Nicolas Cinquini

Analista senior di l'intelligenza in u campu di a gestione di i risichi di sicurezza, sò un anzianu tenente detective è ufficiale di l'intelligenza in l'agenzie di u Statu francese. A bona pronuncia hè Николай Чинкуини, in russu

Tag: whitewashing

  • [Partage] Guerre d’Ukraine et menace russe : prétextes d’une marche forcée vers le fédéralisme européen – Éric Denécé, Cf2R

    […] en premier lieu, de nombreux éléments conduisent à penser que les Européens poursuivent la politique des néoconservateurs de l’ex-équipe Biden […]

    La Realpolitik, caractérisée par la prise en compte réaliste des rapports de force, est de retour à Washington. On le constate avec la démarche de Donald Trump qui a repris contact avec Vladimir Poutine. Il a compris que la stratégie d’affaiblissement de la Russie conçue par les néoconservateurs de l’équipe Biden était un échec et que la guerre ne menait à rien. Trump a intérêt à y mettre un terme pour passer à autre chose. Il veut un deal avec Poutine, car il ne souhaite pas que les hydrocarbures et les terres rares russes partent en Chine. Il se serait même dit prêt à participer au développement de la Crimée et du Donbass.

    Mais cette évolution n’est pas du goût de Zelenski 1 et de son entourage parce que cela remet en cause leur mainmise sur l’Ukraine. Ils bénéficient étonnamment du soutien des Européens, dont on comprend mal ce qu’ils ont à gagner à la poursuite de la guerre. Leur obstination est d’autant plus funeste que les trois années écoulées ont montré que ce conflit était dévastateur pour l’économie européenne et que ses États membres étaient incapables d’assurer eux-mêmes leur sécurité comme de soutenir efficacement Kiev en matière militaire. En réalité, leur attitude s’inscrit dans le cadre d’une stratégie précise, conduite à l’insu des peuples européens.

    Une obstination difficilement compréhensible

    Plusieurs raisons peuvent expliquer l’étonnante attitude de va-t’en guerre des dirigeants européens et de leur slogan stupide de « Paix par la force ».

    – En premier lieu, de nombreux éléments conduisent à penser que les Européens poursuivent la politique des néoconservateurs de l’ex-équipe Biden – à l’origine de ce conflit –, à leur instigation. En effet, les Démocrates, battus à plate couture lors des dernières présidentielles américaines sont en pleine déconfiture aux États-Unis. Le parti est à la dérive, se fissure et les chances de redressement à court terme sont minces. Trump, ayant tiré les leçons de la manière dont son premier mandat avait été saboté par les actions de l’État profond américain piloté par les familles Clinton et Obama, a, dès sa prise de fonctions, lancé toute une série d’actions (dissolution de l’USAID, reprise en mains de l’appareil d’État et de l’administration, recadrage des juges des juges, etc.) qui ne leur permettent pas de perturber efficacement son début de mandat – au moins pas avant les élections de mid term – comme ils l’avaient fait entre 2016 et 2020. Les Démocrates sont donc totalement impuissants. En revanche, divers éléments laissent entrevoir qu’ils s’emploient à saborder sa politique internationale en s’appuyant sur le Royaume-Uni et les États de l’Union européenne.

    En effet, depuis 2003, les dirigeants européens ont fait acte de soumission aux États-Unis et à leur bellicisme. Ils ont d’abord appuyé l’invasion illégale de l’Irak. Puis ils ont accepté de reconnaitre le régime ukrainien issu du coup d’État de Maïdan (2014) et ont fermé les yeux sur la répression violente déclenchée par Kiev au Donbass. Ensuite, ils se sont laissés entraîner, à leurs frais et à leur détriment, dans une guerre voulue par Washington, adoptant parfois des positions plus radicales encore contre Moscou qui n’avait pourtant manifesté contre eux aucune hostilité.

    Tous les dirigeants européens actuels entretiennent les meilleures relations du monde avec l’équipe démocrate et tous – à l’exception de Viktor Orban, Robert Fico et Georgia Meloni – ont, plus ou moins directement et explicitement, pris parti contre la réélection de Trump. Depuis son entrée à la Maison-Blanche, ils ne cessent de critiquer la nouvelle politique américaine. Ils semblent ainsi poursuivre, en vassaux fidèles, la politique des Démocrates, que ceux-ci continuent de piloter dans l’ombre depuis Washington, partant du principe – hautement hasardeux – que l’élection de Trump n’est qu’une malheureuse parenthèse qui prendra fin au plus tard en 2029. Il convient donc de contrer sa politique en attendant leur retour aux affaires… Cela explique la défiance et le mépris de la nouvelle administration américaine à l’égard de ces « leaders » européens qu’elle juge hostiles, raison pour laquelle elle ne tient aucunement compte de leur avis et de leurs agitations improductives.

    – La seconde explication est que le contexte de crise (militaire et économique) que traverse actuellement le Vieux continent favorise l’ensemble de ces leaders vis-à-vis de leur électorat, car la plupart d’entre eux – en particulier Emmanuel Macron – se trouvent dans une situation politique difficile. Ils jouent donc sur la peur d’une menace russe imminente – totalement inventée dans ce but – pour maintenir les populations dans l’angoisse, faire taire les critiques contre leur politique internationale inconsidérée et retarder l’échéance de leur défaite. En effet, les dirigeants européens doivent dissimuler le fait que leur décision de rompre avec la Russie a créé l’inflation, les difficultés économiques et accéléré la désindustrialisation et la dépendance vis-à-vis des États-Unis (GNL, armes, etc.) 2.

    – Enfin, troisième hypothèse à ne pas écarter, c’est le refus de prise en compte du réel des élites européennes, par cécité ou incompétence géopolitique, et la certitude que leur action est juste, fondée et légitime, illustration de leur déconnexion complète des réalités de terrain et de l’évolution des rapports de force internationaux.

    Faire l’Europe par la crise, l’emprunt et la guerre

    Mais en réalité, il existe une autre explication qui commence seulement à être perçue et qui éclaire d’un jour nouveau l’intransigeance des dirigeants européens : ils exploitent au maximum cette crise pour faire avancer l’Europe dans une voie fédérale, sans demander l’avis des peuples. Leur but ? Faire l’Europe par la crise, l’emprunt et la guerre.

    Cette stratégie machiavélique, véritable manipulation antidémocratique pour imposer une Europe supranationale dont personne ne veut, a été mise en place à partir de la seconde moitié des années 2010, exploitant divers événements internationaux : la crise des Subprimes d’abord ; le COVID ensuite ; enfin, la guerre d’Ukraine et la menace russe. Il est important de détailler les étapes de cette dérive organisée.

    Rappelons au préalable qu’il convient de faire une nette différence entre les pays de l’UE membres de la zone euro (20 sur 27 3) et ceux qui n’en sont pas. Si tous dépendent de la Commission, seuls les premiers dépendent en plus de la Banque centrale européenne (BCE). Ils sont donc sous double dépendance de la Commission et de la BCE. Il convient également de rappeler que la BCE n’a pas le droit de proposer des emprunts. Cela est interdit par les traités. Pourtant, il y a eu deux entorses à cette règle :

    – lors de la crise des Subprimes (2008-2009), Mario Draghi a mis en place le Quantitative Easing, c’est-à-dire une émission monétaire de la BCE avec possibilité de racheter des dettes des pays de la zone euro (et non de l’UE) sur le second marché (auprès des banques commerciales auxquelles une partie des dettes ont été rachetées) ;

    – lors de la crise du COVID, un emprunt de 700 milliards d’euros a été émis, garanti par les pays de la zone euro, mais bénéficiant aussi à ceux qui n’en sont pas membres… et qui pourraient décider de ne pas être solidaires pour son remboursement, car rien ne les y oblige. Ce serait alors aux autres États ayant garanti l’emprunt de compenser !

    Ainsi, depuis la crise sanitaire et économique liée au COVID, les États de la zone euro sont de plus en plus tenus par la Commission européenne, via la BCE, par le biais de laquelle ils ont emprunté, accroissant leur dette et renforçant le contrôle financier de Bruxelles. Ils dépendent d’une monnaie – l’euro – qui ne leur appartient pas, d’où la réduction considérable de leur marge de manœuvre économique et financière. Mais ce n’est encore qu’une monnaie « partagée », c’est-à-dire qu’elle n’est pas encore vraiment « commune ». Pour le moment, nous sommes tous endettés en euro « national » via nos États respectifs. Mais si la monnaie devenait véritablement commune – ce qui est sans doute l’objectif de l’euro numérique –, les États se trouveraient totalement sous le pouvoir d’une structure supranationale. Ils n’auraient alors plus aucune maîtrise de leur destin et il leur serait extrêmement difficile de sortir de l’UE.

    Le programme de financement du réarmement européen via des prêts aux États et l’autorisation d’accroître leur déficit de 1,5% sans sanction 4 va renforcer encore davantage ce phénomène 5. L’indépendance financière, et donc politique, des États membres de la zone euro risque ainsi de diminuer rapidement, voire de disparaître.

    Les dérives antidémocratiques et autoritaires de l’UE

    Pour arriver à leurs fins, les dirigeants européens ne reculent devant rien : reniements, propagande, falsifications de la réalité, abus de pouvoir… contrevenant sans scrupule aux principes démocratiques qu’ils sont censés incarner et défendre.

    – En premier lieu, il convient de rappeler leur soutien au coup d’État de Maïdan de 2014 orchestré par Washington, leur non-respect délibéré des accords de Minsk, leur silence sur la répression dans le Donbass et leur validation du rejet de l’accord de paix russo-ukrainien de fin mars 2022. Ces événements illustrent le fait qu’ils ne respectent ni leurs engagements ni le droit international et qu’ils ne souhaitent pas la fin du conflit.

    – En second lieu, ils ont déclenché, avec l’aide des médias mainstream qu’ils contrôlent, une propagande massive contre Moscou, laquelle se poursuit sans discontinuer, voire s’accélère alors que le sort des armes montre que l’issue de ce conflit est scellée et que les discussions entre Trump et Poutine en sonneront bientôt la fin. Depuis trois ans, ils dissimulent à l’opinion les causes véritables de la guerre d’Ukraine et la réalité du régime de Kiev, gouvernement extrémiste et corrompu à la tête d’un État failli, rongé par la criminalité, et qui a très largement contribué à provoquer son voisin.

    – Ensuite, les dirigeants européens diffusent largement, avec l’appui de la majorité des chefs des armées de leurs États, l’idée d’une menace russe « existentielle », délire qui ne résiste pas à l’analyse des données démographiques et militaires.

    – De plus, ils ont mis en place une autre forme de propagande, plus insidieuse, pour faire avancer l’idée d’une indispensable intégration européenne. Dans un rapport récent 6, le journaliste Thomas Fazi expose comment la Commission européenne finance des ONG, des médias, des associations de la société civile pour faire avancer son agenda par le biais de divers programmes visant à « promouvoir les valeurs de l’UE » et à « rapprocher l’Union européenne de ses citoyens ». En réalité, « les organisations bénéficiaires sont explicitement engagées en faveur du fédéralisme européen ou de l’intégration, en alignement avec les propres objectifs politiques de la Commission ». Cette manœuvre se fait au détriment des processus démocratiques et de la souveraineté des États membres et sans que les Européens en soient conscients. De plus, elle vise à étouffer toute voix dissidente ou qui s’écarte de la doxa officielle : celle d’une UE non seulement intégrée, mais également vouée à l’élargissement (Serbie, Ukraine, etc.). « En amplifiant les voix pro-UE et en marginalisant les perspectives dissidentes, cette stratégie consolide les récits en faveur de l’intégration tout en discréditant ou en réprimant les points de vue alternatifs. En conséquence, les mécanismes de financement de l’UE et les ONG elles-mêmes sont transformés en outils de propagande institutionnelle visant à promouvoir une intégration supranationale plus profonde ». C’est donc là une forme indirecte de censure.

    – Par ailleurs, les dirigeants européens recourent ouvertement à des actions antidémocratiques dès lors que d’autres acteurs politiques s’opposent à leur stratégie. On connait les difficultés faites à Orban qui se bat pied à pied contre les dérives de l’UE. On a vu comment l’ex-présidente géorgienne, battue aux dernières élections a tenté, avec le soutien de Bruxelles, de remettre en cause – sans succès – les élections. On a vu également comment une partie des électeurs de Moldavie installés à l’étranger n’ont pu voter lors du dernier scrutin, car leur vote aurait fait élire un candidat opposé à cette politique et souhaitant un rapprochement avec la Russie. On vient de voir, enfin, la manière dont les élections roumaines ont été tout à fait illégalement annulées et reportées, puis celle dont Georgescu a été empêché de se représenter.

    – Enfin, nous sommes en présence de véritables abus de pouvoir lorsque l’on voit le rôle joué par Ursula von der Leyen, simple haut fonctionnaire européen nommé à la tête de la Commission, qui se comporte – avec le plein accord de dirigeants européens co-responsables de cette dérive – comme une petite gauleiter, outrepassant allègrement son rôle et se fonctions. Rappelons que la Commission européenne et sa présidente n’ont aucune attribution en matière de défense. Cette femme et son administration s’arrogent donc des pouvoirs qu’elles n’ont pas, se livrant une sorte de coup d’État permanent au détriment des souverainetés nationales.

    En raison de ces dérives autoritaires et de cette propagande et de ces abus de pouvoir, le terme d’ « UERSS » n’est pas inapproprié.


    Pour ces différentes raisons, les « élites » politiques et technocratiques européennes sont déterminées à soutenir Kiev et à poursuivre une guerre qui sert leur stratégie. Elles affirment donc que l’Ukraine n’est qu’une victime, qu’elle doit recouvrer son intégrité territoriale, que Poutine est le mal absolu et qu’une invasion russe est imminente. Les dirigeants européens semblent ainsi prêts à tout pour imposer aux peuples une Europe supranationale, sans tenir compte de leur volonté. Nous sommes clairement en présence d’une stratégie consistant à « faire » l’Europe par les crises, la monnaie et la guerre, et d’une marche forcée vers le fédéralisme, par une politique des petits pas empêchant tout retour en arrière, en plaçant les peuples devant le fait accompli [fin]

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    14 mars 2025 : « Pensions ou munitions ? » : la fabrique du consentement à « l’effort de guerre » – Pauline Perrenot, Acrimed

    Depuis l’allocution d’Emmanuel Macron à propos de la guerre en Ukraine, le 5 mars, les grands médias sont en ordre de marche. Réhabilitation du président en « chef de guerre », patriotisme exacerbé, concert militariste et glorification des industriels de guerre… Mené tambour battant, le SAV du discours présidentiel s’accompagne d’une nouvelle séquence de matraquage patronal contre le « modèle social » et pour « travailler plus » au nom, prétendument, de l’« effort de guerre » : « Pensions ou munitions ? » ; « Les canons ou les allocations ? » Signés Dominique Seux (Les Échos, 10/03) et Étienne Gernelle (RTL, 10/03), les deux slogans donnent le ton

    14 mars 2025 : US proxy war against China

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    18 février 2025 : La bourgeoisie n’a plus les moyens intellectuels, ni culturels, de sa domination de classe – Harold Bernat, Quartier Général

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    1. Dont le mandat a pris fin le 20 mai 2024, mais qui est resté en place et a prorogé la loi martiale. ↩︎
    2. De tous, ce sont les Allemands dont la soumission aux États-Unis a été la plus frappante et qui ont le plus perdu : ils ont accepté sans broncher la destruction de leur économie par Washington qui a saboté Nord Stream, les a obligés à cesser toute relation avec la Russie et à acheter du GNL au prix fort. Ils se sont littéralement couchés devant les injonctions de leur protecteur, sans aucune réaction ni amour-propre. ↩︎
    3. La zone euro est composée de 20 pays (Allemagne, Autriche, Belgique, Chypre, Croatie, Espagne, Estonie, Finlande, France, Grèce, Irlande, Italie, Lettonie, Lituanie, Luxembourg, Malte, Pays-Bas, Portugal, Slovaquie et Slovénie). Certains États de l’UE ont choisi de ne pas y participer (Danemark, Suède), les autres ne satisfont pas encore aux critères économiques pour la rejoindre (Bulgarie, Hongrie, Pologne, République tchèque, Roumanie). ↩︎
    4. Le montant de 800 milliards d’euros proposé par Bruxelles (à confirmer par une adoption formelle) devrait se répartir de la manière la suivante :
      – un peu moins de 200 milliards vont être pris en charge par la Commission via la BCE ; les États membres en bénéficieront au prorata de la part de leur PIB au sein du PIB européen (soit environ 40 milliards) ;
      – pour le reste, plus de 600 milliards, il s’agit d’une autorisation d’accroissement de 1,5% du déficit autorisé (qui va donc passer de 3% à 4,5%), sans qu’aucune sanction soit imposée.
      ↩︎
    5. A noter que cela n’aura aucun impact pour la France qui dépasse déjà allègrement le futur déficit autorisé avec plus de 6% ces deux dernières années. ↩︎
    6. Thomas Fazi, The EU’s propaganda machine : How the EU Funds NGO to promote itself, Mathias Corvinus Collegium, Brussels, February 2025 (https://brussels.mcc.hu/uploads/default/0001/01/7ab59f9d3aca403f6fbd6ff2af284f236fddad7c.pdf) ↩︎
  • [Partage] « Pensions ou munitions ? » : la fabrique du consentement à « l’effort de guerre » – Pauline Perrenot, Acrimed

    Depuis l’allocution d’Emmanuel Macron à propos de la guerre en Ukraine, le 5 mars, les grands médias sont en ordre de marche. Réhabilitation du président en « chef de guerre », patriotisme exacerbé, concert militariste et glorification des industriels de guerre… Mené tambour battant, le SAV du discours présidentiel s’accompagne d’une nouvelle séquence de matraquage patronal contre le « modèle social » et pour « travailler plus » au nom, prétendument, de l’« effort de guerre » : « Pensions ou munitions ? » ; « Les canons ou les allocations ? » Signés Dominique Seux (Les Échos, 10/03) et Étienne Gernelle (RTL, 10/03), les deux slogans donnent le ton

    Les haut-parleurs médiatiques s’en donnent à plein poumon. « Faire le tri des dépenses budgétaires et sociales au profit de l’impératif militaire », sermonne Nicolas Beytout dans L’Opinion (5/03), dont la Une s’enthousiasme pour « cette rigueur qui vient » : « Concrètement, détaille un second journaliste, il pourrait s’agir de travailler plus longtemps (de quoi torpiller le conclave sur les retraites…), de ne plus indexer les retraites sur l’inflation, de supprimer les dépenses sociales les moins utiles, d’augmenter le taux d’emploi… » Et c’est peu dire que le quotidien entend peser sur les « réformes » envisagées par Emmanuel Macron. « Pas d’échappatoire, il faut réduire les dépenses publiques », prescrit de nouveau Nicolas Beytout deux jours plus tard (7/03), listant les coups de boutoir à imposer « aux collectivités locales et à la sphère sociale » : « âge de la retraite, assurance maladie, chômage, charges sociales, tout devra être questionné. » « Effort de guerre : bientôt la retraite à 70 ans ? », martèle la rédaction, préconisant que la France adopte à cet égard une « Danemark attitude ».

    Même tonalité aux Échos (10/03), où Dominique Seux affirme que « travailler plus est le meilleur moyen de financer l’effort nécessaire pour nos armées », tout en suggérant à Emmanuel Macron de se tenir à distance de ce débat – « méthode » oblige –, afin de ne pas offrir « un angle d’attaque trop facile à ses adversaires », lequel risquerait de fragiliser l’impérieux « consensus sur l’effort en faveur des armées. » Saigneur en chef… et conseiller du prince.

    Par intérêt bien compris, Le Figaro – propriété du groupe Dassault, fleuron de l’armement français ayant réalisé plus de six milliards d’euros de chiffre d’affaires en 2024 –, ne prend quant à lui aucune pincette dans cette vaste opération de propagande. Tous ses lieutenants sont d’ailleurs sur le pied de guerre. Le 7 mars, Guillaume Tabard et Gaëtan de Capèle parlent d’une seule voix : « Il n’y a pas d’autres solutions que de s’attaquer enfin sérieusement aux dépenses de l’État », écrit le premier, avant que le second enjoigne de « dire la vérité crue, telle qu’elle est, en cessant de tourner autour du pot. La voici : notre sacro-saint modèle social […] ruine consciencieusement le pays et le prive de toute marge de manœuvre financière. » Les discussions syndicales et patronales en cours sur la réforme des retraites imposée au forceps ? « Quel clin d’œil pathétique », se désespère Dupond ; Dupont communie : « Il faut se pincer pour le croire. » Le 9, c’est au tour de l’inénarrable Nicolas Baverez de rédiger modestement le « mode d’emploi » du « réarmement ». Sans surprise, « réorienter […] les dépenses de l’État-providence […] vers la défense » et « renouer avec la croissance, la compétitivité et le plein-emploi » via « la modernisation du pacte social » constituent « la seule solution ». Et ainsi de suite.

    « C’est ce comportement collectif de cigale qu’il va falloir payer aujourd’hui »

    Dans la matinale de France Info (11/03), face à Manuel Bompard (LFI) qui dénonce une « stratégie du choc » visant à faire accepter des « politiques de régression sociale » la journaliste Salhia Brakhlia joue (très mal) l’ingénue – « Vous pensez à quoi ? » – avant de soutenir mordicus qu’un tel cap « ne vient pas du gouvernement […]. Et ça ne vient pas du président. » Fichtre ! « Face aux défis que soulèvent la menace russe et l’agressivité commerciale américaine, le ministre délégué à l’Europe Benjamin Haddad […] assume de dire aux Français qu’il faudra travailler plus. Assurance chômage, taux d’emploi, retraites par capitalisation… Il faut, selon lui, accélérer les réformes », lisait-on pourtant le même jour dans La Voix du Nord. Et le 6 mars, dans la matinale de RTL, le même ministre déclarait : « Vous ne pouvez pas dire, le mardi : “Il faut continuer à soutenir l’Ukraine, il faut augmenter nos budgets de défense, il faut faire l’autonomie stratégique” et le mercredi, dire […] : “On va revenir à la retraite à 60, 62 ans et on va travailler moins”. […] Quand vous voyez les voisins autour de nous qui travaillent plus, c’est ça aussi qui donne des marges de manœuvre pour pouvoir augmenter nos budgets défense. » Salhia Brakhlia n’a pas bien lu ses fiches 1 …

    À sa décharge, il serait injuste de s’écharper sur le suivisme (ou non) des médias dans cette affaire, tant les injonctions à « travailler plus » y sont déclinées sur tous les tons depuis un siècle… en toute « autonomie ». Ainsi, nul besoin qu’Emmanuel Macron dicte aux éditorialistes la ligne à prescrire : homogénéisation libérale oblige, ils le font très bien tous seuls ! Le Monde notamment, qui, par voie d’éditorial, ne résiste pas à « sonner l’heure d’un douloureux réveil budgétaire. […] Le réarmement du pays, bien plus endetté que ses voisins, place l’exécutif dans la situation très délicate d’avoir à remettre à plat les dépenses de l’État, des collectivités locales et de la Sécurité sociale pour trouver des gisements durables d’économies. » (7/03) Ni une ni deux, Françoise Fressoz profite de cette ligne éditoriale officielle pour enfoncer le clou – « le mot “économies” reste […] tabou » –, fustiger « les partenaires sociaux » qui « peinent à prendre la dimension du moment » et, bien sûr, parfaire son opus courtisan : « Depuis sa réélection en 2022, Emmanuel Macron tente, en vain, de convaincre le pays qu’il ne parviendra à préserver son modèle qu’en travaillant plus. » (Le Monde, 12/03)

    Au Parisien, c’est François Lenglet qui est appelé en renfort pour dispenser, avec toute la mesure qu’on lui connaît, la leçon de catéchisme – version « revancharde » (9/03) :

    François Lenglet : Nous avons affecté les dividendes de la paix à l’État-providence. Son développement a atteint son sommet sous Macron, avec les dispositifs Covid uniques au monde par leur générosité. Avec l’assurance-chômage pour les démissionnaires, les lunettes à zéro euro, le plan Vélo, le pass Culture, le bonus pour faire réparer son grille-pain, les subventions pour faire repriser ses chaussettes… Du délire. C’est ce comportement collectif de cigale qu’il va falloir payer aujourd’hui […]

    Inquiète à l’idée de perdre le peloton, La Tribune Dimanche se fend d’un sondage (Ipsos) aux petits oignons, cas d’école du verrouillage du débat public. Interrogés sur les modes de financement du réarmement, les sondés ne disposent que de trois « choix » : « Augmenter le déficit en sortant les dépenses liées au budget de la défense de la règle des 3% » ; « Faire des économies sur d’autres dépenses (éducation, environnement, santé…) » ; « Augmenter le temps de travail ». Et rien d’autre. En guise de deuxième corde au cou – les sondeurs débordent d’idées novatrices pour neutraliser à l’avance d’éventuels désagréments –, Ipsos offre à ses interviewés la possibilité d’approuver ces propositions, de s’y opposer… mais aussi de faire valoir une « approbation de principe car la situation le justifie » ! Vous avez dit « l’opinion, ça se travaille » ? Sauf que patatras ! 49% des sondés sont opposés au sacrifice des services publics (seuls 15% l’approuvent) et 50% n’entendent pas travailler plus (ce à quoi ne consentent que 13% du petit échantillon). Qu’à cela ne tienne pour le directeur de l’hebdomadaire, Bruno Jeudy : « La victoire aime l’effort » titre-t-il son éditorial, dans lequel il affirme que « dans ce contexte qui exacerbe les peurs et les passions, les Français – comme le montre notre sondage – semblent prêts à accepter des sacrifices pour doter notre pays de moyens nécessaires à une augmentation importante du budget militaire et à la garantie d’une paix solide et durable en Ukraine. » Sans doute rattrapé par son inconscient déontologique, il poursuit, un tantinet amer :

    Bruno Jeudy : Reste à savoir si, demain, les actionnaires renonceront à une partie de leurs dividendes, les retraités consentiront une désindexation de leur pension sur l’inflation, les jeunes donneront quelques mois pour la réserve militaire, les actifs sacrifieront quelques jours de RTT. On sait bien que, souvent, les exemplaires, ce doit être les autres

    Inutile de déplier à l’infini la partition : elle est à l’identique à peu près partout dans la grande presse. Vissée à ses penchants militaires aux accents glucksmaniens, Libération ne peut faire valoir sa « distinction » qu’à travers des filets d’eau tiède. Jonathan Bouchet-Petersen : « En France, si l’augmentation des dépenses militaires devaient abîmer encore un peu plus nos services publics et notre modèle social, ou servir de prétexte à une moindre prise en compte de l’urgence climatique, “l’effet drapeau” dont l’exécutif profite risque d’être de courte durée. » (11/03) Si patronat et gouvernement n’étaient pas déjà KO debout, peu de chance qu’ils survivent à l’uppercut de la directrice adjointe de la rédaction :

    Alexandra Schwartzbrod : Le chef de l’État en profiterait-il, au prétexte qu’il faut financer le réarmement du pays, pour étouffer le débat renaissant sur l’opportunité de sa sacro-sainte réforme des retraites et affaiblir le modèle social ? Ce serait dommage. Et un jeu périlleux. L’opinion a peur mais elle sait reconnaître une entourloupe

    Espérons qu’elle sache également identifier les faux impertinents. Ainsi, si Libération s’oppose sans ambages à la curée sociale – et le fait savoir, notamment dans son édition du 13 mars où des journalistes dénoncent plus frontalement l’« offensive sur le “si-généreux-modèle-social-français” » et un débat public sous forme de « foire aux idées (de droite) » –, la direction ne cesse de jouer la carte de « la raison ». Pour Alexandra Schwartzbrod en effet (13/03), si le cadrage médiatico-politique est « extrêmement dommage », c’est surtout, au bout du compte, parce qu’il « ne fera pas du bien à une société déjà très clivée » et nuira, par conséquent, à l’impérieux consensus : « Le renforcement de la défense du pays et de l’UE […] se fera d’autant plus facilement qu’il obtiendra l’adhésion du plus grand nombre », avance doctement la co-directrice de Libération, pour mieux camper le rôle d’éditorialiste-prescriptrice : « Les hausses d’impôts […] permettraient, convenablement dosées, de demander un effort aux Français qui en ont les moyens, salariés ou retraités, patrons ou artistes, et aux grandes entreprises. »

    « Il faut choisir : se reposer… ou être libre »

    Dans un tel climat, il semble pour le moins superflu que le patron du Medef se fatigue à courir les studios de RMC dès potron-minet pour vanter le « modèle danois » de retraite à 70 ans (4/03). L’AFP peut également se dispenser de donner de l’écho aux premières mesquineries patronales venues, parmi lesquelles celles du directeur général de BPI France 2, lancées lors de l’interview qui lui fut généreusement accordée dans la matinale de France Culture (5/03). De même, on ne saurait que trop conseiller aux chefferies médiatiques d’économiser leurs experts de référence et autres think tanks de cœur : l’audiovisuel dispose d’abondantes ressources en interne où, partout, l’« appel à la mobilisation » d’Emmanuel Macron a été reçu 5 sur 5

    Dans ce concert d’unanimisme, le pouvoir politique sait aussi pouvoir compter sur une caisse de résonance médiatique pour « tester » ses différentes propositions de financement, observer le « bruit » qu’elles engendrent et mesurer leur réception. Quitte à ce que tout et n’importe quoi soit aussi vite périmé qu’écrit ? Le 9 mars par exemple, dans La Tribune dimanche, la journaliste économique Fanny Guinochet fait savoir que « selon nos informations, la préférence de Bercy pour financer les dépenses militaires est de réorienter les fonds du livret A. » Deux jours plus tard (11/03), Le Parisien fait savoir que « le ministère de l’Économie privilégie, selon nos informations, l’assurance vie et l’épargne retraite » avant de lister « les pistes écartées » par Bercy… parmi lesquelles « le livret A, “faiblement compatible” »… De-ci, de-là, en fonction des jours et des humeurs, les grands médias certifient également l’inclinaison du pouvoir pour un « grand emprunt national ». Au rythme où vont les choses, et si tel devait être le cas, ne doutons pas que l’éditocratie saura (nous) mettre la main à la poche. Et, qui sait, mobiliser ses dessinateurs de référence pour raviver, en couleurs cette fois-ci, la propagande du siècle dernier façon Poulbot [fin]

    L’article original

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    1. La journaliste, qui dédouane également le président de la République, est sans doute passée à côté de la vaste opération de communication qu’orchestrait la PQR il y a moins d’un mois : « Emmanuel Macron prévient les Français qu’ils doivent se préparer à des sacrifices au moment où le Danemark réfléchit à repousser l’âge de la retraite à 70 ans pour financer sa défense », rapportait ainsi Le Progrès (19/02), mais aussi – au mot près – le Dauphiné Libéré (18/02), Le Bien public, Le Journal de Saône et Loire ou encore L’Est Républicain (19/02). Autant de sources que Salhia Brakhlia aurait pu corroborer en lisant sa propre presse locale : « Le Danemark a la cote auprès du pouvoir » (Le Parisien, 20/02). ↩︎
    2. Ce dernier invite notamment à ne « plus accepter de prendre un euro de dette de plus pour financer des dépenses de prestations sociales pures […]. La dette, ça sert à financer les investissements, des canons ou des centrales nucléaires, pas le Doliprane de ma mère ! » ↩︎
  • [Sharing] Zelensky’s friend list dwindling in the Trump White House as peace talk tensions escalate: ‘Best case is that he leaves to France immediately’ – Diana Glebova & Steven Nelson, New York Post

    WASHINGTON — Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has few — if any — advocates in President Trump’s inner circle as the pair’s souring relationship threatens to tank Kyiv’s standing in peace talks with Russia.

    The ever-tenuous relationship between the two leaders descended into open hostility this week after Ukraine’s president rejected an initial US proposal to sign over 50% of his country’s rare earth elements to the US as repayment for military aid — while rebuking Trump’s emissaries for meeting Russian diplomats without him.

    Trump retaliated by blasting Zelensky as a “Dictator,” erroneously claiming the Ukrainian had a 4% approval rating and even suggesting he had triggered Russia’s February 2022 invasion, with Zelensky, in turn, accusing the leader of the free world of living in a “disinformation space.”

    While the deterioration between Washington and Kyiv appears sudden, one source familiar with White House discussions told The Post Thursday: “It’s nothing new to me

    Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelensky holding a press conference in Kyiv, standing before a flag, on February 19, 2025, during the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
    Ukraine President Voldymyr Zelensky speaks to reporters in Kyiv Wednesday (POOL / AFP via Getty Images)

    “I heard months ago it’s time for an election and new leadership,” added this person, who said the public breakdown was a long time coming and that anti-Zelensky feeling is widespread within the West Wing.

    The “real question is, has anyone told [Trump] they really, really like him?” the source said of the Ukrainian president.

    A second source close to Trump concurred with the assessment and suggested that “the best case for [Zelensky] and the world is that he leaves to France immediately”

    President Donald Trump listening to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi during a joint press conference at the White House
    Tensions between President Trump and Zelensky have grown since the Republican’s election victory (Getty Images)

    A White House official, meanwhile, privately confided their anti-Zelensky views, telling The Post that “like the Pope, I’m no fan of someone who bans churches” — referring to Zelensky’s August law that outlawed religious organizations linked to the Russian Orthodox Church, which has close relations with the Kremlin.

    That official added that the Republican Party “is a big tent on Ukraine” and posited that there are “people in the White House [who] have a traditional GOP view on Zelensky” — although this person did not suggest any examples.

    Ukraine’s former advocates at the White House, including national security adviser Mike Waltz, have stepped in behind Trump to rip Zelensky and hold their fire on Russian President Vladimir Putin

    Ukraine’s former advocates at the White House, including national security adviser Mike Waltz, have stepped in behind Trump to rip Zelensky and hold their fire about Russian President Vladimir Putin.
    Ukraine’s former advocates at the White House, including national security adviser Mike Waltz, have stepped in behind Trump to rip Zelensky and hold their fire on Russian President Vladimir Putin (REUTERS)

    “President Trump is obviously very frustrated right now with President Zelensky,” Waltz said Thursday at a White House briefing, where he appeared to indicate a slowdown in arms transfers was taking place, after a Ukrainian parliamentarian claimed “the weapons that were going to be sold have stopped being supplied.”

    “Trump’s administration obviously doesn’t like Zelensky and does everything to let everyone know that,” said a Ukrainian political analyst and active duty soldier who asked not to be identified by name.

    “Recent remarks by the US president show that he wants Ukrainian elections ASAP and Zelensky replaced by someone more negotiable. This can be some who Trump and his allies trust: Military leader or businessman.”

    Washington insiders say there’s no obvious contender who Trump would prefer if Ukraine were to hold elections, as Trump and his allies like Tesla and SpaceX boss Elon Musk insisted this week should happen

    Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy sitting in a chair holding a document, during a meeting in the Oval Office of the White House
    Zelensky during his most recent US trip, at the White House in September 2024 (Bloomberg via Getty Images)

    Presidential elections were due to be held in Ukraine last year, but were postponed due to the state of martial law Zelensky declared Feb. 24, 2022, in response to the Russian invasion. According to the country’s constitution, elections cannot be held under martial law.

    Tensions between Trump and Zelensky date back to 2019 when the then-45th president urged his counterpart to launch an investigation into the Biden family’s dealings with Ukrainian natural gas company Burisma Holdings, which paid Hunter Biden a salary of $1 million a year while his father Joe Biden was vice president and leading American policy toward the country.

    Zelensky declined to launch the investigation but deftly navigated the ensuing controversy after the distribution of a transcript containing Trump’s request — insisting he felt no pressure in that call, as congressional Democrats moved to impeach Trump for allegedly abusing his power

    It’s unclear if the relationship can now be salvaged — with Vice President JD Vance warning Zelensky against “badmouthing” Trump
    It’s unclear if the relationship can now be salvaged — with Vice President JD Vance warning Zelensky against “badmouthing” Trump (REUTERS)

    “We had, I think, a good phone call. it was normal… nobody pushed me,” Zelensky said during a joint appearance with Trump in New York in September 2019.

    Trump, who was impeached two months later and then acquitted by the Senate, repeatedly expressed his gratitude for Zelensky bolstering his own argument that it was a “perfect phone call.”

    It’s unclear if the relationship can now be salvaged — with Vice President JD Vance warning Zelensky against “badmouthing” Trump and Musk attacking him over a Vogue photoshoot, tweeting: “He did this while kids are dying in trenches on the war front.”

    Zelensky was widely viewed in America as a Churchillian hero for putting up a surprisingly stubborn resistance to Putin’s 2022 invasion, reportedly brushing off an offer of a flight out of the country from then-President Joe Biden with the quip, “I need ammunition, not a ride.”

    Signs of tension mounted as Trump returned to power

    Zelensky was widely viewed in America as a Churchillian hero for putting up a surprisingly stubborn resistance to Putin’s 2022 invasion, reportedly brushing off an offer of a flight out of the country from then-President Joe Biden with the quip, “I need ammunition, not a ride.”
    Zelensky was widely viewed in America as a Churchillian hero for putting up a surprisingly stubborn resistance to Putin’s 2022 invasion, reportedly brushing off an offer of a flight out of the country from then-President Joe Biden with the quip, “I need ammunition, not a ride” (Getty Images)

    In January, Donald Trump Jr. revealed on social media that Zelensky was refused a ticket to his father’s inauguration, which was attended by Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and Argentinian President Javier Millei in an expression of the incoming administration’s warm feelings toward those leaders.

    “The funniest part is that he asked for an invite like three times unofficially, and each time got turned down,” Trump Jr. wrote. “Now he’s acting like he decided not to go himself… what a weirdo.”

    Zelensky has also vulgarly disparaged other leading conservative critics of his government — saying this month that former Fox News host Tucker Carlson, a major outside ally of Trump’s, should “stop licking” Putin’s “ass”

    Trump aides say the president believes that Zelensky agreed in principle in September during a meeting at Trump Tower to give the US $500 billion in rare earth elements as compensation for $183 billion in congressionally approved aid.
    Trump aides say the president believes that Zelensky agreed in principle in September during a meeting at Trump Tower to give the US $500 billion in rare earth elements as compensation for $183 billion in congressionally approved aid (Presidential Press Service of Ukraine HANDOUT/EPA-EFE/Shutterstock)

    Trump himself signaled a possible path forward Wednesday night while venting his outrage that Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent was turned away in Kyiv earlier this week upon presenting the natural resources plan.

    “I’m going to resurrect it or things are not going to make him too happy,” Trump told reporters on Air Force One.

    Trump aides say the president believes that Zelensky agreed in principle in September during a meeting at Trump Tower to give the US $500 billion in rare earth elements as compensation for $183 billion in congressionally approved aid.

    “We had a deal,” Trump said during remarks at a Saudi-backed investment conference in Miami. “We had a deal based on rare earth and things, but they broke that deal… they broke it two days ago” [end]

    The original article

    Additional reporting by Caitlin Doornbos in Kyiv

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  • [Sharing] Total Kievan Debellation – Big Serge

    The Russo-Ukrainian War: Year 3

    On March 5, 2022, the wreck of the sailing ship Endurance was found in the depths of the Weddell Sea off the coast of Antarctica. This, of course, was the vessel lost in Ernest Shackelton’s third expedition to Antarctica, which became trapped in the ice and sank in 1915. The story of that expedition is an extraordinary tale of human fortitude – with the Endurance lost to the ice, Shackleton’s crew evacuated to a loose ice flow where they camped for nearly 500 days, drifting about the Antarctic seas, before making a desperate dash across the open ocean in an open 20 foot lifeboat, finally reaching the southern shore of inhospitable and mountainous South Georgia Island, which they then had to cross on foot to reach the safety of a whaling station.

    The story itself has an essentially mythic quality to it, with Shackleton’s crew surviving for years on free floating ice floes in the most inhospitable seas on earth. For our purposes, however, it is the story’s coda that is particularly interesting. In Shackleton’s memoirs, he remembered that, upon finally reaching the safety of the Stromness whaling station, one of his first questions was about the war in Europe. When Shackleton first set out on his ill-fated expedition on August 8, 1914, the First World War was less than a week old, and the German Army had just begun its invasion of Belgium. There was little expectation then that the war would proceed as it did, unleashing four years of slaughterous positional warfare that engulfed the continent.

    Shackleton, having been adrift at sea for years, clearly did not imagine that the war could still be raging, and asked the commandant of the whaling station “tell me, when was the war over?”

    The answer came back: “The war is not over. Millions are being killed. Europe is mad. The world is mad.”

    The timing is serendipitous, since the discovery of the Endurance’s wreck, after more than a hundred years, happened to occur only a few weeks after the world again went mad, with the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian War in February 2022. As time continues its inexorable march and the calendar turns yet again, the war is passing through its third full winter. In February, Z-World will be three years old.

    Of course, modern communications make it extremely unlikely that anybody could be cut fully out of the loop for years at a time, like Shackleton and his men. Instead of being ignorant as to whether or not the war is over, many of us are exposed on a daily basis to footage of men being killed, buildings being blown up, and vehicles being shredded. Twitter has made it essentially impossible to live under a rock, or on an ice floe, as it were.

    If anything, we have the very opposite problem of Shackleton – at least as far as our wartime information infrastructure goes. We are saturated in information, with daily updates tracking advances of a few dozen meters and never ending bombast about new game changing weapons (which seem to change very little), and bluster about “red lines”. This war seems to have an unyielding dynamic on the ground, and no matter how many grand pronouncements we hear that one side or the other is on the verge of collapse, the sprawling front continues to grind up bodies and congeal with bloody positional fighting.

    It would seem difficult to believe that a high intensity ground war in Europe with hundreds of miles worth of front could be boring, yet the static and repetitive nature of the conflict is struggling to hold the attention of foreign observers who have little immediately at stake.

    My intention here is a radical zoom-out from these demoralizing and fatiguing small scale updates (as valuable as the work of the war mappers is), and consider the aggregate of 2024 – arguing that this year was, in fact, very consequential. Taken as a whole, three very important things happened in 2024 which create a very dismal outlook for Ukraine and the AFU in the new year. More specifically, 2024 brought three important strategic developments:

    1. Russian victory in southern Donetsk which destroyed the AFU’s position on one of the war’s key strategic axes.
    2. The expenditure of carefully husbanded Ukrainian resources on a failed offensive towards Kursk, which accelerated the attrition of critical Ukrainian maneuver assets and substantially dampened their prospects in the Donbas.
    3. The exhaustion of Ukraine’s ability to escalate vis a vis new strike systems from NATO – more broadly, the west has largely run out of options to upgrade Ukrainian capabilities, and the much vaunted delivery of longer range strike systems failed to alter the trajectory of the war on the ground.

    Taken together, 2024 revealed a Ukrainian military that is increasingly stretched to the limits, to the point where the Russians were able to largely scratch off an entire sector of front. People continue to wonder where and when the Ukrainian front might begin to break down – I would argue that it *did* break down in the south over the last few months, and 2025 begins with strong Russian momentum that the AFU will be hard pressed to arrest.

    Front Collapse in South Donetsk

    What stands out immediately about the operational developments in 2024 is the marked shift of energies away from the axes of combat that had seen the most intense fighting in the first two years of the war. In a sense, this war has seen each of its fronts activate in a sequence, one after the other.

    After the opening Russian offensive, which boasted as its signature success the capture of the Azov coastline and the linkup of Donetsk and Crimea, the action shifted to the northern front (the Lugansk-Kharkov axis), with Russia fighting a summer offensive which captured Severodonetsk and Lysychansk. This was followed by a pair of Ukrainian counteroffensives in the fall, with a thrust out of Kharkov which pushed the front back over the Oskil, and an operation directed at Kherson which failed to breach Russian defenses but ultimately resulted in a Russian withdrawal in good order over the Dnieper due to concerns over logistical connectivity and an over-extended front. Energies then pivoted yet again to the Central Donbas axis, with the enormous battle around Bakhmut raging through the spring of 2023. This was followed by the failed Ukrainian offensive on Russia’s defenses in Zaporozhia, in the south.

    Just to briefly recapitulate this, we can enumerate several operational phases in the first two years of the war, occurring in sequence and each with a center of gravity in different parts of the front:

    • A Russian offensive across the land bridge, culminating in the capture of Mariupol. (Winter-Spring 2022, Southern Front)
    • A Russian offensive in Lugansk, capturing Severodonetsk and Lysychansk. (Summer 2022, Donets-Oskil front)
    • Ukrainian Counteroffensives towards the Oskil and Kherson (Autumn 2022, Oskil and Dnieper fronts)
    • The Russian assault on Bakhmut (Winter-Spring 2023, Central Front)
    • Ukrainian counteroffensive on the land bridge (Summer 2023)

    Amid all of this, the front that saw the least movement was the southeastern corner of the front, around Donetsk. This was somewhat peculiar. Donetsk is the urban heart of the Donbas – a vast and populous industrial city at the center of a sprawling conurbation, once home to some 2 million people. Even if Russia succeeds in capturing the city of Zaporizhia, Donetsk will be by far the most populous of Ukraine’s former cities to come under Moscow’s control.

    In 2014, with the outbreak of the proto-Donbas war, Donetsk was the locus of much of the fighting, with the airport on the city’s northern approach the scene of particularly intense combat. This made it rather strange, then, that at the start of 2024 the Ukrainian Army continued to occupy many of the same positions that they built a decade prior. As intense fighting ebbed and flowed along other sectors of front, Donetsk remained besieged by a web of powerfully held Ukrainian defenses, anchored by heavily fortified urban areas stretching from Toretsk to Ugledar. Early Russian attempts to crack this iron ring open, including an assault on Ugledar in the winter of 2023, met with failure.

    The signature operational development of 2024, then, was the re-activation of the Donetsk front, after years of static combat. It is not an exaggeration to say that after years of coagulation, the Russian Army cracked this front wide open in 2024 and Ukraine’s long and strongly held network of urban strongpoints collapsed

    Russian Progress on the Donetsk Axis in 2024

    The year began with the AFU fighting for its fortress in Avdiivka, where it continued to block the northern approach to Donetsk. At the time, the typical argument that one heard from the Ukrainian side was that the Russian assault on Avdiivka was pyrrhic – that the Russians were capturing the city with exorbitantly costly “meat assaults” that would inevitably sap Russian combat power and exhaust their ability to continue the offensive.

    With the full measure of the year behind us, we can definitively say that this is not the case. After the fall of Avdiivka, Russian momentum never seriously slackened, and in fact it was the AFU that appeared to be increasingly exhausted. The Ukrainian breakwater position at Ocheretyne (which had previously been their staging point for counterattacks around Avdiivka) was overrun in a matter of days, and by the early summer the frontline had been pushed out towards the approach to Pokrovsk.

    The Russian thrust towards Pokrovsk led many to believe that this city was itself the object of Russian energies, but this was a misread of the operational design. Russia did not need to capture Pokrovsk in 2024 to render it sterile as a logistical hub. Simply by advancing towards the E50 highway, Russian forces were able to cut off Pokrovsk from Ukrainian positions to the south on the Donetsk front, and Pokvrovsk is now a frontline city subject to the full spectrum of overwatch from Russian drones and tube artillery.

    By autumn, the Russian advance had put the Ukrainians in a severe salient, creating an unstable chain of positions in Selydove, Kurakhove, Ugledar, and Krasnogorivka. Russia’s advance from Ocheretyne onto the southern approach to Pokrovsk acted like an enormous scythe, isolating the entire southeastern sector of the front and allowing Russian forces to carve through it in the closing months of the year

    Russian Operations in 2024, Donetsk Axis

    This war has turned the word “collapse” into a devalued buzzword. We are told repeatedly that one side or the other is on the verge of collapse: sanctions will “collapse” the Russian economy, the Wagner uprising of 2023 proved that the Russian political system was “collapsing”, and of course we hear that exorbitant losses have one army or the other on the verge of total failure – which army that may be depends on who you ask.

    I would argue, however, that what we saw from October 2024 onward represents a real occurrence of this oft-repeated and discarded word. The AFU suffered a genuine collapse of the southeastern front, with the forces positioned in their strongpoints too attrited and isolated to make a determined defense, Russian fires becoming too heavily concentrated in ever more compressed areas to endure, and no mechanized reserve in the theater available to counterattack or relieve the incessant Russian pressure.

    Ukraine does maintain enough drones and concentrated fires to limit a full Russian exploitation – that is, Russia is still not able to maneuver at depth. This gave the Russian advance a particular stop-start quality, leapfrogging from one settlement and fortress to the other. More generally, Russia’s preference to use dispersed small-unit assaults limits the potential for exploitation. We have to emphasize, however, that Russian momentum on this axis has never seriously slackened since October, and many of the key Ukrainian positions were overrun or abandoned very quickly

    Ugledar is a good example: the Russians began their final push toward the town on September 24. By September 29, the 72nd Mechanized Brigade began evacuating. By October 1, Ugledar was fully under Russian control. This was a keystone Ukrainian position put in a completely untenable position and it went down in a week. One could argue, of course, that Ugledar held out for years (how then can we say with a straight face that it was captured in a week), but this is precisely the point. In early 2023 Ugledar (with the help of artillery stationed around Kurakhove) successfully repelled a multi-brigade Russian attack in months of heavy fighting. By October 2024, the position was completely untenable and was abandoned almost immediately when attacked.

    The Ukrainians did no better trying to hold Kurakhove – previously a critical rear area that served as both a logistical hub and a base of fire for supporting (former) frontline strongpoints like Ugledar and Krasnogorivka. Kurakhove, now under full Russian control, will in turn serve as a base of support for the ongoing Russian push to the west towards Andriivka.

    Taking the state of the front holistically, the AFU is currently holding two severe salients at the southernmost end of the line – one around Velyka Novosilka, and another around Andriivka. The former is likely to fall first, as the town has been fully isolated by Russian advances on the flanks. This is not a Bakhmut-like situation, where roads are described as “cut” because they are under Russian fire – in this case, all of the highways into Velyka Novosilka are cut by physical Russian blocking positions, making the loss of the position only a matter of waiting for the Russians to assault it. Further north, a more gentle and less strongly held salient exists between Grodivka and Toretsk. With Toretsk now in the final stages of capture (Ukrainian forces now hold only a small residential neighborhood on the city’s outskirts), the front should level here as well in the coming months.

    This leaves the Russians more or less in full control of the approaches to Kostyantinivka and Pokrovsk, which are in many ways the penultimate Ukrainian held positions in Donetsk. Pokrovsk has already been bypassed several miles to the west, and the map portends a re-run of the typical Russian tactical methodology for assaulting urban areas – a methodical advance along the wings of the city to isolate it from arterial highways, followed by an attack on the city itself via several axes

    The coming months promise continued Russian advances across this front, in a continuation of what can only be regarded as the collapse of a critical front on the part of the AFU. The Russian Army is advancing to the western border of Donetsk oblast and will ferret the Ukrainians out of their remaining strongpoints at Velyka Novosilka and Andriivka, while pushing into the belly of Pokrovsk. At no point since the fall of Avdiivka have the Ukrainians demonstrated the ability to seriously stymie Russian momentum along this 75 mile front, and the ongoing dissipation of Ukrainian combat resources indicates that little will change in this regard in 2025.

    Toehold: The Incredible Shrinking Kursk Salient

    Throughout the autumn of 2024 and these early months of winter, as Ukrainian forces were dug out of their dense web of fortified positions in the southern Donbas, their comrades continued to stubbornly hold on to their position in Russia’s Kursk Oblast. The basic shape of Ukraine’s offensive into Kursk is by now well known – billed by Kiev as a gambit to change the psychological trajectory of the war and strike a prestige blow to Russia, the Ukrainian attack had early momentum after achieving initial strategic surprise, but quickly faltered after Ukrainian columns ran into effective Russian blocking positions on the highways out of Sudzha. Efforts to force the roads through Korenovo and Bolshoe Soldatskoe were defeated, and the Ukrainian grouping was left holding on to a modest salient around Sudzha, jutting out into Russia.

    Throughout the autumn, Russian counterattacks have focused on chiseling away at the base of the Ukrainian salient – forcing the Ukrainians out of Snagost and pushing them away from Korenovo. The progress here has been incremental, but significant, and by the start of January the “neck” of the Ukrainian salient had been compressed down to a little over nine miles wide, after their initial penetration in the summer had forced a breach of over twenty miles. All told, Ukraine has lost about 50% of the territory that they grabbed in August.

    The Russian pressure on the flanks of the salient have amplified many of the qualities that make this position wasteful and dangerous for the AFU. There is limited road connectivity for Ukrainian forces – a problem amplified by the rollback from Snagost, which cost them access to the highway running from Korenovo to Sumy. Apart from a few circuitous side roads, Ukrainian forces only have a single highway – the R200 route – to run material and reinforcements into the pocket, which allows Russian forces to surveil their lines of communication and conduct effective interdiction strikes. The compression of the pocket also greatly narrows the targeting area for Russian drones, tube artillery, and rocketry, and creates more condensed and saturating bombardment

    Despite the fact that this position has been profoundly unproductive for Ukraine – being steadily rolled back and having no synergy with other, more critical theaters – the same grouping of Ukrainian units remain here, fighting in a steadily more compressed space. Even more baffling, the Ukrainian grouping consists largely of premiere assets – Mechanized and Air Assault brigades – that could have contributed meaningfully as a reserve in the Donbas over the last three months.

    On January 5, there was a surprise in the form of a renewed Ukrainian attack out of the salient. The internet of course jumped to the conclusion that the AFU was going back over to some sort of general offensive posture in Kursk, but the reality was very underwhelming – something like a battalion sized assault up the axis towards Bolshoe Soldaskoe, which got a few kilometers up the road before it ran out of steam. Ukrainian efforts to jam Russian drones were stymied by the increasing ubiquity of fiber-optic systems, and the Ukrainian attack collapsed within a day

    Kursk Salient – General Situation, January 2025

    The tactical particulars of the Ukrainian attack are interesting, and there’s ongoing speculation as to its purpose – perhaps it was intended to cover a rotation or withdrawal, to improve tactical positions on the northern edge of the salient, or for inscrutable propaganda purposes. However, these specifics are rather unimportant: attacking out the end of the salient (that is, trying to deepen the penetration into Russia) does nothing to reverse Ukraine’s problems in Kursk. These problems are first, on the tactical level, that the salient has been greatly compressed on the flanks and continues to narrow, and on the strategic level the willful expenditure of valuable mechanized assets on a front that does not impact the critical theaters of the war. More simply, Kursk is a sideshow, and it is a sideshow that has gone wrong even within its own operational logic.

    One thing that has been of endless interest, of course, have been the continued rumors of North Korean troops fighting in Kursk. Western intelligence agencies have been adamant about the presence of North Koreans in Kursk. Some people are predisposed to instinctively disbelieve everything that western officialdom says – while I think some skepticism is warranted, I do not automatically assume that they are lying. One recent report lays out what would seem to be a plausible version of this story: that the idea actually originated in Pyongyang, not Moscow, and that a modest number of Korean troops (perhaps 10,000) are embedded with Russian units. The presumption here is that the Koreans hatched the idea as a way to gain combat experience, with the Russians in turn getting auxiliary forces, though of questionable combat effectiveness.

    However, it is worth noting that this is not nearly as important as it has been made out to be. Much has been made of the idea that the North Korean presence proves some sort of Russian state of desperation, but this is fairly silly on its face – with more than 1.5 million active personnel in the Russian military, 10,000 Korean troops in Kursk represents a paltry appendage. More importantly, there has been an attempt to portray the North Korean contingent as a major departure point in the war. In particular, the formulation “North Korean troops in Europe” has been used to conjure cold war imagery of communist despotism clawing at the free world

    The point, however, is that North Korean troops are presumed specifically to be in Kursk, which is in Russia. This is linked, of course, to the recently concluded mutual defense agreement signed between Moscow and Pyongyang. By attacking into Kursk – widening the front into prewar Russian territory – Ukraine created a defensive combat task for Russia which triggers the possibility of military assistance from North Korea. However much one may wish to link the Korean contingent to Russia’s dreaded “war of aggression”, the force in Kursk is very objectively engaged in the defense of Russian territory, and that makes it possible for Russia to use auxiliary forces – including conscripts and the troops of its allies – to fight there.

    Ultimately, then, the presence of North Koreans in Kursk is interesting, but perhaps not very important after all. These troops are not in Ukraine (even under the most maximal definition of the Ukrainian territorial unit), they are not carrying the primary combat load, and they are unequivocally not the problem that the AFU is facing in Kursk. The “big problem” for Ukraine, very simply, is not the presence of some amorphous Korean horde dedicated to spreading Glorious Juche to Europe – it is the loitering of large grouping of their own precious mechanized brigades in a compressed salient, far far away from the Donbas, where they are greatly needed.

    Scraping the Barrel: AFU Force Generation

    I think it is well understood, of course, that Ukraine faces severe manpower constraints relative to Russia, both in terms of the raw totals of male biomass available – with roughly 35 million fighting aged males in Russia against perhaps 9 million in prewar Ukraine – but also in terms of its capacity to mobilize them.

    Ukraine’s mobilization scheme is hampered by both widespread draft evasion (with willingness to serve decreasing as the war has stretched on) and a stubborn unwillingness to draft younger men, aged 18-25. Ukraine is structurally burdened with a deeply imbalanced population structure: there are roughly 60% more Ukrainian men in their 30’s than in their 20’s. Given the relative scarcity of young men, particularly in their early 20’s, the Ukrainian government rightly views this 18-25 year old cohort as a premium demographic cohort that it is loathe to burn away in combat. Given the ubiquity of draft evasion, the refusal to mobilize younger males, and the corruption and inefficiency characteristic of the Ukrainian government, it should come as no surprise when Ukrainian mobilization falters

    Russia, in contrast, has both a much larger pool of potential recruits and a more efficient apparatus for mobilization. In contrast to Ukraine’s scheme of compulsory conscription, Russia has relied on generous sign-on bonuses to solicit volunteers. Russia’s incentive system, to this point, has provided a steady stream of enlistments that has been more than enough to offset Russian losses. Without going too far into the various speculative estimates of Russian casualties, it is widely acknowledged by western military leadership that Russia has significantly more personnel now than it did at the start of the war.

    All of that is to say: Ukraine faces a severe structural disadvantage in military manpower in the aggregate, which is exacerbated by the idiosyncrasies of the Ukrainian mobilization law, ameliorated slightly by the relatively low troop densities and the preponderant power of strike systems in this war.

    The argument that I want to make here, however, is that Ukraine’s systemic problems matching Russian manpower have been exacerbated by several developments which specifically became prominent in 2024. In other words, 2024 can and should be marked as the year where Ukrainian manpower constraints became markedly and perhaps irretrievably worse due to specific decisions made in Kiev, and particular developments on the ground.

    These are as follows:

    1. The decision to expand the AFU’s force structure through the creation of the “15 series” brigades
    2. The decision to deliberately widen the front and create additional demands for manpower by launching the incursion into Kursk
    3. The stall out of Ukraine’s new mobilization program in the autumn
    4. Accelerating problems with desertion in the AFU

    We’ll run through these in order.

    An army that is intaking new personnel has to decide between two possible allocations for them. New personnel can be used as replacements to replenish existing frontline units, or they can be used to expand the force structure by creating new units. That much seems fairly obvious, and ideally mobilization will exceed losses and make it possible to do both. Where armies face hard manpower constraints, however – that is, where losses are equal to or greater than intake of men, the decision to expand the force structure can have monumental consequences. The stereotypical example, of course, would be the late-war Wehrmacht, which created premiere new assets in the form of Waffen SS divisions, which received privileged access to recruits and equipment while regular army divisions in the line suffered from a trickle of replacements which could not keep up with losses.

    Ukraine, with its garbled force structure, has created a mess through its own attempts to expand its force structure in the face of dwindling strength on the line. Late in 2023, the AFU announced intentions to form an entirely new grouping of brigades – the so-called “15 series”, given their designations as the 150th, 151st, 152nd, 153rd, and 154th Mechanized Brigades. This was followed in 2024 with the appending of the 155th Mechanized Brigade, which was to be trained and equipped in France.

    Forming a new grouping of mechanized brigades is essential to the way that Ukraine is presenting its war. Because Ukraine still aims (at least on paper) to recapture all of its Russian held territory, there must always be the illusory possibility of a future offensive, and in order for that illusory possibility to remain, Ukraine must present itself as actively preparing for future offensive operations. Ukraine’s presentation of its own strategic animus – the idea that it is holding the front while it prepares to go back on the offensive – essentially locks it into a program of expanding its force structure

    The problem for Ukraine is that the immense pressure on the front makes it essentially impossible for them to properly husband resources the way they would like. Properly training and equipping half a dozen fresh mechanized brigades and holding them in reserve would be very helpful, but they cannot really do this in light of the demands for personnel at the front. These brigades instead become “paper formations” that have a bureaucratic existence, while their organic assets are pulled apart and sucked into the front – stripped down into battalion or company sized elements that can be plugged into sectors of need on the frontline. At the moment, none of the 15 series brigades have seen action as organic units – that is, fighting as themselves.

    The French-trained 155th brigade forms a useful example. Originally designed as an overweight formation of some 5800 men, equipped with premiere European equipment, the brigade was hemorrhaging personnel from the start, with Ukrainian sources reporting that some 1700 men – many of them forcibly conscripted off the streets of Ukraine – deserted the unit during training and formation. A collapse in the brigade’s leadership – with its commander resigning – made matters even more complicated, and the formation’s first action around Pokrovsk went badly. Now, the brigade is being dismembered, if not formally disbanded, with personnel and vehicles being stripped down and parceled out to bolster neighbor units.

    The decision to allocate personnel to new mechanized brigades (though given stocks of armored vehicles it is questionable whether those designations mean anything) does not necessarily change Ukraine’s manpower balance in the aggregate, but it is certainly an inefficient way to use personnel. To return again to the 155th brigade, one problem noted by Ukrainian analysts was the fact that much of the brigade was formed whole cloth from forcibly mobilized personnel, without a proper cadre of veterans and experienced NCOs – some 75% of the brigade, it turns out, had been mobilized less than two months before arriving in France for training. This fact was certainly instrumental in the mass desertions and the brigade’s poor combat effectiveness.

    Given Ukraine’s constraints, the best course of action would undoubtedly be to allocate new personnel and equipment as replacements to build out the depleted veteran brigades on the front lines, plugging in replacements around existing veterans and officers. Kiev, however, prizes the prestige that comes from force expansion and the “shiny new toy” factor of new formations equipped with scarce and valuable equipment like Leopard tanks. These new brigades, though billed as premiere assets, clearly have lower combat effectiveness than existing formations, given their lack of experience, shortage of veteran officers, and low unit cohesion.

    The simple reality, however, is that replacements for existing brigades are nowhere close to keeping up with burn rates. Frontline units have complained of increasingly dire infantry shortages for months, with some brigades on the Pokrovsk axis reporting that they are down to less than 40% of their allocated infantry complements.

    In short, Ukraine’s decision to embark on force expansion in the face of significant manpower shortages has exacerbated the problem – both starving veteran units of replacements and concentrating newly mobilized personnel into combat ineffective formations that lack a veteran core, experienced officers, and vital equipment. They have tried, belatedly, to square this circle by parceling out new formations to backstop line brigades, but this is less than ideal – it leads to a patchwork order of battle with lower unit cohesion and a fragmented defense.

    Unfortunately, this comes precisely as Ukraine has created additional self-imposed strains on its resources, in particular through its incursion into Kursk. At the moment, elements of at least seven mechanized brigades, two marine infantry brigades, and three air assault brigades are stationed on the Kursk axis. Without going too far into the weeds rehashing Ukraine’s operation here, it’s important to remember that Ukraine – facing extreme pressures on its force generation – voluntarily chose to widen the front into a secondary theater, diverting scarce assets and reducing its own ability to economize forces.

    In summary, Ukraine has made deliberate decisions to widen the front and expand its force structure, both of which have been decidedly detrimental to its efforts to economize personnel. This comes precisely as a 2024 effort to ramp up mobilization has come off the rails.

    Ukraine’s mobilization program suffered from a variety of defects, including gaps and errors in its databases and endemic corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency. Laws passed in 2024 aimed to rectify many of these problems, including through the rollout of an app that would allow draft-eligible men to register and check their status without having to visit recruitment offices. It appeared that matters had come to a head when Zelensky fired several recruitment chiefs in 2023, and there was a real sense of urgency. After some signs of initial promise, it is clear that this intensified mobilization drive has faltered over the autumn and early winter

    There were initially signs of optimism for Ukraine – in the first month after the new mobilization law was passed, there was a surge and the army enlisted 30,000 new personnel. However, by the end of the summer this initial burst of enlistments had faded, and mobilization was again running behind the AFU’s losses. An October briefing from the Ukrainian General Staff confirmed that enlistments had already declined by 40% after the brief surge brought on by the new mobilization law. Around the same time, officials in Odessa (Ukraine’s third largest city) admitted that they were running at only 20% of their mobilization quota.

    The problems are myriad. The new mobilization law led to some initial improvements but has ultimately failed to resolve problems with draft evasion, bureaucratic miscues remain endemic, and employers desperate to retain workers filed an avalanche of employment related draft deferments. Unable to sustain the initial surge of enlistments, Ukraine faces a looming manpower crisis.

    Furthermore, Ukraine’s continued inability to provide either demobilization or timely rotations means that mobilized personnel face the prospect of indefinite service on the frontlines. This is obviously bad for morale, with soldiers contemplating the possibility of years of uninterrupted service, and this in turn drives the desertions that are becoming a mounting problem for the AFU. Some reports indicate that as many as 100,000 Ukrainian troops have deserted by this point, many no doubt driven by the psychological and physical strains of endless combat with no prospect of rotation.

    A deadly feedback loop is now at work, with the lack of rotations and the shortage of replacements synergizing to accelerate the burn of Ukrainian personnel. The AFU is unable to regularly rotate units out of combat, and the inadequate flow of replacements causes frontline infantry complements to wear thin. Unable to rotate or reinforce, line brigades resort to cannibalization – scraping support personnel like mortar teams, drivers, and drone operators to fill out frontline positions. This further accelerates losses as brigades fight with thinned out support and fires elements, and makes Ukrainian men more unwilling to enlist – because there is now no guarantee that becoming a drone operator, for example, will save one from being sent to a frontline trench eventually.

    Where does this leave us? Ukraine continues to dispose of a very large force, with more than a hundred brigades and hundreds of thousands of men under arms. This force, however, is both substantially outnumbered by the Russian army and in a clear trend of decay. Despite a highly touted attempt to reinvigorate the mobilization apparatus in 2024, the intake of new personnel is clearly too low to offset losses, and the heavy lifting formations in critical sectors of front have seen their strength – particularly in the infantry complements – decline, in some cases to critical levels.

    The failure of Ukraine’s 2024 mobilization program has coincided with several strategic choices which have exacerbated manpower concerns – specifically the decision to embark on a program of force expansion even as the AFU voluntarily extended its commitments by opening a new secondary front in Kursk. In other words, Ukraine’s mobilization falls short of its force requirements, and the AFU has also made choices that sabotaged its ability to economize. Units are ground up, replacements come in a paltry trickle, rotations are late or absent, units cannibalize themselves, and angry and weary men desert.

    It’s not at all clear that this will lead to a “breaking point”, in the sense that people are anticipating. Ukrainian strike capabilities and the Russian preference for dispersed, leapfrogging assaults limit the potential for grand breakthroughs and exploitation. However, what we saw over the past three months on the southern Donetsk axis offers a preview of what awaits: an exhausted force being steadily rolled back, dug out of its strongpoints, and mauled – covering its retreat with drones but losing position after position. The line holds, until it doesn’t.

    End of the Line: ATACMs, JASSMs, and Hazelnuts

    Ukraine’s ability to remain in the field depends on a titration of two indispensable resources: first, Ukrainian male biomass, and secondly the critical western weaponry that gives them combat effectiveness. We have evaluated the first: Ukraine is not exactly out of men, but the trends of its mobilization program are poor and personnel shortages are mounting. The trends regarding the second are, if anything, even more foreboding for Kiev.

    There are two general dynamics that have emerged, neither of which create an optimistic picture for Ukraine, which we’ll examine in turn. These are as follows:

    1. The delivery of heavy weaponry to Ukraine (tanks, IFVs, and artillery tubes) has largely dried up in recent months.
    2. The west has essentially run out of escalatory weaponry (strike systems) to give, and those systems already given have failed to meaningfully altar the trajectory of the war.

    In 2023, building out new mechanized units was the name of the game, with the Pentagon leading a multinational effort to stand up an entire army corps worth of units equipped with Leopards, Challengers, and a whole slew of western IFVs and APCs. When that lovingly assembled grouping bashed its head on a rock in the botched assault on the Zaporizhia line, the United States belatedly and begrudgingly dispatched its own Abrams to backstop the Ukrainian tank force. In 2024, however, deliveries of heavy weapons slowed to a trickle.

    The role of the tank in Ukraine has been greatly misunderstood. The vulnerability of tanks to the myriad strike systems of the modern battlefield led some observers to declare that the tank as a weapons system was now obsolete, but this did not really square with the fact that both combatants in this war were eager to deploy as many as possible. Tanks need more critical enablers – more combat engineering, air defense, and electronic warfare support – but they continue to fill an indispensable role and remain an essential item in this war. The failure of Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive showed, if anything, that tanks simply are not “game changing” systems, but mass consumption items – but this has always been the case. The signature quality of iconic tanks like the Sherman and the T34 was that they were numerous

    Unfortunately for Ukraine, deliveries of tanks have dropped off dramatically after the failures of 2023. America’s drawdowns for Ukraine in 2024 were almost entirely devoid of armored vehicles of any kind. Data from the Kiel Institute, which has been meticulous tracking weaponry commitments and deliveries, confirms a sharp dropoff in heavy weapons in 2024. In 2023, Ukraine’s backers pledged 384 tanks. This dropped to just 98 in 2024 – which explains why the new Ukrainian mechanized brigades are perilously light on the equipment indicative of their designations.

    While 2023 was all about building out Ukraine’s mechanized package with tanks, IFVs, and engineering, 2024 has been largely about enhancing Ukraine’s strike capabilities. There have been two separate elements at play – first, the delivery of both air and ground launched systems (most notably the British Storm Shadows and American ATACMs respectively), and secondly the loosening of the rules of engagement to allow Ukraine to strike targets inside pre-war Russia.

    This dovetailed, as it turned out, with Ukraine’s operation in Kursk, and in many ways the most direct impact of the Kursk incursion has been to force the west’s hand on the rules of engagement. While Ukraine has long been striking inside Russia with indigenous systems, most notably drones, the White House continued to drag its feet on formal approval for strikes with American systems. By launching a ground assault on Kursk, Ukraine made the decision for them: the United States gave clearance to use ATACMs to support the ground forces in Kursk, and this metastasized into general license to strike Russia with the full range of available systems. This was a poignant reminder that, however we conceive of the proxy-sponsor relationship, Ukraine has some ability to force America’s hand: a classic example of the tail wagging the dog.

    In any case, 2024 saw Ukraine and its western backers slowly but surely bash through all the supposed red-lines in this domain: the British breached first with the delivery of Storm Shadows late in 2023, and this was followed by the delivery of ATACMs (with a handful of F16’s to boot), and finally the loosening of the rules of engagement to clear strikes on Russia.

    Where does this leave us? There would seem to be three important things to consider.

    1. The west has essentially reached the end of its escalation chain. The only remaining step that they can take would be to supply Ukraine with JASSMs (Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile), which would mark a quantitative but not a meaningful qualitative upgrade to Ukraine’s strike capabilities.
    2. Ukraine’s use of western-supplied strike assets has been dissipated and has not materially improved their situation on the ground.
    3. Russia maintains a dominant strike advantage, both qualitative and quantitative.

    Ukraine faces a stark disadvantage in strike capability relative to Russia, in a variety of ways. Russian strike assets are far more numerous and have significant range advantages, but it is also important to take into consideration both Russia’s significantly greater strategic depth and its more dense and relatively unscathed air defense. Unlike Ukraine, which has seen its air defense stretch to the limit with destroyed launchers and a mounting interceptor shortage, Russia’s air defenses have been essentially untouched, as Ukraine has lacked the large numbers of assets required to conduct a proper SEAD/DEAD (Suppression/Destruction of Enemy Air Defense) campaign.

    Given this basic calculus, using western strike systems to wage a blow for blow strategic air campaign is bad math for Ukraine. It is generally unwise to engage in a bat fight when your opponent is a bigger man with a much longer bat. Instead, Ukraine’s strike systems should have been leveraged to support ground operations – concentrating strikes spatially and in time to synergize with efforts on the ground. Just as a simple thought experiment, it is not difficult to imagine ATACMs making a difference if they had been available in 2023 and used to saturate Russian rear areas during the assault on the Zaporizhia line – striking in tempo with the mechanized assault to disrupt Russian command and control and prevent reinforcement of critical areas.

    Instead, Ukraine’s strike capacity has been largely dissipated in attacks that sometimes achieve success hitting Russian installations but fail to directly support successful operations on the ground. The result is a diffusion of Ukrainian striking power that is less than the sum of its parts. Now, Ukraine has essentially run dry on missiles – of the 500 ATACMs sent by the United States, perhaps 50 are left in Kiev’s stockpiles. Stocks of air launched Storm Shadow missiles are similarly low, and Britain’s commitment to resupply is limited to “a few dozen”

    The last option for the west to backstop Ukrainian strike capability are American JASSMs. While there is a longer-range variant in production (the JASSM-ER, or Extended Range), these are relatively new and expensive and are earmarked for American stocks – it is therefore presumed that the Ukrainians would receive the standard variant. The standard JASSM has slight range advantages over Storm Shadows and ATACMs, at roughly 230 miles. In the event that JASSMs are not given, there is a shorter range system called the SLAM (Standoff Land Attack Missile) with a range of some 170 miles. Both JASSMs and SLAMs would be compatible with Ukrainian F-16s.

    Two things need to be noted about the JASSM. First, the JASSM – while offering slightly longer ranges – would essentially serve as a backstop/replacement for the rapidly dwindling ATACMs and particularly the air launched Storm Shadows – instead of Ukraine’s native SU-24s launching Storm Shadows, they would utilize F-16s launching JASSMs. This would not represent a dramatic upgrade in Ukrainian capabilities, but would instead simply serve to maintain a bare minimum Ukrainian strike capability. JASSMs are a replacement for dwindling capabilities, not an augmentation to them.

    Secondly, it must be understood that JASSMs are the last stop. We’re now entering the territory, not of artificially constructed red lines, but physical and real limits. Russia has essentially eaten the gifted stocks of ATACMs and Storm Shadows, with little discernable effect on their ability to fight, and JASSMs are the last extant item in the inventories to keep Ukrainian strike capabilities operative. We are at the last rung of the aid ladder.

    In the case of JASSMs, however, there are notable downsides for the United States. This is an important case of putting all of one’s eggs in the same technological basket. In 2020, the United States scrapped the development of its conventionally armed Long Range Standoff Missile, making the JASSM – particularly the new extended range variants – the system for the United States, earmarked to play a critical role in future conflicts, particularly in the Pacific. This makes the JASSM an extremely sensitive system, as a centerpiece of American strike capabilities, particularly with the modernization of the Tomahawk system crawling along at a few dozen units per year.

    Given the fact that JASSMs are GPS guided, there are real reasons to be reticent about giving Ukraine such a technologically sensitive system. Russian electronic warfare has enjoyed considerable success jamming GPS and disrupting similarly guided American systems. Allowing the Russians to gain familiarity with a keystone American system could wreak havoc on Pentagon war planning – most, if not all of the strike eggs are in this basket, so why let an adversary peek inside?

    It’s probable, given what we have seen to this point, that these concerns will ultimately be dismissed and Ukraine will receive a line of JASSMs which will backstop their strike capabilities – but given the size of Ukraine’s F-16 fleet, the scale will be constrained. Furthermore, air launched systems are less optimal for Ukraine, given their dependence on large and easily targeted airfields, in contrast to ground launched systems which are mobile and more easily concealed.

    Certainly, JASSMs will never give Ukraine the ability to match Russia’s own strike capacity. After hearing endlessly about how Russia is running out of missiles, it has at last been concluded that this is simply not true, and indeed never was. Recently, Ukrainian defense intelligence admitted that per their own estimates Russia retains about 1,400 long range missiles in its reserves, with a monthly production of roughly 150 units. Russian production of inexpensive Geran drones has also skyrocketed, with Ukrainian intelligence estimating a ceiling as high as 2,000 drones per month.

    There is also the matter of the new Russian missile system – the now famous Oreshnik, or Hazel Tree. Russia tested the Oreshnik system on a large machining plant in Dnipro on November 21, 2024, which allowed the basic capabilities of the system to be gauged. The Oreshnik is an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile, characterized by its hypersonic capabilities (exceeding Mach-10) and its Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle equipped with six separate warheads, with the potential for submunitions in each. Although the attack on Dnipro was essentially a demonstration which used inert training warheads (that is, without explosive payloads), the missile can be configured with nuclear or conventional warheads

    As in the case of the North Korean troops in Kursk, I rather think that the Oreshnik launch was not nearly as important as it was made out to be. The system is expensive and likely impractical for conventional use. I understand the desire to conceive of Oreshnik as a massively powerful conventional weapon – showering its target with half a dozen warheads with the power of an entire flight of Kalibr missiles – but there are several problems with this. The accuracy of the system (the CEP, or “Circular Error Probable” in the technical parlance) is much more consistent with a nuclear delivery system than a conventional one. Furthermore, the problem with using an IRBM for conventional strikes is the danger of miscalculation – foreign adversaries may misinterpret the launch as a nuclear attack and respond appropriately. This is precisely why the Russian government actually alerted the United States to the launch ahead of time – a fine arrangement for a demonstration, but impractical for a weapon that is intended to be used regularly.

    We may see another use of the Oreshnik against Ukraine, but ultimately this is unlikely to be a system of consequence in this war. The demonstration in Dnipro was instead likely intended to send a message to Europe – reminding NATO that Russia has the capacity to deliver strikes against European targets that cannot be intercepted. It also serves as a poignant reminder that Europe lacks the equivalent capability, and in essence provides a demonstration of Russia’s ability to launch missiles from far beyond the range of either Ukrainian or European response. The Hazelnut is a tangible reminder of Russia’s strategic depth and strike dominance in Ukraine.

    Ultimately, Ukraine will lose the strike game. It’s strike capacity has dwindled, with missiles frittered away in a dissipated air campaign, and though the exhaustion of Storm Shadow and ATACMs stocks can be offset somewhat by JASSMs, Ukraine simply lacks the range or quantities necessary to match Russian capabilities. Needing to do more with less, Ukraine instead diffused its assets and failed to synergize its strikes with ground operations. We are now at the end of the line – after JASSMs, there’s nothing left in western warehouses to upgrade Ukrainian capabilities. Hazelnuts or no, the math on this bat fight is bad for Kiev.

    Conclusion: Debellation

    Trapped in an endless news cycle, with daily footage of FPV strikes and exploding vehicles, and a dutiful cottage industry of war mappers alerting us to every 100 meter advance, it can easily feel like the Russo-Ukrainian War is trapped in an interminable doom loop which will never end – Mad Max meets Groundhog Day.

    What I have endeavored to do here, however, is argue that 2024 actually saw several very important developments which make the coming shape of the war relatively clear. To briefly recapitulate:

    1. Russian forces caved in Ukrainian defenses at depth across an entire critical axis of front. After remaining static for years, Ukraine’s position in Southern Donetsk has been obliterated, with Russian forces advancing through an entire belt of fortified positions, pushing the front into Pokrovsk and Kostayantinivka.
    2. The main Ukrainian gambit on the ground (the incursion into Kursk) failed spectacularly, with the salient being progressively caved in. An entire grouping of critical mechanized formations wasted much of the year fighting on this unproductive and secondary front, leaving Ukrainian positions in the Donbas increasingly threadbare and bereft of reserves.
    3. An attempt by the Ukrainian government to reinvigorate its mobilization program failed, with enlistments quickly trailing off. Decisions to expand the force structure exacerbated the shortage of manpower, and as a result the decay of Ukraine’s frontline brigades has accelerated.
    4. Long awaited western upgrades to Ukraine’s strike capabilities failed to defeat Russian momentum, and stocks of ATACMs and Storm Shadows are nearly exhausted. There are now few options remaining to prop up Ukrainian strike capacity, and no prospect of Ukraine gaining dominance in this dimension of the war.

    In short, Ukraine is on the path to debellation – defeat through the total exhaustion of its capacity to resist. They are not exactly out of men and vehicles and missiles, but these lines are all pointing downward. A strategic Ukrainian defeat – once unthinkable to the western foreign policy apparatus and commentariat – is now on the table. Quite interestingly, now that Donald Trump is about to return to the White House, it is suddenly acceptable to speak of Ukrainian defeat. Robert Kagan – a stalwart champion of Ukraine if there ever was one – now says the quiet part out loud:

    Ukraine will likely lose the war within the next 12 to 18 months. Ukraine will not lose in a nice, negotiated way, with vital territories sacrificed but an independent Ukraine kept alive, sovereign, and protected by Western security guarantees. It faces instead a complete defeat, a loss of sovereignty, and full Russian control

    Indeed.

    None of this should be particularly surprising. If anything, it is shocking that my position – that Russia is essentially a very powerful country that was very unlikely to lose a war (which it perceives as existential) right in its own belly – somehow became controversial or fringe. But here we are.

    Carthago delenda est [end]

    The original article

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    The Atlanticist defeat in Donbass and Ukraine

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    Gradually, and then Suddenly

    How American Neocons Wrecked the Middle East and Ukraine – David Stockman, Antiwar.com

    This is part 2 of “Why There Is Still No Peace on Earth: Washington’s Folly From The Persian Gulf to Ukraine.”  Read part 1

    Nazism in Ukraine

    its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine

    The Western disinformation about Ukraine

    chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia

  • [Sharing] Canada’s Nazi war criminal past can no longer be ignored – Owen Schalk, Canadian Dimension

    After WWII, thousands of war criminals were able to settle in Canada, where most lived openly without any fear of prosecution

    Growing up, I always heard about the Nazi SS veteran who lived in our small town in rural Manitoba. His name was Herbie. He worked on farms in the area, and for a time at CN Rail, before passing away in peace and comfort in his 80s.

    Herbie’s Nazi past was an open secret. Everybody in town knew he had fought for the Waffen-SS during the Second World War and hightailed it to Canada when the Allies triumphed. But nobody seemed to know how he had entered Canada so easily, or why the Canadian government didn’t do anything about this man whose Nazi past was known to everyone in the area.

    Rumours circulated that Herbie was a war criminal. I remember hearing one story several times: while he was stationed at a concentration camp for Russian POWs on the Eastern Front, he shot and killed a prisoner simply because he wanted the man’s coat.

    I was always confused why Herbie—an enemy combatant who had fought for what we supposedly recognize as one of the most vile and destructive regimes in history—was not arrested and extradited to Europe. Now I know why. It was a deliberate policy of Ottawa to welcome Nazi war veterans like Herbie into Canada after 1945.

    The stereotype of Nazi-embracing Latin American dictatorships is a common one, but it distracts attention from the myriad ways in which the US and Canada welcomed thousands more Nazi veterans and allowed their ideology to fester, untouched, amongst many far-right diaspora groups.

    In 1997, war crimes investigator and private detective Steven Rambam said, “Canada is where the Nazis are. Canada is the unknown haven for Nazis. Everybody knows about Argentina, but nobody knows about Canada.”

    Whitewashing Nazi crimes

    In Winnipeg, the largest city near my hometown, a man named Alexander Laak lived openly, unbothered by police. He was a Nazi lieutenant and the commander of the Jägala concentration camp in Estonia. Thousands of Jewish people were murdered at Jägala from 1942 to 1943, and Laak himself was reported to have kept female prisoners as sex slaves.

    After the war, Laak lived comfortably in suburban Winnipeg. He was a member of a national diaspora group called the Estonian Central Council (ECC), and from 1955 onward, he worked for Canada’s Department of National Defence.

    The Russian news agency TASS claimed that Laak had bought his house in Winnipeg with proceeds from valuables stolen from victims of mass executions in Estonia. The RCMP had apparently “talked to Laak and found nothing to incriminate him.” Nevertheless, Laak admitted that he “was in the Estonian army and fought against the Russians.”

    In September 1960, Laak was found dead in his garage. The official cause of death was suicide by hanging, but there are theories that he was tracked down and killed by a so-called “Jewish Avenger” squad of Holocaust survivors.

    Following Laak’s death, Canadian media reported that he had undergone and passed a police check before entering Canada. Another article in the Ottawa Citizen used scare quotes when reporting Laak’s crimes, aiming to discredit Soviet accusations that he had participated in the Holocaust.

    One article reads: “A 53-year-old immigrant accused by Russia as a ‘Nazi war criminal’ sought by the Communists for ‘mass murders’ in Estonia committed suicide last night by hanging himself from a garage rafter.” The article also gave Laak the space to discredit his accusers: “Laak said he was the man the Russians were talking about but labelled the story ‘99 percent lies… It is only Communist propaganda.’”

    Meanwhile, an earlier article headlined “Accused of Being Nazi: Family Tells of Struggle” did everything it could to clear Laak’s name, writing of the family’s “struggles in Canada to piece together war-disrupted lives.”

    Dozens of other journalists penned articles claiming Laak was the target of “Red lies” and “Russian propaganda.” Following Laak’s death, the ECC said their organization had “come under a Soviet propaganda barrage.”

    Efforts to complicate accusations against Laak were similar to how the media addresses (or fails to address) the crimes of Ukrainian Holocaust perpetrator Roman Shukhevych today. Whenever his name appears in the media—usually in connection to protests against the bronze bust of his likeness in Edmonton—it is often implied that the narrative around his crimes is “complex”

    Amidst a wave of protest against the Shukhevych statue last year, CTV News quoted the Ukrainian Catholic Eparchy, the organization which erected the bust, as “dismiss[ing] accusations that Shukhevych collaborated with Nazi Germany and was involved in massacres of Jewish and Polish people as ‘Russian disinformation.’”

    A CBC article claimed that Shukhevych has “fallen under increased scrutiny” in recent years. And a CTV article noted: “While Shukhevych is celebrated by some as a Ukrainian military leader, he is also criticized by others as being involved in massacres of Jewish and Polish people.”

    Even amidst the ongoing outrage over Yaroslav Hunka’s visit to the House of Commons, the CBC ran an article in which they wrote of Shukhevych’s “alleged” war crimes and his hero status among many right-wing, ultranationalist Ukrainians:

    Lionized by some in the Ukrainian Canadian community as a brilliant guerilla commander who led the largest insurgency in Europe against Stalin, Shukhevych is considered a war criminal by Jews and Poles for his alleged role in the Holocaust and an ethnic cleansing campaign against the Polish minority in Western Ukraine

    Canada: “Haven for Nazi criminals”

    When meeting with historian Irving Abella, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau was honest about the fact that Ottawa had no intention of prosecuting Nazi war criminals living in Canada. In their meeting, he told Abella that Canada was not seeking to prosecute Nazi veterans on its soil “because they were afraid of exacerbating relationships between Jews and Eastern European ethnic communities.”

    In his research, Abella described the disturbing ways in which the Canadian government welcomed Nazis into the country after the war. In an interview with 60 Minutes, he told host Mike Wallace that one of the ways they could guarantee their entry into Canada “was by showing the SS tattoo… This proved you were an anti-Communist.” If true, this would explain how people like Herbie, Hunka, and Laak were able to enter Canada so easily after fighting for Hitler’s army

    https://twitter.com/MarkAmesExiled/status/1706998956322934918

    The New York Times has described Canada as a “Haven for Nazi Criminals,” while the Jerusalem Post called Canada “a near-blissful refuge” for Nazis. B’nai Brith has accused Ottawa of “intentional harbouring of known Nazi war criminals.”

    It is hard to disagree with any of these statements. For instance, when Jerusalem Post reporters hired Steven Rambam to search for Nazis, he tracked down around 150 suspected war criminals living openly in Canada. And this assignment didn’t test his investigative mettle; tracking them down was often as easy as looking up their names in the phone book.

    In 2014, Rambam said, “It is to the Canadian government’s great and eternal shame that more was not done” to prosecute Nazi war criminals living here. Indeed, Canada openly spurned the petitions of national Jewish organizations which protested the government’s openness toward Nazi veterans:

    In the late 1940s, the Canadian Jewish Congress actively petitioned Ottawa to keep a closer eye on refugee streams from Eastern Europe, as the CJC believed that many former Nazi collaborators were using them to enter the country under false pretenses. These warnings were almost completely ignored, and the Congress’ low-end estimate is that 2,000 war criminals were able to settle in Canada, where most lived openly without any fear of prosecution

    Indeed, it was a policy of the British after the Second World War to dump Ukrainian Nazi prisoners in Canada. A 1948 report from British official Beryl Hughes reads, “What little we know of [Ukrainian Nazis’] war record is bad… We’re still hoping to get rid of the less desirable Ukrainian POWs either to Germany or Canada.”

    These Nazi veterans usually don’t hide their presence or their past actions. Often they are proud of them. For instance, Hunka writes of his time in Hitler’s army with pride and nostalgia. He posted photographs of himself in uniform on a blog for Ukrainian veterans of the SS Galicia Division and described the period under Nazi occupation from 1941 to 1943 as “the happiest years of my life.”

    None of this stopped Parliament from applauding him, even though he was introduced as having fought “against the Russians” during World War II. And it didn’t stop the University of Alberta from distributing a $30,000 endowment fund in Hunka’s name over the past four years (which they finally closed yesterday amidst the uproar around the incident in the House of Commons)

    https://twitter.com/LukewSavage/status/1707425307714584698

    Rehabilitating war criminals

    After the war, the Canadian government welcomed between 1,200 and 2,000 members of the Ukrainian SS Galicia Division into Canada. Other Nazi veterans and collaborators came from Germany, the Baltics, and the Balkan states.

    Over the past decade, the Canadian government has allocated millions of dollars to construct a Memorial to the Victims of Communism in Ottawa—despite a 2015 poll that found 77 percent of Canadians opposed the project. The monument was awarded funding under both the Harper and Trudeau governments, and received letters of support from Green Party leader Elizabeth May, former NDP leader Tom Mulcair, and former federal Justice Minister Irwin Cotler.

    Funding for the monument has also come through a “buy-a-brick” campaign in which Canadians can donate money and dedicate a “virtual brick” to someone they consider a “victim of communism.”

    After being announced in 2021, the “buy-a-brick” campaign was swamped with donations dedicated to Nazi war criminals and collaborators. The General Committee of United Croats of Canada dedicated a brick to Ante Pavelić, the leader of Croatia’s Nazi puppet regime and the country’s chief perpetrator of the Holocaust. Pavelić is responsible for the murders of approximately 32,000 Jews, 25,000 Roma, and 330,000 Serbs. Another brick was dedicated to Mile Budak, one of the most high-ranking figures in the fascist Ustaša. The bricks made no mention of these men’s actions, simply describing Pavelić as a “doctors of laws” and Budak as a “poet.” A third brick was purchased for Ivan Oršanić, another Ustaša member.

    Meanwhile, the League of Ukrainian Canadians’ Edmonton Branch bought five bricks in honour of Roman Shukhevych, whose Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) massacred thousands of Poles and Jews.

    Confronting the past, and present

    It is clear that the presence of Nazi veterans is widespread in Canada. Even so, the federal government is still hiding information on war criminals living in this country.

    The 1986 Deschênes Commission investigated the presence of Nazi war criminals in Canada. However, many of the commission’s findings remain classified, and Ottawa continues to ignore appeals to release additional information.

    Forty years later, the government is still sitting on a long-classified report about Nazis who settled in Canada. According to Ottawa Citizen journalist David Pugliese:

    [The government] has heavily censored another 1986 report examining how Nazis were able to get into Canada. More than 600 pages of that document, obtained by this newspaper and other organizations through the Access to Information law, have been censored

    David Matas, the honourary counsel for B’nai Brith, has attempted to gain access to these documents. His efforts have been fruitless. “We’ve run up against a brick wall,” he told Pugliese.

    It is past time we confront this dark history. We deserve to know how and why these Nazis were allowed to live comfortably in Canada.

    As Friends of Simon Wiesenthal Center President Michael Levitt said, “It’s now time for Ottawa to not only release the unredacted files related to the Deschênes Commission, but to also address the stark reality that there are still former Nazis with blood on their hands living in Canada.”

    Direct demands need to be made of Canadian officials to release all historical documents related to Nazi war criminals within our own borders.

    We also need to ask why we are spending millions on a monument that may bear dedications to Nazi collaborators.

    These questions must be dealt with. Failing to better understand our history will have troubling implications for Canada’s future [end]

    The original article

    Related

    November 19, 2024: Why Is Canada Protecting the Names of Suspected Nazis? – Taylor Noakes, The Walrus

    Ottawa won’t disclose list of alleged war criminals believed to have sheltered here after the Second World War

    September 29, 2023: Nazigate – Max Blumenthal & Aaron Mate, The Grayzone

    November 14, 2022: Chrystia Freeland’s Nazi Problem – Scott Ritter

    Nazism in eastern Europe

    chronicle: its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine and Baltic States, how NATO has supported Nazism in eastern Europe

    The footprint of the Ukrainian Nazism in the West

    chronicle: interactions between Ukrainian Nazi organizations and Western supremacist militants

  • [Sharing] McCarthyism, European style: The elite crackdown on Ukraine dissent – Eldar Mamedov, Responsible Statecraft

    Experts lambasted as Kremlin mouthpieces turned out to be right

    As the war between Russia and Ukraine is framed by the ruling politicians and commentators in Europe and America as part of a purported global struggle between democracies and autocracies, the quality of democracy in the West itself has taken a hit.

    The dominant voices advocating for Ukraine’s victory and Russia’s defeat, both defined in maximalist and increasingly unattainable terms, are intent on snuffing out more thoughtful and nuanced perspectives, thus depriving the public of a democratic debate on the existential questions of war and peace.

    In a familiar pattern throughout the West, respected academics who correctly predicted the quagmire Ukraine and the West now find themselves in have been smeared and delegitimized as Kremlin mouthpieces, subjected to harassment, marginalization and ostracism.

    The situation is particularly alarming in Europe. While the Ukraine debate in the U.S. is, to a worrying extent, shaped by pro-militarist think tanks, such as the Atlantic Council, hawkish politicians and neoconservative pundits, a countervailing movement consisting of pro-restraint voices has been growing. They include Defense Priorities, the CATO Institute, publications like The Nation on the left, and The American Conservative on the right, and academics like Stephen Walt, John Mearsheimer, and Jeffrey Sachs, among others. There is more space for alternative voices in American discourse.

    In Europe, by contrast, foreign policy debates tend to simply echo the most hawkish voices inside Washington’s Beltway.

    Sweden is a particularly telling illustration of that trend. After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Swedish government and political class swiftly moved to join NATO. Yet, as one of the leading Swedish international relations scholars Frida Stranne told me in an interview, “No proper debate was held on the key questions, like whether Russia’s aggression against Ukraine indeed was such an immediate security threat for Sweden that it had to ditch the neutral status it enjoyed even during the Cold War?” (I can testify myself, from my work as a senior foreign policy adviser in the European Parliament in early 2022, that even some members of the then-ruling Swedish social-democratic party were aghast at the government running roughshod over alternative views on NATO).

    Further, in a conversation with me, Stranne, while acknowledging that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was “an egregious breach of international law,” pointed to U.S. policies since 2001, such as the invasion of Iraq, noting that they “have helped to undermine international legal principles and set the precedent for other countries acting ‘preemptively’ against perceived threats.”

    In the same interview, she also warned that “a refusal to countenance a negotiated settlement to the war in Ukraine is leading the world perilously close to the brink of a major military conflict between NATO and Russia.”

    While such points are routinely made by fairly mainstream scholars in the U.S., in Sweden they triggered a vicious campaign against Stranne and made her nearly untouchable by the media and in foreign policy circles. Leading media outlets vilified her as a U.S. hater and a “Putinist.”

    Germany is another example of how enforced groupthink led to a marginalization of dissenting perspectives in political debates. What is particularly noteworthy is the speed and radicalism with which the hawks in think tanks, media, and political parties managed to redefine the debate in a country previously known for its now-defunct Ostpolitik, a policy of pragmatic engagement with the Soviet Union and later Russia.

    One of Germany’s most prominent foreign policy experts, Johannes Varwick of the University Halle-Wittenberg, has long defied the trend and advocated for diplomacy. In December 2021, together with a number of high-ranking former military officers, diplomats and academics, he warned that a massive deterioration in relations with Russia could lead to war — due, in part, to the West’s refusal to take seriously Russia’s security concerns, chiefly related to the prospects of NATO’s eastward expansion.

    Yet such views earned Varwick accusations of “serving Russian interests.” As a result, as he told me in an interview, his “ties with the political parties and ministries responsible for conducting Germany’s foreign and security policy were severed.”

    Experts in neutral countries were not spared marginalization as well. Austrian Prof. Gerhard Mangott, one of the most eminent experts on Russia in the German-speaking world, pointed to a “shared responsibility” of Russia, Ukraine, and Western countries for the failure to resolve the post-2014 Ukrainian conflict peacefully. Such analysis, as Mangott told me, led to his “prompt excommunication by the German-speaking scientific community which turned quickly to political activism and became party to the war.”

    The tragic irony, of course, is that these ostracized voices have proved to be correct in most respects about this war.

    When, despite his warnings, the Russian invasion of Ukraine did occur, Varwick, who condemned it as illegal and unacceptable, called for further efforts to find a realistic negotiated solution to the conflict. As he told me, this should “firstly include a neutral status for Ukraine with strong security guarantees for the country. Secondly, there would be territorial changes in Ukraine that would not be recognized under international law but must be accepted as a temporary modus vivendi, and thirdly, the prospect of suspension of some sanctions in the event of a change in Russia’s behavior must be on offer.”

    In March 2022, both Ukraine and Russia were close to a deal broadly along these same parameters. It did not work, because, among other reasons, the West encouraged Ukraine to believe that a military “victory” was possible. The role of then-British Prime Minister Boris Johnson in undermining the talks is now generally acknowledged. What is, however, particularly striking is that Johnson recently himself admitted that he saw the war in Ukraine as a proxy war against Russia — a claim made by Stranne and the Quincy Institute’s Trita Parsi in their 2023 book, in Swedish, “The Illusion of American Peace,” for which they were lambasted for purportedly pushing Russian narratives.

    Fast forward to late 2024, and, faced with growing difficulties on the battlefield, Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky is now signaling that he could go along with some of the elements outlined by Varwick; namely, accepting some de facto territorial losses to prevent even bigger ones should the war continue.

    Today, Ukraine is farther away from achieving anything remotely resembling a military victory than at any point since February 2022. Contrary to the expectations in the U.S. and EU, sanctions neither tanked Russia’s economy nor changed its policies in the ways the West sought.

    In the West itself, political forces that urge negotiations to end the war are ascendant, as evidenced by the election of Donald Trump as president in the United States and the rise of anti-war parties in Germany, France and other EU countries. Public opinion surveys consistently show a preference of the majority of Europeans for a negotiated end to the war.

    The reality is, irrespective of the outcome of the war in Ukraine, a modus vivendi between the West and Russia will have to be reestablished to ensure, in Varwick’s words, “their coexistence in a Cold War 2.0 without a permanent escalation.” Restoring an open democratic debate about this vital issue is long overdue.

    Listening to the experts who have a proven track record of correct analysis would be a necessary first step [end]

    The original article

    Related

    29 novembre 2023 : How American Neocons Wrecked the Middle East and Ukraine – David Stockman, Antiwar.com

    This is part 2 of “Why There Is Still No Peace on Earth: Washington’s Folly From The Persian Gulf to Ukraine.”  Read part 1

    The Atlanticist defeat in Donbass and Ukraine

    chronicle of a new catastrophic NATO venture

    The Western disinformation about Ukraine

    chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Ukraine against Russia

  • [Sharing] How the Strategy of Fighting to the Last Ukrainian Was Sold to the Public as Morally Righteous – Glenn Diesen

    For almost three years, NATO countries have boycotted diplomatic contacts with Russia, even as hundreds of thousands of men have died on the battlefield. The decision by diplomats to reject diplomacy is morally repugnant as diplomacy could have reduced the excess of violence, prevented escalation, and even resulted in a path to peace. However, the political-media elites skilfully sold the rejection of diplomacy to the public as evidence of their moral righteousness.

    This article will first outline how NATO planned for a long war to exhaust Russia and knock it out from the ranks of great powers. Second, this article will demonstrate how the political-media elites communicated that diplomacy is treasonous and war is virtuous. 

    NATO’s Long War

    To exhaust Russia in a long war, the goal was to ensure that the Russians and Ukrainians kill each other for as long as possible. The US Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin outlined the US objective in the Ukraine War as weakening its strategic adversary: “We want to see Russia weakened to the degree that it can’t do the kinds of things that it has done in invading Ukraine”.1 In late March 2022, Zelensky revealed in an interview with the Economist: “There are those in the West who don’t mind a long war because it would mean exhausting Russia, even if this means the demise of Ukraine and comes at the cost of Ukrainian lives”.2

    The Israeli and Turkish mediators confirmed that Russia and Ukraine agreed to the terms of a peaceful settlement in Istanbul, in which Russia would withdraw its forces and Ukraine would restore its neutrality. However, why would the US and its allies accept that Ukraine return to neutrality, when the alternative was to use the powerful proxy army they had built in Ukraine to bleed and weaken Russia?3

    The Turkish Foreign Minister acknowledged that there are “NATO member states that want the war to continue—let the war continue and Russia gets weaker. They don’t care much about the situation in Ukraine”.4 The former Israeli Prime Minister also confirmed that the US and UK “blocked” the peace agreement as there was a “decision by the West to keep striking Putin” to destroy a strategic rival.5 The retired German General, Harald Kujat, a former head of the German Bundeswehr and former chairman of the NATO Military Committee, also argued that this was a war deliberately provoked by NATO, while the US and UK sabotaged all paths to peace “to weaken Russia politically, economically and militarily”.6 Interviews with American and British leaders in March 2022, revealed that a decision had been made for “the conflict to be extended and thereby bleed Putin” as “the only end game now is the end of Putin regime”.7

    Chas Freeman, the former US Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs and Director for Chinese Affairs at the US State Department criticised Washington for the objective to prolong the fighting to “fight to the last Ukrainian”.8 Republican Senator Lindsey Graham argued that the US was in a favourable position as it could fight Russia to the last Ukrainian: “I like the structural path we’re on here. As long as we help Ukraine with the weapons they need and the economic support, they will fight to the last person”.9 Republican leader Mitch McConnell was similarly explicit:

    the most basic reasons for continuing to help Ukraine degrade and defeat the Russian invaders are cold, hard, practical American interests. Helping equip our friends in Eastern Europe to win this war is also a direct investment in reducing Vladimir Putin’s future capabilities to menace America, threaten our allies, and contest our core interests.10

    Senator Mitt Romney argued that financing the war was “the best national defense spending I think we’ve ever done” as “We’re diminishing and devastating the Russian military for a very small amount of money” and “we’re losing no lives in Ukraine”. US Congressman Dan Crenshaw also celebrated the proxy war as “investing in the destruction of our adversary’s military, without losing a single American troop, strikes me as a good idea”.11

    Retired US General Keith Kellogg similarly called for extending the war in Ukraine as knocking out Russia would allow the US to focus on China: “if you can defeat a strategic adversary not using any US troops, you are at the acme of professionalism”. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg shared this logic as he argued defeating Russia on the battlefield will make it easier for the US to focus also on China. Stoltenberg also noted that “if Ukraine wins, then you will have the second biggest army in Europe, the Ukrainian army, battle-hardened, on our side, and we’ll have a weakened Russian army”.12

    Diplomacy as Treason and War as Virtue

    When the decision had been made for a long war, the politicians and media began to construct narratives and a moral case for a long war, which would convince the public that diplomacy is treasonous, and war is virtuous.

    Presenting the world as a struggle of good versus evil lays the foundation for effective war propaganda, as perpetual peace can be achieved by defeating the evil opponent while negotiations entail sacrificing indispensable values and principles. To this end, the Hitler analogy is very effective as diplomacy becomes dangerous appeasement while peace requires military victory. Reminiscent of George Orwell’s “war is peace”, Stoltenberg argues that weapons are the path to peace.

    The Western public was reassured that fuelling the war was required to push Putin to the negotiation table, however, during almost three years of war the West never proposed negotiations. Reading the Western media, one gets the impression that Russia would not negotiate. However, Russia never opposed diplomacy or negotiations, it was the West that shut the door. So-called “peace summits” were held to give the public the impression that governments pursued peace, although Russia was not invited and the stated purpose was to mobilise public opinion and resources against Russia.

    In November 2022, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley argued for starting negotiations with Russia. Ukraine had just captured large swaths of territory in Kherson and Kharkov, and General Milley argued Ukraine would not be in a better position to negotiate a peace deal. General Milley was correct in this assessment, yet he neglected that the principal objective of the war was to keep it going to bleed Russia. General Milley had to walk back his statements that threatened to end the war.13

    The EU almost always advocates for immediate diplomacy and negotiations in conflicts around the world. In Ukraine, the EU’s foreign policy chief at the beginning of the war, Josep Borrell, argued that the war would be won on the battlefield.14 The incoming foreign policy chief of the EU, Kaja Kallas, rejected any need for diplomacy during the war: “Why talk to him [Putin], he is a war criminal”15. Diplomacy now entails sitting in a room with people who agree with you, and pat each other on the shoulder for having isolated the adversary. The EU has completed its transition from a peace project to a geopolitical project.

    Anyone suggesting to restore diplomacy or start negotiations is immediately smeared as a far-left or far-right pro-Russian stooge. It is hardly original to present the opposition to war as taking the side of the adversary, yet the accusation of treason is a powerful instrument to crush dissent. The Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban travelled to Ukraine, Russia, China, and the US (to meet with Trump) to explore the possibility of charting a path to peace. The EU responded by punishing Hungary and the political-media elites sought to delegitimise him as a puppet of Putin. The same script is applied to anyone suggesting to end the war.

    Arguing against the dangerous precedent of “rewarding” Putin’s aggression with territory has been another seemingly moral argument against peace negotiations. However, this argument is based on the false premise that the war began as a territorial dispute. As we learned from the Istanbul peace agreement, Russia agreed to pull back its troops in return for Ukraine restoring its neutrality. Furthermore, the proxy war has been lost and Ukraine will only lose more men and territory with each passing day.   

    The Coming Backlash

    As the Ukrainian frontlines collapse and their causalities subsequently intensify, the Americans are pushing Ukraine to lower its conscription age as sacrificing the youth could keep the war going for a bit longer. The Ukrainian public no longer wants to fight, desertions increase drastically, and “recruitment” consists of grabbing civilians off the streets and throwing them into vans that take them almost directly to the front lines. A recent Gallup poll found that there is not a single oblast in Ukraine where the majority support continuing the war.16

    Oleksyi Arestovych, the former advisor to President Zelensky, predicted in 2019 that the threat of NATO expansion would “provoke Russia to launch a large-scale military operation against Ukraine”. NATO would then use the Ukrainian army to defeat Russia: “In this conflict, we will be very actively supported by the West—with weapons, equipment, assistance, new sanctions against Russia and the quite possible introduction of a NATO contingent, a no-fly zone etc. We won’t lose, and that’s good’.17

    The war did not go as planned and Ukraine is being destroyed, and Arestovych recognises the folly of continuing the war. There is a growing realisation in Ukrainian society that NATO sabotaged the peace to fight Russia to the last Ukrainian. Ukrainians will resent Russia for decades to come, although there will also be hatred against the West. The war propagandists in the Western media will then surely act bewildered and blame Russian propaganda.

    1. G. Carbonaro, ‘U.S. Wants Russia ‘Weakened’ So It Can Never Invade Again’, Newsweek, 25 April 2022. ↩︎
    2. The Economist. ‘Volodymyr Zelensky on why Ukraine must defeat Putin’ The Economist, 27 March 2022. ↩︎
    3. The Minsk Peace Agreement was never intended to be implemented but used as an opportunity to build a large Ukrainian military, which both German and France have admitted. ↩︎
    4. R. Semonsen, ‘Former Israeli PM: West Blocked Russo-Ukraine Peace Deal’, The European Conservative, 7 February 2023. ↩︎
    5. N. Bennett, ‘Bennett speaks out’, YouTube Channel of Naftali Bennett, 4 February 2023. ↩︎
    6. Emma, ‘Russland will verhandeln!’ [Russia wants to negotiate!], Emma, 4 March 2023. ↩︎
    7. N. Ferguson, ‘Putin Misunderstands History. So, Unfortunately, Does the U.S.’, Bloomberg, 22 March 2022. ↩︎
    8. A. Maté, ‘US fighting Russia ‘to the last Ukrainian’: veteran US diplomat’, The Grayzone, 24 March 2022. ↩︎
    9. A. Maté, ‘US, UK sabotaged peace deal because they ‘don’t care about Ukraine’: fmr. NATO adviser’, The Grayzone, 27 September 2022. ↩︎
    10. M. McConnell, ‘McConnell on Zelenskyy Visit: Helping Ukraine Directly Serves Core American Interests’, Mitch McConnell official website, 21 December 2022. ↩︎
    11. L. Lonas, ‘Crenshaw, Greene clash on Twitter: ‘Still going after that slot on Russia Today’’, The Hill, 11 May 2022. ↩︎
    12. T. O’Conner, ‘So, if the United States is concerned about China and wants to pivot towards Asia, then you have to ensure that Putin doesn’t win in in Ukraine’, Newsweek, 21 September 2023. ↩︎
    13. K. Demirjian, Milley tries to clarify his case for a negotiated end to Ukraine war, The Washington Post, 16 November 2022. ↩︎
    14. Foreign Affairs Council: Remarks by High Representative Josep Borrell upon arrival | EEAS, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/foreign-affairs-council-remarks-high-representative-josep-borrell-upon-arrival-1_en ↩︎
    15. “Why talk to Putin? He’s a war criminal” Estonian PM Kaja Kallas, ↩︎
    16. B. Vigers, Half of Ukrainians Want Quick, Negotiated End to War, Gallup, 19 November 2024, Half of Ukrainians Want Quick, Negotiated End to War ↩︎
    17. A. Arestovich, ‘Voennoe Obozrenie’ [Military Review], Apostrof TV, 18 February 2019. ↩︎

    [end]

    The original article

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    October 16, 2024: Sabotage des Friedens – Glenn Diesen, Die Weltwoche

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    April 11, 2024: U.S. Government Helps Pro-Ukraine Media Spread Propaganda And Silence American Critics – Lee Fang, RealClearInvestigations

    Media outlets organized with substantial funding and direction from the U.S. government have supported censorship, disseminated disinfo, and sought to silence American critics of the war

    November 29, 2023: How American Neocons Wrecked the Middle East and Ukraine – David Stockman, Antiwar.com

    This is part 2 of “Why There Is Still No Peace on Earth: Washington’s Folly From The Persian Gulf to Ukraine.”  Read part 1

    The Atlanticist defeat in Donbass and Ukraine

    chronicle of a new catastrophic NATO venture

    The Western disinformation about Ukraine

    chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia

  • [Partage] Néonazis en Ukraine: un politologue censuré par un grand éditeur – Jérôme Blanchet-Gravel, Libre Média

    Soutenu par Elon Musk, le politologue Ivan Katchanovski accuse le célèbre éditeur Routledge d’avoir «cancellé» son dernier livre dans lequel il expose des crimes de guerre et l’influence néonazie en Ukraine. Entrevue

    Originaire de l’ouest de l’Ukraine, Ivan Katchanovski a suivi un parcours académique remarquable, ayant notamment travaillé à la Bibliothèque du Congrès aux États-Unis et à l’Université Harvard.

    Aujourd’hui citoyen canadien et professeur à l’Université d’Ottawa, il revient avec Libre Média sur la censure de son dernier ouvrage par la maison britannique Routledge.

    Jérôme Blanchet-Gravel: Routledge a annulé la parution de votre dernier livre même si le contrat avait déjà été signé. Pouvez-vous expliquer ce qui s’est passé?

    Ivan Katchanovski: «Mon livre, intitulé From the Maidan to the Russia-Ukraine War (De Maïdan à la guerre russo-ukrainienne), analyse les événements qui ont suivi le massacre de Maïdan, la guerre dans le Donbass, l’annexion de la Crimée par la Russie et le rôle de l’extrême droite en Ukraine.

    Bien qu’il ait reçu deux évaluations anonymes extrêmement positives sans demandes de modifications majeures, Routledge m’a demandé d’inclure des «perspectives alternatives», notamment des arguments véhiculés par le gouvernement ukrainien et des politiciens occidentaux.

    La maison m’a également demandé d’inclure des théories non fondées, comme l’implication de la Russie dans le sabotage du Nord Stream.

    Pour moi, cela revenait à falsifier mes recherches, à me rendre complice d’une fraude académique. Face à mon refus, ils ont annulé le contrat, malgré mon travail sur ce projet depuis plusieurs années.»

    Il s’agit donc d’un nouveau cas de censure académique?

    Ivan Katchanovski: «Absolument. Ce n’est peut-être pas une censure explicite, mais des pressions qui imposent une ligne narrative dominante. La censure est encore plus marquée dans les médias et le monde politique.

    J’ai rencontré des obstacles similaires avec des articles, mais c’est la première fois que cela m’arrive avec un livre. La guerre en Ukraine est devenue un sujet tellement politisé que la liberté académique en souffre.»

    Il est étonnant de voir un éditeur sérieux comme Routledge céder ainsi à la pression…

    Ivan Katchanovski: «La maison veut éviter toute controverse avec les gouvernements occidentaux et Kiev.

    Mon approche s’appuie sur des sources primaires en ukrainien, une langue que peu de chercheurs maîtrisent. Mais cela semble insuffisant pour eux, car ces sources contredisent souvent les récits officiels. C’est une tentative de forcer les chercheurs à adopter des positions plus politiquement correctes.

    Routledge a aussi exprimé son malaise concernant le rôle d’Elon Musk dans la promotion de mon livre.

    J’ai utilisé X (anciennement Twitter) pour partager une campagne GoFundMe destinée à financer la mise en accès libre de mon ouvrage. Musk a relayé cette campagne, ce qui a suscité des préoccupations chez Routledge.

    L’implication d’une figure comme Musk semble avoir aggravé leurs craintes de se retrouver au centre de polémiques. Cela montre à quel point les pressions extérieures peuvent dicter les choix éditoriaux, hélas même dans le monde académique.»

    Votre livre précédent a pourtant été publié sans problème. Quelle est la différence?

    Ivan Katchanovski: «Mon dernier livre, The Maidan Massacre in Ukraine, a été publié par Palgrave Macmillan et est même disponible gratuitement en ligne

    Cependant, From the Maidan to the Russia-Ukraine War traite de sujets considérés comme plus controversés, notamment le rôle de l’extrême droite en Ukraine et les crimes de guerre commis des deux côtés. Ces sujets sont souvent évités en Occident.»

    La censure est-elle un phénomène nouveau dans votre carrière?

    Ivan Katchanovski: «Pas tout à fait. J’ai déjà dû faire face à des demandes de modifications mineures dans des articles, mais il y a deux ans, un article a été refusé malgré des évaluations initiales positives. Ce qui est nouveau, c’est l’ampleur du phénomène.»

    Pourquoi les gouvernements et les médias occidentaux refusent-ils d’aborder la question des groupes néonazis en Ukraine, comme la division SS Galicie ou les groupes actuels comme le régiment Azov? 

    Ivan Katchanovski: «Les raisons sont essentiellement politiques. Des groupes extrémistes ukrainiens, comme celui du militant ultranationaliste Stepan Bandera, ont collaboré avec les nazis pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale.

    Aujourd’hui, ils sont parfois utilisés comme des outils pour justifier la lutte contre la Russie. Ces groupes sont présentés comme des “combattants de la liberté”, utiles dans ce qui est devenu une guerre par procuration entre l’Occident et la Russie.

    Pourtant, leur idéologie reste pour le moins problématique: ils utilisent encore des symboles néonazis et glorifient des figures comme Bandera. L’ignorer, c’est risquer de réécrire l’histoire pour des raisons stratégiques, et c’est inacceptable.

    Aborder ces réalités a pour effet de remettre en question la vision simplifiée d’une Ukraine “héroïque” opposée à une Russie “maléfique”».

    Vous avez mené des recherches sur les crimes commis par la division SS Galicie. Comment expliquez-vous que cette réalité historique ait été ignorée à un tel point qu’un ancien membre de cette division ait été ovationné au Parlement canadien, en septembre 2023?

    Ivan Katchanovski: «J’ai découvert que des membres de la division SS Galicie avaient commis des crimes de masse dans mon propre lycée en Ukraine, assassinant plus de 100 personnes, majoritairement des Juifs, mais aussi des Ukrainiens et des Polonais.

    Ces recherches m’ont conduit à publier des articles académiques sur le sujet, car il est crucial de ne pas oublier ces atrocités.

    Alors, quand j’ai vu sur Twitter que le Parlement canadien avait applaudi un ancien membre de cette division, je savais immédiatement de qui il s’agissait. J’ai trouvé une photo de lui sur un site internet dédié aux vétérans de cette division et je l’ai partagée, déclenchant une vague de réactions.

    Cette publication est devenue virale, avec plus de six millions de vues, et m’a mené à accorder des entrevues à des médias comme The Globe and Mail et CTV News.

    Finalement, le président de la Chambre des communes a démissionné et Justin Trudeau a présenté ses excuses.»

    Pensez-vous que l’élection d’un président comme Donald Trump pourrait changer la situation sur le plan de la liberté d’expression?

    Ivan Katchanovski: «Cela m’apparait peu probable. Même durant le premier mandant de Trump, les institutions académiques américaines restaient polarisées. Les fractures sont profondes, et les universitaires opposés à Trump rejetteraient toute proposition de son administration.

    Je suis préoccupé. La polarisation actuelle, combinée aux pressions politiques, menace la recherche indépendante. Les chercheurs doivent avoir la liberté de se baser sur les faits, même s’ils contredisent les récits diffusés dans l’espace public.»

    Que prévoyez-vous de faire concernant votre livre?

    Ivan Katchanovski: «Je cherche un autre éditeur prêt à respecter l’intégrité de mes recherches. En attendant, pour contourner ces barrières, je continuerai à publier mes travaux dans des formats accessibles au grand public» [fin]

    L’article original

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  • [Sharing] NY Times killed investigation of Israeli hooligans, internal email reveals – Asa Winstanley, The Electronic Intifada

    The New York Times has killed an investigation by one of its own reporters into Israeli mob violence in Amsterdam earlier this month.

    In an internal Times email inadvertently shared with The Electronic Intifada, Dutch reporter Christiaan Triebert explained to a manager that he had pitched “a visual investigation I was conducting into the events of [6-8 November] in Amsterdam.”

    “Unfortunately, that story was killed,” he wrote. “I regret that the planned moment-by-moment visual investigation was not further pursued.”

    “This has been very frustrating, to say the least,” Triebert wrote.

    The email was addressed to senior Times manager Charlie Stadtlander – a former senior press officer for the US National Security Agency and for the US army.

    Triebert appeared interested in carrying out reporting that would set the record straight, remediating the false narrative insistently advanced by his own newspaper – that the Israeli fans were victims of mob violence motivated by anti-Jewish hatred.

    The correspondence between Triebert and Stadtlander on Friday was triggered by The Electronic Intifada’s requests for comment to The Times regarding the paper’s highly misleading reporting of Israeli mob violence in Amsterdam.

    As this reporter explained on The Electronic Intifada livestream on Wednesday, the paper actually inverted reality

    You can watch the full livestream segment in the video above, where we break down the evidence in detail.

    There is still precisely zero evidence that even one anti-Semitic attack took place in Amsterdam – let alone the “pogrom” that Israeli government officials immediately claimed had happened.

    The Times has come under fire for using a video of Israeli football hooligan violence in Amsterdam last week to claim the exact opposite of what the video actually showed.

    The Times claimed footage shot by a Dutch photojournalist showed “anti-Semitic attacks” on Israelis – even though it actually showed Israeli mob violence against a Dutch citizen.

    For several days, the footage was attached to the top of the paper’s 8 November report about events in Amsterdam the night before.

    But on Tuesday the paper was forced to issue a correction, after the video’s creator – Dutch photojournalist Annet de Graaf – publicly condemned international media for mislabeling her video as evidence of “anti-Semitic attacks” against Israeli football supporters.

    In fact, the video shows a mob of dozens of Israeli hooligans attacking someone, after their team Maccabi Tel Aviv lost an away game 5-0 to Dutch club Ajax on 7 November.

    Times manager Stadtlander claimed to The Electronic Intifada in a statement on Friday that after the correction, the newspaper had “removed the video at the creator’s request.”

    But de Graaf insisted that was untrue. “I haven’t said that at all,” she told The Electronic Intifada by phone on Friday. “It’s not true what the chief editor [Stadtlander] is saying to you in the email. Not true.”

    Asked to comment, Stadtlander declined to respond to that, writing only that “my statement to you last night constitutes our comment on the matter.”

    None of the four authors of the article – John Yoon, Christopher F. Schuetze, Jin Yu Young and Claire Moses – responded to requests for comment from The Electronic Intifada.

    Stadtlander denied playing any role in the commissioning or editing of the article.

    After The Electronic Intifada received Triebert’s “inadvertently copied” email, Stadtlander sent a follow-up email in what appears to have been an attempt at damage control.

    He claimed that “the valuable work Christiaan [Triebert] and others on his team were doing did not become a standalone piece” because “much of the material was incorporated” into another article the Times had published.

    But the piece that Stadtlander linked to is yet another whitewash of the Israeli mob violence in Amsterdam – one of a number published by the Times.

    It obfuscates or outright reverses cause and effect and downplays the Israeli attacks on Dutch citizens while relying almost entirely on the Israeli hooligans’ claims.

    It also downplays a video of Maccabi hooligans returning from Amsterdam to Tel Aviv airport chanting an openly genocidal slogan gloating that there are “no children left” in Gaza as merely “incendiary chants against Arabs and Gazans.”

    Anti-Palestinian agenda

    That the Times newsroom had a pro-Israel agenda from the outset of its coverage of the incident is apparent from reading the earliest version of the piece still available in online archives.

    That version did not include the video by Annet de Graaf, and contained no evidence – or even allegation – of anti-Semitism, aside from the baseless claims of Israeli government officials.

    One of the main sources quoted in that version was Itamar Ben-Gvir, Israel’s far-right police minister, who wants to expel all Palestinians. “Fans who went to see a football game encountered anti-Semitism and were attacked with unimaginable cruelty just because of their Jewishness,” the article quoted Ben-Gvir as saying.

    However, all references to Ben-Gvir were removed from the article, within less than two hours.

    To date, The New York Times has published more than a dozen articles substantially focused on the violence in Amsterdam.

    This is an astonishingly high number compared, say, to how the newspaper has ignored or consistently downplayed grave crimes perpetrated by Israelis in Palestine, including systematic and well-documented sexual assaults and rapes of Palestinian prisoners by Israeli forces.

    The Times coverage not only includes numerous news articles baselessly spinning the Amsterdam violence as “anti-Semitic,” but opinion columns with inflammatory headlines such as “Amsterdam Is About Jew Hatred – and Gaza,” “A Worldwide ‘Jew Hunt’” and “The Age of the Pogrom Returns.”

    The willingness of the Times to falsely portray Israel and Israelis as victims in this case is reminiscent of how it has insistently advanced the debunked narrative of “mass rapes” by Palestinian fighters on 7 October 2023, including false reporting by its star correspondent Jeffrey Gettleman.

    Such atrocity propaganda masquerading as journalism has been used to justify Israel’s genocide in Gaza.

    A new front in Israel’s genocidal war?

    In his internal Times email to Stadtlander, reporter Christiaan Triebert explained that, after a conversation with de Graaf, “I reached out to the authors of the article to address the factual inaccuracies it contained.”

    Triebert wrote that he had been unsure “what the rationale was for deleting the video rather than including the detail in the article. I think it would have been helpful to have the video in there with the context that it showed Israeli fans attacking a man.”

    De Graaf has repeatedly clarified as much herself, as even the Times’ correction admits.

    “What I explained to several media channels is that the Maccabi supporters deliberately started the riot in front of central station returning from the game,” de Graaf wrote on X, also known as Twitter

    https://x.com/iAnnetnl/status/1855057599592304984

    And footage of the same incident shared on an Israeli Telegram channel shows the Maccabi hooligans’ attack from a different angle, apparently shot by one of the hooligans themselves.

    The channel falsely claimed in Hebrew that the video showed Maccabi Tel Aviv fans being “violently attacked in the last hour by dozens of Palestinian rioters”

    A full video report of the Israeli hooligans’ rampage by popular Dutch YouTuber Bender also shows footage of the same incident.

    Israeli football hooliganism in Europe seems to have become Israel’s latest global front in its genocidal war in Gaza.

    On Thursday night, Israeli football hooligans attacked supporters of France at a European Nations League match in Paris between the two sides.

    British journalist Peter Allen reported witnessing “horrendous violence” by the Israelis. He said he “spoke to three off-duty soldiers who were over from Tel Aviv, while one openly wore” an Israeli army T-shirt

    Based in Paris for many years, Allen is a contributor of reporting to many international media outlets, including occasionally to The Electronic Intifada.

    Despite the attendance of French President Emmanuel Macron, the match was heavily boycotted, with Reuters reporting that the Stade de France was barely one-fifth full and protests taking place in Paris against the event.

    It was the lowest attendance for any home match in the history of France’s national team [end]

    The original article

    Related

    Hind Rajab Foundation Files Complaint Against Maccabi Tel Aviv Supporters in Amsterdam

    Ajax-Maccabi Tel Aviv incidents: The hypocrisy of European media and politicians – DiEM25

  • [Sharing] Why Is Canada Protecting the Names of Suspected Nazis? – Taylor Noakes, The Walrus

    Ottawa won’t disclose list of alleged war criminals believed to have sheltered here after the Second World War

    The concept of a secret registry of names kept by the federal government feels at odds with our perception of Canada. While there may once have been records of so-called undesirables or suspected subversives, the practice now seems outdated.

    But there is at least one such list—reportedly about 900 names long—that is one of the government’s most closely guarded secrets. It is a record of alleged or suspected war criminals and collaborators who were believed to have found refuge in Canada after the Second World War. These individuals were investigated nearly forty years ago by the Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals, headed by retired Quebec Superior Court chief justice Jules Deschênes. The so-called Deschênes Commission was initiated in part due to persistent rumours that Josef Mengele, the sadistic Nazi doctor at Auschwitz, had entered and possibly lived in Canada in the early 1960s. When Deschênes issued his final report in 1986, the annexes that listed those investigated were never made public.

    Ottawa is refusing to declassify the list, as reported last week by the Globe and Mail, which joined a group of organizations to file an Access to Information request for the names. Bernie Farber, formerly with the Canadian Jewish Congress and the son of a Holocaust survivor, called the decision “a shameful blot.”

    Whether this is a tenable long-term position for the government remains to be seen. The passage of time has neither diminished the public’s interest in the issue nor has it become any less relevant, as last year’s Yaroslav Hunka scandal amply indicated. Pressured to act after Hunka—the then ninety-eight-year-old former Waffen-SS volunteer—was honoured by Parliament as a Canadian and Ukrainian hero for fighting the Russians in the Second World War, Immigration Minister Marc Miller indicated the government would release redacted or classified materials related to the file.

    While Hunka has never been accused of war crimes, it is known that he volunteered for a Ukrainian SS division in 1943, a year after the Nazis’ Wannsee Conference set Hitler’s Final Solution in motion. Hunka’s unit was often called the Galicia Division, in reference to the Eastern European region where its recruits were drawn from. An estimated 2,000 Galicia Division veterans reportedly came to Canada in 1950 by special dispensation of the Canadian government. The Deschênes Commission determined there were perhaps as many as 600 former members of the unit left in the country in the mid-1980s.

    Whether the Galicia Division participated in war crimes is a matter of considerable debate. The published, and public, first part of the Deschênes Commission’s final report concluded that charges against the unit had never been substantiated and that members had already been screened by Allied officials before their admission to Canada.

    But four decades earlier, the Nuremberg tribunal had already established that the entire SS organization—including iterations like the Galicia Division—was a criminal enterprise, complicit in the Holocaust. The Deschênes findings were also contradicted by Alti Rodal, a historian hired by the commission to research the circumstances that led to the presence of Nazi war criminals in Canada. In a 1987 article for Canadian Dimension, journalist Sol Littman cited Rodal, noting that while Soviet and British agents were sent to screen the Galicia Division for potential war criminals, both failed to carry out the task effectively. The British agent, for example, had no history of the unit he was investigating, no documents to refer to, and could not speak Ukrainian.

    Adding to the complexity, when the Galicia Division surrendered to Allied forces in 1945, it was a hodgepodge composed of the survivors of other decimated SS units and the former members of Auxiliary Police units set up by the occupying German Army. Even though there wasn’t evidence at the time to suggest the whole division participated in war crimes, it is known that some of its members were pulled from units believed to be guilty of such acts. There is also evidence pointing to the unit’s participation in numerous massacres—of Poles and possibly of Jews as well—as late as the spring of 1944.

    “When the Deschênes Commission was active forty years ago, it could only rely on evidence provided by the Soviet authorities,” says John-Paul Himka, a professor emeritus in the department of history and classics at the University of Alberta, whose research focuses on Ukraine and the Holocaust. “Today Ukraine has opened all the archives that had formerly been kept secret, including the records of the Soviet security organs and documentation from the German occupation of Ukraine. There are also many more testimonies of Jewish and Polish victims of violence than there were in the 1980s. So it should be possible to verify where the individuals on the list stood on the spectrum of guilt and innocence.”

    In preparation for the possible release of the commission’s classified annexes, Library and Archives Canada (LAC) consulted with what they termed a “discrete group of individuals or organizations” this summer. As reported by David Pugliese of the Ottawa Citizen, neither Holocaust survivors nor scholars were invited to weigh in on the issue, while representatives of the Ukrainian community were.

    During the meetings, some of those present worried declassifying the rest of the final report could result in criminal prosecutions as much as in damaged reputations. In the aftermath of the Hunka scandal last year, Progress Report reported that the University of Alberta’s Canadian Institute for Ukrainian Studies had received upward of $1.4 million in endowments and donations dedicated to members of the Galicia Division and one member of the Nazi-collaborationist Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Another veteran, Peter Savaryn, had been the university’s chancellor and had even received an Order of Canada. Stakeholders consulted by LAC also expressed concern that releasing the information could bolster Russian propaganda interests, as Vladimir Putin has characterized his war against Ukraine as a de-Nazification effort.

    There’s also an element of history repeating here. “The Ukrainian Canadian community was generally opposed to the Deschênes Commission, viewing it as a Soviet-inspired attack on Ukrainians in Canada,” says Himka. An email obtained by The Walrus shows that the Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC) had been fundraising $150,000 to mount a legal challenge in case the government decided to release the names.

    If such a disclosure ever occurs, it is unlikely to result in extraditions or war-crime trials, suggests Himka. “The overwhelming majority of the people on the list will have passed away by now.” But that doesn’t necessarily mean it shouldn’t be done. “First,” says Himka, “the leaders of the organized Ukrainian community have to confront the past, of migrants to Canada who were involved in the crimes of the German occupation. Second, the suppression of the full records of the Deschênes Commission invites study of the Canadian government’s role in protecting the reputation of those Ukrainians who were collaborationist or involved in crimes.”

    The small cadre seeking to delay or prevent full transparency on this file are not doing their community any favours. The UCC, according to Himka, is a major lobbying group. What’s more, says Himka, there is an effort afoot by some members of the organized Ukrainian community to rewrite the history of the Second World War. It was the UCC that recommended that Hunka be invited for President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s visit last year.

    While Himka hopes the Ukrainian Canadian community will welcome openness on this issue, the responsibility ultimately rests with the federal government. Canada needs to account for its actions, past and present. Earlier this year, Miller released a previously redacted section of the Rodal Report as well as related government memos. The information contained therein revealed that the country had, since the war, refused at least four requests for the extradition of suspected Nazis. This included one request, opposed by former prime minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau in his capacity as justice minister in the late 1960s, for the extradition of a Latvian alleged to have been a firing squad captain who took part in the murders of over 5,100 Jews. Trudeau was concerned about how the extradition would impact social cohesion, arguing it would spark tensions among post-war Eastern European immigrant communities.

    Declassifying part of an allegedly flawed investigation isn’t enough. Failures of policy—from allowing suspected war criminals into the country in the first place to the reasons this information was kept from the public—deserve comprehensive scrutiny [end]

    The original article

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    Nazism in Ukraine

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    Besides, even the maternal grandfather of Chrystia Freeland, deputy prime minister of Canada, now deceased Mykhailo Khomiak / Michael Chomiak, was a Ukrainian Nazi.