Analista senior di l'intelligenza in u campu di a gestione di i risichi di sicurezza, sò un anzianu tenente detective è ufficiale di l'intelligenza in l'agenzie di u Statu francese. A bona pronuncia hè Николай Чинкуини, in russu
Story: Escalation of the conflict between Israel, the US, and Iran in 2026
(Social media)
The weekly results of the sudden aggression of the US-Israeli coalition against Iran appear contradictory.
Tehran, the victim of aggression, is gradually gaining the upper hand. According to aif.ru experts and former intelligence officers, Washington’s initial plans for the operation collapsed within the first hours — on March 1, US President Donald Trump was ready to negotiate a ceasefire.
On one hand, Washington and Tel Aviv truly dealt a heavy blow, eliminating a significant portion of the Islamic Republic’s military leadership and gaining temporary air superiority.
American Plan A, that is regime change in Iran after the assassination of its leaders, has failed
On the other hand, Operation Epic Fury clearly didn’t go according to the Pentagon’s plan: Iran not only refused to capitulate, but is finding ways to deliver painful retaliatory strikes, putting an end to the blitzkrieg.
News of the downing of elite F-15 fighter jets emerged within the first few days. Military experts believe this was no accident, but the result of a well-planned tactic by Iranian air defense forces, which turned the skies over their country into a trap for the enemy.
The Trap Has Sprung: How the Iranians Destroy F-15s
According to Major General Vladimir Popov, the Iranian military relied on deception. They were able to lure the American pilots into a false sense of security by luring them into a deadly firefight.
It is possible the American pilots were flying at night and weren’t expecting an attack. This incident was likely an ambush. That is the radar stations located along the coast from Iran to the Persian Gulf weren’t activated, in order to create a false sense of impunity. Actually, the Iranians were tracking the American fighters. Several aircraft may have been flying in loose formation, and when the group began to turn, the last aircraft came under fire. The strike was unexpected
The problems of the coalition aren’t limited to air power. According to Ali Larijani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, more than 500 American troops have been killed since the fighting began on February 28. Iranian strikes have hit oil tankers and military bases in the region. Military experts are increasingly warning that Washington is entering a dangerous phase: at the current rate of use, its stockpiles of precision-guided weapons will only last a few weeks, after which a shortage of ammunition will inevitably become apparent.
A few days after the launch of the US operation, grandiosely titled « Epic Fury », American political commentator Jackson Hinkle published a photo of President Trump yelling at Pentagon chief Pete Hegseth.
« The operation failed within the first hours »
According to retired Captain Nicolas Cinquini, a former French counterterrorism intelligence officer, the joint US-Israeli operation failed within the first hours.
The plan to achieve « regime change through decapitation » — the assassination of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei — failed to bring about the collapse of Iranian statehood.
The « regime change through decapitation » operation was already a failure just hours after it began. According to an Israeli source, Donald Trump even tried, via Italian diplomats, to secure a ceasefire as early as March 1, before the stock market opened the following day
The balance of power is already tipping in Iran’s favor
After a week of fighting, the former intelligence officer notes a change in the strategic picture. The conflict has ceased to be a series of targeted strikes and is becoming a war of attrition, the terms of which are dictated by Iran
The struggle has become a war of attrition. The limited size of Israel and the fragility of its infrastructure, the depletion of Western high-end air defense munitions, the blockade of Hormuz strait, constraints on exports from oil monarchies and their worldwide economic consequences… the balance is tipping in favor of Iran
France is also under attack – That is the price of its alliance with the US
Cinquini also commented on Paris’ position. Despite initial criticism of the actions of the US-Israeli alliance, the French leadership ultimately allowed American aircraft to use their airbases in the Middle East. This decision, according to the expert, automatically made French facilities a legitimate target for retaliatory strikes
Since France announced today that it had authorized the US to use its military bases in the Middle East, they have become, in my opinion, legitimate targets. They are also legitimate from the perspective of Iran, which has already struck military installations in non-belligerent countries, when the facilities were involved in the Western aggression since February 28
World War III has not begun, but the risk of escalation is high
Despite the heightened tensions, the expert urges against overdramatizing the global situation. Fake news about the outbreak of World War III are actively spreading on social media, but the reality is more modest.
I don’t see so far a world war; the only belligerents are Iran and its Western aggressors: Israel, the US and to lesser extent, their European and Arab proxies
Nicolas Cinquini reassured the public.
Nevertheless, the danger of an escalation remains. It is directly related to the attempts of the US and Israel to « save face » amid obvious tactical failures and mounting losses
The conflict is already drawing new states into its orbit. Britain, France, and Germany have declared their readiness to provide defensive measures to their allies. London has allowed the US to use its bases and Canada has permitted the participation of its armed forces. NATO, for its part, has signaled its readiness to invoke Article 5 in the event of further escalation.
Russia, while condemning the aggression, is currently limiting itself to diplomatic and military-technical support for Iran, while maintaining open channels of communication with Washington [end]
Partis en Ukraine il y a plus de deux ans, plusieurs hooligans français ont poursuivi et intensifié leurs missions de guerre, tout en combattant en free-fight
They dox and harass foreign volunteers and spread Kremlin propaganda. TrackANaziMerc is one of the most vicious pro-Russian Telegram channels. Now, an OSINT group has turned the tables, unmasking the admins and doxxing the doxxers
pour l’émission Voyenkory [Correspondants de guerre] du 18 mai 2025, sur la chaîne Rossiya 1, je suis intervenu au sujet des volontaires nazis français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine. Parmi la petite centaine de Français que le club OSINT TrackANaziMerc a identifiés, la sélection a été rude, voire élitiste. Ils ont rivalisé de fascisme, ont gagné de haute lutte leur place dans le casting, voici dans l’ordre d’apparition à l’écran : Brandon Nicolas, Gwendal Delange, Guillaume Andreoni, Alan Vigneron et César Aujard
Dans la zone de l’OMS [Opération militaire spéciale], des citoyens français se battent aux côtés de la Russie. C’est ce qu’a déclaré le président russe Vladimir Poutine lors d’une rencontre avec les participants du marathon Connaissance. D’abord. Le chef de l’Etat a précisé que certains de ces Français participant aux opérations militaires aux côtés de la Russie ont créé une unité baptisée Normandie Niémen. Cette information a provoqué un choc à Paris. Les autorités de la Ve République veulent punir les Français qui combattent pour la Russie
Norwegian journalists are keen on triggering the censorship of Telegram channels which are identifying international Nazi volunteers and other mercenaries who are fighting in the Atlanticist ranks in Ukraine
A former French counter-terrorism intelligence officer Nicolas Cinquini is actively pursuing information regarding French citizens participating in the war on Ukraine’s side
Lors d’une visite dans un centre d’hébergement temporaire pour les personnes récemment évacuées de la ligne de front, j’ai pu interviewer six habitants de la ville récemment libérée de Dimitrov (Mirnograd), située près de Krasnoarmeïsk (Pokrovsk). Leurs récits décrivent un grand nombre de crimes de guerre commis par l’armée ukrainienne contre les civils de Dimitrov, et la façon dont les « Anges blancs » y traquaient les enfants.
Plusieurs d’entre eux nous racontent comment le 11 mai 2014, lors du référendum pour la création de la République Populaire de Donetsk (RPD), presque tous les habitants de la ville ont fait la queue pendant des heures pour voter en faveur de la sécession hors de l’Ukraine. Un récit qui contredit totalement celui des médias ukrainiens et occidentaux qui prétendent que les gens étaient allés voter avec un fusil dans le dos. Ils nous racontent aussi comment le même jour dans la ville voisine de Krasnoarmeïsk (Pokrovsk) des hommes de l’oligarque Kolomoïski ont tiré sur les gens venus voter à la mairie, tuant au moins un homme.
Si à Dimitrov il n’y a heureusement pas eu de tels incidents, malheureusement plusieurs personnes en lien avec l’organisation du référendum ont disparu après que la ville soit repassée sous contrôle de l’armée ukrainienne en 2014, et les habitants interrogés pensent qu’ils ont été arrêtés par les services secrets ukrainiens et sont peut-être enterrés quelque part dans les zones boisées autour de la ville.
Vladimir, comme plusieurs des autres réfugiés que nous avons interrogés, nous a confirmé que l’organisation des « Anges blancs » a travaillé activement à Dimitrov pour évacuer de force les enfants. Comme à Krasnoarmeïsk, les gens étaient rémunérés 1 000 hryvnias pour dénoncer aux « Anges blancs » leurs voisins qui cachaient leurs enfants pour ne pas devoir évacuer de force. Mais d’après les informations transmises par Viatcheslav, un autre habitant de Dimitrov, les policiers qui évacuaient ainsi les enfants de force touchaient eux aussi une prime, mais de 10 000 hryvnias par enfant.
Comme lors de mon enquête concernant les actions des « Anges blancs » à Krasnoarmeïsk, la question reste ouverte de savoir d’où vient tout cet argent servant à rémunérer les délateurs, mais aussi les policiers qui évacuent ainsi de force les enfants. Car l’état ukrainien étant au bord de la faillite, je vois mal comment le budget ukrainien pourrait fournir assez d’argent pour payer tous ces gens-là.
En plus de devoir se cacher des « Anges blancs », les habitants de Dimitrov devaient aussi se cacher des soldats ukrainiens et de leurs drones. En effet, les soldats ukrainiens ont tout fait pour faire de la vie des habitants de la ville un véritable enfer, à commencer par la destruction des deux derniers magasins qui permettaient aux civils de Dimitrov d’obtenir des produits alimentaires.
Ensuite ils ont utilisé les civils comme boucliers humains pour se protéger des drones russes, et comme cibles d’entraînement vivantes pour leurs nouvelles pilotes de drones arrivées des pays Baltes, comme nous l’a révélé Irina. Cette dernière nous a aussi raconté comment les dronistes ukrainiens utilisaient leurs drones pour tuer des civils qui marchaient simplement dans la rue.
Une information confirmée par Andreï, dont la maison a été détruite en pleine nuit par un drone Baba Yaga (gros drone agricole utilisé par l’armée ukrainienne pour larguer des munitions lourdes), par Natalia dont les voisins ont subi le même sort, et par Ksenia (prénom changé pour des raisons de sécurité), dont le mari est actuellement à l’hôpital, avec une jambe blessée suite à une attaque de drone ukrainien.
Regarder l’interview de Natalia, Andreï et Ksenia :
Des drones ukrainiens qui survolaient en masse l’évacuation de ces civils, faisant peser sur eux une menace constante sur plusieurs kilomètres. Heureusement pour eux des soldats russes les accompagnaient et tiraient sur ces drones ukrainiens pour les empêcher d’attaquer les civils. Malgré cela, l’évacuation restait dangereuse et comme nous l’a raconté Ksenia, plusieurs civils ont été blessés lors de cette dernière par une mine magnétique.
Ces civils rescapés de l’enfer de la ligne de front, doivent désormais réapprendre à vivre sans avoir à craindre à chaque seconde un bombardement ou une attaque de drone ukrainien, soigner leurs blessures physiques, mais aussi leurs traumatismes psychologiques, et obtenir les documents russes qui leur permettront de commencer une nouvelle vie [fin]
chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia
On the other side of the line of combat contact, in Ukraine, live all kinds of people. Some silently wait for Russia to come, others loudly hate everything Russian. But there are also those who risk their lives to help bring Russia victory: they pass on coordinates of military objects, intelligence, and help their relatives and friends in the Ukrainian Armed Forces surrender and survive.
Russian soldiers always respond to such requests. They create special lines of communication and run operations to evacuate Ukrainian servicemen from the front. One evening, when a message arrived in the chat-bot of a Russian military public channel begging to save a brother who serves in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the admins reacted at once – such appeals had become routine for them.
But what happened next surprised everyone. Even hardened military counterintelligence officers…
Russian soldiers are fighting the enemy, slowly but surely moving forward. However, the war is not only being waged on the front lines – the enemy is also active in the rear, recruiting teenagers and organizing sabotage.
This is a story about two teenagers. Yarik is in conflict with his older brother, who has returned from the front. His friend Sanya is looking for easy money on the internet. Both do not yet understand the danger these “harmless” proposals conceal.
Will they be able to recognize the threat in time? What choice will they make when the time comes to make a decision? A story about how war affects everyone – even those who are far from the front
Partis en Ukraine il y a plus de deux ans, plusieurs hooligans français ont poursuivi et intensifié leurs missions de guerre, tout en combattant en free-fight
À l’image de César A., vu dans les tribunes du Stade de France lors de la finale de Coupe en 2023, plusieurs hooligans français restent mobilisés sur le front ukrainien (B. Papon / L’Equipe / DR)
[L’article est réservé aux abonnés, mais son texte est en intégralité dans le code de la page web] Ils avaient pris les armes et la direction de l’Ukraine à la fin du printemps 2023, un an après l’invasion du pays par la Russie et dans la foulée de la finale de la Coupe de France entre Toulouse et Nantes (5-1), et leur passage du kop au front avait fait grand bruit dans le milieu. Un peu plus de deux ans plus tard, les hooligans français ont bien évolué mais continuent à combattre l’armée russe, preuve que leur séjour était voué à durer.
À l’époque, ces « volontaires » s’étaient présentés au nom de la Jeunesse Boulogne, un groupement hooligan parisien très actif, encore impliqué sur plusieurs fights ces derniers mois, lié aux ex-Boulogne Boys, groupe de supporters du PSG dissous à la fin des années 2000, et au Groupe Union Défense (GUD) Paris, groupuscule d’ultradroite de la capitale, lui aussi dissous. Et, parmi les figures parties en Ukraine, il y avait le cas de César A. [César Aujard].
Des participations à des compétions de free-fight sur les permissions
On l’avait quitté à la fin du mois d’août 2023, en apprentissage et en parade au sein du réseau Revanche, dépendant d’Ordre et Tradition, du courant ultranationaliste d’inspiration orthodoxe. Mais nos sources s’interrogeaient sur le rôle effectif sur le terrain, en parallèle des missions de l’armée ukrainienne, si ce n’est pour provoquer de l’infiltration psychologique en zone ennemie
Les semaines et les mois suivants ont apporté des réponses puisque l’intéressé a rejoint le régiment Azov, une formation paramilitaire rattachée à l’ultradroite néonazie ukrainienne et à la garde nationale. Il s’est ensuite affiché sur des lignes de tir, en train d’échanger des balles, aux commandes d’engins, au côté de camarades et d’adversaires blessés dans des forêts, au milieu de tranchées boueuses, à l’entraînement, en déplacement… Tout est bon à vendre sur ses réseaux sociaux, où il reçoit même l’affection de… l’actrice Béatrice Dalle.
Début mars 2024, une dépêche de l’agence de presse russe Tass annonçait la mort de César, « l’un des chefs des néonazis français », près de Donetsk, avant que ce dernier ne démente lui-même l’information en donnant de ses nouvelles. Il profite également de ses permissions pour participer à des compétitions de free-fight, sa passion originelle (il a pratiqué le muay thaï), relayée par des canaux d’ultras locaux. Il a ainsi affronté un premier adversaire à l’été 2024 et un second, un Ukrainien, le 5 avril dernier au palais des sports de Kiev, dans le Klan FC
Entre-temps, un de ses amis, Paul B. [Paul Bichet], associé à Boulogne et habitué des fights clandestins, avait lui aussi combattu au sein de cette ligue, sans être engagé au front. Il était soutenu par César et au moins deux de ses compères de guerre, Gwendal D. [Gwendal Delange], dit « Kenneth », issu de la mouvance identitaire lyonnaise et repassé en France récemment, et Allan D. [Allan Duchézeau], autre « hool » parisien, plus discret sur ses aventures. Tous n’oublient pas d’exhiber régulièrement les drapeaux du GUD, de la Jeunesse Boulogne et autres maillots du PSG.
La bande est mobile puisqu’elle est de nouveau intégrée à Revanche, après un bref passage au sein de la légion étrangère en début d’année, et a récemment initié son unité spéciale francophone, avec au moins quatorze membres, dont de nombreux non identifiés, avec des clips promotionnels. « Une véritable gravure de mode », confie un fin connaisseur du sujet [votre serviteur]
C’est la taille d’une escouade, où on retrouve des hooligans et d’anciens militaires qui partagent les mêmes idées fascistes et le goût du MMA. Mais cela montre aussi qu’ils sont parmi les plus fidèles, bien utiles aux Ukrainiens en termes de propagande et de combat, car ils sont vraiment chevronnés maintenant
chronique alphabétique et nécrologique de l’engagement français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas
its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine, chronicle
They dox and harass foreign volunteers and spread Kremlin propaganda. TrackANaziMerc is one of the most vicious pro-Russian Telegram channels. Now, an OSINT group has turned the tables, unmasking the admins and doxxing the doxxers
pour l’émission Voyenkory [Correspondants de guerre] du 18 mai 2025, sur la chaîne Rossiya 1, je suis intervenu au sujet des volontaires nazis français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine. Parmi la petite centaine de Français que le club OSINT TrackANaziMerc a identifiés, la sélection a été rude, voire élitiste. Ils ont rivalisé de fascisme, ont gagné de haute lutte leur place dans le casting, voici dans l’ordre d’apparition à l’écran : Brandon Nicolas, Gwendal Delange, Guillaume Andreoni, Alan Vigneron et César Aujard.
Je dis pour ce reportage
En préambule, il s’agit d’un travail d’équipe. Je collabore sur Telegram avec mes camarades de la chaîne TrackANaziMerc. Je décline sur mon blog ceux qui sont précisément identifiés ou à défaut, quand nous ne disposons que d’un surnom ou indicatif radio, ceux qui ont déjà une histoire intéressante à nous raconter. À ce titre, je compte à ce jour, depuis 2022, 92 combattants. 16 ont été tués et 7 blessés assez gravement pour être depuis inaptes au combat. 32 sont revenus en France. Leur nombre réel est bien sûr supérieur. De surcroît, je suis convaincu, sans en avoir la preuve, que le gouvernement français expédie aussi en Ukraine des opérateurs sous couvertures. Ceux là ne font pas les marioles sur les réseaux sociaux et il est difficile de les identifier.
Ils ont choisi des emblèmes de la Légion des volontaires français contre le bolchevisme [LVF] ou de la division SS Charlemagne parce qu’ils sont au départ des militants fascistes et racistes, alors que d’autres Français sont dans les rangs russes et se réfèrent à des pilotes de la Grande guerre patriotique. Ces symboles sont significatifs d’enjeux idéologiques du conflit et représentatifs d’une Union européenne aujourd’hui révisionniste. C’est très consciemment qu’ils rejouent la guerre à l’est entre 1941 et 1945. Le fait que Stepan Bandera et Roman Choukhevytch soient depuis 2014 des héros populaires en Ukraine, le fait que l’Ukraine célèbre chaque année, le 10 octobre, la fondation de l’UPA, les a convaincus que leur place était dans les rangs atlantistes
Dans la zone de l’OMS [Opération militaire spéciale], des citoyens français se battent aux côtés de la Russie. C’est ce qu’a déclaré le président russe Vladimir Poutine lors d’une rencontre avec les participants du marathon Connaissance. D’abord. Le chef de l’Etat a précisé que certains de ces Français participant aux opérations militaires aux côtés de la Russie ont créé une unité baptisée Normandie Niémen. Cette information a provoqué un choc à Paris. Les autorités de la Ve République veulent punir les Français qui combattent pour la Russie
Norwegian journalists are keen on triggering the censorship of Telegram channels which are identifying international Nazi volunteers and other mercenaries who are fighting in the Atlanticist ranks in Ukraine
A former French counter-terrorism intelligence officer Nicolas Cinquini is actively pursuing information regarding French citizens participating in the war on Ukraine’s side
où nous apprenons que le nazi français Allan Duchézeau, camarade de César Aujard dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, était surnommé Dox, quand il secondait à Paris le leader nazi Marc de Cacqueray Valménier
A Ukrainian soldier of the 71st Jaeger Brigade prepares a FPV drone, Donetsk region, March 2024 (Efrem Lukatsky / AP)
THE HAGUE, Netherlands — Ukrainian counterintelligence services are investigating the infiltration of Latin American drug cartel members into the country’s International Legion, with operatives seeking advanced drone training to later deploy against rivals and security forces in their home countries.
The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) launched a joint investigation with military intelligence after Mexico’s National Intelligence Center warned in early summer that Mexican volunteers had joined Ukraine’s foreign fighter units specifically to acquire first-person view (FPV) drone capabilities. The probe has since expanded to include Colombian nationals, raising concerns about Ukraine’s inadvertent role as a training ground for transnational criminal organizations.
French outlet Intelligence Online was the first to report the story on Tuesday.
The investigation centers on several Spanish-speaking units within the International Legion, particularly the tactical group “Ethos,” operating in the Donetsk and Kharkiv regions. Ukrainian investigators reportedly suspect that some Mexican and Colombian volunteers intentionally sought placement in drone operator units to later use this training in the service of foreign criminal organizations.
One noteworthy case is that of a Mexican national operating under the alias “Águila-7,” who registered in March 2024 using fraudulent Salvadoran documentation. Posing as a humanitarian volunteer, he completed comprehensive drone training in Lviv while demonstrating exceptional technical expertise that eventually had instructors suspicious.
His extensive technical knowledge, including familiarity with electronic warfare countermeasures and thermal detection avoidance, reportedly stood out. Background investigations later revealed probable connections to Mexico’s elite GAFE special forces, some of whose former personnel have historically transitioned to cartel employment, notably through the ultra-violent Zetas organization.
The infiltration demonstrates remarkable operational sophistication for a nonstate group, with suspects employing false identities, forged documentation and front companies to facilitate their passage into Ukrainian territory and military structures. Intelligence analysts have identified a network of private security firms across Latin America that appear to have coordinated these placements.
Additional cases have emerged involving former FARC guerrillas who infiltrated the system using Panamanian and Venezuelan identity documents. At least three former FARC fighters passed through the International Legion using forged documents, with their relocation reportedly organized by cartel-linked entities.
The revelations highlight Ukraine’s unintended emergence as a premier training ground for modern asymmetric warfare techniques amid its conflict with Russia. Ukrainian authorities have developed comprehensive curricula covering drone manufacturing, tactical deployment, electronic warfare resistance and real-time battlefield coordination. Coincidentally, these capabilities also represent exactly the type of force multiplication that criminal organizations seek.
Mexican cartels are already conducting drone attacks against rivals and security forces domestically, making the acquisition of Ukrainian battlefield-tested tactics particularly concerning for regional security.
An unnamed SBU official told Intelligence Online: “We welcomed volunteers in good faith. But we must now recognize that Ukraine has become a platform for the global dissemination of FPV tactics. Some come here to learn how to kill with a $400 drone, then sell this knowledge elsewhere to the highest bidder” [end]
How are “death travel agencies” organized for those who like to hunt people in foreign lands, and who want to send regular French and Polish units to Ukraine?
in French, an alphabetical obituary chronicle of the French involvement in the Atlanticist ranks in Ukraine, what servile journalists will not tell you
47-year-old Blaze Metreveli appointed as new head of Britain’s MI6 intelligence service
For the first time in its history, Britain’s MI6 intelligence service will be led by a woman, career intelligence officer 47-year-old Blaze Metreveli. An intriguing move from Russia’s perennial adversaries — but what’s behind it?
First, let’s consider Russia’s initial reaction. Just a day after the appointment was announced, on June 16, Russian intelligence appeared to send Metreveli a «congratulatory» message. While we can’t say for certain, coincidences seem unlikely. The press office of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) issued a notable statement claiming that Britain, jointly with Ukraine, is preparing provocations in the Baltic Sea aimed at sabotaging Russian-American negotiations and persuading the White House to continue military support to Kiev.
One scenario involves staging a fake Russian torpedo attack on a U.S. Navy vessel. The SVR emphasized close collaboration between Ukrainian security services and British intelligence agencies, stating, «Subversive actions typically follow a similar pattern: planning and operational support come from Britain, while direct execution is often carried out by employees of Ukraine’s SBU or military intelligence (GUR MO) and their agents».
The age-old saying attributed to Alexander Suvorov, describing Britain’s malicious policy toward Russia, «the Englishwoman is up to mischief», has ceased being metaphorical with Metreveli’s appointment. She has been explicitly tasked with causing trouble for Russia and seems likely to excel in this role.
British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, introducing Metreveli, called her appointment «historic», noting that it comes at a time when «the work of Britain’s intelligence services has never been more critical». Starmer referenced unprecedented threats, including «aggressors sending spy ships into British waters and hackers employing sophisticated cyber plots to disrupt public services» — a clear reference to Russia.
But why Blaze Metreveli? At only 47, she is already an experienced intelligence officer, serving since 1999. She will assume her new duties this autumn. Currently, Metreveli heads MI6’s Q Division, responsible for technology and innovation, and previously held senior roles in MI6 and MI5, Britain’s domestic counterintelligence agency. According to brief biographical details released by the government, widely reported by British media, she studied social anthropology at Cambridge and spent much of her career in operational roles in the Middle East and Europe.
Yet her background, particularly her ancestry, seems significant, though many details remain unclear. Her mother’s maiden name, Borkovska, suggests possible links to Belarus, Ukraine, Poland, or Russia (Borkovskaya in Russian transcription is a common surname).
Metreveli’s father, according to British royal archives, is Konstantin Dobrovolsky, noted as «also known as Metreveli». He naturalized in Britain in 1966 under the surname Dobrovolsky. Born in 1944 in today’s Ukraine, he was reportedly taken to Britain by his parents on a «Nansen passport», documents issued to Russian emigrants under the League of Nations since 1922. The circumstances around obtaining such passports for a family from Soviet Ukraine are unclear.
Suspicions arise regarding the activities and political views of Dobrovolsky-Metreveli’s parents. Ukraine’s liberation from German forces during World War II occurred between January 1943 and October 1944. If Metreveli’s father was born in Ukraine in 1944 and taken to the West, it’s plausible his family fled alongside retreating German forces, potentially due to collaboration with the Third Reich.
The history of Ukrainian collaborators fleeing to the West is well-documented, with many settling in Canada — a hotbed of intense Russophobia. Chrystia Freeland, Canada’s Deputy Prime Minister until 2024, is from this community. Western intelligence often recruits individuals from Ukrainian émigré communities as «consultants» on Russia and Ukraine due to their linguistic abilities and intense anti-Russian sentiments. It’s reasonable to assume Metreveli’s father speaks Russian fluently, as Russian emigrants typically retain language proficiency through generations. Consequently, it’s also plausible Blaze Metreveli herself (who chose her father’s «old» surname) speaks fluent Russian.
Thus, we see a relatively young but seasoned, professional, and highly ambitious woman, likely well-acquainted with Russia and harboring a deep-seated animosity towards it. This was possibly a decisive factor in her appointment.
Last year, Metreveli was awarded the Order of St. Michael and St. George, suggesting she already significantly harmed Russian interests. Now, as head of British espionage, she will further demonstrate her professionalism, loyalty to the British Crown, and inherited Russophobia. MI6, true to form, will continue harming Russia through proxies and false-flag operations [end]
its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine, chronicle.
They dox and harass foreign volunteers and spread Kremlin propaganda. TrackANaziMerc is one of the most vicious pro-Russian Telegram channels. Now, an OSINT group has turned the tables, unmasking the admins and doxxing the doxxers
An open-source intelligence (OSINT) unit, The Unintelligence Agency (TUA), @UnintelAgency on X, has granted UNITED24 Media behind-the-scenes access to their investigation into exposing the administrators of one of the most prolific pro-Russian Telegram channels: “TrackANaziMerc” (TaNM).
TaNM “will 100% dig up anything ‘they’ can on you, I hope you’re prepared,” the OSINT team warned when preparing this article.
TaNM has been aggressively pushing disinformation about Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine since 2022. Its core mission is to dox foreign nationals working in support of Ukraine, mocking and intimidating them, and whenever they get the chance, celebrating their deaths.
Russia’s “Nazi” narrative is central to its war propaganda. The channel’s name suggests a mission to hunt down so-called “Nazi mercenaries”—foreigners fighting for Ukraine and resisting Russian aggression.
When hearing about the TUA’s expose on the group, one of the TaNM administrators [me] wrote on X “Nazi sleuths are spending #Yurop-ean tax payers’ money to ‘identify’ people,” a rather ironic comment, as TaNM do exactly that—identify people [not exactly1].
Many suspect that the Russian Security Services (FSB) are behind the channel, but not everything is as it seems. In fact, the information obtained by the OSINT group reveals—sometimes rather humorous—profiles of the European-wide TaNM group administrators.
Exposing these individuals for what they truly are, and not the lies and fanciful personas that they’ve created for themselves, strips them of whatever credibility they may think they have. These aren’t geopolitical experts, intel analysts, or experts on foreign affairs. They are little more than delusional LARPers and deranged individuals seeking validation online.
Anonymous “B”
The Unintelligence Agency (TUA)
We interviewed members of The Unintelligence Agency, who requested anonymity due to privacy concerns. Their insights—labeled Anonymous A, B, and C—offer a rare look into the minds behind TaNM and the wider disinformation ecosystem they operate in.
But first, here’s what the OSINT team uncovered about TaNM’s ties to Russian media and the people who run the channel.
The TaNM channel grew exponentially in August 2023 after various other pro-Russian platforms and figures amplified it. Among them are Nikolay Valuev, a Russian politician and former heavyweight boxer, and Vladimir Solovyov, one of the Kremlin’s most infamous TV propagandists.
Rybar, owned by Mikhail Zvinchuk and Denis Shchukin, is one of several media channels that amplify TaNMs’ content. Shchukin, a computer programmer with a prior cybercrime charge, renounced his German citizenship in 2021 in favor of a Russian passport, according to reports. Zvinchuk is a former press officer with Russia’s Defense Ministry. Both men have ties to the Internet Research Agency, the Kremlin-linked troll farm once associated with the Wagner Group, the OSINT group says.
TaNM’s reach is further amplified by UKR Leaks, a pro-Russian outlet operated by Vasily Prozorov, a former officer of Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) and a known defector. Prozorov, who is currently wanted by Ukrainian authorities, has openly admitted to leaking sensitive information to Russian intelligence beginning in 2014, citing ideological motives. In April 2024, Prozorov was targeted in a car bomb attack in Moscow [indeed, a terrorist attack that the SBU conducted in Moscow on April 12, 2024].
Having lost the honor of an officer due to drunkenness, Prozorov decided to trade his conscience and military oath, finding ‘worthy’ people in the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation.
Ukrainian Secret Service (SBU)
TaNM has worked in coordination with Russian state media outlets, including Zvezda [my interview, that Zvezda published in April 2024], which is owned by the Russian Defense Ministry, TUA reports. Other pro-Kremlin platforms, such as Komsomolskaya Pravda, War Gonzo, and so-called “war reporters” like Alexander Simonov, have also collaborated with the channel, amplifying its campaigns of doxxing, harassment, and targeted intimidation.
Another is Dmitry Astrakhan, a prominent mouthpiece for the so-called “Donetsk People’s Republic” (DNR). Now a war correspondent for RT Russia, Astrakhan began his career by “trolling” on social media. He later styled himself as the editor-in-chief of Pravda DNR—a propaganda outlet where, according to Evocation, the entire editorial board consisted of just one person: Astrakhan himself.
Who are the admins of the TrackANaziMerc group?
Daria Khaltourina
Daria Khaltourina, posting under her alias “Ekaterina II,” is the owner of TaNM and their “de facto ring leader,” who has close connections to Russia. According to her social media, she is the “Head of Department at Federal Research Institute for Health Organization and Informatization of the Ministry of Health of the Russian Federation”
Daria Khaltourina (Source Facebook)
When Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began, she posted on Facebook, “I condemn the war, I do not approve.” However, since then, as the owner of TaNM, she has consistently repeated pro-Kremlin narratives, claiming that civilians in the Bucha massacre were killed by Ukrainians [they were2] and that a 1930s Moscow-made famine and genocide—Holodomor—is a “propaganda lie created by Ukrainian nazis”
We (TaNM) frame, expose mercs, make them cry and shiver all their lives.
Daria Khaltourina
Khaltourina is a founding member and board member of the International Longevity Alliance and Chair of the Board of the Russian Council for Public Health and Demography. In recent years, the Kremlin has been “crazy about eternal life,” making millions of dollars from state funds through anti-aging and genetic projects while promoting several “bizarre” ideas and conspiracies.
Virgil Hesse
“Love him or hate him, the man is interesting and boring at the same time,” wrote an Encyclopedia Dramatica user about Virgil Hesse, an Australian, likely from St. Kilda, Melbourne. One of the most active TaNM admins, Hesse has a long history of online trolling under aliases like “Lesleyblood” and now “Digitalfolklore.”
Once called a “bastion of ridiculousness” and “serial fantasist,” Hesse now mostly posts screenshots of interviews with Ukrainian POWs. For over 15 years, he’s collected, archived, and spread content online. The Unintelligence Agency (TUA) believes “Virgil Hesse” is a nom de plume
Virgil Hesse, who had posted parts of his face on separate occasions, OSINT groups pieced them together to reveal his identity (Source: Encyclopedia Dramatica via The Unintelligence Agency (TUA))
“He’s (ironically) a privacy advocate…and he’s writing to the Australian government, so it seems in character he wouldn’t use his real name when The Man is out to get him,” TUA said. In the early 2000s, as Lesleyblood, he regularly engaged in chaotic online arguments, which escalated and “turned into these bizarre back-and-forths” and led to mocking videos and leaked recordings of him.
Offline, he’s been known to lodge “endless complaints with his local city council for a variety of banal issues,” like off-leash dog zones and bin removal. TUA found footage and documents of these efforts, along with Hesse’s submissions to Australian government inquiries on crypto and surveillance laws.
He claims to have “high-end education” but also says he “never went to high school or brainwashing camps.” On X, he once told Elon Musk he’d built a “bespoke, handmade… better than yours” version of Grok.
Though UA describes him as more of an archiver, Hesse likely sees himself as a hacker. He’s compiled an enormous collection of leaks, drone videos, and files tied to WikiLeaks, Anonymous, the war in Ukraine, and ISIS. He’s also filmed and posted drone footage from Melbourne and discussed drone-making in the TaNM chats.
TUA says Hesse’s accounts follow—and are followed by—Adam Bennett, aka “Lorax” CEO of Australian cybersecurity firm Red Piranha. Bennett once ran the Anonymous Australia Twitter and in 2016 received a suspended sentence for hacking government sites. Hesse is an active poster in “Beregini,” a Telegram group that brands itself as Ukrainian hacktivists, but is actually based in St. Petersburg. The group has pushed fake Ukrainian intel and taken credit for leaks.
As “Digitalfolklore,” Hesse also leaked a phone call between the FBI and Scotland Yard discussing LulzSec—a hacking group behind attacks on PlayStation Network and the CIA site. The FBI later confirmed Anonymous accessed an email containing the call code, raising further suspicions of Hesse’s links to the group. TUA adds he may have known people in Julian Assange’s inner circle [impressive].
Nicolas Cinquini
Cinquini is a former French lieutenant detective and intelligence officer, dismissed from duty after his support for the yellow vest protests in France.
On social media, Cinquini portrays an intriguing, multifaceted personality, much like Hesse. Sharing Russian propaganda, videos of cats and dogs, to even arguing with Grok, Elon Musk’s AI chatbot
Nicolas Cinquini (Source: The Unintelligence Agency) [a screenshot from the interview that Zvezda, TV channel of the Russian defense ministry, published in April 2024]
Cinquini disseminates very typical pro-Kremlin narratives, promotes conspiracy theories, and spreads misinformation about Ukraine. He claims to be the intelligence lead for TaNM [no, I have never claimed that] and has been suspected of leaking information about French volunteers, which Russia used to make false claims about their supposed deaths
He didn’t even try to hide – his ego matched his idiocy [is that a threat ?]. Once sworn to protect France, now cheers terrorists.
The Unintelligence Agency
On May 18, 2025, he was interviewed [that is an excerpt on my YouTube channel, here is rather the complete report on Rossiya 1] by Russian state-media Rossiya 1 where he discussed French fighters serving in the Ukrainian army against Russian aggression. Cinquini, during his interview, furthered his pro-Kremlin narrative and told Russian media that the Frenchmen TrackANaziMerc have identified, “competed with each other in fascism, and won their place in the cast through hard work.” He then went on to dox five servicemen throughout the interview [QED: five French Nazi militants].
There are several more admins of the TaNM channel, some have maintained an anonymous identity.
Other admins behind the channel
Dmitry Levin from Moscow (Source: The Unintelligence Agency)Maxim Bugaev a children’s karate intructor (Source: The Unintelligence Agency)
Luico Festa says he is Italian-Croatian and claims to be affiliated with Camorra, an Italian Mafia-type criminal organization. He has openly threatened previous TaNM members, claiming that within Camorra, his purpose is extortion, drug dealing, and money laundering. Following the TUA’s leak, Festa deleted both his Facebook and VKontakte pages.
“BulgARYAN”—“For someone in a group that supposedly hates Nazis they decided to spell their username with the word “Aryan” in all caps instead of the more usual -rian suffix” TUA said.
Mikhail Yevgenevich Rapoport is a Russian national who has left several reviews about parks and businesses on Google Maps. He is thought to live near Kudrovo, a notorious town where Russia’s largest residential complex, known as the “human anthill,” is located.
“Nataliahunter”—”Natalia is a common nickname Russian soldiers use when referring to Ukrainian women, which makes this individual, who claims to be in the Russian army, particularly disturbing,” TUA said.
“Drexy baba” established a reputation of sorts as someone who collected and documented rare combat footage from the war in Afghanistan, always with a pro-Taliban angle, the OSINT team said
It’s cliché that the KGB recruited ‘winners’ who were really losers—but these guys aren’t even that. The technical term is ‘useful idiot
Anonymous A
The Unintelligence Agency
Interviewing The Unintelligence Agency
Why do you want to expose the admins from TaNM?
Anonymous A: Combating channels like TaNM is a stop-gap, a temporary solution. For every group and individual we can ID, there will always be more. What we really need is a change in how we interact with social media, or rather, how social media interacts with us.
This is not to say that this will necessarily stop them from continuing what they’re doing, but the truth matters and does have an impact.
Vote for people who don’t benefit from disinformation. Demand that whoever is in power acts to put an end to its prevalence and popularity on social media. Start petitions calling for action. Organise protests. Don’t ask—demand!
If we do nothing, then we will rapidly find ourselves in an oligarchy of those with the means to run massive disinformation campaigns that will be bowing down to dictators all over the world.
Why is OSINT important in the modern digital world?
Anonymous A: Social media platforms have become central to how the world consumes news, yet they continue to allow, amplify, and even financially reward those who spread disinformation.
By identifying people like the TaNM admins, we help map the architecture of propaganda networks, removing the mystery of where disinformation originates. More often than not, they aren’t listening to a renowned expert or someone with lived experiences in a subject, but a charlatan and a fraud [I have worked 30 years as police detective and intelligence officer in counter-terrorism].
Anonymous C: Russia is using digital media a force multiplier for its soft power and propaganda apparatus, and Western governments haven’t, by and large, figured out how to counter it effectively yet. Nor have they put sufficient resources into it. But Russia, very cheaply, can produce these outsize effects, largely aimed at shaping narratives, disrupting public discourse, and planting the seeds of doubt.
Their big picture goal is to cut Ukraine off from its allies and its support network. Russia goes about this by shaping public opinion in the West. Or in the case of the “Ukraine is overrun by Nazis” narrative, trying to give Westerners the impression that Ukraine is simply unworthy of support.
What do you believe is TaNM’s main goal?
Anonymous A: After more than two years, it’s evident they’ve failed to stop or even slow the number of people choosing to defend freedom and democracy in Ukraine. Today, TaNM seems more like a small online community of socially isolated individuals who’ve found validation in a space that reinforces their fringe views. Their focus on doxxing and harassment appears less about impact and more about maintaining engagement with like-minded followers, creating a feedback loop of radicalisation.
The real danger isn’t their investigative abilities—often resembling little more than basic social media searches—but the fact that they’ve become a nexus for disinformation and extremism.
Anonymous B: While they claim to be documenting and tracking the presence of “foreign nazi mercenaries” in Ukraine, the true purpose of their channel is to sow doubt and fear. The doxxing serves as a form of intimidation, with people on their chat openly making violent threats and discussing ways to harass volunteers and their family members. Furthermore, there’s a concerted effort to promote paranoia and suspicion amongst volunteers [poor darlings].
Is there a common theme amongst admins from pro-Russian channels?
Anonymous C: Essentially, every Westerner cheering Russia that we’ve come across has been more or less the same archetype–an overinflated sense of self-worth with a lack of any real accomplishments, plus an inability to accept any responsibility for personal failings.
Almost without fail, you can guarantee that they’re online lying about accomplishments they never had, that they’ve all failed in their lives in some way, shape, or form, and all feel like something more was owed to them, but that somehow they were thwarted by the system. They all, therefore, resent the West, and at some level fantasize about how well they’d do if society were shaken up and whatever bit of the system it is they blame for not having succeeded were destroyed.
This archetype must be extremely fertile soil for the Russians because it keeps repeating in the people we come across [end]
its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine, chronicle
Norwegian journalists are keen on triggering the censorship of Telegram channels which are identifying international Nazi volunteers and other mercenaries who are fighting in the Atlanticist ranks in Ukraine
Ukrainian intelligence had provided Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an offshoot of al-Qaeda, with drone support weeks before the group launched the offensive in Syria that ousted former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, The Washington Post reported Tuesday.
“Ukrainian intelligence sent about 20 experienced drone operators and about 150 first-person-view drones to the rebel headquarters in Idlib, Syria, four to five weeks ago,” wrote Washington Post columnist David Ignatius.
While the US has celebrated Assad’s downfall, HTS is still listed by the US as a foreign terrorist organization, and its leader, Abu Mohammad al-Julani, has a $10 million US bounty on his head. That means Ukraine has supplied weapons and intelligence support to a group the US considers a terrorist organization.
Ukrainian and Russian reports have also reported that a special unit of Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (abbreviated GUR or HUR) had provided support to HTS and was involved in some attacks on Russian bases in Syria.
“Ukrainian military instructors from the GUR are present… training HTS fighters for combat operations,” Russian Ambassador to the UN Vassily Nebenzia said at the UN after the HTS offensive started.
The GUR has received significant support from the US over the years. The Washington Post reported last year that the CIA helped build up the GUR and the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) following the 2014 coup that ousted former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych. “GUR was our little baby. We gave them all new equipment and training,” a former US intelligence official who worked in Ukraine told the Post.
The GUR has also been involved in fighting Russia’s Wagner mercenary force in Africa. In Mali, the GUR provided support for a July ambush that killed 84 Wagner operatives and 47 Malians.
“The rebels received the necessary information, which enabled a successful military operation against Russian war criminals,” GUR official Andriy Yusov said of the attack. The rebel coalition that launched the attack in Mali included Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin, an affiliate of al-Qaeda [end]
Until recently, a serious geopolitical working hypothesis was that West Asia and Ukraine were two vectors of the standard Hegemon modus operandi, which is to incite and unleash Forever Wars. Now both wars are united in an Omni-War
the jihadist operation in Paris, on November 13, 2015, was the collateral damage of the Western support to the so-called Syrian revolution, a Sunni radical uprising against the secular government of Syria, which began in 2011 and that global jihadists joined from worldwide
Abstract: This study analyses the nature and extent of involvement by neo-Nazi and other far-right Ukrainian organisations in the Donbas war (2014-2022) and the Odesa massacre (2014). This issue is highly politicised with contrasting narratives. The Russian and Donbas separatist governments, as well as their media, have contended that Ukraine has been a Nazi or neo-Nazi regime since a fascist coup took place in 2014, while Ukrainian and Western governments and media have maintained that such elements in the Ukrainian far-right were marginal, trivial, even non-existent. The article interrogates the historical record with primary sources in the three most relevant languages—Ukrainian, Russian, and English. The investigation reveals crucial far-right involvement in both the early stages of the war in Donbas and the Odesa massacre. Although the percentage of far-right supporters and fighters in Ukraine was relatively small, they exercised disproportionate influence in the country due to their greater reliance on violence and armed formations. The Russian government, however, exaggerated the role of the neo-Nazis in Ukraine to publicly justify the illegal invasion in February 2022.
Introduction
This study analyses the nature and extent of involvement by neo-Nazi and other far-right Ukrainian organisations during both the Donbas war from its start in April 2014 until the Russian invasion in February 2022 and the Odesa massacre on 2 May 2014. Other than the Maidan massacre in February 2014, these were the most significant and contested cases of political violence in Ukraine from its independence in 1991 to the commencement of the Russia-Ukraine war on 24 February 2022.1 The role of far-right Ukrainian groups during these major episodes of political violence is controversial because they are beset by duelling, self-serving narratives. Russian President Vladimir Putin has claimed that the principal goal of the invasion is to “denazify” Ukraine.2 But well before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, there have been several overt and covert Russian military interventions here, including the annexation of the Crimean peninsula and direct support for pro-Russian insurgencies in the Donbas region, particularly in August 2014 and February 2015. Following the overthrow of the pro-Russian Ukrainian government in February 2014, the United States and other Western governments have consistently opposed Russia’s interventions and backed the current central government of Ukraine. In addition to political support, financial and military assistance has been provided, including training during the Obama presidency.3 To justify this support, the US and other Western governments disputed any real power or even the existence of neo-Nazi armed formations in Ukraine or claimed that they abandoned their far-right elements. Understanding the contested issue of far-right involvement in the Donbas war (2014-2022) and the Odesa massacre (2014) is valuable not only for elucidating intrinsically important historical episodes of political violence but also due to the contemporary relevance given the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war.
This article proceeds in five sections. The first section highlights the contribution of our study by describing the weakness of the extant academic literature and our methodological approach to filling in important lacunae in the research landscape. The second section details the duelling of contemporary narratives over the political violence by the far-right in the war in Donbas and in the Odesa massacre. The third and fourth sections develop qualitative case studies with process tracing to illuminate the role of the far-right in the Donbas war and the Odesa massacre. The fifth section presents the conclusion.
Developing the Extant Literature
Research on the far-right in Ukraine since the Euromaidan has been spotty. Studies on neo-Nazi and other far-right organisations in Ukraine following the Euromaidan have been limited in quantity, quality, and scope. Most studies have been produced by researchers outside academe in partisan think tanks or non-government organisations, as well as by journalists who did not subject their work to peer review.4 Such assessments are more likely to be politically driven and less likely to exhibit methodological rigour, even professionalism. For example, Anton Shekhovtsov, the former leader of the Crimean branch of the pro-Russian far-right Eurasian Youth Union, likened the Trade Union building arson attack during the Odesa massacre on 2 May 2014, to his killing of Colorado potato beetles by collecting them in a box and burning them alive. He directly inferred that this was a massacre with far-right involvement but omitted this in his publications.5 Other works have relied on narrow metrics such as the vote-share of far-right parties in Ukraine, without assessing the violence itself in terms of the perpetrators and effects.6 Some researchers have claimed that the presence of Russian speakers in the Azov regiment and other neo-Nazi-led armed formations is evidence of their relative tolerance and asserted that the Azov regiment had moderated by abandoning its far-right roots.7 Such analyses have tended to uncritically rely on Ukrainian and Western government narratives, accepting their claims at face value.
By contrast, other studies suggest a greater degree of far-right involvement in Ukrainian political violence. One quantitative study found that far-right groups in Ukraine, such as Svoboda and Right Sector, fielded the most violent perpetrators and committed the lion’s share of attacks.8 That study is restricted temporally, however, to the 2014 Maidan protests, which led to the violent overthrow of the relatively pro-Russian government and ultimately spiralled into the civil war in Donbas, the Russian annexation of Crimea, and Russian military interventions in these regions of Ukraine.9 Similarly, qualitative studies have presented evidence in the form of videos, eyewitness testimonies, confessions, and forensic examinations of Svoboda and Right Sector involvement in the Maidan massacre.10 Some other studies have focused on specific aspects of the far-right paramilitary and other armed formations during the war in Donbas.11 One academic publication is specifically devoted to the Odesa massacre, which is called “The Odesa Tragedy,” though it concentrates on the public perceptions rather than the perpetrators and their consequences.12 This list of prior works is intended to be illustrative rather than exhaustive. The research landscape around these issues is growing, but uneven in scope and reliability; a lacuna remains in the literature in terms of evaluating rigorously, comprehensively, and dispassionately the nature and extent of far-right involvement in the Donbas war and Odesa massacre, which matters in terms of our understanding of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and political violence more generally.
To elucidate this understudied topic of the far-right in Ukraine, this study makes substantial use of primary source materials in Ukrainian and Russian—the main languages in Ukraine—as well as in English. This linguistic capability is conducive to a more nuanced, accurate assessment. Methodologically, the two case studies employ qualitative process tracing with the benefit of fluency in all three languages.13 The substantive focus and period of analysis are both tightly bounded; the role of the far-right on the Russian side and in the Russia-Ukraine war since February 2022, as well as during the Euromaidan, are weighty topics explored in our other works but fall outside the scope of this study.
The term “far-right” denotes ultranationalists and both racial and ethnic supremacists in accordance with prior scholarship.14 The term “neo-Nazi” refers to far-right organisations that revamp elements of Nazi ideology, particularly its racial and ethnic supremacism, and use symbols associated with Nazi Germany or their stylised versions. As with Nazis, neo-Nazi organisations represent a form of fascism. Major neo-Nazi organisations in Ukraine during the time period covered by this study include the Social-National Assembly, its paramilitary wing Patriot of Ukraine, the National Corps, the White Hammer, and C14. Also included in the analysis are paramilitary and other armed formations organised and led formally or informally by these neo-Nazi organisations, such as the Azov battalion and regiment. Admittedly, militant groups are known to exhibit ideological heterogeneity.15 Within the political violence literature, a burgeoning area of research emphasises that members of the rank-and-file may be motivated by a variety of factors that diverge from the leadership, leading to a principal-agent problem.16 In this study, we classify organisations as neo-Nazi, or at least neo-Nazi-led, when commanders are neo-Nazi, even if not all members can be presumed to share this exact ideology.
A prominent example is Andriy Biletsky, the leader of Patriot of Ukraine and the Social-National Assembly (SNA), both of which were transformed along with the Azov battalion and regiment veterans into the National Corps Party in 2016. He called the ideology of Patriot of Ukraine and SNA “Social Nationalism.” In a collection of his articles published in 2013, he described that social nationalism, as the name suggests, combines elements of ultranationalism of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists with elements of national socialism and called both radical nationalism and national socialism “great ideas.” He wrote that social nationalism is based on “Sociality, Racism, and Great Power.”17 Specifically, it is based on the ideas that the “white race” is “superior” to other races and is the foundation of the Aryan Ukrainian nation; the Ukrainian nation is a “blood-racial community”; and that “the historical mission of our Nation (…) is to head and lead the White Peoples of the world in the last crusade for their existence, a march against the Semitic-led subhumans.”18 Biletsky openly made antisemitic and racist statements, such as his claim that the Jew is “an economic and political parasite.” He saw “a serious clash of native European peoples with foreign colonisers, mainly of African and Muslim origin” and believed that “an ethnic civil war can be won by the native Europeans only under the banner of the New Right National Revolutions.”19
Biletsky was called the “White Leader” and his writings were published by both SNA and Patriot of Ukraine. He was the first commander of the Azov battalion, which was organised and led by Patriot of Ukraine and SNA in May 2014. Patriot of Ukraine, SNA, and the Azov battalion all used a symbol resembling a stylised swastika and Wolfsangel. Azov commanders and their historian, who himself serves in Azov, called the symbol the “Idea of the Nation” and claimed that it is an ancient Ukrainian symbol, even though it was created in 1992 for the Social National Party of Ukraine (SNPU). The creator of this symbol acknowledged that it was called “Idea of the Nation” to represent the radical nationalist ideas of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). He also admitted that SNPU deliberately chose this symbol with the Latin letter N, instead of the equivalent Ukrainian Cyrillic letter, fully aware of its resemblance to Nazi symbols and association with the swastika for many Ukrainians, in particular in Lviv. As with other extremist groups that rebrand out of political expedience, the Social National Party of Ukraine changed its name to Svoboda in 2014, because the Nazi association was politically inconvenient.20 However, this symbol was retained by the SNA and by Patriot of Ukraine, whose Kharkiv branch split from SNPU because of these changes.21 The Azov battalion and its propaganda magazine, which was named Black Sun, also used the Black Sun symbol, an ideological symbol used by Nazis and various neo-Nazi organisations. In addition, groups and individuals—including Patriot of Ukraine, SNA, National Corps, and Azov battalion and regiment leaders, commanders, and members—have displayed on their uniforms various neo-Nazi and Nazi symbols, such as the swastika, the SS sign, and 88 (Heil Hitler code). These, along with Hitler images, Nazi flags, and Totenkopf have also been seen in the form of patches, photographs, flags, and tattoos.
Although the term far-right incorporates both ultranationalist and neo-Nazi organisations, they are not ideologically identical despite their frequent overlap. This study empirically investigates the role of Ukrainian ultra-nationalist organisations such as Svoboda, the Right Sector, the Ukrainian National Assembly–Ukrainian People’s Self-Defence (UNA-UNSO), and Bratstvo; neo-Nazi organisations such as the Social-National Assembly, Patriot of Ukraine, the White Hammer, and C14; and various other paramilitary formations, special police forces, and National Guard units organised and controlled to various extents by them. These armed units include the Azov battalion and regiment, Dnipro, Donbas, Aidar, Sich, Carpathian Sich, OUN, and St. Mary’s battalions, and the Ukrainian Volunteer Corps. To assess these actors, this study analysed thousands of Russian and Ukrainian primary sources: online recordings of live broadcasts, videos of the armed conflict in Donbas and Odesa, and information posted on websites and social media by far-right organisations, their armed units, and activists. It also analysed media reports in Ukrainian, Russian, and English from diverse outlets such as Ukrainska pravda, Strana, BBC, The Guardian, The Washington Post, The New York Times, YouTube, Telegram, V Kontakte, Facebook, and Twitter. To mitigate bias, the authors analysed the primary source materials rather than relying on secondary interpretations.
The Conflicting Narratives
Assessments of the far-right in Ukraine have been wracked by self-serving and thus unreliable perspectives. Russian and separatist leaders, as well as the media, have described the post-Maidan violence in Ukraine, especially in Donbas and Odesa, as perpetrated by “fascists” and “Nazis” akin to genocidal massacres against Jews, Belarusians, Russians, and Ukrainians during the Holocaust and World War Two.22 They often called the Odesa massacre the “Odesa Khatyn,” a reference to the large-scale massacre of Belarusian villagers in 1943 by the Nazis and an auxiliary police battalion, which was based on a paramilitary formation of the Melnyk faction of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists. Based on this narrative, President Putin and his allies have claimed that invading Ukraine is not only justified, but “inevitable” to counter the “Nazi” or “Neo-Nazi regime” in Kyiv.23 Putin and his government thus declared the “de-Nazification” of Ukraine as a key goal of “the special military operation” launched in February 2022.24 This perspective—in its entirety—is widely assailed in the West.25
By contrast, the Ukrainian and Western governments and the media tend to claim that the far-right—including neo-Nazis—is marginal, even non-existent in Ukraine.26 They argue that since Euromaidan, Ukrainian fighters have almost entirely—if not entirely—shed their far-right elements, particularly neo-Nazi. To this end, it is a common point that the Azov Battalion ceased to be led by the neo-Nazi Patriot of Ukraine, a paramilitary wing of the SNA, since integrating into the National Guard as one of its regiments. Kyiv has stressed that the integration of Azov in November 2014 is proof of its transition to moderation and the absence of extremist fighters post-Maidan.27 Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky awarded “Hero of Ukraine” titles in 2022 to prominent Azov leaders such as regiment commander Denys Prokopenko, deputy commander Sviatoslav Palamar, and senior officer Oleh Khomenko.28 After the commencement of the Russia-Ukraine war in February 2022, many Western media outlets, politicians, government officials, and academics adopted this stance that Azov and other controversial Ukrainian fighters on the far-right had not only abandoned extremist elements, but were heroes against Russia’s illegal invasion.29
The Indexing Theory of political communications emphasises that Western media follow narratives of its governments in covering foreign conflicts, including in post-communist countries.30 In some cases, Western media may have taken their cues directly from the Ukrainian government. After the Odesa massacre on 2 May 2014, the Foreign Ministry of Ukraine blamed the arson attack on provocateurs that were “paid generously by the Russian special services”, and the New York Times immediately adopted the same line that pro-Russia groups may have been responsible for torching the building.31 The Western narrative of the far-right in Ukraine since the Euromaidan is not without controversy. Volodymyr Ishchenko, a Ukrainian sociologist who specialises in the far-right in Ukraine, concludes: “The dominant narrative since Maidan in Ukrainian and much of the Western public spheres has been systematically downplaying the problem” by arguing that “the Ukrainian far-right” is “small and marginal.” He stated that “often, the far-right is just ignored.”32
Notably, Western concerns over far-right fighters in Ukraine were more prevalent before the February 2022 invasion. For example, The Nation described Azov in 2018 as “pro-Nazi, as evidenced by its regalia, slogans, and programmatic statements.”33 In 2019, Radio Free Europe called Azov “far-right.”34 In 2020, The Guardian referred to Azov as a “neo-Nazi extremist movement.”35 Consistent with Indexing Theory, such coverage of the neo-Nazis in Ukraine before the February 2022 Russian invasion overlapped with similar expressions by Western governments. In its 2018 Human Rights report, the US State Department called the political wing of the Azov Regiment “a hate group.”36 In 2019, ambassadors from G7 countries warned against “extreme political movements in Ukraine, whose violent actions are worrying in themselves.” The warnings referred specifically to the Azov movement and its violence during the 2019 presidential elections.37 The US Congress has displayed longstanding ambivalence over its designation of Azov. In 2018, forty Congress members signed a letter to the State Department with the request to designate Azov as a terrorist organisation because of its links to terrorist attacks in multiple countries and its recruitment of neo-Nazis in its ranks.38 A defence appropriations bill amendment was adopted by the entire US Congress in 2018, which banned US government funding and training of the Azov regiment due to concerns over its neo-Nazi views and members. Such concerns had been expressed by American officials for several years after the Euromaidan. The amendment was first unanimously adopted by the US House of Representatives in 2015. Congressman John Conyers put it bluntly, “I am grateful that the House of Representatives unanimously passed my amendments last night to ensure that our military does not train members of the repulsive neo-Nazi Azov Battalion.”39 Under pressure from the Pentagon, however, Congress subsequently removed this first amendment. A similar amendment, proposing a ban on US military assistance to radical nationalist and neo-Nazi organisations, voluntary police, and paramilitary formations under their command, was blocked in Congress in 2014.40
In general, however, American and European governments have been careful not to issue public statements against the far-right in Ukraine or to call attention to it. This hesitancy began after the Euromaidan and became starker following the February 2022 Russian invasion. Indeed, Western governments and media increasingly whitewashed the empirical record to present the Ukrainian far-right formations as categorically moderate in order to boost international support. In June 2024, the US State Department stated that the Azov brigade was eligible to receive US weapons under the “Leahy Law” because it was cleared of human rights violations. It made this determination after claiming that the Azov brigade is a new unit that is not subject to the previous Congressional ban, even though in reality this brigade was created on the basis of the Azov regiment, celebrated the 10th anniversary of the Azov battalion creation as its own anniversary, and is led by original Azov battalion commanders.41 However, a subsequent amendment, which was included in the US defence bill which was passed by the US House of Representatives, specifically stated that “none of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available by this Act may be used to provide arms, training, intelligence, or other assistance to the Azov Battalion, the Third Separate Assault Brigade, or any successor organisation.”42
Such instrumental portrayals of allies are not limited to this conflict. Other recent cases of political violence have also featured public relations campaigns by governments and media to present allies as arguably more moderate than their history and contemporary ideology indicate. For example, in the Syrian war, anti-Assad jihadist organisations allied with the West were euphemistically referred to as “rebels,” sometimes “moderate” ones, even when they fought under the direction of a Foreign Terrorist Organisation, as designated by the US State Department.43 A large body of literature within terrorism studies has found that the labelling of violent perpetrators by governments and media is not value-neutral, but expedient to serve political agendas.44 Particularly in these controversial cases of political violence, academe can play an important role in interrogating the empirical record to adjudicate the truth.45
The Far-Right in the Donbas War
Research within the field of terrorism studies has repeatedly noted the difficulty of determining the ideological beliefs of participants in political violence.46 However, fine-grained knowledge of the organisations can substantially increase confidence. Svoboda and the main organisations that remained within the Right Sector after the Euromaidan were widely understood as far-right for maintaining ultra-nationalist and ethnically supremacist views. They openly described themselves as the natural successors of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), inspired by the notorious OUN leader and Nazi collaborator, Stepan Bandera.47 Along with the UNA-UNSO, these organisations used the “Glory to Ukraine! Glory to the Heroes!” slogan, the official greeting of the Bandera faction of the OUN (OUN-B). This greeting, along with a fascist-style hand salute, was modelled on greetings and salutes of other well-known fascist parties in European history, from the Nazi party in Germany to the Ustashe party in Croatia.48 The Right Sector also adopted its red and black flag from the OUN-B and the UPA, which symbolized Ukrainian blood and soil, which were also pervasive in Nazi ideology and flags.49 But the existence of these symbols alone offers weak evidence of far-right influence in the Donbas war without understanding the cultural and historical context.
The violent overthrow of the Viktor Yanukovych government by means of the Maidan massacre triggered the resurgence of separatism in Donbas.50 After his overthrow in February 2014, far-right parties and organisations in Ukraine expanded and organised their armed formations. Along with Ihor Kolomoisky, an oligarch who became the head of the Dnipropetrovsk regional administration, the Right Sector was instrumental in the formation of the Dnipro battalion in the spring of 2014.51 The Azov battalion, notorious for its use of neo-Nazi symbols in its official insignia, was also organised in the spring of 2014 and led by the SNA and the Patriot of Ukraine with the involvement of the Radical Party. As mentioned, “White Leader” Andrii Biletsky was the first commander of Azov.52 Based in Mariupol, the St. Mary’s battalion was formed in the fall of 2014 and led by the far-right Bratstvo party, which is described by its leader (Dmytro Korchynsky) as the “Christian Taliban.”53 Around this time, the Aidar battalion, nominally subordinated to the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, was formed by the Maidan Self-Defence. One of its platoons was led by the White Hammer, a neo-Nazi organisation belonging to the Right Sector during the Euromaidan. Ilia Kiva, a Right Sector member, was the commander of another volunteer police battalion. A previously convicted criminal with a swastika tattoo became the commander of the Tornado Company, a special police unit. He and seven other members of his company were arrested and convicted for various crimes in the warzone, such as torturing detainees. A Nazi-style flag with a swastika was found in their prison cell.54 These units were all under the formal jurisdiction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the National Guard, or the Ministry of Defence. From the start of their formation, they remained under de facto command of radical nationalist or neo-Nazi organisations. These armed formations sprouted up in the early stages of the conflict in Donbas and were stationed there in an attempt to suppress pro-Russian separatism in the region by force. The Right Sector and the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists actively organised various militia and paramilitary units that were not subordinate to the central government of Ukraine. The Volunteer Ukrainian Corps, the largest paramilitary formation, was formed and led by the Right Sector specifically for the war in Donbas, though it also included battalions in Western Ukraine.55
The paramilitary formations, special police, and National Guard units, organised and led by far-right organisations such as the Right Sector, the Social National Assembly, Patriot of Ukraine, Svoboda, C14, and Bratstvo, constituted a small minority of Ukrainian fighters in the Donbas. Based on reports, we estimate the number of members of radical nationalist and neo-Nazi organisations who served in various far right-led, regular, and other armed formations in the Donbas, at around five thousand. This estimate is conservative and represents just one percent of approximately 400,000 people who participated in this war on the side of the central government.56 Additional metrics of influence, however, are also important to consider.
Despite their relatively small numbers, far-right fighters exercised disproportionate influence in the Donbas civil war, particularly in the early stages before the first direct Russian military intervention in August 2014. Far-right Ukrainian groups proliferated after the Euromaidan because they were eager to fight and were responsible for a disproportionate level of violence, especially against civilians and prisoners of war in Mariupol and Krasnoarmiisk. Far-right organisations and far-right-linked battalions thus played a crucial role in escalating the armed conflict in the Donbas. Svoboda and C14, an avowedly neo-Nazi group affiliated with Svoboda until the summer of 2014, organised and led the Sich battalion from June 2014 onwards.57 Meanwhile, the Right Sector carried out a deadly attack on a separatist checkpoint in Sloviansk on 20 April 2014. While Ukrainian and Western media denied far-right involvement in these events, the evidence to the contrary includes business cards linked to far-right members found after the attack. As well, Ukrainian court proceedings revealed that the weapons used by the Right Sector checkpoint attackers were the same as the snipers from this group who killed and wounded police during the Maidan.58 And two years after the attack on the separatist checkpoint, Dmytro Yarosh—the leader of the Right Sector—admitted his personal involvement in thisattack.59 Oleksandr Turchynov, then acting president of Ukraine, and Kolomoisky’s deputy in the Dnipropetrovsk regional administration, reportedly orchestrated this Right Sector operation, aimed to seize and destroy a television transmitter near Sloviansk, several days after this area was seized by the Strelkov-led armed group of Russian nationalists and Ukrainian separatists.60 This attack by the Right Sector constituted a major escalation of the conflict in Donbas because it broke both the Geneva Agreement signed on 17 April 2014 by Ukraine, Russia, the EU, and the US for a peaceful resolution of the conflict, as well as the Orthodox Easter truce between the Ukrainian government and separatists in Donbas.
Far right-led armed formations were also behind many other violent attacks in the Donbas, further escalating the conflict into a civil war. Videos, media reports, and admissions from commanders and other members of the Azov and Dnipro battalions indicate that they participated in the storming of the district police headquarters in Mariupol on 9 May 2014. Approximately ten people, including at least one protester, were killed.61 Analysis of online video streams, media reports, and Ukrainian government documents, also make clear that Azov played a major role in taking back the city of Mariupol from the control of separatists in June 2014.62 The Dnipro battalion, along with other units, seized civilians in the Donetsk Region to prevent the separatist referendum on 11 May 2014. Videos show them shooting unarmed pro-separatist protesters with Kalashnikovs, killing two locals. The Ukrainian government denied the presence of the Dnipro battalion, but it was confirmed by other credible sources, including admissions by battalion members in videos, like Volodymyr Parasiuk’s statement on social media, who became the People’s Deputy of Ukraine.63
The far-right-led armed formations perpetrated a disproportionate amount of violence in the first few months of the Donbas conflict and thus played a major role in escalating it into a larger civil war because the radical nationalist and neo-Nazi-led groups were far more willing to use force at that time. The Ukrainian armed forces, the security service, police and National Guard units were more reluctant to use force against the separatists in Donbas because their commanders and members were publicly blamed by the new government for attempting to forcefully suppress the Maidan protests—and in particular, for the Maidan massacre. Because the new Maidan government came to power through violence, which included the killing of police and protesters, it lacked legitimacy among many military, police, and SBU members in the Donbas region during this initial period of the conflict. Further, compared to the newly ascendant far-right groups in the aftermath of Euromaidan, the regular Ukrainian armed forces, the security service, the police and National Guard units were known for lower morale and higher desertions. Examples of this included the Donetsk SBU Alfa commander and Luhansk Berkut members, who joined the separatists.64
The relative role of the far-right in the political violence was not constant; it began to decline in the Donbas when newly elected president Petro Poroshenko ordered the Ukrainian military, SBU, police, and National Guard to wield lethal force against the separatists and launch the offensive in June 2014.65 The war was most intense and violent in 2014 and 2015, but the fighting declined significantly following the Minsk Agreements in 2015. However, ultra-nationalist and neo-Nazi fighters continued to exert a non-trivial role, even after the Ukrainian military intensified its operations in Donbas and purported to moderate the far-right fighters. After its formal incorporation into the National Guard of Ukraine, the Azov regiment and its commanders maintained a close organisational and ideological relationship with the neo-Nazi National Corps party. This party was formed by the Azov battalion founder and the first commander on the basis of neo-Nazi SNA and Patriot of Ukraine, and it included many Azov battalion and regiment veterans. The Azov regiment functioned as a military wing of the National Corps, which, in essence, represented overlapping elements of the same Azov movement.66 Indeed, Azov regiment commanders shared a neo-Nazi background and had served in the neo-Nazi-led Azov battalion.67 In other words, the rebranding from “battalion” to “regiment” did not alter the key personnel.68 For example, Azov regiment commander Denys Prokopenko was a member of the neo-Nazi White Boys Club, which was formed by the ultras of the Dynamo Kyiv football club. This group of ultras displayed various Nazi symbols and the Nazi salute on their social media and during football games. His Azov battalion platoon had used the Totenkopf insignia of the Nazi SS.69 Andriy Biletsky became the commander of the Third Assault Brigade, which was created by veterans of the Azov battalion and regiment and activists of his neo-Nazi group, the National Corps.70 In 2023, he stated in an interview with Ukrainian media that the united Azov movement included this Azov brigade under his command along with the Azov regiment and the Kraken unit.71 Such admissions in Ukrainian media highlighting enduring far-right allegiances seldom make their way into the Western press.
Importantly, Azov commanders never publicly renounced their neo-Nazi views, symbols, and organisations. In fact, Azov leaders routinely denied in media interviews that they, their units, and organisations, were neo-Nazi, claiming that the well-documented Nazi symbols were fakes or Russian propaganda. Our research of Ukrainian social media as well as other researchers of the far-right in Ukraine, such as Lev Golinkin and Moss Robeson, have identified over one hundred cases of Nazi and neo-Nazi displays by at least several hundred Azov commanders and other members from 2014 to 2022. This number includes displays on uniforms, patches, photographs, flags, and tattoos of neo-Nazi and Nazi symbols, such as the swastika, SS sign, 88 (Heil Hitler code), Hitler images, Nazi flags, and Totenkopf, and a fascist hand salute.72 The continued relevance of far-right extremism in Azov was evident at the very top. Arsen Avakov, the Minister of Internal Affairs, was personally involved in the Azov battalion formation and its later expansion to a regiment.73 President Petro Poroshenko circulated photographs awarding Ukrainian national medals and commendations to some of the most well-known neo-Nazis in Azov.74 The Nazi connection to Azov was clearly not due to a loss of agency control.
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch reported that Azov was involved in many cases of torture, illegal detention, and disappearances during the war in Donbas.75 The impact of these far-right organisations cannot be measured strictly in terms of the direct physical effects, as terrorism researchers have emphasised in many other contexts.76 Ultra-nationalist and neo-Nazi organisations were instrumental in blocking or “spoiling” a peaceful resolution of the armed conflict in Donbas, another well-established source of leverage for extremists.77 Far-right groups such as the Right Sector, Svoboda, and the Radical Party opposed the adoption by the parliament of Constitutional amendments based on provisions from the Minsk Agreements.78 To this end, Svoboda activists launched a grenade attack on 31 August 2015 in front of the Ukrainian parliament, killing four and wounding dozens of policemen and National Guard troops, which helped to block these amendments, undercutting the logic of implementation.79
Far-right groups also challenged the implementation of President Volodymyr Zelensky’s electoral promise to peacefully resolve the Donbas war.80 In October 2019, Zelensky travelled to a front-line position in Donbas to personally convince the Azov fighters to stop blocking the implementation of the Minsk agreements by withdrawing along with separatist troops from the frontline, as he agreed during the summit with Putin and German and French leaders in Paris. But video of the encounter shows that Zelensky was taunted by activists of this neo-Nazi organisation who flouted his appeal.81 According to the Associated Press, thousands of far-right and nationalist activists shouting the far-right OUN and UPA slogan “Glory to Ukraine. Glory to the Heroes” marched through Kyiv protesting against a peace plan for eastern Ukraine.82
The radical flank threatened Zelensky for implementing Minsk on other occasions as well. In May 2019, Dmytro Yarosh, the former Right Sector leader, publicly threatened to hang the new Ukrainian president on a tree if he fulfilled his election promise of a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Donbas.83 In 2021, Yarosh, the commander of the Ukrainian Volunteer Army organised by the Right Sector, was appointed Adviser to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Valerii Zaluzhnyi.84 In the same year, videos, photos, and Ukrainian media reports show police standing down while neo-Nazi and other far-right protesters attacked the Office of the President of Ukraine and painted swastikas on its walls.85 The Russia scholar Stephen F. Cohen concluded that Zelensky “can’t go forward with peace negotiations” because “crazy fascist movements” in Ukraine “literally threatened his life.”86 Although far-right peace rejectionists posed political problems for Zelensky, they were also known to work closely with him. An activist of the neo-Nazi Patriot of Ukraine and former deputy commander of the Azov regiment was appointed the acting head of the National Police of Ukraine during the Poroshenko presidency and then became a deputy minister of Internal Affairs during the Zelensky presidency.87 Prime Minister Oleksii Honcharuk spoke at a “veterans party” organised by a front organisation for the neo-Nazi C14 with a stylised swastika of a neo-Nazi rock band behind him.88 The advisory council of the Ministry of Veteran Affairs under Zelensky retained activists of this neo-Nazi group, including those charged with assassinating the prominent opposition journalist, Oles Buzyna, in 2015.89
In sum, ultra-nationalist and neo-Nazi militant organisations were deeply involved on the side of the central government throughout the Donbas conflict. Although representing a small fraction of Ukrainian forces throughout the conflict, they committed a disproportionate amount of violence, particularly before President Poroshenko ordered the Ukrainian military to increase its use of force against the separatists in the summer of 2014. The much-touted absorption of Azov and other extreme right-wing militia under the official Ukrainian National Guard, police, and military command did not change either their command or their ideological displays. Many of the fighters worked closely with the Kyiv political leadership across administrations, when not using de facto veto power to block peaceful resolution of the conflict in this region.
This interpretation departs from others that rely strictly on vote-share as the proxy for far-right influence. The influence of the far-right in Ukraine after the Maidan far exceeded its electoral support and membership. Svoboda and Right Sector leaders each won only one percent of the votes in the snap presidential elections in May 2014. In the parliamentary elections of October 2014, Svoboda narrowly failed to clear the five percent threshold, receiving 4.7 percent. The Right Sector fared even worse, receiving only two percent of the votes. Ruslan Koshulynsky, one of Svoboda leaders, who was backed by the Right Sector, OUN, and C14, received only 1.7 percent of the votes in the 2019 presidential elections, while Svoboda won 2.2 percent of the votes in the 2019 parliamentary elections. These weak electoral results indicate the limited national support of the far-right in Ukraine, but not its outsized role in the Donbas conflict.
The Far-Right in the Odesa Massacre
Other than the Donbas war, the Odesa massacre was the most significant and deadly instance of political violence after the Maidan massacre in Ukraine since its independence in 1991 until the Russia-Ukraine war in February 2022. The violence took place on 2 May 2014, between a “United Ukraine” rally and pro-Russian separatists, carried out with petrol bombs, gunfire, and rock-throwing, which ended up killing 48 people, primarily separatist protesters.90 The vast majority of the fatalities took place in the Trade Unions House, where 42 separatist activists and employees (forty men, seven women, and one boy) were killed when the building was set ablaze.91
This massacre contributed to the escalation of the separatist conflict in Donbas into the civil war. As noted, the massacre was presented by separatist and Russian leaders and the media as akin to the Nazi massacre of Khatyn in Belarus, and many Odesa separatists joined the separatist forces in Donbas. Despite the importance of this massacre, the International Advisory Panel of the Council of Europe, among other international authorities, has noted that the Ukrainian government failed to properly investigate and prosecute those responsible.92 To ascertain the role of far-right groups in the Odesa massacre, a broad range of key information resources can be analysed, including videos and recordings of live broadcasts of the political violence (and the lead-up to it); published reports; primary source media in Ukrainian, Russian, and English; statements of responsibility; interviews; and testimonies from participants and eyewitnesses on both sides, as well as police commanders.
On 1 May 2014, the day before the mass violence, separatists protested in Odesa to demand a referendum on the newly installed government in Kyiv, which they blamed on far-right activists and Western interference.93 Based on testimonies from a special parliamentary commission report in the immediate aftermath of the May 2014 massacre, Ukrainian and regional government officials planned to use far-right activists and the Maidan Self-Defence to suppress the separatists in the Odesa region and disperse those who were encamped near the Trade Union building.94 Extensive evidence indicates that the police and firefighters were ordered by their superiors to stand by and not interfere during attacks. For instance, a special plan to deal with mass disturbances launched by the Odesa regional police was not authorised, reportedly because of decisions at the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ top level.95 Similarly, top regional officials of the police and other law enforcement agencies were ordered to attend a meeting with their national counterparts before and during the start of the clashes.96 The presence of Andriy Parubiy and five hundred Maidan Self-Defence members, who deployed from Kyiv to Odesa on the eve of the massacre, further suggests that the violent dispersal of the separatist camp by far-right activists was orchestrated by top government leaders.97 Parubiy was a founder and leader of the neo-Nazi Patriot of Ukraine, a paramilitary wing of the Social National Party of Ukraine in the 1990s. He was the head of the Maidan Self-Defence during the Euromaidan and headed the National Security and Defence Council at the time of the Odesa massacre. The State Bureau of Investigations of Ukraine launched a criminal investigation into Parubiy for the Odesa massacre soon after he was replaced as the ex-head of the Ukrainian parliament following the early parliamentary elections in 2019.98 One of the participants acknowledged in an Israeli documentary that he engaged in “provocations” in the Odesa massacre under the command of Parubiy, who had issued orders to attack the separatists and “burn everything.” We assess this acknowledgement as credible because he was filmed along with Maidan activists in the left wing of the Trade Union building in Odesa when the deadly fire began to burn the central entrance.99 He and five other Georgian ex-military members also stated in American, Italian, and Israeli TV documentaries, Russian media interviews, on Macedonian TV, in depositions to Berkut lawyers for the Maidan massacre trial, and in testimonies to the Prosecutor General Office of Belarus for the Prosecutor General Office of Ukraine investigation that their groups of Georgian, Baltic, and far-right-linked Ukrainian snipers received weapons, payments, and orders from specific Maidan and Georgian politicians, including Parubiy, to engage in a mass killing of police and protesters.100 The Maidan massacre trial subsequently confirmed their identities.101
A march led by the Right Sector and football ultras on 2 May 2014 was used as cover to implement this plan to destroy and burn the separatist tent camp.102 The SBU in the Odesa Region received advanced information about planned “provocations” and violent clashes between football ultras and pro-Russian separatists on game day between the Odesa and Kharkiv teams on 2 May. A special train transported hundreds of football ultras from Kharkiv to Odesa.103 Football ultras in Ukraine were notorious for displaying neo-Nazi symbols and expressing neo-Nazi slogans during games and have historically linked up with the Right Sector and other far-right organisations, as during the Maidan protests.104 Both the Right Sector and football ultras in Odesa and Kharkiv were dominated by the neo-Nazi Social National Assembly/Patriot of Ukraine, which organised the Azov battalion right after the Odesa massacre.
Odeska Druzhyna, a small separatist organisation in Odesa, was present among other separatist activists based on evidence from internet streams, videos, testimonies of participants and eyewitnesses, and special parliamentary commission reports.105 Odeska Druzhyna used identifiable red tape labels, and were not Right Sector agent provocateurs, as the Russian media and separatists claimed. However, the Ukrainian government and media also mischaracterised the involvement of Odeska Druzhyna by overstating its coordination with other separatist activists.106 The balance of forces was asymmetric; the groups of numerically superior activists of the Right Sector from Odesa and Kharkiv led by the neo-Nazi Social National Assembly/Patriot of Ukraine, far-right football ultras, and Maidan Self-Defence units from Odesa and other regions attacked the separatists. Numerically disadvantaged, the latter took cover behind a police cordon.107
An Odeska Druzhyna activist was filmed shooting in the direction of the far-right protesters with an AK-74-type assault rifle.108 The official investigation and the May 2 Group maintained that a Right Sector activist was killed by this separatist group member with a 5.45mm calibre bullet.109 However, leaked forensic medical expert reports describe a 5.65mm calibre bullet extracted from his body.110 This bullet reportedly disappeared and reappeared during the investigation. The fact that it did not match bullet samples of any legally registered firearms, the weak sound of the gunshots, as well as the lack of a recoil observed in the videos of the shooting, also suggest that the far-right protester may not have been killed by this separatist, who maintained that the weapon seen in the video was a movie studio prop.111 The killing of the Right Sector activist was not visible in that video nor in any videos of clashes. The investigation and various videos at the scene did not reveal the exact time or location of his killing, or the direction of the gunshot. An Odesa deputy police chief, who was filmed around the time of this killing before he himself was wounded, stated that he saw snipers in camouflage shooting from the second floor of a hotel there. He relayed that they killed this Right Sector activist and the second protester in order to blame the separatists for their killing and provoke a violent response against the separatists.112 Videos filmed before and after his shooting suggest that the second pro-Maidan activist was killed around the same time in the same area during the violent clashes with separatists and shooting from a Kalashnikov-type weapon by one of the separatists.113 However, the government forensic examination determined that he was killed by a bullet from a pneumatic sport-type weapon. Nobody was charged with his killing, and the moment and other circumstances of his killing remain not publicly known.114
In the clashes that followed the killings of these two pro-government protesters, four separatist protesters were killed and many other separatist protesters, policemen and at least one local journalist were wounded. The forensic examination determined that three separatists were killed with hunting ammunition.115 A pro-government activist was filmed shooting with a hunting rifle in the direction of these separatists.116 This pro-government activist was later identified by the Minister of Internal Affairs as a Right Sector member.117 The government investigation charged him with killing at least one of the separatists. However, he was released from arrest and his trial was suspended indefinitely because of threats by the Right Sector and other far-right activists against judges during his trial.118 Evidence—including a recorded phone call—revealed that the events on May 2nd were coordinated by the Odesa regional administration official in charge of law enforcement agencies, and involved the participation of the Maidan Self-Defence commander, Right Sector activists, football ultras, and Maidan Self-Defence units.119 They attacked and burned the tent camp of various separatist organisations, whose activists and supporters then escaped to the nearby Trade Union building and tried to barricade the main entrance doors. Videos, internet streams, and testimonies of eyewitnesses show that attackers threw Molotov cocktails and burning tyres at the main entrance, set the entrance doors on fire, and blocked other exits. Videos, recorded calls to firefighters, and eyewitness reports reveal that the fire and thick smoke started from those burning tyres and Molotov cocktails thrown at the main entrance.120 The evidence does not support claims that the separatist protesters killed in this incident were Russian citizens, that they burned themselves by throwing Molotov cocktails from the roof of the Trade Union building or inside of the building, or that there was no far-right involvement in their killing.
After initial denials, the May 2 Group admitted that the deadly fire started at the main entrance. The May 2 Group was a nominally independent association of mainly journalists, formed after the massacre supposedly to investigate it. It was created with the involvement of the Governor of the Odesa region who was appointed by Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko within a week of the massacre.121 This governor represented not only the central government, but also the Kolomoisky’s oligarchic network, which financed the Right Sector volunteers from the Volyn Region in the Azov battalion and the Right Sector-led Dnipro battalion.122 The Azov battalion was organised by the neo-Nazi SNA and its paramilitary wing, Patriot of Ukraine, which dominated the Right Sector in Odesa and Kharkiv, a few days after the Odesa massacre. But the May 2 Group still claimed that it was impossible to determine who started the fire because both sides were throwing Molotov cocktails. However, there is no public evidence of Molotov cocktails being thrown by separatists at the main entrance; on the contrary, numerous videos feature the far-right protesters throwing Molotov cocktails and burning tyres into the Trade Union building at that time.123
Within Ukraine, far-right activists—particularly from the Right Sector and the SNA— were notorious for using tyres and Molotov cocktails to burn public buildings. Forensic examinations in the government investigation, recordings of radiocommunications by SBU Alfa group, an unpublished admission by a far-right activist to a French journalist, and an academic study determined that the Trade Union headquarters in Kyiv were burned by Maidan activists, including far-right ones, in order to stop its takeover by the Security Service of Ukraine Alfa unit.124 Far-right protesters also started fires by burning tyres in the Inter TV channel building and threatened to burn down the parliament of Ukraine, the Lutsk City Council, the Sviatoshyn District Court that heard the Maidan massacre case, the Constitutional Court, and Inter and 112 Ukraina TV channels buildings by placing tyres next to their entrances.125 Prior usage of the same tactics by the far-right increases the likelihood of their direct involvement.
Analysis of online video streams, government investigation findings, May 2 Group reports, forensic medical examinations, eyewitness testimonies, and other evidence strongly indicate that 42 people perished as a result of the fire, smoke, and from trying to jump from the upper floors of the Trade Union building with far-right activists beating them on the ground and blocking the exits.. The victims were unarmed and included mainly separatists, their supporters, and several employees, in particular women, who were in the building at the time.126 Some of the strongest evidence of far-right involvement in the arson attack comes from the far-right itself, in the form of credit claiming. A growing body of research within terrorism studies focuses on credit claiming. An important finding is that perpetrators are far more likely to deny responsibility for their attacks than to take credit for ones that they did not perpetrate.127 This is particularly true when the targets are civilians. Nonetheless, many extremist groups do claim credit for civilian attacks.128 Statements posted by the Right Sector, the SNA, and the neo-Nazi Misanthropic Division on their websites and social media sites admitted the involvement of their organisations in the massacre. The Right Sector celebrated on its website the massacre by describing it as “another bright page in our fatherland’s history.” Claiming responsibility for the slaughter, it wrote: “In the first minutes of the battle, the ‘Right Sector’ activist was seriously wounded in the stomach. Several more PS [Right Sector] activists received injuries of varying degrees of severity. However, this did not prevent the rest of the PS fighters, together with football fans, from repelling the attack of pro-Russian provocateurs, and as a result, they successfully countered attempts to seize buildings in Odesa. Standing shoulder to shoulder, Odesa activists, football fans and ‘Right Sector’ fighters defeated the forces of pro-Russian mercenaries. Order has been restored in Odesa.”129 The Right Sector—which was dominated in Odesa and Kharkiv by the Social National Assembly and its paramilitary wing, Patriot of Ukraine—and the neo-Nazi Misanthropic Division (which joined the Azov battalion after the massacre) admitted on the social media platform V Kontakte and in other public statements that the fire was set deliberately.130
The official investigation of the Odesa massacre was a farce. Nobody was found guilty of perpetrating this mass killing. As noted, the Right Sector shooter was initially arrested but then released. Only separatists were among those arrested and tried for the Odesa massacre. The Odesa massacre trial of separatists resulted in their acquittal by a local court. The Ukrainian court based its decision on the lack of evidence in support of prosecution charges. Even the verdict acknowledged both the weakness of the investigation into the perpetrators and the role of Parubiy and other government officials.131 The Council of Europe and the UN Special Commission reports also noted the destruction of evidence.132 A report by the special commission of the Council of Europe found that the Ukrainian government’s investigation of the Odesa Massacre was inadequate, politically selective, and featured the falsification of evidence, despite the existence of video footage showing who threw the Molotov cocktails at the building.133
The Ukrainian media cited SBU sources that a far-right activist, who headed the Right Sector in Odesa during the Odesa Massacre, was a secret agent of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and that he and far-right associates were paid by SBU to attack opposition politicians, threaten judges, and conduct other illegal actions.134 This would be consistent with the fact that the Right Sector was not investigated for the Odesa massacre even though the Right Sector publicly admitted involvement. His secret collaboration with SBU would also be consistent with the fact that SBU and the Prosecutor General Office refused to charge him for killing another person in Odesa in 2018. Moreover, in 2020, the SBU gave this far-right activist the status of a victim in this case, even though he streamed this killing on his social media account and the police investigation determined that he was the killer.135 In this sense, the Odesa massacre was not entirely anomalous; it featured post-Maidan far-right involvement with apparent support from high-level political leaders in a corrupt country where investigations and media have inconsistently followed the evidence.
Conclusion
This study assesses the role of the far-right in post-Maidan Ukraine, specifically, in the Donbas war and the Odesa massacre. These were two of the biggest episodes of political violence in the country leading up to the February 2022 Russian invasion. This area of research is worth close investigation because it represents intrinsically important episodes of political violence that have not attracted objective analysis based on available primary sources in Ukrainian, Russian, and English. Investigating the role of the far-right is also timely because the far-right in Ukraine is riven by duelling, self-serving contemporary narratives.
The predominant narratives propagated by governments and the mainstream media in Ukraine, the West, Russia, and separatist-controlled Donbas, concerning the role of the far-right in the war in Donbas and the Odesa massacre, have evidently been partisan. Contrary to the Russian government, separatists, and associated media, the Ukrainian government and military are not Nazi or even neo-Nazi. There were no neo-Nazis among the upper echelon of the Ukrainian government. President Zelensky is certainly not a Jewish neo-Nazi. He tried to placate and mainstream the far-right for political reasons, but has no observable personal affinity to that extreme ideology.
Neo-Nazis constituted only about one percent of the Ukrainian forces before the Russian invasion in 2022, and there is weak electoral support for neo-Nazi parties throughout the country. Similarly, the policy of glorification of the OUN-UPA, their leaders, such as Stepan Bandera, and the adoption and use of their “Glory to Ukraine! Glory to the Heroes!” greeting by the state and the military, including Zelensky, do not make Ukraine a Nazi state. While the OUN and the UPA were far-right terrorist organisations, which collaborated with Nazi Germany and perpetrated the mass murders of Jews, Poles, and Ukrainians, they were not Nazis. Ukrainians could not join the Nazi party because Hitler and other Nazi leaders regarded Ukrainians as racially inferior and opposed independence of Ukraine while also dismissing the attempt to create even a puppet state by the Bandera faction of the OUN in Lviv shortly after the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union. Thus, Putin cannot credibly justify the illegal invasion in February 2022 as a war to “de-Nazify” the “Nazi regime.”136 The power of the far-right and the glorification of the OUN and the UPA in Ukraine under Poroshenko and Zelensky were exaggerated and exploited by the Russian leaders to justify the invasion.
But the West’s efforts to whitewash the far-right in Ukraine also rests on empirically shaky grounds. Despite their relatively small numbers militarily and politically, the far-right in Ukraine exercised outsized power. The far-right organisations, volunteer battalions, and paramilitary units organised and led by them played, along with separatists and Russian nationalists, a significant role in starting and escalating the incipient civil war in the Donbas and then impeding its peaceful resolution. Even after technically integrated into the official Ukrainian forces, Azov and other far-right groups continued to harbour extremist views. Often brandishing the same extremist symbols, the core leaders and members remained and even ascended within the police, military, and security services during the Donbas war. Western media accounts have drawn heavily from biased Ukrainian sources, including “official” investigations and the May 2 Group. Across numerous primary sources in Ukrainian, Russian, and English, we find evidence that the Right Sector, Social-National Assembly, its paramilitary wing Patriot of Ukraine, and groups of far-right football ultras from Odesa and Kharkiv played a critical role in the Odesa massacre against separatist protesters on 2 May 2014. Neo-Nazi SNA/Patriot of Ukraine, which dominated the Right Sector in Odesa and Kharkiv, organised the Azov battalion right after this massacre.
Despite the lack of international consensus over the definition of terrorism, a common interpretation is the use of violence by non-state actors aimed at creating fear for political ends, particularly when the targets are civilians.137 Depending on one’s definition, some attacks within the episodes of political violence covered in this study, such as the Odesa massacre, could, therefore, arguably be classified as terrorism. What is clear is that neither of the duelling narratives accurately captures the role of the far-right. This study has helped to fill that research lacuna by making use of substantial primary source materials in Ukrainian, Russian, and English. Besides the Maidan massacre, the Donbas war and the Odesa massacre are the two most substantial episodes of political violence from the independence of Ukraine in 1991 to the February 2022 illegal Russian invasion [end]
Ivan Katchanovski is a Ukrainian and Canadian political scientist. He teaches at the School of Political Studies and the Conflict Studies and Human Rights Program at the University of Ottawa in Canada. He specialises primarily in politics, conflicts, political violence, and the far right in Ukraine. His academic publications include five books, 21 articles in peer-reviewed journals, and twelve book chapters.
Max Abrahms is a professor of public policy and political science at Northeastern University, where he specialises in international security. Abrahms has published extensively in leading academic and popular outlets such as International Organization, International Security, International Studies Quarterly, Security Studies, Comparative Political Studies, Harvard Business Review, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, New York Times, Washington Post, USA Today, Newsweek, The Atlantic, and Los Angeles Times.
I disagree with the authors on two points
Stepan Bandera & friends were Nazis. How can the authors identify some neo-Nazis in modern Ukraine, while not regarding their historical mentors as Nazis ? Before WW2, they were praising either Adolf Hitler or Benito Mussolini. Their political project was authoritarian, racist and criminal. They were dreaming of ethnic cleansing. De facto during WW2, they committed mass killing of Jews and Poles.
Terrorism is not restricted to non-state actors. Terrorism is violent action to terror civilians, in order to achieve a common political goal. This is not even a value judgement, but Hiroshima bombing was terrorism. The Israeli targeting and mass killing of civilians, in the prospect of ethnic cleansing in Gaza, is terrorism.
chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia
Endnotes
Arel, Dominique and Jesse Driscoll. 2023. Ukraine’s Unnamed War. Before the Russian Invasion of 2022. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Black, J.L. and Michael Johns (Eds.). 2016. The Return of the Cold War: Ukraine, the West and Russia. Abingdon: Routledge; Hahn, Gordon M. 2018. Ukraine Over the Edge: Russia, the West and the “New Cold War.” Jefferson, NC: McFarland Books; Katchanovski, Ivan. 2016a. “The Separatist War in Donbas: A Violent Break-up of Ukraine?” European Politics and Society, 17 (4), 473-489; Kudelia, Serhiy. 2016. “The Donbas Rift.” Russian Politics & Law, 54 (1), 5-27; Pikulicka-Wilczewska, Agnieszka and Richard Sakwa (Eds.). 2015. Ukraine and Russia: People, Politics, Propaganda and Perspectives. Bristol: E-International Relations; Sakwa, Richard. 2015. Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands. London: I.B.Tauris. ↩︎
Danciu, Gabriela-Cătălina. 2023. “A Perspective on Justifying the Ukraine–Russia War. Elements Of Propaganda.” International Journal of Social and Educational Innovation, 10 (19), 224-239; “Address by the President of the Russian Federation” (2022, February 24) http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843. ↩︎
Black, J.L. and Michael Johns (Eds.). 2016. The Return of the Cold War: Ukraine, the West and Russia. Abingdon: Routledge; Katchanovski, Ivan. 2023a. “The Maidan Massacre Trial and Investigation Revelations and Their Implications for the Ukraine-Russia War and Relations.” Russian Politics, 8 (2),181-205. ↩︎
See, for example, Colborne, Michael. 2022. From the Fires of War: Ukraine’s Azov Movement and the Global Far Right, Stuttgart: Ibidem; Davidzon, Vladislav. 2023. “The Search for Neo-Nazis Under the Bedsheets Reflects American Progressive Hysteria, Not Ukrainian Reality.” Tablet Magazine, July. ↩︎
Umland, Andreas. 2019. “Irregular Militias and Radical Nationalism in PostEuromaydan Ukraine: The Prehistory and Emergence of the “Azov” Battalion in 2014.” Terrorism and Political Violence, 31 (1), 105- 131. ↩︎
Umland, Andreas. 2020. ‘The Far Right in Pre- and Post-Euromaidan Ukraine: From Ultra-Nationalist Party Politics to Ethno-Centric Uncivil Society.’ Demokratizatsiya, 28 (2), 247-268. ↩︎
Ishchenko, Volodymyr. 2016. “Far right participation in the Ukrainian Maidan protests: an attempt of systematic estimation.” European Politics and Society, 17 (4), 453-472. ↩︎
Hahn, Gordon M. 2018. Ukraine Over the Edge: Russia, the West and the “New Cold War.” Jefferson, NC: McFarland Books; Katchanovski, Ivan. 2016b. “The Maidan Massacre in Ukraine: A Summary of Analysis, Evidence, and Findings.” In The Return of the Cold War: Ukraine, the West and Russia, eds. J.L. Black and Michael Johns. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 220-224; Katchanovski, Ivan. 2020. “The far right, the Euromaidan, and the Maidan massacre in Ukraine.” Journal of Labor and Society, 23 (1), 5-29; Katchanovski, 2023a; Katchanovski, Ivan. 2023b. “The “Snipers’ Massacre” on the Maidan in Ukraine.” Cogent Social Sciences, 9 (2); Katchanovski, Ivan. 2024. The Maidan Massacre in Ukraine. London: Palgrave Macmillan. ↩︎
Khalil Mutallimzada and Kristian Steiner, (2022), Fighters’ motivations for joining extremist groups: Investigating the attractiveness of the Right Sector’s Volunteer Ukrainian Corps. European Journal of International Security, 1–23. Ilmari Käihkö, (2018), A nation-in-the-making, in arms: control of force, strategy and the Ukrainian Volunteer Battalions. Defence Studies 18:2, 147–166; Tetyana Malyarenko and David J. Galbreath, (2016), Paramilitary motivation in Ukraine: beyond integration and abolition, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 16:1, 113–138. ↩︎
Hale, Henry E., Oxana Shevel and Olga Onuch. 2018. “Believing Facts in the Fog of War: Identity, Media and Hot Cognition in Ukraine’s 2014 Odesa Tragedy.” Geopolitics, 23 (4), 851-881. A poll commissioned for that study found that 44% of Ukrainians believed that this mass killing was committed by provocateurs from Russia, while 11% blamed pro-Russian residents of Odesa. Ten percent of the respondents said that the Odesa massacre was perpetrated by “Ukrainian nationalists from Odesa” and 3% by “pro-Ukrainian” residents of Odesa. ↩︎
Van Evera, Stephen. 1997. Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. ↩︎
Griffin, Roger with Matthew Feldman (Eds.). 2003. Fascism: Critical Concepts in Political Science. London: Routledge. ↩︎
Brahimi, Alia. “Ideology and terrorism.” The Oxford handbook of terrorism (2019): 298. ↩︎
See, for example, Jadoon, Amira, Andrew Mines, and Daniel Milton. “Targeting quality or quantity? The divergent effects of targeting upper verses lower tier leaders of militant organizations.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 67, no. 5 (2023): 1007-1031; Schram, Peter. “Self-managing terror: Resolving agency problems with diverse teams.” Games and Economic Behavior 130 (2021): 240-257; Abrahms, Max, and Philip BK Potter. “Explaining terrorism: Leadership deficits and militant group tactics.” International Organization 69, no. 2 (2015): 311-342; Popovic, Milos. “The perils of weak organization: Explaining loyalty and defection of militant organizations toward Pakistan.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 38, no. 11 (2015): 919-937. ↩︎
Biletsky 2013; Biletsky, Andriy. “Nedochytanyi Franko.” Patriot Ukrainy, (2008). https://web.archive.org/web/20101120085407/http://patriotukr.org.ua/index.php?rub=stat&id=409. Also, please note that the ADL has adopted the spelling of “antisemitism” instead of “anti-Semitism.” After reviewing the history and consulting with other leading experts, they determined that this is the best way to refer to hatred toward Jews, so we have adopted the same spelling convention here. ↩︎
Clarke, Colin P. “The Terrorist Diaspora.” Testimony, House Homeland Security Committee Task Force on Denying Terrorists Entry into the United States (2017). ↩︎
Boyd-Barrett, Oliver. 2016. Western Mainstream Media and the Ukraine Crisis: A Study in Conflict Propaganda. New York: Routledge. ↩︎
Some researchers and Zelensky have cited the presence of Russian-speakers in the Azov regiment and other neo-Nazi-led armed formations as evidence of their relative tolerance and moderation and argued that the Azov regiment distanced itself from its far-right roots. (See Umland 2019; “Zelensky refutes Russian propaganda claim that Azov Regiment is ‘neo-Nazi.’” The New Voice of Ukraine (2022, May 2), https://news.yahoo.com/zelensky-refutes-russian-propaganda-claim-131100438.html. However, these formations were organized and led by neo-Nazi organizations, which had a racist ideology and cast themselves as defenders of the White race. For this reason, they included not only large numbers of Russian speakers from Ukraine but also neo-Nazis from Russia, Belarus, and the Western countries, such as Australia, Sweden, and the US. ↩︎
“Ukraine war: Ros Atkins on… Putin’s false ‘Nazi’ claims.” BBC, (2022, March 26) https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-europe-60853404; Five Azovstal defenders were awarded the title of Heroes of Ukraine. Svidomi, (2022, October 3). https://svidomi.in.ua/en/page/five-azovstal-defenders-were-awarded-the-title-of-heroes-of-ukraine. Loyd, Anthony. “‘Nonsense’: Heroes of Mariupol Denied US Weapons Over neo-Nazi Past.” Times, (2024 May 2). https://www.thetimes.com/world/russia-ukraine-war/article/nonsense-heroes-of-mariupol-denied-us-weapons-over-neo-nazi-past-kwnr0r0pw; “Boris Johnson Praises Nazi Azov Battalion,” YouTube. (2024, May 23). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_6g7i-4wswk. There was similar systematic and politically motivated whitewashing of the far-right in Ukraine in Wikipedia, especially, after the Russian invasion. A small number of Wikipedia editors systematically whitewashed neo-Nazi and other far-right parties, organizations, and their leaders, such as Azov regiment, Patriot of Ukraine, Svoboda, National Corps, the OUN, the UPA, Stepan Bandera, Roman Shukhevych, etc. They removed or deliberately excluded scholarly studies and other evidence of the extremist ideology and involvement in mass murder of the far-right, such as the Maidan and Odesa massacres, the Holocaust, and the Lviv pogrom in Ukraine and smeared in biographical entries scholars and other experts whose studies show such ideology and political violence by the far-right in Ukraine. (See, for example, Azov Brigade, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Azov_Brigade; Patriot of Ukraine, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patriot_of_Ukraine; 2014 Odesa clashes, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014_Odesa_clashes; Far-right politics in Ukraine, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Far-right_politics_in_Ukraine. They included editors who misrepresented the Holocaust in Poland using similar tactics in Wikipedia, which is unreliable but widely accessed source, compared to academic studies (Grabowski, Jan, and Shira Klein. 2023. “Wikipedia’s Intentional Distortion of the History of the Holocaust.” Journal of Holocaust Research 37 (2): 133–90). ↩︎
Katchanovski, Ivan and Alicen Morley. 2012. “Politics of US Television Coverage of Post-Communist Countries.” Problems of Post-Communism, 59 (1), 15-30. ↩︎
Bhatia, Michael. 2008. “Fighting words: naming terrorists, bandits, rebels and other violent actors, ”Third World Quarterly, 26 (1), 5-22; Schmid, Alex P. 2012. “The revised academic consensus definition of terrorism.” Perspectives on Terrorism, 6 (2), 158-159; Ganor, Boaz. 2002. “Defining terrorism: Is one man’s terrorist another man’s freedom fighter?” Police Practice and Research, 3 (4), 287-304. ↩︎
Although the focus of this analysis is on the portrayal of the far-right in Ukraine, a related narrative dispute has been over whether to characterise the conflict in the Donbas as a civil war. The Ukrainian and Western governments and the media described the war in Donbas as an interstate war between Russia and Ukraine or a hybrid war while denying that there was a civil war. By contrast, the Russian and Donbas separatist governments and associated media denied any Russian military involvement in the war and called it a purely civil war. The majority of scholars and datasets such as the Correlates of War Project and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program classified it as a civil war or an intrastate conflict, while also noting the Russian military interventions in Donbas prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in See, for example, Arel and Driscoll 2023; Black and Johns 2016; Hahn 2018; Katchanovski 2016a; Kudelia 2016. ↩︎
Abrahms, Max. “What terrorists really want: Terrorist motives and counterterrorism strategy.” International Security 32, no. 4 (2008): 78-105. ↩︎
Rossolinski-Liebe, Grzegorz. 2014. Stepan Bandera: The life and afterlife of a Ukrainian nationalist. Stuttgart: Ibidem. ↩︎
Yeomans, Rory, (Ed.). 2016. The Utopia of Terror: Life and Death in Wartime Croatia. Rochester: University of Rochester Press; Katchanovski, Ivan. 2015. “Terrorists or National Heroes? Politics and Perceptions of the OUN and the UPA in Ukraine.” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 48 (2-3), 217-228. ↩︎
Rudling, Per Anders. 2011. “The OUN, the UPA and the Holocaust. A Study in the Manufacturing of Historical Myths.” Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies, #2107, Center for Russian and East European Studies, Pittsburgh University. ↩︎
See Katchanovski, 2016a; Katchanovski, Ivan. 2006. Cleft Countries: Regional Political Divisions and Cultures in Post-Soviet Ukraine and Moldova. Stuttgart: Ibidem. ↩︎
Umland, Andreas. 2019. “Irregular Militias and Radical Nationalism in PostEuromaydan Ukraine: The Prehistory and Emergence of the “Azov” Battalion in 2014.” Terrorism and Political Violence, 31 (1), 105-131. ↩︎
Mueller, John E. 2006. Overblown: How politicians and the terrorism industry inflate national security threats, and why we believe them. New York: Simon and Schuster; Abrahms, Max. 2006. “Why terrorism does not work.” International Security, 31 (2), 42-78. ↩︎
Kydd, Andrew, and Barbara F. Walter. 2002. “Sabotaging the peace: The politics of extremist violence.” International Organization, 56 (2), 263-296. ↩︎
“Zvit tymchasovoi slidchoi komisii Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy z pytan rozsliduvannia faktiv zahybeli hromadian u mistakh Odesi, Nariupoli, a takozh inshykh mistakh Donetskoi ta Luhanskoi oblastei Ukrainy.” (2014, September 5). Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy. http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=52134↩︎
Abrahms, Max, and Justin Conrad. “The strategic logic of credit claiming: A new theory for anonymous terrorist attacks.” Security Studies 26, no. 2 (2017): 279-304. ↩︎
Schmid, Alex. “Terrorism-the definitional problem.” Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 36 (2004): 375; Schmid, Alex P. “The definition of terrorism.” In The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, pp. 39-157. Routledge, 2011; Schmid, Alex P. “Discussion 1-Revisiting the wicked problem of defining terrorism.” Terrorism: Its Past, Present & Future Study A Special Issue to Commemorate CSTPV at 25 (2020): 3. ↩︎