societies were embarked.

    Unverified Ukrainian reports (liaison reporting) served up to western leaders therefore is not a ‘glitch’ – it is a ‘feature’ of the new Intelligence 101 paradigm intended to confuse and dull its electorate [end]

    The original article

    my related piece

    The Western disinformation about Ukraine

    chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Ukraine against Russia

  • Ukrainian terrorism in Moscow

    chronicle, thriller

    Around 9:35 pm, on August 20, 2022, an explosion blows up in Moscow suburb the usual car of Alexandr Dugin, that his daughter, Daria Platonova, is driving alone. The 29-year-old woman is killed. Likely the intended target, her father was traveling in another car. On social networks, the Ukrainian nationalists are celebrating the attack. At 12:12 am, time in Paris, 1:12 am in Moscow, Eliot Higgins bullies on Twitter the father of the victim

    43-year-old British national Higgins is a blogger and the founder of Bellingcat, the worst example of what the nerds are calling pompously open source intelligence (OSINT). Their analysis do not need to be reliable, they are supporting a political agenda in post-truth Western societies. That work is public and propaganda. Bellingcat is collaborating with atlanticist think tanks and Western intelligence agencies. Higgins and his fellows are morbid russophobic maniacs.

    While Ukraine is losing the war on the battlefield, NATO is assessing an asymmetric strategy : threat of a nuclear catastrophe in Energodar, sabotages in Crimea and likely, political assassinations in Russia, which are terrorism.

    60-year-old Aleksandr Dugin is a philosopher, was a dissident during the 80s in Soviet Union. In 1993, he co-founded the National Bolshevik Party (NBP), a scholarly mix of far-right and far-left, which opposed later Vladimir Putin -when Dugin had already left in 1998-, was suspected of preparing an armed uprising, was banned in 2007 as an extremist organization. He was the deputy head of the department of sociology of international relations at Moscow State University from 2009 to 2014, was finally not appointed head, while he was denouncing Maidan as a US coup and was calling for a Russian military involvement in Donbass. He has predicted that in Ukraine, the US would fight until the last Ukrainian. Some Ukrainians are fan of Dugin and Kiev democracy is cracking down on them. He is expressing his will to challenge the atlanticist empire, is pleading for eurasianism as a balance. Dugin is on a US sanctions list since 2014.

    His daughter Daria was a journalist and an activist, on a US sanctions list since March 2022. She has written that the massacre in Bucha was staged. I am supporting this clear reality, the special purpose formations of the Ukrainian national police have slaughtered collaborationists there, the Ukrainian artillery had previously killed other victims.

    On August 21, in a murder case so far, the investigators are still working on the site of the attack. In a criminal investigation, the first 48 hours are decisive, deserve a special attention. Little sleep for the detectives

    In the afternoon, the authorities state

    it has already been established that an explosive device was planted under the bottom of the car on the driver’s side

    The understanding of the bomb will be a major step. Was it automatic, remotely controlled ? In the second hypothesis, the perpetrators would have finally decided themselves or received the order to trigger the explosion, despite Alexander Dugin was not onboard.

    Spokeswoman of the Russian defense ministry, Maria Zakharova states

    Russian law enforcement agencies are investigating the death of Daria Dugina. If the Ukrainian trace is confirmed – and this version was voiced by the head of the DPR Denis Pushilin, and it must be verified by the competent authorities – then we should talk about the policy of state terrorism implemented by the Kyiv regime. There have been plenty of facts accumulated over the years : from political calls for violence to the leadership and participation of Ukrainian state structures in crimes. We are waiting for the results of the investigation

    Funny effect in Ukraine, where August 24 is also the day of independence since 1991. Media report that from August 22 to 26, all employees of the government neighborhood in Kiev have been recommended to work from home. I guess COVID is not the issue. Strikes on decision centers are feared and in the evening, large traffic jams appear at the exits of Kiev.

    47-year-old Ilya Ponomarev is a wealthy businessman, whose political identity is winding, between communism, pan-slavism and social democracy, likely ambitious and opportunist. Then member of the State Duma, he opposed in 2014 the annexation of Crimea. He is living in exile between California and Kiev. Ukrainian nationalist, fan of historical Nazi leader Stepan Bandera, former president Petro Poroshenko has granted him the Ukrainian nationality in 2019. About 24 hours after the assassination of Daria Platonova, Ponomarev publishes a statement on his YouTube channel, February Morning, takes credit for the attack, on behalf of a so-called [Russian] national republican army (NRA). He states that Daria was indeed the target

    As a clue of his intellectual integrity, I notice in his statement that Ponomarev is regarding the Ukrainian war crime in Yelenovka as a Russian attack. With so few scruples, he may be the optimal puppet for NATO and Ukrainian special operations in Russia.

    Alexandr Dugin has seen the explosion of the car that Daria was driving, is now hospitalized. The investigators have been allowed to talk to him. He reports that his daughter and himself have recently received many threats from Ukrainian nationalists on social networks.

    • August 22, 2022

    I was so eager to read them. While the assassination of Daria Platonova looks so far a terrorist operation, in order to threat common Russians, provoke a strategic reaction from Russia, like strikes on Ukrainian decision centers, in order also to boost a fantasized violent opposition, an operation carried out at the instigation of NATO, with the cultural trace of British SAS, in the same vein as the threat of a nuclear catastrophe in Energodar and the sabotages in Crimea, when Ukraine has already lost the war on the battlefield, an operation that a puppet has already claimed, the wealthy businessman but winding, mediocre and venal politician Ilya Ponomarev (cf. supra), most British journalists, many servile stooges, or racist, nationalist and arrogant British petits bourgeois, are telling their readers that the assassination would be likely a Russian false flag, in order to boost the popular support to the special military operation in Donbass and Ukraine. The assertion is moronic : Ukraine has already lost the war and the popular support to the Russian government is higher than ever. Funny how the same sleuths are usually mocking the conspiracy-theorist-tinfoil-hat

    The Times, especially, stresses that the victim was

    the daughter of an ultra-nationalist Russian philosopher who backed the invasion of Ukraine […] has advocated an imperialist theory called Eurasianism […] to unite ethnic Russians and reject western, European values

    Through experience, I know that among the promoters of the good, the rejection of Western, European values, is an unforgivable crime. The reading of the Western feelings and moods, especially among Britons who are still mourning the loss of the British empire, is a pleasure for fine gourmets. But the interest of such literature is elsewhere. Actually, this article is a new clue, which is indicating the area where the culprits of an assassination should be chased.

    In less than 48 hours, the Russian intelligence (FSB) and law enforcement agencies have already achieved an impressive job, have identified the bomber in the case of Daria Platonova assassination.

    43-year-old Ukrainian national Natalia Shaban has entered Russia in July, rented an apartment in the victim’s building. She has attended the event where the bomb has been fixed under the victim’s car. After the assassination, she has left for Estonia, a NATO country. Last but not the least, while she is traveling with her 12-year-old daughter, Shaban is a Ukrainian operative within military intelligence (GUR)

    Here is her card of the Ukrainian national guard, Nazi Azov regiment. Her call sign is Vovk

    The FSB releases footage of Shaban’s slices of life in Russia, between late July and August. She has used accessories, so pointless for a common tourist, like a set of different license plates, apparently from Donetsk People’s Republic, Kazakhstan and Ukraine

    I am watching for six months the Ukrainian PSYOPs and false flag crimes. No surprise, the Ukrainian authorities are denying that new terrorist action, their involvement in the assassination of Daria Platonova. They are denying summarily and do not risk to discuss the facts. No surprise, the US State Department and British media are supporting the Ukrainian deny. The Western communication is story-telling and disinformation.

    The office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights believes that those responsible for murder of journalist Daria Dugina should be brought to justice. I agree, extrajudicial denazification should be an ultimate solution, if countries prevent the suspect from appearing before a Russian court.

    UN general secretary spokesman Stéphane Dujarric states

    the United Nations are calling for an investigation to establish the facts behind the death of Daria Dugina

    Fortunately, Russia has not waited for the UN call. As I have written supra, the first 48 hours after the crime are decisive.

    Vladimir Putin pays tribute to the victim

    A vile, cruel crime cut short life of Daria Dugina, a bright, talented person with a real Russian heart – kind, loving, sympathetic and open. A journalist, scientist, philosopher, war correspondent, she honestly served the people, the Fatherland, she proved by deed what it means to be a patriot of Russia

    He has also awarded to her the Order of Courage, for courage and dedication shown in the performance of professional duty

    • August 23, 2022

    Alexandr Dugin speaks at the funeral of his daughter Daria

    Russian people can not be broken, so Daria’s killers will not achieve their goal

    According to unconfirmed reports, Natalia Shaban / Vovk may have stayed at the ibis Hauptbahnhof hotel in Vienna, Austria, on the night of August 22-23, after her public identification. This customer is traveling with two other women and a child. If Vovk, her adult companions would be guardians, whose nationalities would be interesting, on the winding path to a final destination, likely not Ukraine, where the Russian intelligence is managing many agents.

    So interesting, the Ukrainian communication has adapted. About the Ukrainian suspect, Volodymyr Zelenskyy states

    it’s definitely not our responsibility. This is not a citizen of our country, we are not interested in her. And she was not on the territory of Ukraine

    The FSB has done a great job and Zelensky knows it. Natalia Shaban / Vovk is burnt and I guess, at least one third country is taking care of her. In default thereof, her own side will kill her. Vovk was born in Mariupol and the president of Ukraine has therefore acknowledged the independence of Donbass.

    • August 24, 2022

    Russian news agency RIA Novosti reports that Natalia Shaban / Vovk entered Russia in July with a Kazakh passport under the false identity of Yulia Zayko, born on December 26, 1980

    What about the passport ? False or real ? The National Security Committee (KNB), intelligence agency in Kazakhstan, may work sometimes with foreign counterparts, MI6 or CIA.

    • August 25, 2022

    Money ! Where did it come from ? Natalia Shaban / Vovk rented in Moscow a 80 meters square apartment, with several bathrooms, for about 100,000 rubles (about 1,700 euros) a month. What a folly for a tourist whose last documented job, thanks to RaHDIt hackers, was until February, phone operator within the Ukrainian national guard.

    • August 26, 2022

    Unconfirmed report, a tip

    The passport is of course real and Kazakh numbers are real and all issued in December 2021, at the request of MI6 [British foreign intelligence]. KNB [Kazakh intelligence agency] under Masimov was a branch of MI5 [British home intelligence] and MI6 like the SBU [Ukrainian State security agency] is now in Ukraine. We saw the result in the version of the failed coup in Kazakhstan. Of course, it is better not to escalate the situation in Kazakhstan, but all documents are real. The KNB knew to whom and why this passport was issued. Natalia Shaban/Vovk has been a staff member of the UAFs’ Main Intelligence Directorate [GUR, Ukrainian military intelligence] since 2010, the rank of major, military specialty : infiltration and data collection. Since the European Football Championship, she has regularly engaged in sexual relations with the necessary characters for development, constantly traveled to London, Dubai, Warsaw, and the Baltic countries. Rumors had long been circulating through GUR that her daughter’s father was Vasily Burba [GUR head until August 2020, sacked after a failed dirty trick] and it was an obstacle to closer interaction with handlers from MI6 since the start of Russia’s SMO. Apparently, they were given the task of proving their reliability and solvency

    The source is public, Marat Bashirov is chairman of the ministers council in Lugansk People’s Republic. I am so surprised and terribly disappointed that Bellingcat has not yet released a report in this case

    • August 29, 2022

    The FSB has identified an accomplice. 43-year-old Ukrainian national Bogdan Tsyganenko was likely the artificer. From Estonia, he came to Russia on July 30, was driving sometimes alone Shaban’s Mini. They went to a rented garage in Moscow, where the bomb was made. He left for Estonia the day before the attack