Nicolas Cinquini

Analista senior di l'intelligenza in u campu di a gestione di i risichi di sicurezza, sò un anzianu tenente detective è ufficiale di l'intelligenza in l'agenzie di u Statu francese. A bona pronuncia hè Николай Чинкуини, in russu

Tag: sweden

  • [Sharing] Germany’s new right: Trading on nostalgia for past prosperity in an age of uncertainty – Ingo Schmidt, Canadian Dimension

    Ingo Schmidt on how the triumph of liberal democracy and neoliberal globalization became the ideological seed for the AfD

    On November 6, 2024 German Chancellor Olaf Scholz fired Finance Minister Christian Lindner. Notwithstanding the broad agreement on policy goals, striking a balance between deficit reduction, support for renewable energy and increased arms spending turned out to be impossible. Lindner, a liberal, opted for social cuts; Scholz, a social democrat, wants to avoid them. They had to part ways. After Scholz lost a no-confidence vote, federal elections were scheduled for February 23, 2025. The question that worries everyone from old-school conservatives to new millennium lefties is: How many votes will go to the hard right (if not neo-Nazi) party Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland or AfD). In the last federal elections in 2021, the AfD got 10.4 percent of the total vote. Current polls put them at 20 percent, but nobody knows what will happen on election day. In this new age of uncertainty, polls don’t predict election results as reliably as in the past.

    Elections in the East German provinces Brandenburg, Saxony and Thuringia have already shown what hard-right success looks like. They also reveal the inability of the political centre to understand how much it contributed to the rise of a new right. Refashioning totalitarianism theory in the New Cold War climate, centrist politicians and pundits typically portray the success of the new right as the outgrowth of the Nazi and Communist dictatorships that ruled East Germany from 1933 to 1990. West Germany, which was spared Communist rule and, allegedly, shook off the burden of its Nazi past, appears as a role model in this democracy-versus-dictatorship story. Totalitarianism theory could possibly explain why the AfD is more successful, so far at least, in East than in West Germany. But it can’t explain right-wing success in other countries, like France, that were never under Communist rule and know Nazi rule only from occupation, which strengthened anti-fascist traditions in those countries. But even these traditions couldn’t stop the rise of the new right there.

    This article offers a different explanation for the hard-right surge in Germany. It shows that German unification in 1990, signalling the triumph of liberal democracy and the onset of neoliberal globalization, unleashed a new form of nationalism—Deutschmark nationalism—which, after mutating into export nationalism for a while, became the ideological seed for the AfD. West Germany, or, more precisely, the economic miracle that was West Germany in the post-war era, served as a role model during German unification. Promoted by West German elites and eagerly embraced by people in East Germany, it raised the expectation of a new economic miracle materializing in the West and extending to the East. However, these hopes were soon disappointed as political unification caused socioeconomic divisions between East and West Germany and, in the early 2000s, a turn to austerity policies that were highly unpopular in the East and the West. Just when it seemed that Germany would weather the world economic crisis of 2008-9 better than other Western countries, and maybe even become the European hegemon, things started falling apart. The Euro-crisis made clear that it was not only politically united Germany that was plagued by massive socioeconomic and geographical divisions but the European Union, too. Continued economic weakness combined with New Cold War marching orders from Washington fed a nostalgia for a supposedly great past—symbolized by the Deutschmark. This nostalgia, I argue, would not have taken root if the left had been able to channel growing discontent into mobilization for a more equitable and less insecure future.

    State elections in Brandenburg, Saxony, and Thuringia

    State elections don’t typically get international media attention. The September 1, 2024, elections in Thuringia and Saxony did. After all, it was the first time since the downfall of the Nazi-regime that a hard-right party, the AfD, pulled the majority of votes in a German election. It proved a bitter coincidence: The AfD celebrated their victory in Thuringia, obtaining 32.8 percent of the total vote, on the 85th anniversary of the Nazi-invasion of Poland that marked the beginning of the Second World War.

    The Conservative Christian Democrats (the Christlich-Demokratische Union or CDU) came in second with 23.6 percent. The parties of the federal government coalition, Social Democrats (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands or SPD), Greens (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) and Liberals (Freie Demokratische Partei or FDP) ended up with single-digit results, the FDP reduced to a mere 1.1 percent. At the time of the election, this was the party of the federal minister of finance. The Left Party (Die Linke), which in the previous election had become the strongest party for the first time in any German state, lost almost 18 percent and came in fourth, even trailing the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht or BSW), a breakaway group from the Left Party.

    In Saxony, the AfD won 30.6 percent of the votes, just behind the CDU’s 31.9 percent. As in Thuringia, none of the parties of the federal government coalition achieved double-digit results. The Left Party lost more than half of its vote and ended up with a devastating 4.5 percent. The BSW came in a distant third with 11.8 percent.

    Just three weeks after their election victories in Thuringia and Saxony, the AfD scored another success in Brandenburg. Narrowly beaten by the SPD that got 30.9 percent of the total vote, the AfD came in second with 29.2 percent, way ahead of the BSW’s 13.1 percent and the CDU’s 12.1 percent. The Left Party and the Greens obtained less than five percent of the vote, which is the minimum threshold for holding seats in provincial or federal parliament under the mixed-member proportional electoral system. The FDP pulled less than one percent.

    Mainstream media fails to explain right-wing success

    Barely beaten by the Conservatives in Saxony and the Social Democrats in Brandenburg, the AfD was elected by roughly a third of the electorate in three East German states, becoming the strongest party only in Thuringia. If ever there was a right-wing surge, this was it. Most media reports attributed the phenomenon to widespread dissatisfaction with the federal government, particularly regarding migration, climate policies and the war in Ukraine. Accounts of why the AfD is more popular in the East (approval ratings in the west of Germany range from 8.5 percent in Hamburg and the Saarland to 21 percent in Lower Saxony) focus mostly on disappointments caused by German unification, continuing socioeconomic disparities and a widespread feeling among erstwhile East Germans of being second class citizens. Other explanations invoke the authoritarian heritage of communist rule in East Germany, which is often presented as an extension of the Nazi-regime. Against the two dictatorships in the East, West Germany is presented as a role model of liberal democracy. This as if there hadn’t been considerable continuity between Third Reich and West German elites; as if East Germany’s ruling bureaucracy, despite all its dictatorial wrongs, wasn’t established by antifascists who had been exiled or jailed during the Nazi reign; as if the nationalization of the means of production, despite the wrongs of bureaucratic rule, had not marked a break from the West German capitalism that made West Germany a junior partner in the American Empire; as if West German capitalism had not dictated the terms of unification at the very time that a grassroots movement for democracy unsettled bureaucratic rule in East Germany. The destruction of the East German economy and the integration of the East into existing West German institutions left no room for the aspirations of East Germany’s civil rights movement. Rather than explaining growing support for the new right, media talk about the “peculiarities of the East” reinforces existing frustrations there—frustrations that help shed light on the relative strength, so far at least, of the right-wing surge in the East.

    The ‘two-dictatorships’ thesis that pits the East against the liberal democratic West revives the totalitarianism theory that was an integral part of the anti-communist, anti-Soviet consensus during the Cold War. It is now part of the New Cold War ideology that counterposes democracy and authoritarianism. As in the old Cold War, charges of totalitarianism serve to short circuit thinking about alternative economic and political systems, reinforcing the neoliberal creed that there is no alternative to capitalism. The lack of actually existing alternatives is, of course, also one of the reasons for the rise of the new right. Emerging out of an ailing neoliberalism, this right-wing force presents itself as an alternative to the status quo but actually just recasts neoliberalism in a nationalist and racist mould. Replacing neoliberalism’s earlier commitment to corporate globalization in Germany, as elsewhere, neoliberalism is haunted by the spectre of fascism, which, to centrist neoliberals, has everything to do with misled masses unable to understand the virtues of capitalist liberal democracy and nothing to do with capitalist crises that undermine the legitimacy of liberal democracy. Neoliberalism is also haunted by the spectre of communism as ruling classes worry that crisis of legitimacy could extend to capitalism itself. As the neoliberal centre denies the possibility of alternatives and the left generally (not only the Left Party in Germany) appears unable to advance real world alternatives, the growing appetite for change, spurred by recurrent crises wrought by capitalism, settles for right-wing fantasies of a harmonious life in a nation that competes successfully with other countries economically and is freed from job- and welfare-stealing migrants.

    The impact of German unification and the rise and decline of neoliberal globalization

    Capitalist crises and their exploitation by the right are common phenomena, certainly in the imperialist centres of the world system, but also in the peripheries. But they play out differently in different national contexts. Behind the AfD’s electoral successes in Thuringia and Saxony as well as its broader surge in popularity lie the combined histories of German unification and the rise and decline of neoliberal globalization. The upsurge of the new right is just one of the outcomes of these combined histories. Equally important is the defeat of the federal government coalition and the rout of the FDP, whose leader, former federal Minister of Finance Christian Lindner, promotes austerity policies that stymie government plans to subsidize the transition to non-fossil energies. These policies also lead to a creeping roll-back of social spending—except when it comes to arms spending. Little wonder a government that took office on the promise of something like a Green New Deal lost its credibility almost entirely and called for a federal election scheduled for February 23 of this year.

    And then there is the defeat of the Left Party that, despite programmatic commitments to progressive alternatives, is widely seen as the appendage of a lame-duck government in Berlin. At the other end of the political spectrum, the AfD is widely perceived as an oppositional force, even though its program blends austerity, nationalism and militarism in ways that are more extreme but qualitatively not much different from policies advanced by the CDU and the FDP.

    In the face of electoral defeat, the federal government, which embraced the US’s New Cold War policies a few weeks after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, also introduced dramatically tougher migration policies. Rather than representing any kind of alternative, as its name purports, the AfD is the black sheep of the establishment family, expressing racist views more radically and bluntly than even the Conservatives. While the Social Democrats, Liberals and Greens are intent on denying such views, they reveal themselves as Western supremacists when it comes to fending off so-called authoritarian threats arising from Russia and China, stirring up longstanding fears in the West that ‘the Russians are coming’ or that ‘Asian hordes’ augur “the decline of the West,” in the words of right-wing intellectual Oswald Spengler.

    The hypocrisy of the Greens, who advocate a green transition while supporting the purchase of dirty oil and gas (wherever they can get it ever since the Russian invasion of Ukraine ended Russian gas-flows to Germany), make them a prime target of AfD agitation. But in reality the AfD and the Greens share the fear of Western decline. The AfD engage in fearmongering around the replacement of white people by non-white immigrants and accuse the Greens and their coalition partners in the federal government of accelerating Western decline. But while the Greens may be the prime target of the AfD’s culture war, the truth is that despite significant differences in tone, the Greens and the AfD share a basic consensus on the decline of the West.

    AfD success in the east: history holds the key

    Encouraged by Glasnost in the Soviet Union, many East Germans took to the streets in the fall of 1989. Under the banner “We Are the People” they demanded democratic reforms of East Germany. Neither unification with West Germany nor a return to a capitalist economy was on their agenda—at least not initially. As protests grew, and especially after the ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED) had opened the border to the West, “We Are the People” was replaced by “We Are One People” more and more often. It was supplemented by the slogan “Germany, United Fatherland,” which is actually a quote from East Germany’s national anthem, written by the communist poet Johannes R. Becher in 1949, at a time when the leaders of the SED still thought a united Germany could be achieved—not necessarily socialist but not aligned on either the US or the Soviet Union. Such hopes were buried by the Cold War, for which the Berlin Wall became a symbol, casting a dark shadow over communist East Germany and allowing capitalist West Germany to present itself as a beacon of freedom. It was in a matter of weeks in the winter of 1989-90 that the abstract possibility became a demand, massively fanned by West German politicians—notably then chancellor Helmut Kohl—and mainstream media, which hinted at the possibility of East Germany adopting the West German Deutschmark. Many East Germans seized on such hints as an irresistible offer. “If the D-Mark comes, we’ll stay here; if it doesn’t come, we’ll go to it” became the next popular protest slogan. Since the opening of the border, thousands of East Germans had gone to the West, creating conditions reminiscent of the times before the wall was built in 1961. Back then, the East German economy lost so many people, most of them young and well-trained, that a collapse of social reproduction became a real threat. The wall stopped the bleeding of the East German economy but inflicted irreparable damage on the legitimacy of the political system.

    Almost 30 years later, the opening of the border by the SED-leadership came as a bit of a surprise to West German elites. Yet, they were quick to grasp the possibilities it created. To them, this meant the integration of East Germany into the West German political and economic system, not coexistence with a somehow reformed but still politically independent East Germany. The ‘take over the East’ goal of West German elites and the Deutschmark rush of East German masses fed each other. The civil rights movement that wanted to democratize East Germany was sidelined. Some of the groups active in that movement adjusted to the new zeitgeist quickly, some even entered into an electoral alliance with the East German conservative party, despite their having criticized it as a small but integral part of the SED-regime. Angela Merkel, who would later become chancellor, belonged to one of these East German groups that allied with other conservative-turned-civil-rights groups and the East German CDU. This Alliance for Germany easily won the last East German elections and negotiated the integration of East Germany into West Germany’s institutional structures. On July 1, 1990, the Deutschmark came to the East, three months later the independent state of East Germany vanished into an enlarged West Germany. Most of the Alliance for Germany dissolved into the West German CDU immediately after unification. In December this enlarged CDU won federal elections.

    In less than a year the Cold War had come to an end and an entire state had disappeared. However, the hopes pinned on unification, notably the introduction of the Deutschmark, were soon dashed. A year after unification, unemployment, which had existed in communist East Germany primarily in a hidden form, stood at 10.2 percent and rose to over 20 percent in the early 2000s. It didn’t fall below 10 percent until 2014, a quarter of a century after the Berlin Wall fell. Moreover, mass migration from East to West Germany, which the introduction of the Deutschmark was meant to curb, actually accelerated after the arrival of the Deutschmark. From 1990 to 2015, East Germany lost significantly more than one million people, the vast majority during the first two years after unification, and almost all of them of working age. Were it not for this emigration as well as early retirement schemes and retraining schemes for thousands of workers, unemployment in the East would have been even higher than it actually was. Introducing a new form of hidden unemployment, many of the participants in retraining were enrolled in one course after another, often in different fields, until they were old enough for early retirement.

    One of the main, if not the main, reasons for the collapse of the East German economy was the Deutschmark. Introduced at a rate of one Mark West for one Mark East, while average productivity of East Germany was estimated to be about a quarter that of West Germany, German monetary union gave private households the boost in purchasing power they so desired. But it made East German firms uncompetitive. Lower wages could not compensate productivity differentials between firms in East Germany and Western countries. The privatization of East Germany’s state-owned firms facilitated the downfall of the East German economy even further. In some cases, Western companies bought East German firms just to shut them down so that they would not become competitors in the future. In other cases, they wanted patents or certain segments of production that they could integrate into their own supply-chains, leaving everything else to be shut down. The closures and cherry-picking of some more desirable segments destroyed the reproduction process of the East German economy even beyond the damage done by rendering it uncompetitive through monetary union.

    The result was that bits and pieces of the East German economy became a periphery of production networks controlled by West German corporations. Ironically, the neoliberal restructuring of production processes went hand in hand with massive fiscal transfers from West to East Germany. A price that had to be paid to sustain some level of social cohesion while disappointment that political unification was followed by economic decline and continued social divisions between East and West instead of an Eastern economic miracle following the example of West Germany from the late 1950s to the early 1970s. At some point, a third of East German incomes came from fiscal transfers. As a result, government debt as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) rose from 41.8 percent in 1989 to 61.2 percent in 1999, which is nothing compared to today’s numbers. Yet, back then the lesson that had yet to be learned is that neoliberalism, despite its balanced-budget rhetoric, really is a mix of austerity and tax cuts for the rich that produces increasing debt levels at every slowdown or downturn of the economy. In the 1990s, government debt over 60 percent of GDP was a scandal. Not least because, at the urging of the conservative German government, 60 percent had become the benchmark for membership in the European monetary union, for which the roadmap had been laid out in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty.

    Budget deficits, accumulating into government debt, weren’t the only deficit scandal in 1990s Germany. The other was in the current account. From a surplus of 4.6 percent in 1989, the current account dropped to a –1.9 percent deficit in 1991 and remained in deficit territory until 2001. In most other countries, deficits between negative one and negative two percent wouldn’t be a matter of concern. In Germany they were. After all, West German prosperity—the very model East Germans admired so much—had been reliant on export-driven growth, which was always understood as export surpluses. As it turned out, unification in the early 1990s, led to a boom in West Germany as East Germans spent many of their newly acquired Deutschmarks on consumer goods ‘Made in (West) Germany’—despite massive job losses. This boom drove prices up and made German exports less competitive on the world market. At the same time, some of the money from the East German spending spree went to foreign companies. As exports took a hit and imports got a boost, the current account went from positive to negative.

    The East was integrated into the West German political system as it existed prior to unification. The Kohl government didn’t agree to any changes suggested by the East German government that formally negotiated unification but really rubberstamped the subordination of East German society to West German institutions. Economic integration was different though. The collapse of the East German economy, triggered by the design of monetary union and privatizations, had a lasting impact on the West German economic model that East Germans had been eager to embrace. The first decade after unification was marked by a twin deficit in government budgets and current accounts. During the unification boom from 1990 to 1993, inflation went up to levels not seen since the oil-price hikes and inflationary struggles between capital and labour from the 1970s to the early 1980s. At that time, however, the West German inflation rate was still below that of other Western countries, whereas in the early 1990s it was amongst the highest

    West Germany as a role model

    Running continued deficits—let alone a twin deficit—was unthinkable in a country that rebuilt its economy after the Second World War through integration into a world market with rules established and enforced by the US. In this American Empire, West Germany played the role of bulwark against Soviet Communism, including East Germany, and as a showcase of Western capitalism. To succeed in this role, foreign debt, accumulated by the Nazis and inherited by West Germany as legal successor of the Third Reich, was forgiven through the 1953 London Debt Agreement. West Germany also inherited low wages, industrial capacity and new technologies from the Nazi economy that, contrary to widespread assumptions, survived the war largely intact. This gave West German industries a competitive advantage that was further buttressed by favourable exchange rates on which basis West Germany was admitted to the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates in 1952. Reintegration into the world market also allowed West Germany to transition from a coal-based to an oil-based economy. Oil was cheaper than coal but its supplies were controlled by US companies and the American state.

    However, being a junior partner in the American Empire turned out to be a much better deal for the German bourgeoisie than its earlier quests for world power. The territory under its direct control was much smaller after two failed power grabs but profits were stellar. Driven by exports, or export surpluses more precisely, the West German economy didn’t require fiscal stimulus and kept growing until the US turned to floating exchange rates, which led to a significant appreciation of the Deutschmark. Further, oil prices exploded in the 1970s. But it was during these turbulences that West Germany consolidated its reputation as a beacon of economic stability. Political management of the crisis, notably codetermination (German lingo for the institutionalized cooperation between unions and employer association), kept wages and inflation lower than in most other Western countries. This helped to sustain export surpluses for much of the 1970s. In turn, export surpluses allowed the government to keep fiscal stimulus and unemployment rates low. Again, this is compared to other Western countries, not compared to the post-war boom.

    West Germany’s relative success in managing the economic crises of the 1970s raised some concerns among its allies, who considered this success a case of beggar-thy-neighbour policies. The US pressured the West German government to increase public spending in order to stimulate the world economy. The West German government couldn’t shrug off these US demands entirely. The social democratic party was led by Helmut Schmidt at the time, and some extra spending also appeased the left wing in his own party as well as some unionists. However, calls for a Keynesian fix of the economic crises never overcame the general preference for fiscal prudence and low inflation that marked West German society after two lost wars, each followed by the introduction of a new currency, one of them also by unprecedented hyperinflation. Not entirely without reason, export success after the Second World War was widely attributed to liberal economic principles, conveniently ignoring the fact that this ‘liberalism in one country’ could only work because other economies placed growing demand on the world market.

    Export success also created an ersatz-identity that allowed West Germans to repress the horrors of the Nazi regime and the roles most of them had played in these horrors, as perpetrators or bystanders. Social democrats never really fit into this picture. Willy Brandt, who spent the Nazi reign in underground resistance circles and exile and would later become West Germany’s first social democratic chancellor, was seen by many as a traitor. His successor Helmut Schmidt, who had served in the Nazi air force, opposed many of Brandt’s plans for social reform and applied Keynesian policies only in homeopathic doses. He was successfully branded as the one responsible for rising unemployment and inflation by the Conservatives and Liberals. Crossing the floor from SPD to CDU, the Liberals made Helmut Kohl chancellor. Kohl won two elections before unification on the promise of bringing post-war prosperity back. He won another two after unification on the promise of bringing the prosperity to East Germany.

    For a long time, Kohl presented himself successfully as the defender of the West German export model and guarantor of the collective identity tied to that model, despite the fact that 1980s West Germany never saw a return to postwar prosperity. Disappointment with his broken promises for a West German economic miracle 2.0 began spreading towards the end of the 1980s. Yet, the disintegration of the SED regime allowed him to renew and extend his promises to the East. The national euphoria that secured his 1990 election victory also saw a transformation of collective identity. West German pride in being export world champion turned into Deutschmark nationalism. Widely shared in the East, where people were happy to get the Deutschmark, and the West, where people saw it as symbol of their postwar achievements, this was not the pure money, or currency, fetishism Karl Marx wrote about in Capital. It had a distinctive nationalist character that was subdued in West Germany’s pre-unification export-identity. With unification, the nationalist seed blossomed. Not only did this help Kohl become the ‘chancellor of unity,’ but it also gave cover to a burst of neo-Nazi attacks on immigrants, leftists and queer people, culminating in arson attacks in Rostock, Mölln and Solingen. The latter two killed eight people, while the attack in Rostock laid a four-day siege on an apartment block inhabited by foreign workers who had been employed in East Germany’s now defunct state-owned economy. The openly neo-Nazi attacks of the early 1990s, later dubbed “baseball bat years,” were followed by a series of murders committed by the National Socialist Underground (NSU) that cost nine immigrants and one cop their lives from 2000 to 2007. The role of the German secret service in covering up, or even facilitating, these murders has never been investigated as key documents remain classified until this day. Hans-Georg Maaßen, head of the secret service from 2012 to 2018, was one of the individuals responsible for blocking investigations of the NSU-murders. He also heads up an ultra-conservative circle, initially inside the CDU and now operating in the right-wing space between the CDU und the AfD.

    Exports über alles: Eastern peripheries boost corporate profits

    During unification and in the first few years afterwards, nationalism was a mass ideology. It rallied flag-waving masses in the streets, it dominated German politics and inspired Nazi-skinheads to chase people they considered enemies. As it became clear that the hopes for an economic miracle 2.0 would not be realized, street protests receded, most skinheads scaled down their activism and just a few turned to clandestine terrorist attacks. It seemed that nationalism had lost the force it had just recently. However, the entanglements between Nazis and parts of the state apparatuses indicate that while nationalism wasn’t as visible as before, it had not disappeared.

    As it turned out, the opening of the Berlin Wall was a key step towards what would later be called neoliberal globalization. As the German bourgeoisie sought its place in a world seemingly governed by the invisible hand of the market—not Soviet planners or the milder version of Western government intervention—nationalism also found a new role as mass ideology. The ideological wind blowing from the ‘real West,’ that is, the United States, rebranded free trade theory going back to the days of David Ricardo as globalization. Sticking closely to Ricardo’s principles, academic globalists argued that firms, if left alone by the state, would specialize in the production of those goods they can produce more cheaply than firms in another country either because they possess more productive technologies or use input factors more plentiful and cheap than in another country. All countries will be better off if firms in each country specialize according to their comparative advantages.

    Globalization practitioners talked about entire countries as if they were firms competing against each other. Competitiveness of nation-states became the lodestar of capitalists, and their political executors, who used it to justify the roll-back of wages and social standards in all countries. Their run-the-country-like-a-business propaganda was so persuasive that even working class people whose wages, pensions and public services were cut fell for it in large numbers, electing and re-electing neoliberal globalizers over and over again. At the same time, fear that the policies just voted for would cause a race to the bottom spread in the rich countries that saw parts of their production outsourced to poor countries, where labour was really cheap, while immigrants from such countries would take on jobs in the burgeoning low-wage sectors of the rich countries. Migration, segmented labour markets and a global reserve army of labour, enabling capitalists to engage in global labour arbitrage, were neither part of academic globalization theory nor did they feature in politicians’ globalization propaganda. Absent from public debate, these real-life factors created fears that a new right could build on by portraying economic problems as questions of national identity. Translated into policy terms, that meant a program of keeping immigrants out and capital in. This protectionist backlash against neoliberal globalization, coupled with the rise of a new right ranging from populist to neo-Nazi formations, occurred all over the Global North. It began slowly in the late 1990s and early 2000s while globalization was still expanding, and then gathered steam in the wake of the 2008-9 world financial crisis that marked the end of accumulation driven by globalization. It has accelerated again since the COVID-19 recession as well as the escalating great power politics vis-à-vis Russia and China, which have led to openly imperialist policies couched in the same nationalist ideology which the new right thrives on. The competitive nation-as-corporation ideology and the policies that marked actually unfolding globalization was the breeding ground for today’s strange bedfellowship of globalizers-turned-great-power-warriors and national supremacists of the new right. Theories of unregulated free trade opening the path towards global prosperity were just an ideological tool that was useful as long the integration of more and more countries into the US-dominated world market fuelled capitalist accumulation, and thereby hopes for the eventual trickle-down. It was replaced with the rhetoric of concern for national security and democracy as accumulation ended in a new phase of stagnation.

    The German bourgeoisie had already adopted the logic of the state as business competitor after the Second World War when it traded world power ambitions for a junior partner role in the American Empire. Balanced budgets and tight money formed the core of its policies. That, along with competitive advantages inherited from the Nazis or granted by the US, enabled export-driven growth and, ultimately, export surpluses. Despite verbal commitments to liberalism, these policies were mercantilist in substance. Shattered but not derailed by the crises of the 1970s, West Germany’s mercantilist regime of accumulation survived until unification led to a twin deficit, slow growth and socioeconomic divisions between East and West. Unified Germany’s economy stumbled along while the US enjoyed its New Economy boom, even though that turned out to be short-lived, and China attained unprecedented levels of economic growth.

    The Kohl government didn’t respond to the bourgeoisie’s growing concerns about economic stagnation in Germany. Neither did it respond to growing dissatisfaction with social conditions among the popular classes. After uniting Germany, Kohl turned to further uniting Europe. Partly, he wanted to demonstrate Germany’s continued commitment to cooperation in the European Union as some European leaders—notably British Prime Minister Thatcher and French President François Mitterrand—had expressed reservations about German unification and worried about a return of German great power ambitions. European monetary union became Kohl’s preferred route to an “ever closer union,” as EU-parlance had it at the time. However, regarding other countries, notably in the Mediterranean, Kohl successfully pushed for tight fiscal and monetary rules—the same kind of rules West German policy makers followed in the postwar period. Under the favourable conditions granted by the US to integrate into the world market, this led to export-driven prosperity. However, other countries didn’t enjoy the same favourable conditions. What would upset governments and people in such countries even more was the fact that Kohl had abandoned the rules he was preaching to other European countries in his very own united Germany

    Helmut Kohl at the CDU national party convention in Hamburg, 1973. Photo from Wikimedia Commons

    There, European monetary union was widely seen as a top-down capitalist elite project, part of corporate globalization or as a handing over of the beloved Deutschmark to irresponsible Eurocrats and the Club Med, a derogatory term often used in public debates to denounce people in the Mediterranean countries as lazy, spend-thrifty and, worst of all, happily having a good time at the expense of others. Euro-scepticism added to disappointment with the collapse of East Germany’s economy after unification, growing income polarization and fears of job loss all over Germany and a sense of losing national sovereignty to global capital. Unresponsive to any of these concerns, Kohl and his coalition of Conservatives and Liberals eventually lost the 1998 election to the Social Democrats and Greens who formed a coalition government offering a blend of light Keynesianism, green transition and control of financial markets. This is where the German—and international—bourgeoisies got really concerned.

    The opening ideological salvos to derail the newly elected government’s plans came from the British tabloid The Sun, calling Oskar Lafontaine, the new finance minister who proposed the introduction of a Tobin tax, “Europe’s most dangerous man.” Next came Madeleine Albright, then US secretary of state, who gave Germany’s Green Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer the choice of joining the bombing campaign against Yugoslavia or having his country isolated from Western allies. Fischer, and the new Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, chose war. Seeing that his opposition to the war wasn’t supported by anyone else in the cabinet, Lafontaine resigned before the bombing began.

    A few months later, The Economist called Germany the “Sick man of the Euro.” Coming from the central organ of global capitalism and unrepentant advocate of liberalism since the days when England, not China, was the workshop of the world, this was not just another opinion piece. It was a warning that the international investment community—exactly the CEOs, bankers, brokers and financiers targeted by the then-emerging movement against corporate globalization—lost confidence in the German market and expected pro-business measures to boost their propensity to invest.

    After a few months in office, Schröder had to choose between meeting voters’ expectations (job creation, reduction of job insecurities and income inequality) and capitalists’ cost-reduction demands. He chose the capitalists’ side, earning him the nickname Genosse der Bosse (Comrade of the Bosses). In the absence of a social movement from below that could have pushed him to deliver on the election platforms of the SPD and the Greens, this choice might actually better be called caving to capitalist threats of an investment strike. From 2000 to 2005, the Schröder government axed corporate tax rates, exempted capital gains from taxation and lowered equity requirements for credits. The other side of the class divide saw drastic reductions in unemployment benefits, essentially slashing them to the level of welfare payment rates after one year of benefits. At the same time, legal obstacles to employing temporary workers were greatly reduced. Capitalists were thrilled. Profits and asset prices shot up, but capital formation declined during the years pro-business laws were passed.

    Reorganizing existing production capacities was more important to corporate executives than creating new capacities. This was not surprising as capacity utilization dropped when the New Economy bubble burst, triggering a downturn of the world economy that kept even booming China below double-digit growth. As it turned out, united Germany did not inherit the export successes of pre-unification West Germany, but was certainly heir to its export dependence.

    In the early 2000s, Germany’s current account turned positive again—not because exports grew so strongly (they actually stagnated due to the world economic downturn), but because imports declined owing to weak domestic demand associated with the Schröder government’s neoliberal policies. However, as the world economy bounced back (China saw growth rates of 10-14 percent from 2003 to 2006), German exports grew again. Eventually the reorganization of production processes in the aftermath of German unification paid off. West German corporations now controlled production networks linking corporate headquarters controlling finance, research and development, and capital-intensive parts of actual assembly in the centres with labour intensive production in low-wage areas in the peripheries from Eastern Germany all the way to China. In these networks, East Germany occupied the position of a semi-periphery. On the supply side, German export success in the early 2000s relied on continued wage inequality between centres and peripheries, which doesn’t mean that all workers in the centres earned high wages. The threat to relocate production to the East or the South put the brakes on all wages. The lowering of social standards propelled the growth of low-wage employment, notably in the service sector. Well-paying, permanent jobs began to decrease as a share of total employment even in West Germany. As a result, discontent that was widespread in the East since political unification was followed by economic collapse, and social downgrading began to creep into the West.

    2010s: Exporting the Euro-crisis

    The export surpluses of the early 2000s relied on the same mercantilism that had generated such surpluses during the postwar prosperity. However, during the postwar period, unprecedented growth rates across the Western, and parts of the non-Western, world made it possible to superimpose a welfare state on a mercantilist economy that didn’t squeeze profit rates but operated with capital’s consent in a way that seemed unthinkable during the age of catastrophe from 1914 to 1945. In the early 2000s, by contrast, successful mercantilism demanded the roll-back of the welfare state. Tragically, the extension of West Germany’s welfare state institutions to East Germany, where they were superimposed on a collapsing economy, created the profit squeeze that was needed to curtail the material protections granted by the welfare state. To sustain competitive advantages gained by scaling back the welfare state, it was imperative to keep wage-growth low even after surging exports pulled the economy out of the slump. Unlike during the period of postwar prosperity, export surpluses didn’t stimulate domestic demand very much. In fact, current account surpluses in the early 2000s, which surged from -1.8 percent in 2000 to 6.7 percent in 2007, were as much driven by rising exports as by weak growth of imports, a clear indicator of the overall sluggishness of domestic demand. Unemployment rates rose from 9.3 percent in 2000 to 12.1 percent in 2005. After that, unemployment went into long-term decline, briefly interrupted by the 2008/9 Great Recession and slowed down by the 2009/15 Euro-crisis, eventually reaching five percent before the 2020 COVID-19 Recession. However, this job growth occurred almost entirely in low wage occupations.

    Paradoxically, it was during the Euro-crisis that a wave of “export nationalism” covered up the discontent that was growing, at variable speeds, across Germany. The Deutschmark nationalism that emerged during German unification had taken a hit with the introduction of the Euro. However, when it turned out that the Euro was basically the old Deutschmark under a new name and export surplus levels were reaching unprecedented heights, it almost seemed that the long-awaited return of prosperity was about to materialize. But of course, it wasn’t the same as the postwar prosperity that saw strong growth almost everywhere. The 2010s, by contrast, were a time of stagnation. The rebound after the 2008/9 recession was stronger in Germany than in other countries, but then growth rates fell in line with the one-to-two percent range of other Western countries.

    It was during this time of recurrent crises and long-term stagnation that the German government, led by Angela Merkel with the Social Democrats as junior partner, felt compelled to lecture other governments on economic policy. Completely blind to the fact that beggar-thy-neighbour policies are a zero-sum game, the Merkel-government told Southern European countries to impose austerity despite the fact that they were suffering from a sovereign debt crisis due to the end of cheap credit that became available after the creation of the European monetary union, helping to pay for imports from Germany. Merkel also told them that, after a painful but unavoidable period of belt-tightening, they would eventually succeed as export countries like Germany.

    The European monetary union’s contradictory character torn between further integrating Europe and spreading German mercantilism shifted entirely to the latter. Southern Europeans, governments and ordinary people, understood that austerity would further subordinate their economies to Germany’s economic dominance. The Brits, like the Germans and the “Frugal Four” (Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden), although not warm to the idea of bailing out crisis-ridden Southern Europeans, were suspicious that Germany’s leading role in handling the crisis would turn the country’s economic dominance into fully-fledged hegemony. Brexit has its origin here. Eastern Europe’s post-communist comprador governments had imposed austerity on their countries in acts of pre-emptive obedience and now felt betrayed as they thought the bailout packages the Merkel government used as a means to impose austerity on the South were actually some sort of welfare package.

    Centrifugal forces in the EU were further fuelled when, in face of civil war and foreign interventions in Syria, Merkel unilaterally declared open borders for Syrian refuges and then told EU member states they all had to take their share of refugees. European governments already concerned over Germany’s domineering role in managing the Euro-crisis were dismayed. Public debate within Germany was sharply divided between liberals and leftists applauding Merkel’s humanist stance and right-wingers, including in her own party, warning of an uncontrolled flow of immigrants. Largely unnoticed was the fact that Merkel’s decision to open borders for Syrian refugees was tied to the anti-Russian turn in German foreign policy following the sharp polarization between pro- and anti-Russian forces in Ukraine during and after the Maidan protests in 2014. Most of the Syrian refugees were fleeing the Russian-backed Assad-regime, which was considered an adversary. Opening borders for these refugees set a precedent for the surge of Ukrainian refugees following Russia’s invasion of Eastern Ukraine in 2022. At that point, Merkel, who had already retired, told the media that her government saw the Minsk accords, officially meant to reach a settlement between contending political and military forces within Ukraine, as a means of buying time to arm the Zelensky government.

    2020s: Sick man of Europe 2.0

    As Ukraine, already torn by civil war, became the scene for a proxy war between NATO-countries and Russia, Germany was firmly subordinated to US foreign policy. Post-communist governments in Germany had, more or less enthusiastically, supported deepening trade relations with Russia. Oil and gas imports might have been the most significant part of German-Russian trade but were certainly not the only one. Torn between allegiance to the US and lucrative business deals with Russia, the German government, now headed by Social Democrat Olaf Scholz, cut its economic ties with Russia after the latter’s invasion of Ukraine. The price to be paid was a further spike in energy prices, on top of the increases attendant on the economic recovery from the COVID-19-recession.

    As part of current US efforts to contain China, the German government has been pressured to scale down its trade with China—Germany’s largest trading partner and also a prime outlet for German foreign direct investments. Since Germany’s economy is as much export-driven as export-dependent, the US turn from neoliberal globalization to escalating sanctions and protectionism in the name of national security has caused high levels of uncertainty within the German bourgeoisie. In addition to the return of secular stagnation after the very short post-COVID recovery in the West and the petering out of the China boom, this uncertainty is driving low levels of investment. Inflation, fuelled by post-COVID recovery and rising energy prices, and lower real incomes leading directly to less consumer spending, but also indirectly, as households build up their savings in anticipation of more economic shocks in the future. Meanwhile the Scholz government boosted arms spending while otherwise imposing austerity.

    After two years of recession, Germany is again being branded the “sick man of Europe” by The Economist. The last time Germany earned this title the neoliberal turn against the welfare state produced massive current account surpluses, meagre general growth rates and massive social and regional inequalities. The export nationalism that concealed the mounting discontent with neoliberalism was shaken by the US turn from neoliberal globalization to protectionism and militarism. Given its high level of export dependence, Germany was ill prepared for the turn against it, which unleashed pent-up disappointments and anxieties into the political sphere. This happened all over Germany but more so in the East than in the West as regional differences in income, wealth and representation in leadership positions had created widespread feelings of being second class citizens in a politically united Germany.

    In the absence of socialist imagination, German politics are haunted by the spectres of the past. An insurgent hard-right pins the labels of communism or Marxism on everything that ever came from the left, Social Democrats, the Greens and, of course, the Left Party, no matter how members, activists and supporters of these parties position themselves on the political spectrum. At the same time, the hard-right wants Germany to leave its Nazi past behind. Downplaying Nazi atrocities, accusing liberals and leftists of burdening Germans with a cult of guilt, they propagate the reclaiming of German national pride and sovereignty from allegedly cosmopolitan elites. Between the very real and growing right and a weak and largely imaginary left, centrist parties that proclaimed the end of history in the heyday of neoliberalism are also shifting to the right. The decline of the Left Party is a mirror image of the rise of the AfD.

    Alternative für Deutschland: A child of Deutschmark nationalism

    Mainstream media and centrist parties view the new right as if it were some external force inexplicably appearing on the political scene and threatening the liberal order. But this is empirically wrong. Almost all leading figures of the AfD come from conservative West German milieus where they previously held positions in public administration or private businesses. Although they present themselves as anti-establishment rebels, they are establishment people who turned from the centre-right to the hard-right. The AfD also includes party activists who come from militant neo-Nazi groups that have existed on the fringes of West German society since the CDU gave many old Nazis a political home after the downfall of the Third Reich. Making small advances into electoral politics in the late 1960s and again in the 1980s, the neo-Nazis remained marginal until they found common ground with disgruntled conservatives. Deutschmark nationalism served as the ideological bonding material for neo-Nazis and right-of-centre conservatives, and became a rallying point for growing numbers of people dissatisfied with the policies of neoliberal globalization advanced by the centrist parties. It emerged in the tumultuous days after the fall of the Berlin wall as a mass ideology that shaped East and West German politics in the direction of unification. After that, it became an ideological point of reference that allowed for the integration of different political ideas and currents into a new right political project, the AfD.

    Riding on the wave of Euro-scepticism that accompanied the Euro crisis, the AfD, founded in 2013, promoted a German exit from the EU, which would also have meant exit from the Euro. However, boosting the Deutschmark nostalgia associated with German-style Euro-scepticism got the newly minted party only so far. What really fuelled the AfD’s take-off was the wave of Syrian refugees coming to Germany (and other EU-countries) in 2015. The party’s approval ratings rose from roughly five percent in its first two years to around 12 percent in the next two years. With the surge in voter approval came a programmatic shift from ‘neoliberalism in one country’ to neoliberalism hidden behind ethnonationalist hate propaganda. Despite advocating for a strong state, the AfD also presents itself as a rebellious party of freedom. This paradox is resolved by portraying cosmopolitan elites, represented most notably by the Greens, as a force dominating state apparatuses and misusing them to bring excessive numbers of foreigners into the country with their cultures that allegedly threaten German people, suppress German heritage and push the economy into decay. Therefore a strong state is needed to defend Germany against foreign incursion and revive its inherent strength

    Election poster of the AfD in Thuringia supporting remigration. Photo from Wikimedia Commoms

    The Scholz government created the conditions in which the AfD’s self-portrayal as freedom fighters gave the party another boost. The modest Green New Deal platforms on which the SPD and Greens ran their 2021 election campaign didn’t gain enough traction to allow them to form a government, despite support from unions and even, more cautiously, employer associations. To obtain a majority in the Bundestag, SPD and Greens formed an ostensibly unlikely coalition with the FDP, a party mostly focused on cutting taxes and limiting public deficits. These commitments to tax breaks for the rich and austerity for the poor stood in the way of effective state-sponsored energy transition programs. Hence, the Scholz-government was perceived as weak from the start. Things went from bad to worse for the government after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Under pressure from the US, Scholz opted for sanctions against Russia, arms deliveries to Ukraine and a continued increase in arms spending. At a time when the prices of everything from butter to housing were soaring, making it clear that money would still be available for guns but maybe not for butter not only destroyed whatever support the government had before the Ukraine war but also gave the AfD another boost. A year and a half into the war, the SPD was trailing the AfD in federal polls. Picking up widespread, though by no means dominant, unease with arms support for Ukraine and fear of war with Russia, the AfD advocates a negotiated peace settlement between Russia and Ukraine and, more importantly to the AfD, the lifting of sanctions on Russia. For the AfD, urging peace with Russia is not a matter of a principled anti-militarism but a means of reviving German trade with Russia, notably Russian energy imports that are seen as a precondition for economic recovery. To achieve this, Germany has to free itself from the ‘cosmopolitan sell-out elite.’ Whether everybody now supporting the AfD subscribes to the freedom-for-German-supremacy-view is open to debate. What can’t be denied is the fact that many discontented people, whatever their main grievance, are looking to the right, not the left, for alternatives to a failing political centre. Some are also turning to the CDU, which claims to be different from both the AfD and the federal coalition government, without offering anything other than praise for the good old days. That served the party well at times when the German economy could thrive, to a greater or lesser degree, on US-enabled expansion of world markets. With the US protectionist turn, this is no longer possible and the party is torn between centrism and the new right. Current support for the CDU is highly unstable, which could easily work in the AfD’s favour, especially in the absence of persuasive alternatives from the left, which so far have not materialized.

    This wasn’t always the case. Something like a left renewal had once seemed to be in the offing in the most unlikely place: East Germany during the transition from state socialism to a peripheral position in an enlarged capitalist Germany. In West Germany, the nationalist wave that came with unification swept away much of the activist left that had rallied thousands—sometimes tens or even hundreds of thousands— of people in the 1980s against the stationing of US nuclear missiles, nuclear power plants, Nazis, and South Africa’s apartheid regime, among other causes. Left circles within the SPD, the Greens and the labour movement weathered the nationalist storm without leaving a mark on German politics. In this political climate, the Party of Democratic Socialism (Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus or PDS) stood out as a beacon of the left.

    Emerging from East Germany’s ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED), the PDS became the political home of many East Germans who lost their jobs, social status and cultural identity during the transition to capitalism. Quickly establishing a presence in East Germany’s provincial and municipal parliaments, the party expressed the discomfort of many East Germans who felt like second class citizens under the domination of West German institutions, politicians, corporations and culture. It highlighted East Germany’s socialist heritage, which encompassed commitments to anti-fascism, peace and international solidarity as much as the dictatorship of the politburo, Stasi-surveillance and an overbearing bureaucracy. The party hung itself up in endless debates between those who downplayed or justified East German communism’s dark sides and others who sought to disown that history by embracing liberal principles. Practically, these disputes didn’t make much difference. Upholding socialist principles didn’t stop the party from pragmatically working within the political and economic confines created by unification. At times, this included voting for privatization of public housing and infrastructure. For decades since the party was founded, the contradiction between socialist principles and the subordination to neoliberal policies imposed by the West German bourgeoisie didn’t stop the PDS or its successor organization Die Linke (the Left Party), from becoming something like a catch-all or people’s party in East Germany, a role long held by the CDU und the SPD in West Germany. For years, the PDS/Left Party achieved election results in the mid-20 percent range, peaking at 28 percent in Brandenburg in 2004 and 32 percent in Thuringia in 2019. It was also, and still is, part of various coalition governments in East German states. Until the September 2024 election, the Thuringian government was led by the Left Party’s Bodo Ramelow.

    Despite this overall success and despite the party’s fidelity to socialist principles, the social group that wasn’t interested in voting PDS consisted of workers, who still voted CDU in large numbers despite g the CDU’s failed to deliver on its big promises of post-unification prosperity. More recently they shifted to the AfD. Meanwhile, in West Germany, the PDS remained marginal throughout its existence, only attracting activists from various left grouplets. What little remained of left protest milieus after unification was still dominated by a mix of environmentalists, antifas and international solidarity activists who might vote Green, or maybe even SPD, but hardly ever PDS. The old working class milieus that were shrinking with the decline of smokestack industries were still dominated by unionists closer to the SPD than the PDS. This started to change when, under chancellor Schröder, the SPD implemented neoliberal counter-reforms on a scale his conservative predecessor Kohl had avoided throughout his 16-year tenure, despite his supposed commitment to unleashing market forces. Growing frustrations among left social democrats and unionists fed mass demonstrations against Schröder’s SPD and created a social and organizational base (including, most prominently, Schröder’s short-time finance minister Lafontaine) that merged with the PDS into the Left Party in 2007. In the federal elections two years later, the Left Party won 11.9 percent of the vote, then 9.2 percent in the 2017 elections, but fell to 4.9 percent in the 2021 elections. This was a worse result than the 5.1 percent the PDS obtained in 1998, an election that also saw an increased vote for the SPD, which allowed Schröder to succeed Kohl. It is worth noting that the PDS vote came almost entirely from East Germany, which represents less than a quarter of Germany’s total population.

    While the PDS mostly maintained peaceful coexistence between socialist theory and market-conforming practice, the Left Party continuously debated whether or not it should join centre-left governments, if given the chance. The bitterness with which party activists argued over this question stood in stark contrast to its actual relevance. In states where the party was relegated to opposition status by poor election results, this status didn’t attract additional voters keen on seeing a principled opposition in parliament. In states where the party joined governments, the results were mixed: sometimes it maintained its vote share in the subsequent election; sometimes it suffered losses. A paradoxical result came about in the Thuringian elections in September 2024: The Left Party lost massively, although, had there been direct elections for the minister-president (a position equivalent to provincial premier in Canada), the Left Party’s Bodo Ramelow would have won the election. This fits into a trend that became visible over the last few years in a number of state elections in East and West Germany. Party loyalties based on shared worldviews wear thin. Elections are often decided based on the media appeal of top politicians, regardless of party affiliation. Remarkably enough, Ramelow, just like Dietmar Woidke, the SPD’s lead candidate in the Brandenburg elections, dropped the name of his party on campaign posters, presenting himself as more of a provincial father figure than a man of the party.

    However, rather than signalling the end of ideology, as centrist politicians and postmodern philosophers might have argued before the rise of a very explicitly ideologically committed new right, the focus on limelight politicians pushes democratic debates into the shadows. In the case of the Left Party, it might also have been an attempt to distract from its own image as an organization mired in endless debates not producing any coherent, let alone persuasive, policies. The reasons for permanent internal discord are sociological and ideological. The Left Party was strongest in its early days, when the PDS’s social base still comprised a cross-section of the East German population, although workers remained underrepresented. It also attracted dissident social democrats and unionists from West Germany. To a limited extent, therefore the Left Party had the working class base the PDS never had.

    The blend of Keynesian and Marxist ideas around which social democratic dissidents and union leftists organized had been defeated as a significant political current during the crises of the 1970s by the Social Democratic right and corporatist union leaders who put competitiveness of the West German economy over income distribution from profits to wages. In the new millennium, when these currents joined forces with the PDS, they were still sizeable enough to give the newly founded Left Party a boost. But not for long. The smokestack industries around which these left currents were organizing were in continued decline, which made strategies based on that moribund reality obsolete. Moreover, these strategies often stood in the way of mobilizing and organizing the new working classes that emerged in the service sector and, on a much smaller scale, IT, bio tech, and green energy.

    As the ranks of the Left Party thinned out with the loss of members coming out of communist East Germany or from West German union and social democratic circles, the party was able to attract new blood mainly in the form of highly educated, often precariously employed, urban dwellers. The shift in membership from old left offspring to the children of neoliberal globalization was paralleled by a geographical shift in electoral support. In urban centres, losses among the party’s old left supporters could be partially compensated; in rural areas, however, where the PDS and the Left Party had always been weak, the party disappeared almost entirely. Often, there isn’t even anyone to put up election campaign posters

    Anti-AfD protest in Germany. Photo by strassenstriche.net/Flickr

    Unlike the original base of both the PDS and the Left Party, the urban hipsters who joined the Left Party had no old left reference points. Even when they talked about Marx and class they did so with postmodern accents. However, this did not help them to gain sizeable support among the working classes—sometimes lumped together as the “precariat”—that developed in expanding economic sectors. The political offerings of the Left Party seemed to exercise little appeal for both old and potentially new constituencies. The party’s founding basis of unity was opposition to neoliberalism. In the early days this left room for East German concerns about the outcomes of unification—arguably a kind of neoliberal restructuring—with opposition to the neoliberal turn of the Schröder-government in East and West Germany. It also left plenty of room for a variety of goals, from resurrecting the Keynesian welfare state to a multitude of vaguely defined socialisms for the future to opposition without a vision for the future. However, what sufficed to form the Left Party wasn’t enough to sustain and grow it, especially not as it became harder to label government policies neoliberal.

    The Great Recession, the COVID-19 pandemic, and commitments to ongoing arms production brought state intervention back to the centre of politics, contrary to the 1990s and early 2000s when politics was dominated by advancing capital mobility and free trade. Back then, ruling elites organized consent of the popular classes, more or less successfully, under the banner of “international competitiveness.” The new watchword “national security” is better at rallying the new right than building support for centrist parties. Left Party intellectuals debated the new political conjuncture under the label “post-neoliberalism,” a word-monster that hints, perhaps unwittingly, at the party’s inability to develop a strategy beyond rejecting neoliberalism. In reaction to the imposition of a party line by its predecessor organization, the PDS and the Left Party allowed a wide range of views. However, members of various organized currents, ranging from social-liberal to communist, tended to talk more about each other than with each other.

    Postmodernist philosophers’ contention that the days of master narratives are over was wrong with respect to neoliberalism—if there ever was a master narrative, it was neoliberalism—but it does apply to the Left Party, which could not synthesize different ideas into compelling left policies that could rally growing discontent. Instead, internal debates turned into factional turf wars in a party that resembled an appendix of the Scholz government, costing the Left Party more and more support.

    After years of bitter infighting, discontent with declining voter approval and accommodation of government policies led to the split of the federal party caucus and the formation of the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) in January 2024. As its name indicates, the party is entirely built around its frontwoman, who represented the Left Party in the Bundestag from 2009 to 2023. In the BSW, the cacophony that destructively marks the Left Party is replaced by closed-door debates. As in the Communist party of old, membership isn’t open to everyone; applications to join must be approved. Wagenknecht, originally a member of the Communist Platform (one of the organized currents inside the PDS), had shifted to left-Keynesian, pro-welfare state positions. But, years before her split from the Left Party, she began advocating ordoliberal positions—a branch of neoliberal thinking that stresses the role of the state in allowing businesses to compete without being bogged down by monopolies. This German version of neoliberalism has been the hallmark of economic policy and ideology since the early years of West German world market integration. In Wagenknecht’s current adaptation of ordoliberalism, the state guarantees competition, which, in turn, creates a strong economy capable of providing stable employment, social security and a fairer distribution of incomes. She combines this embrace of free markets plus the welfare state with a critique of the European Union as an institution operating in the interest of big corporations and a critique of NATO and US hegemony. Her condemnation of American hegemony appealed to some members of the Left Party, as did her critique of the EU, although her more recent favourable references to ordoliberalism and policies aiming at stricter migration controls were less popular.

    The BSW’s outlook is very much shaped by positive memories of West German postwar prosperity. Yet, the party’s advocacy of international cooperation, a position going back to 1970s detente policies, contrasts sharply with orientations of the centrist parties and some currents within her own former party. Demand for a negotiated settlement of the Ukraine war overlaps with AfD positions. However, the AfD considers this a matter of Germany’s national interest that doesn’t preclude support for rearmament and war in other regions, like Gaza most recently. The BSW, on the other hand, sees militarism largely as the US’s last recourse for defending its ailing empire. It remains to be seen how the BSW’s principled opposition to militarism and war can mesh with current negotiations for a coalition government with the CDU and the SPD, both committed to military support for Zelensky in Ukraine and Netanyahu in Israel. Polls suggest that electoral support for the BSW was largely driven by the desire for an anti-war voice in parliament. At the same time, there is considerable support for efforts to keep the AfD out of government, despite all the support the AfD garnered in the fall state elections in East Germany. If this means compromising its anti-militarism, the BSW may, like the Left Party before it, soon be seen as a superfluous appendix of unpopular centrist parties.

    After weeks of negotiations, the BSW entered into a coalition government with the SPD in Brandenburg as well as with the CDU and SPD in Thuringia. It also supports a minority government made up of the CDU and the SPD in Saxony. It did all this to keep the AfD out of government positions. Understandable as such efforts are, they have already cost the BSW in the polls. Hovering just above five percent, the BSW may not reach the five-percent threshold for obtaining seats in the upcoming federal elections. The Left Party, standing at 3.5 percent in the polls, will probably fall short. Founded as a project to unify left forces from East and West Germany, its split early last year already signalled the failure of that project. The next election may reduce it to insignificance, leaving lots of room for the AfD [end]

    The original article

    Ingo Schmidt is an economist and works as the coordinator of the Labour Studies Program at Athabasca University

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    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in the Serebryanskyi forest – RYBAR 56

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time on the AFU’s positions – RYBAR 55

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in Voronezh – RYBAR 54

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in a tank brigade – RYBAR 53

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in Toretsk – RYBAR 52

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time near Tykhe – RYBAR 51

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time near Skudne – RYBAR 50

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time near Staromayorske – RYBAR 49

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in the basements – RYBAR 48

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in the gray zone – RYBAR 47

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time in the flow – RYBAR 46

    adventures in country-404

    Once on the Platform – RYBAR 45

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, on the way home – RYBAR 44

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Ukrainsk – RYBAR 43

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in hard times – RYBAR 42

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, it couldn’t be otherwise – RYBAR 41

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Vesyoloye – RYBAR 40

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in Trudovoe – RYBAR 39

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Kurakhove – RYBAR 38

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Vuhledar – RYBAR 37

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in captivity – RYBAR 36

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in Krasnohorivka – RYBAR 34

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in Verkhnya Syrovatka – RYBAR 33

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in Pervomais’ke – RYBAR 32

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, while fleeing from the 404 country – RYBAR 31

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, at sea – RYBAR 30

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, on that very street – RYBAR 29

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, during a surrender – RYBAR 28

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Artemivka – RYBAR 27

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Umanske – RYBAR 26

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Novoselivka Persha – RYBAR 25

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Ostroverkhivka – RYBAR 24

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Krasnohorivka – RYBAR 23

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, near Chasiv Yar – RYBAR 22

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in Kharkiw – RYBAR 21

    adventures in country-404

    Once upon a time, in Spain – RYBAR 20

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, on the election day – RYBAR 19

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near Berdychi – RYBAR 18

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near Kostyantynivka – RYBAR 17

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Oleshky – RYBAR 16

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, on February 24 – RYBAR 15

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near Bakhmut – RYBAR 14

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near Robotyne – RYBAR 13

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near Kreminna – RYBAR 12

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Lugansk – RYBAR 11

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Krynky – RYBAR 10

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Mar’inka – RYBAR 9

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Avdiivka – RYBAR 8

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Nova Kakhovka – RYBAR 7

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in the Azovets camp – RYBAR 6

    adventures in country -404

    Once upon a time, in Klishchiivka – RYBAR 5

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near the Russia-Ukraine border – RYBAR 4

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, near Novodarivka – RYBAR 3

    tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, on Independence Day in country 404 – RYBAR 2

    the tale of an unsuccessful counterattack

    Once upon a time, in Urozhaine – RYBAR 1

    A tale of a failed counter-attack

  • [Sharing] McCarthyism, European style: The elite crackdown on Ukraine dissent – Eldar Mamedov, Responsible Statecraft

    Experts lambasted as Kremlin mouthpieces turned out to be right

    As the war between Russia and Ukraine is framed by the ruling politicians and commentators in Europe and America as part of a purported global struggle between democracies and autocracies, the quality of democracy in the West itself has taken a hit.

    The dominant voices advocating for Ukraine’s victory and Russia’s defeat, both defined in maximalist and increasingly unattainable terms, are intent on snuffing out more thoughtful and nuanced perspectives, thus depriving the public of a democratic debate on the existential questions of war and peace.

    In a familiar pattern throughout the West, respected academics who correctly predicted the quagmire Ukraine and the West now find themselves in have been smeared and delegitimized as Kremlin mouthpieces, subjected to harassment, marginalization and ostracism.

    The situation is particularly alarming in Europe. While the Ukraine debate in the U.S. is, to a worrying extent, shaped by pro-militarist think tanks, such as the Atlantic Council, hawkish politicians and neoconservative pundits, a countervailing movement consisting of pro-restraint voices has been growing. They include Defense Priorities, the CATO Institute, publications like The Nation on the left, and The American Conservative on the right, and academics like Stephen Walt, John Mearsheimer, and Jeffrey Sachs, among others. There is more space for alternative voices in American discourse.

    In Europe, by contrast, foreign policy debates tend to simply echo the most hawkish voices inside Washington’s Beltway.

    Sweden is a particularly telling illustration of that trend. After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Swedish government and political class swiftly moved to join NATO. Yet, as one of the leading Swedish international relations scholars Frida Stranne told me in an interview, “No proper debate was held on the key questions, like whether Russia’s aggression against Ukraine indeed was such an immediate security threat for Sweden that it had to ditch the neutral status it enjoyed even during the Cold War?” (I can testify myself, from my work as a senior foreign policy adviser in the European Parliament in early 2022, that even some members of the then-ruling Swedish social-democratic party were aghast at the government running roughshod over alternative views on NATO).

    Further, in a conversation with me, Stranne, while acknowledging that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was “an egregious breach of international law,” pointed to U.S. policies since 2001, such as the invasion of Iraq, noting that they “have helped to undermine international legal principles and set the precedent for other countries acting ‘preemptively’ against perceived threats.”

    In the same interview, she also warned that “a refusal to countenance a negotiated settlement to the war in Ukraine is leading the world perilously close to the brink of a major military conflict between NATO and Russia.”

    While such points are routinely made by fairly mainstream scholars in the U.S., in Sweden they triggered a vicious campaign against Stranne and made her nearly untouchable by the media and in foreign policy circles. Leading media outlets vilified her as a U.S. hater and a “Putinist.”

    Germany is another example of how enforced groupthink led to a marginalization of dissenting perspectives in political debates. What is particularly noteworthy is the speed and radicalism with which the hawks in think tanks, media, and political parties managed to redefine the debate in a country previously known for its now-defunct Ostpolitik, a policy of pragmatic engagement with the Soviet Union and later Russia.

    One of Germany’s most prominent foreign policy experts, Johannes Varwick of the University Halle-Wittenberg, has long defied the trend and advocated for diplomacy. In December 2021, together with a number of high-ranking former military officers, diplomats and academics, he warned that a massive deterioration in relations with Russia could lead to war — due, in part, to the West’s refusal to take seriously Russia’s security concerns, chiefly related to the prospects of NATO’s eastward expansion.

    Yet such views earned Varwick accusations of “serving Russian interests.” As a result, as he told me in an interview, his “ties with the political parties and ministries responsible for conducting Germany’s foreign and security policy were severed.”

    Experts in neutral countries were not spared marginalization as well. Austrian Prof. Gerhard Mangott, one of the most eminent experts on Russia in the German-speaking world, pointed to a “shared responsibility” of Russia, Ukraine, and Western countries for the failure to resolve the post-2014 Ukrainian conflict peacefully. Such analysis, as Mangott told me, led to his “prompt excommunication by the German-speaking scientific community which turned quickly to political activism and became party to the war.”

    The tragic irony, of course, is that these ostracized voices have proved to be correct in most respects about this war.

    When, despite his warnings, the Russian invasion of Ukraine did occur, Varwick, who condemned it as illegal and unacceptable, called for further efforts to find a realistic negotiated solution to the conflict. As he told me, this should “firstly include a neutral status for Ukraine with strong security guarantees for the country. Secondly, there would be territorial changes in Ukraine that would not be recognized under international law but must be accepted as a temporary modus vivendi, and thirdly, the prospect of suspension of some sanctions in the event of a change in Russia’s behavior must be on offer.”

    In March 2022, both Ukraine and Russia were close to a deal broadly along these same parameters. It did not work, because, among other reasons, the West encouraged Ukraine to believe that a military “victory” was possible. The role of then-British Prime Minister Boris Johnson in undermining the talks is now generally acknowledged. What is, however, particularly striking is that Johnson recently himself admitted that he saw the war in Ukraine as a proxy war against Russia — a claim made by Stranne and the Quincy Institute’s Trita Parsi in their 2023 book, in Swedish, “The Illusion of American Peace,” for which they were lambasted for purportedly pushing Russian narratives.

    Fast forward to late 2024, and, faced with growing difficulties on the battlefield, Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky is now signaling that he could go along with some of the elements outlined by Varwick; namely, accepting some de facto territorial losses to prevent even bigger ones should the war continue.

    Today, Ukraine is farther away from achieving anything remotely resembling a military victory than at any point since February 2022. Contrary to the expectations in the U.S. and EU, sanctions neither tanked Russia’s economy nor changed its policies in the ways the West sought.

    In the West itself, political forces that urge negotiations to end the war are ascendant, as evidenced by the election of Donald Trump as president in the United States and the rise of anti-war parties in Germany, France and other EU countries. Public opinion surveys consistently show a preference of the majority of Europeans for a negotiated end to the war.

    The reality is, irrespective of the outcome of the war in Ukraine, a modus vivendi between the West and Russia will have to be reestablished to ensure, in Varwick’s words, “their coexistence in a Cold War 2.0 without a permanent escalation.” Restoring an open democratic debate about this vital issue is long overdue.

    Listening to the experts who have a proven track record of correct analysis would be a necessary first step [end]

    The original article

    Related

    29 novembre 2023 : How American Neocons Wrecked the Middle East and Ukraine – David Stockman, Antiwar.com

    This is part 2 of “Why There Is Still No Peace on Earth: Washington’s Folly From The Persian Gulf to Ukraine.”  Read part 1

    The Atlanticist defeat in Donbass and Ukraine

    chronicle of a new catastrophic NATO venture

    The Western disinformation about Ukraine

    chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Ukraine against Russia

  • Daily pictures: the fall guy

    the Germans have bowed down to the US sabotage by Joe Biden administration of Nord Stream pipelines, only to end up with Donald Trump’s America First doctrine in economy and defense

    In the evening of November 6, 2024, after the landslide victory of Donald Trump in the US presidential election, social democrat chancellor Olaf Scholz dismisses Christian Lindner, his neoliberal finance minister. That’s the collapse of the government coalition in Germany

    Related

    September 27, 2022: US operatives have sabotaged Nord Stream

    the motive, the opportunity and the means

    February 8, 2023: How America Took Out The Nord Stream Pipeline – Seymour Hersh

    The New York Times called it a “mystery,” but the United States executed a covert sea operation that was kept secret—until now

    March 22, 2023: THE COVER-UP – Seymour Hersh

    The Biden Administration continues to conceal its responsibility for the destruction of the Nord Stream pipelines

    August 14, 2024: Nord Stream sabotage: Germany issues arrest warrant – Deutsche Welle

    A Ukrainian national, whose last known address was in Poland, is being sought by German authorities for the 2022 attacks on the Nord Stream gas pipelines. He is believed to have acted with two accomplices [That is a piece of German humor. Such a small team and its limited means would not have been able to provoke such damage and actually, the sabotage of Nord Stream pipelines was obviously a US secret operation. From the beginning, that lead was a red herring]

    September 26, 2024: For the first few days, the harbormaster on Christiansø “didn’t have to say a word”. But today he can reveal a bit – Politiken

    In September 2022, the explosions of the Nord Stream gas pipelines caused enormous international attention. At first, everyone believed that Russia must be behind the sabotage. Now Germany is looking for a Ukrainian diving group on a yacht, while Denmark and Sweden have dropped the investigation. So what do we know about the case, which they soon forget on Christiansø?

    October 9, 2024: The old man and the sea

    new information about the US sabotage of Nord Stream pipelines

    The Atlanticist defeat in Donbass and Ukraine

    chronicle of a new catastrophic NATO venture

  • Daily pictures : the old man and the sea

    new information about the US sabotage of Nord Stream pipelines

    Seymour Hersh is right. We are many and we are right, despite the efforts of the US/German intelligence, through New York Times articles, to make us believe that a bunch of Ukrainian crayfish fishermen would have carried out the attack. Politiken is a major Danish daily newspaper, writes on September 26

    […] For the first few days, the harbor master said he was “not allowed to say a thing”. But today, John Anker Nielsen can reveal that four or five days before the Nord Stream blasts, he was out with the rescue service on Christiansø because there were some ships with switched-off radios. They turned out to be American naval vessels, and when the rescue service approached, they were told by Naval Command to turn back.

    Therefore, the harbor master has some faith in the theory that American star journalist Seymour Hersh, among others, has put forward without any documentation: that the US was behind the sabotage. The Americans have these small unmanned submarines that can solve any task, John Anker Nielsen has been told […]

    On September 21, 2022, five days before the attack, in a rescue mission from Christiansø island, the old sailor met USS Kearsarge (LHD-3), one Wasp-class amphibious assault ship. Here is an analytical thread on X

    But the US war ships were so shy about their pastime in that part of the Baltic Sea.

    September 26, 2024: For the first few days, the harbormaster on Christiansø “didn’t have to say a word”. But today he can reveal a bit – Politiken

    In September 2022, the explosions of the Nord Stream gas pipelines caused enormous international attention. At first, everyone believed that Russia must be behind the sabotage. Now Germany is looking for a Ukrainian diving group on a yacht, while Denmark and Sweden have dropped the investigation. So what do we know about the case, which they soon forget on Christiansø?

    Related

    September 27, 2022: US operatives have sabotaged Nord Stream

    the motive, the opportunity and the means

    February 8, 2023: How America Took Out The Nord Stream Pipeline – Seymour Hersh

    The New York Times called it a “mystery,” but the United States executed a covert sea operation that was kept secret—until now

    March 22, 2023: THE COVER-UP – Seymour Hersh

    The Biden Administration continues to conceal its responsibility for the destruction of the Nord Stream pipelines

    August 14, 2024: Nord Stream sabotage: Germany issues arrest warrant – Deutsche Welle

    A Ukrainian national, whose last known address was in Poland, is being sought by German authorities for the 2022 attacks on the Nord Stream gas pipelines. He is believed to have acted with two accomplices [That is a piece of German humor. Such a small team and its limited means would not have been able to provoke such damage and actually, the sabotage of Nord Stream pipelines was obviously a US secret operation. From the beginning, that lead was a red herring]

  • [Sharing] Far-Right Political Violence in Ukraine: Assessment of the Donbas War and the Odesa Massacre – Ivan Katchanovski and Max Abrahms, Perspectives on Terrorism

    Volume XVIII, Issue 3

    Abstract: This study analyses the nature and extent of involvement by neo-Nazi and other far-right Ukrainian organisations in the Donbas war (2014-2022) and the Odesa massacre (2014). This issue is highly politicised with contrasting narratives. The Russian and Donbas separatist
    governments, as well as their media, have contended that Ukraine has been a Nazi or neo-Nazi regime since a fascist coup took place in 2014, while Ukrainian and Western governments and media have maintained that such elements in the Ukrainian far-right were marginal, trivial, even non-existent. The article interrogates the historical record with primary sources in the three most relevant languages—Ukrainian, Russian, and English. The investigation reveals crucial far-right involvement in both the early stages of the war in Donbas and the Odesa massacre. Although the percentage of far-right supporters and fighters in Ukraine was relatively small, they exercised disproportionate influence in the country due to their greater reliance on violence and armed formations. The Russian government, however, exaggerated the role of the neo-Nazis in Ukraine to publicly justify the illegal invasion in February 2022.

    Introduction

    This study analyses the nature and extent of involvement by neo-Nazi and other far-right Ukrainian organisations during both the Donbas war from its start in April 2014 until the Russian invasion in February 2022 and the Odesa massacre on 2 May 2014. Other than the Maidan massacre in February 2014, these were the most significant and contested cases of political violence in Ukraine from its independence in 1991 to the commencement of the Russia-Ukraine war on 24 February 2022.1 The role of far-right Ukrainian groups during these major episodes of political violence is controversial because they are beset by duelling, self-serving narratives. Russian President Vladimir Putin has claimed that the principal goal of the invasion is to “denazify” Ukraine.2 But well before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, there have been several overt and covert Russian military interventions here, including the annexation of the Crimean peninsula and direct support for pro-Russian insurgencies in the Donbas region, particularly in August 2014 and February 2015. Following the overthrow of the pro-Russian Ukrainian government in February 2014, the United States and other Western governments have consistently opposed Russia’s interventions and backed the current central government of Ukraine. In addition to political support, financial and military assistance has been provided, including training during the Obama presidency.3 To justify this support, the US and other Western governments disputed any real power or even the existence of neo-Nazi armed formations in Ukraine or claimed that they abandoned their far-right elements. Understanding the contested issue of far-right involvement in the Donbas war (2014-2022) and the Odesa massacre (2014) is valuable not only for elucidating intrinsically important historical episodes of political violence but also due to the contemporary relevance given the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war.

    This article proceeds in five sections. The first section highlights the contribution of our study by describing the weakness of the extant academic literature and our methodological approach to filling in important lacunae in the research landscape. The second section details the duelling of contemporary narratives over the political violence by the far-right in the war in Donbas and in the Odesa massacre. The third and fourth sections develop qualitative case studies with process tracing to illuminate the role of the far-right in the Donbas war and the Odesa massacre. The fifth section presents the conclusion.

    Developing the Extant Literature

    Research on the far-right in Ukraine since the Euromaidan has been spotty. Studies on neo-Nazi and other far-right organisations in Ukraine following the Euromaidan have been limited in quantity, quality, and scope. Most studies have been produced by researchers outside academe
    in partisan think tanks or non-government organisations, as well as by journalists who did not subject their work to peer review.4 Such assessments are more likely to be politically driven and less likely to exhibit methodological rigour, even professionalism. For example, Anton Shekhovtsov, the former leader of the Crimean branch of the pro-Russian far-right Eurasian Youth Union, likened the Trade Union building arson attack during the Odesa massacre on 2 May 2014, to his killing of Colorado potato beetles by collecting them in a box and burning them alive. He directly inferred that this was a massacre with far-right involvement but omitted this in his publications.5 Other works have relied on narrow metrics such as the vote-share of far-right parties in Ukraine, without assessing the violence itself in terms of the perpetrators and effects.6 Some researchers have claimed that the presence of Russian speakers in the Azov regiment and other neo-Nazi-led armed formations is evidence of their relative tolerance and asserted that the Azov regiment had moderated by abandoning its far-right roots.7 Such analyses have tended to uncritically rely on Ukrainian and Western government narratives, accepting their claims at face value.

    By contrast, other studies suggest a greater degree of far-right involvement in Ukrainian political violence. One quantitative study found that far-right groups in Ukraine, such as Svoboda and Right Sector, fielded the most violent perpetrators and committed the lion’s share of attacks.8 That study is restricted temporally, however, to the 2014 Maidan protests, which led to the violent overthrow of the relatively pro-Russian government and ultimately spiralled into the civil war in Donbas, the Russian annexation of Crimea, and Russian military interventions in these regions of Ukraine.9 Similarly, qualitative studies have presented evidence in the form of videos, eyewitness testimonies, confessions, and forensic examinations of Svoboda and Right Sector involvement in the Maidan massacre.10 Some other studies have focused on specific aspects of the far-right paramilitary and other armed formations during the war in Donbas.11 One academic publication is specifically devoted to the Odesa massacre, which is called “The Odesa Tragedy,” though it concentrates on the public perceptions rather than the perpetrators and their consequences.12 This list of prior works is intended to be illustrative rather than exhaustive. The research landscape around these issues is growing, but uneven in scope and reliability; a lacuna remains in the literature in terms of evaluating rigorously, comprehensively, and dispassionately the nature and extent of far-right involvement in the Donbas war and Odesa massacre, which matters in terms of our understanding of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and political violence more generally.

    To elucidate this understudied topic of the far-right in Ukraine, this study makes substantial use of primary source materials in Ukrainian and Russian—the main languages in Ukraine—as well as in English. This linguistic capability is conducive to a more nuanced, accurate assessment. Methodologically, the two case studies employ qualitative process tracing with the benefit of fluency in all three languages.13 The substantive focus and period of analysis are both tightly
    bounded; the role of the far-right on the Russian side and in the Russia-Ukraine war since February 2022, as well as during the Euromaidan, are weighty topics explored in our other works but fall outside the scope of this study.

    The term “far-right” denotes ultranationalists and both racial and ethnic supremacists in accordance with prior scholarship.14 The term “neo-Nazi” refers to far-right organisations that revamp elements of Nazi ideology, particularly its racial and ethnic supremacism, and use symbols associated with Nazi Germany or their stylised versions. As with Nazis, neo-Nazi organisations represent a form of fascism. Major neo-Nazi organisations in Ukraine during the time period covered by this study include the Social-National Assembly, its paramilitary wing Patriot of Ukraine, the National Corps, the White Hammer, and C14. Also included in the analysis are paramilitary and other armed formations organised and led formally or informally by these neo-Nazi organisations, such as the Azov battalion and regiment. Admittedly, militant groups are known to exhibit ideological heterogeneity.15 Within the political violence literature, a burgeoning area of research emphasises that members of the rank-and-file may be motivated by a variety of factors that diverge from the leadership, leading to a principal-agent problem.16 In this study, we classify organisations as neo-Nazi, or at least neo-Nazi-led, when commanders are neo-Nazi, even if not all members can be presumed to share this exact ideology.

    A prominent example is Andriy Biletsky, the leader of Patriot of Ukraine and the Social-National Assembly (SNA), both of which were transformed along with the Azov battalion and regiment veterans into the National Corps Party in 2016. He called the ideology of Patriot of Ukraine and SNA “Social Nationalism.” In a collection of his articles published in 2013, he described that social nationalism, as the name suggests, combines elements of ultranationalism of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists with elements of national socialism and called both radical nationalism and national socialism “great ideas.” He wrote that social nationalism is based on “Sociality, Racism, and Great Power.”17 Specifically, it is based on the ideas that the “white race” is “superior” to other races and is the foundation of the Aryan Ukrainian nation; the Ukrainian nation is a “blood-racial community”; and that “the historical mission of our Nation (…) is to head and lead the White Peoples of the world in the last crusade for their existence, a march against the Semitic-led subhumans.”18 Biletsky openly made antisemitic and racist statements, such as his claim that the Jew is “an economic and political parasite.” He saw “a serious clash of native European peoples with foreign colonisers, mainly of African and Muslim origin” and believed that “an ethnic civil war can be won by the native Europeans only under the banner of the New Right National Revolutions.”19

    Biletsky was called the “White Leader” and his writings were published by both SNA and Patriot of Ukraine. He was the first commander of the Azov battalion, which was organised and led by Patriot of Ukraine and SNA in May 2014. Patriot of Ukraine, SNA, and the Azov battalion all used a symbol resembling a stylised swastika and Wolfsangel. Azov commanders and their historian, who himself serves in Azov, called the symbol the “Idea of the Nation” and claimed that it is an ancient Ukrainian symbol, even though it was created in 1992 for the Social National Party of Ukraine (SNPU). The creator of this symbol acknowledged that it was called “Idea of the Nation” to represent the radical nationalist ideas of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). He also admitted that SNPU deliberately chose this symbol with the Latin letter N, instead of the equivalent Ukrainian Cyrillic letter, fully aware of its resemblance to Nazi symbols and association with the swastika for many Ukrainians, in particular in Lviv. As with other extremist groups that rebrand out of political expedience, the Social National Party of Ukraine changed its name to Svoboda in 2014, because the Nazi association was politically inconvenient.20 However, this symbol was retained by the SNA and by Patriot of Ukraine, whose Kharkiv branch split from SNPU because of these changes.21 The Azov battalion and its propaganda magazine, which was named Black Sun, also used the Black Sun symbol, an ideological symbol used by Nazis and various neo-Nazi organisations. In addition, groups and individuals—including Patriot of Ukraine, SNA, National Corps, and Azov battalion and regiment leaders, commanders, and members—have displayed on their uniforms various neo-Nazi and Nazi symbols, such as the swastika, the SS sign, and 88 (Heil Hitler code). These, along with Hitler images, Nazi flags, and Totenkopf have also been seen in the form of patches, photographs, flags, and tattoos.

    Although the term far-right incorporates both ultranationalist and neo-Nazi organisations, they are not ideologically identical despite their frequent overlap. This study empirically investigates the role of Ukrainian ultra-nationalist organisations such as Svoboda, the Right Sector, the Ukrainian National Assembly–Ukrainian People’s Self-Defence (UNA-UNSO), and Bratstvo; neo-Nazi organisations such as the Social-National Assembly, Patriot of Ukraine, the White Hammer, and C14; and various other paramilitary formations, special police forces, and National Guard units organised and controlled to various extents by them. These armed units include the Azov battalion and regiment, Dnipro, Donbas, Aidar, Sich, Carpathian Sich, OUN, and St. Mary’s battalions, and the Ukrainian Volunteer Corps. To assess these actors, this study analysed thousands of Russian and Ukrainian primary sources: online recordings of live broadcasts, videos of the armed conflict in Donbas and Odesa, and information posted on websites and social media by far-right organisations, their armed units, and activists. It also analysed media reports in Ukrainian, Russian, and English from diverse outlets such as Ukrainska pravda, Strana, BBC, The Guardian, The Washington Post, The New York Times, YouTube, Telegram, V Kontakte, Facebook, and Twitter. To mitigate bias, the authors analysed the primary source materials rather than relying on secondary interpretations.

    The Conflicting Narratives

    Assessments of the far-right in Ukraine have been wracked by self-serving and thus unreliable perspectives. Russian and separatist leaders, as well as the media, have described the post-Maidan violence in Ukraine, especially in Donbas and Odesa, as perpetrated by “fascists” and “Nazis” akin to genocidal massacres against Jews, Belarusians, Russians, and Ukrainians during the Holocaust and World War Two.22 They often called the Odesa massacre the “Odesa Khatyn,” a reference to the large-scale massacre of Belarusian villagers in 1943 by the Nazis and an auxiliary police battalion, which was based on a paramilitary formation of the Melnyk faction of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists. Based on this narrative, President Putin and his allies have claimed that invading Ukraine is not only justified, but “inevitable” to counter the “Nazi” or “Neo-Nazi regime” in Kyiv.23 Putin and his government thus declared the “de-Nazification” of Ukraine as a key goal of “the special military operation” launched in February 2022.24 This perspective—in its entirety—is widely assailed in the West.25

    By contrast, the Ukrainian and Western governments and the media tend to claim that the far-right—including neo-Nazis—is marginal, even non-existent in Ukraine.26 They argue that since Euromaidan, Ukrainian fighters have almost entirely—if not entirely—shed their far-right elements, particularly neo-Nazi. To this end, it is a common point that the Azov Battalion ceased to be led by the neo-Nazi Patriot of Ukraine, a paramilitary wing of the SNA, since integrating into the National Guard as one of its regiments. Kyiv has stressed that the integration of Azov in November 2014 is proof of its transition to moderation and the absence of extremist fighters post-Maidan.27 Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky awarded “Hero of Ukraine” titles in 2022 to prominent Azov leaders such as regiment commander Denys Prokopenko, deputy commander Sviatoslav Palamar, and senior officer Oleh Khomenko.28 After the commencement of the Russia-Ukraine war in February 2022, many Western media outlets, politicians, government officials, and academics adopted this stance that Azov and other controversial Ukrainian fighters on the far-right had not only abandoned extremist elements, but were heroes against Russia’s illegal invasion.29

    The Indexing Theory of political communications emphasises that Western media follow narratives of its governments in covering foreign conflicts, including in post-communist countries.30 In some cases, Western media may have taken their cues directly from the Ukrainian government. After the Odesa massacre on 2 May 2014, the Foreign Ministry of Ukraine blamed the arson attack on provocateurs that were “paid generously by the Russian special services”, and the New York Times immediately adopted the same line that pro-Russia groups may have been responsible for torching the building.31 The Western narrative of the far-right in Ukraine since the Euromaidan is not without controversy. Volodymyr Ishchenko, a Ukrainian sociologist who specialises in the far-right in Ukraine, concludes: “The dominant narrative since Maidan in Ukrainian and much of the Western public spheres has been systematically downplaying the problem” by arguing that “the Ukrainian far-right” is “small and marginal.” He stated that “often, the far-right is just ignored.”32

    Notably, Western concerns over far-right fighters in Ukraine were more prevalent before the February 2022 invasion. For example, The Nation described Azov in 2018 as “pro-Nazi, as evidenced by its regalia, slogans, and programmatic statements.”33 In 2019, Radio Free Europe called Azov “far-right.”34 In 2020, The Guardian referred to Azov as a “neo-Nazi extremist movement.”35 Consistent with Indexing Theory, such coverage of the neo-Nazis in Ukraine before the February 2022 Russian invasion overlapped with similar expressions by Western governments. In its 2018 Human Rights report, the US State Department called the political wing of the Azov Regiment “a hate group.”36 In 2019, ambassadors from G7 countries warned against “extreme political movements in Ukraine, whose violent actions are worrying in themselves.” The warnings referred specifically to the Azov movement and its violence during the 2019 presidential elections.37 The US Congress has displayed longstanding ambivalence over its designation of Azov. In 2018, forty Congress members signed a letter to the State
    Department with the request to designate Azov as a terrorist organisation because of its links to terrorist attacks in multiple countries and its recruitment of neo-Nazis in its ranks.38 A defence appropriations bill amendment was adopted by the entire US Congress in 2018, which banned US government funding and training of the Azov regiment due to concerns over its neo-Nazi views and members. Such concerns had been expressed by American officials for several years after the Euromaidan. The amendment was first unanimously adopted by the US House of Representatives in 2015. Congressman John Conyers put it bluntly, “I am grateful that the House of Representatives unanimously passed my amendments last night to ensure that our military does not train members of the repulsive neo-Nazi Azov Battalion.”39 Under pressure from the Pentagon, however, Congress subsequently removed this first amendment. A similar amendment, proposing a ban on US military assistance to radical nationalist and neo-Nazi organisations, voluntary police, and paramilitary formations under their command, was blocked in Congress in 2014.40

    In general, however, American and European governments have been careful not to issue public statements against the far-right in Ukraine or to call attention to it. This hesitancy began after the Euromaidan and became starker following the February 2022 Russian invasion. Indeed, Western governments and media increasingly whitewashed the empirical record to present the Ukrainian far-right formations as categorically moderate in order to boost international support. In June 2024, the US State Department stated that the Azov brigade was eligible to receive US weapons under the “Leahy Law” because it was cleared of human rights violations. It made this determination after claiming that the Azov brigade is a new unit that is not subject to the previous Congressional ban, even though in reality this brigade was created on the basis of the Azov regiment, celebrated the 10th anniversary of the Azov battalion creation as its own anniversary, and is led by original Azov battalion commanders.41 However, a subsequent amendment, which was included in the US defence bill which was passed by the US House of Representatives, specifically stated that “none of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available by this Act may be used to provide arms, training, intelligence, or other assistance to the Azov Battalion, the Third Separate Assault Brigade, or any successor organisation.”42

    Such instrumental portrayals of allies are not limited to this conflict. Other recent cases of political violence have also featured public relations campaigns by governments and media to present allies as arguably more moderate than their history and contemporary ideology indicate. For example, in the Syrian war, anti-Assad jihadist organisations allied with the West were euphemistically referred to as “rebels,” sometimes “moderate” ones, even when they fought under the direction of a Foreign Terrorist Organisation, as designated by the US State Department.43 A large body of literature within terrorism studies has found that the labelling of violent perpetrators by governments and media is not value-neutral, but expedient to serve political agendas.44 Particularly in these controversial cases of political violence, academe can play an important role in interrogating the empirical record to adjudicate the truth.45

    The Far-Right in the Donbas War

    Research within the field of terrorism studies has repeatedly noted the difficulty of determining the ideological beliefs of participants in political violence.46 However, fine-grained knowledge of the organisations can substantially increase confidence. Svoboda and the main organisations that remained within the Right Sector after the Euromaidan were widely understood as far-right for maintaining ultra-nationalist and ethnically supremacist views. They openly described themselves as the natural successors of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), inspired by the notorious OUN leader and Nazi collaborator, Stepan Bandera.47 Along with the UNA-UNSO, these organisations used the “Glory to Ukraine! Glory to the Heroes!” slogan, the official greeting of the Bandera faction of the OUN (OUN-B). This greeting, along with a fascist-style hand salute, was modelled on greetings and salutes of other well-known fascist parties in European history, from the Nazi party in Germany to the Ustashe party in Croatia.48 The Right Sector also adopted its red and black flag from the OUN-B and the UPA, which symbolized Ukrainian blood and soil, which were also pervasive in Nazi ideology and flags.49 But the existence of these symbols alone offers weak evidence of far-right influence in the Donbas war without understanding the cultural and historical context.

    The violent overthrow of the Viktor Yanukovych government by means of the Maidan massacre triggered the resurgence of separatism in Donbas.50 After his overthrow in February 2014, far-right parties and organisations in Ukraine expanded and organised their armed formations. Along with Ihor Kolomoisky, an oligarch who became the head of the Dnipropetrovsk regional administration, the Right Sector was instrumental in the formation of the Dnipro battalion in the spring of 2014.51 The Azov battalion, notorious for its use of neo-Nazi symbols in its official insignia, was also organised in the spring of 2014 and led by the SNA and the Patriot of Ukraine with the involvement of the Radical Party. As mentioned, “White Leader” Andrii Biletsky was the first commander of Azov.52 Based in Mariupol, the St. Mary’s battalion was formed in the fall of 2014 and led by the far-right Bratstvo party, which is described by its leader (Dmytro Korchynsky) as the “Christian Taliban.”53 Around this time, the Aidar battalion, nominally subordinated to the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, was formed by the Maidan Self-Defence. One of its platoons was led by the White Hammer, a neo-Nazi organisation belonging to the Right Sector during the Euromaidan. Ilia Kiva, a Right Sector member, was the commander of another volunteer police battalion. A previously convicted criminal with a swastika tattoo became the commander of the Tornado Company, a special police unit. He and seven other members of his company were arrested and convicted for various crimes in the warzone, such as torturing detainees. A Nazi-style flag with a swastika was found in their prison cell.54 These units were all under the formal jurisdiction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the National Guard, or the Ministry of Defence. From the start of their formation, they remained under de facto command of radical nationalist or neo-Nazi organisations. These armed formations sprouted up in the early stages of the conflict in Donbas and were stationed there in an attempt to suppress pro-Russian separatism in the region by force. The Right Sector and the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists actively organised various militia and paramilitary units that were not subordinate to the central government of Ukraine. The Volunteer Ukrainian Corps, the largest paramilitary formation, was formed and led by the Right Sector specifically for the war in Donbas, though it also included battalions in Western Ukraine.55

    The paramilitary formations, special police, and National Guard units, organised and led by far-right organisations such as the Right Sector, the Social National Assembly, Patriot of Ukraine, Svoboda, C14, and Bratstvo, constituted a small minority of Ukrainian fighters in the Donbas. Based on reports, we estimate the number of members of radical nationalist and neo-Nazi organisations who served in various far right-led, regular, and other armed formations in the Donbas, at around five thousand. This estimate is conservative and represents just one percent of approximately 400,000 people who participated in this war on the side of the central government.56 Additional metrics of influence, however, are also important to consider.

    Despite their relatively small numbers, far-right fighters exercised disproportionate influence in the Donbas civil war, particularly in the early stages before the first direct Russian military intervention in August 2014. Far-right Ukrainian groups proliferated after the Euromaidan because they were eager to fight and were responsible for a disproportionate level of violence, especially against civilians and prisoners of war in Mariupol and Krasnoarmiisk. Far-right organisations and far-right-linked battalions thus played a crucial role in escalating the armed conflict in the Donbas. Svoboda and C14, an avowedly neo-Nazi group affiliated with Svoboda until the summer of 2014, organised and led the Sich battalion from June 2014 onwards.57 Meanwhile, the Right Sector carried out a deadly attack on a separatist checkpoint in Sloviansk on 20 April 2014. While Ukrainian and Western media denied far-right involvement in these events, the evidence to the contrary includes business cards linked to far-right members found after the attack. As well, Ukrainian court proceedings revealed that the weapons used by the Right Sector checkpoint attackers were the same as the snipers from this group who killed and wounded police during the Maidan.58 And two years after the attack on the separatist checkpoint, Dmytro Yarosh—the leader of the Right Sector—admitted his personal involvement in thisattack.59 Oleksandr Turchynov, then acting president of Ukraine, and Kolomoisky’s deputy in the Dnipropetrovsk regional administration, reportedly orchestrated this Right Sector operation, aimed to seize and destroy a television transmitter near Sloviansk, several days after this area was seized by the Strelkov-led armed group of Russian nationalists and Ukrainian separatists.60 This attack by the Right Sector constituted a major escalation of the conflict in Donbas because it broke both the Geneva Agreement signed on 17 April 2014 by Ukraine, Russia, the EU, and the US for a peaceful resolution of the conflict, as well as the Orthodox Easter truce between the Ukrainian government and separatists in Donbas.

    Far right-led armed formations were also behind many other violent attacks in the Donbas, further escalating the conflict into a civil war. Videos, media reports, and admissions from commanders and other members of the Azov and Dnipro battalions indicate that they participated in the storming of the district police headquarters in Mariupol on 9 May 2014. Approximately ten people, including at least one protester, were killed.61 Analysis of online video streams, media reports, and Ukrainian government documents, also make clear that Azov played a major role in taking back the city of Mariupol from the control of separatists in June 2014.62 The Dnipro battalion, along with other units, seized civilians in the Donetsk Region to prevent the separatist referendum on 11 May 2014. Videos show them shooting unarmed pro-separatist protesters with Kalashnikovs, killing two locals. The Ukrainian government denied the presence of the Dnipro battalion, but it was confirmed by other credible sources, including admissions by battalion members in videos, like Volodymyr Parasiuk’s statement on social media, who became the People’s Deputy of Ukraine.63

    The far-right-led armed formations perpetrated a disproportionate amount of violence in the first few months of the Donbas conflict and thus played a major role in escalating it into a larger civil war because the radical nationalist and neo-Nazi-led groups were far more willing to use force at that time. The Ukrainian armed forces, the security service, police and National Guard units were more reluctant to use force against the separatists in Donbas because their commanders and members were publicly blamed by the new government for attempting to forcefully suppress the Maidan protests—and in particular, for the Maidan massacre. Because the new Maidan government came to power through violence, which included the killing of police and protesters, it lacked legitimacy among many military, police, and SBU members in the Donbas region during this initial period of the conflict. Further, compared to the newly ascendant far-right groups in the aftermath of Euromaidan, the regular Ukrainian armed forces, the security service, the police and National Guard units were known for lower morale and higher desertions. Examples of this included the Donetsk SBU Alfa commander and Luhansk Berkut members, who joined the separatists.64

    The relative role of the far-right in the political violence was not constant; it began to decline in the Donbas when newly elected president Petro Poroshenko ordered the Ukrainian military, SBU, police, and National Guard to wield lethal force against the separatists and launch the offensive in June 2014.65 The war was most intense and violent in 2014 and 2015, but the fighting declined significantly following the Minsk Agreements in 2015. However, ultra-nationalist and neo-Nazi fighters continued to exert a non-trivial role, even after the Ukrainian military intensified its operations in Donbas and purported to moderate the far-right fighters. After its formal incorporation into the National Guard of Ukraine, the Azov regiment and its commanders maintained a close organisational and ideological relationship with the neo-Nazi National Corps party. This party was formed by the Azov battalion founder and the first commander on the basis of neo-Nazi SNA and Patriot of Ukraine, and it included many Azov battalion and regiment veterans. The Azov regiment functioned as a military wing of the National Corps, which, in essence, represented overlapping elements of the same Azov movement.66 Indeed, Azov regiment commanders shared a neo-Nazi background and had served in the neo-Nazi-led Azov battalion.67 In other words, the rebranding from “battalion” to “regiment” did not alter the key personnel.68 For example, Azov regiment commander Denys Prokopenko was a member of the neo-Nazi White Boys Club, which was formed by the ultras of the Dynamo Kyiv football club. This group of ultras displayed various Nazi symbols and the Nazi salute on their social media and during football games. His Azov battalion platoon had used the Totenkopf insignia of the Nazi SS.69 Andriy Biletsky became the commander of the Third Assault Brigade, which was created by veterans of the Azov battalion and regiment and activists of his neo-Nazi group, the National Corps.70 In 2023, he stated in an interview with Ukrainian media that the united Azov movement included this Azov brigade under his command along with the Azov regiment and the Kraken unit.71 Such admissions in Ukrainian media highlighting enduring far-right allegiances seldom make their way into the Western press.

    Importantly, Azov commanders never publicly renounced their neo-Nazi views, symbols, and organisations. In fact, Azov leaders routinely denied in media interviews that they, their units, and organisations, were neo-Nazi, claiming that the well-documented Nazi symbols were fakes or Russian propaganda. Our research of Ukrainian social media as well as other researchers of the far-right in Ukraine, such as Lev Golinkin and Moss Robeson, have identified over one hundred cases of Nazi and neo-Nazi displays by at least several hundred Azov commanders and other members from 2014 to 2022. This number includes displays on uniforms, patches, photographs, flags, and tattoos of neo-Nazi and Nazi symbols, such as the swastika, SS sign, 88 (Heil Hitler code), Hitler images, Nazi flags, and Totenkopf, and a fascist hand salute.72 The continued relevance of far-right extremism in Azov was evident at the very top. Arsen Avakov, the Minister of Internal Affairs, was personally involved in the Azov battalion formation and its later expansion to a regiment.73 President Petro Poroshenko circulated photographs awarding Ukrainian national medals and commendations to some of the most well-known neo-Nazis in Azov.74 The Nazi connection to Azov was clearly not due to a loss of agency control.

    Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch reported that Azov was involved in many cases of torture, illegal detention, and disappearances during the war in Donbas.75 The impact of these far-right organisations cannot be measured strictly in terms of the direct physical effects, as terrorism researchers have emphasised in many other contexts.76 Ultra-nationalist and neo-Nazi organisations were instrumental in blocking or “spoiling” a peaceful resolution of the armed conflict in Donbas, another well-established source of leverage for extremists.77 Far-right groups such as the Right Sector, Svoboda, and the Radical Party opposed the adoption by the parliament of Constitutional amendments based on provisions from the Minsk Agreements.78 To this end, Svoboda activists launched a grenade attack on 31 August 2015 in front of the Ukrainian parliament, killing four and wounding dozens of policemen and National Guard troops, which helped to block these amendments, undercutting the logic of implementation.79

    Far-right groups also challenged the implementation of President Volodymyr Zelensky’s electoral promise to peacefully resolve the Donbas war.80 In October 2019, Zelensky travelled to a front-line position in Donbas to personally convince the Azov fighters to stop blocking the implementation of the Minsk agreements by withdrawing along with separatist troops from the frontline, as he agreed during the summit with Putin and German and French leaders in Paris. But video of the encounter shows that Zelensky was taunted by activists of this neo-Nazi organisation who flouted his appeal.81 According to the Associated Press, thousands of far-right and nationalist activists shouting the far-right OUN and UPA slogan “Glory to Ukraine. Glory to the Heroes” marched through Kyiv protesting against a peace plan for eastern Ukraine.82

    The radical flank threatened Zelensky for implementing Minsk on other occasions as well. In May 2019, Dmytro Yarosh, the former Right Sector leader, publicly threatened to hang the new Ukrainian president on a tree if he fulfilled his election promise of a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Donbas.83 In 2021, Yarosh, the commander of the Ukrainian Volunteer Army organised by the Right Sector, was appointed Adviser to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Valerii Zaluzhnyi.84 In the same year, videos, photos, and Ukrainian media reports show police standing down while neo-Nazi and other far-right protesters attacked the Office of the President of Ukraine and painted swastikas on its walls.85 The Russia scholar Stephen F. Cohen concluded that Zelensky “can’t go forward with peace negotiations” because “crazy fascist movements” in Ukraine “literally threatened his life.”86 Although far-right peace rejectionists posed political problems for Zelensky, they were also known to work closely with him. An activist of the neo-Nazi Patriot of Ukraine and former deputy commander of the Azov regiment was appointed the acting head of the National Police of Ukraine during the Poroshenko presidency and then became a deputy minister of Internal Affairs during the Zelensky presidency.87 Prime Minister Oleksii Honcharuk spoke at a “veterans party” organised by a front organisation for the neo-Nazi C14 with a stylised swastika of a neo-Nazi rock band behind him.88 The advisory council of the Ministry of Veteran Affairs under Zelensky retained activists of this neo-Nazi group, including those charged with assassinating the prominent opposition journalist, Oles Buzyna, in 2015.89

    In sum, ultra-nationalist and neo-Nazi militant organisations were deeply involved on the side of the central government throughout the Donbas conflict. Although representing a small fraction of Ukrainian forces throughout the conflict, they committed a disproportionate amount of violence, particularly before President Poroshenko ordered the Ukrainian military to increase its use of force against the separatists in the summer of 2014. The much-touted absorption of Azov and other extreme right-wing militia under the official Ukrainian National Guard, police, and military command did not change either their command or their ideological displays. Many of the fighters worked closely with the Kyiv political leadership across administrations, when not using de facto veto power to block peaceful resolution of the conflict in this region.

    This interpretation departs from others that rely strictly on vote-share as the proxy for far-right influence. The influence of the far-right in Ukraine after the Maidan far exceeded its electoral support and membership. Svoboda and Right Sector leaders each won only one percent of the votes in the snap presidential elections in May 2014. In the parliamentary elections of October 2014, Svoboda narrowly failed to clear the five percent threshold, receiving 4.7 percent. The Right Sector fared even worse, receiving only two percent of the votes. Ruslan Koshulynsky, one of Svoboda leaders, who was backed by the Right Sector, OUN, and C14, received only 1.7 percent of the votes in the 2019 presidential elections, while Svoboda won 2.2 percent of the votes in the 2019 parliamentary elections. These weak electoral results indicate the limited national support of the far-right in Ukraine, but not its outsized role in the Donbas conflict.

    The Far-Right in the Odesa Massacre

    Other than the Donbas war, the Odesa massacre was the most significant and deadly instance of political violence after the Maidan massacre in Ukraine since its independence in 1991 until the Russia-Ukraine war in February 2022. The violence took place on 2 May 2014, between a “United Ukraine” rally and pro-Russian separatists, carried out with petrol bombs, gunfire, and rock-throwing, which ended up killing 48 people, primarily separatist protesters.90 The vast majority of the fatalities took place in the Trade Unions House, where 42 separatist activists and employees (forty men, seven women, and one boy) were killed when the building was set ablaze.91

    This massacre contributed to the escalation of the separatist conflict in Donbas into the civil war. As noted, the massacre was presented by separatist and Russian leaders and the media as akin to the Nazi massacre of Khatyn in Belarus, and many Odesa separatists joined the separatist forces in Donbas. Despite the importance of this massacre, the International Advisory Panel of the Council of Europe, among other international authorities, has noted that the Ukrainian government failed to properly investigate and prosecute those responsible.92 To ascertain the role of far-right groups in the Odesa massacre, a broad range of key information resources can be analysed, including videos and recordings of live broadcasts of the political violence (and the lead-up to it); published reports; primary source media in Ukrainian, Russian, and English; statements of responsibility; interviews; and testimonies from participants and eyewitnesses on both sides, as well as police commanders.

    On 1 May 2014, the day before the mass violence, separatists protested in Odesa to demand a referendum on the newly installed government in Kyiv, which they blamed on far-right activists and Western interference.93 Based on testimonies from a special parliamentary commission report in the immediate aftermath of the May 2014 massacre, Ukrainian and regional government officials planned to use far-right activists and the Maidan Self-Defence to suppress the separatists in the Odesa region and disperse those who were encamped near the Trade Union building.94 Extensive evidence indicates that the police and firefighters were ordered by their superiors to stand by and not interfere during attacks. For instance, a special plan to deal with mass disturbances launched by the Odesa regional police was not authorised, reportedly because of decisions at the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ top level.95 Similarly, top regional officials of the police and other law enforcement agencies were ordered to attend a meeting with their national counterparts before and during the start of the clashes.96 The presence of Andriy Parubiy and five hundred Maidan Self-Defence members, who deployed from Kyiv to Odesa on the eve of the massacre, further suggests that the violent dispersal of the separatist camp by far-right activists was orchestrated by top government leaders.97 Parubiy was a founder and leader of the neo-Nazi Patriot of Ukraine, a paramilitary wing of the Social National Party of Ukraine in the 1990s. He was the head of the Maidan Self-Defence during the Euromaidan and headed the National Security and Defence Council at the time of the Odesa massacre. The State Bureau of Investigations of Ukraine launched a criminal investigation into Parubiy for the Odesa massacre soon after he was replaced as the ex-head of the Ukrainian parliament following the early parliamentary elections in 2019.98 One of the participants acknowledged in an Israeli documentary that he engaged in “provocations” in the Odesa massacre under the command of
    Parubiy, who had issued orders to attack the separatists and “burn everything.” We assess this acknowledgement as credible because he was filmed along with Maidan activists in the left wing of the Trade Union building in Odesa when the deadly fire began to burn the central entrance.99 He and five other Georgian ex-military members also stated in American, Italian, and Israeli TV documentaries, Russian media interviews, on Macedonian TV, in depositions to Berkut lawyers for the Maidan massacre trial, and in testimonies to the Prosecutor General Office of Belarus for the Prosecutor General Office of Ukraine investigation that their groups of Georgian, Baltic, and far-right-linked Ukrainian snipers received weapons, payments, and orders from specific Maidan and Georgian politicians, including Parubiy, to engage in a mass killing of police and protesters.100 The Maidan massacre trial subsequently confirmed their identities.101

    A march led by the Right Sector and football ultras on 2 May 2014 was used as cover to implement this plan to destroy and burn the separatist tent camp.102 The SBU in the Odesa Region received advanced information about planned “provocations” and violent clashes between football ultras and pro-Russian separatists on game day between the Odesa and Kharkiv teams on 2 May. A special train transported hundreds of football ultras from Kharkiv to Odesa.103 Football ultras in Ukraine were notorious for displaying neo-Nazi symbols and expressing neo-Nazi slogans during games and have historically linked up with the Right Sector and other far-right organisations, as during the Maidan protests.104 Both the Right Sector and football ultras in Odesa and Kharkiv were dominated by the neo-Nazi Social National Assembly/Patriot of Ukraine, which organised the Azov battalion right after the Odesa massacre.

    Odeska Druzhyna, a small separatist organisation in Odesa, was present among other separatist activists based on evidence from internet streams, videos, testimonies of participants and eyewitnesses, and special parliamentary commission reports.105 Odeska Druzhyna used identifiable red tape labels, and were not Right Sector agent provocateurs, as the Russian media and separatists claimed. However, the Ukrainian government and media also mischaracterised the involvement of Odeska Druzhyna by overstating its coordination with other separatist activists.106 The balance of forces was asymmetric; the groups of numerically superior activists of the Right Sector from Odesa and Kharkiv led by the neo-Nazi Social National Assembly/Patriot of Ukraine, far-right football ultras, and Maidan Self-Defence units from Odesa and other regions attacked the separatists. Numerically disadvantaged, the latter took cover behind a police cordon.107

    An Odeska Druzhyna activist was filmed shooting in the direction of the far-right protesters with an AK-74-type assault rifle.108 The official investigation and the May 2 Group maintained that a Right Sector activist was killed by this separatist group member with a 5.45mm calibre bullet.109 However, leaked forensic medical expert reports describe a 5.65mm calibre bullet extracted from his body.110 This bullet reportedly disappeared and reappeared during the investigation. The fact that it did not match bullet samples of any legally registered firearms, the weak sound of the gunshots, as well as the lack of a recoil observed in the videos of the shooting, also suggest that the far-right protester may not have been killed by this separatist, who maintained that the weapon seen in the video was a movie studio prop.111 The killing of the Right Sector activist was not visible in that video nor in any videos of clashes. The investigation and various videos at the scene did not reveal the exact time or location of his killing, or the direction of the gunshot. An Odesa deputy police chief, who was filmed around the time of this killing before he himself was wounded, stated that he saw snipers in camouflage shooting from the second floor of a hotel there. He relayed that they killed this Right Sector activist and the second protester in order to blame the separatists for their killing and provoke a violent response against the separatists.112 Videos filmed before and after his shooting suggest that the second pro-Maidan activist was killed around the same time in the same area during the violent clashes with separatists and shooting from a Kalashnikov-type weapon by one of the separatists.113 However, the government forensic examination determined that he was killed by a bullet from a pneumatic sport-type weapon. Nobody was charged with his killing, and the moment and other circumstances of his killing remain not publicly known.114

    In the clashes that followed the killings of these two pro-government protesters, four separatist protesters were killed and many other separatist protesters, policemen and at least one local journalist were wounded. The forensic examination determined that three separatists were killed with hunting ammunition.115 A pro-government activist was filmed shooting with a hunting rifle in the direction of these separatists.116 This pro-government activist was later identified by the Minister of Internal Affairs as a Right Sector member.117 The government investigation charged him with killing at least one of the separatists. However, he was released from arrest and his trial was suspended indefinitely because of threats by the Right Sector and other far-right activists against judges during his trial.118 Evidence—including a recorded phone call—revealed that the events on May 2nd were coordinated by the Odesa regional administration official in charge of law enforcement agencies, and involved the participation of the Maidan Self-Defence commander, Right Sector activists, football ultras, and Maidan Self-Defence units.119 They attacked and burned the tent camp of various separatist organisations, whose activists and supporters then escaped to the nearby Trade Union building and tried to barricade the main entrance doors. Videos, internet streams, and testimonies of eyewitnesses show that attackers threw Molotov cocktails and burning tyres at the main entrance, set the entrance doors on fire, and blocked other exits. Videos, recorded calls to firefighters, and eyewitness reports reveal that the fire and thick smoke started from those burning tyres and Molotov cocktails thrown at the main entrance.120 The evidence does not support claims that the separatist protesters killed in this incident were Russian citizens, that they burned themselves by throwing Molotov cocktails from the roof of the Trade Union building or inside of the building, or that there was no far-right involvement in their killing.

    After initial denials, the May 2 Group admitted that the deadly fire started at the main entrance. The May 2 Group was a nominally independent association of mainly journalists, formed after the massacre supposedly to investigate it. It was created with the involvement of the Governor of the Odesa region who was appointed by Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko within a week of the massacre.121 This governor represented not only the central government, but also the Kolomoisky’s oligarchic network, which financed the Right Sector volunteers from the Volyn Region in the Azov battalion and the Right Sector-led Dnipro battalion.122 The Azov battalion was organised by the neo-Nazi SNA and its paramilitary wing, Patriot of Ukraine, which dominated the Right Sector in Odesa and Kharkiv, a few days after the Odesa massacre. But the May 2 Group still claimed that it was impossible to determine who started the fire because both sides were throwing Molotov cocktails. However, there is no public evidence of Molotov cocktails being thrown by separatists at the main entrance; on the contrary, numerous videos feature the far-right protesters throwing Molotov cocktails and burning tyres into the Trade Union building at that time.123

    Within Ukraine, far-right activists—particularly from the Right Sector and the SNA— were notorious for using tyres and Molotov cocktails to burn public buildings. Forensic examinations in the government investigation, recordings of radiocommunications by SBU Alfa group, an unpublished admission by a far-right activist to a French journalist, and an academic study determined that the Trade Union headquarters in Kyiv were burned by Maidan activists, including far-right ones, in order to stop its takeover by the Security Service of Ukraine Alfa unit.124 Far-right protesters also started fires by burning tyres in the Inter TV channel building and threatened to burn down the parliament of Ukraine, the Lutsk City Council, the Sviatoshyn District Court that heard the Maidan massacre case, the Constitutional Court, and Inter and 112 Ukraina TV channels buildings by placing tyres next to their entrances.125 Prior usage of the same tactics by the far-right increases the likelihood of their direct involvement.

    Analysis of online video streams, government investigation findings, May 2 Group reports, forensic medical examinations, eyewitness testimonies, and other evidence strongly indicate that 42 people perished as a result of the fire, smoke, and from trying to jump from the upper floors of the Trade Union building with far-right activists beating them on the ground and blocking the exits.. The victims were unarmed and included mainly separatists, their supporters, and several employees, in particular women, who were in the building at the time.126 Some of the strongest evidence of far-right involvement in the arson attack comes from the far-right itself, in the form of credit claiming. A growing body of research within terrorism studies focuses on credit claiming. An important finding is that perpetrators are far more likely to deny responsibility for their attacks than to take credit for ones that they did not perpetrate.127 This is particularly true when the targets are civilians. Nonetheless, many extremist groups do claim credit for civilian attacks.128 Statements posted by the Right Sector, the SNA, and the neo-Nazi Misanthropic Division on their websites and social media sites admitted the involvement of their organisations in the massacre. The Right Sector celebrated on its website the massacre by describing it as “another bright page in our fatherland’s history.” Claiming responsibility for the slaughter, it wrote: “In the first minutes of the battle, the ‘Right Sector’ activist was seriously wounded in the stomach. Several more PS [Right Sector] activists received injuries of varying degrees of severity. However, this did not prevent the rest of the PS fighters, together with football fans, from repelling the attack of pro-Russian provocateurs, and as a result, they successfully countered attempts to seize buildings in Odesa. Standing shoulder to shoulder, Odesa activists, football fans and ‘Right Sector’ fighters defeated the forces of pro-Russian mercenaries. Order has been restored in Odesa.”129 The Right Sector—which was dominated in Odesa and Kharkiv by the Social National Assembly and its paramilitary wing, Patriot of Ukraine—and the neo-Nazi Misanthropic Division (which joined the Azov battalion after the massacre) admitted on the social media platform V Kontakte and in other public statements that the fire was set deliberately.130

    The official investigation of the Odesa massacre was a farce. Nobody was found guilty of perpetrating this mass killing. As noted, the Right Sector shooter was initially arrested but then released. Only separatists were among those arrested and tried for the Odesa massacre. The Odesa massacre trial of separatists resulted in their acquittal by a local court. The Ukrainian court based its decision on the lack of evidence in support of prosecution charges. Even the verdict acknowledged both the weakness of the investigation into the perpetrators and the role of Parubiy and other government officials.131 The Council of Europe and the UN Special Commission reports also noted the destruction of evidence.132 A report by the special commission of the Council of Europe found that the Ukrainian government’s investigation of the Odesa Massacre was inadequate, politically selective, and featured the falsification of evidence, despite the existence of video footage showing who threw the Molotov cocktails at the building.133

    The Ukrainian media cited SBU sources that a far-right activist, who headed the Right Sector in Odesa during the Odesa Massacre, was a secret agent of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and that he and far-right associates were paid by SBU to attack opposition politicians, threaten judges, and conduct other illegal actions.134 This would be consistent with the fact that the Right Sector was not investigated for the Odesa massacre even though the Right Sector publicly admitted involvement. His secret collaboration with SBU would also be consistent with the fact that SBU and the Prosecutor General Office refused to charge him for killing another person in Odesa in 2018. Moreover, in 2020, the SBU gave this far-right activist the status of a victim in this case, even though he streamed this killing on his social media account and the police investigation determined that he was the killer.135 In this sense, the Odesa massacre was not entirely anomalous; it featured post-Maidan far-right involvement with apparent support from high-level political leaders in a corrupt country where investigations and media have inconsistently followed the evidence.

    Conclusion

    This study assesses the role of the far-right in post-Maidan Ukraine, specifically, in the Donbas war and the Odesa massacre. These were two of the biggest episodes of political violence in the country leading up to the February 2022 Russian invasion. This area of research is worth close investigation because it represents intrinsically important episodes of political violence that have not attracted objective analysis based on available primary sources in Ukrainian, Russian, and English. Investigating the role of the far-right is also timely because the far-right in Ukraine is riven by duelling, self-serving contemporary narratives.

    The predominant narratives propagated by governments and the mainstream media in Ukraine, the West, Russia, and separatist-controlled Donbas, concerning the role of the far-right in the war in Donbas and the Odesa massacre, have evidently been partisan. Contrary to the Russian government, separatists, and associated media, the Ukrainian government and military are not Nazi or even neo-Nazi. There were no neo-Nazis among the upper echelon of the Ukrainian government. President Zelensky is certainly not a Jewish neo-Nazi. He tried to placate and
    mainstream the far-right for political reasons, but has no observable personal affinity to that extreme ideology.

    Neo-Nazis constituted only about one percent of the Ukrainian forces before the Russian invasion in 2022, and there is weak electoral support for neo-Nazi parties throughout the country. Similarly, the policy of glorification of the OUN-UPA, their leaders, such as Stepan Bandera, and the adoption and use of their “Glory to Ukraine! Glory to the Heroes!” greeting by the state and the military, including Zelensky, do not make Ukraine a Nazi state. While the OUN and the UPA were far-right terrorist organisations, which collaborated with Nazi Germany and perpetrated the mass murders of Jews, Poles, and Ukrainians, they were not Nazis. Ukrainians could not join the Nazi party because Hitler and other Nazi leaders regarded Ukrainians as racially inferior and opposed independence of Ukraine while also dismissing the attempt to create even a puppet state by the Bandera faction of the OUN in Lviv shortly after the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union. Thus, Putin cannot credibly justify the illegal invasion in February 2022 as a war to “de-Nazify” the “Nazi regime.”136 The power of the far-right and the glorification of the OUN and the UPA in Ukraine under Poroshenko and Zelensky were exaggerated and exploited by the Russian leaders to justify the invasion.

    But the West’s efforts to whitewash the far-right in Ukraine also rests on empirically shaky grounds. Despite their relatively small numbers militarily and politically, the far-right in Ukraine exercised outsized power. The far-right organisations, volunteer battalions, and paramilitary units organised and led by them played, along with separatists and Russian nationalists, a significant role in starting and escalating the incipient civil war in the Donbas and then impeding its peaceful resolution. Even after technically integrated into the official Ukrainian forces, Azov and other far-right groups continued to harbour extremist views. Often brandishing the same extremist symbols, the core leaders and members remained and even ascended within the police, military, and security services during the Donbas war. Western media accounts have drawn heavily from biased Ukrainian sources, including “official” investigations and the May 2 Group. Across numerous primary sources in Ukrainian, Russian, and English, we find evidence that the Right Sector, Social-National Assembly, its paramilitary wing Patriot of Ukraine, and groups of far-right football ultras from Odesa and Kharkiv played a critical role in the Odesa massacre against separatist protesters on 2 May 2014. Neo-Nazi SNA/Patriot of Ukraine, which dominated the Right Sector in Odesa and Kharkiv, organised the Azov battalion right after this massacre.

    Despite the lack of international consensus over the definition of terrorism, a common interpretation is the use of violence by non-state actors aimed at creating fear for political ends, particularly when the targets are civilians.137 Depending on one’s definition, some attacks within the episodes of political violence covered in this study, such as the Odesa massacre, could, therefore, arguably be classified as terrorism. What is clear is that neither of the duelling narratives accurately captures the role of the far-right. This study has helped to fill that research lacuna by making use of substantial primary source materials in Ukrainian, Russian, and English. Besides the Maidan massacre, the Donbas war and the Odesa massacre are the two most substantial episodes of political violence from the independence of Ukraine in 1991 to the February 2022 illegal Russian invasion [end]

    The original article

    Ivan Katchanovski is a Ukrainian and Canadian political scientist. He teaches at the School of Political Studies and the Conflict Studies and Human Rights Program at the University of Ottawa in Canada. He specialises primarily in politics, conflicts, political violence, and the far right in Ukraine. His academic publications include five books, 21 articles in peer-reviewed journals, and twelve book chapters.

    Max Abrahms is a professor of public policy and political science at Northeastern University, where he specialises in international security. Abrahms has published extensively in leading academic and popular outlets such as International Organization, International Security, International Studies Quarterly, Security Studies, Comparative Political Studies, Harvard Business Review, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, New York Times, Washington Post, USA Today, Newsweek, The Atlantic, and Los Angeles Times.

    I disagree with the authors on two points

    • Stepan Bandera & friends were Nazis. How can the authors identify some neo-Nazis in modern Ukraine, while not regarding their historical mentors as Nazis ? Before WW2, they were praising either Adolf Hitler or Benito Mussolini. Their political project was authoritarian, racist and criminal. They were dreaming of ethnic cleansing. De facto during WW2, they committed mass killing of Jews and Poles.
    • Terrorism is not restricted to non-state actors. Terrorism is violent action to terror civilians, in order to achieve a common political goal. This is not even a value judgement, but Hiroshima bombing was terrorism. The Israeli targeting and mass killing of civilians, in the prospect of ethnic cleansing in Gaza, is terrorism.

    The PDF

    My related articles

    Nazism in Ukraine

    its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine

    The footprint of the Ukrainian Nazism in the West

    interactions between Ukrainian Nazi organizations and Western supremacist militants

    The Western disinformation about Ukraine

    chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia

    Endnotes

    1. Arel, Dominique and Jesse Driscoll. 2023. Ukraine’s Unnamed War. Before the Russian Invasion of 2022.
      Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Black, J.L. and Michael Johns (Eds.). 2016. The Return of the
      Cold War: Ukraine, the West and Russia. Abingdon: Routledge; Hahn, Gordon M. 2018. Ukraine Over the
      Edge: Russia, the West and the “New Cold War.” Jefferson, NC: McFarland Books; Katchanovski, Ivan.
      2016a. “The Separatist War in Donbas: A Violent Break-up of Ukraine?” European Politics and Society,
      17 (4), 473-489; Kudelia, Serhiy. 2016. “The Donbas Rift.” Russian Politics & Law, 54 (1), 5-27; Pikulicka-Wilczewska, Agnieszka and Richard Sakwa (Eds.). 2015. Ukraine and Russia: People, Politics, Propaganda and Perspectives. Bristol: E-International Relations; Sakwa, Richard. 2015. Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands. London: I.B.Tauris. ↩︎
    2. Danciu, Gabriela-Cătălina. 2023. “A Perspective on Justifying the Ukraine–Russia War. Elements Of Propaganda.” International Journal of Social and Educational Innovation, 10 (19), 224-239; “Address by
      the President of the Russian Federation” (2022, February 24) http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843. ↩︎
    3. Black, J.L. and Michael Johns (Eds.). 2016. The Return of the Cold War: Ukraine, the West and Russia.
      Abingdon: Routledge; Katchanovski, Ivan. 2023a. “The Maidan Massacre Trial and Investigation Revelations and Their Implications for the Ukraine-Russia War and Relations.” Russian Politics, 8 (2),181-205. ↩︎
    4. See, for example, Colborne, Michael. 2022. From the Fires of War: Ukraine’s Azov Movement and the Global Far Right, Stuttgart: Ibidem; Davidzon, Vladislav. 2023. “The Search for Neo-Nazis Under the Bedsheets Reflects American Progressive Hysteria, Not Ukrainian Reality.” Tablet Magazine, July. ↩︎
    5. See Facebook (2014, May 2), https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=10100399733883920; On his background, see “AntiNATOvskii weekend v Sevastopole.” (2006, May 30). Evraziiskii soyuz molodezhi. http://rossia3.ru/Regions/san. ↩︎
    6. Umland, Andreas. 2019. “Irregular Militias and Radical Nationalism in PostEuromaydan Ukraine: The
      Prehistory and Emergence of the “Azov” Battalion in 2014.” Terrorism and Political Violence, 31 (1), 105-
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    7. Umland, Andreas. 2020. ‘The Far Right in Pre- and Post-Euromaidan Ukraine: From Ultra-Nationalist Party Politics to Ethno-Centric Uncivil Society.’ Demokratizatsiya, 28 (2), 247-268. ↩︎
    8. Ishchenko, Volodymyr. 2018. “Nationalist Radicalization Trends in Post-Euromaidan Ukraine.” Ponars Eurasia, Policy Memo 529. http://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/nationalist-radicalization-trends-post-euromaidan-ukraine. ↩︎
    9. Ishchenko, Volodymyr. 2016. “Far right participation in the Ukrainian Maidan protests: an attempt of systematic estimation.” European Politics and Society, 17 (4), 453-472. ↩︎
    10. Hahn, Gordon M. 2018. Ukraine Over the Edge: Russia, the West and the “New Cold War.” Jefferson, NC: McFarland Books; Katchanovski, Ivan. 2016b. “The Maidan Massacre in Ukraine: A Summary of Analysis, Evidence, and Findings.” In The Return of the Cold War: Ukraine, the West and Russia, eds. J.L. Black and Michael Johns. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 220-224; Katchanovski, Ivan. 2020. “The far right, the Euromaidan, and the Maidan massacre in Ukraine.” Journal of Labor and Society, 23 (1), 5-29; Katchanovski, 2023a; Katchanovski, Ivan. 2023b. “The “Snipers’ Massacre” on the Maidan in Ukraine.” Cogent Social Sciences, 9 (2); Katchanovski, Ivan. 2024. The Maidan Massacre in Ukraine. London: Palgrave Macmillan. ↩︎
    11. Khalil Mutallimzada and Kristian Steiner, (2022), Fighters’ motivations for joining extremist groups:
      Investigating the attractiveness of the Right Sector’s Volunteer Ukrainian Corps. European Journal of International Security, 1–23. Ilmari Käihkö, (2018), A nation-in-the-making, in arms: control of force, strategy and the Ukrainian Volunteer Battalions. Defence Studies 18:2, 147–166; Tetyana Malyarenko and David J. Galbreath, (2016), Paramilitary motivation in Ukraine: beyond integration and abolition, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 16:1, 113–138. ↩︎
    12. Hale, Henry E., Oxana Shevel and Olga Onuch. 2018. “Believing Facts in the Fog of War: Identity, Media
      and Hot Cognition in Ukraine’s 2014 Odesa Tragedy.” Geopolitics, 23 (4), 851-881. A poll commissioned for
      that study found that 44% of Ukrainians believed that this mass killing was committed by provocateurs from Russia, while 11% blamed pro-Russian residents of Odesa. Ten percent of the respondents said that the Odesa massacre was perpetrated by “Ukrainian nationalists from Odesa” and 3% by “pro-Ukrainian”
      residents of Odesa. ↩︎
    13. Van Evera, Stephen. 1997. Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. ↩︎
    14. Griffin, Roger with Matthew Feldman (Eds.). 2003. Fascism: Critical Concepts in Political Science. London: Routledge. ↩︎
    15. Brahimi, Alia. “Ideology and terrorism.” The Oxford handbook of terrorism (2019): 298. ↩︎
    16. See, for example, Jadoon, Amira, Andrew Mines, and Daniel Milton. “Targeting quality or quantity? The divergent effects of targeting upper verses lower tier leaders of militant organizations.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 67, no. 5 (2023): 1007-1031; Schram, Peter. “Self-managing terror: Resolving agency problems with diverse teams.” Games and Economic Behavior 130 (2021): 240-257; Abrahms, Max, and Philip BK Potter. “Explaining terrorism: Leadership deficits and militant group tactics.” International Organization 69, no. 2 (2015): 311-342; Popovic, Milos. “The perils of weak organization: Explaining loyalty and defection of militant organizations toward Pakistan.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 38, no. 11 (2015): 919-937. ↩︎
    17. Biletsky, Andriy. 2013. Slovo Biloho Vozhdia, ND: Sotsial-Natsionalna Asambleia. https://web.archive.org/web/20140924041340/http://rid.org.ua/knigarnya/AB/slovo.pdf. ↩︎
    18. Biletsky 2013; Biletsky, Andriy. “Ukrainskyi racovyi Sotsial-Natsionalism v ideologii organizatsii “Patriot Ukrainy.”“ Slovo Oriiv, 35 (2018, March). https://web.archive.org/web/20180924065537/http://slovoor.runvira.in.ua/SO35/St35Vid.htm. ↩︎
    19. Biletsky 2013; Biletsky, Andriy. “Nedochytanyi Franko.” Patriot Ukrainy, (2008). https://web.archive.org/web/20101120085407/http://patriotukr.org.ua/index.php?rub=stat&id=409. Also, please note that the ADL has adopted the spelling of “antisemitism” instead of “anti-Semitism.” After reviewing the history and consulting with other leading experts, they determined that this is the best way to refer to hatred toward Jews, so we have adopted the same spelling convention here. ↩︎
    20. Clarke, Colin P. “The Terrorist Diaspora.” Testimony, House Homeland Security Committee Task Force on Denying Terrorists Entry into the United States (2017). ↩︎
    21. See “Proniuk // Liudyna yaka namaliuvala symvol “Ideia Natsii “ (2023, October 31). https://acrains.com/interview/proniuk-2023/. ↩︎
    22. “Nyneshnii ukrainskii rezhim imeeet vse cherty natsistskogo, zayavil Lavrov.” RIA Novosti. (2018, December 17). https://ria.ru/20181217/1548087419.html. ↩︎
    23. “Clash with Neo-Nazis in Ukraine was inevitable, says Putin.” TASS. (2022, November 4). https://tass.com/politics/1532573. ↩︎
    24. “Address.” ↩︎
    25. Kirby, Paul. “Has Putin’s war failed and what does Russia want from Ukraine?” BBC News. (2022, February 24). https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56720589. ↩︎
    26. Boyd-Barrett, Oliver. 2016. Western Mainstream Media and the Ukraine Crisis: A Study in Conflict Propaganda. New York: Routledge. ↩︎
    27. Some researchers and Zelensky have cited the presence of Russian-speakers in the Azov regiment and other neo-Nazi-led armed formations as evidence of their relative tolerance and moderation and argued that the Azov regiment distanced itself from its far-right roots. (See Umland 2019; “Zelensky refutes Russian propaganda claim that Azov Regiment is ‘neo-Nazi.’” The New Voice of Ukraine (2022, May 2), https://news.yahoo.com/zelensky-refutes-russian-propaganda-claim-131100438.html. However, these formations were organized and led by neo-Nazi organizations, which had a racist ideology and cast themselves as defenders of the White race. For this reason, they included not only large numbers of Russian speakers from Ukraine but also neo-Nazis from Russia, Belarus, and the Western countries, such as Australia, Sweden, and the US. ↩︎
    28. “Factbox: Last defenders of Mariupol: what is Ukraine’s Azov Regiment?” Reuters. (2022, May 17) https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/last-defenders-mariupol-what-is-ukraines-azov-regiment-2022-05-17/. ↩︎
    29. “Ukraine war: Ros Atkins on… Putin’s false ‘Nazi’ claims.” BBC, (2022, March 26) https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-europe-60853404; Five Azovstal defenders were awarded the title of Heroes of Ukraine. Svidomi, (2022, October 3). https://svidomi.in.ua/en/page/five-azovstal-defenders-were-awarded-the-title-of-heroes-of-ukraine. Loyd, Anthony. “‘Nonsense’: Heroes of Mariupol Denied US Weapons Over neo-Nazi Past.” Times, (2024 May 2). https://www.thetimes.com/world/russia-ukraine-war/article/nonsense-heroes-of-mariupol-denied-us-weapons-over-neo-nazi-past-kwnr0r0pw; “Boris Johnson Praises Nazi Azov Battalion,” YouTube. (2024, May 23). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_6g7i-4wswk. There was similar systematic and politically motivated whitewashing of the far-right in Ukraine in Wikipedia, especially, after the Russian invasion. A small number of Wikipedia editors systematically whitewashed neo-Nazi and other far-right parties, organizations, and their leaders, such as Azov regiment, Patriot of Ukraine, Svoboda, National Corps, the OUN, the UPA, Stepan Bandera, Roman Shukhevych, etc. They removed or deliberately excluded scholarly studies and other evidence of the extremist ideology and involvement in mass murder of the far-right, such as the Maidan and Odesa massacres, the Holocaust, and the Lviv pogrom in Ukraine and smeared in biographical entries
      scholars and other experts whose studies show such ideology and political violence by the far-right
      in Ukraine. (See, for example, Azov Brigade, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Azov_Brigade; Patriot of
      Ukraine, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patriot_of_Ukraine; 2014 Odesa clashes, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014_Odesa_clashes; Far-right politics in Ukraine, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Far-right_politics_in_Ukraine. They included editors who misrepresented the Holocaust in Poland using similar tactics in Wikipedia, which is unreliable but widely accessed source, compared to academic studies (Grabowski, Jan, and Shira Klein. 2023. “Wikipedia’s Intentional Distortion of the History of the Holocaust.” Journal of Holocaust Research 37 (2): 133–90). ↩︎
    30. Katchanovski, Ivan and Alicen Morley. 2012. “Politics of US Television Coverage of Post-Communist Countries.” Problems of Post-Communism, 59 (1), 15-30. ↩︎
    31. Smale, Alison and Andrew E. Kramer. “Ukraine Presses Pro-Russia Militants After Fighting Spreads to a Port City.” New York Times, (2014, May 3). https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/04/world/europe/ukraine.html; “Ukraine: Investigate Odessa Deaths.” Human Rights Watch. (2014, May 8), https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/08/ukraine-investigate-odessa-deaths. [n.b. While the modern spelling of the city in Ukraine is “Odesa”, several instances of the older spelling “Odessa” are still found online.] ↩︎
    32. Ishchenko, Volodymyr. “Denial of the obvious: Far right in Maidan protests and their danger today.” VoxUkraine. (2018, April 16). https://voxukraine.org/en/denial-of-the-obvious-far-right-in-maidan-protests-and-their-danger-today. ↩︎
    33. Cohen, Stephen F. “America’s Collusion with Neo-Nazis.” Nation. (2018, May 2), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/americas-collusion-with-neo-nazis/. ↩︎
    34. Miller, Christopher. “G7 Letter Takes Aim At Role Of Violent Extremists In Ukrainian Society, Election.” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. (2019, March 22). https://www.rferl.org/a/g7-takes-aim-at-role-of-violent-extremists-in-ukrainian-society-election/29836811.html. ↩︎
    35. Golinkin, Lev. “The Western Media Is Whitewashing the Azov Battalion.” Nation. (2023, June 13). https://www.thenation.com/article/world/azov-battalion-neo-nazi/. ↩︎
    36. “Ukraine 2018 Human Rights Report. State Department.” 2019. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/UKRAINE-2018-HUMAN-RIGHTS-REPORT.pdf. ↩︎
    37. Miller, Christopher. “G7 Letter Takes Aim At Role Of Violent Extremists In Ukrainian Society, Election,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, (2019, March 22). https://www.rferl.org/a/g7-takes-aim-at-role-of-violent-extremists-in-ukrainian-society-election/29836811.html. ↩︎
    38. See Twitter, (2019, October 16). https://twitter.com/RepMaxRose/status/1184518558392504321?s=20. ↩︎
    39. Cohen, Josh. “Ukraine Should Beware the Azov Extremists.” Moscow Times, (2015, July 20). https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2015/07/20/ukraine-should-beware-the-azov-extremists-a48402. ↩︎
    40. “H.Amdt. 492 – 114th Congress (2015-2016).” (2015, June 11). https://www.congress.gov/amendment/114th-congress/house-amendment/492?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22azov%22%5D%7D&resultIndex=1. ↩︎
    41. Birnbaum, Michael, Siobhán O’Grady, and Alex Horton. “U.S. Lifts Weapons Ban on Ukrainian Military Unit.” Washington Post, (2024, June 12). https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/06/10/azov-brigade-ukraine-us-weapons/. ↩︎
    42. Congressional Record (2024, June 27). https://www.congress.gov/118/crec/2024/06/27/170/108/CREC-2024-06-27.pdf . ↩︎
    43. Sanger, David E. “Jihadists Receiving Most Arms Sent to Syrian Rebels.” The New York Times, (2012. October 15). https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/15/world/middleeast/jihadists-receiving-most-arms-sent-to-syrian-rebels.html. Mahmood, Mona, and Ian Black. “Free Syrian Army Rebels Defect to Islamist Group Jabhat Al-Nusra.” Guardian, (2018, April 14). https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/08/free-syrian-army-rebels-defect-islamist-group; Abrahms, Max. “Syria’s Extremist Opposition: How Western Media Have Whitewashed the Rebels’ Record.” Foreign Affairs (2017, October 30); Doran, Michael, William McCants, and Clint Watts. “The Good and Bad of Ahrar al-Sham.” Foreign Affairs (2014, January 23). ↩︎
    44. Bhatia, Michael. 2008. “Fighting words: naming terrorists, bandits, rebels and other violent actors, ”Third World Quarterly, 26 (1), 5-22; Schmid, Alex P. 2012. “The revised academic consensus definition of terrorism.” Perspectives on Terrorism, 6 (2), 158-159; Ganor, Boaz. 2002. “Defining terrorism: Is one man’s terrorist another man’s freedom fighter?” Police Practice and Research, 3 (4), 287-304. ↩︎
    45. Although the focus of this analysis is on the portrayal of the far-right in Ukraine, a related narrative dispute has been over whether to characterise the conflict in the Donbas as a civil war. The Ukrainian and Western governments and the media described the war in Donbas as an interstate war between Russia and Ukraine or a hybrid war while denying that there was a civil war. By contrast, the Russian and Donbas separatist governments and associated media denied any Russian military involvement in the war and called it a purely civil war. The majority of scholars and datasets such as the Correlates of War Project and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program classified it as a civil war or an intrastate conflict, while also noting the Russian military interventions in Donbas prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in See, for example, Arel and Driscoll 2023; Black and Johns 2016; Hahn 2018; Katchanovski 2016a; Kudelia 2016. ↩︎
    46. Abrahms, Max. “What terrorists really want: Terrorist motives and counterterrorism strategy.” International Security 32, no. 4 (2008): 78-105. ↩︎
    47. Rossolinski-Liebe, Grzegorz. 2014. Stepan Bandera: The life and afterlife of a Ukrainian nationalist. Stuttgart: Ibidem. ↩︎
    48. Yeomans, Rory, (Ed.). 2016. The Utopia of Terror: Life and Death in Wartime Croatia. Rochester: University of Rochester Press; Katchanovski, Ivan. 2015. “Terrorists or National Heroes? Politics and
      Perceptions of the OUN and the UPA in Ukraine.” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 48 (2-3), 217-228. ↩︎
    49. Rudling, Per Anders. 2011. “The OUN, the UPA and the Holocaust. A Study in the Manufacturing of Historical Myths.” Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies, #2107, Center for Russian and East European Studies, Pittsburgh University. ↩︎
    50. See Katchanovski, 2016a; Katchanovski, Ivan. 2006. Cleft Countries: Regional Political Divisions and Cultures in Post-Soviet Ukraine and Moldova. Stuttgart: Ibidem. ↩︎
    51. See Katchanovski, Ivan. (2015, March 28). “An Interview with Al Jazeera Concerning Far Right Militia and Paramilitary Battalions and Other Formations in Ukraine.” https://www.academia.edu/11815497/An_Interview_with_Al_Jazeera_Concerning_Far_Right_Militia_and_Paramilitary_Battalions_and_Other_Formations_in_Ukraine. ↩︎
    52. See, for example, Dorell, Oren. (2015, March 10). “Volunteer Ukrainian unit includes Nazis.” USA TODAY. https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/03/10/ukraine-azov-brigade-nazis-abuses-separatists/24664937; Katchanovski, “An Interview.” ↩︎
    53. See Khalel, Sheren and Matthew Vickery. (2015, April 15). “‘Christian Taliban’s’ crusade on Ukraine’s front lines.” Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/04/taliban-crusade-ukraine-front-lines-150414125522623.html ↩︎
    54. “V kamere eks-boitsov Tornado nashli nozhi i flag so svastikoi: foto.” (2018, August 14). Liga. https://news.liga.net/incidents/news/v-kamere-eks-boytsov-tornado-nashli-noji-i-flag-so-svastikoy-foto. ↩︎
    55. “Dobrovolchyi Ukrainskyi Korpus “Pravyi Sektor.””(ND). Pravyi Sektor, https://pravyysektor.info/dobrovolchyy-ukrayinskyy-korpus-pravyy-sektor ↩︎
    56. Estimated from “V Ukraini na obliku maizhe 370 tysiach uchansykiv boiovykh dii.” (2019, September
      18). Ukrinform. https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/2782328-v-ukraini-majze-370-tisac-ucasnikiv-bojovih-dij.html ↩︎
    57. See, for example, “Partiia Svoboda stvoriue vlasnyi battalion.” (2014, June 13). Korrespondent.net. https://ua.korrespondent.net/ukraine/politics/3377514-partiia-svoboda-stvoruiie-vlasnyi-batalion. ↩︎
    58. “Ukhvala,” Pechersk District Court of Kyiv City, February 12, 2016. http://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/55966993. ↩︎
    59. “Dmytro Yarosh: “Pershyi nastupalnyi bіi vіiny vіdbuvsia 20 kvіtnia 2014-ho – Dobrovol’tsі atakuvaly
      blokpost pіd Slovianskom.” (2016, April 22). Censor.net. http://censor.net.ua/resonance/385673/dmitro_yarosh_pershiyi_nastupalniyi_byi_vyini_vdbuvsya_20_kvtnya_2014go_dobrovolts_atakuvali_blokpost. ↩︎
    60. Ibid. ↩︎
    61. Dzhyndzia, Andrii. “Batalion AZOV zatrymav terorysta Tiulenia.” (2014, May 12). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=681hBNGeVUM. ↩︎
    62. “On June 13, 2014, Mariupol was liberated from the terrorist DPR. Liberation from the Russian occupation is next.” Ukrainian Institute of National Memory, 13 June 2022, https://uinp.gov.ua/pres-centr/novyny/13-chervnya-2014-mariupol-zvilnyly-vid-terorystychnoyi-dnr-na-cherzi-zvilnennya-vid-rosiyskoyi-okupaciyi. ↩︎
    63. See, for example, “Krasnoarmeisk. Rasstrel mirnykh zhitelei 11.05.2014.” (2014, May 11). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W4joK6D_-Wc. ↩︎
    64. Marples, David R. “Russia’s perceptions of Ukraine: Euromaidan and historical conflicts.” In Ukraine in Crisis, pp. 4-17. Routledge, 2017. ↩︎
    65. The war was most intense and violent in 2014 and 2015. The violence declined significantly following
      the Minsk Agreements in 2015. ↩︎
    66. See, for example, Kuzmenko, Oleksiy. “The Azov Regiment has not depoliticized.” UkraineAlert, (2020, March 19). https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/the-azov-regiment-has-not-depoliticized/. ↩︎
    67. Stern, David. 2014. “Ukraine Vote Could Push the Country into Chaos.” BBC News, (2014, October 24). https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29755967. ↩︎
    68. Cohen, Josh. 2023. “Ukraine Should Beware the Azov Extremists.” The Moscow Times, (2023, August 26). https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2015/07/20/ukraine-should-beware-the-azov-extremists-a48402. ↩︎
    69. See Golinkin ↩︎
    70. “Ukraine’s Advances Near Bakhmut Expose Rifts in Russian Forces.” New York Times, (2023 May 17). https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/12/world/europe/ukraine-bakhmut-russia.html. ↩︎
    71. “Andrii Biletsky: Rosiiany sterly svoi kadrovi chastyny v Ukrayini v nul.” Ukrainska Pravda, (2023, October 17). https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2023/10/17/7424397. ↩︎
    72. Many of them were hidden or scrapped after the Russian invasion. See, for example, Twitter (2024,
      June 13), https://x.com/mossrobeson__/status/1801415521608327584. ↩︎
    73. Umland, Andreas. 2019. “Irregular Militias and Radical Nationalism in PostEuromaydan Ukraine: The Prehistory and Emergence of the “Azov” Battalion in 2014.” Terrorism and Political Violence, 31 (1),
      105-131. ↩︎
    74. Stern, David. “Ukraine underplays role of far right in conflict.” BBC News (2014, December 13). https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30414955. ↩︎
    75. Lokshina, Tanya. “‘You Don’t Exist.’” Human Rights Watch, (2016, July 21). https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/07/21/you-dont-exist/arbitrary-detentions-enforced-disappearances-and-torture-eastern. ↩︎
    76. Mueller, John E. 2006. Overblown: How politicians and the terrorism industry inflate national security threats, and why we believe them. New York: Simon and Schuster; Abrahms, Max. 2006. “Why terrorism does not work.” International Security, 31 (2), 42-78. ↩︎
    77. Kydd, Andrew, and Barbara F. Walter. 2002. “Sabotaging the peace: The politics of extremist violence.” International Organization, 56 (2), 263-296. ↩︎
    78. “Right Sector Challenges Kyiv in Western Ukraine – Jamestown.” 2016. Jamestown. September 20, https://jamestown.org/program/right-sector-challenges-kyiv-in-western-ukraine/. ↩︎
    79. Hranatu kynuv “svobodivets”“ iz batalionu “Sich” – Avakov. Ukrainska pravda, (2015, August 31). https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2015/08/31/7079662; “Right-Wing Party Members Charged with Ukraine Clashes.” Voice of America, (2015, September 4). https://www.voanews.com/a/ap-ukraine-right-wing-party-leader-questioned-in-kyiv/2946747.html. ↩︎
    80. See Reiter, Andrew G. 2015. “Does spoiling work? Assessing the impact of spoilers on civil war peace agreements.” Civil Wars, 17 (1), 89-111. ↩︎
    81. “Zelenskyy: Ia ne loh kakoi-to.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3zNLrZXTZsA. ↩︎
    82. “Ukrainian Far-Right Groups, Veterans Protest President’s Peace Plan.” 2019. PBS, (2019, October
      14). https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/ukrainian-far-right-groups-veterans-protest-presidents-peace-plan. ↩︎
    83. “Yarosh: esli Zelenskyy predast Ukrainu — poteriaet ne dolzhnost, a zhizn.” Obozrevatel, (2019, May 27). https://incident.obozrevatel.com/crime/dmitrij-yarosh-esli-zelenskij-predast-ukrainu-poteryaet-ne-dolzhnost-a-zhizn.htm. ↩︎
    84. “Henshtab ne ziznayetsia pro rol Yarosha. Toj proinspektuvav svoiu dobrovolchu armiiu.” Ukrainska pravda. (2021, December 13). https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2021/12/13/7317209. ↩︎
    85. See, for example, (2021 March 20), https://t.me/stranaua/12696. ↩︎
    86. “Ukrainegate Impeachment Saga Worsens US-Russia Cold War.” (2019, November 13). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bpASSqz1hGc. ↩︎
    87. Sokol, Sam. “Kiev Regional Police Head Accused of Neo-Nazi Ties.” The Jerusalem Post, (2014, November 12). https://www.jpost.com/diaspora/kiev-regional-police-head-accused-of-neo-nazi-ties-381559; “Troyana zrobyly zastupnykom Avakova,” UN, (2017, February 8). https://ukranews.com/ua/news/477875-troyana-zrobyly-zastupnykom-avakova. ↩︎
    88. “Premier Goncharuk blagodarit uchastnikov kontserta ultrapravoi gruppy “Sokira Peruna.”“ (2019, October 14). Strana. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D3WuiYje3eA. ↩︎
    89. “Pro Russian Journalist Gunned Down in Kiev.” NBC News, (2015, April 16). https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/ukraine-crisis/pro-russian-journalist-oles-buzina-shot-dead-kiev-masked-gunmen-n342661. ↩︎
    90. “Accountability for killings in Ukraine from January 2014 to May 2016.” Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. 2016. https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Countries/UA/OHCHRThematicReportUkraineJan2014-May2016_EN.pdf ↩︎
    91. “Report of the International Advisory Panel on its Review of the Investigations into the Events in Odesa on 2 May 2014.” (2015, November 4). Council of Europe. https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=090000168048610f ↩︎
    92. “Report.” ↩︎
    93. Twitter, (2023, July 26). https://twitter.com/i/status/1684280903508303872. ↩︎
    94. “Zvit tymchasovoi slidchoi komisii Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy z pytan rozsliduvannia faktiv zahybeli hromadian u mistakh Odesi, Nariupoli, a takozh inshykh mistakh Donetskoi ta Luhanskoi oblastei Ukrainy.” (2014, September 5). Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy. http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=52134 ↩︎
    95. ““Chto takoe operativnyi plan “Volna”? Chast 3.” (2014, August 3). Gruppa 2 Maia. https://2maygroup.blogspot.com/2014/08/blog-post.html. ↩︎
    96. “Zvit.” ↩︎
    97. “Zvit.” ↩︎
    98. “Ukraine’s SBI opens case against ex-Parliament Speaker over Odesa events of May 2, 2014.” (2019,
      September 23). UNIAN. https://www.unian.info/society/10695003-ukraine-s-sbi-opens-case-against-ex-parliament-speaker-over-odesa-events-of-may-2-2014.html. ↩︎
    99. Stephan, Anna. (2018, May 4). “Ploshchad Razbityh Nadezhd (polnaia versiia).” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C-7xjDxFSQc. ↩︎
    100. Ibid and Katchanovski (2020; 2024). ↩︎
    101. “Zasidannia vid 14.12.2021 u spravi pro «Vbyvstva lyudei 20.02.2014 pid chas Evromaidanu».” https://youtu.be/iwaXGtd1Pe8?t=6026. ↩︎
    102. “7 Years with No Answers. What Is Lacking in the Investigations of the Events in Odesa on 2 May 2014?” United Nations Ukraine, (2022, 30 April 20). https://ukraine.un.org/en/126054-7-years-no-answers-what-lacking-investigations-events-odesa-2-may-2014. ↩︎
    103. Zvit. ↩︎
    104. “Euro;” Katchanovski (2020). ↩︎
    105. “15.26;15.28 Odessa 2 Maia 2014 goda.” (2015, May 8). Gruppa 2 Maia. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gicl3WFn6fw ↩︎
    106. Katchanovski, Ivan. (May 6, 2015) “A new analysis of the massacre events in Odesa Ukraine of May 2. New Cold War. https://newcoldwar.org/a-new-analysis-of-the-massacre-events-in-odessa-ukraine-of-may-2-2014/; ↩︎
    107. See, for example, “1523 Napadenie 2 Maia 2014, Odessa.” (2015, May 10). Gruppa 2 Maia. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vj_NehDtSrA; “Khronologiya sobytiy v Odesse 2 Maia 2014 goda (ch.1).” (2015, May 15). Gruppa 2 Maia. http://2mayodessa.org/. ↩︎
    108. “Odessa strelok s AK-47 na Deribasovskoi.” (2014, May 4). Poslednie sobytiya. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LWI6s89srvw. ↩︎
    109. See “Khronologiya.” ↩︎
    110. ““SOROK VOSEM.” Zakliucheniia sudebno-medicinskoi ekspertizy po faktam gibeli liudei v hode Odesskoi boini 2 maia 2014 g.” (ND). IGCP. https://vk.com/doc4683615_387082531?hash=50ef6fd55f4f5a7c71&dl=1ad9e60aff875593d8. ↩︎
    111. Tkachov, Yuriy. (2017, April 27). “Tragedia 2 Maia v Odesse. Rekonstruktsiia.” Strana. https://strana.ua/articles/analysis/67438-tragediya-2-maya-v-voprosah-i-otvetah.html; Odessa strelok. ↩︎
    112. “Odessa: tri goda. Film Arkadiia Mamontova.” Spetsialnyi korrespondent ot 24.04.17. (2017, April
      24). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yayhe4wXcWQ. ↩︎
    113. “2 Maia 2014 goda. Odessa.” (2016, January 15). Vladimir Sarkisian. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NZNQQ9vXclQ. ↩︎
    114. “SOROK.” ↩︎
    115. “SOROK.” ↩︎
    116. “Odessa 2 Maia.” (2014, May 9). Svidetelstvo ochevidtsa /1612. Informatsionnyi kanal “16/12.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0ZdT1mspt70. ↩︎
    117. “Avakov: u spravi “2 travnia v Odesi figure chlen “Pravoho sektora.”“ (2015, December 18). Ukrainska pravda. https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2015/12/18/7092946. ↩︎
    118. “Deputat Mosiichuk zastavliaet sudiiu Primorskogo suda Odessy Poprevicha vziat samootvod.” (2015, August 4). Ivan Ivanov. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ueHHestJUgk. ↩︎
    119. “Igor Bolianskii zvonit Dmitriiu Gumeniuku i daet prikaz “zachistit” Kulikovo pole.” (2014, December 2). Sergei Rulev. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tern1-ro9YU. ↩︎
    120. “Odessa marsh za edinstvo 02.05.2014.” (2014, May 2). sergiydibrov. http://bambuser.com/v/4585430; “19 49.” (2015, July 16). Gruppa 2 Maia. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZT-e_QGhHNI; “19 50.” (2015, July 16). Gruppa 2 Maia. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1dIqF4C1E8A; “Ukraine: Masks of the Revolution.” (2016, February 16). Java Films PRO. https://vimeo.com/ondemand/masksofukrainepl. ↩︎
    121. Olearchyk, Roman. 2014. “Kiev Hands Odessa Post to New Governor in Effort to End Uprising.” Financial
      Times, (2014 May 6). https://www.ft.com/content/edc91232-d535-11e3-9bca-00144feabdc0. ↩︎
    122. ““Gruppa 2 Maia” opublikovala otchet o pozhare v dome profsoyuzov v Odesse.” (2015, March 24). Korrespondent.net. https://korrespondent.net/ukraine/3495145-hruppa-2-maia-opublykovala-otchet-o-pozhare-v-dome-profsouizov-v-odesse; See also “Avtomobil dlia “Azovu” prydbaiut za hroshi Ihora Palytsi.” (2014, October 23). Volynski novyny. https://www.volynnews.com/news/society/avtomobil-dlia-azovu-prydbaiut-za-koshty-ihoria-palytsi. ↩︎
    123. “Avtomobili.” ↩︎
    124. Katchanovski, Ivan. 2020. ‘The far right, the Euromaidan, and the Maidan massacre in Ukraine.’ Journal of Labor and Society, 23 (1), 5-29. ↩︎
    125. See, for example, “Aktsia pid KS.” Ukrainska pravda, (2020, October 30) https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2020/10/30/7271758. ↩︎
    126. “SOROK”. ↩︎
    127. Abrahms, Max, and Justin Conrad. “The strategic logic of credit claiming: A new theory for anonymous terrorist attacks.” Security Studies 26, no. 2 (2017): 279-304. ↩︎
    128. Ibid. ↩︎
    129. “Bіitsі “Pravoho sektora” ta aktyvіsty Odesy vіdbyly napad prorosіiskykh naimantsіv.” (2014, May 2). Pravyi sektor. http://old.pravyysektor.info/news/bijtsi-pravoho-sektora-ta-aktyvisty-odesy-vidbyly-napad-prorosijskyh-najmantsiv/. ↩︎
    130. “Siohodni v Odesi vidbulysia kryvavi boi za Ukrainu.” (2014, May 2). Sotsial-Natsionalna Assambleia. http://snaua.info/sogodni-v-odesi-vidbulisya-krivavi-boyi-za-ukrayinu/. ↩︎
    131. “Sud opravdal prorossiiskikh uchastnikov odesskoi tragedii 2 maia, no ikh sobiraiutsia snova zaderzhat.” (2017, September 18). Dumskaya. http://dumskaya.net/news/sud-prigovor-077120. ↩︎
    132. See “Report.” ↩︎
    133. “Report,” 38. ↩︎
    134. “Strana” uznala familiyu kuratora radikala Sternenko iz SBU.” Strana, (2019, May 24). https://strana.ua/news/202834-stala-izvestna-familija-sotrudnika-sbu-kotoryj-kuriruet-radikalov-odessy.html. ↩︎
    135. “Natsionalista Sternenko, zarezavshego cheloveka v Odesse, priznali poterpevshim.” Strana, (2020, May 18). https://strana.ua/news/267850-sbu-priznala-sternenko-poterpevshim-nesmotrja-na-smet-ivana-kuznetsova.html. ↩︎
    136. “Clash.” ↩︎
    137. Schmid, Alex. “Terrorism-the definitional problem.” Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 36 (2004): 375; Schmid, Alex P. “The definition of terrorism.” In The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, pp. 39-157. Routledge, 2011; Schmid, Alex P. “Discussion 1-Revisiting the wicked problem of defining terrorism.” Terrorism: Its Past, Present & Future Study A Special Issue to Commemorate CSTPV at 25 (2020): 3. ↩︎
  • [German humor] Nord Stream sabotage: Germany issues arrest warrant – Deutsche Welle

    A Ukrainian national, whose last known address was in Poland, is being sought by German authorities for the 2022 attacks on the Nord Stream gas pipelines. He is believed to have acted with two accomplices

    German authorities have issued an arrest warrant over the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines nearly two years ago, according to German news outlets ARD, Süddeutsche Zeitung and Die Zeit.

    In an investigation published Wednesday, the outlets reported that the suspect is a Ukrainian diving instructor, named only as Volodymyr Z. [no kidding] for privacy reasons.

    It is alleged he attacked the pipelines in tandem with at least two others, who are also believed to be Ukrainian citizens.

    The suspect was believed to last be living in Poland, but Polish authorities said they could not act on the warrant because he had left the country.

    What happened to the Nord Stream pipelines?

    The Nord Stream 1 and the not-yet operational Nord Stream 2 were major conduits in the Baltic Sea for Russian gas into Europe, particularly Germany. Their use was always controversial for their role in making the EU reliant on Russian energy, and became even more so after Moscow’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

    On September 26, 2022, several explosions were detected along the pipelines, leading to gas leaks.

    Germany, Denmark, and Sweden all opened investigations into the incident, but the Danish and Swedish probes were closed without pinpointing a suspect.

    The explosions attracted worldwide media attention, fueling speculation about who could be responsible. Russia and the West have accused each other of being behind the blasts. It was immediately suspected that Ukrainians were involved, but Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has strongly denied the state played a role.

    What did the German investigation find?

    According to German authorities, Volodymyr Z. and two others approached the driver of the German-flagged yacht Andromeda, which docked in the northern island of Rügen. 

    ARD reported that Volodymyr Z. directed the driver out to the location of the pipeline, and two of the three suspects donned diving gear and went underwater.

    The driver has reportedly identified Z. from a photo array shown to him by police. According to the report, a white van suspected of being used to transport diving material was caught on a traffic camera on Rügen in September 2022 with a passenger “strongly resembling Z.”

    A German court issued an arrest warrant for Volodymyr Z. in June.

    The news outlets that initially reported on the case said they had based their findings on “information from a foreign intelligence service.”

    Where is Volodymyr Z.?

    The suspect was last known to be living in a village outside of Warsaw, Poland. However, he is believed to have gone into hiding.

    Following questions as to why Poland did not honor the European arrest warrant within the required 60 days, a spokeswoman for the public prosecutor’s office said that the suspect had fled to Ukraine before they could do so. She said they had searched his resident outside Warsaw, but he was already gone.

    No links between the suspects and the Ukrainian government have been found.

    The two other suspects, a married couple who do not have warrants issued in their names, have denied knowing Z. and said that they were on vacation in Bulgaria when the attack took place.

    A German Justice Ministry spokeswoman said they were “not commenting on the media reports” about the warrant [end]

    The original article

    Such a small team and its limited means would not have been able to provoke such damage and actually, the sabotage of Nord Stream pipelines was obviously a US secret operation. From the beginning, that lead was a red herring

    Related

    September 27, 2022: US operatives have sabotaged Nord Stream

    the motive, the opportunity and the means

    February 8, 2023: How America Took Out The Nord Stream Pipeline – Seymour Hersh

    The New York Times called it a “mystery,” but the United States executed a covert sea operation that was kept secret—until now

    March 22, 2023: THE COVER-UP – Seymour Hersh

    The Biden Administration continues to conceal its responsibility for the destruction of the Nord Stream pipelines

  • [Sharing] The Franco-British Plot to Dismember Russia [1917 – ?] – Kit Klarenberg, Global Delinquents

    In failing to crush the Russian revolution, Britain and France not only lost a historic opportunity to “strangle Bolshevism in its cradle,” in Winston Churchill’s pestilential phrase. London and Paris had planned to carve up the Soviet Union’s vast resources, while neutralising any prospect of Moscow emerging as a major international anti-capitalist agitator. The failure of invading powers to learn lessons from the debacle, and Russia’s visceral modern day memories of the mass invasion, in no small part account for where we are today.

    ‘Prolonged Enslavement’

    In March 1931, Western-dwelling Russian-born academic Leonid I. Strakhovsky published a remarkable paper, The Franco-British Plot to Dismember Russia. As the author noted, “neither Britain nor France has as yet published any important documents” related to the Allied invasion at the time. This largely remains the case over a century later. Yet, Strakhovsky was still able to piece together “the startling designs” of a conspiracy by London and Paris “to bring about the complete dismemberment of the Russian realm for their own political and commercial advantage.”

    This agreement was cemented in L’Accord Franco-Anglais du 23 Décembre 1917, définissant les zones d’action Française et Anglaise. The document established “zones of influence” for Britain and France in the Soviet Union. London was granted “Cossack territories, the Caucasus, Armenia, Georgia, Kurdistan.” Paris received “Bessarabia, the Ukraine, Crimea.” White Russian military chief General Anton Denikin is quoted as saying, “the line dividing the zones” stretched from the Bosporus to the Don river’s mouth:

    This strange line had no reason whatsoever from the strategic point of view, taking in no consideration of the Southern operation directions to Moscow nor the idea of unity of command. Also, in dividing into halves the land of the Don Cossacks, it did not correspond to the possibilities of a rational supplying of the Southern armies, and satisfied rather the interests of occupation and exploitation than those of a strategic covering and help

    Strakhovsky observes, “a survey of the economic resources in the two zones of influence” lends credence to Denikin’s analysis. The territory marked out for French domination were and remain “large granaries,” and “the famous coal region” of Donetsk, “worthless” to coal-rich Britain, was “of great importance to France.” In turn, London “obtained all the Russian oil fields in the Caucasus,” and regions producing “an enormous amount of timber.” Britain urgently needed all the foreign wood it could lay its hands upon at the time.

    Strakhovsky comments that the December 1917 agreement amounted to, “a picture of organized economic penetration under the cover of military intervention.” Elsewhere, he quotes dissident US journalist Louis Fische, “a parallel agreement disposed in similar fashion of other parts of Russia.” Despite this, France was “not satisfied” with its resource windfall. Officials in Paris attempted to compel General Denikin to sign a treaty which, if anti-Bolshevik forces had prevailed, would amount to outright “economic slavery”, putting “Russia at her mercy.” 

    Denikin was not persuaded. His successor Pyotr Wrangel was. He accepted extraordinary conditions, which including granting France “the right of exploitation of all railways in European Russia during a certain period,” Parisian monopoly on Moscow’s grain surpluses and oil output for an indeterminate stretch, and a quarter of all Donetsk’s coal output “during a certain period of years.” As a Soviet writer quoted in Strakhovsky’s paper observed:

    France was striving to obtain a prolonged and if possible an all-sided domination over Russia…a means of a prolonged enslavement of Russia

    ‘Half Measures’

    Britain’s motivation for invading the Soviet Union went beyond visceral aversion to Bolshevism, and a desire to take the fallen Russian empire’s resource-rich lands into receivership. Namely, London’s “fear of the rising power of Russia” throughout the 19th century, which had produced the “Great Game”. This confrontation in Central Asia was concerned with preventing India – “the jewel in the crown” of the British empire – falling into Moscow’s sphere of economic and political influence.

    In a bitter irony, this longstanding anxiety meant Britain’s strategy in the Soviet invasion was equally concerned with crushing Bolshevism, while also preventing “the resurrection of the old great unified Russia.” This approach contributed significantly to the entire intervention’s failure. Strakhovsky notes, “Britain carried out her part of the intervention in Russia by half-measures, which certainly did not help the anti-Bolshevik forces in their struggle for a national government.” He cites a Soviet writer:

    In the North as well as in the South and in Siberia, the tactics of the English were clearly denoted by their desire to support the Russian counter-revolution, only as much as it was necessary to prevent a unification of Russia on the one hand under the Bolsheviks, and on the other hand under the [White] supporters of the great one indivisible Russia

    There was another ironic boomerang to Britain’s simultaneous belligerence and treachery in the Soviet Union. Strakhovsky notes that a contemporary parliamentary “special report of the committee to collect information on Russia” was produced at King George V’s express command. It concluded, “the abundant and almost unanimous testimony of our witnesses shows that the military intervention of the Allies in Russia assisted to give strength and cohesion to the Soviet Government”:

    Up to the time of military intervention the majority of Russian intellectuals were well-disposed toward the Allies, and more especially to Great Britain, but that later the attitude of the Russian people toward the Allies became characterized by indifference, distrust and antipathy

    Per Strakhovsky, this “was the reward that Great Britain and France received” for attempting to dismember Russia. A similar dynamic is afoot today, as the Ukraine proxy war grinds on. The more genocidal, Russophobic rhetoric issues from EU and US officials, and the more Western-encouraged attacks on Moscow occur, the more united Russians become in opposition to their adversaries, and with each other.

    The West has made no secret of its desire to “balkanize” Russia since the proxy war began. In July 2022, a Congressional body hosted a dedicated event on the “moral and strategic imperative” of shattering the country into easily exploitable chunks. It proposed sponsoring local separatist movements for the purpose. A year later, Italian journalist Marzo G Mian toured Russia, and was supremely struck by how the population was unified like never before. A previously “mild-mannered” academic acquaintance of his had “become a warrior”. They said:

    [Stalingrad] is our reference point now more than ever, an unparalleled symbol of resistance, our enemies’ worst nightmare. Whosoever tries it will meet the end of all the others – Swedes, Napoleon, the Germans and their allies. Russians are like the Scythians: they wait, they suffer, they die, and then they kill

    [end]

    The original article

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  • [Partage] Troupes françaises en Ukraine, une gaffe présidentielle sous escorte médiatique : les nouveaux chiens de guerre – Serge Halimi & Pierre Rimbert, Le Monde diplomatique

    Des combats entre la France et la Russie ? Autrefois inimaginable, l’hypothèse s’est installée après les déclarations de M. Emmanuel Macron évoquant une « guerre existentielle » et l’envoi de « troupes au sol » en Ukraine. Depuis, le ton ne cesse de monter à Paris comme à Moscou. Une escalade qui semble ravir les médias français, au diapason du président de la République

    Les alchimistes ont enfin trouvé des successeurs à leur quête infructueuse. À la fin de l’hiver, les journalistes français se sont évertués à transformer une gaffe présidentielle en un joyau de l’analyse géopolitique. Il n’y a « pas de consensus aujourd’hui pour envoyer de manière officielle, assumée et endossée, des troupes au sol », lance M. Emmanuel Macron, le lundi 26 février 2024, à l’issue d’une réunion internationale de soutien à l’Ukraine qui vient de se conclure à Paris. « Mais, en dynamique, rien ne doit être exclu. Nous ferons tout ce qu’il faut pour que la Russie ne puisse pas gagner cette guerre », prévient-il.

    Dans les heures qui suivent, la déclaration du président de la République provoque une pluie de démentis. Répliquant à un partenaire français toujours trop bavard, le chancelier allemand Olaf Scholz s’en tient à quelques mots : « Une chose est claire : il n’y aura pas de troupes au sol d’États européens ou de l’OTAN [Organisation du traité de ­l’Atlantique nord]  » (X, 27 février). Deux des principaux soutiens de Kiev se mettent au diapason : « Nous n’envisageons pas d’envoyer nos troupes en Ukraine et nous avons sur ce point une position commune » avec Prague, explique le premier ministre polonais Donald Tusk lors d’une conférence de presse avec son homologue tchèque. « Il n’y a aucun projet de troupes de combat de l’OTAN sur le terrain en Ukraine », renchérit auprès de l’Agence France-Presse (AFP) un responsable de cette organisation militaire pilotée par Washington.

    Aux États-Unis, justement, les porte-­parole de la Maison Blanche, du département d’État et du Pentagone se relaient pour tenir la lance à incendie : « Il n’y aura pas de troupes américaines engagées au sol en Ukraine », martèlera M. John Kirby, porte-parole du président américain. Le premier ministre britannique Rishi Sunak fait chorus : « Nous ne prévoyons pas de déploiement à grande échelle. » L’Espagne, l’Italie, la Hongrie, la Suède opposent la même fin de non-recevoir […]

    L’article complet

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  • [Sharing] The EU Is Willing to Go to War Over Lithium? – Phil Butler, New Eastern Outlook

    The riddle of unhinged EU support for the Zelensky regime in Kyiv is now solved. Anyone inclined can unravel why the Germans, in particular, backstabbed Russia in the Minsk peace boondoggle. Lithium.

    Energy Monitor’s parent company, GlobalData, recently released a report showing that Europe’s biggest lithium reserves lie in the Donbass region of Russia. The former Ukrainian Shevchenkivske field in the Donetsk region and the Kruta Balka block in the Zaporizhzhia region are now part of Russia. These reserves add tremendously to Russia’s humongous Lithium deposits (now 1.5M metric tons) and solidify the country’s top ten position globally. If we consider other BRICS nations’ reserves, including China (2M metric tons), EU industry is at a leverage point.

    What’s most significant about this is that the EU, and Germany in particular, desperately need the rare mineral to manufacture green energy technologies such as wind turbines, electric vehicles, and a wide variety of electronic devices. This text from the Critical Minerals Thematic Intelligence Report overview is telling:

    “Critical minerals are key to transitioning to a low-carbon world. There are over 70 countries globally that have set net-zero targets and pledged to lower their emissions. However, these widespread measures for a greener future are straining natural resources, especially the minerals required to produce energy transition technologies such as electric vehicles (EVs) and solar panels…”

    The report goes on to reveal how these rare minerals are monopolized by just a few regions and how supply chain problems affect their recovery and distribution. In short, if Europe does not procure more Lithium, the energy transition EU President Ursula von der Leyen toots her horn about every other day will either be delayed or made unfeasible because of demand shortages.

    While the United States, Australia, and a few Latin American countries hold the lion’s share of Lithium reserves, EU access to these supplies will be expensive. In addition, the U.S. and these emerging nations will surely use the biggest part of their reserves for domestic needs.

    The demand (need) for European Lithium supply is so intense, German CDU MP Roderich Kiesewetter came right out and admitted the Russia-Ukraine conflict is all about the 500,000 tons or more of the mineral under the ground of the Donbass region. Kiesewetter said, “The European Union supports Ukraine because of lithium deposits in the Donbass.” The politician also took note of the Donbass being part of Russia now, means Berlin’s dependence on Moscow.

    Kiesewetter, a retired colonel, is also suggesting that Germany provide Zelensky’s regime with the highly accurate Taurus cruise missiles, which have a 500km range. The Swedish/German air-launched missile carries a 1,100-pound warhead and is essentially a bunker-buster type weapon. The missiles would be far more useful for Zelensky’s remaining Nazi battalions than a few rusty old Leopard tanks. What the MP’s statements mean, however, is that Germany and the EU intend on taking Ukraine’s vast resources by force now. The Euromaidan Coup only got the Western elites’ feet in the door, and now the singular order has few options left since the failed Ukraine offensive.

    The EU commissars are in the process of slitting their own throats. Just the other day, the commission passed another round of sanctions aimed at Russia’s luxury diamond exports to the bloc. This will not affect the average EU citizen, but the upper-middle class and the wealthy will have to fork over more Euros to get pretty round diamonds. The Americans (or British) blowing up the gas pipelines, the potential for grain shortages in the EU, and other key minerals Russia and nations friendly to her export begin to take their toll on an already shaky confederation of member states.

    Consider what EU member states manufacture and export to elevate their GNP. In the lists here, you’ll click on two vital exports. Cars and/or refined petroleum are vital to every country. Cars are, by far, the biggest import and export commodities. So, when these autos finally go electric, just imagine how desperate EU industry and consumers will be for Lithium! The Europeans will flounder if forced to import quantities of this strategic mineral from distant sources that have their own batteries to make. If there is a WWIII over the Russia/Ukraine situation, I am sure we’ll be able to name it “The Great Lithium War.” [end]

    The original article

    Phil Butler, is a policy investigator and analyst, a political scientist and expert on Eastern Europe, he’s an author of the recent bestseller “Putin’s Praetorians” and other books. He writes exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

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