Nicolas Cinquini

Analista senior di l'intelligenza in u campu di a gestione di i risichi di sicurezza, sò un anzianu tenente detective è ufficiale di l'intelligenza in l'agenzie di u Statu francese. A bona pronuncia hè Николай Чинкуини, in russu

Tag: policemisconduct

  • [Sharing] EU and NATO are attempting to foment a Ukraine-style coup in Georgia – Thomas Fazi

    They’re applying the Euromaidan playbook all over again

    In a recent article, I predicted that, following the results of last month’s Georgian elections — won by the ruling Georgian Dream party, which advocates friendly political and economic relations with neighbouring Russia — the EU and NATO, desperate to transform Georgia into a second front in their proxy war against Russia, would apply to Georgia the same playbook as they did to Ukraine:

    Just as in the lead-up to the 2014 coup in Kyiv, they’re first denying the legitimacy of the elected government, accusing it of being a Russian pawn. From there, they’re using Western-funded “NGOs” to mobilise the pro-EU minority against the government, while also pushing for sanctions. If the government still doesn’t yield to the pressure, they’ll try to move to the next phase: unrest in parliament and on the streets; a hoped-for police crackdown; and ultimately the toppling of the government and the appearance of a friendly pro-Western alternative. Certainly, influential Western foreign policy think tanks are already predicting exactly this scenario. In a recent article, the Atlantic Council argued that “Georgia’s 2024 parliamentary election has entered its ‘Maidan’ phase” — and that Western governments must “support the Georgian people in both the immediate period ahead and the longer term”. The NATO establishment’s aims couldn’t be clearer

    This is exactly what is happening; however, things are moving faster than I expected. Usually the protests start out peacefully, in order to build support both domestically and abroad, and then move on to the “insurrectionist” phase only if the nonviolent strategy doesn’t yield results. This is what happened with the 2013-14 Euromaidan protests in Ukraine. In Georgia, however, it would appear that they’ve fast-forwarded straight to the latter phase. For several days, the capital Tbilisi has been rocked by violent protests involving molotov cocktails and retrofitted fireworks, and even direct attacks on the Parliament building.

    The official trigger for the protests was the Georgian Dream government bloc’s announcement that it was halting the EU accession talks, a decision that is hardly surprising considering that the EU has been challenging the legitimacy of the elections from the day one, and effectively asking the government to step down as a condition for the continuation of the EU accession process (great diplomacy!). No wonder the government accuses the EU of using the prospect of accession talks to “blackmail” Georgia, and wanting to “organise a revolution in the country”. Recent events have confirmed this.

    Following the violent protests, which have so far met a relatively soft-handed response from police — especially when compared to the standard response of Western security forces to much less violent protests — EU leaders have predictably expressed their solidarity with the demonstrators and ramped up threats against the government. They’re following every step of the Euromaidan script.

    To make matters worse, the country’s staunchly pro-Western president Salome Zourabichvili has refused to step down when her term ends this month, accusing the parliament of being “illegitimate” and calling for new elections. This is the textbook definition of an attempted institutional coup, which Western governments would not hesitate to condemn if the roles were reversed. But Zourabichvili is an EU-NATO proxy — indeed, she’s spent most of her life working as a French diplomat, including as the country’s ambassador to Georgia, and only became a Georgian citizen in 2004 — so anything goes.

    The situation in Georgia is potentially a very explosive one, and the risk of the country turning into another Ukraine — and therefore into another front in the EU-NATO war against Russia — exists. However, the situation in Georgia is also very different. For starters, Georgia fortunately lacks a large neo-Nazi and ultranationalist presence capable of mounting a serious armed insurrection against the government, as Ukraine did. But there also other reasons why fomenting a Ukraine-style coup in Georgia may prove challenging. Not only are most Georgians determined to avoid a Ukrainian scenario, for obvious reasons, but prime minister Kobakhidze has been “coup-proofing” the country for some time. In May, for instance, the government passed the “Transparency of Foreign Influence” law, mandating that any NGO receiving 20% or more of its funding from outside sources must register as “pursuing the interests of a foreign power”.

    So hopefully the Georgian government will succeed in resisting this foreign-funded attack. Yet the mere fact that the EU-NATO establishment is overtly attempting to overthrow a democratically elected government — primarily to destabilise Russia and its near abroad, while intensifying the conflict in Ukraine — serves as a striking example of how far Western leaders have strayed from reason. They have become an existential threat to the entire European continent [end]

    The original article

    Related

    November 28, 2024: Al’Asad ‘iilaa al’abad

    a few days ago, the West-backed Jihadists started an offensive toward Aleppo, in the northwest of Russia-backed Syria

    November 2, 2024: The West is goading Georgia – Thomas Fazi, UnHerd

    Tbilisi has been ensnared by Nato hypocrisy

    March 9, 2023: Atlanticist coup attempt in Georgia

    where protestors are now demanding the resignation of the democratic government

    March 8, 2023: Maidan 2.0 in Georgia?

    The Atlanticist defeat in Donbass and Ukraine

    the ongoing chronicle of a new catastrophic NATO venture

  • [Sharing] Hind Rajab Foundation Files Complaint Against Maccabi Tel Aviv Supporters in Amsterdam

    Amsterdam, November 9, 2024 – The Hind Rajab Foundation, in partnership with the March 30 Movement, has taken an urgent legal step to combat rising instances of hate-fueled violence in Europe. Following disturbing incidents in Amsterdam, the two organizations have submitted a formal criminal complaint to the Amsterdam Public Prosecutor’s Office, seeking immediate action against supporters of Maccabi Tel Aviv who have reportedly engaged in acts of incitement, violence, and vandalism.

    ​This complaint, filed by attorney Mr. Haroon Raza on behalf of the Hind Rajab Foundation, cites multiple violent events that occurred in the streets of Amsterdam beginning on November 5, 2024. These actions reportedly include:

    • Incitement to Hatred and Genocidal Rhetoric: Maccabi supporters have been documented chanting slogans that incite violence against Palestinians and Arabs, especially children, echoing genocidal rhetoric that aligns with the ongoing atrocities in Gaza.
    • Assaults on Citizens and Targeted Hate Speech: Pro-Palestinian individuals were reportedly attacked by Maccabi supporters for displaying Palestinian symbols, leading to physical harm and creating an atmosphere of fear.
    • Vandalism and Property Destruction: Numerous incidents involved Maccabi supporters destroying Palestinian symbols and personal property, illustrating a targeted campaign of intimidation and hostility.

    The incidents in question occurred in highly public areas of Amsterdam, with supporters allegedly engaging in coordinated displays of hate and violence. Despite the presence of law enforcement, there was a conspicuous absence of arrests or intervention, a failure that the Hind Rajab Foundation and March 30 Movement have condemned.

    “The Hind Rajab Foundation is committed to ending impunity for those who commit or promote violence, particularly in a context that threatens vulnerable groups like children,” said Dyab Abou Jahjah, Chairman of the Hind Rajab Foundation and the March 30 Movement.

    “The inflammatory chants and violent acts witnessed in Amsterdam must be addressed urgently. We call on Dutch authorities to uphold the law and demonstrate that incitement and violence have no place in our society.”

    This urgent complaint underscores the need for swift action by the Amsterdam Public Prosecutor. The Hind Rajab Foundation and the March 30 Movement urge the authorities to secure social media footage, gather surveillance evidence, and investigate all responsible parties to bring perpetrators to justice [end]

    The original article

    About the Hind Rajab Foundation and March 30 Movement: the Hind Rajab Foundation, founded as a branch of the March 30 Movement, is dedicated to holding individuals and organizations accountable for crimes against humanity, particularly in the context of Palestinian rights. The foundation conducts thorough investigations, compiles evidence, and submits legal complaints on both national and international levels. Together with the March 30 Movement, the foundation aims to shift narratives and support justice for Palestine through sustained advocacy and legal action.

    [About Hind Rajab] on 29 January, 2024, a six-year-old Palestinian child in Gaza City, Hind Rajab, pleaded over the phone for emergency workers to rescue her from a car riddled with bullets. Her body was found two weeks later, on 10 February, alongside the bodies of six of her family members in the car they drove to flee their neighbourhood as Israeli forces invaded. The bodies of two Palestine Red Crescent Society (PRCS) paramedics, missing since the evening of the call when they were dispatched to rescue Hind, were discovered in their ambulance about 50 metres away.

    related

    Ajax-Maccabi Tel Aviv incidents: The hypocrisy of European media and politicians – DiEM25

    The recent incidents involving fans of Israeli football team Maccabi Tel Aviv in Amsterdam serve as a stark reminder of a recurring double standard in European discourse regarding Israel amid the ongoing genocide in Gaza

  • [Sharing] Far-Right Political Violence in Ukraine: Assessment of the Donbas War and the Odesa Massacre – Ivan Katchanovski and Max Abrahms, Perspectives on Terrorism

    Volume XVIII, Issue 3

    Abstract: This study analyses the nature and extent of involvement by neo-Nazi and other far-right Ukrainian organisations in the Donbas war (2014-2022) and the Odesa massacre (2014). This issue is highly politicised with contrasting narratives. The Russian and Donbas separatist
    governments, as well as their media, have contended that Ukraine has been a Nazi or neo-Nazi regime since a fascist coup took place in 2014, while Ukrainian and Western governments and media have maintained that such elements in the Ukrainian far-right were marginal, trivial, even non-existent. The article interrogates the historical record with primary sources in the three most relevant languages—Ukrainian, Russian, and English. The investigation reveals crucial far-right involvement in both the early stages of the war in Donbas and the Odesa massacre. Although the percentage of far-right supporters and fighters in Ukraine was relatively small, they exercised disproportionate influence in the country due to their greater reliance on violence and armed formations. The Russian government, however, exaggerated the role of the neo-Nazis in Ukraine to publicly justify the illegal invasion in February 2022.

    Introduction

    This study analyses the nature and extent of involvement by neo-Nazi and other far-right Ukrainian organisations during both the Donbas war from its start in April 2014 until the Russian invasion in February 2022 and the Odesa massacre on 2 May 2014. Other than the Maidan massacre in February 2014, these were the most significant and contested cases of political violence in Ukraine from its independence in 1991 to the commencement of the Russia-Ukraine war on 24 February 2022.1 The role of far-right Ukrainian groups during these major episodes of political violence is controversial because they are beset by duelling, self-serving narratives. Russian President Vladimir Putin has claimed that the principal goal of the invasion is to “denazify” Ukraine.2 But well before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, there have been several overt and covert Russian military interventions here, including the annexation of the Crimean peninsula and direct support for pro-Russian insurgencies in the Donbas region, particularly in August 2014 and February 2015. Following the overthrow of the pro-Russian Ukrainian government in February 2014, the United States and other Western governments have consistently opposed Russia’s interventions and backed the current central government of Ukraine. In addition to political support, financial and military assistance has been provided, including training during the Obama presidency.3 To justify this support, the US and other Western governments disputed any real power or even the existence of neo-Nazi armed formations in Ukraine or claimed that they abandoned their far-right elements. Understanding the contested issue of far-right involvement in the Donbas war (2014-2022) and the Odesa massacre (2014) is valuable not only for elucidating intrinsically important historical episodes of political violence but also due to the contemporary relevance given the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war.

    This article proceeds in five sections. The first section highlights the contribution of our study by describing the weakness of the extant academic literature and our methodological approach to filling in important lacunae in the research landscape. The second section details the duelling of contemporary narratives over the political violence by the far-right in the war in Donbas and in the Odesa massacre. The third and fourth sections develop qualitative case studies with process tracing to illuminate the role of the far-right in the Donbas war and the Odesa massacre. The fifth section presents the conclusion.

    Developing the Extant Literature

    Research on the far-right in Ukraine since the Euromaidan has been spotty. Studies on neo-Nazi and other far-right organisations in Ukraine following the Euromaidan have been limited in quantity, quality, and scope. Most studies have been produced by researchers outside academe
    in partisan think tanks or non-government organisations, as well as by journalists who did not subject their work to peer review.4 Such assessments are more likely to be politically driven and less likely to exhibit methodological rigour, even professionalism. For example, Anton Shekhovtsov, the former leader of the Crimean branch of the pro-Russian far-right Eurasian Youth Union, likened the Trade Union building arson attack during the Odesa massacre on 2 May 2014, to his killing of Colorado potato beetles by collecting them in a box and burning them alive. He directly inferred that this was a massacre with far-right involvement but omitted this in his publications.5 Other works have relied on narrow metrics such as the vote-share of far-right parties in Ukraine, without assessing the violence itself in terms of the perpetrators and effects.6 Some researchers have claimed that the presence of Russian speakers in the Azov regiment and other neo-Nazi-led armed formations is evidence of their relative tolerance and asserted that the Azov regiment had moderated by abandoning its far-right roots.7 Such analyses have tended to uncritically rely on Ukrainian and Western government narratives, accepting their claims at face value.

    By contrast, other studies suggest a greater degree of far-right involvement in Ukrainian political violence. One quantitative study found that far-right groups in Ukraine, such as Svoboda and Right Sector, fielded the most violent perpetrators and committed the lion’s share of attacks.8 That study is restricted temporally, however, to the 2014 Maidan protests, which led to the violent overthrow of the relatively pro-Russian government and ultimately spiralled into the civil war in Donbas, the Russian annexation of Crimea, and Russian military interventions in these regions of Ukraine.9 Similarly, qualitative studies have presented evidence in the form of videos, eyewitness testimonies, confessions, and forensic examinations of Svoboda and Right Sector involvement in the Maidan massacre.10 Some other studies have focused on specific aspects of the far-right paramilitary and other armed formations during the war in Donbas.11 One academic publication is specifically devoted to the Odesa massacre, which is called “The Odesa Tragedy,” though it concentrates on the public perceptions rather than the perpetrators and their consequences.12 This list of prior works is intended to be illustrative rather than exhaustive. The research landscape around these issues is growing, but uneven in scope and reliability; a lacuna remains in the literature in terms of evaluating rigorously, comprehensively, and dispassionately the nature and extent of far-right involvement in the Donbas war and Odesa massacre, which matters in terms of our understanding of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and political violence more generally.

    To elucidate this understudied topic of the far-right in Ukraine, this study makes substantial use of primary source materials in Ukrainian and Russian—the main languages in Ukraine—as well as in English. This linguistic capability is conducive to a more nuanced, accurate assessment. Methodologically, the two case studies employ qualitative process tracing with the benefit of fluency in all three languages.13 The substantive focus and period of analysis are both tightly
    bounded; the role of the far-right on the Russian side and in the Russia-Ukraine war since February 2022, as well as during the Euromaidan, are weighty topics explored in our other works but fall outside the scope of this study.

    The term “far-right” denotes ultranationalists and both racial and ethnic supremacists in accordance with prior scholarship.14 The term “neo-Nazi” refers to far-right organisations that revamp elements of Nazi ideology, particularly its racial and ethnic supremacism, and use symbols associated with Nazi Germany or their stylised versions. As with Nazis, neo-Nazi organisations represent a form of fascism. Major neo-Nazi organisations in Ukraine during the time period covered by this study include the Social-National Assembly, its paramilitary wing Patriot of Ukraine, the National Corps, the White Hammer, and C14. Also included in the analysis are paramilitary and other armed formations organised and led formally or informally by these neo-Nazi organisations, such as the Azov battalion and regiment. Admittedly, militant groups are known to exhibit ideological heterogeneity.15 Within the political violence literature, a burgeoning area of research emphasises that members of the rank-and-file may be motivated by a variety of factors that diverge from the leadership, leading to a principal-agent problem.16 In this study, we classify organisations as neo-Nazi, or at least neo-Nazi-led, when commanders are neo-Nazi, even if not all members can be presumed to share this exact ideology.

    A prominent example is Andriy Biletsky, the leader of Patriot of Ukraine and the Social-National Assembly (SNA), both of which were transformed along with the Azov battalion and regiment veterans into the National Corps Party in 2016. He called the ideology of Patriot of Ukraine and SNA “Social Nationalism.” In a collection of his articles published in 2013, he described that social nationalism, as the name suggests, combines elements of ultranationalism of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists with elements of national socialism and called both radical nationalism and national socialism “great ideas.” He wrote that social nationalism is based on “Sociality, Racism, and Great Power.”17 Specifically, it is based on the ideas that the “white race” is “superior” to other races and is the foundation of the Aryan Ukrainian nation; the Ukrainian nation is a “blood-racial community”; and that “the historical mission of our Nation (…) is to head and lead the White Peoples of the world in the last crusade for their existence, a march against the Semitic-led subhumans.”18 Biletsky openly made antisemitic and racist statements, such as his claim that the Jew is “an economic and political parasite.” He saw “a serious clash of native European peoples with foreign colonisers, mainly of African and Muslim origin” and believed that “an ethnic civil war can be won by the native Europeans only under the banner of the New Right National Revolutions.”19

    Biletsky was called the “White Leader” and his writings were published by both SNA and Patriot of Ukraine. He was the first commander of the Azov battalion, which was organised and led by Patriot of Ukraine and SNA in May 2014. Patriot of Ukraine, SNA, and the Azov battalion all used a symbol resembling a stylised swastika and Wolfsangel. Azov commanders and their historian, who himself serves in Azov, called the symbol the “Idea of the Nation” and claimed that it is an ancient Ukrainian symbol, even though it was created in 1992 for the Social National Party of Ukraine (SNPU). The creator of this symbol acknowledged that it was called “Idea of the Nation” to represent the radical nationalist ideas of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). He also admitted that SNPU deliberately chose this symbol with the Latin letter N, instead of the equivalent Ukrainian Cyrillic letter, fully aware of its resemblance to Nazi symbols and association with the swastika for many Ukrainians, in particular in Lviv. As with other extremist groups that rebrand out of political expedience, the Social National Party of Ukraine changed its name to Svoboda in 2014, because the Nazi association was politically inconvenient.20 However, this symbol was retained by the SNA and by Patriot of Ukraine, whose Kharkiv branch split from SNPU because of these changes.21 The Azov battalion and its propaganda magazine, which was named Black Sun, also used the Black Sun symbol, an ideological symbol used by Nazis and various neo-Nazi organisations. In addition, groups and individuals—including Patriot of Ukraine, SNA, National Corps, and Azov battalion and regiment leaders, commanders, and members—have displayed on their uniforms various neo-Nazi and Nazi symbols, such as the swastika, the SS sign, and 88 (Heil Hitler code). These, along with Hitler images, Nazi flags, and Totenkopf have also been seen in the form of patches, photographs, flags, and tattoos.

    Although the term far-right incorporates both ultranationalist and neo-Nazi organisations, they are not ideologically identical despite their frequent overlap. This study empirically investigates the role of Ukrainian ultra-nationalist organisations such as Svoboda, the Right Sector, the Ukrainian National Assembly–Ukrainian People’s Self-Defence (UNA-UNSO), and Bratstvo; neo-Nazi organisations such as the Social-National Assembly, Patriot of Ukraine, the White Hammer, and C14; and various other paramilitary formations, special police forces, and National Guard units organised and controlled to various extents by them. These armed units include the Azov battalion and regiment, Dnipro, Donbas, Aidar, Sich, Carpathian Sich, OUN, and St. Mary’s battalions, and the Ukrainian Volunteer Corps. To assess these actors, this study analysed thousands of Russian and Ukrainian primary sources: online recordings of live broadcasts, videos of the armed conflict in Donbas and Odesa, and information posted on websites and social media by far-right organisations, their armed units, and activists. It also analysed media reports in Ukrainian, Russian, and English from diverse outlets such as Ukrainska pravda, Strana, BBC, The Guardian, The Washington Post, The New York Times, YouTube, Telegram, V Kontakte, Facebook, and Twitter. To mitigate bias, the authors analysed the primary source materials rather than relying on secondary interpretations.

    The Conflicting Narratives

    Assessments of the far-right in Ukraine have been wracked by self-serving and thus unreliable perspectives. Russian and separatist leaders, as well as the media, have described the post-Maidan violence in Ukraine, especially in Donbas and Odesa, as perpetrated by “fascists” and “Nazis” akin to genocidal massacres against Jews, Belarusians, Russians, and Ukrainians during the Holocaust and World War Two.22 They often called the Odesa massacre the “Odesa Khatyn,” a reference to the large-scale massacre of Belarusian villagers in 1943 by the Nazis and an auxiliary police battalion, which was based on a paramilitary formation of the Melnyk faction of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists. Based on this narrative, President Putin and his allies have claimed that invading Ukraine is not only justified, but “inevitable” to counter the “Nazi” or “Neo-Nazi regime” in Kyiv.23 Putin and his government thus declared the “de-Nazification” of Ukraine as a key goal of “the special military operation” launched in February 2022.24 This perspective—in its entirety—is widely assailed in the West.25

    By contrast, the Ukrainian and Western governments and the media tend to claim that the far-right—including neo-Nazis—is marginal, even non-existent in Ukraine.26 They argue that since Euromaidan, Ukrainian fighters have almost entirely—if not entirely—shed their far-right elements, particularly neo-Nazi. To this end, it is a common point that the Azov Battalion ceased to be led by the neo-Nazi Patriot of Ukraine, a paramilitary wing of the SNA, since integrating into the National Guard as one of its regiments. Kyiv has stressed that the integration of Azov in November 2014 is proof of its transition to moderation and the absence of extremist fighters post-Maidan.27 Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky awarded “Hero of Ukraine” titles in 2022 to prominent Azov leaders such as regiment commander Denys Prokopenko, deputy commander Sviatoslav Palamar, and senior officer Oleh Khomenko.28 After the commencement of the Russia-Ukraine war in February 2022, many Western media outlets, politicians, government officials, and academics adopted this stance that Azov and other controversial Ukrainian fighters on the far-right had not only abandoned extremist elements, but were heroes against Russia’s illegal invasion.29

    The Indexing Theory of political communications emphasises that Western media follow narratives of its governments in covering foreign conflicts, including in post-communist countries.30 In some cases, Western media may have taken their cues directly from the Ukrainian government. After the Odesa massacre on 2 May 2014, the Foreign Ministry of Ukraine blamed the arson attack on provocateurs that were “paid generously by the Russian special services”, and the New York Times immediately adopted the same line that pro-Russia groups may have been responsible for torching the building.31 The Western narrative of the far-right in Ukraine since the Euromaidan is not without controversy. Volodymyr Ishchenko, a Ukrainian sociologist who specialises in the far-right in Ukraine, concludes: “The dominant narrative since Maidan in Ukrainian and much of the Western public spheres has been systematically downplaying the problem” by arguing that “the Ukrainian far-right” is “small and marginal.” He stated that “often, the far-right is just ignored.”32

    Notably, Western concerns over far-right fighters in Ukraine were more prevalent before the February 2022 invasion. For example, The Nation described Azov in 2018 as “pro-Nazi, as evidenced by its regalia, slogans, and programmatic statements.”33 In 2019, Radio Free Europe called Azov “far-right.”34 In 2020, The Guardian referred to Azov as a “neo-Nazi extremist movement.”35 Consistent with Indexing Theory, such coverage of the neo-Nazis in Ukraine before the February 2022 Russian invasion overlapped with similar expressions by Western governments. In its 2018 Human Rights report, the US State Department called the political wing of the Azov Regiment “a hate group.”36 In 2019, ambassadors from G7 countries warned against “extreme political movements in Ukraine, whose violent actions are worrying in themselves.” The warnings referred specifically to the Azov movement and its violence during the 2019 presidential elections.37 The US Congress has displayed longstanding ambivalence over its designation of Azov. In 2018, forty Congress members signed a letter to the State
    Department with the request to designate Azov as a terrorist organisation because of its links to terrorist attacks in multiple countries and its recruitment of neo-Nazis in its ranks.38 A defence appropriations bill amendment was adopted by the entire US Congress in 2018, which banned US government funding and training of the Azov regiment due to concerns over its neo-Nazi views and members. Such concerns had been expressed by American officials for several years after the Euromaidan. The amendment was first unanimously adopted by the US House of Representatives in 2015. Congressman John Conyers put it bluntly, “I am grateful that the House of Representatives unanimously passed my amendments last night to ensure that our military does not train members of the repulsive neo-Nazi Azov Battalion.”39 Under pressure from the Pentagon, however, Congress subsequently removed this first amendment. A similar amendment, proposing a ban on US military assistance to radical nationalist and neo-Nazi organisations, voluntary police, and paramilitary formations under their command, was blocked in Congress in 2014.40

    In general, however, American and European governments have been careful not to issue public statements against the far-right in Ukraine or to call attention to it. This hesitancy began after the Euromaidan and became starker following the February 2022 Russian invasion. Indeed, Western governments and media increasingly whitewashed the empirical record to present the Ukrainian far-right formations as categorically moderate in order to boost international support. In June 2024, the US State Department stated that the Azov brigade was eligible to receive US weapons under the “Leahy Law” because it was cleared of human rights violations. It made this determination after claiming that the Azov brigade is a new unit that is not subject to the previous Congressional ban, even though in reality this brigade was created on the basis of the Azov regiment, celebrated the 10th anniversary of the Azov battalion creation as its own anniversary, and is led by original Azov battalion commanders.41 However, a subsequent amendment, which was included in the US defence bill which was passed by the US House of Representatives, specifically stated that “none of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available by this Act may be used to provide arms, training, intelligence, or other assistance to the Azov Battalion, the Third Separate Assault Brigade, or any successor organisation.”42

    Such instrumental portrayals of allies are not limited to this conflict. Other recent cases of political violence have also featured public relations campaigns by governments and media to present allies as arguably more moderate than their history and contemporary ideology indicate. For example, in the Syrian war, anti-Assad jihadist organisations allied with the West were euphemistically referred to as “rebels,” sometimes “moderate” ones, even when they fought under the direction of a Foreign Terrorist Organisation, as designated by the US State Department.43 A large body of literature within terrorism studies has found that the labelling of violent perpetrators by governments and media is not value-neutral, but expedient to serve political agendas.44 Particularly in these controversial cases of political violence, academe can play an important role in interrogating the empirical record to adjudicate the truth.45

    The Far-Right in the Donbas War

    Research within the field of terrorism studies has repeatedly noted the difficulty of determining the ideological beliefs of participants in political violence.46 However, fine-grained knowledge of the organisations can substantially increase confidence. Svoboda and the main organisations that remained within the Right Sector after the Euromaidan were widely understood as far-right for maintaining ultra-nationalist and ethnically supremacist views. They openly described themselves as the natural successors of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), inspired by the notorious OUN leader and Nazi collaborator, Stepan Bandera.47 Along with the UNA-UNSO, these organisations used the “Glory to Ukraine! Glory to the Heroes!” slogan, the official greeting of the Bandera faction of the OUN (OUN-B). This greeting, along with a fascist-style hand salute, was modelled on greetings and salutes of other well-known fascist parties in European history, from the Nazi party in Germany to the Ustashe party in Croatia.48 The Right Sector also adopted its red and black flag from the OUN-B and the UPA, which symbolized Ukrainian blood and soil, which were also pervasive in Nazi ideology and flags.49 But the existence of these symbols alone offers weak evidence of far-right influence in the Donbas war without understanding the cultural and historical context.

    The violent overthrow of the Viktor Yanukovych government by means of the Maidan massacre triggered the resurgence of separatism in Donbas.50 After his overthrow in February 2014, far-right parties and organisations in Ukraine expanded and organised their armed formations. Along with Ihor Kolomoisky, an oligarch who became the head of the Dnipropetrovsk regional administration, the Right Sector was instrumental in the formation of the Dnipro battalion in the spring of 2014.51 The Azov battalion, notorious for its use of neo-Nazi symbols in its official insignia, was also organised in the spring of 2014 and led by the SNA and the Patriot of Ukraine with the involvement of the Radical Party. As mentioned, “White Leader” Andrii Biletsky was the first commander of Azov.52 Based in Mariupol, the St. Mary’s battalion was formed in the fall of 2014 and led by the far-right Bratstvo party, which is described by its leader (Dmytro Korchynsky) as the “Christian Taliban.”53 Around this time, the Aidar battalion, nominally subordinated to the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, was formed by the Maidan Self-Defence. One of its platoons was led by the White Hammer, a neo-Nazi organisation belonging to the Right Sector during the Euromaidan. Ilia Kiva, a Right Sector member, was the commander of another volunteer police battalion. A previously convicted criminal with a swastika tattoo became the commander of the Tornado Company, a special police unit. He and seven other members of his company were arrested and convicted for various crimes in the warzone, such as torturing detainees. A Nazi-style flag with a swastika was found in their prison cell.54 These units were all under the formal jurisdiction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the National Guard, or the Ministry of Defence. From the start of their formation, they remained under de facto command of radical nationalist or neo-Nazi organisations. These armed formations sprouted up in the early stages of the conflict in Donbas and were stationed there in an attempt to suppress pro-Russian separatism in the region by force. The Right Sector and the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists actively organised various militia and paramilitary units that were not subordinate to the central government of Ukraine. The Volunteer Ukrainian Corps, the largest paramilitary formation, was formed and led by the Right Sector specifically for the war in Donbas, though it also included battalions in Western Ukraine.55

    The paramilitary formations, special police, and National Guard units, organised and led by far-right organisations such as the Right Sector, the Social National Assembly, Patriot of Ukraine, Svoboda, C14, and Bratstvo, constituted a small minority of Ukrainian fighters in the Donbas. Based on reports, we estimate the number of members of radical nationalist and neo-Nazi organisations who served in various far right-led, regular, and other armed formations in the Donbas, at around five thousand. This estimate is conservative and represents just one percent of approximately 400,000 people who participated in this war on the side of the central government.56 Additional metrics of influence, however, are also important to consider.

    Despite their relatively small numbers, far-right fighters exercised disproportionate influence in the Donbas civil war, particularly in the early stages before the first direct Russian military intervention in August 2014. Far-right Ukrainian groups proliferated after the Euromaidan because they were eager to fight and were responsible for a disproportionate level of violence, especially against civilians and prisoners of war in Mariupol and Krasnoarmiisk. Far-right organisations and far-right-linked battalions thus played a crucial role in escalating the armed conflict in the Donbas. Svoboda and C14, an avowedly neo-Nazi group affiliated with Svoboda until the summer of 2014, organised and led the Sich battalion from June 2014 onwards.57 Meanwhile, the Right Sector carried out a deadly attack on a separatist checkpoint in Sloviansk on 20 April 2014. While Ukrainian and Western media denied far-right involvement in these events, the evidence to the contrary includes business cards linked to far-right members found after the attack. As well, Ukrainian court proceedings revealed that the weapons used by the Right Sector checkpoint attackers were the same as the snipers from this group who killed and wounded police during the Maidan.58 And two years after the attack on the separatist checkpoint, Dmytro Yarosh—the leader of the Right Sector—admitted his personal involvement in thisattack.59 Oleksandr Turchynov, then acting president of Ukraine, and Kolomoisky’s deputy in the Dnipropetrovsk regional administration, reportedly orchestrated this Right Sector operation, aimed to seize and destroy a television transmitter near Sloviansk, several days after this area was seized by the Strelkov-led armed group of Russian nationalists and Ukrainian separatists.60 This attack by the Right Sector constituted a major escalation of the conflict in Donbas because it broke both the Geneva Agreement signed on 17 April 2014 by Ukraine, Russia, the EU, and the US for a peaceful resolution of the conflict, as well as the Orthodox Easter truce between the Ukrainian government and separatists in Donbas.

    Far right-led armed formations were also behind many other violent attacks in the Donbas, further escalating the conflict into a civil war. Videos, media reports, and admissions from commanders and other members of the Azov and Dnipro battalions indicate that they participated in the storming of the district police headquarters in Mariupol on 9 May 2014. Approximately ten people, including at least one protester, were killed.61 Analysis of online video streams, media reports, and Ukrainian government documents, also make clear that Azov played a major role in taking back the city of Mariupol from the control of separatists in June 2014.62 The Dnipro battalion, along with other units, seized civilians in the Donetsk Region to prevent the separatist referendum on 11 May 2014. Videos show them shooting unarmed pro-separatist protesters with Kalashnikovs, killing two locals. The Ukrainian government denied the presence of the Dnipro battalion, but it was confirmed by other credible sources, including admissions by battalion members in videos, like Volodymyr Parasiuk’s statement on social media, who became the People’s Deputy of Ukraine.63

    The far-right-led armed formations perpetrated a disproportionate amount of violence in the first few months of the Donbas conflict and thus played a major role in escalating it into a larger civil war because the radical nationalist and neo-Nazi-led groups were far more willing to use force at that time. The Ukrainian armed forces, the security service, police and National Guard units were more reluctant to use force against the separatists in Donbas because their commanders and members were publicly blamed by the new government for attempting to forcefully suppress the Maidan protests—and in particular, for the Maidan massacre. Because the new Maidan government came to power through violence, which included the killing of police and protesters, it lacked legitimacy among many military, police, and SBU members in the Donbas region during this initial period of the conflict. Further, compared to the newly ascendant far-right groups in the aftermath of Euromaidan, the regular Ukrainian armed forces, the security service, the police and National Guard units were known for lower morale and higher desertions. Examples of this included the Donetsk SBU Alfa commander and Luhansk Berkut members, who joined the separatists.64

    The relative role of the far-right in the political violence was not constant; it began to decline in the Donbas when newly elected president Petro Poroshenko ordered the Ukrainian military, SBU, police, and National Guard to wield lethal force against the separatists and launch the offensive in June 2014.65 The war was most intense and violent in 2014 and 2015, but the fighting declined significantly following the Minsk Agreements in 2015. However, ultra-nationalist and neo-Nazi fighters continued to exert a non-trivial role, even after the Ukrainian military intensified its operations in Donbas and purported to moderate the far-right fighters. After its formal incorporation into the National Guard of Ukraine, the Azov regiment and its commanders maintained a close organisational and ideological relationship with the neo-Nazi National Corps party. This party was formed by the Azov battalion founder and the first commander on the basis of neo-Nazi SNA and Patriot of Ukraine, and it included many Azov battalion and regiment veterans. The Azov regiment functioned as a military wing of the National Corps, which, in essence, represented overlapping elements of the same Azov movement.66 Indeed, Azov regiment commanders shared a neo-Nazi background and had served in the neo-Nazi-led Azov battalion.67 In other words, the rebranding from “battalion” to “regiment” did not alter the key personnel.68 For example, Azov regiment commander Denys Prokopenko was a member of the neo-Nazi White Boys Club, which was formed by the ultras of the Dynamo Kyiv football club. This group of ultras displayed various Nazi symbols and the Nazi salute on their social media and during football games. His Azov battalion platoon had used the Totenkopf insignia of the Nazi SS.69 Andriy Biletsky became the commander of the Third Assault Brigade, which was created by veterans of the Azov battalion and regiment and activists of his neo-Nazi group, the National Corps.70 In 2023, he stated in an interview with Ukrainian media that the united Azov movement included this Azov brigade under his command along with the Azov regiment and the Kraken unit.71 Such admissions in Ukrainian media highlighting enduring far-right allegiances seldom make their way into the Western press.

    Importantly, Azov commanders never publicly renounced their neo-Nazi views, symbols, and organisations. In fact, Azov leaders routinely denied in media interviews that they, their units, and organisations, were neo-Nazi, claiming that the well-documented Nazi symbols were fakes or Russian propaganda. Our research of Ukrainian social media as well as other researchers of the far-right in Ukraine, such as Lev Golinkin and Moss Robeson, have identified over one hundred cases of Nazi and neo-Nazi displays by at least several hundred Azov commanders and other members from 2014 to 2022. This number includes displays on uniforms, patches, photographs, flags, and tattoos of neo-Nazi and Nazi symbols, such as the swastika, SS sign, 88 (Heil Hitler code), Hitler images, Nazi flags, and Totenkopf, and a fascist hand salute.72 The continued relevance of far-right extremism in Azov was evident at the very top. Arsen Avakov, the Minister of Internal Affairs, was personally involved in the Azov battalion formation and its later expansion to a regiment.73 President Petro Poroshenko circulated photographs awarding Ukrainian national medals and commendations to some of the most well-known neo-Nazis in Azov.74 The Nazi connection to Azov was clearly not due to a loss of agency control.

    Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch reported that Azov was involved in many cases of torture, illegal detention, and disappearances during the war in Donbas.75 The impact of these far-right organisations cannot be measured strictly in terms of the direct physical effects, as terrorism researchers have emphasised in many other contexts.76 Ultra-nationalist and neo-Nazi organisations were instrumental in blocking or “spoiling” a peaceful resolution of the armed conflict in Donbas, another well-established source of leverage for extremists.77 Far-right groups such as the Right Sector, Svoboda, and the Radical Party opposed the adoption by the parliament of Constitutional amendments based on provisions from the Minsk Agreements.78 To this end, Svoboda activists launched a grenade attack on 31 August 2015 in front of the Ukrainian parliament, killing four and wounding dozens of policemen and National Guard troops, which helped to block these amendments, undercutting the logic of implementation.79

    Far-right groups also challenged the implementation of President Volodymyr Zelensky’s electoral promise to peacefully resolve the Donbas war.80 In October 2019, Zelensky travelled to a front-line position in Donbas to personally convince the Azov fighters to stop blocking the implementation of the Minsk agreements by withdrawing along with separatist troops from the frontline, as he agreed during the summit with Putin and German and French leaders in Paris. But video of the encounter shows that Zelensky was taunted by activists of this neo-Nazi organisation who flouted his appeal.81 According to the Associated Press, thousands of far-right and nationalist activists shouting the far-right OUN and UPA slogan “Glory to Ukraine. Glory to the Heroes” marched through Kyiv protesting against a peace plan for eastern Ukraine.82

    The radical flank threatened Zelensky for implementing Minsk on other occasions as well. In May 2019, Dmytro Yarosh, the former Right Sector leader, publicly threatened to hang the new Ukrainian president on a tree if he fulfilled his election promise of a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Donbas.83 In 2021, Yarosh, the commander of the Ukrainian Volunteer Army organised by the Right Sector, was appointed Adviser to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Valerii Zaluzhnyi.84 In the same year, videos, photos, and Ukrainian media reports show police standing down while neo-Nazi and other far-right protesters attacked the Office of the President of Ukraine and painted swastikas on its walls.85 The Russia scholar Stephen F. Cohen concluded that Zelensky “can’t go forward with peace negotiations” because “crazy fascist movements” in Ukraine “literally threatened his life.”86 Although far-right peace rejectionists posed political problems for Zelensky, they were also known to work closely with him. An activist of the neo-Nazi Patriot of Ukraine and former deputy commander of the Azov regiment was appointed the acting head of the National Police of Ukraine during the Poroshenko presidency and then became a deputy minister of Internal Affairs during the Zelensky presidency.87 Prime Minister Oleksii Honcharuk spoke at a “veterans party” organised by a front organisation for the neo-Nazi C14 with a stylised swastika of a neo-Nazi rock band behind him.88 The advisory council of the Ministry of Veteran Affairs under Zelensky retained activists of this neo-Nazi group, including those charged with assassinating the prominent opposition journalist, Oles Buzyna, in 2015.89

    In sum, ultra-nationalist and neo-Nazi militant organisations were deeply involved on the side of the central government throughout the Donbas conflict. Although representing a small fraction of Ukrainian forces throughout the conflict, they committed a disproportionate amount of violence, particularly before President Poroshenko ordered the Ukrainian military to increase its use of force against the separatists in the summer of 2014. The much-touted absorption of Azov and other extreme right-wing militia under the official Ukrainian National Guard, police, and military command did not change either their command or their ideological displays. Many of the fighters worked closely with the Kyiv political leadership across administrations, when not using de facto veto power to block peaceful resolution of the conflict in this region.

    This interpretation departs from others that rely strictly on vote-share as the proxy for far-right influence. The influence of the far-right in Ukraine after the Maidan far exceeded its electoral support and membership. Svoboda and Right Sector leaders each won only one percent of the votes in the snap presidential elections in May 2014. In the parliamentary elections of October 2014, Svoboda narrowly failed to clear the five percent threshold, receiving 4.7 percent. The Right Sector fared even worse, receiving only two percent of the votes. Ruslan Koshulynsky, one of Svoboda leaders, who was backed by the Right Sector, OUN, and C14, received only 1.7 percent of the votes in the 2019 presidential elections, while Svoboda won 2.2 percent of the votes in the 2019 parliamentary elections. These weak electoral results indicate the limited national support of the far-right in Ukraine, but not its outsized role in the Donbas conflict.

    The Far-Right in the Odesa Massacre

    Other than the Donbas war, the Odesa massacre was the most significant and deadly instance of political violence after the Maidan massacre in Ukraine since its independence in 1991 until the Russia-Ukraine war in February 2022. The violence took place on 2 May 2014, between a “United Ukraine” rally and pro-Russian separatists, carried out with petrol bombs, gunfire, and rock-throwing, which ended up killing 48 people, primarily separatist protesters.90 The vast majority of the fatalities took place in the Trade Unions House, where 42 separatist activists and employees (forty men, seven women, and one boy) were killed when the building was set ablaze.91

    This massacre contributed to the escalation of the separatist conflict in Donbas into the civil war. As noted, the massacre was presented by separatist and Russian leaders and the media as akin to the Nazi massacre of Khatyn in Belarus, and many Odesa separatists joined the separatist forces in Donbas. Despite the importance of this massacre, the International Advisory Panel of the Council of Europe, among other international authorities, has noted that the Ukrainian government failed to properly investigate and prosecute those responsible.92 To ascertain the role of far-right groups in the Odesa massacre, a broad range of key information resources can be analysed, including videos and recordings of live broadcasts of the political violence (and the lead-up to it); published reports; primary source media in Ukrainian, Russian, and English; statements of responsibility; interviews; and testimonies from participants and eyewitnesses on both sides, as well as police commanders.

    On 1 May 2014, the day before the mass violence, separatists protested in Odesa to demand a referendum on the newly installed government in Kyiv, which they blamed on far-right activists and Western interference.93 Based on testimonies from a special parliamentary commission report in the immediate aftermath of the May 2014 massacre, Ukrainian and regional government officials planned to use far-right activists and the Maidan Self-Defence to suppress the separatists in the Odesa region and disperse those who were encamped near the Trade Union building.94 Extensive evidence indicates that the police and firefighters were ordered by their superiors to stand by and not interfere during attacks. For instance, a special plan to deal with mass disturbances launched by the Odesa regional police was not authorised, reportedly because of decisions at the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ top level.95 Similarly, top regional officials of the police and other law enforcement agencies were ordered to attend a meeting with their national counterparts before and during the start of the clashes.96 The presence of Andriy Parubiy and five hundred Maidan Self-Defence members, who deployed from Kyiv to Odesa on the eve of the massacre, further suggests that the violent dispersal of the separatist camp by far-right activists was orchestrated by top government leaders.97 Parubiy was a founder and leader of the neo-Nazi Patriot of Ukraine, a paramilitary wing of the Social National Party of Ukraine in the 1990s. He was the head of the Maidan Self-Defence during the Euromaidan and headed the National Security and Defence Council at the time of the Odesa massacre. The State Bureau of Investigations of Ukraine launched a criminal investigation into Parubiy for the Odesa massacre soon after he was replaced as the ex-head of the Ukrainian parliament following the early parliamentary elections in 2019.98 One of the participants acknowledged in an Israeli documentary that he engaged in “provocations” in the Odesa massacre under the command of
    Parubiy, who had issued orders to attack the separatists and “burn everything.” We assess this acknowledgement as credible because he was filmed along with Maidan activists in the left wing of the Trade Union building in Odesa when the deadly fire began to burn the central entrance.99 He and five other Georgian ex-military members also stated in American, Italian, and Israeli TV documentaries, Russian media interviews, on Macedonian TV, in depositions to Berkut lawyers for the Maidan massacre trial, and in testimonies to the Prosecutor General Office of Belarus for the Prosecutor General Office of Ukraine investigation that their groups of Georgian, Baltic, and far-right-linked Ukrainian snipers received weapons, payments, and orders from specific Maidan and Georgian politicians, including Parubiy, to engage in a mass killing of police and protesters.100 The Maidan massacre trial subsequently confirmed their identities.101

    A march led by the Right Sector and football ultras on 2 May 2014 was used as cover to implement this plan to destroy and burn the separatist tent camp.102 The SBU in the Odesa Region received advanced information about planned “provocations” and violent clashes between football ultras and pro-Russian separatists on game day between the Odesa and Kharkiv teams on 2 May. A special train transported hundreds of football ultras from Kharkiv to Odesa.103 Football ultras in Ukraine were notorious for displaying neo-Nazi symbols and expressing neo-Nazi slogans during games and have historically linked up with the Right Sector and other far-right organisations, as during the Maidan protests.104 Both the Right Sector and football ultras in Odesa and Kharkiv were dominated by the neo-Nazi Social National Assembly/Patriot of Ukraine, which organised the Azov battalion right after the Odesa massacre.

    Odeska Druzhyna, a small separatist organisation in Odesa, was present among other separatist activists based on evidence from internet streams, videos, testimonies of participants and eyewitnesses, and special parliamentary commission reports.105 Odeska Druzhyna used identifiable red tape labels, and were not Right Sector agent provocateurs, as the Russian media and separatists claimed. However, the Ukrainian government and media also mischaracterised the involvement of Odeska Druzhyna by overstating its coordination with other separatist activists.106 The balance of forces was asymmetric; the groups of numerically superior activists of the Right Sector from Odesa and Kharkiv led by the neo-Nazi Social National Assembly/Patriot of Ukraine, far-right football ultras, and Maidan Self-Defence units from Odesa and other regions attacked the separatists. Numerically disadvantaged, the latter took cover behind a police cordon.107

    An Odeska Druzhyna activist was filmed shooting in the direction of the far-right protesters with an AK-74-type assault rifle.108 The official investigation and the May 2 Group maintained that a Right Sector activist was killed by this separatist group member with a 5.45mm calibre bullet.109 However, leaked forensic medical expert reports describe a 5.65mm calibre bullet extracted from his body.110 This bullet reportedly disappeared and reappeared during the investigation. The fact that it did not match bullet samples of any legally registered firearms, the weak sound of the gunshots, as well as the lack of a recoil observed in the videos of the shooting, also suggest that the far-right protester may not have been killed by this separatist, who maintained that the weapon seen in the video was a movie studio prop.111 The killing of the Right Sector activist was not visible in that video nor in any videos of clashes. The investigation and various videos at the scene did not reveal the exact time or location of his killing, or the direction of the gunshot. An Odesa deputy police chief, who was filmed around the time of this killing before he himself was wounded, stated that he saw snipers in camouflage shooting from the second floor of a hotel there. He relayed that they killed this Right Sector activist and the second protester in order to blame the separatists for their killing and provoke a violent response against the separatists.112 Videos filmed before and after his shooting suggest that the second pro-Maidan activist was killed around the same time in the same area during the violent clashes with separatists and shooting from a Kalashnikov-type weapon by one of the separatists.113 However, the government forensic examination determined that he was killed by a bullet from a pneumatic sport-type weapon. Nobody was charged with his killing, and the moment and other circumstances of his killing remain not publicly known.114

    In the clashes that followed the killings of these two pro-government protesters, four separatist protesters were killed and many other separatist protesters, policemen and at least one local journalist were wounded. The forensic examination determined that three separatists were killed with hunting ammunition.115 A pro-government activist was filmed shooting with a hunting rifle in the direction of these separatists.116 This pro-government activist was later identified by the Minister of Internal Affairs as a Right Sector member.117 The government investigation charged him with killing at least one of the separatists. However, he was released from arrest and his trial was suspended indefinitely because of threats by the Right Sector and other far-right activists against judges during his trial.118 Evidence—including a recorded phone call—revealed that the events on May 2nd were coordinated by the Odesa regional administration official in charge of law enforcement agencies, and involved the participation of the Maidan Self-Defence commander, Right Sector activists, football ultras, and Maidan Self-Defence units.119 They attacked and burned the tent camp of various separatist organisations, whose activists and supporters then escaped to the nearby Trade Union building and tried to barricade the main entrance doors. Videos, internet streams, and testimonies of eyewitnesses show that attackers threw Molotov cocktails and burning tyres at the main entrance, set the entrance doors on fire, and blocked other exits. Videos, recorded calls to firefighters, and eyewitness reports reveal that the fire and thick smoke started from those burning tyres and Molotov cocktails thrown at the main entrance.120 The evidence does not support claims that the separatist protesters killed in this incident were Russian citizens, that they burned themselves by throwing Molotov cocktails from the roof of the Trade Union building or inside of the building, or that there was no far-right involvement in their killing.

    After initial denials, the May 2 Group admitted that the deadly fire started at the main entrance. The May 2 Group was a nominally independent association of mainly journalists, formed after the massacre supposedly to investigate it. It was created with the involvement of the Governor of the Odesa region who was appointed by Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko within a week of the massacre.121 This governor represented not only the central government, but also the Kolomoisky’s oligarchic network, which financed the Right Sector volunteers from the Volyn Region in the Azov battalion and the Right Sector-led Dnipro battalion.122 The Azov battalion was organised by the neo-Nazi SNA and its paramilitary wing, Patriot of Ukraine, which dominated the Right Sector in Odesa and Kharkiv, a few days after the Odesa massacre. But the May 2 Group still claimed that it was impossible to determine who started the fire because both sides were throwing Molotov cocktails. However, there is no public evidence of Molotov cocktails being thrown by separatists at the main entrance; on the contrary, numerous videos feature the far-right protesters throwing Molotov cocktails and burning tyres into the Trade Union building at that time.123

    Within Ukraine, far-right activists—particularly from the Right Sector and the SNA— were notorious for using tyres and Molotov cocktails to burn public buildings. Forensic examinations in the government investigation, recordings of radiocommunications by SBU Alfa group, an unpublished admission by a far-right activist to a French journalist, and an academic study determined that the Trade Union headquarters in Kyiv were burned by Maidan activists, including far-right ones, in order to stop its takeover by the Security Service of Ukraine Alfa unit.124 Far-right protesters also started fires by burning tyres in the Inter TV channel building and threatened to burn down the parliament of Ukraine, the Lutsk City Council, the Sviatoshyn District Court that heard the Maidan massacre case, the Constitutional Court, and Inter and 112 Ukraina TV channels buildings by placing tyres next to their entrances.125 Prior usage of the same tactics by the far-right increases the likelihood of their direct involvement.

    Analysis of online video streams, government investigation findings, May 2 Group reports, forensic medical examinations, eyewitness testimonies, and other evidence strongly indicate that 42 people perished as a result of the fire, smoke, and from trying to jump from the upper floors of the Trade Union building with far-right activists beating them on the ground and blocking the exits.. The victims were unarmed and included mainly separatists, their supporters, and several employees, in particular women, who were in the building at the time.126 Some of the strongest evidence of far-right involvement in the arson attack comes from the far-right itself, in the form of credit claiming. A growing body of research within terrorism studies focuses on credit claiming. An important finding is that perpetrators are far more likely to deny responsibility for their attacks than to take credit for ones that they did not perpetrate.127 This is particularly true when the targets are civilians. Nonetheless, many extremist groups do claim credit for civilian attacks.128 Statements posted by the Right Sector, the SNA, and the neo-Nazi Misanthropic Division on their websites and social media sites admitted the involvement of their organisations in the massacre. The Right Sector celebrated on its website the massacre by describing it as “another bright page in our fatherland’s history.” Claiming responsibility for the slaughter, it wrote: “In the first minutes of the battle, the ‘Right Sector’ activist was seriously wounded in the stomach. Several more PS [Right Sector] activists received injuries of varying degrees of severity. However, this did not prevent the rest of the PS fighters, together with football fans, from repelling the attack of pro-Russian provocateurs, and as a result, they successfully countered attempts to seize buildings in Odesa. Standing shoulder to shoulder, Odesa activists, football fans and ‘Right Sector’ fighters defeated the forces of pro-Russian mercenaries. Order has been restored in Odesa.”129 The Right Sector—which was dominated in Odesa and Kharkiv by the Social National Assembly and its paramilitary wing, Patriot of Ukraine—and the neo-Nazi Misanthropic Division (which joined the Azov battalion after the massacre) admitted on the social media platform V Kontakte and in other public statements that the fire was set deliberately.130

    The official investigation of the Odesa massacre was a farce. Nobody was found guilty of perpetrating this mass killing. As noted, the Right Sector shooter was initially arrested but then released. Only separatists were among those arrested and tried for the Odesa massacre. The Odesa massacre trial of separatists resulted in their acquittal by a local court. The Ukrainian court based its decision on the lack of evidence in support of prosecution charges. Even the verdict acknowledged both the weakness of the investigation into the perpetrators and the role of Parubiy and other government officials.131 The Council of Europe and the UN Special Commission reports also noted the destruction of evidence.132 A report by the special commission of the Council of Europe found that the Ukrainian government’s investigation of the Odesa Massacre was inadequate, politically selective, and featured the falsification of evidence, despite the existence of video footage showing who threw the Molotov cocktails at the building.133

    The Ukrainian media cited SBU sources that a far-right activist, who headed the Right Sector in Odesa during the Odesa Massacre, was a secret agent of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and that he and far-right associates were paid by SBU to attack opposition politicians, threaten judges, and conduct other illegal actions.134 This would be consistent with the fact that the Right Sector was not investigated for the Odesa massacre even though the Right Sector publicly admitted involvement. His secret collaboration with SBU would also be consistent with the fact that SBU and the Prosecutor General Office refused to charge him for killing another person in Odesa in 2018. Moreover, in 2020, the SBU gave this far-right activist the status of a victim in this case, even though he streamed this killing on his social media account and the police investigation determined that he was the killer.135 In this sense, the Odesa massacre was not entirely anomalous; it featured post-Maidan far-right involvement with apparent support from high-level political leaders in a corrupt country where investigations and media have inconsistently followed the evidence.

    Conclusion

    This study assesses the role of the far-right in post-Maidan Ukraine, specifically, in the Donbas war and the Odesa massacre. These were two of the biggest episodes of political violence in the country leading up to the February 2022 Russian invasion. This area of research is worth close investigation because it represents intrinsically important episodes of political violence that have not attracted objective analysis based on available primary sources in Ukrainian, Russian, and English. Investigating the role of the far-right is also timely because the far-right in Ukraine is riven by duelling, self-serving contemporary narratives.

    The predominant narratives propagated by governments and the mainstream media in Ukraine, the West, Russia, and separatist-controlled Donbas, concerning the role of the far-right in the war in Donbas and the Odesa massacre, have evidently been partisan. Contrary to the Russian government, separatists, and associated media, the Ukrainian government and military are not Nazi or even neo-Nazi. There were no neo-Nazis among the upper echelon of the Ukrainian government. President Zelensky is certainly not a Jewish neo-Nazi. He tried to placate and
    mainstream the far-right for political reasons, but has no observable personal affinity to that extreme ideology.

    Neo-Nazis constituted only about one percent of the Ukrainian forces before the Russian invasion in 2022, and there is weak electoral support for neo-Nazi parties throughout the country. Similarly, the policy of glorification of the OUN-UPA, their leaders, such as Stepan Bandera, and the adoption and use of their “Glory to Ukraine! Glory to the Heroes!” greeting by the state and the military, including Zelensky, do not make Ukraine a Nazi state. While the OUN and the UPA were far-right terrorist organisations, which collaborated with Nazi Germany and perpetrated the mass murders of Jews, Poles, and Ukrainians, they were not Nazis. Ukrainians could not join the Nazi party because Hitler and other Nazi leaders regarded Ukrainians as racially inferior and opposed independence of Ukraine while also dismissing the attempt to create even a puppet state by the Bandera faction of the OUN in Lviv shortly after the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union. Thus, Putin cannot credibly justify the illegal invasion in February 2022 as a war to “de-Nazify” the “Nazi regime.”136 The power of the far-right and the glorification of the OUN and the UPA in Ukraine under Poroshenko and Zelensky were exaggerated and exploited by the Russian leaders to justify the invasion.

    But the West’s efforts to whitewash the far-right in Ukraine also rests on empirically shaky grounds. Despite their relatively small numbers militarily and politically, the far-right in Ukraine exercised outsized power. The far-right organisations, volunteer battalions, and paramilitary units organised and led by them played, along with separatists and Russian nationalists, a significant role in starting and escalating the incipient civil war in the Donbas and then impeding its peaceful resolution. Even after technically integrated into the official Ukrainian forces, Azov and other far-right groups continued to harbour extremist views. Often brandishing the same extremist symbols, the core leaders and members remained and even ascended within the police, military, and security services during the Donbas war. Western media accounts have drawn heavily from biased Ukrainian sources, including “official” investigations and the May 2 Group. Across numerous primary sources in Ukrainian, Russian, and English, we find evidence that the Right Sector, Social-National Assembly, its paramilitary wing Patriot of Ukraine, and groups of far-right football ultras from Odesa and Kharkiv played a critical role in the Odesa massacre against separatist protesters on 2 May 2014. Neo-Nazi SNA/Patriot of Ukraine, which dominated the Right Sector in Odesa and Kharkiv, organised the Azov battalion right after this massacre.

    Despite the lack of international consensus over the definition of terrorism, a common interpretation is the use of violence by non-state actors aimed at creating fear for political ends, particularly when the targets are civilians.137 Depending on one’s definition, some attacks within the episodes of political violence covered in this study, such as the Odesa massacre, could, therefore, arguably be classified as terrorism. What is clear is that neither of the duelling narratives accurately captures the role of the far-right. This study has helped to fill that research lacuna by making use of substantial primary source materials in Ukrainian, Russian, and English. Besides the Maidan massacre, the Donbas war and the Odesa massacre are the two most substantial episodes of political violence from the independence of Ukraine in 1991 to the February 2022 illegal Russian invasion [end]

    The original article

    Ivan Katchanovski is a Ukrainian and Canadian political scientist. He teaches at the School of Political Studies and the Conflict Studies and Human Rights Program at the University of Ottawa in Canada. He specialises primarily in politics, conflicts, political violence, and the far right in Ukraine. His academic publications include five books, 21 articles in peer-reviewed journals, and twelve book chapters.

    Max Abrahms is a professor of public policy and political science at Northeastern University, where he specialises in international security. Abrahms has published extensively in leading academic and popular outlets such as International Organization, International Security, International Studies Quarterly, Security Studies, Comparative Political Studies, Harvard Business Review, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, New York Times, Washington Post, USA Today, Newsweek, The Atlantic, and Los Angeles Times.

    I disagree with the authors on two points

    • Stepan Bandera & friends were Nazis. How can the authors identify some neo-Nazis in modern Ukraine, while not regarding their historical mentors as Nazis ? Before WW2, they were praising either Adolf Hitler or Benito Mussolini. Their political project was authoritarian, racist and criminal. They were dreaming of ethnic cleansing. De facto during WW2, they committed mass killing of Jews and Poles.
    • Terrorism is not restricted to non-state actors. Terrorism is violent action to terror civilians, in order to achieve a common political goal. This is not even a value judgement, but Hiroshima bombing was terrorism. The Israeli targeting and mass killing of civilians, in the prospect of ethnic cleansing in Gaza, is terrorism.

    The PDF

    My related articles

    Nazism in Ukraine

    its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine

    The footprint of the Ukrainian Nazism in the West

    interactions between Ukrainian Nazi organizations and Western supremacist militants

    The Western disinformation about Ukraine

    chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia

    Endnotes

    1. Arel, Dominique and Jesse Driscoll. 2023. Ukraine’s Unnamed War. Before the Russian Invasion of 2022.
      Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Black, J.L. and Michael Johns (Eds.). 2016. The Return of the
      Cold War: Ukraine, the West and Russia. Abingdon: Routledge; Hahn, Gordon M. 2018. Ukraine Over the
      Edge: Russia, the West and the “New Cold War.” Jefferson, NC: McFarland Books; Katchanovski, Ivan.
      2016a. “The Separatist War in Donbas: A Violent Break-up of Ukraine?” European Politics and Society,
      17 (4), 473-489; Kudelia, Serhiy. 2016. “The Donbas Rift.” Russian Politics & Law, 54 (1), 5-27; Pikulicka-Wilczewska, Agnieszka and Richard Sakwa (Eds.). 2015. Ukraine and Russia: People, Politics, Propaganda and Perspectives. Bristol: E-International Relations; Sakwa, Richard. 2015. Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands. London: I.B.Tauris. ↩︎
    2. Danciu, Gabriela-Cătălina. 2023. “A Perspective on Justifying the Ukraine–Russia War. Elements Of Propaganda.” International Journal of Social and Educational Innovation, 10 (19), 224-239; “Address by
      the President of the Russian Federation” (2022, February 24) http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843. ↩︎
    3. Black, J.L. and Michael Johns (Eds.). 2016. The Return of the Cold War: Ukraine, the West and Russia.
      Abingdon: Routledge; Katchanovski, Ivan. 2023a. “The Maidan Massacre Trial and Investigation Revelations and Their Implications for the Ukraine-Russia War and Relations.” Russian Politics, 8 (2),181-205. ↩︎
    4. See, for example, Colborne, Michael. 2022. From the Fires of War: Ukraine’s Azov Movement and the Global Far Right, Stuttgart: Ibidem; Davidzon, Vladislav. 2023. “The Search for Neo-Nazis Under the Bedsheets Reflects American Progressive Hysteria, Not Ukrainian Reality.” Tablet Magazine, July. ↩︎
    5. See Facebook (2014, May 2), https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=10100399733883920; On his background, see “AntiNATOvskii weekend v Sevastopole.” (2006, May 30). Evraziiskii soyuz molodezhi. http://rossia3.ru/Regions/san. ↩︎
    6. Umland, Andreas. 2019. “Irregular Militias and Radical Nationalism in PostEuromaydan Ukraine: The
      Prehistory and Emergence of the “Azov” Battalion in 2014.” Terrorism and Political Violence, 31 (1), 105-
      131. ↩︎
    7. Umland, Andreas. 2020. ‘The Far Right in Pre- and Post-Euromaidan Ukraine: From Ultra-Nationalist Party Politics to Ethno-Centric Uncivil Society.’ Demokratizatsiya, 28 (2), 247-268. ↩︎
    8. Ishchenko, Volodymyr. 2018. “Nationalist Radicalization Trends in Post-Euromaidan Ukraine.” Ponars Eurasia, Policy Memo 529. http://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/nationalist-radicalization-trends-post-euromaidan-ukraine. ↩︎
    9. Ishchenko, Volodymyr. 2016. “Far right participation in the Ukrainian Maidan protests: an attempt of systematic estimation.” European Politics and Society, 17 (4), 453-472. ↩︎
    10. Hahn, Gordon M. 2018. Ukraine Over the Edge: Russia, the West and the “New Cold War.” Jefferson, NC: McFarland Books; Katchanovski, Ivan. 2016b. “The Maidan Massacre in Ukraine: A Summary of Analysis, Evidence, and Findings.” In The Return of the Cold War: Ukraine, the West and Russia, eds. J.L. Black and Michael Johns. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 220-224; Katchanovski, Ivan. 2020. “The far right, the Euromaidan, and the Maidan massacre in Ukraine.” Journal of Labor and Society, 23 (1), 5-29; Katchanovski, 2023a; Katchanovski, Ivan. 2023b. “The “Snipers’ Massacre” on the Maidan in Ukraine.” Cogent Social Sciences, 9 (2); Katchanovski, Ivan. 2024. The Maidan Massacre in Ukraine. London: Palgrave Macmillan. ↩︎
    11. Khalil Mutallimzada and Kristian Steiner, (2022), Fighters’ motivations for joining extremist groups:
      Investigating the attractiveness of the Right Sector’s Volunteer Ukrainian Corps. European Journal of International Security, 1–23. Ilmari Käihkö, (2018), A nation-in-the-making, in arms: control of force, strategy and the Ukrainian Volunteer Battalions. Defence Studies 18:2, 147–166; Tetyana Malyarenko and David J. Galbreath, (2016), Paramilitary motivation in Ukraine: beyond integration and abolition, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 16:1, 113–138. ↩︎
    12. Hale, Henry E., Oxana Shevel and Olga Onuch. 2018. “Believing Facts in the Fog of War: Identity, Media
      and Hot Cognition in Ukraine’s 2014 Odesa Tragedy.” Geopolitics, 23 (4), 851-881. A poll commissioned for
      that study found that 44% of Ukrainians believed that this mass killing was committed by provocateurs from Russia, while 11% blamed pro-Russian residents of Odesa. Ten percent of the respondents said that the Odesa massacre was perpetrated by “Ukrainian nationalists from Odesa” and 3% by “pro-Ukrainian”
      residents of Odesa. ↩︎
    13. Van Evera, Stephen. 1997. Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. ↩︎
    14. Griffin, Roger with Matthew Feldman (Eds.). 2003. Fascism: Critical Concepts in Political Science. London: Routledge. ↩︎
    15. Brahimi, Alia. “Ideology and terrorism.” The Oxford handbook of terrorism (2019): 298. ↩︎
    16. See, for example, Jadoon, Amira, Andrew Mines, and Daniel Milton. “Targeting quality or quantity? The divergent effects of targeting upper verses lower tier leaders of militant organizations.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 67, no. 5 (2023): 1007-1031; Schram, Peter. “Self-managing terror: Resolving agency problems with diverse teams.” Games and Economic Behavior 130 (2021): 240-257; Abrahms, Max, and Philip BK Potter. “Explaining terrorism: Leadership deficits and militant group tactics.” International Organization 69, no. 2 (2015): 311-342; Popovic, Milos. “The perils of weak organization: Explaining loyalty and defection of militant organizations toward Pakistan.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 38, no. 11 (2015): 919-937. ↩︎
    17. Biletsky, Andriy. 2013. Slovo Biloho Vozhdia, ND: Sotsial-Natsionalna Asambleia. https://web.archive.org/web/20140924041340/http://rid.org.ua/knigarnya/AB/slovo.pdf. ↩︎
    18. Biletsky 2013; Biletsky, Andriy. “Ukrainskyi racovyi Sotsial-Natsionalism v ideologii organizatsii “Patriot Ukrainy.”“ Slovo Oriiv, 35 (2018, March). https://web.archive.org/web/20180924065537/http://slovoor.runvira.in.ua/SO35/St35Vid.htm. ↩︎
    19. Biletsky 2013; Biletsky, Andriy. “Nedochytanyi Franko.” Patriot Ukrainy, (2008). https://web.archive.org/web/20101120085407/http://patriotukr.org.ua/index.php?rub=stat&id=409. Also, please note that the ADL has adopted the spelling of “antisemitism” instead of “anti-Semitism.” After reviewing the history and consulting with other leading experts, they determined that this is the best way to refer to hatred toward Jews, so we have adopted the same spelling convention here. ↩︎
    20. Clarke, Colin P. “The Terrorist Diaspora.” Testimony, House Homeland Security Committee Task Force on Denying Terrorists Entry into the United States (2017). ↩︎
    21. See “Proniuk // Liudyna yaka namaliuvala symvol “Ideia Natsii “ (2023, October 31). https://acrains.com/interview/proniuk-2023/. ↩︎
    22. “Nyneshnii ukrainskii rezhim imeeet vse cherty natsistskogo, zayavil Lavrov.” RIA Novosti. (2018, December 17). https://ria.ru/20181217/1548087419.html. ↩︎
    23. “Clash with Neo-Nazis in Ukraine was inevitable, says Putin.” TASS. (2022, November 4). https://tass.com/politics/1532573. ↩︎
    24. “Address.” ↩︎
    25. Kirby, Paul. “Has Putin’s war failed and what does Russia want from Ukraine?” BBC News. (2022, February 24). https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56720589. ↩︎
    26. Boyd-Barrett, Oliver. 2016. Western Mainstream Media and the Ukraine Crisis: A Study in Conflict Propaganda. New York: Routledge. ↩︎
    27. Some researchers and Zelensky have cited the presence of Russian-speakers in the Azov regiment and other neo-Nazi-led armed formations as evidence of their relative tolerance and moderation and argued that the Azov regiment distanced itself from its far-right roots. (See Umland 2019; “Zelensky refutes Russian propaganda claim that Azov Regiment is ‘neo-Nazi.’” The New Voice of Ukraine (2022, May 2), https://news.yahoo.com/zelensky-refutes-russian-propaganda-claim-131100438.html. However, these formations were organized and led by neo-Nazi organizations, which had a racist ideology and cast themselves as defenders of the White race. For this reason, they included not only large numbers of Russian speakers from Ukraine but also neo-Nazis from Russia, Belarus, and the Western countries, such as Australia, Sweden, and the US. ↩︎
    28. “Factbox: Last defenders of Mariupol: what is Ukraine’s Azov Regiment?” Reuters. (2022, May 17) https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/last-defenders-mariupol-what-is-ukraines-azov-regiment-2022-05-17/. ↩︎
    29. “Ukraine war: Ros Atkins on… Putin’s false ‘Nazi’ claims.” BBC, (2022, March 26) https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-europe-60853404; Five Azovstal defenders were awarded the title of Heroes of Ukraine. Svidomi, (2022, October 3). https://svidomi.in.ua/en/page/five-azovstal-defenders-were-awarded-the-title-of-heroes-of-ukraine. Loyd, Anthony. “‘Nonsense’: Heroes of Mariupol Denied US Weapons Over neo-Nazi Past.” Times, (2024 May 2). https://www.thetimes.com/world/russia-ukraine-war/article/nonsense-heroes-of-mariupol-denied-us-weapons-over-neo-nazi-past-kwnr0r0pw; “Boris Johnson Praises Nazi Azov Battalion,” YouTube. (2024, May 23). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_6g7i-4wswk. There was similar systematic and politically motivated whitewashing of the far-right in Ukraine in Wikipedia, especially, after the Russian invasion. A small number of Wikipedia editors systematically whitewashed neo-Nazi and other far-right parties, organizations, and their leaders, such as Azov regiment, Patriot of Ukraine, Svoboda, National Corps, the OUN, the UPA, Stepan Bandera, Roman Shukhevych, etc. They removed or deliberately excluded scholarly studies and other evidence of the extremist ideology and involvement in mass murder of the far-right, such as the Maidan and Odesa massacres, the Holocaust, and the Lviv pogrom in Ukraine and smeared in biographical entries
      scholars and other experts whose studies show such ideology and political violence by the far-right
      in Ukraine. (See, for example, Azov Brigade, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Azov_Brigade; Patriot of
      Ukraine, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patriot_of_Ukraine; 2014 Odesa clashes, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014_Odesa_clashes; Far-right politics in Ukraine, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Far-right_politics_in_Ukraine. They included editors who misrepresented the Holocaust in Poland using similar tactics in Wikipedia, which is unreliable but widely accessed source, compared to academic studies (Grabowski, Jan, and Shira Klein. 2023. “Wikipedia’s Intentional Distortion of the History of the Holocaust.” Journal of Holocaust Research 37 (2): 133–90). ↩︎
    30. Katchanovski, Ivan and Alicen Morley. 2012. “Politics of US Television Coverage of Post-Communist Countries.” Problems of Post-Communism, 59 (1), 15-30. ↩︎
    31. Smale, Alison and Andrew E. Kramer. “Ukraine Presses Pro-Russia Militants After Fighting Spreads to a Port City.” New York Times, (2014, May 3). https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/04/world/europe/ukraine.html; “Ukraine: Investigate Odessa Deaths.” Human Rights Watch. (2014, May 8), https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/08/ukraine-investigate-odessa-deaths. [n.b. While the modern spelling of the city in Ukraine is “Odesa”, several instances of the older spelling “Odessa” are still found online.] ↩︎
    32. Ishchenko, Volodymyr. “Denial of the obvious: Far right in Maidan protests and their danger today.” VoxUkraine. (2018, April 16). https://voxukraine.org/en/denial-of-the-obvious-far-right-in-maidan-protests-and-their-danger-today. ↩︎
    33. Cohen, Stephen F. “America’s Collusion with Neo-Nazis.” Nation. (2018, May 2), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/americas-collusion-with-neo-nazis/. ↩︎
    34. Miller, Christopher. “G7 Letter Takes Aim At Role Of Violent Extremists In Ukrainian Society, Election.” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. (2019, March 22). https://www.rferl.org/a/g7-takes-aim-at-role-of-violent-extremists-in-ukrainian-society-election/29836811.html. ↩︎
    35. Golinkin, Lev. “The Western Media Is Whitewashing the Azov Battalion.” Nation. (2023, June 13). https://www.thenation.com/article/world/azov-battalion-neo-nazi/. ↩︎
    36. “Ukraine 2018 Human Rights Report. State Department.” 2019. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/UKRAINE-2018-HUMAN-RIGHTS-REPORT.pdf. ↩︎
    37. Miller, Christopher. “G7 Letter Takes Aim At Role Of Violent Extremists In Ukrainian Society, Election,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, (2019, March 22). https://www.rferl.org/a/g7-takes-aim-at-role-of-violent-extremists-in-ukrainian-society-election/29836811.html. ↩︎
    38. See Twitter, (2019, October 16). https://twitter.com/RepMaxRose/status/1184518558392504321?s=20. ↩︎
    39. Cohen, Josh. “Ukraine Should Beware the Azov Extremists.” Moscow Times, (2015, July 20). https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2015/07/20/ukraine-should-beware-the-azov-extremists-a48402. ↩︎
    40. “H.Amdt. 492 – 114th Congress (2015-2016).” (2015, June 11). https://www.congress.gov/amendment/114th-congress/house-amendment/492?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22azov%22%5D%7D&resultIndex=1. ↩︎
    41. Birnbaum, Michael, Siobhán O’Grady, and Alex Horton. “U.S. Lifts Weapons Ban on Ukrainian Military Unit.” Washington Post, (2024, June 12). https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/06/10/azov-brigade-ukraine-us-weapons/. ↩︎
    42. Congressional Record (2024, June 27). https://www.congress.gov/118/crec/2024/06/27/170/108/CREC-2024-06-27.pdf . ↩︎
    43. Sanger, David E. “Jihadists Receiving Most Arms Sent to Syrian Rebels.” The New York Times, (2012. October 15). https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/15/world/middleeast/jihadists-receiving-most-arms-sent-to-syrian-rebels.html. Mahmood, Mona, and Ian Black. “Free Syrian Army Rebels Defect to Islamist Group Jabhat Al-Nusra.” Guardian, (2018, April 14). https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/08/free-syrian-army-rebels-defect-islamist-group; Abrahms, Max. “Syria’s Extremist Opposition: How Western Media Have Whitewashed the Rebels’ Record.” Foreign Affairs (2017, October 30); Doran, Michael, William McCants, and Clint Watts. “The Good and Bad of Ahrar al-Sham.” Foreign Affairs (2014, January 23). ↩︎
    44. Bhatia, Michael. 2008. “Fighting words: naming terrorists, bandits, rebels and other violent actors, ”Third World Quarterly, 26 (1), 5-22; Schmid, Alex P. 2012. “The revised academic consensus definition of terrorism.” Perspectives on Terrorism, 6 (2), 158-159; Ganor, Boaz. 2002. “Defining terrorism: Is one man’s terrorist another man’s freedom fighter?” Police Practice and Research, 3 (4), 287-304. ↩︎
    45. Although the focus of this analysis is on the portrayal of the far-right in Ukraine, a related narrative dispute has been over whether to characterise the conflict in the Donbas as a civil war. The Ukrainian and Western governments and the media described the war in Donbas as an interstate war between Russia and Ukraine or a hybrid war while denying that there was a civil war. By contrast, the Russian and Donbas separatist governments and associated media denied any Russian military involvement in the war and called it a purely civil war. The majority of scholars and datasets such as the Correlates of War Project and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program classified it as a civil war or an intrastate conflict, while also noting the Russian military interventions in Donbas prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in See, for example, Arel and Driscoll 2023; Black and Johns 2016; Hahn 2018; Katchanovski 2016a; Kudelia 2016. ↩︎
    46. Abrahms, Max. “What terrorists really want: Terrorist motives and counterterrorism strategy.” International Security 32, no. 4 (2008): 78-105. ↩︎
    47. Rossolinski-Liebe, Grzegorz. 2014. Stepan Bandera: The life and afterlife of a Ukrainian nationalist. Stuttgart: Ibidem. ↩︎
    48. Yeomans, Rory, (Ed.). 2016. The Utopia of Terror: Life and Death in Wartime Croatia. Rochester: University of Rochester Press; Katchanovski, Ivan. 2015. “Terrorists or National Heroes? Politics and
      Perceptions of the OUN and the UPA in Ukraine.” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 48 (2-3), 217-228. ↩︎
    49. Rudling, Per Anders. 2011. “The OUN, the UPA and the Holocaust. A Study in the Manufacturing of Historical Myths.” Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies, #2107, Center for Russian and East European Studies, Pittsburgh University. ↩︎
    50. See Katchanovski, 2016a; Katchanovski, Ivan. 2006. Cleft Countries: Regional Political Divisions and Cultures in Post-Soviet Ukraine and Moldova. Stuttgart: Ibidem. ↩︎
    51. See Katchanovski, Ivan. (2015, March 28). “An Interview with Al Jazeera Concerning Far Right Militia and Paramilitary Battalions and Other Formations in Ukraine.” https://www.academia.edu/11815497/An_Interview_with_Al_Jazeera_Concerning_Far_Right_Militia_and_Paramilitary_Battalions_and_Other_Formations_in_Ukraine. ↩︎
    52. See, for example, Dorell, Oren. (2015, March 10). “Volunteer Ukrainian unit includes Nazis.” USA TODAY. https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/03/10/ukraine-azov-brigade-nazis-abuses-separatists/24664937; Katchanovski, “An Interview.” ↩︎
    53. See Khalel, Sheren and Matthew Vickery. (2015, April 15). “‘Christian Taliban’s’ crusade on Ukraine’s front lines.” Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/04/taliban-crusade-ukraine-front-lines-150414125522623.html ↩︎
    54. “V kamere eks-boitsov Tornado nashli nozhi i flag so svastikoi: foto.” (2018, August 14). Liga. https://news.liga.net/incidents/news/v-kamere-eks-boytsov-tornado-nashli-noji-i-flag-so-svastikoy-foto. ↩︎
    55. “Dobrovolchyi Ukrainskyi Korpus “Pravyi Sektor.””(ND). Pravyi Sektor, https://pravyysektor.info/dobrovolchyy-ukrayinskyy-korpus-pravyy-sektor ↩︎
    56. Estimated from “V Ukraini na obliku maizhe 370 tysiach uchansykiv boiovykh dii.” (2019, September
      18). Ukrinform. https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/2782328-v-ukraini-majze-370-tisac-ucasnikiv-bojovih-dij.html ↩︎
    57. See, for example, “Partiia Svoboda stvoriue vlasnyi battalion.” (2014, June 13). Korrespondent.net. https://ua.korrespondent.net/ukraine/politics/3377514-partiia-svoboda-stvoruiie-vlasnyi-batalion. ↩︎
    58. “Ukhvala,” Pechersk District Court of Kyiv City, February 12, 2016. http://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/55966993. ↩︎
    59. “Dmytro Yarosh: “Pershyi nastupalnyi bіi vіiny vіdbuvsia 20 kvіtnia 2014-ho – Dobrovol’tsі atakuvaly
      blokpost pіd Slovianskom.” (2016, April 22). Censor.net. http://censor.net.ua/resonance/385673/dmitro_yarosh_pershiyi_nastupalniyi_byi_vyini_vdbuvsya_20_kvtnya_2014go_dobrovolts_atakuvali_blokpost. ↩︎
    60. Ibid. ↩︎
    61. Dzhyndzia, Andrii. “Batalion AZOV zatrymav terorysta Tiulenia.” (2014, May 12). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=681hBNGeVUM. ↩︎
    62. “On June 13, 2014, Mariupol was liberated from the terrorist DPR. Liberation from the Russian occupation is next.” Ukrainian Institute of National Memory, 13 June 2022, https://uinp.gov.ua/pres-centr/novyny/13-chervnya-2014-mariupol-zvilnyly-vid-terorystychnoyi-dnr-na-cherzi-zvilnennya-vid-rosiyskoyi-okupaciyi. ↩︎
    63. See, for example, “Krasnoarmeisk. Rasstrel mirnykh zhitelei 11.05.2014.” (2014, May 11). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W4joK6D_-Wc. ↩︎
    64. Marples, David R. “Russia’s perceptions of Ukraine: Euromaidan and historical conflicts.” In Ukraine in Crisis, pp. 4-17. Routledge, 2017. ↩︎
    65. The war was most intense and violent in 2014 and 2015. The violence declined significantly following
      the Minsk Agreements in 2015. ↩︎
    66. See, for example, Kuzmenko, Oleksiy. “The Azov Regiment has not depoliticized.” UkraineAlert, (2020, March 19). https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/the-azov-regiment-has-not-depoliticized/. ↩︎
    67. Stern, David. 2014. “Ukraine Vote Could Push the Country into Chaos.” BBC News, (2014, October 24). https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29755967. ↩︎
    68. Cohen, Josh. 2023. “Ukraine Should Beware the Azov Extremists.” The Moscow Times, (2023, August 26). https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2015/07/20/ukraine-should-beware-the-azov-extremists-a48402. ↩︎
    69. See Golinkin ↩︎
    70. “Ukraine’s Advances Near Bakhmut Expose Rifts in Russian Forces.” New York Times, (2023 May 17). https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/12/world/europe/ukraine-bakhmut-russia.html. ↩︎
    71. “Andrii Biletsky: Rosiiany sterly svoi kadrovi chastyny v Ukrayini v nul.” Ukrainska Pravda, (2023, October 17). https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2023/10/17/7424397. ↩︎
    72. Many of them were hidden or scrapped after the Russian invasion. See, for example, Twitter (2024,
      June 13), https://x.com/mossrobeson__/status/1801415521608327584. ↩︎
    73. Umland, Andreas. 2019. “Irregular Militias and Radical Nationalism in PostEuromaydan Ukraine: The Prehistory and Emergence of the “Azov” Battalion in 2014.” Terrorism and Political Violence, 31 (1),
      105-131. ↩︎
    74. Stern, David. “Ukraine underplays role of far right in conflict.” BBC News (2014, December 13). https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30414955. ↩︎
    75. Lokshina, Tanya. “‘You Don’t Exist.’” Human Rights Watch, (2016, July 21). https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/07/21/you-dont-exist/arbitrary-detentions-enforced-disappearances-and-torture-eastern. ↩︎
    76. Mueller, John E. 2006. Overblown: How politicians and the terrorism industry inflate national security threats, and why we believe them. New York: Simon and Schuster; Abrahms, Max. 2006. “Why terrorism does not work.” International Security, 31 (2), 42-78. ↩︎
    77. Kydd, Andrew, and Barbara F. Walter. 2002. “Sabotaging the peace: The politics of extremist violence.” International Organization, 56 (2), 263-296. ↩︎
    78. “Right Sector Challenges Kyiv in Western Ukraine – Jamestown.” 2016. Jamestown. September 20, https://jamestown.org/program/right-sector-challenges-kyiv-in-western-ukraine/. ↩︎
    79. Hranatu kynuv “svobodivets”“ iz batalionu “Sich” – Avakov. Ukrainska pravda, (2015, August 31). https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2015/08/31/7079662; “Right-Wing Party Members Charged with Ukraine Clashes.” Voice of America, (2015, September 4). https://www.voanews.com/a/ap-ukraine-right-wing-party-leader-questioned-in-kyiv/2946747.html. ↩︎
    80. See Reiter, Andrew G. 2015. “Does spoiling work? Assessing the impact of spoilers on civil war peace agreements.” Civil Wars, 17 (1), 89-111. ↩︎
    81. “Zelenskyy: Ia ne loh kakoi-to.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3zNLrZXTZsA. ↩︎
    82. “Ukrainian Far-Right Groups, Veterans Protest President’s Peace Plan.” 2019. PBS, (2019, October
      14). https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/ukrainian-far-right-groups-veterans-protest-presidents-peace-plan. ↩︎
    83. “Yarosh: esli Zelenskyy predast Ukrainu — poteriaet ne dolzhnost, a zhizn.” Obozrevatel, (2019, May 27). https://incident.obozrevatel.com/crime/dmitrij-yarosh-esli-zelenskij-predast-ukrainu-poteryaet-ne-dolzhnost-a-zhizn.htm. ↩︎
    84. “Henshtab ne ziznayetsia pro rol Yarosha. Toj proinspektuvav svoiu dobrovolchu armiiu.” Ukrainska pravda. (2021, December 13). https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2021/12/13/7317209. ↩︎
    85. See, for example, (2021 March 20), https://t.me/stranaua/12696. ↩︎
    86. “Ukrainegate Impeachment Saga Worsens US-Russia Cold War.” (2019, November 13). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bpASSqz1hGc. ↩︎
    87. Sokol, Sam. “Kiev Regional Police Head Accused of Neo-Nazi Ties.” The Jerusalem Post, (2014, November 12). https://www.jpost.com/diaspora/kiev-regional-police-head-accused-of-neo-nazi-ties-381559; “Troyana zrobyly zastupnykom Avakova,” UN, (2017, February 8). https://ukranews.com/ua/news/477875-troyana-zrobyly-zastupnykom-avakova. ↩︎
    88. “Premier Goncharuk blagodarit uchastnikov kontserta ultrapravoi gruppy “Sokira Peruna.”“ (2019, October 14). Strana. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D3WuiYje3eA. ↩︎
    89. “Pro Russian Journalist Gunned Down in Kiev.” NBC News, (2015, April 16). https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/ukraine-crisis/pro-russian-journalist-oles-buzina-shot-dead-kiev-masked-gunmen-n342661. ↩︎
    90. “Accountability for killings in Ukraine from January 2014 to May 2016.” Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. 2016. https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Countries/UA/OHCHRThematicReportUkraineJan2014-May2016_EN.pdf ↩︎
    91. “Report of the International Advisory Panel on its Review of the Investigations into the Events in Odesa on 2 May 2014.” (2015, November 4). Council of Europe. https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=090000168048610f ↩︎
    92. “Report.” ↩︎
    93. Twitter, (2023, July 26). https://twitter.com/i/status/1684280903508303872. ↩︎
    94. “Zvit tymchasovoi slidchoi komisii Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy z pytan rozsliduvannia faktiv zahybeli hromadian u mistakh Odesi, Nariupoli, a takozh inshykh mistakh Donetskoi ta Luhanskoi oblastei Ukrainy.” (2014, September 5). Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy. http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=52134 ↩︎
    95. ““Chto takoe operativnyi plan “Volna”? Chast 3.” (2014, August 3). Gruppa 2 Maia. https://2maygroup.blogspot.com/2014/08/blog-post.html. ↩︎
    96. “Zvit.” ↩︎
    97. “Zvit.” ↩︎
    98. “Ukraine’s SBI opens case against ex-Parliament Speaker over Odesa events of May 2, 2014.” (2019,
      September 23). UNIAN. https://www.unian.info/society/10695003-ukraine-s-sbi-opens-case-against-ex-parliament-speaker-over-odesa-events-of-may-2-2014.html. ↩︎
    99. Stephan, Anna. (2018, May 4). “Ploshchad Razbityh Nadezhd (polnaia versiia).” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C-7xjDxFSQc. ↩︎
    100. Ibid and Katchanovski (2020; 2024). ↩︎
    101. “Zasidannia vid 14.12.2021 u spravi pro «Vbyvstva lyudei 20.02.2014 pid chas Evromaidanu».” https://youtu.be/iwaXGtd1Pe8?t=6026. ↩︎
    102. “7 Years with No Answers. What Is Lacking in the Investigations of the Events in Odesa on 2 May 2014?” United Nations Ukraine, (2022, 30 April 20). https://ukraine.un.org/en/126054-7-years-no-answers-what-lacking-investigations-events-odesa-2-may-2014. ↩︎
    103. Zvit. ↩︎
    104. “Euro;” Katchanovski (2020). ↩︎
    105. “15.26;15.28 Odessa 2 Maia 2014 goda.” (2015, May 8). Gruppa 2 Maia. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gicl3WFn6fw ↩︎
    106. Katchanovski, Ivan. (May 6, 2015) “A new analysis of the massacre events in Odesa Ukraine of May 2. New Cold War. https://newcoldwar.org/a-new-analysis-of-the-massacre-events-in-odessa-ukraine-of-may-2-2014/; ↩︎
    107. See, for example, “1523 Napadenie 2 Maia 2014, Odessa.” (2015, May 10). Gruppa 2 Maia. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vj_NehDtSrA; “Khronologiya sobytiy v Odesse 2 Maia 2014 goda (ch.1).” (2015, May 15). Gruppa 2 Maia. http://2mayodessa.org/. ↩︎
    108. “Odessa strelok s AK-47 na Deribasovskoi.” (2014, May 4). Poslednie sobytiya. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LWI6s89srvw. ↩︎
    109. See “Khronologiya.” ↩︎
    110. ““SOROK VOSEM.” Zakliucheniia sudebno-medicinskoi ekspertizy po faktam gibeli liudei v hode Odesskoi boini 2 maia 2014 g.” (ND). IGCP. https://vk.com/doc4683615_387082531?hash=50ef6fd55f4f5a7c71&dl=1ad9e60aff875593d8. ↩︎
    111. Tkachov, Yuriy. (2017, April 27). “Tragedia 2 Maia v Odesse. Rekonstruktsiia.” Strana. https://strana.ua/articles/analysis/67438-tragediya-2-maya-v-voprosah-i-otvetah.html; Odessa strelok. ↩︎
    112. “Odessa: tri goda. Film Arkadiia Mamontova.” Spetsialnyi korrespondent ot 24.04.17. (2017, April
      24). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yayhe4wXcWQ. ↩︎
    113. “2 Maia 2014 goda. Odessa.” (2016, January 15). Vladimir Sarkisian. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NZNQQ9vXclQ. ↩︎
    114. “SOROK.” ↩︎
    115. “SOROK.” ↩︎
    116. “Odessa 2 Maia.” (2014, May 9). Svidetelstvo ochevidtsa /1612. Informatsionnyi kanal “16/12.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0ZdT1mspt70. ↩︎
    117. “Avakov: u spravi “2 travnia v Odesi figure chlen “Pravoho sektora.”“ (2015, December 18). Ukrainska pravda. https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2015/12/18/7092946. ↩︎
    118. “Deputat Mosiichuk zastavliaet sudiiu Primorskogo suda Odessy Poprevicha vziat samootvod.” (2015, August 4). Ivan Ivanov. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ueHHestJUgk. ↩︎
    119. “Igor Bolianskii zvonit Dmitriiu Gumeniuku i daet prikaz “zachistit” Kulikovo pole.” (2014, December 2). Sergei Rulev. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tern1-ro9YU. ↩︎
    120. “Odessa marsh za edinstvo 02.05.2014.” (2014, May 2). sergiydibrov. http://bambuser.com/v/4585430; “19 49.” (2015, July 16). Gruppa 2 Maia. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZT-e_QGhHNI; “19 50.” (2015, July 16). Gruppa 2 Maia. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1dIqF4C1E8A; “Ukraine: Masks of the Revolution.” (2016, February 16). Java Films PRO. https://vimeo.com/ondemand/masksofukrainepl. ↩︎
    121. Olearchyk, Roman. 2014. “Kiev Hands Odessa Post to New Governor in Effort to End Uprising.” Financial
      Times, (2014 May 6). https://www.ft.com/content/edc91232-d535-11e3-9bca-00144feabdc0. ↩︎
    122. ““Gruppa 2 Maia” opublikovala otchet o pozhare v dome profsoyuzov v Odesse.” (2015, March 24). Korrespondent.net. https://korrespondent.net/ukraine/3495145-hruppa-2-maia-opublykovala-otchet-o-pozhare-v-dome-profsouizov-v-odesse; See also “Avtomobil dlia “Azovu” prydbaiut za hroshi Ihora Palytsi.” (2014, October 23). Volynski novyny. https://www.volynnews.com/news/society/avtomobil-dlia-azovu-prydbaiut-za-koshty-ihoria-palytsi. ↩︎
    123. “Avtomobili.” ↩︎
    124. Katchanovski, Ivan. 2020. ‘The far right, the Euromaidan, and the Maidan massacre in Ukraine.’ Journal of Labor and Society, 23 (1), 5-29. ↩︎
    125. See, for example, “Aktsia pid KS.” Ukrainska pravda, (2020, October 30) https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2020/10/30/7271758. ↩︎
    126. “SOROK”. ↩︎
    127. Abrahms, Max, and Justin Conrad. “The strategic logic of credit claiming: A new theory for anonymous terrorist attacks.” Security Studies 26, no. 2 (2017): 279-304. ↩︎
    128. Ibid. ↩︎
    129. “Bіitsі “Pravoho sektora” ta aktyvіsty Odesy vіdbyly napad prorosіiskykh naimantsіv.” (2014, May 2). Pravyi sektor. http://old.pravyysektor.info/news/bijtsi-pravoho-sektora-ta-aktyvisty-odesy-vidbyly-napad-prorosijskyh-najmantsiv/. ↩︎
    130. “Siohodni v Odesi vidbulysia kryvavi boi za Ukrainu.” (2014, May 2). Sotsial-Natsionalna Assambleia. http://snaua.info/sogodni-v-odesi-vidbulisya-krivavi-boyi-za-ukrayinu/. ↩︎
    131. “Sud opravdal prorossiiskikh uchastnikov odesskoi tragedii 2 maia, no ikh sobiraiutsia snova zaderzhat.” (2017, September 18). Dumskaya. http://dumskaya.net/news/sud-prigovor-077120. ↩︎
    132. See “Report.” ↩︎
    133. “Report,” 38. ↩︎
    134. “Strana” uznala familiyu kuratora radikala Sternenko iz SBU.” Strana, (2019, May 24). https://strana.ua/news/202834-stala-izvestna-familija-sotrudnika-sbu-kotoryj-kuriruet-radikalov-odessy.html. ↩︎
    135. “Natsionalista Sternenko, zarezavshego cheloveka v Odesse, priznali poterpevshim.” Strana, (2020, May 18). https://strana.ua/news/267850-sbu-priznala-sternenko-poterpevshim-nesmotrja-na-smet-ivana-kuznetsova.html. ↩︎
    136. “Clash.” ↩︎
    137. Schmid, Alex. “Terrorism-the definitional problem.” Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 36 (2004): 375; Schmid, Alex P. “The definition of terrorism.” In The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, pp. 39-157. Routledge, 2011; Schmid, Alex P. “Discussion 1-Revisiting the wicked problem of defining terrorism.” Terrorism: Its Past, Present & Future Study A Special Issue to Commemorate CSTPV at 25 (2020): 3. ↩︎
  • Daily pictures : is TrackANaziMerc evil ?

    Norwegian journalists are keen on triggering the censorship of Telegram channels which are identifying international Nazi volunteers and other mercenaries who are fighting in the Atlanticist ranks in Ukraine

    Verdens Gang [The Walk of the World, VG] is a daily tabloid and the largest circulation in the Norwegian press. On September 25, 2024, VG publishes an article titled, here is an English translation

    Faktisk.no: Over 40 Norwegians named and mocked in Russian Telegram channels

    A network of Telegram channels linked to Russian hacker circles spreads personal information about Norwegians. Some people have had their social security numbers or passports leaked. Several receive threats. In addition, nine Norwegian children are mentioned and three deceased Norwegians are being slandered. This is shown by a survey conducted by Faktisk.no […]

    A nice graphic is provided. In order not to give them any publicity, the two main Telegram channels of that network are not named in the article. The number one is ForeignCombatants ; the number two and major one is TrackANaziMerc. These are actually international clubs of open source intelligence (OSINT). Many members are indeed Russian. I am Corsican and working on the French subjects.

    I am indeed exploiting the information that brilliant Russian IT specialists are collecting within the Ukrainian bureaucracy and making public, am cross-checking them with public data on social networks and information from other sources, press or informants

    Slandered ? Through my French sample, I have established and written on my personal blog that between one third and the half of these French subjects are not exactly mercenaries, in French legal term, but rather far-right and Nazi volunteers. Unless they are personally involved, I am never unveiling identities of relatives whom I however know.

    The Norwegian journalists remind us that on August 24, 2024, French police arrested Pavel Durov, founder and boss of Telegram messaging service, under abusive legal pretexts, to weigh on the company, in expectation of gaining clear access to our encrypted messages. The journalists are also suggesting that our channels should be censored. They are evil.

    related

    The original article (in Norwegian)

    L’engagement français dans les rangs ukrainiens

    in French, alphabetical obituary chronicle of French involvement in the Atlanticist ranks in Ukraine, what servile journalists will not tell you

    The Western disinformation about Ukraine

    chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia

  • Pensée du jour : couvrez ce sein que je ne saurais voir

    petite anthologie pour lecteurs français

    Une fréquentation me confia voila quelques années que dans les réunions de cadres du privé, une règle d’or est de ne jamais aborder les questions qui fâchent. J’ai compris avec le temps comme la contrainte est vraie. Dans une société dont les règles sont aujourd’hui édictées par les écoles de commerce, ce vice profond est un symptôme de l’inéluctable déclin de la civilisation occidentale

    En 1974, époque lointaine, cet état d’esprit était réservé aux enfants mais une poitrine dénudée ne choquait presque personne

    Articles connexes

    Fils de Pétain

    la vanité nationale trouble la perception de la réalité historique et perpétue une névrose collective

    Pauvre Sacré Charlemagne

    la mythologie européiste

    L’engagement français dans les rangs ukrainiens

    chronique alphabétique et nécrologique de l’engagement français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas

    Hallucinant : l’État français délocalise la répression politique

    la DGSI sous-traite à Londres

    La Police nationale est peuplée de petites frappes

    nouvel épisode le 27 juin 2023

    Les oeils de Moscou

    le magazine l’Express nous en parle, fait le lien indispensable entre démocratie libérale occidentale et fascisme

    Le grand-guignol, une tradition française

    Abaya contre Samuel Paty

    EPER, personne morale

    deux Français sont tués en Ukraine le 1er février 2024

    Troupes françaises en Ukraine, une gaffe présidentielle sous escorte médiatique : les nouveaux chiens de guerre – Serge Halimi & Pierre Rimbert, Le Monde diplomatique

    Belle jeunesse

    un grand bravo aux Jeunes Communistes de la section de Lille

    Du rififi au pays des pinzuti

    La campagne pour les élections législatives anticipées montre encore une fois comme dans leur immense majorité, les Français sont hystériques et vains

    Vespasienne flottante

    Entre l’haleine fétide d’une vieille droite pétainiste qui s’insurge contre une chanteuse d’origine malienne, d’une part, la vulgarité et la vanité, d’autre part, d’un spectacle de drag queens qui se pense à tort l’antithèse des pétainistes, semble échappé d’un backroom gay de la ville devenue musée, égaré dans une cérémonie d’ouverture de jeux olympiques […]

    La Macronie matraque la liberté d’expression

    créateur et dirigeant du service de messagerie cryptée Telegram, Pavel Durov est arrêté au Bourget le 24 août 2024

  • Images du jour : la Macronie matraque la liberté d’expression

    Pavel Durov a été arrếté au Bourget

    Le 24 août 2024, la vile flicaille au rabais, coterie de laquais de l’autorité administrative, à défaut d’être auxiliaire de justice, sur instructions de l’État français, laquais de l’OTAN, a arrêté au Bourget Pavel Durov. Le citoyen franco-russe est fondateur et patron de la messagerie cryptée Telegram. Son entreprise est basée aux Émirats arabes unis.

    Je suis un utilisateur quotidien de l’application, qui me permet de communiquer avec les sources qui enrichissent mon travail sur l’engagement français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine.

    Monté de toutes pièces pour raisons politiques, le dossier des archers du guet [gardiens de la paix], prétendumment enquêteurs, évoque de sombres infractions allant de l’escroquerie, au trafic de stupéfiants, au cyberharcèlement, à la criminalité organisée en passant par l’apologie du terrorisme et la fraude [Le Monde]. Les incriminations sont ridicules. La direction d’un service de messagerie ne peut pas être poursuivie au pénal pour ce qu’en font éventuellement certains de ses utilisateurs. J’ai hâte de connaître l’issue de la garde à vue, si un juge sera assez servile pour plagier une police médiocre, qui agit sur ordre de l’autorité administrative

    En réalité, l’État français, dont l’héritage pétainiste est atavique, sinon congénital, ne lui pardonne pas d’avoir refusé au FBI, puis aux pinzuti [Français], de leur donner le moyen technique d’espionner les utilisateurs de Telegram. Mais aux USA, la liberté n’est pas un vain mot

    Il est toujours utile de rappeler que la France d’Emmanuel Macron est championne du monde, en valeur absolue et non pas en rapport à la population, du nombre de demandes de censure sur les réseaux sociaux, pour raisons politiques, pas pour la justice

    Je suis hilare, à la lecture le lundi 26 août des télégraphistes de presse française grand public. Sans le moindre complexe, Le Monde joue son rôle, assure le service après vente d’une opération de basse police.

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    L’engagement français dans les rangs ukrainiens

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    en Anglais, chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia

  • [Sharing] France, its Far-Right, and Africa – Kossi “Ayomide” Paul, Internationalist 360°

    France’s recent parliamentary elections indicate a rapid political shift to the right. Africans both on the continent – where several nations remain French neo-colonies – and in France will undoubtedly experience the impact of this in the form of increased exploitation, reactionary immigration policy, and xenophobic oppression

    Elections for the European Parliament took place on June 9, 2024. These elections are generally shunned by the French electorate, and the latest was no exception with nearly 50% abstaining from voting. This is one of the highest abstention rates in the region – a clear sign of the disconnect between the people and its institutions. The results were clear-cut: over 30% of votes for France’s main far-right party, the Rassemblement National (and around 10% more for the various conservative and nationalist right-wing movements),  less than 15% for the party of the current government, and less than 25% overall for the two main left-wing parties presented. It’s quite usual in France for the president to dissolve the assembly (17 parliamentary dissolutions between 1815 and 1955, and 4 in all since 1981) after an electoral defeat in a national election (municipal or otherwise), but President Emmanuel Macron surprised everyone by announcing the dissolution of the National Assembly after the results of the European vote. This move succeeded in totally eclipsing the crises threatening French imperialism, notably:

    • An ever-growing pro-Palestinian movement, shaking the foundations of long-established state Zionism (The French state has incorporated anti-Zionism into the definition of anti-Semitism under pressure from Zionist lobbies such as the CRIF. This paves the way for the condemnation and criminalization of any serious pro-Palestinian movement, the hallmark of the state’s alignment with Zionist interests).
    • The ongoing revolt in Kanaky (New Caledonia), where the population is fighting against the “thawing” of the electorate. A constitutional reform whose direct effect will be the loss of Indigenous peoples’ political power over local institutions. This was a  power obtained by the natives through struggle. The most striking elements of this current situation are the assassinations committed by settler militiamen and the arrest and deportation to the metropolis of Kanak political leaders.
    • A popular movement to challenge French influence in West Africa was crystallized by military coups and the formation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) in Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, and the election in Senegal of Bassirou Diomaye Faye[7] after a campaign waged on a clearly anti-colonial line.

    Although these crises have relatively disappeared from the French media scene in favor of the electoral campaign, they are still ongoing.

    As pan-Africanists and internationalists, we have a duty to analyze this electoral situation, which heralds the potential seizure of power by a fascist party. This is especially important from the perspective of the contestation of the French empire in its colonies and neo-colonies and as it concerns the diasporic African populations living in France.

    I. The French Far-Right and Africa

    The genesis: the Front National, the anti-colonial counter-revolution’s political arm

    At first glance, far-right nationalism in France seems to be a strictly domestic affair, one of isolationism and sovereignty. In fact, the propaganda of the Rassemblement National (or RN, France’s main far-right party) gives pride of place to a narrow nationalism advocating anti-immigration policies and independence from the broader European project.  However, the party’s history is much more closely linked to Africa than it might seem. Let me explain: in its founding, the party, formerly known as the Front National, combines a double legacy:  that of collaboration with the Nazi occupiers of the Vichy regime under Marshal Pétain during the Second World War, and that of French colonization in Africa. Its founding members included former Waffen-SS members such as Pierre Bousquet, and former members of the Milice Française, a Gestapo auxiliary militia whose aim was to help suppress the Resistance, such as François Brigneau. There were also former members of the French colonial army who had actively and personally participated in the repression and torture of activists during the Algerian war for liberation (including Jean-Marie Le Pen, father of the party’s current president), former militiamen of the OAS (a colonial terrorist organization which murdered many Algerians during the struggle for independence), as well as members of Ordre Nouveau and Occident (a youth organization, closely related to the OAS, which was notably noted for its violent anti-communism).

    The FN, now RN, was born in a particular context, not unlike that of today. Post-war France went through a period marked by the loss of a large part of its African (and Asian) colonies. Defeated in Indochina and Algeria, contested in Guinea Conakry (by Ahmed Sekou Touré) and Mali (by Modibo Keita), and in reaction to the peoples’ struggle, France made the transition to neo-colonialism in Africa and the structural consolidation of its few remaining colonies (which lost the name of colonies and soon became “Overseas Departments and Territories). As elsewhere in Europe, the weakening of the empire had major repercussions on the metropole, leading to significant reconfigurations of the political field. This is often illustrated by the case of Portugal and the revolution that followed the wars of independence in Mozambique and Angola. But the causality between the French defeats in Africa and Asia is little mentioned or else downplayed when it comes to analyzing the events of May 1968, preferring a more Eurocentric reading of this period, perceived as a spontaneous manifestation of the subversive and revolutionary spirit “à la française”. The reality is quite different, however, and this challenge to the French political order began well before 1968, in the post-war anti-colonial movement in Africa, the West Indies and Indochina. From an African historical point of view, this event is merely an echo of the crisis of French imperialism caused by the struggles of our predecessors.

    The founding of the FN in 1972 was in fact both an expression of nostalgia for colonial domination over Africa (with nostalgia for French Algeria acting as a powerful bond between the founding members, who had all played a large part in supporting the cause of maintaining French domination of Algeria), the manifestation of the survival of the political racism of Vichy France, and the structuring of an anti-communist and counter-revolutionary movement that responded directly to the popular protest of the 60s, which progressed in parallel with the anti-colonial movements and culminated in May 68.

    Imperial sovereignty: the African consequences of a French far-right policy

    Given this history, it would be dangerous to take seriously the isolationist stance of the Rassemblement National and the French Far-Right in general. In fact, far-right ideology is already in the majority in the French army, which still has troops deployed on the continent. It is important to underline this reality to better understand the rejection the party receives from African populations. Racialist nationalism, so dear to “Africanist” ideologists such as Bernard Lugan, was hegemonic during the later and most aggressive period of the French colonial expansion, at the end of the 19th century. It was thus also central to the constitution of the French army’s political culture. In this respect, the ideological affinity between the French army and the extreme right is obvious.

    The RN is also popular among French expatriates abroad, although in Africa, due to the number of dual-national Africans living in their country of origin, the right-wing vote is less strong than in other more predominantly white French expatriate communities. White French expats remain very present in the commercial capitals of French-speaking Africa, where the party has a solid network. Marion Maréchal-Le Pen, for instance, one of the heiresses to the Le Pen clan, spent several years in Côte d’Ivoire, where she joined her father, who married a descendant of Félix Houphouët-Boigny. Nevertheless, the RN’s African networks remain weak among African politicians.

    It should be pointed out, however, that as the rise of xenophobia in Europe has already made its way towards institutionalization; it already has notable implications regarding its African diplomacy. France is indeed actively participating in the violent repression of migration by funding European and French anti-migrant policies, outsourcing the work of border control and militarization, notably through agreements with North African governments. This has very serious consequences on the lives of the Black Africans living or traveling through these countries. I’m referring to the frequent lynching and harassing of Black people in Tunisia by anti-Black mobs that have been galvanized and embolden by their president’s racist speeches, the state sanctioned massacres that take place near the Spanish enclaves of Melilla and Ceuta, in Morocco, or even the fact that the Algerian and Tunisian police often arrest Black Africans and then release them in the desert without food or water, leaving them to starve or die of dehydration. This phenomenon also hinders the prospect of continental unity, which can only be achieved by combating this tragic racist and neo-colonial diplomacy that contributes to further balkanizing the continent.

    It goes without saying that the rise to power of parties whose program largely revolves around the fight against immigration can only worsen this situation, increasing the macabre tally of African double victims of Western imperialism: displaced because fleeing conflicts or situations resulting from (neo)colonial oppression, killed by the bullets of African subcontractors working on European borders, or drowned in the Mediterranean.

    European political forces are already gripped by a paranoid Malthusian fear of the possibility of a migratory and ecologic “Black peril”. Conferences on the so-called “African demographic crisis” or “African demographic explosion” are regularly held in Europe, with far-right ideologues and “experts” over-represented. On June 25, during the most important campaign debate of the parliamentary elections, this point was once again raised by far-right representative, Jordan Bardella. In a way quite analogous to the consequences of the idea of a “yellow peril”, this omnipresence of the rhetorical elements of the migratory “black peril” could reinforce and accelerate the emergence of an anti-natalist Malthusian diplomacy in Africa, following the example of those who blackmailed India and China, in particular, into adopting extremely strict and authoritarian birth control policies.

    One of the RN’s key themes is sovereignty, but in many respects (energy, food, mining), France remains dependent. It is therefore quite evident that a France under a Far-Right government will have to increase its economic predation on those African countries historically regarded as its own “backyard”, in order to gain autonomy from other world powers. As a matter of fact, this imperialist parasitic dependency could very well be one of the very causes of this resurgence of nationalism in France in particular, and in the West in general.

    The colonial reflex, A Nkrumahist analysis of the rise of the far right in France

    Rather than the theses on populism and “the affects” popular with Western leftists, Kwame Nkrumah built on Lenin’s investigation of the parasitic relations between the imperialists and its dependencies, offering an anti-colonial analysis of the fluctuations in the political system of colonial metropoles. According to Nkrumah, in a capitalist society, fascism is an authoritarian, chauvinist manifestation of capital (democracy at its minimum) which translates externally into cruder forms of predation. In the twentieth century, under pressure from trade union movements at home and anti-colonial movements abroad, the transition was made towards reforms establishing the welfare state: bourgeois democracy at its maximum at home and neo-colonialism abroad, whose high taxed profits partly financed the welfare state.

    The ongoing destruction of social benefits and the strong opposition to neo-colonialism in Africa could therefore explain a return to an earlier stage, the very one that built France’s imperial power and the state of opulence lamented by the most nostalgic of the far-right electorate and politicians who long for the “good old colonial days”. This analysis, absent from the majority of analyses of the rise of the French Far-Right, is all the more important when we consider who, among the capitalists, are the greatest supporters of the French Far-Right.

    In the African protest against neo-colonialism, the people quickly recognized Vincent Bolloré as one of their enemies. Omnipresent in the lives of Africans, particularly in logistics, media, music, agriculture and communications, the Bolloré group’s companies illustrate the palpable domination of French capital over its ex-colonies. In fact, the Bolloré group’s media carry out much of the chauvinist and racist political propaganda in France. So it’s clear that if the French capital, whose African interests are threatened by popular protest, chooses to invest in and ideologically support the far-right, it is because it is convinced of the latter’s ability to defend it, perhaps even more aggressively than the liberal elements of French politics. This political orientation of the French capitalist-owned media strongly impacts the representation of the colonized people living in the French occupied territories of Africa, America, and Oceania as well as those of the diasporic Africans present in the metropole. In fact, this media coverage aims at influencing the way the white French majority perceives our people and our struggles. Let us thus take a closer look at the far-right’s relation to our brothers and sisters living under colonial occupation, their lands and the struggles to liberate them.

    II. The French Far-Right and the overseas colonies

    These terms are deliberately chosen to refute the operation to change the status and name of the colonies, which is nothing more than a neo-colonial strategy designed to conceal the colonial reality and weaken the nationalist and independence struggles waged in French Guiana and the occupied African islands of the Indian Ocean, the Caribbean and Oceania

    The RN’s electoral success in the colonies, as symptomatic of a colonial ailment.

    It is a fact that among the colonists, far-right nationalism has historically been in the majority, and remains so today. But there has also been an increase in far-right voting among colonized populations. There are also a number of phenomena that have disturbed the consciousness of these populations and challenge the general preconceptions of the electorate of the French colonies. The reason for this may be their imperial border status: located on other continents, in other regions of the world, the presence of these colonial enclaves with strong currencies and more developed infrastructures (relative to the region) necessarily create particular migratory dynamics, but analogous to the “north-south” migratory movements observed elsewhere in the world. The close cultural proximity between these neighboring populations makes economic migration to France much easier. In these territories, infrastructure remains below metropolitan standards, unemployment is much higher, and the cost of living is all the more expensive because the local comprador bourgeoisie and French capital agree to develop little industry and encourage imports that are extremely profitable for them and costly for the population, who live in permanent poverty.

    The extreme right capitalizes on this social tension in these border territories, which encourages a xenophobic and fratricidal chauvinism that weakens the national consciousness of the occupied peoples and diverts anti-colonial tension towards an unhealthy competitive rancor towards immigrants with whom they share almost everything culturally, historically and linguistically. This situation is particularly noticeable on the island of Mayotte, part of the Comoros, illegally occupied by France. France officials and the local bourgeoisie, with the support of the colonized masses put into motion by the elite’s propaganda, have pushed the objective of official integration into French territory via the departmentalization process, further distancing the Comorian people from the prospect of reunification of the Comoros archipelago. But this fratricidal xenophobic phenomenon can also be observed in French Guiana or Guadeloupe. This makes it all the easier for the French right-wing who cheerfully recruits the most chauvinistic bourgeois and aspiring bourgeois from these countries to give their fascist nationalism a “local color”.

    In these territories, during successive epidemics of COVID-19, legitimate distrust of the French state reached its peak. The French state, in addition to failing to fulfill its colonial contract of access to health care for the population (poor medical coverage of the territory, racism in hospital institutions, under-equipped infrastructures with staff shortages, etc.) was also found to have participated in and covered up a health scandal. Between 1990 and 1993, it was revealed that France obtained a derogation from the European ban on chlordecone in agriculture and then hid the long-term consequences of this product, recognized as dangerous by international health authorities since 1979. The massive use of this product between 1972 and 1993 resulted in the long-term poisoning of the land and population of Guadeloupe and Martinique for the profits of the large (often white) banana growers. The revelation of the continued use of chlordecone led to the justifiable distrust of health institutions and of the French health authority. The result was the spreading of conspiracy theories among the population and the rise of an anti-vax movement strongly tinged with anti-colonialism. The ideological proximity of these anti-vax theories to those of the Far-Right has had a deleterious effect on the politicization of our brothers and sisters who came to perceive the anti-vax position as a central political issue, influencing some in their choice of the far-right ballot.

    Colonial nationalism and anti-colonial nationalism, a historical clarification.

    Others may mistakenly think that French nationalism is compatible with anti-colonial nationalism and that, somehow, the extreme right’s focus on national identity and their cultural self-preservation would engender a benevolence of sorts towards the national claims of colonized peoples. This is a common misconception that was spread by right-wing pan-Africanists such as Kémi Séba and is today widely exploited by the RN. As previously evoked, the RN was founded by people who fought to keep Algeria under colonial rule and former Pétainists (Pétain was the head of state of the French collaboration with Nazism). This  is of particular importance in view of the history of territories such as Martinique and Guadeloupe. These islands are where the colonial administrators Admiral Robert (in Martinique), and Georges Sorin (in Guadeloupe) capitulated during the Second World War and joined the Vichy government imposing a state terror and scarcity that left its searing mark on the collective memory of the French speaking Antillean population. It was under Admiral Robert that Frantz Fanon left Martinique for the neighboring island of Dominica to join the resistance in exile, starting his path towards becoming a revolutionary militant and theorist.

    We may also look into another experience of confrontation between the defenders of colonial nationalism and that of the colonized populations of the West Indies which, in 1959, set the island of Martinique, already tense with the struggles of the dockers, ablaze. Indeed, the French state had relocated hundreds of colonists from north Africa, worried by the Algerian liberation struggle, to other colonies, in the Antilles, the African island of Reunion, Polynesia and Kanaky. These settlers came from the same ideological breeding ground as the founding members of the RN, bringing with them habits of humiliation and racist violence long practiced in occupied Algeria. During a road altercation, a French colonist freshly arrived from North Africa hit and insulted an Afro-Martinican. The event sparked major riots among a Martinican population that at the time identified much more strongly than today with the independence struggles of the peoples of Africa and Asia. Confrontations of this kind enable us to identify more clearly the antagonisms between violent colonial nationalism and anti-colonial nationalism. Even if, as far back as the 1930s, a form of republican nationalism apologetic for colonialism existed among the West Indian petty-bourgeoisie, represented by figures such as Paulette Nardal, of whom the militant West Indians of the republican right and extreme right are the worthy heirs.

    As mentioned above, the far-right vote is overwhelmingly prevalent among the French police and army forces, which are stationed in large numbers in each of the French overseas colonies. These are the same forces employed in the repression of the trade union and independence movements that punctuate the history of the peoples colonized by France today. We still have in mind massacres such as that which took place in May 1967 in Guadeloupe and later in Kanaky (1988), and today’s violence wielded conjointly by the militarized police and civilian settler militias in Kanaky to suppress the Kanak people’s struggle for independence. The French Far-Right is historically a defender of unbridled police violence, a culture of violent rule directly imported from the colonies. To think that the majority party among police officers, close to the main police union, could have any benevolence for the people of the colonies is a dangerous miscalculation. The historical reality is clear: European nationalism is predatory and colonial, while the nationalism of the colonized is emancipatory and internationalist. Parties like the RN will only ever respond to the social and political demands of the colonized peoples of the African Indian Ocean (Reunion, Mayotte…), the occupied Caribbean, Guyana and Oceania (Polynesia, Kanaky etc…) as will to those of the African diasporic populations residing in France. Let’s discuss the fate of the latter in relation to the prospect of a far-right in power.

    III. The Far-Right and Africans in France

    The African post-colonial migration, both exploited and oppressed

    African populations in France stem from several migratory movements. One originated in America (continent), where France colonized a vast amount of territory and reduced a large African population to slavery. Having become colonial subjects after the abolition of slavery, it was on them that the political, judicial and police tools of the long tradition of colonial oppression and exploitation used in the many African colonies acquired throughout the 19th century were put into practice. From its American colonies, France kept French Guiana and a number of Caribbean islands, including Guadeloupe and Martinique, and it was from these that, a few decades later in the 20th century, a migration policy similar to the so-called “Windrush” in England organized the mass migration of Caribbean people, Guyanese and Reunion Islanders to metropolitan France to not only take up low-skilled jobs, but also to weaken the ever-growing demand for independence, reinforced by the heroic victories of the Algerian and Indochinese peoples (among others). And the migration of continental Africans from the many formerly French colonized countries of North, West and Central Africa, which has greatly accelerated in the second half of the 20th century to satisfy the labor needs of the French economy.

    Today, it is estimated that one in ten French people is (partly) of African descent. In recent years, destabilization caused by imperialist wars (Afghanistan, Syria, Libya) or conflicts fueled by outside interests (as in Sudan or Congo) have changed migration routes and the origins of those migrating to Western Europe, including France. Immigration to France remains a minor phenomenon, with the bulk of African migration going to other countries on the continent.

    Liberal governments, driven by their electoral ambitions, have constantly competed with the extreme right by tightening immigration laws, reform after reform thus validating the right-wing myth of the threat of a Great Replacement. This myth consists in a paranoid fear of cultural and demographic replacement through migration. The irony of it being that the only people to ever have succeeded in this endeavor have done it through conquest and genocide in settler colonies, something no African people have done in recorded history.

    Neoliberal pseudo-fascism: systemic racism in the neo-liberal state

    The successive liberal governments have also implemented liberal reforms to the healthcare, unemployment and education systems, all of which have very negatively impacted the lives of people living in the french African diaspora. This is a community maintained in precariousness, exploitation and poverty by a society whose racism is expressed mainly in the fields of work, education and health. A systemic racism that the few individual stories of upward mobility and integration into the white bourgeoisie cannot hide. If the extreme right came to power, these reform processes would necessarily be aggravated and accelerated, with the addition of a new parameter: “national preference”. Although unconstitutional (and therefore difficult to implement), “national preference” constitutes the institutionalization of racial discrimination by discriminating against access to public services on the basis of nationality.

    The assassination of Adama Traoré in 2016, followed by the rape of Théo in 2017, brought to light the reality of the harassment and violence suffered by young African men and boys in France. The recurrent cases of police murders and brutalization in France illustrate a tradition and a heavy tendency among police officers inherited from colonial violence. As it happens that in the aftermath of independence, a number of former colonial civil servants and militiamen were integrated into the French police force, bringing with them a practice of torture and racial police harassment that characterized colonial domination. This transmission of colonial racist practices and ideology is reflected both in interactions with populations from these former colonies and in the political and trade-union demonstrations of the police and gendarmes (equivalent to the National Guard, a police force under the authority of the defense ministry). Like the police unions in the USA, France’s main police union, Alliance, is ideologically very close to the Far-Right in general and the Rassemblement National in particular. Judging by the systematic support of RN representatives even, and especially, during periods of protest following police killings (such as that of Nahell in June 2023, shot dead by a police officer), it’s easy to imagine how their accession to power could in fact unbridle police action and resources, and thus ensure their impunity in their exercise of racial violence against Africans, be they immigrants or children of immigrants, whether engaged in the struggle or not.

    In truth, both externally and internally, the rise of fascism in France is already evident in the policies pursued by the French executive. Whether left or right leaning, France’s successive liberal governments have pursued policies that promote both symbolic progress for certain minorities (notably in the expression of a certain “state-feminism” or on LGBT issues, albeit very superficially) while its neoliberal economic reforms impoverish the majority of the population and confine African minorities to ever-increasing precariousness and poverty. Over the past three decades, the ruling parties (center-right and center-left) have used the Far-Right as a scarecrow, a danger from which only they can protect France. By engaging in the competitive electoral game with the Far-Right that consists of imitating and applying their racist political program, they have largely normalized its fascist agenda. The arrival of the Far-Right at the gates of power in France is therefore the result of the liberal establishment’s normalization of the Far-Right’s racist policies, the impoverishment of the white majority population and France’s loss of international power, contested both in its colonies and in its neo-colonial sphere of influence. Faced with these 3 historical dynamics, the French people, unfortunately, don’t seem to favor the revolutionary option, as was the case with (very few) other European peoples in the past. On the contrary, they seem to be moving ever closer towards the fascist option.

    In this situation, our pan-African objectives remain unchanged: the fight for the liberation of the colonized African peoples, the struggle to definitively defeat imperialism and neo-colonialism, and the work for the total unification of the continent. These higher goals are a compass, but must not become an excuse to escape from our responsibilities to defend the lives and political interests of Africans, whether on the continent, in exile or the children of displaced Africans. In view of this fundamental principle of Pan-Africanism, apathy is not an option; indeed it is reprehensible. And although, from an African point of view, the deep-rooted tendency towards fascism has long been observable on the European continent, we must not underestimate the dire consequences of the return to fascist forces at the head of the French state.

    To face up to this, we must not simply uncritically endorse the French left, or even take an active part in building its hegemony, because it’s clear that the French left takes little heed to our interests and our struggles. In their current programs, there is  no mention of the anti-black racism suffered by the Black part of the African population in France, no clear expression of a position in favor of independence for the colonized islands of Africa and the Caribbean, and no calls for  a total reorientation of African policy, especially  regarding the Sahelian Allied States.

    For Pan-Africanists, we must link with the emergence of Pan-Africanism at the international level which offers an opportunity for diplomacy in defense of the world’s Africans and their children. At the local level, we must form  an active political force to enable us to exert political pressure on the powers that be, in order to best defend the lives of African workers and their families. Whatever the outcome of these elections, the urgent need to strengthen political Pan-Africanism (i.e. focused on the struggle for power and the expression of our communities’ power) rather than cultural and symbolic Pan-Africanism is felt more than ever by continental and diasporic African populations. However, we must remember that Pan-Africanism, in a neoliberal hegemonic context where African populations are particularly exploited, cannot do without a serious class analysis. Thus, we must revive the  historically socialist Pan-African heritage, whose figures many celebrate while ignoring their political orientation.

    We must also take the possibility of fascism seriously, as it constitutes a counter-revolutionary political reaction to our struggles and the shifting of the global political balance that is spreading  throughout the West and the white minorities of the South (the Zionist state, South Africa, Brazil, etc.). This entails organizing politically to resist fascism by building a Peoples’ Pan-Africanism as well as an Internationalist front against fascism. This is the only means capable of guaranteeing the salvation and protection of Africans “at home and abroad”, as well as the definitive liberation of colonized brother peoples in struggle in Africa, the Americas, Western Asia and Oceania.

    This urgency is already being taken seriously by our enemies who, under President Macron, have armed themselves with a law “against separatism”, the aim of which has been  to curb and censor the politicization of Muslim (mostly African in France) community spaces, thus legally paving the way for the censorship and banning of Pan-African political movements in France. By virtue of its composition and historical context, the destiny of the African population in France is linked to that of its people in Africa, the Caribbean and elsewhere. And in the face of a France that is making its return to nationalism clearer by the day, African people  still find themselves enjoined to take up the generational challenge posed by Frantz Fanon: our generation must  “discover its mission, fulfill it or betray it” [end]

    The original article

    Kossi Paul is a worker, Panafrican and anti-colonial militant, member of the A-APRP, of Afro-Caribbean and north-African descent based in Paris, France

    Related

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  • [Partage] Romans-sur-Isère : les médias au secours des néo-nazis – Contre Attaque

    Pour France Info et BFM, poursuivre des arabes et des noirs dans la rue pour les tabasser est un acte militant

    Vous avez encore un doute sur le fait que les médias, y compris le service public, soient totalement imprégnés par les idées d’extrême droite ? Voici une étude de cas avec un article de France Info publié ce dimanche 26 novembre, dont l’orientation est flagrante.

    Le média public titre : «Mort de Thomas : un militant de 20 ans hospitalisé après avoir été agressé par des jeunes». D’entrée de jeu, l’information principale n’est pas que des néo-nazis aient attaqué un quartier pour frapper des noirs et des arabes, mais «l’agression» d’un des néo-nazis. Un angle journalistique qui inverse les responsabilités.

    France Info introduit son article ainsi : «80 personnes d’ultra-droite sont allées manifester dans le quartier de la Monnaie aux cris de “Justice pour Thomas”».

    Il faut lire attentivement. Chaque mot est important. France Info ne parle pas «d’attaque», ni «d’émeute raciste» ou «de raid néo-nazi». Non : ce sont de simples «personnes» qui sont venues «manifester».

    Deuxième mensonge dans la même phrase : le slogan «justice pour Thomas». En réalité le groupe d’assaillants chantait «La France aux français» et «Islam hors d’Europe». Très loin d’un quelconque hommage : il s’agissait bien d’aller frapper les habitants d’un quartier stigmatisé. Tout a été filmé par les fascistes eux-même et largement diffusé.

    Pourquoi mentir ? Pour humaniser l’extrême droite. En réalité, les victimes seraient les néo-nazis qui ont débarqué dans la cité. Ils venaient simplement “manifester”.

    La légende de la photo – qui montre des fourgons de CRS et non le cortège d’extrême droite, évitant ainsi de montrer le motif de cette confrontation – parle d’un «impressionnant dispositif policier». Comme si c’était exceptionnel. Les manifestations de gauche ou les banlieues sont systématiquement étouffées par des dispositif de répression infiniment plus gros, sans que jamais les médias ne s’en émeuvent. Pourquoi insister dessus ? Pour faire croire que l’extrême droite serait réprimée, par opposition au «laxisme» dont parlent ce même média à l’égard d’autres populations. Pourtant il semblerait qu’un équipage de la BAC ait prévenu les agresseurs fascistes de l’arrivée des CRS, on a connu pire comme répression.

    Deuxième phrase : «un militant de 20 ans a été hospitalisé». Ici encore, il s’agit d’une stratégie d’humanisation. «Militant» c’est sympa, ça donne l’impression d’un engagement. Dans une manif de gauche, France Info aurait parlé de «black bloc» ou de «casseur». Et dans une cité d’«émeutier». Mais là, non : «militant». France Info précise même son âge.

    C’est donc un jeune garçon engagé politiquement. Certainement pas un sauvageon, une racaille ou un écoterroriste sans visage ni objectif, juste venu pour tout casser. France info «oublie» encore de préciser qu’il est nazi, tout juste le média concède-t-il plus loin le mot «ultra-droite» qui ne veut absolument rien dire.

    Il faut que le lecteur s’identifie à lui : il aurait donc été «hospitalisé». Ici France Info s’inquiète de l’état de santé d’un homme qui, rappelons-le, a participé à un raid punitif d’extrême droite dans une cité avec l’objectif évident de frapper ses habitants. Deux ados auraient d’ailleurs été blessés par l’extrême droite. Mais France Info ne parle pas d’eux. Seul le jeune «militant» intéresse ce média. Il aurait donc été hospitalisé. Le pauvre.

    Des centaines de personnes ont été hospitalisées au printemps dans les manifestations pour les retraites. Cela n’est presque jamais soulevé par les médias, ou alors sous la forme d’un chiffre donné à la va-vite. Leurs vies ne comptent pas.

    Après la mort de Nahel, au moins 8 personnes ont perdu un œil suite à des tirs policiers, et un jeune homme a été tué par une balle en caoutchouc dans le torse. Discrétion maximale de France Info à l’époque. Mais au lendemain d’une descente néo-nazie, on s’inquiète des bobos d’un des agresseurs.

    Quel est le message ? Finalement, les vraies victimes seraient du côté de ceux qui organisent l’attaque d’un quartier. Et les vrais violents, les sauvages, ceux qui “agressent” sont… les habitants du quartier qui se sont défendus !

    Donner la parole aux habitants ? Ce n’est même pas envisagé. Enquêter sur la recrudescence des violences fascistes ? Sur les groupes qui organisent une telle attaque ? Bien sur que non, ça demanderait des compétences de journalisme.

    S’il vous reste encore le moindre doute sur l’opinion de ce média, on peut rappeler une autre couverture. En mars 2021, à propos d’un jeune écologiste DANS LE COMA après un tir de grenade en pleine tête, France Info titrait : «l’un des manifestants grièvement blessé est fiché S» et ajoutait «cet homme a notamment participé à des manifestations violentes sur la ZAD de Notre-Dame-des-Landes». Une information à charge, basée sur la communication policière, destinée pour faire croire au public que, finalement, cet écologiste l’avait bien mérité. Un traitement diamétralement opposé de celui offert au nazi corrigé à Romans-sur-Isère

    Il n’y a pas que France Info. BFM est même allé plus loin en titrant : «un militant d’ultra-droite gravement blessé en marge de la manifestation». Plusieurs arrangements avec la réalité en une seule phrase, un joli exploit. Mais revenons sur l’expression, incroyable, de «gravement blessé». Ce fasciste n’a reçu que quelques coups de poings, mais BFM s’inquiète pour sa santé.

    Les Gilets Jaunes ou écolos qui ont fini avec des trous dans le visage ou des mains arrachées n’étaient pourtant jamais qualifiés de blessés “graves”. Parfois, les médias ont même écrit à leur propos «blessé selon lui par la police», remettant en cause l’origine même de leurs mutilations… On se souvient aussi de la réécriture du réel en direct, par une commentatrice de BFM, qui parlait de “maquillage” pour décrire un joueur de tambour frappé par la police et dont la tête dégoulinait de sang.

    Merci à France Info de soutenir le fascisme avec l’argent public et BFM avec les sous de Drahi ! [fin]

    L’article original

    article connexe

    Fils de Pétain

    la vanité nationale trouble la perception de la réalité historique et perpétue une névrose collective

  • [Sharing] TRAVEL AGENCY “DEATH”. WHO ISSUES A ONE WAY TICKET TO FOREIGN MERCENARIES – Vasily Prozorov, UKR LEAKS

    Since the beginning of the Special Military Operation in February 2022, the topic of the participation of foreign mercenaries in the conflict in Ukraine has been one of the most discussed ones. I want to remind you that foreigners began to take part in hostilities in Ukraine long before the start of the Special Military Operation. For example, I published a remark “Americans in Donbass,” in which I talked about crimes against the civilian population of what was then Ukraine by such mercenaries as Craig Lang, Quinn David Rickert, Santi Emilio Pirtle, Alex Zwiefelhofer and others. It’s easy to find stories online of many other mercenaries who themselves talk about serving on the side of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and even write memoirs. When was the Georgian Legion created? Right. Long before SMO. Therefore, the topic of mercenaries is not new in the context of the Ukrainian conflict. But the question remains open: Who, where and how recruits them? I will try to answer this question in this material.

    For a more complete understanding of the issue, I turned to the people who are more versed in this – one of the founders of the telegram channel @TrackNaziMerc, whose name I cannot disclose due to security reasons, the team of the telegram channel @ForeignCombatants, as well as a former French police inspector , intelligence officer Nicolas Cinquini.

    My analysis of the information confirms the conclusions of the channel’s authors. I would like to immediately emphasize that the statements of Ukrainian leaders about several tens of thousands of foreigners already fighting on the side of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the same number of “willing” ones are a lie. Loud statements were made solely in order to show that supposedly the whole world is with Ukraine and against Russia. For example, the news about the “Armenian Legion” as part of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

    There are indeed Armenians in the ranks of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. But their number does not correspond to such a concept as “Legion”. According to my estimate, their total number does not exceed one hundred people. These are mainly militants of the pro-Western Russophobic party “Sasna Tsrer”, wandering between Ukraine and Armenia.

    In addition, the Russian Ministry of Defense has repeatedly reported about the real number of foreign mercenaries in the ranks of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – about 12 thousand people arrived in Ukraine, many of whom have already become “200” (killed) and “300” (wounded). We should not forget that most of them fled to their homeland after seeing the harsh reality.

    In almost every corner of the world there are networks of Western intelligence services engaged in recruiting people to join the “International Legion” of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

    Who is coming to fight on the side of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and why?

    I divide these individuals into three categories.

    1. These are ideological neo-Nazis, ardent Russophobes, football ultras recruited through networks of neo-Nazi communities.
    2. Individuals who want to make big money from war.
    3. Active military personnel of foreign armies training Ukrainian military personnel, as well as directly participating in the planning and conduct of operations.

    While evidence of the presence in Ukraine of persons from the first and second categories is obvious, the fact of the participation of active military personnel is carefully hidden. I raised this issue in my video interview with the Caserta family, in which we discussed the mysterious deaths of American military personnel. Let me remind you that Teri and Patrick Caserta are the initiators of the creation of the Brandon Act, according to which all US military personnel have the right to receive psychological help at any time. And this need is caused by regular cases of suicide, the details of which are carefully hidden from the relatives of military personnel.

    Moreover, I also asked experts from the telegram channel @foreigncombatants about active military personnel of foreign armies:

    “All employees of foreign law enforcement agencies who are sent to Ukraine are given a leave (usually three months), but there are not many of them. In general, we can say that the number of mercenaries who arrived through PMCs or former military personnel is currently in the West is considered sufficient and they do not see the need to send personnel employees. The already established scheme for creating NPOs has shown itself to be good for consulting and instructing officers.

    In addition, do not underestimate the various so-called volunteer NPOs that provide supplies and material support to the Armed Forces of Ukraine. A huge number of foreigners are involved in them. This allows to seriously unload the costs of waging war and transfer to them the functions of logistics, supply, supply of provisions, software, delivery of drones and equipment, using micromarketing tools. NATO countries managed to involve their citizens in financing this bloody machine with collections for “aid” to Ukraine through multiple NPOs, which make this machine work smoothly and take new lives. We know the officers of the Czech army who oversee the supply of equipment to Ukraine, and although de jure they do not participate in hostilities, in fact they are full-fledged participants in hostilities.”

    Nicolas Cinquini kindly answered my questions and also confirmed the fact of the participation of active military personnel in Ukraine:

    “I have received confirmation from reliable sources that active French soldiers are being offered false resignations to participate in the Ukrainian war, with a guarantee of reinstatement at the end, and before that, a salary that is difficult to refuse.”

    Representatives of the @TrackNaziMerc channel do not deny the presence of active military personnel of foreign armies in Ukraine. This is evidenced by the following facts:

    – The team was able to identify several mine clearance dog handlers from the United States who are on official missions. We did not post their information on the channel because we do not consider them mercenaries, but humanitarian personnel.

     – The list of people awarded Ukrainian medals includes representatives of official law enforcement agencies of the Baltic countries.

      – From a Ukrainian source participating in the battles in the northern direction, we know about the presence of Polish career military personnel stationed in the Chernigov region. But these are combat control and logistics support units for Polish mechanized divisions.

     – Some of the deaths of combatants have a strange backstory, the conclusions of which may lead one to believe that they were on active service.

      – Daniel Swift, killed on January 15, 2023 in Bakhmut, was de facto on active military service, although he was listed as a deserter. As far as is known, the American side did not demand his extradition, although Swift fought in one of the elite units of the Legion, directly associated with the 73rd Naval Special Operations Center, whose military personnel undergo the strictest checks.

    The conclusions of the @foreigncombatants telegram channel team also completely coincide with the previously provided scheme:

    Recruitment of mercenaries occurs through different channels depending on the countries. Professionals with combat experience in hot spots from the United States and Great Britain mainly end up in Ukraine through contacts with mercenaries who have connections with Western PMCs or who fought on the side of the Kurds (YPG) in Iraq and Syria. As a rule, they then form separate units in Ukraine and may have funding from “private sponsors”. There are recruiters in the French Foreign Legion and in the airborne regiment of engineers in Montauban. The French without combat experience come to Ukraine from right-wing radical movements that have connections with Azov or Right Sector. Latin Americans are recruited through the military attache of the Ukrainian Embassy. Mercenaries come from the police and security forces, leaving for high salaries by local standards. Poles and Scandinavians come to Ukraine through contacts in their armed forces, where they previously served.

    In support of the above scheme of the Ukrainian recruitment network, I propose to study the known facts and ways of entry of foreign mercenaries into Ukrainian units. Looking ahead, I want to emphasize that the United States plays a huge role in recruiting mercenaries, pushing people to enter into an armed conflict against Russia, using both financial, ideological and violent methods of influence.

    USA

    The death of American Marines in Ukraine has become an almost weekly event. Not surprising. One of the first advertisements for the recruitment of mercenaries was published on the American website Silent Professionals. The announcement has been active almost from the very beginning of the Special Military Operation and it does not ambiguously indicate that people are being recruited to participate in hostilities in Ukraine.

    In addition, the media and the Internet regularly reported news about the arrival in Ukraine of employees of a number of private military companies. For example:

    • Kellogg, Brown and Root
    • Amentum (earlier called DynCorp),
    • Blackwater (other names – Xe Services/ Academi/ Constellis)
    • Greystone
    • Northbridge Services Group
    • Mozart

    All of these PMCs (with the exception of Mozart, which ceased to exist without being able to do anything to oppose the Wagner PMC) have close ties with the US government, consist of former military personnel and have enormous opportunities to recruit personnel not only in their own country, but also abroad. Many American mercenaries came to Ukraine precisely through the recruiters of these PMCs. It’s no secret to anyone that PMCs carry out US government tasks, are armed and financed by the government. These are convenient tools for waging war against Russia by supposedly non-state actors.

    France

    Nicolas Cinquini told me about French mercenaries in Ukraine in an exclusive interview. Nicolas is a former French official, police inspector since 1989, judicial police officer, then intelligence officer. He was fired in 2020 for publicly protesting on the street, in court and in the press against the unlawful violence committed against the Yellow Vests. He also highlights the US role in fueling the conflict in Ukraine:

    “I see the conflict in Donbass and Ukraine as a new illustration of the proxy wars that the Western bloc is waging against Russia, China and all those who dare oppose its hegemony. I started getting really interested in this issue in 2014 because I didn’t understand France’s support for the Islamist uprising in Syria. My blog activity intensified during the siege of Mariupol. A number of evidence led me to assume that there were active French civil servants there next to the Ukrainian garrison. To confirm this theory, I began to collect information about French mercenaries operating in Ukraine. I realized that many of them were supporters of neo-Nazi ideas, whom the French press tried to whitewash and turn into heroes. In my opinion, the deceased Frenchman Thibaut Rigon, who was posthumously awarded by Zelensky, could be an active civil servant, since there are a lot of mysterious circumstances surrounding his death, and I am trying to clarify all the details.”

    It is noteworthy that a large number of mercenaries with neo-Nazi views actually arrived from France, and work to attract them to Ukraine is still actively ongoing. Thus, in October 2023, the website of the neo-Nazi Azov appeared in French, the main task of which is to search for radicals to join the unit.

    Great Britain

    There is little information in the public domain about the activities of British organizations recruiting militants for Ukraine. The bulk of mercenaries arrive by signing a contract with the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and joining the International Legion. However, it is known about the organization Akkadian International, whose members have been spotted in Ukraine and have repeatedly held conferences in Poland and Great Britain, calling for entry into the conflict on the side of the Kiev regime.

    Poland

    @TrackNaziMerc:

    All mercenaries arriving in Ukraine enter the country through Poland.

    The mercenary’s path often includes the following stages:

    Warsaw => Lvov/Drohobych => Rovno, where military unit A7420 and the training ground are located.

    The classic route for militants from Latin America also passes through Poland:

    Capital International Airport => Transit airport in the United Arab Emirates/Egypt/Bahrain => Warsaw => Ternopol International Airport, where the contract is directly signed and the unit is staffed => Frontline unit.

    There are a huge number of Polish mercenaries in Ukraine. It was possible to find out that many of them were trained at the ESA (European Security Academy) center.

    ESA is headquartered in the Wroclaw area of Poland and provides training services to military and law enforcement personnel. ESA has already been at the center of a high-profile scandal related to Ukraine. Bellingcat investigators have proven that a large number of Ukrainian Nazis were trained at its training base. The instructors were not taken aback by swastika tattoos or typical greetings.

    This center had (and most likely still has) an extensive network of branches in all regions of the world, as evidenced by accounts on Instagram. You can find Scandinavia, Romania, Bulgaria, Austria, South America, and other accounts of company branches.

    Representatives of the company removed the section with their foreign representative offices from the official website, but their functioning has not been stopped. They search for and train mercenaries in their areas of responsibility.

    This is easy to prove by studying the social networks of mercenaries – on the Internet it is easy to find photographs of militants fighting in Ukraine with the ESA chevron. As proof, I attach a photo of a Portuguese who arrived in Ukraine through the Polish branch of ESA.

    The activities of the ESA center are closely connected with Spain.

    Spain

    Spain was also at the center of a major scandal involving the recruitment of mercenaries to participate in the fighting in Ukraine. As it became known, the GOA Tactical company provides specialized training for mercenaries for 700 euros and is in close contact with the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.

    Concerned residents of Spain filed a lawsuit against this company demanding that its leader be held accountable, since mercenary activity is prohibited in the country.

    But the company has very large connections with the country’s Ministry of Defense, as well as directly with NATO. A huge influence on GOA Tactical is Eva Álvarez del Manzano, daughter of Bernardo Álvarez del Manzano, the late Army Lieutenant General and former Chief of Operations at the Spanish Defense Headquarters.

    The direct leader of GOA Tactical is Francisco Galvan, call sign “Siscu”.

    As Galvan stated, Eva Manzano is the link between his company, the Spanish army and NATO. An interesting fact is that in various podcasts Manzano is mentioned as an expert in the field of intelligence, special operations, and espionage.

    Returning to GOA Tactical: the company has branches in Israel, Peru and Poland. In Poland they work closely with the same ESA. It was possible to find out that other Spanish companies also work closely with ESA.

    For example, the Spanish company Geitsinternational listed ESA as a partner on its poster, and the last few training courses took place in Poland.

    This is not the only military and police training company that works closely with the Polish ESA. For example, Astespana, located in Madrid, also actively interacts with the Polish ESA and conducts combat training at its training base.

    Georgia

    On the territory of Georgia, with the financial support of the US Embassy, measures are being taken to train and send mercenaries from both Georgian citizens and nationals of other states to the combat zone in Ukraine. For this purpose, a coordination headquarters has been organized in Georgia (Tbilisi), created on the basis of the non-governmental organization “Free Zone”. The organization includes representatives of the youth wing of the opposition political party “United National Movement”: Gagnidze Bondo, Gigauri Zurab, Keinashvili Demur, Kimadze David, Kumsishvili Guram, Kurkumuli Lola (female), Mamulashvili Vakhtang, Potskhverashvili Tatia (female), Rachveshvili Guram , Anna Siradze (female), Irakli Tkeshelashvili, Boris Khurtsilava, Chokheli Shmagi.

    After combat coordination of the mercenaries, groups are formed for gradual dispatch to the territory of Poland. The transfer is carried out by charter flights, as well as by US military transport aircraft from Novoalekseevka International Airport (Tbilisi, Georgia) to the Chopin international airport (Warsaw, Poland). The arrivals are met and escorted to the Polish-Ukrainian border (Shegeni-Medika checkpoint) by Georgian citizen D. Kokoladze and Ukrainian citizen A. Yavansky.

    Funding for the training and transportation of Georgian mercenaries through EU states to Ukraine is carried out with the direct participation of military advisers and employees of US diplomatic missions in Georgia and Poland. Influential representatives of the Georgian diaspora in Poland and the United States, including T. Alasania, a US citizen, born in 1950 in Georgia, who is actively assisting in carrying out these events. He is related to the ex-President of Georgia M. Saakashvili. In 1985, while working for the UN, he was suspected of arms trafficking. In 2004, he was prosecuted for extortion, however, at the direction of M. Saakashvili, the case was dropped. Among the relatives of T. Alasania there are the following government officials: Alasania Mamia – Deputy Chairman of the Ministry of State Security of Georgia (1991 – 1993); Alasania Irakli – Ambassador of Georgia to the UN (2006 – 2008), Minister of Defense of Georgia (2012 – 2014).

    Belarus

    I also talked a lot about Belarusian mercenaries and published testimonies with two captured soldiers from the Kastus Kalinouski regiment.

    As a rule, these are oppositionists who fled abroad. With the outbreak of hostilities in Ukraine, failed Belarusian radicals were forced to fight with weapons in their hands on the side of the Ukrainian Armed Forces under the threat of extradition to official Minsk.

    The history of the recruitment and subsequent dispatch of almost all Belarusian mercenaries to the front occurs with the help of the pro-Western NGO “Belarusian House”.

    Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and other countries of the post-Soviet space

    The network contains information only about isolated cases of mercenaries from Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and other former republics of the Soviet Union participating in hostilities on the side of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. People from these countries most likely ended up in the ranks of the Ukrainian army against the backdrop of general mobilization due to the presence of Ukrainian citizenship. At the same time, there are also volunteers. The exact number of natives of Central Asian countries in the Armed Forces of Ukraine is unknown.

    At the same time, the authorities of these countries are making attempts to limit the entry of their citizens into the combat zone. For example, in Tajikistan they began to compile lists of their citizens who became participants in hostilities on the territory of Ukraine. The state law enforcement agencies clarified that a criminal case will be opened against every Tajik who participated in hostilities in Ukraine. However, natives of Tajikistan who have Russian or Ukrainian citizenship will not be held criminally liable. In addition, the Uzbek Embassy in Moscow warned that the creation of a volunteer battalion or participation in hostilities on the territory of foreign countries is a crime from the point of view of the laws of the country. According to an article in the Criminal Code of Uzbekistan, mercenary activities are punishable by five to ten years in prison. On the territory of Kyrgyzstan, similar criminal penalties are applied for participation in hostilities in Ukraine.

    Information was found online about individual citizens of the former USSR republics serving in the ranks of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Thus, on various sites of pirated online cinemas, as an advertisement before viewing content by users from the territory of the Russian Federation, a video with the participation of an alleged citizen of Kyrgyzstan against the background of the emblem of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine is circulated, calling on his compatriots to surrender the positions of Russian troops, as well as the location of strategic objects of the Ministry of Defense RF authorities of Ukraine.

    Middle East

    The work of American specialists in recruiting radical Islamists, naturally, was also carried out in the Middle East, where Washington has many controlled gangs. It is known about the statement of the Shiite group Ashab Al-Kahf, which said that the forces of the international coalition led by the United States are recruiting young people to be sent to Ukraine. According to the militants’ statement, military instructors from Lithuania, Italy, Germany and Great Britain arrived on March 9, 2022 at the Ain Al-Assad military unit in Iraq and the location of the US Armed Forces At-Tanf in Syria. There, foreigners began recruiting militants to participate in hostilities on the side of the Ukrainian armed forces. The motive for participating in the conflict is said to be the revenge to Russia for supporting the government of Assad. Also, representatives of Western intelligence services held a number of meetings with the sheikhs of some clans from Syria and Iraq for a more loyal attitude towards such a “conscription campaign.”

    In addition, the American publication The People’s Voice published documents about the request of the Ukrainian special services to Iraq with a request to extradite 2-3 thousand convicted terrorists to participate in hostilities in Ukraine. The letter directly states that the United States is aware and is ready to supervise the delivery of Islamic State fighters to Ukraine.

    Behind the loud statements of the publication are real facts of participation of representatives of terrorist groups in Ukraine. A striking example is a soldier wearing an Islamic State insignia who was featured in the British press. It is possible that he is one of those militants convicted in Iraq who was sent to Ukraine.

    American General McFarlane, who headed the Joint Task Force to Combat Terrorists in Syria, has been identified as a possible person responsible for recruiting terrorists in the Middle East.

    It is also known about the actions of the Turkish PMC SADAT in Ukraine. The company is controlled by the Turkish authorities and takes an active part in military operations in Syria and Libya. Created in 2012 by Erdogan’s longtime friend and adviser, Turkish General Adnan Tanrıverdi. Information about the arrival of about a hundred fighters of this unit on Ukrainian territory appeared in September 2022. Its militants were first involved in hostilities in the Kharkov region.

    Afghanistan

    I talked about the participation of Afghan mercenaries in Ukraine in my replica “Afghan Legion” and showed a secret document from the SBU regarding the entry of Afghans into the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

    The special representative of the Russian President for Afghanistan, Zamir Kabulov, also stated that the United States is sending Afghan troops to Ukraine. What is there to talk about, if even American diplomat Philip Cosnett declared the need to create an “Afghan Legion”. Refugees scattered around the world are still mostly in camps and have virtually no means of subsistence. Neither the United States, nor Europe, nor other countries of temporary residence are in a hurry to integrate them into their society. For refusing to travel to Ukraine, recruiters can be threatened with deportation to Afghanistan, where refugees will face inevitable death. Especially former military personnel.

    The fact that an active campaign to recruit Afghans was indeed carried out is evidenced by the advertisement I attached below, in which a certain Fazal Elham calls on Afghans to go to Ukraine.

    In addition, it is reliably known about the death of the Afghan mercenary Jalal Nuri in the Zaporozhye direction in June 2023.

    Iran

    Many of you may be wondering how the Iranians can fight on the side of the Ukrainian Armed Forces if Tehran is Moscow’s closest ally. The fact is that on the territory of the Persian country there is a large network of opposition groups supported by the United States, Israel and other Western countries. Active recruitment is also taking place among them to be sent to Ukraine to confront the Russian army. A striking example was published by the Rybar telegram channel.

    Latin America

    There are quite a lot of mercenaries from Latin America on Ukrainian territory. Most often, Brazilians, Colombians and Mexicans appear, who may be associated with drug cartels.

    In particular, the telegram channel “Rybar” published a letter from a resident of Mexico, which stated that the Ukrainian diplomatic mission is actively recruiting Latin Americans to join the ranks of the International Legion.

    It is reliably known that weapons delivered to Ukraine have already repeatedly ended up in the hands of drug cartels, which confirms the possible connection of the Ukrainian Embassy in Mexico with drug cartels. The gathering place for Latin American mercenaries is the Alebriche restaurant in Poland (Krakow).

    Brazil

    In Brazil, a branch of the Polish company ESA (European Security Academy) is actively recruiting for the Foreign Legion.

    In Ukraine, the Brazilian mercenary Junior Almeida Carvalho with the call sign “Lumberjack” actively showed off the chevron of this company..

    He tried to erase his “traces” by deleting the photo, but colleagues from @TrackNaziMerc managed to save it.

    The Brazilian branch of the European Security Academy is one of the main suppliers of mercenaries from Latin America to Ukraine. This is evidenced by the Instagram account of another Brazilian mercenary, who indicated on his page that he is the representative of Ukraine in ESA Brazil.

    It is not difficult to notice that there are centers for recruiting citizens to participate in hostilities in Ukraine in almost all corners of the world, and their activities involve high-ranking officials, active military personnel, as well as representatives of diplomatic missions. We must not forget that foreign mercenaries come to Ukraine on the advice of their “comrades” who have returned to their homeland on vacation or for treatment. Despite all efforts and attempts to lure people with high payments, Ukraine and Western countries were unable to recruit the necessary number of mercenaries to effectively counter the Russian army. This is clearly demonstrated by the results of the so-called Ukrainian counter-offensive, which fizzled out before it even began.

    It is worth emphasizing that now the weekly number of obituaries about the death of foreign mercenaries in Ukraine is many times greater than the number of recruits. In light of the onset of winter, failures at the front, low morale among Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers, as well as reports of a possible offensive by Russian troops, Ukraine will have to rely solely on its own forces. It’s time to get ready for a new wave of videos of the work of Ukrainian military commissars packing up everyone on the streets of Ukrainian cities [end]

    The original article

    Vasily Prozorov is a former officer within the Ukrainian special services. He is currently leading UKR LEAKS investigation centre

    related

    L’engagement français dans les rangs ukrainiens

  • [Совместное использование] ТУРАГЕНТСТВО «СМЕРТЬ». КТО ВЫДАЕТ БИЛЕТ В ОДИН КОНЕЦ ИНОСТРАННЫМ НАЕМНИКАМ – Центр расследований Василия Прозорова, UKR LEAKS

    С начала Специальной военной операции в феврале 2022 г. тема участия иностранных наемников в конфликте на Украине является одной из самых обсуждаемых. Я хочу напомнить, что иностранцы начали принимать участие в боевых действиях на Украине еще задолго до начала СВО. Например, я публиковал реплику «Американцы на Донбассе», в которой рассказывал о преступлениях против мирного населения тогда еще Украины таких наемников как Крейг Лэнг, Квинн Дэвид Рикерт, Санти Эмилио Пиртл, Алекс Цвифельхофер и других. В сети легко найти истории и многих иных наемников, которые сами рассказывают о службе на стороне ВСУ и даже пишут мемуары. А когда был создан «Грузинский Легион»? Правильно. Задолго до СВО. Поэтому тема наемников не является новой в контексте украинского конфликта. Но остается открытым вопрос: Кто, где и как их вербует? На этот вопрос я и постараюсь ответить в данном материале.

    Для более полного понимания вопроса я обратился к людям, которые на этом «съели собаку» – одному из основателей телеграм канала @TrackNaziMerc, имя которого я не могу раскрыть из-за соображений безопасности, команде телеграм канала @ForeignCombatants, а также бывшему инспектору французской полиции, офицеру разведки Николя Чинкуини.

    Проведенный мной анализ информации подтверждает выводы авторов канала. Хочу сразу подчеркнуть, что заявления украинских лидеров о нескольких десятках тысяч иностранцев, уже воюющих на стороне ВСУ и таком же количестве «желающих», являются ложью. Громкие высказывания сделаны исключительного для того, чтобы показать, что якобы весь мир с Украиной и против России. Чего только стоит новость об «Армянском легионе» в составе ВСУ?

    В рядах ВСУ действительно присутствуют армяне. Но их количество не соответствует такому понятию как «Легион». По моей оценке, их общее количество не превышает сто человек. В основном это боевики прозападной русофобской партии «Сасна црер», кочующие между Украиной и Арменией.

    Кроме того, о реальном количестве иностранных наемников в рядах ВСУ неоднократно сообщало МО РФ, и многие тз них уже стали «200-ми» и «300-ми». Не стоит забывать, что большая часть сбежала к себе на родину, увидев суровую реальность.

    Кто и зачем едет воевать на стороне ВСУ?

    Я разделяю этих лиц на три категории.

    1. Это идейные неонацисты, ярые русофобы, футбольные ультрас, завербованные через сети неонацистских сообществ.
    2. Лица, желающие заработать большие деньги на войне.
    3. Действующие военнослужащие иностранных армий, осуществляющие подготовку украинских военнослужащих, а также непосредственно участвующие в планировании и проведении операций.

    Если доказательства присутствия на Украине лиц из первой и второй категорий очевидны, то факт участия действующих военнослужащих тщательно скрывается. Я поднимал этот вопрос в своем видео-интервью с семьей Касерта, в котором мы обсуждали загадочные смерти американских военнослужащих. Напомню, что Тери и Патрик Касерта являются инициаторами создания закона «Брендона», согласно которому все военнослужащие армии США имеют право получать психологическую помощь в любое время. А вызвана такая необходимость регулярными случаями суицида, подробности которых тщательно скрываются от родственников военнослужащих.

    Более того, о действующих военнослужащих иностранных армий я также спросил и экспертов телеграм-канала @foreigncombatants:

    “Все сотрудники иностранных силовых структур, которые направляются на Украину, оформляются в отпуск (как правило, трёхмесячный), но их не так много. В целом, можно сказать, что того количества наёмников, прибывших через ЧВК или бывших военных, на данный момент на западе считают достаточным и не видят необходимости отправлять кадровых сотрудников. Для консультирования офицерского состава и инструктажа хорошо показала себя уже сложившаяся схема по созданию НКО.

    Кроме того, не стоит недооценивать различные так называемые волонтёрские НКО, которые занимаются снабжением и материальным обеспечением ВСУ. В них вовлечено огромное количество иностранцев. Это позволяет серьёзно разгрузить затраты на ведение войны и переложить на них функции логистики, снабжения, подвоза провизии, матобеспечения, доставки дронов и снаряжения, используя инструменты микромаркетинга. Странам НАТО удалось вовлечь своих граждан в финансирование этой кровавой машины сборами на «помощь» Украине через множественные НКО, которые заставляют эту машину работать бесперебойно и уносить новые жизни. Нам известны офицеры чешской армии, которые курируют поставки экипировки на Украину, и хотя де-юре в боевых действиях они не участвуют, но фактически они являются полноценными участниками военных действий.”

    Николя Чинкуини любезно ответил на мои вопросы и также подтвердил, факт участия действующих военных на Украине:

    «Из надежных источников я получил подтверждение того, что действующим французским солдатам предлагают ложные отставки для участия в Украине, с гарантией восстановления в должности в конце, а до этого – зарплату, от которой трудно отказаться».

    Не отрицают наличие на Украине действующих военнослужащих иностранных армий и представители канала @TrackNaziMerc. Об этом свидетельствуют следующие факты:

    – Команде удалось идентифицировать нескольких кинологов из Соединенных Штатов, занимающихся разминированием, которые находятся в официальных командировках. Мы не размещали их данные на канале, потому что считаем их не наемниками, а гуманитарным персоналом.

    – В списках людей, награжденных украинскими медалями, есть представители официальных правоохранительных органов стран Балтии.

    – От украинского источника, участвующего в боях на северном направлении, нам известно о присутствии польских кадровых военнослужащих, дислоцированных в Черниговской области. Но это подразделения боевого управления и материально-технического обеспечения польских механизированных дивизий.

    – Некоторые из смертей комбатантов имеют странную предысторию, выводы из прочтения которой могут навести на мысль, что они находились на действительной службе.

    – Дэниел Свифт, убитый 15 января 2023 года в Бахмуте, де-факто находился на действительной военной службе, хотя и числился дезертиром. Насколько известно, американская сторона не требовала его экстрадиции, хотя Свифт воевал в одном из элитных подразделений Легиона, напрямую связанного с 73 морским центром специальных операций, военнослужащие которого проходят строжайшие проверки.

    Выводы команды телеграм-канала @foreigncombatants также полностью совпадают с ранее предоставленной схемой:

    Вербовка наёмников происходит по разным каналам в зависимости от стран. Профессионалы с боевым опытом в горячих точках из США и Великобритании в основном попадают на Украину через контакты с наёмниками, имеющими связи с западными ЧВК или воевавшими на стороне курдов (YPG) в Ираке и Сирии. Как правило, затем они формируют отдельные подразделения на Украине и могут иметь финансирование от «частных спонсоров». Есть вербовщики во французском иностранном легионе и в инженерно-десантном полку в Монтобане. Французы без боевого опыта на Украину попадают из праворадикальных движений, которые имеют связи с «Азовом» или «Правым сектором». Латиноамериканцы вербуются через военный атташат посольства Украины. Наёмники приходят из полиции и силовых структур, увольняясь ради высокой по местным меркам зарплаты. Поляки и скандинавы попадают на Украину через контакты в своих вооружённых силах, где они служили ранее.

    В подтверждение приведенной схемы вербовочной сети Украины предлагаю изучить известные факты и пути вступления иностранных наемников в подразделения Украины. Забегая вперед, хочу подчеркнуть, что огромную роль в вербовке наемников играют Соединенные Штаты, которые подталкивают людей вступать в вооруженный конфликт против России, используя как финансовые, идеологические, так и насильственные методы воздействия.

    США

    Гибель американских морпехов на Украине стала практически еженедельным событием.Не удивительно. Одно из первых объявлений о наборе наемников было опубликовано именно на американском сайте Silent Professionals. Объявление активно практически с самого начала СВО и в нем не двусмысленно указано, что ведется набор людей для участия в боевых действиях на Украине.

    Кроме того, в СМИ и Интернете регулярно проходили новости о прибытии на Украину сотрудников целого ряда частных военных компаний. Например:

    • Kellogg, Brown and Root
    • Amentum (ранее DynCorp),
    • Blackwater (другие названия – Xe Services/ Academi/ Constellis
    • Greystone
    • Northbridge Services Group
    • Mozart

    Все эти ЧВК (за исключением «Моцарт», прекратившим свое существование так и не сумев ничего противопоставить ЧВК «Вагнер») имеют тесные связи с правительством США, состоят из бывших военных и имеют огромные возможности по набору личного состава не только у себя в стране, но и за рубежом. Многие американские наемники попали на Украину именно через вербовщиков этих ЧВК. Ни для кого, ни секрет, что ЧВК выполняют государственные задачи США, вооружаются и финансируются правительством. Это удобные инструменты ведения войны против России якобы негосударственными структурами.

    Франция

    О французских наемниках на Украине в эксклюзивном интервью мне рассказал Николя Чинкуини. Николя – бывший французский чиновник, инспектор полиции с 1989 года, офицер судебной полиции, затем офицер разведки. Его уволили в 2020 году за то, что он публично протестовал на улице, в суде и в прессе против незаконного насилия, совершенного в отношении «Желтых жилетов». Он также подчеркивает роль США в разжигании конфликта на Украине:

    «Я рассматриваю конфликт на Донбассе и Украине как новую иллюстрацию прокси-войн, которые Западный блок ведет против России, Китая и всех тех, кто осмелится выступить против его гегемонии. Я начал по-настоящему интересоваться этой проблемой в 2014 году, так как не понимал поддержки Францией исламистского восстания в Сирии. Моя деятельность в блоге активизировалась во время блокады Мариуполя. Ряд улик заставили меня предположить, что рядом с украинским гарнизоном там находились действующие французские госслужащие. Чтобы подтвердить эту теорию, я начал собирать информацию о действующих на Украине французских наемниках. Я понял, что многие из них были сторонниками идей неонацизма, которых французская пресса пыталась обелить и превратить в героев. По моему мнению, погибший француз Тибо Ригон, посмертно награжденный Зеленским, мог являться действующим госслужащим, так как вокруг его смерти очень много загадочных обстоятельств, и я стараюсь прояснить все детали.

    Примечательно, что из Франции действительно прибыло большое количество наемников с неонацистскими взглядами и работа по их привлечению на Украину активно продолжается до сих пор. Так, в октябре 2023 года на французском языке появился сайт неонацистского «Азова», основной задачей которого является поиск радикалов для вступления в подразделение.

    Великобритания

    Информации о деятельности британских организаций по вербовке боевиков на Украину в открытом доступе немного. Основная масса наемников прибывает путем подписания контракта с Министерством обороны Украины и вступления в Интернациональный легион. Тем не менее, известно об организации «Аккадиан Интернэшнл», члены которой были замечены на Украине, неоднократно проводили конференции в Польше и Великобритании, призывая вступать в конфликт на стороне киевского режима.

    Польша

    @TrackNaziMerc:

    Все наемники, прибывающие на Украину, попадают в страну через Польшу.

    Путь наемника часто включает в себя следующие этапы:

    Варшава => Львов/Дрогобыч => Ровно, где расположена воинская часть А7420 и учебный полигон.

    Классический маршрут для боевиков с Латинской Америки также проходит через Польшу:

    Столичный международный аэропорт => Транзитный аэропорт в Объединенных Арабских Эмиратах/Египте/Бахрейне => Варшава => Тернопольский международный аэропорт, где непосредственно подписывается контракт и укомплектовывается подразделение => Передовое подразделение.

    Польских наемников на Украине огромное количество. Удалось выяснить, что многие из них прошли обучение в центре ESA (European Security Academy).

    Штаб-квартира ESA расположена в районе польского города Вроцлав и оказывает обучающие услуги военным и сотрудникам правоохранительных органов. ESA уже фигурировала в центре громкого скандала, связанного с Украиной. Расследователи группы «Беллингкэт» доказали, что на ее тренировочной базе прошли обучение большое количество украинских нацистов. Инструкторов не смущали ни татуировки со свастикой, ни характерные приветствия.

    Данный центр располагал (и скорее всего до сих пор имеет) обширную сеть филиалов во всех регионах мира, о чем свидетельствуют аккаунты в Инстаграм. Можно найти Скандинавию, Румынию, Болгарию, Австрию, Южную Америку, и другие аккаунты филиалов компании.

    Представители компании удалили с официального сайта раздел с своими зарубежными представительствами, но их функционирование не остановлено. Они занимаются поиском и тренировкой наемников в зонах своей ответственности.

    Это легко доказать изучив социальные сети наемников – в интернете легко найти фотографии боевиков, воюющих на Украине с шевроном ESA. В качестве доказательства прикладываю фото португальца, прибывшего на Украину через польский филиал ESA.

    Деятельность центра ESA тесно связана и с Испанией.

    Испания

    Испания также попала в центр крупного скандала, связанного с вербовкой наемников для участия в боевых действиях на Украине. Как стало известно компания GOA Tactical за 700 евро проводит специализированную подготовку для наемников и находится в тесном контакте с Министерством обороны Украины.

    Неравнодушные жители Испании подали иск в суд на данную компанию с требованием привлечь ее руководителя к ответственности, так как наемничество в стране запрещено.

    Но компания обладает весьма крупными связями с Министерством обороны страны, а также непосредственно с НАТО. Огромное влияние на GOA Tactical оказывает Eва Альварез Мансано (Eva Álvarez del Manzano) – дочь Бернардо Альвареза Мансано (Bernardo Alvarez del Manzano), покойного генерал-лейтенанта Сухопутной армии, бывшего начальника оперативного командования штаба обороны Испании.

    Непосредственно руководителем GOA Tactical является Франциско Галван, позывной («Сиску» Siscu).

    Как заявлял Галван,Eва Мансано является связующим звеном между его компанией, армией Испании и НАТО. Любопытен тот факт, что в различных подкастах Мансано упоминается как эксперт в области разведки, проведения специальных операций, шпионажа.

    Возвращаясь к GOA Tactical, то компания имеет филиалы в Израиле, Перу и Польше. В Польше они тесно взаимодействуют с той самой ESA. Удалось выяснить, что и другие испанские компании тесно сотрудничают с ESA.

    Например, испанская компания «Geitsinternational» на своем постере указала ESA в качестве партнера, а последние несколько курсов по обучению прошли именно на территории Польши.

    Это не единственная компания, занимающаяся обучением военнослужащих и полицейских, которая близко взаимодействует с польским ESA. Например, «Astespana», расположенная в Мадриде, также активно взаимодействует с польской ESA и проводит на ее тренировочной базе боевое обучение.

    Грузия

    На территории Грузии при финансовой поддержке посольства США осуществляются мероприятия по подготовке и отправке в зону боевых действий на Украине наемников как из числа грузинских граждан, так и подданных других государств. С этой целью в Грузии организована работа координационного штаба (г. Тбилиси), созданного на базе неправительственной организации «Свободная зона». В состав организации входят представители молодежного крыла оппозиционной политической партии «Единое национальное движение»: Гагнидзе Бондо, Гигаури Зураб, Кеинашвили Демур, Кимадзе Давид, Кумсишвили Гурам, Куркумули Лола (жен.), Мамулашвили Вахтанг, Поцхверашвили Татия (жен.), Рачвешвили Гурам, Сирадзе Анна (жен.), Ткешелашвили Ираклий, Хурцилава Борис, Чохели Шмаги.

    После проведения боевого слаживания наемников формируются группы для поэтапной отправки на территорию Польши. Переброска осуществляется чартерными рейсами, а также самолетами военно-транспортной авиации США из международного аэропорта Новоалексеевка (г. Тбилиси, Грузия) до международного аэропорта им. Ф.Шопена (г. Варшава, Польша). Встречу прибывших, их сопровождение до польско-украинской границы (пункт пропуска «Шегени-Медика») осуществляют гражданин Грузии Д.Коколадзе и гражданин Украины А.Яванський.

    Финансирование подготовки и переправки грузинских наемников через государства ЕС на Украину осуществляется при непосредственном участии военных советников и сотрудников дипломатических представительств США в Грузии и Польше. Активное содействие в проведении указанных мероприятий оказывают влиятельные представители грузинской диаспоры в Польше и США, среди которых Т.Аласания – гражданин США, родился в 1950 году в Грузии. Состоит в родственных связях с экс-президентом Грузии М.Саакашвили. В 1985 году, работая в структуре ООН, подозревался в торговле оружием. В 2004 году привлекался к уголовной ответственности за вымогательство, однако, по указанию М.Саакашвили, дело было прекращено. В числе родственников Т.Аласания имеются следующие государственные деятели: Аласания Мамия – заместитель председателя министерства государственной безопасности Грузии (1991 – 1993 гг.); Аласания Ираклий – посол Грузии при ООН (2006 – 2008 гг.), министр обороны Грузии (2012 – 2014 гг.).

    Беларусь

    Про белорусских наемников я также рассказывал очень много и публиковал показания с двумя пленными бойцами из полка «Кастуся Калиновского».

    Как правило, это сбежавшие заграницу оппозиционеры.С началом боевых действий на Украине несостоявшихся белорусских радикалов заставили с оружием в руках воевать на стороне ВСУ под угрозой выдачи официальному Минску.

    История вербовки и дальнейшей отправки практически всех белорусских наемников на фронт происходит при помощи прозападной НПО «Белорусский дом».

    Таджикистан, Киргизия, Узбекистан, Казахстана и другие страны постсоветского пространства

    В сети имеются сведения лишь о единичных случаях участия в боевых действиях на стороне ВСУ наемников из Таджикистана, Киргизии, Узбекистана, Казахстана и других бывших республик Советского Союза. Выходцы из данных стран скорее всего попали в ряды украинской армии на фоне всеобщей мобилизации ввиду наличия украинского гражданства. В то же время есть и добровольцы. Точное количество уроженцев стран Центральной Азии в составе ВСУ неизвестно.

    При этом, власти этих стран предпринимают попытки ограничить попадание своих граждан в зону боевых действий. Например, в Таджикистане начали составлять списки своих граждан, которые стали участниками боевых действий на территории Украины. В силовых ведомствах государства уточнили, что в отношении каждого таджика, участвовавшего в боевых действиях на Украине, будет возбуждено уголовное дело. Однако уроженцы Таджикистана, имеющие гражданство РФ или Украины, к уголовной ответственности привлекаться не будут. Кроме того, посольство Узбекистана в Москве предупреждало о том, что создание добровольческого батальона или участие в боевых действиях на территории иностранных государств является преступлением с точки зрения законов страны. По статье уголовного кодекса Узбекистана за наемничество грозит от пяти до десяти лет тюрьмы. На территории Киргизии за участие в боевых действиях на Украине применяется аналогичное уголовное наказание.

    В сети были обнаружены сведения об отдельных гражданах бывших республик СССР, проходящих службу в рядах ВСУ. Так, на различных площадках пиратских онлайн-кинотеатров в качестве рекламы перед просмотром контента пользователями с территории Российской Федерации «гуляет» видеоролик с участием якобы гражданина Киргизии на фоне эмблемы ГУР МО Украины, призывающего своих соотечественников сдавать позиции российских войск, а также расположение стратегических объектов МО РФ властям Украины.

    Ближний Восток

    Работа американских специалистов по набору радикальных исламистов, естественно, проводилась и на Ближнем Востоке, где у Вашингтона много подконтрольных бандформирований.Известно о заявлении шиитской группировки «Асхаб Аль-Кахф», в котором говорилось, что силы международной коалиции во главе с США вербуют молодых людей для отправки на Украину. Согласно заявлению боевиков, военные инструкторы из Литвы, Италии, Германии и Великобритании 9 марта 2022 года прибыли в воинскую часть «Айн Аль-Асад» в Ираке и расположение ВС США «Ат-Танф» в Сирии. Там иностранцы занялись вербовкой боевиков для участия в боевых действиях на стороне вооруженных сил Украины. В качестве мотива для участия в конфликте наемникам называют месть России за поддержку правительства Б.Асада. Также представители западных спецслужб провели ряд встреч с шейхами некоторых кланов из Сирии и Ирака для более лояльного отношения к такой «призывной кампании».

    Кроме того, американское издание The People’s Voice опубликовало документы о запросе украинских спецслужб к Ираку с просьбой выдать 2-3 тысяч осужденных террористов для участия в боевых действиях на Украине. В письме прямо говорится, что США в курсе и готовы курировать доставку боевиков ИГ* на Украину.

    За громкими заявлениями издания стоят реальные факты участия на Украине представителей террористических группировок. Ярким примером является засветившийся в объективе британской прессы военнослужащий с шевроном Исламского Государства. Не исключаю, что он является одним из тех самых осужденных в Ираке боевиков, отправленным на Украину.

    В качестве возможного лица, ответственного за вербовку террористов на Ближнем Востоке, указан американский генерал МакФарлейн, возглавлявший Объединенную оперативную группу по борьбе с террористами в Сирии.

    Известно и о действиях на Украине турецкой ЧВК SADAT. Компания подконтрольна турецким властям и принимает активное участие в военных действиях в Сирии и Ливии. Создана в 2012 году давним другом и советником Эрдогана, турецким генералом Аднаном Танрыверди. Информация о прибытии около сотни бойцов данного подразделения на украинскую территорию появилась в сентябре 2022 года. Ее боевики впервые были задействованы в боевых действиях в Харьковской области.

    Афганистан

    Об участии афганских наемников на Украине я рассказывал в своей реплике «Афганский Легион» и демонстрировал секретный документ СБУ относительно вступления афганцев в ВС Украины.

    О том, что США отправляют на Украину афганских военных, заявлял и спецпредставитель президента РФ по Афганистану Замир Кабулов. О чем говорить, если даже американский дипломат Филипп Коснетт заявлял

    о необходимости создания «Афганского легиона». Разбросанные по всему миру беженцы до сих пор находятся по большей части в лагерях и практически не имеют средств к существованию. Ни США, ни Европа, ни другие страны временного пребывания не спешат интегрировать их в свое общество. За отказ от поездки на Украину вербовщики могут пригрозить депортацией в Афганистан, где беженцев ждет неминуемая смерть. В особенности, бывших военнослужащих.

    О том, что активная компания по вербовке афганцев действительно проводилась, свидетельствует и приложенное мною ниже объявление, в котором некий Фазал Элхам призывает афганцев отправиться на Украину.

    Кроме того, достоверно известно о гибели афганского наемника Джалала Нури на запорожском направлении в июне 2023 года.

    Иран

    Многие из Вас могут задаться вопросом, как иранцы могут воевать на стороне ВСУ, если Тегеран является ближайшим союзником Москвы. Дело в том, что на территории персидской страны действует большая сеть оппозиционных формирований, поддерживаемых США, Израилем и другими странами Запада. Среди них также проходит активная вербовка для отправки на Украину для противостояния российской армии. Яркий пример публиковал телеграм-канал «Рыбарь».

    Латинская Америка

    Наемников из Латинской Америки на территории Украины достаточно много. Чаще всего фигурируют бразильцы, колумбийцы и мексиканцы, которые могут быть связаны с наркокартелями.

    В частности, телеграм канал «Рыбарь» публиковал письмо жителя Мексики, в котором говорилось о том, что дипмиссия Украины активно занимается вербовкой латиноамериканцев для вступления в ряды «Интернационального легиона».

    Достоверно известно, что поставленное на Украину оружие уже неоднократно светилось в руках наркокартелей, что подтверждает возможную связь посольства Украины в Мексике с наркокартелями. Место сбора латиноамериканских наемников – ресторан «Alebriche» в Польше (г. Краков).

    Бразилия

    В Бразилии активной вербовкой в «Иностранный легион» занимается филиал польской компании ESA (European Security Academy).

    На Украине с шевроном данной фирмы активно красовался бразильский наемник Джулио Альваро Карвальо с позывным «Лесоруб» (Lumberjack).

    Он попытался стереть «следы», удалив фотографию, но коллеги из @TrackNaziMerc успели ее сохранить.

    Бразильский филиал European Security Academy один из главных поставщиков наемников из Латинской Америки на Украину. Об этом свидетельствует и инстаграм аккаунт другого бразильского наемника, который указал у себя на странице, что является представителем Украины в ESA Brazil.

    Не трудно заметить, что центры вербовки граждан для участия в боевых действиях на Украине имеются практически во всех уголках мира, а в их деятельность вовлечены высокопоставленные чиновники, действующие военные, а также представители дипломатических миссий. Нельзя забывать, что иностранные наемники приезжают на Украину и по совету своих «товарищей», вернувшихся к себе на Родину в отпуск или на лечение. Несмотря на все усилия и попытки заманить людей высокими выплатами, Украина и страны Запада не смогли набрать необходимое количество наемников для эффективного противодействия российской армии. Это наглядно демонстрируют результаты так называемого украинского контрнаступления, которое захлебнулось, не успев начаться.

    Стоит подчеркнуть, что теперь еженедельное количество некрологов о гибели иностранных наёмников на Украине кратно превышает количество новобранцев. В свете наступления зимы, неудач на фронте, низкого МПС среди солдат ВСУ, а также сообщениях о возможном наступлении российских войск, Украине придется рассчитывать исключительно на свои силы. Стоит приготовиться к новой волне видеороликов работы украинских военкомов, пакующих всех подряд на улицах украинских городов [конец]

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