Nicolas Cinquini

Analista senior di l'intelligenza in u campu di a gestione di i risichi di sicurezza, sò un anzianu tenente detective è ufficiale di l'intelligenza in l'agenzie di u Statu francese. A bona pronuncia hè Николай Чинкуини, in russu

Tag: georgia

  • L’engagement français dans les rangs ukrainiens

    • Mordant, Dylan, né le 13 septembre 1996,

    vit à Nice, commença par exercer le métier de plombier, perdit son emploi en raison de l’épidémie de COVID-19, devint fossoyeur mais a été licencié, lorsqu’à l’appel de Volodymyr Zelenskyy, il part une première fois pour l’Ukraine début mars 2022

    Il est de retour dans les rangs atlantistes en mai 2023, commence à diffuser des images du front le 19 juillet. Il est affecté au 2d bataillon de Légion internationale, attaché à la 95e brigade d’assaut aéroporté de l’armée régulière

    Il arbore une bande Velcro Napoleon ; j’imagine une référence au général corse Napoleone Buonaparte. Décidément. Il se définit comme patriote, ici lors d’un échange sur Telegram le 27 août

    Comme quoi la discussion est possible. Il me confie que Boris Crouzette l’a recruté. Début septembre, il est muté dans le 3e bataillon de la Légion internationale, alors que son camarade Charles Roussel regagne la France.

    En repos le 17 octobre 2023, il commence à partager de la propagande sans rapport avec l’Ukraine, pour tenter de justifier le crime de guerre massif que les forces israéliennes ont commis dans la soirée, contre l’hôpital Al Mamadani de Gaza. Cela permet de profiler un peu mieux l’idéologie du patriote, nous oriente vers l’identitaire.

    Toujours au repos, probablement en France, il continue les jours suivants dans cette veine et en vertu de six mois passés au front, s’improvise expert en géopolitique. Mais ses analyses sont faibles. Quelle exaltation, il n’a jamais croupi que quelques semaines dans des tranchées, d’où il lâchait des rafales pour se faire plaisir. Il n’a jamais participé à un assaut ou opération tactique difficile. Si tel avait été le cas, compte tenu de son niveau militaire, il serait mort.

    Après la saignée parmi les volontaires les premiers mois, l’OTAN a compris tout le mal que les morts étrangers faisaient à la propagande atlantiste. L’administration militaire ukrainienne jongle aujourd’hui avec du personnel de qualités très différentes. Les bleus comme Mordant sont affectés à des formations de second ordre, chargées d’occuper des tranchées dans des secteurs plutôt calmes. Les vétérans sont employés comme Flash à des opérations tactiques agressives courtes, qui demandent de la compétence mais ne les exposent pas trop. Et la chair à canon ukrainienne continue de se faire hacher. Les Colombiens aussi, car si Volodymyr Zelenskyy est un gros client de l’agrochimie d’Amérique latine, les volontaires de Colombie semblent moins côtés que les Européens ou Nord-Américains.

    Mordant prend peur le 8 janvier 2024, quand il est évoqué par le nazi Alan Vigneron, dans une interview publiée par L’Obs, trois jours après un premier article plus général de la journaliste Cécile Deffontaines, qui s’attaque à la question du nazisme parmi les combattants français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine

    Fatalitas, disait Chéri-Bibi. Mordant n’a pas résisté à la pression sociale et à ses remords. Il se dénonce mais nie les faits, abrège le travail du renseignement russe.

    Le 14 novembre 2023, le ministère russe de la défense publia la vidéo des aveux d’un prisonnier géorgien qui avait sévi dans les rangs du 2d bataillon de Légion internationale. Il raconta notamment que les volontaires étrangers comme lui sont souvent employés dans une fonction disciplinaire. En seconde ligne, ils sont chargés, comme des vidéos amateurs l’ont déjà montré, d’empêcher par tous moyens la désertion des conscrits ukrainiens. Tireur de précision, Georgy Chubetidze en avait lui même tués. Point particulier : le Géorgien dénonça aussi, sans les nommer, deux Français qu’il avait vus abattre un civil qui s’opposait à ce que la soldatesque ne rentre chez lui. Meurtre de civil, crime de guerre

    Les faits lui sont rappelés lorsque Mordant accède à une vidéo qu’un contact lui soumet sur les réseaux sociaux. Pourtant pétainiste, le polémiste Xavier Moreau y raconte l’affaire et ajoute que le renseignement russe ne tardera pas à identifier les coupables.

    En mars 2022, avant son premier séjour en Ukraine, Mordant confia à un journaliste niçois la crainte que lui inspirent les fins limiers de Vladimir Poutine. Ses remords et la vidéo de Xavier Moreau le convainquent le 21 janvier 2024 de prendre les devants, de la commenter et en définitive, sans passer aux aveux, de se dénoncer

    […] Georgy Chubetidze est un volontaire géorgien qui combat au sein de la Légion internationale, qui était au sein de mon bataillon, avec qui on est parti en mission […] Je ne lui en veux absolument pas de ce qu’il a pu dire, il est sous la contrainte […] On peut lui faire dire n’importe quoi […]

    Qui était son comparse ? Charles Roussel ?

    Dans les minutes qui suivent la révélation de son implication dans le meurtre d’un civil, il fait irruption dans le chat du canal Telegram international TrackANaziMerc. Sa seule défense consiste à se plaindre de la propagande russe, alors que nous avons scrupuleusement agrégé et analysé des faits, qu’il se garde d’aborder. En désespoir de cause, il insulte les internautes et se pose en héroïque combattant, dont la valeur serait prouvée par le volume de son public sur TikTok.

    En réalité, il n’a jamais été militaire dans l’armée française et ses activités en Ukraine paraissent d’une grande médiocrité technique et morale.

    Au fait de mon engagement contre les violences policières dont étaient victimes les Gilets jaunes, il évoque avec jubilation les tirs de LBD qui en ont mutilés, ce qui accrédite un peu plus son inclination pour les exactions sur civils désarmés

    Il se déclare habituellement patriote, mais confirme par sa personnalité la sentence d’un auteur anglais du XVIIIe siècle –le patriotisme est l’ultime refuge de la canaille– que les sbires de Joseph Darnand ont illustrée entre 1943 et 1944, dans la formation paramilitaire pétainiste qu’était la Milice française.

    Pourquoi n’est il resté qu’un mois dans le 3e bataillon, plus opérationnel que le 2d ? Peu décidé à retourner en Ukraine, qu’il quitta en octobre, sans expérience réelle du combat mais plutôt cinq mois d’exactions, il reste au chaud à Nice, où à l’instar de son prédécesseur Marseillais Ernesto Barbieri, il se recentre résolument sur TikTok. Il offre son conseil à tous ceux qui souhaitent à leur tour devenir volontaires, pour la défense de ce qu’il appelle le 28 janvier, le bouclier de l’Europe

    Le 24 février, il participe sur la promenade des Anglais à un rassemblement de l’Association franco-ukrainienne de la Côte d’Azur (AFUCA).

    Au terme d’une année sabbatique sur la Côte d’Azur, le Niçois retourne en Ukraine fin octobre 2024 et nous apparaît engagé ensuite dans la région russe de Koursk, où les forces atlantistes ont lancé à l’été une offensive aussi vaine que Wacht am Rhein, fin 1944, dans les Ardennes belges

    Pour l’anecdote, son camarade au second plan n’est pas n’importe qui, puisque tombé le 25 décembre 2024 dans la région russe de Koursk, Hugo Dizerens, dit Silver, sera le premier citoyen suisse tué dans ce conflit.

    Un mystère s’éclaircit le 8 mars 2025. Nous comprenons pourquoi Mordant quitta l’Ukraine en octobre 2023, après un mois seulement dans les rangs du 3e bataillon de Légion internationale, a passé ensuite un an en France

    Il dénonce sur les réseaux sociaux des actes de tortures, par des Français aux ordres d’un capitaine Ukrainien, sur d’autres militaires du 3e bataillon. Il partage aussi une vidéo floutée où résonnent les pleurs d’un homme frappé, promet enfin de dévoiler par la suite les identités des tortionnaires. Nous les attendons toujours en cette fin mars et pensons qu’en réalité, il en fut lui même la victime. Avoir de l’empathie pour d’autres que sa propre personne n’est pas dans les cordes d’un Dylan Mordant. Cette désagréable expérience me paraît une punition bien insuffisante pour le coauteur, avec Charles Roussel, du meurtre d’un civil à l’été 2023.

    Au terme d’un second séjour de six mois, sa participation à la catastrophique offensive atlantiste dans la région russe de Koursk, vaincu mais intact, il est de retour à la maison et fait le beau le 3 avril 2025 sur le plateau de BFMTV Côte d’Azur. Langue de bois et cirage des pompes de sa Vacuité Emmanuel Macron, il apparaît comme un splendide spécimen de ce qu’est aujourd’hui le pays des pinzuti [Français, en Corse], aussi appelé Macronie

    Comme toujours, je m’en voudrais de ruiner l’ambiance de la chaîne locale de préfecture, mais non, ce Niçois n’a pas passé 3 ans sur le front Ukrainien. Il rompit un premier contrat de six mois en octobre 2023, après avoir été un peu sévèrement bizuté par de petits camarades du 3e bataillon de Légion internationale. À partir d’octobre 2024, ses nouvelles aventures lui ont fait sans doute approcher de plus près les risques inhérents à l’activité militaire.

    Dans une envolée de haute tenue géopolitique, il célèbre ici le Droit international, devrait plus humblement se préoccuper de Droit pénal et du meurtre de civil dans lequel il fut impliqué à l’été 2023 avec son camarade français Charles Roussel

    Au terme de huit mois de vacances, il retourne en Ukraine en novembre 2025 et commence en décembre à afficher l’insigne du 3e corps d’armée, émanation de l’organisation nazie Azov dans l’armée régulière ukrainienne. De talentueux informaticiens russes recueillent auprès de la bureaucratie ukrainienne des données à son sujet et confirment qu’il est désormais affecté à la 60e brigade mécanisée, qui en fait partie.

    Le 7 octobre 2026, il confirme ce qui apparaissait depuis le début du mois de septembre : à l’instar de nombre de ses compatriotes, il a acquis la spécialité de pilote de drones.

    in L’engagement français dans les rangs ukrainiens

    chronique alphabétique et nécrologique de l’engagement français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas

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  • [Sharing] Getica’s Fifth Column: How an Ilegal Armed Group on Ukraine’s Payroll Blacklists EU and US Citizens – Stéphane Luçon

    Since the annulment of the 2024 election, Romania’s rule of law keeps crumbling. Here comes Getica – a paramilitary unit who puts EU and US citizens on a Fifth Column list and jokes about war crimes

    Romania annulled its presidential election in December 2024 amid allegations of Russian interference. Eighteen months later, Romanian authorities still have not publicly produced evidence showing that Russian influence determined the result.

    Yet, those who challenge that narrative increasingly find themselves labeled as pro-Russian, fact-checked, publicly denounced, censored, or added to the “Fifth Column” blacklist of Romanian Battlegroup Getica, an armed group linked to Ukrainian military structures.

    The story of how I ended up on that blacklist reveals something larger than a single paramilitary database. It points to an ecosystem of media outlets, NGOs, activists, fact-checkers, and an armed group that appears to use accusations of Russian influence to stigmatize political opponents and critics of Romania’s (and the EU’s) official electoral narrative.

    The question is not only why journalists, politicians, academics, and activists end up on Getica’s Fifth Column database, but most importantly why Romanian and Ukrainian authorities continue to tolerate an armed group threatening civilians while nobody accepts responsibility for it.

    Getica’s “Fifth Column” database has grown far beyond Romanian politics. At some point, Donald Trump was on it. Steve Bannon is still on it. Republicans for National Renewal and its leader Mark Ivanyo were recently added — alongside European politicians and journalists. Including myself.

    To some targets, Getica confirmed modeling their “Fifth Column” list on Ukraine’s infamous Myrotvorets death list. Those armed men wearing military uniform with Ukrainian and Romanian flags and, for some of them, on Ukraine’s army’s payroll, have joked about war crimes, war time rape, doxxed a civilian, constantly lied on their nature, and, last but not least, kept emitting threat no later than this week

    Screenshot from the last Getica video, threatening Sebastian Dracopol for his reporting and pushback on Getica’s Fifth Column

    In 2024, Getica’s Fifth column’s manifesto declared possible terrorist action if Ukraine loses the war.

    Protected Speech or Military Misconduct?

    I had been monitoring the Fifth Column site for a while when I appeared on the list. The move was an anticipated one after recurring signaling from Newsweek Romania trying to frame me as being aligned with Russia — despite not having posted anything in support of Russia. It came first as the logical conclusion of a pattern of smear and harassment coming from people connected to Newsweek România, Alianța — a US 501(c)(3) meddling with Romanian politics — and the local businessman Marius Bostan, who consolidated his fortune on state contracts awarded during the COVID crisis.

    But then came the questions — is it a real thing? Is it dangerous? Unfortunately, it is. Especially in the context of a country whose rule of law was buried altogether with the 2024 election.

    I contacted Getica to receive an explanation and clarify the label of “enemy of Romania”. An anonymous representative replied that nobody had ever suffered consequences from inclusion and argued that the project merely exercised free speech. They also explained that they used to be affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence, but are now under the authority of the Ukrainian Armed Forces… Further investigation would reveal how blurred are the lines under which Getica operates.

    The answer regarding free speech raises an obvious problem. You can’t claim free speech protection while operating as a military organization targeting civilians. If they’re civilians, Getica’s members enjoy broad free-speech protections — that is, up to the point where speech crosses into incitement or creates immediate, real-world threats. In that case, law enforcement and civilian justice should handle them. If they’re military, the problem is different. Military organizations operate under rules of engagement. They don’t target civilians. They don’t maintain independent blacklists of enemies. They answer to a chain of command. If they’re out-of-control military members, they should answer before a military tribunal.

    Getica claims both at once: military affiliation when it suits them (Ukrainian unit emblems on the website, Ukrainian battlegroup membership, fundraising for its activities), and civilian free speech protection when confronted with responsibility for the Fifth Column database. Right after I sent them a series of questions on the way they were assessing people to put them on their “Fifth Column” list, they blocked me on Facebook although I didn’t even ever tag them nor publish anything on them yet. The honor and ethics of military service were traded for the methods of petty mobsters.

    But the question goes beyond the activities of Getica. If Ukraine is supporting these activities, then it is crossing another line, in a context already extremely loaded due to the recent attribution of the Nord Stream sabotage to a Ukrainian agent by a German tribunal — the worst attack on a NATO country infrastructure so far has been performed by somebody affiliated with the Ukrainian military. The atmosphere is even more loaded since a Ukrainian drone recently exploded in the Romanian port of Constanta — the biggest NATO port on the Black Sea — a few hundred meters away from the oil terminals and from an ammonium nitrate deposit, a chemical product that made major damages in the port of Beirut in 2020. With Getica, the question of Ukraine’s willingness to target Western civilians and western infrastructure is all the more acute. You can’t receive Western support and attack the West. You can’t claim funding for your military and pay the members of Getica as they target EU and US civilians. If Ukraine can’t court-martial those targeting EU and US citizens, if it covers for them, then the whole story of defending a democracy against an autocracy crumbles and, with it, part of the reasons to support Ukraine against the Russian invasion.

    Getica — illegal, dangerous and… aligned with Macron?

    In Romania, paramilitary organizations operating outside state command are constitutionally prohibited. Yet, Romanian Battlegroup Getica appears to operate openly: armed men claiming ties to Ukrainian military structures, running a blacklist of civilians, and even claiming to have conducted two operations on Romanian soil.

    Its historical founder and commander, Sergiu Meșeșan, claims participation in dozens of combat missions in Ukraine. Its members and supporters have doxed critics and targeted family members. Meșeșan recently returned to Romania to teach people how to use FPV drones, including arming them with explosives. In public exchanges, the group has joked about war crimes, rape, disappearances, and other conduct that would normally trigger serious scrutiny.

    In one live exchange on X, the Romanian Legion Getica account replied to another user with language trivializing rape and invoking Azov: “Several army groups participated in your creation, Azov too I think. The woman didn’t complain.” The reference is not incidental. Azov’s neo-Nazi origins were documented to the point that the US Congress prohibited weapons transfers to the unit in 2018, a restriction that remained in place until 2024. During that period, Radu Hossu — Getica’s main fundraiser and co-founder — appeared in a June 2023 interview wearing an Azov emblem containing the Wolfsangel, a symbol with direct Nazi lineage. In one of his own fundraising reports, he also acknowledged purchasing equipment for two military personnel enrolled in Azov, adding parenthetically: “yes, that AZOV”

    Radu Hossu, on the Romanian podcast Vorbintorici, wearing the Azov Wolfsangel in June 2023, when the US congress ban on arming Azov was still enforced due to Azov’s neo-nazi elements

    The point is not guilt by association. It is that an armed group maintaining a civilian blacklist, joking about rape and war crimes, invoking disappearances, and displaying proximity to military formations controversial enough to trigger years of congressional restrictions should have attracted institutional scrutiny long before journalists, politicians, and foreign citizens began appearing on its list.

    Whose Army?

    Some Getica members hold Ukrainian military ID cards and receive Ukrainian Army salaries

    Sergiu Meseșan military document shared on the Romanian Battlegroup Getica Facebook account – A0515 is a Military Intelligence Directorate Unit

    According to representatives of the group contacted directly for this investigation, Getica has operated under Ukrainian military command — initially under GUR, the Ukrainian military intelligence directorate, and later under ZSU, the Ukrainian Armed Forces. When pressed on the specifics of their affiliation, they directed us to their website.

    That website has been telling its own story. Until May 30, 2026, it displayed the emblem of the 4th Heavy Mechanized Brigade of the Ukrainian Army

    On that date — shortly after this investigation began sending right-of-reply letters to Romanian and Ukrainian institutions — the emblem was quietly removed, with an announcement that a new unit affiliation would be revealed. Days later, two new emblems appeared: that of the 1230th Separate Engineering and Technical Support Battalion, part of the 48th Engineering Brigade of the Ukrainian Support Forces; and that of the International Legion of Defense Intelligence of Ukraine, MUNA 3449 — a separate unit of foreign fighters subordinated to the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, which is the GUR

    International Legion of Defense Intelligence of Ukraine
    1230th Separate Engineering and Technical Support Battalion

    No Ukrainian institution has formally claimed oversight of the group. No Romanian institution has either.

    The people behind Getica form an unusual partnership. On one side, Sergiu Meșeșan, the group’s historical founder and commander, is a Romanian volunteer fighter in Ukraine who was previously sentenced in Sweden to three years in prison for aggravated fraud as the leader of a bank-card-skimming and phishing operation active across Sweden, Finland, and Denmark.

    On the other is Radu Hossu, a self-described founding father of the project: a prominent pro-Ukraine activist, fundraiser, and politician from USR — the party created by Romania’s current president and aligned with Macron’s Renew Europe group — as well as an “embedded” war journalist, covering military operations and units he simultaneously helped finance.

    One man built and commanded the organization, and would publish the manifesto of the Fifth Column blacklist and maintain it. The other provided funding, public legitimacy, media access, and political connections.

    Questions about Getica’s financing had already produced one of the earliest public conflicts surrounding the group. IT specialist Sebastian Dracopol, later added to the Fifth Column database himself, challenged the use of funds raised by Hossu through a personal Revolut account. After being doxxed and threatened, Dracopol sued Hossu. Although he did not obtain a restraining order, the proceedings produced one of the few official records concerning Getica, including admissions regarding Hossu’s fundraising role, his creation and ownership of the group’s Telegram channel, and the armed nature of the combatants operating under the Getica banner. We will return to that case later.

    The April 2024 “Fifth Column” Manifesto

    In April 2024, Getica commander Sergiu Meșeșan published what amounts to the founding document of the Fifth Column project, laying out his program in explicit terms:

    We believe it is normal to have different opinions and freedom of expression. That is what democracy is about. But we wish to warn, through this message, that there is a limit to the subversive activities we will tolerate — I am referring to ‘Getica’ — on the territory of Romania or the Republic of Moldova.

    And we are EXTREMELY ready to act from the shadows to limit the impact of Russian influence in both states.

    Thus, when Ukraine collapses — as this category of Russophiles maintains, and if it should actually come to pass — we will be ready to strike with an intensity and firepower the likes of which Romania has never seen, in order to defend the national and vital interests of the nation.

    We are aware that there is a legal framework that is not exactly favorable for state defense institutions to act freely and effectively. Laws change, however, and for the homeland, ‘Getica’ is ready even to circumvent them. We own that. We might be called terrorists. But the terrorists of some are the freedom fighters of others.

    […] We already have a website, a secure server, and a domain. We will publish them very shortly. Beyond the information and presentation images you have been able to see on our page over time, we wish to put into practice the concept of the #coloana5 database. We firmly believe that exposing the identity of subversive elements and useful idiots will deter them more or less from their activities of sabotaging public opinion, and will spare us other actions — unfortunately far more invasive — in the near future

    Meșeșan’s manifesto remains live on Facebook today. He has since returned to Romania.

    The idea of an armed group on Ukrainian payroll going rogue and targeting citizens of NATO member states should have warranted a reaction from authorities, at least from Romania and from Ukraine. In response to our inquiry, the Armed Forces of Ukraine stated that the matter fell within the competence of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) of the Defense Ministry. The Romanian Defense Ministry denied any affiliation. No further clarification was provided.

    A year after its manifesto, Getica goes… “clandestine”?

    In a lengthy statement published on April 14, 2025, Getica founder Sergiu Meșeșan described himself as having conducted 37 combat missions in Ukraine, including infantry, SIGINT, drone ISR, and attack-drone roles. He stated that Getica had approximately 50 members over its existence and never more than 20 active fighters at any given time.

    More importantly, he publicly acknowledged that the group had carried out “2 limited surveillance operations on Romanian territory.” Meșeșan did not disclose the targets, legal basis, beneficiaries, or institutional authorization of the two Romanian surveillance operations. No Romanian authority contacted during this investigation acknowledged requesting, supervising, authorizing, or even being aware of them. The statement raises obvious questions about the legality of intelligence-style activities conducted on Romanian territory by individuals presenting themselves as members of a foreign military structure. If they are a paramilitary group, their activities are unconstitutional and illegal in Romania. If they are affiliated to Ukraine’s military, this is a serious breach of the treaties that prevent any such activity. If these missions were happening with the blessing of the Romanian Army, then somebody at the MaPN lied to us and covered up for Getica – and this person should answer before the law too.

    In the same statement, Meșeșan proclaimed that: “From today, Getica becomes a multinational, global and clandestine operation.”

    By any reasonable definition, Getica does not display the characteristics of a regular military force. Regular military forces operate with rules of engagement, a formal conduct code, and an accountable command hierarchy — constraints that precisely prevent armed groups from targeting civilians, engaging in public discourse, or taking sides in political debate.

    Getica’s Fifth Column

    Coloana 5 — Fifth Column — is Getica’s blacklist. By May 2024, the page was online. It currently lists over 150 American and European citizens and organizations accused of serving Russian interests, acting as useful idiots, or being enemies of Romania.

    Inclusion is not notified in advance. According to the operators themselves, a profile can be spotted automatically by a combination of alleged military AI systems — an OSINT database and an LLM — and then approved by a human operator. The list is not static: operators state they monitor listed individuals and may revise positions over time, an implicit form of pressure to coerce people into alignment. The original version of the site included a “Recommended actions” rubric specifying measures such as localization and monitoring of listed individuals. That section has since been removed. At some point, the site began blocking web archiving tools, making earlier versions inaccessible.

    In direct communication with a listed person, Getica leadership referenced Myrotvorets explicitly as a model — the Ukrainian hit list on which was Chilean-American influencer Gonzalo Lira, whose case gained attention in 2023 when Elon Musk publicly questioned his detention. According to Ukrainian officials, Lira died in detention from pneumonia and health complications; his family and supporters alleged mistreatment and torture

    Lira’s last tweet

    A development in sync with the election calendar

    Getica’s Fifth Column project did not emerge during an ordinary political period. In 2024, every major elected office was scheduled for renewal in Romania.

    In late April, the European Union activated its Rapid Response System to flag content during the European Parliament election campaign, and Getica simultaneously began listing members of the opposition on its website. The framing had been set weeks earlier: on March 6, Ursula von der Leyen, campaigning for her reelection, made the stakes explicit in her Bucharest rally cry:

    [..] Putin’s friends are trying to rewrite our history and hijack our future. They are spreading hate from behind their keyboards. And let there be no doubt what’s at stake in this election. Our peaceful and united Europe is being challenged like never before by populists, nationalists, and demagogues. Whether it is the far right or the far left. Whether it is the AfD, the Rassemblement National, the confederatia or Wasraschdene. The names may be different, but the goal is the same: They want to trample on our values, and they want to destroy our Europe. But we, the EPP, will never let that happen

    Following the Russiagate playbook, critics and opposition to power are “Russian influence” – this would become a recurring theme during the long Romanian election cycle. Getica’s project, supposedly aimed at exposing Russian influence, would just plainly overlap with domestic political conflicts, opposition figures, journalists, commentators, and critics of power.

    The involvement of USR member Radu Hossu makes an obvious case for direct political support or, at least, convenient complacency, with the criminal activities of Getica. Contacted, neither Dominic Fritz – leader of USR – nor USR Brașov provided a statement to distance themselves from Hossu. Bucharest leader of USR, Vlad Voiculescu, replied in a direct message that he didn’t see how the matter was related to USR. Yet, the fact that a USR member helped and covered for a coercion gang is obviously a USR problem. None of the questions sent to USR-founder, and now President Nicusor Dan, to the Ministry of Defence, led by USR member Radu Miruta, nor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, led by USR member Oana Toiu, delivered a significant assessment, response, let alone an acknowledgement of the gravity of the matter. Silence seems to clearly mean consent, and Getica’s utility for the USR could be summarized like that: if propaganda fails, if censorship and the weaponization of the DSA fails, then an informal tool to threatens or silences people find its full utility.

    Who makes it to the list?

    The progression from media labeling to blacklisting can be observed directly in my own case. Since December 2024, I have repeatedly described the absurdity of framing as pro-Russian people who — like most of the Romanian conservatives — have condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and hold Russia in distrust for many historical reasons. In a country where 87.5% of the people are West-oriented and consider EU and NATO membership as warranties of security and prosperity, framing a part of the population — the conservatives — as anti-EU, anti-NATO, pro-Russia only serves a propaganda machine.

    Before appearing in the Fifth Column database, I had already been repeatedly smeared as pro-Russian, pro-Orbán, pro-Georgescu or part of various influence networks — and this without ever having published pro-Russian, pro-Georgescu or pro-Orbán material. The attacks had far more to do with the reporting I published than with any pro-Russian content.

    I have documented how the current implementation of the EU Digital Services Act created a growing ecosystem of censorship actors while leaving user protections largely theoretical (see DSA: Europe’s Injustice System).

    Later this year, I contributed to The Managed Ballot, published through MCC Brussels, with a chapter on Romania’s Hybrid Regime and its European Accomplices. It argued that the country’s democratic downgrade was driven by the regime itself — the government and the intelligence community — working hand in hand with a local “fake civil society” that lacked real constituencies and ran on foreign executive-power funding, including the EU’s. Behind it, external interference from Brussels and from Macron. The result: a country the Economist’s Democracy Index had reclassified as a “hybrid regime” — no longer a democracy. The publication of the MCC report triggered an ad hominem attack in a media outlet owned by Marius Bostan.

    The combination placed me in direct conflict with actors who considered the Russian-interference narrative settled fact. Beyond my own reporting, I also publish the Romanian edition of Le Monde diplomatique and regularly translate writers who frequently challenge official foreign-policy narratives and oppose censorship, including Serge Halimi, Pierre Rimbert, Matt Taibbi, Aaron Maté, Thomas Fazi, Jeffrey Sachs and John Mearsheimer.

    A few days ago, another Newsweek Romania “embedded journalist” — mixing coverage of the Ukraine war with support for Ukraine —, Remus Cernea, alleged that Sachs and Mearsheimer were “Putin’s intellectuals”.

    Newsweek România, Alianța and the Bostan ecosystem

    But things accelerated when I debunked a hit piece published by Newsweek România targeting Georgică Severin, one of the few members of the National Audiovisual Council (CNA) consistently opposing censorship measures within Romania’s media regulator. My article also noted how the advertorial section of Newsweek România only contained representatives of the government. Before publishing my rebuttal, I sent detailed questions to Newsweek România. No answer was received. Two days later, Newsweek România published a new article targeting both Severin and me. Another article followed in Newsweek, reminding readers of my positive reaction to AUR’s medical caravan project and the fact that my wife is an AUR member.

    Facing calls for deportation, I debunked the most outrageous allegations in a single published response, rather than engaging every online harasser.

    Shortly afterwards, I appeared on Getica’s Fifth Column database, directly tagged as an “enemy of Romania” and a “potential collaborator.” Getica’s file referenced articles published by two media outlets in which a key stakeholder is Marius Bostan — În Linie Dreaptă and Newsweek România (a local licensee, not the US edition, with full editorial autonomy). Bostan is a former Romanian Telecommunications Minister from the “technocratic government” that governed Romania from 2015 to 2017, formed after the Colectiv nightclub fire protests. Later, Bostan largely benefited from government contracts during the COVID crisis. In 2018, Newsweek România was launched, at an event where the head of the Romanian Intelligence Service would participate. Bostan exerts further influence via Alianța, a US 501(c) originally created to nurture US-Romania friendship, gathering former US ambassadors on its board. Through Newsweek România and Alianța-related actors, a common pattern emerges: individuals challenging dominant narratives are first publicly framed as vectors of disinformation before some eventually find themselves referenced by Getica’s Fifth Column project.

    In one instance, the Getica Twitter account even asked the editor of În Linie Dreaptă when to add an academic to the list — which raises the question of direct management of the Getica list by Bostan’s employees.

    On July 22, 2025, Getica publicly justified AUR MEP Gheorghe Piperea’s inclusion by posting a screenshot of a Digi24 article reporting that the European Commission considered his motion of censure against Ursula von der Leyen to be linked to Moscow’s interests. Getica’s accompanying comment was: “connecting the dots 😉” A normal parliamentary procedure — a motion of censure, one of the European Parliament’s standard checks-and-balances instruments — had already been reframed by Newsweek România as an initiative of the “Russophile extremist AUR party” before Getica treated it as a Russian-interference signal.

    Getica’s list has kept growing since its launch. In April 2025, Donald Trump was added. He was removed shortly after — no removal date confirmed.

    Months later, the operators claimed it had been a test to confuse enemies. That explanation is difficult to take at face value: it is more plausible that internal pushback warned them of the risk of directly targeting a sitting US president. What followed makes the Trump removal look less like a policy and more like damage control — the additions continued. The targeting pattern is hard to separate from the political positioning of Getica’s main fundraiser, Radu Hossu, and his party USR, which has maintained a radically conflicting stance toward Donald Trump, the MAGA movement, and USR’s local rivals, the AUR party.

    The same chronology appears around Republicans for National Renewal. In early 2026, Newsweek România published an article about a distinction awarded by the American organization to AUR’s leader George Simion. Shortly afterwards, RNR leader Mark Ivanyo was added to the Fifth Column database together with the organization itself. Dragoș Moldoveanu, an AUR member, was added in the same batch, and a Bulgarian figure associated with the same political ecosystem was also added. More additions followed after public discussions involving AUR MP Mihai Neamțu and sovereignty-oriented commentators, including Laurențiu Țîrcă.

    Țîrcă received some of the most radical messaging from Getica. The group confirmed to him that Myrotvorets was its model, and pointed to how people on such lists suffer “accidental” deaths. Țîrcă reported seeing a now-removed image of his name written on a rocket launcher. When he challenged Getica over alleged war crimes committed during the Kursk incursion, where elderly civilians died, the Getica account replied: “I don’t deal with pensioners only, I deal with students too.” Țîrcă was a student at that time.

    Although Newsweek România carries the name of the American weekly, asked about editorial oversight and accountability, Newsweek USA told us that its international publishing partners are responsible for their own editorial operations and content, while also stating that Newsweek expects organizations operating under its brand to uphold responsible journalism standards.

    The concentration of impostors at the local edition of Newsweek goes so far that it receives contribution from Ovidiu Nahoiu, Chief Editor of Radio France International Romania, who shone a year ago with an obsequious interview of the French Ambassador — that is the representative of the government that pays Nahoiu’s salary — were 3 blatant lies went uncheck on air in order to support the Russian influence narrative justifying the annulment of the election. Newsweek also hosts editorial from Adrian Zuckerman — a former ambassador who constantly meddles with Romanian politics, sometimes to praise the Ministry of Internal Affairs for his role in the 2024 coup – naturally framed as “saving Romania”-, sometimes to urge the Romanian Presidency not to join Trump board of Peace.

    A few years ago, a reporting by Recorder had already highlited one of the key reason explaining the journalistic fraud within Newsweek and a large part of the press — government money flooding them.

    “The destruction of these emitters of toxic ideas must be part of the response.”

    The overlap with Getica’s rhetoric extends beyond Newsweek itself. One recurring node is Alianța, a network whose members and participants have included business leaders, activists, former diplomats, former American ambassadors, media figures and public officials. On September 20, 2025, Alianța member Andrei Caramitru publicly defended Getica and its blacklist, describing Getica as Romanian patriots and heroes and claiming the list contained pro-Russian actors from Romania and Moldova. He added that the list was probably already known to Azov, Ukrainian services, Western services and others. We offered a right of reply to Alianța in letters addressed to each board member and to former US ambassadors — no answer was received.

    Alianța bills itself as a nonpartisan 501(c)(3), yet its own Board Chair, former US Ambassador Adrian Zuckerman, used an interview to declare the leading conservative opposition party, AUR, “a party dangerous to Romania, dangerous to democracy, dangerous to the West — a party that shouldn’t exist in Romania.” A US tax-exempt nonpartisan organization is, on its own platform, calling for the elimination of a Romanian parliamentary party.

    One of the most revealing pieces of language in this ecosystem has been recently supplied by Marius Bostan, shareholder of Newsweek România and central actor in the Alianța network. At the Newsweek IT & Cyber Summit 2026, Bostan compared ideological opponents to pests invading a field and argued that rapid intervention was necessary: “When pests invade a field you need to spray quickly. If you don’t react immediately, you lose.” He continued: “Sometimes attack is a better form of defense. The destruction of these emitters of toxic ideas must be part of the response.”

    The wording mirrors the coercive logic already present in Meșeșan’s Fifth Column manifesto. Bostan was not speaking as an anonymous extremist but as a Newsweek România shareholder and Alianța figure, at a Newsweek-branded event, immediately after a Presidential Palace summit devoted to informational resilience where the leading opposition faces were put on display as “public vectors of disinformation”. The pinnacle of Romania’s executive power hosting an event targeting the opposition as an enemy in an information war. When a democracy crumbles, signs are everywhere.

    This is why the Fifth Column database cannot be understood as an isolated website run by a fringe armed group. The labels appearing on the list often predate the list itself. They emerge first in media coverage, public campaigns, anti-disinformation initiatives, political commentary and institutional discourse.

    At the end of the day, the tabloidisation of Newsweek România, the extremely low level of “hit job journalism,” is a matter that would be solved by the market and readers’ interest. Except for the government money that flows into this ecosystem, directly or indirectly. Which leads to the bigger issue — more problematic than Newsweek România producing trash news and hit pieces: the role of Romania’s regime.

    The Consequences of a Lie — The 2024 Election Annulment

    To understand the current situation in Romania, we need to go back to the 2024 presidential election, when an outsider candidate, Călin Georgescu, won the first round with 23% of the vote. A second round was scheduled for December 8, 2024. It never happened. On December 6 — with voting in Romania’s large overseas diaspora already under way — the Constitutional Court annulled the entire electoral process. The annulment followed roughly two weeks of public signaling about alleged Russian interference and algorithmic manipulation, driven by a series of NGOs financed by the European Commission calling on Brussels for help.

    What followed was a ritual of whitewashing the decision, by European leaders spinning the idea that Russia was behind Georgescu’s success. Macron offered one of the most revealing examples, declaring in a February 2025 live broadcast that the court had detected fraud, vote purchases, and annulled the election because of Russian interference. One fabrication after another. In reality, the Constitutional Court had validated the first round (Decision 31), finding no electoral fraud, and its annulment decision contains no attribution of the result to Russia (Decision 32).

    We are now in June 2026. Romania has never formally attributed the Georgescu campaign to Russia. Romanians are still being told that proof is about to be released by President Nicușor Dan. The implicit conclusion is twofold: at the time of the annulment, the Constitutional Court had no proof of Russian meddling — yet it annulled the election. And eighteen months later, the reason proof has not been produced is likely that there was no provable decisive Russian interference.

    Alternative Explanations Identified After the Annulment

    The few operations that were identified — including those referenced in the Defense Council meeting that served as justification for the annulment — actually originated from Romania and Ukraine.

    On December 6 and 13, 2024, French daily Le Monde identified a Ukrainian sponsor behind the Georgescu influencer campaign: Dmitriy Makarov, a 32-year-old Ukrainian entrepreneur who had previously publicly supported Ukraine against Russia, whose companies — FA Agency, GMG, and Zlodeї — recruited influencers to promote Georgescu.

    On December 18, the Romanian outlet Snoop.ro revealed that PNL, the National Liberal Party, a member of the governing coalition, had financed one of the campaigns promoting its own competitor, Georgescu. That a governing party financed the rise of a candidate deemed so dangerous the election had to be annulled — leaving that party in power — remains one of the least addressed paradoxes of Romania’s democratic regression.

    2024 — a Modern Taboo

    Since then, saying there is no proof of Russian involvement has become the new taboo. On March 5, 2026, journalist Lucian Davidescu was fact-checked by Romania’s leading fact-checker, Factual — run by Funky Citizens, on Meta’s platform — for stating precisely that there was no real Russian implication in the 2024 election. The “fact-check” affirmed information directly contradicted by the Constitutional Court’s own decisions it was referring to. Davidescu obtained the publication of a Right of Reply response, but the fact-check stayed for months as a “flagged issue” on his Facebook account. Challenging the “successful Russian interference” narrative is nevertheless a widespread opinion, shared by former president Traian Băsescu, and even by Georgescu’s opponent in the second round that never took place, Elena Lasconi — at the time endorsed by Macron himself.

    Also on the Getica list, journalist Marius Tuca had been censored by the National Council for Audiovisual in March 2025 for calling the 2024-2025 sequence a coup — two months before the rerun of the presidential election, which Georgescu was barred from running in. One of the grievances against me is precisely to have described a judicial coup (see the timeline of the coup here).

    In May 2026, eighteen months after the annulment, President Nicușor Dan delivered yet another interview promising the long-awaited report.

    Proper attribution should be the golden rule when framing anything as a Russian influence. As I argue in my articles “The Iceberg That Can Sink Europe” and in “European Diplomacy Seems too Ashamed to Look at What Happened in Romania”, using the concept of Foreign Influence to target people who have no ties to a foreign power is an extremely dangerous game – one that leads to more “fifth column” craze and McCarthyism.

    It’s all the more important to remember that, since when it comes to attribution, Romania is far from being a powerless state.

    The State That Chose Not to See

    Romania’s internal intelligence service, the SRI, operates on a budget of over one billion dollars annually — three times that of France’s DGSI in nominal terms, six times in purchasing power parity, for a country three to four times smaller. All in all, ten to twenty times more resources per capita dedicated to surveillance and control. Not to mention that France has numerous terrorist threats to handle, whereas Getica seems to be the only one the Romanian authority have to deal with… The overpowered capacity of Romania’s intelligence services was praised in 2023 by Brigadier General Anton Rog, head of Cyberint — SRI’s cyber intelligence division — explaining in precise terms what his agency could do when democracy was under attack. It could counter campaigns online, take down websites, shut down operations. “We can get such a warrant in less than an hour,” he said.

    Yet when the Georgescu campaign was running in late 2024, nothing happened.

    When Getica published its blacklist, threatened journalists, doxxed families, and announced missions on Romanian soil, nothing happened.

    When AUR MP Dan Tanasă sent a formal parliamentary question (PDF) about the armed paramilitary group Getica to the government — still nothing, just a four page reply (PDF). The response, Tanasă said, contained no indication that the matter had been referred to DIICOT (the Directorate for Investigating Organized Crime and Terrorism) or any other investigative authority.

    A member of Parliament asked them about a band of volunteers that carry arms and that make lists of the enemies [including members of] the Romanian Parliament and they did nothing

    Tanasă said, adding that

    The purpose of this list is to silence the people on it one way or another, either through public shaming or, who knows, by a lunatic who would believe that I or any other person on this list is paid by Russia and would try to harm us physically

    Tanasă is currently preparing a criminal complaint against those responsible for the project.

    And the Media That Chose Not to See

    Since its first appearance in September 2023, Getica has drawn more than forty favorable pieces in the Romanian press — nearly half of them published after the blacklist’s existence was already known. The most revealing reporting on the matter came instead from Sebastian Dracopol, one of the people Getica blacklisted: first on his Substack, and more recently through his NGO, Patria Prima. He documented Meșeșan’s criminal past, the opacity of Hossu’s fundraising, and unresolved questions about the group’s actual combat record. Meșeșan’s answer to the latest reveal was to launch a fresh fundraising campaign on June 6, 2026 — to cover legal fees for suing Patria Prima and to buy military gear — this time routed through an NGO ostensibly dedicated to civilian aid, Volunteers Without Borders. The NGO did not respond to our request for comment.

    Recently, Patria Prima started asking every outlet why they presented Getica as a military unit, implicitly helping them to raise money, whereas the Ukrainian army denied any responsibility for it and Mesesan – as well as Hossu – reframed the group as an informal one. As a response, yet another article was published, by Veridica, in support of Getica. Patria Prima announced suing again. The author, Alex Craiu Rosenberg then published a video to frame Dracopol’s actions as SLAPP – Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation. The missing element of this analysis is the relation of power – Getica is a criminal, illegal, anti-constitutional and dangerous group who raised money in an illegal manner, yet benefits from the complacency of power, serves the interests of one or more parties of the governing coalition, and receives positive coverage from a press that lives off some executive power money (may it be the Romanian government or the money from Foreign countries – as Veridica does). Like for Newsweek’s hit pieces, Veridica’s work doesn’t qualify for the SLAPP victim card – it is part of the larger propaganda, censorship and coercion machine that targets critics, the opposition, and other nonaligned voices.

    When asked about the impunity that Getica enjoys, several journalists present on the list pointed to the entanglement with Romania’s intelligence services and how Romanian military personnel often go on leave to participate in paid missions — as mercenaries. This is corroborated by something I found out investigating the DSA in September 2025, when I was told by Freedom House Romania’s Director, Cristina Guseth, that Getica was part of the support provided by Romania to Ukraine, and “something that the Romanian government decided not to make public.”

    This could explain a part of the ambiguity and the silence our investigation received. Why public responsibility for Getica’s activities remained unclaimed.

    On October 27, 2025, Romania’s Intelligence Service — the SRI — responded to a formal parliamentary question submitted by AUR MP Fabian Radu, a member of the Joint Standing Committee exercising parliamentary oversight of SRI’s activities. The response invoked information classification and the “need to know” principle, offering no substantive answer. The formulation leaves two possibilities open: either the issue is being monitored and is too sensitive to be made public, or the non-answer is itself a cover.

    The months that followed make the silence harder to explain. Between late 2025 and mid-2026, the list expanded further — adding US politicians, more members of the opposition, and me, a French journalist. During the same period, Getica’s founder began publishing video tutorials on preparing First-Person View (FPV) drones for military use.

    On June 7, the Getica account republished on X a video montage of FPV drone footage reaching their targets: 67 different Russian soldiers (with possibly a civilian among them)

    original tweet here

    Monitoring Failure or State Complicity?

    If Romania’s Intelligence Services’ intent was to monitor — through surveillance or infiltration — before acting against Getica, eight months seem more than enough time to assess and intervene. But if Romanian intelligence services have some form of control over the battlegroup, then the continued expansion of the blacklist to include opposition politicians, journalists, and US citizens during that period is not a failure of oversight, but a state scandal.

    The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MAI) did respond to our investigation, but only to state that, pursuant to Article 285(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, criminal investigation proceedings are non-public — neither confirming nor denying that any proceeding exists.

    Romania’s Intelligence Service (SRI) also replied, citing the classified nature of its activities, and neither confirmed nor denied whether Getica had ever been assessed as a national-security concern, whether information had been transmitted to Romanian authorities, or whether any monitoring or investigation existed.

    As mentioned, formal inquiries sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Romanian Presidency, and the French Presidency received no reply. The atmosphere is one of pervasive institutional ambiguity, in which responsibility is continually deferred while the blacklist continues to expand.

    Three months ago, in a private conversation with a member of the Romanian government, I asked about the incapacity to prove Russian interference and the widespread suspicion that what happened was an inside job — the answer was unambiguous: “Of course. But you do realize that if they admit it wasn’t the Russians, the country would descend into chaos.”

    Three months later, the credibility and legitimacy of Romania’s current regime are lower than ever. A vote of no confidence brought down the government on May 5. One month later, a Ukrainian drone exploded in the Romanian port of Constanța, and the authorities failed to obtain a clear explanation from Ukraine or to provide the public with a convincing account of the incident. The prospect of impeaching President Dan — unthinkable until recently — is now on the table [end]

    The original article

    Stéphane Luçon is a French journalist based in Romania. After Romania’s annulled elections, he began investigating the EU’s Digital Services Act — censorship, transparency failures — and its impact on the information flow

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  • [Partage] Jacques Baud nous répond – Hélène Richard-Favre

    Bonjour Jacques BAUD! Vous vous rappelez bien sûr la série d’entretiens que nous avions menés ensemble sur ce blog. C’était un article de Sylvain Besson qui avait motivé ma démarche auprès de vous pour en savoir un peu plus. Nous étions début septembre 2020. 

    Voici ce même journaliste reprendre un article paru sur Radio free Europe et parler de vous en termes que je vous serais reconnaissante de commenter. L’article en question, paru sur le site de la Tribune de Genève, est déjà suivi de plus de 300 commentaires. Qu’avez-vous à nous en dire ?

    Merci pour votre question. Oui, j’ai été surpris par cette information, même si je ne sais pas encore en ce moment si elle est vraie ou non. Je pars de l’idée qu’elle l’est.

    Mon approche du conflit russo-ukrainien (comme des autres, d’ailleurs) est d’exposer les faits afin de comprendre ce qui se passe, avec la finalité d’y trouver une solution. Comme je le répète souvent: « de la manière de comprendre une crise découle celle de la résoudre ». Cette compréhension doit se faire indépendamment de toute préférence pour l’une ou l’autre des parties en présence. Aujourd’hui, particulièrement en Europe, si votre appréciation s’écarte un tant soit peu de la ligne officielle, vous êtes considéré comme « pro-russe » ou « conspirationniste ». Si vous lisez les commentaires des différentes interviews que j’ai accordées, les commentaires « équilibrés », « factuels » ou « balancés » reviennent le plus souvent. Après une interview qui a été publiée sur un média américain, un internaute a commenté: « Bien que Baud soit pro-ukrainien, il a bien compris la position russe! ». On est aux antipodes de ce que racontent nos journalistes. En novembre 2022, le journaliste suisse Jean-Philippe Schaller de la RTS déclarait que j’étais un agent au service de Vladimir Poutine! Quelles sont ses sources? Aucune: c’est du conspirationnisme pur et simple.

    Le problème aujourd’hui est que si l’on dit que « la Russie gagne » on est automatiquement considéré comme « pro-russe ». Mais la victoire ou la défaite de l’un ou de l’autre ne dépend pas de ce que nous disons ou pensons! C’est une réalité. On pourrait même aller plus loin, j’ai expliqué dès 2022 pourquoi l’Ukraine perdait. Si on en avait tenu compte et aidé l’Ukraine non pas pour affaiblir la Russie mais pour qu’elle gagne, elle gagnerait aujourd’hui. Tout était parfaitement clair à la fin 2022. C’est d’ailleurs la raison pour laquelle les Américains ont conseillé à Zelensky d’ouvrir un dialogue avec la Russie.

    Nos journalistes croient aider l’Ukraine, mais c’est faux. À Bruxelles, j’ai été à quatre reprises arrêté dans la rue par des Ukrainiens (de Kharkiv, Odessa et Dniepropetrovsk) qui m’ont remercié pour ce que je fais. Un Ukrainien m’a même envoyé une carte postale avec le timbre de l’attaque contre le croiseur russe Moskva dans la Mer Noire. Nous avons un regard plus polarisé que les Ukrainiens eux-mêmes sur ce conflit. D’ailleurs, pour ceux qui veulent prendre la peine de lire mes livres, ils constateront que je n’utilise aucune source russe, mais exclusivement la presse ukrainienne et américaine: je prends la presse européenne (suisse en particulier) pour les mauvais exemples! Nos journalistes n’utilisent que l’information qui sort des bureaux de l’administration ukrainienne. Les journalistes ukrainiens sont beaucoup plus honnêtes et professionnels que les nôtres. La catastrophe de la bataille de Krinky, sur le Dniepr, par exemple, a été rapportée en grands détails avec des critiques sérieuses contre les militaires britanniques qui l’avaient planifiée et dirigée. Pas un mot dans nos médias. Lisez mes livres. Il y a des centaines de notes: elles viennent presque toutes de médias ukrainiens ou américains.

    Aujourd’hui, même le premier-ministre belge reconnaît qu’une défaite de la Russie est une illusion. C’était déjà ce que les Américains pensaient en novembre 2022, lorsqu’ils ont conseillé à Zelensky d’ouvrir un dialogue avec Moscou. Dire que la Russie ne perd pas ne signifie pas que l’on est pro-russe, c’est un avertissement. Qu’ont fait les Besson et autres plumitifs pour tenir compte de ces avertissements et faire en sorte que l’on aide l’Ukraine efficacement ? Rien! Rien du tout, à part vociférer contre la Russie. Le problème est qu’aujourd’hui le narratif entre en collision avec la réalité et, après 4 ans (!), le système se défend en interdisant les vues qui ne lui plaisent pas. J’ai décrit exactement les mécanismes internes à la conduite ukrainienne qui la défavorisaient sur le terrain. Qui s’en est soucié pour améliorer la conduite ukrainienne? Personne. Aujourd’hui, on s’aperçoit qu’on a loupé une occasion. Cette guerre, qu’on le veuille ou non, est plus dictée par la haine de la Russie que par l’amour de l’Ukraine. Même Zelensky s’en est aperçu.

    Lorsque Sylvain Besson m’a appelé vendredi 12 décembre, il m’a demandé si je croyais que la Russie avait bien attaqué l’Ukraine, j’ai répondu que oui, mais que je pense qu’il y a eu provocation, exactement comme en Géorgie en 2008, et que je m’appuyais sur une interview d’Olekseï Arestovitch (alors conseiller de Zelensky), dans une interview du 18 mars 2019 au média ukrainien Apostrof’, lors de laquelle il explique qu’il faudra une guerre avec la Russie pour pouvoir entrer dans l’OTAN et que cette guerre aurait probablement lieu en « 2021-2022 ».  À ceci s’ajoutent les observations faites par les observateurs de l’OSCE entre le 16 et le 21 février 2022, qui montraient une claire intensification des frappes contre les populations du Donbass. Sans compter le décret du 24 mars 2021 de Zelensky qui déclare la reprise de la Crimée et qui marque le début de la montée en puissance de l’Ukraine sur les pourtours du Donbass. Évidemment, Besson s’est bien gardé de le mentionner dans son article!… et pour cause!

    Mais il y a d’autres choses pas honnêtes. Par exemple, j’ai toujours refusé les invitations de médias officiels russes, parce que je voulais éviter que mes analyses puissent être instrumentalisées à des fins de propagande. J’ai expliqué ça aux journalistes russes qui l’ont très bien compris. Les médias mentionnés par Besson (Agoravox, media 4-4-2 et RT) sont des médias qui ont repris (sans me le demander) des interviews faites sur d’autres plateformes et/ou vendues par elles. Omerta est un média qui m’interviewe occasionnellement, dont le directeur (Régis le Sommier) apparaît également sur Europe 1 et d’autres médias mainstream français.

    Quant à la présence de soldats nord-coréens en Ukraine, je ne l’ai pas mise en doute. J’ai mis en doute leur intégration dans les forces russes. Et les faits m’ont donné raison.  La conférence à laquelle j’ai participé à Winterthour portait sur la neutralité de la Suisse. Je ne me suis jamais exprimé sur les questions liées au Covid et aux vaccins, comme le suggère Besson. Contrairement à ce qu’il affirme, je n’ai jamais participé à la « formation d’armées locales », j’ai toujours été engagé dans le cadre des Nations Unies et sous leur contrôle.

    Conclusion: une fois de plus, Sylvain Besson ne s’est pas montré comme un  journaliste intègre. Une étude de l’Université d’Uppsala (pas une officine comme Conspiracy Watch payée par le gouvernement britannique!) le qualifie de conspirationniste et d’inspirateur d’Anders Breivik, responsable de la tuerie d’Utoya.

    Dans tous les cas de figure, penser que l’UE conduit l’Ukraine à sa perte n’est – à ma connaissance – pas un délit!

    Merci beaucoup de vos réponses, Jacques Baud. Et juste encore pour préciser à nos lecteurs que si vous avez donc eu droit à être fiché conspirationniste par Conspiracy Watch, du seul fait de vous avoir interrogé sur mon blog m’a valu d’être étiquetée telle sur ledit site. C’est dire où on en est! [fin]

    L’article original

    Jacques Baud a été colonel du renseignement suisse, spécialiste de l’Europe de l’Est. Entre 2009 et 2011, il dirigeait à New York l’équipe Politiques et Doctrine du Bureau des affaires militaires du Département des opérations de maintien de la paix des Nations Unies. Ce fut dans le cadre de l’OTAN qu’il participa à des programmes en Ukraine en 2014 et 2017

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  • [Translation] The Killer Godfather – Susann Witt-Stahl, junge Welt

    Ukraine: Andriy Parubiy has written a world-shaking chapter in fascist criminal history. His crimes, however, have not been dealt with to this day

    The former president of the Ukrainian parliament was buried on Tuesday, with great nationalistic pathos, at Lychakivsky cemetery in Lviv. His murderer has already confessed. Politicians throughout the Western world — including German members of the CDU and the Green Party — are mourning the loss of Andriy Parubiy as a statesman and a deserving champion of the European ideal and democracy in Ukraine. If Parubiy’s dark past is even mentioned, for example as leader of paramilitary neo-Nazi organization « Patriot of Ukraine », from which Azov militia emerged in 2014, the talk is always of the politician’s alleged moderation and rejection of right-wing radicalism after the Maidan struggle.

    Actually, Parubiy was fueling the war against Russia and expressed on a TV show, as recently as 2018, his admiration for Adolf Hitler. Independent US researcher Moss Robeson is even considering him the « secret godfather of the Banderite anti-peace movement »: Parubiy was the first to announce the « resistance movement against surrender », before the 2019 parliamentary elections – a reaction to Zelensky’s promise to negotiate a stable peace with Moscow. In 2020, Parubiy demanded in a speech to supporters

    We must bring the day closer when we oust Zelensky from office

    The seventh Commandment

    The leadership of the « resistance movement » was recruited from Bandera wing of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN-B), including long-time close associates of Parubiy like Andriy Levus. On his Bandera lobby blog, Robeson points to photos on social media, which are showing Parubiy with top Banderist figures in the recent past, for example in New York City in 2019. In 2021, he participated there in the conference of an OUN-B think tank. In 2024, he commemorated his suddenly deceased « friend » Stefan Romaniv, the global leader of the OUN-B. The organization’s obituary for Parubiy also expresses a deep sense of solidarity, making it clear that he was by no means just a salon Nazi. It asserts that Parubiy « did not deviate from his uncompromising path as a Ukrainian nationalist until his last breath », has always lived « zealously », according to the OUN’s « Decalogue ». Published on the day of his death, the statement ends with the fifth commandment, « Avenge the death of the great knights! »

    Apparently, Parubiy acted, with a particular consistency, according to the seventh commandment – ​​« You shall not hesitate to commit the greatest crime if the cause demands it », as stated in the 1929 original version – and did so as a key figure in two massacres in 2014, which continue to shake the world today.

    We have long known that on April 29, Parubiy personally went to the Maidan checkpoints near Odessa, handed out Class 5 bulletproof vests and ordered them to carry out the pogrom at the Trade Union Building

    Vasil Polischuk reported last week. Polischuk was at the time a city councilor in Odessa and eyewitness to the violence on May 2. After he had demanded an investigation, his son was beaten on the street by three unknown assailants with metal bars and suffered a skull fracture. The family was forced to leave Ukraine.

    Canadian political scientist Ivan Katchanovsky recently underscored Polischuk’s allegations. He pointed out that on the eve of the incident, Parubiy, then head of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council, had traveled with around 500 Maidan thugs, from Kiev to Odessa, where he had explicitly ordered the arson attack. For Katchanovsky, that is just one of many indications that the fascist hunt for Maidan opponents during those days was « orchestrated by high-ranking government officials », as he explains in a 2024 treatise on « Far-Right Political Violence in Ukraine ».

    Massacre on Maidan

    He ordered everything to be smashed, destroyed, and burned

    testifies Tsesari Badjalidze, in Anna Stephan’s 2018 Israeli documentary « The Square of Broken Hopes ». Badjalidze was member of a group of Georgian snipers, assigned to support the fascists in Odessa. When the anti-Maidan protesters were forced to flee to the Trade Union Building, Parubiy’s « appetite only grew », Badjalidze says. Although desperate cries for help could increasingly be heard from the burning building, Parubiy ordered the fire department’s fire engines to be blocked and the trapped people not to be allowed to escape.

    Prior to that, Parubiy was one of the masterminds on February 20, 2014, behind the Maidan massacre, which left dozens dead. During the false flag operation, from surrounding buildings, including Hotel Ukraine, snipers fired at demonstrators and police officers, deliberately targeted journalists. The core of the sniper squad is said to have been around 50 Georgians, including Badshalidze, who had been recruited as mercenaries by Mamuka Mamulashvili, a confidant of the recently retired President Mikheil Saakashvili and later commander of the Georgian Legion in Ukraine.

    Witnesses eliminated

    Andriy Parubiy personally picked up the snipers from Borispil Airport in Kyiv and brought them to a secret apartment

    said Tristan Tsitelashvili, in an interview conducted by Junge Welt in Tbilisi in December 2024. They were prepared for their deployment at the Krtsanisi military training center, which is also used by the US Army near the Georgian capital, Tsitelashvili continued. The retired major general had been the superior of one of the mercenaries when he was still an officer in the Georgian army and had himself been on Maidan to observe the situation as a military expert. When after the successful coup in Kiev, at least six of the Georgian Maidan snipers, who had since gone into hiding in Macedonia and other Eastern European countries, were murdered in order to eliminate potential witnesses, the mercenary, who was known to him, allegedly asked Tsitelashvili for assistance. Tsitelashvili then organized a secret meeting of some of the surviving Georgians with selected international press representatives. By allowing these Maidan snipers to take the plunge and make their way into the media spotlight, many stories that had previously been dismissed as « tall tales » were proven to be historical fact.

    In his study « The Maidan Massacre in Ukraine », Katchanovsky presented witnesses, including those close to Parubiy, who testified that as Maidan commander, he had already ordered « bloodshed » for the large demonstration on February 18, which had been announced as peaceful. Parubiy (as well as later Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko) ordered the sniper attack two days later because the Maidan movement urgently needed « sacred victims » to gain power. Katchanovsky has also evidence that around six weeks after the deadly escalation of the riots, Parubiy helped « Right Sector » killers pack their weapons away in music cases so that investigators could not confiscate them.

    So far, eyewitnesses, as well as the few researchers and journalists who have investigated the crimes of Parubiy and his accomplices, are vilified as « Kremlin propagandists ». Ivan Katchanovsky repeatedly criticized the Western media’s conspicuous unwillingness to investigate, despite the « explosive confessions » available. There are even cases of disinformation: in 2021 for example, the ARD “Faktenfinder” program attempted to undermine the credibility of the Georgian snipers who had testified against Parubiy and other instigators of the 2014 fascist rampage — for example by claiming that one of them had actually been imprisoned during the Maidan massacre. « Fake news », Katchanovsky countered. False claims, lies, and obfuscations can be found in alarmingly large numbers in mainstream media about the events of that time and their fatal consequences — often originating from front networks of the international Bandera lobby.

    The original article

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  • [Sharing] Ukrainian, Georgian, and British — all in one? – Igor Pshenichnikov, GEOFOR

    47-year-old Blaze Metreveli appointed as new head of Britain’s MI6 intelligence service

    For the first time in its history, Britain’s MI6 intelligence service will be led by a woman, career intelligence officer 47-year-old Blaze Metreveli. An intriguing move from Russia’s perennial adversaries — but what’s behind it?

    First, let’s consider Russia’s initial reaction. Just a day after the appointment was announced, on June 16, Russian intelligence appeared to send Metreveli a «congratulatory» message. While we can’t say for certain, coincidences seem unlikely. The press office of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) issued a notable statement claiming that Britain, jointly with Ukraine, is preparing provocations in the Baltic Sea aimed at sabotaging Russian-American negotiations and persuading the White House to continue military support to Kiev.

    One scenario involves staging a fake Russian torpedo attack on a U.S. Navy vessel. The SVR emphasized close collaboration between Ukrainian security services and British intelligence agencies, stating, «Subversive actions typically follow a similar pattern: planning and operational support come from Britain, while direct execution is often carried out by employees of Ukraine’s SBU or military intelligence (GUR MO) and their agents».

    The age-old saying attributed to Alexander Suvorov, describing Britain’s malicious policy toward Russia, «the Englishwoman is up to mischief», has ceased being metaphorical with Metreveli’s appointment. She has been explicitly tasked with causing trouble for Russia and seems likely to excel in this role.

    British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, introducing Metreveli, called her appointment «historic», noting that it comes at a time when «the work of Britain’s intelligence services has never been more critical». Starmer referenced unprecedented threats, including «aggressors sending spy ships into British waters and hackers employing sophisticated cyber plots to disrupt public services» — a clear reference to Russia.

    But why Blaze Metreveli? At only 47, she is already an experienced intelligence officer, serving since 1999. She will assume her new duties this autumn. Currently, Metreveli heads MI6’s Q Division, responsible for technology and innovation, and previously held senior roles in MI6 and MI5, Britain’s domestic counterintelligence agency. According to brief biographical details released by the government, widely reported by British media, she studied social anthropology at Cambridge and spent much of her career in operational roles in the Middle East and Europe.

    Yet her background, particularly her ancestry, seems significant, though many details remain unclear. Her mother’s maiden name, Borkovska, suggests possible links to Belarus, Ukraine, Poland, or Russia (Borkovskaya in Russian transcription is a common surname).

    Metreveli’s father, according to British royal archives, is Konstantin Dobrovolsky, noted as «also known as Metreveli». He naturalized in Britain in 1966 under the surname Dobrovolsky. Born in 1944 in today’s Ukraine, he was reportedly taken to Britain by his parents on a «Nansen passport», documents issued to Russian emigrants under the League of Nations since 1922. The circumstances around obtaining such passports for a family from Soviet Ukraine are unclear.

    Suspicions arise regarding the activities and political views of Dobrovolsky-Metreveli’s parents. Ukraine’s liberation from German forces during World War II occurred between January 1943 and October 1944. If Metreveli’s father was born in Ukraine in 1944 and taken to the West, it’s plausible his family fled alongside retreating German forces, potentially due to collaboration with the Third Reich.

    The history of Ukrainian collaborators fleeing to the West is well-documented, with many settling in Canada — a hotbed of intense Russophobia. Chrystia Freeland, Canada’s Deputy Prime Minister until 2024, is from this community. Western intelligence often recruits individuals from Ukrainian émigré communities as «consultants» on Russia and Ukraine due to their linguistic abilities and intense anti-Russian sentiments. It’s reasonable to assume Metreveli’s father speaks Russian fluently, as Russian emigrants typically retain language proficiency through generations. Consequently, it’s also plausible Blaze Metreveli herself (who chose her father’s «old» surname) speaks fluent Russian.

    Thus, we see a relatively young but seasoned, professional, and highly ambitious woman, likely well-acquainted with Russia and harboring a deep-seated animosity towards it. This was possibly a decisive factor in her appointment.

    Last year, Metreveli was awarded the Order of St. Michael and St. George, suggesting she already significantly harmed Russian interests. Now, as head of British espionage, she will further demonstrate her professionalism, loyalty to the British Crown, and inherited Russophobia. MI6, true to form, will continue harming Russia through proxies and false-flag operations [end]

    The original article

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  • [Partage] Guerre d’Ukraine et menace russe : prétextes d’une marche forcée vers le fédéralisme européen – Éric Denécé, Cf2R

    […] en premier lieu, de nombreux éléments conduisent à penser que les Européens poursuivent la politique des néoconservateurs de l’ex-équipe Biden […]

    La Realpolitik, caractérisée par la prise en compte réaliste des rapports de force, est de retour à Washington. On le constate avec la démarche de Donald Trump qui a repris contact avec Vladimir Poutine. Il a compris que la stratégie d’affaiblissement de la Russie conçue par les néoconservateurs de l’équipe Biden était un échec et que la guerre ne menait à rien. Trump a intérêt à y mettre un terme pour passer à autre chose. Il veut un deal avec Poutine, car il ne souhaite pas que les hydrocarbures et les terres rares russes partent en Chine. Il se serait même dit prêt à participer au développement de la Crimée et du Donbass.

    Mais cette évolution n’est pas du goût de Zelenski 1 et de son entourage parce que cela remet en cause leur mainmise sur l’Ukraine. Ils bénéficient étonnamment du soutien des Européens, dont on comprend mal ce qu’ils ont à gagner à la poursuite de la guerre. Leur obstination est d’autant plus funeste que les trois années écoulées ont montré que ce conflit était dévastateur pour l’économie européenne et que ses États membres étaient incapables d’assurer eux-mêmes leur sécurité comme de soutenir efficacement Kiev en matière militaire. En réalité, leur attitude s’inscrit dans le cadre d’une stratégie précise, conduite à l’insu des peuples européens.

    Une obstination difficilement compréhensible

    Plusieurs raisons peuvent expliquer l’étonnante attitude de va-t’en guerre des dirigeants européens et de leur slogan stupide de « Paix par la force ».

    – En premier lieu, de nombreux éléments conduisent à penser que les Européens poursuivent la politique des néoconservateurs de l’ex-équipe Biden – à l’origine de ce conflit –, à leur instigation. En effet, les Démocrates, battus à plate couture lors des dernières présidentielles américaines sont en pleine déconfiture aux États-Unis. Le parti est à la dérive, se fissure et les chances de redressement à court terme sont minces. Trump, ayant tiré les leçons de la manière dont son premier mandat avait été saboté par les actions de l’État profond américain piloté par les familles Clinton et Obama, a, dès sa prise de fonctions, lancé toute une série d’actions (dissolution de l’USAID, reprise en mains de l’appareil d’État et de l’administration, recadrage des juges des juges, etc.) qui ne leur permettent pas de perturber efficacement son début de mandat – au moins pas avant les élections de mid term – comme ils l’avaient fait entre 2016 et 2020. Les Démocrates sont donc totalement impuissants. En revanche, divers éléments laissent entrevoir qu’ils s’emploient à saborder sa politique internationale en s’appuyant sur le Royaume-Uni et les États de l’Union européenne.

    En effet, depuis 2003, les dirigeants européens ont fait acte de soumission aux États-Unis et à leur bellicisme. Ils ont d’abord appuyé l’invasion illégale de l’Irak. Puis ils ont accepté de reconnaitre le régime ukrainien issu du coup d’État de Maïdan (2014) et ont fermé les yeux sur la répression violente déclenchée par Kiev au Donbass. Ensuite, ils se sont laissés entraîner, à leurs frais et à leur détriment, dans une guerre voulue par Washington, adoptant parfois des positions plus radicales encore contre Moscou qui n’avait pourtant manifesté contre eux aucune hostilité.

    Tous les dirigeants européens actuels entretiennent les meilleures relations du monde avec l’équipe démocrate et tous – à l’exception de Viktor Orban, Robert Fico et Georgia Meloni – ont, plus ou moins directement et explicitement, pris parti contre la réélection de Trump. Depuis son entrée à la Maison-Blanche, ils ne cessent de critiquer la nouvelle politique américaine. Ils semblent ainsi poursuivre, en vassaux fidèles, la politique des Démocrates, que ceux-ci continuent de piloter dans l’ombre depuis Washington, partant du principe – hautement hasardeux – que l’élection de Trump n’est qu’une malheureuse parenthèse qui prendra fin au plus tard en 2029. Il convient donc de contrer sa politique en attendant leur retour aux affaires… Cela explique la défiance et le mépris de la nouvelle administration américaine à l’égard de ces « leaders » européens qu’elle juge hostiles, raison pour laquelle elle ne tient aucunement compte de leur avis et de leurs agitations improductives.

    – La seconde explication est que le contexte de crise (militaire et économique) que traverse actuellement le Vieux continent favorise l’ensemble de ces leaders vis-à-vis de leur électorat, car la plupart d’entre eux – en particulier Emmanuel Macron – se trouvent dans une situation politique difficile. Ils jouent donc sur la peur d’une menace russe imminente – totalement inventée dans ce but – pour maintenir les populations dans l’angoisse, faire taire les critiques contre leur politique internationale inconsidérée et retarder l’échéance de leur défaite. En effet, les dirigeants européens doivent dissimuler le fait que leur décision de rompre avec la Russie a créé l’inflation, les difficultés économiques et accéléré la désindustrialisation et la dépendance vis-à-vis des États-Unis (GNL, armes, etc.) 2.

    – Enfin, troisième hypothèse à ne pas écarter, c’est le refus de prise en compte du réel des élites européennes, par cécité ou incompétence géopolitique, et la certitude que leur action est juste, fondée et légitime, illustration de leur déconnexion complète des réalités de terrain et de l’évolution des rapports de force internationaux.

    Faire l’Europe par la crise, l’emprunt et la guerre

    Mais en réalité, il existe une autre explication qui commence seulement à être perçue et qui éclaire d’un jour nouveau l’intransigeance des dirigeants européens : ils exploitent au maximum cette crise pour faire avancer l’Europe dans une voie fédérale, sans demander l’avis des peuples. Leur but ? Faire l’Europe par la crise, l’emprunt et la guerre.

    Cette stratégie machiavélique, véritable manipulation antidémocratique pour imposer une Europe supranationale dont personne ne veut, a été mise en place à partir de la seconde moitié des années 2010, exploitant divers événements internationaux : la crise des Subprimes d’abord ; le COVID ensuite ; enfin, la guerre d’Ukraine et la menace russe. Il est important de détailler les étapes de cette dérive organisée.

    Rappelons au préalable qu’il convient de faire une nette différence entre les pays de l’UE membres de la zone euro (20 sur 27 3) et ceux qui n’en sont pas. Si tous dépendent de la Commission, seuls les premiers dépendent en plus de la Banque centrale européenne (BCE). Ils sont donc sous double dépendance de la Commission et de la BCE. Il convient également de rappeler que la BCE n’a pas le droit de proposer des emprunts. Cela est interdit par les traités. Pourtant, il y a eu deux entorses à cette règle :

    – lors de la crise des Subprimes (2008-2009), Mario Draghi a mis en place le Quantitative Easing, c’est-à-dire une émission monétaire de la BCE avec possibilité de racheter des dettes des pays de la zone euro (et non de l’UE) sur le second marché (auprès des banques commerciales auxquelles une partie des dettes ont été rachetées) ;

    – lors de la crise du COVID, un emprunt de 700 milliards d’euros a été émis, garanti par les pays de la zone euro, mais bénéficiant aussi à ceux qui n’en sont pas membres… et qui pourraient décider de ne pas être solidaires pour son remboursement, car rien ne les y oblige. Ce serait alors aux autres États ayant garanti l’emprunt de compenser !

    Ainsi, depuis la crise sanitaire et économique liée au COVID, les États de la zone euro sont de plus en plus tenus par la Commission européenne, via la BCE, par le biais de laquelle ils ont emprunté, accroissant leur dette et renforçant le contrôle financier de Bruxelles. Ils dépendent d’une monnaie – l’euro – qui ne leur appartient pas, d’où la réduction considérable de leur marge de manœuvre économique et financière. Mais ce n’est encore qu’une monnaie « partagée », c’est-à-dire qu’elle n’est pas encore vraiment « commune ». Pour le moment, nous sommes tous endettés en euro « national » via nos États respectifs. Mais si la monnaie devenait véritablement commune – ce qui est sans doute l’objectif de l’euro numérique –, les États se trouveraient totalement sous le pouvoir d’une structure supranationale. Ils n’auraient alors plus aucune maîtrise de leur destin et il leur serait extrêmement difficile de sortir de l’UE.

    Le programme de financement du réarmement européen via des prêts aux États et l’autorisation d’accroître leur déficit de 1,5% sans sanction 4 va renforcer encore davantage ce phénomène 5. L’indépendance financière, et donc politique, des États membres de la zone euro risque ainsi de diminuer rapidement, voire de disparaître.

    Les dérives antidémocratiques et autoritaires de l’UE

    Pour arriver à leurs fins, les dirigeants européens ne reculent devant rien : reniements, propagande, falsifications de la réalité, abus de pouvoir… contrevenant sans scrupule aux principes démocratiques qu’ils sont censés incarner et défendre.

    – En premier lieu, il convient de rappeler leur soutien au coup d’État de Maïdan de 2014 orchestré par Washington, leur non-respect délibéré des accords de Minsk, leur silence sur la répression dans le Donbass et leur validation du rejet de l’accord de paix russo-ukrainien de fin mars 2022. Ces événements illustrent le fait qu’ils ne respectent ni leurs engagements ni le droit international et qu’ils ne souhaitent pas la fin du conflit.

    – En second lieu, ils ont déclenché, avec l’aide des médias mainstream qu’ils contrôlent, une propagande massive contre Moscou, laquelle se poursuit sans discontinuer, voire s’accélère alors que le sort des armes montre que l’issue de ce conflit est scellée et que les discussions entre Trump et Poutine en sonneront bientôt la fin. Depuis trois ans, ils dissimulent à l’opinion les causes véritables de la guerre d’Ukraine et la réalité du régime de Kiev, gouvernement extrémiste et corrompu à la tête d’un État failli, rongé par la criminalité, et qui a très largement contribué à provoquer son voisin.

    – Ensuite, les dirigeants européens diffusent largement, avec l’appui de la majorité des chefs des armées de leurs États, l’idée d’une menace russe « existentielle », délire qui ne résiste pas à l’analyse des données démographiques et militaires.

    – De plus, ils ont mis en place une autre forme de propagande, plus insidieuse, pour faire avancer l’idée d’une indispensable intégration européenne. Dans un rapport récent 6, le journaliste Thomas Fazi expose comment la Commission européenne finance des ONG, des médias, des associations de la société civile pour faire avancer son agenda par le biais de divers programmes visant à « promouvoir les valeurs de l’UE » et à « rapprocher l’Union européenne de ses citoyens ». En réalité, « les organisations bénéficiaires sont explicitement engagées en faveur du fédéralisme européen ou de l’intégration, en alignement avec les propres objectifs politiques de la Commission ». Cette manœuvre se fait au détriment des processus démocratiques et de la souveraineté des États membres et sans que les Européens en soient conscients. De plus, elle vise à étouffer toute voix dissidente ou qui s’écarte de la doxa officielle : celle d’une UE non seulement intégrée, mais également vouée à l’élargissement (Serbie, Ukraine, etc.). « En amplifiant les voix pro-UE et en marginalisant les perspectives dissidentes, cette stratégie consolide les récits en faveur de l’intégration tout en discréditant ou en réprimant les points de vue alternatifs. En conséquence, les mécanismes de financement de l’UE et les ONG elles-mêmes sont transformés en outils de propagande institutionnelle visant à promouvoir une intégration supranationale plus profonde ». C’est donc là une forme indirecte de censure.

    – Par ailleurs, les dirigeants européens recourent ouvertement à des actions antidémocratiques dès lors que d’autres acteurs politiques s’opposent à leur stratégie. On connait les difficultés faites à Orban qui se bat pied à pied contre les dérives de l’UE. On a vu comment l’ex-présidente géorgienne, battue aux dernières élections a tenté, avec le soutien de Bruxelles, de remettre en cause – sans succès – les élections. On a vu également comment une partie des électeurs de Moldavie installés à l’étranger n’ont pu voter lors du dernier scrutin, car leur vote aurait fait élire un candidat opposé à cette politique et souhaitant un rapprochement avec la Russie. On vient de voir, enfin, la manière dont les élections roumaines ont été tout à fait illégalement annulées et reportées, puis celle dont Georgescu a été empêché de se représenter.

    – Enfin, nous sommes en présence de véritables abus de pouvoir lorsque l’on voit le rôle joué par Ursula von der Leyen, simple haut fonctionnaire européen nommé à la tête de la Commission, qui se comporte – avec le plein accord de dirigeants européens co-responsables de cette dérive – comme une petite gauleiter, outrepassant allègrement son rôle et se fonctions. Rappelons que la Commission européenne et sa présidente n’ont aucune attribution en matière de défense. Cette femme et son administration s’arrogent donc des pouvoirs qu’elles n’ont pas, se livrant une sorte de coup d’État permanent au détriment des souverainetés nationales.

    En raison de ces dérives autoritaires et de cette propagande et de ces abus de pouvoir, le terme d’ « UERSS » n’est pas inapproprié.


    Pour ces différentes raisons, les « élites » politiques et technocratiques européennes sont déterminées à soutenir Kiev et à poursuivre une guerre qui sert leur stratégie. Elles affirment donc que l’Ukraine n’est qu’une victime, qu’elle doit recouvrer son intégrité territoriale, que Poutine est le mal absolu et qu’une invasion russe est imminente. Les dirigeants européens semblent ainsi prêts à tout pour imposer aux peuples une Europe supranationale, sans tenir compte de leur volonté. Nous sommes clairement en présence d’une stratégie consistant à « faire » l’Europe par les crises, la monnaie et la guerre, et d’une marche forcée vers le fédéralisme, par une politique des petits pas empêchant tout retour en arrière, en plaçant les peuples devant le fait accompli [fin]

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    3. La zone euro est composée de 20 pays (Allemagne, Autriche, Belgique, Chypre, Croatie, Espagne, Estonie, Finlande, France, Grèce, Irlande, Italie, Lettonie, Lituanie, Luxembourg, Malte, Pays-Bas, Portugal, Slovaquie et Slovénie). Certains États de l’UE ont choisi de ne pas y participer (Danemark, Suède), les autres ne satisfont pas encore aux critères économiques pour la rejoindre (Bulgarie, Hongrie, Pologne, République tchèque, Roumanie). ↩︎
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      ↩︎
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  • [Sharing] EU and NATO are attempting to foment a Ukraine-style coup in Georgia – Thomas Fazi

    They’re applying the Euromaidan playbook all over again

    In a recent article, I predicted that, following the results of last month’s Georgian elections — won by the ruling Georgian Dream party, which advocates friendly political and economic relations with neighbouring Russia — the EU and NATO, desperate to transform Georgia into a second front in their proxy war against Russia, would apply to Georgia the same playbook as they did to Ukraine:

    Just as in the lead-up to the 2014 coup in Kyiv, they’re first denying the legitimacy of the elected government, accusing it of being a Russian pawn. From there, they’re using Western-funded “NGOs” to mobilise the pro-EU minority against the government, while also pushing for sanctions. If the government still doesn’t yield to the pressure, they’ll try to move to the next phase: unrest in parliament and on the streets; a hoped-for police crackdown; and ultimately the toppling of the government and the appearance of a friendly pro-Western alternative. Certainly, influential Western foreign policy think tanks are already predicting exactly this scenario. In a recent article, the Atlantic Council argued that “Georgia’s 2024 parliamentary election has entered its ‘Maidan’ phase” — and that Western governments must “support the Georgian people in both the immediate period ahead and the longer term”. The NATO establishment’s aims couldn’t be clearer

    This is exactly what is happening; however, things are moving faster than I expected. Usually the protests start out peacefully, in order to build support both domestically and abroad, and then move on to the “insurrectionist” phase only if the nonviolent strategy doesn’t yield results. This is what happened with the 2013-14 Euromaidan protests in Ukraine. In Georgia, however, it would appear that they’ve fast-forwarded straight to the latter phase. For several days, the capital Tbilisi has been rocked by violent protests involving molotov cocktails and retrofitted fireworks, and even direct attacks on the Parliament building.

    The official trigger for the protests was the Georgian Dream government bloc’s announcement that it was halting the EU accession talks, a decision that is hardly surprising considering that the EU has been challenging the legitimacy of the elections from the day one, and effectively asking the government to step down as a condition for the continuation of the EU accession process (great diplomacy!). No wonder the government accuses the EU of using the prospect of accession talks to “blackmail” Georgia, and wanting to “organise a revolution in the country”. Recent events have confirmed this.

    Following the violent protests, which have so far met a relatively soft-handed response from police — especially when compared to the standard response of Western security forces to much less violent protests — EU leaders have predictably expressed their solidarity with the demonstrators and ramped up threats against the government. They’re following every step of the Euromaidan script.

    To make matters worse, the country’s staunchly pro-Western president Salome Zourabichvili has refused to step down when her term ends this month, accusing the parliament of being “illegitimate” and calling for new elections. This is the textbook definition of an attempted institutional coup, which Western governments would not hesitate to condemn if the roles were reversed. But Zourabichvili is an EU-NATO proxy — indeed, she’s spent most of her life working as a French diplomat, including as the country’s ambassador to Georgia, and only became a Georgian citizen in 2004 — so anything goes.

    The situation in Georgia is potentially a very explosive one, and the risk of the country turning into another Ukraine — and therefore into another front in the EU-NATO war against Russia — exists. However, the situation in Georgia is also very different. For starters, Georgia fortunately lacks a large neo-Nazi and ultranationalist presence capable of mounting a serious armed insurrection against the government, as Ukraine did. But there also other reasons why fomenting a Ukraine-style coup in Georgia may prove challenging. Not only are most Georgians determined to avoid a Ukrainian scenario, for obvious reasons, but prime minister Kobakhidze has been “coup-proofing” the country for some time. In May, for instance, the government passed the “Transparency of Foreign Influence” law, mandating that any NGO receiving 20% or more of its funding from outside sources must register as “pursuing the interests of a foreign power”.

    So hopefully the Georgian government will succeed in resisting this foreign-funded attack. Yet the mere fact that the EU-NATO establishment is overtly attempting to overthrow a democratically elected government — primarily to destabilise Russia and its near abroad, while intensifying the conflict in Ukraine — serves as a striking example of how far Western leaders have strayed from reason. They have become an existential threat to the entire European continent [end]

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  • [Sharing] The West is goading Georgia – Thomas Fazi, UnHerd

    Tbilisi has been ensnared by Nato hypocrisy

    Food. Churches. Chacha. This is what Georgia has long been known for. But now this ancient country, flanked by the mountains and the sea in the heart of the Caucasus, is the battleground in a new Not-So-Cold War. Due to its strategic location — it shares a large border with Russia to the north — the country has found itself caught up in the geopolitical power play between the West and Russia. And just like the Euromaidan revolt in Ukraine a decade ago, Georgia’s domestic politics have been framed in Nato circles as an existential fight. On one side sits the Georgian Dream, the allegedly pro-Russian ruling party, in power since 2012. On the other sits the opposition, avowedly pro-Western and pro-EU.

    Little wonder, then, that last week’s parliamentary elections have turned into a global event. As predicted by the polls, Georgian Dream won by a wide margin, securing over 53% of the vote. The four major opposition coalitions together managed less than 40%. There is no reason to believe that the vote was fixed: despite raising some concerns about pressure on voters, biased media coverage and an environment of political polarisation, independent observers found no evidence of electoral fraud, let alone of Russian interference.

    Yet that doesn’t fit the geopolitical mood. Desperate to finally shut Russia out from its near abroad, there seems to be no line Western politicians and their allies in Georgia are unwilling to cross to achieve their geopolitical aims — even if that means ignoring basic liberal principles and or else overturning the will of the people wholesale. Dovetailed with ominously similar moves across the Black Sea in Moldova, meanwhile, and Tbilisi may not be the last capital to suffer.

    Even if Georgia’s elections were almost certainly free and fair, the opposition has refused to accept defeat. They’ve accused the government of “stealing” the election as part of a “Russian special operation”. By Monday, thousands of pro-EU demonstrators had rallied outside the Georgian parliament. For its part, the opposition can count on a powerful ally within the Georgian state: the country’s staunchly pro-Western president Salome Zourabichvili.

    Born in Paris, she’s spent most of her life working as a French diplomat, including as the country’s ambassador to Georgia. Yet despite only becoming a Georgian citizen in 2004, Zourabichvili was nonetheless confident that victory belonged to the opposition. “I do not accept this election,” she said. “It cannot be accepted, accepting it would be accepting Russia into this country, the acceptance of Georgia’s subordination to Russia.” Even more remarkably, Zourabichvili claimed that whether Russian interference could actually be proved didn’t matter. What was important, she said, was “what the Georgian population knows, feels and sees”.

    If the roles were reversed, Western governments would rightly laugh off such claims as unhinged. Instead, they’re echoing her claims: Joe Biden expressed “alarm” at the election, while Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, and Charles Michel, president of the European Council, have both called for a probe into alleged irregularities.

    Senior parliamentarians across the bloc have made similar noises. They’ve claimed that “these elections were neither free nor fair”, arguing that “the European Union cannot recognise the result” and demanding “personal sanctions” against government officials. Displaying a zero-sum mentality, typical of this new Cold War, they added “this election was about Europe or isolation, democracy or authoritarianism, freedom or Russification” implying that Georgia was headed in the wrong direction. For his part, Boris Johnson has suggested that Georgian democracy was “stolen by Putin’s puppet government in Tbilisi”.

    It’s hard to overstate how irresponsible these claims are. Consider, after all, what happened the last time Western governments forced a country geographically, politically and culturally split between Russia and the West to make a binary civilisational choice between the two. That was Ukraine — and look at the blood-stained consequences there. First: a Western-supported coup against a democratically elected government. Then: civil strife in the Donbas and outright war with Russia.

    This is precisely the outcome that Irakli Kobakhidze and his Georgian Dream party are trying to avoid. The prime minister rejects the West’s “pro-Russian” labels, arguing instead that he’s just being pragmatic. Given his homeland’s history, size and geography, Kobakhidze says it makes no sense for Georgia to fully move into the Western sphere of influence, let alone sever ties with Russia altogether, or even worse adopt a confrontational attitude towards the latter. Indeed, the government has stressed the importance of having “normal, peaceful relations” with Russia.

    Georgia has good reasons to play it safe. Economic data shows that increased tourism and trade with Russia, alongside strengthened ties with China, have played an important role in boosting the economy, which grew by 7.5% last year. Perhaps most crucially, though, his party’s imperative is avoiding war — that is, becoming a second front in Nato’s proxy war against Russia.

    Claiming that Kobakhidze is merely a pro-Russian stooge simply reflects the West’s disconnect from reality, or outright bad faith. Though the war in Ukraine has certainly opened a rift between Georgian Dream and Brussels, the party has equally been clear that it’s eager for integration with Europe. This is certainly more than rhetorical: the party enshrined pursuing EU and Nato membership in the Georgian constitution, and submitted an application for EU membership in 2022. All Kobakhidze has requested in return is that Brussels plays “by Georgian rules” as Tbilisi journeys towards the promised land in Belgium.

    In short, then, Georgian Dream’s geoeconomic platform can be summed up as follows: focusing on economic growth and preserving internal stability by maintaining friendly political and economic relations with both the West and Russia, and the wider non-Western bloc, while avoiding being drawn into external conflicts. Taken together, then, Kobakhidze’s hard-nosed approach can plausibly be compared to another Western bête noire: Hungary. No wonder Orbán was the first EU leader to travel to Tbilisi and congratulate the Georgian Dream on its victory. “Nobody wants their own country to be destroyed and involved in war”, the Hungarian leader said. “Therefore, we understand the Georgian people’s decision to choose in favour of freedom.”

    To quote Orbán, many Georgians seem happy not letting their country become a “second Ukraine” — while also pursuing a “multipolar” agenda elsewhere, notably partnering with China to build a strategic port on the Black Sea. Unfortunately, it seems like the West has other plans. Indeed, Washington and its allies seem to be applying the same playbook to Georgia as they did to Ukraine. Just as in the lead-up to the 2014 coup in Kyiv, they’re first denying the legitimacy of the elected government, accusing it of being a Russian pawn. From there, they’re using Western-funded “NGOs” to mobilise the pro-EU minority against the government, while also pushing for sanctions. If the government still doesn’t yield to the pressure, they’ll try to move to the next phase: unrest in parliament and on the streets; a hoped-for police crackdown; and ultimately the toppling of the government and the appearance of a friendly pro-Western alternative.

    Certainly, influential Western foreign policy think tanks are already predicting exactly this scenario. In a recent article, the Atlantic Council argued that “Georgia’s 2024 parliamentary election has entered its ‘Maidan’ phase” — and that Western governments must “support the Georgian people in both the immediate period ahead and the longer term”. The Nato establishment’s aims couldn’t be clearer.

    Yet in the event, fomenting a Ukraine-style “coup” in Georgia may prove challenging. That’s partly because most Georgians are determined to avoid this outcome, and partly because Kobakhidze has been “coup-proofing” the country for some time. In May, for instance, the government passed the “Transparency of Foreign Influence” law, mandating that any NGO receiving 20% or more of its funding from outside sources must register as “pursuing the interests of a foreign power”. The EU and US accused the bill of being a sign of Georgia’s “democratic backsliding” and “Russification” — and even imposed sanctions. Protests followed, some of which were joined by Western politicians, only fuelling the country’s political polarisation.

    Yet as the Georgian government rightly points out, variations of its so-called “foreign agent” act already exist across the West. No less striking, there’s plenty of evidence that NGOs do play a nefarious role in the country’s politics: it’s just that they pursue pro-Western agendas. For one thing, there are the raw numbers. Though reliable data is hard to find — itself part of the problem — there are roughly 30,000 NGOs in Georgia. That’s a huge number for a country of less than four million people. Then there’s the question of funding. Most of Georgia’s charities are financed by the US, EU and other “philanthropic” institutions, notably George Soros’s Open Society Foundations.

    And while these varied organisations officially focus on innocuous topics such as democracy and human rights, it’s no secret that Western governments use them to push their own interests, up to and including regime change. Western-funded NGOs, for example, played a key role in fostering several “colour revolutions” in the early 2000s. That mostly involved non-violent protests, swiftly leading to pro-Western changes of government: especially in post-Soviet states like Ukraine (2004-5), Kyrgyzstan (2005) and even Georgia itself (2003).

    It’s telling in this regard that Victoria Nuland, the former US diplomat who played a key role in the 2014 coup in Ukraine, has just joined the board of directors of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED): one of the key players in the NGO-isation of US foreign policy. No wonder Bidzina Ivanishvili, one of the main founders of Georgian Dream, recently described the NGO class as a “pseudo-elite” nurtured by foreigners, and one basically embarrassed by its own country. It’s surely revealing too that Georgian opposition politicians are often interviewed with EU, US and Nato flags in the background.

    It’s clear, in short, that the moral panic over Georgia’s “foreign agent” law had little to do with democracy. Rather, as the historian Bryan Gigantino puts it, Western countries fear the rule would strip them of “important leverage” in the country’s domestic and foreign policy. Samantha Power, head of USAID, essentially admitted as much when she said that the law “gravely threatens Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic future”.

    This is perhaps the most hypocritical aspect of the Western narrative about somewhere like Georgia. Whatever Russia’s “foreign influence” — and it surely exists — the West’s is far greater. More to the point, it’s perfectly natural for a country like Georgia, straddling the border between Europe and Asia, to exploit the ongoing “multipolarisation” of global politics and boost its own autonomy. Given the West’s own tumbling influence, meanwhile, ham-fisted attempts to forcefully disrupt this process will only push Georgians even closer into the arms of Russia and China.

    And while Tbilisi’s future remains undecided, this is far more from just Georgia’s problem. After all, something similar is now happening in Moldova. There, too, recent elections revealed a deeply divided electorate. No less important is the role of Western and Western-funded NGOs in that country. For example, various deputies of the pro-Western ruling party, and even the current president of Moldova, have previously participated in Soros Foundations programmes. Combined with the potential for similar trouble elsewhere in the post-Soviet sphere, and it’s clear that the Georgian Dream could yet become a nightmare right across the region [end]

    The original article

    Related

    March 9, 2023: Atlanticist coup attempt in Georgia

    where protestors are now demanding the resignation of the democratic government

    March 8, 2023: Maidan 2.0 in Georgia?

  • [Sharing] Is Russia Really The “Greatest Threat” To France? – Andrew Korybko, Oriental Review

    Russia’s support of multipolar processes in West Africa has dealt a heavy blow to French hegemony there, which France has responded to by waging a proxy war on Russia in Mali while going on the strategic offensive in the South Caucasus and Eastern Europe

    French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu claimed in an interview that Russia is his country’s “greatest threat” apart from terrorist groups. He pointed to its “aggressive” actions over the past year, “not only to our interests in Africa, but also directly to our Armed Forces”. Lecornu also accused Russia of “waging an information war” and “militarizing new environments, including the seabed and cyberspace.” The reality is that Russia does pose a threat to France, but only to its hegemony, not to its legitimate interests.

    Russia’s African policy, which readers can learn more about here, seeks to accelerate multipolar processes there. This has taken the form of supporting the former French colonies of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, not only bilaterally, but also multilaterally with regard to their newly formed Sahelian Alliance and Confederation. Their patriotic military leaderships envisage reducing their outsized dependence on France by relying more on Russia in order to regain as much of their lost sovereignty as possible.

    In tangible terms, this has seen them replace France with Russia as their preferred anti-terrorist partner, with some speculating that the immediate quid pro quo is privileged Russian access to their resources. The short-term goal is to restore stability, after which the medium-term one of further disengaging from the French “sphere of influence” can more confidently be pursued, ideally by introducing a new regional currency to replace the CFA Franc that Paris continues to exploit for enriching itself at their expense.

    These two developments threaten French hegemony since the first impedes its efforts to divide-and-rule these countries while the second has traditionally been responsible for buoying its economy. Taken together, Russia’s support of these multipolar processes does indeed deal a heavy blow to French interests, but once again, only to its hegemonic interests and not its legitimate ones. France can’t acknowledge the way in which Russia threatens it in Africa since the dark truth makes it look very bad.

    It won’t go down without a fight, however, which is why it’s waging a proxy war on Russia in Mali together with the US and Ukraine through their patronage of Tuareg separatists and Islamist groups. Other battlefronts could be opened against the Sahelian Alliance/Confederation such as if Franco-American forces in the Ivory Coast try to destabilize southern Mali and Burkina Faso. Jihadist violence in the latter, which is already approaching critical proportions, could also soon worsen with their support.

    France isn’t just playing defense since it’s also going on the strategic offensive against Russia in the South Caucasus through its efforts to accelerate Armenia’s pro-Western pivot. The ultra-nationalist Armenian diaspora that it hosts has played a crucial role in this process. France is also selling military equipment to Armenia too in order to exacerbate Russia’s suspicions of its intentions. Close Russian-Azerbaijani ties and impressively pragmatic Russian-Georgian ones put a check on the West’s plans though.

    If they ever were to succeed, they’d pose a direct threat to Russia’s legitimate interests by provoking a major conflict along its southern periphery, thus making France’s meddling in the South Caucasus much more threatening in an objective sense than Russia’s support of multipolar processes in West Africa. The same goes for the other strategic offensive that France has gone on against Russia since losing its “sphere of influence” in the Sahel by signaling interest in conventionally intervening in Ukraine.

    French President Emmanuel Macron, whose spree of foreign policy mistakes was analyzed here, has since toned down his rhetoric but nevertheless still isn’t ruling out such a scenario. The reason why this is so dangerous to flirt with is because it could lead to the outbreak of conventional NATO-Russian hostilities in Ukraine that might escalate into World War III by miscalculation. France knows the enormity of what’s at stake but it’s still recklessly considering this course of action as revenge against Russia.

    Reviewing the insight that was shared thus far, Russia’s support of multipolar processes in West Africa has dealt a heavy blow to French hegemony there, which France has responded to by waging a proxy war on Russia in Mali while going on the strategic offensive in the South Caucasus and Eastern Europe. Therefore, it’s not Russia that’s the “greatest threat” to France, but France that’s a “great threat” to Russia and the world in general due to the havoc that it’s wreaking in three separate regions out of spite [end]

    The original article

    related

    African revolution

    France is expelled from its former colonies in West Africa

    The Atlanticist defeat in Donbass and Ukraine

    chronicle of a new catastrophic NATO venture

    L’engagement français dans les rangs ukrainiens

    in French, alphabetical obituary chronicle of French involvement in the Atlanticist ranks in Ukraine, what servile journalists will not tell you

  • [Sharing] Far-Right Political Violence in Ukraine: Assessment of the Donbas War and the Odesa Massacre – Ivan Katchanovski and Max Abrahms, Perspectives on Terrorism

    Volume XVIII, Issue 3

    Abstract: This study analyses the nature and extent of involvement by neo-Nazi and other far-right Ukrainian organisations in the Donbas war (2014-2022) and the Odesa massacre (2014). This issue is highly politicised with contrasting narratives. The Russian and Donbas separatist
    governments, as well as their media, have contended that Ukraine has been a Nazi or neo-Nazi regime since a fascist coup took place in 2014, while Ukrainian and Western governments and media have maintained that such elements in the Ukrainian far-right were marginal, trivial, even non-existent. The article interrogates the historical record with primary sources in the three most relevant languages—Ukrainian, Russian, and English. The investigation reveals crucial far-right involvement in both the early stages of the war in Donbas and the Odesa massacre. Although the percentage of far-right supporters and fighters in Ukraine was relatively small, they exercised disproportionate influence in the country due to their greater reliance on violence and armed formations. The Russian government, however, exaggerated the role of the neo-Nazis in Ukraine to publicly justify the illegal invasion in February 2022.

    Introduction

    This study analyses the nature and extent of involvement by neo-Nazi and other far-right Ukrainian organisations during both the Donbas war from its start in April 2014 until the Russian invasion in February 2022 and the Odesa massacre on 2 May 2014. Other than the Maidan massacre in February 2014, these were the most significant and contested cases of political violence in Ukraine from its independence in 1991 to the commencement of the Russia-Ukraine war on 24 February 2022.1 The role of far-right Ukrainian groups during these major episodes of political violence is controversial because they are beset by duelling, self-serving narratives. Russian President Vladimir Putin has claimed that the principal goal of the invasion is to “denazify” Ukraine.2 But well before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, there have been several overt and covert Russian military interventions here, including the annexation of the Crimean peninsula and direct support for pro-Russian insurgencies in the Donbas region, particularly in August 2014 and February 2015. Following the overthrow of the pro-Russian Ukrainian government in February 2014, the United States and other Western governments have consistently opposed Russia’s interventions and backed the current central government of Ukraine. In addition to political support, financial and military assistance has been provided, including training during the Obama presidency.3 To justify this support, the US and other Western governments disputed any real power or even the existence of neo-Nazi armed formations in Ukraine or claimed that they abandoned their far-right elements. Understanding the contested issue of far-right involvement in the Donbas war (2014-2022) and the Odesa massacre (2014) is valuable not only for elucidating intrinsically important historical episodes of political violence but also due to the contemporary relevance given the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war.

    This article proceeds in five sections. The first section highlights the contribution of our study by describing the weakness of the extant academic literature and our methodological approach to filling in important lacunae in the research landscape. The second section details the duelling of contemporary narratives over the political violence by the far-right in the war in Donbas and in the Odesa massacre. The third and fourth sections develop qualitative case studies with process tracing to illuminate the role of the far-right in the Donbas war and the Odesa massacre. The fifth section presents the conclusion.

    Developing the Extant Literature

    Research on the far-right in Ukraine since the Euromaidan has been spotty. Studies on neo-Nazi and other far-right organisations in Ukraine following the Euromaidan have been limited in quantity, quality, and scope. Most studies have been produced by researchers outside academe
    in partisan think tanks or non-government organisations, as well as by journalists who did not subject their work to peer review.4 Such assessments are more likely to be politically driven and less likely to exhibit methodological rigour, even professionalism. For example, Anton Shekhovtsov, the former leader of the Crimean branch of the pro-Russian far-right Eurasian Youth Union, likened the Trade Union building arson attack during the Odesa massacre on 2 May 2014, to his killing of Colorado potato beetles by collecting them in a box and burning them alive. He directly inferred that this was a massacre with far-right involvement but omitted this in his publications.5 Other works have relied on narrow metrics such as the vote-share of far-right parties in Ukraine, without assessing the violence itself in terms of the perpetrators and effects.6 Some researchers have claimed that the presence of Russian speakers in the Azov regiment and other neo-Nazi-led armed formations is evidence of their relative tolerance and asserted that the Azov regiment had moderated by abandoning its far-right roots.7 Such analyses have tended to uncritically rely on Ukrainian and Western government narratives, accepting their claims at face value.

    By contrast, other studies suggest a greater degree of far-right involvement in Ukrainian political violence. One quantitative study found that far-right groups in Ukraine, such as Svoboda and Right Sector, fielded the most violent perpetrators and committed the lion’s share of attacks.8 That study is restricted temporally, however, to the 2014 Maidan protests, which led to the violent overthrow of the relatively pro-Russian government and ultimately spiralled into the civil war in Donbas, the Russian annexation of Crimea, and Russian military interventions in these regions of Ukraine.9 Similarly, qualitative studies have presented evidence in the form of videos, eyewitness testimonies, confessions, and forensic examinations of Svoboda and Right Sector involvement in the Maidan massacre.10 Some other studies have focused on specific aspects of the far-right paramilitary and other armed formations during the war in Donbas.11 One academic publication is specifically devoted to the Odesa massacre, which is called “The Odesa Tragedy,” though it concentrates on the public perceptions rather than the perpetrators and their consequences.12 This list of prior works is intended to be illustrative rather than exhaustive. The research landscape around these issues is growing, but uneven in scope and reliability; a lacuna remains in the literature in terms of evaluating rigorously, comprehensively, and dispassionately the nature and extent of far-right involvement in the Donbas war and Odesa massacre, which matters in terms of our understanding of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and political violence more generally.

    To elucidate this understudied topic of the far-right in Ukraine, this study makes substantial use of primary source materials in Ukrainian and Russian—the main languages in Ukraine—as well as in English. This linguistic capability is conducive to a more nuanced, accurate assessment. Methodologically, the two case studies employ qualitative process tracing with the benefit of fluency in all three languages.13 The substantive focus and period of analysis are both tightly
    bounded; the role of the far-right on the Russian side and in the Russia-Ukraine war since February 2022, as well as during the Euromaidan, are weighty topics explored in our other works but fall outside the scope of this study.

    The term “far-right” denotes ultranationalists and both racial and ethnic supremacists in accordance with prior scholarship.14 The term “neo-Nazi” refers to far-right organisations that revamp elements of Nazi ideology, particularly its racial and ethnic supremacism, and use symbols associated with Nazi Germany or their stylised versions. As with Nazis, neo-Nazi organisations represent a form of fascism. Major neo-Nazi organisations in Ukraine during the time period covered by this study include the Social-National Assembly, its paramilitary wing Patriot of Ukraine, the National Corps, the White Hammer, and C14. Also included in the analysis are paramilitary and other armed formations organised and led formally or informally by these neo-Nazi organisations, such as the Azov battalion and regiment. Admittedly, militant groups are known to exhibit ideological heterogeneity.15 Within the political violence literature, a burgeoning area of research emphasises that members of the rank-and-file may be motivated by a variety of factors that diverge from the leadership, leading to a principal-agent problem.16 In this study, we classify organisations as neo-Nazi, or at least neo-Nazi-led, when commanders are neo-Nazi, even if not all members can be presumed to share this exact ideology.

    A prominent example is Andriy Biletsky, the leader of Patriot of Ukraine and the Social-National Assembly (SNA), both of which were transformed along with the Azov battalion and regiment veterans into the National Corps Party in 2016. He called the ideology of Patriot of Ukraine and SNA “Social Nationalism.” In a collection of his articles published in 2013, he described that social nationalism, as the name suggests, combines elements of ultranationalism of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists with elements of national socialism and called both radical nationalism and national socialism “great ideas.” He wrote that social nationalism is based on “Sociality, Racism, and Great Power.”17 Specifically, it is based on the ideas that the “white race” is “superior” to other races and is the foundation of the Aryan Ukrainian nation; the Ukrainian nation is a “blood-racial community”; and that “the historical mission of our Nation (…) is to head and lead the White Peoples of the world in the last crusade for their existence, a march against the Semitic-led subhumans.”18 Biletsky openly made antisemitic and racist statements, such as his claim that the Jew is “an economic and political parasite.” He saw “a serious clash of native European peoples with foreign colonisers, mainly of African and Muslim origin” and believed that “an ethnic civil war can be won by the native Europeans only under the banner of the New Right National Revolutions.”19

    Biletsky was called the “White Leader” and his writings were published by both SNA and Patriot of Ukraine. He was the first commander of the Azov battalion, which was organised and led by Patriot of Ukraine and SNA in May 2014. Patriot of Ukraine, SNA, and the Azov battalion all used a symbol resembling a stylised swastika and Wolfsangel. Azov commanders and their historian, who himself serves in Azov, called the symbol the “Idea of the Nation” and claimed that it is an ancient Ukrainian symbol, even though it was created in 1992 for the Social National Party of Ukraine (SNPU). The creator of this symbol acknowledged that it was called “Idea of the Nation” to represent the radical nationalist ideas of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). He also admitted that SNPU deliberately chose this symbol with the Latin letter N, instead of the equivalent Ukrainian Cyrillic letter, fully aware of its resemblance to Nazi symbols and association with the swastika for many Ukrainians, in particular in Lviv. As with other extremist groups that rebrand out of political expedience, the Social National Party of Ukraine changed its name to Svoboda in 2014, because the Nazi association was politically inconvenient.20 However, this symbol was retained by the SNA and by Patriot of Ukraine, whose Kharkiv branch split from SNPU because of these changes.21 The Azov battalion and its propaganda magazine, which was named Black Sun, also used the Black Sun symbol, an ideological symbol used by Nazis and various neo-Nazi organisations. In addition, groups and individuals—including Patriot of Ukraine, SNA, National Corps, and Azov battalion and regiment leaders, commanders, and members—have displayed on their uniforms various neo-Nazi and Nazi symbols, such as the swastika, the SS sign, and 88 (Heil Hitler code). These, along with Hitler images, Nazi flags, and Totenkopf have also been seen in the form of patches, photographs, flags, and tattoos.

    Although the term far-right incorporates both ultranationalist and neo-Nazi organisations, they are not ideologically identical despite their frequent overlap. This study empirically investigates the role of Ukrainian ultra-nationalist organisations such as Svoboda, the Right Sector, the Ukrainian National Assembly–Ukrainian People’s Self-Defence (UNA-UNSO), and Bratstvo; neo-Nazi organisations such as the Social-National Assembly, Patriot of Ukraine, the White Hammer, and C14; and various other paramilitary formations, special police forces, and National Guard units organised and controlled to various extents by them. These armed units include the Azov battalion and regiment, Dnipro, Donbas, Aidar, Sich, Carpathian Sich, OUN, and St. Mary’s battalions, and the Ukrainian Volunteer Corps. To assess these actors, this study analysed thousands of Russian and Ukrainian primary sources: online recordings of live broadcasts, videos of the armed conflict in Donbas and Odesa, and information posted on websites and social media by far-right organisations, their armed units, and activists. It also analysed media reports in Ukrainian, Russian, and English from diverse outlets such as Ukrainska pravda, Strana, BBC, The Guardian, The Washington Post, The New York Times, YouTube, Telegram, V Kontakte, Facebook, and Twitter. To mitigate bias, the authors analysed the primary source materials rather than relying on secondary interpretations.

    The Conflicting Narratives

    Assessments of the far-right in Ukraine have been wracked by self-serving and thus unreliable perspectives. Russian and separatist leaders, as well as the media, have described the post-Maidan violence in Ukraine, especially in Donbas and Odesa, as perpetrated by “fascists” and “Nazis” akin to genocidal massacres against Jews, Belarusians, Russians, and Ukrainians during the Holocaust and World War Two.22 They often called the Odesa massacre the “Odesa Khatyn,” a reference to the large-scale massacre of Belarusian villagers in 1943 by the Nazis and an auxiliary police battalion, which was based on a paramilitary formation of the Melnyk faction of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists. Based on this narrative, President Putin and his allies have claimed that invading Ukraine is not only justified, but “inevitable” to counter the “Nazi” or “Neo-Nazi regime” in Kyiv.23 Putin and his government thus declared the “de-Nazification” of Ukraine as a key goal of “the special military operation” launched in February 2022.24 This perspective—in its entirety—is widely assailed in the West.25

    By contrast, the Ukrainian and Western governments and the media tend to claim that the far-right—including neo-Nazis—is marginal, even non-existent in Ukraine.26 They argue that since Euromaidan, Ukrainian fighters have almost entirely—if not entirely—shed their far-right elements, particularly neo-Nazi. To this end, it is a common point that the Azov Battalion ceased to be led by the neo-Nazi Patriot of Ukraine, a paramilitary wing of the SNA, since integrating into the National Guard as one of its regiments. Kyiv has stressed that the integration of Azov in November 2014 is proof of its transition to moderation and the absence of extremist fighters post-Maidan.27 Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky awarded “Hero of Ukraine” titles in 2022 to prominent Azov leaders such as regiment commander Denys Prokopenko, deputy commander Sviatoslav Palamar, and senior officer Oleh Khomenko.28 After the commencement of the Russia-Ukraine war in February 2022, many Western media outlets, politicians, government officials, and academics adopted this stance that Azov and other controversial Ukrainian fighters on the far-right had not only abandoned extremist elements, but were heroes against Russia’s illegal invasion.29

    The Indexing Theory of political communications emphasises that Western media follow narratives of its governments in covering foreign conflicts, including in post-communist countries.30 In some cases, Western media may have taken their cues directly from the Ukrainian government. After the Odesa massacre on 2 May 2014, the Foreign Ministry of Ukraine blamed the arson attack on provocateurs that were “paid generously by the Russian special services”, and the New York Times immediately adopted the same line that pro-Russia groups may have been responsible for torching the building.31 The Western narrative of the far-right in Ukraine since the Euromaidan is not without controversy. Volodymyr Ishchenko, a Ukrainian sociologist who specialises in the far-right in Ukraine, concludes: “The dominant narrative since Maidan in Ukrainian and much of the Western public spheres has been systematically downplaying the problem” by arguing that “the Ukrainian far-right” is “small and marginal.” He stated that “often, the far-right is just ignored.”32

    Notably, Western concerns over far-right fighters in Ukraine were more prevalent before the February 2022 invasion. For example, The Nation described Azov in 2018 as “pro-Nazi, as evidenced by its regalia, slogans, and programmatic statements.”33 In 2019, Radio Free Europe called Azov “far-right.”34 In 2020, The Guardian referred to Azov as a “neo-Nazi extremist movement.”35 Consistent with Indexing Theory, such coverage of the neo-Nazis in Ukraine before the February 2022 Russian invasion overlapped with similar expressions by Western governments. In its 2018 Human Rights report, the US State Department called the political wing of the Azov Regiment “a hate group.”36 In 2019, ambassadors from G7 countries warned against “extreme political movements in Ukraine, whose violent actions are worrying in themselves.” The warnings referred specifically to the Azov movement and its violence during the 2019 presidential elections.37 The US Congress has displayed longstanding ambivalence over its designation of Azov. In 2018, forty Congress members signed a letter to the State
    Department with the request to designate Azov as a terrorist organisation because of its links to terrorist attacks in multiple countries and its recruitment of neo-Nazis in its ranks.38 A defence appropriations bill amendment was adopted by the entire US Congress in 2018, which banned US government funding and training of the Azov regiment due to concerns over its neo-Nazi views and members. Such concerns had been expressed by American officials for several years after the Euromaidan. The amendment was first unanimously adopted by the US House of Representatives in 2015. Congressman John Conyers put it bluntly, “I am grateful that the House of Representatives unanimously passed my amendments last night to ensure that our military does not train members of the repulsive neo-Nazi Azov Battalion.”39 Under pressure from the Pentagon, however, Congress subsequently removed this first amendment. A similar amendment, proposing a ban on US military assistance to radical nationalist and neo-Nazi organisations, voluntary police, and paramilitary formations under their command, was blocked in Congress in 2014.40

    In general, however, American and European governments have been careful not to issue public statements against the far-right in Ukraine or to call attention to it. This hesitancy began after the Euromaidan and became starker following the February 2022 Russian invasion. Indeed, Western governments and media increasingly whitewashed the empirical record to present the Ukrainian far-right formations as categorically moderate in order to boost international support. In June 2024, the US State Department stated that the Azov brigade was eligible to receive US weapons under the “Leahy Law” because it was cleared of human rights violations. It made this determination after claiming that the Azov brigade is a new unit that is not subject to the previous Congressional ban, even though in reality this brigade was created on the basis of the Azov regiment, celebrated the 10th anniversary of the Azov battalion creation as its own anniversary, and is led by original Azov battalion commanders.41 However, a subsequent amendment, which was included in the US defence bill which was passed by the US House of Representatives, specifically stated that “none of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available by this Act may be used to provide arms, training, intelligence, or other assistance to the Azov Battalion, the Third Separate Assault Brigade, or any successor organisation.”42

    Such instrumental portrayals of allies are not limited to this conflict. Other recent cases of political violence have also featured public relations campaigns by governments and media to present allies as arguably more moderate than their history and contemporary ideology indicate. For example, in the Syrian war, anti-Assad jihadist organisations allied with the West were euphemistically referred to as “rebels,” sometimes “moderate” ones, even when they fought under the direction of a Foreign Terrorist Organisation, as designated by the US State Department.43 A large body of literature within terrorism studies has found that the labelling of violent perpetrators by governments and media is not value-neutral, but expedient to serve political agendas.44 Particularly in these controversial cases of political violence, academe can play an important role in interrogating the empirical record to adjudicate the truth.45

    The Far-Right in the Donbas War

    Research within the field of terrorism studies has repeatedly noted the difficulty of determining the ideological beliefs of participants in political violence.46 However, fine-grained knowledge of the organisations can substantially increase confidence. Svoboda and the main organisations that remained within the Right Sector after the Euromaidan were widely understood as far-right for maintaining ultra-nationalist and ethnically supremacist views. They openly described themselves as the natural successors of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), inspired by the notorious OUN leader and Nazi collaborator, Stepan Bandera.47 Along with the UNA-UNSO, these organisations used the “Glory to Ukraine! Glory to the Heroes!” slogan, the official greeting of the Bandera faction of the OUN (OUN-B). This greeting, along with a fascist-style hand salute, was modelled on greetings and salutes of other well-known fascist parties in European history, from the Nazi party in Germany to the Ustashe party in Croatia.48 The Right Sector also adopted its red and black flag from the OUN-B and the UPA, which symbolized Ukrainian blood and soil, which were also pervasive in Nazi ideology and flags.49 But the existence of these symbols alone offers weak evidence of far-right influence in the Donbas war without understanding the cultural and historical context.

    The violent overthrow of the Viktor Yanukovych government by means of the Maidan massacre triggered the resurgence of separatism in Donbas.50 After his overthrow in February 2014, far-right parties and organisations in Ukraine expanded and organised their armed formations. Along with Ihor Kolomoisky, an oligarch who became the head of the Dnipropetrovsk regional administration, the Right Sector was instrumental in the formation of the Dnipro battalion in the spring of 2014.51 The Azov battalion, notorious for its use of neo-Nazi symbols in its official insignia, was also organised in the spring of 2014 and led by the SNA and the Patriot of Ukraine with the involvement of the Radical Party. As mentioned, “White Leader” Andrii Biletsky was the first commander of Azov.52 Based in Mariupol, the St. Mary’s battalion was formed in the fall of 2014 and led by the far-right Bratstvo party, which is described by its leader (Dmytro Korchynsky) as the “Christian Taliban.”53 Around this time, the Aidar battalion, nominally subordinated to the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, was formed by the Maidan Self-Defence. One of its platoons was led by the White Hammer, a neo-Nazi organisation belonging to the Right Sector during the Euromaidan. Ilia Kiva, a Right Sector member, was the commander of another volunteer police battalion. A previously convicted criminal with a swastika tattoo became the commander of the Tornado Company, a special police unit. He and seven other members of his company were arrested and convicted for various crimes in the warzone, such as torturing detainees. A Nazi-style flag with a swastika was found in their prison cell.54 These units were all under the formal jurisdiction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the National Guard, or the Ministry of Defence. From the start of their formation, they remained under de facto command of radical nationalist or neo-Nazi organisations. These armed formations sprouted up in the early stages of the conflict in Donbas and were stationed there in an attempt to suppress pro-Russian separatism in the region by force. The Right Sector and the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists actively organised various militia and paramilitary units that were not subordinate to the central government of Ukraine. The Volunteer Ukrainian Corps, the largest paramilitary formation, was formed and led by the Right Sector specifically for the war in Donbas, though it also included battalions in Western Ukraine.55

    The paramilitary formations, special police, and National Guard units, organised and led by far-right organisations such as the Right Sector, the Social National Assembly, Patriot of Ukraine, Svoboda, C14, and Bratstvo, constituted a small minority of Ukrainian fighters in the Donbas. Based on reports, we estimate the number of members of radical nationalist and neo-Nazi organisations who served in various far right-led, regular, and other armed formations in the Donbas, at around five thousand. This estimate is conservative and represents just one percent of approximately 400,000 people who participated in this war on the side of the central government.56 Additional metrics of influence, however, are also important to consider.

    Despite their relatively small numbers, far-right fighters exercised disproportionate influence in the Donbas civil war, particularly in the early stages before the first direct Russian military intervention in August 2014. Far-right Ukrainian groups proliferated after the Euromaidan because they were eager to fight and were responsible for a disproportionate level of violence, especially against civilians and prisoners of war in Mariupol and Krasnoarmiisk. Far-right organisations and far-right-linked battalions thus played a crucial role in escalating the armed conflict in the Donbas. Svoboda and C14, an avowedly neo-Nazi group affiliated with Svoboda until the summer of 2014, organised and led the Sich battalion from June 2014 onwards.57 Meanwhile, the Right Sector carried out a deadly attack on a separatist checkpoint in Sloviansk on 20 April 2014. While Ukrainian and Western media denied far-right involvement in these events, the evidence to the contrary includes business cards linked to far-right members found after the attack. As well, Ukrainian court proceedings revealed that the weapons used by the Right Sector checkpoint attackers were the same as the snipers from this group who killed and wounded police during the Maidan.58 And two years after the attack on the separatist checkpoint, Dmytro Yarosh—the leader of the Right Sector—admitted his personal involvement in thisattack.59 Oleksandr Turchynov, then acting president of Ukraine, and Kolomoisky’s deputy in the Dnipropetrovsk regional administration, reportedly orchestrated this Right Sector operation, aimed to seize and destroy a television transmitter near Sloviansk, several days after this area was seized by the Strelkov-led armed group of Russian nationalists and Ukrainian separatists.60 This attack by the Right Sector constituted a major escalation of the conflict in Donbas because it broke both the Geneva Agreement signed on 17 April 2014 by Ukraine, Russia, the EU, and the US for a peaceful resolution of the conflict, as well as the Orthodox Easter truce between the Ukrainian government and separatists in Donbas.

    Far right-led armed formations were also behind many other violent attacks in the Donbas, further escalating the conflict into a civil war. Videos, media reports, and admissions from commanders and other members of the Azov and Dnipro battalions indicate that they participated in the storming of the district police headquarters in Mariupol on 9 May 2014. Approximately ten people, including at least one protester, were killed.61 Analysis of online video streams, media reports, and Ukrainian government documents, also make clear that Azov played a major role in taking back the city of Mariupol from the control of separatists in June 2014.62 The Dnipro battalion, along with other units, seized civilians in the Donetsk Region to prevent the separatist referendum on 11 May 2014. Videos show them shooting unarmed pro-separatist protesters with Kalashnikovs, killing two locals. The Ukrainian government denied the presence of the Dnipro battalion, but it was confirmed by other credible sources, including admissions by battalion members in videos, like Volodymyr Parasiuk’s statement on social media, who became the People’s Deputy of Ukraine.63

    The far-right-led armed formations perpetrated a disproportionate amount of violence in the first few months of the Donbas conflict and thus played a major role in escalating it into a larger civil war because the radical nationalist and neo-Nazi-led groups were far more willing to use force at that time. The Ukrainian armed forces, the security service, police and National Guard units were more reluctant to use force against the separatists in Donbas because their commanders and members were publicly blamed by the new government for attempting to forcefully suppress the Maidan protests—and in particular, for the Maidan massacre. Because the new Maidan government came to power through violence, which included the killing of police and protesters, it lacked legitimacy among many military, police, and SBU members in the Donbas region during this initial period of the conflict. Further, compared to the newly ascendant far-right groups in the aftermath of Euromaidan, the regular Ukrainian armed forces, the security service, the police and National Guard units were known for lower morale and higher desertions. Examples of this included the Donetsk SBU Alfa commander and Luhansk Berkut members, who joined the separatists.64

    The relative role of the far-right in the political violence was not constant; it began to decline in the Donbas when newly elected president Petro Poroshenko ordered the Ukrainian military, SBU, police, and National Guard to wield lethal force against the separatists and launch the offensive in June 2014.65 The war was most intense and violent in 2014 and 2015, but the fighting declined significantly following the Minsk Agreements in 2015. However, ultra-nationalist and neo-Nazi fighters continued to exert a non-trivial role, even after the Ukrainian military intensified its operations in Donbas and purported to moderate the far-right fighters. After its formal incorporation into the National Guard of Ukraine, the Azov regiment and its commanders maintained a close organisational and ideological relationship with the neo-Nazi National Corps party. This party was formed by the Azov battalion founder and the first commander on the basis of neo-Nazi SNA and Patriot of Ukraine, and it included many Azov battalion and regiment veterans. The Azov regiment functioned as a military wing of the National Corps, which, in essence, represented overlapping elements of the same Azov movement.66 Indeed, Azov regiment commanders shared a neo-Nazi background and had served in the neo-Nazi-led Azov battalion.67 In other words, the rebranding from “battalion” to “regiment” did not alter the key personnel.68 For example, Azov regiment commander Denys Prokopenko was a member of the neo-Nazi White Boys Club, which was formed by the ultras of the Dynamo Kyiv football club. This group of ultras displayed various Nazi symbols and the Nazi salute on their social media and during football games. His Azov battalion platoon had used the Totenkopf insignia of the Nazi SS.69 Andriy Biletsky became the commander of the Third Assault Brigade, which was created by veterans of the Azov battalion and regiment and activists of his neo-Nazi group, the National Corps.70 In 2023, he stated in an interview with Ukrainian media that the united Azov movement included this Azov brigade under his command along with the Azov regiment and the Kraken unit.71 Such admissions in Ukrainian media highlighting enduring far-right allegiances seldom make their way into the Western press.

    Importantly, Azov commanders never publicly renounced their neo-Nazi views, symbols, and organisations. In fact, Azov leaders routinely denied in media interviews that they, their units, and organisations, were neo-Nazi, claiming that the well-documented Nazi symbols were fakes or Russian propaganda. Our research of Ukrainian social media as well as other researchers of the far-right in Ukraine, such as Lev Golinkin and Moss Robeson, have identified over one hundred cases of Nazi and neo-Nazi displays by at least several hundred Azov commanders and other members from 2014 to 2022. This number includes displays on uniforms, patches, photographs, flags, and tattoos of neo-Nazi and Nazi symbols, such as the swastika, SS sign, 88 (Heil Hitler code), Hitler images, Nazi flags, and Totenkopf, and a fascist hand salute.72 The continued relevance of far-right extremism in Azov was evident at the very top. Arsen Avakov, the Minister of Internal Affairs, was personally involved in the Azov battalion formation and its later expansion to a regiment.73 President Petro Poroshenko circulated photographs awarding Ukrainian national medals and commendations to some of the most well-known neo-Nazis in Azov.74 The Nazi connection to Azov was clearly not due to a loss of agency control.

    Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch reported that Azov was involved in many cases of torture, illegal detention, and disappearances during the war in Donbas.75 The impact of these far-right organisations cannot be measured strictly in terms of the direct physical effects, as terrorism researchers have emphasised in many other contexts.76 Ultra-nationalist and neo-Nazi organisations were instrumental in blocking or “spoiling” a peaceful resolution of the armed conflict in Donbas, another well-established source of leverage for extremists.77 Far-right groups such as the Right Sector, Svoboda, and the Radical Party opposed the adoption by the parliament of Constitutional amendments based on provisions from the Minsk Agreements.78 To this end, Svoboda activists launched a grenade attack on 31 August 2015 in front of the Ukrainian parliament, killing four and wounding dozens of policemen and National Guard troops, which helped to block these amendments, undercutting the logic of implementation.79

    Far-right groups also challenged the implementation of President Volodymyr Zelensky’s electoral promise to peacefully resolve the Donbas war.80 In October 2019, Zelensky travelled to a front-line position in Donbas to personally convince the Azov fighters to stop blocking the implementation of the Minsk agreements by withdrawing along with separatist troops from the frontline, as he agreed during the summit with Putin and German and French leaders in Paris. But video of the encounter shows that Zelensky was taunted by activists of this neo-Nazi organisation who flouted his appeal.81 According to the Associated Press, thousands of far-right and nationalist activists shouting the far-right OUN and UPA slogan “Glory to Ukraine. Glory to the Heroes” marched through Kyiv protesting against a peace plan for eastern Ukraine.82

    The radical flank threatened Zelensky for implementing Minsk on other occasions as well. In May 2019, Dmytro Yarosh, the former Right Sector leader, publicly threatened to hang the new Ukrainian president on a tree if he fulfilled his election promise of a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Donbas.83 In 2021, Yarosh, the commander of the Ukrainian Volunteer Army organised by the Right Sector, was appointed Adviser to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Valerii Zaluzhnyi.84 In the same year, videos, photos, and Ukrainian media reports show police standing down while neo-Nazi and other far-right protesters attacked the Office of the President of Ukraine and painted swastikas on its walls.85 The Russia scholar Stephen F. Cohen concluded that Zelensky “can’t go forward with peace negotiations” because “crazy fascist movements” in Ukraine “literally threatened his life.”86 Although far-right peace rejectionists posed political problems for Zelensky, they were also known to work closely with him. An activist of the neo-Nazi Patriot of Ukraine and former deputy commander of the Azov regiment was appointed the acting head of the National Police of Ukraine during the Poroshenko presidency and then became a deputy minister of Internal Affairs during the Zelensky presidency.87 Prime Minister Oleksii Honcharuk spoke at a “veterans party” organised by a front organisation for the neo-Nazi C14 with a stylised swastika of a neo-Nazi rock band behind him.88 The advisory council of the Ministry of Veteran Affairs under Zelensky retained activists of this neo-Nazi group, including those charged with assassinating the prominent opposition journalist, Oles Buzyna, in 2015.89

    In sum, ultra-nationalist and neo-Nazi militant organisations were deeply involved on the side of the central government throughout the Donbas conflict. Although representing a small fraction of Ukrainian forces throughout the conflict, they committed a disproportionate amount of violence, particularly before President Poroshenko ordered the Ukrainian military to increase its use of force against the separatists in the summer of 2014. The much-touted absorption of Azov and other extreme right-wing militia under the official Ukrainian National Guard, police, and military command did not change either their command or their ideological displays. Many of the fighters worked closely with the Kyiv political leadership across administrations, when not using de facto veto power to block peaceful resolution of the conflict in this region.

    This interpretation departs from others that rely strictly on vote-share as the proxy for far-right influence. The influence of the far-right in Ukraine after the Maidan far exceeded its electoral support and membership. Svoboda and Right Sector leaders each won only one percent of the votes in the snap presidential elections in May 2014. In the parliamentary elections of October 2014, Svoboda narrowly failed to clear the five percent threshold, receiving 4.7 percent. The Right Sector fared even worse, receiving only two percent of the votes. Ruslan Koshulynsky, one of Svoboda leaders, who was backed by the Right Sector, OUN, and C14, received only 1.7 percent of the votes in the 2019 presidential elections, while Svoboda won 2.2 percent of the votes in the 2019 parliamentary elections. These weak electoral results indicate the limited national support of the far-right in Ukraine, but not its outsized role in the Donbas conflict.

    The Far-Right in the Odesa Massacre

    Other than the Donbas war, the Odesa massacre was the most significant and deadly instance of political violence after the Maidan massacre in Ukraine since its independence in 1991 until the Russia-Ukraine war in February 2022. The violence took place on 2 May 2014, between a “United Ukraine” rally and pro-Russian separatists, carried out with petrol bombs, gunfire, and rock-throwing, which ended up killing 48 people, primarily separatist protesters.90 The vast majority of the fatalities took place in the Trade Unions House, where 42 separatist activists and employees (forty men, seven women, and one boy) were killed when the building was set ablaze.91

    This massacre contributed to the escalation of the separatist conflict in Donbas into the civil war. As noted, the massacre was presented by separatist and Russian leaders and the media as akin to the Nazi massacre of Khatyn in Belarus, and many Odesa separatists joined the separatist forces in Donbas. Despite the importance of this massacre, the International Advisory Panel of the Council of Europe, among other international authorities, has noted that the Ukrainian government failed to properly investigate and prosecute those responsible.92 To ascertain the role of far-right groups in the Odesa massacre, a broad range of key information resources can be analysed, including videos and recordings of live broadcasts of the political violence (and the lead-up to it); published reports; primary source media in Ukrainian, Russian, and English; statements of responsibility; interviews; and testimonies from participants and eyewitnesses on both sides, as well as police commanders.

    On 1 May 2014, the day before the mass violence, separatists protested in Odesa to demand a referendum on the newly installed government in Kyiv, which they blamed on far-right activists and Western interference.93 Based on testimonies from a special parliamentary commission report in the immediate aftermath of the May 2014 massacre, Ukrainian and regional government officials planned to use far-right activists and the Maidan Self-Defence to suppress the separatists in the Odesa region and disperse those who were encamped near the Trade Union building.94 Extensive evidence indicates that the police and firefighters were ordered by their superiors to stand by and not interfere during attacks. For instance, a special plan to deal with mass disturbances launched by the Odesa regional police was not authorised, reportedly because of decisions at the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ top level.95 Similarly, top regional officials of the police and other law enforcement agencies were ordered to attend a meeting with their national counterparts before and during the start of the clashes.96 The presence of Andriy Parubiy and five hundred Maidan Self-Defence members, who deployed from Kyiv to Odesa on the eve of the massacre, further suggests that the violent dispersal of the separatist camp by far-right activists was orchestrated by top government leaders.97 Parubiy was a founder and leader of the neo-Nazi Patriot of Ukraine, a paramilitary wing of the Social National Party of Ukraine in the 1990s. He was the head of the Maidan Self-Defence during the Euromaidan and headed the National Security and Defence Council at the time of the Odesa massacre. The State Bureau of Investigations of Ukraine launched a criminal investigation into Parubiy for the Odesa massacre soon after he was replaced as the ex-head of the Ukrainian parliament following the early parliamentary elections in 2019.98 One of the participants acknowledged in an Israeli documentary that he engaged in “provocations” in the Odesa massacre under the command of
    Parubiy, who had issued orders to attack the separatists and “burn everything.” We assess this acknowledgement as credible because he was filmed along with Maidan activists in the left wing of the Trade Union building in Odesa when the deadly fire began to burn the central entrance.99 He and five other Georgian ex-military members also stated in American, Italian, and Israeli TV documentaries, Russian media interviews, on Macedonian TV, in depositions to Berkut lawyers for the Maidan massacre trial, and in testimonies to the Prosecutor General Office of Belarus for the Prosecutor General Office of Ukraine investigation that their groups of Georgian, Baltic, and far-right-linked Ukrainian snipers received weapons, payments, and orders from specific Maidan and Georgian politicians, including Parubiy, to engage in a mass killing of police and protesters.100 The Maidan massacre trial subsequently confirmed their identities.101

    A march led by the Right Sector and football ultras on 2 May 2014 was used as cover to implement this plan to destroy and burn the separatist tent camp.102 The SBU in the Odesa Region received advanced information about planned “provocations” and violent clashes between football ultras and pro-Russian separatists on game day between the Odesa and Kharkiv teams on 2 May. A special train transported hundreds of football ultras from Kharkiv to Odesa.103 Football ultras in Ukraine were notorious for displaying neo-Nazi symbols and expressing neo-Nazi slogans during games and have historically linked up with the Right Sector and other far-right organisations, as during the Maidan protests.104 Both the Right Sector and football ultras in Odesa and Kharkiv were dominated by the neo-Nazi Social National Assembly/Patriot of Ukraine, which organised the Azov battalion right after the Odesa massacre.

    Odeska Druzhyna, a small separatist organisation in Odesa, was present among other separatist activists based on evidence from internet streams, videos, testimonies of participants and eyewitnesses, and special parliamentary commission reports.105 Odeska Druzhyna used identifiable red tape labels, and were not Right Sector agent provocateurs, as the Russian media and separatists claimed. However, the Ukrainian government and media also mischaracterised the involvement of Odeska Druzhyna by overstating its coordination with other separatist activists.106 The balance of forces was asymmetric; the groups of numerically superior activists of the Right Sector from Odesa and Kharkiv led by the neo-Nazi Social National Assembly/Patriot of Ukraine, far-right football ultras, and Maidan Self-Defence units from Odesa and other regions attacked the separatists. Numerically disadvantaged, the latter took cover behind a police cordon.107

    An Odeska Druzhyna activist was filmed shooting in the direction of the far-right protesters with an AK-74-type assault rifle.108 The official investigation and the May 2 Group maintained that a Right Sector activist was killed by this separatist group member with a 5.45mm calibre bullet.109 However, leaked forensic medical expert reports describe a 5.65mm calibre bullet extracted from his body.110 This bullet reportedly disappeared and reappeared during the investigation. The fact that it did not match bullet samples of any legally registered firearms, the weak sound of the gunshots, as well as the lack of a recoil observed in the videos of the shooting, also suggest that the far-right protester may not have been killed by this separatist, who maintained that the weapon seen in the video was a movie studio prop.111 The killing of the Right Sector activist was not visible in that video nor in any videos of clashes. The investigation and various videos at the scene did not reveal the exact time or location of his killing, or the direction of the gunshot. An Odesa deputy police chief, who was filmed around the time of this killing before he himself was wounded, stated that he saw snipers in camouflage shooting from the second floor of a hotel there. He relayed that they killed this Right Sector activist and the second protester in order to blame the separatists for their killing and provoke a violent response against the separatists.112 Videos filmed before and after his shooting suggest that the second pro-Maidan activist was killed around the same time in the same area during the violent clashes with separatists and shooting from a Kalashnikov-type weapon by one of the separatists.113 However, the government forensic examination determined that he was killed by a bullet from a pneumatic sport-type weapon. Nobody was charged with his killing, and the moment and other circumstances of his killing remain not publicly known.114

    In the clashes that followed the killings of these two pro-government protesters, four separatist protesters were killed and many other separatist protesters, policemen and at least one local journalist were wounded. The forensic examination determined that three separatists were killed with hunting ammunition.115 A pro-government activist was filmed shooting with a hunting rifle in the direction of these separatists.116 This pro-government activist was later identified by the Minister of Internal Affairs as a Right Sector member.117 The government investigation charged him with killing at least one of the separatists. However, he was released from arrest and his trial was suspended indefinitely because of threats by the Right Sector and other far-right activists against judges during his trial.118 Evidence—including a recorded phone call—revealed that the events on May 2nd were coordinated by the Odesa regional administration official in charge of law enforcement agencies, and involved the participation of the Maidan Self-Defence commander, Right Sector activists, football ultras, and Maidan Self-Defence units.119 They attacked and burned the tent camp of various separatist organisations, whose activists and supporters then escaped to the nearby Trade Union building and tried to barricade the main entrance doors. Videos, internet streams, and testimonies of eyewitnesses show that attackers threw Molotov cocktails and burning tyres at the main entrance, set the entrance doors on fire, and blocked other exits. Videos, recorded calls to firefighters, and eyewitness reports reveal that the fire and thick smoke started from those burning tyres and Molotov cocktails thrown at the main entrance.120 The evidence does not support claims that the separatist protesters killed in this incident were Russian citizens, that they burned themselves by throwing Molotov cocktails from the roof of the Trade Union building or inside of the building, or that there was no far-right involvement in their killing.

    After initial denials, the May 2 Group admitted that the deadly fire started at the main entrance. The May 2 Group was a nominally independent association of mainly journalists, formed after the massacre supposedly to investigate it. It was created with the involvement of the Governor of the Odesa region who was appointed by Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko within a week of the massacre.121 This governor represented not only the central government, but also the Kolomoisky’s oligarchic network, which financed the Right Sector volunteers from the Volyn Region in the Azov battalion and the Right Sector-led Dnipro battalion.122 The Azov battalion was organised by the neo-Nazi SNA and its paramilitary wing, Patriot of Ukraine, which dominated the Right Sector in Odesa and Kharkiv, a few days after the Odesa massacre. But the May 2 Group still claimed that it was impossible to determine who started the fire because both sides were throwing Molotov cocktails. However, there is no public evidence of Molotov cocktails being thrown by separatists at the main entrance; on the contrary, numerous videos feature the far-right protesters throwing Molotov cocktails and burning tyres into the Trade Union building at that time.123

    Within Ukraine, far-right activists—particularly from the Right Sector and the SNA— were notorious for using tyres and Molotov cocktails to burn public buildings. Forensic examinations in the government investigation, recordings of radiocommunications by SBU Alfa group, an unpublished admission by a far-right activist to a French journalist, and an academic study determined that the Trade Union headquarters in Kyiv were burned by Maidan activists, including far-right ones, in order to stop its takeover by the Security Service of Ukraine Alfa unit.124 Far-right protesters also started fires by burning tyres in the Inter TV channel building and threatened to burn down the parliament of Ukraine, the Lutsk City Council, the Sviatoshyn District Court that heard the Maidan massacre case, the Constitutional Court, and Inter and 112 Ukraina TV channels buildings by placing tyres next to their entrances.125 Prior usage of the same tactics by the far-right increases the likelihood of their direct involvement.

    Analysis of online video streams, government investigation findings, May 2 Group reports, forensic medical examinations, eyewitness testimonies, and other evidence strongly indicate that 42 people perished as a result of the fire, smoke, and from trying to jump from the upper floors of the Trade Union building with far-right activists beating them on the ground and blocking the exits.. The victims were unarmed and included mainly separatists, their supporters, and several employees, in particular women, who were in the building at the time.126 Some of the strongest evidence of far-right involvement in the arson attack comes from the far-right itself, in the form of credit claiming. A growing body of research within terrorism studies focuses on credit claiming. An important finding is that perpetrators are far more likely to deny responsibility for their attacks than to take credit for ones that they did not perpetrate.127 This is particularly true when the targets are civilians. Nonetheless, many extremist groups do claim credit for civilian attacks.128 Statements posted by the Right Sector, the SNA, and the neo-Nazi Misanthropic Division on their websites and social media sites admitted the involvement of their organisations in the massacre. The Right Sector celebrated on its website the massacre by describing it as “another bright page in our fatherland’s history.” Claiming responsibility for the slaughter, it wrote: “In the first minutes of the battle, the ‘Right Sector’ activist was seriously wounded in the stomach. Several more PS [Right Sector] activists received injuries of varying degrees of severity. However, this did not prevent the rest of the PS fighters, together with football fans, from repelling the attack of pro-Russian provocateurs, and as a result, they successfully countered attempts to seize buildings in Odesa. Standing shoulder to shoulder, Odesa activists, football fans and ‘Right Sector’ fighters defeated the forces of pro-Russian mercenaries. Order has been restored in Odesa.”129 The Right Sector—which was dominated in Odesa and Kharkiv by the Social National Assembly and its paramilitary wing, Patriot of Ukraine—and the neo-Nazi Misanthropic Division (which joined the Azov battalion after the massacre) admitted on the social media platform V Kontakte and in other public statements that the fire was set deliberately.130

    The official investigation of the Odesa massacre was a farce. Nobody was found guilty of perpetrating this mass killing. As noted, the Right Sector shooter was initially arrested but then released. Only separatists were among those arrested and tried for the Odesa massacre. The Odesa massacre trial of separatists resulted in their acquittal by a local court. The Ukrainian court based its decision on the lack of evidence in support of prosecution charges. Even the verdict acknowledged both the weakness of the investigation into the perpetrators and the role of Parubiy and other government officials.131 The Council of Europe and the UN Special Commission reports also noted the destruction of evidence.132 A report by the special commission of the Council of Europe found that the Ukrainian government’s investigation of the Odesa Massacre was inadequate, politically selective, and featured the falsification of evidence, despite the existence of video footage showing who threw the Molotov cocktails at the building.133

    The Ukrainian media cited SBU sources that a far-right activist, who headed the Right Sector in Odesa during the Odesa Massacre, was a secret agent of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and that he and far-right associates were paid by SBU to attack opposition politicians, threaten judges, and conduct other illegal actions.134 This would be consistent with the fact that the Right Sector was not investigated for the Odesa massacre even though the Right Sector publicly admitted involvement. His secret collaboration with SBU would also be consistent with the fact that SBU and the Prosecutor General Office refused to charge him for killing another person in Odesa in 2018. Moreover, in 2020, the SBU gave this far-right activist the status of a victim in this case, even though he streamed this killing on his social media account and the police investigation determined that he was the killer.135 In this sense, the Odesa massacre was not entirely anomalous; it featured post-Maidan far-right involvement with apparent support from high-level political leaders in a corrupt country where investigations and media have inconsistently followed the evidence.

    Conclusion

    This study assesses the role of the far-right in post-Maidan Ukraine, specifically, in the Donbas war and the Odesa massacre. These were two of the biggest episodes of political violence in the country leading up to the February 2022 Russian invasion. This area of research is worth close investigation because it represents intrinsically important episodes of political violence that have not attracted objective analysis based on available primary sources in Ukrainian, Russian, and English. Investigating the role of the far-right is also timely because the far-right in Ukraine is riven by duelling, self-serving contemporary narratives.

    The predominant narratives propagated by governments and the mainstream media in Ukraine, the West, Russia, and separatist-controlled Donbas, concerning the role of the far-right in the war in Donbas and the Odesa massacre, have evidently been partisan. Contrary to the Russian government, separatists, and associated media, the Ukrainian government and military are not Nazi or even neo-Nazi. There were no neo-Nazis among the upper echelon of the Ukrainian government. President Zelensky is certainly not a Jewish neo-Nazi. He tried to placate and
    mainstream the far-right for political reasons, but has no observable personal affinity to that extreme ideology.

    Neo-Nazis constituted only about one percent of the Ukrainian forces before the Russian invasion in 2022, and there is weak electoral support for neo-Nazi parties throughout the country. Similarly, the policy of glorification of the OUN-UPA, their leaders, such as Stepan Bandera, and the adoption and use of their “Glory to Ukraine! Glory to the Heroes!” greeting by the state and the military, including Zelensky, do not make Ukraine a Nazi state. While the OUN and the UPA were far-right terrorist organisations, which collaborated with Nazi Germany and perpetrated the mass murders of Jews, Poles, and Ukrainians, they were not Nazis. Ukrainians could not join the Nazi party because Hitler and other Nazi leaders regarded Ukrainians as racially inferior and opposed independence of Ukraine while also dismissing the attempt to create even a puppet state by the Bandera faction of the OUN in Lviv shortly after the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union. Thus, Putin cannot credibly justify the illegal invasion in February 2022 as a war to “de-Nazify” the “Nazi regime.”136 The power of the far-right and the glorification of the OUN and the UPA in Ukraine under Poroshenko and Zelensky were exaggerated and exploited by the Russian leaders to justify the invasion.

    But the West’s efforts to whitewash the far-right in Ukraine also rests on empirically shaky grounds. Despite their relatively small numbers militarily and politically, the far-right in Ukraine exercised outsized power. The far-right organisations, volunteer battalions, and paramilitary units organised and led by them played, along with separatists and Russian nationalists, a significant role in starting and escalating the incipient civil war in the Donbas and then impeding its peaceful resolution. Even after technically integrated into the official Ukrainian forces, Azov and other far-right groups continued to harbour extremist views. Often brandishing the same extremist symbols, the core leaders and members remained and even ascended within the police, military, and security services during the Donbas war. Western media accounts have drawn heavily from biased Ukrainian sources, including “official” investigations and the May 2 Group. Across numerous primary sources in Ukrainian, Russian, and English, we find evidence that the Right Sector, Social-National Assembly, its paramilitary wing Patriot of Ukraine, and groups of far-right football ultras from Odesa and Kharkiv played a critical role in the Odesa massacre against separatist protesters on 2 May 2014. Neo-Nazi SNA/Patriot of Ukraine, which dominated the Right Sector in Odesa and Kharkiv, organised the Azov battalion right after this massacre.

    Despite the lack of international consensus over the definition of terrorism, a common interpretation is the use of violence by non-state actors aimed at creating fear for political ends, particularly when the targets are civilians.137 Depending on one’s definition, some attacks within the episodes of political violence covered in this study, such as the Odesa massacre, could, therefore, arguably be classified as terrorism. What is clear is that neither of the duelling narratives accurately captures the role of the far-right. This study has helped to fill that research lacuna by making use of substantial primary source materials in Ukrainian, Russian, and English. Besides the Maidan massacre, the Donbas war and the Odesa massacre are the two most substantial episodes of political violence from the independence of Ukraine in 1991 to the February 2022 illegal Russian invasion [end]

    The original article

    Ivan Katchanovski is a Ukrainian and Canadian political scientist. He teaches at the School of Political Studies and the Conflict Studies and Human Rights Program at the University of Ottawa in Canada. He specialises primarily in politics, conflicts, political violence, and the far right in Ukraine. His academic publications include five books, 21 articles in peer-reviewed journals, and twelve book chapters.

    Max Abrahms is a professor of public policy and political science at Northeastern University, where he specialises in international security. Abrahms has published extensively in leading academic and popular outlets such as International Organization, International Security, International Studies Quarterly, Security Studies, Comparative Political Studies, Harvard Business Review, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, New York Times, Washington Post, USA Today, Newsweek, The Atlantic, and Los Angeles Times.

    I disagree with the authors on two points

    • Stepan Bandera & friends were Nazis. How can the authors identify some neo-Nazis in modern Ukraine, while not regarding their historical mentors as Nazis ? Before WW2, they were praising either Adolf Hitler or Benito Mussolini. Their political project was authoritarian, racist and criminal. They were dreaming of ethnic cleansing. De facto during WW2, they committed mass killing of Jews and Poles.
    • Terrorism is not restricted to non-state actors. Terrorism is violent action to terror civilians, in order to achieve a common political goal. This is not even a value judgement, but Hiroshima bombing was terrorism. The Israeli targeting and mass killing of civilians, in the prospect of ethnic cleansing in Gaza, is terrorism.

    The PDF

    My related articles

    Nazism in Ukraine

    its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine

    The footprint of the Ukrainian Nazism in the West

    interactions between Ukrainian Nazi organizations and Western supremacist militants

    The Western disinformation about Ukraine

    chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia

    Endnotes

    1. Arel, Dominique and Jesse Driscoll. 2023. Ukraine’s Unnamed War. Before the Russian Invasion of 2022.
      Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Black, J.L. and Michael Johns (Eds.). 2016. The Return of the
      Cold War: Ukraine, the West and Russia. Abingdon: Routledge; Hahn, Gordon M. 2018. Ukraine Over the
      Edge: Russia, the West and the “New Cold War.” Jefferson, NC: McFarland Books; Katchanovski, Ivan.
      2016a. “The Separatist War in Donbas: A Violent Break-up of Ukraine?” European Politics and Society,
      17 (4), 473-489; Kudelia, Serhiy. 2016. “The Donbas Rift.” Russian Politics & Law, 54 (1), 5-27; Pikulicka-Wilczewska, Agnieszka and Richard Sakwa (Eds.). 2015. Ukraine and Russia: People, Politics, Propaganda and Perspectives. Bristol: E-International Relations; Sakwa, Richard. 2015. Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands. London: I.B.Tauris. ↩︎
    2. Danciu, Gabriela-Cătălina. 2023. “A Perspective on Justifying the Ukraine–Russia War. Elements Of Propaganda.” International Journal of Social and Educational Innovation, 10 (19), 224-239; “Address by
      the President of the Russian Federation” (2022, February 24) http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843. ↩︎
    3. Black, J.L. and Michael Johns (Eds.). 2016. The Return of the Cold War: Ukraine, the West and Russia.
      Abingdon: Routledge; Katchanovski, Ivan. 2023a. “The Maidan Massacre Trial and Investigation Revelations and Their Implications for the Ukraine-Russia War and Relations.” Russian Politics, 8 (2),181-205. ↩︎
    4. See, for example, Colborne, Michael. 2022. From the Fires of War: Ukraine’s Azov Movement and the Global Far Right, Stuttgart: Ibidem; Davidzon, Vladislav. 2023. “The Search for Neo-Nazis Under the Bedsheets Reflects American Progressive Hysteria, Not Ukrainian Reality.” Tablet Magazine, July. ↩︎
    5. See Facebook (2014, May 2), https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=10100399733883920; On his background, see “AntiNATOvskii weekend v Sevastopole.” (2006, May 30). Evraziiskii soyuz molodezhi. http://rossia3.ru/Regions/san. ↩︎
    6. Umland, Andreas. 2019. “Irregular Militias and Radical Nationalism in PostEuromaydan Ukraine: The
      Prehistory and Emergence of the “Azov” Battalion in 2014.” Terrorism and Political Violence, 31 (1), 105-
      131. ↩︎
    7. Umland, Andreas. 2020. ‘The Far Right in Pre- and Post-Euromaidan Ukraine: From Ultra-Nationalist Party Politics to Ethno-Centric Uncivil Society.’ Demokratizatsiya, 28 (2), 247-268. ↩︎
    8. Ishchenko, Volodymyr. 2018. “Nationalist Radicalization Trends in Post-Euromaidan Ukraine.” Ponars Eurasia, Policy Memo 529. http://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/nationalist-radicalization-trends-post-euromaidan-ukraine. ↩︎
    9. Ishchenko, Volodymyr. 2016. “Far right participation in the Ukrainian Maidan protests: an attempt of systematic estimation.” European Politics and Society, 17 (4), 453-472. ↩︎
    10. Hahn, Gordon M. 2018. Ukraine Over the Edge: Russia, the West and the “New Cold War.” Jefferson, NC: McFarland Books; Katchanovski, Ivan. 2016b. “The Maidan Massacre in Ukraine: A Summary of Analysis, Evidence, and Findings.” In The Return of the Cold War: Ukraine, the West and Russia, eds. J.L. Black and Michael Johns. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 220-224; Katchanovski, Ivan. 2020. “The far right, the Euromaidan, and the Maidan massacre in Ukraine.” Journal of Labor and Society, 23 (1), 5-29; Katchanovski, 2023a; Katchanovski, Ivan. 2023b. “The “Snipers’ Massacre” on the Maidan in Ukraine.” Cogent Social Sciences, 9 (2); Katchanovski, Ivan. 2024. The Maidan Massacre in Ukraine. London: Palgrave Macmillan. ↩︎
    11. Khalil Mutallimzada and Kristian Steiner, (2022), Fighters’ motivations for joining extremist groups:
      Investigating the attractiveness of the Right Sector’s Volunteer Ukrainian Corps. European Journal of International Security, 1–23. Ilmari Käihkö, (2018), A nation-in-the-making, in arms: control of force, strategy and the Ukrainian Volunteer Battalions. Defence Studies 18:2, 147–166; Tetyana Malyarenko and David J. Galbreath, (2016), Paramilitary motivation in Ukraine: beyond integration and abolition, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 16:1, 113–138. ↩︎
    12. Hale, Henry E., Oxana Shevel and Olga Onuch. 2018. “Believing Facts in the Fog of War: Identity, Media
      and Hot Cognition in Ukraine’s 2014 Odesa Tragedy.” Geopolitics, 23 (4), 851-881. A poll commissioned for
      that study found that 44% of Ukrainians believed that this mass killing was committed by provocateurs from Russia, while 11% blamed pro-Russian residents of Odesa. Ten percent of the respondents said that the Odesa massacre was perpetrated by “Ukrainian nationalists from Odesa” and 3% by “pro-Ukrainian”
      residents of Odesa. ↩︎
    13. Van Evera, Stephen. 1997. Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. ↩︎
    14. Griffin, Roger with Matthew Feldman (Eds.). 2003. Fascism: Critical Concepts in Political Science. London: Routledge. ↩︎
    15. Brahimi, Alia. “Ideology and terrorism.” The Oxford handbook of terrorism (2019): 298. ↩︎
    16. See, for example, Jadoon, Amira, Andrew Mines, and Daniel Milton. “Targeting quality or quantity? The divergent effects of targeting upper verses lower tier leaders of militant organizations.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 67, no. 5 (2023): 1007-1031; Schram, Peter. “Self-managing terror: Resolving agency problems with diverse teams.” Games and Economic Behavior 130 (2021): 240-257; Abrahms, Max, and Philip BK Potter. “Explaining terrorism: Leadership deficits and militant group tactics.” International Organization 69, no. 2 (2015): 311-342; Popovic, Milos. “The perils of weak organization: Explaining loyalty and defection of militant organizations toward Pakistan.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 38, no. 11 (2015): 919-937. ↩︎
    17. Biletsky, Andriy. 2013. Slovo Biloho Vozhdia, ND: Sotsial-Natsionalna Asambleia. https://web.archive.org/web/20140924041340/http://rid.org.ua/knigarnya/AB/slovo.pdf. ↩︎
    18. Biletsky 2013; Biletsky, Andriy. “Ukrainskyi racovyi Sotsial-Natsionalism v ideologii organizatsii “Patriot Ukrainy.”“ Slovo Oriiv, 35 (2018, March). https://web.archive.org/web/20180924065537/http://slovoor.runvira.in.ua/SO35/St35Vid.htm. ↩︎
    19. Biletsky 2013; Biletsky, Andriy. “Nedochytanyi Franko.” Patriot Ukrainy, (2008). https://web.archive.org/web/20101120085407/http://patriotukr.org.ua/index.php?rub=stat&id=409. Also, please note that the ADL has adopted the spelling of “antisemitism” instead of “anti-Semitism.” After reviewing the history and consulting with other leading experts, they determined that this is the best way to refer to hatred toward Jews, so we have adopted the same spelling convention here. ↩︎
    20. Clarke, Colin P. “The Terrorist Diaspora.” Testimony, House Homeland Security Committee Task Force on Denying Terrorists Entry into the United States (2017). ↩︎
    21. See “Proniuk // Liudyna yaka namaliuvala symvol “Ideia Natsii “ (2023, October 31). https://acrains.com/interview/proniuk-2023/. ↩︎
    22. “Nyneshnii ukrainskii rezhim imeeet vse cherty natsistskogo, zayavil Lavrov.” RIA Novosti. (2018, December 17). https://ria.ru/20181217/1548087419.html. ↩︎
    23. “Clash with Neo-Nazis in Ukraine was inevitable, says Putin.” TASS. (2022, November 4). https://tass.com/politics/1532573. ↩︎
    24. “Address.” ↩︎
    25. Kirby, Paul. “Has Putin’s war failed and what does Russia want from Ukraine?” BBC News. (2022, February 24). https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56720589. ↩︎
    26. Boyd-Barrett, Oliver. 2016. Western Mainstream Media and the Ukraine Crisis: A Study in Conflict Propaganda. New York: Routledge. ↩︎
    27. Some researchers and Zelensky have cited the presence of Russian-speakers in the Azov regiment and other neo-Nazi-led armed formations as evidence of their relative tolerance and moderation and argued that the Azov regiment distanced itself from its far-right roots. (See Umland 2019; “Zelensky refutes Russian propaganda claim that Azov Regiment is ‘neo-Nazi.’” The New Voice of Ukraine (2022, May 2), https://news.yahoo.com/zelensky-refutes-russian-propaganda-claim-131100438.html. However, these formations were organized and led by neo-Nazi organizations, which had a racist ideology and cast themselves as defenders of the White race. For this reason, they included not only large numbers of Russian speakers from Ukraine but also neo-Nazis from Russia, Belarus, and the Western countries, such as Australia, Sweden, and the US. ↩︎
    28. “Factbox: Last defenders of Mariupol: what is Ukraine’s Azov Regiment?” Reuters. (2022, May 17) https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/last-defenders-mariupol-what-is-ukraines-azov-regiment-2022-05-17/. ↩︎
    29. “Ukraine war: Ros Atkins on… Putin’s false ‘Nazi’ claims.” BBC, (2022, March 26) https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-europe-60853404; Five Azovstal defenders were awarded the title of Heroes of Ukraine. Svidomi, (2022, October 3). https://svidomi.in.ua/en/page/five-azovstal-defenders-were-awarded-the-title-of-heroes-of-ukraine. Loyd, Anthony. “‘Nonsense’: Heroes of Mariupol Denied US Weapons Over neo-Nazi Past.” Times, (2024 May 2). https://www.thetimes.com/world/russia-ukraine-war/article/nonsense-heroes-of-mariupol-denied-us-weapons-over-neo-nazi-past-kwnr0r0pw; “Boris Johnson Praises Nazi Azov Battalion,” YouTube. (2024, May 23). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_6g7i-4wswk. There was similar systematic and politically motivated whitewashing of the far-right in Ukraine in Wikipedia, especially, after the Russian invasion. A small number of Wikipedia editors systematically whitewashed neo-Nazi and other far-right parties, organizations, and their leaders, such as Azov regiment, Patriot of Ukraine, Svoboda, National Corps, the OUN, the UPA, Stepan Bandera, Roman Shukhevych, etc. They removed or deliberately excluded scholarly studies and other evidence of the extremist ideology and involvement in mass murder of the far-right, such as the Maidan and Odesa massacres, the Holocaust, and the Lviv pogrom in Ukraine and smeared in biographical entries
      scholars and other experts whose studies show such ideology and political violence by the far-right
      in Ukraine. (See, for example, Azov Brigade, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Azov_Brigade; Patriot of
      Ukraine, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patriot_of_Ukraine; 2014 Odesa clashes, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014_Odesa_clashes; Far-right politics in Ukraine, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Far-right_politics_in_Ukraine. They included editors who misrepresented the Holocaust in Poland using similar tactics in Wikipedia, which is unreliable but widely accessed source, compared to academic studies (Grabowski, Jan, and Shira Klein. 2023. “Wikipedia’s Intentional Distortion of the History of the Holocaust.” Journal of Holocaust Research 37 (2): 133–90). ↩︎
    30. Katchanovski, Ivan and Alicen Morley. 2012. “Politics of US Television Coverage of Post-Communist Countries.” Problems of Post-Communism, 59 (1), 15-30. ↩︎
    31. Smale, Alison and Andrew E. Kramer. “Ukraine Presses Pro-Russia Militants After Fighting Spreads to a Port City.” New York Times, (2014, May 3). https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/04/world/europe/ukraine.html; “Ukraine: Investigate Odessa Deaths.” Human Rights Watch. (2014, May 8), https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/08/ukraine-investigate-odessa-deaths. [n.b. While the modern spelling of the city in Ukraine is “Odesa”, several instances of the older spelling “Odessa” are still found online.] ↩︎
    32. Ishchenko, Volodymyr. “Denial of the obvious: Far right in Maidan protests and their danger today.” VoxUkraine. (2018, April 16). https://voxukraine.org/en/denial-of-the-obvious-far-right-in-maidan-protests-and-their-danger-today. ↩︎
    33. Cohen, Stephen F. “America’s Collusion with Neo-Nazis.” Nation. (2018, May 2), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/americas-collusion-with-neo-nazis/. ↩︎
    34. Miller, Christopher. “G7 Letter Takes Aim At Role Of Violent Extremists In Ukrainian Society, Election.” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. (2019, March 22). https://www.rferl.org/a/g7-takes-aim-at-role-of-violent-extremists-in-ukrainian-society-election/29836811.html. ↩︎
    35. Golinkin, Lev. “The Western Media Is Whitewashing the Azov Battalion.” Nation. (2023, June 13). https://www.thenation.com/article/world/azov-battalion-neo-nazi/. ↩︎
    36. “Ukraine 2018 Human Rights Report. State Department.” 2019. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/UKRAINE-2018-HUMAN-RIGHTS-REPORT.pdf. ↩︎
    37. Miller, Christopher. “G7 Letter Takes Aim At Role Of Violent Extremists In Ukrainian Society, Election,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, (2019, March 22). https://www.rferl.org/a/g7-takes-aim-at-role-of-violent-extremists-in-ukrainian-society-election/29836811.html. ↩︎
    38. See Twitter, (2019, October 16). https://twitter.com/RepMaxRose/status/1184518558392504321?s=20. ↩︎
    39. Cohen, Josh. “Ukraine Should Beware the Azov Extremists.” Moscow Times, (2015, July 20). https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2015/07/20/ukraine-should-beware-the-azov-extremists-a48402. ↩︎
    40. “H.Amdt. 492 – 114th Congress (2015-2016).” (2015, June 11). https://www.congress.gov/amendment/114th-congress/house-amendment/492?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22azov%22%5D%7D&resultIndex=1. ↩︎
    41. Birnbaum, Michael, Siobhán O’Grady, and Alex Horton. “U.S. Lifts Weapons Ban on Ukrainian Military Unit.” Washington Post, (2024, June 12). https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/06/10/azov-brigade-ukraine-us-weapons/. ↩︎
    42. Congressional Record (2024, June 27). https://www.congress.gov/118/crec/2024/06/27/170/108/CREC-2024-06-27.pdf . ↩︎
    43. Sanger, David E. “Jihadists Receiving Most Arms Sent to Syrian Rebels.” The New York Times, (2012. October 15). https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/15/world/middleeast/jihadists-receiving-most-arms-sent-to-syrian-rebels.html. Mahmood, Mona, and Ian Black. “Free Syrian Army Rebels Defect to Islamist Group Jabhat Al-Nusra.” Guardian, (2018, April 14). https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/08/free-syrian-army-rebels-defect-islamist-group; Abrahms, Max. “Syria’s Extremist Opposition: How Western Media Have Whitewashed the Rebels’ Record.” Foreign Affairs (2017, October 30); Doran, Michael, William McCants, and Clint Watts. “The Good and Bad of Ahrar al-Sham.” Foreign Affairs (2014, January 23). ↩︎
    44. Bhatia, Michael. 2008. “Fighting words: naming terrorists, bandits, rebels and other violent actors, ”Third World Quarterly, 26 (1), 5-22; Schmid, Alex P. 2012. “The revised academic consensus definition of terrorism.” Perspectives on Terrorism, 6 (2), 158-159; Ganor, Boaz. 2002. “Defining terrorism: Is one man’s terrorist another man’s freedom fighter?” Police Practice and Research, 3 (4), 287-304. ↩︎
    45. Although the focus of this analysis is on the portrayal of the far-right in Ukraine, a related narrative dispute has been over whether to characterise the conflict in the Donbas as a civil war. The Ukrainian and Western governments and the media described the war in Donbas as an interstate war between Russia and Ukraine or a hybrid war while denying that there was a civil war. By contrast, the Russian and Donbas separatist governments and associated media denied any Russian military involvement in the war and called it a purely civil war. The majority of scholars and datasets such as the Correlates of War Project and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program classified it as a civil war or an intrastate conflict, while also noting the Russian military interventions in Donbas prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in See, for example, Arel and Driscoll 2023; Black and Johns 2016; Hahn 2018; Katchanovski 2016a; Kudelia 2016. ↩︎
    46. Abrahms, Max. “What terrorists really want: Terrorist motives and counterterrorism strategy.” International Security 32, no. 4 (2008): 78-105. ↩︎
    47. Rossolinski-Liebe, Grzegorz. 2014. Stepan Bandera: The life and afterlife of a Ukrainian nationalist. Stuttgart: Ibidem. ↩︎
    48. Yeomans, Rory, (Ed.). 2016. The Utopia of Terror: Life and Death in Wartime Croatia. Rochester: University of Rochester Press; Katchanovski, Ivan. 2015. “Terrorists or National Heroes? Politics and
      Perceptions of the OUN and the UPA in Ukraine.” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 48 (2-3), 217-228. ↩︎
    49. Rudling, Per Anders. 2011. “The OUN, the UPA and the Holocaust. A Study in the Manufacturing of Historical Myths.” Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies, #2107, Center for Russian and East European Studies, Pittsburgh University. ↩︎
    50. See Katchanovski, 2016a; Katchanovski, Ivan. 2006. Cleft Countries: Regional Political Divisions and Cultures in Post-Soviet Ukraine and Moldova. Stuttgart: Ibidem. ↩︎
    51. See Katchanovski, Ivan. (2015, March 28). “An Interview with Al Jazeera Concerning Far Right Militia and Paramilitary Battalions and Other Formations in Ukraine.” https://www.academia.edu/11815497/An_Interview_with_Al_Jazeera_Concerning_Far_Right_Militia_and_Paramilitary_Battalions_and_Other_Formations_in_Ukraine. ↩︎
    52. See, for example, Dorell, Oren. (2015, March 10). “Volunteer Ukrainian unit includes Nazis.” USA TODAY. https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/03/10/ukraine-azov-brigade-nazis-abuses-separatists/24664937; Katchanovski, “An Interview.” ↩︎
    53. See Khalel, Sheren and Matthew Vickery. (2015, April 15). “‘Christian Taliban’s’ crusade on Ukraine’s front lines.” Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/04/taliban-crusade-ukraine-front-lines-150414125522623.html ↩︎
    54. “V kamere eks-boitsov Tornado nashli nozhi i flag so svastikoi: foto.” (2018, August 14). Liga. https://news.liga.net/incidents/news/v-kamere-eks-boytsov-tornado-nashli-noji-i-flag-so-svastikoy-foto. ↩︎
    55. “Dobrovolchyi Ukrainskyi Korpus “Pravyi Sektor.””(ND). Pravyi Sektor, https://pravyysektor.info/dobrovolchyy-ukrayinskyy-korpus-pravyy-sektor ↩︎
    56. Estimated from “V Ukraini na obliku maizhe 370 tysiach uchansykiv boiovykh dii.” (2019, September
      18). Ukrinform. https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/2782328-v-ukraini-majze-370-tisac-ucasnikiv-bojovih-dij.html ↩︎
    57. See, for example, “Partiia Svoboda stvoriue vlasnyi battalion.” (2014, June 13). Korrespondent.net. https://ua.korrespondent.net/ukraine/politics/3377514-partiia-svoboda-stvoruiie-vlasnyi-batalion. ↩︎
    58. “Ukhvala,” Pechersk District Court of Kyiv City, February 12, 2016. http://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/55966993. ↩︎
    59. “Dmytro Yarosh: “Pershyi nastupalnyi bіi vіiny vіdbuvsia 20 kvіtnia 2014-ho – Dobrovol’tsі atakuvaly
      blokpost pіd Slovianskom.” (2016, April 22). Censor.net. http://censor.net.ua/resonance/385673/dmitro_yarosh_pershiyi_nastupalniyi_byi_vyini_vdbuvsya_20_kvtnya_2014go_dobrovolts_atakuvali_blokpost. ↩︎
    60. Ibid. ↩︎
    61. Dzhyndzia, Andrii. “Batalion AZOV zatrymav terorysta Tiulenia.” (2014, May 12). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=681hBNGeVUM. ↩︎
    62. “On June 13, 2014, Mariupol was liberated from the terrorist DPR. Liberation from the Russian occupation is next.” Ukrainian Institute of National Memory, 13 June 2022, https://uinp.gov.ua/pres-centr/novyny/13-chervnya-2014-mariupol-zvilnyly-vid-terorystychnoyi-dnr-na-cherzi-zvilnennya-vid-rosiyskoyi-okupaciyi. ↩︎
    63. See, for example, “Krasnoarmeisk. Rasstrel mirnykh zhitelei 11.05.2014.” (2014, May 11). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W4joK6D_-Wc. ↩︎
    64. Marples, David R. “Russia’s perceptions of Ukraine: Euromaidan and historical conflicts.” In Ukraine in Crisis, pp. 4-17. Routledge, 2017. ↩︎
    65. The war was most intense and violent in 2014 and 2015. The violence declined significantly following
      the Minsk Agreements in 2015. ↩︎
    66. See, for example, Kuzmenko, Oleksiy. “The Azov Regiment has not depoliticized.” UkraineAlert, (2020, March 19). https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/the-azov-regiment-has-not-depoliticized/. ↩︎
    67. Stern, David. 2014. “Ukraine Vote Could Push the Country into Chaos.” BBC News, (2014, October 24). https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29755967. ↩︎
    68. Cohen, Josh. 2023. “Ukraine Should Beware the Azov Extremists.” The Moscow Times, (2023, August 26). https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2015/07/20/ukraine-should-beware-the-azov-extremists-a48402. ↩︎
    69. See Golinkin ↩︎
    70. “Ukraine’s Advances Near Bakhmut Expose Rifts in Russian Forces.” New York Times, (2023 May 17). https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/12/world/europe/ukraine-bakhmut-russia.html. ↩︎
    71. “Andrii Biletsky: Rosiiany sterly svoi kadrovi chastyny v Ukrayini v nul.” Ukrainska Pravda, (2023, October 17). https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2023/10/17/7424397. ↩︎
    72. Many of them were hidden or scrapped after the Russian invasion. See, for example, Twitter (2024,
      June 13), https://x.com/mossrobeson__/status/1801415521608327584. ↩︎
    73. Umland, Andreas. 2019. “Irregular Militias and Radical Nationalism in PostEuromaydan Ukraine: The Prehistory and Emergence of the “Azov” Battalion in 2014.” Terrorism and Political Violence, 31 (1),
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    74. Stern, David. “Ukraine underplays role of far right in conflict.” BBC News (2014, December 13). https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30414955. ↩︎
    75. Lokshina, Tanya. “‘You Don’t Exist.’” Human Rights Watch, (2016, July 21). https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/07/21/you-dont-exist/arbitrary-detentions-enforced-disappearances-and-torture-eastern. ↩︎
    76. Mueller, John E. 2006. Overblown: How politicians and the terrorism industry inflate national security threats, and why we believe them. New York: Simon and Schuster; Abrahms, Max. 2006. “Why terrorism does not work.” International Security, 31 (2), 42-78. ↩︎
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    78. “Right Sector Challenges Kyiv in Western Ukraine – Jamestown.” 2016. Jamestown. September 20, https://jamestown.org/program/right-sector-challenges-kyiv-in-western-ukraine/. ↩︎
    79. Hranatu kynuv “svobodivets”“ iz batalionu “Sich” – Avakov. Ukrainska pravda, (2015, August 31). https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2015/08/31/7079662; “Right-Wing Party Members Charged with Ukraine Clashes.” Voice of America, (2015, September 4). https://www.voanews.com/a/ap-ukraine-right-wing-party-leader-questioned-in-kyiv/2946747.html. ↩︎
    80. See Reiter, Andrew G. 2015. “Does spoiling work? Assessing the impact of spoilers on civil war peace agreements.” Civil Wars, 17 (1), 89-111. ↩︎
    81. “Zelenskyy: Ia ne loh kakoi-to.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3zNLrZXTZsA. ↩︎
    82. “Ukrainian Far-Right Groups, Veterans Protest President’s Peace Plan.” 2019. PBS, (2019, October
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    83. “Yarosh: esli Zelenskyy predast Ukrainu — poteriaet ne dolzhnost, a zhizn.” Obozrevatel, (2019, May 27). https://incident.obozrevatel.com/crime/dmitrij-yarosh-esli-zelenskij-predast-ukrainu-poteryaet-ne-dolzhnost-a-zhizn.htm. ↩︎
    84. “Henshtab ne ziznayetsia pro rol Yarosha. Toj proinspektuvav svoiu dobrovolchu armiiu.” Ukrainska pravda. (2021, December 13). https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2021/12/13/7317209. ↩︎
    85. See, for example, (2021 March 20), https://t.me/stranaua/12696. ↩︎
    86. “Ukrainegate Impeachment Saga Worsens US-Russia Cold War.” (2019, November 13). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bpASSqz1hGc. ↩︎
    87. Sokol, Sam. “Kiev Regional Police Head Accused of Neo-Nazi Ties.” The Jerusalem Post, (2014, November 12). https://www.jpost.com/diaspora/kiev-regional-police-head-accused-of-neo-nazi-ties-381559; “Troyana zrobyly zastupnykom Avakova,” UN, (2017, February 8). https://ukranews.com/ua/news/477875-troyana-zrobyly-zastupnykom-avakova. ↩︎
    88. “Premier Goncharuk blagodarit uchastnikov kontserta ultrapravoi gruppy “Sokira Peruna.”“ (2019, October 14). Strana. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D3WuiYje3eA. ↩︎
    89. “Pro Russian Journalist Gunned Down in Kiev.” NBC News, (2015, April 16). https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/ukraine-crisis/pro-russian-journalist-oles-buzina-shot-dead-kiev-masked-gunmen-n342661. ↩︎
    90. “Accountability for killings in Ukraine from January 2014 to May 2016.” Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. 2016. https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Countries/UA/OHCHRThematicReportUkraineJan2014-May2016_EN.pdf ↩︎
    91. “Report of the International Advisory Panel on its Review of the Investigations into the Events in Odesa on 2 May 2014.” (2015, November 4). Council of Europe. https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=090000168048610f ↩︎
    92. “Report.” ↩︎
    93. Twitter, (2023, July 26). https://twitter.com/i/status/1684280903508303872. ↩︎
    94. “Zvit tymchasovoi slidchoi komisii Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy z pytan rozsliduvannia faktiv zahybeli hromadian u mistakh Odesi, Nariupoli, a takozh inshykh mistakh Donetskoi ta Luhanskoi oblastei Ukrainy.” (2014, September 5). Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy. http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=52134 ↩︎
    95. ““Chto takoe operativnyi plan “Volna”? Chast 3.” (2014, August 3). Gruppa 2 Maia. https://2maygroup.blogspot.com/2014/08/blog-post.html. ↩︎
    96. “Zvit.” ↩︎
    97. “Zvit.” ↩︎
    98. “Ukraine’s SBI opens case against ex-Parliament Speaker over Odesa events of May 2, 2014.” (2019,
      September 23). UNIAN. https://www.unian.info/society/10695003-ukraine-s-sbi-opens-case-against-ex-parliament-speaker-over-odesa-events-of-may-2-2014.html. ↩︎
    99. Stephan, Anna. (2018, May 4). “Ploshchad Razbityh Nadezhd (polnaia versiia).” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C-7xjDxFSQc. ↩︎
    100. Ibid and Katchanovski (2020; 2024). ↩︎
    101. “Zasidannia vid 14.12.2021 u spravi pro «Vbyvstva lyudei 20.02.2014 pid chas Evromaidanu».” https://youtu.be/iwaXGtd1Pe8?t=6026. ↩︎
    102. “7 Years with No Answers. What Is Lacking in the Investigations of the Events in Odesa on 2 May 2014?” United Nations Ukraine, (2022, 30 April 20). https://ukraine.un.org/en/126054-7-years-no-answers-what-lacking-investigations-events-odesa-2-may-2014. ↩︎
    103. Zvit. ↩︎
    104. “Euro;” Katchanovski (2020). ↩︎
    105. “15.26;15.28 Odessa 2 Maia 2014 goda.” (2015, May 8). Gruppa 2 Maia. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gicl3WFn6fw ↩︎
    106. Katchanovski, Ivan. (May 6, 2015) “A new analysis of the massacre events in Odesa Ukraine of May 2. New Cold War. https://newcoldwar.org/a-new-analysis-of-the-massacre-events-in-odessa-ukraine-of-may-2-2014/; ↩︎
    107. See, for example, “1523 Napadenie 2 Maia 2014, Odessa.” (2015, May 10). Gruppa 2 Maia. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vj_NehDtSrA; “Khronologiya sobytiy v Odesse 2 Maia 2014 goda (ch.1).” (2015, May 15). Gruppa 2 Maia. http://2mayodessa.org/. ↩︎
    108. “Odessa strelok s AK-47 na Deribasovskoi.” (2014, May 4). Poslednie sobytiya. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LWI6s89srvw. ↩︎
    109. See “Khronologiya.” ↩︎
    110. ““SOROK VOSEM.” Zakliucheniia sudebno-medicinskoi ekspertizy po faktam gibeli liudei v hode Odesskoi boini 2 maia 2014 g.” (ND). IGCP. https://vk.com/doc4683615_387082531?hash=50ef6fd55f4f5a7c71&dl=1ad9e60aff875593d8. ↩︎
    111. Tkachov, Yuriy. (2017, April 27). “Tragedia 2 Maia v Odesse. Rekonstruktsiia.” Strana. https://strana.ua/articles/analysis/67438-tragediya-2-maya-v-voprosah-i-otvetah.html; Odessa strelok. ↩︎
    112. “Odessa: tri goda. Film Arkadiia Mamontova.” Spetsialnyi korrespondent ot 24.04.17. (2017, April
      24). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yayhe4wXcWQ. ↩︎
    113. “2 Maia 2014 goda. Odessa.” (2016, January 15). Vladimir Sarkisian. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NZNQQ9vXclQ. ↩︎
    114. “SOROK.” ↩︎
    115. “SOROK.” ↩︎
    116. “Odessa 2 Maia.” (2014, May 9). Svidetelstvo ochevidtsa /1612. Informatsionnyi kanal “16/12.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0ZdT1mspt70. ↩︎
    117. “Avakov: u spravi “2 travnia v Odesi figure chlen “Pravoho sektora.”“ (2015, December 18). Ukrainska pravda. https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2015/12/18/7092946. ↩︎
    118. “Deputat Mosiichuk zastavliaet sudiiu Primorskogo suda Odessy Poprevicha vziat samootvod.” (2015, August 4). Ivan Ivanov. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ueHHestJUgk. ↩︎
    119. “Igor Bolianskii zvonit Dmitriiu Gumeniuku i daet prikaz “zachistit” Kulikovo pole.” (2014, December 2). Sergei Rulev. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tern1-ro9YU. ↩︎
    120. “Odessa marsh za edinstvo 02.05.2014.” (2014, May 2). sergiydibrov. http://bambuser.com/v/4585430; “19 49.” (2015, July 16). Gruppa 2 Maia. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZT-e_QGhHNI; “19 50.” (2015, July 16). Gruppa 2 Maia. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1dIqF4C1E8A; “Ukraine: Masks of the Revolution.” (2016, February 16). Java Films PRO. https://vimeo.com/ondemand/masksofukrainepl. ↩︎
    121. Olearchyk, Roman. 2014. “Kiev Hands Odessa Post to New Governor in Effort to End Uprising.” Financial
      Times, (2014 May 6). https://www.ft.com/content/edc91232-d535-11e3-9bca-00144feabdc0. ↩︎
    122. ““Gruppa 2 Maia” opublikovala otchet o pozhare v dome profsoyuzov v Odesse.” (2015, March 24). Korrespondent.net. https://korrespondent.net/ukraine/3495145-hruppa-2-maia-opublykovala-otchet-o-pozhare-v-dome-profsouizov-v-odesse; See also “Avtomobil dlia “Azovu” prydbaiut za hroshi Ihora Palytsi.” (2014, October 23). Volynski novyny. https://www.volynnews.com/news/society/avtomobil-dlia-azovu-prydbaiut-za-koshty-ihoria-palytsi. ↩︎
    123. “Avtomobili.” ↩︎
    124. Katchanovski, Ivan. 2020. ‘The far right, the Euromaidan, and the Maidan massacre in Ukraine.’ Journal of Labor and Society, 23 (1), 5-29. ↩︎
    125. See, for example, “Aktsia pid KS.” Ukrainska pravda, (2020, October 30) https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2020/10/30/7271758. ↩︎
    126. “SOROK”. ↩︎
    127. Abrahms, Max, and Justin Conrad. “The strategic logic of credit claiming: A new theory for anonymous terrorist attacks.” Security Studies 26, no. 2 (2017): 279-304. ↩︎
    128. Ibid. ↩︎
    129. “Bіitsі “Pravoho sektora” ta aktyvіsty Odesy vіdbyly napad prorosіiskykh naimantsіv.” (2014, May 2). Pravyi sektor. http://old.pravyysektor.info/news/bijtsi-pravoho-sektora-ta-aktyvisty-odesy-vidbyly-napad-prorosijskyh-najmantsiv/. ↩︎
    130. “Siohodni v Odesi vidbulysia kryvavi boi za Ukrainu.” (2014, May 2). Sotsial-Natsionalna Assambleia. http://snaua.info/sogodni-v-odesi-vidbulisya-krivavi-boyi-za-ukrayinu/. ↩︎
    131. “Sud opravdal prorossiiskikh uchastnikov odesskoi tragedii 2 maia, no ikh sobiraiutsia snova zaderzhat.” (2017, September 18). Dumskaya. http://dumskaya.net/news/sud-prigovor-077120. ↩︎
    132. See “Report.” ↩︎
    133. “Report,” 38. ↩︎
    134. “Strana” uznala familiyu kuratora radikala Sternenko iz SBU.” Strana, (2019, May 24). https://strana.ua/news/202834-stala-izvestna-familija-sotrudnika-sbu-kotoryj-kuriruet-radikalov-odessy.html. ↩︎
    135. “Natsionalista Sternenko, zarezavshego cheloveka v Odesse, priznali poterpevshim.” Strana, (2020, May 18). https://strana.ua/news/267850-sbu-priznala-sternenko-poterpevshim-nesmotrja-na-smet-ivana-kuznetsova.html. ↩︎
    136. “Clash.” ↩︎
    137. Schmid, Alex. “Terrorism-the definitional problem.” Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 36 (2004): 375; Schmid, Alex P. “The definition of terrorism.” In The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, pp. 39-157. Routledge, 2011; Schmid, Alex P. “Discussion 1-Revisiting the wicked problem of defining terrorism.” Terrorism: Its Past, Present & Future Study A Special Issue to Commemorate CSTPV at 25 (2020): 3. ↩︎