Nicolas Cinquini

Analista senior di l'intelligenza in u campu di a gestione di i risichi di sicurezza, sò un anzianu tenente detective è ufficiale di l'intelligenza in l'agenzie di u Statu francese. A bona pronuncia hè Николай Чинкуини, in russu

Tag: nordstream

  • [Sharing] German Imperialism: An Urgent Explainer – Kit Klarenberg

    The fate of Central and Eastern Europe after the People’s Democracies’ post-1989 fall cannot be fully appreciated without reference to the EU as an extension of German imperialism. Berlin’s drive to ensure the region remains composed of weak, frequently mutually-resentful microstates has endured for well-over a century. Over time, battlefield conquest and occupation has been supplanted by economic and monetary union, and ever-rising military, security and intelligence “interoperability” and “cooperation”, all conducted under “internationalist” auspices.

    Comprehending this process and the consistent needs of German imperialism provides a typically absent, critical lens through which to view events such as Yugoslavia’s destruction, the rise and recent demise of Hungary’s Viktor Orban, and seen and unseen political machinations throughout the Balkans old and new. German imperialism is a potent, dangerous force frequently overlooked due to its nigh-invisible operation. With US global hegemony irreversibly faltering, it is vital to truly understand the phenomenon as it threatens to emerge in its own militarised right again.

    Today, German imperialism is little-understood even in countries and regions intimately shaped if not outright created by Berlin’s colonial meddling and concomitant hegemonic expansion. Its historic apotheosis was the 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The terms and consequences provide an eerily precise blueprint for the EU’s modern day role as German empire via other means. Despite Brest-Litovsk’s seismic import, mainstream English language accounts are comparatively rare. A highly compelling, informative synthesis is nonetheless provided by Adam Tooze’s much-overlooked 2014 work The Deluge.

    Tooze writes of how “Brest gave birth to the precursors to the Baltic states in their modern form,” and an “independent Ukraine” for the very first time in history. Resource-rich territory that over prior centuries comprised much larger dynastic land empires was broken up into easily exploitable chunks. The newly-formed nations, and corresponding nationalisms, spread throughout ethnically, linguistically and religiously diverse swaths of Central and Eastern Europe constituted a formidable stronghold. Self-determination facilitated Germany’s untrammelled economic, military, and political penetration.

    Commenting on Eurasia’s 21st century map, Tooze observes how since the Soviet Union’s 1991 dissolution, all Brest-Litovsk’s “creations” have “come to be regarded as legitimate members of the family of nations.” Moreover, states such as the Baltics and Poland then as now “look to protectors in the West,” being “keen members of an American-dominated NATO and the European Union, in which Germany is the dominant force.” Via Brest-Litovsk, “all of these polities fell willy-nilly under the ‘protection’ of Imperial Germany”

    Treaties of Brest-Litovsk | Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary | Britannica
    Brest-Litovsk delegates negotiate, early 1918

    The Treaty was signed between Moscow and Austro-Hungary, Bulgaria, Germany and the Ottoman Empire in March 1918, following months of tense negotiations produced the previous December by revolutionary Russia signing an armistice with Berlin. At Brest-Litvosk, both sides had advanced their respective visions of “self-determination” for the Central and Eastern European components of the Tsar’s collapsed empire. Vladimir Lenin hoped newly-independent states in the region would be free to turn Bolshevik. Yet, Imperial Germany had no intention of letting that happen.

    Instead, the country’s “more intelligent strategic thinkers” realised “there was no better means to dynamite the Tsarist Empire than for Berlin to espouse the demand for self-determination” at Brest-Litovsk. This “manipulative ruse” would allow Germany to extend her hegemony imperceptibly throughout enormously profitable territories. It was “a vision of negotiated sovereignty in which economic and military independence was pooled by smaller states with larger states.” Tooze reports how German imperialists argued “full, unfettered sovereignty” was “always a chimera” – “the real choice was one between hegemons”:

    Germany would secure power on a continental scale not through annexation, but through the formation of an economic and military bloc of smaller Eastern European states…The autonomous Polish entity carved by Germany and Austria out of Russian territory in the autumn of 1916 was a start. While in economic and military terms the new Poland would be bound tightly and irrevocably to Germany, in the social and cultural sphere it would be given the freedom ‘to express itself nationally’

    ‘Military Protection’

    From the Central Powers’ perspective, self-determination’s colonial windfall was immense. In territorial terms, Moscow lost control of today’s Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine. This prime former Tsarist real estate accounted for 34% of the fallen empire’s population, 54% of its industrial land, 89% of its coalfields, and 26% of its railways. Berlin well-knew the regional treasure trove would be hotly contested, and could easily “fall into the orbit of another great power” – “if not Germany or Russia, then Britain”.

    Hence, Brest-Litovsk’s terms exclusively allowed for ‘independence’ under formal “German military protection.” This transformed millions of people throughout the region into potential proxy warriors arrayed against Russia, or other major powers threatening Berlin’s local hegemony, in the manner of NATO today. Rapidly collapsing into civil war, with Franco-British intervention to reverse the Revolution impending, the incipient Soviet Union acquiesced to the Treaty’s harsh stipulations. Lenin believed the Bolsheviks would eventually recapture the lost territories, by sheer force of radical gravity

    Contemporary map of Central and Eastern European states created by Brest-Litovsk

    Brest-Litovsk was torn up by the June 1919 Treaty of Versailles, compelling Berlin to grant independence to assorted German-conquered protectorates that had been established throughout the region. Chaotic, violent struggles unfolded over the next three years between Red Army-assisted local revolutionary elements and ‘independent’ states led by collaborationist puppets. Belarus and Ukraine were successfully absorbed as republics, while the Baltics and Poland remained autonomous. Meanwhile, the seed of German hegemony via self-determination had been decisively sown throughout Central and Eastern Europe.

    German colonialism particularly left its mark post-Brest-Litovsk via the emergence of nationalisms and according national creation myths throughout the region, which were innately and rabidly antagonistic toward Moscow. In Poland in 1916, Berlin’s invading forces had successfully portrayed themselves as liberators. In the Baltics, Russians represented a large proportion of the country’s urban, land-owning elite. They were easily framed by German propagandists, and in ultranationalist imaginations, as parasitic overlords of largely illiterate ethnic Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian peasantry, who overwhelmingly resided in rural steppes.

    Convincing Ukraine’s multiethnic population to embrace an anti-Russian ‘independence’ was considerably more difficult, given their similar backgrounds, customs and languages, and the substantial influence of each others’ culture in both directions since Kiev’s 1654 union with Moscow. Ukraine’s contemporaneous veneration of genocidal fascists, and indeed the wider ongoing proxy war, are direct upshots of efforts by German imperialists to promote enmity and antagonism between Russians and Ukrainians. This strategy was maintained throughout the Cold War by the CIA and MI6, with Nazi-riddled West Berlin’s assistance.

    ‘Civilising Mission’

    Another enduring legacy of Brest-Litovsk was the transformation of “self-determination” from a liberal German imperialist crusade, to a fundamental principle of Anglo-American-dominated international relations. The cause was eagerly and cynically seized upon first by British Prime Minister Lloyd George, then US President Woodrow Wilson. The right to minority self-determination globally became absolutely central to the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. The world over, anti-colonial and nationalist movements saw an opportunity to achieve independence from foreign subjugation.

    At the Conference, Austro-Hungary brutally fell victim to this self-determination push, with Britain successfully ordering its constituent territories be “liberated” via the empire’s total breakup. This created the independent states of Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. The latter pair were entirely new countries, with Yugoslavia forged from Austro-Hungary’s southern Slavic regions – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia – and the revolutionary kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro. In a bitter irony, Austro-Hungary herself had previously encouraged self-determination regionally à la Brest-Litovsk, to entrench her imperial rule.

    In June 1878, the little-known Congress of Berlin was convened. Major European powers sought to reorganise the Balkans, in the wake of Russia’s victory over the Ottoman Empire three months earlier. The conflict ended with Moscow asserting hegemony over Constantinople’s remaining holdings in Southeastern Europe, via an allied Greater Bulgaria, and the newly-formed, independent states of Montenegro, Romania, and Serbia. However, Austria-Hungary, Britain, France, rapidly expanding host empire Germany, and Italy, wished for these terms to be revised

    Map of the Balkans to illustrate the Treaty of Berlin 1878.

    While the Congress recognised the three new Balkan states’ independence, attendees demanded Bosnia and Herzegovina become an Austro-Hungarian protectorate into the bargain, much to Serbia’s chagrin. Vienna’s resultant takeover of Sarajevo sent tens of thousands of Muslim inhabitants fleeing to Turkey. This exodus intensified in 1881, after the imposition of military conscription. The move was inspired by Serbia and Montenegro supporting local anti-imperial elements. It was just one Austro-Hungarian connivance intended to transform harmoniously multiethnic, multifaith Bosnia and Herzegovina into a fractious powder keg.

    In service of this goal, Sarajevo’s Austro-Hungarian occupation authorities actively nurtured a nationhood centred exclusively on Bosniak – Bosnian Muslim – identity. The local Serbo-Croatian dialect was proclaimed a separate Bosnian language, Cyrillic text got suppressed, while Serbian books and newspapers were banned. Vienna’s meddling failed to incite violent, separatist division between Bosnia’s diverse peoples. It nonetheless created a vast army of conscripts for any future regional war, while providing Austro-Hungary with an imperial public relations victory. Per historian Maximilian Georg:

    [Vienna’s] objects were to teach the population their supposed Bosnian, pro-Habsburg identity, legitimise the Austro-Hungarian rulers as the new Romans, and demonstrate to Europe and the world the success of Austro-Hungary’s ‘civilising mission’ in an ‘oriental’ country. This ‘civilising mission’ under military occupation was the strongest indicator of an Austro-Hungarian colonialism

    ‘Yugoslav Nationalist’

    Austro-Hungary and Germany alike considered independent Serbia’s mere existence a permanent irritant to their Eastern European supremacy, in need of eventual neutralisation. Tensions constantly mounted after the turn of the century, leading in 1908 to Bosnia’s formal annexation by Vienna. All along, imperialists in Berlin were spectating Austro-Hungary’s colonial machinations with intense interest. In 1888, Chancellor Otto von Bismarck prophetically foresaw “some damned foolish thing in the Balkans” upsetting Europe’s delicate balance of power, and precipitating a major global conflict.

    Serbia and Montenegro’s October 1912 invasion of Albania, in the wake of her declaration of independence from Ottoman rule, almost proved that “damned foolish thing.” Serb and Montenegrin forces sought to permanently capture territory, but retreated a year later under threat of Austro-Hungarian intervention. In the aftermath, Kaiser Wilhelm II visited Vienna, declaring to colonial officials “war between East and West was in the long run inevitable.” As Slavs “were born not to rule but to obey,” their anti-imperialist tendencies couldn’t be tolerated much longer.

    Wilhelm II moreover pledged to “back” Austro-Hungary in any future conflict in Eastern Europe, assuring his Viennese counterparts Berlin was “ready to draw the saber any time your action makes it necessary.” Bosnian Serb Gavrilo Princip’s June 1914 assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo provided an ideal pretext for the Kaiser’s long-desired showdown between Slavs and Teutons. Pressured by Austro-Hungarian authorities to implicate Belgrade directly in his actions while on trial, Princip instead insisted he was ideologically motivated:

    I am a Yugoslav nationalist, aiming for the unification of all Yugoslavs, and I do not care what form of state, but it must be free from Austria…The plan was to unite all South Slavs. It was understood that Serbia as the free part of the South Slavs had the moral duty to help in the unification, to be to the South Slavs as the Piedmont was to Italy…In my opinion every Serb, Croat and Slovene should be an enemy of Austria

    In post-World War I Yugoslavia, Princip was elevated to national hero. In early 1930, a plaque was erected on the site of Ferdinand’s assassination, celebrating a foundational event in the new country’s creation. It was the sole trophy claimed by the Nazis following the Axis invasion of Yugoslavia, presented to Adolf Hitler at a formal ceremony on his 52nd birthday in April 1941, two days after Belgrade’s surrender. A potent totem of German embarrassment expunged, it was now time to erase Yugoslavia permanently

    Adolf Hitler inspects the plundered plaque commemorating Archduke Ferdinand’s assassination by Gavrilo Princip

    Carving up the country relied heavily on constructing genocidal, ethnonationalist puppet entities. Painful memories of these attempts to exert hegemony over the Balkans under the banner of “self-determination” remained visceral for many residents of Yugoslavia in December 1991. Then, newly-reunified Germany unilaterally recognised federation members Croatia and Slovenia as ‘independent’ states, while encouraging other republics comprising the collapsing country to follow the pair’s secessionist lead. It was widely predicted Yugoslavia’s demise would produce bloodshed, on a grand scale.

    ‘Fundamental Subordination’

    Dissolving Yugoslavia began waging war on Croat and Slovene secessionists six months earlier. The latter conflict lasted just 10 days, but the former was still simmering. The European Community and UN futilely struggled all along to achieve peaceful settlements to Yugoslavia’s gravely worsening crisis, while formally committed to preserving the country in some form. Berlin’s recognition summarily sabotaged those efforts, removing any incentive for Yugoslav republics to negotiate their futures with Belgrade, while emboldening nationalists in every republic.

    Fears of Berlin’s resurgent imperialism were not confined to Yugoslavia. As TIME contemporaneously observed, “it used to be a given of European political life Germany…would not take a leading or controversial role in world affairs,” which “suited its neighbors very well indeed.” While occupied West Germany operated throughout the Cold War as “an economic giant and a political dwarf,” unified Berlin’s “unexpected show of diplomatic muscle” in recognising Croatia and Slovenia as ‘independent’ countries was now causing “discomfort” throughout Western capitals.

    In Britain’s parliament, then-Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd explicitly evoked the World Wars as disquieting precedents for Germany’s modern-day “self-determination” push in the soon-to-be former Yugoslavia. “There is a tradition of the main states of Western Europe splitting in rivalry on these Balkan questions, and this all ending up on the battlefield. I don’t think that tradition is a good one,” Hurd cautioned. Washington, immensely irritated by Berlin belligerently “getting out ahead of the US,” duly assumed management of the Yugoslav crisis, with disastrous consequences.

    Fratricidal conflicts that subsequently engulfed Yugoslavia forged a highly invasive beachhead, via which German economic and political hegemony throughout the region surged, without direct military engagement. While Berlin framed her support for Croat and Slovene ‘independence’ in terms of human rights, the rich financial rewards of shattering the federation were plain. As by far the two wealthiest republics, Germany effectively granted herself access to “the best productive assets” in the soon-to-be former country by kickstarting its practical and physical collapse, per a 2008 academic paper.

    The authors write of how Berlin’s “hegemonic relationship” with Yugoslav successor nations was thereafter writ considerably larger than even Germany’s imperial infiltration of “smaller states” elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe. This is due to the “specific dependence” of Balkan countries on Berlin’s “structural power”. In economic terms, this means vast national trade deficits with Germany across the region, with “Balkan pre-products and raw materials” flowing in vast, constant profusion to Berlin, while German corporations and products dominate many commercial, financial and industrial sectors locally.

    Undergirding this extraordinary economic colonisation was adoption by Yugoslavia’s successor states of ‘independent’ currencies, pegged first to the former Deutschmark, now Euro. This proved pivotal to the “fundamental subordination of the political economies of the region to the ideological and operational norms” of the EU – or German empire, via other means. New national and private banking systems of post-Yugoslav countries were structured specifically according to Berlin’s own, with German banks ascendant, as elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe. That’s not all:

    [Deutschmark/Euro pegging] was an essential precondition for the shaping of the macro-economic policies of these (and other transition) states, for their foreign economic relationships, for the further development of their capital markets and the programmes of liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation which ensued

    ‘European Continent’

    Berlin’s Balkan banking takeover moreover fundamentally “facilitates the penetration of all German enterprises into the commercial life of the Balkan economies.” Berlin has gluttonously feasted on local resources and industry alike ever since, its investment regionally “characterised by takeovers.” For example, throughout Central and Eastern Europe German supermarkets are a near-monopoly, with prices of goods frequently higher than back home, despite meagre local purchasing power. Low wages, vast structural unemployment, and mass brain drain are all interlinked, ruinous inheritances.

    The Balkans’ Western “transition” has been far more destructive than even the horrors unleashed upon the former Warsaw Pact in the 1990s. Heavily influenced “by prescriptive programmes emanating from the EU and from the World Bank,” Brussels has since 1999 also been “actively involved” in advising and guiding every country in the region towards bloc membership. After so much imposed impoverishment, it isn’t precisely clear what meaningful benefits Balkan states or populations will reap from their vassalage under German imperialism becoming formalised.

    In late 2019, a Balkan liberal who once eagerly supported their country joining the EU wrote a sorrowful ode to “the process of so-called integration” Yugoslav successor states suffered by adopting “measures”, “instruments”, and “reforms” dictated by “Western technocrats”. Freshly ‘independent’ countries “were expected to build a fully developed Western liberal democracy from scratch…upon the ruins of a different yet fully developed system…while dragging behind us the burden of deepening poverty and trauma.” Several were and remain deeply scarred by Berlin and Brussels-encouraged ‘independence’ wars.

    However, “this excruciating process of destroying and building anew a whole system…went neither fast enough nor successfully enough” for the new German empire. What’s more, “competition was not fair” – “opening our markets to the developed capitalism of the West and undertaking neoliberal reforms drained our human and economic resources while we kept trying to stay apace.” Socialism’s vestiges were eradicated, state industries sold off, and social spending slashed. The op-ed mysteriously failed to mention how Germany’s contemporary Balkan economic assault has a “strong security dimension”

    06/18/99: KFOR Sectors
    Kosovo’s original KFOR occupation map, June 1999

    The 2008 paper notes Berlin exerts direct colonial-style control across the region, for example via Bosnia and Herzegovina’s EU-chosen Office of the High Representative, which traditionally serves as Germany’s imperial viceroy in Sarajevo. Moreover, Berlin has always been a key contributor to NATO’s Kosovo peacekeeping force KFOR, sustaining a military occupation under which Pristina controversially declared independence from Serbia in February 2008. This summer, Washington’s KFOR contingent began departing Kosovo after 27 years.

    Meanwhile, the Americans are openly signalling Bosnia’s abandonment, raising potentially urgent questions about the unified country’s future. In April, EU Commission Ursula von der Leyen made clear the EU and she personally intend to “[complete] the European continent so it does not fall under Russian, Turkish or Chinese influence,” in explicit reference to the former Yugoslavia. History shows us such declarations by German imperialists frequently result in world-threatening catastrophe. Meanwhile, “some damned foolish thing in the Balkans” could evidently today yet again trigger war [end]

    The original article

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  • [Sharing] Ray McGovern: The Bucha Massacre… of truth and other Western Big Lies in the service of war – Finian Cunningham, Strategic Culture Foundation

    A proxy war against Russia is now spiralling into an all-out confrontation

    Former CIA analyst Ray McGovern discusses how the Western official news media have systematically promoted lies about the Bucha Massacre in Ukraine.

    No Western official outlet has questioned the narrative purporting that Russia perpetrated a mass killing of civilians. Credible Russian information to the contrary is dismissed out of hand as Kremlin propaganda.

    Ironically, it is Western media that are seen as the propagandists and the purveyors of Big Lies – if one cares to examine the record objectively

    The alleged Bucha atrocity involved the apparent execution of hundreds of civilians by Russian forces as they were withdrawing from Kiev and surrounding areas at the end of March 2022. European leaders ritualistically visit a memorial in Bucha and condemn Russian barbarity.

    The political objective of those shocking Western media claims was to sabotage a potential peace deal with Moscow and to prolong the proxy war with the aim of NATO strategically defeating Russia. That culminated in nearly five years of war, millions of casualties, a failed NATO objective, and worse still, the danger of a general war in Europe going nuclear.

    Ray McGovern points out that the timeline of the Bucha killings does not fit the Western media narrative. The corpses on the streets of Bucha appeared days after the Russian forces made their withdrawal to what was then the East of Ukraine.

    Recently, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov presented new details at the United Nations that substantiate the claim that the Bucha killings were a false-flag propaganda stunt to smear Russia and to wreck any prospect of an early peace deal with Ukraine. A Russian-led investigation reveals that many of the alleged civilian victims whose names are inscribed on a memorial wall were identified as Ukrainian soldiers who had been killed in action and buried elsewhere.

    The Russian report is entitled “Heirs of Goebbels: falsification of the events in Bucha and bloody staged performances of the Kiev regime.” (Western internet has suppressed links to the report, though it can be accessed from the Russian foreign ministry.)

    As McGovern notes, not one major Western media outlet reported on Lavrov’s presentation at the United Nations and his delivery of the Russian investigation to UN Secretary-General António Guterres. McGovern believes the perpetrators were MI6, CIA, and the Kiev regime operatives.

    This egregious example of Western media suppression of Russian information and perspective on the conflict in Ukraine is repeated over and over. Another example, as McGovern amply recounts, was the attempt by Moscow to engage the United States and European NATO partners in a security treaty in late 2021. Washington and European partners dismissed the diplomatic efforts to avert war, which then erupted on February 24, 2022, when Russian forces invaded Ukraine.

    The Russian invasion was not unprovoked aggression, as Western media have dutifully asserted. It was a preemptive response to NATO covert aggression via the NeoNazi Kiev regime over seven years since the coup in 2014.

    The Nord Stream gas pipeline sabotage is another case study of how Western media have systematically ignored the evidence implicating a NATO provocation and the background to the proxy war against Russia.

    Official Western media are in the service of a political agenda and not the public interest. Their function is to prevent popular understanding of the real nature of the war in Ukraine, a proxy war against Russia that is now spiralling into an all-out confrontation.

    We refer to the quote from Thomas Jefferson, the third U.S. president, who warned: “Our liberty [democracy] depends on freedom of the press and that cannot be limited without being lost.”

    Ray McGovern laments that there has been a dreadful erosion of democracy and media independence over recent decades since the end of the Cold War and the rise of U.S. unilateralism.

    However, on a positive note, he sees hopeful signs from the phenomenal growth in alternative media and independent information, generating more critical public awareness of government abuses of power. He believes that genuine democracy can survive and thrive – despite the official Western media whose power is waning as more people realize its insidious role in promoting criminal wars.

    Ray McGovern worked as a CIA intelligence analyst for nearly 30 years under seven presidents, the first being John F Kennedy in 1963. On his retirement, he was awarded the Intelligence Commendation Medal. He handed back the medal in 2006 in protest over the CIA’s practice of systematic torture. He has repudiated the Agency as an enemy of democracy.

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    The original article

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  • [Sharing] Too late to save Europe: What Putin, Lavrov, Oreshkin, and Karaganov told me at the Valdai Summit 2026 – Lorenzo Maria Pacini, Strategic Culture Foundation

    If the door that Moscow says is open is actually closed, it’s closed on this side – and it wasn’t Rome that closed it of its own accord

    A Valdai summit off-site

    What I’m going to share in this article is less technical and more personal than usual. It concerns the information gathered over several days of dialogue, discussion, and, apparently, a “scandalous” question that became a media sensation in Europe – because I asked the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, what will become of Europe.

    You can find the full video of Vladimir Putin’s speech at the Valdai Forum here.

    You can find my remarks and Putin’s responses here.

    This year, the Valdai Forum did not meet in Sochi. Invitations sent out in the summer still listed the Black Sea city as the venue, but then, in late August, the organizers announced the move to the Moscow region. According to FT, the Federal Protective Service demanded the relocation, concerned about the threat of Ukrainian drones following a summer of attacks on coastal refineries. This logistical detail carries its own weight. The war – which at Valdai is always discussed in the language of the international system – is now also influencing the practical organization of the forum.

    The 23rd Annual Meeting took place from September 28 to October 1 under a title that to a European sounds almost like a personal question: “Responsibility for the Future: The Limits of the Possible or Limitless Possibilities?” The opening featured the Club’s annual report, Keep Calm. The State and Responsibility for the Future, which the authors present – with a nod to Kubrick – as a manual for stopping worrying and learning to love chaos. This was followed by nine thematic sessions, a special session, and, on the final day, the plenary session with the President.

    I arrived as an Italian and a European, knowing that in those halls, the two identities carry different weight. Over the course of the week, I spoke, in particular, with four high-level interlocutors: Sergey Karaganov, Maksim Oreshkin, Sergey Lavrov, and, during the plenary session, Vladimir Putin. The first three conversations took place on the sidelines of the sessions, and I’m recounting them from my notes – in essence, not word for word. The fourth exchange is public and documented by a transcript, from which I’m quoting directly.

    Taken one by one, the four dialogues convey things that anyone following the Russian debate is already familiar with. When viewed in sequence, however, they paint a clearer picture: a shared assessment of Europe and four different ways of drawing conclusions from it. And, above all, a future that is by no means bright.

    Karaganov: Europe as the source of evil

    Sergei Karaganov is one of the founders of the Valdai Club, honorary chairman of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, and for years has been the most radical voice of Russian realism. With him, the conversation began immediately with the most contentious point. Europe, he said, is the root of all evil. If it were destroyed, no one would mourn it. A tactical nuclear conflict on its territory would not involve other actors. Europeans have had plenty of time to find a solution to their own problems; now that they have chosen to prepare for war against Russia, it is too late to offer them another chance.

    I must be honest: I’ve never been a fan of Karaganov; I’ve often found his views too radical and old-fashioned. But starting with an after-lunch coffee together – and continuing over the course of a week of discussions – I discovered that we think very similarly and that his views are by no means trivial. Anyone who has read his recent statements will recognize this line of thinking. In June 2023, Karaganov had publicly argued that Russia should lower the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons to restore credibility to its deterrence and induce the West to withdraw from the conflict in Ukraine. Part of that approach was subsequently incorporated into official documents: the Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence, updated in November 2024, treat an attack by a non-nuclear state carried out with the participation or support of a nuclear power as a joint attack.

    His words, however, contain three distinct assertions, and it is worth keeping them separate. The first is a historical and civilizational judgment: Europe as the source of modernity’s great catastrophes, from the world wars to colonialism. This is a thesis that Karaganov has long argued and which can be contested, but it belongs to the realm of interpretation. The second – that no one would mourn Europe – is a prediction about others’ reactions; from what I observed during those days, it resonates with a significant portion of the Asian, African, and Latin American participants. The third is a strategic hypothesis that underpins everything else: a nuclear escalation in Europe would remain confined to Europe.

    On this point, the literature on deterrence has been debating for seventy years, and – fortunately – empirical evidence is lacking. The factor that complicates this hypothesis lies within Europe itself. France and the United Kingdom possess national arsenals, and in March 2025, Paris formally opened the debate on the European dimension of its own deterrence. A “solely European” nuclear conflict presupposes that two European nuclear powers would stand idly by. This is the weakest assumption in the entire argument, regardless of how one assesses the other two.

    It should also be noted that Karaganov does not speak on behalf of the government. At the Valdai Forum, he represents the wing of the Russian debate that pushes the Kremlin toward more definitive positions, and one of his roles is precisely to push the boundaries of what can be said. Viewed in this light, his “too late” is an indication of a trend rather than a doctrine.

    Oreshkin: The market that no longer exists

    With Maksim Oreshkin, the tone has shifted entirely. Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration, former Minister of Economic Development, and later the President’s economic advisor, Oreshkin reasons in terms of cash flows and balance sheets. His assessment was blunt: Europe is finished. There is no longer any viable competition in the energy market, because China and India now occupy the top spots among Russia’s customers. And there is no reason to invest in a European bailout, since the Europeans, to date, have shown no interest in finding a peaceful and reasonable solution. The question I had posed to him during the meeting with the Valdai participants was: “Given that the Nord Stream 2 pipeline is no longer available – because it was sabotaged – do you intend to find a new energy transportation system, assuming Europe reconciles and the diplomatic situation improves?” His blunt – and perhaps brutal – response is like a dagger of truth plunged into the conscience of every European.

    “Over” should be understood in a technical sense. Oreshkin was not speaking directly about European civilization but about Europe as a trading partner: a market that has ceased to be central to Russia and therefore does not warrant political concessions to win it back. After 2022, Russian crude oil found its main buyers in China and India, while Brussels, through the agreement between the Council and the European Parliament in December 2025, committed to phasing out imports of Russian gas – including pipeline gas and LNG – by 2027. The energy interdependence that had kept Europe and Russia connected for half a century – even during the worst moments of the Cold War – has been dismantled by both sides. Oreshkin’s reasoning captures the simplest consequence of this: whoever is no longer the main customer no longer has leverage. These are the laws of the market, and neither in London, nor in Berlin, nor in Brussels are there any politicians or power groups left who can tell Russia “what to do”.

    The flip side is well known in Moscow, too. A market dominated by two major buyers allows them to demand discounts, and replacing Europe with Asia comes at a cost in terms of price and access to technology. But according to the logic presented to me, the question is no longer whether Europe is in Russia’s interest. It is how much it would cost to make it beneficial again, and the implicit answer is that Europeans must bear that cost.

    Lavrov: the door closed on “this” order

    With Sergey Lavrov, the discussion shifted from the economy to diplomacy, without changing the conclusion. Europe, he said, had many opportunities to reestablish a dialogue with Russia and chose instead to fuel direct confrontation. Now it is too late to turn back: all limits have been crossed, and with the current European order, there is no way to return to previous relations.

    I’d like us to pause for a moment to consider the weight of these words. Those who know Lavrov know that he is a politician capable of weighing every word with great intelligence, even in more relaxed settings such as the Valdai Summit. “The limits have been crossed.” It would be pointless to list these limits, because they are so obvious to the whole world that it would simply be a waste of time. But the look in Lavrov’s eyes as he spoke about Europe – I will never forget that. I have met him many other times, but on this occasion, there was something different.

    The minister has a track record of events that Russian diplomacy regularly references: the Minsk agreements, the draft treaties on security guarantees submitted to the United States and NATO on December 17, 2021, and the Istanbul negotiations in the spring of 2022. The Russian interpretation of each of these developments is controversial, and it is contested in Europe. What interests me here is another element – a qualification that, upon re-reading after the plenary session, proved to be the key to the entire week. A return is impossible under this European framework. Not with Europe, in its current form – that is, the EU and NATO. The rejection concerns a ruling class and an institutional architecture, not the countries that are part of it.

    I wonder just how much Russian patience has been abused to reach the point of saying such things? Classic Russian literature offers us admirable examples of how Russian politicians are capable of stalling, ignoring, and being patient. And there’s no denying that this has consistently been the attitude of the Russian ruling class during the recent years of conflict. To go so far as to say that the limit has been crossed – something Putin would later echo in the summit’s plenary session – means there are no more resources to waste on patient waiting; it means the Bear has been awakened from its hibernation at the wrong moment; it means the consequences of these actions will be of epochal significance.

    Lavrov added one more thing:

    We are ready to strike Europe in an exemplary manner, not as we did in Ukraine

    Take note of these words, dear European friends. Reread them and reflect on their weight. Nothing more needs to be said.

    An Italian professor asks Putin a question

    We come now to one of the most dangerous moments of my career. The plenary session took place, as is traditional, with the Russian president in attendance and Fyodor Lukyanov moderating. I took the floor and asked a two-part question:

    I come from Italy, a country that currently does not have good relations with Russia. As a European, I would like to ask you: What conditions will Russia set for developing a new security system for European countries? And, if we imagine a post-European Union Europe, will you consider it part of a great Eurasian partnership, or, in your view, will the United States and Russia always be competing for these territories?

    Putin began with the second part, and the order is no coincidence:

    Italy is, in fact, located in Europe, and I am speaking of a Eurasian partnership: it goes without saying, therefore, that we will consider – and already do consider – Italy a Eurasian partner as well

    Immediately afterward, he clarified that the fate of the European Union, and Italy’s continued membership in it, “is none of our business.” Moscow does not even intend to discuss it, because any comment on the matter would be interpreted as an attempt to break up the EU, “while we do not want to break up anything at all. We only want to build and cooperate.”

    On the conditions for a new security system, the response was clear: “We have no preconditions.” The obstacle, in his view, lies on the other side. Some European politicians consider it unacceptable for a single country to open a dialogue with Russia, and Putin has called this demand a diktat even harsher than that of the Soviet era. The comparison was carefully crafted: the USSR was a unitary and highly centralized state, whose republics were part of a single state structure; the European Union, in theory, is not, but in practice behaves as if it were. “No one is forbidding us; we’re ready.”

    At that point, Lukyanov interjected with a provocative remark typical of an experienced moderator: since Brussels forbids it, wouldn’t it be better to contribute a little to the disintegration of the EU, so as to make it easier to deal with individual countries? The answer came without hesitation: “But there’s no need – they’ll fall apart on their own.”

    Then Putin addressed me directly. “Our Italian colleague knows this better than we do,” he said, and began running the numbers: Italian public debt at 140%, the deficit around 3%, and in other European countries close to 5%. The figures were rounded but not far from the truth. According to Istat and Eurostat, at the end of 2024, Italy’s public debt stood at 135.3% of GDP and its net borrowing at 3.4%. The point of the passage, however, wasn’t about the decimal points. All problems start with the economy: living standards fall, unemployment rises, and citizens of the major European economies feel it firsthand – and this, he said, “also undermines the very foundations of the European Union. But that’s not our business; we don’t interfere.”

    He concluded by reiterating the offer in a balanced manner: dialogue with the Union as a whole, if the Union so desires, or with individual countries, without preconditions. “But there must be no preconditions on the European side either.”

    Trying to grasp the magnitude of these words, the political balance they reveal, and the strength of a statesman who cares not only about the good of his own country but also that of an entire other continent is a true lesson in what politics is all about.

    Listen to Putin’s entire speech, and you will understand how, in less than five minutes, it is possible to capture the decline of all of Europe, in all its facets, while at the same time wistfully reiterating that Russia has done everything in its power to offer its assistance. But the choices of Europeans are their own, whatever flag they may fly. Russia respects and will always respect the fundamental principles of its foreign policy and its political tradition. No miraculous messianism, no improvised savior.

    Europe – or rather, the Europeans of this Europe – what do they intend to do?

    Rereading my travel notes

    Rereading my notes upon my return, the first thing that stands out is the convergence of views. The strategist, the economist, the foreign minister, and the President have each expressed, in their own words, the same assessment: today’s Europe has exhausted its credit with Moscow. The second thing that stands out is that each draws a different conclusion from that diagnosis.

    For Karaganov, the conclusion is coercive and takes on an almost eschatological tone: Europe has had its chance, and what follows is no longer a matter for diplomacy. For Oreshkin, it is a matter of cold, hard accounting: Europe is not worth the investment needed to win it back. For Lavrov, it is a limited diplomatic withdrawal, focused on the political structure rather than the people. Finally, for Putin, the door remains open – but toward individual states, not toward Brussels – accompanied by the expectation that economic erosion will do the rest.

    The apparent contradiction between the “too late” stance of the first three and the “no preconditions” stance of the fourth is resolved precisely in Lavrov’s characterization. The result is a coherent line, which I would call “bilateralization”: Moscow will not deal with the Union as a political entity as long as its current leadership remains in place; it offers individual member states channels without preconditions and lets Europe’s internal difficulties make those channels attractive. The reference to Italy as a Eurasian partner “already today” must be understood within this framework: it is not a courtesy; it is an indication of which interlocutor Moscow prefers.

    I certainly cannot claim that the four exceptional interlocutors had reached an agreement – that goes without saying – but I found this convergence truly “prophetic.” Valdai has always been the venue where the breadth of Russian debate is showcased to a foreign audience. I can say that these perspectives are compatible and mutually reinforcing: Karaganov’s tough stance makes Putin’s offer appear moderate; Oreshkin’s figures lend credibility to the idea that Moscow does not need to make concessions; and Lavrov’s formula balances firmness with openness.

    The 2010–2012 sovereign debt crisis gave rise to the European Stability Mechanism and the banking union; the pandemic led to Next Generation EU and the first large-scale common debt. Within the Union, crises have generated at least as much centralization as fragmentation. “They will fall apart on their own” is therefore a gamble, not an observation – even if the gamble costs little to those making it: if the EU holds together, Moscow has at least offered dialogue; if it collapses, it already has bilateral channels in place.

    The indicators to watch over the next twelve to eighteen months are fairly clear. The first concerns bilateral visits to Moscow by EU heads of government, in addition to the previous visits by Viktor Orbán in July 2024 and Robert Fico in May 2025. The second is whether unanimity holds during the semi-annual renewals of sanctions, where a single veto is enough to open a crack. The third concerns national exemptions from the timeline for phasing out Russian gas. The fourth – and most significant for us – is the possible opening of a structured channel by a major capital, including Rome.

    What do I take away from this? As an Italian, the phrase I’m taking with me isn’t the one about disintegration; it’s the other one: “We already consider Italy a Eurasian partner as well.” It contains both an offer and an observation directed at us. If the door that Moscow says is open is actually closed, it’s closed on this side – and it wasn’t Rome that closed it of its own accord.

    How long can a country with a debt exceeding 135% of GDP afford to leave it up to others to decide who can speak with whom? No one in Moscow asked me that. It’s a question I brought home with me on my own. And every Italian of good conscience, every European who still has a heart, knows the answer [end]

    The original article

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  • [Sharing] Getica’s Fifth Column: How an Ilegal Armed Group on Ukraine’s Payroll Blacklists EU and US Citizens – Stéphane Luçon

    Since the annulment of the 2024 election, Romania’s rule of law keeps crumbling. Here comes Getica – a paramilitary unit who puts EU and US citizens on a Fifth Column list and jokes about war crimes

    Romania annulled its presidential election in December 2024 amid allegations of Russian interference. Eighteen months later, Romanian authorities still have not publicly produced evidence showing that Russian influence determined the result.

    Yet, those who challenge that narrative increasingly find themselves labeled as pro-Russian, fact-checked, publicly denounced, censored, or added to the “Fifth Column” blacklist of Romanian Battlegroup Getica, an armed group linked to Ukrainian military structures.

    The story of how I ended up on that blacklist reveals something larger than a single paramilitary database. It points to an ecosystem of media outlets, NGOs, activists, fact-checkers, and an armed group that appears to use accusations of Russian influence to stigmatize political opponents and critics of Romania’s (and the EU’s) official electoral narrative.

    The question is not only why journalists, politicians, academics, and activists end up on Getica’s Fifth Column database, but most importantly why Romanian and Ukrainian authorities continue to tolerate an armed group threatening civilians while nobody accepts responsibility for it.

    Getica’s “Fifth Column” database has grown far beyond Romanian politics. At some point, Donald Trump was on it. Steve Bannon is still on it. Republicans for National Renewal and its leader Mark Ivanyo were recently added — alongside European politicians and journalists. Including myself.

    To some targets, Getica confirmed modeling their “Fifth Column” list on Ukraine’s infamous Myrotvorets death list. Those armed men wearing military uniform with Ukrainian and Romanian flags and, for some of them, on Ukraine’s army’s payroll, have joked about war crimes, war time rape, doxxed a civilian, constantly lied on their nature, and, last but not least, kept emitting threat no later than this week

    Screenshot from the last Getica video, threatening Sebastian Dracopol for his reporting and pushback on Getica’s Fifth Column

    In 2024, Getica’s Fifth column’s manifesto declared possible terrorist action if Ukraine loses the war.

    Protected Speech or Military Misconduct?

    I had been monitoring the Fifth Column site for a while when I appeared on the list. The move was an anticipated one after recurring signaling from Newsweek Romania trying to frame me as being aligned with Russia — despite not having posted anything in support of Russia. It came first as the logical conclusion of a pattern of smear and harassment coming from people connected to Newsweek România, Alianța — a US 501(c)(3) meddling with Romanian politics — and the local businessman Marius Bostan, who consolidated his fortune on state contracts awarded during the COVID crisis.

    But then came the questions — is it a real thing? Is it dangerous? Unfortunately, it is. Especially in the context of a country whose rule of law was buried altogether with the 2024 election.

    I contacted Getica to receive an explanation and clarify the label of “enemy of Romania”. An anonymous representative replied that nobody had ever suffered consequences from inclusion and argued that the project merely exercised free speech. They also explained that they used to be affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence, but are now under the authority of the Ukrainian Armed Forces… Further investigation would reveal how blurred are the lines under which Getica operates.

    The answer regarding free speech raises an obvious problem. You can’t claim free speech protection while operating as a military organization targeting civilians. If they’re civilians, Getica’s members enjoy broad free-speech protections — that is, up to the point where speech crosses into incitement or creates immediate, real-world threats. In that case, law enforcement and civilian justice should handle them. If they’re military, the problem is different. Military organizations operate under rules of engagement. They don’t target civilians. They don’t maintain independent blacklists of enemies. They answer to a chain of command. If they’re out-of-control military members, they should answer before a military tribunal.

    Getica claims both at once: military affiliation when it suits them (Ukrainian unit emblems on the website, Ukrainian battlegroup membership, fundraising for its activities), and civilian free speech protection when confronted with responsibility for the Fifth Column database. Right after I sent them a series of questions on the way they were assessing people to put them on their “Fifth Column” list, they blocked me on Facebook although I didn’t even ever tag them nor publish anything on them yet. The honor and ethics of military service were traded for the methods of petty mobsters.

    But the question goes beyond the activities of Getica. If Ukraine is supporting these activities, then it is crossing another line, in a context already extremely loaded due to the recent attribution of the Nord Stream sabotage to a Ukrainian agent by a German tribunal — the worst attack on a NATO country infrastructure so far has been performed by somebody affiliated with the Ukrainian military. The atmosphere is even more loaded since a Ukrainian drone recently exploded in the Romanian port of Constanta — the biggest NATO port on the Black Sea — a few hundred meters away from the oil terminals and from an ammonium nitrate deposit, a chemical product that made major damages in the port of Beirut in 2020. With Getica, the question of Ukraine’s willingness to target Western civilians and western infrastructure is all the more acute. You can’t receive Western support and attack the West. You can’t claim funding for your military and pay the members of Getica as they target EU and US civilians. If Ukraine can’t court-martial those targeting EU and US citizens, if it covers for them, then the whole story of defending a democracy against an autocracy crumbles and, with it, part of the reasons to support Ukraine against the Russian invasion.

    Getica — illegal, dangerous and… aligned with Macron?

    In Romania, paramilitary organizations operating outside state command are constitutionally prohibited. Yet, Romanian Battlegroup Getica appears to operate openly: armed men claiming ties to Ukrainian military structures, running a blacklist of civilians, and even claiming to have conducted two operations on Romanian soil.

    Its historical founder and commander, Sergiu Meșeșan, claims participation in dozens of combat missions in Ukraine. Its members and supporters have doxed critics and targeted family members. Meșeșan recently returned to Romania to teach people how to use FPV drones, including arming them with explosives. In public exchanges, the group has joked about war crimes, rape, disappearances, and other conduct that would normally trigger serious scrutiny.

    In one live exchange on X, the Romanian Legion Getica account replied to another user with language trivializing rape and invoking Azov: “Several army groups participated in your creation, Azov too I think. The woman didn’t complain.” The reference is not incidental. Azov’s neo-Nazi origins were documented to the point that the US Congress prohibited weapons transfers to the unit in 2018, a restriction that remained in place until 2024. During that period, Radu Hossu — Getica’s main fundraiser and co-founder — appeared in a June 2023 interview wearing an Azov emblem containing the Wolfsangel, a symbol with direct Nazi lineage. In one of his own fundraising reports, he also acknowledged purchasing equipment for two military personnel enrolled in Azov, adding parenthetically: “yes, that AZOV”

    Radu Hossu, on the Romanian podcast Vorbintorici, wearing the Azov Wolfsangel in June 2023, when the US congress ban on arming Azov was still enforced due to Azov’s neo-nazi elements

    The point is not guilt by association. It is that an armed group maintaining a civilian blacklist, joking about rape and war crimes, invoking disappearances, and displaying proximity to military formations controversial enough to trigger years of congressional restrictions should have attracted institutional scrutiny long before journalists, politicians, and foreign citizens began appearing on its list.

    Whose Army?

    Some Getica members hold Ukrainian military ID cards and receive Ukrainian Army salaries

    Sergiu Meseșan military document shared on the Romanian Battlegroup Getica Facebook account – A0515 is a Military Intelligence Directorate Unit

    According to representatives of the group contacted directly for this investigation, Getica has operated under Ukrainian military command — initially under GUR, the Ukrainian military intelligence directorate, and later under ZSU, the Ukrainian Armed Forces. When pressed on the specifics of their affiliation, they directed us to their website.

    That website has been telling its own story. Until May 30, 2026, it displayed the emblem of the 4th Heavy Mechanized Brigade of the Ukrainian Army

    On that date — shortly after this investigation began sending right-of-reply letters to Romanian and Ukrainian institutions — the emblem was quietly removed, with an announcement that a new unit affiliation would be revealed. Days later, two new emblems appeared: that of the 1230th Separate Engineering and Technical Support Battalion, part of the 48th Engineering Brigade of the Ukrainian Support Forces; and that of the International Legion of Defense Intelligence of Ukraine, MUNA 3449 — a separate unit of foreign fighters subordinated to the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, which is the GUR

    International Legion of Defense Intelligence of Ukraine
    1230th Separate Engineering and Technical Support Battalion

    No Ukrainian institution has formally claimed oversight of the group. No Romanian institution has either.

    The people behind Getica form an unusual partnership. On one side, Sergiu Meșeșan, the group’s historical founder and commander, is a Romanian volunteer fighter in Ukraine who was previously sentenced in Sweden to three years in prison for aggravated fraud as the leader of a bank-card-skimming and phishing operation active across Sweden, Finland, and Denmark.

    On the other is Radu Hossu, a self-described founding father of the project: a prominent pro-Ukraine activist, fundraiser, and politician from USR — the party created by Romania’s current president and aligned with Macron’s Renew Europe group — as well as an “embedded” war journalist, covering military operations and units he simultaneously helped finance.

    One man built and commanded the organization, and would publish the manifesto of the Fifth Column blacklist and maintain it. The other provided funding, public legitimacy, media access, and political connections.

    Questions about Getica’s financing had already produced one of the earliest public conflicts surrounding the group. IT specialist Sebastian Dracopol, later added to the Fifth Column database himself, challenged the use of funds raised by Hossu through a personal Revolut account. After being doxxed and threatened, Dracopol sued Hossu. Although he did not obtain a restraining order, the proceedings produced one of the few official records concerning Getica, including admissions regarding Hossu’s fundraising role, his creation and ownership of the group’s Telegram channel, and the armed nature of the combatants operating under the Getica banner. We will return to that case later.

    The April 2024 “Fifth Column” Manifesto

    In April 2024, Getica commander Sergiu Meșeșan published what amounts to the founding document of the Fifth Column project, laying out his program in explicit terms:

    We believe it is normal to have different opinions and freedom of expression. That is what democracy is about. But we wish to warn, through this message, that there is a limit to the subversive activities we will tolerate — I am referring to ‘Getica’ — on the territory of Romania or the Republic of Moldova.

    And we are EXTREMELY ready to act from the shadows to limit the impact of Russian influence in both states.

    Thus, when Ukraine collapses — as this category of Russophiles maintains, and if it should actually come to pass — we will be ready to strike with an intensity and firepower the likes of which Romania has never seen, in order to defend the national and vital interests of the nation.

    We are aware that there is a legal framework that is not exactly favorable for state defense institutions to act freely and effectively. Laws change, however, and for the homeland, ‘Getica’ is ready even to circumvent them. We own that. We might be called terrorists. But the terrorists of some are the freedom fighters of others.

    […] We already have a website, a secure server, and a domain. We will publish them very shortly. Beyond the information and presentation images you have been able to see on our page over time, we wish to put into practice the concept of the #coloana5 database. We firmly believe that exposing the identity of subversive elements and useful idiots will deter them more or less from their activities of sabotaging public opinion, and will spare us other actions — unfortunately far more invasive — in the near future

    Meșeșan’s manifesto remains live on Facebook today. He has since returned to Romania.

    The idea of an armed group on Ukrainian payroll going rogue and targeting citizens of NATO member states should have warranted a reaction from authorities, at least from Romania and from Ukraine. In response to our inquiry, the Armed Forces of Ukraine stated that the matter fell within the competence of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) of the Defense Ministry. The Romanian Defense Ministry denied any affiliation. No further clarification was provided.

    A year after its manifesto, Getica goes… “clandestine”?

    In a lengthy statement published on April 14, 2025, Getica founder Sergiu Meșeșan described himself as having conducted 37 combat missions in Ukraine, including infantry, SIGINT, drone ISR, and attack-drone roles. He stated that Getica had approximately 50 members over its existence and never more than 20 active fighters at any given time.

    More importantly, he publicly acknowledged that the group had carried out “2 limited surveillance operations on Romanian territory.” Meșeșan did not disclose the targets, legal basis, beneficiaries, or institutional authorization of the two Romanian surveillance operations. No Romanian authority contacted during this investigation acknowledged requesting, supervising, authorizing, or even being aware of them. The statement raises obvious questions about the legality of intelligence-style activities conducted on Romanian territory by individuals presenting themselves as members of a foreign military structure. If they are a paramilitary group, their activities are unconstitutional and illegal in Romania. If they are affiliated to Ukraine’s military, this is a serious breach of the treaties that prevent any such activity. If these missions were happening with the blessing of the Romanian Army, then somebody at the MaPN lied to us and covered up for Getica – and this person should answer before the law too.

    In the same statement, Meșeșan proclaimed that: “From today, Getica becomes a multinational, global and clandestine operation.”

    By any reasonable definition, Getica does not display the characteristics of a regular military force. Regular military forces operate with rules of engagement, a formal conduct code, and an accountable command hierarchy — constraints that precisely prevent armed groups from targeting civilians, engaging in public discourse, or taking sides in political debate.

    Getica’s Fifth Column

    Coloana 5 — Fifth Column — is Getica’s blacklist. By May 2024, the page was online. It currently lists over 150 American and European citizens and organizations accused of serving Russian interests, acting as useful idiots, or being enemies of Romania.

    Inclusion is not notified in advance. According to the operators themselves, a profile can be spotted automatically by a combination of alleged military AI systems — an OSINT database and an LLM — and then approved by a human operator. The list is not static: operators state they monitor listed individuals and may revise positions over time, an implicit form of pressure to coerce people into alignment. The original version of the site included a “Recommended actions” rubric specifying measures such as localization and monitoring of listed individuals. That section has since been removed. At some point, the site began blocking web archiving tools, making earlier versions inaccessible.

    In direct communication with a listed person, Getica leadership referenced Myrotvorets explicitly as a model — the Ukrainian hit list on which was Chilean-American influencer Gonzalo Lira, whose case gained attention in 2023 when Elon Musk publicly questioned his detention. According to Ukrainian officials, Lira died in detention from pneumonia and health complications; his family and supporters alleged mistreatment and torture

    Lira’s last tweet

    A development in sync with the election calendar

    Getica’s Fifth Column project did not emerge during an ordinary political period. In 2024, every major elected office was scheduled for renewal in Romania.

    In late April, the European Union activated its Rapid Response System to flag content during the European Parliament election campaign, and Getica simultaneously began listing members of the opposition on its website. The framing had been set weeks earlier: on March 6, Ursula von der Leyen, campaigning for her reelection, made the stakes explicit in her Bucharest rally cry:

    [..] Putin’s friends are trying to rewrite our history and hijack our future. They are spreading hate from behind their keyboards. And let there be no doubt what’s at stake in this election. Our peaceful and united Europe is being challenged like never before by populists, nationalists, and demagogues. Whether it is the far right or the far left. Whether it is the AfD, the Rassemblement National, the confederatia or Wasraschdene. The names may be different, but the goal is the same: They want to trample on our values, and they want to destroy our Europe. But we, the EPP, will never let that happen

    Following the Russiagate playbook, critics and opposition to power are “Russian influence” – this would become a recurring theme during the long Romanian election cycle. Getica’s project, supposedly aimed at exposing Russian influence, would just plainly overlap with domestic political conflicts, opposition figures, journalists, commentators, and critics of power.

    The involvement of USR member Radu Hossu makes an obvious case for direct political support or, at least, convenient complacency, with the criminal activities of Getica. Contacted, neither Dominic Fritz – leader of USR – nor USR Brașov provided a statement to distance themselves from Hossu. Bucharest leader of USR, Vlad Voiculescu, replied in a direct message that he didn’t see how the matter was related to USR. Yet, the fact that a USR member helped and covered for a coercion gang is obviously a USR problem. None of the questions sent to USR-founder, and now President Nicusor Dan, to the Ministry of Defence, led by USR member Radu Miruta, nor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, led by USR member Oana Toiu, delivered a significant assessment, response, let alone an acknowledgement of the gravity of the matter. Silence seems to clearly mean consent, and Getica’s utility for the USR could be summarized like that: if propaganda fails, if censorship and the weaponization of the DSA fails, then an informal tool to threatens or silences people find its full utility.

    Who makes it to the list?

    The progression from media labeling to blacklisting can be observed directly in my own case. Since December 2024, I have repeatedly described the absurdity of framing as pro-Russian people who — like most of the Romanian conservatives — have condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and hold Russia in distrust for many historical reasons. In a country where 87.5% of the people are West-oriented and consider EU and NATO membership as warranties of security and prosperity, framing a part of the population — the conservatives — as anti-EU, anti-NATO, pro-Russia only serves a propaganda machine.

    Before appearing in the Fifth Column database, I had already been repeatedly smeared as pro-Russian, pro-Orbán, pro-Georgescu or part of various influence networks — and this without ever having published pro-Russian, pro-Georgescu or pro-Orbán material. The attacks had far more to do with the reporting I published than with any pro-Russian content.

    I have documented how the current implementation of the EU Digital Services Act created a growing ecosystem of censorship actors while leaving user protections largely theoretical (see DSA: Europe’s Injustice System).

    Later this year, I contributed to The Managed Ballot, published through MCC Brussels, with a chapter on Romania’s Hybrid Regime and its European Accomplices. It argued that the country’s democratic downgrade was driven by the regime itself — the government and the intelligence community — working hand in hand with a local “fake civil society” that lacked real constituencies and ran on foreign executive-power funding, including the EU’s. Behind it, external interference from Brussels and from Macron. The result: a country the Economist’s Democracy Index had reclassified as a “hybrid regime” — no longer a democracy. The publication of the MCC report triggered an ad hominem attack in a media outlet owned by Marius Bostan.

    The combination placed me in direct conflict with actors who considered the Russian-interference narrative settled fact. Beyond my own reporting, I also publish the Romanian edition of Le Monde diplomatique and regularly translate writers who frequently challenge official foreign-policy narratives and oppose censorship, including Serge Halimi, Pierre Rimbert, Matt Taibbi, Aaron Maté, Thomas Fazi, Jeffrey Sachs and John Mearsheimer.

    A few days ago, another Newsweek Romania “embedded journalist” — mixing coverage of the Ukraine war with support for Ukraine —, Remus Cernea, alleged that Sachs and Mearsheimer were “Putin’s intellectuals”.

    Newsweek România, Alianța and the Bostan ecosystem

    But things accelerated when I debunked a hit piece published by Newsweek România targeting Georgică Severin, one of the few members of the National Audiovisual Council (CNA) consistently opposing censorship measures within Romania’s media regulator. My article also noted how the advertorial section of Newsweek România only contained representatives of the government. Before publishing my rebuttal, I sent detailed questions to Newsweek România. No answer was received. Two days later, Newsweek România published a new article targeting both Severin and me. Another article followed in Newsweek, reminding readers of my positive reaction to AUR’s medical caravan project and the fact that my wife is an AUR member.

    Facing calls for deportation, I debunked the most outrageous allegations in a single published response, rather than engaging every online harasser.

    Shortly afterwards, I appeared on Getica’s Fifth Column database, directly tagged as an “enemy of Romania” and a “potential collaborator.” Getica’s file referenced articles published by two media outlets in which a key stakeholder is Marius Bostan — În Linie Dreaptă and Newsweek România (a local licensee, not the US edition, with full editorial autonomy). Bostan is a former Romanian Telecommunications Minister from the “technocratic government” that governed Romania from 2015 to 2017, formed after the Colectiv nightclub fire protests. Later, Bostan largely benefited from government contracts during the COVID crisis. In 2018, Newsweek România was launched, at an event where the head of the Romanian Intelligence Service would participate. Bostan exerts further influence via Alianța, a US 501(c) originally created to nurture US-Romania friendship, gathering former US ambassadors on its board. Through Newsweek România and Alianța-related actors, a common pattern emerges: individuals challenging dominant narratives are first publicly framed as vectors of disinformation before some eventually find themselves referenced by Getica’s Fifth Column project.

    In one instance, the Getica Twitter account even asked the editor of În Linie Dreaptă when to add an academic to the list — which raises the question of direct management of the Getica list by Bostan’s employees.

    On July 22, 2025, Getica publicly justified AUR MEP Gheorghe Piperea’s inclusion by posting a screenshot of a Digi24 article reporting that the European Commission considered his motion of censure against Ursula von der Leyen to be linked to Moscow’s interests. Getica’s accompanying comment was: “connecting the dots 😉” A normal parliamentary procedure — a motion of censure, one of the European Parliament’s standard checks-and-balances instruments — had already been reframed by Newsweek România as an initiative of the “Russophile extremist AUR party” before Getica treated it as a Russian-interference signal.

    Getica’s list has kept growing since its launch. In April 2025, Donald Trump was added. He was removed shortly after — no removal date confirmed.

    Months later, the operators claimed it had been a test to confuse enemies. That explanation is difficult to take at face value: it is more plausible that internal pushback warned them of the risk of directly targeting a sitting US president. What followed makes the Trump removal look less like a policy and more like damage control — the additions continued. The targeting pattern is hard to separate from the political positioning of Getica’s main fundraiser, Radu Hossu, and his party USR, which has maintained a radically conflicting stance toward Donald Trump, the MAGA movement, and USR’s local rivals, the AUR party.

    The same chronology appears around Republicans for National Renewal. In early 2026, Newsweek România published an article about a distinction awarded by the American organization to AUR’s leader George Simion. Shortly afterwards, RNR leader Mark Ivanyo was added to the Fifth Column database together with the organization itself. Dragoș Moldoveanu, an AUR member, was added in the same batch, and a Bulgarian figure associated with the same political ecosystem was also added. More additions followed after public discussions involving AUR MP Mihai Neamțu and sovereignty-oriented commentators, including Laurențiu Țîrcă.

    Țîrcă received some of the most radical messaging from Getica. The group confirmed to him that Myrotvorets was its model, and pointed to how people on such lists suffer “accidental” deaths. Țîrcă reported seeing a now-removed image of his name written on a rocket launcher. When he challenged Getica over alleged war crimes committed during the Kursk incursion, where elderly civilians died, the Getica account replied: “I don’t deal with pensioners only, I deal with students too.” Țîrcă was a student at that time.

    Although Newsweek România carries the name of the American weekly, asked about editorial oversight and accountability, Newsweek USA told us that its international publishing partners are responsible for their own editorial operations and content, while also stating that Newsweek expects organizations operating under its brand to uphold responsible journalism standards.

    The concentration of impostors at the local edition of Newsweek goes so far that it receives contribution from Ovidiu Nahoiu, Chief Editor of Radio France International Romania, who shone a year ago with an obsequious interview of the French Ambassador — that is the representative of the government that pays Nahoiu’s salary — were 3 blatant lies went uncheck on air in order to support the Russian influence narrative justifying the annulment of the election. Newsweek also hosts editorial from Adrian Zuckerman — a former ambassador who constantly meddles with Romanian politics, sometimes to praise the Ministry of Internal Affairs for his role in the 2024 coup – naturally framed as “saving Romania”-, sometimes to urge the Romanian Presidency not to join Trump board of Peace.

    A few years ago, a reporting by Recorder had already highlited one of the key reason explaining the journalistic fraud within Newsweek and a large part of the press — government money flooding them.

    “The destruction of these emitters of toxic ideas must be part of the response.”

    The overlap with Getica’s rhetoric extends beyond Newsweek itself. One recurring node is Alianța, a network whose members and participants have included business leaders, activists, former diplomats, former American ambassadors, media figures and public officials. On September 20, 2025, Alianța member Andrei Caramitru publicly defended Getica and its blacklist, describing Getica as Romanian patriots and heroes and claiming the list contained pro-Russian actors from Romania and Moldova. He added that the list was probably already known to Azov, Ukrainian services, Western services and others. We offered a right of reply to Alianța in letters addressed to each board member and to former US ambassadors — no answer was received.

    Alianța bills itself as a nonpartisan 501(c)(3), yet its own Board Chair, former US Ambassador Adrian Zuckerman, used an interview to declare the leading conservative opposition party, AUR, “a party dangerous to Romania, dangerous to democracy, dangerous to the West — a party that shouldn’t exist in Romania.” A US tax-exempt nonpartisan organization is, on its own platform, calling for the elimination of a Romanian parliamentary party.

    One of the most revealing pieces of language in this ecosystem has been recently supplied by Marius Bostan, shareholder of Newsweek România and central actor in the Alianța network. At the Newsweek IT & Cyber Summit 2026, Bostan compared ideological opponents to pests invading a field and argued that rapid intervention was necessary: “When pests invade a field you need to spray quickly. If you don’t react immediately, you lose.” He continued: “Sometimes attack is a better form of defense. The destruction of these emitters of toxic ideas must be part of the response.”

    The wording mirrors the coercive logic already present in Meșeșan’s Fifth Column manifesto. Bostan was not speaking as an anonymous extremist but as a Newsweek România shareholder and Alianța figure, at a Newsweek-branded event, immediately after a Presidential Palace summit devoted to informational resilience where the leading opposition faces were put on display as “public vectors of disinformation”. The pinnacle of Romania’s executive power hosting an event targeting the opposition as an enemy in an information war. When a democracy crumbles, signs are everywhere.

    This is why the Fifth Column database cannot be understood as an isolated website run by a fringe armed group. The labels appearing on the list often predate the list itself. They emerge first in media coverage, public campaigns, anti-disinformation initiatives, political commentary and institutional discourse.

    At the end of the day, the tabloidisation of Newsweek România, the extremely low level of “hit job journalism,” is a matter that would be solved by the market and readers’ interest. Except for the government money that flows into this ecosystem, directly or indirectly. Which leads to the bigger issue — more problematic than Newsweek România producing trash news and hit pieces: the role of Romania’s regime.

    The Consequences of a Lie — The 2024 Election Annulment

    To understand the current situation in Romania, we need to go back to the 2024 presidential election, when an outsider candidate, Călin Georgescu, won the first round with 23% of the vote. A second round was scheduled for December 8, 2024. It never happened. On December 6 — with voting in Romania’s large overseas diaspora already under way — the Constitutional Court annulled the entire electoral process. The annulment followed roughly two weeks of public signaling about alleged Russian interference and algorithmic manipulation, driven by a series of NGOs financed by the European Commission calling on Brussels for help.

    What followed was a ritual of whitewashing the decision, by European leaders spinning the idea that Russia was behind Georgescu’s success. Macron offered one of the most revealing examples, declaring in a February 2025 live broadcast that the court had detected fraud, vote purchases, and annulled the election because of Russian interference. One fabrication after another. In reality, the Constitutional Court had validated the first round (Decision 31), finding no electoral fraud, and its annulment decision contains no attribution of the result to Russia (Decision 32).

    We are now in June 2026. Romania has never formally attributed the Georgescu campaign to Russia. Romanians are still being told that proof is about to be released by President Nicușor Dan. The implicit conclusion is twofold: at the time of the annulment, the Constitutional Court had no proof of Russian meddling — yet it annulled the election. And eighteen months later, the reason proof has not been produced is likely that there was no provable decisive Russian interference.

    Alternative Explanations Identified After the Annulment

    The few operations that were identified — including those referenced in the Defense Council meeting that served as justification for the annulment — actually originated from Romania and Ukraine.

    On December 6 and 13, 2024, French daily Le Monde identified a Ukrainian sponsor behind the Georgescu influencer campaign: Dmitriy Makarov, a 32-year-old Ukrainian entrepreneur who had previously publicly supported Ukraine against Russia, whose companies — FA Agency, GMG, and Zlodeї — recruited influencers to promote Georgescu.

    On December 18, the Romanian outlet Snoop.ro revealed that PNL, the National Liberal Party, a member of the governing coalition, had financed one of the campaigns promoting its own competitor, Georgescu. That a governing party financed the rise of a candidate deemed so dangerous the election had to be annulled — leaving that party in power — remains one of the least addressed paradoxes of Romania’s democratic regression.

    2024 — a Modern Taboo

    Since then, saying there is no proof of Russian involvement has become the new taboo. On March 5, 2026, journalist Lucian Davidescu was fact-checked by Romania’s leading fact-checker, Factual — run by Funky Citizens, on Meta’s platform — for stating precisely that there was no real Russian implication in the 2024 election. The “fact-check” affirmed information directly contradicted by the Constitutional Court’s own decisions it was referring to. Davidescu obtained the publication of a Right of Reply response, but the fact-check stayed for months as a “flagged issue” on his Facebook account. Challenging the “successful Russian interference” narrative is nevertheless a widespread opinion, shared by former president Traian Băsescu, and even by Georgescu’s opponent in the second round that never took place, Elena Lasconi — at the time endorsed by Macron himself.

    Also on the Getica list, journalist Marius Tuca had been censored by the National Council for Audiovisual in March 2025 for calling the 2024-2025 sequence a coup — two months before the rerun of the presidential election, which Georgescu was barred from running in. One of the grievances against me is precisely to have described a judicial coup (see the timeline of the coup here).

    In May 2026, eighteen months after the annulment, President Nicușor Dan delivered yet another interview promising the long-awaited report.

    Proper attribution should be the golden rule when framing anything as a Russian influence. As I argue in my articles “The Iceberg That Can Sink Europe” and in “European Diplomacy Seems too Ashamed to Look at What Happened in Romania”, using the concept of Foreign Influence to target people who have no ties to a foreign power is an extremely dangerous game – one that leads to more “fifth column” craze and McCarthyism.

    It’s all the more important to remember that, since when it comes to attribution, Romania is far from being a powerless state.

    The State That Chose Not to See

    Romania’s internal intelligence service, the SRI, operates on a budget of over one billion dollars annually — three times that of France’s DGSI in nominal terms, six times in purchasing power parity, for a country three to four times smaller. All in all, ten to twenty times more resources per capita dedicated to surveillance and control. Not to mention that France has numerous terrorist threats to handle, whereas Getica seems to be the only one the Romanian authority have to deal with… The overpowered capacity of Romania’s intelligence services was praised in 2023 by Brigadier General Anton Rog, head of Cyberint — SRI’s cyber intelligence division — explaining in precise terms what his agency could do when democracy was under attack. It could counter campaigns online, take down websites, shut down operations. “We can get such a warrant in less than an hour,” he said.

    Yet when the Georgescu campaign was running in late 2024, nothing happened.

    When Getica published its blacklist, threatened journalists, doxxed families, and announced missions on Romanian soil, nothing happened.

    When AUR MP Dan Tanasă sent a formal parliamentary question (PDF) about the armed paramilitary group Getica to the government — still nothing, just a four page reply (PDF). The response, Tanasă said, contained no indication that the matter had been referred to DIICOT (the Directorate for Investigating Organized Crime and Terrorism) or any other investigative authority.

    A member of Parliament asked them about a band of volunteers that carry arms and that make lists of the enemies [including members of] the Romanian Parliament and they did nothing

    Tanasă said, adding that

    The purpose of this list is to silence the people on it one way or another, either through public shaming or, who knows, by a lunatic who would believe that I or any other person on this list is paid by Russia and would try to harm us physically

    Tanasă is currently preparing a criminal complaint against those responsible for the project.

    And the Media That Chose Not to See

    Since its first appearance in September 2023, Getica has drawn more than forty favorable pieces in the Romanian press — nearly half of them published after the blacklist’s existence was already known. The most revealing reporting on the matter came instead from Sebastian Dracopol, one of the people Getica blacklisted: first on his Substack, and more recently through his NGO, Patria Prima. He documented Meșeșan’s criminal past, the opacity of Hossu’s fundraising, and unresolved questions about the group’s actual combat record. Meșeșan’s answer to the latest reveal was to launch a fresh fundraising campaign on June 6, 2026 — to cover legal fees for suing Patria Prima and to buy military gear — this time routed through an NGO ostensibly dedicated to civilian aid, Volunteers Without Borders. The NGO did not respond to our request for comment.

    Recently, Patria Prima started asking every outlet why they presented Getica as a military unit, implicitly helping them to raise money, whereas the Ukrainian army denied any responsibility for it and Mesesan – as well as Hossu – reframed the group as an informal one. As a response, yet another article was published, by Veridica, in support of Getica. Patria Prima announced suing again. The author, Alex Craiu Rosenberg then published a video to frame Dracopol’s actions as SLAPP – Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation. The missing element of this analysis is the relation of power – Getica is a criminal, illegal, anti-constitutional and dangerous group who raised money in an illegal manner, yet benefits from the complacency of power, serves the interests of one or more parties of the governing coalition, and receives positive coverage from a press that lives off some executive power money (may it be the Romanian government or the money from Foreign countries – as Veridica does). Like for Newsweek’s hit pieces, Veridica’s work doesn’t qualify for the SLAPP victim card – it is part of the larger propaganda, censorship and coercion machine that targets critics, the opposition, and other nonaligned voices.

    When asked about the impunity that Getica enjoys, several journalists present on the list pointed to the entanglement with Romania’s intelligence services and how Romanian military personnel often go on leave to participate in paid missions — as mercenaries. This is corroborated by something I found out investigating the DSA in September 2025, when I was told by Freedom House Romania’s Director, Cristina Guseth, that Getica was part of the support provided by Romania to Ukraine, and “something that the Romanian government decided not to make public.”

    This could explain a part of the ambiguity and the silence our investigation received. Why public responsibility for Getica’s activities remained unclaimed.

    On October 27, 2025, Romania’s Intelligence Service — the SRI — responded to a formal parliamentary question submitted by AUR MP Fabian Radu, a member of the Joint Standing Committee exercising parliamentary oversight of SRI’s activities. The response invoked information classification and the “need to know” principle, offering no substantive answer. The formulation leaves two possibilities open: either the issue is being monitored and is too sensitive to be made public, or the non-answer is itself a cover.

    The months that followed make the silence harder to explain. Between late 2025 and mid-2026, the list expanded further — adding US politicians, more members of the opposition, and me, a French journalist. During the same period, Getica’s founder began publishing video tutorials on preparing First-Person View (FPV) drones for military use.

    On June 7, the Getica account republished on X a video montage of FPV drone footage reaching their targets: 67 different Russian soldiers (with possibly a civilian among them)

    original tweet here

    Monitoring Failure or State Complicity?

    If Romania’s Intelligence Services’ intent was to monitor — through surveillance or infiltration — before acting against Getica, eight months seem more than enough time to assess and intervene. But if Romanian intelligence services have some form of control over the battlegroup, then the continued expansion of the blacklist to include opposition politicians, journalists, and US citizens during that period is not a failure of oversight, but a state scandal.

    The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MAI) did respond to our investigation, but only to state that, pursuant to Article 285(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, criminal investigation proceedings are non-public — neither confirming nor denying that any proceeding exists.

    Romania’s Intelligence Service (SRI) also replied, citing the classified nature of its activities, and neither confirmed nor denied whether Getica had ever been assessed as a national-security concern, whether information had been transmitted to Romanian authorities, or whether any monitoring or investigation existed.

    As mentioned, formal inquiries sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Romanian Presidency, and the French Presidency received no reply. The atmosphere is one of pervasive institutional ambiguity, in which responsibility is continually deferred while the blacklist continues to expand.

    Three months ago, in a private conversation with a member of the Romanian government, I asked about the incapacity to prove Russian interference and the widespread suspicion that what happened was an inside job — the answer was unambiguous: “Of course. But you do realize that if they admit it wasn’t the Russians, the country would descend into chaos.”

    Three months later, the credibility and legitimacy of Romania’s current regime are lower than ever. A vote of no confidence brought down the government on May 5. One month later, a Ukrainian drone exploded in the Romanian port of Constanța, and the authorities failed to obtain a clear explanation from Ukraine or to provide the public with a convincing account of the incident. The prospect of impeaching President Dan — unthinkable until recently — is now on the table [end]

    The original article

    Stéphane Luçon is a French journalist based in Romania. After Romania’s annulled elections, he began investigating the EU’s Digital Services Act — censorship, transparency failures — and its impact on the information flow

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    Juste après la victoire de son camp aux élections fédérales du 23 février 2025, Johann Wadephul fut piégé par deux humoristes russes qui se faisaient passer au téléphone pour des membres de l’équipe du président ukrainien Voldodymyr Zelenskyy. Celui qui est aujourd’hui le ministre allemand des affaires étrangères leur déclara

    Russland wird immer ein Feind und eine Gefahr für unsere europäische Sicherheit sein [La Russie sera toujours un ennemi et une menace pour notre sécurité européenne]

    Ce véritable coming out n’a pas échappé à la sagacité de journalistes suisses

    En cette mi-août, les gesticulations et déclarations enflammées d’un Friedrich Merz, d’une Ursula von der Leyen ou de leur caniche Emmanuel Macron m’insupportent au point de devoir énoncer quelques vérités simples

    Le problème majeur de cette Europe en déclin vertigineux est aujourd’hui l’Allemagne, dont la réunification en 1990 fut une catastrophe pour la paix. Moins d’un an plus tard, ses services secrets, le Bundesnachrichtendienst, contribuèrent à semer le chaos en Yougoslavie. Un pays que les partisans communistes de Josip Broz Tito étaient parvenus à libérer seuls en 1945, détruisant les petits États fantoches nazis instaurés par les Allemands en 1941

    Pour raisons personnelles, je connais bien les Allemands. D’ailleurs, je regarde presque quotidiennement leurs journaux télévisés, où l’incantation unsere Demokratie [notre démocratie] est prononcée avec une emphase suspecte toutes les trois phrases. Quand de vils commentateurs français invoquent la liberté ou la démocratie au sujet du conflit en Ukraine, ils singent le révisionnisme allemand, un peu de la même façon que l’immense majorité de leurs anciens faisaient des ronds de jambe dans les Kommandanturen entre 1940 et 1944

    Les Allemands se rêvent dans une mythologie nationale qui leur fait croire qu’ils auraient été les victimes [je sais bien que c’est grotesque] d’une dictature nazie, dont les USA et nul autre les auraient libérés. Mais la Russie leur rappelle perpétuellement ce qu’ils étaient en réalité. Les boches n’ont toujours pas accepté d’avoir été vaincus en 1945 par l’Union soviétique, voudraient encore se croire sortis de la cuisse de Siegfried. C’est pourquoi je me délecte de leur déconfiture. Et si les pinzuti [Français, en Corse] devaient sombrer avec eux, inchallah.

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    The Atlanticist defeat in Donbass and Ukraine

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  • The British intelligence is planning secret operations of sabotage in order to trigger the overt and shameless Western piracy of tankers transporting Russian oil

    On August 4, 2025, the Russian State news agency, TASS, wrote

    The UK’s secret services are planning to enlist NATO allies in a large-scale operation targeting the “shadow fleet,” which could lead to an environmental disaster in international waters, the press bureau of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) said in a statement obtained by TASS.

    “British secret services are planning ecological disaster in international waters. The press bureau of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation informs that, according to the information coming to the SVR, the British secret services are planning to involve NATO allies in a massive roundup for the ‘shadow fleet’,” the statement said.

    According to London’s plan, the impetus for such a campaign should be provided by “a resonant incident involving one or more tankers.”

    “The plan involves organizing a major act of sabotage the losses of which would allow the transportation of Russian oil to be declared a threat to all international shipping. This would untie Western countries’ hands in choosing methods of counteraction,” the document said.

    Two scenarios and actors

    According to the SVR, the British are working on “two potential casus belli.” “The first scenario implicates setting up an ‘unwanted’ tanker accident in one of bottlenecks of sea communications (for example, in straits). As it is believed in London, oil spills and fairway blocking would provide NATO countries with ‘sufficient’ grounds for establishing a precedent of ‘extraordinary’ vessel inspection under the guise of maritime safety and environmental regulations compliance,” the statement noted.

    “The second one involves setting fire to a tanker at loading in a port of a state friendly to Russia. It is expected that the fire would cause significant damage to the port infrastructure and spread to other vessels, which would require an international investigation,” the SVR emphasized.

    “London is going to entrust Ukrainian security forces with the implementation of both terrorist attacks. Their expectedly dirty work and inability to ‘cover up’ their tracks are considered by the British as a guarantee of impunity for themselves. The international investigation would hold either Russia or at worst Ukraine responsible for the accident, similar to the situation with the Nord Stream gas pipeline explosion,” the press bureau stressed.

    Eying sanctions

    The SVR pointed out that the timing of the UK attack is intended to be chosen so as to use the media effect from it to put pressure on the administration of US President Donald Trump.

    “The aim is to force Washington, in defiance of its national interests, to impose the most severe secondary sanctions against Russian energy resources buyers, making them seen as ‘indirect culprits of the tragedy’,” the statement said.

    “It seems like nostalgia for the lost dominance at sea and for authorized by the Crown pirate lawlessness have completely deprived the British Intelligence of the remnants of common sense. It’s high time for our British colleagues to understand that their increasingly bold attempts not only ‘to get back at’ their rivals, but also to cause damage to the global energy security and ecology are capable to make even their most loyal allies run out of patience,” the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service concluded

    US social networking service X is integrating Grok, a funny artificial intelligence chatbot, which is regarding the Western mainstream media literature as gospel truth. Here is its definition of the so-called Russian shadow fleet

    a group of over 600 aging vessels (average age nearing 30 years) used to evade Western sanctions on Russian oil exports, as detailed in a 2025 Windward.ai report analyzing shifts in trade routes to India, China, and Turkey

    To assess the atmosphere, in the context of the proxy attrition war that the West is losing in Donbass and Ukraine, here is a piece on August 5 from the Financial Times, a British outlet

    Donald Trump’s administration is considering additional sanctions on Russia’s “shadow fleet” of oil tankers if President Vladimir Putin does not agree to a ceasefire in Ukraine by Friday.

    Blacklisting vessels in the fleet would mark the first time the US has imposed sanctions aimed at Moscow since Trump returned to the White House in January.

    Russia has used a shadow fleet of largely ageing tankers to ship oil around the world in an attempt to evade western restrictions imposed in the wake of Moscow’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Proceeds from these crude exports have helped to finance the conflict.

    The term “shadow fleet” refers to vessels whose ownership is hidden and which avoid using services from western companies. Enforcing sanctions against their owners is difficult, although measures targeting the ships themselves have recently proven effective.

    Two people familiar with the White House’s deliberations said additional US sanctions on the shadow fleet were seen as an easy first step to impose costs on Russia. A third person close to the administration said it was considering a range of options, including sanctions on the fleet.

    Joe Biden’s administration added 213 crude, chemical or product tankers to the sanctions list. Trump has held off imposing further sanctions on Russia in an effort to secure a negotiated settlement to end the war.

    But he has grown increasingly frustrated with Putin’s refusal to agree to a ceasefire, and gave the Russian leader an ultimatum to change tack by Friday or face tougher sanctions.

    Further US penalties on the fleet would bolster the EU’s recent steps against the fleet, said Kevin Book, managing director of research with ClearView Energy Partners. The bloc sanctioned more than 100 ships last month, bringing the total to 415.

    Under the terms of the sanctions regime, western-linked companies are prohibited from buying seaborne oil priced above a G7 price cap fixed at $60 a barrel for crude. The shadow fleet has allowed Russia to ship oil above the cap — mainly to China and India.

    In early 2024, Biden administration officials were surprised to realise that listing individual ships — rather than their owners or managers — proved to be effective, with buyers of Russian oil reluctant to deal with vessels that had been named. The EU and UK took up the practice as a result.

    A Financial Times analysis of 115 crude tankers sanctioned by the US shows they became much less productive afterwards. Data from Kpler, a cargo analytics platform, reveals the vessels shipped a monthly average of 48mn barrels of Russian crude in the six months prior to their listing, but an average of only 13mn barrels in the six months afterwards.

    Benjamin Hilgenstock, head of macroeconomic research and strategy at the Kyiv School of Economics Institute, said: “Aggressively going after the shadow fleet is a straightforward way of making things harder for Russia, and reinforce the message that the EU and UK have been sending.”

    The Kremlin has disregarded a number of deadlines set by the US president to agree to a ceasefire and in recent weeks has significantly stepped up its attacks on Ukraine.

    Trump has grown increasingly frustrated with his Russian counterpart and people close to the administration said Moscow would pay a price if it did not come to the negotiating table [That is a typical blatant lie. Russia is at the negotiation table and in order to implement a ceasefire, is demanding that the defeated Atlanticist troops withdraw first from the positions they are still occupying in Donetsk, Kherson, Lugansk and Zaporozhye regions].

    He discussed possible measures against Moscow in a phone call with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on Tuesday. “We talked about sanctions against Russia,” said Ukraine’s leader. “Their economy continues to fall and that is why Moscow is so attentive to this prospect . . . This can change a lot.”

    The US president on Monday also announced plans to increase tariffs on India, one of the leading buyers of Russian oil. “They don’t care how many people in Ukraine are being killed by the Russian war machine,” the president said in a post on social media.

    Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff is expected to travel to Moscow this week, with Russian state newswire Tass reporting on Tuesday that he was due to arrive on Wednesday.

    Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said: “We are always glad to see Mr Witkoff in Moscow. We view such contacts as important, substantive and very useful.”

    Trump will probably decide on what potential costs to impose on Moscow when his envoy returns, said the person close to the administration.

    “It depends on what Witkoff brings back,” the person said. “If Witkoff comes back empty-handed, with absolutely nothing, Trump is going to go ballistic.”

    Anna Kelly, White House deputy press secretary, said: “The president has been clear that there will be biting sanctions if Putin does not agree to end the war. We will not get ahead of the president on specifics.”

    Other options for the administration include more stringent enforcement of existing sanctions, or joining the EU’s new dynamic floating price cap on Russian oil which is set to take effect in early September, experts said.

    Washington could also impose secondary sanctions on banks and oil refineries in other countries that facilitate trade in Russian oil, said Edward Fishman, a senior research scholar at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy.

    “There’s incredible latitude right now to actually impose hard-hitting oil sanctions on Russia,” he added.

    A bill put forward by Senators Lindsey Graham and Richard Blumenthal calling for tariffs of upwards of 500 per cent on countries that continue to buy Russian energy products has also gained widespread bipartisan support among lawmakers on capitol hill.

    Trump has said he is “very strongly” considering supporting the bill, although analysts have questioned whether such steep tariffs could be sustainably enforced

    Here is an excellent summary of the plot. The author is Irish journalist Chay Bowes

    Related

    August 5, 2025: Donald Trump readies fresh US sanctions against Russia’s shadow fleet – Financial Times

    US president has threatened Vladimir Putin with punitive measures to force him to end war in Ukraine

    August 4, 2025: UK secret services plotting maritime ecological disaster – TASS

    “The plan involves organizing a major act of sabotage the losses of which would allow the transportation of Russian oil to be declared a threat to all international shipping,” the SVR said

    June 26, 2025: In a plot twist worthy of John le Carré, we reveal the grandfather of the brilliant new head of MI6 was a Nazi spy chief – Daily Mail

    October 9, 2024: the old man and the sea

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  • [Partage] Guerre d’Ukraine et menace russe : prétextes d’une marche forcée vers le fédéralisme européen – Éric Denécé, Cf2R

    […] en premier lieu, de nombreux éléments conduisent à penser que les Européens poursuivent la politique des néoconservateurs de l’ex-équipe Biden […]

    La Realpolitik, caractérisée par la prise en compte réaliste des rapports de force, est de retour à Washington. On le constate avec la démarche de Donald Trump qui a repris contact avec Vladimir Poutine. Il a compris que la stratégie d’affaiblissement de la Russie conçue par les néoconservateurs de l’équipe Biden était un échec et que la guerre ne menait à rien. Trump a intérêt à y mettre un terme pour passer à autre chose. Il veut un deal avec Poutine, car il ne souhaite pas que les hydrocarbures et les terres rares russes partent en Chine. Il se serait même dit prêt à participer au développement de la Crimée et du Donbass.

    Mais cette évolution n’est pas du goût de Zelenski 1 et de son entourage parce que cela remet en cause leur mainmise sur l’Ukraine. Ils bénéficient étonnamment du soutien des Européens, dont on comprend mal ce qu’ils ont à gagner à la poursuite de la guerre. Leur obstination est d’autant plus funeste que les trois années écoulées ont montré que ce conflit était dévastateur pour l’économie européenne et que ses États membres étaient incapables d’assurer eux-mêmes leur sécurité comme de soutenir efficacement Kiev en matière militaire. En réalité, leur attitude s’inscrit dans le cadre d’une stratégie précise, conduite à l’insu des peuples européens.

    Une obstination difficilement compréhensible

    Plusieurs raisons peuvent expliquer l’étonnante attitude de va-t’en guerre des dirigeants européens et de leur slogan stupide de « Paix par la force ».

    – En premier lieu, de nombreux éléments conduisent à penser que les Européens poursuivent la politique des néoconservateurs de l’ex-équipe Biden – à l’origine de ce conflit –, à leur instigation. En effet, les Démocrates, battus à plate couture lors des dernières présidentielles américaines sont en pleine déconfiture aux États-Unis. Le parti est à la dérive, se fissure et les chances de redressement à court terme sont minces. Trump, ayant tiré les leçons de la manière dont son premier mandat avait été saboté par les actions de l’État profond américain piloté par les familles Clinton et Obama, a, dès sa prise de fonctions, lancé toute une série d’actions (dissolution de l’USAID, reprise en mains de l’appareil d’État et de l’administration, recadrage des juges des juges, etc.) qui ne leur permettent pas de perturber efficacement son début de mandat – au moins pas avant les élections de mid term – comme ils l’avaient fait entre 2016 et 2020. Les Démocrates sont donc totalement impuissants. En revanche, divers éléments laissent entrevoir qu’ils s’emploient à saborder sa politique internationale en s’appuyant sur le Royaume-Uni et les États de l’Union européenne.

    En effet, depuis 2003, les dirigeants européens ont fait acte de soumission aux États-Unis et à leur bellicisme. Ils ont d’abord appuyé l’invasion illégale de l’Irak. Puis ils ont accepté de reconnaitre le régime ukrainien issu du coup d’État de Maïdan (2014) et ont fermé les yeux sur la répression violente déclenchée par Kiev au Donbass. Ensuite, ils se sont laissés entraîner, à leurs frais et à leur détriment, dans une guerre voulue par Washington, adoptant parfois des positions plus radicales encore contre Moscou qui n’avait pourtant manifesté contre eux aucune hostilité.

    Tous les dirigeants européens actuels entretiennent les meilleures relations du monde avec l’équipe démocrate et tous – à l’exception de Viktor Orban, Robert Fico et Georgia Meloni – ont, plus ou moins directement et explicitement, pris parti contre la réélection de Trump. Depuis son entrée à la Maison-Blanche, ils ne cessent de critiquer la nouvelle politique américaine. Ils semblent ainsi poursuivre, en vassaux fidèles, la politique des Démocrates, que ceux-ci continuent de piloter dans l’ombre depuis Washington, partant du principe – hautement hasardeux – que l’élection de Trump n’est qu’une malheureuse parenthèse qui prendra fin au plus tard en 2029. Il convient donc de contrer sa politique en attendant leur retour aux affaires… Cela explique la défiance et le mépris de la nouvelle administration américaine à l’égard de ces « leaders » européens qu’elle juge hostiles, raison pour laquelle elle ne tient aucunement compte de leur avis et de leurs agitations improductives.

    – La seconde explication est que le contexte de crise (militaire et économique) que traverse actuellement le Vieux continent favorise l’ensemble de ces leaders vis-à-vis de leur électorat, car la plupart d’entre eux – en particulier Emmanuel Macron – se trouvent dans une situation politique difficile. Ils jouent donc sur la peur d’une menace russe imminente – totalement inventée dans ce but – pour maintenir les populations dans l’angoisse, faire taire les critiques contre leur politique internationale inconsidérée et retarder l’échéance de leur défaite. En effet, les dirigeants européens doivent dissimuler le fait que leur décision de rompre avec la Russie a créé l’inflation, les difficultés économiques et accéléré la désindustrialisation et la dépendance vis-à-vis des États-Unis (GNL, armes, etc.) 2.

    – Enfin, troisième hypothèse à ne pas écarter, c’est le refus de prise en compte du réel des élites européennes, par cécité ou incompétence géopolitique, et la certitude que leur action est juste, fondée et légitime, illustration de leur déconnexion complète des réalités de terrain et de l’évolution des rapports de force internationaux.

    Faire l’Europe par la crise, l’emprunt et la guerre

    Mais en réalité, il existe une autre explication qui commence seulement à être perçue et qui éclaire d’un jour nouveau l’intransigeance des dirigeants européens : ils exploitent au maximum cette crise pour faire avancer l’Europe dans une voie fédérale, sans demander l’avis des peuples. Leur but ? Faire l’Europe par la crise, l’emprunt et la guerre.

    Cette stratégie machiavélique, véritable manipulation antidémocratique pour imposer une Europe supranationale dont personne ne veut, a été mise en place à partir de la seconde moitié des années 2010, exploitant divers événements internationaux : la crise des Subprimes d’abord ; le COVID ensuite ; enfin, la guerre d’Ukraine et la menace russe. Il est important de détailler les étapes de cette dérive organisée.

    Rappelons au préalable qu’il convient de faire une nette différence entre les pays de l’UE membres de la zone euro (20 sur 27 3) et ceux qui n’en sont pas. Si tous dépendent de la Commission, seuls les premiers dépendent en plus de la Banque centrale européenne (BCE). Ils sont donc sous double dépendance de la Commission et de la BCE. Il convient également de rappeler que la BCE n’a pas le droit de proposer des emprunts. Cela est interdit par les traités. Pourtant, il y a eu deux entorses à cette règle :

    – lors de la crise des Subprimes (2008-2009), Mario Draghi a mis en place le Quantitative Easing, c’est-à-dire une émission monétaire de la BCE avec possibilité de racheter des dettes des pays de la zone euro (et non de l’UE) sur le second marché (auprès des banques commerciales auxquelles une partie des dettes ont été rachetées) ;

    – lors de la crise du COVID, un emprunt de 700 milliards d’euros a été émis, garanti par les pays de la zone euro, mais bénéficiant aussi à ceux qui n’en sont pas membres… et qui pourraient décider de ne pas être solidaires pour son remboursement, car rien ne les y oblige. Ce serait alors aux autres États ayant garanti l’emprunt de compenser !

    Ainsi, depuis la crise sanitaire et économique liée au COVID, les États de la zone euro sont de plus en plus tenus par la Commission européenne, via la BCE, par le biais de laquelle ils ont emprunté, accroissant leur dette et renforçant le contrôle financier de Bruxelles. Ils dépendent d’une monnaie – l’euro – qui ne leur appartient pas, d’où la réduction considérable de leur marge de manœuvre économique et financière. Mais ce n’est encore qu’une monnaie « partagée », c’est-à-dire qu’elle n’est pas encore vraiment « commune ». Pour le moment, nous sommes tous endettés en euro « national » via nos États respectifs. Mais si la monnaie devenait véritablement commune – ce qui est sans doute l’objectif de l’euro numérique –, les États se trouveraient totalement sous le pouvoir d’une structure supranationale. Ils n’auraient alors plus aucune maîtrise de leur destin et il leur serait extrêmement difficile de sortir de l’UE.

    Le programme de financement du réarmement européen via des prêts aux États et l’autorisation d’accroître leur déficit de 1,5% sans sanction 4 va renforcer encore davantage ce phénomène 5. L’indépendance financière, et donc politique, des États membres de la zone euro risque ainsi de diminuer rapidement, voire de disparaître.

    Les dérives antidémocratiques et autoritaires de l’UE

    Pour arriver à leurs fins, les dirigeants européens ne reculent devant rien : reniements, propagande, falsifications de la réalité, abus de pouvoir… contrevenant sans scrupule aux principes démocratiques qu’ils sont censés incarner et défendre.

    – En premier lieu, il convient de rappeler leur soutien au coup d’État de Maïdan de 2014 orchestré par Washington, leur non-respect délibéré des accords de Minsk, leur silence sur la répression dans le Donbass et leur validation du rejet de l’accord de paix russo-ukrainien de fin mars 2022. Ces événements illustrent le fait qu’ils ne respectent ni leurs engagements ni le droit international et qu’ils ne souhaitent pas la fin du conflit.

    – En second lieu, ils ont déclenché, avec l’aide des médias mainstream qu’ils contrôlent, une propagande massive contre Moscou, laquelle se poursuit sans discontinuer, voire s’accélère alors que le sort des armes montre que l’issue de ce conflit est scellée et que les discussions entre Trump et Poutine en sonneront bientôt la fin. Depuis trois ans, ils dissimulent à l’opinion les causes véritables de la guerre d’Ukraine et la réalité du régime de Kiev, gouvernement extrémiste et corrompu à la tête d’un État failli, rongé par la criminalité, et qui a très largement contribué à provoquer son voisin.

    – Ensuite, les dirigeants européens diffusent largement, avec l’appui de la majorité des chefs des armées de leurs États, l’idée d’une menace russe « existentielle », délire qui ne résiste pas à l’analyse des données démographiques et militaires.

    – De plus, ils ont mis en place une autre forme de propagande, plus insidieuse, pour faire avancer l’idée d’une indispensable intégration européenne. Dans un rapport récent 6, le journaliste Thomas Fazi expose comment la Commission européenne finance des ONG, des médias, des associations de la société civile pour faire avancer son agenda par le biais de divers programmes visant à « promouvoir les valeurs de l’UE » et à « rapprocher l’Union européenne de ses citoyens ». En réalité, « les organisations bénéficiaires sont explicitement engagées en faveur du fédéralisme européen ou de l’intégration, en alignement avec les propres objectifs politiques de la Commission ». Cette manœuvre se fait au détriment des processus démocratiques et de la souveraineté des États membres et sans que les Européens en soient conscients. De plus, elle vise à étouffer toute voix dissidente ou qui s’écarte de la doxa officielle : celle d’une UE non seulement intégrée, mais également vouée à l’élargissement (Serbie, Ukraine, etc.). « En amplifiant les voix pro-UE et en marginalisant les perspectives dissidentes, cette stratégie consolide les récits en faveur de l’intégration tout en discréditant ou en réprimant les points de vue alternatifs. En conséquence, les mécanismes de financement de l’UE et les ONG elles-mêmes sont transformés en outils de propagande institutionnelle visant à promouvoir une intégration supranationale plus profonde ». C’est donc là une forme indirecte de censure.

    – Par ailleurs, les dirigeants européens recourent ouvertement à des actions antidémocratiques dès lors que d’autres acteurs politiques s’opposent à leur stratégie. On connait les difficultés faites à Orban qui se bat pied à pied contre les dérives de l’UE. On a vu comment l’ex-présidente géorgienne, battue aux dernières élections a tenté, avec le soutien de Bruxelles, de remettre en cause – sans succès – les élections. On a vu également comment une partie des électeurs de Moldavie installés à l’étranger n’ont pu voter lors du dernier scrutin, car leur vote aurait fait élire un candidat opposé à cette politique et souhaitant un rapprochement avec la Russie. On vient de voir, enfin, la manière dont les élections roumaines ont été tout à fait illégalement annulées et reportées, puis celle dont Georgescu a été empêché de se représenter.

    – Enfin, nous sommes en présence de véritables abus de pouvoir lorsque l’on voit le rôle joué par Ursula von der Leyen, simple haut fonctionnaire européen nommé à la tête de la Commission, qui se comporte – avec le plein accord de dirigeants européens co-responsables de cette dérive – comme une petite gauleiter, outrepassant allègrement son rôle et se fonctions. Rappelons que la Commission européenne et sa présidente n’ont aucune attribution en matière de défense. Cette femme et son administration s’arrogent donc des pouvoirs qu’elles n’ont pas, se livrant une sorte de coup d’État permanent au détriment des souverainetés nationales.

    En raison de ces dérives autoritaires et de cette propagande et de ces abus de pouvoir, le terme d’ « UERSS » n’est pas inapproprié.


    Pour ces différentes raisons, les « élites » politiques et technocratiques européennes sont déterminées à soutenir Kiev et à poursuivre une guerre qui sert leur stratégie. Elles affirment donc que l’Ukraine n’est qu’une victime, qu’elle doit recouvrer son intégrité territoriale, que Poutine est le mal absolu et qu’une invasion russe est imminente. Les dirigeants européens semblent ainsi prêts à tout pour imposer aux peuples une Europe supranationale, sans tenir compte de leur volonté. Nous sommes clairement en présence d’une stratégie consistant à « faire » l’Europe par les crises, la monnaie et la guerre, et d’une marche forcée vers le fédéralisme, par une politique des petits pas empêchant tout retour en arrière, en plaçant les peuples devant le fait accompli [fin]

    Article original

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    14 mars 2025 : « Pensions ou munitions ? » : la fabrique du consentement à « l’effort de guerre » – Pauline Perrenot, Acrimed

    Depuis l’allocution d’Emmanuel Macron à propos de la guerre en Ukraine, le 5 mars, les grands médias sont en ordre de marche. Réhabilitation du président en « chef de guerre », patriotisme exacerbé, concert militariste et glorification des industriels de guerre… Mené tambour battant, le SAV du discours présidentiel s’accompagne d’une nouvelle séquence de matraquage patronal contre le « modèle social » et pour « travailler plus » au nom, prétendument, de l’« effort de guerre » : « Pensions ou munitions ? » ; « Les canons ou les allocations ? » Signés Dominique Seux (Les Échos, 10/03) et Étienne Gernelle (RTL, 10/03), les deux slogans donnent le ton

    14 mars 2025 : US proxy war against China

    Secretary of State Marco Rubio is supporting the Uyghur Jihadists

    18 février 2025 : La bourgeoisie n’a plus les moyens intellectuels, ni culturels, de sa domination de classe – Harold Bernat, Quartier Général

    Une crise sans précédent de la culture de classe est en train de se dérouler sous nos yeux. Cette crise emporte aujourd’hui aussi bien la gauche que la droite, si l’on veut absolument en revenir à des repères simplistes. La classe sociale dominante jouit, mais ne pense plus, ne crée plus. Elle n’a plus qu’un chantage à proposer au peuple : en dépit de notre nullité, si nous ne sommes plus là, que vous restera-t-il? Ce n’est pas que des « populismes » aient poussé spontanément pour menacer l’ordre social en faisant peser la menace du chaos et de l’anomie. Ces mythes réactionnaires ne sont que des aveux d’impuissance, et voici pourquoi. Un nouveau grand texte d’Harold Bernat, agrégé de philosophie et collaborateur de « Quartier Populaire », à lire aujourd’hui sur QG

    4 décembre 2024 : Is it a pattern ?

    Sketch: Zelenskyy gives a course in dEmoKrACy to Macron (France), Yoon (South Korea) and Zourabichvili (Georgia)

    6 novembre 2024 : The fall guy

    the Germans have bowed down to the US sabotage by Joe Biden administration of Nord Stream pipelines, only to end up with Donald Trump’s America First doctrine in economy and defense

    9 octobre 2024 : The old man and the sea

    new information about the US sabotage of Nord Stream pipelines

    29 novembre 2023 : How American Neocons Wrecked the Middle East and Ukraine – David Stockman, Antiwar.com

    This is part 2 of “Why There Is Still No Peace on Earth: Washington’s Folly From The Persian Gulf to Ukraine.”  Read part 1


    1. Dont le mandat a pris fin le 20 mai 2024, mais qui est resté en place et a prorogé la loi martiale. ↩︎
    2. De tous, ce sont les Allemands dont la soumission aux États-Unis a été la plus frappante et qui ont le plus perdu : ils ont accepté sans broncher la destruction de leur économie par Washington qui a saboté Nord Stream, les a obligés à cesser toute relation avec la Russie et à acheter du GNL au prix fort. Ils se sont littéralement couchés devant les injonctions de leur protecteur, sans aucune réaction ni amour-propre. ↩︎
    3. La zone euro est composée de 20 pays (Allemagne, Autriche, Belgique, Chypre, Croatie, Espagne, Estonie, Finlande, France, Grèce, Irlande, Italie, Lettonie, Lituanie, Luxembourg, Malte, Pays-Bas, Portugal, Slovaquie et Slovénie). Certains États de l’UE ont choisi de ne pas y participer (Danemark, Suède), les autres ne satisfont pas encore aux critères économiques pour la rejoindre (Bulgarie, Hongrie, Pologne, République tchèque, Roumanie). ↩︎
    4. Le montant de 800 milliards d’euros proposé par Bruxelles (à confirmer par une adoption formelle) devrait se répartir de la manière la suivante :
      – un peu moins de 200 milliards vont être pris en charge par la Commission via la BCE ; les États membres en bénéficieront au prorata de la part de leur PIB au sein du PIB européen (soit environ 40 milliards) ;
      – pour le reste, plus de 600 milliards, il s’agit d’une autorisation d’accroissement de 1,5% du déficit autorisé (qui va donc passer de 3% à 4,5%), sans qu’aucune sanction soit imposée.
      ↩︎
    5. A noter que cela n’aura aucun impact pour la France qui dépasse déjà allègrement le futur déficit autorisé avec plus de 6% ces deux dernières années. ↩︎
    6. Thomas Fazi, The EU’s propaganda machine : How the EU Funds NGO to promote itself, Mathias Corvinus Collegium, Brussels, February 2025 (https://brussels.mcc.hu/uploads/default/0001/01/7ab59f9d3aca403f6fbd6ff2af284f236fddad7c.pdf) ↩︎
  • [Sharing] Paralyzed by acute dementia, Europe declares war on Russia all over again – Pepe Escobar, Strategic Culture Foundation

    The SMO [Special Military Operation] will keep rollin’ on. And as the Europeans want it, to the last Ukrainian

    Let’s start with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s Road to Damascus moment:

    Frankly, it’s a proxy war between nuclear powers, the United States helping Ukraine and Russia, and it needs to come to an end

    Now that’s a howler. Jeffrey Sachs to the rescue. Of course, the correct formulation would be “proxy war launched by the United States”. But still: Hallelujah! Such illumination – by proxy – from Heavens Above could never had hit the previous American Secretary of Genocide.

    Now cut to panic. Total European panic.

    Le Petit Roi, as popular in France as nighttime mosquitoes in a five-star beach resort, has declared that peace in Europe is only possible with a “tamed” Russia – and that Russia is a direct threat to France and Europe.

    On Ukraine, he pontificated that peace simply cannot take place under Russian terms or via the – inevitable – Ukrainian surrender.

    Le breathless Petit Roi literally went nuclear. He stressed that France possesses a nuclear deterrent – and offered it to the rest of Europe, while insisting that Europe’s future should not be dictated by Moscow or Washington.

    Le Petit Roi napoleonically all but declared war on Russia. Well, the fact remains that the overwhelming majority of France would gladly agree that mini-Napoleon should be dispatched to the battlefields in the black soil of Novorossiya right away – where he would surrender in less than 5 minutes, waving a rainbow flag, as he realizes he’s about to be turned into an instant steak tartare.

    Now couple this Moliere farce with the fate of the much larger, fatter, pan-European New Model Woke Army regimented by the Fuhrerin SS von der Lugen out of Brussels, allegedly to be financed to the tune of 800 billion euros – money that no one has, and would have to be loaned then repaid with sky-high extorsion interest rates to the usual international financial system vultures.

    SS von der Lugen insists Europe is in danger, so the solution is a massive expansion of the military-industrial complex – in practice, buying more overpriced American weapons – and “rearmament”.

    Talk about Gotterdammerung on crack.

    Were the New Model Woke Army ever come to light, surrender would also be a matter of less than 5 minutes – brandishing rainbow flags – as its woke warriors would face the dire prospect of being Oreshniked to a pile of charcoal grilled burgers.

    Add to it the Return of the Nord Stream Saga – with a new plot twist. Sy Hersh conclusively proved that the Nord Streams were bombed under orders of the previous Crash Test Dummy regime in Washington. Now Nord Stream 2, at least, could be back in business via a not-so-secret U.S.-Russia deal involving Gazprom and American oligarchs.

    All that while fanatics in Berlin assure right and left they want to explore every possible way to prevent (italics mine) the Nord Stream system from being repaired – because after all no one, especially the new BlackRock chancellor, can deviate from the official policy of destroying the German economy by all means necessary.

    Compounding the Kafkaesque scenario, the Prime Minister of Denmark – which is on the brink of losing Greenland “one way or another” to Trump 2.0 – immortalized the words, “peace in Ukraine will be more dangerous than war.” The Polish Prime Minister did not miss a beat, adding that “Europe is stronger than Russia and capable of winning in any military, financial, or economic confrontation.” Europe is in such a “winning” streak now – as the record shows.

    All this discombobulated Tower of Babel proves, without a shadow of a doubt, that Europe is geopolitically – and geoeconomically – dead and buried. No Teutonic Gods – complete with fat lady singin’ – will be able to resurrect it.

    Flirting with a one-way ticket back to the Stone Age

    The notion that Europe is able to pose a military threat to Russia does not even qualify as trashy propaganda for sub-zero IQs. It would take at least a decade to re-militarize Germany as its economy is moribund, serially stabbed by unmanageable energy costs. Russia for its part is protected from a possible nuclear attack by Le Petit Roi’s puny “umbrella” arsenal by the most sophisticated missile defenses in the world.

    The Aegis defensive missiles in Poland are relatively worthless – even if their prime danger to Russia remains that the system can be converted to handle offensive missiles. As a whole, the Aegis, Patriot, THAAD-PAC-3, SBIR-HIGH Ground Based Infrared Systems are all relatively useless.

    Other than the U.S., NATO simply has no military worth. And Washington under Trump 2.0 simply will not be involved in the next European War.

    The U.S. has satellite systems for targeting but no one else in NATO has them. With the U.S. pulling out, and in the event of a hypothetical von der Lugen-led New Woke Army attack against Russia, Russian missiles can knock out all European ports, airports and manufacturing and energy systems in a day max – instantly returning Europe to the stone age.

    This applies to England, France, Germany, not to mention assorted chihuahuas: all of NATO. Russia can knock out all British power systems with Zircons launched from a conventional submarine. Stone Age, here we come. Russian hypersonic missiles cannot be intercepted.

    Meanwhile, President Putin insists on talking sense to lunatics. At the Collegia of the FSB on February 27, he noted how, “some Western elites are still determined to maintain instability in the world, and these forces will try to disrupt and compromise the dialogue [with the U.S.] that has begun. We see this. We need to take this into account and use all the possibilities of diplomacy and special services to disrupt such attempts.”

    As Andrei Martyanov has noted, superpowers have “only two options in the 21st century: either start WWIII which will end with nuclear exchange or find a modus vivendi.” That’s a conversation for adults that automatically excludes the European hospice and the childish tantrums of the cracked actor in Kiev.

    The cracked actor never had any (italics mine) cards. He now cuts a pathetic figure, doing somersaults to cling to power, propped by (former) collective West money, weapons and massive propaganda. Now the 404 nation he “created” is losing not only the war but the P.R. war as well.

    The former adviser to the head of Zelensky’s office, Oleksiy Arestovych, as slimy as they come, but always with his pulse on reliable info, is convinced that the Ukrainian Army, blind and cross-eyed, can hold out at best for another one and a half to two months without all those American goodies. Without intel data, Kiev’s forces cannot prepare strikes against the Russian federation or conduct reconnaissance and cyber ops.

    Country 404 as a whole is now entering Walking Dead territory. Europe, with or without its SS von der Lugen Invincible Armada, does not have the industrial capacity, the financial might, and the military capability to stop the debacle. Russia has already stated that any European “peacekeeping” troops will immediately become legitimate targets.

    The spectacular failure of Project Ukraine is a sight to behold. It’s no wonder the current, tawdry, ghastly political “elites” are in total panic. Without Project Ukraine, and without the Mafia protection of His Master’s Voice, they are just, geopolitically, an irrelevant, post-colonial small peninsula on the western borders of fast-integrating Eurasia.

    As for Trump 2.0 and the Kremlin already having hit some sort of pre-deal – even before the start of serious negotiations – there’s no evidence yet to corroborate it. According to Russian intel sources, what has been struck is a general agreement on the framework of discussions, and what can be achieved in practice. This initial stage will last at least a few months.

    Themes on the table range from lifting sanctions on Russian banks and the use of MIR cards to restoring direct flights and curbing the militarization of the Arctic.

    Everything essentially hinges on whether Trump wants – and is able to ensure – a fast endgame in Ukraine while disengaging, slowly but surely, from NATO.

    Considering what seems to be his strategic direction, Trump wants to make sure he won’t have to offer Mafia protection to European NATO members if they insist on keep going with their Forever War against Russia. It’s clear that shutting off Starlink and shutting off satellite ISR would lead to a much faster endgame in the battlefield.

    The SMO, meanwhile, will keep rollin’ on. And as the Europeans want it, to the last Ukrainian [end]

    The original article

    Related

    The Atlanticist defeat in Donbass and Ukraine

    chronicle of a new catastrophic NATO venture

    L’engagement français dans les rangs ukrainiens

    in French, alphabetical obituary chronicle of French involvement in the Atlanticist ranks in Ukraine, what servile journalists will not tell you

    February 4, 2025: Germany’s new right: Trading on nostalgia for past prosperity in an age of uncertainty – Ingo Schmidt, Canadian Dimension

    Ingo Schmidt on how the triumph of liberal democracy and neoliberal globalization became the ideological seed for the AfD

    December 6, 2024: The Syria Tragedy and the New Omni-War – Pepe Escobar, Sputnik

    Until recently, a serious geopolitical working hypothesis was that West Asia and Ukraine were two vectors of the standard Hegemon modus operandi, which is to incite and unleash Forever Wars. Now both wars are united in an Omni-War

    November 16, 2024: Leaks expose secret British military cell plotting to ‘keep Ukraine fighting’ – Kit Klarenberg, The Grayzone

    Leaked files show top UK military figures conspired to carry out the Kerch bridge bombing, covertly train “Gladio”-style stay-behind forces in Ukraine, and groom the British public for a drop in living standards caused by the proxy war against Russia

    November 8, 2024: Putin Outlines The ‘Moment of Truth’ – Pepe Escobar, Sputnik

    President Putin’s plenary session performance (address + Q&A) at the annual Valdai Club meeting in Sochi felt like a high-speed train on cruise control

    April 30, 2024: Soviet Union crushed Nazi Germany

    May 30, 2023: Fils de Pétain

    in French, national vanity is clouding the perception of historical reality and is perpetuating a collective neurosis

    November 26, 2022: C’est la Bérézina !

    a well understood French exclamation

  • [Sharing] Germany’s new right: Trading on nostalgia for past prosperity in an age of uncertainty – Ingo Schmidt, Canadian Dimension

    Ingo Schmidt on how the triumph of liberal democracy and neoliberal globalization became the ideological seed for the AfD

    On November 6, 2024 German Chancellor Olaf Scholz fired Finance Minister Christian Lindner. Notwithstanding the broad agreement on policy goals, striking a balance between deficit reduction, support for renewable energy and increased arms spending turned out to be impossible. Lindner, a liberal, opted for social cuts; Scholz, a social democrat, wants to avoid them. They had to part ways. After Scholz lost a no-confidence vote, federal elections were scheduled for February 23, 2025. The question that worries everyone from old-school conservatives to new millennium lefties is: How many votes will go to the hard right (if not neo-Nazi) party Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland or AfD). In the last federal elections in 2021, the AfD got 10.4 percent of the total vote. Current polls put them at 20 percent, but nobody knows what will happen on election day. In this new age of uncertainty, polls don’t predict election results as reliably as in the past.

    Elections in the East German provinces Brandenburg, Saxony and Thuringia have already shown what hard-right success looks like. They also reveal the inability of the political centre to understand how much it contributed to the rise of a new right. Refashioning totalitarianism theory in the New Cold War climate, centrist politicians and pundits typically portray the success of the new right as the outgrowth of the Nazi and Communist dictatorships that ruled East Germany from 1933 to 1990. West Germany, which was spared Communist rule and, allegedly, shook off the burden of its Nazi past, appears as a role model in this democracy-versus-dictatorship story. Totalitarianism theory could possibly explain why the AfD is more successful, so far at least, in East than in West Germany. But it can’t explain right-wing success in other countries, like France, that were never under Communist rule and know Nazi rule only from occupation, which strengthened anti-fascist traditions in those countries. But even these traditions couldn’t stop the rise of the new right there.

    This article offers a different explanation for the hard-right surge in Germany. It shows that German unification in 1990, signalling the triumph of liberal democracy and the onset of neoliberal globalization, unleashed a new form of nationalism—Deutschmark nationalism—which, after mutating into export nationalism for a while, became the ideological seed for the AfD. West Germany, or, more precisely, the economic miracle that was West Germany in the post-war era, served as a role model during German unification. Promoted by West German elites and eagerly embraced by people in East Germany, it raised the expectation of a new economic miracle materializing in the West and extending to the East. However, these hopes were soon disappointed as political unification caused socioeconomic divisions between East and West Germany and, in the early 2000s, a turn to austerity policies that were highly unpopular in the East and the West. Just when it seemed that Germany would weather the world economic crisis of 2008-9 better than other Western countries, and maybe even become the European hegemon, things started falling apart. The Euro-crisis made clear that it was not only politically united Germany that was plagued by massive socioeconomic and geographical divisions but the European Union, too. Continued economic weakness combined with New Cold War marching orders from Washington fed a nostalgia for a supposedly great past—symbolized by the Deutschmark. This nostalgia, I argue, would not have taken root if the left had been able to channel growing discontent into mobilization for a more equitable and less insecure future.

    State elections in Brandenburg, Saxony, and Thuringia

    State elections don’t typically get international media attention. The September 1, 2024, elections in Thuringia and Saxony did. After all, it was the first time since the downfall of the Nazi-regime that a hard-right party, the AfD, pulled the majority of votes in a German election. It proved a bitter coincidence: The AfD celebrated their victory in Thuringia, obtaining 32.8 percent of the total vote, on the 85th anniversary of the Nazi-invasion of Poland that marked the beginning of the Second World War.

    The Conservative Christian Democrats (the Christlich-Demokratische Union or CDU) came in second with 23.6 percent. The parties of the federal government coalition, Social Democrats (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands or SPD), Greens (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) and Liberals (Freie Demokratische Partei or FDP) ended up with single-digit results, the FDP reduced to a mere 1.1 percent. At the time of the election, this was the party of the federal minister of finance. The Left Party (Die Linke), which in the previous election had become the strongest party for the first time in any German state, lost almost 18 percent and came in fourth, even trailing the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht or BSW), a breakaway group from the Left Party.

    In Saxony, the AfD won 30.6 percent of the votes, just behind the CDU’s 31.9 percent. As in Thuringia, none of the parties of the federal government coalition achieved double-digit results. The Left Party lost more than half of its vote and ended up with a devastating 4.5 percent. The BSW came in a distant third with 11.8 percent.

    Just three weeks after their election victories in Thuringia and Saxony, the AfD scored another success in Brandenburg. Narrowly beaten by the SPD that got 30.9 percent of the total vote, the AfD came in second with 29.2 percent, way ahead of the BSW’s 13.1 percent and the CDU’s 12.1 percent. The Left Party and the Greens obtained less than five percent of the vote, which is the minimum threshold for holding seats in provincial or federal parliament under the mixed-member proportional electoral system. The FDP pulled less than one percent.

    Mainstream media fails to explain right-wing success

    Barely beaten by the Conservatives in Saxony and the Social Democrats in Brandenburg, the AfD was elected by roughly a third of the electorate in three East German states, becoming the strongest party only in Thuringia. If ever there was a right-wing surge, this was it. Most media reports attributed the phenomenon to widespread dissatisfaction with the federal government, particularly regarding migration, climate policies and the war in Ukraine. Accounts of why the AfD is more popular in the East (approval ratings in the west of Germany range from 8.5 percent in Hamburg and the Saarland to 21 percent in Lower Saxony) focus mostly on disappointments caused by German unification, continuing socioeconomic disparities and a widespread feeling among erstwhile East Germans of being second class citizens. Other explanations invoke the authoritarian heritage of communist rule in East Germany, which is often presented as an extension of the Nazi-regime. Against the two dictatorships in the East, West Germany is presented as a role model of liberal democracy. This as if there hadn’t been considerable continuity between Third Reich and West German elites; as if East Germany’s ruling bureaucracy, despite all its dictatorial wrongs, wasn’t established by antifascists who had been exiled or jailed during the Nazi reign; as if the nationalization of the means of production, despite the wrongs of bureaucratic rule, had not marked a break from the West German capitalism that made West Germany a junior partner in the American Empire; as if West German capitalism had not dictated the terms of unification at the very time that a grassroots movement for democracy unsettled bureaucratic rule in East Germany. The destruction of the East German economy and the integration of the East into existing West German institutions left no room for the aspirations of East Germany’s civil rights movement. Rather than explaining growing support for the new right, media talk about the “peculiarities of the East” reinforces existing frustrations there—frustrations that help shed light on the relative strength, so far at least, of the right-wing surge in the East.

    The ‘two-dictatorships’ thesis that pits the East against the liberal democratic West revives the totalitarianism theory that was an integral part of the anti-communist, anti-Soviet consensus during the Cold War. It is now part of the New Cold War ideology that counterposes democracy and authoritarianism. As in the old Cold War, charges of totalitarianism serve to short circuit thinking about alternative economic and political systems, reinforcing the neoliberal creed that there is no alternative to capitalism. The lack of actually existing alternatives is, of course, also one of the reasons for the rise of the new right. Emerging out of an ailing neoliberalism, this right-wing force presents itself as an alternative to the status quo but actually just recasts neoliberalism in a nationalist and racist mould. Replacing neoliberalism’s earlier commitment to corporate globalization in Germany, as elsewhere, neoliberalism is haunted by the spectre of fascism, which, to centrist neoliberals, has everything to do with misled masses unable to understand the virtues of capitalist liberal democracy and nothing to do with capitalist crises that undermine the legitimacy of liberal democracy. Neoliberalism is also haunted by the spectre of communism as ruling classes worry that crisis of legitimacy could extend to capitalism itself. As the neoliberal centre denies the possibility of alternatives and the left generally (not only the Left Party in Germany) appears unable to advance real world alternatives, the growing appetite for change, spurred by recurrent crises wrought by capitalism, settles for right-wing fantasies of a harmonious life in a nation that competes successfully with other countries economically and is freed from job- and welfare-stealing migrants.

    The impact of German unification and the rise and decline of neoliberal globalization

    Capitalist crises and their exploitation by the right are common phenomena, certainly in the imperialist centres of the world system, but also in the peripheries. But they play out differently in different national contexts. Behind the AfD’s electoral successes in Thuringia and Saxony as well as its broader surge in popularity lie the combined histories of German unification and the rise and decline of neoliberal globalization. The upsurge of the new right is just one of the outcomes of these combined histories. Equally important is the defeat of the federal government coalition and the rout of the FDP, whose leader, former federal Minister of Finance Christian Lindner, promotes austerity policies that stymie government plans to subsidize the transition to non-fossil energies. These policies also lead to a creeping roll-back of social spending—except when it comes to arms spending. Little wonder a government that took office on the promise of something like a Green New Deal lost its credibility almost entirely and called for a federal election scheduled for February 23 of this year.

    And then there is the defeat of the Left Party that, despite programmatic commitments to progressive alternatives, is widely seen as the appendage of a lame-duck government in Berlin. At the other end of the political spectrum, the AfD is widely perceived as an oppositional force, even though its program blends austerity, nationalism and militarism in ways that are more extreme but qualitatively not much different from policies advanced by the CDU and the FDP.

    In the face of electoral defeat, the federal government, which embraced the US’s New Cold War policies a few weeks after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, also introduced dramatically tougher migration policies. Rather than representing any kind of alternative, as its name purports, the AfD is the black sheep of the establishment family, expressing racist views more radically and bluntly than even the Conservatives. While the Social Democrats, Liberals and Greens are intent on denying such views, they reveal themselves as Western supremacists when it comes to fending off so-called authoritarian threats arising from Russia and China, stirring up longstanding fears in the West that ‘the Russians are coming’ or that ‘Asian hordes’ augur “the decline of the West,” in the words of right-wing intellectual Oswald Spengler.

    The hypocrisy of the Greens, who advocate a green transition while supporting the purchase of dirty oil and gas (wherever they can get it ever since the Russian invasion of Ukraine ended Russian gas-flows to Germany), make them a prime target of AfD agitation. But in reality the AfD and the Greens share the fear of Western decline. The AfD engage in fearmongering around the replacement of white people by non-white immigrants and accuse the Greens and their coalition partners in the federal government of accelerating Western decline. But while the Greens may be the prime target of the AfD’s culture war, the truth is that despite significant differences in tone, the Greens and the AfD share a basic consensus on the decline of the West.

    AfD success in the east: history holds the key

    Encouraged by Glasnost in the Soviet Union, many East Germans took to the streets in the fall of 1989. Under the banner “We Are the People” they demanded democratic reforms of East Germany. Neither unification with West Germany nor a return to a capitalist economy was on their agenda—at least not initially. As protests grew, and especially after the ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED) had opened the border to the West, “We Are the People” was replaced by “We Are One People” more and more often. It was supplemented by the slogan “Germany, United Fatherland,” which is actually a quote from East Germany’s national anthem, written by the communist poet Johannes R. Becher in 1949, at a time when the leaders of the SED still thought a united Germany could be achieved—not necessarily socialist but not aligned on either the US or the Soviet Union. Such hopes were buried by the Cold War, for which the Berlin Wall became a symbol, casting a dark shadow over communist East Germany and allowing capitalist West Germany to present itself as a beacon of freedom. It was in a matter of weeks in the winter of 1989-90 that the abstract possibility became a demand, massively fanned by West German politicians—notably then chancellor Helmut Kohl—and mainstream media, which hinted at the possibility of East Germany adopting the West German Deutschmark. Many East Germans seized on such hints as an irresistible offer. “If the D-Mark comes, we’ll stay here; if it doesn’t come, we’ll go to it” became the next popular protest slogan. Since the opening of the border, thousands of East Germans had gone to the West, creating conditions reminiscent of the times before the wall was built in 1961. Back then, the East German economy lost so many people, most of them young and well-trained, that a collapse of social reproduction became a real threat. The wall stopped the bleeding of the East German economy but inflicted irreparable damage on the legitimacy of the political system.

    Almost 30 years later, the opening of the border by the SED-leadership came as a bit of a surprise to West German elites. Yet, they were quick to grasp the possibilities it created. To them, this meant the integration of East Germany into the West German political and economic system, not coexistence with a somehow reformed but still politically independent East Germany. The ‘take over the East’ goal of West German elites and the Deutschmark rush of East German masses fed each other. The civil rights movement that wanted to democratize East Germany was sidelined. Some of the groups active in that movement adjusted to the new zeitgeist quickly, some even entered into an electoral alliance with the East German conservative party, despite their having criticized it as a small but integral part of the SED-regime. Angela Merkel, who would later become chancellor, belonged to one of these East German groups that allied with other conservative-turned-civil-rights groups and the East German CDU. This Alliance for Germany easily won the last East German elections and negotiated the integration of East Germany into West Germany’s institutional structures. On July 1, 1990, the Deutschmark came to the East, three months later the independent state of East Germany vanished into an enlarged West Germany. Most of the Alliance for Germany dissolved into the West German CDU immediately after unification. In December this enlarged CDU won federal elections.

    In less than a year the Cold War had come to an end and an entire state had disappeared. However, the hopes pinned on unification, notably the introduction of the Deutschmark, were soon dashed. A year after unification, unemployment, which had existed in communist East Germany primarily in a hidden form, stood at 10.2 percent and rose to over 20 percent in the early 2000s. It didn’t fall below 10 percent until 2014, a quarter of a century after the Berlin Wall fell. Moreover, mass migration from East to West Germany, which the introduction of the Deutschmark was meant to curb, actually accelerated after the arrival of the Deutschmark. From 1990 to 2015, East Germany lost significantly more than one million people, the vast majority during the first two years after unification, and almost all of them of working age. Were it not for this emigration as well as early retirement schemes and retraining schemes for thousands of workers, unemployment in the East would have been even higher than it actually was. Introducing a new form of hidden unemployment, many of the participants in retraining were enrolled in one course after another, often in different fields, until they were old enough for early retirement.

    One of the main, if not the main, reasons for the collapse of the East German economy was the Deutschmark. Introduced at a rate of one Mark West for one Mark East, while average productivity of East Germany was estimated to be about a quarter that of West Germany, German monetary union gave private households the boost in purchasing power they so desired. But it made East German firms uncompetitive. Lower wages could not compensate productivity differentials between firms in East Germany and Western countries. The privatization of East Germany’s state-owned firms facilitated the downfall of the East German economy even further. In some cases, Western companies bought East German firms just to shut them down so that they would not become competitors in the future. In other cases, they wanted patents or certain segments of production that they could integrate into their own supply-chains, leaving everything else to be shut down. The closures and cherry-picking of some more desirable segments destroyed the reproduction process of the East German economy even beyond the damage done by rendering it uncompetitive through monetary union.

    The result was that bits and pieces of the East German economy became a periphery of production networks controlled by West German corporations. Ironically, the neoliberal restructuring of production processes went hand in hand with massive fiscal transfers from West to East Germany. A price that had to be paid to sustain some level of social cohesion while disappointment that political unification was followed by economic decline and continued social divisions between East and West instead of an Eastern economic miracle following the example of West Germany from the late 1950s to the early 1970s. At some point, a third of East German incomes came from fiscal transfers. As a result, government debt as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) rose from 41.8 percent in 1989 to 61.2 percent in 1999, which is nothing compared to today’s numbers. Yet, back then the lesson that had yet to be learned is that neoliberalism, despite its balanced-budget rhetoric, really is a mix of austerity and tax cuts for the rich that produces increasing debt levels at every slowdown or downturn of the economy. In the 1990s, government debt over 60 percent of GDP was a scandal. Not least because, at the urging of the conservative German government, 60 percent had become the benchmark for membership in the European monetary union, for which the roadmap had been laid out in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty.

    Budget deficits, accumulating into government debt, weren’t the only deficit scandal in 1990s Germany. The other was in the current account. From a surplus of 4.6 percent in 1989, the current account dropped to a –1.9 percent deficit in 1991 and remained in deficit territory until 2001. In most other countries, deficits between negative one and negative two percent wouldn’t be a matter of concern. In Germany they were. After all, West German prosperity—the very model East Germans admired so much—had been reliant on export-driven growth, which was always understood as export surpluses. As it turned out, unification in the early 1990s, led to a boom in West Germany as East Germans spent many of their newly acquired Deutschmarks on consumer goods ‘Made in (West) Germany’—despite massive job losses. This boom drove prices up and made German exports less competitive on the world market. At the same time, some of the money from the East German spending spree went to foreign companies. As exports took a hit and imports got a boost, the current account went from positive to negative.

    The East was integrated into the West German political system as it existed prior to unification. The Kohl government didn’t agree to any changes suggested by the East German government that formally negotiated unification but really rubberstamped the subordination of East German society to West German institutions. Economic integration was different though. The collapse of the East German economy, triggered by the design of monetary union and privatizations, had a lasting impact on the West German economic model that East Germans had been eager to embrace. The first decade after unification was marked by a twin deficit in government budgets and current accounts. During the unification boom from 1990 to 1993, inflation went up to levels not seen since the oil-price hikes and inflationary struggles between capital and labour from the 1970s to the early 1980s. At that time, however, the West German inflation rate was still below that of other Western countries, whereas in the early 1990s it was amongst the highest

    West Germany as a role model

    Running continued deficits—let alone a twin deficit—was unthinkable in a country that rebuilt its economy after the Second World War through integration into a world market with rules established and enforced by the US. In this American Empire, West Germany played the role of bulwark against Soviet Communism, including East Germany, and as a showcase of Western capitalism. To succeed in this role, foreign debt, accumulated by the Nazis and inherited by West Germany as legal successor of the Third Reich, was forgiven through the 1953 London Debt Agreement. West Germany also inherited low wages, industrial capacity and new technologies from the Nazi economy that, contrary to widespread assumptions, survived the war largely intact. This gave West German industries a competitive advantage that was further buttressed by favourable exchange rates on which basis West Germany was admitted to the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates in 1952. Reintegration into the world market also allowed West Germany to transition from a coal-based to an oil-based economy. Oil was cheaper than coal but its supplies were controlled by US companies and the American state.

    However, being a junior partner in the American Empire turned out to be a much better deal for the German bourgeoisie than its earlier quests for world power. The territory under its direct control was much smaller after two failed power grabs but profits were stellar. Driven by exports, or export surpluses more precisely, the West German economy didn’t require fiscal stimulus and kept growing until the US turned to floating exchange rates, which led to a significant appreciation of the Deutschmark. Further, oil prices exploded in the 1970s. But it was during these turbulences that West Germany consolidated its reputation as a beacon of economic stability. Political management of the crisis, notably codetermination (German lingo for the institutionalized cooperation between unions and employer association), kept wages and inflation lower than in most other Western countries. This helped to sustain export surpluses for much of the 1970s. In turn, export surpluses allowed the government to keep fiscal stimulus and unemployment rates low. Again, this is compared to other Western countries, not compared to the post-war boom.

    West Germany’s relative success in managing the economic crises of the 1970s raised some concerns among its allies, who considered this success a case of beggar-thy-neighbour policies. The US pressured the West German government to increase public spending in order to stimulate the world economy. The West German government couldn’t shrug off these US demands entirely. The social democratic party was led by Helmut Schmidt at the time, and some extra spending also appeased the left wing in his own party as well as some unionists. However, calls for a Keynesian fix of the economic crises never overcame the general preference for fiscal prudence and low inflation that marked West German society after two lost wars, each followed by the introduction of a new currency, one of them also by unprecedented hyperinflation. Not entirely without reason, export success after the Second World War was widely attributed to liberal economic principles, conveniently ignoring the fact that this ‘liberalism in one country’ could only work because other economies placed growing demand on the world market.

    Export success also created an ersatz-identity that allowed West Germans to repress the horrors of the Nazi regime and the roles most of them had played in these horrors, as perpetrators or bystanders. Social democrats never really fit into this picture. Willy Brandt, who spent the Nazi reign in underground resistance circles and exile and would later become West Germany’s first social democratic chancellor, was seen by many as a traitor. His successor Helmut Schmidt, who had served in the Nazi air force, opposed many of Brandt’s plans for social reform and applied Keynesian policies only in homeopathic doses. He was successfully branded as the one responsible for rising unemployment and inflation by the Conservatives and Liberals. Crossing the floor from SPD to CDU, the Liberals made Helmut Kohl chancellor. Kohl won two elections before unification on the promise of bringing post-war prosperity back. He won another two after unification on the promise of bringing the prosperity to East Germany.

    For a long time, Kohl presented himself successfully as the defender of the West German export model and guarantor of the collective identity tied to that model, despite the fact that 1980s West Germany never saw a return to postwar prosperity. Disappointment with his broken promises for a West German economic miracle 2.0 began spreading towards the end of the 1980s. Yet, the disintegration of the SED regime allowed him to renew and extend his promises to the East. The national euphoria that secured his 1990 election victory also saw a transformation of collective identity. West German pride in being export world champion turned into Deutschmark nationalism. Widely shared in the East, where people were happy to get the Deutschmark, and the West, where people saw it as symbol of their postwar achievements, this was not the pure money, or currency, fetishism Karl Marx wrote about in Capital. It had a distinctive nationalist character that was subdued in West Germany’s pre-unification export-identity. With unification, the nationalist seed blossomed. Not only did this help Kohl become the ‘chancellor of unity,’ but it also gave cover to a burst of neo-Nazi attacks on immigrants, leftists and queer people, culminating in arson attacks in Rostock, Mölln and Solingen. The latter two killed eight people, while the attack in Rostock laid a four-day siege on an apartment block inhabited by foreign workers who had been employed in East Germany’s now defunct state-owned economy. The openly neo-Nazi attacks of the early 1990s, later dubbed “baseball bat years,” were followed by a series of murders committed by the National Socialist Underground (NSU) that cost nine immigrants and one cop their lives from 2000 to 2007. The role of the German secret service in covering up, or even facilitating, these murders has never been investigated as key documents remain classified until this day. Hans-Georg Maaßen, head of the secret service from 2012 to 2018, was one of the individuals responsible for blocking investigations of the NSU-murders. He also heads up an ultra-conservative circle, initially inside the CDU and now operating in the right-wing space between the CDU und the AfD.

    Exports über alles: Eastern peripheries boost corporate profits

    During unification and in the first few years afterwards, nationalism was a mass ideology. It rallied flag-waving masses in the streets, it dominated German politics and inspired Nazi-skinheads to chase people they considered enemies. As it became clear that the hopes for an economic miracle 2.0 would not be realized, street protests receded, most skinheads scaled down their activism and just a few turned to clandestine terrorist attacks. It seemed that nationalism had lost the force it had just recently. However, the entanglements between Nazis and parts of the state apparatuses indicate that while nationalism wasn’t as visible as before, it had not disappeared.

    As it turned out, the opening of the Berlin Wall was a key step towards what would later be called neoliberal globalization. As the German bourgeoisie sought its place in a world seemingly governed by the invisible hand of the market—not Soviet planners or the milder version of Western government intervention—nationalism also found a new role as mass ideology. The ideological wind blowing from the ‘real West,’ that is, the United States, rebranded free trade theory going back to the days of David Ricardo as globalization. Sticking closely to Ricardo’s principles, academic globalists argued that firms, if left alone by the state, would specialize in the production of those goods they can produce more cheaply than firms in another country either because they possess more productive technologies or use input factors more plentiful and cheap than in another country. All countries will be better off if firms in each country specialize according to their comparative advantages.

    Globalization practitioners talked about entire countries as if they were firms competing against each other. Competitiveness of nation-states became the lodestar of capitalists, and their political executors, who used it to justify the roll-back of wages and social standards in all countries. Their run-the-country-like-a-business propaganda was so persuasive that even working class people whose wages, pensions and public services were cut fell for it in large numbers, electing and re-electing neoliberal globalizers over and over again. At the same time, fear that the policies just voted for would cause a race to the bottom spread in the rich countries that saw parts of their production outsourced to poor countries, where labour was really cheap, while immigrants from such countries would take on jobs in the burgeoning low-wage sectors of the rich countries. Migration, segmented labour markets and a global reserve army of labour, enabling capitalists to engage in global labour arbitrage, were neither part of academic globalization theory nor did they feature in politicians’ globalization propaganda. Absent from public debate, these real-life factors created fears that a new right could build on by portraying economic problems as questions of national identity. Translated into policy terms, that meant a program of keeping immigrants out and capital in. This protectionist backlash against neoliberal globalization, coupled with the rise of a new right ranging from populist to neo-Nazi formations, occurred all over the Global North. It began slowly in the late 1990s and early 2000s while globalization was still expanding, and then gathered steam in the wake of the 2008-9 world financial crisis that marked the end of accumulation driven by globalization. It has accelerated again since the COVID-19 recession as well as the escalating great power politics vis-à-vis Russia and China, which have led to openly imperialist policies couched in the same nationalist ideology which the new right thrives on. The competitive nation-as-corporation ideology and the policies that marked actually unfolding globalization was the breeding ground for today’s strange bedfellowship of globalizers-turned-great-power-warriors and national supremacists of the new right. Theories of unregulated free trade opening the path towards global prosperity were just an ideological tool that was useful as long the integration of more and more countries into the US-dominated world market fuelled capitalist accumulation, and thereby hopes for the eventual trickle-down. It was replaced with the rhetoric of concern for national security and democracy as accumulation ended in a new phase of stagnation.

    The German bourgeoisie had already adopted the logic of the state as business competitor after the Second World War when it traded world power ambitions for a junior partner role in the American Empire. Balanced budgets and tight money formed the core of its policies. That, along with competitive advantages inherited from the Nazis or granted by the US, enabled export-driven growth and, ultimately, export surpluses. Despite verbal commitments to liberalism, these policies were mercantilist in substance. Shattered but not derailed by the crises of the 1970s, West Germany’s mercantilist regime of accumulation survived until unification led to a twin deficit, slow growth and socioeconomic divisions between East and West. Unified Germany’s economy stumbled along while the US enjoyed its New Economy boom, even though that turned out to be short-lived, and China attained unprecedented levels of economic growth.

    The Kohl government didn’t respond to the bourgeoisie’s growing concerns about economic stagnation in Germany. Neither did it respond to growing dissatisfaction with social conditions among the popular classes. After uniting Germany, Kohl turned to further uniting Europe. Partly, he wanted to demonstrate Germany’s continued commitment to cooperation in the European Union as some European leaders—notably British Prime Minister Thatcher and French President François Mitterrand—had expressed reservations about German unification and worried about a return of German great power ambitions. European monetary union became Kohl’s preferred route to an “ever closer union,” as EU-parlance had it at the time. However, regarding other countries, notably in the Mediterranean, Kohl successfully pushed for tight fiscal and monetary rules—the same kind of rules West German policy makers followed in the postwar period. Under the favourable conditions granted by the US to integrate into the world market, this led to export-driven prosperity. However, other countries didn’t enjoy the same favourable conditions. What would upset governments and people in such countries even more was the fact that Kohl had abandoned the rules he was preaching to other European countries in his very own united Germany

    Helmut Kohl at the CDU national party convention in Hamburg, 1973. Photo from Wikimedia Commons

    There, European monetary union was widely seen as a top-down capitalist elite project, part of corporate globalization or as a handing over of the beloved Deutschmark to irresponsible Eurocrats and the Club Med, a derogatory term often used in public debates to denounce people in the Mediterranean countries as lazy, spend-thrifty and, worst of all, happily having a good time at the expense of others. Euro-scepticism added to disappointment with the collapse of East Germany’s economy after unification, growing income polarization and fears of job loss all over Germany and a sense of losing national sovereignty to global capital. Unresponsive to any of these concerns, Kohl and his coalition of Conservatives and Liberals eventually lost the 1998 election to the Social Democrats and Greens who formed a coalition government offering a blend of light Keynesianism, green transition and control of financial markets. This is where the German—and international—bourgeoisies got really concerned.

    The opening ideological salvos to derail the newly elected government’s plans came from the British tabloid The Sun, calling Oskar Lafontaine, the new finance minister who proposed the introduction of a Tobin tax, “Europe’s most dangerous man.” Next came Madeleine Albright, then US secretary of state, who gave Germany’s Green Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer the choice of joining the bombing campaign against Yugoslavia or having his country isolated from Western allies. Fischer, and the new Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, chose war. Seeing that his opposition to the war wasn’t supported by anyone else in the cabinet, Lafontaine resigned before the bombing began.

    A few months later, The Economist called Germany the “Sick man of the Euro.” Coming from the central organ of global capitalism and unrepentant advocate of liberalism since the days when England, not China, was the workshop of the world, this was not just another opinion piece. It was a warning that the international investment community—exactly the CEOs, bankers, brokers and financiers targeted by the then-emerging movement against corporate globalization—lost confidence in the German market and expected pro-business measures to boost their propensity to invest.

    After a few months in office, Schröder had to choose between meeting voters’ expectations (job creation, reduction of job insecurities and income inequality) and capitalists’ cost-reduction demands. He chose the capitalists’ side, earning him the nickname Genosse der Bosse (Comrade of the Bosses). In the absence of a social movement from below that could have pushed him to deliver on the election platforms of the SPD and the Greens, this choice might actually better be called caving to capitalist threats of an investment strike. From 2000 to 2005, the Schröder government axed corporate tax rates, exempted capital gains from taxation and lowered equity requirements for credits. The other side of the class divide saw drastic reductions in unemployment benefits, essentially slashing them to the level of welfare payment rates after one year of benefits. At the same time, legal obstacles to employing temporary workers were greatly reduced. Capitalists were thrilled. Profits and asset prices shot up, but capital formation declined during the years pro-business laws were passed.

    Reorganizing existing production capacities was more important to corporate executives than creating new capacities. This was not surprising as capacity utilization dropped when the New Economy bubble burst, triggering a downturn of the world economy that kept even booming China below double-digit growth. As it turned out, united Germany did not inherit the export successes of pre-unification West Germany, but was certainly heir to its export dependence.

    In the early 2000s, Germany’s current account turned positive again—not because exports grew so strongly (they actually stagnated due to the world economic downturn), but because imports declined owing to weak domestic demand associated with the Schröder government’s neoliberal policies. However, as the world economy bounced back (China saw growth rates of 10-14 percent from 2003 to 2006), German exports grew again. Eventually the reorganization of production processes in the aftermath of German unification paid off. West German corporations now controlled production networks linking corporate headquarters controlling finance, research and development, and capital-intensive parts of actual assembly in the centres with labour intensive production in low-wage areas in the peripheries from Eastern Germany all the way to China. In these networks, East Germany occupied the position of a semi-periphery. On the supply side, German export success in the early 2000s relied on continued wage inequality between centres and peripheries, which doesn’t mean that all workers in the centres earned high wages. The threat to relocate production to the East or the South put the brakes on all wages. The lowering of social standards propelled the growth of low-wage employment, notably in the service sector. Well-paying, permanent jobs began to decrease as a share of total employment even in West Germany. As a result, discontent that was widespread in the East since political unification was followed by economic collapse, and social downgrading began to creep into the West.

    2010s: Exporting the Euro-crisis

    The export surpluses of the early 2000s relied on the same mercantilism that had generated such surpluses during the postwar prosperity. However, during the postwar period, unprecedented growth rates across the Western, and parts of the non-Western, world made it possible to superimpose a welfare state on a mercantilist economy that didn’t squeeze profit rates but operated with capital’s consent in a way that seemed unthinkable during the age of catastrophe from 1914 to 1945. In the early 2000s, by contrast, successful mercantilism demanded the roll-back of the welfare state. Tragically, the extension of West Germany’s welfare state institutions to East Germany, where they were superimposed on a collapsing economy, created the profit squeeze that was needed to curtail the material protections granted by the welfare state. To sustain competitive advantages gained by scaling back the welfare state, it was imperative to keep wage-growth low even after surging exports pulled the economy out of the slump. Unlike during the period of postwar prosperity, export surpluses didn’t stimulate domestic demand very much. In fact, current account surpluses in the early 2000s, which surged from -1.8 percent in 2000 to 6.7 percent in 2007, were as much driven by rising exports as by weak growth of imports, a clear indicator of the overall sluggishness of domestic demand. Unemployment rates rose from 9.3 percent in 2000 to 12.1 percent in 2005. After that, unemployment went into long-term decline, briefly interrupted by the 2008/9 Great Recession and slowed down by the 2009/15 Euro-crisis, eventually reaching five percent before the 2020 COVID-19 Recession. However, this job growth occurred almost entirely in low wage occupations.

    Paradoxically, it was during the Euro-crisis that a wave of “export nationalism” covered up the discontent that was growing, at variable speeds, across Germany. The Deutschmark nationalism that emerged during German unification had taken a hit with the introduction of the Euro. However, when it turned out that the Euro was basically the old Deutschmark under a new name and export surplus levels were reaching unprecedented heights, it almost seemed that the long-awaited return of prosperity was about to materialize. But of course, it wasn’t the same as the postwar prosperity that saw strong growth almost everywhere. The 2010s, by contrast, were a time of stagnation. The rebound after the 2008/9 recession was stronger in Germany than in other countries, but then growth rates fell in line with the one-to-two percent range of other Western countries.

    It was during this time of recurrent crises and long-term stagnation that the German government, led by Angela Merkel with the Social Democrats as junior partner, felt compelled to lecture other governments on economic policy. Completely blind to the fact that beggar-thy-neighbour policies are a zero-sum game, the Merkel-government told Southern European countries to impose austerity despite the fact that they were suffering from a sovereign debt crisis due to the end of cheap credit that became available after the creation of the European monetary union, helping to pay for imports from Germany. Merkel also told them that, after a painful but unavoidable period of belt-tightening, they would eventually succeed as export countries like Germany.

    The European monetary union’s contradictory character torn between further integrating Europe and spreading German mercantilism shifted entirely to the latter. Southern Europeans, governments and ordinary people, understood that austerity would further subordinate their economies to Germany’s economic dominance. The Brits, like the Germans and the “Frugal Four” (Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden), although not warm to the idea of bailing out crisis-ridden Southern Europeans, were suspicious that Germany’s leading role in handling the crisis would turn the country’s economic dominance into fully-fledged hegemony. Brexit has its origin here. Eastern Europe’s post-communist comprador governments had imposed austerity on their countries in acts of pre-emptive obedience and now felt betrayed as they thought the bailout packages the Merkel government used as a means to impose austerity on the South were actually some sort of welfare package.

    Centrifugal forces in the EU were further fuelled when, in face of civil war and foreign interventions in Syria, Merkel unilaterally declared open borders for Syrian refuges and then told EU member states they all had to take their share of refugees. European governments already concerned over Germany’s domineering role in managing the Euro-crisis were dismayed. Public debate within Germany was sharply divided between liberals and leftists applauding Merkel’s humanist stance and right-wingers, including in her own party, warning of an uncontrolled flow of immigrants. Largely unnoticed was the fact that Merkel’s decision to open borders for Syrian refugees was tied to the anti-Russian turn in German foreign policy following the sharp polarization between pro- and anti-Russian forces in Ukraine during and after the Maidan protests in 2014. Most of the Syrian refugees were fleeing the Russian-backed Assad-regime, which was considered an adversary. Opening borders for these refugees set a precedent for the surge of Ukrainian refugees following Russia’s invasion of Eastern Ukraine in 2022. At that point, Merkel, who had already retired, told the media that her government saw the Minsk accords, officially meant to reach a settlement between contending political and military forces within Ukraine, as a means of buying time to arm the Zelensky government.

    2020s: Sick man of Europe 2.0

    As Ukraine, already torn by civil war, became the scene for a proxy war between NATO-countries and Russia, Germany was firmly subordinated to US foreign policy. Post-communist governments in Germany had, more or less enthusiastically, supported deepening trade relations with Russia. Oil and gas imports might have been the most significant part of German-Russian trade but were certainly not the only one. Torn between allegiance to the US and lucrative business deals with Russia, the German government, now headed by Social Democrat Olaf Scholz, cut its economic ties with Russia after the latter’s invasion of Ukraine. The price to be paid was a further spike in energy prices, on top of the increases attendant on the economic recovery from the COVID-19-recession.

    As part of current US efforts to contain China, the German government has been pressured to scale down its trade with China—Germany’s largest trading partner and also a prime outlet for German foreign direct investments. Since Germany’s economy is as much export-driven as export-dependent, the US turn from neoliberal globalization to escalating sanctions and protectionism in the name of national security has caused high levels of uncertainty within the German bourgeoisie. In addition to the return of secular stagnation after the very short post-COVID recovery in the West and the petering out of the China boom, this uncertainty is driving low levels of investment. Inflation, fuelled by post-COVID recovery and rising energy prices, and lower real incomes leading directly to less consumer spending, but also indirectly, as households build up their savings in anticipation of more economic shocks in the future. Meanwhile the Scholz government boosted arms spending while otherwise imposing austerity.

    After two years of recession, Germany is again being branded the “sick man of Europe” by The Economist. The last time Germany earned this title the neoliberal turn against the welfare state produced massive current account surpluses, meagre general growth rates and massive social and regional inequalities. The export nationalism that concealed the mounting discontent with neoliberalism was shaken by the US turn from neoliberal globalization to protectionism and militarism. Given its high level of export dependence, Germany was ill prepared for the turn against it, which unleashed pent-up disappointments and anxieties into the political sphere. This happened all over Germany but more so in the East than in the West as regional differences in income, wealth and representation in leadership positions had created widespread feelings of being second class citizens in a politically united Germany.

    In the absence of socialist imagination, German politics are haunted by the spectres of the past. An insurgent hard-right pins the labels of communism or Marxism on everything that ever came from the left, Social Democrats, the Greens and, of course, the Left Party, no matter how members, activists and supporters of these parties position themselves on the political spectrum. At the same time, the hard-right wants Germany to leave its Nazi past behind. Downplaying Nazi atrocities, accusing liberals and leftists of burdening Germans with a cult of guilt, they propagate the reclaiming of German national pride and sovereignty from allegedly cosmopolitan elites. Between the very real and growing right and a weak and largely imaginary left, centrist parties that proclaimed the end of history in the heyday of neoliberalism are also shifting to the right. The decline of the Left Party is a mirror image of the rise of the AfD.

    Alternative für Deutschland: A child of Deutschmark nationalism

    Mainstream media and centrist parties view the new right as if it were some external force inexplicably appearing on the political scene and threatening the liberal order. But this is empirically wrong. Almost all leading figures of the AfD come from conservative West German milieus where they previously held positions in public administration or private businesses. Although they present themselves as anti-establishment rebels, they are establishment people who turned from the centre-right to the hard-right. The AfD also includes party activists who come from militant neo-Nazi groups that have existed on the fringes of West German society since the CDU gave many old Nazis a political home after the downfall of the Third Reich. Making small advances into electoral politics in the late 1960s and again in the 1980s, the neo-Nazis remained marginal until they found common ground with disgruntled conservatives. Deutschmark nationalism served as the ideological bonding material for neo-Nazis and right-of-centre conservatives, and became a rallying point for growing numbers of people dissatisfied with the policies of neoliberal globalization advanced by the centrist parties. It emerged in the tumultuous days after the fall of the Berlin wall as a mass ideology that shaped East and West German politics in the direction of unification. After that, it became an ideological point of reference that allowed for the integration of different political ideas and currents into a new right political project, the AfD.

    Riding on the wave of Euro-scepticism that accompanied the Euro crisis, the AfD, founded in 2013, promoted a German exit from the EU, which would also have meant exit from the Euro. However, boosting the Deutschmark nostalgia associated with German-style Euro-scepticism got the newly minted party only so far. What really fuelled the AfD’s take-off was the wave of Syrian refugees coming to Germany (and other EU-countries) in 2015. The party’s approval ratings rose from roughly five percent in its first two years to around 12 percent in the next two years. With the surge in voter approval came a programmatic shift from ‘neoliberalism in one country’ to neoliberalism hidden behind ethnonationalist hate propaganda. Despite advocating for a strong state, the AfD also presents itself as a rebellious party of freedom. This paradox is resolved by portraying cosmopolitan elites, represented most notably by the Greens, as a force dominating state apparatuses and misusing them to bring excessive numbers of foreigners into the country with their cultures that allegedly threaten German people, suppress German heritage and push the economy into decay. Therefore a strong state is needed to defend Germany against foreign incursion and revive its inherent strength

    Election poster of the AfD in Thuringia supporting remigration. Photo from Wikimedia Commoms

    The Scholz government created the conditions in which the AfD’s self-portrayal as freedom fighters gave the party another boost. The modest Green New Deal platforms on which the SPD and Greens ran their 2021 election campaign didn’t gain enough traction to allow them to form a government, despite support from unions and even, more cautiously, employer associations. To obtain a majority in the Bundestag, SPD and Greens formed an ostensibly unlikely coalition with the FDP, a party mostly focused on cutting taxes and limiting public deficits. These commitments to tax breaks for the rich and austerity for the poor stood in the way of effective state-sponsored energy transition programs. Hence, the Scholz-government was perceived as weak from the start. Things went from bad to worse for the government after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Under pressure from the US, Scholz opted for sanctions against Russia, arms deliveries to Ukraine and a continued increase in arms spending. At a time when the prices of everything from butter to housing were soaring, making it clear that money would still be available for guns but maybe not for butter not only destroyed whatever support the government had before the Ukraine war but also gave the AfD another boost. A year and a half into the war, the SPD was trailing the AfD in federal polls. Picking up widespread, though by no means dominant, unease with arms support for Ukraine and fear of war with Russia, the AfD advocates a negotiated peace settlement between Russia and Ukraine and, more importantly to the AfD, the lifting of sanctions on Russia. For the AfD, urging peace with Russia is not a matter of a principled anti-militarism but a means of reviving German trade with Russia, notably Russian energy imports that are seen as a precondition for economic recovery. To achieve this, Germany has to free itself from the ‘cosmopolitan sell-out elite.’ Whether everybody now supporting the AfD subscribes to the freedom-for-German-supremacy-view is open to debate. What can’t be denied is the fact that many discontented people, whatever their main grievance, are looking to the right, not the left, for alternatives to a failing political centre. Some are also turning to the CDU, which claims to be different from both the AfD and the federal coalition government, without offering anything other than praise for the good old days. That served the party well at times when the German economy could thrive, to a greater or lesser degree, on US-enabled expansion of world markets. With the US protectionist turn, this is no longer possible and the party is torn between centrism and the new right. Current support for the CDU is highly unstable, which could easily work in the AfD’s favour, especially in the absence of persuasive alternatives from the left, which so far have not materialized.

    This wasn’t always the case. Something like a left renewal had once seemed to be in the offing in the most unlikely place: East Germany during the transition from state socialism to a peripheral position in an enlarged capitalist Germany. In West Germany, the nationalist wave that came with unification swept away much of the activist left that had rallied thousands—sometimes tens or even hundreds of thousands— of people in the 1980s against the stationing of US nuclear missiles, nuclear power plants, Nazis, and South Africa’s apartheid regime, among other causes. Left circles within the SPD, the Greens and the labour movement weathered the nationalist storm without leaving a mark on German politics. In this political climate, the Party of Democratic Socialism (Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus or PDS) stood out as a beacon of the left.

    Emerging from East Germany’s ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED), the PDS became the political home of many East Germans who lost their jobs, social status and cultural identity during the transition to capitalism. Quickly establishing a presence in East Germany’s provincial and municipal parliaments, the party expressed the discomfort of many East Germans who felt like second class citizens under the domination of West German institutions, politicians, corporations and culture. It highlighted East Germany’s socialist heritage, which encompassed commitments to anti-fascism, peace and international solidarity as much as the dictatorship of the politburo, Stasi-surveillance and an overbearing bureaucracy. The party hung itself up in endless debates between those who downplayed or justified East German communism’s dark sides and others who sought to disown that history by embracing liberal principles. Practically, these disputes didn’t make much difference. Upholding socialist principles didn’t stop the party from pragmatically working within the political and economic confines created by unification. At times, this included voting for privatization of public housing and infrastructure. For decades since the party was founded, the contradiction between socialist principles and the subordination to neoliberal policies imposed by the West German bourgeoisie didn’t stop the PDS or its successor organization Die Linke (the Left Party), from becoming something like a catch-all or people’s party in East Germany, a role long held by the CDU und the SPD in West Germany. For years, the PDS/Left Party achieved election results in the mid-20 percent range, peaking at 28 percent in Brandenburg in 2004 and 32 percent in Thuringia in 2019. It was also, and still is, part of various coalition governments in East German states. Until the September 2024 election, the Thuringian government was led by the Left Party’s Bodo Ramelow.

    Despite this overall success and despite the party’s fidelity to socialist principles, the social group that wasn’t interested in voting PDS consisted of workers, who still voted CDU in large numbers despite g the CDU’s failed to deliver on its big promises of post-unification prosperity. More recently they shifted to the AfD. Meanwhile, in West Germany, the PDS remained marginal throughout its existence, only attracting activists from various left grouplets. What little remained of left protest milieus after unification was still dominated by a mix of environmentalists, antifas and international solidarity activists who might vote Green, or maybe even SPD, but hardly ever PDS. The old working class milieus that were shrinking with the decline of smokestack industries were still dominated by unionists closer to the SPD than the PDS. This started to change when, under chancellor Schröder, the SPD implemented neoliberal counter-reforms on a scale his conservative predecessor Kohl had avoided throughout his 16-year tenure, despite his supposed commitment to unleashing market forces. Growing frustrations among left social democrats and unionists fed mass demonstrations against Schröder’s SPD and created a social and organizational base (including, most prominently, Schröder’s short-time finance minister Lafontaine) that merged with the PDS into the Left Party in 2007. In the federal elections two years later, the Left Party won 11.9 percent of the vote, then 9.2 percent in the 2017 elections, but fell to 4.9 percent in the 2021 elections. This was a worse result than the 5.1 percent the PDS obtained in 1998, an election that also saw an increased vote for the SPD, which allowed Schröder to succeed Kohl. It is worth noting that the PDS vote came almost entirely from East Germany, which represents less than a quarter of Germany’s total population.

    While the PDS mostly maintained peaceful coexistence between socialist theory and market-conforming practice, the Left Party continuously debated whether or not it should join centre-left governments, if given the chance. The bitterness with which party activists argued over this question stood in stark contrast to its actual relevance. In states where the party was relegated to opposition status by poor election results, this status didn’t attract additional voters keen on seeing a principled opposition in parliament. In states where the party joined governments, the results were mixed: sometimes it maintained its vote share in the subsequent election; sometimes it suffered losses. A paradoxical result came about in the Thuringian elections in September 2024: The Left Party lost massively, although, had there been direct elections for the minister-president (a position equivalent to provincial premier in Canada), the Left Party’s Bodo Ramelow would have won the election. This fits into a trend that became visible over the last few years in a number of state elections in East and West Germany. Party loyalties based on shared worldviews wear thin. Elections are often decided based on the media appeal of top politicians, regardless of party affiliation. Remarkably enough, Ramelow, just like Dietmar Woidke, the SPD’s lead candidate in the Brandenburg elections, dropped the name of his party on campaign posters, presenting himself as more of a provincial father figure than a man of the party.

    However, rather than signalling the end of ideology, as centrist politicians and postmodern philosophers might have argued before the rise of a very explicitly ideologically committed new right, the focus on limelight politicians pushes democratic debates into the shadows. In the case of the Left Party, it might also have been an attempt to distract from its own image as an organization mired in endless debates not producing any coherent, let alone persuasive, policies. The reasons for permanent internal discord are sociological and ideological. The Left Party was strongest in its early days, when the PDS’s social base still comprised a cross-section of the East German population, although workers remained underrepresented. It also attracted dissident social democrats and unionists from West Germany. To a limited extent, therefore the Left Party had the working class base the PDS never had.

    The blend of Keynesian and Marxist ideas around which social democratic dissidents and union leftists organized had been defeated as a significant political current during the crises of the 1970s by the Social Democratic right and corporatist union leaders who put competitiveness of the West German economy over income distribution from profits to wages. In the new millennium, when these currents joined forces with the PDS, they were still sizeable enough to give the newly founded Left Party a boost. But not for long. The smokestack industries around which these left currents were organizing were in continued decline, which made strategies based on that moribund reality obsolete. Moreover, these strategies often stood in the way of mobilizing and organizing the new working classes that emerged in the service sector and, on a much smaller scale, IT, bio tech, and green energy.

    As the ranks of the Left Party thinned out with the loss of members coming out of communist East Germany or from West German union and social democratic circles, the party was able to attract new blood mainly in the form of highly educated, often precariously employed, urban dwellers. The shift in membership from old left offspring to the children of neoliberal globalization was paralleled by a geographical shift in electoral support. In urban centres, losses among the party’s old left supporters could be partially compensated; in rural areas, however, where the PDS and the Left Party had always been weak, the party disappeared almost entirely. Often, there isn’t even anyone to put up election campaign posters

    Anti-AfD protest in Germany. Photo by strassenstriche.net/Flickr

    Unlike the original base of both the PDS and the Left Party, the urban hipsters who joined the Left Party had no old left reference points. Even when they talked about Marx and class they did so with postmodern accents. However, this did not help them to gain sizeable support among the working classes—sometimes lumped together as the “precariat”—that developed in expanding economic sectors. The political offerings of the Left Party seemed to exercise little appeal for both old and potentially new constituencies. The party’s founding basis of unity was opposition to neoliberalism. In the early days this left room for East German concerns about the outcomes of unification—arguably a kind of neoliberal restructuring—with opposition to the neoliberal turn of the Schröder-government in East and West Germany. It also left plenty of room for a variety of goals, from resurrecting the Keynesian welfare state to a multitude of vaguely defined socialisms for the future to opposition without a vision for the future. However, what sufficed to form the Left Party wasn’t enough to sustain and grow it, especially not as it became harder to label government policies neoliberal.

    The Great Recession, the COVID-19 pandemic, and commitments to ongoing arms production brought state intervention back to the centre of politics, contrary to the 1990s and early 2000s when politics was dominated by advancing capital mobility and free trade. Back then, ruling elites organized consent of the popular classes, more or less successfully, under the banner of “international competitiveness.” The new watchword “national security” is better at rallying the new right than building support for centrist parties. Left Party intellectuals debated the new political conjuncture under the label “post-neoliberalism,” a word-monster that hints, perhaps unwittingly, at the party’s inability to develop a strategy beyond rejecting neoliberalism. In reaction to the imposition of a party line by its predecessor organization, the PDS and the Left Party allowed a wide range of views. However, members of various organized currents, ranging from social-liberal to communist, tended to talk more about each other than with each other.

    Postmodernist philosophers’ contention that the days of master narratives are over was wrong with respect to neoliberalism—if there ever was a master narrative, it was neoliberalism—but it does apply to the Left Party, which could not synthesize different ideas into compelling left policies that could rally growing discontent. Instead, internal debates turned into factional turf wars in a party that resembled an appendix of the Scholz government, costing the Left Party more and more support.

    After years of bitter infighting, discontent with declining voter approval and accommodation of government policies led to the split of the federal party caucus and the formation of the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) in January 2024. As its name indicates, the party is entirely built around its frontwoman, who represented the Left Party in the Bundestag from 2009 to 2023. In the BSW, the cacophony that destructively marks the Left Party is replaced by closed-door debates. As in the Communist party of old, membership isn’t open to everyone; applications to join must be approved. Wagenknecht, originally a member of the Communist Platform (one of the organized currents inside the PDS), had shifted to left-Keynesian, pro-welfare state positions. But, years before her split from the Left Party, she began advocating ordoliberal positions—a branch of neoliberal thinking that stresses the role of the state in allowing businesses to compete without being bogged down by monopolies. This German version of neoliberalism has been the hallmark of economic policy and ideology since the early years of West German world market integration. In Wagenknecht’s current adaptation of ordoliberalism, the state guarantees competition, which, in turn, creates a strong economy capable of providing stable employment, social security and a fairer distribution of incomes. She combines this embrace of free markets plus the welfare state with a critique of the European Union as an institution operating in the interest of big corporations and a critique of NATO and US hegemony. Her condemnation of American hegemony appealed to some members of the Left Party, as did her critique of the EU, although her more recent favourable references to ordoliberalism and policies aiming at stricter migration controls were less popular.

    The BSW’s outlook is very much shaped by positive memories of West German postwar prosperity. Yet, the party’s advocacy of international cooperation, a position going back to 1970s detente policies, contrasts sharply with orientations of the centrist parties and some currents within her own former party. Demand for a negotiated settlement of the Ukraine war overlaps with AfD positions. However, the AfD considers this a matter of Germany’s national interest that doesn’t preclude support for rearmament and war in other regions, like Gaza most recently. The BSW, on the other hand, sees militarism largely as the US’s last recourse for defending its ailing empire. It remains to be seen how the BSW’s principled opposition to militarism and war can mesh with current negotiations for a coalition government with the CDU and the SPD, both committed to military support for Zelensky in Ukraine and Netanyahu in Israel. Polls suggest that electoral support for the BSW was largely driven by the desire for an anti-war voice in parliament. At the same time, there is considerable support for efforts to keep the AfD out of government, despite all the support the AfD garnered in the fall state elections in East Germany. If this means compromising its anti-militarism, the BSW may, like the Left Party before it, soon be seen as a superfluous appendix of unpopular centrist parties.

    After weeks of negotiations, the BSW entered into a coalition government with the SPD in Brandenburg as well as with the CDU and SPD in Thuringia. It also supports a minority government made up of the CDU and the SPD in Saxony. It did all this to keep the AfD out of government positions. Understandable as such efforts are, they have already cost the BSW in the polls. Hovering just above five percent, the BSW may not reach the five-percent threshold for obtaining seats in the upcoming federal elections. The Left Party, standing at 3.5 percent in the polls, will probably fall short. Founded as a project to unify left forces from East and West Germany, its split early last year already signalled the failure of that project. The next election may reduce it to insignificance, leaving lots of room for the AfD [end]

    The original article

    Ingo Schmidt is an economist and works as the coordinator of the Labour Studies Program at Athabasca University

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