Analista senior di l'intelligenza in u campu di a gestione di i risichi di sicurezza, sò un anzianu tenente detective è ufficiale di l'intelligenza in l'agenzie di u Statu francese. A bona pronuncia hè Николай Чинкуини, in russu
mon commentaire pour le média russe Arguments et Faits des déclarations d’Emmanuel Macron, le 20 janvier 2025, au sujet de la réserve
à Cesson Sévigné, garnison du Commandement de l’appui terrestre numérique et cyber (CATNC), le 20 janvier 2025 (Stéphane Mahe / Reuters)
Il est toujours plus difficile de prendre Emmanuel Macron au sérieux. Je considère depuis longtemps ses déclarations avec dérision et à quelques 20% d’opinion favorable, son crédit est au plus bas parmi les Français. Il me semble que peu de journalistes ou citoyens ont pris la peine jusqu’à présent de commenter son ambition de mieux détecter et former de jeunes volontaires en renfort des armées.
Je n’imagine pas un instant que la France puisse rétablir le service militaire tel que je l’ai connu dans les années 80, obligatoire et pour une durée d’un an. L’économie, la sociologie et l’opinion publique s’y opposent
à Berlin, en 1987
Son vague projet concerne la réserve. Aujourd’hui, l’armée française compte environ 40 000 réservistes, c’est insignifiant. Alors qu’il quittera le pouvoir en 2027, au plus tard, il en souhaite 80 000 pour 2030 et pour 2035, 100 000, soit un réserviste pour deux militaires d’active. Ce ne serait pas la levée en masse de 1793 (deux volontaires pour un militaire d’active, amalgamés dans les demi-brigades) et seulement dans dix ans. Or il adresse évidemment le contexte international actuel, au moment où le Néerlandais Mark Rutte (OTAN) et l’Estonienne Kaja Kallas (UE), deux autres épées, font des déclarations similaires dans leurs domaines de compétence. Il fait du Macron, c’est à dire de la communication, du vent.
Nous entendons aussi un débat au sujet d’un maintien de la paix par des troupes occidentales en Ukraine, après un cessez-le-feu. Dans l’expectative de cet hypothétique cessez-le-feu, c’est mettre la charrue très avant les bœufs. Après l’arrivée au pouvoir de Donald Trump et avant des élections en Allemagne, les Européens donnent l’impression de paniquer
Le 11 janvier, des combattants russes de la 4e compagnie / 3e bataillon / 109e régiment de fusiliers dressent leur étendard sur un terril de la ville minière de Dzerjynsk, que les Ukrainiens appellent Toretsk et qu’eux libèrent en république populaire de Donetsk (capture d’écran)
Je pense que le projet stratégique de Macron est aussi peu tangible que ses déclarations au sujet de la réserve. Il essaierait plutôt de stimuler ses partenaires, quand la défaite occidentale paraît inéluctable au Donbass et en Ukraine. Macron personnifie le déclin accéléré de la France. Mon hypothèse est que son agitation est motivée par la crainte de la fin de l’hégémonie occidentale, comment ce déclin accélérera la démolition de la Francafrique et de graves conséquences pour l‘économie de marché en France.
chronique alphabétique et nécrologique de l’engagement français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas
[my illustration: a debris of US ATACMS ballistic missile has fallen on Kursk-Vostochny airfield on November 25, 2023 (Russian defense ministry)]
On March 5, 2022, the wreck of the sailing ship Endurance was found in the depths of the Weddell Sea off the coast of Antarctica. This, of course, was the vessel lost in Ernest Shackelton’s third expedition to Antarctica, which became trapped in the ice and sank in 1915. The story of that expedition is an extraordinary tale of human fortitude – with the Endurance lost to the ice, Shackleton’s crew evacuated to a loose ice flow where they camped for nearly 500 days, drifting about the Antarctic seas, before making a desperate dash across the open ocean in an open 20 foot lifeboat, finally reaching the southern shore of inhospitable and mountainous South Georgia Island, which they then had to cross on foot to reach the safety of a whaling station.
The story itself has an essentially mythic quality to it, with Shackleton’s crew surviving for years on free floating ice floes in the most inhospitable seas on earth. For our purposes, however, it is the story’s coda that is particularly interesting. In Shackleton’s memoirs, he remembered that, upon finally reaching the safety of the Stromness whaling station, one of his first questions was about the war in Europe. When Shackleton first set out on his ill-fated expedition on August 8, 1914, the First World War was less than a week old, and the German Army had just begun its invasion of Belgium. There was little expectation then that the war would proceed as it did, unleashing four years of slaughterous positional warfare that engulfed the continent.
Shackleton, having been adrift at sea for years, clearly did not imagine that the war could still be raging, and asked the commandant of the whaling station “tell me, when was the war over?”
The answer came back: “The war is not over. Millions are being killed. Europe is mad. The world is mad.”
The timing is serendipitous, since the discovery of the Endurance’s wreck, after more than a hundred years, happened to occur only a few weeks after the world again went mad, with the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian War in February 2022. As time continues its inexorable march and the calendar turns yet again, the war is passing through its third full winter. In February, Z-World will be three years old.
Of course, modern communications make it extremely unlikely that anybody could be cut fully out of the loop for years at a time, like Shackleton and his men. Instead of being ignorant as to whether or not the war is over, many of us are exposed on a daily basis to footage of men being killed, buildings being blown up, and vehicles being shredded. Twitter has made it essentially impossible to live under a rock, or on an ice floe, as it were.
If anything, we have the very opposite problem of Shackleton – at least as far as our wartime information infrastructure goes. We are saturated in information, with daily updates tracking advances of a few dozen meters and never ending bombast about new game changing weapons (which seem to change very little), and bluster about “red lines”. This war seems to have an unyielding dynamic on the ground, and no matter how many grand pronouncements we hear that one side or the other is on the verge of collapse, the sprawling front continues to grind up bodies and congeal with bloody positional fighting.
It would seem difficult to believe that a high intensity ground war in Europe with hundreds of miles worth of front could be boring, yet the static and repetitive nature of the conflict is struggling to hold the attention of foreign observers who have little immediately at stake.
My intention here is a radical zoom-out from these demoralizing and fatiguing small scale updates (as valuable as the work of the war mappers is), and consider the aggregate of 2024 – arguing that this year was, in fact, very consequential. Taken as a whole, three very important things happened in 2024 which create a very dismal outlook for Ukraine and the AFU in the new year. More specifically, 2024 brought three important strategic developments:
Russian victory in southern Donetsk which destroyed the AFU’s position on one of the war’s key strategic axes.
The expenditure of carefully husbanded Ukrainian resources on a failed offensive towards Kursk, which accelerated the attrition of critical Ukrainian maneuver assets and substantially dampened their prospects in the Donbas.
The exhaustion of Ukraine’s ability to escalate vis a vis new strike systems from NATO – more broadly, the west has largely run out of options to upgrade Ukrainian capabilities, and the much vaunted delivery of longer range strike systems failed to alter the trajectory of the war on the ground.
Taken together, 2024 revealed a Ukrainian military that is increasingly stretched to the limits, to the point where the Russians were able to largely scratch off an entire sector of front. People continue to wonder where and when the Ukrainian front might begin to break down – I would argue that it *did* break down in the south over the last few months, and 2025 begins with strong Russian momentum that the AFU will be hard pressed to arrest.
Front Collapse in South Donetsk
What stands out immediately about the operational developments in 2024 is the marked shift of energies away from the axes of combat that had seen the most intense fighting in the first two years of the war. In a sense, this war has seen each of its fronts activate in a sequence, one after the other.
After the opening Russian offensive, which boasted as its signature success the capture of the Azov coastline and the linkup of Donetsk and Crimea, the action shifted to the northern front (the Lugansk-Kharkov axis), with Russia fighting a summer offensive which captured Severodonetsk and Lysychansk. This was followed by a pair of Ukrainian counteroffensives in the fall, with a thrust out of Kharkov which pushed the front back over the Oskil, and an operation directed at Kherson which failed to breach Russian defenses but ultimately resulted in a Russian withdrawal in good order over the Dnieper due to concerns over logistical connectivity and an over-extended front. Energies then pivoted yet again to the Central Donbas axis, with the enormous battle around Bakhmut raging through the spring of 2023. This was followed by the failed Ukrainian offensive on Russia’s defenses in Zaporozhia, in the south.
Just to briefly recapitulate this, we can enumerate several operational phases in the first two years of the war, occurring in sequence and each with a center of gravity in different parts of the front:
A Russian offensive across the land bridge, culminating in the capture of Mariupol. (Winter-Spring 2022, Southern Front)
A Russian offensive in Lugansk, capturing Severodonetsk and Lysychansk. (Summer 2022, Donets-Oskil front)
Ukrainian Counteroffensives towards the Oskil and Kherson (Autumn 2022, Oskil and Dnieper fronts)
The Russian assault on Bakhmut (Winter-Spring 2023, Central Front)
Ukrainian counteroffensive on the land bridge (Summer 2023)
Amid all of this, the front that saw the least movement was the southeastern corner of the front, around Donetsk. This was somewhat peculiar. Donetsk is the urban heart of the Donbas – a vast and populous industrial city at the center of a sprawling conurbation, once home to some 2 million people. Even if Russia succeeds in capturing the city of Zaporizhia, Donetsk will be by far the most populous of Ukraine’s former cities to come under Moscow’s control.
In 2014, with the outbreak of the proto-Donbas war, Donetsk was the locus of much of the fighting, with the airport on the city’s northern approach the scene of particularly intense combat. This made it rather strange, then, that at the start of 2024 the Ukrainian Army continued to occupy many of the same positions that they built a decade prior. As intense fighting ebbed and flowed along other sectors of front, Donetsk remained besieged by a web of powerfully held Ukrainian defenses, anchored by heavily fortified urban areas stretching from Toretsk to Ugledar. Early Russian attempts to crack this iron ring open, including an assault on Ugledar in the winter of 2023, met with failure.
The signature operational development of 2024, then, was the re-activation of the Donetsk front, after years of static combat. It is not an exaggeration to say that after years of coagulation, the Russian Army cracked this front wide open in 2024 and Ukraine’s long and strongly held network of urban strongpoints collapsed
Russian Progress on the Donetsk Axis in 2024
The year began with the AFU fighting for its fortress in Avdiivka, where it continued to block the northern approach to Donetsk. At the time, the typical argument that one heard from the Ukrainian side was that the Russian assault on Avdiivka was pyrrhic – that the Russians were capturing the city with exorbitantly costly “meat assaults” that would inevitably sap Russian combat power and exhaust their ability to continue the offensive.
With the full measure of the year behind us, we can definitively say that this is not the case. After the fall of Avdiivka, Russian momentum never seriously slackened, and in fact it was the AFU that appeared to be increasingly exhausted. The Ukrainian breakwater position at Ocheretyne (which had previously been their staging point for counterattacks around Avdiivka) was overrun in a matter of days, and by the early summer the frontline had been pushed out towards the approach to Pokrovsk.
The Russian thrust towards Pokrovsk led many to believe that this city was itself the object of Russian energies, but this was a misread of the operational design. Russia did not need to capture Pokrovsk in 2024 to render it sterile as a logistical hub. Simply by advancing towards the E50 highway, Russian forces were able to cut off Pokrovsk from Ukrainian positions to the south on the Donetsk front, and Pokvrovsk is now a frontline city subject to the full spectrum of overwatch from Russian drones and tube artillery.
By autumn, the Russian advance had put the Ukrainians in a severe salient, creating an unstable chain of positions in Selydove, Kurakhove, Ugledar, and Krasnogorivka. Russia’s advance from Ocheretyne onto the southern approach to Pokrovsk acted like an enormous scythe, isolating the entire southeastern sector of the front and allowing Russian forces to carve through it in the closing months of the year
Russian Operations in 2024, Donetsk Axis
This war has turned the word “collapse” into a devalued buzzword. We are told repeatedly that one side or the other is on the verge of collapse: sanctions will “collapse” the Russian economy, the Wagner uprising of 2023 proved that the Russian political system was “collapsing”, and of course we hear that exorbitant losses have one army or the other on the verge of total failure – which army that may be depends on who you ask.
I would argue, however, that what we saw from October 2024 onward represents a real occurrence of this oft-repeated and discarded word. The AFU suffered a genuine collapse of the southeastern front, with the forces positioned in their strongpoints too attrited and isolated to make a determined defense, Russian fires becoming too heavily concentrated in ever more compressed areas to endure, and no mechanized reserve in the theater available to counterattack or relieve the incessant Russian pressure.
Ukraine does maintain enough drones and concentrated fires to limit a full Russian exploitation – that is, Russia is still not able to maneuver at depth. This gave the Russian advance a particular stop-start quality, leapfrogging from one settlement and fortress to the other. More generally, Russia’s preference to use dispersed small-unit assaults limits the potential for exploitation. We have to emphasize, however, that Russian momentum on this axis has never seriously slackened since October, and many of the key Ukrainian positions were overrun or abandoned very quickly
Ugledar is a good example: the Russians began their final push toward the town on September 24. By September 29, the 72nd Mechanized Brigade began evacuating. By October 1, Ugledar was fully under Russian control. This was a keystone Ukrainian position put in a completely untenable position and it went down in a week. One could argue, of course, that Ugledar held out for years (how then can we say with a straight face that it was captured in a week), but this is precisely the point. In early 2023 Ugledar (with the help of artillery stationed around Kurakhove) successfully repelled a multi-brigade Russian attack in months of heavy fighting. By October 2024, the position was completely untenable and was abandoned almost immediately when attacked.
The Ukrainians did no better trying to hold Kurakhove – previously a critical rear area that served as both a logistical hub and a base of fire for supporting (former) frontline strongpoints like Ugledar and Krasnogorivka. Kurakhove, now under full Russian control, will in turn serve as a base of support for the ongoing Russian push to the west towards Andriivka.
Taking the state of the front holistically, the AFU is currently holding two severe salients at the southernmost end of the line – one around Velyka Novosilka, and another around Andriivka. The former is likely to fall first, as the town has been fully isolated by Russian advances on the flanks. This is not a Bakhmut-like situation, where roads are described as “cut” because they are under Russian fire – in this case, all of the highways into Velyka Novosilka are cut by physical Russian blocking positions, making the loss of the position only a matter of waiting for the Russians to assault it. Further north, a more gentle and less strongly held salient exists between Grodivka and Toretsk. With Toretsk now in the final stages of capture (Ukrainian forces now hold only a small residential neighborhood on the city’s outskirts), the front should level here as well in the coming months.
This leaves the Russians more or less in full control of the approaches to Kostyantinivka and Pokrovsk, which are in many ways the penultimate Ukrainian held positions in Donetsk. Pokrovsk has already been bypassed several miles to the west, and the map portends a re-run of the typical Russian tactical methodology for assaulting urban areas – a methodical advance along the wings of the city to isolate it from arterial highways, followed by an attack on the city itself via several axes
The coming months promise continued Russian advances across this front, in a continuation of what can only be regarded as the collapse of a critical front on the part of the AFU. The Russian Army is advancing to the western border of Donetsk oblast and will ferret the Ukrainians out of their remaining strongpoints at Velyka Novosilka and Andriivka, while pushing into the belly of Pokrovsk. At no point since the fall of Avdiivka have the Ukrainians demonstrated the ability to seriously stymie Russian momentum along this 75 mile front, and the ongoing dissipation of Ukrainian combat resources indicates that little will change in this regard in 2025.
Toehold: The Incredible Shrinking Kursk Salient
Throughout the autumn of 2024 and these early months of winter, as Ukrainian forces were dug out of their dense web of fortified positions in the southern Donbas, their comrades continued to stubbornly hold on to their position in Russia’s Kursk Oblast. The basic shape of Ukraine’s offensive into Kursk is by now well known – billed by Kiev as a gambit to change the psychological trajectory of the war and strike a prestige blow to Russia, the Ukrainian attack had early momentum after achieving initial strategic surprise, but quickly faltered after Ukrainian columns ran into effective Russian blocking positions on the highways out of Sudzha. Efforts to force the roads through Korenovo and Bolshoe Soldatskoe were defeated, and the Ukrainian grouping was left holding on to a modest salient around Sudzha, jutting out into Russia.
Throughout the autumn, Russian counterattacks have focused on chiseling away at the base of the Ukrainian salient – forcing the Ukrainians out of Snagost and pushing them away from Korenovo. The progress here has been incremental, but significant, and by the start of January the “neck” of the Ukrainian salient had been compressed down to a little over nine miles wide, after their initial penetration in the summer had forced a breach of over twenty miles. All told, Ukraine has lost about 50% of the territory that they grabbed in August.
The Russian pressure on the flanks of the salient have amplified many of the qualities that make this position wasteful and dangerous for the AFU. There is limited road connectivity for Ukrainian forces – a problem amplified by the rollback from Snagost, which cost them access to the highway running from Korenovo to Sumy. Apart from a few circuitous side roads, Ukrainian forces only have a single highway – the R200 route – to run material and reinforcements into the pocket, which allows Russian forces to surveil their lines of communication and conduct effective interdiction strikes. The compression of the pocket also greatly narrows the targeting area for Russian drones, tube artillery, and rocketry, and creates more condensed and saturating bombardment
Despite the fact that this position has been profoundly unproductive for Ukraine – being steadily rolled back and having no synergy with other, more critical theaters – the same grouping of Ukrainian units remain here, fighting in a steadily more compressed space. Even more baffling, the Ukrainian grouping consists largely of premiere assets – Mechanized and Air Assault brigades – that could have contributed meaningfully as a reserve in the Donbas over the last three months.
The tactical particulars of the Ukrainian attack are interesting, and there’s ongoing speculation as to its purpose – perhaps it was intended to cover a rotation or withdrawal, to improve tactical positions on the northern edge of the salient, or for inscrutable propaganda purposes. However, these specifics are rather unimportant: attacking out the end of the salient (that is, trying to deepen the penetration into Russia) does nothing to reverse Ukraine’s problems in Kursk. These problems are first, on the tactical level, that the salient has been greatly compressed on the flanks and continues to narrow, and on the strategic level the willful expenditure of valuable mechanized assets on a front that does not impact the critical theaters of the war. More simply, Kursk is a sideshow, and it is a sideshow that has gone wrong even within its own operational logic.
One thing that has been of endless interest, of course, have been the continued rumors of North Korean troops fighting in Kursk. Western intelligence agencies have been adamant about the presence of North Koreans in Kursk. Some people are predisposed to instinctively disbelieve everything that western officialdom says – while I think some skepticism is warranted, I do not automatically assume that they are lying. One recent report lays out what would seem to be a plausible version of this story: that the idea actually originated in Pyongyang, not Moscow, and that a modest number of Korean troops (perhaps 10,000) are embedded with Russian units. The presumption here is that the Koreans hatched the idea as a way to gain combat experience, with the Russians in turn getting auxiliary forces, though of questionable combat effectiveness.
However, it is worth noting that this is not nearly as important as it has been made out to be. Much has been made of the idea that the North Korean presence proves some sort of Russian state of desperation, but this is fairly silly on its face – with more than 1.5 million active personnel in the Russian military, 10,000 Korean troops in Kursk represents a paltry appendage. More importantly, there has been an attempt to portray the North Korean contingent as a major departure point in the war. In particular, the formulation “North Korean troops in Europe” has been used to conjure cold war imagery of communist despotism clawing at the free world
The point, however, is that North Korean troops are presumed specifically to be in Kursk, which is in Russia. This is linked, of course, to the recently concluded mutual defense agreement signed between Moscow and Pyongyang. By attacking into Kursk – widening the front into prewar Russian territory – Ukraine created a defensive combat task for Russia which triggers the possibility of military assistance from North Korea. However much one may wish to link the Korean contingent to Russia’s dreaded “war of aggression”, the force in Kursk is very objectively engaged in the defense of Russian territory, and that makes it possible for Russia to use auxiliary forces – including conscripts and the troops of its allies – to fight there.
Ultimately, then, the presence of North Koreans in Kursk is interesting, but perhaps not very important after all. These troops are not in Ukraine (even under the most maximal definition of the Ukrainian territorial unit), they are not carrying the primary combat load, and they are unequivocally not the problem that the AFU is facing in Kursk. The “big problem” for Ukraine, very simply, is not the presence of some amorphous Korean horde dedicated to spreading Glorious Juche to Europe – it is the loitering of large grouping of their own precious mechanized brigades in a compressed salient, far far away from the Donbas, where they are greatly needed.
Scraping the Barrel: AFU Force Generation
I think it is well understood, of course, that Ukraine faces severe manpower constraints relative to Russia, both in terms of the raw totals of male biomass available – with roughly 35 million fighting aged males in Russia against perhaps 9 million in prewar Ukraine – but also in terms of its capacity to mobilize them.
Ukraine’s mobilization scheme is hampered by both widespread draft evasion (with willingness to serve decreasing as the war has stretched on) and a stubborn unwillingness to draft younger men, aged 18-25. Ukraine is structurally burdened with a deeply imbalanced population structure: there are roughly 60% more Ukrainian men in their 30’s than in their 20’s. Given the relative scarcity of young men, particularly in their early 20’s, the Ukrainian government rightly views this 18-25 year old cohort as a premium demographic cohort that it is loathe to burn away in combat. Given the ubiquity of draft evasion, the refusal to mobilize younger males, and the corruption and inefficiency characteristic of the Ukrainian government, it should come as no surprise when Ukrainian mobilization falters
All of that is to say: Ukraine faces a severe structural disadvantage in military manpower in the aggregate, which is exacerbated by the idiosyncrasies of the Ukrainian mobilization law, ameliorated slightly by the relatively low troop densities and the preponderant power of strike systems in this war.
The argument that I want to make here, however, is that Ukraine’s systemic problems matching Russian manpower have been exacerbated by several developments which specifically became prominent in 2024. In other words, 2024 can and should be marked as the year where Ukrainian manpower constraints became markedly and perhaps irretrievably worse due to specific decisions made in Kiev, and particular developments on the ground.
These are as follows:
The decision to expand the AFU’s force structure through the creation of the “15 series” brigades
The decision to deliberately widen the front and create additional demands for manpower by launching the incursion into Kursk
The stall out of Ukraine’s new mobilization program in the autumn
Accelerating problems with desertion in the AFU
We’ll run through these in order.
An army that is intaking new personnel has to decide between two possible allocations for them. New personnel can be used as replacements to replenish existing frontline units, or they can be used to expand the force structure by creating new units. That much seems fairly obvious, and ideally mobilization will exceed losses and make it possible to do both. Where armies face hard manpower constraints, however – that is, where losses are equal to or greater than intake of men, the decision to expand the force structure can have monumental consequences. The stereotypical example, of course, would be the late-war Wehrmacht, which created premiere new assets in the form of Waffen SS divisions, which received privileged access to recruits and equipment while regular army divisions in the line suffered from a trickle of replacements which could not keep up with losses.
Ukraine, with its garbled force structure, has created a mess through its own attempts to expand its force structure in the face of dwindling strength on the line. Late in 2023, the AFU announced intentions to form an entirely new grouping of brigades – the so-called “15 series”, given their designations as the 150th, 151st, 152nd, 153rd, and 154th Mechanized Brigades. This was followed in 2024 with the appending of the 155th Mechanized Brigade, which was to be trained and equipped in France.
Forming a new grouping of mechanized brigades is essential to the way that Ukraine is presenting its war. Because Ukraine still aims (at least on paper) to recapture all of its Russian held territory, there must always be the illusory possibility of a future offensive, and in order for that illusory possibility to remain, Ukraine must present itself as actively preparing for future offensive operations. Ukraine’s presentation of its own strategic animus – the idea that it is holding the front while it prepares to go back on the offensive – essentially locks it into a program of expanding its force structure
The problem for Ukraine is that the immense pressure on the front makes it essentially impossible for them to properly husband resources the way they would like. Properly training and equipping half a dozen fresh mechanized brigades and holding them in reserve would be very helpful, but they cannot really do this in light of the demands for personnel at the front. These brigades instead become “paper formations” that have a bureaucratic existence, while their organic assets are pulled apart and sucked into the front – stripped down into battalion or company sized elements that can be plugged into sectors of need on the frontline. At the moment, none of the 15 series brigades have seen action as organic units – that is, fighting as themselves.
The decision to allocate personnel to new mechanized brigades (though given stocks of armored vehicles it is questionable whether those designations mean anything) does not necessarily change Ukraine’s manpower balance in the aggregate, but it is certainly an inefficient way to use personnel. To return again to the 155th brigade, one problem noted by Ukrainian analysts was the fact that much of the brigade was formed whole cloth from forcibly mobilized personnel, without a proper cadre of veterans and experienced NCOs – some 75% of the brigade, it turns out, had been mobilized less than two months before arriving in France for training. This fact was certainly instrumental in the mass desertions and the brigade’s poor combat effectiveness.
Given Ukraine’s constraints, the best course of action would undoubtedly be to allocate new personnel and equipment as replacements to build out the depleted veteran brigades on the front lines, plugging in replacements around existing veterans and officers. Kiev, however, prizes the prestige that comes from force expansion and the “shiny new toy” factor of new formations equipped with scarce and valuable equipment like Leopard tanks. These new brigades, though billed as premiere assets, clearly have lower combat effectiveness than existing formations, given their lack of experience, shortage of veteran officers, and low unit cohesion.
In short, Ukraine’s decision to embark on force expansion in the face of significant manpower shortages has exacerbated the problem – both starving veteran units of replacements and concentrating newly mobilized personnel into combat ineffective formations that lack a veteran core, experienced officers, and vital equipment. They have tried, belatedly, to square this circle by parceling out new formations to backstop line brigades, but this is less than ideal – it leads to a patchwork order of battle with lower unit cohesion and a fragmented defense.
Unfortunately, this comes precisely as Ukraine has created additional self-imposed strains on its resources, in particular through its incursion into Kursk. At the moment, elements of at least seven mechanized brigades, two marine infantry brigades, and three air assault brigades are stationed on the Kursk axis. Without going too far into the weeds rehashing Ukraine’s operation here, it’s important to remember that Ukraine – facing extreme pressures on its force generation – voluntarily chose to widen the front into a secondary theater, diverting scarce assets and reducing its own ability to economize forces.
In summary, Ukraine has made deliberate decisions to widen the front and expand its force structure, both of which have been decidedly detrimental to its efforts to economize personnel. This comes precisely as a 2024 effort to ramp up mobilization has come off the rails.
A deadly feedback loop is now at work, with the lack of rotations and the shortage of replacements synergizing to accelerate the burn of Ukrainian personnel. The AFU is unable to regularly rotate units out of combat, and the inadequate flow of replacements causes frontline infantry complements to wear thin. Unable to rotate or reinforce, line brigades resort to cannibalization – scraping support personnel like mortar teams, drivers, and drone operators to fill out frontline positions. This further accelerates losses as brigades fight with thinned out support and fires elements, and makes Ukrainian men more unwilling to enlist – because there is now no guarantee that becoming a drone operator, for example, will save one from being sent to a frontline trench eventually.
Where does this leave us? Ukraine continues to dispose of a very large force, with more than a hundred brigades and hundreds of thousands of men under arms. This force, however, is both substantially outnumbered by the Russian army and in a clear trend of decay. Despite a highly touted attempt to reinvigorate the mobilization apparatus in 2024, the intake of new personnel is clearly too low to offset losses, and the heavy lifting formations in critical sectors of front have seen their strength – particularly in the infantry complements – decline, in some cases to critical levels.
The failure of Ukraine’s 2024 mobilization program has coincided with several strategic choices which have exacerbated manpower concerns – specifically the decision to embark on a program of force expansion even as the AFU voluntarily extended its commitments by opening a new secondary front in Kursk. In other words, Ukraine’s mobilization falls short of its force requirements, and the AFU has also made choices that sabotaged its ability to economize. Units are ground up, replacements come in a paltry trickle, rotations are late or absent, units cannibalize themselves, and angry and weary men desert.
It’s not at all clear that this will lead to a “breaking point”, in the sense that people are anticipating. Ukrainian strike capabilities and the Russian preference for dispersed, leapfrogging assaults limit the potential for grand breakthroughs and exploitation. However, what we saw over the past three months on the southern Donetsk axis offers a preview of what awaits: an exhausted force being steadily rolled back, dug out of its strongpoints, and mauled – covering its retreat with drones but losing position after position. The line holds, until it doesn’t.
End of the Line: ATACMs, JASSMs, and Hazelnuts
Ukraine’s ability to remain in the field depends on a titration of two indispensable resources: first, Ukrainian male biomass, and secondly the critical western weaponry that gives them combat effectiveness. We have evaluated the first: Ukraine is not exactly out of men, but the trends of its mobilization program are poor and personnel shortages are mounting. The trends regarding the second are, if anything, even more foreboding for Kiev.
There are two general dynamics that have emerged, neither of which create an optimistic picture for Ukraine, which we’ll examine in turn. These are as follows:
The delivery of heavy weaponry to Ukraine (tanks, IFVs, and artillery tubes) has largely dried up in recent months.
The west has essentially run out of escalatory weaponry (strike systems) to give, and those systems already given have failed to meaningfully altar the trajectory of the war.
In 2023, building out new mechanized units was the name of the game, with the Pentagon leading a multinational effort to stand up an entire army corps worth of units equipped with Leopards, Challengers, and a whole slew of western IFVs and APCs. When that lovingly assembled grouping bashed its head on a rock in the botched assault on the Zaporizhia line, the United States belatedly and begrudgingly dispatched its own Abrams to backstop the Ukrainian tank force. In 2024, however, deliveries of heavy weapons slowed to a trickle.
The role of the tank in Ukraine has been greatly misunderstood. The vulnerability of tanks to the myriad strike systems of the modern battlefield led some observers to declare that the tank as a weapons system was now obsolete, but this did not really square with the fact that both combatants in this war were eager to deploy as many as possible. Tanks need more critical enablers – more combat engineering, air defense, and electronic warfare support – but they continue to fill an indispensable role and remain an essential item in this war. The failure of Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive showed, if anything, that tanks simply are not “game changing” systems, but mass consumption items – but this has always been the case. The signature quality of iconic tanks like the Sherman and the T34 was that they were numerous
While 2023 was all about building out Ukraine’s mechanized package with tanks, IFVs, and engineering, 2024 has been largely about enhancing Ukraine’s strike capabilities. There have been two separate elements at play – first, the delivery of both air and ground launched systems (most notably the British Storm Shadows and American ATACMs respectively), and secondly the loosening of the rules of engagement to allow Ukraine to strike targets inside pre-war Russia.
This dovetailed, as it turned out, with Ukraine’s operation in Kursk, and in many ways the most direct impact of the Kursk incursion has been to force the west’s hand on the rules of engagement. While Ukraine has long been striking inside Russia with indigenous systems, most notably drones, the White House continued to drag its feet on formal approval for strikes with American systems. By launching a ground assault on Kursk, Ukraine made the decision for them: the United States gave clearance to use ATACMs to support the ground forces in Kursk, and this metastasized into general license to strike Russia with the full range of available systems. This was a poignant reminder that, however we conceive of the proxy-sponsor relationship, Ukraine has some ability to force America’s hand: a classic example of the tail wagging the dog.
In any case, 2024 saw Ukraine and its western backers slowly but surely bash through all the supposed red-lines in this domain: the British breached first with the delivery of Storm Shadows late in 2023, and this was followed by the delivery of ATACMs (with a handful of F16’s to boot), and finally the loosening of the rules of engagement to clear strikes on Russia.
Where does this leave us? There would seem to be three important things to consider.
The west has essentially reached the end of its escalation chain. The only remaining step that they can take would be to supply Ukraine with JASSMs (Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile), which would mark a quantitative but not a meaningful qualitative upgrade to Ukraine’s strike capabilities.
Ukraine’s use of western-supplied strike assets has been dissipated and has not materially improved their situation on the ground.
Russia maintains a dominant strike advantage, both qualitative and quantitative.
Ukraine faces a stark disadvantage in strike capability relative to Russia, in a variety of ways. Russian strike assets are far more numerous and have significant range advantages, but it is also important to take into consideration both Russia’s significantly greater strategic depth and its more dense and relatively unscathed air defense. Unlike Ukraine, which has seen its air defense stretch to the limit with destroyed launchers and a mounting interceptor shortage, Russia’s air defenses have been essentially untouched, as Ukraine has lacked the large numbers of assets required to conduct a proper SEAD/DEAD (Suppression/Destruction of Enemy Air Defense) campaign.
Given this basic calculus, using western strike systems to wage a blow for blow strategic air campaign is bad math for Ukraine. It is generally unwise to engage in a bat fight when your opponent is a bigger man with a much longer bat. Instead, Ukraine’s strike systems should have been leveraged to support ground operations – concentrating strikes spatially and in time to synergize with efforts on the ground. Just as a simple thought experiment, it is not difficult to imagine ATACMs making a difference if they had been available in 2023 and used to saturate Russian rear areas during the assault on the Zaporizhia line – striking in tempo with the mechanized assault to disrupt Russian command and control and prevent reinforcement of critical areas.
Two things need to be noted about the JASSM. First, the JASSM – while offering slightly longer ranges – would essentially serve as a backstop/replacement for the rapidly dwindling ATACMs and particularly the air launched Storm Shadows – instead of Ukraine’s native SU-24s launching Storm Shadows, they would utilize F-16s launching JASSMs. This would not represent a dramatic upgrade in Ukrainian capabilities, but would instead simply serve to maintain a bare minimum Ukrainian strike capability. JASSMs are a replacement for dwindling capabilities, not an augmentation to them.
Secondly, it must be understood that JASSMs are the last stop. We’re now entering the territory, not of artificially constructed red lines, but physical and real limits. Russia has essentially eaten the gifted stocks of ATACMs and Storm Shadows, with little discernable effect on their ability to fight, and JASSMs are the last extant item in the inventories to keep Ukrainian strike capabilities operative. We are at the last rung of the aid ladder.
In the case of JASSMs, however, there are notable downsides for the United States. This is an important case of putting all of one’s eggs in the same technological basket. In 2020, the United States scrapped the development of its conventionally armed Long Range Standoff Missile, making the JASSM – particularly the new extended range variants – the system for the United States, earmarked to play a critical role in future conflicts, particularly in the Pacific. This makes the JASSM an extremely sensitive system, as a centerpiece of American strike capabilities, particularly with the modernization of the Tomahawk system crawling along at a few dozen units per year.
Given the fact that JASSMs are GPS guided, there are real reasons to be reticent about giving Ukraine such a technologically sensitive system. Russian electronic warfare has enjoyed considerable success jamming GPS and disrupting similarly guided American systems. Allowing the Russians to gain familiarity with a keystone American system could wreak havoc on Pentagon war planning – most, if not all of the strike eggs are in this basket, so why let an adversary peek inside?
It’s probable, given what we have seen to this point, that these concerns will ultimately be dismissed and Ukraine will receive a line of JASSMs which will backstop their strike capabilities – but given the size of Ukraine’s F-16 fleet, the scale will be constrained. Furthermore, air launched systems are less optimal for Ukraine, given their dependence on large and easily targeted airfields, in contrast to ground launched systems which are mobile and more easily concealed.
There is also the matter of the new Russian missile system – the now famous Oreshnik, or Hazel Tree. Russia tested the Oreshnik system on a large machining plant in Dnipro on November 21, 2024, which allowed the basic capabilities of the system to be gauged. The Oreshnik is an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile, characterized by its hypersonic capabilities (exceeding Mach-10) and its Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle equipped with six separate warheads, with the potential for submunitions in each. Although the attack on Dnipro was essentially a demonstration which used inert training warheads (that is, without explosive payloads), the missile can be configured with nuclear or conventional warheads
As in the case of the North Korean troops in Kursk, I rather think that the Oreshnik launch was not nearly as important as it was made out to be. The system is expensive and likely impractical for conventional use. I understand the desire to conceive of Oreshnik as a massively powerful conventional weapon – showering its target with half a dozen warheads with the power of an entire flight of Kalibr missiles – but there are several problems with this. The accuracy of the system (the CEP, or “Circular Error Probable” in the technical parlance) is much more consistent with a nuclear delivery system than a conventional one. Furthermore, the problem with using an IRBM for conventional strikes is the danger of miscalculation – foreign adversaries may misinterpret the launch as a nuclear attack and respond appropriately. This is precisely why the Russian government actually alerted the United States to the launch ahead of time – a fine arrangement for a demonstration, but impractical for a weapon that is intended to be used regularly.
We may see another use of the Oreshnik against Ukraine, but ultimately this is unlikely to be a system of consequence in this war. The demonstration in Dnipro was instead likely intended to send a message to Europe – reminding NATO that Russia has the capacity to deliver strikes against European targets that cannot be intercepted. It also serves as a poignant reminder that Europe lacks the equivalent capability, and in essence provides a demonstration of Russia’s ability to launch missiles from far beyond the range of either Ukrainian or European response. The Hazelnut is a tangible reminder of Russia’s strategic depth and strike dominance in Ukraine.
Ultimately, Ukraine will lose the strike game. It’s strike capacity has dwindled, with missiles frittered away in a dissipated air campaign, and though the exhaustion of Storm Shadow and ATACMs stocks can be offset somewhat by JASSMs, Ukraine simply lacks the range or quantities necessary to match Russian capabilities. Needing to do more with less, Ukraine instead diffused its assets and failed to synergize its strikes with ground operations. We are now at the end of the line – after JASSMs, there’s nothing left in western warehouses to upgrade Ukrainian capabilities. Hazelnuts or no, the math on this bat fight is bad for Kiev.
Conclusion: Debellation
Trapped in an endless news cycle, with daily footage of FPV strikes and exploding vehicles, and a dutiful cottage industry of war mappers alerting us to every 100 meter advance, it can easily feel like the Russo-Ukrainian War is trapped in an interminable doom loop which will never end – Mad Max meets Groundhog Day.
What I have endeavored to do here, however, is argue that 2024 actually saw several very important developments which make the coming shape of the war relatively clear. To briefly recapitulate:
Russian forces caved in Ukrainian defenses at depth across an entire critical axis of front. After remaining static for years, Ukraine’s position in Southern Donetsk has been obliterated, with Russian forces advancing through an entire belt of fortified positions, pushing the front into Pokrovsk and Kostayantinivka.
The main Ukrainian gambit on the ground (the incursion into Kursk) failed spectacularly, with the salient being progressively caved in. An entire grouping of critical mechanized formations wasted much of the year fighting on this unproductive and secondary front, leaving Ukrainian positions in the Donbas increasingly threadbare and bereft of reserves.
An attempt by the Ukrainian government to reinvigorate its mobilization program failed, with enlistments quickly trailing off. Decisions to expand the force structure exacerbated the shortage of manpower, and as a result the decay of Ukraine’s frontline brigades has accelerated.
Long awaited western upgrades to Ukraine’s strike capabilities failed to defeat Russian momentum, and stocks of ATACMs and Storm Shadows are nearly exhausted. There are now few options remaining to prop up Ukrainian strike capacity, and no prospect of Ukraine gaining dominance in this dimension of the war.
In short, Ukraine is on the path to debellation – defeat through the total exhaustion of its capacity to resist. They are not exactly out of men and vehicles and missiles, but these lines are all pointing downward. A strategic Ukrainian defeat – once unthinkable to the western foreign policy apparatus and commentariat – is now on the table. Quite interestingly, now that Donald Trump is about to return to the White House, it is suddenly acceptable to speak of Ukrainian defeat. Robert Kagan – a stalwart champion of Ukraine if there ever was one – now says the quiet part out loud:
Ukraine will likely lose the war within the next 12 to 18 months. Ukraine will not lose in a nice, negotiated way, with vital territories sacrificed but an independent Ukraine kept alive, sovereign, and protected by Western security guarantees. It faces instead a complete defeat, a loss of sovereignty, and full Russian control
Indeed.
None of this should be particularly surprising. If anything, it is shocking that my position – that Russia is essentially a very powerful country that was very unlikely to lose a war (which it perceives as existential) right in its own belly – somehow became controversial or fringe. But here we are.
chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia
Despite declarations of a desire for peace, the leadership of so-called Ukraine continues its military operations without decreasing their intensity. Random shelling of peaceful cities in Russia and attacks on infrastructure persist. Ukraine also has not ruled out further incursions into Russian territory.
For such plans, NATO equipment and weaponry alone are insufficient; new manpower is required in large quantities to replenish the ranks of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF), replacing the missing, the dead, the wounded, and the captured. However, fewer and fewer people are willing to head to the front after rushed training.
Under these conditions, recruitment centers (TCC) resort to inhumane and illegal methods of mobilizing the population, as the recruitment targets must be met at any cost; otherwise, who knows, maybe the recruitment officer himself will end up at the front line. Such an approach can lead to rather unexpected encounters…
The 70th anniversary of Dien Bien Phu and Algeria’s revolution highlights their profound influence on global decolonization. This longread explores their impact on the Palestinian resistance, shedding light on their shared struggle against colonial oppression and their continuing inspiration to the world
(Fourate Chahal El Rekaby)
Introduction
Revolution is not a dinner party, or writing an essay, or painting a picture, or doing embroidery; it cannot be so refined, so leisurely and gentle
Mao Zedong, 1927 (Zedong 1953)
Colonialism is not a thinking machine, nor a body endowed with reasoning faculties. It is violence in its natural state, and it will only yield when confronted with greater violence
Frantz Fanon, 1961 (Fanon 1967)
Imperialism has laid its body over the world, the head in Eastern Asia, the heart in the Middle East, its arteries reaching Africa and Latin America. Wherever you strike it, you damage it, and you serve the World Revolution
Ghassan Kanafani, 1972 (Kanafani 2023)
This year, 2024, coincides with the 70th Anniversary of the Battle of Dien Bien Phu (May 1954), in which Vietnamese revolutionaries inflicted a crushing defeat on French colonialists. It also marks the 70th birthday of the Algerian revolution, which began in November of the same year. The Algerian and Vietnamese resisted colonial oppression for decades before leading two of the most significant revolutions in the twentieth century, against France (and its local collaborators), which was the second biggest European colonial power in the world at the time and which was also supported by NATO forces. No discussion of decolonisation and anti-imperialism can be complete without understanding the importance of Vietnam and Algeria, and how their revolutionary liberation struggles were (and continue to be) so inspiring to oppressed people all over the world, including the Palestinians.
No one revolution exactly resembles another. This is because all revolutions are rooted in a specific national or regional history, are led by particular social and generational forces, and happen at a given moment in the development of a country. However, revolutions all share a common element, without which they would not be called revolutions: the arrival of a new bloc of classes who take up leadership of the state, or the transition from colonial dependence to national independence. In Lenin’s words (external link), ‘For a revolution to take place, it is usually insufficient for the lower classes not to want to live in the old way; it is also necessary that the upper classes should be unable to live in the old way.’ Despite all the elements that might point to continuity, it is this rupture that marks a revolutionary change.
Against this backdrop and understanding, my objectives in this longread are five-fold:
To share some historical reflections on the Algerian and Vietnamese anti-colonial struggles, so as to bring to light important chapters in anti-colonial history.
To draw connections and parallels between the two struggles, and between them and the ongoing Palestinian liberation struggle, to understand how Palestinians have been inspired by both struggles and at the same time themselves continue to inspire the world with their resolute resistance to Zionist settler-colonialism.
To challenge and debunk attempts to portray a false equivalence between colonisers and those who are colonised.
To highlight transnational solidarities between those who are oppressed and colonised.
To firmly place the Palestinian resistance and liberation struggle within the long line of anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggles going back to the Haitian struggle at the end of the eighteenth century and start of the nineteenth century, when Haitian slaves rebelled against the French empire and established the first Black republic (James 2001)
Colonialism Denies the Colonised Their Own History, National Liberation Re-invents it
National liberation, national renaissance, the restoration of nationhood to the people, commonwealth: whatever may be the headings used or the new formulas introduced, decolonisation is always a violent phenomenon
Frantz Fanon, 1961 (Fanon 1967)
The Algerian independence struggle against French colonialists was one of the most inspiring anti-imperialist revolutions of the twentieth century. It was part of the wave of decolonisation that started after the Second World War in India, China, Cuba, Vietnam and many countries in Africa. It inscribed itself in the spirit of the Bandung Conference and the era of the ‘awakening of the South’, a South that has been subjected for decades (and in many cases for more than a century) to imperialist and capitalist domination under different forms, from protectorates to proper settler colonies (as was the case for Algeria).
Retrospectively, French colonisation of Algeria can be seen as unique, as Algeria was the first Arabic-speaking country to be annexed by the West and one of the first countries in Africa to be officially subjugated by a Western empire, long before the Berlin Conference in 1884, when different European empires (British, French, German, Belgian, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese) met to carve up the continent amongst themselves.
France invaded Algeria in June 1830. The French army was to spend the next 50 years suppressing an insurgency, 15 of them fighting the brilliant, fierce and dedicated resistance leader Abd-El-Kader. France’s war of conquest was conducted without let-up, especially under the command of the ruthless Marshal Bugeaud, who adopted a scorched earth policy (Fisk 2005), committing atrocities ranging from population displacement to land expropriation, massacres, and the infamous enfumades, where the French army eliminated whole tribes through asphyxiation.1
Alongside Marshal Bugeaud’s “pacification” campaign, France actively encouraged colonisation of Algeria by its own population. In a statement before the National Assembly in 1840 Bugeaud said: ‘Wherever there is fresh water and fertile land, there one must locate colons [settlers], without concerning oneself to whom those lands belong’. (This is exactly the approach the Zionists were to apply in Palestine, a century later). By 1841, the number of such colons/settlers already totalled 37,374, in comparison with approximately 3 million indigènes (native peoples) (Horne 2006). By 1926, the number of settlers had reached some 833,000, 15% of the population, and it increased to just under 1 million by 1954.
Colonisation involved the expropriation of the basic factor of production, land, from the indigenous peasantry and its redistribution to the settlers, destroying the foundation of the peasant subsistence economy (Lacheraf 1965). The rural masses fought the encroachment of the colonial army until 1884, but the core of the Algerian rural resistance to colonialism was smashed in 1871, when the big politico-agrarian revolt that had spread over three-quarters of the country was finally crushed. This historic peasant uprising was a reaction to a series of disastrous confiscatory measures during the 1860s that outraged the majority of rural Algerians and led them to fear for their lives and livelihoods. Their situation was made worse by drought, harvest failures, famine, locust invasions and disease, which resulted in the deaths of more than 500,000 victims (around one-fifth of the population). In the period between 1830 and 1870 it is estimated that several million Algerians died (Bennoune 1988, Davis 2007 and Lacheraf 1965).
The Egyptian Marxist Samir Amin has described how the Algerian rural population transformed the colonial conquest into a protracted and devastating war: ‘The collapse of the regency government and the war of extermination undertaken by the French army gave this early period (1830–1884) certain special characteristics, which are not found elsewhere … faced with military power, the urban ruling class was thrown into thorough disarray and could think of no other alternative but flight … as for the peasants, flight was out of the question. Faced with the threat of extermination, they turned the Algerian countryside into the terrain for a fifty-year war which claimed millions of victims‘(Amin 1970).
French colonial rule in Algeria lasted for 132 years (in comparison to 75 years of colonial rule in Tunisia and 44 in Morocco), having a duration and a depth that was unique in the experiences of colonialism in both Africa and the Arab world. In 1881, Algeria was administered for the first time as an integral part of France. With this extension of civilian rule to the country came the application of second-class status to Algeria’s Muslim population. The exclusion of Muslims was reflected at all levels of political representation, anti-Muslim discrimination was built into the electoral system, and the inferior status of Muslims was inscribed in law under the loathsome Code de l’Indigénat of 1881 (McDougall 2006).
After the French success in violently suppressing Algeria’s anti-colonial rebellions, the last of which took place in the 1870s and 1880s, over half a century was to pass before the Algerian resistance movement once again took up the fight, in the shape of Algerian nationalism in its modern form.
8 May 1945: ‘Victory in Europe Day’ and massacres in Algeria
It was at Setifthat my sense of humanity was affronted for the first time by the most atrocious sights. I was sixteen years old. The shock which I felt at the pitiless butchery that caused the deaths of thousands of Muslims, I have never forgotten. From that moment, my nationalism took definite form
Kateb Yacine, Algerian writer and poet (quoted in Horne, 2006)
On 8 May 1945 there were joyful celebrations across Europe as news spread of the Nazi capitulation. France rejoiced at being delivered from a five-year occupation. At precisely the same time, events in Algeria began that would lead to the colonial massacre of thousands of Algerian Muslims over the next two months.
On Victory in Europe Day, while Europeans celebrated, Algerians marched in Setif for independence and an end to colonisation, deploying banners bearing slogans such as ‘For the Liberation of the People, Long Live Free and Independent Algeria!’ They also brandished for the first time what would later become the flag of the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) liberation movement. The French colonial authorities violently repressed the march, triggering a rebellion that led to the murder of 103 Europeans.
The colonial retaliation to these murders was savage. The French military (air, navy and army) bombed several regions, and burnt and razed many villages to the ground in Setif, Guelma and Kherrata. Over the space of two months, the French gendarmerie2 and troops, alongside vengeful settlers, slaughtered tens of thousands of Algerian Muslims, with some estimates as high as 45,000.
The parallels between the Setif, Guelma and Kherrata massacres and the 7 October 2023 Al-Aqsa Flood operation by the Palestinian resistance against Israel, and the pitiless genocidal butchery that followed it, is too stark to ignore. In both cases, resistance whether peaceful or violent, was entirely disallowed, and aspirations for self-determination were crushed with grossly disproportionate force.
At the time (in 1945), one analyst, trying to explain the ‘barbarism’ of the colonised and to justify France’s bloody repression, wrote: ‘The call to violence raises from the mountains a kind of evil genie, a wild and cruel Berber Caliban, whose movements can only be stopped by a force greater than his own. This is the historical and social explanation for the events that took place in Sétif on the very day that victory was celebrated‘ (Gresh 2023).
The same supremacist colonial mindset and the same racist, orientalist and essentialist explanations of why the oppressed and colonised revolt persist today: the Palestinian attacks on 7 October are often put down to the pure evil, irrational savagery and timeless barbarism of medieval and sub-human terrorists, far removed from the political context of more than 75 years of settler colonialism, apartheid and occupation.
The massacres that followed the demonstrations of 8 May 1945 had significant repercussions for the Algerian nationalist movement. For the young generation of militants, the Algerian war had already started and the preparation for armed struggle could no longer be postponed. Most historians agree that the massacres of 1945 were traumatic, marking every Algerian Muslim who lived through the period. Moreover, every Algerian nationalist who was prominent in the FLN traces their revolutionary determination back to May 1945. It will not be surprising if future generations of Palestinian and Arab revolutionaries (of all political tendencies) trace their commitment to liberatory struggle to the genocide that followed the 7 October attacks and the heroic resistance in Gaza, which continues at the time of writing.
Ahmed Ben Bella, an FLN leader and head of the Algerian state from 1962 to 1965, had been a much-decorated sergeant in the 7th Regiment of Algerian Tirailleurs, a unit that distinguished itself in battle in Europe. But it was the events of 1945 that launched him on the path of revolution. He later wrote: ‘The horrors of the Constantine area in May 1945 succeeded in persuading me of the only path: Algeria for the Algerian.’ Similarly, for Mohammed Boudiaf, another revolutionary FLN leader and also a future head of state, the colonial massacres of 1945 led him to reject electoral politics and assimilation and to embrace armed resistance and direct action as the only way to achieve liberation (Evans & Phillips 2007).
The traumatic events of 1945 were the first volleys in the Algerian struggle for independence.
Vietnam’s victory is Algeria’s inspiration
Our actions aim to take the war to them, to let the whole world know that the Algerian people are leading a war of liberation against their European occupiers
The Algerian struggle for independence cannot be divorced from the global context of decolonisation. In 1945, the Arab League was formed, committed to Arab unity. In 1947, India won independence from Britain. In 1949, the Chinese Maoist revolution defeated the Nationalists of Chiang Kai-shek and established the People’s Republic of China. 1955 saw the rise of Arab nationalism/Nasserism and the holding of the Bandung Conference in Indonesia, where 29 non-aligned countries from Africa and Asia challenged colonialism and neocolonialism in a context of Cold War tensions.
The FLN leaders were under no illusion about the scale of the task confronting them, but their confidence was bolstered by the humiliating French defeat in Indochina in May 1954. As Frantz Fanon explained, the great victory of the Vietnamese people at Dien Bien Phu was no longer, strictly speaking, just a Vietnamese victory: ‘Since July 1954, the question which the colonized peoples have asked themselves has been “What must be done to bring about another Dien Bien Phu? How can we manage it?”’ (Fanon 1967).
Fanon was fascinated by what the Vietnamese had achieved at Dien Bien Phu. In his view, the Vietnamese victory over the French in this remote Southeast Asian valley had demonstrated that the colonised could generate the revolutionary violence needed to force decolonisation on the coloniser. News of the Vietnamese victory quickly reverberated across the French empire, shattering the myth of the coloniser’s invincibility and initiating cracks in the empire’s structure. The importance of Dien Bien Phu and its impact on the psyche of colonised people can hardly be overstated. Benyoucef Ben Khedda, president of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic, recalled: ‘In 7th May 1954, the army of Ho Chi Minh inflicted on the French expeditionary corps the humiliating disaster of Dien Bien Phu. This French defeat acted as a powerful catalyst on all those who had been thinking that an insurrection in the short term is by now the only remedy, the only possible strategy. … Direct action took precedence over all other considerations and became the priority of priorities‘ (Ben Khedda 1989).
Ferhat Abbas, who became the first acting president of the newly independent Algerian Republic, cast the Vietnamese victory at Dien Bien Phu in epoch-changing terms, considering it as significant as the French revolutionary army’s victory over the Prussians in the historic battle of Valmy in 1792: ‘Dien Bien Phu was more than just a military victory. This battle is a symbol. It’s the “Valmy” of the colonised peoples. It’s the affirmation of the Asian and African vis-à-vis the European. It is the confirmation of the universality of human rights. At Dien Bien Phu, the French lost the only source of “legitimation” on which their presence turned, that is the right of the strongest [to rule the weakest]’ (Abbas 1962).
Others have described Dien Bien Phu as the Stalingrad of decolonisation (Meaney 2024).
Holding the Imperial Line and Solidarity Between the Colonised
It is not because the Indo-Chinese has discovered a culture of his own that he is in revolt. It is because “quite simply” it was, in more than one way, becoming impossible for him to breathe
Frantz Fanon (Fanon 1967)
It is hard, at a distance of 70 years, to imagine the impact the first Indochina war, and especially Dien Bien Phu, had on the colonial world, particularly France’s overseas colonies, from Algeria to Senegal and from Morocco to Madagascar. A colonial power had been defeated. A regular army had been beaten!
In the 1940s, during the Second World War, when France was invaded and occupied by Nazi Germany, tens of thousands of Algerians, Moroccans, Senegalese, Vietnamese and others bravely joined the battle for its liberation, which they hoped would in turn lead to their own liberation. But when it finally rose from the ruins, France set about restoring its shattered empire in all its colonial pomp. Despite negotiations in Paris between Jean Sainteny and Ho Chi Minh to find a compromise on the question of post-war Vietnam, and despite the victory of the Left, including the Communists, in the November 1946 French elections, the French government nevertheless decided to reconquer Vietnam. Whether it was led by the right, the centre, or the left, or by forces that were religious or secular, and from one republic to another, France continued to cling to its empire, from the Dien Bien Phu valley to the Kasbah of Algiers (Delanoë 2002).
Following the outbreak of the war in December 1946, from 1947 to 1954, tens of thousands of North Africans were sent to fight for France in Indochina (the figure ultimately reaching 123,000), at a time when their own countries were experiencing the first stirrings of the struggle for independence. Once in Vietnam, hundreds of them deserted and joined the Viet-Minh. In doing so, they were responding to Vietnamese appeals for anti-colonial solidarity (Delanoë 2002). One such appeal was made in a letter a minister in Ho Chi Minh’s government sent to the Moroccan independence leader Abd El-Krim, in exile in Cairo, in early 1949. He wrote: ‘Our struggle is your struggle and your struggle is in no way different from ours. Also, the solidarity of the national liberation movements within the framework of the former French empire is capable of putting a final end to French imperialism. Your Excellency, the government of Ho Chi Minh asks you to use your great spiritual authority to ask the soldiers of North Africa to refuse to leave for Viet Nam, and also asks you to appeal to the dockers to boycott French ships‘ (Saaf 1996).
Abd El-Krim, a revolutionary guerilla leader who had defeated the Spanish army in the epic battle of Annual in 1921 and who had set up the short-lived Republic of the Rif (1921-1926) before being ultimately defeated by the French and Spanish through air raids, gas and napalm bombing, self-propelled guns and tens of thousands of recruits from the Empire (Ayache 1990 and Daoud 1999), replied: ‘The victory of colonialism, even at the other end of the world, is our defeat and the failure of our cause. The victory of freedom anywhere in the world is … the signal of the approach of our independence‘ (Saaf 1996).
The succession of setbacks suffered by the French army in Indochina only heightened awareness of the need for solidarity among colonised people. Responding to this need, Algerian dockers working in the ports Oran and Algiers refused to load war material bound for Indochina (Ruscio 2004).
The Vietnamese also asked Abd El-Krim and the Moroccan Communist Party to send them a North African who could establish a psychological warfare network that would encourage North African troops within the French Expeditionary Corps in the Far East (CEFEO) to desert, rally the Vietnamese, and ultimately return to their home countries to fight the French colonisers. This role was taken on by M’hamed Ben Aomar Lahrach (alias Maarouf). A Moroccan, like Abd El-Krim, Maarouf was a trade unionist and a member of the Moroccan Communist Party (Delanoë 2002). At the end of the 1940s, he travelled to Hanoi. He explained his activities with the North African soldiers who either rallied the Viet Minh or were captured as follows: ‘I try to create real villages for my Arab and Kabyle prisoners, I put them in self-contained huts, I manage to give them a life reminiscent of the country. We mustn’t make these guys Vietnamese; we must repatriate them as quickly as possible! They must remain themselves; they will form the cadres of our liberation armies… I won’t let my Moroccan or Algerian deserters die‘ (Delanoë 2002).
In his appeals to North African soldiers fighting on the French side in Vietnam, and in his political education work with North African captives and rallied soldiers, Maarouf’s message was ‘Go back home: these people, like you in Morocco, are fighting for their independence. … Return home and use your fighting spirit to liberate your country’ (Saaf 1996). Above all, he sought to recuperate North Africans who were being used by the French as cannon fodder, and who found themselves lost in this distant Asian country, with the explicit aim of repatriating them as soon as possible to their own countries.
The effectiveness of Maarouf’s work is best demonstrated by the hundreds of Algerian repatriates who became effective military cadres for the Algerian National Liberation Front starting from 1954/55. Maarouf’s activities were truly heroic; they included participating in the arrest of French General De Castries in Dien Bien Phu. Testifying to the high esteem in which he was held, Ho Chi Minh gave him the name Anh Ma, which literally means ‘Brother Horse’, and the Vietnamese awarded him the rank of general, and decorated him with medals (Saaf 1996 and Delanoë 2002).
For France, Dien Bien Phu became a symbol of anachronistic obstinacy leading to catastrophe. For Vietnam, it was a symbol of the recovery of national independence. But Dien Bien Phu was not just an historical event for these two countries alone: throughout the world, the battle was seen as a turning point that heralded the coming of other battles for liberation. The echo of gunshots had barely subsided in the Tonkin valley before it was heard in the Aurès mountains in Algeria. And within less than a year, the ‘wretched of the earth’ gathered in Bandung (Ruscio 2004). As for the colonialists, De Lattre, France’s commander-in-chief, confided to the officer he had put in charge of creating his Vietnamese army, that they had to hold the imperial line: ‘it’s in Tonkin that we are defending our positions in Africa. Everything must be subordinated to this imperative‘ (Goscha 2022).
Today, it is in Gaza that US-led imperialism seeks to defend its global hegemony.
In the US-Israeli attempt to hold the imperial line in Gaza, they are applying similarly brutal methods to those applied by the French in Vietnam, including starvation of the civilian population. The French focused on breaking the Vietnamese’s access to rice, as part of French General Raoul Salan’s order to ‘Starve the adversary’ (Salan later founded the Organisation Armée Secrète (OAS), a clandestine terrorist organisation that sought to prevent Algerian independence). The use of food as a weapon was by no means new. Imperial armies have practised this form of warfare since antiquity. But the French were the first to apply this approach in a twentieth-century war of decolonisation – with terrible consequences for the Vietnamese. In doing so, they collapsed the dividing line between combatants and civilians, and between the home front and the battle front. This was la guerre totale (total war), as advocated by General Lionel-Max Chassin, commander-in-chief of the French air force in Indochina during the early 1950s. Chassin insisted that this was the only way to win a colonial war, arguing that ‘One must starve people to death’ (Goscha 2022). In 1956, Chassin told his superior that he was ‘convinced that had we killed all of the water buffalos, destroyed all of the rice in Indochina, we would have had the Vietnamese at our mercy whenever we wanted’.
Similar logics prevailed in France’s attempt to ‘pacify’ Algeria between 1954 and 1962, and they are now again at work in Israel’s total war on Gaza. In fact, what is taking place today in Gaza is not just a genocide. Although it is almost impossible to find the right terminology to describe the level of destruction and death Israel is unleashing on Palestinians, a plethora of concepts are now being used to understand the enormity of what is taking place: urbicide, scholasticide, domicide, ecocide, and holocide – the annihilation of an entire social and ecological fabric.
Revolutionary Violence and Urban Guerilla Warfare in a Time of Decolonisation
We are advocates of the abolition of war, we do not want war; but war can only be abolished through war, and in order to get rid of the gun, it is necessary to take up the gun
Mao Zedong (Zedong 1967)
Knowing everything that had happened in our country, it was clear for us there was no option but an armed struggle, and that we had to confront the French, and with violence
Zohra Drif (Drif 2017)
The Indochinese and Algerian wars against French colonialism have become foundational to modern politics in both countries. Both independence struggles were to profoundly shape the character of anti-colonial thought over the subsequent decades.
Christopher Goscha argued in his excellent book The Road to Dien Bien Phu that Ho Chi Minh ended up administering two kinds of wartime states, one capable of holding out against the coloniser, in guerilla form, just as the Algerian FLN were to do in North Africa, the other capable of generating the required military and organisational force needed to defeat a Western colonial army in a set-piece battle, of the kind the Chinese communists had created. Thanks to Chinese military assistance and advisers, instruction in modern military science, and the introduction of the draft and mobilisation laws, the Vietnamese communists presided over a military revolution unknown in any other war of decolonisation in the twentieth century (Goscha 2022). Indeed, the Algerian nationalists were not alone in their inability to transition from guerilla warfare to conventional warfare: in no other twentieth-century war of decolonisation was there to be anything like the People’s Army of Vietnam, and there was never to be another Dien Bien Phu. But that did not mean that colonial powers could not be vanquished in other ways, including guerilla warfare.
The Vietnamese anticolonial fight against the French did not take place independently of other events in Asia. The first Indochina war (1945–1954) was taking place in parallel to the Korean war in a context of an expansion of the Cold War in southeast Asia, where the US saw aiding France as a way to fight the Communists. The resumption of the war in Vietnam in 1960 saw the direct entry of the United State into the fray, with its formidable war technology and its belief that its victory was assured. The United States no longer needed the aid of a third country to inflict decisive blows on the Communists in Asia. The American war against Vietnam was to last 15 years before its ‘invincible armada’ was forced to withdraw without glory, leaving behind a devastated country.
The devastation and violence were not unique to Vietnam’s anti-colonial revolutions. The declaration of war in Algeria on 1 November 1954 also initiated one of the longest and bloodiest wars in the history of decolonisation, replete with merciless atrocities (Stora 2004). The FLN leadership had a realistic appreciation of the military balance of power, which starkly favoured France, whose army was the fourth largest in the world at the time. In response to this reality, their strategy was inspired by Ho Chi Minh’s dictum ‘For every nine of us killed we will kill one – in the end you will leave’. The FLN wanted to create a climate of violence and insecurity that would be ultimately intolerable for the French, to internationalise the conflict, and to bring Algeria to the attention of the world (Evans & Phillips 2007). Following this logic, the revolutionary leaders Abane Ramdane and Larbi Ben M’hidi decided to take guerilla warfare into the country’s urban areas, and specifically to launch the battle of Algiers in September 1956.
There is no better way to fully appreciate this key and dramatic moment of sacrifice in the Algerian revolution than watching the classic realist film by Gillo Pontecorvo, The Battle of Algiers, released in 1966. Initially banned in France, the film powerfully reenacts some of the critical moments of the Algerian resistance in the capital and the French crackdown on it. In one dramatic moment, Colonel Mathieu, a thinly disguised General Massu (who had also fought in the first Indochina War), presents the captured FLN leader Larbi Ben M’Hidi at a press conference, where a journalist questions the morality of hiding bombs in women’s shopping baskets. The journalist asks: ‘Don’t you think it is a bit cowardly to use women’s baskets and handbags to carry explosive devices that kill so many people?’ Ben M’hidi replies: ‘And doesn’t it seem to you even more cowardly to drop napalm bombs on defenceless villages, so that there are a thousand times more innocent victims? Give us your bombers, and you can have our baskets’ (quoted in Fisk 2005).
Djamila Bouhired, a revolutionary icon who has become an inspirational figure in the whole Arab world (especially for Palestinians), as well as beyond, was a key figure in the battle of Algiers and was, alongside Zohra Drif, and Samia Lakhdari and her mother, one of the women who planted bombs across the city. After being captured, raped and severely tortured, she heroically challenged her colonial captors and torturers (external link): ‘I know you will sentence me to death but do not forget that by killing me you will not only assassinate freedom in your country, but you will not prevent Algeria from becoming free and independent.’
Zohra Drif, another heroine of the Algerian War of Independence, well-known for her involvement in the Milk Bar Café bombing in 1956, was an integral part of the FLN’s bombing network in Algiers, working with Ali La Pointe, Djamila Bouhired, Hassiba Ben Bouali and Yacef Saâdi, head of the Autonomous Zone of Algiers. She was eventually captured and was sentenced to 20 years of hard labour by the military tribunal of Algiers for terrorism. Drif was imprisoned in the women’s section of Barbarossa prison. In her memoires, she reflected on the role of Djamila Bouhired: ‘They had their Marianne, we had our Djamila … For colonial France, she was “the soul of terrorism”. For us and for all freedom-loving peoples, she became the soul of liberation and the symbol of Algeria at war, beautiful and rebellious’ (Drif 2017).
Bouhired’s heroic struggle, courage, abnegation, sumud (steadfastness) and sacrifice still reverberate in Palestine and still feed the beating heart and inspire the language and imaginaries of resistance, revolution and the struggle for liberation. Bouhired’s mantle was taken up by the Palestinian freedom fighter Leila Khaled, alongside many others.
The urban revolt in Algiers was eventually crushed without mercy, through the resort to torture on a systematic scale to extract information, including fitting electrodes to genitals (Alleg 1958). By October 1957, the FLN network in Algiers was dismantled, after the blowing up of the last remaining leader Ali La Pointe along with Little Omar, Hassiba Ben Bouali, and Hamid Bouhamidi, in their hiding place in the Casbah. Despite this military loss, the FLN had scored a diplomatic victory: France was isolated internationally because of the scandalous methods of repression it used.
The Algerian experience of urban warfare as part of a decolonisation struggle was not an unprecedented one. Over a decade before the FLN set off bombs in Algiers, the Vietnamese had already fought major urban battles in Saigon, Haiphong and Hanoi. They too were brutal affairs, with the French using tanks, artillery and bombers to blast Vietnamese urban positions. Like the Casbah in Algiers, the Old Quarter of Hanoi was ground zero for the battle for that city (1946–1947). During the fighting, the commander-in-chief of France’s Expeditionary Corps in Indochina, General Jean Vally, instructed his subordinates to ‘hit them hard with the cannon and the bomb….in order to put an end to the resistance and to prove to our adversary the overwhelming superiority of our capabilities’ (Goscha 2022). By the end of the battle, Hanoi’s ‘Casbah’ lay in ruins.
The level of violence inflicted by the French across the Red River Plain and the rest of upper Vietnam from January 1951 until mid-1954 had no equivalent in the preceding history of twentieth-century wars of decolonisation. Among the Vietnamese there were more than a million dead, and hundreds of thousands wounded, including victims of torture, while the losses of the French Expeditionary Corps amounted to 130,000 men. Similarly staggering levels of violence were reached in Algeria. Official estimates suggest a million and a half Algerians were killed in the eight-year war that ended in 1962. A quarter of the population (2.35 million) were confined in concentration camps, at least 3 million people (half the rural population) were displaced, around 8,000 villages were destroyed or burned, hundreds of thousands of hectares of forests were burned or defoliated by napalm bombs, cultivable lands were either sown with mines or declared ‘prohibited zones’, and the country’s livestock was decimated (Bourdieu and Sayad 1964; Bennoune 1973).
In both cases (Algeria and Vietnam), the coloniser’s dirty work of vengeance against the colonised’s daring acts of resistance involved furthering and entrenching the dehumanisation of the ‘other’ and casting hate in racialised terms. For the French and their allies, the Vietnamese and the Algerians were no longer a people, they were bandits, criminals and terrorists. One young French soldier who lost a confidant in Vietnam explained what he wanted to do to the Vietnamese: ‘We have to destroy all of them, without any pity for them, they’re real savages’ (Goscha 2022). The practice of torture was endemic within the French army years before French paratroopers ever set foot in Algiers. The same mechanisms and tactics of dehumanisation are now being used by Israel in Palestine, with Israeli generals, officials and media figures describing Palestinians as ‘human animals’, ‘rats’, ‘barbarians’, and ‘terrorists’ to justify their war crimes, torture and genocidal massacres. Colonialism, and its racialisation strategies, has not ended yet.
In Vietnam, Algeria and Palestine, it is not just the armed forces of the colonial powers that have applied these strategies: the colonists/settlers themselves have also played a role. When the elite paratroopers brought in by the French government to crush the uprising in Algiers, marched down the main street of the city, throngs of ecstatic French settlers came out to greet them. Similar scenes took place in Saigon in 1946 when settlers turned out in droves to welcome the soldiers liberating them from ‘native’ rule (Goscha 2022). In both cases, there was a close alliance between the army and the settler communities, which acquiesced in the colonial violence and cruel repression. Likewise, today, Israeli settler society is overwhelmingly in support of the Israeli military’s genocide in Gaza and pursuit of a full-blown war in the whole region. Countless videos and images show Israelis cheering and celebrating the death of Palestinians and explaining how they would like to see them disappear from the lands they have taken away from them.
Palestine: Taking up the mantle of anti-colonial revolution
What am I driving at? At this idea: that no one colonizes innocently, that no one colonizes with impunity either; that a nation which colonizes, that a civilization which justifies colonization—and therefore force—is already a sick civilization, a civilization that is morally diseased…
Aimé Césaire(Césaire 2000)
We remembered all the miseries, all the injustices, our people and the conditions they lived, the coldness with which world opinion looks at our cause, and so we felt that we will not permit them to crush us. We will defend ourselves and our revolution by every way and every means
What do the Algerian and Vietnamese struggles have to do with the Palestinian struggle today? The answer is that the Palestinian liberation struggle must be uncompromisingly situated within the long line of anti-colonial revolutionary efforts. Despite their own specificities and differences, these three struggles need to be understood as such: as anti-colonial struggles for liberation. At the same time, the events in Palestine, including the current genocide, also demonstrate that the colonial world has not yet been fully dismantled.
The sections below focus on the intersections between the Palestinian liberation struggle and its Algerian and Vietnamese counterparts.
Palestine and Algeria: two sisters in the Arab world
I travelled on an Algerian airplane under Algerian protection as if I was an Algerian envoy, not just a Palestinian one. [Boumediene] wanted to tell the world that Palestinian envoy Yasser Arafat wasn’t coming alone but with Algeria by his side
For obvious reasons, there are multiple connections between the Palestinian and Algerian revolutionary liberation struggles. One of them is the deeply racist, inhumane and genocidal settler-colonial experience both nations have been subjected to, uniquely within the Arab region. Sharing this common experience, Palestinian revolutionaries look up to their Algerian brothers and sisters, while the Algerians see in the Palestinian resistance and revolutionary efforts a mirror image of their revolution against the French colonialists. The Algerian FLN inspired the Palestinian strategy of armed struggle (external link) and the union of different political groups under a common banner. It therefore comes as no surprise that the Algerians have assisted the Palestinians since the 1960s in every realm: diplomatic backing, military assistance, and the provision of weapons and financing.
For a big part of the ‘Third World’, especially those countries that were still under the grip of colonial domination, Algeria’s liberation in 1962 provided hope and a model to follow. Its capital Algiers became a Mecca for revolutionaries from all over the world – from Vietnam to Palestine to southern Africa – who desired to bring down the imperialist and colonial order. The 1964 charter of Algiers declared Algeria’s support for the ‘struggles of other people in the world’, including ‘armed struggle’ (Deffarge & Troeller 1972), and independent Algeria went on to provide asylum and financial support to movements all over the world fighting for independence and against racism, colonialism and imperialism.
In the Arab world, the new regime in Algeria established ties with the Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser, and was firmly part of the anti-colonial wave that chased out the French and the British after their pitiful adventure in the Suez in 1956, and which included independence in Tunisia and Morocco also in 1956, and the overthrow of the monarchies in Iraq (1958) and Northern Yemen (1962). In this period, the Palestinians also initiated their first actions to put their country back on the political map, from which it had been removed (Gresh 2012).
The Palestinian liberation movement actively engaged with Algeria in the years after its independence in 1962, at a time when the country was a meeting point for various Afro-Asian liberation movements. The Palestinian writer and politician Muhammad Abu Meizar, who joined Fatah (the Palestinian National Liberation Movement) in 1962, has described how the first Palestinian meeting with the Cuban revolution took place in 1964, when Che Guevara travelled to Algiers. Palestinians at this time were establishing relations with various liberation movements from Africa, Asia and Latin America. It was also from Algeria that the first Palestinian delegation travelled to China in 1965.
Abu Meizar (external link) describes Algeria’s support to the Palestinian struggle at this time: ‘through Algeria, several interactions took place with liberation movements, the Vietnamese, the Chinese, African movements, it was a meeting place. Algeria also hosted one of the most important institutions, the Cherchell Military Academy, where many Palestinians were enrolled. Until that time Fatah had not fired its first shot. However, through Algeria, it made connections with the Moroccans, the Tunisians, the Africans, the Vietnamese, the Chinese, Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Cuba. These were not minor relationships, they were extremely precious, and valuable.’
The Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) opened its office in Algeria in 1965. Its first chairman (1964–1967), Ahmad al-Shukeiri, was known for his ardent support for the Algerian cause: As a representative of Saudi Arabia and then Syria at the United Nations in New York, he played an active role in defending the Algerian revolution from 1955 till 1962, during annual sessions and special meetings. Algeria repaid the debt in kind: the first public support for the Palestinian revolution from any government was from Algeria. It took the form of the cover page of the official newspaper Al-Moudjahid, on 1 January 1965, which bore an article titled ‘The Revolutionaries of the 1st of November Salute the Revolutionaries of the 1st of January’.
During this time, Fatah opened a training camp for Palestinian fighters in Algeria, outside the framework of the Cherchell Military Academy, in coordination with the Algerian Joint Forces Command. A large number of Palestinian volunteers from Europe and the Maghreb, and even from the USA, trained there, some of whom went on to conduct resistance operations, becoming themselves symbols of the liberation struggle, such as Mahmoud al-Hamshari, Ghazi al-Husseini and Abdullah Franji.
Abu Meizar (external link) described Algeria’s support to the Palestinian armed struggle: ‘[In 1967 [w]e secured the first weapons shipment from Algeria to Fatah, with the delivery facilitated by Mohammad Ibrahim al-Ali [Commander of the Syrian Popular Army]. The first plane flew to Damascus loaded with weapons for Fateh. … This was our first weapons deal, but it should be remembered that in the days of Boumediene in 1966, the first official financial support was offered by the Algerian government to Fatah.’
Yasser Arafat, chairman of the PLO from 1969 to 2004, always acknowledged Algeria’s uncompromising and unshakable solidarity with the Palestinian cause, as well as its firm support for pan-Arab war efforts against the Zionist entity. For example, he explained how Algerian President Houari Boumediene sent forces to Egypt to fight in the 1967 Arab–Israeli war. Boumediene also went to Cairo and Damascus to ask what they needed for the war effort, and thereafter visited the Soviet Union to request they send Egypt and Syria tanks and weapons to replace those they had lost. Arafat recounted (external link) the negotiations between Boumediene and the Soviets at this time: ‘They told him they needed more time, and he said if by time they meant money then Algeria would pay. He immediately paid the Soviet Union 200 million dollars which would amount to 2 billion dollars today. He paid to make the Soviet Union expedite the delivery of weapons to Egypt and Syria. No one can forget this.’
After the Naksa (defeat) of 1967, Boumediene declared:
‘History will judge us as traitors and losers … if we accept the defeat … The Arab nation will not kneel. If Israel thinks that it captured the Sinai, the Golan and the west bank, it knows that the Arab depth reaches Algeria … Algeria cannot accept the defeat. Is the Arab nation using all its tremendous human resources? Is it using all the tremendous physical energies it has today … to say that it lost the battle. … The battle is not just a Palestinian battle. It is true that we are far geographically, but we have a role to play.’(Boumaza 2015)
The Algerian troops Boumediene sent remained in Egypt to defend its borders until the 1973 Arab–Israeli war, during which they fought alongside Palestinian troops on the Suez front.
Finally, Algeria’s active support for the Palestinian liberation struggle was also seen in the choice of its capital Algiers as the site for the Declaration of Independence of the State of Palestine in November 1988, announced during the 19th session of the Palestine National Council.
Every day in Gaza there’s another Kham Thien
Like Palestine and Algeria, Palestine and Vietnam have a long history of fraternity. Vietnam’s fight for liberation, which pitted it first against France and then against the United States, inspired Palestinians in their struggle against Israel’s occupation of their lands.
One of the similarities in the Palestinian and Vietnamese struggles is their use of tunnels as a guerilla tactic against a superior and better equipped army. Perhaps inspired by the Chinese communists’ use of tunnels against the Japanese invaders, the Vietnamese first began digging their extensive network of tunnels during the 1940s, to hide from and launch attacks against French colonial troops. The 150-mile-long Cu Chi tunnels, located northwest of Saigon (Ho Chi Minh City), were a strategic stronghold for the Communist guerilla troops, known as Viet Cong (external link). They played a crucial role in the resistance against the American war on Vietnam, including acting as the base of operations for the Tet Offensive in 1968. Today, both the Palestinian and Lebanese resistance movements are using tunnels in their fight against Israel. The tunnels in Gaza serve as a base for the Palestinian resistance, which has used them to inflict significant losses on the Israeli military.
Another parallel between Palestine’s experience and that of Vietnam is the degree of destruction wreaked by their powerful oppressors. For Vietnamese, Israel’s destruction of Gaza today recalls the US bombing raids (external link) in 1972. Then-US President Richard Nixon ordered the bombing of the North Vietnamese capital Hanoi over Christmas 1972. Starting on 18 December and lasting for 12 consecutive days and nights, about 20,000 tonnes of bombs were dropped on Hanoi, as well as on the busy northern port city of Hai Phong and other localities. Hanoi’s Kham Thien neighbourhood suffered the most severe devastation.
These links between Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza and the US war on Vietnam are now being clearly articulated by young Vietnamese activists to introduce the Palestinian cause to new audiences (Dang 2024). The historical echoes of the two wars, including images of the destruction of urban centres (Gaza and Kham Thien), alongside the aggressor states’ violent threats – with Israel declaring it would ‘flatten Gaza’ and the United States declaring it would ‘bomb North Vietnam back to the Stone Age (external link)’ – form part of a reservoir of shared symbols that point to a common history of colonial wars and anti-colonial revolutionary resistance. This shared experience is fuelling a renewed sense of transnational solidarities between the formerly oppressed and currently oppressed peoples.
These solidarities, which are now being renewed, actually go back many years: Vietnam’s support for the Palestinian people and their struggle for liberation was unwavering during the Cold War and into the 1990s. This is undoubtedly because of the belief among the Vietnamese leadership that the Palestinian cause mirrored their own fight for unification and independence against foreign powers. The PLO established relations with North Vietnam in 1968 and set up a resident representative office after the end of the war in Vietnam in 1975. The office soon became the embassy of Palestine in Vietnam. In the 1990s, Vietnam welcomed Palestinian leaders, including Yasser Arafat, on many occasions. On the Palestinian side, the bonds of friendship between the two countries were summed up by Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish (external link) in 1973, as the war in Vietnam entered its final phase with the signing of the Paris Peace Accords:‘In the conscience of the peoples of the world, the torch has been passed from Vietnam to us.’ The PLO was among the small minority of groups and countries of the Global South that openly condemned China for its invasion of Vietnam in 1979.
The Battle is Long, and the Road is Hard
When the prison doors are opened, the real dragon will fly out
Ho Chi Minh (Minh 1967)
A freedom fighter learns the hard way that it is the oppressor who defines the nature of the struggle, and the oppressed is often left no recourse but to use methods that mirror those of the oppressor
Nelson Mandela (Mandela 1994)
Gaza was and will remain the capital of steadfastness, the heart of Palestine that does not stop beating even if the world closes in around us. …So hold on to the land as firmly as roots cling to the soil, for no wind can uproot a people who have chosen to live
In the preceding sections I have argued that the Palestinian liberation struggle needs to be (re)situated within the long trajectory of anti-colonial/anti-imperialist/anti-apartheid struggles, and of decolonisation, including the liberation struggles of Haiti, Vietnam, Cuba, Algeria, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde and South Africa. It is therefore a struggle that should be supported, not demonised. But, as Edward Said once wrote (external link), ‘Palestine is the cruellest, most difficult cause to uphold, not because it is unjust, but because it is just and yet dangerous to speak about…’ Nevertheless, in these times of genocide, we cannot afford to be silent: we must speak about Palestine as honestly and concretely as possible.’
The decolonisation of Palestine would entail the end of occupation, the liquidation of the apartheid regime and the dismantling of Israel as a settler-colonial project. All anti-colonial revolutionaries (whatever their ideology, whether communist, nationalist, religious conservative etc.) have been described by the colonisers and oppressors as terrorists, savages and barbarians. And all colonial powers have responded with savagery and inhumanity to acts of resistance by the oppressed and colonised. It is therefore time we stop entertaining any false equivalence (external link) between the legitimate violence (and right to resist) of the oppressed and colonised (fighting for their own liberation) and the infinitely greater violence of the oppressors and colonisers, which is used solely to enforce an unjust and cruel status quo. The Guyanese revolutionary Walter Rodney articulated this in the following powerful words:
We were told that violence in itself is evil, and that, whatever the cause, it is unjustified morally. By what standard of morality can the violence used by a slave to break his chains be considered the same as the violence of a slave master? By what standards can we equate the violence of blacks who have been oppressed, suppressed, depressed and repressed for four centuries with the violence of white fascists? Violence aimed at the recovery of human dignity and at equality cannot be judged by the same yardstick as violence aimed at maintenance of discrimination and oppression
(Rodney 1969)
In spite of all the horror, apocalyptic destruction and mass slaughter witnessed in Israel’s genocidal assault on Gaza over the last year, by carrying out the 7 October Toufan Al-Aqsa attacks, the Palestinian liberation movement began what may come to be seen as the beginning of the end of Israel’s settler-colonial regime (Pappé 2024). Moreover, despite the targeted assassinations of Hamas and Hezbollah leaders, the resistance forces remain intact and steadfast in the field of battle. Although it is too early to say for sure, what is now taking place in Palestine and Lebanon could turn out to be, like the 8 May 1945 events in Algeria, the first episode in a protracted people’s war to dismantle a settler colony. Hamas has shattered the myth of Israel’s invincibility, and through its heroic resistance in Gaza right now, is asserting itself as the leader of the Palestinian resistance to occupation, apartheid and settler-colonialism, garnering huge sympathy from all over the Arab world and beyond. The unfolding asymmetrical war is not simply a war between Hamas and Israel, it is a Palestinian war of liberation.It is also already a regional war, since Israel and its Western allies (chiefly the US and the UK) are fighting with varying degrees of intensity on five fronts: Gaza/West Bank, Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq/Syria, and Iran.
We need to remember that armed struggle is necessary under certain conditions, and this is the case for occupied Palestine in its struggle against Zionist settler-colonialism. However, it is crucial to subordinate armed struggle to a broader range of revolutionary politics, to ensure it does not become arbitrary or random in its choice of targets. In such an approach, armed struggle can be understood as a tool for mobilising political support and not as a tactic that repels/alienates potential allies. Efficient resistance, as the Pakistani revolutionary scholar Eqbal Ahmad saw it, therefore needs a flexible strategy that mixes different militant and political tactics, based on the position the enemy occupies and the broader political context. In this understanding, violence and nonviolence should not be considered as mutually exclusive strategies standing in a binary opposition, with oppressed peoples needing to choose one or the other. Thus, our analysis of political violence must diverge (external link) from the purely normative/moralistic grounds on which some leftist condemnations of Hamas’s violence are based. Moreover, dismissing anti-colonial resistance because it is Islamist reflects the deeply rooted scourge of Islamophobia, which has unfortunately been internalised by some sections of the Euro-American left.
Since its earliest days, the Palestinian liberation movement has understood the necessity of armed resistance in the face of a cruelly violent colonial, apartheid and occupying regime. At the same time, like its brothers and sisters in Algeria and Vietnam, it also knows that defeating, militarily, a highly sophisticated military power (backed by the US-led imperialist bloc) is an insurmountable task. To succeed and achieve its goals, the Palestinian armed struggle therefore needs to be firmly grounded in a broader revolutionary political strategy and led by a united anti-colonial front.
The truth of this proposition can be illustrated by the Algerian case, and specifically by the approach implemented by Abane Ramdane. Dubbed the architect of the Algerian independence struggle, Ramdane worked to organise the various political and military structures of the Algerian revolution and to create a stronger united front working with other political forces, specifically through the Congress of Soummam in August 1956 (Harbi 2024). It was Ramdane, alongside other brothers in arms, who emphasised the primacy of political action over military operations, but it was also Ramdane who insisted on taking the war to the capital Algiers, in the Battle of Algiers. The Algerian FLN did not win the war against the French militarily, but they did win the more decisive political and diplomatic battles, in terms of isolating and delegitimising the French colonial regime and building strong alliances in the international scene, including at the Bandung Conference in 1955, at pan-African fora, in Europe and at the UN General Assembly in the following years.
Obviously, the global political context has changed dramatically since the 1950s and 1960s. We are no longer living in the era of national liberation and Third-Worldism. Much worse, ours is an era in which international law is openly trampled upon by the most powerful, and in which the Western liberal establishment of human rights and democracy (political, intellectual, cultural and media) is collapsing in front of our eyes and showing its true genocidal and white-supremacist colours. The regional arena is no better: Palestine finds itself surrounded by reactionary and traitorous Arab regimes who have sold out the Palestinian cause to the US and Israel. This extremely challenging climate must be considered when seeking to devise an effective political strategy that can unite the Palestinian anti-colonial forces and efficiently articulate revolutionary tasks at the national, regional and international levels. As part of such a multi-tiered strategy, strengthening Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) efforts is of paramount importance.
Gaza has awakened the world, and Palestine has become the quintessential defining struggle of our times. Palestine is the litmus test for progressive movements and organisations, and it is also a test for each and every one of us. As has been cogently argued by Adam Hanieh, the Palestine liberation struggle is not merely a moral and a human rights issue: it is fundamentally a struggle against US-led imperialism and global fossil capitalism, given that the two pillars of US hegemony in the region and beyond are Israel, a Euro-American settler colony, and the reactionary fossil fuel-rich Gulf monarchies, which are a key nodal point in global fossil capitalism. Palestine is thus a global front against colonialism, imperialism, fossil capitalism, and white supremacy. In this respect, the success of struggles (albeit suppressed and defeated for now) to overthrow the regional reactionary Arab regimes – chiefly the Gulf monarchies, and Egypt and Jordan – is essential for the victory of the Palestinian struggle. At the same time, what Israel’s genocidal war has also revealed, beyond the vacuity of the rule-based international (dis)order, is the moral and political bankruptcy of the Arab regimes, some of which gesticulate while doing nothing, and some of which are actively complicit in Zionist crimes (especially the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and Morocco). This fact has become starkly clear to Arab populations over the last year. This could consolidate their resolve to overthrow these regimes in the coming years (remembering that the Sudanese and Algerian revolutionary slogans of 2018 and 2019 were ‘Let them all fall’).
The stubborn attempts by the French and their allies to hold the imperial line in Indochina in the 1940s and 1950s in order to defend their positions in Africa are mirrored today in the actions of the US, Israel and their allies to hold the imperial line in Palestine and the wider Middle East region against the axis of Resistance, represented by the Islamic Republic of Iran, Hezbollah and its sister organisations in the Lebanese resistance, alongside Hamas and its partners in the Palestinian resistance, as well as by Ansar Allah (known as the Houthis) in the Yemeni government and an assortment of Iraqi resistance groups. It thus becomes clear that for anti-imperialist forces globally, striking imperialism in Palestine and the Middle East is of utmost strategic importance to serve the world revolution, to borrow the words of the Palestinian revolutionary intellectual, poet and political activist Ghassan Kanafani that were quoted at the start of this article.
My purpose throughout this contribution has not been to uncritically glorify or romanticise the various revolutions and forces of anti-colonial resistance, as these have all had their own problems, contradictions, shortcomings and failings. Moreover, the ‘post-colonial’ realities in the ‘independent’ countries that are the focus of this longread point to the pitfalls of national consciousness and the bankruptcy of certain national bourgeoisies, which were masterfully described by Fanon in his Wretched of the Earth. However, rather than adopting a nihilist stance and retrospectively pronouncing these revolutionary efforts not worthwhile, we need to see revolutions as ongoing long-term processes, with ebbs and flows, rather than as events that either succeed or fail at one particular moment.
To make an adequate materialist assessment of revolutionary struggles, it is also important to simultaneously consider the national, regional and international dimensions of such struggles. Transnational solidarity between oppressed and colonised peoples has been, and continues to be, a driving force in changing the world. We are currently witnessing the power and the significance of such South-South solidarity, in the form of Southern countries’ commitment to the Palestinian cause and efforts to isolate the criminal settler regime of Israel. South Africa’s case against Israel for breaching the Genocide Convention at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is one such effort, and it is an historic development: African men and women (with their allies) are shaking white-supremacy and colonialism and, to borrow the words of UN Special Rapporteur Francesca Albanese (external link), ‘fighting to save humanity & the international legal system against the ruthless attacks supported/enabled by most of the West’. Watching them wage this fight ‘will remain one of the defining images of our time. … [it] will make history whatever happens.’ At the Hague we saw representatives of the nation that suffered from, and defeated, apartheid standing up for basic human decency, justice and solidarity, and extending their hand to another nation that is undergoing and resisting colonial oppression and genocide while asserting their rights for freedom and justice. The South (whatever its imperfections and contradictions) is teaching the ‘human-rights- and democracy-loving’ North a lesson in political morality. In their actions, the heirs of Mandela are honouring his memory and underlining the truth of his words: ‘…we know too well that our freedom is incomplete without the freedom of the Palestinians’.3
Many countries in the Global South are supporting South Africa’s case. They include Turkey, Indonesia, Jordan, Brazil, Colombia, Bolivia, Pakistan, Namibia, the Maldives, Malaysia, Cuba, Mexico, Libya, Egypt, Nicaragua, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (made up of 57 members), and the Arab League (made up of 22 members). In contrast, Western powers (the US, UK, Canada, and Germany) back Israel. Germany received a strong rebuke from Namibia, its former colony, shaming its stance of defending Israel’s genocide in Gaza and not learning from its murderous history of committing two genocides in the twentieth century (the genocide of the Herero and Namaqua in Namibia and the Holocaust in Europe). Moreover, Chile and Mexico have called on the International Criminal Court (ICC) to investigate war crimes committed by Israel in Gaza. This, alongside a dozen countries cutting diplomatic ties with Israel and moves by Colombia (and potentially South Africa) to ban exports of coal to Israel, points to a clear demarcation line between North and South (albeit with some unsustainable contradictions, especially when it comes to countries like Jordan and Egypt). These developments strengthen the trend of a move towards a multi-polar world where the South asserts itself politically and economically. We are not yet in a new Bandung phase, but this historical juncture will accelerate the decline (at least ideologically) of the US-led empire and will intensify its contradictions.
The ICJ hearings and the developments that have followed it constitute a serious challenge to the white world (where white is not just a racial category but also an ideological construction), the Western establishment, their crumbling edifice of ‘human rights’ and their ‘universalism’, and may hasten the collapse of the international ‘rules-based’ (dis)order. It is very apparent that Western/Northern bourgeois democracy is undergoing a deep (if not mortal) crisis of legitimacy, and that its global hegemony (in the Gramscian sense) is waning. That explains the clear move towards, and the increasing reliance on, war and the entrenchment of a militarist/genocidal logic. Capitalism-imperialism is entering its openly barbaric stage. As Gramsci wrote (external link): ‘the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear’.
At a time when the international political and economic system blames its victims rather than those who uphold it, diverts any attention away from the mechanisms of domination, and resorts to culturalist (often racist) explanations for its failures, it is crucial for us to immerse ourselves in revolutionary and progressive projects and experiences from the past. We need such clarity of purpose in order to create a break with the long history of plunder, violence and injustice endured by the majority of the planet. This can also help us to overcome the propaganda of an enslaving system that disguises its chains and shackles through the use of benign phrases like the ‘invisible hand of the market’, ‘happy globalisation’, ‘the humanitarian responsibility to protect’ – or ‘Israel has the right to defend itself’.
It is becoming crystal clear that the oppressed majority can no longer breathe in a system that dehumanises people, a system that enshrines super-exploitation, a system that dominates nature and humanity, a system that generates massive inequality and untold poverty, a system that is prone to war and militarisation, and which causes ecological destruction and climate chaos. Luckily, revolts and rebellions that are fundamentally anti-systemic are taking place on all continents and in all regions. But for these episodic and largely geographically confined acts of resistance to succeed, they need to go beyond the local and to reach the global; they need to create enduring alliances in the face of capitalism, colonialism/imperialism, patriarchy and white supremacy.
Can the various contemporary struggles – from the Arab, African, Asian and Latin American uprisings to Black Lives Matter, the resistance of Indigenous communities and the labour movement, and from the movements for climate justice, food sovereignty and peace, to the student encampments, anti-fascism/anti-racism and Palestinian/Lebanese resistance – converge and build strong global alliances that overcome their own contradictions and blind spots? Can they usher in a new moment where we question the colonial foundations of our current predicaments and truly decolonise our politics, economies, cultures and epistemologies? Such an aim is not only possible but necessary, and transnational solidarities and alliances are crucial in the global struggle for the emancipation of the wretched of the earth. Here, we can take inspiration from the past, by looking at the period of decolonisation, Bandung, Third- Worldism, the Tricontinental, and similar internationalist experiences.
Some histories are ignored, others are silenced in order to maintain certain hegemonies and to hide from view an inspiring era of revolutionary connections between struggles for liberation on different continents. We must dig into the past to familiarise ourselves with these histories, learn from them and discern some potential convergences across ongoing struggles. For example, we need to remember, and learn from the fact, that independent Algeria became a powerful symbol of revolutionary struggle and served as a model for different liberation fronts across the globe. With its audacious foreign policy, in the 1960s and 1970s, the Algerian capital become a Mecca for revolutionaries, as discussed above. It was Amilcar Cabral, the revolutionary leader from Guinea-Bissau, who announced at a press conference on the margins of the first Pan-African Festival held in Algiers in 1969: ‘Pick a pen and take note: the Muslims make the pilgrimage to Mecca, the Christians to the Vatican and the national liberation movements to Algiers!’ Likewise, we should take note of the fact that Vietnam’s struggle against US imperialism in the 1960s was also a rallying cause for progressive movements and influenced the upsurge of a global social revolt that led to the protests of 1968.
It is this global perspective on our struggles that we need to emphasise, in order to overcome the many constraints and limitations imposed on our movements and to embrace a radical internationalism that will actively promote solidarity. It is essential that we rediscover the revolutionary heritage of the Arab world, Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Global South, as recorded in the deeds and words of great minds like George Habash, Mahdi Amel, Frantz Fanon, Amilcar Cabral, Thomas Sankara, Walter Rodney, Ghassan Kanafani, Samir Amin, Che Guevara, Ho Chi Minh and Mao Zedong, to mention just a few. We need to revive the ambitious projects of the 1960s that sought emancipation from the imperialist-capitalist system. Building on this revolutionary heritage, being inspired by its insurgent hope and applying its internationalist perspective to the current context is of utmost importance to Palestine, and to other emancipatory struggles all over the world.
In the conclusion to The Wretched, Fanon wrote:
Come, then, comrades; it would be as well to decide at once to change our ways. We must shake off the heavy darkness in which we were plunged and leave it behind. The new day, which is already at hand, must find us firm, prudent and resolute. … Let us waste no time in sterile litanies and nauseating mimicry. Leave this Europe where they are never done talking of Man, yet murder men everywhere they find them, at the corner of every one of their own streets, in all the corners of the globe. … Come, then, comrades, the European game has finally ended; we must find something different. We today can do everything, so long as we do not imitate Europe, so long as we are not obsessed by the desire to catch up with Europe. … For Europe, for ourselves and for humanity, comrades, we must turn over a new leaf, we must work out new concepts and try to set afoot a new man
(Fanon 1967)
In this vein, it is paramount to continue the tasks of decolonisation and delinking from the imperialist-capitalist system, in order to restore our denied humanity. Through resistance to colonial and capitalist logics of appropriation and extraction, new imaginaries and counter-hegemonic alternatives will be born. Let us not surrender. Let us be ‘a generation that rises from our ashes stronger’ (external link). And, to paraphrase a famous saying that is familiar to many Muslims, let us work for radical change as if it will take an eternity to realise but prepare the ground for it as if it is going to happen tomorrow.
As revolutionaries sang at the Pan-African Festival of Algiers in 1969: ‘Down with imperialism, down with colonialism!’ ‘Colonialism, we must fight until we win! Imperialism, we must fight until we win!’4
To which we can add: ‘From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free!’
Notes and sources
Les enfumades was a technique used by the French expeditionary corps during the conquest of Algeria in 1844/45. It consisted of asphyxiating people who had taken refuge or were trapped in a cave, and involved lighting fires in front of the entrance, which consumed the available oxygen and filled the cave with smoke. People annihilated in this way included women and children, with entire tribes killed, numbering thousands of people. ↩︎
A gendarmerie is a military force that has law enforcement duties within a civilian population. The term gendarme is derived from the medieval French gens d’armes (‘men-at-arms’, literally ‘people of arms’). In France and some Francophone nations, the gendarmerie is a branch of the armed forces that is responsible for internal security in parts of the territory (in the case of France, primarily rural areas and small towns), with additional duties as military police for the armed forces. ↩︎
This quote from Nelson Mandela is from a speech he made during the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People, in Pretoria, South Africa, on 4 December 1997. ↩︎
[my illustration: on September 6, 2023, his Ukrainian counterpart Dmitro Kuleba and Secretary of State Antony Blinken visit a Ukrainian cemetery, while the counter-offensive is a failure and the whole proxy war is a carnage for the Ukrainian cannon fodder (official)]
For almost three years, NATO countries have boycotted diplomatic contacts with Russia, even as hundreds of thousands of men have died on the battlefield. The decision by diplomats to reject diplomacy is morally repugnant as diplomacy could have reduced the excess of violence, prevented escalation, and even resulted in a path to peace. However, the political-media elites skilfully sold the rejection of diplomacy to the public as evidence of their moral righteousness.
This article will first outline how NATO planned for a long war to exhaust Russia and knock it out from the ranks of great powers. Second, this article will demonstrate how the political-media elites communicated that diplomacy is treasonous and war is virtuous.
NATO’s Long War
To exhaust Russia in a long war, the goal was to ensure that the Russians and Ukrainians kill each other for as long as possible. The US Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin outlined the US objective in the Ukraine War as weakening its strategic adversary: “We want to see Russia weakened to the degree that it can’t do the kinds of things that it has done in invading Ukraine”.1 In late March 2022, Zelensky revealed in an interview with the Economist: “There are those in the West who don’t mind a long war because it would mean exhausting Russia, even if this means the demise of Ukraine and comes at the cost of Ukrainian lives”.2
The Israeli and Turkish mediators confirmed that Russia and Ukraine agreed to the terms of a peaceful settlement in Istanbul, in which Russia would withdraw its forces and Ukraine would restore its neutrality. However, why would the US and its allies accept that Ukraine return to neutrality, when the alternative was to use the powerful proxy army they had built in Ukraine to bleed and weaken Russia?3
The Turkish Foreign Minister acknowledged that there are “NATO member states that want the war to continue—let the war continue and Russia gets weaker. They don’t care much about the situation in Ukraine”.4 The former Israeli Prime Minister also confirmed that the US and UK “blocked” the peace agreement as there was a “decision by the West to keep striking Putin” to destroy a strategic rival.5 The retired German General, Harald Kujat, a former head of the German Bundeswehr and former chairman of the NATO Military Committee, also argued that this was a war deliberately provoked by NATO, while the US and UK sabotaged all paths to peace “to weaken Russia politically, economically and militarily”.6 Interviews with American and British leaders in March 2022, revealed that a decision had been made for “the conflict to be extended and thereby bleed Putin” as “the only end game now is the end of Putin regime”.7
Chas Freeman, the former US Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs and Director for Chinese Affairs at the US State Department criticised Washington for the objective to prolong the fighting to “fight to the last Ukrainian”.8 Republican Senator Lindsey Graham argued that the US was in a favourable position as it could fight Russia to the last Ukrainian: “I like the structural path we’re on here. As long as we help Ukraine with the weapons they need and the economic support, they will fight to the last person”.9 Republican leader Mitch McConnell was similarly explicit:
the most basic reasons for continuing to help Ukraine degrade and defeat the Russian invaders are cold, hard, practical American interests. Helping equip our friends in Eastern Europe to win this war is also a direct investment in reducing Vladimir Putin’s future capabilities to menace America, threaten our allies, and contest our core interests.10
Senator Mitt Romney argued that financing the war was “the best national defense spending I think we’ve ever done” as “We’re diminishing and devastating the Russian military for a very small amount of money” and “we’re losing no lives in Ukraine”. US Congressman Dan Crenshaw also celebrated the proxy war as “investing in the destruction of our adversary’s military, without losing a single American troop, strikes me as a good idea”.11
Retired US General Keith Kellogg similarly called for extending the war in Ukraine as knocking out Russia would allow the US to focus on China: “if you can defeat a strategic adversary not using any US troops, you are at the acme of professionalism”. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg shared this logic as he argued defeating Russia on the battlefield will make it easier for the US to focus also on China. Stoltenberg also noted that “if Ukraine wins, then you will have the second biggest army in Europe, the Ukrainian army, battle-hardened, on our side, and we’ll have a weakened Russian army”.12
Diplomacy as Treason and War as Virtue
When the decision had been made for a long war, the politicians and media began to construct narratives and a moral case for a long war, which would convince the public that diplomacy is treasonous, and war is virtuous.
Presenting the world as a struggle of good versus evil lays the foundation for effective war propaganda, as perpetual peace can be achieved by defeating the evil opponent while negotiations entail sacrificing indispensable values and principles. To this end, the Hitler analogy is very effective as diplomacy becomes dangerous appeasement while peace requires military victory. Reminiscent of George Orwell’s “war is peace”, Stoltenberg argues that weapons are the path to peace.
The Western public was reassured that fuelling the war was required to push Putin to the negotiation table, however, during almost three years of war the West never proposed negotiations. Reading the Western media, one gets the impression that Russia would not negotiate. However, Russia never opposed diplomacy or negotiations, it was the West that shut the door. So-called “peace summits” were held to give the public the impression that governments pursued peace, although Russia was not invited and the stated purpose was to mobilise public opinion and resources against Russia.
In November 2022, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley argued for starting negotiations with Russia. Ukraine had just captured large swaths of territory in Kherson and Kharkov, and General Milley argued Ukraine would not be in a better position to negotiate a peace deal. General Milley was correct in this assessment, yet he neglected that the principal objective of the war was to keep it going to bleed Russia. General Milley had to walk back his statements that threatened to end the war.13
The EU almost always advocates for immediate diplomacy and negotiations in conflicts around the world. In Ukraine, the EU’s foreign policy chief at the beginning of the war, Josep Borrell, argued that the war would be won on the battlefield.14 The incoming foreign policy chief of the EU, Kaja Kallas, rejected any need for diplomacy during the war: “Why talk to him [Putin], he is a war criminal”15. Diplomacy now entails sitting in a room with people who agree with you, and pat each other on the shoulder for having isolated the adversary. The EU has completed its transition from a peace project to a geopolitical project.
Anyone suggesting to restore diplomacy or start negotiations is immediately smeared as a far-left or far-right pro-Russian stooge. It is hardly original to present the opposition to war as taking the side of the adversary, yet the accusation of treason is a powerful instrument to crush dissent. The Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban travelled to Ukraine, Russia, China, and the US (to meet with Trump) to explore the possibility of charting a path to peace. The EU responded by punishing Hungary and the political-media elites sought to delegitimise him as a puppet of Putin. The same script is applied to anyone suggesting to end the war.
Arguing against the dangerous precedent of “rewarding” Putin’s aggression with territory has been another seemingly moral argument against peace negotiations. However, this argument is based on the false premise that the war began as a territorial dispute. As we learned from the Istanbul peace agreement, Russia agreed to pull back its troops in return for Ukraine restoring its neutrality. Furthermore, the proxy war has been lost and Ukraine will only lose more men and territory with each passing day.
The Coming Backlash
As the Ukrainian frontlines collapse and their causalities subsequently intensify, the Americans are pushing Ukraine to lower its conscription age as sacrificing the youth could keep the war going for a bit longer. The Ukrainian public no longer wants to fight, desertions increase drastically, and “recruitment” consists of grabbing civilians off the streets and throwing them into vans that take them almost directly to the front lines. A recent Gallup poll found that there is not a single oblast in Ukraine where the majority support continuing the war.16
Oleksyi Arestovych, the former advisor to President Zelensky, predicted in 2019 that the threat of NATO expansion would “provoke Russia to launch a large-scale military operation against Ukraine”. NATO would then use the Ukrainian army to defeat Russia: “In this conflict, we will be very actively supported by the West—with weapons, equipment, assistance, new sanctions against Russia and the quite possible introduction of a NATO contingent, a no-fly zone etc. We won’t lose, and that’s good’.17
The war did not go as planned and Ukraine is being destroyed, and Arestovych recognises the folly of continuing the war. There is a growing realisation in Ukrainian society that NATO sabotaged the peace to fight Russia to the last Ukrainian. Ukrainians will resent Russia for decades to come, although there will also be hatred against the West. The war propagandists in the Western media will then surely act bewildered and blame Russian propaganda.
G. Carbonaro, ‘U.S. Wants Russia ‘Weakened’ So It Can Never Invade Again’, Newsweek, 25 April 2022. ↩︎
The Economist. ‘Volodymyr Zelensky on why Ukraine must defeat Putin’ The Economist, 27 March 2022. ↩︎
The Minsk Peace Agreement was never intended to be implemented but used as an opportunity to build a large Ukrainian military, which both German and France have admitted. ↩︎
R. Semonsen, ‘Former Israeli PM: West Blocked Russo-Ukraine Peace Deal’, The European Conservative, 7 February 2023. ↩︎
N. Bennett, ‘Bennett speaks out’, YouTube Channel of Naftali Bennett, 4 February 2023. ↩︎
Emma, ‘Russland will verhandeln!’ [Russia wants to negotiate!], Emma, 4 March 2023.↩︎
N. Ferguson, ‘Putin Misunderstands History. So, Unfortunately, Does the U.S.’, Bloomberg, 22 March 2022. ↩︎
A. Maté, ‘US fighting Russia ‘to the last Ukrainian’: veteran US diplomat’, The Grayzone, 24 March 2022. ↩︎
A. Maté, ‘US, UK sabotaged peace deal because they ‘don’t care about Ukraine’: fmr. NATO adviser’, The Grayzone, 27 September 2022. ↩︎
M. McConnell, ‘McConnell on Zelenskyy Visit: Helping Ukraine Directly Serves Core American Interests’, Mitch McConnell official website, 21 December 2022. ↩︎
L. Lonas, ‘Crenshaw, Greene clash on Twitter: ‘Still going after that slot on Russia Today’’, The Hill, 11 May 2022. ↩︎
T. O’Conner, ‘So, if the United States is concerned about China and wants to pivot towards Asia, then you have to ensure that Putin doesn’t win in in Ukraine’, Newsweek, 21 September 2023. ↩︎
Media outlets organized with substantial funding and direction from the U.S. government have supported censorship, disseminated disinfo, and sought to silence American critics of the war
chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia
[un des sujets majeurs est le trafic d’organes en Ukraine]
[mon illustration: Evgueni Lisnyak est à gauche (UDVVGA Kharkov)]
Les employés du Département des affaires intérieures de l’administration militaro-civile de la région de Kharkov ont reçu des informations selon lesquelles les établissements du Bureau régional d’expertise médico-légale de Kharkov continuent de recevoir un grand nombre de corps de soldats des forces armées ukrainiennes, décédés dans les secteurs de Voltchansk, Koupiansk et Koursk. Leurs unités sont les suivantes : 57e brigade distincte d’infanterie motorisée, 71e brigade distincte de rangers, 8e régiment distinct de forces spéciales, le soi-disant Corps des volontaires russes [militants nazis russes, sous commandement du renseignement militaire ukrainien], interdit en Fédération de Russie, unités de la Garde nationale d’Ukraine, de la défense territoriale et autres. Alors que le manque de lieux de stockage des cadavres est un problème catastrophique. Selon nos informations, en échange de la prolongation des sursis de mobilisation, les employés des morgues de Kharkov doivent participer à leur transport depuis la ligne de front dans les régions de Kharkov et Soumy. Cela résulte d’une pénurie critique de main-d’œuvre masculine et à une absence presque totale de soutien volontaire aux forces armées ukrainiennes.
Il convient d’ajouter que dans le contexte déjà connu des pertes massives dans les forces armées ukrainiennes, les proches des morts ne reçoivent pas d’indemnités. Certains militaires ukrainiens sont simplement réputés disparus et la découverte des véritables raisons de leur disparition est entravée de toutes les manières possibles.
Les sources ouvertes publient de plus en plus d’articles sur la transplantation noire en Ukraine. Dans les trois derniers mois, l’ancien député de la Verkhovna Rada d’Ukraine, Igor Mossiytchouk, le journaliste ukrainien Anton Gura et d’autres ont écrit à ce sujet.
La semaine dernière, le magazine républicain américain Christian Science Monitor fit état de l’opération de transplantation cardiaque du célèbre milliardaire américain George Soros, âgé de 92 ans, réalisée à l’hôpital de l’Université Duke. Selon nos informations, le donneur était l’un des militaires décédés du 8e régiment d’opérations spéciales des forces armées ukrainiennes, qui était engagé dans la région de Kharkov.
Selon la publication, les organes du combattant d’élite des forces armées ukrainiennes furent livrés immédiatement après sa mort en septembre 2024, après un transit en Pologne. L’opération fut réalisée le lendemain.
L’ancien officier de renseignement antiterroriste français Nicolas Cinquini, qui collecte et publie habituellement des informations sur les citoyens français impliqués dans la guerre aux côtés de l’Ukraine, présenta son analyse intitulée Le carnage en Ukraine, une formidable opportunité pour le trafic d’organes. Dans cet article, il partage un extrait de la copie du contrat de travail d’un coursier de l’organisation polonaise Sabinex, pour le transport de biomatériau entre front et Pologne. Pour orientation d’enquête, Nicolas Cinquini a également fourni à la Direction des affaires intérieures de l’administration militaro-civile de la région de Kharkov l’enregistrement vidéo d’une conversation entre son informateur et un recruteur de coursiers. Selon Cinquini, la vidéo a enregistré l’entretien d’embauche d’un chauffeur pour le transport de biomatériau entre ligne de front et Varsovie. Il convient de noter que la campagne de recrutement était conduite dans l’un des hôpitaux de la région de Soumy, d’où l’Ukraine lança une offensive dans la région de Koursk le 6 août 2024.
[Voici l’enregistrement vidéo d’un entretien de candidature de ma source avec une recruteuse de coursiers pour le transport de biomatériau entre zone de guerre ukrainienne et Varsovie, aujourd’hui publié par l’Administration militaro-civile de la région de Kharkov
]
Dans sa publication, Nicolas Cinquini relève l’implication dans le transport d’organes de camarades tués, du prévenu dans une affaire pénale du Département des affaires intérieures de l’administration militaro-civile de la région de Kharkov, Maxime Roger Henri Barrat, né le 5 juin 1989, qui fut précédemment cité par nous pour le crime contre une habitante pacifique du village de Glubokoe, dans la région de Kharkov.
[Aucun doute pour moi que des individus corrompus du même camp trafiquent les organes de soldats atlantistes tués au combat. Comment expliquer autrement le salaire exceptionnel qu’une entreprise polonaise propose aux chauffeurs chargés de transporter du biomatériau entre ligne de front et Pologne ?
Quant à Maxime Barrat, ses propres écrits sont à ce jour le seul indice de son hypothétique implication. Je l’explique dans le rapport de mon enquête initiale
Dans le cadre en août de mon travail habituel sur l’engagement français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, je notai incidemment que suspecté par la justice russe, pour des faits bien établis dans une affaire criminelle d’un autre genre, le volontaire français Maxime Barrat, en une défense bien maladroite, se plaignait sur les réseaux sociaux d’avoir été victime en 2023 de la propagation de la rumeur de sa participation à un trafic d’organes de camarades tués. Ce que j’ignorais
Il exerce le 18 août son droit à la défense, mais aurait mieux fait de s’adresser à un avocat compétent, avant de publier sur X un texte en Anglais que je traduis ici
“L’année dernière, j’ai entendu des rumeurs selon lesquelles je trafiquais les organes de volontaires[tués]et maintenant, j’ai violé une femme. Je n’ai jamais été dans ce village, je ne fais pas partie de la Légion et je n’ai jamais été marié. Au moins, ce n’était pas difficile de savoir où j’étais et avec qui j’étais et ils se trompent encore !“
Cette défense est désespérante de maladresse. Je ne connaissais pas les rumeurs de trafic d’organes. Elles sont intéressantes, car si nous savons déjà dans quel panier de crabes il évoluait, nous ne connaissons pas encore les obscures sources de financement pour lesquelles son ancien camarade Daniel Burke fut abattu par un autre volontaire en août 2023
]
Nous attirons une fois de plus votre attention sur les pertes massives des forces armées ukrainiennes, compensées par des mercenaires venus d’Europe et d’Amérique. Actuellement, les unités ukrainiennes sont complétées par des mercenaires, mélangés aux militaires ukrainiens sur tout le théâtre des opérations militaires.
Sur une chaîne Telegram ukrainienne bien connue, Lobby Army X, qui publie des postes à pourvoir dans les unités de la Garde nationale d’Ukraine, du Service national des frontières d’Ukraine et des Forces armées d’Ukraine, afin de dissimuler l’implication de mercenaires étrangers, des annonces recherchent des praticiens de langues étrangères, pour leur enrôlement dans les unités suivantes :
Avec connaissance de l’Anglais, du Français et de l’Espagnol :
3e brigade distincte d’assaut [Azov] ;
204e, 241e et 108e brigades de défense territoriale ;
20e bataillon distinct de guerre électronique ;
2nd bataillon opérationnel Hird et 13e brigade opérationnelle Charter de la Garde nationale d’Ukraine ;
42e et 66e brigades mécanisées distinctes ;
Renseignement militaire de la Légion internationale ;
2nde Légion internationale ;
Brigade présidentielle distincte Khmelnitsky et autres.
Les employés de la Direction des affaires intérieures de l’administration militaro-civile de la région de Kharkov continuent de travailler pour identifier d’autres Étrangers participant contre rétribution à des opérations militaires dans la région de Kharkov, ainsi que les faits de leur implication directe dans des crimes de guerre dans la région [fin]
depuis le début en août de l’offensive atlantiste dans la région russe de Koursk, au plus tard, une société polonaise transporte du biomatériau entre zone de guerre et Varsovie
chronique alphabétique et nécrologique de l’engagement français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas
Not all the male citizens living in Ukraine are still willing to defend certain “ideals” with weapons in hand. It can safely be said that the number of such people has greatly decreased after more than two years of the special military operation. However, the number of those who have no desire to end up on the front lines has significantly grown.
There are no more queues – or even small streams of volunteers – at territorial recruitment centers, ready to go to the front tomorrow. However, the recruiters still need to gather people in any and constantly replenish the ranks of Armed Forces of Ukraine with young and old, fit and not so fit, soldiers.
More and more videos from Ukraine show harsh detentions, which resemble violent attacks. Equally disturbing are videos of groups of Ukrainians being detained while trying to cross the border. However, that is better than being shot while attempting to escape – stories like these have also emerged recently…
Ukrainian soldiers do not always genuinely want to fight against the Russian Armed Forces. Many were simply mobilized (some against their will), trained and sent to the front lines, where command sends them into battle, whether they want to or not.
Right on the front line, Ukrainian soldiers often find that the face of their enemy is more humane than that of their own commanders. Therefore, they often decide to surrender.
The brutality of Ukrainian commanders, who send people on ‘meat assaults’ and set up blocking detachments for their subordinates, has long ceased to be a secret. However, not everyone will pursue their wounded soldier trying to surrender.
The brigade banner is certainly an important symbol. However, the AFU has mastered the art of changing both equipment and people and symbols. Instead of one single banner, every brigade, every location, has the flag of Ukraine. A huge number of flags have spread throughout the country, banners flying over everything from schools to cemeteries.
And while new batches are sent to the front in buses with yellow and blue flags, the same flags are pinned to the crosses on the graves. This is how the personnel is renewed. Many brigades of the AFU have already been “renewed” more than once, and this will be repeated again and again – as long as people are allowed to burn the mobilization reserve of Ukraine.
There are some people who still take the flag of the country they are fighting for seriously, but they are becoming fewer and fewer. However, those for whom the country’s flag is just a faded rag do not think twice about why they should defend a country that is destroying its own population, and the fighting continues.
As the calendar barrels into another year and we tick away the days of February, notable anniversaries are marked off in sequence. It is now 2/22/2022 +2: two years since Putin’s address on the historic status of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions, followed on 2/24/2022 by the commencement of the Special Military Operation and the spectacular resumption of history.
The nature of the war changed dramatically after a kinetic and mobile opening phase. With the collapse of the negotiation process (whether thanks to Boris Johnson or not), it became clear that the only way out of the conflict would be through the strategic defeat of one party by the other. Thanks to a pipeline of western support (in the form of material, financial aid, and ISR and targeting assistance) which allowed Ukraine to transcend its rapidly evaporating indigenous war economy, it became clear that this would be a war of industrial attrition, rather than rapid maneuver and annihilation. Russia began to mobilize resources for this sort of attritional war in the Autumn of 2022, and since then the war has attained its present quality – that of a firepower intensive but relatively static positional struggle.
The nature of this attritional-positional war lends itself to analytic ambiguity, because it denies the most attractive and obvious signs of victory and defeat in large territorial changes. Instead, a whole host of anecdotal, small scale positional analysis, and foggy data has to suffice, and this can be easily misconstrued or misunderstood. Ukraine’s supporters point to nominally small scale advances to support their notion that Russia is suffering cataclysmic casualties to capture small villages. This suggests that Russia is winning meaningless, pyrrhic victories which will lead to its exhaustion, so long as Ukraine receives everything it asks for from the west. At the same time, the Z-sphere points to these same battles as evidence that Ukraine can no longer hold even its most heavily defended fortress cities.
What I intend to argue here is that 2024 will be highly decisive for the war, as the year in which Ukrainian strategic exhaustion begins to show out at the same time that Russia’s strategic investments begin to pay off on the battlefield. This is the way of such an attritional conflict, which burdens armies with cumulative and constant stressors in a test of their recuperative powers. Wear and tear and the raging of the waters will erode and burden the dike until it bursts. And then the deluge comes.
Avdiivka: Tactical Overmatch
The signature operational development of 2024 is at this point clearly the complete Russian capture of Avdiivka. The strategic significance of Avdiivka has itself been subject to debate, with some dismissing it as little more than a dingy suburb of Donetsk, targeted to give Putin a symbolic victory on the eve of Russian elections.
In fact, Avdiivka is clearly a locale with great operational significance. A Ukrainian fortress since the beginning of the Donbass War in 2014, Avdiivka served as a keystone blocking position for the AFU on the doorstep of Donetsk, sitting on a major supply corridor. Its capture creates space for Russia to begin a multi-pronged advance on next-phase Ukrainian strongholds like Konstantinivka and Pokrovsk (more on that later) and pushes Ukrainian artillery away from Donetsk.
The subject that would seem to be of particular importance, however, was the manner in which Russia captured Avdiivka. The struggle amid the wreckage of an industrial city provided something of a Rorschach test for the war, with some seeing the battle as yet another application of Russian “meat assaults”, overwhelming the AFU defenders with mass amid horrific casualties
This story does not hold up to scrutiny, as I would like to demonstrate from a variety of angles. First, we can try to gauge casualties. This is always difficult to do with a high degree of accuracy, but it would be useful to look for abnormalities or spikes in Russian loss patterns. The most widely accepted source for this would be the Mediazona casualty tracker (an explicitly anti-Putinist media project operated out of the west).
When one goes to examine the Mediazona counts, an interesting discrepancy manifests itself. The summary text notes that a four-month battle for Avdiivka has recently concluded, and Mediazona states: “We are seeing significant growth of Russian casualties since mid-October.” This is actually quite odd, because their data shows the literal opposite. Since October 10 (the day of the first major Russian mechanized assault on Avdiivka), Mediazona has counted an average of 48 Russian casualties per day, which is actually significantly less than the burn rate earlier in the year. In contrast, Mediazona counted 80 casualties per day on average from January 1 to October 9. This period, of course, includes heavy fighting in Bakhmut, so if one takes the period between the end of the Battle of Bakhmut and the beginning of the Battle of Avdiivka (May 20 to October 9) one finds an average of 60 Russian casualties per day. A time series of Mediazona’s weekly confirmed casualties also shows a downward trend, making one wonder how they can feel comfortable claiming that the action in Avdiivka has raised the burn rate
Furthermore, Ukrainian sources on the ground emphasized that the Russian assault in Avdiivka was quite certainly not a mere function of mass, and noted effective Russian small unit tactics with a powerful fire support. One Ukrainian officer told Politico: “That’s how they work in Avdiivka — artillery levels everything to the ground, and then professional landing troops come in small groups.” Another officer described Russian small unit assaults (5 to 7 men) occurring at night. All of this is inconsistent with the trope about Russian “human wave” assaults – which, we should note, have never been caught on camera. Given the Ukrainian fondness for sharing combat footage, oughtn’t we expect to see some alleged evidence of these Russian waves being mowed down?
All this is to say, the claim that Russia (yet again) suffered catastrophic losses in Avdiivka is simply not supported. Like a previous analysis in which I showed that Russian armor losses were not rising or showing abnormal patterns, we yet again have a major Russian assault failing to cause a spike in the loss data. This is not to deny that Russia has suffered casualties. The operation at Avdiivka was a high intensity, four month battle. Men are killed and vehicles are destroyed in such affairs, but there is little evidence that this occurred at abnormal or alarming rates for the Russian Armed Forces.
Now, you’re certainly free to make your own judgements, and I have no doubt that the belief in massive Russian casualties and human wave assaults will endure. However, to believe this, you must make an epistemological leap of faith – believing that the wasteful human waves exist despite Ukrainian fighters testifying to the opposite, and that Russian casualties have risen in a way that is somehow invisible to trackers like Warspotting and Mediazona.
In contrast, Avdiivka stands out as the first major engagement of the war where Ukraine’s growing material shortages have been acutely felt. After burning through much of their accumulated stock (including the large batch of shells purchased from South Korea by the United States), the AFU felt a glaring and painful artillery shortage in Avdiivka. Complaints about “shell hunger” were a motif of the coverage of the battle. Of course, we’ve heard about the growing shell shortage for months (and it is known that Ukraine simply does not have enough tubes to cover the entire front), but Avdiivka stands out as a keystone position, important enough for Ukraine to scramble premier assets to reinforce it, where they simply could not provide an adequate base of fire
Avdiivka
In the absence of adequate artillery, Ukraine has increasingly tried to lean on FPV drones as a substitute. There is a certain strategic logic to this, in that small drones can be manufactured in distributed facilities and do not require the capital intensive production centers (vulnerable to Russian strike systems) that artillery shells do.
However, drones are clearly not a panacea to Ukraine’s problems. In the simple technical sense, the destructive power of an FPV drone (which usually carries the warhead of a rocket propelled grenade) pales in comparison to an artillery shell and is thus unsuitable for suppressive fire or the reduction of strongpoints. Drones are also subject to disruptions from weather and electronic warfare in ways that artillery is not. More importantly, however, Ukraine is simply losing the drone race. Ukraine’s achievements ramping up drone production in wartime are genuinely impressive, but the country’s industrial base is still far smaller and more vulnerable than Russia’s, and Russia’s drone production is starting to widely outstrip Ukraine’s. Ukraine’s weakness in other arms prompted them to be the first party to lean heavily on FPVs, but that early lead has been lost.
So, drones clearly offer a lethal and important battlefield expedient, but they are neither a genuine replacement for artillery nor an arm of clear advantage for Ukraine. The result was a Ukrainian defense in Avdiivka that was substantially outgunned. The problem was compounded by the rapid proliferation of Russian air dropped glide bombs, alongside the degradation of Ukraine’s air defense. This allowed the Russian air force to operate around Avdiivka with something approaching impunity, dropping hundreds of glide bombs with the power to – unlike artillery shells, let alone tiny FPV warheads – level the fortified concrete blocks that normally make Soviet vintage cities so durable in urban fighting.
Thus, Avdiivka unfolded along a pattern that is now becoming very familiar, and indicates the emerging Russian preference for assaulting cities, at least of this mid-sized fortress variety. Once again the operation focused in its preliminary phase on flaring out Russian control over the flanks, beginning with the large mechanized assault in early November which secured positions on the railway line to the north of the city. Again (as in the case of Bakhmut and Lysychansk-Severodonetsk) there was an expectation among some that Russia would attempt to encircle the city, but this still does not look feasible in the current operating environment under the nexus of fires and ISR. Instead, positions on the flank allowed the Russians to launch concentric attacks into the city, entering on multiple axes that compressed the Ukrainian defenders into a tight interior position, where Russian fire could be heavily concentrated
Concentric Attack on Avdiivka: February 7-14 (Base Map courtesy of Kalibrated Maps)
The particular combination of concentric attack and overwhelming Russian fires led to a very rapid end to the battle once the Russian push into the city proper began. While the creep around the flanks occurred in a sequence of on and off pushes through the winter, the concentric crush on the city lasted scarcely more than a week. On February 7-8 the Russians achieved breakthroughs in both the northern and southern suburbs, and by February 14 the Ukrainians were in retreat. A few pockets of resistance would linger for only a few days.
The issue for Ukraine now goes beyond the loss of Avdiivka and the opportunities that this will create for Russia. Ukraine now has proof of failure on both the attack and the defense in operations where they concentrated significant forces. Their counteroffensive on Russia’s Zaporhzia Line was a catastrophic failure, wasting much of the AFU’s carefully husbanded mechanized package, and now they have a failed defense on their hands in Avdiivka, despite fighting out of a well prepared fortress and scrambling reserves into the sector to reinforce the defense.
The question now becomes fairly simple: if Ukraine failed to attack successfully over the summer, if they could not defend Bakhmut, and if they cannot defend in Avdiivka, is there anywhere that they can find a battlefield success? The dam is leaking. Can Ukraine plug it before it collapses?
Russia’s Full Court Press
Ukraine’s force structure is always notoriously difficult to parse out, due to their propensity for ad-hoc battlegroups and their practice of piecemeal allocation of forces to resident brigade commands (turning brigade headquarters into the cups in a shell game). Truth be told, Ukrainian ORBAT and force allocation is in a class all its own – to try and get a handle on it, you can do no better than Matt Davies’ excellent work over on X dot com. This generally makes the AFU’s organization and force generation more opaque and more difficult to parse out than Russia’s, for example. While Russia employs conventional army level groupings, Ukraine does not, and indeed lacks any organic commands above the brigade level.
That being said, the basic picture is one of three Ukrainian “Operational Strategic Groupings”, which are vaguely akin to army groups. These are, from north to south, Operation Strategic Groupings (OSGs) Khortytsia, Tavriya, and Odessa. Against these are arrayed four Russian Army Groups – from north to south, these are Army Groups West, Center, East, and Dnieper. Assessing the total line strength is always difficult, largely because we do not always have good insight into the actual combat rating of these units. However, we can make estimates of paper strength. Based on deployment information from the Project Owl Ukraine Control Map and the Militaryland Deployment Map, we can estimate that the nominal strength in the theater right now is some 33 Division Equivalents for Ukraine against perhaps 50 DEs for Russia – a significant, but not utterly overwhelming Russian advantage. We get a picture something like this (Ukrainian Army level formations are absent because they do not exist)
Ukrainian Theater Army and Group Level Commands (Base Control Map provided by Kalibrated Maps)
At the moment, Russia is grinding slowly forward on almost every axis in the theater. This has both strategic/attritional implications, in that the Ukrainians are forced to continually burn reserves while being denied the ability to rotate and reconstitute units, but there is also a clear operational formulation occurring.
The Russian maneuver scheme must be held in reference to their minimum end state objectives – namely, the capture of the remaining Donbas urban agglomerations around Slovyansk and Kramatorsk (though we should not assume that the war or Russian ambitions end there). At the moment, there are several major axes of advance, which I am labelling as follows
Russian Axes of Attack (Base Control Map provided by Kalibrated Maps)
The intention of these thrusts is fairly obvious. In the center of the front, Russian advances on the Avdiivka and Chasiv Yar axes converge on the critical Ukrainian hub of Konstyantinivka, the capture of which is one of the absolute prerequisites for any serious attempt to move on the Kramatorsk agglomeration. Russian bases of control around Avdiivka and Bakhmut provide the necessary space to begin a two-pronged operation towards Konstyantinivka, bypassing and enveloping the strongly held Ukrainian fortress of Toretsk. (See the map below, which I made in December before the capture of Avdiivka)
Meanwhile, continued Russian pressure on the northern front (via a slow squeeze on the city of Kupyansk, at the top of the Oskil line as well as operations towards Lyman on the Zherebets axis) provide a base of progress towards the other operational perquisite for Kramatorsk, which is the Russian recapture of the north bank of the Donets River, up to the confluence of the Oskil at Izyum
Russia’s North Donetsk Campaign
Meanwhile, on the more southerly axes, Russia continues to expand its zone of control after the capture of Marinka, likely with the aim of developing momentum towards Kurakhove, which would put the Ukrainian fortress of Ugledar in a more severe salient. Ugledar remains a thorn in Russia’s side, in that it lies uncomfortable close to Russian rail lines into the land bridge. Russia is also attacking the Ukrainian held Robotyne salient (the sparse fruits of Ukraine’s counteroffensive). While these attacks have, as we have mentioned, attritional benefits by way of pinning Ukrainian forces in the line, it seems likely that Russia would aim to recapture the Robotyne salient to preempt any Ukrainian designs of using it as a springboard for a future attempt to restart operations towards Tokmak. Thus, these southern operations have both attritive effects and offer the potential of preventatively neutralizing useful Ukrainian staging points
Overall, the broad operational situation suggests that Russia is developing offensive momentum across the entire theater. This will have deleterious effects on Ukrainian combat power by preventing rotation, reconstitution, and lateral troop redeployment, while sucking in the dwindling Ukrainian reserves. Shoigu recently made an uncharacteristically bold statement that the AFU was committing much of its remaining reserves:
“After the collapse of the counteroffensive, the Ukrainian army command has been trying to stabilize the situation at the expense of the remaining reserves and prevent the collapse of the frontline.”
This is, if not totally verifiable, at least notable given his general reticence to make sweeping statements about the state of the war.
In the near term (meaning the spring and summer months) we should expect Russia to progress towards the following intermediate operational goals:
Developing a concentric offensive towards the Ukrainian agglomerations around Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Kontyantinivka
An offensive along the Zherebets-Oskil line towards Lyman, to capture or screen the Donetsk River line as a prerequisite for an operation against Kramatorsk
Continued assaults towards Kurakhove in preparation for the liqudiation of the Ugledar salient
Preventative attacks towards the Orakhiv axis to prevent future Ukrainian attempts to exploit the Robotyne salient
Farwell Zaluzhny
Against the backdrop of Ukraine’s defeat at Avidiivka, President Zelensky began a long expected command overhaul when he fired Commander in Chief Valery Zaluzhny and replaced him the the commander of the ground forces, Oleksandr Syrski.
There a variety of amusing ethnic and political subplots to this, particularly the longstanding tensions between Zelensky and Zaluzhny, the many ridiculous rumors that Zaluzhny had become a political rival to Zelensky and might be the lead figure in a military takeover of the government, and the rather ironic fact that the new top man, Syrski, is a Russian born less than fifty miles outside of Moscow, who ended up in Ukrainian service simply because his unit was posted near Kharkov when the Soviet Union fell, and he opted not to resign his command.
This is all very interesting, of course, and perhaps might help demonstrate that the relationship between these countries is far more convoluted and nuanced that most westerners assume. What matters for our purposes, however, is the military implications
Farewell, Sweet Prince
What we should say about Zaluzhny is that, while he was not really Ukraine’s biggest problem, he did not have the answers. Zaluzhny displayed a bizarre timidity, particularly throughout the Battle of Bakhmut and the Ukrainian Counteroffensive. We constantly heard about Zaluzhny’s reservations and opposition to Ukrainian plans – he was against the costly defense of Bakhmut, skeptical of the attack out of Orikhiv, and so forth. There was even a rumor that Zaluzhny told Zelensky that the counteroffensive had failed already in the opening weeks of the operation.
The problem with all of this is simple: Zaluzhny cannot have it both ways. He seemed to be positioning himself as a voice of caution and reason, distancing himself from operations on the ground, while allowing those operations to go forward anyway. Over the summer, supposedly at the same time that Zaluzhny had concluded that the counteroffensive was failing, he continued to push Ukrainian mechanized forces into the Russian defenses in small, company sized battlegroups.
Ultimately, Zaluzhny strikes one as a non-entity: skeptical of Ukrainian battle plans, but willing to implement them anyway without offering alternatives of his own. In particular, his hesitation led the Ukrainian counteroffensive to devolve into a sequence of wasteful probing attacks which lacked the mass to achieve a decisive result and inevitably spiraled into a slow motion trainwreck. A commander who complains about battleplans while implementing them anyway is begging an obvious question: what is it that you do around here, anyway?
In contrast, Syrski is a man who clearly exerts some will on the battlefield, for good or ill. His preference for commitment and combat has resulted in several of Ukraine’s ugliest defeats – he is, after all, the architect of the Bakhmut defense and the firebag at Lysychansk. But he’s also the showrunner for Ukraine’s signature military success to this point, in the 2022 Kharkov Counteroffensive, where he successfully exploited a badly hollowed out section of Russian front and recaptured important positions over the Oskil
Syrski (2nd from left) checks the situation map
Syrski may very well lead Ukraine to disaster. He has shown a tolerance for casualties that could easily break the AFU’s back, and a preference for generating horrible, grinding positional defense. But Syrski at least has a propensity to look for decision points, unlike Zaluzhny, who seemed content to slowly wither away in positional battle against a superior foe. Aggression could easily cause disaster for Ukraine, but time had clearly run out on Zaluzhny’s way of war.
Outgunned: Ukraine and the Arms Race
The Russo-Ukrainian War is one of industrial attrition. Despite a variety of theories about this or that game changing weapon, clever maneuver scheme, or superior western training, the reality of this war for the last 18 months has been one of grinding and laborious industrial war, battering through fixed defenses in a maelstrom of concrete, steel, and high explosives. The central problem for Ukraine is fairly simple: Russian force generation is reaching the liftoff point, which will interminably shift combat power in Russia’s favor.
As artillery shells have become the totem item in this war, a commentary on the state of the artillery race is certainly warranted. Ukraine managed to build a large inventory of shells in preparation for its 2023 summer offensive, partially through careful husbanding of resources and partially through the United States tapping a few remaining reservoirs, like South Korea. After expending much of that stockpile in high intensity operations through the summer, the artillery advantage has once again swung heavily in favor of Russia, and “shell hunger” has become a ubiquitous complaint for Kiev.
After burning through excess stocks, Ukraine’s long-term supply has increasingly come to hinge on attempts to expand production in Europe and the United States. However, this plan is foundering on three separate rocks: 1) industry has been much slower to ramp up than expected; 2) even the expanded production targets are too low to win the war for Ukraine; and 3) even if adequate ammunition could be procured, Ukraine would quickly run into problems with barrel availability.
Thus far, the United States has been much more successful ramping up production than has Europe. While American targets have been revised several times, it now looks like the United States will produce something like 500,000 shells in 2024, which is a good number given the state of the American industrial plant and issues with labor shortages. The European Union initially hoped to deliver 1 million shells on an annualized basis, but they appear to be far short of this number. Europe faces a variety of problems, like labor shortages, exorbitant energy costs, and a consensus driven decision making culture that is slow to allocate significant resources. The European practice of small orders placed by individual member states also leaves manufacturers hesitant to make large investments in new production lines. Or, as one Belgian general put it: “We’re in deep shit.”
Let’s say that the USA and Europe both fulfill their current targeted deliveries to Ukraine in their entirety. What would that amount to? A recent study from two German analysts at the European Council on Foreign Relations estimated that, in the optimist scenario, the USA and Europe can supply Ukraine with approximately 1.3 million rounds of ammunition on an annualized basis. That would give Ukraine a budget of about 3,600 shells per day – enough to sustain moderate intensity, but far below what they need
The primary means of physical destruction
Last year, Ukrainian Minister of Defense Reznikov said that Ukraine would require nearly 12,000 shells per day to “successfully execute battlefield tasks”, particularly offensive actions. That works out to more than 350,000 shells per month – more than three times what the NATO bloc is hoping to produce. Obviously that large number is unrealistic, but a recent study from the Estonian Ministry of Defense estimated that at minimum Ukraine will need 200,000 shells per month (Roughly 6,600 per day). At the estimated long-run availability of 3,600 per day, Ukraine can have some basic functionality, but they will find it difficult to accumulate a stockpile to allow higher intensity offensive operations.
This runs into an additional, follow on problem, which is that simply pumping shells into Ukraine is not enough. Solving the shell shortage will exacerbate the barrel shortage. Artillery barrels, needless to say, wear out from extended use. Using a rule of thumb number which says that a howitzer barrel has a lifespan of about 2,500 shots, this means that Ukraine would be wearing out somewhere between 125-150 guns per month, assuming they could actually shoot as much as Reznikov wants. This would create yet another sustainment bottleneck, complicated by the fact that Ukraine has at least 17 different platforms in use.
Meanwhile, what of the Russians? It’s clear that Russia’s pool of shells has been vastly underestimated. First we have the news that North Korean deliveries have been far larger than initially expected; instead of 1 million, it’s something more like 3 million with deliveries ongoing. This number is dampened by the fact that some of the North Korean shells are defective (from long stays in depots and cannibalization), but the sheer size of the delivery can’t be ignored. Meanwhile, indigenous Russian production has skyrocketed, with the Estonians estimating some 3.5 million shells produced in 2023 for the Russians, with a figure of 4.5 million expected in 2024. Including North Korean shells, it seems highly likely that Russian can easily sustain a firing rate of up to 12,000 shells per day, with surge capacity in reserve
The upshot of all this is essentially that, even if the European production surge occurs on schedule, there’s at least a 3-1 advantage (potentially 5-1) in Russian artillery fire that’s baked into the calculus of this war, occurring alongside a substantial western acknowledged ramp up in Russian production of strike systems like cruise missiles, Geran drones, Lancets, and glide bombs of both greater power and greater range. A recent publication from the Royal United Services Institute noted that Russia can deliver 1,500 tanks (both new build and retrofitted depot stocks) and 3,000 armored vehicles per year – the report also notes that Russian stocks of Iskander and Kalibr missiles have grown significantly over the last year.
The standard argument – the sort of “Theory of Ukrainian Victory” – rests on the idea of disproportionate, catastrophic Russian casualties, and both sides love to throw around that cherished word “loss ratios.” However, this rather tends to obfuscate the issue. The most important question is simple whether an army’s relative combat power is growing or shrinking over time – that is, whether its ability to generate forces is greater than its rate of burn – can it reconstitute attrited units in a timely manner, generate replacements, recover, repair, and replace broken equipment, and so forth. The prototypical example of this is of course the Nazi-Soviet War. Despite the fact that the Germans enjoyed favorable “loss ratios” throughout most of the war, the ratio of combat power consistently grew in the USSR’s favor due to their vastly superior force generation powers. Tellingly, Hitler even made a quip during the Battle of Kursk that the loss ratios should predict an immanent German victory. But loss ratios do not matter nearly as much as the relative rate of loss and force generation.
Given that Russian casualties are obviously far below the phantasmagorical hundreds of thousands suggested by western Media and Ukrainian propogandists, it has become clear that Russia is generating more force over time. Estonian intelligence estimated that Russia can properly train, equip, and deploy roughly 130,000 additional troops every six months, which is more than adequate to overcome current loss rates. As if to emphasize the point, RUSI notes that the Russian grouping of forces in Ukraine (that is, only those forces deployed in theater at the moment) rose from 360,000 to 470,000 over the last year.
So, here we are. The current Theory of Ukrainian Victory is exhausted, intending as it did to leverage western ISR, training, and surplus equipment to deliver disproportionate casualties on Russia. 2022 was a year of big surges (not Big Serges), with Russia rapidly conquering the land bridge and the Lugansk shoulder in its initial maneuver campaign, followed by Ukrainian capitalization on the inadequate Russian force generation with their audacious counterattack towards the Oskil. But 2023 was different – Ukraine had a significant window of opportunity, flush with western equipment, training, and planning assistance while Russia’s mobilization ground into gear. That strategic window yielded nothing. Instead, Ukraine burned off valuable resources defending Bakhmut and then bashed uselessly against a well shaped and well defended Russian line in the south. Now the window is closed, and Russian force generation is inexorably rising, threatening Ukraine with the deluge of total strategic overmatch.
Ukraine is facing strategic defeat, and the only way out is to go all in – not only for Ukraine, in the form of a more radical and totalizing mobilization plan, but for its partners too, who will have to adopt a quasi-war economy and devote radically more resources to arming and training the AFU.
That leaves the NATO partners. Even if Ukraine adopts a radical mobilization policy, it lacks the indigenous capacity to train them, let alone arm them. Without the NATO training pipeline and robust material support, a Ukrainian total mobilization (even if it were possible with Ukraine’s limited state capacity) would serve only to inflate casualties and burn off what is left of the nation’s demographic base. With even a stable level of Ukraine aid struggling to get through an American congress that is suffering from Ukraine fatigue and a host of domestic crises, it seems unlikely that any by the Baltic States are in the mood to double down and begin sending daily trains full of material to Kiev.
And so, we once again return to the motif of strategic exhaustion. 2022 was the year of wild swings as the front stabilized into a conveniently shaped and easily supplied Russian position, and 2023 was the year of Ukraine’s strategic window of opportunity, frittered away at Bakhmut and Robotyne. 2024 is the year that Russia’s swelling force generation reaches a climax and the war turns in an obvious and irreversible way against Ukraine.
The great German soldier and author Ernst Jünger had the following comment on the prospect of war with Russia:
When Spengler warned against any invasion of Russia for reasons of space, he was, as we have since seen, right. Even more questionable become each of these invasions for metaphysical reasons, insofar as one approaches one of the great sufferers, a titan, a genius of suffering power. In its aura, in its sphere of influence, one will become acquainted with pain in a way that far exceeds any imagination.
Much is always made of Russia’s propensity for “suffering”, with interpretations ranging from a romantic Russian-patriotic notion of sacrifice for the motherland to an anti-Russian criticism of the Russian tolerance for casualties. Perhaps it means both: the individual Russian soldier is more willing to sit in a freezing trench and trade shells than his adversary, and the Russian state and people are able to lose more and last longer in the aggregate.
I rather think, however, that Jünger’s metaphysical “titan of suffering” is not so metaphysical at all. It rather refers to a mundane power of the Russian state, namely its excellence and willingness across the centuries to mobilize huge numbers of men and material for war, at the expense of other social goals. War with Russia sucks. It means mass casualties, cold trenches, scarred earth, and long nights of shelling. The Ukrainians have coped with this as well as anyone (because they are themselves quasi-Russian, however much they deny it), but it is an awful thing to trade shells for years on end. The Russian power of suffering is to willingly fight wars that devolve into bat fights, knowing they have a bigger bat.
The window of strategic opportunity has closed for Ukraine, and now opens wide for Russia. The earth opens wide for the dead [end]