Nicolas Cinquini

Analista senior di l'intelligenza in u campu di a gestione di i risichi di sicurezza, sรฒ un anzianu tenente detective รจ ufficiale di l'intelligenza in l'agenzie di u Statu francese. A bona pronuncia hรจ ะะธะบะพะปะฐะน ะงะธะฝะบัƒะธะฝะธ, in russu

Tag: olafscholz

  • [Sharing] German Imperialism: An Urgent Explainer – Kit Klarenberg

    The fate of Central and Eastern Europe after the Peopleโ€™s Democraciesโ€™ post-1989 fall cannot be fully appreciated without reference to the EU as an extension of German imperialism. Berlinโ€™s drive to ensure the region remains composed of weak, frequently mutually-resentful microstates has endured for well-over a century. Over time, battlefield conquest and occupation has been supplanted by economic and monetary union, and ever-rising military, security and intelligence โ€œinteroperabilityโ€ and โ€œcooperationโ€, all conducted under โ€œinternationalistโ€ auspices.

    Comprehending this process and the consistent needs of German imperialism provides a typically absent, critical lens through which to view events such as Yugoslaviaโ€™s destruction, the rise and recent demise of Hungaryโ€™s Viktor Orban, and seen and unseen political machinations throughout the Balkans old and new. German imperialism is a potent, dangerous force frequently overlooked due to its nigh-invisible operation. With US global hegemony irreversibly faltering, it is vital to truly understand the phenomenon as it threatens to emerge in its own militarised right again.

    Today, German imperialism is little-understood even in countries and regions intimately shaped if not outright created by Berlinโ€™s colonial meddling and concomitant hegemonic expansion. Its historic apotheosis was the 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The terms and consequences provide an eerily precise blueprint for the EUโ€™s modern day role as German empire via other means. Despite Brest-Litovskโ€™s seismic import, mainstream English language accounts are comparatively rare. A highly compelling, informative synthesis is nonetheless provided by Adam Toozeโ€™s much-overlooked 2014 work The Deluge.

    Tooze writes of how โ€œBrest gave birth to the precursors to the Baltic states in their modern form,โ€ and an โ€œindependent Ukraineโ€ for the very first time in history. Resource-rich territory that over prior centuries comprised much larger dynastic land empires was broken up into easily exploitable chunks. The newly-formed nations, and corresponding nationalisms, spread throughout ethnically, linguistically and religiously diverse swaths of Central and Eastern Europe constituted a formidable stronghold. Self-determination facilitated Germanyโ€™s untrammelled economic, military, and political penetration.

    Commenting on Eurasiaโ€™s 21st century map, Tooze observes how since the Soviet Unionโ€™s 1991 dissolution, all Brest-Litovskโ€™s โ€œcreationsโ€ have โ€œcome to be regarded as legitimate members of the family of nations.โ€ Moreover, states such as the Baltics and Poland then as now โ€œlook to protectors in the West,โ€ being โ€œkeen members of an American-dominated NATO and the European Union, in which Germany is the dominant force.โ€ Via Brest-Litovsk, โ€œall of these polities fell willy-nilly under the โ€˜protectionโ€™ of Imperial Germanyโ€

    Treaties of Brest-Litovsk | Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary | Britannica
    Brest-Litovsk delegates negotiate, early 1918

    The Treaty was signed between Moscow and Austro-Hungary, Bulgaria, Germany and the Ottoman Empire in March 1918, following months of tense negotiations produced the previous December by revolutionary Russia signing an armistice with Berlin. At Brest-Litvosk, both sides had advanced their respective visions of โ€œself-determinationโ€ for the Central and Eastern European components of the Tsarโ€™s collapsed empire. Vladimir Lenin hoped newly-independent states in the region would be free to turn Bolshevik. Yet, Imperial Germany had no intention of letting that happen.

    Instead, the countryโ€™s โ€œmore intelligent strategic thinkersโ€ realised โ€œthere was no better means to dynamite the Tsarist Empire than for Berlin to espouse the demand for self-determinationโ€ at Brest-Litovsk. This โ€œmanipulative ruseโ€ would allow Germany to extend her hegemony imperceptibly throughout enormously profitable territories. It was โ€œa vision of negotiated sovereignty in which economic and military independence was pooled by smaller states with larger states.โ€ Tooze reports how German imperialists argued โ€œfull, unfettered sovereigntyโ€ was โ€œalways a chimeraโ€ – โ€œthe real choice was one between hegemonsโ€:

    Germany would secure power on a continental scale not through annexation, but through the formation of an economic and military bloc of smaller Eastern European statesโ€ฆThe autonomous Polish entity carved by Germany and Austria out of Russian territory in the autumn of 1916 was a start. While in economic and military terms the new Poland would be bound tightly and irrevocably to Germany, in the social and cultural sphere it would be given the freedom โ€˜to express itself nationallyโ€™

    โ€˜Military Protectionโ€™

    From the Central Powersโ€™ perspective, self-determinationโ€™s colonial windfall was immense. In territorial terms, Moscow lost control of todayโ€™s Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine. This prime former Tsarist real estate accounted for 34% of the fallen empireโ€™s population, 54% of its industrial land, 89% of its coalfields, and 26% of its railways. Berlin well-knew the regional treasure trove would be hotly contested, and could easily โ€œfall into the orbit of another great powerโ€ – โ€œif not Germany or Russia, then Britainโ€.

    Hence, Brest-Litovskโ€™s terms exclusively allowed for โ€˜independenceโ€™ under formal โ€œGerman military protection.โ€ This transformed millions of people throughout the region into potential proxy warriors arrayed against Russia, or other major powers threatening Berlinโ€™s local hegemony, in the manner of NATO today. Rapidly collapsing into civil war, with Franco-British intervention to reverse the Revolution impending, the incipient Soviet Union acquiesced to the Treatyโ€™s harsh stipulations. Lenin believed the Bolsheviks would eventually recapture the lost territories, by sheer force of radical gravity

    Contemporary map of Central and Eastern European states created by Brest-Litovsk

    Brest-Litovsk was torn up by the June 1919 Treaty of Versailles, compelling Berlin to grant independence to assorted German-conquered protectorates that had been established throughout the region. Chaotic, violent struggles unfolded over the next three years between Red Army-assisted local revolutionary elements and โ€˜independentโ€™ states led by collaborationist puppets. Belarus and Ukraine were successfully absorbed as republics, while the Baltics and Poland remained autonomous. Meanwhile, the seed of German hegemony via self-determination had been decisively sown throughout Central and Eastern Europe.

    German colonialism particularly left its mark post-Brest-Litovsk via the emergence of nationalisms and according national creation myths throughout the region, which were innately and rabidly antagonistic toward Moscow. In Poland in 1916, Berlinโ€™s invading forces had successfully portrayed themselves as liberators. In the Baltics, Russians represented a large proportion of the countryโ€™s urban, land-owning elite. They were easily framed by German propagandists, and in ultranationalist imaginations, as parasitic overlords of largely illiterate ethnic Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian peasantry, who overwhelmingly resided in rural steppes.

    Convincing Ukraineโ€™s multiethnic population to embrace an anti-Russian โ€˜independenceโ€™ was considerably more difficult, given their similar backgrounds, customs and languages, and the substantial influence of each othersโ€™ culture in both directions since Kievโ€™s 1654 union with Moscow. Ukraineโ€™s contemporaneous veneration of genocidal fascists, and indeed the wider ongoing proxy war, are direct upshots of efforts by German imperialists to promote enmity and antagonism between Russians and Ukrainians. This strategy was maintained throughout the Cold War by the CIA and MI6, with Nazi-riddled West Berlinโ€™s assistance.

    โ€˜Civilising Missionโ€™

    Another enduring legacy of Brest-Litovsk was the transformation of โ€œself-determinationโ€ from a liberal German imperialist crusade, to a fundamental principle of Anglo-American-dominated international relations. The cause was eagerly and cynically seized upon first by British Prime Minister Lloyd George, then US President Woodrow Wilson. The right to minority self-determination globally became absolutely central to the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. The world over, anti-colonial and nationalist movements saw an opportunity to achieve independence from foreign subjugation.

    At the Conference, Austro-Hungary brutally fell victim to this self-determination push, with Britain successfully ordering its constituent territories be โ€œliberatedโ€ via the empireโ€™s total breakup. This created the independent states of Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. The latter pair were entirely new countries, with Yugoslavia forged from Austro-Hungaryโ€™s southern Slavic regions – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia – and the revolutionary kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro. In a bitter irony, Austro-Hungary herself had previously encouraged self-determination regionally ร  la Brest-Litovsk, to entrench her imperial rule.

    In June 1878, the little-known Congress of Berlin was convened. Major European powers sought to reorganise the Balkans, in the wake of Russiaโ€™s victory over the Ottoman Empire three months earlier. The conflict ended with Moscow asserting hegemony over Constantinopleโ€™s remaining holdings in Southeastern Europe, via an allied Greater Bulgaria, and the newly-formed, independent states of Montenegro, Romania, and Serbia. However, Austria-Hungary, Britain, France, rapidly expanding host empire Germany, and Italy, wished for these terms to be revised

    Map of the Balkans to illustrate the Treaty of Berlin 1878.

    While the Congress recognised the three new Balkan statesโ€™ independence, attendees demanded Bosnia and Herzegovina become an Austro-Hungarian protectorate into the bargain, much to Serbiaโ€™s chagrin. Viennaโ€™s resultant takeover of Sarajevo sent tens of thousands of Muslim inhabitants fleeing to Turkey. This exodus intensified in 1881, after the imposition of military conscription. The move was inspired by Serbia and Montenegro supporting local anti-imperial elements. It was just one Austro-Hungarian connivance intended to transform harmoniously multiethnic, multifaith Bosnia and Herzegovina into a fractious powder keg.

    In service of this goal, Sarajevoโ€™s Austro-Hungarian occupation authorities actively nurtured a nationhood centred exclusively on Bosniak – Bosnian Muslim – identity. The local Serbo-Croatian dialect was proclaimed a separate Bosnian language, Cyrillic text got suppressed, while Serbian books and newspapers were banned. Viennaโ€™s meddling failed to incite violent, separatist division between Bosniaโ€™s diverse peoples. It nonetheless created a vast army of conscripts for any future regional war, while providing Austro-Hungary with an imperial public relations victory. Per historian Maximilian Georg:

    [Viennaโ€™s] objects were to teach the population their supposed Bosnian, pro-Habsburg identity, legitimise the Austro-Hungarian rulers as the new Romans, and demonstrate to Europe and the world the success of Austro-Hungaryโ€™s โ€˜civilising missionโ€™ in an โ€˜orientalโ€™ country. This โ€˜civilising missionโ€™ under military occupation was the strongest indicator of an Austro-Hungarian colonialism

    โ€˜Yugoslav Nationalistโ€™

    Austro-Hungary and Germany alike considered independent Serbiaโ€™s mere existence a permanent irritant to their Eastern European supremacy, in need of eventual neutralisation. Tensions constantly mounted after the turn of the century, leading in 1908 to Bosniaโ€™s formal annexation by Vienna. All along, imperialists in Berlin were spectating Austro-Hungaryโ€™s colonial machinations with intense interest. In 1888, Chancellor Otto von Bismarck prophetically foresaw โ€œsome damned foolish thing in the Balkansโ€ upsetting Europeโ€™s delicate balance of power, and precipitating a major global conflict.

    Serbia and Montenegroโ€™s October 1912 invasion of Albania, in the wake of her declaration of independence from Ottoman rule, almost proved that โ€œdamned foolish thing.โ€ Serb and Montenegrin forces sought to permanently capture territory, but retreated a year later under threat of Austro-Hungarian intervention. In the aftermath, Kaiser Wilhelm II visited Vienna, declaring to colonial officials โ€œwar between East and West was in the long run inevitable.โ€ As Slavs โ€œwere born not to rule but to obey,โ€ their anti-imperialist tendencies couldnโ€™t be tolerated much longer.

    Wilhelm II moreover pledged to โ€œbackโ€ Austro-Hungary in any future conflict in Eastern Europe, assuring his Viennese counterparts Berlin was โ€œready to draw the saber any time your action makes it necessary.โ€ Bosnian Serb Gavrilo Principโ€™s June 1914 assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo provided an ideal pretext for the Kaiserโ€™s long-desired showdown between Slavs and Teutons. Pressured by Austro-Hungarian authorities to implicate Belgrade directly in his actions while on trial, Princip instead insisted he was ideologically motivated:

    I am a Yugoslav nationalist, aiming for the unification of all Yugoslavs, and I do not care what form of state, but it must be free from Austria…The plan was to unite all South Slavs. It was understood that Serbia as the free part of the South Slavs had the moral duty to help in the unification, to be to the South Slavs as the Piedmont was to Italy…In my opinion every Serb, Croat and Slovene should be an enemy of Austria

    In post-World War I Yugoslavia, Princip was elevated to national hero. In early 1930, a plaque was erected on the site of Ferdinandโ€™s assassination, celebrating a foundational event in the new countryโ€™s creation. It was the sole trophy claimed by the Nazis following the Axis invasion of Yugoslavia, presented to Adolf Hitler at a formal ceremony on his 52nd birthday in April 1941, two days after Belgradeโ€™s surrender. A potent totem of German embarrassment expunged, it was now time to erase Yugoslavia permanently

    Adolf Hitler inspects the plundered plaque commemorating Archduke Ferdinandโ€™s assassination by Gavrilo Princip

    Carving up the country relied heavily on constructing genocidal, ethnonationalist puppet entities. Painful memories of these attempts to exert hegemony over the Balkans under the banner of โ€œself-determinationโ€ remained visceral for many residents of Yugoslavia in December 1991. Then, newly-reunified Germany unilaterally recognised federation members Croatia and Slovenia as โ€˜independentโ€™ states, while encouraging other republics comprising the collapsing country to follow the pairโ€™s secessionist lead. It was widely predicted Yugoslaviaโ€™s demise would produce bloodshed, on a grand scale.

    โ€˜Fundamental Subordinationโ€™

    Dissolving Yugoslavia began waging war on Croat and Slovene secessionists six months earlier. The latter conflict lasted just 10 days, but the former was still simmering. The European Community and UN futilely struggled all along to achieve peaceful settlements to Yugoslaviaโ€™s gravely worsening crisis, while formally committed to preserving the country in some form. Berlinโ€™s recognition summarily sabotaged those efforts, removing any incentive for Yugoslav republics to negotiate their futures with Belgrade, while emboldening nationalists in every republic.

    Fears of Berlinโ€™s resurgent imperialism were not confined to Yugoslavia. As TIME contemporaneously observed, โ€œit used to be a given of European political life Germanyโ€ฆwould not take a leading or controversial role in world affairs,โ€ which โ€œsuited its neighbors very well indeed.โ€ While occupied West Germany operated throughout the Cold War as โ€œan economic giant and a political dwarf,โ€ unified Berlinโ€™s โ€œunexpected show of diplomatic muscleโ€ in recognising Croatia and Slovenia as โ€˜independentโ€™ countries was now causing โ€œdiscomfortโ€ throughout Western capitals.

    In Britainโ€™s parliament, then-Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd explicitly evoked the World Wars as disquieting precedents for Germanyโ€™s modern-day โ€œself-determinationโ€ push in the soon-to-be former Yugoslavia. โ€œThere is a tradition of the main states of Western Europe splitting in rivalry on these Balkan questions, and this all ending up on the battlefield. I donโ€™t think that tradition is a good one,โ€ Hurd cautioned. Washington, immensely irritated by Berlin belligerently โ€œgetting out ahead of the US,โ€ duly assumed management of the Yugoslav crisis, with disastrous consequences.

    Fratricidal conflicts that subsequently engulfed Yugoslavia forged a highly invasive beachhead, via which German economic and political hegemony throughout the region surged, without direct military engagement. While Berlin framed her support for Croat and Slovene โ€˜independenceโ€™ in terms of human rights, the rich financial rewards of shattering the federation were plain. As by far the two wealthiest republics, Germany effectively granted herself access to โ€œthe best productive assetsโ€ in the soon-to-be former country by kickstarting its practical and physical collapse, per a 2008 academic paper.

    The authors write of how Berlinโ€™s โ€œhegemonic relationshipโ€ with Yugoslav successor nations was thereafter writ considerably larger than even Germanyโ€™s imperial infiltration of โ€œsmaller statesโ€ elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe. This is due to the โ€œspecific dependenceโ€ of Balkan countries on Berlinโ€™s โ€œstructural powerโ€. In economic terms, this means vast national trade deficits with Germany across the region, with โ€œBalkan pre-products and raw materialsโ€ flowing in vast, constant profusion to Berlin, while German corporations and products dominate many commercial, financial and industrial sectors locally.

    Undergirding this extraordinary economic colonisation was adoption by Yugoslaviaโ€™s successor states of โ€˜independentโ€™ currencies, pegged first to the former Deutschmark, now Euro. This proved pivotal to the โ€œfundamental subordination of the political economies of the region to the ideological and operational normsโ€ of the EU – or German empire, via other means. New national and private banking systems of post-Yugoslav countries were structured specifically according to Berlinโ€™s own, with German banks ascendant, as elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe. Thatโ€™s not all:

    [Deutschmark/Euro pegging] was an essential precondition for the shaping of the macro-economic policies of these (and other transition) states, for their foreign economic relationships, for the further development of their capital markets and the programmes of liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation which ensued

    โ€˜European Continentโ€™

    Berlinโ€™s Balkan banking takeover moreover fundamentally โ€œfacilitates the penetration of all German enterprises into the commercial life of the Balkan economies.โ€ Berlin has gluttonously feasted on local resources and industry alike ever since, its investment regionally โ€œcharacterised by takeovers.โ€ For example, throughout Central and Eastern Europe German supermarkets are a near-monopoly, with prices of goods frequently higher than back home, despite meagre local purchasing power. Low wages, vast structural unemployment, and mass brain drain are all interlinked, ruinous inheritances.

    The Balkansโ€™ Western โ€œtransitionโ€ has been far more destructive than even the horrors unleashed upon the former Warsaw Pact in the 1990s. Heavily influenced โ€œby prescriptive programmes emanating from the EU and from the World Bank,โ€ Brussels has since 1999 also been โ€œactively involvedโ€ in advising and guiding every country in the region towards bloc membership. After so much imposed impoverishment, it isnโ€™t precisely clear what meaningful benefits Balkan states or populations will reap from their vassalage under German imperialism becoming formalised.

    In late 2019, a Balkan liberal who once eagerly supported their country joining the EU wrote a sorrowful ode to โ€œthe process of so-called integrationโ€ Yugoslav successor states suffered by adopting โ€œmeasuresโ€, โ€œinstrumentsโ€, and โ€œreformsโ€ dictated by โ€œWestern technocratsโ€. Freshly โ€˜independentโ€™ countries โ€œwere expected to build a fully developed Western liberal democracy from scratchโ€ฆupon the ruins of a different yet fully developed systemโ€ฆwhile dragging behind us the burden of deepening poverty and trauma.โ€ Several were and remain deeply scarred by Berlin and Brussels-encouraged โ€˜independenceโ€™ wars.

    However, โ€œthis excruciating process of destroying and building anew a whole systemโ€ฆwent neither fast enough nor successfully enoughโ€ for the new German empire. Whatโ€™s more, โ€œcompetition was not fairโ€ – โ€œopening our markets to the developed capitalism of the West and undertaking neoliberal reforms drained our human and economic resources while we kept trying to stay apace.โ€ Socialismโ€™s vestiges were eradicated, state industries sold off, and social spending slashed. The op-ed mysteriously failed to mention how Germanyโ€™s contemporary Balkan economic assault has a โ€œstrong security dimensionโ€

    06/18/99: KFOR Sectors
    Kosovoโ€™s original KFOR occupation map, June 1999

    The 2008 paper notes Berlin exerts direct colonial-style control across the region, for example via Bosnia and Herzegovinaโ€™s EU-chosen Office of the High Representative, which traditionally serves as Germanyโ€™s imperial viceroy in Sarajevo. Moreover, Berlin has always been a key contributor to NATOโ€™s Kosovo peacekeeping force KFOR, sustaining a military occupation under which Pristina controversially declared independence from Serbia in February 2008. This summer, Washingtonโ€™s KFOR contingent began departing Kosovo after 27 years.

    Meanwhile, the Americans are openly signalling Bosniaโ€™s abandonment, raising potentially urgent questions about the unified countryโ€™s future. In April, EU Commission Ursula von der Leyen made clear the EU and she personally intend to โ€œ[complete] the European continent so it does not fall under Russian, Turkish or Chinese influence,โ€ in explicit reference to the former Yugoslavia. History shows us such declarations by German imperialists frequently result in world-threatening catastrophe. Meanwhile, โ€œsome damned foolish thing in the Balkansโ€ could evidently today yet again trigger war [end]

    The original article

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    • Macron, Emmanuel, nรฉ le 21 dรฉcembre 1977,

    est aprรจs Nicolas Sarkozy et Franรงois Hollande, le troisiรจme gouverneur dโ€™une France infรฉodรฉe aux ร‰tats-Unis et ร  leurs intรฉrรชts. Et en mรชme temps, que ce soit l’expression de son arrogance ou une faรงon de sรฉduire ses rares รฉlecteurs, il sโ€™agite dans des efforts dรฉsespรฉrรฉs pour apparaรฎtre au dessus de ses moyens

    Sa personnalitรฉ infantile, ses caprices, sa vacuitรฉ abyssale de politicien typique de l’Occident de ce dรฉbut de troisiรจme millรฉnaire, de pur communicant, en font sans doute le personnage le moins intรฉressant de ce panthรฉon. Je retiens quand mรชme de Macron qu’il tenta le 11 novembre 2018 de rรฉhabiliter le dirigeant fasciste Philippe Pรฉtain.

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    Quand des pays comme l’Allemagne ou la France, avec leurs passifs historiques, ont l’insolence de prรฉtendre dรฉfendre, comme des vierges de Delphes, la dรฉmocratie ou la libertรฉ, les vastes restes du monde rigolent doucement. La dรฉcence la plus รฉlรฉmentaire exigerait plus d’humilitรฉ.

    La derniรจre action indรฉpendante et dรฉcente de la France sur la scรจne internationale fut pour le bien, en 2003, l’opposition de Jacques Chirac ร  l’invasion anglo-รฉtats-unienne de l’Irak

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    En juin 2023, dรฉjร , la 12e brigade spรฉciale, รฉmanation de l’organisation nazie Azov dans la garde nationale ukrainienne, employait au front l’obusier de 155 mm TRF1, prรฉdรฉcesseur dans l’armรฉe franรงaise du CAESAR

    Le 2 mars 2024, lโ€™entrepreneur libertarien David Sacks dรฉfinit fort bien la nature actuelle de lโ€™OTAN, dans un tweet que je traduis ici en Franรงais

    En 1991, lโ€™Union soviรฉtique sโ€™effondra et lโ€™OTAN fut confrontรฉe ร  une crise existentielle : sa raison dโ€™รชtre nโ€™existait plus. Mais plutรดt que de se dรฉmanteler, elle sโ€™est donnรฉe une nouvelle mission : sโ€™รฉtendre. Et dans une boucle autorรฉfรฉrentielle, lโ€™expansion de lโ€™OTAN crรฉerait lโ€™hostilitรฉ nรฉcessaire pour se justifier

    Et voila le rรฉsultat, la descente dโ€™une prise de coke qui รฉtait censรฉe apaiser les troubles anxieux de petits bourgeois froussards, que leur lรขchetรฉ fait aujourdโ€™hui immoler des centaines de milliers dโ€™Ukrainiens, enrรดlรฉs de force dans les troupes atlantistes. Les incantations sur la dรฉmocratie ou la libertรฉ ne sont quโ€™une bouillie politiquement correcte, le colonialisme du XIXe siรจcle, qui dรฉjร  prรฉtendait civiliser, passรฉ au blender. La question se pose encore une fois : qui sont les barbares ?

    Le 30 mars 2024, deux vrais journalistes, Serge Halimi et Pierre Rimbert, dรฉcrivent enfin dans le Monde diplomatique ce qui se passe dans le microcosme politico-journalistique d’un pays qu’au tout dรฉbut de ce troisiรจme millรฉnaire, la CIA classait dรฉjร  parmi les rรฉpubliques bananiรจres

    Troupes franรงaises en Ukraine, une gaffe prรฉsidentielle sous escorte mรฉdiatique : les nouveaux chiens de guerre […] ร€ la fin de lโ€™hiver, les journalistes franรงais se sont รฉvertuรฉs ร  transformer une gaffe prรฉsidentielle en un joyau de lโ€™analyse gรฉopolitique […]

    Le phรฉnomรจne est paradoxal, mais plus La France rรฉtrรฉcit, plus elle se prend pour le centre du monde. Dans la rรฉalitรฉ, le camp occidental a aussitรดt rabrouรฉ le fanfaron, qui a donc ratรฉ sa brillante manoeuvre psychologique. Seule la presse bleu horizon ne le trouve pas ridicule et si lโ€™armรฉe franรงaise devait obรฉir ร  lโ€™ordre absurde de sโ€™engager seule en Ukraine, les survivants en reviendraient plus traumatisรฉs que ceux de la Bรฉrรฉzina.

    Alors que selon la rumeur, Macron serait sur le point dโ€™officialiser la prรฉsence de militaires franรงais sur le champ de bataille en Ukraine et au Donbass, le vice-prรฉsident du Conseil italien, Matteo Salvini, รฉcrit le 4 juin et illustre sur les rรฉseaux sociaux

    Je dirai ร  Macron : tu devrais aller en Ukraine pour te battre, mettre un casque et ne pas jouer avec les tรชtes des Italiens

    ร€ la cรฉlรฉbration du 80e anniversaire du dรฉbarquement de Normandie, Macron a eu le mauvais goรปt d’inviter Volodymyr Zelenskyy, reprรฉsentant d’un pays en guerre ethnique depuis le coup d’ร‰tat d’extrรชme-droite en 2014, qui contrairement ร  ses promesses รฉlectorales mais sous la pression d’un ร‰tat profond nazi, n’a pas mis fin au conflit, un pays rรฉvisionniste qui cรฉlรจbre le souvenir des fascistes qui ont combattu dans les rangs du III. Reich

    Avec lโ€™invitation de lโ€™Allemagne depuis 2004 et maintenant celle de lโ€™Ukraine, l’anniversaire du dรฉbarquement de Normandie est une vulgaire sauterie atlantiste, un spectacle cringe, qui fait de la peine pour les vรฉtรฉrans qui sโ€™y prรชtent encore. Par sa personnalitรฉ, Macron en accentue la vulgaritรฉ

    Le spectacle de cabaret ne porte pas chance aux Playmobil et ร  leur brigadier Yaรซl Braun Pivet. L’Assemblรฉe nationale est dissoute le 9 juin, ร  l’issue d’รฉlections europรฉennes qui sont une dรฉroute pour Macron et tous ceux qui ont ovationnรฉ Zelenskyy

    Le 9 octobre, il partage sur X une jolie vidรฉo de l’entraรฎnement en France de militaires ukrainiens et commente

    Jโ€™en avais pris lโ€™engagement : nos militaires forment actuellement 2 300 soldats ukrainiens dans le Grand Est, avec des รฉquipements quโ€™ils utiliseront en mission.

    La brigade Anne de Kyiv sera formรฉe et รฉquipรฉe grรขce ร  la solidaritรฉ de la France

    C’est sans doute Gabin Donnio Choupeaux, qui dans un entretien du mois de mars, a soufflรฉ le nom de la brigade ร  la propagande bleu horizon. Bravo

    Nous partageons une histoire commune avec Anne de Kiev, รฉpouse de Henri Ier et reine des Francs de 1051 ร  1060

    En guise de rรฉfรฉrence, dans un souci de communication, une femme politique รขgรฉe dโ€™environ 1000 ans est plus commode que beaucoup de personnages franรงais ou ukrainiens de la 2de guerre mondiale. Mais le diable est dans les dรฉtails. Personne ร  la cour de sa Vacuitรฉ nโ€™a remarquรฉ lโ€™รฉcusson ? Portรฉ notamment par un instructeur en tenue camouflรฉe franรงaise, il reprend les couleurs rouge et noir, qui nโ€™ont rien de nationales mais sont en Ukraine celles des nazis dโ€™hier et dโ€™aujourdโ€™hui

    Il est l’insigne de la 155e brigade, formรฉe en juin avec de nouveaux contingents de chair ร  canon ukrainienne. L’unitรฉ est d’infanterie ou mรฉcanisรฉe, l’histoire n’est pas encore catรฉgorique sur ce point

    Cela dรฉpendra sans doute de la solidaritรฉ du contribuable franรงais. Car comme disait autrefois lโ€™ร‰tat franรงais, ils donnent leur sang, donnez votre travail

    Anne de Kiev ou Eva Braun ? L’image a รฉtรฉ dรฉcouverte par des internautes polonais qui la partagent le 4 novembre et s’en offusquent ร  juste titre. Des stagiaires ukrainiens de la 155e brigade et probablement aussi leurs instructeurs franรงais, tous en tenue camouflรฉe franรงaise, posent dans l’automne champenois

    Le groupe dรฉploie un รฉtendard qui ne reproduit pas l’insigne de la brigade, est une des multiples versions du drapeau que les nazis ukrainiens considรจrent comme un emblรจme national. Les couleurs rouge et noir sont celles de l’Armรฉe des insurgรฉs (UPA), milice nazie ukrainienne qui entre 1943 et 1945, a massacrรฉ au moins 50 000, peut รชtre 100 000 civils polonais. Coquetterie de cette version, le bien connu Reichsadler [aigle impรฉrial] (cf. Sylvain Caupin), oรน le trident ukrainien a remplacรฉ le swastika des nazis allemands de la 2de guerre mondiale.

    ร€ l’instar de l’ex premier ministre, le vraiment trรจs jeune Gabriel Attal, le dรฉpartement commercial de la Misanthropic Division, confrรฉrie nazie internationale, fondรฉe et basรฉe en Ukraine depuis 2013, cรฉlรจbre le 19 novembre le 1000e jour de l’opรฉration militaire spรฉciale russe, dernier chapitre d’une guerre qui fait rage au Donbass depuis 3830 jours, soit 10 ans, 5 mois et 24 jours

    Les nazis ukrainiens n’oublient pas la contribution franรงaise ร  leur cause. Leur collage comporte l’image d’un militant du GUD parisien et celle partagรฉe le 4 par des internautes polonais, prise en Champagne par des stagiaires miltaires ukrainiens, qui aux frais de la princesse, dรฉployรจrent leur drapeau nazi

    Pour sa part, le petit Gabriel partage cette image sur X, oรน il clame en Ukrainien ะกะปะฐฬะฒะฐ ะฃะบั€ะฐั—ฬะฝั–! ะ“ะตั€ะพัะผ ัะปะฐะฒะฐ! [Gloire ร  l’Ukraine ! Gloire aux hรฉros !]. Ses anciennes fonctions le dispensent d’ignorer que le slogan Gloire aux hรฉros fut inaugurรฉ en avril 1941 par les fascistes de l’OUN (Organisation des nationalistes ukrainiens), alors implantรฉs dans le Generalgouvernement fรผr die besetzten polnischen Gebiete [Gouvernement gรฉnรฉral des territoires polonais occupรฉs].

    Dans un entretien que la BBC publie le 23 novembre 2024, Jean-Noรซl Barrot dรฉclare quโ€™il nโ€™y a pas de ligne rouge quand il est question de soutenir lโ€™Ukraine, que La France autorise ร  lancer en territoire russe ses missiles franรงais de longue portรฉe (SCALP, le nom franรงais du missile de croisiรจre que les Britanniques appellent Storm Shadow)

    Quel est le contexte des fanfaronnades du frais รฉmoulu ministre des affaires รฉtrangรจres de la Macronie ? En guise dโ€™avertissement, au petit matin du 21 novembre, la Russie utilisa un missile balistique, pour cette fois ร  charge conventionnelle. La cible รฉtait une usine militaire ร  Dnipro, oรน la vidรฉosurveillance montre clairement les arrivรฉes de six ogives distinctes

    Dans une allocution en soirรฉe, Vladimir Poutine prรฉcisa que le nouveau systรจme dโ€™armes est appelรฉ Oreshnik [Noisette]. Le missile balistique hypersonique de portรฉe intermรฉdiaire (IRBM hypersonique) vole ร  une vitesse proche de Mach 10. Sa portรฉe de 5 000 km le prรฉdispose au traitement de cibles en Europe

    Il ajouta

    Nous nous considรฉrons en droit dโ€™utiliser nos armes contre les installations militaires des pays qui autorisent lโ€™utilisation de leurs armes contre nos installations. Et en cas dโ€™escalade des actions agressives, nous rรฉpondrons de maniรจre dรฉcisive et en miroir

    Cette dรฉmonstration รฉtait une riposte ร  plusieurs attaques avec des missiles de lโ€™OTAN, que les forces atlantistes avaient menรฉes sur le territoire russe depuis que Joe Biden les autorisa le 17 novembre

    Que justifie les menaces russes de frappes nuclรฉaires ? Depuis le dรฉclenchement en 2014 des opรฉrations militaires, contre les insurgรฉs russophones du Donbass, dโ€™un pouvoir ukrainien issu dโ€™un coup dโ€™ร‰tat dโ€™extrรชme-droite en fรฉvrier de cette annรฉe lร , de faรงon encore plus รฉvidente aprรจs le dรฉbut en 2022 de lโ€™opรฉration militaire spรฉciale russe, les stratรจges occidentaux voient la Russie comme une grenouille plongรฉe dans une eau lentement portรฉe ร  รฉbullition. Lโ€™escalade de leur guerre par procuration est graduelle, avec lโ€™ambition illusoire de ne pas provoquer de rรฉaction russe symรฉtrique. Point particulier : elle est conduite aujourd’hui avec des armes que l’Ukraine ne pourrait pas employer en territoire russe sans le concours des satellites et techniciens de l’OTAN. Cโ€™est ร  cette escalade graduelle que rรฉpondent les menaces de frappes nuclรฉaires. Non pas aux effets rรฉels de quelques missiles tactiques dont la plupart sont abattus par la dรฉfense aรฉrienne avant dโ€™atteindre leur cibles en territoire russe. Car cette variable est essentielle ร  lโ€™analyse de la situation : les tirs de ces munitions occidentales ne changeront pas le rapport de force et nโ€™empรชcheront pas la victoire militaire de la Russie.

    Pourquoi ces tirs de missiles de lโ€™OTAN ? Escalade graduelle donc. Mais encore ? Biden les autorisa moins de deux semaines aprรจs la victoire sans appel de Donald Trump et ร  deux mois de son retour ร  la Maison blanche. Envenimer la situation militaire pour saboter ou compliquer le rรจglement politique ultรฉrieur du conflit ? Cโ€™est bien possible. Lโ€™inaliรฉnable alliance historique entre les USA et le Royaume-Uni est une constante de lโ€™รฉquation. De surcroรฎt, la russophobie รฉpidermique et tout aussi historique des classes dirigeantes dโ€™Albion explique aussi la position britannique.

    Mais pourquoi cette posture franรงaise de supplรฉtif doublรฉ dโ€™une mouche de coche ? Pour galvaniser la masse des innocents qui sโ€™informent auprรจs de BFMTV, CNews ou LCI ? Sans doute, tant la communication est une prรฉoccupation majeure des gouvernements de la Macronie. Pour satisfaire lโ€™รฉgo puรฉril dโ€™Emmanuel Macron ? Je le crains, mais pas seulement

    Les classes dirigeantes franรงaises sont รฉpouvantรฉes par lโ€™effondrement de lโ€™hรฉgรฉmonie occidentale, ce que la perte de la Franรงafrique pourrait coรปter ร  lโ€™รฉconomie franรงaise

    Mais plus les Occidentaux et Franรงais feront monter les enchรจres, sans pourtant empรชcher la victoire russe en Ukraine ou les lรฉgitimes aspirations des Africains ร  leur libรฉration, plus la dรฉfaite sera finalement humiliante et plus dure sera la chute.

    Le drame est รฉvoquรฉ en public le 13 dรฉcembre 2024, par le journaliste ukrainien Iouri Butoussov. Le reconstituer dans son intรฉgralitรฉ est une tรขche aisรฉe pour lโ€™observateur chevronnรฉ.

    Engagรฉe en Rรฉpublique populaire de Donetsk, soumise dans le secteur de Pokrovsk ร  lโ€™รฉtreinte puissante des forces russes, la brigade Frรฉnรฉgonde de Pouille [ou quelque chose comme รงa] sโ€™est dรฉsagrรฉgรฉe le 10 dรฉcembre. Au moins un millier dโ€™hommes, prรจs de la moitiรฉ de son effectif thรฉorique total, sont partis en dรฉroute et ont dรฉsertรฉ

    Cโ€™est aux frais de la princesse, que cette 155e brigade mรฉcanisรฉe avait รฉtรฉ รฉquipรฉe de matรฉriel franรงais et entraรฎnรฉe en Champagne. Macron sโ€™en vanta le 9 octobre sur les rรฉseaux sociaux. Mais tout est perdu, mรชme l’honneur.

    Le 2 janvier 2025, pour boire le calice jusqu’ร  la lie, le Parisien nous rappelle la brigade Frรฉnรฉgonde de Pouille [ou quelque-chose comme รงa], pour nous apprendre que le nombre de dรฉsertions s’รฉlรจverait alors ร  1 700. Soit 74% d’un effectif total de 2 300, que j’ai pris la peine de relever en octobre. Et non pas 4 500, comme le quotidien cocardier le prรฉtend, quand il relaie la propagande atlantiste. 4 500 est l’effectif moyen d’une brigade รฉtats-unienne, mais celles formรฉes en Ukraine sont toujours de petits calibres.

    L’article stimule ma curiositรฉ et alors que le rรฉcit de ces dรฉboires fait le tour des rรฉdactions des vastes restes du monde, dont hilares, celles de la perfide Albion, une source peu suspecte de sympathie pour la Russie, Wikipedia, nous prรฉcise le 3 janvier que dรฉbut dรฉcembre, le nombre de dรฉsertions s’รฉlรจvaient dรฉjร  ร  1 883, dont 50 en France, soit 82% d’un effectif total de 2 300

    Comme nous le savions dรฉjร , le reliquat a รฉtรฉ engagรฉ dans le secteur de Pokrovsk, Rรฉpublique populaire de Donetsk, oรน il s’est fait รฉtriller. La guerre tue, surtout les vaincus, c’est un peu le principe. Mais un animateur de foire comme Emmanuel Macron est si peu รฉquipรฉ pour en saisir le sens ou les vertus.

    Le 17 fรฉvrier 2025, veille de lโ€™ouverture en Arabie Saoudite de nรฉgociations entre Russie et ร‰tats-Unis au sujet de lโ€™Ukraine, il accueille ร  Paris une rรฉunion impromptue de dirigeants europรฉens qui sโ€™opposent aux perspectives de paix favorisรฉes par la victoire de Donald Trump. Leur hostilitรฉ ร  la fin de la guerre atlantiste par procuration en Ukraine est dโ€™ailleurs la raison pour laquelle ces matamores europรฉens ne sont pas invitรฉs ร  participer aux nรฉgociations entre les deux grandes puissances. Les ร‰tats-uniens ont beau jeu de rappeler que France et Allemagne รฉtaient censรฉes garantir depuis 2014 le respect par l’Ukraine des accords de Minsk. La presse bleu horizon tรขche de vanter l’รฉvรฉnement, mais la rรฉalitรฉ est sordide

    Aussi peu performants en gรฉnรฉral ou populaires ร  domicile que Macron, le Britannique Keir Starmer et lโ€™Allemand Olaf Scholz sont les vedettes de la rรฉunion. Donald Tusk est aussi prรฉsent, mais la Pologne a dรฉjร  dรฉcidรฉ de ne pas engager son armรฉe en Ukraine. Dโ€™autres chefs dโ€˜ร‰tats et la bureaucrate teutonne Ursula von der Leyen complรจtent le tableau. Leur tactique immรฉdiate consiste ร  quรฉmander une participation europรฉenne aux nรฉgociations et pour lโ€™Ukraine, un accรจs ร  lโ€™OTAN que Washington refuse dรฉjร . Royaume-Uni et France clament leur volontรฉ de dรฉployer des troupes de maintien dโ€™un รฉventuel cessez-le-feu mais ne disposent plus en volume dโ€™armรฉes capables de mener une telle opรฉration.

    Le mรชme jour, le philosophe Harold Bernat publie un texte fort ร  propos, oรน il constate lโ€™effondrement [intellectel] sidรฉrant dโ€™une bourgeoisie dont Emmanuel Macron est le hรฉraut.

    Un autre exemple spectaculaire de ce syndrome est une femme, รฉgalement impliquรฉe dans les mรฉfaits de lโ€™Europe en Ukraine : la ministre allemande des affaires รฉtrangรจres Annalena Baerbock, qui a sidรฉrรฉ depuis 2022 par ses lacunes en gรฉomรฉtrie et gรฉographie. Toujours le 17 fรฉvrier, elle se montre incapable de garder un secret stratรฉgique et rรฉvรจle ร  la presse berlinoise le projet europรฉen dโ€™une nouvelle aide financiรจre apportรฉe ร  Volodymyr Zelenskyy et ses amis, pour un montant de 700 milliards dโ€™euros.

    Le 20 fรฉvrier, il se prรชte sur les rรฉseaux sociaux ร  une confรฉrence citoyenne au sujet de l’Ukraine. Son introduction est une farce, qui s’adresse ร  des demeurรฉs, qui n’auraient pas suivi l’actualitรฉ et ne comprendraient rien ร  la gรฉopolitique. Il commence par recyler tous les lieux communs de la propagande et dรฉsinformation atlantiste, les mensonges qui avec la nouvelle administration de Donald Trump, ont disparu dans la communication รฉtats-unienne

    Le flot de questions sur les nombreuses plateformes est รฉvidemment filtrรฉ par une รฉquipe d’assistants, qui ignorent celles qui posent vraiment problรจme. J’en retiens deux qui resteront sans rรฉponse, tout d’abord de Jacques [Baud, analyste stratรฉgique suisse] et Aude [Lancelin, journaliste franรงaise]

    Bonjour M Le Prรฉsident. Question de Jacques de Genรจve et Aude de Paris. Pourquoi les europรฉens ont ils empรชchรฉ le prรฉsident Zelensky, ร  3 reprises au printemps 22, de signer un accord avec la Russie garantissant lโ€™intรฉgritรฉ territoriale de lโ€™Ukraine ?

    puis la mienne

    Bonjour,

    votre stratรฉgie d’engagement militaire franรงais apparaรฎt confuse, vos dรฉclarations, contradictoires.

    La possibilitรฉ semble se dรฉgager du stationnement dans l’ouest du pays de militaires franรงais qui permettraient ร  l’Ukraine, par translation, d’en envoyer autant au front.

    Pensez vous que les Russes se dispenseront de mener des frappes stratรฉgiques contres les militaires franรงais stationnรฉs en Ukraine ?

    Pete Hegseth, Secrรฉtaire ร  la dรฉfense US, prรฉcisa dรฉjร  le 12 fรฉvrier qu’engagรฉes en Ukraine, les troupes europรฉennes ne seraient pas couvertes par l’article 5 de l’OTAN.

    Le 22 fรฉvrier, Donald Trump fait longuement patienter Andrzej Duda et ne lui accorde ensuite quโ€™une dizaine de minutes. Le prรฉsident polonais est le premier dโ€™un convoi de dirigeants europรฉens qui se prรฉcipitent ร  Washington pour tenter dโ€™inflรฉchir la stratรฉgie en Ukraine de la nouvelle administration US. Lorsquโ€™il sโ€™adressa aux Franรงais le 20, Emmanuel Macron se prรฉvalut dโ€™une familiaritรฉ qui devait lui permettre de faire la leรงon ร  son homologue รฉtats-unien, de le convaincre de ne pas se montrer faible ร  l’รฉgard de Vladimir Poutine

    Comme lโ€™illustrent ses traits tirรฉs par la fatique sur la photographie prise ร  la Maison Blanche le 24 fรฉvrier, il nโ€™obtient rien de Trump. Je suppose au contraire que ses fanfaronnades antรฉrieures, ses familiaritรฉs ร  Washington et les questions de fond exaspรจrent le prรฉsident US, trois jours avant qu’ร  son tour, le Britannique Keir Starmer ne se prรชte ร  l’exercice

    His name is Lecornu, Sรฉbastien Lecornu. Le 6 mars 2025, au lendemain de la confirmation de la suspension des รฉchanges du renseignement รฉtats-unien avec lโ€™Ukraine, le ministre des armรฉes annonce au micro de France Inter

    [โ€ฆ] on a des moyens de renseignement, dont nous faisons bรฉnรฉficier les Ukrainiens [โ€ฆ]

    Dans la foulรฉe de nouveaux mensonges et fanfaronnades tรฉlรฉvisuels dโ€™Emmanuel Macron, il cherche aussi ร  stimuler le sens civique de ses concitoyens

    [โ€ฆ] placez votre argent de maniรจre patriotique, pour financer la dรฉfense [โ€ฆ]

    On [qui est un con] pourrait aussi appeler cela la Banque de lโ€™Indochine, ouโ€ฆ les Emprunts russes. L’inspecteur Clouseau s’en va t’en guerre

    Pendant ce temps, le MEDEF (Mouvement des entreprises de France), qui ne perd pas le nord, la presse bleu horizon ou macroniste, distillent lโ€™idรฉe dโ€™une retraite ร  70 ans, qui serait justifiรฉe par lโ€™opportunitรฉ dโ€™un effort militaire en soutien ร  lโ€™Ukraine. Car en rรฉalitรฉ, la seule dรฉmarche stratรฉgique cohรฉrente de Macron est trรจs simple ; elle consiste ร  casser les acquis sociaux et imposer une sociรฉtรฉ ultra libรฉrale. Si personne ne peut vraiment le qualifier dโ€™homme intelligent, il est cependant malin comme un singe

    Il sait comment faire avaler des couleuvres. Son terrain est facile : il flatte la vanitรฉ nationale des Franรงais. Le philosophe allemand Arthur Schoppenhauer (1788-1860) รฉnonรงa avant 1851

    La fiertรฉ nationale est la forme la moins coรปteuse de fiertรฉ. Si un homme est fier de sa nation, cela signifie quโ€™il nโ€™a aucune qualitรฉ dont il puisse รชtre fier. Autrement, il ne pourrait pas faire appel ร  celles quโ€™il partage avec des millions de ses concitoyens. Lโ€™homme qui possรจde des qualitรฉs personnelles importantes ne verra que trop bien dans quels domaines sa propre nation est dรฉficiente, car ses dรฉfauts seront constamment sous ses yeux. Mais tout misรฉrable imbรฉcile qui nโ€™a rien dont il puisse รชtre fier, adopte en dernier recours la fiertรฉ de la nation ร  laquelle il appartient ; il est prรชt et heureux de dรฉfendre bec et ongles tous les dรฉfauts et les folies de la nation, se dรฉdommageant ainsi de sa propre infรฉrioritรฉ

    Les derniers รฉvรฉnements permettent de clarifier la subordination dโ€™Emmanuel Macron. Il nโ€™est pas fidรจle aux autoritรฉs lรฉgales des ร‰tats-Unis, puisquโ€™il sโ€™oppose ร  lโ€™administration de Donald Trump, qui accomplit une inflexion stratรฉgique majeure, quand Joe Biden et Europรฉens รฉtaient au diapason. Il sโ€™affirme plutรดt comme lโ€™hรฉriter dโ€™un Franรงois Hollande, qui alors Premier secrรฉtaire du Parti socialiste, protestait contre lโ€™opposition de Jacques Chirac ร  lโ€™invasion anglo-รฉtats-unienne de lโ€™Irak en 2003 et faisait des ronds de jambes ร  lโ€™ambassade parisienne de lโ€™administration de George W Bush.

    Il ne dรฉfend pas non plus les intรฉrรชts des Franรงais, puisquโ€™il a besoin de leur mentir de faรงon grotesque, quand il prรฉtend quโ€™aprรจs lโ€™Ukraine, la Russie pourrait attaquer dโ€™autres pays. Lโ€™idรฉe est farfelue, car une telle agressivitรฉ dรฉclencherait lโ€™article 5 de lโ€™OTAN. Leur ment quand il prรฉtend que la Russie nโ€™aurait pas respectรฉ les accords de Minsk, alors que cโ€™รฉtait รฉvidemment lโ€™Ukraine qui ne les a pas appliquรฉs et le mรชme Franรงois Hollande qui mentait, quand il prรฉtendait les garantir. Lui-mรชme et Angela Merkel reconnurent fin 2022 et dรฉbut 2023 que dans leur esprit, ces accords รฉtaient une escroquerie pour tromper la Russie, devaient donner ร  lโ€™OTAN le temps dโ€™armer lโ€™Ukraine. Non, Macron nโ€™est pas un aigle, mais mรชme lui ne peut croire de telles sornettes

    Alors de quoi est il le nom ? Comme le montre aussi sa politique intรฉrieure et ร  lโ€™instar du social-dรฉmocrate Keir Starmer comme de la droitarde Ursula von der Leyen, il apparaรฎt comme le soldat dโ€™une collusion puissante entre ploutocrates europรฉens et nรฉoconservateurs US, plus sournois quand ils appartiennent au Parti dรฉmocrate. Trump bouleverse des dรฉcennies de politique รฉtrangรจre des ร‰tats-Unis et Macron est le caniche de von der Leyen. Sa relation aux femmes plus รขgรฉes est compliquรฉe.

    Le 23 avril 2025, les divas europรฉennes sabotent les nรฉgociations de paix en Ukraine. Ce jour lร  ร  Londres, une rรฉunion est prรฉvue entre pays occidentaux. Mais au dernier moment, Volodymyr Zelenskyy prรฉvient par voie de presse quโ€™il refuse dโ€™accepter la perte de la Crimรฉe, pourtant un moindre mal, vu la situation militaire. Par consรฉquent, le Secrรฉtaire dโ€™ร‰tat Marco Rubio se dรฉcommande, ce qui annule aussi la participation des ministres europรฉens des affaires รฉtrangรจres.

    Quel รขme damnรฉe a bien pu inspirer le comรฉdien ukrainien ? Alors en visite ร  Madagascar, dans la foulรฉe de la colonie de Mayotte, le porte parole dโ€™Ursula von der Leyen le fait savoir dans la journรฉe par lโ€™ร‰lysรฉe

    Lโ€™intรฉgritรฉ territoriale et la vocation europรฉenne de lโ€™Ukraine sont des exigences trรจs fortes des Europรฉens

    Alors que son Envoyรฉ spรฉcial Keith Kellogg se rendra ร  Moscou dans la semaine, Donald Trump รฉcrit sur les rรฉseaux sociaux

    [โ€ฆ] La situation de lโ€™Ukraine est dรฉsastreuse. Il [Zelenskyy] peut obtenir la paix ou se battre pendant trois ans de plus, avant de perdre tout le pays [โ€ฆ]

    Difficile de mieux rรฉsumer la situation militaire, qui par tradition bien ancrรฉe dans une guerre, dicte le sens des nรฉgociations de paix. Son opposition dogmatique ร  la paix et son incapacitรฉ ร  accepter la rรฉalitรฉ du terrain illustrent ร  quel point la corrompue Union europรฉenne nโ€™est plus aujourdโ€™hui que lโ€™automate des illuminรฉs de lโ€™ร‰tat profond nรฉoconservateur US. Je suis trรจs optimiste car convaincu qu’elle le paiera cher.

    Emmanuel Macron subit ร  nouveau une spectaculaire humiliation diplomatique au cours du weekend des 10 et 11 mai 2025. Ses partenaires lโ€™ont dรฉjร  adoubรฉ hรฉraut de lโ€™Europe, alors quโ€™ร  dรฉfaut de lโ€™estomac nรฉcessaire pour mener ร  terme ses projets pacifiques en Ukraine, Donald Trump se dรฉsintรฉresse dรฉsormais du sujet. En consรฉquence, la Russie envisage la possibilitรฉ dโ€™adapter sa stratรฉgie, de rรฉsoudre le conflit en moins de deux mois, par une campagne dรฉcisive de frappes qui liquiderait les dirigeants ukrainiens et dรฉtruirait en totalitรฉ les infrastructures critiques de lโ€™Ukraine

    Volodymyr Zelenskyy et les Europรฉens commencent par proposer un cessez le feu dโ€™un mois ร  compter du 12 mai. Donald Trump soutient lโ€™idรฉe et voilร  que sa Vacuitรฉ explose en plein vol, exige le respect de ce cessez-le-feu par la Russie, quโ€™il menace ร  dรฉfaut de nouvelles sanctions รฉconomiques. Effets indรฉsirables, peut รชtre, de l’abus de substances pyschotropes. Son obsession est toujours dโ€™employer un tel cessez-le-feu ร  injecter en Ukraine des troupes franรงaises et britanniques

    Aprรจs minuit, le 11 mai, ร  lโ€™issue dโ€™une trรชve unilatรฉrale russe de trois jours, en mรฉmoire de la victoire soviรฉtique, 80 ans plus tรดt, sur les armรฉes fascistes europรฉennes, Vladimir Poutine mรฉprise avec calme lโ€™ultimatum de lโ€™arrogant Franรงais. Il propose la reprise ร  Istanbul, le 15 mai, des nรฉgociations de paix qui avaient bien commencรฉ en mars 2022, mais que le Royaume-Uni et les ร‰tats-Unis de Joe Biden sabotรจrent, pour poursuivre contre la Russie une guerre par procuration aujourdโ€™hui perdue. Donald Trump lui apporte son soutien dans la journรฉe. Volodymyr Zelenskyy accepte aussi et peut รชtre encore en altitude, รฉcrit sur les rรฉseaux sociaux qu’il pense rencontrer personnellement Vladimir Poutine ร  Istanbul.

    Lโ€™anecdote illustre mon analyse supra de la subordination dโ€™Emmanuel Macron. Aprรจs la rรฉception ร  lโ€™ร‰lysรฉe le 7 mai du djihadiste Abou Mohammed al Joulani, dictateur dโ€™une Syrie dรฉsormais saignรฉe par les persรฉcutions religieuses, Jean-Noรซl Barrot, erreur de casting au ministรจre des affaires รฉtrangรจres, est le 15 ร  Istanbul, oรน il prรฉsente ses ronds de jambe ร  la plus grotesque figure nรฉoconservatrice, lโ€™immonde sรฉnateur sudiste rรฉpublicain Lindsey Graham

    Sur le fond, la Russie ignore les gesticulations franรงaises et europรฉennes. Dans la mรชme ville, le lendemain, ses plรฉnipotentiaires prรฉsentent ร  une dรฉlรฉgation ukrainienne leurs conditions pour un cessez-le-feu : le retrait des troupes atlantistes des positions quโ€™elles occupent encore dans les rรฉgions de Donetsk, Kherson, Lugansk et Zaporojie

    Heureusement, pour notre dรฉtente, Emmanuel Macron et ses pรฉrรฉgrinations internationales, comme le 25 mai 2025 ร  Hanoรฏ, sont aussi une source inรฉpuisable de plaisanteries.

    Savamment synchronisรฉs, ร  deux jours dโ€™intervalle, le chef dโ€™รฉtat-major Thierry Burkhard puis Emmanuel Macron, le 13 juillet, se succรจdent ร  la tribune pour galvaniser les crรฉtins qui sโ€™appellent eux-mรชmes patriotes

    Prรฉserver un modรจle social hรฉritรฉ du Conseil national de la rรฉsistance (CNR) au lendemain de la 2de guerre mondiale ou doubler* le budget militaire, Macron a choisi, car il veut รชtre craint. Mission dรฉlicate, car depuis huit ans, il passe pour un imbรฉcile auprรจs de ses homologues รฉtrangers. Parmi ses soutiens, le mignon Gabriel Attal veut tenir son rang

    Face aux menaces, les plus pressantes sans doute depuis 1945, la France doit impรฉrativement continuer son rรฉarmement. Pour tenir son rang, รชtre respectรฉ, et protรฉger nos intรฉrรชts vitaux [en Franรงafrique]

    Maintenant la bonne nouvelle : puisquโ€™ils ont choisi lโ€™affrontement, je prรฉdis que les pinzuti [Franรงais] se feront quand mรชme humilier. Car aucun sacrifice social ne suffira ร  empรชcher lโ€™effondrement de lโ€™hรฉgรฉmonie occidentale. Pas plus que furent victorieuses les guerres anachroniques pour prรฉserver lโ€™empire colonial.

    * lโ€™objectif est de doubler par rapport ร  2017 et avant la fin de son second mandat, un budget militaire en constante augmentation. Il est de โ‚ฌ50,5 milliards en 2025, devrait รชtre de โ‚ฌ63,4 milliards en 2027

    Malheureux concours de circonstances ou bien schizophrรฉnie franรงaise et perversion dโ€™Emmanuel Macron ? Le 15 juillet, le premier ministre Franรงois Bayrou dรฉvoile les grandes lignes du budget 2026 dโ€™une France en redressement judiciaire, aprรจs 18 ans de gouvernement atlantiste. Cette actualitรฉ nationale est riche dโ€™enseignements et dans un article quโ€™il publie le 17 juillet, Emmanuel Todd est contraint de recourir ร  la psychiatrie pour comprendre les effets de bord du dรฉclin occidental et franรงais. La conclusion sโ€™impose : la Russie est la cible des fantasmes รฉrotomanes dโ€™Emmanuel Macron et ses laquais.

    Le prix Nobel de la paix est la derniรจre obsession de Donald Trump, qui le 18 aoรปt 2025, trois jours aprรจs sa rencontre avec Vladimir Poutine ร  Anchorage, accueille Volodymyr Zelenskyy et un quarteron de dirigeants europรฉens ร  la Maison Blanche. La chorรฉgraphie de la rรฉunion des laquais de daddy Trump est un travail psychologique, une catharsis, pour que lโ€™Occident reconnaisse enfin sa dรฉfaite dans le Donbass et en Ukraine

    Encore traumatisรฉ par son humiliation ร  Washington, Emmanuel Macron accorde le lendemain un entretien aux journalistes de LCI. Lors de cette nouvelle envolรฉe lyrique, il dรฉclare

    Ne soyons pas naรฏfs. Y compris pour sa propre survie, il [la Russie oรน Vladimir Poutine ?] a besoin de continuer de manger. C’est un prรฉdateur, un ogre ร  nos portes

    illustre le diagnostic antรฉrieur d’Emmanuel Todd. Le prรฉsident franรงais souffre d’รฉrotomanie.

    La sรปretรฉ de lโ€™ร‰tat franรงais a cessรฉ depuis longtemps de mโ€™intรฉresser et au contraire, je suis mรชme rรฉputรฉ lui porter atteinte. Dโ€™autres sont entrรฉs dans la carriรจre, dit la chanson, essuient aujourdโ€™hui un รฉchec cruel. Ce qui arrive mรชme aux meilleurs. Mais ce sont les Alliรฉs qui ne sont pas contents. La France aura beau nier, eux savent que les donnรฉes sont authentiques.

    Membres du groupe Killnet (cf. David Piguet), des as russes de lโ€™informatique sont parvenus ร  recueillir auprรจs de lโ€™administration franรงaise des informations sensibles : les procรจs-verbaux et autres documents de rรฉunions secrรจtes au sujet de lโ€™Ukraine entre France, Pologne, Roumanie et Royaume-Uni. Dont une carte datรฉe du 28 avril 2025, destinรฉe ร  lโ€™รฉtat-major des armรฉes franรงaises, qui est rendue publique sur le web le 9 septembre.

    En marge du document que chacun peut consulter, les pirates ont rรฉalisรฉ une synthรจse du projet de la Coalition de volontaires, si cher ร  Emmanuel Macron. Aux Russes, lโ€™intรฉgralitรฉ du Donbass, ainsi que les rรฉgions de Kherson et Zaporojie, jusquโ€™ร  la ligne de cessez-le-feu ; aux Franรงais, les ressources minรฉrales de Jytomir, Kharkov et Soumy ; aux Polonais et Roumains, Odessa et les rรฉgions frontaliรจres ; les Britanniques se contenteraient de plateformes logistiques un peu partout ; 50 000 hommes pour emballer le butin occidental

    Mais la Russie a dit et rรฉpรจte jusquโ€™ร  ce jour quโ€™elle ne tolรฉrera pas de troupes de lโ€™OTAN sur le territoire de lโ€™actuelle Ukraine. Notez que depuis le 31 aoรปt, Thierry Burkhard nโ€™est plus Chef dโ€™รฉtat-major.

    Dans un entretien que le journal italien de gauche Il Fatto Quotidiano publie le 13 septembre, le prestigieux รฉconomiste Jeffrey Sachs rรฉvรจle une conversation personnelle avec Emmanuel Macron. ร€ lโ€™รฉpoque oรน le professeur de lโ€™universitรฉ Columbia fut fait chevalier de la Lรฉgion dโ€™honneur, ce qui nous ramรจne en mai 2022, trois mois aprรจs le dรฉbut de lโ€™opรฉration militaire spรฉciale russe, le prรฉsident franรงais lui expliqua que lโ€™OTAN portait lโ€™entiรจre culpabilitรฉ du conflit. Cette information confirme, dans tous les cas de figure, que sa Vacuitรฉ ment comme un arracheur de dent

    ร€ New York le 24 septembre 2025, ร  lโ€™instar de son grand ami [cโ€™est Emmanuel Macron qui le dit] Javier Milei, catastrophe nรฉo-libรฉrale pour lโ€™รฉconomie de lโ€™Argentine et son peuple, sa Vacuitรฉ est reconnue employรฉ de lโ€™annรฉe par lโ€™Atlantic Council, un think tank militariste dont la mission est de dรฉfendre les intรฉrรชts de lโ€™empire รฉtats-unien.

    Il ne tarde pas ร  mettre en scรจne une nouvelle farce, car son psychisme est trop faible pour parvenir ร  accepter sa dรฉfaite au Donbass et en Ukraine. De dรฉpit le 2 octobre, il compense par une nouvelle envolรฉe lyrique au Sommet de la Communautรฉ politique europรฉenne (EPC) de Copenhague. Lโ€™Europe est alors en proie ร  une รฉpidรฉmie dโ€™hystรฉrie collective, voit des drones partout. Qui dโ€™autre que des Russes pourraient les piloter ?

    La bulle mรฉdiatique contient surtout paranoรฏa et dรฉsinformation, car la presse bleu horizon est incapable dโ€™envisager lโ€™hypothรจse la plus probable de plaisantins locaux, aux commandes de quelques inoffensifs aรฉronefs. Au contraire, les mรชmes pressetituรฉs colportent une fable ukrainienne particuliรจrement farfelue : les drones seraient lancรฉs par la flotte dite fantรดme, des navires armรฉs par les vastes restes du monde, qui transportent du pรฉtrole russe et nโ€™ont pas le goรปt ou lโ€™envie de se soumettre aux sanctions administratives occidentales

    Sa Vacuitรฉ est incapable de limiter ses gesticulations ร  la scรจne danoise et alors que le Droit garantit pourtant le libre passage dans les eaux internationales, il dรฉcide ร  47 ans de se lancer dans la piraterie maritime

    Ses officiers sont chinois et chargรฉ de pรฉtrole russe, le navire bรฉninois vogue paisiblement vers lโ€™Inde, quand le 27 septembre, les corsaires franรงais montent ร  lโ€™abordage du Boracay dans les eaux internationales. Mais vaine recherche et choux blanc, pas le moindre indice nโ€™รฉtaye les accusations ukrainiennes de lancement de drones en Scandinavie. Bien quโ€™aux ordres de l’exรฉcutif, le parquet franรงais est contraint au soir du 2 octobre de laisser le pรฉtrolier lever lโ€™ancre. Illustration de la mesquinerie atavique des pinzuti, la convocation du commandant ร  comparaรฎtre le 23 fรฉvrier 2026 ร  Brest pour refus d’obtempรฉrer, quand la piraterie et leurs pitreries en treillis obligeraient plutรดt les autoritรฉs ร  prรฉsenter de plates excuses

    Huit jours aprรจs que des corsaires franรงais soient montรฉs ร  lโ€™abordage du pรฉtrolier fantรดme bรฉninois Boracay, le nouveau ministre de la contre-menace-prรฉdatrice-et-existentielle [Macron], Bruno Le Maire, est enfin prรชt le 5 octobre 2025 ร  provoquer l’effondrement [Le Maire] de lโ€™armรฉe Russe, ร  la dilater comme jamais [Le Maire]

    Le lendemain, les vastes restes du monde ont tort de ricaner, car la Russie tremble. Vladimir Poutine a bien compris que l’implosion de l’รฉphรฉmรจre gouvernement Lecornu est une ruse de guerre.

    Vous nโ€™aimez pas votre travail ? Essayez de vous mettre ร  la place des pauvres garรงons, le 17 novembre 2025, qui font les jardiniรจres sur la base aรฉrienne de Villacoublay, pendant quโ€™au premier plan, deux divas posent pour Gala

    On me dit ร  lโ€™oreillette que Volodymyr Zelenskyy sโ€™engage ร  acheter 100 chasseurs Rafale. Avec quel argent ? Avant ou aprรจs dรฉtournement par son รฉquipe ? Pour en faire quoi et surtout, quand ?

    Emmanuel Macron figure parmi les dirigeants europรฉens qui dรฉfilent ร  Berlin le 15 dรฉcembre, mettent en scรจne leur vacuitรฉ pour geindre et quรฉmander encore une fois auprรจs des ร‰tats-Unis. Ils semblent ignorer que le rรฉsultat dโ€™une guerre se dรฉcide sur le champ de bataille. Le Donbass sera libรฉrรฉ par la diplomatie ou par la force, que cela leur plaise ou pas. Le mรชme jour, le Conseil de lโ€™Europe impose des sanctions ร  plusieurs personnes, dont lโ€™expert suisse Jacques Baud, qui selon le communiquรฉ

    sert de porte-parole ร  la propagande pro-russe et propage des thรฉories du complot

    Lโ€™accusation est dรฉlirante. Jacques Baud a รฉtรฉ colonel du renseignement suisse, spรฉcialiste de lโ€™Europe de lโ€™Est. Entre 2009 et 2011, il dirigeait ร  New York lโ€™รฉquipe Politiques et Doctrine du Bureau des affaires militaires du Dรฉpartement des opรฉrations de maintien de la paix des Nations Unies. Ce fut dans le cadre de lโ€™OTAN quโ€™il participa ร  des programmes en Ukraine en 2014 et 2017. Sa rigueur et son travail dโ€™analyse sont considรฉrables

    Alors pourquoi cette punition administrative ? Dรจs la fin 2022, ร  lโ€™instar de votre serviteur et beaucoup dโ€™autres, lโ€™expert รฉnonรงa la rรฉalitรฉ : lโ€™Occident subit une dรฉfaite humiliante au Donbass et en Ukraine. Washington lโ€™a aussi compris. Elle semble sโ€™imposer aujourdโ€™hui ร  des foules, puisquโ€™ร  croire lโ€™immense majoritรฉ hystรฉrique des employรฉs de presse franรงaise, les chars russes se rapprochent dangereusement de la place de lโ€™ร‰toile

    Radio Free Europe, un organe de la CIA, dรฉvoila dรจs le 10 dรฉcembre sa sanction et lโ€™intรฉressรฉ put la commenter. En lโ€™apprenant, il mโ€™a bien semblรฉ sentir une odeur fรฉtide, un peu comme lโ€™haleine dโ€™un Philippe Henriot (1889-1944), Secrรฉtaire ร  lโ€™information et ร  la propagande de lโ€™ร‰tat franรงais, une grande voix franรงaise que des rรฉsistants communistes arrachรจrent ร  lโ€™affection des siens. Il porte ร  Bruxelles sa tรชte habituelle de dรฉtraquรฉ, quand Jean-Noรซl Barrot confirme que ces sanctions sont prises ร  lโ€™initiative de la France

    Je crois le ministre des affaires รฉtrangรจres assez crรฉtin pour exercer des reprรฉsailles par dรฉpit de sa dรฉfaite par procuration au Donbass et en Ukraine. Car sa punition amplifiera le succรจs des excellentes analyses de Jacques Baud

    Si lโ€™objectif est plutรดt de dissuader la rรฉsistance ร  la dรฉsinformation occidentale, alors je crains pour eux que les Franรงais nโ€™aient fait comme souvent une projection de leurs propres carences. Chaque jour qui passe, leur gouvernement alimente de vilains prรฉjugรฉs ร  leur sujet : froussards, mesquins, lรขches, incompรฉtents et arrogants

    Cโ€™รฉtait avec grand plaisir que je me suis entretenu avec une journaliste russe, pour un documentaire que la chaรฎne Russia Today, censurรฉe en Europe mais largement regardรฉe aux ร‰tats-Unis, en Afrique ou en Chine, diffuse le 19 dรฉcembre.

    Les premiers jours de 2026 รฉclairent dโ€™une lumiรจre crue la fonction politique de lโ€™employรฉ de banque Macron et par consรฉquent, sa posture au sujet de lโ€™Ukraine. Grouillot de ploutocrates europรฉens et nรฉoconservateurs รฉtats-uniens, il sโ€™illustre comme le plus inconditionnel soutien europรฉen du raid que les porte-flingues de Donald Trump exรฉcutent au Venezuela au petit matin du 3 janvier

    De lโ€™aveu mรชme du prรฉsident des ร‰tats-Unis, son objectif est colonial, pour le pรฉtrole et le bien dโ€™un empire nรฉolibรฉral dotรฉ de deux capitales : Jรฉrusalem et Washington

    Non content dโ€™avoir fait ricaner la terre entiรจre avec ses lunettes de soleil au Forum รฉconomique mondial de Davos le 20 janvier, Emmanuel Macron poursuit ses facรฉties et pour prouver sa virilitรฉ le 22, envoie les corsaires de la Marine nationale ร  lโ€™abordage en toute illรฉgalitรฉ en mรฉditerranรฉe du pรฉtrolier comorien Grinch, un parmi les quelques centaines de trรจs sournois navires de la vilaine flotte fantรดme russe.

    Sa Vacuitรฉ, vous dis je, faiseur de vent de la catรฉgorie des tempรชtes du grand large. Contrairement ร  ce quโ€™assรจnent les posts brouillons et vindicatifs du compte French Response sur X, organe burlesque du quai dโ€™Orsay, rien ne peut justifier la rรฉtention du pรฉtrolier comorien Grinch. Les sanctions occidentales ne sont pas de Droit international ou maritime. Aucune infraction pรฉnale franรงaise nโ€™a รฉtรฉ constatรฉe et finalement, aucune information judiciaire nโ€™est ouverte. Mรชme le parquet, corps de magistrats chargรฉs dโ€™initier les poursuites pรฉnales et qui en France, sont des laquais du pouvoir exรฉcutif, est frappรฉ de confusion mentale quand il รฉvoque briรจvement une immobilisation administrative. Rien ne va dans cette opรฉration publicitaire de piraterie, une ratatouille juridique oรน un chef dโ€™ร‰tat puรฉril sโ€™affranchit du Droit national et international

    Abus de substances psychotropes ? Revenu dans le monde rรฉel le 29 janvier, Emmanuel Macron sโ€™entretient au tรฉlรฉphone avec Volodymyr Zelenskyy et piteux, se plaint du Droit franรงais, qui lโ€™oblige ร  relรขcher le navire et son รฉquipage indien – il est temps de sโ€™en apercevoir. Ces paroles sont rapportรฉes le lendemain par le journal en ligne ukrainien European Pravda, qui nous apprend aussi que puisquโ€™il a violรฉ la loi, le fanfaron sโ€™engage auprรจs de son homologue kievien ร  la faire changer sine die. C’est une autre rรฉforme juridique que l’Europe attend depuis longtemps en France : la sรฉparation du parquet et du pouvoir exรฉcutif

    Beaucoup de talent chez le dessinateur franรงais qui le 13 fรฉvrier, sait croquer avec tant de prรฉcision la personnalitรฉ de Jean-Noรซl Barrot, ministre des affaires รฉtrangรจres de la Macronie.

    Ce sont probablement des agents implantรฉs en Ukraine qui ont informรฉ le SVR. Lโ€™agence russe de renseignement extรฉrieur dรฉvoile lโ€™affaire le 24 fรฉvrier 2026, quatriรจme anniversaire du dรฉclenchement de lโ€™opรฉration militaire spรฉciale au Donbass et en Ukraine. Dans le contexte de la dรฉfaite militaire gรฉnรฉrale des troupes atlantistes, la France et le Royaume-Uni projettent de doter en secret lโ€™Ukraine de lโ€™arme nuclรฉaire

    Une solution technique envisagรฉe est le transfert de tรชtes franรงaises TN75, que portent les missiles balistiques intercontinentaux en cours de remplacement M51.1. Chacune dรฉlivre une petite charge de 110 kt รฉquivalents de TNT, soit 7,5 Hiroshima. Le vice consiste ร  faire croire que lโ€™arme nuclรฉaire ukrainienne serait le rรฉsultat dโ€™un dรฉveloppement national. Le communiquรฉ russe prรฉcise que sollicitรฉe, lโ€™Allemagne a dรฉclinรฉ lโ€™offre de se joindre ร  lโ€™affaire.

    Vice-prรฉsident du Conseil de sรฉcuritรฉ de Russie, Dmitri Medvedev รฉclaire ensuite le public sur les raisons stratรฉgiques de cette rรฉvรฉlation. Elle est un avertissement ; en cas de transfert effectif du matรฉriel, la Russie lancerait pour le moins des frappes nuclรฉaires tactiques sur les sites ukrainiens de destination.

    Le projet secret europรฉen est non seulement une violation du traitรฉ de non-prolifรฉration, mais aussi une folie stratรฉgique qui risque de dรฉgรฉnรฉrer en confrontation nuclรฉaire. Le fanatisme affichรฉ depuis quatre ans par les dirigeants europรฉens, les personnalitรฉs retorses et dรฉsรฉquilibrรฉes dโ€™un Emmanuel Macron ou dโ€™un Volodymyr Zelenskyy ne laissent guรจre de doute sur lโ€™authenticitรฉ des informations que le SVR a exploitรฉes

    Dans un article que RTL publie le 8 mai 2026, Georges Malbrunot confirme de sources franรงaises ce quโ€™affirment depuis longtemps les autoritรฉs du Mali : dans une tentative de restaurer son emprise nรฉocoloniale au Sahel et pour nuire du mรชme coup ร  la Russie, la France collabore avec lโ€™Ukraine dans leur soutien de groupes djihadistes.

    Sous quelque prรฉtexte que ce soit, sa Vacuitรฉ poursuit son projet maniaque dโ€™injecter des troupes franรงaises en Ukraine. Le 24 juin, le quotidien numรฉrique Intelligence Online rรฉvรจle que sous couvert de formation, des militaires du rรฉgiment de cyberdรฉfense de Saint Jacques de la Lande y opรจrent avec la Sรปretรฉ dโ€™ร‰tat ukrainienne (SBU)

    La Russie a toujours averti quโ€™elle ne tolรจre pas de troupes occidentales en Ukraine. Ne sera pas virtuel, le missile balistique Iskander que ces cyberguerriers risquent de recevoir sur la tรชte.

    Les autoritรฉs franรงaises nient, mentent รฉvidemment. Comme dans le cas du soutien franco-ukrainien de groupes djihadistes au Sahel, cette implication aurait du rester secrรจte

    Cette belle photographie date du 10 juillet. Elle est ensuite partagรฉe par Lostarmour, un site russe qui documente les vรฉhicules atlantistes dรฉtruits ou capturรฉs. Au cours de leur progression, les combattants russes ont atteint cette รฉpave de canon automoteur franรงais CAESAR.

    Comme ร  son habitude, en guise de parade politicienne ร  une augmentation des prix du carburant causรฉe par les conflits dans le Golfe et en Ukraine -oรน il refuse toujours de reconnaรฎtre son humiliante dรฉfaite par procuration– Emmanuel Macron fait de la fumรฉe

    Convoquรฉs en grande pompe le 18 septembre 2026, des reprรฉsentants de partis politiques se font prรฉsenter ร  l’ร‰lysรฉe un รฉtat de la menace, le leurre dโ€™une prรฉtendue guerre hybride russe en Europe. Comme nous le savons dรฉjร , les agences occidentales dites de renseignement nโ€™en font plus guรจre et sont plutรดt payรฉes pour servir la communication dโ€™รฉphรฉmรจres gouvernements dโ€™incompรฉtents.

    Bien plus intรฉressant, les autoritรฉs avouent ce que nous avions dรฉjร  compris

    Les Forces armรฉes franรงaises ont menรฉ des ripostes militaires conventionnelles non rendues publiques contre la Russie ร  la suite d’attaques hybrides [Le Monde]

    Lโ€™engagement direct des coqs gaulois dans des opรฉrations offensives injustifiรฉes contre la Russie rend sans doute leur dรฉfaite plus amรจre encore. Pour sa part, le Royaume Uni a commencรฉ depuis dรฉcembre 2025 ร  rendre publiques des pertes.

    in Lโ€™engagement franรงais dans les rangs ukrainiens

    chronique alphabรฉtique et nรฉcrologique de lโ€™engagement franรงais dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas

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  • [Sharing] The West has engineered its own downfall – Kishore Mahbubani, Institute of Art and Ideas

    The West has become a lonely, narcissistic civilization

    Our world is full of divides. Yet, the greatest divide is between the 12% of the worldโ€™s population who live in the West and the 88% who live outside. When the West looks at itself in the mirror, it sees itself as the most virtuous civilization on planet Earth, taking care of its own citizens and generously and selflessly making the world a better place. And when the rest of the world looks at the West, they see a trigger-happy, violent civilization which has killed more innocent people in unnecessary wars than any other civilization in recent decades. So where does the truth lie?

    Sadly, the data doesnโ€™t lie. Since the end of the Cold War, when the world was expected to receive a peace dividend, the West has involved itself in one misadventure after another. The results have been disastrous. The Brown University Watson School of International and Public Affairsโ€™ Cost of War Project has estimated that at least 940,000 people were killed directly by violence in the post-9/11 wars between 2001 and 2023, and a further 3.6โ€“3.8 million people died indirectly due to secondary causes such as diseases, malnutrition and so on. Many of these wars were initiated by the West.

    Curiously, for a civilization that prides itself on intellectual honesty and deep introspection, there has been little reflection on how and why the West has gone so wrong with its constant interventions. Initially, the intervention in Afghanistan was legal and justified under international law, on the basis of UNSC Resolution 1386 (20 December 2001). Yet, after removing the Taliban government, which had harbored the Al-Qaeda terrorists, the West had no strategy for managing its exit from Afghanistan. Instead, it stayed on for 20 years in Afghanistan, only to go from rescuing the Afghan people from the Taliban government to returning the Afghan people to the Taliban government. And in those 20 years, apart from the soldiers who died in battle, over 100,000 Afghan civilians were killed or wounded. No one in the West has been held accountable for this incredible disaster.

    Unlike the Afghan invasion, which was legal under international law, the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 was illegal. The former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan bravely declared that it was illegal and was persecuted by the Bush Administration for stating the truth. Here, too, a huge number of innocent civilians lost their lives in an illegal war. Yet no one has been held accountable, although Western public opinion has reluctantly conceded that the war was illegal and unnecessary.

    The Western reaction to the failed intervention in Libya has been even more callous. โ€œWe came. We saw. He died.โ€ So said Hillary Clinton, the then US Secretary of State, proudly when Gaddafi was killed on October 20, 2011. Yet, while Gaddafi was alive, the majority of Libyans enjoyed a decent life, particularly from the 1990s onward, which was a period of relative political stability and economic growth. No war or conflict. Each Libyan household also received extensive welfare benefits from the state. GDP grew from US$ 31 billion in 1990 to $75 billion in 2010. Libyaโ€™s per capita GDP in 2010, at $11.6 thousand, was the highest in Africa. By 2020, 10 years after Gaddafi was removed, Libyaโ€™s GDP declined to $47 billion. Its GDP per capita declined to $6.7 thousand. Millions of ordinary Libyans were transported from a safe and secure existence to hell. The West never said sorry to them.

    This callous indifference to the pain and suffering that the West has clearly wrought on so many innocent civilians undermines the Western self-belief that they are an inherently virtuous civilization. And the West is also unaware of how its claims to moral virtue have been further eroded by the manifest double standards it has applied when passing judgements on human rights violations.

    For decades, the West had preached that torture was abominable and was outlawed by several human rights conventions. Indeed, the West had regarded the UN Convention against Torture, adopted on December 10, 1984, as a great leap forward. President Reagan stated, when transmitting the Convention to the US Senate for ratification in May 1988, that doing so would โ€œclearly express United States opposition to torture, an abhorrent practice unfortunately still prevalent in the world today.โ€ Yet, when the Bush Administration became the first modern developed country to reintroduce torture in Guantรกnamo, the erstwhile defenders of human rights in Europe didnโ€™t just fail to condemn the Bush Administration. They aided and abetted this torture with several โ€œrenditionโ€ programs, kidnapping people and sending them to countries where they face a high risk of torture or abuse.

    The Western double standards on human rights were further exposed in the contrasting reactions of the West to the loss of innocent civilian lives in Ukraine and Gaza. Many Western leaders correctly expressed moral outrage when innocent Ukrainian civilians or children were killed in Ukraine. Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, after the Russian missile and drone attack on Kyiv in August 2025, said, โ€œAnother night of Russia’s relentless bombings struck civilian infrastructure and killed innocents.โ€ Kaja Kallas, then EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, stated that โ€œRussia once again deliberately targeted and killed Ukrainian civiliansโ€. President Joe Biden, after the July 2024 Russian missile strikes that killed civilians, including children at Kyiv’s Okhmatdyt children’s hospital, described the attacks as a โ€œhorrific reminder of Russia’s brutalityโ€ and said that Russia had โ€œtargeted Ukrainian civilians.โ€ The UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, responding to the same attack on the children’s hospital, described โ€œattacking innocent childrenโ€ as โ€œthe most depraved of actions.โ€ Western leaders broadly described the killings as atrocities and war crimes. Yet, when many more innocent civilians, including children, were killed in the Gaza conflict, the same Western leaders remained largely silent on Gaza.

    No single event has damaged the moral credibility of the West as much as Gaza has. As modern cell phones have become ubiquitous, we have seen with our own eyes how millions of innocent Palestinian civilians have suffered in Gaza. The 88% of the worldโ€™s population who live outside the West have also heard the loud silence of the West on Gaza. Pankaj Mishra, the Indian novelist and author of The World After Gaza, said in January 2025, โ€œGaza has really damaged American institutions, Western institutions, international institutions, to an extent no previous war, no previous conflict has.โ€ The Booker Prize-winning Indian novelist, Arundhati Roy, has said more starkly, โ€œWhat is under the rubble in Gaza is not just the bodies of Palestinians, but the carcass of Western liberal democracy.โ€

    Yet, even if Western external interventions and policies have been disastrous, many leading Western thinkers and politicians console themselves with the thought that domestically they still have the best-performing societies. Josep Borrell, the then European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, said on 13 October 2022, โ€œEurope is a garden. We have built a garden. Everything works. It is the best combination of political freedom, economic prosperity and social cohesion that humankind has been able to build โ€ฆ Most of the rest of the world is a jungle, and the jungle could invade the garden.โ€

    Thereโ€™s no question that people living in the modern, advanced Western societies still enjoy better standards of living than their counterparts in the Global South. The current citizens of the West are the beneficiaries of the wise and sound public policies made by their ancestors. But what are they leaving behind for their future generations? Will future generations in Europe and North America have equally good lives? Or will they see a steady decline?

    Surveys show that most Western populations do not believe that their children and grandchildren will enjoy equally good lives. A January 2025 Pew Survey revealed that over 75% of respondents in Europe as well as in the US and Canada believed that their children would be financially worse off than their parents.

    Indeed, even today, large segments of the population in the West have experienced a deterioration, not improvement, in their lives. The Brookings Institution reported in May 2026 that โ€œIn 2024, 45.5% of US households did not earn enough to make ends meet. In nearly every year since 2014, more than 40% of American households struggled to make ends meet.โ€ The report added, โ€œAs it stands, the cost of living will never be affordable if wages do not substantially increase. Evidence shows that even though US productivity nearly doubled between 1979 and 2025, average hourly pay increased by only 34%. In other words, productivity gains have concentrated wealth among capital owners and the highest-earning Americans, hollowing out the middle class rather than driving broad-based wage growth.โ€

    Angus Deaton and Anne Case have documented in Deaths of Despair that the US faces an epidemic of โ€œdeaths of despairโ€โ€”that is, deaths from drug overdoses, suicides, and alcoholโ€”among midlife non-Hispanic white Americans. They wrote: โ€œDeaths of despair among white men and women aged forty-five to fifty-four rose from thirty per one hundred thousand in 1990 to ninety-two per one hundred thousand in 2017. In every US state, suicide mortality rates for whites aged forty-five to fifty-four increased between 1999โ€“2000 and 2016โ€“17. In all but two states, mortality rates from alcoholic liver disease rose. And in every state, drug overdose mortality rates increased.โ€

    Most Western eyes do not see a connection between their failed external geopolitical ventures and the internal despair of their populations. Actually, the two are linked. Money and resources wasted on unnecessary external interventions could have been better spent on their populations. Speaking about the Iraq war, the Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz wrote, โ€œFor one-sixth of the cost of the war, the US could put its Social Security system on sound footing for more than a half-century, without cutting benefits or raising contributions.โ€

    Even if some thoughtful people in the West may agree with the arguments so far, acknowledging that many Western interventions in the Global South were unnecessary and disastrous, they would not in any way agree that the Ukraine war also reflects Western geopolitical incompetence. Thereโ€™s no question that the Russian invasion of Ukraine was illegal. Russia deserves to be condemned for the loss of thousands of innocent lives.

    Yet, when the West imposed sanctions on Russia for invading Ukraine, it didnโ€™t notice that 85% of the worldโ€™s population did not follow suit. Why not? Does this reflect a lack of moral integrity in the Global South? Or does it reflect a shrewd geopolitical assessment? When countries like Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, and South Africa did not impose sanctions on Russia, this did not mean that they supported the Russian invasion. It signaled their rejection of the Western claim that the war in Ukraine was โ€œunprovokedโ€ and only Russia was to blame for the Ukraine invasion.

    Itโ€™s truly shocking how many Western leaders have used the word โ€œunprovokedโ€ to describe the Ukraine war. President Joe Biden, US President, said, on 24 February 2022, โ€œThe Russian military has begun a brutal assault on the people of Ukraine without provocation, without justification, without necessity.โ€ Around the same time, Prime Minister Boris Johnson described Russiaโ€™s action as a โ€œbrutal and unprovoked attack on a free and sovereign European country.โ€ Justin Trudeau, the Canadian Prime Minister, said, โ€œToday, we woke up to a changed world. Russia has launched a brutal and unprovoked attack on the sovereignty of Ukraine.โ€ The leaders of G7 collectively described Russiaโ€™s action as โ€œthis unprovoked and completely unjustified attack on the democratic state of Ukraine.โ€

    Little do these leaders realize that when they use the word โ€œunprovokedโ€ to describe the war in Ukraine, they are effectively insulting the intelligence of the countries of the Global South, including thoughtful leaders like Brazilian President Luiz Inรกcio Lula da Silva. He captured a more nuanced view on the war in Ukraine when he said, in May 2022, โ€œPutin shouldnโ€™t have invaded Ukraine. But itโ€™s not just Putin who is guilty. The United States and the EU are also guilty. What was the reason for the Ukraine invasion? NATO? Then the United States and Europe should have said: โ€˜Ukraine wonโ€™t join NATO.โ€™ That would have solved the problem.โ€

    This great gap in perceptions between the West and the rest on recent geopolitical developments is both surprising and paradoxical. In theory, our world is shrinking. We have more information available today, even from our cell phones, than at any other time in human history. Yet, when we witness the same recent events, the Western perceptions and those in the rest of the world seem to exist in two different universes. What is even more shocking is that most Western leaders and pundits seem completely unaware that they have lost the support and confidence of the majority of the worldโ€™s population. This is why the words of S. Jaishankar, the Indian foreign minister, resonated strongly in the Global South when he said, in June 2022, โ€œSomewhere Europe has to grow out of the mindset that Europe’s problems are the world’s problems but the world’s problems are not Europe’s problems.โ€ A year later, in February 2023, the then German Chancellor Olaf Scholz admitted that Jaishankar โ€œhas a point.โ€ Referring to the countries of Latin America, Africa and Asia, Scholz further stated, โ€œWe have to generally address the interests and concerns of these countries as a basic prerequisite for joint action.โ€

    Despite the growing differences between the United States and Europe, both share a common concern on China and will work in one way or another to isolate and stop China. However, when they do so, they will find that the rest of the world will ignore them and continue engaging with China. Hence, instead of isolating China, the West will be isolating itself from the world.

    At the end of the day, the refusal of the West to acknowledge that they have lost the rest represents a massive act of self-deception. The West wants to continue believing that it is still the most virtuous civilization on planet Earth. The longer this self-deception persists, the more the West will be seen as a lonely, narcissistic civilization which is self-absorbed and unaware of how the majority of humanity views them. If this gap between the West and the rest is not addressed effectively and soon, the world will be headed into more troubled waters.

    The original article

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  • [Partage] Dislocation de lโ€™Occident : les menaces – Emmanuel Todd

    La perversitรฉ de Trump se dรฉploie au Moyen-Orient, le bellicisme de lโ€™OTAN en Europe

    Je viens dโ€™รฉcrire ร  la demande de mon รฉditeur slovรจne une nouvelle prรฉface ร  La Dรฉfaite de lโ€™Occident, quโ€™il mโ€™apparaรฎt nรฉcessaire de publier sur Substack immรฉdiatement. La menace dโ€™une aggravation de tous les conflits se prรฉcise. On trouvera dans ce texte une interprรฉtation schรฉmatique et provisoire, mais actualisรฉe du dรฉveloppement de la crise que nous vivons. Ce texte est de fait la conclusion de mon dernier entretien avec Diane Lagrange sur Frรฉquence Populaire : ยซ Victoire de la Russie, enfermement et fracturation de la France et de lโ€™Occident ยป.

    Prรฉface ร  lโ€™รฉdition slovรจne

    De la dรฉfaite ร  la dislocation

    Moins de deux ans aprรจs la publication en franรงais de La Dรฉfaite de lโ€™Occident, en janvier 2024, les principales prรฉdictions du livre sont vรฉrifiรฉes. La Russie a militairement et รฉconomiquement tenu le choc. Lโ€™industrie militaire amรฉricaine est รฉpuisรฉe. Les รฉconomies et les sociรฉtรฉs europรฉennes sont au bord de lโ€™implosion. Avant mรชme que sโ€™effondre lโ€™armรฉe ukrainienne, le stade suivant de la dislocation de lโ€™Occident est atteint.

    Je suis depuis toujours hostile ร  la politique russophobe des ร‰tats-Unis et de lโ€™Europe mais, en tant quโ€™occidental attachรฉ ร  la dรฉmocratie libรฉrale, Franรงais formรฉ ร  la recherche en Angleterre, enfant dโ€™une mรจre rรฉfugiรฉe aux ร‰tats-Unis pendant la deuxiรจme guerre mondiale, je suis catastrophรฉ par les consรฉquences pour nous, Occidentaux, de la guerre menรฉe sans intelligence contre la Russie.

    Nous ne sommes quโ€™au dรฉbut de la catastrophe. Un point de bascule approche au-delร  duquel se dรฉvelopperont les consรฉquences ultimes de la dรฉfaite.

    Le ยซ Reste du monde ยป (ou Sud global, ou Majoritรฉ globale), qui sโ€™รฉtait contentรฉ de soutenir la Russie en refusant de boycotter son รฉconomie, affiche dรฉsormais ouvertement son soutien ร  Vladimir Poutine. Les BRICS sโ€™รฉlargissent en acceptant de nouveaux adhรฉrents, ils accroissent leur cohรฉsion. Sommรฉe par les ร‰tats-Unis de choisir son camp, lโ€™Inde a choisi lโ€™indรฉpendance : les photos de Poutine, Xi et Modi rรฉunis ร  lโ€™occasion de la rรฉunion dโ€™aout 2025 de lโ€™Organisation de Coopรฉration de Shanghai resteront comme le symbole de ce moment clef. Les mรฉdias occidentaux ne cessent pourtant de nous reprรฉsenter Poutine comme un monstre et les Russes comme des serfs. Ces mรฉdias avaient dรฉjร  รฉtรฉ incapables dโ€™imaginer que le Reste du monde les voit comme un dirigeant et des รชtres humains ordinaires, porteurs dโ€™une culture russe spรฉcifique et dโ€™une volontรฉ de souverainetรฉ. Jโ€™ai peur dรฉsormais que nos mรฉdias nโ€™aggravent notre aveuglement en รฉtant incapables dโ€™imaginer le regain de prestige de la Russie dans ce Reste du monde, exploitรฉ รฉconomiquement et traitรฉ avec arrogance par lโ€™Occident durant des siรจcles. Les Russes ont osรฉ. Ils ont dรฉfiรฉ lโ€™Empire et ils ont gagnรฉ.

    Lโ€™ironie de lโ€™histoire, cโ€™est que les Russes, peuple europรฉen et blanc, de langue slave, sont devenus le bouclier militaire du Reste du monde parce que lโ€™Occident a refusรฉ de les intรฉgrer aprรจs la chute du communisme. Jโ€™imagine les Slovรจnes particuliรจrement bien placรฉs culturellement pour apprรฉcier cette ironie mรชme si ce que je sais bien, en tant quโ€™anthropologue de la famille et de la religion, que, malgrรฉ sa langue slave, la Slovรฉnie est beaucoup plus proche socialement et idรฉologiquement de la Suisse que de la Russie.

    Je peux รฉbaucher ici un modรจle de la dislocation de lโ€™Occident, malgrรฉ les incohรฉrences de la politique de Donald Trump, prรฉsident amรฉricain de la dรฉfaite. Ces incohรฉrences ne rรฉsultent pas, je pense, dโ€™une personnalitรฉ instable, et sans doute perverse, mais dโ€™un dilemme insoluble pour les ร‰tats-Unis. Dโ€™une part, leurs dirigeants, au Pentagone comme ร  la Maison blanche, savent que la guerre est perdue et que lโ€™Ukraine devra รชtre abandonnรฉe. Le bon sens les conduit donc ร  vouloir sortir de la guerre. Mais dโ€™autre part, le mรชme bon sens leur fait pressentir que le retrait dโ€™Ukraine aura pour lโ€™Empire des consรฉquences dramatiques que nโ€™avaient pas eu ceux du Vietnam, dโ€™Irak ou dโ€™Afghanistan. Il sโ€™agit en effet de la premiรจre dรฉfaite stratรฉgique amรฉricaine dโ€™รฉchelle planรฉtaire, dans un contexte de dรฉsindustrialisation massive des ร‰tats-Unis et de rรฉindustrialisation difficile. La Chine est devenue lโ€™atelier du monde ; sa trรจs faible fรฉconditรฉ, certes, lui interdira de remplacer les Etats-Unis, mais il est dรฉjร  trop tard pour la concurrencer industriellement.

    La dรฉdollarisation de lโ€™รฉconomie mondiale a commencรฉ. Trump et ses conseillers nโ€™arrivent pas ร  lโ€™accepter car ce serait la fin de lโ€™Empire. Un รขge post-impรฉrial pourtant devrait รชtre le but du projet MAGA, Make America Great Again, qui cherche un retour de lโ€™รฉtat-nation amรฉricain. Mais pour une Amรฉrique dont la capacitรฉ productive en biens rรฉels est aujourdโ€™hui trรจs faible (voir chapitre 9 sur la vraie nature de lโ€™รฉconomie amรฉricaine), il est impossible de renoncer ร  vivre ร  crรฉdit comme elle le fait en produisant des dollars. Un tel retrait impรฉrial-monรฉtaire impliquerait une chute brutale de son niveau de vie, y compris pour les รฉlecteurs populaires de Trump. Le premier budget de la deuxiรจme prรฉsidence Trump, le ยซ One Big Beautiful Bill Act ยป, reste donc impรฉrial malgrรฉ les protections tarifaires qui incarnent le projet ou rรชve protectionniste. Lโ€™ OBBBA relance les dรฉpenses militaires et le dรฉficit. Qui dit dรฉficit budgรฉtaire aux ร‰tats-Unis dit, inรฉvitablement, production de dollars et dรฉficit commercial. La dynamique impรฉriale, lโ€™inertie impรฉriale plutรดt, nโ€™en finit pas de miner le rรชve dโ€™un retour ร  lโ€™รฉtat-nation productif.

    En Europe, la dรฉfaite militaire reste mal comprise des dirigeants. Ils nโ€™ont pas dirigรฉ les opรฉrations. Cโ€™est le Pentagone qui avait mis au point les plans de la contre-offensive ukrainienne de lโ€™รฉtรฉ 2023 (durant laquelle jโ€™avais รฉcrit La Dรฉfaite de lโ€™Occident). Les militaires amรฉricains, mรชme sโ€™ils ont fait mener la guerre par leur proxy ukrainien, savent quโ€™ils se sont brisรฉs sur la dรฉfense russe – parce quโ€™ils ne pouvaient produire assez dโ€™armes et parce que les militaires russes ont รฉtรฉ plus intelligents quโ€™eux. Les dirigeants europรฉens nโ€™ont fourni que des systรจmes dโ€™armes et pas les plus importants. Inconscients de lโ€™ampleur de la dรฉfaite militaire, ils savent en revanche que leurs propres รฉconomies ont รฉtรฉ paralysรฉes par la politique de sanctions, tout spรฉcialement par la rupture de leur approvisionnement en รฉnergie russe bon marchรฉ. Couper en deux รฉconomiquement le continent europรฉen fut un acte de folie suicidaire. Lโ€™รฉconomie allemande stagne. Partout ร  lโ€™ouest, la pauvretรฉ et les inรฉgalitรฉs augmentent. Le Royaume-Uni est au bord du gouffre. La France le suit de prรจs. Sociรฉtรฉs et systรจmes politiques sont bloquรฉes.

    Une dynamique รฉconomique et sociale nรฉgative prรฉexistait ร  la guerre et mettait dรฉjร  lโ€™Occident sous tension. Elle รฉtait visible, ร  des degrรฉs divers, dans toute lโ€™Europe de lโ€™Ouest. Le libre-รฉchange y mine la base industrielle. Lโ€™immigration y dรฉveloppe un syndrome identitaire, particuliรจrement dans les classes populaires privรฉes dโ€™emplois sรปrs et correctement payรฉs.

    Plus en profondeur, la dynamique nรฉgative de fragmentation est culturelle : lโ€™รฉducation supรฉrieure de masse crรฉe des sociรฉtรฉs stratifiรฉes dans lesquelles les รฉduquรฉs supรฉrieurs โ€“ 20%, 30%, 40% de la population – se mettent ร  vivre entre eux, ร  se penser supรฉrieurs, ร  mรฉpriser les milieux populaires, ร  rejeter le travail manuel et lโ€™industrie. Lโ€™รฉducation primaire pour tous (lโ€™alphabรฉtisation universelle) avait nourri la dรฉmocratie, crรฉant une sociรฉtรฉ homogรจne dont le subconscient รฉtait รฉgalitaire. Lโ€™รฉducation supรฉrieure a engendrรฉ des oligarchies, et parfois des ploutocraties, sociรฉtรฉs stratifiรฉes envahies par un subconscient inรฉgalitaire. Paradoxe ultime : le dรฉveloppement de lโ€™รฉducation supรฉrieure a fini par produire dans ces oligarchies ou ploutocraties une baisse du niveau intellectuel ! Jโ€™avais dรฉcrit cette sรฉquence il y a plus dโ€™un quart de siรจcle dans Lโ€™Illusion รฉconomique, publiรฉe en 1997. Lโ€™industrie occidentale sโ€™en est allรฉe dans le Reste du monde et aussi, bien sรปr, dans les anciennes dรฉmocraties populaires dโ€™Europe de lโ€™Est qui, libรฉrรฉes de leur sujรฉtion ร  la Russie soviรฉtique, ont dรฉsormais retrouvรฉ leur statut plurisรฉculaire de pรฉriphรฉrie dominรฉe par lโ€™Europe de lโ€™Ouest. Je parle en dรฉtail au chapitre 3 de cette espรจce de Chine intรฉrieure oรน les ouvriers dโ€™industrie restent nombreux. Partout cependant en Europe lโ€™รฉlitisme des รฉduquรฉs supรฉrieurs a engendrรฉ le ยซ populisme ยป.

    La guerre a fait monter dโ€™un cran la tension europรฉenne. Elle appauvrit le continent. Mais surtout, รฉchec stratรฉgique majeur, elle dรฉlรฉgitime des dirigeants incapables de mener leurs pays ร  la victoire. Le dรฉveloppement de mouvements populaires conservateurs (habituellement dรฉsignรฉ par les รฉlites journalistiques par des termes comme ยซ populistes ยป ou ยซ dโ€™extrรชme droite ยป ou ยซ nationalistes ยป) sโ€™accรฉlรจre. Reform UK au Royaume-Uni. AfD en Allemagne, Rassemblement national en Franceโ€ฆ Ironie toujours : les sanctions รฉconomiques dont lโ€™OTAN attendait un ยซ regime change ยป en Russie sont sur le point dโ€™apporter ร  lโ€™Europe occidentale une cascade de ยซ regime changes ยป. Les classes dirigeantes occidentales sont dรฉlรฉgitimรฉes par la dรฉfaite au moment mรชme oรน la dรฉmocratie autoritaire russe est relรฉgitimรฉe par la victoire, ou plutรดt, surlรฉgitimรฉe puisque le retour de la Russie ร  la stabilitรฉ sous Poutine lui assurait au dรฉpart une lรฉgitimitรฉ incontestรฉe.

    Tel est notre monde ร  lโ€™approche de 2026.

    La dislocation de lโ€™Occident prend la forme dโ€™une ยซ fracturation hiรฉrarchique ยป

    Les ร‰tats-Unis renoncent au contrรดle de la Russie, et je le pense de plus en plus, de la Chine. Mis sous blocus chinois pour leurs importations de samarium, cette terre rare indispensable ร  lโ€™aรฉronautique militaire, les ร‰tats-Unis ne peuvent plus rรชver dโ€™affronter la Chine militairement. Le Reste du monde โ€“ Inde, Brรฉsil, monde arabe, Afrique – en profite et leur รฉchappe. Mais les ร‰tats-Unis se retournent vigoureusement contre leurs ยซ alliรฉs ยป europรฉens et est-asiatiques, dans un effort ultime de surexploitation, et aussi, il faut lโ€™admettre, par pur et simple dรฉpit. Pour รฉchapper ร  leur humiliation, pour cacher au monde et ร  eux-mรชmes leur faiblesse, ils punissent lโ€™Europe. Lโ€™Empire se dรฉvore lui-mรชme. Cโ€™est le sens des tariffs et investissements forcรฉs imposรฉs par Trump aux Europรฉens, devenus sujets coloniaux dans un empire rรฉtrรฉci plutรดt que partenaires. Le temps des dรฉmocraties libรฉrales solidaires est fini.

    Le trumpisme est un ยซ conservatisme populaire blanc ยป. Ce qui รฉmerge en Occident nโ€™est pas une solidaritรฉ des conservatismes populaires mais une rupture des solidaritรฉs internes. La rage qui rรฉsulte de la dรฉfaite conduit chaque pays, pour รฉponger son ressentiment, ร  se retourner contre plus faible que lui. Les ร‰tats-Unis se retournent contre lโ€™Europe ou le Japon. La France rรฉactive son conflit avec lโ€™Algรฉrie, ancienne colonie. Nul doute que lโ€™Allemagne, qui, de Scholz ร  Merz, a acceptรฉ dโ€™obรฉir aux Etats-Unis, ne retourne son humiliation contre ses partenaires europรฉens plus faibles. Mon propre pays, la France, me semble le plus menacรฉ.

    Lโ€™un des concepts fondamentaux de la dรฉfaite de lโ€™Occident est le nihilisme. Jโ€™explique comment ยซ lโ€™รฉtat zรฉro ยป de la religion protestante – la sรฉcularisation arrivรฉe ร  son terme – nโ€™explique pas seulement lโ€™effondrement รฉducatif et industriel amรฉricain. Lโ€™รฉtat zรฉro ouvre aussi un vide mรฉtaphysique. Je ne suis pas personnellement croyant et je ne milite pour aucun retour du religieux (je ne le crois pas possible) mais je dois, en tant quโ€™historien, constater que la disparition des valeurs sociales dโ€™origine religieuse mรจne ร  une crise morale, ร  une pulsion de destruction des choses et des hommes (la guerre) et ultimement ร  une tentative dโ€™abolition de la rรฉalitรฉ (le phรฉnomรจne transgenre pour les dรฉmocrates amรฉricains et la nรฉgation du rรฉchauffement climatique pour les rรฉpublicains par exemple). La crise existe pour tous les pays complรจtement sรฉcularisรฉs mais elle est pire dans ceux dont la religion รฉtait le protestantisme ou le judaรฏsme, religions absolutistes dans leur recherche du transcendant, plutรดt que le catholicisme, plus ouvert ร  la beautรฉ du monde et de la vie terrestre. Cโ€™est bien en aux ร‰tats-Unis et en Israรซl que lโ€™on voit se dรฉvelopper des formes parodiques des religions traditionnelles, parodies dโ€™essence selon moi nihiliste.

    Cette dimension irrationnelle est au cล“ur de la dรฉfaite. Celle-ci nโ€™est donc pas seulement une perte ยซ technique ยป de puissance mais aussi un รฉpuisement moral, une absence de but existentiel positif qui mรจne au nihilisme.

    Ce nihilisme est derriรจre la volontรฉ des dirigeants europรฉens, particuliรจrement sur les bords protestants de la Baltique, dโ€™รฉlargir la guerre contre la Russie par des provocations incessantes. Ce nihilisme est aussi derriรจre la dรฉstabilisation amรฉricaine du Proche-Orient, lieu par excellence dโ€™expression de la rage qui rรฉsulte de la dรฉfaite amรฉricaine face ร  la Russie. Surtout, ne cรฉdons pas ร  lโ€™รฉvidence trop facile dโ€™une autonomie guerriรจre du rรฉgime Netanyahu en Israรซl dans le gรฉnocide de Gaza ou dans lโ€™attaque contre lโ€™Iran. Protestantisme-zรฉro et judaรฏsme-zรฉro mรชlent certes tragiquement leurs effets nihilistes dans ces accรจs de violence. Mais partout au Moyen-Orient ce sont bien les ร‰tats-Unis qui, en fournissant les armes et parfois en attaquant eux-mรชmes, sont en derniรจre instance les dรฉcideurs du chaos. Ils poussent Israรซl ร  lโ€™action comme ils ont poussรฉ les Ukrainiens. La premiรจre prรฉsidence Trump avait รฉtabli lโ€™ambassade des ร‰tats-Unis ร  Jรฉrusalem et cโ€™est bien Trump qui le premier a imaginรฉ Gaza transformรฉ en station balnรฉaire. Je suis conscient quโ€™il faudrait un livre pour dรฉmontrer cette thรจse, un livre qui dรฉmonterait une ร  une les interactions entre les acteurs. Mais, historien de mรฉtier, et faisant de la gรฉopolitique depuis un-demi-siรจcle, je sens que, comme lโ€™Europe otanienne, Israรซl a cessรฉ dโ€™รชtre un รฉtat indรฉpendant. Le problรจme de lโ€™Occident est bien la mort programmรฉe de lโ€™รฉtat-nation.

    Lโ€™Empire est vaste et il se dรฉcompose dans le bruit et la fureur. Cet Empire est dรฉjร  polycentrique, divisรฉ sur ses buts, schizophrรจne. Mais aucune de ses parties nโ€™est indรฉpendante du tout. Trump est son ยซ centre ยป actuel ; il est aussi sa meilleure expression idรฉologico-pratique en ce quโ€™il mรชle une volontรฉ rationnelle de repliement sur sa sphรจre de domination immรฉdiate (lโ€™Europe et Israรซl) ร  des impulsions nihilistes de prรฉfรฉrence pour la guerre. Ces tendances โ€“ repliement et violence – sโ€™expriment aussi ร  lโ€™intรฉrieur du cล“ur amรฉricain de lโ€™Empire oรน le principe de fracturation hiรฉrarchique fonctionne en interne. Des auteurs anglo-amรฉricains de plus en plus nombreux รฉvoquent la venue dโ€™une guerre civile.

    La ploutocratie amรฉricaine est pluraliste. Il y a celle des financiers, celle des pรฉtroliers, celle de la Silicon Valley. Les ploutocrates trumpistes, pรฉtroliers texans ou ralliรฉs rรฉcent de la Silicon Valley, mรฉprisent les รฉlites รฉduquรฉes dรฉmocrates de la cรดte Est, qui mรฉprisent elles-mรชmes les petits-blancs trumpistes du heartland, qui mรฉprisent eux-mรชmes les Noirs dรฉmocrates, etcโ€ฆ

    Lโ€™une des particularitรฉs intรฉressantes de lโ€™Amรฉrique actuelle est que ses dirigeants ont de plus en plus de mal ร  distinguer lโ€™interne de lโ€™externe, malgrรฉ la tentative MAGA dโ€™arrรชter par un mur lโ€™immigration venue du sud. Lโ€™armรฉe tire sur des bateaux qui sortent du Vรฉnรฉzuรฉla, elle bombarde lโ€™Iran, elle entre dans le centre des villes dรฉmocrates des ร‰tats-Unis, elle commandite lโ€™aviation israรฉlienne pour une attaque sur le Qatar oรน se trouve une immense base amรฉricaine. Tout lecteur de science-fiction reconnaรฎtra dans cette รฉnumรฉration inquiรฉtante lโ€™amorce dโ€™une entrรฉe en dystopie, cโ€™est-ร -dire dans un monde nรฉgatif oรน se mรชlent puissance, fragmentation, hiรฉrarchie, violence, pauvretรฉ et perversitรฉ.

    Restons donc nous-mรชmes, hors de lโ€™Amรฉrique. Gardons notre perception de lโ€™intรฉrieur et de lโ€™extรฉrieur, notre sens de la mesure, notre contact avec la rรฉalitรฉ, notre conception de ce qui est juste et beau. Ne nous laissons pas non plus entraรฎner dans une fuite en avant guerriรจre par nos propres dirigeants europรฉens, ces privilรฉgiรฉs รฉgarรฉs dans lโ€™histoire, dรฉsespรฉrรฉs dโ€™avoir รฉtรฉ vaincus, terrorisรฉs ร  lโ€™idรฉe dโ€™รชtre un jour jugรฉs par leurs peuples. Et surtout, surtout, continuons de rรฉflรฉchir au sens des choses.

    Paris, le 28 septembre 2025 [fin]

    L’article original

    voici la synthรจse de Grok, l’outil US d’intelligence artificielle de X

    A blog preface to the Slovenian edition of Emmanuel Todd’s 2024 book La Dรฉfaite de lโ€™Occident, updating his analysis of Western geopolitical failures, including Russia’s resilience in Ukraine and Global South alignment against U.S. dominance.

    Todd critiques Trump’s Middle East policies as extensions of U.S. imperial nihilism, linking them to actions like arming Israel for Gaza operations, while highlighting NATO’s bellicose Ukraine strategy as a catalyst for European economic stagnation and rising populist movements.

    Amid de-dollarization and China’s industrial ascent, Todd warns of deepening Western internal fractures, such as U.S. tariffs on allies and moral exhaustion from Protestant secularization, potentially eroding liberal democracies without viable paths to recovery.

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  • [Partage] Une Allemande prรฉsidente de la Commission Europรฉenne qui finit un post par un slogan banderiste ! – ร‰douard Husson

    le retour du refoulรฉ

    Dans les annรฉes 1990, l’Allemagne rรฉunifiรฉe a consciencieusement dรฉtruit la Yougoslavie pour faire payer aux Serbes les dรฉfaites de 1918 et 1945.

    Cela ne suffisait pas. En 2022 s’est produite l’occasion inespรฉrรฉe. On allait enfin faire payer aux Russes l’abominable dรฉfaite de 1945 !

    Et que je t’envoie des panzers en Ukraine. Et que je rรชve de Taurus s’รฉcrasant sur le Kremlin !

    La perspective de dรฉfiler sur la place Rouge derriรจre l’armรฉe amรฉricaine…

    Las ! La Russie est une puissance nuclรฉaire, redevenue la premiรจre armรฉe du monde. Elle mรจne une guerre lente, de trรจs moyenne intensitรฉ, qui sert surtout ร  vider les stocks militaires des pays dรฉsindustrialisรฉs de l’OTAN.

    L’Allemagne est tombรฉe dans le piรจge. Elle a cru pouvoir renoncer au gaz russe bon marchรฉ pour quelques mois. Dรจs la dรฉfaite militaire de la Russie on se servirait ร  des conditions plus favorables… Cela fait 3 ans que รงa dure. Et l’industrie allemande se casse la figure.

    Il y a bien l’idรฉe d’une reconversion dans le secteur de la dรฉfense. On va mรชme installer des sites de production en Ukraine, que les Russes aiment bien cibler.

    Depuis le dรฉbut, les Russes sont perplexes. Moscou a รฉtรฉ d’une gรฉnรฉrositรฉ certaine aprรจs 1945. Malgrรฉ les 27 millions de morts causรฉs par l’ร‰tat le plus civilisรฉ d’Europe, les reprรฉsailles sont restรฉes limitรฉes. Malgrรฉ la Guerre froide et le maintien en activitรฉ, par les Amรฉricains, d’une partie des รฉlites fascistes europรฉennes sous prรฉtexte de combattre le communisme, Moscou a signรฉ les traitรฉs de l’Ostpolitik.

    En 1990, Moscou a acceptรฉ la rรฉunification. Un peu naรฏf, Gorbatchev a mรชme acceptรฉ que l’Allemagne rรฉunifiรฉe soit dans l’OTAN qui ne servait plus ร  rien… sauf ร  empรชcher la rรฉunification de cette Europe europรฉenne que De Gaulle avait appelรฉe de ses voeux.

    Dans les annรฉes 1990, les mauvaises habitudes allemandes ont vite รฉtรฉ retrouvรฉes. Destruction de la Yougoslavie, division du travail en Europe centrale, occidentalisation forcenรฉe de l’Ukraine pour que les chaรฎnes d’approvisionnement de l’industrie allemande disposent d’une main d’ล“uvre รฉduquรฉe corvรฉable ร  merci…

    Le Generalplan Ost sans les dรฉrapages adolfiens. Un fascisme ร  visage humain ?

    Je suis les affaires allemandes depuis 35 ans et je peux vous dire que l’Allemagne est autant responsable de la tragรฉdie ukrainienne que les Etats-Unis.

    Et puis, qu’il soit doux ou dur, le fascisme, รงa finit toujours mal : Berlin est, avec Washington, la premiรจre responsable des pertes militaires ukrainiennes abyssales…

    Au total, Ursula peut bien s’envelopper de tous les drapeaux ukrainiens qu’elle veut, Merz peut dรฉvelopper tous les discours martiaux possibles, l’Allemagne va buter sur la dure rรฉalitรฉ.

    Les Russes avaient tournรฉ la page de la Premiรจre Guerre mondiale malgrรฉ l’envoi irresponsable de Lรฉnine en Russie par l’Allemagne wilhelmienne. Ils avaient tendu la main malgrรฉ les crimes de la Wehrmacht, en particulier le siรจge de Leningrad. Mais le comportement d’Angela Merkel, Olaf Scholz, Friedrich Merz, Ursula von der Leyen, lui, ne sera pas oubliรฉ [fin]

    Le post original

    ร‰doouard Husson est historien

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  • [Partage] L’รฉtrange dรฉbรขcle – Marc de Sovakhine, Quartier Gรฉnรฉral

    Du rรชve impรฉrial ร  lโ€™ordre nรฉolibรฉral

    Nous nโ€™avons pas suffisamment pris la mesure du rรดle central que les รฉlites franรงaises ont jouรฉ depuis prรจs dโ€™un demi-siรจcle dans la construction de lโ€™ordre nรฉolibรฉral tant ร  lโ€™รฉchelle europรฉenne que mondiale. Si cet ordre a รฉtรฉ pensรฉ et initiรฉ par des penseurs et acteurs austro-allemands et anglo-amรฉricains, ce sont, dans une large mesure, des technocrates franรงais qui ont mis leur savoir-faire dโ€™organisateurs au service de sa construction juridico-institutionnelle au sein des organisations supranationales crรฉรฉes ร  cet effet. Ils ont รฉgalement รฉtรฉ parmi les premiers ร  se porter volontaires pour occuper les places dans les conseils dโ€™administration et les comitรฉs exรฉcutifs des nouveaux acteurs globalisรฉs de la finance, grandes banques et fonds internationaux. 

    Lโ€™ordre nรฉolibรฉral actuel se donne ร  voir comme le reflet troublรฉ des anciens empires europรฉens : les Britanniques ont transmis le flambeau de lโ€™hรฉgรฉmonie mondiale (รฉconomique et militaire) ร  leurs cousins amรฉricains, les Austro-Allemands ร  lโ€™Union europรฉenne leur rรชve impรฉrial conรงu ร  lโ€™รฉchelle du continent sur le modรจle des empires centraux et les Franรงais ร  leurs รฉlites frustrรฉes par lโ€™รฉchec de leur vocation impรฉriale lโ€™espace dรฉterritorialisรฉ des institutions du marchรฉ globalisรฉ ; comme si lโ€™universalisme abstrait de la fille aรฎnรฉe de lโ€™Eglise, revisitรฉ par lโ€™idรฉal hugolien de la ยซ Rรฉpublique universelle ยป (ยซ O France, adieu! tu es trop grande pour nโ€™รชtre quโ€™une patrie ยป), sโ€™รฉtait finalement dissous dans les abstractions de la marchandise et du capital. Si les deux premiรจres utopies impรฉriales sโ€™attachent encore ร  des territoires (le monde et le continent europรฉen), la troisiรจme se projette dans un espace de rรจgles de droit et dโ€™institutions supranationales qui viennent mailler les flux mondiaux de marchandises et de capitaux. La France comme fille aรฎnรฉe du Marchรฉ globalisรฉ aura sans doute รฉtรฉ la plus sensible aux visions eschatologiques de Francis Fukuyama.

    A partir de la fin de annรฉes 1970, le FMI a รฉtรฉ dirigรฉ par des haut fonctionnaires franรงais de faรงon ininterrompue de 1978 ร  2000, puis de 2007 ร  2019. Les Amรฉricains qui, de leur cรดtรฉ, sโ€™รฉtaient attribuรฉ la direction de la Banque mondiale, poussรจrent dans ce sens, trop contents de pouvoir bรฉnรฉficier de leur expertise bureaucratique reconnue et dโ€™arrimer ร  leur agenda des รฉlites franรงaises dont les ambitions se sont mises ร  devenir trop grandes pour se contenter de leur patrie. De 1985 ร  1995, dans ces annรฉes dรฉcisives pour ladite ยซ construction europรฉenne ยป, entre lโ€™entrรฉe en vigueur de lโ€™Acte unique et la crรฉation de la monnaie unique, le dรฉmocrate-chrรฉtien Jacques Delors prรฉsidera la Commission europรฉenne. Cโ€™est sous sa conduite et sur la base dโ€™un pacte franco-allemand que la future Union europรฉenne prendra sa forme actuelle dโ€™un Empire du droit marchand et capitaliste qui place ses ร‰tats membres sous souverainetรฉ limitรฉe dans un espace marchand unique oรน sโ€™organise, une fois levรฉs tous les obstacles au commerce et ร  lโ€™investissement et sous le rรฉgime du droit de la concurrence, la division internationale du travail ร  lโ€™รฉchelle du continent. Certes, si Mitterrand, qui portait sur le monde un regard de politique, a acceptรฉ de renouveler le compromis avec lโ€™Allemagne, vingt ans aprรจs le Traitรฉ de lโ€™Elysรฉe, cโ€™est surtout parce quโ€™il ne se doutait pas que lโ€™URSS sโ€™รฉcroulerait aussi vite, offrant ร  son voisin dโ€™outre-Rhin la possibilitรฉ de reconstituer sa zone dโ€™expansion รฉconomique en Europe centrale. En 1991, il est dรฉjร  trop tard mais il espรจre pouvoir encore enfermer lโ€™Allemagne rรฉunifiรฉe dans un vaste espace politique eurasiatique bornรฉ ร  lโ€™est par la Russie, lโ€™autre puissance nuclรฉaire. De leur cรดtรฉ, les technocrates dont il sโ€™est entourรฉ nourrissent en parallรจle dโ€™autres projets 

    ร€ la mรชme รฉpoque, le cล“ur de lโ€™Etat franรงais se met au service de la constitution de grands groupes bancaires dans la perspective de faire de Paris la plus grande place financiรจre du continent. De la dรฉcision prise par Mitterrand de maintenir la France dans le systรจme monรฉtaire europรฉen en 1983 jusquโ€™au grand mouvement de concentration, sous le gouvernement Jospin, du secteur bancaire ร  la fin des annรฉes 1990, la fraction la plus modernisatrice de la haute fonction publique va prรชter main forte ร  la constitution de grandes banques universelles, privatisรฉes quelques annรฉes plus tรดt et adossรฉes ร  un marchรฉ de capitaux profond, profitant de la force de la monnaie allemande, poumon industriel du continent. Delors ร  Bruxelles, le ministre Bรฉrรฉgovoy engage la modernisation et le dรฉcloisonnement des marchรฉs de capitaux en France au mitan des annรฉes 1980. Il rรฉformera, dans le mรชme mouvement, les instruments de dette publique pour les adapter aux demandes de liquiditรฉ des marchรฉs modernisรฉs. Quinze ans plus tard, comme pour clore le cycle, Dominique Strauss-Kahn supervise depuis Bercy, ร  la veille de lโ€™entrรฉe en vigueur de la monnaie unique, lโ€™achรจvement des grandes opรฉrations de concentration bancaires. Les contours de la rรฉpartition des rรดles entre la France et lโ€™Allemagne se dessinent nettement au dรฉbut du siรจcle. Le modรจle mercantiliste allemand soutient une monnaie forte qui autorise lโ€™Etat franรงais ร  sโ€™endetter ร  moindre coรปt โ€“ pour maintenir la paix sociale face aux consรฉquences de la dรฉsindustrialisation et mรฉnager les passions rentiรจres de la vieille bourgeoisie franรงaise โ€“ et aux banques hexagonales de consolider leurs ambitions internationales, entraรฎnant dans leur sillage lโ€™industrie nationale. 

    Depuis 2017, Bercy et la place financiรจre de Paris sont plus que jamais rรฉsolus ร  poursuivre le cap que la France sโ€™est fixรฉ il y a quarante ans. ยซ Paris est en premiรจre ligne, comme le titrait rรฉcemment Les Echos, pour faire avancer lโ€™Union des marchรฉs de capitaux ยป, dans la foulรฉe du rapport rendu par lโ€™ancien gouverneur de la Banque de France Christian Noyer et de celui de Mario Draghi, accueilli dans un concert de louanges. Lโ€™idรฉe est de dรฉcloisonner les marchรฉs de capitaux europรฉens par la standardisation des produits financiers et lโ€™assouplissement des rรจgles de ยซ titrisation ยป des crรฉances bancaires en titres nรฉgociables sur les marchรฉs. En somme, accรฉlรฉrer la prise de pouvoir du capital financier qui a dรฉjร  mis plusieurs cordes au cou des Etats toujours plus endettรฉs, au motif de ยซ financer lโ€™avenir ยป. Du reste, en favorisant la montรฉe en puissance des produits dโ€™รฉpargne retraite par capitalisation ร  travers le P.E.R, petite sล“ur du produit paneuropรฉen dโ€™รฉpargne retraite (PEPP), la rรฉcente rรฉforme des retraites en France constitue lโ€™une des รฉtapes-clรฉs de ce processus : ยซ dรฉsocialiser ยป le financement des retraites et pousser les assurรฉs sociaux, ร  lโ€™unisson des รฉpargnants, ร  placer leur รฉpargne dรฉsocialisรฉe auprรจs de fonds ร  long terme peu liquides et au capital non garanti, sur le modรจle de fonds de pension nรฉerlandais, pourtant enclins ร  des crises rรฉpรฉtรฉes depuis vingt ans. Pas de quoi effrayer les artisans de lโ€™omnipotence du capital financier, pour qui la crise agit comme un pharmakon de choc, poison pour les sociรฉtรฉs et remรจde pour justifier lโ€™extension de son pouvoir. 

    Lโ€™unification des forces de la bourgeoisie franรงaise sous la forme dโ€™une oligarchie techno-financiรจre

    ร€ la faveur de cet accord plus ou moins tacite entre la France et lโ€™Allemagne, toutes les composantes de la bourgeoisie franรงaise, qui autrefois pouvaient encore sโ€™opposer entre elles, ont entrepris nolens volens leur unification pour se placer sous le commandement du capital financier. Lโ€™ancienne ยซ noblesse dโ€™ร‰tat ยป a amorcรฉ sa fusion avec la grande bourgeoisie financiรจre internationalisรฉe, formant avec elle une oligarchie techno-financiรจre dรฉnationalisรฉe ร  laquelle se sont assujetties la bourgeoisie industrielle et ร  la petite bourgeoisie, comme toujours ร  la remorque. On a fait sortir Fouquet de prison pour lโ€™installer ร  Versailles oรน chaque annรฉe est organisรฉe la grand-messe de lโ€™attractivitรฉ, ยซ Choose France ยป. Emmanuel Macron, candidat de la grande banque et de la haute fonction publique logรฉe ร  Bercy, est ร  la fois le produit et lโ€™artisan terminal de cette mutation 

    Lร  oรน les banques allemandes continuent encore de financer un tissu industriel composรฉ dโ€™entreprises dont le capital demeure trรจs contrรดlรฉ et les chaรฎnes de valeur resserrรฉes en Europe centrale, leurs homologues franรงaises, arrimรฉes ร  un horizon sans territoire et faรงonnรฉes pour affronter les marchรฉs mondiaux, se sont dรฉtournรฉes du tissu productif national, accompagnant lโ€™internationalisation des grandes entreprises franรงaises dont la dรฉtention capitalistique et les chaรฎnes de valeur offrent un degrรฉ dโ€™ouverture et dโ€™extraversion parmi les plus รฉlevรฉs des รฉconomies occidentales. Ce fut lโ€™appel du large pour les grandes banques universelles et les anciens fleurons industriels, pressรฉs, avec le concours de lโ€™Etat, de sโ€™รฉbrouer dans les eaux tumultueuses des marchรฉs internationaux encadrรฉs par un ordre supranational assis sur les droits imprescriptibles de la marchandise et du capital. Un appel doublรฉ de celui ร  prendre des places pour ces nouveaux mercenaires attachรฉs, en guise de politique industrielle, ร  louer les vertus de ยซ lโ€™attractivitรฉ ยป dโ€™un pays quโ€™ils prostituent pour pouvoir eux-mรชmes se prostituer comme individus dont les trajectoires sociales ont changรฉ dโ€™รฉchelle. 

    Se plaรงant sous la protection de la monnaie unique โ€“ un Deutschemark europรฉen โ€“ et sโ€™en remettant aux mรขnes du marchรฉ globalisรฉ, lโ€™oligarchie techno-financiรจre ne voyait plus aucune raison de conserver en France une base industrielle sans laquelle lโ€™exercice effectif de la souverainetรฉ devient pourtant illusoire. Nostalgique de son rรชve impรฉrial, elle lit dans le destin des Etats-Unis celui dont lโ€™Histoire lโ€™a privรฉe dans un pays qui nโ€™a plus les moyens de la hisser sur le pavois du monde ; pour lui redonner vie, il lui fallait encore lโ€™associer ร  celui que lโ€™Allemagne se surprend, elle aussi, ร  mรปrir dans les territoires libรฉrรฉs par la fonte du glacis soviรฉtique. Lโ€™Union europรฉenne deviendra le cadre รฉconomique et juridique oรน peut sโ€™incarner un destin impรฉrial enchรขssรฉ dans celui de lโ€™hรฉgรฉmon amรฉricain. Comme lโ€™a bien montrรฉ Quinn Slobodian dans son livre Les globalistes โ€“ Une histoire intellectuelle du nรฉolibรฉralisme, la pensรฉe nรฉolibรฉrale nait dรจs les annรฉes 1920 dans les dรฉcombres de lโ€™Empire des Habsbourg qui constituait, aux yeux de Friedrich Hayek et de Wilhelm Rรถpke, un modรจle dโ€™organisation efficace pour repenser un espace articulรฉ autour de la primautรฉ juridique du dominium marchand sur lโ€™imperium dโ€™Etats interdรฉpendants, dรฉclinaison de la distinction ancienne entre lโ€™auctoritas de lโ€™empereur et la potestas des rois. Leurs successeurs, rรฉunis au lendemain de la Seconde guerre mondiale au sein de lโ€™รฉcole ordo-libรฉrale, sโ€™attacheront ร  รฉriger, dans une filiation avec la tradition juridique allemande du Rechtsstaat, les libertรฉs รฉconomiques et le droit de propriรฉtรฉ au rang de droits de lโ€™homme garantis par des institutions sโ€™imposant aux Etats souverains. Il sโ€™agit, en dernier ressort, de tenir les peuples ร  lโ€™รฉcart au sein dโ€™un ordre pensรฉ comme un ajustement souple aux mouvements du marchรฉ globalisรฉ et du capital. 

    Au terme de ce vaste mouvement de recomposition de la division internationale du travail ordonnรฉ par des institutions supranationales, lโ€™oligarchie techno-financiรจre franรงaise sโ€™est libรฉrรฉe de sa chrysalide nationale pour rejoindre les grandes citadelles โ€“ Bruxelles, Londres, Francfort, Washington โ€“ de son nouvel empire sans territoire. On ne fait carriรจre aujourdโ€™hui au Ministรจre de lโ€™Economie et des finances quโ€™en acceptant de passer par lโ€™une dโ€™entre elles. En liant le destin de la France aux lois de cet ordre nรฉolibรฉral stratifiรฉ, elle lโ€™a, du mรชme coup, dรฉlibรฉrรฉment amputรฉe dโ€™une partie de sa souverainetรฉ et privรฉe de ses marges de manล“uvre. Cโ€™est ainsi quโ€™il faut comprendre actuellement lโ€™isolement et la marginalisation de la France sur la scรจne internationale. 

    Au sein des รฉlites dirigeantes, une partie importante, souvent des gens de qualitรฉ animรฉs du sens de lโ€™intรฉrรชt gรฉnรฉral, sโ€™est vu confier la fastidieuse gestion de la province franรงaise de lโ€™Empire anglo-amรฉricain secondรฉ par son dรฉlรฉgataire allemand. On en trouve encore dans le corps prรฉfectoral, mais aussi dans tous les รฉchelons dรฉcentralisรฉs et dรฉmembrรฉs de lโ€™ร‰tat, collectivitรฉs locales et autres รฉtablissements publics placรฉs sous contrainte budgรฉtaire, oรน leurs soutiers tentent chaque jour de colmater la carรจne dโ€™un navire navigant au grรฉ des courants impรฉtueux de la mondialisation et des possibilitรฉs de dรฉbarquement des troupes de choc de lโ€™oligarchie quโ€™il convoie. Rรฉduite ร  une opposition stรฉrile et placรฉe sous perfusion de dette publique dans les fiefs subventionnรฉs oรน elle cultive une opposition stรฉrile, la petite bourgeoisie dont le cล“ur penche ร  gauche permet, quant ร  elle, ร  lโ€™oligarchie techno-financiรจre hors-sol, avec qui elle communie dans les dogmes de la construction europรฉenne et de la ยซ sociรฉtรฉ ouverte ยป, de sโ€™accrocher au pouvoir. Jamais, dans lโ€™histoire de la Rรฉpublique, nโ€™avait-on vu une classe dirigeante aussi minoritaire dans la sociรฉtรฉ. Sans le renfort de la petite bourgeoisie armรฉe dโ€™une fausse conscience qui vient se nicher dans un barragisme aussi inconsรฉquent quโ€™indispensable ร  sa perpรฉtuation en tant que classe dโ€™appoint, lโ€™oligarchie ne pourrait pas continuer ร  diriger le pays.

    Une nouvelle donne ?

    Le ยซ moteur franco-allemand ยป avait dรฉjร  commencรฉ ร  sโ€™enrayer ; depuis le dรฉclenchement de la guerre en Ukraine, il menace dโ€™exploser. Sommes-nous prรฉparรฉs ร  ce que nous imaginions encore impensable il y a quelques annรฉes ? 

    Lโ€™un des enjeux de lโ€™aprรจs-guerre est de savoir qui, de lโ€™Allemagne ou de la France, sโ€™imposera โ€“ en retenant lโ€™hypothรจse dโ€™une perspective de sortie prochaine du conflit โ€“ comme le principal interlocuteur de la Russie et chef de file europรฉen pour rebรขtir une sรฉcuritรฉ collective en Europe. Privรฉe de gaz russe, lโ€™Allemagne a renforcรฉ sa dรฉpendance aux ร‰tats-Unis et assiste ร  lโ€™agonie de son modรจle รฉconomique, mais refuse de se laisser mourir et pousse ร  la signature rapide de traitรฉs de libre-รฉchange afin de se mรฉnager de nouveaux dรฉbouchรฉs et subventionner son industrie par la baisse attendue du prix des produits agricoles en Europe. Sa ligne est constante depuis les nรฉgociations du Traitรฉ de Rome en 1957 au cours desquelles elle avait tentรฉ de sโ€™opposer aux accords prรฉfรฉrentiels avec le continent africain en voie de dรฉcolonisation, avant de voir son objectif satisfait ร  la faveur du ยซ Consensus de Washington ยป dans les annรฉes 1990. Aprรจs avoir annoncรฉ un plan dโ€™investissement de cent milliards dโ€™euros en vue de son rรฉarmement, elle entend faire de son industrie de dรฉfense la base matรฉrielle de ยซ lโ€™Europe de la dรฉfense ยป, alors que tous les projets dโ€™armement franco-allemands sont au point mort. La ministre des affaires รฉtrangรจres Annalena Baerbock a dรฉclarรฉ le 13 novembre au Bundestag vouloir une ยซ Europe unie ยป avec une Allemagne ยซ prรชte ร  diriger ยป. 

    La France, de son cรดtรฉ, a abandonnรฉ depuis longtemps toute rรฉflexion gรฉostratรฉgique. Son oligarchie nโ€™a aucun intรฉrรชt ร  renoncer ร  lโ€™utopie fukuyamesque dโ€™une harmonie par le marchรฉ conduite par les ร‰tats-Unis et garantie en Europe par une discipline juridico-marchande dโ€™inspiration germanique, consentie en contrepartie dโ€™une monnaie unique ร  lโ€™ombre de laquelle elle sโ€™est constituรฉe comme classe unifiรฉe. Les efforts de la diplomatie franรงaise sont dรฉsormais presque exclusivement orientรฉs vers la signature de contrats dโ€™armement pour offrir des dรฉbouchรฉs ร  son industrie militaire et maintenir une autonomie stratรฉgique qui sโ€™avรจre illusoire en lโ€™absence de stratรฉgie et dโ€™un plan de paix. Depuis que son mini-complexe militaro-industriel a entrepris de mettre ses armements aux normes de lโ€™OTAN, elle espรจre, face ร  lโ€™Allemagne, trouver de nouveaux clients parmi les autres Etats europรฉens qui se fournissent presque exclusivement auprรจs des Etats-Unis, aggravant les risques dโ€™une escalade guerriรจre. 

    Si la France adoptait une conduite rationnelle et conforme ร  ses intรฉrรชts, ร  lโ€™instar des Etats-Unis ou de lโ€™Allemagne, elle profiterait de ce retour du politique dans les affaires du monde pour repenser lโ€™รฉquilibre du continent, dans le cadre dโ€™une relation raisonnรฉe avec la Russie, et desserrer lโ€™รฉtau germano-amรฉricain. Ceci exigerait de sโ€™affranchir du carcan des traitรฉs europรฉens et de recouvrer les instruments de la souverainetรฉ ; de ne plus tourner le dos ร  une Histoire que lโ€™oligarchie techno-financiรจre, enchaรฎnรฉe ร  ses abstractions impรฉriales, a prรฉtendu vouloir ยซ dรฉpasser ยป. Rien nโ€™est moins sรปr de la part de cette classe attachรฉe ร  ses privilรจges et ร  la prรฉservation desquels elle a sacrifiรฉ des pans entiers de notre รฉconomie. 

    Il est des dรฉbรขcles moins spectaculaires que celle de 1940 mais de celle-ci, insidieuse et lancinante, il sera difficile de sโ€™en remettre sans un sursaut du peuple franรงais qui, comme souvent dans son histoire, ne peut compter que sur lui-mรชme pour ne pas disparaitre et รฉchapper ร  lโ€™impasse du rรชve impรฉrial ร  laquelle le condamnent ses รฉlites [fin]

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  • [Partage] Guerre dโ€™Ukraine et menace russe : prรฉtextes dโ€™une marche forcรฉe vers le fรฉdรฉralisme europรฉen – ร‰ric Denรฉcรฉ, Cf2R

    […] en premier lieu, de nombreux รฉlรฉments conduisent ร  penser que les Europรฉens poursuivent la politique des nรฉoconservateurs de lโ€™ex-รฉquipe Biden […]

    La Realpolitik, caractรฉrisรฉe par la prise en compte rรฉaliste des rapports de force, est de retour ร  Washington. On le constate avec la dรฉmarche de Donald Trump qui a repris contact avec Vladimir Poutine. Il a compris que la stratรฉgie dโ€™affaiblissement de la Russie conรงue par les nรฉoconservateurs de lโ€™รฉquipe Biden รฉtait un รฉchec et que la guerre ne menait ร  rien. Trump a intรฉrรชt ร  y mettre un terme pour passer ร  autre chose. Il veut un deal avec Poutine, car il ne souhaite pas que les hydrocarbures et les terres rares russes partent en Chine. Il se serait mรชme dit prรชt ร  participer au dรฉveloppement de la Crimรฉe et du Donbass.

    Mais cette รฉvolution nโ€™est pas du goรปt de Zelenski 1 et de son entourage parce que cela remet en cause leur mainmise sur lโ€™Ukraine. Ils bรฉnรฉficient รฉtonnamment du soutien des Europรฉens, dont on comprend mal ce quโ€™ils ont ร  gagner ร  la poursuite de la guerre. Leur obstination est dโ€™autant plus funeste que les trois annรฉes รฉcoulรฉes ont montrรฉ que ce conflit รฉtait dรฉvastateur pour lโ€™รฉconomie europรฉenne et que ses ร‰tats membres รฉtaient incapables dโ€™assurer eux-mรชmes leur sรฉcuritรฉ comme de soutenir efficacement Kiev en matiรจre militaire. En rรฉalitรฉ, leur attitude sโ€™inscrit dans le cadre dโ€™une stratรฉgie prรฉcise, conduite ร  lโ€™insu des peuples europรฉens.

    Une obstination difficilement comprรฉhensible

    Plusieurs raisons peuvent expliquer lโ€™รฉtonnante attitude de va-tโ€™en guerre des dirigeants europรฉens et de leur slogan stupide de ยซ Paix par la force ยป.

    โ€“ En premier lieu, de nombreux รฉlรฉments conduisent ร  penser que les Europรฉens poursuivent la politique des nรฉoconservateurs de lโ€™ex-รฉquipe Biden โ€“ ร  lโ€™origine de ce conflit โ€“, ร  leur instigation. En effet, les Dรฉmocrates, battus ร  plate couture lors des derniรจres prรฉsidentielles amรฉricaines sont en pleine dรฉconfiture aux ร‰tats-Unis. Le parti est ร  la dรฉrive, se fissure et les chances de redressement ร  court terme sont minces. Trump, ayant tirรฉ les leรงons de la maniรจre dont son premier mandat avait รฉtรฉ sabotรฉ par les actions de lโ€™ร‰tat profond amรฉricain pilotรฉ par les familles Clinton et Obama, a, dรจs sa prise de fonctions, lancรฉ toute une sรฉrie dโ€™actions (dissolution de lโ€™USAID, reprise en mains de lโ€™appareil dโ€™ร‰tat et de lโ€™administration, recadrage des juges des juges, etc.) qui ne leur permettent pas de perturber efficacement son dรฉbut de mandat โ€“ au moins pas avant les รฉlections de mid term โ€“ comme ils lโ€™avaient fait entre 2016 et 2020. Les Dรฉmocrates sont donc totalement impuissants. En revanche, divers รฉlรฉments laissent entrevoir quโ€™ils sโ€™emploient ร  saborder sa politique internationale en sโ€™appuyant sur le Royaume-Uni et les ร‰tats de lโ€™Union europรฉenne.

    En effet, depuis 2003, les dirigeants europรฉens ont fait acte de soumission aux ร‰tats-Unis et ร  leur bellicisme. Ils ont dโ€™abord appuyรฉ lโ€™invasion illรฉgale de lโ€™Irak. Puis ils ont acceptรฉ de reconnaitre le rรฉgime ukrainien issu du coup dโ€™ร‰tat de Maรฏdan (2014) et ont fermรฉ les yeux sur la rรฉpression violente dรฉclenchรฉe par Kiev au Donbass. Ensuite, ils se sont laissรฉs entraรฎner, ร  leurs frais et ร  leur dรฉtriment, dans une guerre voulue par Washington, adoptant parfois des positions plus radicales encore contre Moscou qui nโ€™avait pourtant manifestรฉ contre eux aucune hostilitรฉ.

    Tous les dirigeants europรฉens actuels entretiennent les meilleures relations du monde avec lโ€™รฉquipe dรฉmocrate et tous โ€“ ร  lโ€™exception de Viktor Orban, Robert Fico et Georgia Meloni โ€“ ont, plus ou moins directement et explicitement, pris parti contre la rรฉรฉlection de Trump. Depuis son entrรฉe ร  la Maison-Blanche, ils ne cessent de critiquer la nouvelle politique amรฉricaine. Ils semblent ainsi poursuivre, en vassaux fidรจles, la politique des Dรฉmocrates, que ceux-ci continuent de piloter dans lโ€™ombre depuis Washington, partant du principe โ€“ hautement hasardeux โ€“ que lโ€™รฉlection de Trump nโ€™est quโ€™une malheureuse parenthรจse qui prendra fin au plus tard en 2029. Il convient donc de contrer sa politique en attendant leur retour aux affairesโ€ฆ Cela explique la dรฉfiance et le mรฉpris de la nouvelle administration amรฉricaine ร  lโ€™รฉgard de ces ยซ leaders ยป europรฉens quโ€™elle juge hostiles, raison pour laquelle elle ne tient aucunement compte de leur avis et de leurs agitations improductives.

    โ€“ La seconde explication est que le contexte de crise (militaire et รฉconomique) que traverse actuellement le Vieux continent favorise lโ€™ensemble de ces leaders vis-ร -vis de leur รฉlectorat, car la plupart dโ€™entre eux โ€“ en particulier Emmanuel Macron โ€“ se trouvent dans une situation politique difficile. Ils jouent donc sur la peur dโ€™une menace russe imminente โ€“ totalement inventรฉe dans ce but โ€“ pour maintenir les populations dans lโ€™angoisse, faire taire les critiques contre leur politique internationale inconsidรฉrรฉe et retarder lโ€™รฉchรฉance de leur dรฉfaite. En effet, les dirigeants europรฉens doivent dissimuler le fait que leur dรฉcision de rompre avec la Russie a crรฉรฉ lโ€™inflation, les difficultรฉs รฉconomiques et accรฉlรฉrรฉ la dรฉsindustrialisation et la dรฉpendance vis-ร -vis des ร‰tats-Unis (GNL, armes, etc.) 2.

    โ€“ Enfin, troisiรจme hypothรจse ร  ne pas รฉcarter, cโ€™est le refus de prise en compte du rรฉel des รฉlites europรฉennes, par cรฉcitรฉ ou incompรฉtence gรฉopolitique, et la certitude que leur action est juste, fondรฉe et lรฉgitime, illustration de leur dรฉconnexion complรจte des rรฉalitรฉs de terrain et de lโ€™รฉvolution des rapports de force internationaux.

    Faire lโ€™Europe par la crise, lโ€™emprunt et la guerre

    Mais en rรฉalitรฉ, il existe une autre explication qui commence seulement ร  รชtre perรงue et qui รฉclaire dโ€™un jour nouveau lโ€™intransigeance des dirigeants europรฉens : ils exploitent au maximum cette crise pour faire avancer lโ€™Europe dans une voie fรฉdรฉrale, sans demander lโ€™avis des peuples. Leur but ? Faire lโ€™Europe par la crise, lโ€™emprunt et la guerre.

    Cette stratรฉgie machiavรฉlique, vรฉritable manipulation antidรฉmocratique pour imposer une Europe supranationale dont personne ne veut, a รฉtรฉ mise en place ร  partir de la seconde moitiรฉ des annรฉes 2010, exploitant divers รฉvรฉnements internationaux : la crise des Subprimes dโ€™abord ; le COVID ensuite ; enfin, la guerre dโ€™Ukraine et la menace russe. Il est important de dรฉtailler les รฉtapes de cette dรฉrive organisรฉe.

    Rappelons au prรฉalable quโ€™il convient de faire une nette diffรฉrence entre les pays de lโ€™UE membres de la zone euro (20 sur 27 3) et ceux qui nโ€™en sont pas. Si tous dรฉpendent de la Commission, seuls les premiers dรฉpendent en plus de la Banque centrale europรฉenne (BCE). Ils sont donc sous double dรฉpendance de la Commission et de la BCE. Il convient รฉgalement de rappeler que la BCE nโ€™a pas le droit de proposer des emprunts. Cela est interdit par les traitรฉs. Pourtant, il y a eu deux entorses ร  cette rรจgle :

    โ€“ lors de la crise des Subprimes (2008-2009), Mario Draghi a mis en place le Quantitative Easing, cโ€™est-ร -dire une รฉmission monรฉtaire de la BCE avec possibilitรฉ de racheter des dettes des pays de la zone euro (et non de lโ€™UE) sur le second marchรฉ (auprรจs des banques commerciales auxquelles une partie des dettes ont รฉtรฉ rachetรฉes) ;

    โ€“ lors de la crise du COVID, un emprunt de 700 milliards dโ€™euros a รฉtรฉ รฉmis, garanti par les pays de la zone euro, mais bรฉnรฉficiant aussi ร  ceux qui nโ€™en sont pas membresโ€ฆ et qui pourraient dรฉcider de ne pas รชtre solidaires pour son remboursement, car rien ne les y oblige. Ce serait alors aux autres ร‰tats ayant garanti lโ€™emprunt de compenser !

    Ainsi, depuis la crise sanitaire et รฉconomique liรฉe au COVID, les ร‰tats de la zone euro sont de plus en plus tenus par la Commission europรฉenne, via la BCE, par le biais de laquelle ils ont empruntรฉ, accroissant leur dette et renforรงant le contrรดle financier de Bruxelles. Ils dรฉpendent dโ€™une monnaie โ€“ lโ€™euro โ€“ qui ne leur appartient pas, dโ€™oรน la rรฉduction considรฉrable de leur marge de manล“uvre รฉconomique et financiรจre. Mais ce nโ€™est encore quโ€™une monnaie ยซ partagรฉe ยป, cโ€™est-ร -dire quโ€™elle nโ€™est pas encore vraiment ยซ commune ยป. Pour le moment, nous sommes tous endettรฉs en euro ยซ national ยป via nos ร‰tats respectifs. Mais si la monnaie devenait vรฉritablement commune โ€“ ce qui est sans doute lโ€™objectif de lโ€™euro numรฉrique โ€“, les ร‰tats se trouveraient totalement sous le pouvoir dโ€™une structure supranationale. Ils nโ€™auraient alors plus aucune maรฎtrise de leur destin et il leur serait extrรชmement difficile de sortir de lโ€™UE.

    Le programme de financement du rรฉarmement europรฉen via des prรชts aux ร‰tats et lโ€™autorisation dโ€™accroรฎtre leur dรฉficit de 1,5% sans sanction 4 va renforcer encore davantage ce phรฉnomรจne 5. Lโ€™indรฉpendance financiรจre, et donc politique, des ร‰tats membres de la zone euro risque ainsi de diminuer rapidement, voire de disparaรฎtre.

    Les dรฉrives antidรฉmocratiques et autoritaires de lโ€™UE

    Pour arriver ร  leurs fins, les dirigeants europรฉens ne reculent devant rien : reniements, propagande, falsifications de la rรฉalitรฉ, abus de pouvoirโ€ฆ contrevenant sans scrupule aux principes dรฉmocratiques quโ€™ils sont censรฉs incarner et dรฉfendre.

    โ€“ En premier lieu, il convient de rappeler leur soutien au coup dโ€™ร‰tat de Maรฏdan de 2014 orchestrรฉ par Washington, leur non-respect dรฉlibรฉrรฉ des accords de Minsk, leur silence sur la rรฉpression dans le Donbass et leur validation du rejet de lโ€™accord de paix russo-ukrainien de fin mars 2022. Ces รฉvรฉnements illustrent le fait quโ€™ils ne respectent ni leurs engagements ni le droit international et quโ€™ils ne souhaitent pas la fin du conflit.

    โ€“ En second lieu, ils ont dรฉclenchรฉ, avec lโ€™aide des mรฉdias mainstream quโ€™ils contrรดlent, une propagande massive contre Moscou, laquelle se poursuit sans discontinuer, voire sโ€™accรฉlรจre alors que le sort des armes montre que lโ€™issue de ce conflit est scellรฉe et que les discussions entre Trump et Poutine en sonneront bientรดt la fin. Depuis trois ans, ils dissimulent ร  lโ€™opinion les causes vรฉritables de la guerre dโ€™Ukraine et la rรฉalitรฉ du rรฉgime de Kiev, gouvernement extrรฉmiste et corrompu ร  la tรชte dโ€™un ร‰tat failli, rongรฉ par la criminalitรฉ, et qui a trรจs largement contribuรฉ ร  provoquer son voisin.

    โ€“ Ensuite, les dirigeants europรฉens diffusent largement, avec lโ€™appui de la majoritรฉ des chefs des armรฉes de leurs ร‰tats, lโ€™idรฉe dโ€™une menace russe ยซ existentielle ยป, dรฉlire qui ne rรฉsiste pas ร  lโ€™analyse des donnรฉes dรฉmographiques et militaires.

    โ€“ De plus, ils ont mis en place une autre forme de propagande, plus insidieuse, pour faire avancer lโ€™idรฉe dโ€™une indispensable intรฉgration europรฉenne. Dans un rapport rรฉcent 6, le journaliste Thomas Fazi expose comment la Commission europรฉenne finance des ONG, des mรฉdias, des associations de la sociรฉtรฉ civile pour faire avancer son agenda par le biais de divers programmes visant ร  ยซ promouvoir les valeurs de lโ€™UE ยป et ร  ยซ rapprocher lโ€™Union europรฉenne de ses citoyens ยป. En rรฉalitรฉ, ยซ les organisations bรฉnรฉficiaires sont explicitement engagรฉes en faveur du fรฉdรฉralisme europรฉen ou de lโ€™intรฉgration, en alignement avec les propres objectifs politiques de la Commission ยป. Cette manล“uvre se fait au dรฉtriment des processus dรฉmocratiques et de la souverainetรฉ des ร‰tats membres et sans que les Europรฉens en soient conscients. De plus, elle vise ร  รฉtouffer toute voix dissidente ou qui sโ€™รฉcarte de la doxa officielle : celle dโ€™une UE non seulement intรฉgrรฉe, mais รฉgalement vouรฉe ร  lโ€™รฉlargissement (Serbie, Ukraine, etc.). ยซ En amplifiant les voix pro-UE et en marginalisant les perspectives dissidentes, cette stratรฉgie consolide les rรฉcits en faveur de lโ€™intรฉgration tout en discrรฉditant ou en rรฉprimant les points de vue alternatifs. En consรฉquence, les mรฉcanismes de financement de lโ€™UE et les ONG elles-mรชmes sont transformรฉs en outils de propagande institutionnelle visant ร  promouvoir une intรฉgration supranationale plus profonde ยป. Cโ€™est donc lร  une forme indirecte de censure.

    โ€“ Par ailleurs, les dirigeants europรฉens recourent ouvertement ร  des actions antidรฉmocratiques dรจs lors que dโ€™autres acteurs politiques sโ€™opposent ร  leur stratรฉgie. On connait les difficultรฉs faites ร  Orban qui se bat pied ร  pied contre les dรฉrives de lโ€™UE. On a vu comment lโ€™ex-prรฉsidente gรฉorgienne, battue aux derniรจres รฉlections a tentรฉ, avec le soutien de Bruxelles, de remettre en cause โ€“ sans succรจs โ€“ les รฉlections. On a vu รฉgalement comment une partie des รฉlecteurs de Moldavie installรฉs ร  lโ€™รฉtranger nโ€™ont pu voter lors du dernier scrutin, car leur vote aurait fait รฉlire un candidat opposรฉ ร  cette politique et souhaitant un rapprochement avec la Russie. On vient de voir, enfin, la maniรจre dont les รฉlections roumaines ont รฉtรฉ tout ร  fait illรฉgalement annulรฉes et reportรฉes, puis celle dont Georgescu a รฉtรฉ empรชchรฉ de se reprรฉsenter.

    โ€“ Enfin, nous sommes en prรฉsence de vรฉritables abus de pouvoir lorsque lโ€™on voit le rรดle jouรฉ par Ursula von der Leyen, simple haut fonctionnaire europรฉen nommรฉ ร  la tรชte de la Commission, qui se comporte โ€“ avec le plein accord de dirigeants europรฉens co-responsables de cette dรฉrive โ€“ comme une petite gauleiter, outrepassant allรจgrement son rรดle et se fonctions. Rappelons que la Commission europรฉenne et sa prรฉsidente nโ€™ont aucune attribution en matiรจre de dรฉfense. Cette femme et son administration sโ€™arrogent donc des pouvoirs quโ€™elles nโ€™ont pas, se livrant une sorte de coup dโ€™ร‰tat permanent au dรฉtriment des souverainetรฉs nationales.

    En raison de ces dรฉrives autoritaires et de cette propagande et de ces abus de pouvoir, le terme dโ€™ ยซ UERSS ยป nโ€™est pas inappropriรฉ.


    Pour ces diffรฉrentes raisons, les ยซ รฉlites ยป politiques et technocratiques europรฉennes sont dรฉterminรฉes ร  soutenir Kiev et ร  poursuivre une guerre qui sert leur stratรฉgie. Elles affirment donc que lโ€™Ukraine nโ€™est quโ€™une victime, quโ€™elle doit recouvrer son intรฉgritรฉ territoriale, que Poutine est le mal absolu et quโ€™une invasion russe est imminente. Les dirigeants europรฉens semblent ainsi prรชts ร  tout pour imposer aux peuples une Europe supranationale, sans tenir compte de leur volontรฉ. Nous sommes clairement en prรฉsence dโ€™une stratรฉgie consistant ร  ยซ faire ยป lโ€™Europe par les crises, la monnaie et la guerre, et dโ€™une marche forcรฉe vers le fรฉdรฉralisme, par une politique des petits pas empรชchant tout retour en arriรจre, en plaรงant les peuples devant le fait accompli [fin]

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    The Western disinformation about Ukraine

    chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia

    14 mars 2025 : ยซ Pensions ou munitions ? ยป : la fabrique du consentement ร  ยซ lโ€™effort de guerre ยป โ€“ Pauline Perrenot, Acrimed

    Depuis lโ€™allocution dโ€™Emmanuel Macron ร  propos de la guerre en Ukraine, le 5 mars, les grands mรฉdias sont en ordre de marche. Rรฉhabilitation du prรฉsident en ยซ chef de guerre ยป, patriotisme exacerbรฉ, concert militariste et glorification des industriels de guerreโ€ฆ Menรฉ tambour battant, le SAV du discours prรฉsidentiel sโ€™accompagne dโ€™une nouvelle sรฉquence de matraquage patronal contre le ยซ modรจle social ยป et pour ยซ travailler plus ยป au nom, prรฉtendument, de lโ€™ยซ effort de guerre ยป : ยซ Pensions ou munitions ? ยป ; ยซ Les canons ou les allocations ? ยป Signรฉs Dominique Seux (Les ร‰chos, 10/03) et ร‰tienne Gernelle (RTL, 10/03), les deux slogans donnent le ton

    14 mars 2025 : US proxy war against China

    Secretary of State Marco Rubio is supporting the Uyghur Jihadists

    18 fรฉvrier 2025 : La bourgeoisie nโ€™a plus les moyens intellectuels, ni culturels, de sa domination de classe โ€“ Harold Bernat, Quartier Gรฉnรฉral

    Une crise sans prรฉcรฉdent de la culture de classe est en train de se dรฉrouler sous nos yeux. Cette crise emporte aujourdโ€™hui aussi bien la gauche que la droite, si lโ€™on veut absolument en revenir ร  des repรจres simplistes. La classe sociale dominante jouit, mais ne pense plus, ne crรฉe plus. Elle nโ€™a plus quโ€™un chantage ร  proposer au peuple : en dรฉpit de notre nullitรฉ, si nous ne sommes plus lร , que vous restera-t-il? Ce nโ€™est pas que des ยซ populismes ยป aient poussรฉ spontanรฉment pour menacer lโ€™ordre social en faisant peser la menace du chaos et de lโ€™anomie. Ces mythes rรฉactionnaires ne sont que des aveux dโ€™impuissance, et voici pourquoi. Un nouveau grand texte dโ€™Harold Bernat, agrรฉgรฉ de philosophie et collaborateur de ยซ Quartier Populaire ยป, ร  lire aujourdโ€™hui sur QG

    4 dรฉcembre 2024 : Is it a pattern ?

    Sketch: Zelenskyy gives a course in dEmoKrACy to Macron (France), Yoon (South Korea) and Zourabichvili (Georgia)

    6 novembre 2024 : The fall guy

    the Germans have bowed down to the US sabotage by Joe Biden administration of Nord Stream pipelines, only to end up with Donald Trumpโ€™s America First doctrine in economy and defense

    9 octobre 2024 : The old man and the sea

    new information about the US sabotage of Nord Stream pipelines

    29 novembre 2023 : How American Neocons Wrecked the Middle East and Ukraine โ€“ David Stockman, Antiwar.com

    This is part 2 of โ€œWhy There Is Still No Peace on Earth: Washingtonโ€™s Folly From The Persian Gulf to Ukraine.โ€  Read part 1


    1. Dont le mandat a pris fin le 20 mai 2024, mais qui est restรฉ en place et a prorogรฉ la loi martiale. โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
    2. De tous, ce sont les Allemands dont la soumission aux ร‰tats-Unis a รฉtรฉ la plus frappante et qui ont le plus perduย : ils ont acceptรฉ sans broncher la destruction de leur รฉconomie par Washington qui a sabotรฉ Nordย Stream, les a obligรฉs ร  cesser toute relation avec la Russie et ร  acheter du GNL au prix fort. Ils se sont littรฉralement couchรฉs devant les injonctions de leur protecteur, sans aucune rรฉaction ni amour-propre. โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
    3. La zone euro est composรฉe deย 20 paysย (Allemagne, Autriche, Belgique, Chypre, Croatie, Espagne, Estonie, Finlande, France, Grรจce, Irlande, Italie, Lettonie, Lituanie, Luxembourg, Malte, Pays-Bas, Portugal, Slovaquie et Slovรฉnie). Certains ร‰tats de lโ€™UE ont choisi de ne pas y participer (Danemark, Suรจde), les autres ne satisfont pas encore aux critรจres รฉconomiques pour la rejoindre (Bulgarie, Hongrie, Pologne, Rรฉpublique tchรจque, Roumanie). โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
    4. Le montant de 800 milliards dโ€™euros proposรฉ par Bruxelles (ร  confirmer par une adoption formelle) devrait se rรฉpartir de la maniรจre la suivanteย :
      โ€“ un peu moins de 200 milliards vont รชtre pris en charge par la Commission via la BCEย ; les ร‰tats membres en bรฉnรฉficieront au prorata de la part de leur PIB au sein du PIB europรฉen (soit environ 40ย milliards)ย ;
      โ€“ pour le reste, plus de 600 milliards, il sโ€™agit dโ€™une autorisation dโ€™accroissement de 1,5% du dรฉficit autorisรฉ (qui va donc passer de 3% ร  4,5%), sans quโ€™aucune sanction soit imposรฉe.
      โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
    5. A noter que cela nโ€™aura aucun impact pour la France qui dรฉpasse dรฉjร  allรจgrement le futur dรฉficit autorisรฉ avec plus de 6% ces deux derniรจres annรฉes. โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
    6. Thomas Fazi, The EUโ€™s propaganda machine : How the EU Funds NGO to promote itself, Mathias Corvinus Collegium, Brussels, February 2025 (https://brussels.mcc.hu/uploads/default/0001/01/7ab59f9d3aca403f6fbd6ff2af284f236fddad7c.pdf) โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
  • [Sharing] Germanyโ€™s new right: Trading on nostalgia for past prosperity in an age of uncertainty – Ingo Schmidt, Canadian Dimension

    Ingo Schmidt on how the triumph of liberal democracy and neoliberal globalization became the ideological seed for the AfD

    On November 6, 2024 German Chancellor Olaf Scholz fired Finance Minister Christian Lindner. Notwithstanding the broad agreement on policy goals, striking a balance between deficit reduction, support for renewable energy and increased arms spending turned out to be impossible. Lindner, a liberal, opted for social cuts; Scholz, a social democrat, wants to avoid them. They had to part ways. After Scholz lost a no-confidence vote, federal elections were scheduled for February 23, 2025. The question that worries everyone from old-school conservatives to new millennium lefties is: How many votes will go to the hard right (if not neo-Nazi) party Alternative for Germany (Alternative fรผr Deutschland or AfD). In the last federal elections in 2021, the AfD got 10.4 percent of the total vote. Current polls put them at 20 percent, but nobody knows what will happen on election day. In this new age of uncertainty, polls donโ€™t predict election results as reliably as in the past.

    Elections in the East German provinces Brandenburg, Saxony and Thuringia have already shown what hard-right success looks like. They also reveal the inability of the political centre to understand how much it contributed to the rise of a new right. Refashioning totalitarianism theory in the New Cold War climate, centrist politicians and pundits typically portray the success of the new right as the outgrowth of the Nazi and Communist dictatorships that ruled East Germany from 1933 to 1990. West Germany, which was spared Communist rule and, allegedly, shook off the burden of its Nazi past, appears as a role model in this democracy-versus-dictatorship story. Totalitarianism theory could possibly explain why the AfD is more successful, so far at least, in East than in West Germany. But it canโ€™t explain right-wing success in other countries, like France, that were never under Communist rule and know Nazi rule only from occupation, which strengthened anti-fascist traditions in those countries. But even these traditions couldnโ€™t stop the rise of the new right there.

    This article offers a different explanation for the hard-right surge in Germany. It shows that German unification in 1990, signalling the triumph of liberal democracy and the onset of neoliberal globalization, unleashed a new form of nationalismโ€”Deutschmark nationalismโ€”which, after mutating into export nationalism for a while, became the ideological seed for the AfD. West Germany, or, more precisely, the economic miracle that was West Germany in the post-war era, served as a role model during German unification. Promoted by West German elites and eagerly embraced by people in East Germany, it raised the expectation of a new economic miracle materializing in the West and extending to the East. However, these hopes were soon disappointed as political unification caused socioeconomic divisions between East and West Germany and, in the early 2000s, a turn to austerity policies that were highly unpopular in the East and the West. Just when it seemed that Germany would weather the world economic crisis of 2008-9 better than other Western countries, and maybe even become the European hegemon, things started falling apart. The Euro-crisis made clear that it was not only politically united Germany that was plagued by massive socioeconomic and geographical divisions but the European Union, too. Continued economic weakness combined with New Cold War marching orders from Washington fed a nostalgia for a supposedly great pastโ€”symbolized by the Deutschmark. This nostalgia, I argue, would not have taken root if the left had been able to channel growing discontent into mobilization for a more equitable and less insecure future.

    State elections in Brandenburg, Saxony, and Thuringia

    State elections donโ€™t typically get international media attention. The September 1, 2024, elections in Thuringia and Saxony did. After all, it was the first time since the downfall of the Nazi-regime that a hard-right party, the AfD, pulled the majority of votes in a German election. It proved a bitter coincidence: The AfD celebrated their victory in Thuringia, obtaining 32.8 percent of the total vote, on the 85th anniversary of the Nazi-invasion of Poland that marked the beginning of the Second World War.

    The Conservative Christian Democrats (the Christlich-Demokratische Union or CDU) came in second with 23.6 percent. The parties of the federal government coalition, Social Democrats (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands or SPD), Greens (Bรผndnis 90/Die Grรผnen) and Liberals (Freie Demokratische Partei or FDP) ended up with single-digit results, the FDP reduced to a mere 1.1 percent. At the time of the election, this was the party of the federal minister of finance. The Left Party (Die Linke), which in the previous election had become the strongest party for the first time in any German state, lost almost 18 percent and came in fourth, even trailing the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (Bรผndnis Sahra Wagenknecht or BSW), a breakaway group from the Left Party.

    In Saxony, the AfD won 30.6 percent of the votes, just behind the CDUโ€™s 31.9 percent. As in Thuringia, none of the parties of the federal government coalition achieved double-digit results. The Left Party lost more than half of its vote and ended up with a devastating 4.5 percent. The BSW came in a distant third with 11.8 percent.

    Just three weeks after their election victories in Thuringia and Saxony, the AfD scored another success in Brandenburg. Narrowly beaten by the SPD that got 30.9 percent of the total vote, the AfD came in second with 29.2 percent, way ahead of the BSWโ€™s 13.1 percent and the CDUโ€™s 12.1 percent. The Left Party and the Greens obtained less than five percent of the vote, which is the minimum threshold for holding seats in provincial or federal parliament under the mixed-member proportional electoral system. The FDP pulled less than one percent.

    Mainstream media fails to explain right-wing success

    Barely beaten by the Conservatives in Saxony and the Social Democrats in Brandenburg, the AfD was elected by roughly a third of the electorate in three East German states, becoming the strongest party only in Thuringia. If ever there was a right-wing surge, this was it. Most media reports attributed the phenomenon to widespread dissatisfaction with the federal government, particularly regarding migration, climate policies and the war in Ukraine. Accounts of why the AfD is more popular in the East (approval ratings in the west of Germany range from 8.5 percent in Hamburg and the Saarland to 21 percent in Lower Saxony) focus mostly on disappointments caused by German unification, continuing socioeconomic disparities and a widespread feeling among erstwhile East Germans of being second class citizens. Other explanations invoke the authoritarian heritage of communist rule in East Germany, which is often presented as an extension of the Nazi-regime. Against the two dictatorships in the East, West Germany is presented as a role model of liberal democracy. This as if there hadnโ€™t been considerable continuity between Third Reich and West German elites; as if East Germanyโ€™s ruling bureaucracy, despite all its dictatorial wrongs, wasnโ€™t established by antifascists who had been exiled or jailed during the Nazi reign; as if the nationalization of the means of production, despite the wrongs of bureaucratic rule, had not marked a break from the West German capitalism that made West Germany a junior partner in the American Empire; as if West German capitalism had not dictated the terms of unification at the very time that a grassroots movement for democracy unsettled bureaucratic rule in East Germany. The destruction of the East German economy and the integration of the East into existing West German institutions left no room for the aspirations of East Germanyโ€™s civil rights movement. Rather than explaining growing support for the new right, media talk about the โ€œpeculiarities of the Eastโ€ reinforces existing frustrations thereโ€”frustrations that help shed light on the relative strength, so far at least, of the right-wing surge in the East.

    The โ€˜two-dictatorshipsโ€™ thesis that pits the East against the liberal democratic West revives the totalitarianism theory that was an integral part of the anti-communist, anti-Soviet consensus during the Cold War. It is now part of the New Cold War ideology that counterposes democracy and authoritarianism. As in the old Cold War, charges of totalitarianism serve to short circuit thinking about alternative economic and political systems, reinforcing the neoliberal creed that there is no alternative to capitalism. The lack of actually existing alternatives is, of course, also one of the reasons for the rise of the new right. Emerging out of an ailing neoliberalism, this right-wing force presents itself as an alternative to the status quo but actually just recasts neoliberalism in a nationalist and racist mould. Replacing neoliberalismโ€™s earlier commitment to corporate globalization in Germany, as elsewhere, neoliberalism is haunted by the spectre of fascism, which, to centrist neoliberals, has everything to do with misled masses unable to understand the virtues of capitalist liberal democracy and nothing to do with capitalist crises that undermine the legitimacy of liberal democracy. Neoliberalism is also haunted by the spectre of communism as ruling classes worry that crisis of legitimacy could extend to capitalism itself. As the neoliberal centre denies the possibility of alternatives and the left generally (not only the Left Party in Germany) appears unable to advance real world alternatives, the growing appetite for change, spurred by recurrent crises wrought by capitalism, settles for right-wing fantasies of a harmonious life in a nation that competes successfully with other countries economically and is freed from job- and welfare-stealing migrants.

    The impact of German unification and the rise and decline of neoliberal globalization

    Capitalist crises and their exploitation by the right are common phenomena, certainly in the imperialist centres of the world system, but also in the peripheries. But they play out differently in different national contexts. Behind the AfDโ€™s electoral successes in Thuringia and Saxony as well as its broader surge in popularity lie the combined histories of German unification and the rise and decline of neoliberal globalization. The upsurge of the new right is just one of the outcomes of these combined histories. Equally important is the defeat of the federal government coalition and the rout of the FDP, whose leader, former federal Minister of Finance Christian Lindner, promotes austerity policies that stymie government plans to subsidize the transition to non-fossil energies. These policies also lead to a creeping roll-back of social spendingโ€”except when it comes to arms spending. Little wonder a government that took office on the promise of something like a Green New Deal lost its credibility almost entirely and called for a federal election scheduled for February 23 of this year.

    And then there is the defeat of the Left Party that, despite programmatic commitments to progressive alternatives, is widely seen as the appendage of a lame-duck government in Berlin. At the other end of the political spectrum, the AfD is widely perceived as an oppositional force, even though its program blends austerity, nationalism and militarism in ways that are more extreme but qualitatively not much different from policies advanced by the CDU and the FDP.

    In the face of electoral defeat, the federal government, which embraced the USโ€™s New Cold War policies a few weeks after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, also introduced dramatically tougher migration policies. Rather than representing any kind of alternative, as its name purports, the AfD is the black sheep of the establishment family, expressing racist views more radically and bluntly than even the Conservatives. While the Social Democrats, Liberals and Greens are intent on denying such views, they reveal themselves as Western supremacists when it comes to fending off so-called authoritarian threats arising from Russia and China, stirring up longstanding fears in the West that โ€˜the Russians are comingโ€™ or that โ€˜Asian hordesโ€™ augur โ€œthe decline of the West,โ€ in the words of right-wing intellectual Oswald Spengler.

    The hypocrisy of the Greens, who advocate a green transition while supporting the purchase of dirty oil and gas (wherever they can get it ever since the Russian invasion of Ukraine ended Russian gas-flows to Germany), make them a prime target of AfD agitation. But in reality the AfD and the Greens share the fear of Western decline. The AfD engage in fearmongering around the replacement of white people by non-white immigrants and accuse the Greens and their coalition partners in the federal government of accelerating Western decline. But while the Greens may be the prime target of the AfDโ€™s culture war, the truth is that despite significant differences in tone, the Greens and the AfD share a basic consensus on the decline of the West.

    AfD success in the east: history holds the key

    Encouraged by Glasnost in the Soviet Union, many East Germans took to the streets in the fall of 1989. Under the banner โ€œWe Are the Peopleโ€ they demanded democratic reforms of East Germany. Neither unification with West Germany nor a return to a capitalist economy was on their agendaโ€”at least not initially. As protests grew, and especially after the ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED) had opened the border to the West, โ€œWe Are the Peopleโ€ was replaced by โ€œWe Are One Peopleโ€ more and more often. It was supplemented by the slogan โ€œGermany, United Fatherland,โ€ which is actually a quote from East Germanyโ€™s national anthem, written by the communist poet Johannes R. Becher in 1949, at a time when the leaders of the SED still thought a united Germany could be achievedโ€”not necessarily socialist but not aligned on either the US or the Soviet Union. Such hopes were buried by the Cold War, for which the Berlin Wall became a symbol, casting a dark shadow over communist East Germany and allowing capitalist West Germany to present itself as a beacon of freedom. It was in a matter of weeks in the winter of 1989-90 that the abstract possibility became a demand, massively fanned by West German politiciansโ€”notably then chancellor Helmut Kohlโ€”and mainstream media, which hinted at the possibility of East Germany adopting the West German Deutschmark. Many East Germans seized on such hints as an irresistible offer. โ€œIf the D-Mark comes, weโ€™ll stay here; if it doesnโ€™t come, weโ€™ll go to itโ€ became the next popular protest slogan. Since the opening of the border, thousands of East Germans had gone to the West, creating conditions reminiscent of the times before the wall was built in 1961. Back then, the East German economy lost so many people, most of them young and well-trained, that a collapse of social reproduction became a real threat. The wall stopped the bleeding of the East German economy but inflicted irreparable damage on the legitimacy of the political system.

    Almost 30 years later, the opening of the border by the SED-leadership came as a bit of a surprise to West German elites. Yet, they were quick to grasp the possibilities it created. To them, this meant the integration of East Germany into the West German political and economic system, not coexistence with a somehow reformed but still politically independent East Germany. The โ€˜take over the Eastโ€™ goal of West German elites and the Deutschmark rush of East German masses fed each other. The civil rights movement that wanted to democratize East Germany was sidelined. Some of the groups active in that movement adjusted to the new zeitgeist quickly, some even entered into an electoral alliance with the East German conservative party, despite their having criticized it as a small but integral part of the SED-regime. Angela Merkel, who would later become chancellor, belonged to one of these East German groups that allied with other conservative-turned-civil-rights groups and the East German CDU. This Alliance for Germany easily won the last East German elections and negotiated the integration of East Germany into West Germanyโ€™s institutional structures. On July 1, 1990, the Deutschmark came to the East, three months later the independent state of East Germany vanished into an enlarged West Germany. Most of the Alliance for Germany dissolved into the West German CDU immediately after unification. In December this enlarged CDU won federal elections.

    In less than a year the Cold War had come to an end and an entire state had disappeared. However, the hopes pinned on unification, notably the introduction of the Deutschmark, were soon dashed. A year after unification, unemployment, which had existed in communist East Germany primarily in a hidden form, stood at 10.2 percent and rose to over 20 percent in the early 2000s. It didnโ€™t fall below 10 percent until 2014, a quarter of a century after the Berlin Wall fell. Moreover, mass migration from East to West Germany, which the introduction of the Deutschmark was meant to curb, actually accelerated after the arrival of the Deutschmark. From 1990 to 2015, East Germany lost significantly more than one million people, the vast majority during the first two years after unification, and almost all of them of working age. Were it not for this emigration as well as early retirement schemes and retraining schemes for thousands of workers, unemployment in the East would have been even higher than it actually was. Introducing a new form of hidden unemployment, many of the participants in retraining were enrolled in one course after another, often in different fields, until they were old enough for early retirement.

    One of the main, if not the main, reasons for the collapse of the East German economy was the Deutschmark. Introduced at a rate of one Mark West for one Mark East, while average productivity of East Germany was estimated to be about a quarter that of West Germany, German monetary union gave private households the boost in purchasing power they so desired. But it made East German firms uncompetitive. Lower wages could not compensate productivity differentials between firms in East Germany and Western countries. The privatization of East Germanyโ€™s state-owned firms facilitated the downfall of the East German economy even further. In some cases, Western companies bought East German firms just to shut them down so that they would not become competitors in the future. In other cases, they wanted patents or certain segments of production that they could integrate into their own supply-chains, leaving everything else to be shut down. The closures and cherry-picking of some more desirable segments destroyed the reproduction process of the East German economy even beyond the damage done by rendering it uncompetitive through monetary union.

    The result was that bits and pieces of the East German economy became a periphery of production networks controlled by West German corporations. Ironically, the neoliberal restructuring of production processes went hand in hand with massive fiscal transfers from West to East Germany. A price that had to be paid to sustain some level of social cohesion while disappointment that political unification was followed by economic decline and continued social divisions between East and West instead of an Eastern economic miracle following the example of West Germany from the late 1950s to the early 1970s. At some point, a third of East German incomes came from fiscal transfers. As a result, government debt as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) rose from 41.8 percent in 1989 to 61.2 percent in 1999, which is nothing compared to todayโ€™s numbers. Yet, back then the lesson that had yet to be learned is that neoliberalism, despite its balanced-budget rhetoric, really is a mix of austerity and tax cuts for the rich that produces increasing debt levels at every slowdown or downturn of the economy. In the 1990s, government debt over 60 percent of GDP was a scandal. Not least because, at the urging of the conservative German government, 60 percent had become the benchmark for membership in the European monetary union, for which the roadmap had been laid out in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty.

    Budget deficits, accumulating into government debt, werenโ€™t the only deficit scandal in 1990s Germany. The other was in the current account. From a surplus of 4.6 percent in 1989, the current account dropped to a โ€“1.9 percent deficit in 1991 and remained in deficit territory until 2001. In most other countries, deficits between negative one and negative two percent wouldnโ€™t be a matter of concern. In Germany they were. After all, West German prosperityโ€”the very model East Germans admired so muchโ€”had been reliant on export-driven growth, which was always understood as export surpluses. As it turned out, unification in the early 1990s, led to a boom in West Germany as East Germans spent many of their newly acquired Deutschmarks on consumer goods โ€˜Made in (West) Germanyโ€™โ€”despite massive job losses. This boom drove prices up and made German exports less competitive on the world market. At the same time, some of the money from the East German spending spree went to foreign companies. As exports took a hit and imports got a boost, the current account went from positive to negative.

    The East was integrated into the West German political system as it existed prior to unification. The Kohl government didnโ€™t agree to any changes suggested by the East German government that formally negotiated unification but really rubberstamped the subordination of East German society to West German institutions. Economic integration was different though. The collapse of the East German economy, triggered by the design of monetary union and privatizations, had a lasting impact on the West German economic model that East Germans had been eager to embrace. The first decade after unification was marked by a twin deficit in government budgets and current accounts. During the unification boom from 1990 to 1993, inflation went up to levels not seen since the oil-price hikes and inflationary struggles between capital and labour from the 1970s to the early 1980s. At that time, however, the West German inflation rate was still below that of other Western countries, whereas in the early 1990s it was amongst the highest

    West Germany as a role model

    Running continued deficitsโ€”let alone a twin deficitโ€”was unthinkable in a country that rebuilt its economy after the Second World War through integration into a world market with rules established and enforced by the US. In this American Empire, West Germany played the role of bulwark against Soviet Communism, including East Germany, and as a showcase of Western capitalism. To succeed in this role, foreign debt, accumulated by the Nazis and inherited by West Germany as legal successor of the Third Reich, was forgiven through the 1953 London Debt Agreement. West Germany also inherited low wages, industrial capacity and new technologies from the Nazi economy that, contrary to widespread assumptions, survived the war largely intact. This gave West German industries a competitive advantage that was further buttressed by favourable exchange rates on which basis West Germany was admitted to the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates in 1952. Reintegration into the world market also allowed West Germany to transition from a coal-based to an oil-based economy. Oil was cheaper than coal but its supplies were controlled by US companies and the American state.

    However, being a junior partner in the American Empire turned out to be a much better deal for the German bourgeoisie than its earlier quests for world power. The territory under its direct control was much smaller after two failed power grabs but profits were stellar. Driven by exports, or export surpluses more precisely, the West German economy didnโ€™t require fiscal stimulus and kept growing until the US turned to floating exchange rates, which led to a significant appreciation of the Deutschmark. Further, oil prices exploded in the 1970s. But it was during these turbulences that West Germany consolidated its reputation as a beacon of economic stability. Political management of the crisis, notably codetermination (German lingo for the institutionalized cooperation between unions and employer association), kept wages and inflation lower than in most other Western countries. This helped to sustain export surpluses for much of the 1970s. In turn, export surpluses allowed the government to keep fiscal stimulus and unemployment rates low. Again, this is compared to other Western countries, not compared to the post-war boom.

    West Germanyโ€™s relative success in managing the economic crises of the 1970s raised some concerns among its allies, who considered this success a case of beggar-thy-neighbour policies. The US pressured the West German government to increase public spending in order to stimulate the world economy. The West German government couldnโ€™t shrug off these US demands entirely. The social democratic party was led by Helmut Schmidt at the time, and some extra spending also appeased the left wing in his own party as well as some unionists. However, calls for a Keynesian fix of the economic crises never overcame the general preference for fiscal prudence and low inflation that marked West German society after two lost wars, each followed by the introduction of a new currency, one of them also by unprecedented hyperinflation. Not entirely without reason, export success after the Second World War was widely attributed to liberal economic principles, conveniently ignoring the fact that this โ€˜liberalism in one countryโ€™ could only work because other economies placed growing demand on the world market.

    Export success also created an ersatz-identity that allowed West Germans to repress the horrors of the Nazi regime and the roles most of them had played in these horrors, as perpetrators or bystanders. Social democrats never really fit into this picture. Willy Brandt, who spent the Nazi reign in underground resistance circles and exile and would later become West Germanyโ€™s first social democratic chancellor, was seen by many as a traitor. His successor Helmut Schmidt, who had served in the Nazi air force, opposed many of Brandtโ€™s plans for social reform and applied Keynesian policies only in homeopathic doses. He was successfully branded as the one responsible for rising unemployment and inflation by the Conservatives and Liberals. Crossing the floor from SPD to CDU, the Liberals made Helmut Kohl chancellor. Kohl won two elections before unification on the promise of bringing post-war prosperity back. He won another two after unification on the promise of bringing the prosperity to East Germany.

    For a long time, Kohl presented himself successfully as the defender of the West German export model and guarantor of the collective identity tied to that model, despite the fact that 1980s West Germany never saw a return to postwar prosperity. Disappointment with his broken promises for a West German economic miracle 2.0 began spreading towards the end of the 1980s. Yet, the disintegration of the SED regime allowed him to renew and extend his promises to the East. The national euphoria that secured his 1990 election victory also saw a transformation of collective identity. West German pride in being export world champion turned into Deutschmark nationalism. Widely shared in the East, where people were happy to get the Deutschmark, and the West, where people saw it as symbol of their postwar achievements, this was not the pure money, or currency, fetishism Karl Marx wrote about in Capital. It had a distinctive nationalist character that was subdued in West Germanyโ€™s pre-unification export-identity. With unification, the nationalist seed blossomed. Not only did this help Kohl become the โ€˜chancellor of unity,โ€™ but it also gave cover to a burst of neo-Nazi attacks on immigrants, leftists and queer people, culminating in arson attacks in Rostock, Mรถlln and Solingen. The latter two killed eight people, while the attack in Rostock laid a four-day siege on an apartment block inhabited by foreign workers who had been employed in East Germanyโ€™s now defunct state-owned economy. The openly neo-Nazi attacks of the early 1990s, later dubbed โ€œbaseball bat years,โ€ were followed by a series of murders committed by the National Socialist Underground (NSU) that cost nine immigrants and one cop their lives from 2000 to 2007. The role of the German secret service in covering up, or even facilitating, these murders has never been investigated as key documents remain classified until this day. Hans-Georg MaaรŸen, head of the secret service from 2012 to 2018, was one of the individuals responsible for blocking investigations of the NSU-murders. He also heads up an ultra-conservative circle, initially inside the CDU and now operating in the right-wing space between the CDU und the AfD.

    Exports รผber alles: Eastern peripheries boost corporate profits

    During unification and in the first few years afterwards, nationalism was a mass ideology. It rallied flag-waving masses in the streets, it dominated German politics and inspired Nazi-skinheads to chase people they considered enemies. As it became clear that the hopes for an economic miracle 2.0 would not be realized, street protests receded, most skinheads scaled down their activism and just a few turned to clandestine terrorist attacks. It seemed that nationalism had lost the force it had just recently. However, the entanglements between Nazis and parts of the state apparatuses indicate that while nationalism wasnโ€™t as visible as before, it had not disappeared.

    As it turned out, the opening of the Berlin Wall was a key step towards what would later be called neoliberal globalization. As the German bourgeoisie sought its place in a world seemingly governed by the invisible hand of the marketโ€”not Soviet planners or the milder version of Western government interventionโ€”nationalism also found a new role as mass ideology. The ideological wind blowing from the โ€˜real West,โ€™ that is, the United States, rebranded free trade theory going back to the days of David Ricardo as globalization. Sticking closely to Ricardoโ€™s principles, academic globalists argued that firms, if left alone by the state, would specialize in the production of those goods they can produce more cheaply than firms in another country either because they possess more productive technologies or use input factors more plentiful and cheap than in another country. All countries will be better off if firms in each country specialize according to their comparative advantages.

    Globalization practitioners talked about entire countries as if they were firms competing against each other. Competitiveness of nation-states became the lodestar of capitalists, and their political executors, who used it to justify the roll-back of wages and social standards in all countries. Their run-the-country-like-a-business propaganda was so persuasive that even working class people whose wages, pensions and public services were cut fell for it in large numbers, electing and re-electing neoliberal globalizers over and over again. At the same time, fear that the policies just voted for would cause a race to the bottom spread in the rich countries that saw parts of their production outsourced to poor countries, where labour was really cheap, while immigrants from such countries would take on jobs in the burgeoning low-wage sectors of the rich countries. Migration, segmented labour markets and a global reserve army of labour, enabling capitalists to engage in global labour arbitrage, were neither part of academic globalization theory nor did they feature in politiciansโ€™ globalization propaganda. Absent from public debate, these real-life factors created fears that a new right could build on by portraying economic problems as questions of national identity. Translated into policy terms, that meant a program of keeping immigrants out and capital in. This protectionist backlash against neoliberal globalization, coupled with the rise of a new right ranging from populist to neo-Nazi formations, occurred all over the Global North. It began slowly in the late 1990s and early 2000s while globalization was still expanding, and then gathered steam in the wake of the 2008-9 world financial crisis that marked the end of accumulation driven by globalization. It has accelerated again since the COVID-19 recession as well as the escalating great power politics vis-ร -vis Russia and China, which have led to openly imperialist policies couched in the same nationalist ideology which the new right thrives on. The competitive nation-as-corporation ideology and the policies that marked actually unfolding globalization was the breeding ground for todayโ€™s strange bedfellowship of globalizers-turned-great-power-warriors and national supremacists of the new right. Theories of unregulated free trade opening the path towards global prosperity were just an ideological tool that was useful as long the integration of more and more countries into the US-dominated world market fuelled capitalist accumulation, and thereby hopes for the eventual trickle-down. It was replaced with the rhetoric of concern for national security and democracy as accumulation ended in a new phase of stagnation.

    The German bourgeoisie had already adopted the logic of the state as business competitor after the Second World War when it traded world power ambitions for a junior partner role in the American Empire. Balanced budgets and tight money formed the core of its policies. That, along with competitive advantages inherited from the Nazis or granted by the US, enabled export-driven growth and, ultimately, export surpluses. Despite verbal commitments to liberalism, these policies were mercantilist in substance. Shattered but not derailed by the crises of the 1970s, West Germanyโ€™s mercantilist regime of accumulation survived until unification led to a twin deficit, slow growth and socioeconomic divisions between East and West. Unified Germanyโ€™s economy stumbled along while the US enjoyed its New Economy boom, even though that turned out to be short-lived, and China attained unprecedented levels of economic growth.

    The Kohl government didnโ€™t respond to the bourgeoisieโ€™s growing concerns about economic stagnation in Germany. Neither did it respond to growing dissatisfaction with social conditions among the popular classes. After uniting Germany, Kohl turned to further uniting Europe. Partly, he wanted to demonstrate Germanyโ€™s continued commitment to cooperation in the European Union as some European leadersโ€”notably British Prime Minister Thatcher and French President Franรงois Mitterrandโ€”had expressed reservations about German unification and worried about a return of German great power ambitions. European monetary union became Kohlโ€™s preferred route to an โ€œever closer union,โ€ as EU-parlance had it at the time. However, regarding other countries, notably in the Mediterranean, Kohl successfully pushed for tight fiscal and monetary rulesโ€”the same kind of rules West German policy makers followed in the postwar period. Under the favourable conditions granted by the US to integrate into the world market, this led to export-driven prosperity. However, other countries didnโ€™t enjoy the same favourable conditions. What would upset governments and people in such countries even more was the fact that Kohl had abandoned the rules he was preaching to other European countries in his very own united Germany

    Helmut Kohl at the CDU national party convention in Hamburg, 1973. Photo from Wikimedia Commons

    There, European monetary union was widely seen as a top-down capitalist elite project, part of corporate globalization or as a handing over of the beloved Deutschmark to irresponsible Eurocrats and the Club Med, a derogatory term often used in public debates to denounce people in the Mediterranean countries as lazy, spend-thrifty and, worst of all, happily having a good time at the expense of others. Euro-scepticism added to disappointment with the collapse of East Germanyโ€™s economy after unification, growing income polarization and fears of job loss all over Germany and a sense of losing national sovereignty to global capital. Unresponsive to any of these concerns, Kohl and his coalition of Conservatives and Liberals eventually lost the 1998 election to the Social Democrats and Greens who formed a coalition government offering a blend of light Keynesianism, green transition and control of financial markets. This is where the Germanโ€”and internationalโ€”bourgeoisies got really concerned.

    The opening ideological salvos to derail the newly elected governmentโ€™s plans came from the British tabloid The Sun, calling Oskar Lafontaine, the new finance minister who proposed the introduction of a Tobin tax, โ€œEuropeโ€™s most dangerous man.โ€ Next came Madeleine Albright, then US secretary of state, who gave Germanyโ€™s Green Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer the choice of joining the bombing campaign against Yugoslavia or having his country isolated from Western allies. Fischer, and the new Chancellor Gerhard Schrรถder, chose war. Seeing that his opposition to the war wasnโ€™t supported by anyone else in the cabinet, Lafontaine resigned before the bombing began.

    A few months later, The Economist called Germany the โ€œSick man of the Euro.โ€ Coming from the central organ of global capitalism and unrepentant advocate of liberalism since the days when England, not China, was the workshop of the world, this was not just another opinion piece. It was a warning that the international investment communityโ€”exactly the CEOs, bankers, brokers and financiers targeted by the then-emerging movement against corporate globalizationโ€”lost confidence in the German market and expected pro-business measures to boost their propensity to invest.

    After a few months in office, Schrรถder had to choose between meeting votersโ€™ expectations (job creation, reduction of job insecurities and income inequality) and capitalistsโ€™ cost-reduction demands. He chose the capitalistsโ€™ side, earning him the nickname Genosse der Bosse (Comrade of the Bosses). In the absence of a social movement from below that could have pushed him to deliver on the election platforms of the SPD and the Greens, this choice might actually better be called caving to capitalist threats of an investment strike. From 2000 to 2005, the Schrรถder government axed corporate tax rates, exempted capital gains from taxation and lowered equity requirements for credits. The other side of the class divide saw drastic reductions in unemployment benefits, essentially slashing them to the level of welfare payment rates after one year of benefits. At the same time, legal obstacles to employing temporary workers were greatly reduced. Capitalists were thrilled. Profits and asset prices shot up, but capital formation declined during the years pro-business laws were passed.

    Reorganizing existing production capacities was more important to corporate executives than creating new capacities. This was not surprising as capacity utilization dropped when the New Economy bubble burst, triggering a downturn of the world economy that kept even booming China below double-digit growth. As it turned out, united Germany did not inherit the export successes of pre-unification West Germany, but was certainly heir to its export dependence.

    In the early 2000s, Germanyโ€™s current account turned positive againโ€”not because exports grew so strongly (they actually stagnated due to the world economic downturn), but because imports declined owing to weak domestic demand associated with the Schrรถder governmentโ€™s neoliberal policies. However, as the world economy bounced back (China saw growth rates of 10-14 percent from 2003 to 2006), German exports grew again. Eventually the reorganization of production processes in the aftermath of German unification paid off. West German corporations now controlled production networks linking corporate headquarters controlling finance, research and development, and capital-intensive parts of actual assembly in the centres with labour intensive production in low-wage areas in the peripheries from Eastern Germany all the way to China. In these networks, East Germany occupied the position of a semi-periphery. On the supply side, German export success in the early 2000s relied on continued wage inequality between centres and peripheries, which doesnโ€™t mean that all workers in the centres earned high wages. The threat to relocate production to the East or the South put the brakes on all wages. The lowering of social standards propelled the growth of low-wage employment, notably in the service sector. Well-paying, permanent jobs began to decrease as a share of total employment even in West Germany. As a result, discontent that was widespread in the East since political unification was followed by economic collapse, and social downgrading began to creep into the West.

    2010s: Exporting the Euro-crisis

    The export surpluses of the early 2000s relied on the same mercantilism that had generated such surpluses during the postwar prosperity. However, during the postwar period, unprecedented growth rates across the Western, and parts of the non-Western, world made it possible to superimpose a welfare state on a mercantilist economy that didnโ€™t squeeze profit rates but operated with capitalโ€™s consent in a way that seemed unthinkable during the age of catastrophe from 1914 to 1945. In the early 2000s, by contrast, successful mercantilism demanded the roll-back of the welfare state. Tragically, the extension of West Germanyโ€™s welfare state institutions to East Germany, where they were superimposed on a collapsing economy, created the profit squeeze that was needed to curtail the material protections granted by the welfare state. To sustain competitive advantages gained by scaling back the welfare state, it was imperative to keep wage-growth low even after surging exports pulled the economy out of the slump. Unlike during the period of postwar prosperity, export surpluses didnโ€™t stimulate domestic demand very much. In fact, current account surpluses in the early 2000s, which surged from -1.8 percent in 2000 to 6.7 percent in 2007, were as much driven by rising exports as by weak growth of imports, a clear indicator of the overall sluggishness of domestic demand. Unemployment rates rose from 9.3 percent in 2000 to 12.1 percent in 2005. After that, unemployment went into long-term decline, briefly interrupted by the 2008/9 Great Recession and slowed down by the 2009/15 Euro-crisis, eventually reaching five percent before the 2020 COVID-19 Recession. However, this job growth occurred almost entirely in low wage occupations.

    Paradoxically, it was during the Euro-crisis that a wave of โ€œexport nationalismโ€ covered up the discontent that was growing, at variable speeds, across Germany. The Deutschmark nationalism that emerged during German unification had taken a hit with the introduction of the Euro. However, when it turned out that the Euro was basically the old Deutschmark under a new name and export surplus levels were reaching unprecedented heights, it almost seemed that the long-awaited return of prosperity was about to materialize. But of course, it wasnโ€™t the same as the postwar prosperity that saw strong growth almost everywhere. The 2010s, by contrast, were a time of stagnation. The rebound after the 2008/9 recession was stronger in Germany than in other countries, but then growth rates fell in line with the one-to-two percent range of other Western countries.

    It was during this time of recurrent crises and long-term stagnation that the German government, led by Angela Merkel with the Social Democrats as junior partner, felt compelled to lecture other governments on economic policy. Completely blind to the fact that beggar-thy-neighbour policies are a zero-sum game, the Merkel-government told Southern European countries to impose austerity despite the fact that they were suffering from a sovereign debt crisis due to the end of cheap credit that became available after the creation of the European monetary union, helping to pay for imports from Germany. Merkel also told them that, after a painful but unavoidable period of belt-tightening, they would eventually succeed as export countries like Germany.

    The European monetary unionโ€™s contradictory character torn between further integrating Europe and spreading German mercantilism shifted entirely to the latter. Southern Europeans, governments and ordinary people, understood that austerity would further subordinate their economies to Germanyโ€™s economic dominance. The Brits, like the Germans and the โ€œFrugal Fourโ€ (Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden), although not warm to the idea of bailing out crisis-ridden Southern Europeans, were suspicious that Germanyโ€™s leading role in handling the crisis would turn the countryโ€™s economic dominance into fully-fledged hegemony. Brexit has its origin here. Eastern Europeโ€™s post-communist comprador governments had imposed austerity on their countries in acts of pre-emptive obedience and now felt betrayed as they thought the bailout packages the Merkel government used as a means to impose austerity on the South were actually some sort of welfare package.

    Centrifugal forces in the EU were further fuelled when, in face of civil war and foreign interventions in Syria, Merkel unilaterally declared open borders for Syrian refuges and then told EU member states they all had to take their share of refugees. European governments already concerned over Germanyโ€™s domineering role in managing the Euro-crisis were dismayed. Public debate within Germany was sharply divided between liberals and leftists applauding Merkelโ€™s humanist stance and right-wingers, including in her own party, warning of an uncontrolled flow of immigrants. Largely unnoticed was the fact that Merkelโ€™s decision to open borders for Syrian refugees was tied to the anti-Russian turn in German foreign policy following the sharp polarization between pro- and anti-Russian forces in Ukraine during and after the Maidan protests in 2014. Most of the Syrian refugees were fleeing the Russian-backed Assad-regime, which was considered an adversary. Opening borders for these refugees set a precedent for the surge of Ukrainian refugees following Russiaโ€™s invasion of Eastern Ukraine in 2022. At that point, Merkel, who had already retired, told the media that her government saw the Minsk accords, officially meant to reach a settlement between contending political and military forces within Ukraine, as a means of buying time to arm the Zelensky government.

    2020s: Sick man of Europe 2.0

    As Ukraine, already torn by civil war, became the scene for a proxy war between NATO-countries and Russia, Germany was firmly subordinated to US foreign policy. Post-communist governments in Germany had, more or less enthusiastically, supported deepening trade relations with Russia. Oil and gas imports might have been the most significant part of German-Russian trade but were certainly not the only one. Torn between allegiance to the US and lucrative business deals with Russia, the German government, now headed by Social Democrat Olaf Scholz, cut its economic ties with Russia after the latterโ€™s invasion of Ukraine. The price to be paid was a further spike in energy prices, on top of the increases attendant on the economic recovery from the COVID-19-recession.

    As part of current US efforts to contain China, the German government has been pressured to scale down its trade with Chinaโ€”Germanyโ€™s largest trading partner and also a prime outlet for German foreign direct investments. Since Germanyโ€™s economy is as much export-driven as export-dependent, the US turn from neoliberal globalization to escalating sanctions and protectionism in the name of national security has caused high levels of uncertainty within the German bourgeoisie. In addition to the return of secular stagnation after the very short post-COVID recovery in the West and the petering out of the China boom, this uncertainty is driving low levels of investment. Inflation, fuelled by post-COVID recovery and rising energy prices, and lower real incomes leading directly to less consumer spending, but also indirectly, as households build up their savings in anticipation of more economic shocks in the future. Meanwhile the Scholz government boosted arms spending while otherwise imposing austerity.

    After two years of recession, Germany is again being branded the โ€œsick man of Europeโ€ by The Economist. The last time Germany earned this title the neoliberal turn against the welfare state produced massive current account surpluses, meagre general growth rates and massive social and regional inequalities. The export nationalism that concealed the mounting discontent with neoliberalism was shaken by the US turn from neoliberal globalization to protectionism and militarism. Given its high level of export dependence, Germany was ill prepared for the turn against it, which unleashed pent-up disappointments and anxieties into the political sphere. This happened all over Germany but more so in the East than in the West as regional differences in income, wealth and representation in leadership positions had created widespread feelings of being second class citizens in a politically united Germany.

    In the absence of socialist imagination, German politics are haunted by the spectres of the past. An insurgent hard-right pins the labels of communism or Marxism on everything that ever came from the left, Social Democrats, the Greens and, of course, the Left Party, no matter how members, activists and supporters of these parties position themselves on the political spectrum. At the same time, the hard-right wants Germany to leave its Nazi past behind. Downplaying Nazi atrocities, accusing liberals and leftists of burdening Germans with a cult of guilt, they propagate the reclaiming of German national pride and sovereignty from allegedly cosmopolitan elites. Between the very real and growing right and a weak and largely imaginary left, centrist parties that proclaimed the end of history in the heyday of neoliberalism are also shifting to the right. The decline of the Left Party is a mirror image of the rise of the AfD.

    Alternative fรผr Deutschland: A child of Deutschmark nationalism

    Mainstream media and centrist parties view the new right as if it were some external force inexplicably appearing on the political scene and threatening the liberal order. But this is empirically wrong. Almost all leading figures of the AfD come from conservative West German milieus where they previously held positions in public administration or private businesses. Although they present themselves as anti-establishment rebels, they are establishment people who turned from the centre-right to the hard-right. The AfD also includes party activists who come from militant neo-Nazi groups that have existed on the fringes of West German society since the CDU gave many old Nazis a political home after the downfall of the Third Reich. Making small advances into electoral politics in the late 1960s and again in the 1980s, the neo-Nazis remained marginal until they found common ground with disgruntled conservatives. Deutschmark nationalism served as the ideological bonding material for neo-Nazis and right-of-centre conservatives, and became a rallying point for growing numbers of people dissatisfied with the policies of neoliberal globalization advanced by the centrist parties. It emerged in the tumultuous days after the fall of the Berlin wall as a mass ideology that shaped East and West German politics in the direction of unification. After that, it became an ideological point of reference that allowed for the integration of different political ideas and currents into a new right political project, the AfD.

    Riding on the wave of Euro-scepticism that accompanied the Euro crisis, the AfD, founded in 2013, promoted a German exit from the EU, which would also have meant exit from the Euro. However, boosting the Deutschmark nostalgia associated with German-style Euro-scepticism got the newly minted party only so far. What really fuelled the AfDโ€™s take-off was the wave of Syrian refugees coming to Germany (and other EU-countries) in 2015. The partyโ€™s approval ratings rose from roughly five percent in its first two years to around 12 percent in the next two years. With the surge in voter approval came a programmatic shift from โ€˜neoliberalism in one countryโ€™ to neoliberalism hidden behind ethnonationalist hate propaganda. Despite advocating for a strong state, the AfD also presents itself as a rebellious party of freedom. This paradox is resolved by portraying cosmopolitan elites, represented most notably by the Greens, as a force dominating state apparatuses and misusing them to bring excessive numbers of foreigners into the country with their cultures that allegedly threaten German people, suppress German heritage and push the economy into decay. Therefore a strong state is needed to defend Germany against foreign incursion and revive its inherent strength

    Election poster of the AfD in Thuringia supporting remigration. Photo from Wikimedia Commoms

    The Scholz government created the conditions in which the AfDโ€™s self-portrayal as freedom fighters gave the party another boost. The modest Green New Deal platforms on which the SPD and Greens ran their 2021 election campaign didnโ€™t gain enough traction to allow them to form a government, despite support from unions and even, more cautiously, employer associations. To obtain a majority in the Bundestag, SPD and Greens formed an ostensibly unlikely coalition with the FDP, a party mostly focused on cutting taxes and limiting public deficits. These commitments to tax breaks for the rich and austerity for the poor stood in the way of effective state-sponsored energy transition programs. Hence, the Scholz-government was perceived as weak from the start. Things went from bad to worse for the government after Russiaโ€™s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Under pressure from the US, Scholz opted for sanctions against Russia, arms deliveries to Ukraine and a continued increase in arms spending. At a time when the prices of everything from butter to housing were soaring, making it clear that money would still be available for guns but maybe not for butter not only destroyed whatever support the government had before the Ukraine war but also gave the AfD another boost. A year and a half into the war, the SPD was trailing the AfD in federal polls. Picking up widespread, though by no means dominant, unease with arms support for Ukraine and fear of war with Russia, the AfD advocates a negotiated peace settlement between Russia and Ukraine and, more importantly to the AfD, the lifting of sanctions on Russia. For the AfD, urging peace with Russia is not a matter of a principled anti-militarism but a means of reviving German trade with Russia, notably Russian energy imports that are seen as a precondition for economic recovery. To achieve this, Germany has to free itself from the โ€˜cosmopolitan sell-out elite.โ€™ Whether everybody now supporting the AfD subscribes to the freedom-for-German-supremacy-view is open to debate. What canโ€™t be denied is the fact that many discontented people, whatever their main grievance, are looking to the right, not the left, for alternatives to a failing political centre. Some are also turning to the CDU, which claims to be different from both the AfD and the federal coalition government, without offering anything other than praise for the good old days. That served the party well at times when the German economy could thrive, to a greater or lesser degree, on US-enabled expansion of world markets. With the US protectionist turn, this is no longer possible and the party is torn between centrism and the new right. Current support for the CDU is highly unstable, which could easily work in the AfDโ€™s favour, especially in the absence of persuasive alternatives from the left, which so far have not materialized.

    This wasnโ€™t always the case. Something like a left renewal had once seemed to be in the offing in the most unlikely place: East Germany during the transition from state socialism to a peripheral position in an enlarged capitalist Germany. In West Germany, the nationalist wave that came with unification swept away much of the activist left that had rallied thousandsโ€”sometimes tens or even hundreds of thousandsโ€” of people in the 1980s against the stationing of US nuclear missiles, nuclear power plants, Nazis, and South Africaโ€™s apartheid regime, among other causes. Left circles within the SPD, the Greens and the labour movement weathered the nationalist storm without leaving a mark on German politics. In this political climate, the Party of Democratic Socialism (Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus or PDS) stood out as a beacon of the left.

    Emerging from East Germanyโ€™s ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED), the PDS became the political home of many East Germans who lost their jobs, social status and cultural identity during the transition to capitalism. Quickly establishing a presence in East Germanyโ€™s provincial and municipal parliaments, the party expressed the discomfort of many East Germans who felt like second class citizens under the domination of West German institutions, politicians, corporations and culture. It highlighted East Germanyโ€™s socialist heritage, which encompassed commitments to anti-fascism, peace and international solidarity as much as the dictatorship of the politburo, Stasi-surveillance and an overbearing bureaucracy. The party hung itself up in endless debates between those who downplayed or justified East German communismโ€™s dark sides and others who sought to disown that history by embracing liberal principles. Practically, these disputes didnโ€™t make much difference. Upholding socialist principles didnโ€™t stop the party from pragmatically working within the political and economic confines created by unification. At times, this included voting for privatization of public housing and infrastructure. For decades since the party was founded, the contradiction between socialist principles and the subordination to neoliberal policies imposed by the West German bourgeoisie didnโ€™t stop the PDS or its successor organization Die Linke (the Left Party), from becoming something like a catch-all or peopleโ€™s party in East Germany, a role long held by the CDU und the SPD in West Germany. For years, the PDS/Left Party achieved election results in the mid-20 percent range, peaking at 28 percent in Brandenburg in 2004 and 32 percent in Thuringia in 2019. It was also, and still is, part of various coalition governments in East German states. Until the September 2024 election, the Thuringian government was led by the Left Partyโ€™s Bodo Ramelow.

    Despite this overall success and despite the partyโ€™s fidelity to socialist principles, the social group that wasnโ€™t interested in voting PDS consisted of workers, who still voted CDU in large numbers despite g the CDUโ€™s failed to deliver on its big promises of post-unification prosperity. More recently they shifted to the AfD. Meanwhile, in West Germany, the PDS remained marginal throughout its existence, only attracting activists from various left grouplets. What little remained of left protest milieus after unification was still dominated by a mix of environmentalists, antifas and international solidarity activists who might vote Green, or maybe even SPD, but hardly ever PDS. The old working class milieus that were shrinking with the decline of smokestack industries were still dominated by unionists closer to the SPD than the PDS. This started to change when, under chancellor Schrรถder, the SPD implemented neoliberal counter-reforms on a scale his conservative predecessor Kohl had avoided throughout his 16-year tenure, despite his supposed commitment to unleashing market forces. Growing frustrations among left social democrats and unionists fed mass demonstrations against Schrรถderโ€™s SPD and created a social and organizational base (including, most prominently, Schrรถderโ€™s short-time finance minister Lafontaine) that merged with the PDS into the Left Party in 2007. In the federal elections two years later, the Left Party won 11.9 percent of the vote, then 9.2 percent in the 2017 elections, but fell to 4.9 percent in the 2021 elections. This was a worse result than the 5.1 percent the PDS obtained in 1998, an election that also saw an increased vote for the SPD, which allowed Schrรถder to succeed Kohl. It is worth noting that the PDS vote came almost entirely from East Germany, which represents less than a quarter of Germanyโ€™s total population.

    While the PDS mostly maintained peaceful coexistence between socialist theory and market-conforming practice, the Left Party continuously debated whether or not it should join centre-left governments, if given the chance. The bitterness with which party activists argued over this question stood in stark contrast to its actual relevance. In states where the party was relegated to opposition status by poor election results, this status didnโ€™t attract additional voters keen on seeing a principled opposition in parliament. In states where the party joined governments, the results were mixed: sometimes it maintained its vote share in the subsequent election; sometimes it suffered losses. A paradoxical result came about in the Thuringian elections in September 2024: The Left Party lost massively, although, had there been direct elections for the minister-president (a position equivalent to provincial premier in Canada), the Left Partyโ€™s Bodo Ramelow would have won the election. This fits into a trend that became visible over the last few years in a number of state elections in East and West Germany. Party loyalties based on shared worldviews wear thin. Elections are often decided based on the media appeal of top politicians, regardless of party affiliation. Remarkably enough, Ramelow, just like Dietmar Woidke, the SPDโ€™s lead candidate in the Brandenburg elections, dropped the name of his party on campaign posters, presenting himself as more of a provincial father figure than a man of the party.

    However, rather than signalling the end of ideology, as centrist politicians and postmodern philosophers might have argued before the rise of a very explicitly ideologically committed new right, the focus on limelight politicians pushes democratic debates into the shadows. In the case of the Left Party, it might also have been an attempt to distract from its own image as an organization mired in endless debates not producing any coherent, let alone persuasive, policies. The reasons for permanent internal discord are sociological and ideological. The Left Party was strongest in its early days, when the PDSโ€™s social base still comprised a cross-section of the East German population, although workers remained underrepresented. It also attracted dissident social democrats and unionists from West Germany. To a limited extent, therefore the Left Party had the working class base the PDS never had.

    The blend of Keynesian and Marxist ideas around which social democratic dissidents and union leftists organized had been defeated as a significant political current during the crises of the 1970s by the Social Democratic right and corporatist union leaders who put competitiveness of the West German economy over income distribution from profits to wages. In the new millennium, when these currents joined forces with the PDS, they were still sizeable enough to give the newly founded Left Party a boost. But not for long. The smokestack industries around which these left currents were organizing were in continued decline, which made strategies based on that moribund reality obsolete. Moreover, these strategies often stood in the way of mobilizing and organizing the new working classes that emerged in the service sector and, on a much smaller scale, IT, bio tech, and green energy.

    As the ranks of the Left Party thinned out with the loss of members coming out of communist East Germany or from West German union and social democratic circles, the party was able to attract new blood mainly in the form of highly educated, often precariously employed, urban dwellers. The shift in membership from old left offspring to the children of neoliberal globalization was paralleled by a geographical shift in electoral support. In urban centres, losses among the partyโ€™s old left supporters could be partially compensated; in rural areas, however, where the PDS and the Left Party had always been weak, the party disappeared almost entirely. Often, there isnโ€™t even anyone to put up election campaign posters

    Anti-AfD protest in Germany. Photo by strassenstriche.net/Flickr

    Unlike the original base of both the PDS and the Left Party, the urban hipsters who joined the Left Party had no old left reference points. Even when they talked about Marx and class they did so with postmodern accents. However, this did not help them to gain sizeable support among the working classesโ€”sometimes lumped together as the โ€œprecariatโ€โ€”that developed in expanding economic sectors. The political offerings of the Left Party seemed to exercise little appeal for both old and potentially new constituencies. The partyโ€™s founding basis of unity was opposition to neoliberalism. In the early days this left room for East German concerns about the outcomes of unificationโ€”arguably a kind of neoliberal restructuringโ€”with opposition to the neoliberal turn of the Schrรถder-government in East and West Germany. It also left plenty of room for a variety of goals, from resurrecting the Keynesian welfare state to a multitude of vaguely defined socialisms for the future to opposition without a vision for the future. However, what sufficed to form the Left Party wasnโ€™t enough to sustain and grow it, especially not as it became harder to label government policies neoliberal.

    The Great Recession, the COVID-19 pandemic, and commitments to ongoing arms production brought state intervention back to the centre of politics, contrary to the 1990s and early 2000s when politics was dominated by advancing capital mobility and free trade. Back then, ruling elites organized consent of the popular classes, more or less successfully, under the banner of โ€œinternational competitiveness.โ€ The new watchword โ€œnational securityโ€ is better at rallying the new right than building support for centrist parties. Left Party intellectuals debated the new political conjuncture under the label โ€œpost-neoliberalism,โ€ a word-monster that hints, perhaps unwittingly, at the partyโ€™s inability to develop a strategy beyond rejecting neoliberalism. In reaction to the imposition of a party line by its predecessor organization, the PDS and the Left Party allowed a wide range of views. However, members of various organized currents, ranging from social-liberal to communist, tended to talk more about each other than with each other.

    Postmodernist philosophersโ€™ contention that the days of master narratives are over was wrong with respect to neoliberalismโ€”if there ever was a master narrative, it was neoliberalismโ€”but it does apply to the Left Party, which could not synthesize different ideas into compelling left policies that could rally growing discontent. Instead, internal debates turned into factional turf wars in a party that resembled an appendix of the Scholz government, costing the Left Party more and more support.

    After years of bitter infighting, discontent with declining voter approval and accommodation of government policies led to the split of the federal party caucus and the formation of the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) in January 2024. As its name indicates, the party is entirely built around its frontwoman, who represented the Left Party in the Bundestag from 2009 to 2023. In the BSW, the cacophony that destructively marks the Left Party is replaced by closed-door debates. As in the Communist party of old, membership isnโ€™t open to everyone; applications to join must be approved. Wagenknecht, originally a member of the Communist Platform (one of the organized currents inside the PDS), had shifted to left-Keynesian, pro-welfare state positions. But, years before her split from the Left Party, she began advocating ordoliberal positionsโ€”a branch of neoliberal thinking that stresses the role of the state in allowing businesses to compete without being bogged down by monopolies. This German version of neoliberalism has been the hallmark of economic policy and ideology since the early years of West German world market integration. In Wagenknechtโ€™s current adaptation of ordoliberalism, the state guarantees competition, which, in turn, creates a strong economy capable of providing stable employment, social security and a fairer distribution of incomes. She combines this embrace of free markets plus the welfare state with a critique of the European Union as an institution operating in the interest of big corporations and a critique of NATO and US hegemony. Her condemnation of American hegemony appealed to some members of the Left Party, as did her critique of the EU, although her more recent favourable references to ordoliberalism and policies aiming at stricter migration controls were less popular.

    The BSWโ€™s outlook is very much shaped by positive memories of West German postwar prosperity. Yet, the partyโ€™s advocacy of international cooperation, a position going back to 1970s detente policies, contrasts sharply with orientations of the centrist parties and some currents within her own former party. Demand for a negotiated settlement of the Ukraine war overlaps with AfD positions. However, the AfD considers this a matter of Germanyโ€™s national interest that doesnโ€™t preclude support for rearmament and war in other regions, like Gaza most recently. The BSW, on the other hand, sees militarism largely as the USโ€™s last recourse for defending its ailing empire. It remains to be seen how the BSWโ€™s principled opposition to militarism and war can mesh with current negotiations for a coalition government with the CDU and the SPD, both committed to military support for Zelensky in Ukraine and Netanyahu in Israel. Polls suggest that electoral support for the BSW was largely driven by the desire for an anti-war voice in parliament. At the same time, there is considerable support for efforts to keep the AfD out of government, despite all the support the AfD garnered in the fall state elections in East Germany. If this means compromising its anti-militarism, the BSW may, like the Left Party before it, soon be seen as a superfluous appendix of unpopular centrist parties.

    After weeks of negotiations, the BSW entered into a coalition government with the SPD in Brandenburg as well as with the CDU and SPD in Thuringia. It also supports a minority government made up of the CDU and the SPD in Saxony. It did all this to keep the AfD out of government positions. Understandable as such efforts are, they have already cost the BSW in the polls. Hovering just above five percent, the BSW may not reach the five-percent threshold for obtaining seats in the upcoming federal elections. The Left Party, standing at 3.5 percent in the polls, will probably fall short. Founded as a project to unify left forces from East and West Germany, its split early last year already signalled the failure of that project. The next election may reduce it to insignificance, leaving lots of room for the AfD [end]

    The original article

    Ingo Schmidt is an economist and works as the coordinator of the Labour Studies Program at Athabasca University

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  • [Sharing] Germanyโ€™s far-left disrupter claims credit for limiting aid to Ukraine – Guy Chazan, Financial Times

    Sahra Wagenknechtโ€™s party rises in polls ahead of regional elections in eastern German states

    Sahra Wagenknecht, Germanyโ€™s most prominent far-left politician, has taken credit for the governmentโ€™s decision to limit military aid to Kyiv, saying her strong opposition to arming Ukraine was influencing Berlinโ€™s policy on the war.

    In an interview with the Financial Times, Wagenknecht said the fact that the German government โ€œhas said it at least doesnโ€™t want to continue to top up weapons deliveriesโ€ was โ€œa result of our high opinion poll ratingsโ€.

    Finance minister Christian Lindner last week warned fellow government members that he would veto any new payment requests for Kyiv.

    Chancellor Olaf Scholz on Tuesday denied that Berlin was giving up on Ukraine, saying Germany would donate โ‚ฌ4bn in military aid to Kyiv next year, more than any other European country.

    But Wagenknecht was adamant about the impact her stance made.

    โ€œWe are already having an effect, even though weโ€™re not even in power,โ€ she said of her party, the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW). โ€œOur approval ratings are affecting the national debate.โ€

    After splitting from the established far-left Die Linke party to form BSW seven months ago, Wagenknecht has emerged as the leftโ€™s disrupter-in-chief.

    Her rise in the polls inserts fresh instability into a political landscape challenged by the rise of the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) โ€” which also espouses Ukraine-sceptical, pro-Russian views.

    BSW has surged in the polls ahead of elections next month in three eastern German states that are expected to confirm the regionโ€™s drift to the political extremes and deliver a stinging rebuke to Scholzโ€™s increasingly unpopular three-way coalition.

    A poll by Forsa on Tuesday put BSW on 13 per cent in Saxony and 18 per cent in Thuringia, both of which hold elections on September 1 โ€” an extraordinary achievement for a party that is not even a year old. Scholzโ€™s Social Democrats, by contrast, is at just 6 to 7 per cent in both states

    Squeezed on the left by the BSW and on the right by the AfD, mainstream parties face a major dilemma: should they entertain coalitions with an outfit whose opposition to military aid to Ukraine has placed it firmly outside the political consensus?

    The dilemma is most acute for the centre-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU), which has been steadfast in its support for Kyiv since the very start of the war and has frequently castigated Scholzโ€™s government for not doing enough to help the beleaguered country.

    But polls suggest the CDU will not be able to govern โ€” in Thuringia at least โ€” without the BSW as junior partner. Having ruled out co-operation with both the AfD and Die Linke, which at present leads a minority regional government, the CDU has few options left.

    โ€œThereโ€™s no way this works without the BSW,โ€ said Martin Debes, author of Germany of the Extremes, a political history of Thuringia.

    CDU leader Friedrich Merz initially banned any coalition with the BSW, describing Wagenknecht as โ€œrightwing extremist on some issues, and on others, leftwing extremeโ€.

    But he later backpedalled, saying local branches of the CDU should decide on their own whether to team up with Wagenknechtโ€™s party.

    โ€œEssentially we have to figure out what is possible on the local level and what will lead to stable majorities,โ€ Mario Voigt, CDU leader in Thuringia, told the FT. โ€œBut one thing is clear: there will be neither a coalition nor co-operation with the AfD.โ€

    A political contrarian who joined the East German Communist party just months before the fall of the Berlin Wall, Wagenknecht is revelling in her new status as kingmaker.

    She has set out a series of tough conditions for any coalition, saying she wonโ€™t team up with any party that supports Scholzโ€™s plan to station US medium-range missiles in Germany from 2026.

    She also said the BSW would only join a government that explicitly backed diplomatic efforts to end the war in Ukraine

    CDU officials make the point that such issues are dealt with only by the federal government, not in regions such as Thuringia. Thuringiaโ€™s social democrat leader Georg Maier said: โ€œShe is just trying to blackmail all her potential coalition partners, especially the CDU.โ€

    But Wagenknecht herself said she was only reflecting votersโ€™ wishes. โ€œPeople in the east want a change in foreign policy โ€” they are scared of being dragged into a major European war,โ€ she told the FT.

    She also said that a majority of Germans living in the east rejected the US missile plan. Recent polling by Forsa shows that about two-thirds of respondents in eastern Germany are against the deployment, while at a national level, 49 per cent oppose it.

    A โ€œkey conditionโ€ for any regional government was that it โ€œreflects and represents such positions, because otherwise voters will just be disappointed againโ€, she said.

    Though many in Berlin have bristled at Wagenknechtโ€™s conditions, some in the east have echoed her rhetoric. Michael Kretschmer, the CDU prime minister of Saxony, has also spoken out forcefully against weapons supplies to Kyiv.

    In Thuringia, the CDUโ€™s Voigt โ€” while stressing his partyโ€™s commitment to supporting Ukraine โ€” has backed the call for more diplomacy to end the war, urging the federal government to โ€œdo more in this regardโ€. โ€œGermany was always a force for peace and a force for diplomacy, but little of that is happening at the moment,โ€ he said.

    Wagenknecht said she found Voigtโ€™s intervention โ€œremarkableโ€. โ€œWe were always berated for taking this position, and now Voigt is demanding it, too.โ€

    But others are outraged by the BSW leaderโ€™s rhetoric. A recent petition signed by civil rights activists accused Wagenknecht and her party of spreading Kremlin disinformation and called on other parties to โ€œdistance themselves much more clearly from the BSW and its ideas about โ€˜national Socialismโ€™.โ€

    The suggestion of a link to Nazism is a designation Wagenknecht firmly rejects. But her idiosyncratic platform does represent a curious mix of traditional leftwing ideas such as higher taxes on the rich with rightwing demands for curbs on immigration and sympathy for Russia.

    In her interview, she cemented her status as one of Germanyโ€™s leading Putinversteher (Putin apologists), a reputation underscored by her decision to boycott President Volodymyr Zelenskyyโ€™s speech in the Bundestag in June.

    She criticised the Ukrainian offensive in Kursk, saying it would โ€œhardenโ€ the positions of the warring parties, and said the war happened only because Russia โ€œwouldnโ€™t accept Ukraine turning into an American military outpostโ€.

    Wagenknecht said her party had succeeded in changing German politics for the better by peeling votes away from the AfD.

    โ€œBefore we existed, all the anger and protest benefited the AfD alone,โ€ she said. โ€œNow you see that when thereโ€™s a serious alternative, a lot of people will vote for it.โ€ [end]

    The original article

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