Analista senior di l'intelligenza in u campu di a gestione di i risichi di sicurezza, sò un anzianu tenente detective è ufficiale di l'intelligenza in l'agenzie di u Statu francese. A bona pronuncia hè Николай Чинкуини, in russu
The first time I learned about Kent McLellan “Boneface” was through the investigation of Vasily Prozorov a former employee of the Ukrainian Security Services now uncovering the hidden truths of Ukraine on his channel UKRLEAKS [on Telegram].
Then Boneface himself contacted my colleague Truthseeker77 wanting to challenge some of the reports I have made on my channel about him. We decided to ask Boneface for an interview, we would laid the questions together, and Truthseeker77 would conduct all the “interrogatory” to the US Neo Nazi.
The results of this work not only produced the written interview with Mclellan about his time in Ukraine but also videos and information about his past troubles with the American authorities and a insight to the mindset of a US white supremacist thanks to the excellent job of my colleague.
Kent Ryan McLellan, April 22, 1990, St. Cloud (Florida). Son of the front man of neo Nazi rock band Brutal Attack, in high school, he already became a member of the racist organization “The American Front”. He was first arrested at the age of 18 in September 2008 for racist graffiti. In 2010, he served time for vandalism and beating immigrants. In May 2012, the FBI detained McLellan and his accomplices from the “American Front” for preparing a terrorist act against national minorities in Florida.
He joined the ranks of the “Ukrainian Volunteer Corps of the Right Sector” (DUK RS) in 2014 for a number of months going back to the US to keep running Misanthropic Division and its recruitment campaign for Ukraine. In January 2022, returned to Ukraine and joined Azov Battalion.
When did you heard about Ukraine first?
Ukraine as political situation; I’ve always known it existed as a nation. That’s clear. As far as being a skinhead/white nationalist goes, the videos from Tesak, in which he had a huge following in Ukraine, not just Russia.
What organizations did you contact and how?
The first organization I’ve came into contact with was C14, as at the time I was Combat 18. Which is it’s Western equivalent.
I kept contact with them predominantly with vk.com [VKontakte, Russian social networking service], it was difficult and still is difficult to maintain a page on most social media. My original vk.com account was vk.com/kenthate [blocked for violation of VK terms of service].
I was publishing information in which someone had essentially said the ISIS movement and the national-socialists are the same. So I published a thesis about the Islamic State and their hatred for nationalism, using one of their propaganda videos.
After C14 shared it, Francisco got in contact with me. He was Misanthropic Division.
From there I didn’t immediately joined, but I respected a lot of their publishing. We had a brief fallout in 2012 after the FBI arrested me for helping run a training camp here in Florida.
I remember the Kiev protests were just starting. A lot of the guys from C14 and at the time what became Right Sector, (Svoboda, Blue Boys, C14, Blood and Honor, Slavic Union), we’re attending this. It wasn’t long before things got crazy into it. People we’re leaving the protest sites and simply vanishing. It wasn’t long before Vodafone started getting jammed up. So I formed a squad of guys to essentially get around the DNS, and create a patch in network so people could coordinate with one another
Boneface in Ukraine in the ranks of Right Sector. 2014
How did you travel there?
I earned an OSCP [hacking] certification with Offensive Security, got a passport. I got there in 2014. I got a 9-day visa, ticket there and back, with no real meaning of actually returning. That was the first time.
By the time I went I was already running Misanthropic Division in the United States.
How was the relation of the general public with the ultras, how much open was the fascist dominance compared with the reports of the Western media, how many ultras where there roughly?
The public were the ultras, as crazy as it sounds. Everyone was patriotic. Back then, everyone knew what was happening. BBC reported, Americans reported it.
As far as ultra groups went, there wasn’t that many in number of actual organizations. Everyone was pretty much C14 and the title “Pravyi sektor [Right Sector] absorbed everything else.
They hosted events nearly daily in every oblast that wasn’t seeing war.
How many people from foreign countries were there?
Foreign members included a lot from Georgia, Latvia, America, Finland, a lot of skinheads.
In case the world wonders what happened to all the real skinheads. They all went to Ukraine.
What groups in the US support them?
Ukraine doesn’t work very closely anymore with the Americans. There is a American DUK, even Misanthropic Division had its own goals here vs what they had going on there. Ukraine has their shit together.
Just look at Florida, It’s all literal trash. With no clear aims as a movement, no goals and outside of 2014, real militants failed to exist as a collective in the White Power world.
In fact, most militias existing in the United States today are a result of Atom Waffen [Atom Waffen Division, international Nazi group based in the US], and the Misanthropic Division [international Nazi organization based in Ukraine].
What you did while in Ukraine, what people and from where you met there?
I wasn’t by far the first person to go to Ukraine. We sent several others, we kept having hiccups in all this. Dalton; Lane, are noted individuals. We did this entirely on our own, out of our pockets, etc.
I never knew the circumstances of Lane, and what he was running from. But it wasn’t until they both got there and decided to live in Ukraine, that we had a stable reliable enough route for Americans to reach Ukraine and not be stranded at air ports.
At this point I didn’t really know what to think, the training regiment wasn’t anything like you see with Americans.
It wasn’t dehumanizing. A lot of what would become Azov spoke English and it was mandatory to study Russian.
Right Sector controlled nearly everything as far as the militant nationalists went.
How did fellow Azov members accepted you?
They weren’t Azov yet, but yeah they took me well. Ukrainians didn’t really, because of the language barrier. They must’ve thought I was retarded.
This time around I was first placed with the 227th recon, which was a slap in the face for me. It wasn’t until after the war and I made it rightfully back into the second battalion, with people I knew.
How was your deployment time in Mariupol with Azov Battalion?
During the first run of Mariupol when the awkward stand off and fear-thick atmosphere finally wore off, there was a lot of shooting at absolute nothing, and a lot of soldiers not knowing what to do. Myself included at that.
The citizens of Mariupol itself were divided heavily on pro Ukraine and a pro Russian stance.
There were occasional Russian soldiers in the mix of things, this can be attested to a dozen or so pro Russian separatist prisoners
Did the U.S. government entice you or help you in any way?
As far as the government goes. During the Maidan coup, I got caught teaching the UKR guys DNS poisoning (placing false information in a DNS resolver cache on internet).
They wanted to sit in and help. They didn’t want names or anything, but they wanted to monitor the situation. Without this backing I would’ve been charged with violation of American neutrality act. Which is a law written in 1784.
Have you witnessed war crimes committed by any Ukrainian battalions?
Before I was even deployed I remember hearing about a bunch of red anarchists killed in Odessa.
Tornado [Ukrainian Nazi battalion] was by far the most horrifying thing I’ve ever seen or dealt with in my life. I’m in that botched crucifying video I’m not even wearing a mask.
I remember being deployed from Kiev to Mariupol. The dress uniform of what became Azov, was not by any means tactical. We were told to expect the presence of GRU [Russian military intelligence] as-well as militia formed by leftists in Donbass.
I’ve seen some shit with the first go around in Ukraine. I can only really sum up Mariupol with, ” It’s war”. This is were a lot of heinous shit started.
Interrogation happens. I had a job interrogating a lot. The treatment of such people is the same with the Russians I would guess.
I remember being asked to photograph Aidar [Ukrainian Nazi battalion] and Tornado members posing with the corpses of a lynched pregnant woman and a man they said was her husband.
The video can be found it’s titled “Kikes get the rope” but it literally has nothing to do with Jewish people. I wouldn’t have supported an action like that anyway.
Tornado was a weird bunch of guys. Some of them were of Chechen decent and that’s were I learned the history of Dagestan and the insanity that happened in Grozny.
What is the weapon of your choice?
I was a gunner for the most part. PKM [light machine gun], Kalashnikov.
Why- being a gunner requires a knowledge of all aspects. It’s not simply firing blindly.
You have to understand infantry, you have to understand armor.
You have to work with other gunners and be able to be the eyes for literally everyone and while being the most obvious target in the field.
Without gunners, armored columns are useless.
Areas outside of a chain, that are not visible, you have to reach. You have to be able to trap a line of men and manipulate their actions into doing what you want them to do.
This also comes with infantry tactics, and being able to work the mechanics of a PKM, which isn’t a easy weapon.
Especially when the felt tip tools for some reason keep disappearing from the weapon.
Were you paid to do this? And by whom? Did you get a salary?
I was never paid, I in fact ruined myself economically by going to Ukraine. I couldn’t imagine doing that for any value.
I wasn’t paid. No.
During the time we were in talks with the CIA and the Pentagon, (Mariupol). It is true the Pentagon conducted intelligence operations during the war there.
Why did you return to the U.S.?
I didn’t intend too. I was shipped back on a order after some SBU [Ukrainian State security agency, counter-intelligence] guys got caught cooperating with Russians, they planned on apparently killing me in the SBU hospital in Kiev.
Are Russian and DNR [Donetsk People’s Republic] troops worthy opponents?
Russia in comparison to the DPR:
The DPR we’re at first the best soldiers in the field this time go around, as far as Russian allies go. Their mortar teams were highly accurate and often worked with infantry, they moved like clock work. They generally had no fear for any actions they carried out.
The first waves of Russian soldiers I nearly felt bad for. The air force, is obviously a very skilled endeavor on the Russian team.
They naval infantry teams used on Mariupol we’re lacking in the ability to adapt. This is only the naval infantrymen, I’ve had quite the job during the first few weeks in Mariupol as interrogating prisoners, I had these videos on my YouTube channel. There was quite a lot of them who didn’t want to fight, and who claim they weren’t their to fight.
Then the third guard Spetznaz [Russian special forces] came. Which was a entirely different story.
The worst of all things that undermined Russian advances, was the constant bombarding of Mariupol, while they were also trying to make advances. To understand this, you’ll have to understand how explosives work.
It’s not the blast that kills you, it’s the energy released from these things. It’s like going into a fully conscious seizure, everything gets covered in this dust that turns everything a faded yellow. You can literally taste it. It’s chemical as fuck.
Whereas the Azov Regiment, and The DPR both were native to Mariupol and the Donetsk oblast, in theory. The Russian infantry would often become lost on hostile land.
The DPR and LPR [Lugansk People’s Republic] guys seemed to be the ones who knew how to navigate through Mariupol a lot better. They were fearsome. The second battalion (Azov) and them (Sparta [pro-Russia battalion from Donetsk]) have a historic feud, as you know.
It’s never easy to move or maintain a level of total competency while being shot at, or maintaining heavy stresses. They did. You have got to respect them off the field
Are you in direct contact with your old comrades there?
I talk to a number of them daily.
Frostovik had most of my footage along as his own. David Ruslan as well. That guy’s a fucking beast. I was with him when he lost his leg. The attack killed another Azov member.
Will you go back to fight?
I’m not entirely sure of going back. Depends on my health. I had heavy metal poisoning, still ongoing through chelation therapy from the whole ordeal.
I support Azov, to the fullest. But I don’t support NATO, or the EU, but ultimately I feel as if NATO gets involved there won’t be anything, as far as a nationalist goes, worth or left fighting for.
How do you see the conflict from a geopolitical perspective?
American meddling in Ukraine has caused the Russian invasion.
Ukraine war can be simply placed by two prospectives, the nationalist war, and Zelenski’s war.
Zelenski is the powers which be, and the nationalists are the obvious.
It needs to be noted that;
The Ukrainian Government has tried to bench Azov, and the DUK on three different occasions. Once their usefulness for the NATO regime ran out.
The head of the Right Sector even said before he was assassinated in Kiev: “We’re not finished yet, in the Maidan”.
This is clearly World War three.
I would like to see Russia just go home, and while the government in Kiev is frail another (Maidan) revolution.
I don’t see Russia as the victim here. But I do see Russia as provoked. Beyond all realms of reason, people have to be able to see that not everything is black and white here.
In fact this war only helped us get denied for NATO. No one wants that war with Russia.
I don’t believe that Ukraine has any issues in the future with Russia nuclear capability. Russia can handle a loss to Ukraine, but I don’t for see Russia handling a loss if NATO jumps in this. Does that make sense?
Moscow won’t be Berlin in 1945.
As long as the war stays in Ukraine, I think nuclear war isn’t in the goal post.
What do you think of how Western media reports on it?
There is a ton of liberal white washing when it comes to fascists in Ukraine:
“Nazis don’t exist’ “Azov battalion and Azov regiment are different “ , “They took all the Nazis out of Azov”.
We know all these to be false, and to a guy who knew and been there; I see it has pure disrespect to tarnish the legacy of a lot of those who died.
Clearly they don’t know what to think of it. I speak out against the white washing of nationalists by the media. Despite the fact they blasted us for years and even the Ukrainians tried to force fully uproot Azov at one point.
I use Twitter to mainly troll the (western) left, as they believe Ukraine military isn’t full of nationalist ideals.
So you actually can grasp what’s happened. Do you admit that it was a mistake for you to go to Ukraine?
I don’t regret Ukraine. I just can’t make it clear enough that the nationalists in Ukraine are not the same as the nationalists here in the US who are all basically inbred.
I feel the war that the nationalists are fighting is entirely different than the one the state is fighting. I know there was massive celebration when Ukraine was denied for NATO.
I notice a lot of Americans don’t even know nations like Ossetia exist, the Georgian invasion of such places, so on so fourth. They just think Russia decides to bomb the fuck out of places for no reason.
Similar to World War two, everything and every move had a reason. Ukraine unfortunately is stuck in the middle of that.
The butler documentary strikes a chord.
The United States has only been at peace for 22 years of it’s existence.
The right to maintain a navy, (The Marines are owned by the department of the navy, though controlled by the president) has kept us in a state of conflict, which obviously keeps the military at a rate. The Obama administration hurt the American military. Badly. I can hardly tell what losses we will take as a nation if we put troops on the ground there.
Did you have a fascist upbringing? Someone in your family filling your head with that ideology? Just curious. US/CIA media brainwashed Americans to hate Russia. Is that what happened in your case?
Honestly I grew up in the north. When I was a skinhead originally I was a traditional. I didn’t have any say in politics. I was 12.
I didn’t really know how big of a deal my dad was as he lived in England.
Even growing up and eventually getting into third position politics I was asked to not talk about it, as it would piss off people, in the sense of making me look entitled to something. So I didn’t.
I came up under David Lynch, Mark Faella and James Porozzo in the American Front.
Smartest people I knew, they had differing beliefs and forming your own opinion was a big deal to them.
I think James is actually pro Russian for whatever reason. Dave is dead and Mark retired after the FBI arrest [end]
chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Ukraine against Russia
Like dominos, African states are one by one falling outside the shackles of neocolonialism. Chad, Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and now Gabon are saying ‘non’ to France’s longtime domination of African financial, political, economic, and security affairs
(The Cradle)
By adding two new African member-states to its roster, last week’s summit in Johannesburg heralding the expanded BRICS 11 showed once again that Eurasian integration is inextricably linked to the integration of Afro-Eurasia.
Belarus is now proposing to hold a joint summit between BRICS 11, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the Eurasia Economic Union (EAEU). President Aleksandr Lukashenko’s vision for the convergence of these multilateral organizations may, in due time, lead to the Mother of All Multipolarity Summits.
But Afro-Eurasia is a much more complicated proposition. Africa still lags far behind its Eurasian cousins on the road toward breaking the shackles of neocolonialism.
The continent today faces horrendous odds in its fight against the deeply entrenched financial and political institutions of colonization, especially when it comes to smashing French monetary hegemony in the form of the Franc CFA – or the Communauté Financière Africaine (African Financial Community).
Still, one domino is falling after another – Chad, Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and now Gabon. This process has already turned Burkina Faso’s President Captain Ibrahim Traoré, into a new hero of the multipolar world – as a dazed and confused collective west can’t even begin to comprehend the blowback represented by its 8 coups in West and Central Africa in less than 3 years.
Bye bye Bongo
Military officers decided to take power in Gabon after hyper pro-France President Ali Bongo won a dodgy election that “lacked credibility.” Institutions were dissolved. Borders with Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, and the Republic of Congo were closed. All security deals with France were annulled. No one knows what will happen with the French military base.
All that was as popular as it comes: soldiers took to the streets of the capital Libreville in joyful singing, cheered on by onlookers.
Bongo and his father, who preceded him, have ruled Gabon since 1967. He was educated at a French private school and graduated from the Sorbonne. Gabon is a small nation of 2.4 million with a small army of 5,000 personnel that could fit into Donald Trump’s penthouse. Over 30 percent of the population lives on less than $1 a day, and in over 60 percent of regions have zero access to healthcare and drinking water.
The military qualified Bongo’s 14-year rule as leading to a “deterioration in social cohesion” that was plunging the country “into chaos.”
On cue, French mining company Eramet suspended its operations after the coup. That’s a near monopoly. Gabon is all about lavish mineral wealth – in gold, diamonds, manganese, uranium, niobium, iron ore, not to mention oil, natural gas, and hydropower. In OPEC-member Gabon, virtually the whole economy revolves around mining.
The case of Niger is even more complex. France exploits uranium and high-purity petrol as well as other types of mineral wealth. And the Americans are on site, operating three bases in Niger with up to 4,000 military personnel. The key strategic node in their ‘Empire of Bases’ is the drone facility in Agadez, known as Niger Air Base 201, the second-largest in Africa after Djibouti.
French and American interests clash, though, when it comes to the saga over the Trans-Sahara gas pipeline. After Washington broke the umbilical steel cord between Russia and Europe by bombing the Nord Streams, the EU, and especially Germany, badly needed an alternative.
Algerian gas supply can barely cover southern Europe. American gas is horribly expensive. The ideal solution for Europeans would be Nigerian gas crossing the Sahara and then the deep Mediterranean.
Nigeria, with 5,7 trillion cubic meters, has even more gas than Algeria and possibly Venezuela. By comparison, Norway has 2 trillion cubic meters. But Nigeria’s problem is how to pump its gas to distant customers – so Niger becomes an essential transit country.
When it comes to Niger’s role, energy is actually a much bigger game than the oft-touted uranium – which in fact is not that strategic either for France or the EU because Niger is only the 5th largest world supplier, way behind Kazakhstan and Canada. Still, the ultimate French nightmare is losing the juicy uranium deals plus a Mali remix: Russia, post-Prighozin, arriving in Niger in full force with a simultaneous expulsion of the French military.
Adding Gabon only makes things dicier. Rising Russian influence could lead to boosting supply lines to rebels in Cameroon and Nigeria, and privileged access to the Central African Republic, where Russian presence is already strong.
It’s no wonder that Francophile Paul Biya, in power for 41 years in Cameroon, has opted for a purge of his Armed Forces after the coup in Gabon. Cameroon may be the next domino to fall.
ECOWAS meets AFRICOM
The Americans, as it stands, are playing Sphynx. There’s no evidence so far that Niger’s military wants the Agadez base shut down. The Pentagon has invested a fortune in their bases to spy on a great deal of the Sahel and, most of all, Libya.
About the only thing Paris and Washington agree on is that, under the cover of ECOWAS (the Economic Community of West African States), the hardest possible sanctions should be slapped on one of the world’s poorest nations (where only 21% of the population has access to electricity) – and they should be much worse than those imposed on the Ivory Coast in 2010.
Then there’s the threat of war. Imagine the absurdity of ECOWAS invading a country that is already fighting two wars on terror on two separate fronts: Against Boko Haram in the southeast and against ISIS in the Tri-Border region.
ECOWAS, one of 8 African political and economic unions, is a proverbial mess. It packs 15 member nations – Francophone, Anglophone and one Lusophone – in Central and West Africa, and it is rife with internal division.
The French and the Americans first wanted ECOWAS to invade Niger as their “peacekeeping” puppet. But that didn’t work because of popular pressure against it. So, they switched to some form of diplomacy. Still, troops remain on stand-by, and a mysterious “D-Day” has been set for the invasion.
The role of the African Union (AU) is even murkier. Initially, they stood against the coup and suspended Niger’s membership. Then they turned around and condemned the possible western-backed invasion. Neighbors have closed their borders with Niger.
ECOWAS will implode without US, France, and NATO backing. Already it’s essentially a toothless chihuahua – especially after Russia and China have demonstrated via the BRICS summit their soft power across Africa.
Western policy in the Sahel maelstrom seems to consist of salvaging anything they can from a possible unmitigated debacle – even as the stoic people in Niger are impervious to whatever narrative the west is trying to concoct.
It’s important to keep in mind that Niger’s main party, the “National Movement for the Defense of the Homeland” represented by General Abdourahamane Tchiani, has been supported by the Pentagon – complete with military training – from the beginning.
The Pentagon is deeply implanted in Africa and connected to 53 nations. The main US concept since the early 2000s was always to militarize Africa and turn it into War on Terror fodder. As the Dick Cheney regime spun it in 2002: “Africa is a strategic priority in fighting terrorism.”
That’s the basis for the US military command AFRICOM and countless “cooperative partnerships” set up in bilateral agreements. For all practical purposes, AFRICOM has been occupying large swathes of Africa since 2007.
How sweet is my colonial franc
It is absolutely impossible for anyone across the Global South, Global Majority, or “Global Globe” (copyright Lukashenko) to understand Africa’s current turmoil without understanding the nuts and bolts of French neocolonialism.
The key, of course, is the CFA franc, the “colonial franc” introduced in 1945 in French Africa, which still survives even after the CFA – with a nifty terminological twist – began to stand for “African Financial Community”.
The whole world remembers that after the 2008 global financial crisis, Libya’s Leader Muammar Gaddafi called for the establishment of a pan-African currency pegged to gold.
At the time, Libya had about 150 tons of gold, kept at home, and not in London, Paris, or New York banks. With a little more gold, that pan-African currency would have its own independent financial center in Tripoli – and everything based on a sovereign gold reserve.
For scores of African nations, that was the definitive Plan B to bypass the western financial system.
The whole world also remembers what happened in 2011. The first airstrike on Libya came from a French Mirage fighter jet. France’s bombing campaign started even before the end of emergency talks in Paris between western leaders.
In March 2011, France became the first country in the world to recognize the rebel National Transitional Council as the legitimate government of Libya. In 2015, the notoriously hacked emails of former US secretary of state Hillary Clinton revealed what France was up to in Libya: “The desire to achieve a greater share in Libyan oil production,” to increase French influence in North Africa, and to block Gaddafi’s plans to create a pan-African currency that would replace the CFA franc printed in France.
It is no wonder the collective west is terrified of Russia in Africa – and not just because of the changing of the guard in Chad, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and now Gabon: Moscow has never sought to rob or enslave Africa.
Russia treats Africans as sovereign people, does not engage in Forever Wars, and does not drain Africa of resources while paying a pittance for them. Meanwhile, French intel and CIA “foreign policy” translate into corrupting African leaders to the core and snuffing out those that are incorruptible.
You have the right to no monetary policy
The CFA racket makes the Mafia look like street punks. It means essentially that the monetary policy of several sovereign African nations is controlled by the French Treasury in Paris.
The Central Bank of each African nation was initially required to keep at least 65 percent of their annual foreign exchange reserves in an “operation account” held at the French Treasury, plus another 20 percent to cover financial “liabilities.”
Even after some mild “reforms” were enacted since September 2005, these nations were still required to transfer 50 percent of their foreign exchange to Paris, plus 20 percent V.A.T.
And it gets worse. The CFA Central Banks impose a cap on credit to each member country. The French Treasury invests these African foreign reserves in its own name on the Paris bourse and pulls in massive profits on Africa’s dime.
The hard fact is that more than 80 percent of foreign reserves of African nations have been in “operation accounts” controlled by the French Treasury since 1961. In a nutshell, none of these states has sovereignty over their monetary policy.
But the theft doesn’t stop there: the French Treasury uses African reserves as if they were French capital, as collateral in pledging assets to French payments to the EU and the ECB.
Across the “FranceAfrique” spectrum, France still, today, controls the currency, foreign reserves, the comprador elites, and trade business.
The examples are rife: French conglomerate Bolloré’s control of port and marine transport throughout West Africa; Bouygues/Vinci dominate construction and public works, water, and electricity distribution; Total has huge stakes in oil and gas. And then there’s France Telecom and big banking – Societe Generale, Credit Lyonnais, BNP-Paribas, AXA (insurance), and so forth.
France de facto controls the overwhelming majority of infrastructure in Francophone Africa. It is a virtual monopoly.
“FranceAfrique” is all about hardcore neocolonialism. Policies are issued by the President of the Republic of France and his “African cell.” They have nothing to do with parliament, or any democratic process, since the times of Charles De Gaulle.
The “African cell” is a sort of General Command. They use the French military apparatus to install “friendly” comprador leaders and get rid of those that threaten the system. There’s no diplomacy involved. Currently, the cell reports exclusively to Le Petit Roi, Emmanuel Macron.
Caravans of drugs, diamonds, and gold
Paris completely supervised the assassination of Burkina Faso’s anti-colonial leader Thomas Sankara, in 1987. Sankara had risen to power via a popular coup in 1983, only to be overthrown and assassinated four years later.
As for the real “war on terror” in the African Sahel, it has nothing to do with the infantile fictions sold in the West. There are no Arab “terrorists” in the Sahel, as I saw when backpacking across West Africa a few months before 9/11. They are locals who converted to Salafism online, intent on setting up an Islamic State to better control smuggling routes across the Sahel.
Those fabled ancient salt caravans plying the Sahel from Mali to southern Europe and West Asia are now caravans of drugs, diamonds, and gold. This is what funded Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), for instance, then supported by Wahhabi lunatics in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf.
After Libya was destroyed by NATO in early 2011, there was no more “protection,” so the western-backed Salafi-jihadis who fought against Gaddafi offered the Sahel smugglers the same protection as before – plus a lot of weapons.
Assorted Mali tribes continue the merry smuggling of anything they fancy. AQIM still extracts illegal taxation. ISIS in Libya is deep into human and narcotics trafficking. And Boko Haram wallows in the cocaine and heroin market.
There is a degree of African cooperation to fight these outfits. There was something called the G5 Sahel, focused on security and development. But after Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali, and Chad went the military route, only Mauritania remains. The new West Africa Junta Belt, of course, wants to destroy terror groups, but most of all, they want to fight FranceAfrique, and the fact that their national interests are always decided in Paris.
France has for decades made sure there’s very little intra-Africa trade. Landlocked nations badly need neighbors for transit. They mostly produce raw materials for export. There are virtually no decent storage facilities, feeble energy supply, and terrible intra-African transportation infrastructure: that’s what Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects are bent on addressing in Africa.
In March 2018, 44 heads of state came up with the African Continental Free Trade Area (ACFTA) – the largest in the world in terms of population (1.3 billion people) and geography. In January 2022, they established the Pan-African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS) – focused on payments for companies in Africa in local currencies.
So inevitably, they will be going for a common currency further on down the road. Guess what’s in their way: the Paris-imposed CFA.
A few cosmetic measures still guarantee direct control by the French Treasury on any possible new African currency set up, preference for French companies in bidding processes, monopolies, and the stationing of French troops. The coup in Niger represents a sort of “we’re not gonna take it anymore.”
All of the above illustrates what the indispensable economist Michael Hudson has been detailing in all his works: the power of the extractivist model. Hudson has shown how the bottom line is control of the world’s resources; that’s what defines a global power, and in the case of France, a global mid-ranking power.
France has shown how easy it is to control resources via control of monetary policy and setting up monopolies in these resource-rich nations to extract and export, using virtual slave labor with zero environmental or health regulations.
It’s also essential for exploitative neocolonialism to keep those resource-rich nations from using their own resources to grow their own economies. But now the African dominoes are finally saying, “The game is over.” Is true decolonization finally on the horizon? [end]
Humour russe qui souligne l’inéluctable déclin de la France
Dans le contexte lamentable d’une nouvelle exception culturelle, dont l’initiative suscite au mieux la pitié à travers les vastes restes du monde, l’interdiction faite à des jeunes filles de porter l’Abaya à l’école, Emmanuel Macron s’est exprimé le 4 septembre 2023
Nous vivons aussi dans notre société avec une minorité, des gens qui, détournant une religion, viennent défier la République et la laïcité. Ça a parfois donné le pire. On ne peut pas faire comme s’il n’y avait pas eu l’attaque terroriste et l’assassinat de Samuel Paty dans notre pays
Le personnage s’est révélé depuis longtemps, il est si facile à cerner. La France est bipolaire, en partie vichyste et comme l’a écrit Alain Badiou, le pétainisme existait dans l’hexagone bien avant le dirigeant fasciste Philippe Pétain. Dans un mouvement perpétuel de pendule, ce vice national est redevenu majoritaire au début des années 2000, à l’époque de l’ascension de Nicolas Sarkozy. Macron en est l’incarnation.
La France est aussi un pays très littéraire, où une large part de la population reste focalisée sur la partie la moins noble de son anatomie. Le propos de Macron pourrait bien être un état d’âme. Cela soulignerait un esprit d’une grande vulgarité. Si la fine analyse se voulait plus technique, elle fut au mieux d’une bêtise crasse et l’expression d’un autre courant majoritaire, dont la réputation mondiale est d’avoir peur de son ombre. La France est le pays dont des représentants ont déjà commis l’idée grotesque d’insécurité culturelle.
Macron prétend atténuer les malheurs de la France, mais au même titre que les opérations djihadistes du 13 novembre 2015 à Paris, l’assassinat de Samuel Paty ne fut pas plus qu’un anecdotique dommage collatéral de la politique étrangère d’un pays qui voudrait encore paraître comme une puissance d’envergure mondiale. Comme à l’occasion autrefois d’événements encore plus calamiteux, par vanité, les autorités sont encore incapables, trois ans après, d’analyser sereinement les ressorts du fait divers. Désormais à la traîne des États-Unis, dans une posture parfois excessive de mouche du coche, la France a été avec François Hollande, autre figure emblématique, le plus hystérique support, depuis 2011, d’une insurrection islamiste en Syrie, contre le gouvernement légal et laïc de Bashar Assad.
Abdoulakh Anzorov, gamin de 18 ans, s’est radicalisé, dans ce contexte volcanique, au contact sur les réseaux sociaux des djihadistes d’al Qaeda, appelé localement Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham [Organisation de libération du Levant, HTS], qui vaincus ailleurs par les opérations militaires conjuguées de la Syrie, de la Russie et de l’Iran, sont réfugiés encore aujourd’hui dans la poche d’Idlib, nord-ouest de la Syrie, où USA, OTAN et Union européenne les protègent, en raison d’intérêts géopolitiques supérieurs. Ce sont donc des amis de la France qui ont guidé le bras de l’assassin adolescent. C’est cocasse
Le 28 octobre 2020, les militants d’HTS célèbrent à Idlib le martyre d’Abdoulakh Anzorov (Moussa NDT)
Voila pour le mobile. Il nous faut maintenant aborder l’aspect le plus cruel de la pathétique affaire, celui de l’opportunité. Anzorov se motivait sur les réseaux sociaux, où son expression était tellement violente et prémonitoire, qu’à l’été 2020, il a été signalé plusieurs fois à PHAROS, le pompeux Portail officiel de signalement illicit des contenus de l’internet. Problème, les éminents analystes de la DGSI (Direction générale de la sécurité intérieure) ne l’ont pas estimé dangereux. Savoir faire de la police politique, contre toute forme sérieuse d’opposition, ou alors du renseignement anti-terroriste, il faut choisir. La suite est impardonnable.
Au mois d’octobre, le SCRT (Service central du renseignement territorial) surveillait dans le Val d’Oise une paire de militants des Frères musulmans (organisation politique internationale qui fut aussi à l’origine de l’insurrection en Syrie, c’est cocasse), qui manifestaient contre le professeur. C’est alors que deus ex machina, le jeune Abdoullakh Anzorov est entré en contact avec les deux agitateurs. Mais l’incapacité de la DGSI et du SCRT, une fois encore, à analyser correctement la situation et surtout, à recouper leurs informations, conduisit le 16 octobre 2020, à l’assassinat de Samuel Paty. Si les fins limiers du grotesque Gérald Darmanin avaient connu le b.a-ba du métier pour lequel ils sont payés, le professeur serait encore en vie.
Le 7 juillet 2023, presque trois ans après les faits, l’avocate de la famille put enfin annoncer qu’un juge d’instruction avait ouvert une information, sur les graves incuries de l’État français. Car un rappel peut être utile, à l’exception d’Alain Badiou, des Frères musulmans et de l’avocate, tous les personnages et organismes français cités plus haut sont grassement payés par vos impôts.
It has been a while since I published anything long-form commenting on the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War, and I confess that writing this article gave me a modicum of trouble. Ukraine’s much anticipated grand summer counteroffensive has now been underway for about eighty days with little to show for it. The summer has seen fierce fighting in a variety of sectors (to be enumerated below), but the contact line has shifted very little. I have been reluctant to publish a discussion of the Ukrainian campaign simply because they have continued to hold assets in reserve, and I did not want to post a premature commentary that went to press right before the Ukrainians showed some new trick or revealed a hidden ace up their sleeve. Sure enough, I wrote the bulk of this article last week, right before Ukraine launched yet another major attempt to force a breach in the Orikhiv sector.
At this point, however, the appearance of some of Ukraine’s last remaining premier brigades, which had previously been held in reserve, confirms that the axes of Ukraine’s attack are concretized. Only time will tell if these precious reserves manage to achieve a breach in the Russian lines, but enough time has passed that we can sketch out what exactly Ukraine has been trying to do, why, and why it has failed to this point.
Part of the problem with narrating the war in Ukraine is the positional and attritional nature of the fighting. People continue to look for bold operational maneuver to break the deadlock, but the reality seems to be that for now some combination of capability and reticence has turned this war into a positional struggle with a plodding offensive pace, which far more resembles the first world war than the second.
Ukraine had aspirations of breaking open this grinding front and reopening mobile operations – escaping the attritional struggle and driving on operationally meaningful targets – but these efforts have so far come to naught. For all the lofty boasts of demonstrating the superior art of maneuver, Ukraine still finds itself trapped in a siege, painfully trying to break open a calcified Russian position without success.
Ukraine may not be interested in a war of attrition, but attrition is certainly interested in Ukraine.
Ukraine’s Strategic Paradigm
For those that have been following the war closely, what follows will probably not be new information, but I think it is worth thinking holistically about Ukraine’s war and the factors that drive their strategic decision making.
For Ukraine, the conduct of the war is shaped by a variety of disturbing strategic asymmetries.
Some of these are obvious, like Russia’s much larger population and military industrial plant, or the fact that Russia’s war economy is indigenous, while Ukraine is entirely reliant on western deliveries of equipment and munitions. Russia can autonomously ramp up armaments production and there are abundant signs from the battlefield that the Russian war economy is beginning to find its groove, with new systems like the Lancet present in increasing abundance, and western sources now admitting that Russia has successfully serialized a domestic version of the Iranian Shahed Drone. Furthermore, Russia has the asymmetrical capacity to strike Ukrainian rear areas to an extent that Ukraine cannot reciprocate, even if they are given the dreaded ATACMs (these will give Ukraine the range to strike operational depth targets in the theater, but they can’t hit facilities in Moscow and Tula the way Russian missiles can strike anywhere in Ukraine)
Medvedev inspects a tank production run
With significant Russian asymmetries in population size, industrial capacity, strike capability, and – let us be blunt – sovereignty and decision-making freedom, an attritional-positional struggle is simply bad math for Ukraine, and yet that is precisely the sort of war in which it has become trapped.
What is important for us to understand, however, is that the strategic asymmetry goes beyond physical capacities like population base, industrial plant, and missile technology, and extends into the realm of strategic objectives and timelines.
Russia’s war has been deliberately framed in a fairly open-ended way, with goals largely tied to the idea of “demilitarizing” Ukraine. In fact, Russia’s territorial objectives remain rather nebulous beyond the 4 annexed oblasts (though it is safe to say that Moscow would like to acquire far more than just these). All that to say, Putin’s government has deliberately framed the war as a military-technical enterprise focused on destroying the Ukrainian armed forces, and has shown itself to be perfectly free to give up territory in the name of operational prudentia.
In contrast, Ukraine has maximalist goals that are explicitly territorial in nature. The Zelensky government has been open about the fact that it aims – however fanciful this may be – to restore the entirety of its 1991 territories, including not just the four mainland oblasts but also Crimea.
The confluence of these two factors – Ukrainian territorial maximalism combined with asymmetrical Russian advantages in a positional-attritional struggle – forces Ukraine to seek a way to break open the front and restore a state of operational fluidity. Remaining locked in a positional struggle is unworkable for Kiev, partially because Russia’s material advantages will inevitably shine through (in a fight between two big guys swinging big bats at each other, bet on the bigger guy with the bigger bat), and partially because a positional war (which amounts essentially to a massive siege) is simply not an efficient way to retake territory.
This leaves Ukraine with no choice but to unfreeze the front and try to restore mobile operations, with an eye towards creating some asymmetry of their own. The only feasible way to accomplish this is to launch an offensive aimed at severing critical lines of Russian communication and supply. Contrary to some suggestions that were popular this spring, a large Ukrainian offensive against Bakhmut or Donetsk simply did not fit the bill.
Frankly, there are only two suitable operational targets for Ukraine. One is Starobils’k – the beating heart at the center of Russia’s Lugansk front. Capturing or screening Svatove and then Starobils’k would create a genuine operational catastrophe for Russia in the north, with cascading effects all the way down to Bakhmut. The second possible target was the land bridge to Crimea, which could be cut by a thrust across lower Zaporizhia towards the Azov coast.
It was probably inevitable that Ukraine would select the Azov option, for a few reasons. The land bridge to Crimea is a more self-contained battlespace – an offensive in Lugansk would occur under the shadow of the Belgorod and Voronezh regions of Russia, making it relatively more difficult to put significant Russian forces out of supply. Perhaps even more significant, however, is Kiev’s complete obsession with Crimea and the Kerch Bridge – targets that hold hypnotic sway in a way that Starobils’k never could.
Again, this may sound like fairly intuitive review, but it’s worth contemplating how and why Ukraine ended up launching an offensive that was widely telegraphed and expected. There was no strategic surprise whatsoever – a definitely real video of GUR chief Budanov smirking didn’t fool anyone. The Russian armed forces certainly weren’t fooled, as they spent months saturating the front with minefields, trenches, firing emplacements, and obstacles. Everyone knew that Ukraine was going to attack toward the Azov Coast, specifically with an eye towards Tokmak and Melitopol, and that’s exactly what they did. A frontal attack against a prepared defense without the element of surprise is generally considered a poor choice, but here is Ukraine not only attempting such an attack but even launching it against a backdrop of global celebration and phantasmagorical expectations
Ukraine’s infantile plea for OPSEC
It’s impossible to make sense of this without understanding the way that Ukraine is shackled by a particular interpretation of the war to this point. Ukraine and its supporters point to two successes in 2022 where Ukraine was able to retake a substantial swathe of territory, in Kharkov and Kherson oblasts. The problem is that neither of these situations is portable to Zaporizhia.
In the case of the Kharkov offensive, Ukraine identified a sector of the Russian front that had been hollowed out and was defended only by a thin screening force. They were able to stage a force and achieve a measure of strategic surprise, due to the thick forests and general paucity of Russian ISR in the area. This is not to mitigate the scale of Ukraine’s success there; it was certainly the best uses of forces available to them and they did exploit a weak section of front. This success is hardly relevant to circumstances in the south today; mobilization has ameliorated Russia’s force generation problems so that they now longer have to make hard choices about what to defend, and the heavily fortified Zaporizhia frontline is nothing like the thinly held front in Kharkov.
The second case study – the Kherson counteroffensive – is even less germane. In this case, Ukrainian leadership is rewriting history in record time. The AFU banged its head on Russian defenses in Kherson for months throughout the summer and autumn last year and took atrocious losses. An entire grouping of AFU brigades was mauled in Kherson without achieving a breakthrough, and this even with Russian forces in a uniquely difficult operational disposition where they had their backs to a river. Kherson was only abandoned months later due to concerns that the Kakhovka dam might fail or be sabotaged (for those keeping score, it did in fact end up failing), and due to Russia’s need at the time to economize forces.
Again, this can easily be misconstrued as arguing that Russia’s withdrawal from Kherson did not matter. Obviously, abandoning a hard-earned bridgehead is a major setback, and retaking west-bank Kherson was a boon for Kiev. But we need to be honest about why it happened, and it plainly did not happen because of Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive – to underscore this, recall that Ukrainian officials openly wondered if the Russian withdrawal was a trickor a trap. The question is simply whether Ukraine’s Kherson offensive is predictive of future offensive success. It is not.
So, we have one case where Ukraine identified a lightly defended section of front and ran through it, and another where Russian troops abandoned a bridgehead due to logistical and force allocation concerns. Neither is particularly relevant to the situation on the Azov coast, and in fact an honest reflection of the AFU’s Kherson Counteroffensive might have given Ukraine second thoughts about a frontal assault on prepared Russian defenses.
Instead, Kharkov and Kherson have both been presented as proof positive that Ukraine can shatter Russian defenses in a straight up fight – in fact, we still have no examples from this war of the AFU defeating strongly held Russian positions, particularly post-mobilization when Russia finally began to resolve its manpower deficiencies. But Ukraine is caught in the grip of its own particular story about this war, which has imparted unearned confidence in its ability to conduct offensive operations. Tragically for mobilized Ukrainian Mykolas, this has dovetailed with a second swagger-producing mythology.
A major selling point for the Ukrainian counteroffensive has been the assessed superiority of the AFU’s big-ticket donations from the west – the main battle tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. Since the first deliveries were announced, there has been no shortage of boasting about the many superior qualities of western models like the Leopards and Challengers. The suggestion has essentially been that skilled Ukrainian tankers are only waiting to be unleashed once they get behind the wheel of superlative western builds. My personal favorite motif has been the practice of dismissing Russian tanks as “Soviet Era” – neglecting to note that the Abrams (designed 1975) and the Leopard 2 (1979) are also Cold War models
A burn out Leopard in Syria
It must be stated, again, that there is nothing wrong with western tanks. The Abrams and the Leopard are fine vehicles, but confidence in their game-changing capabilities stems from a mistaken assumption about the role of armor. It must be appreciated that tanks always have been and always will be mass-consumption items. Tanks blow up. They are disabled. They break down and are captured. Tank forces attrit – much faster than people expect. Given that the brigades prepared for Ukraine’s assault on the Zapo line were significantly understrength in vehicles, it was simply irrational to expect them to have an oversized impact. This is not to say that tanks aren’t important – armor remains critical to modern combat – but in a peer conflict one should always expect to lose armor at a steady clip, especially when the enemy retains fires superiority.
One can see, then how a measure of hubris can easily creep in to Ukrainian thinking, fueled by a healthy dose of desperation and strategic need. Reasoning from a distorted understanding of its successes in Kharkov and Kherson, emboldened by their shiny new toys, and guided by an overriding strategic animus that requires them to unlock the front somehow, the idea of a frontal attack without strategic surprise against a prepared defense really could seem like a good idea. Add in the good old fashioned trope about Russian incompetenceand disorder, and you have all the recipes for an imprudent roll of the dice by Ukraine.
The Misfire
So now we come to the operational minutia. For a variety of reasons, Ukraine has chosen to attempt a frontal assault on Russia’s fortified Zaporizhia front, with the intention of breaching towards the sea of Azov. How can this be accomplished?
We had a few clues early on, accruing from a variety of geographic features and alleged intelligence leaks. In May, the Dreizin Report published what was purported to be a Russian synthesis of Ukraine’s OPORD (Operational Order). An OPORD functions as a broad sketch of an operation’s intended progression, and the document shared by Dreizin was billed as a summary of Russia’s expectation for Ukraine’s offensive (that is, it is not a leak of Ukraine’s internal planning documents, but a leak of Russia’s best guess at Ukraine’s plans).
In any case, in a vacuum it was anybody’s guess as to whether Dreizin’s OPORD was authentic, but we’ve subsequently been able to cross-check it. This is because of the other, even more infamous leak from earlier this spring, which included the Pentagon’s combat power build plan for Ukraine.
NATO was very generous and built Ukraine a mechanized strike package from scratch. However, because this mechanized force was cobbled together with a variety of different systems from all corners of the NATO Cinematic Universe, Ukraine formations are uniquely identifiable by their particular combination of vehicles and equipment. So, for example, the presence of Strykers, Marders, and Challengers indicates the presence of the 82nd Brigade in the field, and so forth.
Thus, despite Ukrainian pretensions of operational security, it’s actually been trivially easy for observers to know which Ukrainian formations are in the field. There have been a few deviations from the script – for example, the 47th Brigade was supposed to field the Frankenstein Slovenian M55 tanks, but in the end the decision was made to send the underpowered M55’s to the northern front and the 47th was deployed with a contingent of Leopard Tanks originally operated by the 33rd Brigade. But these are minor details, and on the whole we’ve had a good sense of when and where specific AFU formations get on the field.
Based on identifiable units, the Dreizin OPORD looks very close to what we actually saw at the onset of the Ukrainian offensive. The Dreizin OPORD called for an assault by the 47th and 65th Brigades on the Russian lines south or Orikhiv, in the sector bounded by Nesterianka and Novoprokopivka. Directly in the middle of this sector is the town of Robotyne, and sure enough that’s where the first big AFU assault came overnight on June 7-8, spearheaded by the 47th Brigade.
Now, from this point it becomes difficult to evaluate the Dreizin OPORD simply because Ukraine’s attack became instantaneously derailed, but one thing we can say is that Dreizin’s source was correct about the order that Ukrainian units would be introduced into battle. Based on this, we can flesh out the OPORD and feel pretty safe wagering that this is what the Ukrainians were hoping to achieve:
Ukraine’s Dream: The Drive to the Sea
The intention seems to have been to force a breach in the Russian line using a concentrated armored assault by the 47th and 65th Brigades, after which a follow on force of the 116th, 117th, and 118th would begin the exploitation phase, driving for the Azov Coast and the towns of Mikhailivka and Vesele to the west. The objective was clearly not to get bogged down in urban fighting attempting to capture places like Tokmak, Berdyansk, or Melitopol, but to bypass them and cut them off by taking up blocking positions on the main roads.
Simultaneously, a lesser – but no less critical – thrust would come out of the Gulyaipole area and drive along the Bilmak axis. This would have the effect of both screening the main advance to the west and wedging the Russian front open, splintering the integrity of the Russian forces caught in the middle. Overall, this is a fairly sensible, if ambitious and uncreative plan. In many ways, this was really the only option.
So what went wrong? Well, conceptually it’s easy. There is no breach. The bulk of the maneuver scheme is dedicated to exploitation – reaching such and such a line, taking up this blocking position, masking that city, and so forth. But what happens when there’s no breach at all? How can such a catastrophe occur, and how can the operation be salvaged when it comes untracked in the opening phase?
Indeed, this is precisely what has happened. Ukraine finds itself stuck on the edge of Russia’s outermost screening line, spending substantial resources trying to capture the small village of Robotyne, and/or bypass it to the east by infiltrating the gap between it and the neighboring village of Verbove. So instead of that rapid breach and turning maneuver towards Melitopol, we get something like this:
Ukrainian Counteroffensive with Mapped Russian Defensive Lines
We could be generous and say that Robotyne is the last village before the Ukrainian attack reaches the main Russian defensive belt, but we’d be lying – they will also have to clear the larger town of Novoprokopivka, two kilometers to the south. Just for reference, here’s a closer look at the mapped Russian defenses in the battlespace, based on the excellent work of Brady Africk
Russian defenses in the Robotyne Sector
The discussion about these emplacements can get a little muddled, simply because it’s not always clear what is meant by that popular phrase “first line of defense.” Clearly there are some defensive works around and in Robotyne, and the Russians chose to fight for the village, so in some sense Robotyne is part of the “first line” – but it is more proper to speak of it as part of what we would call a “screening line”. The first line of continuous fortifications across the front is several kilometers further south, and this is the belt that Ukraine has yet to even reach, let alone breach.
As of this moment, it appears that Russian troops have lost total control of Robotyne but continue to hold the southern half of the village, while Ukrainian troops in the northern half of the village remain subject to heavy Russian shelling. We should probably at this point consider the village to be continuously contested and a feature of the gray zone
Robotyne, in all its glory
Now, a quick note about Robotyne itself and why both sides are so determined to fight for it. It seems rather odd on the surface, given that the Russian preference in 2022 was to make tactical withdrawals under their fires umbrella. This time though, they are fiercely counterattacking to contest Robotyne. The value of the village lies not only in its location on the T-0408 Highway, but also its excellent perch on top of a ridge. Both Robotyne and Novoprokopivka lie on a ridge of elevated ground which is as much as 70 meters higher than the low-lying plain to the east.
What this means is fairly simple; if the AFU presses forward in attempts to bypass the Robotyne-Novoprokopivka position by pushing into the gap between Robotyne and Verbove, it will be vulnerable to fire on the flanks (particularly by ATGMs) by Russian troops on the high ground. We already have seen footage of this, with Ukrainian vehicles being taken in the flank by fire from Robotyne. I am highly skeptical that Ukraine can even attempt an earnest assault on the first defensive belt until they have captured both Robotyne and Novoprokopivka.
This would all be a tough nut to crack under ideal circumstances, with a variety of engineering problems to mediate, obstacles designed to funnel the attacker into firing lanes, perpendicular trenches to allow enfilade fire on advancing Ukrainian columns, and robust defenses on all the major roadways. But these are not the best of circumstances. This is a tired force that has exhausted much of its indigenous combat power, which is attempting to organize the attack using a piecemeal and understrength assault package.
Several factors conspired against the Ukrainian offensive, and synergistically they have created a bona fide military catastrophe for Kiev. Let us enumerate them.
Problem 1: The Hidden Defensive Layer
At this point, we need to acknowledge something that everybody missed about Russia’s defense. I previously expressed high confidence that Ukraine’s forces would be unable to breach the Russian defenses, but I mistakenly believed that the Russian defense would function according to the classic Soviet defense-in-depth principles (elucidated in great detail by the writings of David Glantz, for example)
Idealized Defense in Depth by a Motor Rifle Brigade
Such a defense, put simply, is open to the idea that the enemy will breach the first or even second lines of defense. The purpose of the multilayered (or “echeloned” in the classic terminology) defense is to ensure that the enemy force gets stuck as it tries to break through. It may penetrate the first layer, but as it goes it is continually chewed up by the subsequent belts. The classic example is the Battle of Kursk, where powerful German panzers broke into the Soviet defensive belts but subsequently became stuck as they were ground down. You can think of this as being analogically similar to a Kevlar vest, which uses a web of fibers to stop projectiles: rather than bouncing off, the bullet is caught and its energy is absorbed by the layered fibers.
I was actually quite open to the idea that Ukraine would generate some penetration, but I anticipated them getting stuck in the subsequent belts and sputtering out.
What was missing from this picture – and this is a credit to Russian planning – was an unseen defensive belt forward of the proper trenches and fortifications. This forward belt consisted of extremely dense minefields and strongly held forward positions in the screening line, which the Russians evidently intended to fight for fiercely. Rather than breaking through the first belt and getting stuck in the interstitial areas, the Ukrainians have been repeatedly mauled in the security zone, and the Russians have consistently counterattacked to knock them back when they do manage to get footholds.
In other words, while we expected Russia to fight a defense in depth that absorbed the Ukrainian spearheads and shredded them in the heart of the defense, the Russians have actually shown a strong commitment to defending their forwardmost positions, of which Robotyne is the most famous.
On paper, Robotyne was expected to function as part of a so-called “crumple zone”, or “security zone” – a sort of lightly held buffer that puts the enemy through pre-registered fires before they bump into the first belt of continuous and strongly held defenses. Indeed, a variety of aerial and satellite surveys of the area taken before Ukraine went on the attack showed Robotyne laying well forward of the first solid and continuous Russian fortification belt.
What was missed, it seemed, was the extent to which the Russian defenders had mined the areas on the approach to Robotyne and were committed to defending within the security zone. The scale of the mining certainly seems to have surprised the Ukrainians, and creates a strain on Ukraine’s limited combat engineering capabilities. Even more importantly, the dense mines have created predictable avenues of approach for the Ukrainian forces, which force them to repeatedly run through the same gauntlet of fires and Russian standoff weaponry.
Problem 2: Insufficient Suppression
The signature image of the first great assaults on the Zapo Line has been columns of unsupported maneuver assets, being raked with Russian fires, both ground based (rocketry, ATGMs, and tube artillery) and from air platforms like the Ka-52 Alligator attack helicopter. One of the more startling aspects of these scenes was the way Ukrainian forces would come under heavy fire while still in their marching columns, taking losses before they ever deployed into firing lines to begin their assault proper.
There are myriad reasons for this. One is the now blasé issue of Ukrainian munition shortages. Consider the following items of interest. In the runup to Ukraine’s counteroffensive, Russia waged a heavy counter-preparatory air campaign that knocked out large AFU ammunition dumps. Ukraine’s initial assaults collapse in the face of heavy and unsuppressed Russian fires. The United States decides to transfer cluster munitions to Ukraine because, in the words of the president, “they’re running out of ammunition.” Add in the degradation of Ukrainian air defense, which allows Russian helicopters to operate with great effect along the contact line, and you have a recipe for disaster. Lacking the tubes to suppress Russian fires or the air defense to chase away Russian aircraft, the AFU opened their offensive by disastrously pushing forward unsupported maneuver elements into a hail of fire.
Problem 3: Russian Standoff Weapons
It’s crucial to understand that the Russian toolbox is fundamentally different than it was during the battle for Kherson last year, due to the rapidly expanding production of a variety of Russian standoff weapons – most notably the Lancet and the UMPK glide modifications for gravity bombs.
The proliferation of the Lancet and similar systems means, in a nutshell, that nothing within 30km of the contact line is safe, and this in turn disrupts the AFU’s deployment of critical support assets like air defense and engineering, magnifying their vulnerability to Russian mines and fires. In fact, we’ve increasingly seen Ukrainian artillery use decline in the Robotyne area due to the threat of lancets (they seem to be transferring tubes to other fronts), and the AFU is favoring the use of HIMARS in the suppressive role.
Problem 4: Repetitive Lines of Approach
Because the AFU failed to breach the Robotyne sector on their first attempt, they’ve been forced to continually move up additional units and resources to hammer on the position. This has particular implications, both in the sense that AFU forces must continually traverse the same lines of approach to contact, and in the fact that they are using the same rear area to assemble and stage their assault forces.
This makes the burden on Russian ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) significantly easier, since the AFU has no effective way to disperse or hide the assets that they are bringing forward to the assault. Staged Ukrainian forces and material have been hid repeatedly in the villages immediately behind Orikhiv, like Tavriiske and Omeln’yk, and Russia is able to strike rear area infrastructure like ammunition depots because – to put it simply – there are only so many places these these assets can be staged when you are repeatedly assaulting the same 20km wide sector of front.
We recently had Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Defense Hanna Malair complaining that the 82nd Brigade – newly deployed to the Orikhiv sector – had been hit with a series of Russian airstrikes in its staging areas. According to her, this was because of poor OPSEC revealing the brigade’s location to the Russians. But this really makes very little sense; the entire area of operations around Orikhiv is perhaps 25km deep (from Kopani to Tavriiske) and 20 km wide (from Kopani to Verbove). This is a small area that has seen a huge amount of military traffic along the same roads throughout the summer. The idea that Russia needs insider information to know that they ought to surveil and attack targets in this area is absurd.
Problem 5: Fragile Brigades
It actually takes significantly less damage to “destroy” an operational level unit than people think. A unit can become a combat scratch off at 30% losses (with some variance depending on how those are allocated). This is because when people hear the term “destruction”, they think that means total losses. Sometimes that’s how the word is used in colloquial conversation, but what matters for officers trying to manage an operation is whether or not a formation is combat capable of the tasks being asked of it – and those capabilities can vanish much more quickly than people realize.
This is particularly the case for the Ukrainian mech package, for a variety of reasons. For one, as we discussed in previous articles, these brigades started the fight well understrength (remember, for example, that the Ukrainian 82nd Brigade has only 90 Stryker AFVs, while an American Strkyer Brigade is supposed to have 300). Additionally, the cobbled together nature of these brigades – and the total lack of indigenous sustainment systems like repair and maintenance – means that the Ukrainians will naturally have to cannibalize these vehicles. They’ve already started designating “donor” vehicles that are written off completely to be stripped down for parts. The nexus of these two facts is that Ukraine’s mechanized brigades are understrength on vehicles to begin with, and will have an abysmally poor recovery rate, with hidden attrition behind the scenes due to cannibalization.
What this means is that when we heard admissions by mid-July that Ukraine had already lost 20% of its maneuver assets, there is an associated catastrophic decline in combat capability. The lead brigades – which chewed through 50% or more of their maneuver vehicles – can no longer shoulder combat tasks appropriate for a brigade, and the Ukrainians are forced to feed in their second echelon units prematurely.
At this point, partial elements of at least ten different brigades have been deployed in the Robotyne sector, with the 82nd likely to join them soon. Given that the NATO combat power build plan only included 9 NATO trained brigades, plus a few reconstituted Ukrainian formations, it’s safe to say that blooding all of them over a 71 day fight just to break into the screening line was not in the plan.
Staring at the Abyss
I’ve seen a variety of analysts and writers lately arguing that the insertion of additional Ukrainian units into the Robotyne sector signals the next phase of the operation.
This is nonsense. Ukraine is still mired in the first phase. What has happened is instead that the attrition of their first echelon brigades has forced them to commit their second (and third) wave to complete the tasks of the opening phase. The initial attack, led by the 47th Brigade, was intended to create a breach in the Russian screening line around Robotyne and advance to the main Russian belt further to the south. They failed, and the additional brigades earmarked for exploitation – the 116th, 117th, 118th, 82nd, 33rd, and more – are now being systematically fed in to keep the pressure on.
These brigades have not been destroyed, of course, simply because they are not being committed in their entirety, but rather as subunits. Nevertheless, at this point Ukrainian losses make up the better part of a whole brigade, distributed around the broader package, and over 300 maneuver elements (tanks, IFVs, APCs, etc) have been scratched off.
We need to say this very explicitly. Ukraine has not moved on to the next phase of their operation. They are stuck in the first phase, and have been forced to prematurely commit portions of the second echelon that was earmarked for later action. They are slowly but surely burning through the entire operational grouping, and so far they have not breached Russia’s screening line. The great counteroffensive is turning into a military catastrophe
Now, this does not mean that the operation has failed, simply because it is still ongoing. History teaches us that it is unwise to make definitive pronouncements. Luck and human factors (bravery and intelligence, cowardice and stupidity) always have something to say. However, the trajectory is undeniably towards abject failure at the current moment.
So far, the AFU has shown some adaptability. In particular, we’ve recently seen them shift away from pushing forward unsupported columns of mechanized assets – instead they’ve been leaning on small dismounted units, trying to slowly push forward into the space between Robotyne and Verbove. The move towards dispersal is intended to reduce loss rates, but it also reduces the probability of a dramatic breakthrough even further and marks the temporary abandonment of decisive breaching action in favor of – once again – creeping positional warfare.
We would be remiss if we failed to note that there have been meaningful Russian losses in all of this. We know that the Russian forces in the Robotyne sector have required rotation and reinforcement, including with elite VDV and Naval Infantry units. Russia has taken counterbattery losses, it has lost vehicles in counterattacking action, and men have been killed holding their trenches. The initial assault groups that the Ukrainians threw in had a lot of combat power, and the fighting was very bloody for both sides. It’s not a one-sided shooting gallery, but a high intensity war.
But therein is the crux of the matter – Ukraine seems unable to escape the attritional and positional war that it finds itself in. It sounds all well and good to proclaim a return to “maneuver” warfare, but if there is an inability to breach enemy defenses, this is only an empty boast, and the nature of the struggle remains attritional. When the question becomes “will we breach before we run out of combat power”, you are not maneuvering. You are attriting.
In my series of articles on military history, we’ve looked at a variety of cases where armies tried desperately to unlock the front and restore a state of operational maneuver, but when there is no technical capacity to do so, these intentions do not matter one bit. Nobody wants to be trapped on the wrong side of attritional mathematics, but sometimes what you want does not matter at all. Sometimes attrition is imposed on you.
In the absence of the capabilities required to successfully breach Russia’s prodigious defenses – more ranged fires, more air defense, more ISR, more EW, more combat engineering, more more more – Ukraine is trapped in a rock fight. Two fighters are swinging bats at each other, and Russia is a bigger man with a bigger bat.
Two Bad Copes
Amid a clear misfire and growing strategic disappointment, two new suggestions have increasingly crept into the conversation – “copes”, if you will, that are utilized as a narrative comfort to explain why the Ukrainian operation is actually going just fine (despite nearly universal acknowledgment in the west that the results have been lackluster at best). I would like to briefly address each of these in turn.
Cope 1: “The first stage is the hardest”
You frequently see it argued that all the AFU has to do is break open the Russian screening line, and the remainder of the defenses will fall like dominos. The general thrust of this argument is that the Russians lack reserves and that the subsequent defensive lines are not adequately manned – just break open the first line, and the rest will fall apart.
This is probably a comforting thing to tell oneself, but it’s rather irrational. We could talk, for example, about Russia’s doctrinal schema for defense in depth, which prescribes liberal allocation of reserves at all depths of the defensive system, but it’s probably more fruitful to point at more immediate evidence.
Let us simply consider Russia’s behavior over the last six months. They have spent a tremendous amount of effort constructing echeloned defenses – are we really to believe that they did all this only to waste all their combat power fighting in front of these defenses? Nor is there any evidence that Russia is having trouble supplying the front with manpower at the present moment. We’ve seen continued rotations and redeployments amid an overall process of military enlargement in Russia. Indeed, of the two belligerents, it is Ukraine that seems to be scraping the barrel for manpower.
Cope 2: “Get within firing range”
This is the more fantastical story, and it represents a radical ad-hoc shift of the goalposts. The argument is that Ukraine doesn’t actually need to advance to the sea and physically cut the land bridge, all it has to do is get the Russian supply routes within firing range to cut off Russian troops. This theory has been advance liberally on Twitter X and by personalities like Peter Zeihan (a man who knows nothing about military affairs).
There are many problems with this line of thought, most of which stem from an inflated notion of “fire control.” To put it simply, being “in range” of artillery fire does not imply effective area denial or severed supply lines. If that were the case, Ukraine would be unable to attack out of Orikhiv at all, since the entire axis of approach is within Russian firing range. In Bakhmut, the AFU continued to fight long after their main supply routes came under Russian shelling.
The simple fact is that most military tasks are conducted within range of at least some of the enemy’s ranged fires, and the idea that Russia will collapse if the AFU manages to put a shell on the Azov coastal highway is fairly ridiculous. In fact, Russia’s main rail line is already within range of Ukrainian HIMARS, and the Ukrainians have successfully launched strikes on coastal cities like Berdyansk. Meanwhile, Russia strikes at Ukrainian sustainment infrastructure with regularity – yet neither army has collapsed yet. This is because ranged fires are a tool to improve attritional calculus and further operational goals – they do not magically win wars just by tagging the enemy’s supply roads.
Let’s be charitable though, and indulge this line of thinking. Suppose the Ukrainians managed to advance – not all the way to the coast, but far enough to bring Russia’s main supply routes within range of artillery. What would they do? Wheel up a battery of howitzers, park them at the very front line, and begin firing nonstop at the road? What do you think would happen to those howitzers? Counterbattery systems would surely set upon them. The idea that you can just haul up a big gun and start taking potshots at Russian supply trucks is really quite childish. Putting enemy forces out of supply has always required physically blocking transit, and that’s what Ukraine will have to do if they want to cut Russia’s land bridge.
The Distraction
I am cognizant of the fact that I would be raked over the coals if I failed to discuss a secondary area of Ukrainian effort, farther to the east in Donestk oblast. Here, the Ukrainians have worked their way a good distance up the highway out of the town of Velyka Novosilka capturing several settlements.
The problem with this “other” Ukrainian attack is that it is, in a word, inconsequential. This axis of advance is operationally sterile in a very fundamental way, as it involves pushing groups up a narrow corridor of road that doesn’t lead anywhere important. As in the Robotyne sector, the AFU is still quite some distance from any of the serious Russian fortifications, and to make matters worse the road and settlements on this axis lay along a small river. Rivers, as we know, flow along the floor of the terrain, which means the roadway sits at the bottom of a wadis/embakement/glacis, choose your terminology. In fact, the road network as such consists of nothing except a single-lane roadway on either side of the river
The Sideshow in the East
My reading of this axis is essentially that it was intended as a feint to create some semblance of operational confusion, but when the primary effort on the Orikhiv axis turned into a colossal misfire, the decision was made to continue to press here simply for narrative purposes. Ultimately, this is simply not an axis of advance that can exert a meaningful influence on the wider war. The forces deployed here are relatively miniscule in the grand scope of things, and they aren’t going anywhere important. Certainly, a thin, needlelike penetration is not going to drive more than 80 kilometers down a single lane road to the sea and win the war.
Conclusion: Finger Pointing
One of the surest signs that Ukraine’s counteroffensive has taken a cataclysmic turn is the way Kiev and Washington have already begun to blame each other, conducting a postmortem while the body is still warm. Zelensky has blamed the west for being too slow to deliver the requisite equipment and ammunition, arguing that unacceptable delays allowed the Russians to improve their defenses. This strikes me as rather obscene and ungrateful. NATO built Ukraine a new army from scratch in a process that already required greatly truncating the training times.
On the other hand, western experts have begun to blame Ukraine for supposedly being unable to adopt “combined arms warfare”. This is really a very nonsensical attempt to use jargon (incorrectly) to explain away problems. Combined arms simply means the integration and simultaneous use of various arms like armor, infantry, artillery, and air assets. Claiming that Ukraine and Russia are somehow cognitively or institutionally incapable of this is extremely silly. The Red Army had a complex and extremely thorough doctrine of combined arms operation. One professor at the US Arms School of Advanced Military Studies said: “The single most coherent core of theoretical writings on operational art is still found among the Soviet writers.” The idea that combined arms is some foreign and novel concept to Soviet officers (a caste that includes the Russian and Ukrainian high command) is ridiculous.
This issue is not some sort of Ukrainian doctrinal obstinacy, but a combination of structural factors rooted in the insufficiency of Ukrainian combat power and the changing face of warfare.
It’s frankly a little silly to say that Ukraine needs to learn about “combined arms” when they are very simply lacking important capabilities that would make a successful maneuver campaign possible – namely, adequate ranged fires, a functioning air force (and no, F-16’s will not fix this), engineering, and electronic warfare. The issue very fundamentally is not one of doctrinal flexibility, but of capability. By way of analogy, this is a bit like sending a boxer out to fight with a broken arm, and then critiquing his technique. The problem is not his technique – the problem is that he’s injured and materially weaker than his opponent. So too, the problem for Ukraine is not that they are incapable of coordinating arms, the problem is that their arms are shattered.
Secondly – and this, I admit, is rather shocking to me – western observers do not seem open to the possibility that the accuracy of modern ranged fires (be it Lancet drones, guided artillery shells, or GMLRS rockets) combined with the density of ISR systems may simply make it impossible to conduct sweeping mobile operations, except in very specific circumstances. When the enemy has the capacity to surveil staging areas, strike rear area infrastructure with cruise missiles and drones, precisely saturate approach lines with artillery fire, and soak the earth in mines, how exactly can it be possible to maneuver?
Combined arms and maneuver are predicated on the ability to rapidly concentrate enormous fighting power and attack with great violence at narrow points. This is probably impossible given the density of Russian surveillance, firepower, and the many obstacles they have put up to deny Ukrainian freedom of movement and scleroticize their activity. The main examples of maneuver in recent western memory – the campaigns in Iraq – have only tenuous relevance to circumstances in Zaporizhia.
Ultimately, we have returned to a war of mass – particularly massed ISR assets and fires. The only way Ukraine can maneuver the way they want is to break open the front, and they can only do this with more of everything – more mine clearing equipment, more shells and tubes, more rocketry, more armor. Only mass can crack open a suitable breach in the Russian lines. Otherwise, they are stuck in a positional creep through the dense Russian defenses, and criticizing them for being unable to grasp some sort of magical western notion of “combined arms” is the strangest sort of finger pointing.
So, whence goes the war from here? Well, the obvious question to ask is whether we believe Ukraine will ever have a more potent assault package than the one they started the summer with. The answer clearly seems to be no. It was like pulling teeth to scrape together these understrength brigades – the idea that, following on a defeat in the Battle of Zaporizhia, NATO will somehow put together a more powerful package seems like a stretch. More to the point, we have American officials saying fairly explicitly that this was the best mechanized package Ukraine was going to get.
It does not seem controversial to say that this was Ukraine’s best shot at some sort of genuine operational victory, which at this point seems to be slowly trickling away into modest but materially costly tactical advances. The ultimate implication of this is that Ukraine is unable to escape a war of industrial attrition, which is precisely the sort of war that it cannot win, due to all the asymmetries that we mentioned earlier.
In particular, however, Ukraine cannot win a positional-attritional war because of its own maximalist definition of “winning.” Since Kiev has insisted that it will not give up until it returns its 1991 borders, an inability to dislodge Russian forces poses a particularly nasty problem – Kiev will either need to admit defeat and acknowledge Russian control over the annexed areas, or it will continue to fight obstinately until it is a failed state with nothing left in the tank.
Trapped in a bat fight, with attempts to unlock the front with maneuver coming to naught, what Ukraine needs most is a much bigger bat. The alternative is a totalizing strategic disaster [end]
[my illustration : wrecks in Rabotino vicinity, Zaporojie region, on June 9, 2023, of US Bradley infantry fighting vehicles and one German Leopard 2A6 Panzerkampfwagen (screenshot)]
On a normal summer’s day, the road to Rabotino would be empty, save for the odd combine tractor and the vehicles driven by farmers and their families as they tend to the fields of crops they had planted in spring.
The summer’s heat would reflect off the horizon, creating glimmering mirages, while the still air would echo with the chirping of birds and the buzzing of insects. On a normal summer’s day, the road to Rabotino would resemble paradise.
Today, the road to Rabotino can best be described as a highway to hell: the serene landscape scarred with craters made by artillery shells, bombs, and mines. Fields that once grew crops intended to feed the world now seem to produce another crop—the torn, burned-out hulks of Ukrainian tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and other military vehicles of all shapes and sizes.
The air buzzes not with bees, but bullets, and the sky above is torn by the sound of shells passing overhead, on their way to their intended target, often consisting of a new crop of military metal waiting to be consumed by fire. The smell of fresh soil, young crops, and flowers of the field has been replaced by the fetid stench of rotting corpses, abandoned by their comrades who fled for their lives.
The Russian Ministry of Defense has assessed that, since the Ukrainian counteroffensive began in early June, the Ukrainian Army has suffered some 43,000 casualties, with more than 4,900 pieces of equipment, including 1,831 tanks and infantry fighting vehicles (among which are included 25 German-made Leopard tanks and 21 US-made M-2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles) having been destroyed.
Russian casualties, while unspecified, have been alluded to by President Putin, who stated that the kill ratio was 10:1 in Russia’s favor. That equates to 4,300 casualties: the brutal blade of war cuts both ways.
The casualties suffered by Ukraine roughly align with the casualties suffered by German forces during their offensive operations against the Soviet Army in the battle of Kursk, fought in the month of July and August 1943. The Kursk battle was one of the largest during the Second World War.
This should give one an idea of the scope and scale of the violence which has transpired in and around the village of Rabotino, and elsewhere in the Zaporozhye and Donetsk regions where Ukraine and Russian forces are confronting one another.
When an army suffers a defeat of the scope and scale of that suffered by Ukraine near Rabotino, and in other fields and villages across the line of contact with Russia, it is normally incumbent upon the leadership of the defeated forces to ascertain the reasons why the defeat occurred, and then to undertake remedial action to correct the problems identified.
It came weeks after being on the receiving end of criticism from their erstwhile allies and partners in NATO, who provided Ukraine with both the material used to equip the Ukrainian Army, and training on how this equipment was to be used in battle against the Russians.
According to NATO, the Ukrainians were not using the tactics taught to them in Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, and as such failed to make best use of the equipment that had been provided to them for this offensive.
From the Ukrainian perspective, however, the blame is cast back on NATO for providing Ukraine with a plan of action, but not providing the tools necessary to successfully implement the plan. While the Ukrainian military did receive most, if not all (or in some cases, more) of the 300 tanks, 500 infantry fighting vehicles, and 500 artillery pieces it had said were required for a successful counterattack designed to throw Russian forces from the former Ukrainian territories of Kherson, Zaporozhye, Donetsk, and Lugansk that were annexed by Russia in September 2022 following a referendum on joining Russia—as well as Crimea, which Russia annexed back in 2014—the Ukrainians did not receive the artillery ammunition or modern F-16 fighter aircraft it had requested.
The failure of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, according to the Ukrainian leadership, was directly attributable to the inability of Ukraine to suppress Russian artillery and airpower, both of which, when combined with the extensive use by Russia of mines in preparing their defenses, prevented the Ukrainians from achieving their goals and objectives outlined for the operation, namely to break through the Russian defenses and capture the city of Melitopol, thereby severing the land bridge connecting Crimea to Russia.
But the reality is that the Ukrainian counteroffensive was never going to work, under any circumstance. First and foremost, the Ukrainian Army is not the same military force that existed when the Special Military Operation began in February 2022. That army was largely destroyed in the fighting that raged from February through June 2022.
Thanks to tens of billions of NATO-provided equipment, and billions more in financial and training support, Ukraine was able to rebuild its army, which it used to good effect in the fall of 2022, driving Russian forces out of the Kharkov region and from the right back of the Dnieper River.
But this victory came with a heavy price tag, and NATO and Ukraine were compelled to build a third army, consisting of the equipment requested by Ukraine, and some 60-90,000 Ukrainian troops who were trained by NATO. It is this army that is being sacrificed on the road to Rabotino today.
Most of the troops that comprised this new army had little or no prior military experience. They received approximately three weeks of training on military fundamentals, before being trained on the operation (and maintenance) of the new NATO weapons they would be using.
Then they spent a few weeks carrying out field exercises designed to simulate an attack on the Russian defenses using complex “combined arms” tactics taught by NATO and American instructors. After this, they were shipped back to Ukraine and sent on the road to Rabotino.
The reduction of a prepared defensive line is one of the most complicated tasks one can assign a military unit in combat. To successfully execute this mission, the assault forces need to be masters of their craft, operating as part of a combined arms team capable of suppressing enemy forces, and breaching minefields while maneuvering under fire.
This is a task that experienced units with years of training under their belts would have difficulty pulling off. For an army like Ukraine’s third-generation force, this was a mission impossible, something every NATO trainer involved in preparing the Ukrainian forces would have known.
The massacre that occurred along the road to Rabotino was unavoidable so long as Ukraine and their NATO masters believe that the conflict with Russia can be resolved through force of arms. The problem is that the disparity between the quality and quantity of forces deployed by Ukraine and their western supporters on the one side, and Russia on the other, is too wide to be bridged by any combination of training and equipment NATO might be able to provide.
There is no magic weapon available to the West that can change the reality on the battlefield in and around Rabotino. Neither F-16’s and/or ATACMS can alter this reality. Nor is there a magic wand that can be waved over the battlefield to change the qualitative issues regarding the Ukrainian soldiers, who arrive on one of the most technologically advanced—and lethal—battlefields in modern history with little or no training.
The Ukrainian generals responsible for giving the orders to the Ukrainian Army, and the NATO trainers who prepared them for battle, knew that the outcome that is transpiring along the road to Rabotino was inevitable.
The harsh fact is that tens of thousands of Ukrainian soldiers and billions of dollars of western military equipment have been sacrificed not for viable military purposes, of which there are none, but rather to assuage the political needs of Ukraine’s leaders, who needed to be seen as being willing to make use of the training and material support provided, and their US and NATO masters, who needed to be able to point to battlefield successes in Ukraine to justify the diversion of their respective national treasury and military arsenal to the Ukrainian cause.
The road to Rabotino is paved with the detritus of western hubris, manifested in the flesh and blood of the Ukrainian Army scattered amongst the destroyed material produced by the defense industries of the collective West. This battle had only one possible ending, which has come to pass.
But the real tragedy is that neither Ukraine nor the collective West have absorbed the lessons that they were taught by the Russian Army—that the conflict in Ukraine can only end in a Russian victory. Sadly, many thousands of more Ukrainian soldiers, and tens of billions of dollars more of western military equipment, will need to be sacrificed before this lesson is finally driven home [end]
62-year-old Scott Ritter is a former intelligence officer within the US Marine Corps (USMC), then inspector of the United Nations in Iraq. When in 2003, the US and their British minions were about to invade the country under this false pretext, Ritter was claiming that there was no weapon of mass destruction (WMD) there. He was right.
Aujourd’hui âgé de 38 ans, Florian Menesplier a été autrefois militaire du 35e régiment d’infanterie (Copains d’avant)
L’information m’est parvenue et aucune disposition légale ne s’oppose à ce que j’informe mes lecteurs de l’identité d’un mis en cause dans une affaire de meurtre. J’ai été officier de police judiciaire dans les années 90, longtemps à la Brigade criminelle, quai des Orfèvres, n’ai pas de doute quant à la destination de l’intéressé, si la loi s’applique à tous en France. Il devrait être mis en examen et répondre plus tard de ses actes devant la Cour d’assises.
L’auteur du tir illégal qui a pris la vie du jeune Nahel, 17 ans, le 27 juin 2023, à Nanterre, tireur actuellement en garde à vue dans une affaire de meurtre, est le gardien de la paix [entre inspecteurs, nous disions autrefois archer du guet]
Florian Menesplier, né le 30 janvier 1985
qui a été décoré en mai 2021 par Didier Lallement, le préfet qui sentait Papon. L’information me parait de première importance, car l’extrême-droite fait courir le bruit que le malfaiteur serait un Arabe. Je dispose aussi de l’adresse personnelle de Menesplier mais la diffuser pourrait être mal interprété.
Une affaire dans l’affaire souligne un peu plus l’état de putréfaction de la Police nationale. Le syndicat France police – Policiers en colère est un organe d’extrême-droite parmi d’autres dans l’institution. Son secrétaire général adjoint est l’ex archer du guet Bruno Attal, qui ne fait pas secret de son idéologie quand il écrit par exemple le 21 juin
Je n’aurais pas voulu être le voisin d’un membre de la CGT dans les années 40
D’autres en revanche sont fiers que leur famille ait compté des résistants communistes qui le fusil en mains, ont affronté les SS, plutôt que l’infamie de flicaillons, qui pour le compte de l’État français, donc des nazis allemands, de la Préfecture de police aux GMR (groupes mobiles de réserve, ancêtres des CRS), de Paris au plateau des Glières, ont raflé les Juifs et pourchassé les résistants.
Après la mort de Nahel, le représentant sur Twitter du même syndicat, dont le compte collectif a été depuis suspendu, a écrit
#Nanterre Bravo aux collègues qui ont ouvert le feu sur un jeune criminel de 17 ans. En neutralisant son véhicule, ils ont protégé leur vie et celle des autres usagers de la route. Les seuls responsables de la mort de ce voyou sont ses parents, incapables d’éduquer leur fils
Voilà où est rendu un pays dont l’exécutif, à seule fin de réprimer des mouvements sociaux, a caressé pendant six ans dans le sens du poil une police recrutée au rabais, formée à l’avenant et rongée par l’extrême-droite. Ainsi dépassé par sa base, le ministre de l’intérieur Gérald Darmanin est le 28 juin dans l’obligation juridique (article 40 du Code de procédure pénale) d’informer le parquet
Autre caricature de la Police nationale, autre organisation d’extrême-droite, le Syndicat indépendant des commissaires de police (SICP) et son porte-parole, Matthieu Valet, commissaire de mauvaise facture, ancien archer du guet, dont les interventions sont toujours politiques, la même obsession de l’extrême-gauche que son collègueBruno Attal et son ministre Gérald Darmanin. Après la mort de Nahel, il a commencé par mettre en accusation la victime, souligner le refus d’obtempérer mais renouvelé sa confiance dans la justice de [son] pays. Moi aussi, c’est une affaire de meurtre qu’elle traite
Le bonimenteur continue son cirque le lendemain, accuse élus et avocats de faire le lit de la haine de la police, leur refuse le droit de qualifier d’exécution le meurtre de Nahel. En revanche, il s’émeut que l’identité du mis en cause soit divulguée, ose alors évoquer l’État de droit et menace
J’attends ton enquête, Valet.
Postscriptum, chronique
29 juin 2023
Le matin, le parquet de Nanterre demande le placement en détention provisoire de Florian Menesplier, désormais mis en examen dans une affaire de meurtre. Le syndicat Alliance est majoritaire dans une police qui se rêve plus en coterie de porte-flingues de l’État qu’en auxiliaire de justice. Ses représentants applaudirent en 2022 le candidat Eric Zemmour, quand il leur parla de combat de civilisation contre les enclaves étrangères de banlieue, quand leur ministre est un opposant farouche aux rayons communautaires dans les magasins. L’organisation est célèbre dans toute la corporation pour la laideur de ses tracts
Sur l’antenne d’Europe 1, son représentant Éric Henry s’autorise à constester la décision des magistrats, décision qu’il qualifie de disproportionnée. N’a t il jamais entendu parler de mettre fin au trouble exceptionnel et persistant à l’ordre public provoqué par la gravité de l’infraction ? Une première réforme nécessaire de cette police serait que les archers du guet apprennent la loi. Cela leur éviterait d’abord de commettre des meurtres.
3 juillet 2023
Un premier point judiciaire, car outre ses méfaits, la Police nationale cultive l’art consommé de se ridiculiser.
5 juillet 2023
Le journal Libération révèle les graves antécédents administratifs de l’archer du guet Florian Menesplier, qui toujours au sein de la Préfecture de police de Paris, avant la compagnie motocycliste des Hauts de Seine, a été précédemment affecté à la BRAV-M et à la CSI 93, deux formations emblématiques de la Police nationale, en matières de violences policières illégales et de corruption
Le 20 avril 2019, j’ai pris à Paris, place de la République, cette photo d’un peloton de voltigeurs
Dans le contexte du mouvement social des Gilets jaunes, la BRAV-M (Brigade de répression de l’action violente – motorisée) fut en mars 2019 la résurrection d’une précédente formation de maintien de l’ordre, les Voltigeurs, qui fut dissoute après qu’un jeune innocent, Malik Oussekine, eut été battu à mort le 6 décembre 1986. Enfants du préfet Didier Lallement, les nouveaux voltigeurs [ce qu’ils restent pour moi] sont devenus à Paris des supplétifs indispensables de la stratégie de répression des mouvements sociaux par le gouvernement. Ils se sont illustrés par de nombreuses violences illégales, comme celles que des témoins enregistrèrent 20 mars 2023, contre des manifestants opposés à la réforme néo-libérale des retraites.
Fille de Nicolas Sarkozy, la CSI 93 (Compagnie de sécurisation et d’intervention en Seine Saint Denis) est un scandale mémorable. Une enquête commencée en juin 2019 établit qu’y étaient devenues courantes des pratiques de faux et usage, violences volontaires, vol…, un abcès purulent. Le préfet qui sentait Papon annonça sa dissolution sous la pression médiatique en 2020, puis se ravisa par temps plus clair. Il fut limogé le 21 juillet 2022, en raison du scandale international de l’incompétence et de la violence de sa mauvaise troupe, lors de la finale au Stade de France de la Ligue des champions de l’UEFA, le 28 mai.
L’archer du guet Menesplier a été à bonne école.
Le même jour, la Commission des lois du Sénat entend Gérald Darmanin, qui se plaint à juste titre de la faiblesse du niveau de recrutement des archers du guet. Il oublie cependant que résoudre ce problème est précisément ce pourquoi il est grassement payé et qu’il aurait pu s’y attaquer depuis trois ans. En réalité, cette décadence est le résultat direct des entreprises de la famille politique du sarkozyste Darmanin, commença en 1995, sous Charles Pasqua, par la dissolution du corps des inspecteurs.
La publication fait enrager les figures proéminentes de l’extrême-droite de réseaux sociaux. De même et à la demande de syndicats policiers que j’estime avoir déjà trop entendus, Gérald Darmanin annonce qu’il dépose plainte contre les journalistes
Mais l’analyse juridique du ministre de l’intérieur est déficiente. Florian Menesplier n’est pas un policier… etc Il est un justiciable mis en examen et incarcéré dans une information conduite par un juge d’instruction pour meurtre.
Pour éclairer les raisons de cette carence en Droit, je peux rappeler ici que Darmanin n’est pas une oie blanche. Même si la justice a choisi de classer ses affaires, il reste inscrit dans les fichiers d’antécédents de sa propre administration. Cette authentique grenouille de bénitier avait coutume de convaincre des administrées de lui pratiquer des fellations contre récompense. Un peu comme des prêtres catholiques profitent de leur ministère pour s’adonner à la pédophilie. Mais si en France, le parquet est souvent l’auxiliaire zélé de l’exécutif, ce que ses partenaires judiciaires étrangers déplorent comme une violation du principe de la séparation des pouvoirs, je doute que cette nouvelle inquisition aboutisse
Anecdote concomitante, les publications factuelles et analytiques de mon blog ont été signalées à PHAROS, le portail officiel de signalement des contenus illicites de l’internet. Cela me rappelle un échec récent et retentissant du ministère de l’intérieur et de la Police nationale sous Darmanin. Les publications extrêmement violentes sur Twitter d’Abdoulakh Anzorov avaient été signalées plusieurs fois à PHAROS au mois de juillet, mais l’incapacité de la DGSI (Direction générale de la sécurité intérieure) et du SCRT (Service central du renseignement territorial) à analyser correctement la situation et surtout, à recouper leurs informations, conduisit le 16 octobre 2020, à l’assassinat de Samuel Paty
Un point à ce jour, sur les méthodes employées par les forces de l’ordre, contre les émeutiers. La vérité est dans les détails, que des individus comme Matthieu Valet aimeraient noyer dans leurs envolées lyriques. Les RAID tirent des Bean Bags [sacs de haricots], en réalité remplis de plomb, de sable ou billes d’acier, qu’un euphémisme administratif français qualifie de moyen de force intermédiaire [avant les tirs à balle réelle] mais que j’appelle plutôt munitions à moitié létales.
Drôle de concours de circonstances, j’ai évoqué hier PHAROS et le scandale de l’assassinat de Samuel Paty. Nous apprenons ce matin que suite à une plainte qui vise notamment le ministère de l’intérieur, un juge d’instruction a enfin ouvert une information.
23 juillet 2023
Alors qu’à la suite du meurtre à Nanterre du jeune Nahel par Florian Menesplier, des émeutes secouaient Marseille dans la nuit du 1er au 2 juillet 2023, quatre BACqueux [policiers de Brigade anti-criminalité] s’en sont pris à un jeune restaurateur qui quittait son travail. Touchée à la tête par un tir de LBD, la victime fut ensuite rouée de coups, puis abandonnée à son sort par les archers du guet. Traumatisme crânien, mâchoire cassée, oeil poché, Hedi est depuis en arrêt de travail pour plus de 60 jours.
Les violences ayant entraîné une incapacité totale de travail pendant plus de huit jours
L’Article 222-12 ajoute que ces violences sont punies de sept ans d’emprisonnement et 100 000 euros d’amende lorsqu’elle sont commises dans au moins deux, parmi quinze circonstances aggravantes, dont
par une personne dépositaire de l’autorité publique ou chargée d’une mission de service public dans l’exercice ou à l’occasion de l’exercice de ses fonctions ou de sa mission
ou
par plusieurs personnes agissant en qualité d’auteur ou de complice
ou
avec usage ou menace d’une arme
Point particulier : si Hedi souffre par la suite d’une quelconque infirmité, nous changeons de registre, ce sera la cour d’assises pour les archers du guet, à condition bien sûr que la loi soit la même pour tous. Identifiés, les malfaiteurs ont été mis en examen, trois placés sous contrôle judiciaire, le quatrième,
Christophe I*, tireur au LBD (si je parvenais à connaître son identité complète, je la publierais),
en détention provisoire, ce qui a provoqué une vague soudaine de peste bubonique parmi les archers du guet marseillais. Ces fonctionnaires ne bénéficient pas du droit de grève et se sont faits porter pâles
De façon générale, je considère qu’avant un éventuel procès, un policier n’a pas sa place en prison, même s’il a pu commettre des fautes ou des erreurs graves dans le cadre de son travail. J’exclus de mon propos les affaires qui concernent la probité ou l’honnêteté. Mais lorsqu’un policier est dans l’exercice de sa mission, on doit admettre qu’il peut commettre des erreurs d’appréciation. Le policier doit rendre compte de son action, y compris devant la justice, mais on doit aussi tenir compte des garanties dont il bénéficie et qui le distinguent des malfaiteurs ou des voyous
Il faut oser. La proposition est aberrante et sa justification dénote une grande confusion mentale. Sortie du cadre ludique de certains enfants, la société n’est pas peuplée de gentils policiers et méchants voyous, mais de justiciables égaux devant la loi. Garanties ? Celles que les porte-flingues de l’État veillent plus particulièrement à ne jamais se comporter en voyous, en raison de ce qu’ils devraient être avant tout, des auxiliaires de justice.
Âgé de 67 ans, le préfet est Directeur général de la Police nationale depuis le 3 février 2020. En qualité de fonctionnaire, il est tenu au devoir de réserve. Hélas, l’enfant du Grand Sud-Ouest n’en est pas à sa première bêtise. Dans l’Essonne, entre 2016 et 2019, des policiers ont commis le pire crime possible dans mon esprit pour de prétendus enquêteurs, hélas aujourd’hui des archers du guet défroqués. Parce que leur travail consistait à identifier les auteurs d’une grave agression de policiers à Viry-Châtillon, les fins limiers se sont autorisés à fabriquer des faux, pour incriminer injustement des personnes, dont certaines ont été incarcérées plusieurs années. Quand le loup fut levé en 2021 et les faussaires poursuivis, Veaux osa déclarer
Je les soutiens de toutes mes forces quoi qu’il arrive et quoi qu’on dise. Je les défends et je les défendrai
Probité ? Le DGPN n’est pas seulement inapte en matière d’exemplarité, mais un crétin profond. Serait ce pourquoi Emmanuel Macron l’a choisi ?
Pour revenir au contexte local, Angelina, 19 ans, aussi appelée Maria, était vendeuse à Marseille. Le 8 décembre 2018, elle quitta son travail alors que la ville était traversée par un cortège de Gilets jaunes. Un troupeau de porcs commença par l’immobiliser d’un tir de LBD dans les jambes. Alors qu’elle gisait au sol, les archers du guet s’acharnèrent à coups de matraques et de pieds, pour finalement l’abandonner dans une mare de sang. Erreur d’appréciation ?
(Mediapart)
Traumatisme crânien et contusion cérébrale, elle souffre toujours de séquelles. Les boeuf-carottes [IGPN] ont mitonné une vaine recherche. Par un très malheureux concours de circonstances, ils ne sont pas parvenus à identifier les criminels… en série ?
Le préfet de police de Paris s’autorise à partager les propos du DGPN
J’exhorte Laurent Nunez à pratiquer l’autocritique. La plus spectaculaire opération de la Préfecture de police à ce jour fut la rafle du Vel’d’Hiv’. C’est Français, Madame Bourdelle, c’est la police française, disait Adolfo Ramirez. La mécanique fut plus poussive le 13 novembre 2015, quand ils étaient 30 000 contre seulement 9 en face. Nunez était aussi Secrétaire d’État auprès du ministre de l’intérieur lorsque Angelina fut démolie à Marseille.
Conspiration ? Quand j’étais jeune inspecteur de police, dans les années 90, le Parisien était déjà appelé la main-courante de la Prefecture de police. Pas toujours, car le même journaliste Jean-Michel Décugis a réalisé mon interview en 2020.
24 juillet 2023
C’est du bout des lèvres qu’Emmanuel Macron désavoue ses deux sbires
Nul en république n’est au-dessus de la loi
Pas mal mais il pourrait mieux faire. Les policiers font respecter l’État de droit pour tous ? Oublions trente secondes l’État, qui pourrait être précisément le problème, quand les archers du guet et leur hiérarchie ne respectent pas le Droit.
Le reste de l’interview ne laisse présager rien de bon
Notre pays a besoin d’un retour de l’autorité à chaque niveau et d’abord dans la famille
Je ne pense pas que travail, famille et patrie soit la solution, quand ce pauvre pays a plutôt besoin de justice, à tous les niveaux. La censure non plus
Nous avons besoin de trouver un ordre public numérique qui permette de prévenir les débordements
Ce genre de réaction est hélas un syndrome français. Nous savons depuis la fin du XVIIIe siècle et par l’auteur français Sébastien-Roch-Nicolas Chamfort, que
l’Anglais respecte la loi et repousse ou méprise l’autorité. Le Français, au contraire, respecte l’autorité et méprise la loi
26 juillet 2023
C’est français, c’est la police française, voici le résultat d’un passage à tabac par la Police nationale. Kombini News a interviewé Hedi, que des BACqueux de Marseille ont démoli, puis laissé pour mort, dans la nuit du 1er au 2 juillet
31 juillet 2023
J’étais convaincu de l’imminence d’un tel rebondissement. Mediapart révèle que parmi les trois archers du guet sous contrôle judiciaire pour l’agression d’Hedi, le 2 juillet 2023,
David B* (si je parvenais à connaître son identité complète, je la publierais)
est déjà impliqué par un faisceau d’indices dans les violences criminelles contre Angelina, en décembre 2018 (cf. supra, 23 juillet). Des fonctionnaires de la Police nationale l’ont protégé à l’époque et des preuves ont été détruites.
3 août 2023
La Chambre de l’instruction de la Cour d’appel d’Aix en Provence suit le parquet et prononce le maintien en détention provisoire de Christophe I*, l’archer du guet qui le 2 juillet, a tiré au LBD sur Hedi (cf. supra, 23 juillet), à Marseille. Les sydicats policiers sont pareils à eux-mêmes. Unité SGP Police, pourtant réputé Force ouvrière, demande aussi
un débat sur le traitement judiciaire des fonctionnaires dans l’exercice de leurs fonctions
c’est à dire une justice devant laquelle les archers du guet seraient plus égaux que d’autres.
Ainsi, les porte-flingues de l’État persistent à vouloir s’émanciper des contraintes du Droit commun. Si un privilège leur était accordé en matière de détention provisoire, les mêmes seraient encouragés à revendiquer ensuite d’autres bricolages, tels que l’élargissement du champ légal d’emploi des armes et ainsi de suite. C’est l’inverse qui est aujourd’hui nécessaire. En raison de la complaisance de l’exécutif qu’ils servent, quand les archers du guet devraient se considérer en démocratie des auxiliaires de justice, leur montrer des limites, par la vertueuse application des lois actuelles, est devenu urgent. Leur donner satisfaction confinerait au rétablissement de ce qu’était la Police nationale, après sa fondation par Vichy en 1941.
Operation enters the second week of Ukraine’s long-awaited and highly touted counteroffensive, some basic conclusions can be drawn even though the fighting continues, and will continue to rage, for some time to come.
[my illustration : wrecks of Western armored fighting vehicles on June 9, 2023, south of Orekhov, Zaporojie region]
First and foremost, the counteroffensive gambit has failed. While there is still considerable combat strength left in the Ukrainian military, including more than 75% of the NATO-trained and -equipped 60,000-strong cohort Ukraine had assembled in the past eight months, fundamentally flawed assumptions about the quality of the force on which Ukraine and its NATO allies had placed their collective hopes for victory over Russia have been exposed. In short, Ukraine lacks the military capacity to overcome Russian defenses.
Ukraine’s most elite assault brigades, equipped with the latest Western military technology, failed to advance out of what Russian defensive doctrine calls the “cover” line of defense—the buffer that is designed to channel and disrupt an attacking force prior to reaching the “main” line of defense. Ukrainian casualties were extremely heavy, with Russia achieving a 10:1 kill ratio in terms of manpower, which is unsustainable from the Ukrainian perspective. The reasons for the Ukrainian failure are fundamental in nature, meaning that they cannot be overcome as things currently stand and, as such, the Ukrainian military has zero chance of success, no matter how hard they press subsequent attacks.
First and foremost is the quality of the Russian defenses, especially in terms of the barrier network (minefields, obstacles, and trenches) which, when combined with the tenacity of the Russian defender and the overwhelming superiority Russia enjoys in terms of fire support (both artillery and air-delivered), is the reason the Ukrainians are unable to advance beyond the “cover” layer of the Russian defenses. Ukrainian equipment and tactics are insufficient to the task of breaching the Russian obstacle barriers in any meaningful manner, dooming the attacking forces to be destroyed piecemeal by Russian artillery and air strikes, as well as local counterattacks mounted by Russian special forces.
Besides the poor tactics and equipment deficiencies (yes, the Leopard tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles were not the miracle weapons Ukraine and its Western supporters had hyped them up to be), the Ukrainians are paying the price for Russia’s impressive suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) campaign that has been ongoing for many weeks now. Russia has not only neutralized Ukraine’s ability to defend strategic targets far beyond the front lines, but also to project any meaningful air defense capability into the actual zone of conflict. This, combined with the lack of any viable air force, leaves the attacking Ukrainian ground forces exposed to the full weight of Russian air power.
Russian fixed-wing aircraft have been able to deliver precision-guided munitions with deadly effect to the assembly areas used by Ukraine to gather their attacking forces prior to committing them to the battlefield. It is estimated that between 25-30% of Ukraine’s casualties occur from these strikes. Russian helicopters can use their anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) with lethal effect on Ukrainian forces operating in the zone of contact, and Russian loitering munitions (i.e., “kamikaze drones”) have taken a heavy toll of Ukrainian forces as well. Unless Ukraine can reassert some semblance of air defense onto the battlefield, both in the rear areas as well as the frontlines, and sortie its own air power capable of challenging Russian air superiority over the battlefield, then no amount of courage and tactical innovation on the part of the Ukrainian ground forces will alter the deadly calculus of war that currently prevails today.
One of the many tragedies of the ongoing Ukrainian-Russian conflict is the fact that much of what Ukraine does on the battlefield is dictated not by military necessity, but rather political imperative. The recently concluded months-long Battle for Artemovsk (Bakhmut) is a case in point, where Ukrainian President Zelensky insisted on pouring manpower and equipment into a battle for a town that most military experts believed to hold minimal strategic military value. The geography, however, did not dictate the scope and scale of the battle, but rather the perception of Ukrainian defensive tenacity, and as a result between 60-75.000 Ukrainian soldiers lost their lives in what was a losing effort. Similarly, the Ukrainian army is being asked to make what amounts to a suicide attack against well-prepared Russian defenses under conditions which, as detailed earlier, can only result in a decisive Ukrainian defeat. This time, the culprit is Ukraine’s NATO allies who, on the eve of their annual summit, are desperate for any sign that the multi-billion-dollar investment they have collectively made in the Ukrainian military can pay even the most rudimentary dividends. For this reason, NATO will continue to pressure Ukraine to double down on defeat, pressing the Russians offensively even though any gains, if in fact any can be had, would be pyrrhic in nature and unsustainable over the long run.
The reality is that when NATO gathers in Vilnius on July 11, the Russians will be well into the process of destroying the third Ukrainian army built by NATO. The first was assembled during the buffer provided by the diplomatic “sham” of the Minsk Accords, from 2015-2022. Some 260,000 strong, this force was largely destroyed by June of 2022. The second army, consisting of some 80,000 newly trained and equipped Ukrainian soldiers backed by thousands of foreign mercenaries, the direct result of tens of billions of dollars of military aid provided by NATO, was able to launch the successful Ukrainian counterattack in the fall of 2022, before being decimated in the positional war that followed (including the Bakhmut slaughter).
The 60,000-strong 12-brigade Ukrainian counterattack force currently operating against the Russians, again the result of tens of billions of dollars in military equipment (including modern Western tanks, artillery, and infantry fighting vehicles), will most probably be destroyed, or facing imminent destruction, by the time the NATO summit convenes. The primary question facing NATO is does it have the political, economic, and military capacity to raise a fourth Ukrainian army, and after its demise, a fifth, sixth, and more?
NATO is politically committed to waging a proxy conflict with Russia “to the last Ukrainian.” This tragic reality means that, regardless of the battlefield reality that exists in Ukraine, NATO will continue to push Ukraine to sacrifice its manpower in a fruitless struggle against Russia for the simple fact that NATO is unwilling to willingly lose political face at home and abroad.
However, this political will does not automatically mean that NATO will be able to sustain this objective either economically or militarily.
While recent statements made by US General Mark Miley, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, indicate that there are tens of thousands of Ukrainian soldiers in the US/NATO training “pipeline”, and that the US/NATO is assembling equipment sufficient to equip these soldiers, they will not be ready for combat for several months yet—long after the third Ukrainian army has met its fate on the field of battle.
Miley spoke of new air defense systems for Ukraine, and other NATO officials speak of the possibility of providing Ukraine with (old) F-16 aircraft. New air defense systems, however, cannot in and of themselves alter a military reality imposed by Russia on Ukraine through its strategic SEAD victory. Ukraine will simply continue a losing struggle against Russian air power. The same holds true of any F-16 fighters that might be provided to Ukraine—too little, too late, and in any event incapable of achieving a meaningful battlefield result.
In Vilnius, NATO will be confronted with the reality of its impotency as a military alliance when it comes to countering Russia in Ukraine. Any military analyst of any competence will know that, as things currently stand, Ukraine simply cannot prevail over Russia. NATO illusions of a “frozen conflict” that seem to drive their insane desire to arm Ukraine to infinity and beyond, moreover, are driven by fundamentally flawed assessments regarding Russian economic competence and capacity, Russian military proficiency, and the will of the Russian people to sustain this conflict.
Here is the root cause of NATO’s strategic failure in Ukraine—a complete lack of understanding about the reality of Russia today. Russia will be able to out-produce NATO from a standpoint of military technology until which time NATO nations fully transition into a wartime economy, something NATO nations neither have the political will nor economic means to accomplish.
The Russian military has largely overcome the deficiencies which plagued it in the initial phases of the Special Military Operation, and the Russia armed forces assemble in the Special Military Operation zone are highly trained, well-equipped, and properly trained for the tasks they have been assigned. Moreover, the Russian nation has rallied around the leadership of Russian President Vladimir Putin in an overwhelming fashion, united in the belief that the proxy war NATO is waging against Russia in Ukraine is existential in nature and, as such, one that Russia cannot lose.
NATO will not alter course in the immediate period following the Vilnius summit—there is simply too much political momentum in place to bring about any meaningful alteration of the current trajectory in Ukraine. But neither will NATO produce a winning formula in Ukraine. Rather, NATO will continue to pursue little more than a variation of an existing theme—to arm Ukraine so that it can fight as long as it is capable of sustaining the fight.
This short-sighted posture will result in the inevitable military collapse of Ukraine, probably sometime between late summer/early fall of this year. When this happens, NATO will be left scrambling to construct some sort of face-saving mechanism to salvage its weakened geopolitical position vis-à-vis Russia. What that will look like is unknown at this time. But one thing is for certain—because NATO refuses to consider an off-ramp from the Ukrainian conflict today, there will be no future for Ukraine tomorrow. NATO political pride will be the downfall and destruction of the Ukrainian nation, its military, and its people [end]
61-year-old Scott Ritter is a former intelligence officer within the US Marine Corps (USMC), then inspector of the United Nations in Iraq. When in 2003, the US and their British minions were about to invade the country under this false pretext, Ritter was claiming that there was no weapon of mass destruction (WMD) there. He was right.
[Last bullfighting in Barcelona on September 25, 2011 (Manu Fernandez / AP)]
Finally the bull charged, the horse leaders ran for the barrera, the picador hit too far back, and the bull got under the horse, lifted him, threw him onto his back.
Zurito watched. The monos, in their red shirts, running out to drag the picador clear. The picador, now on his feet, swearing and flopping his arms. Manuel and Hernandez standing ready with their capes. And the bull, the great, black bull, with a horse on his back, hooves dangling, the bridle caught in the horns. Black bull with a horse on his back, staggering short-legged, then arching his neck and lifting, thrusting, charging to slide the horse off, horse sliding down. Then the bull into a lunging charge at the cape Manuel spread for him.
The long-awaited Ukrainian counter-offensive has finally begun. After months of handwringing and speculation, the western investment in Ukrainian military might has been put on display for the whole world to see—billions of dollars of advanced weaponry, drawn from NATO stocks, manned by Ukrainian soldiers who have been trained by NATO instructors, and whose actions have been shaped by NATO intelligence and directed by NATO planners. Let there be no doubt—this is a NATO offensive, a sad reflection on the reality that what was once called a simple proxy conflict has morphed into so much more—direct force-on-force combat between the collective west and Russia.
For Anne Applebaum, this offensive is an answer to her prayers. The Polish-American Pulitzer Prize-winning historian has for some time now been calling for such an action, a decisive blow by the collective west and Ukraine against a Russia she characterizes as autocratic and dangerous. The lessons of history have been shunted aside in favor of her feverish lust for Russian blood. Killing Russians, Applebaum believes, is the only way for the civilized west to show the Russian nation—autocrats and automatons alike—that the price for regional hegemony is too high for the Russian people and their government to bear.
Anne Applebaum (Photo: Olga Majrowska)
In a new article she penned for The Atlantic, Applebaum—a staff writer for the journal— writes of things she has no knowledge of or experience in, namely military operations, both operational and psychological. Like the dilletante she is, Applebaum throws about buzz phrases as if by putting them down on paper, it somehow makes them real, and the schemes they describe possible.
Applebaum, however, is hampered by her inadequacy as a military analyst and—perhaps more importantly—her total ignorance of the character of the Russian people, their leadership, and the nation they represent collectively. Elegantly stated ignorance is Applebaum’s forte, especially when it comes to glossing over both the causation and consequences of a conflict she has been promoting her entire adult life.
https://youtu.be/T5N_2Y0R-38
Scott Ritter will discuss this article and answer audience questions on Ep. 73 of Ask the Inspector.
Applebaum has turned an extensive stint in academia, inclusive of a six-month exchange program as a student to Leningrad circa 1985, into the intellectual foundation of a career spent sorting through the detritus of Soviet history, to reimagine Stalin and the Soviet experience in the worst possible light. It is not that one would be desirous of reimagining Stalin and Stalinism as the golden era of Soviet rule.
But perspective, and historical accuracy, do matter, and Applebaum’s writing seems destined to a particular brand of Russophobic western elite pre-programmed into accepting at face value anything negative about Stalin and his times. Her hatred for everything Russian, especially its leader, Vladimir Putin, drips from every paragraph she pens. She sees herself and the collective west as combatants in the greater struggle against what she derisively calls “Putinism.”
“[A]s long as Russia is ruled by [Vladimir] Putin,” Applebaum wrote recently, “then Russia is at war with us [i.e., the collective west] too.”
This fight is not theoretical. It requires armies, strategies, weapons, and long-term plans…NATO can no longer operate as if it might someday be required to defend itself; it needs to start operating as it did during the Cold War, on the assumption that an invasion could happen at any time.
Germany’s decision to raise defense spending by 100 billion euros is a good start; so is Denmark’s declaration that it too will boost defense spending. But deeper military and intelligence coordination might require new institutions—perhaps a voluntary European Legion, connected to the European Union, or a Baltic alliance that includes Sweden and Finland—and different thinking about where and how we invest in European and Pacific defense.
Applebaum’s words are a direct reflection of the sentiment expressed by one of her mentors, the Hungarian billionaire George Soros. In 1993, Soros wrote an article where Applebaum’s “new institution” thematic was expressed in more direct terms. Soros wrote of the need for a new world order “based on the United States as the remaining superpower and on open society as the organizing principle.”
It consists of a series of alliances, the most important of which is NATO and, through NATO, the Partnership for Peace which girds the Northern Hemisphere. The United States would not be called upon to act as the policeman of the world. When it acts, it would act in conjunction with others. Incidentally, the combination of manpower from Eastern Europe with the technical capabilities of NATO would greatly enhance the military potential of the Partnership because it would reduce the risk of body bags for NATO countries, which is the main constraint on their willingness to act. This is a viable alternative to the looming world disorder.
The combination of manpower from Eastern Europe with the technical capabilities of NATO as a mechanism for reducing the risk of body bags for NATO countries sounds very much like precisely what is taking place today in the current struggle between Ukraine and Russia. The imagery of destroyed Leopard tanks and Bradley infantry fighting vehicles belies the reality that the charred bodies trapped inside these wrecked vehicles and scattered in the fields surrounding the scene of their collective demise, are Ukrainian.
NATO technical capabilities and Ukrainian manpower does, in fact, reduce the risk of NATO body bags. It also emboldens western writers such as Applebaum to urge the Ukrainians on in a fight with Russia neither they nor the west has a chance of winning. The goal of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, Applebaum contends, is to “convince the Russian elite that the war was a mistake and that Russia can’t win it, not in the short term and not in the long term, either.”
Applebaum would do well to reflect on the reality that the anti-Putin Russian elite she fantasizes about influencing through the nexus of NATO technical capabilities and Ukrainian blood does not exist inside Russia any longer. Liliya Vezhevatova, an anti-war and LGTBQ activist from Novosibirsk who fled to Armenia following the initiation of Russia’s Special Military Operation in February 2022, noted that before the conflict started her organization could boast around 2,000 activists. Today that number is down to around 200.
“It is an irony of this conflict,” Vezhevatova laments, “that the female relatives of perished soldiers often hold the most ardent pro-war positions.” Vezhevatova explains this phenomenon by declaring that these mothers have been raised on the mythology of the “Great Patriotic War” (World War II), which casts the mother of a soldier as a heroic figure. “The situation is complicated by deep psychological mechanisms at play,” Vezhevatova notes. “It is hard to accept that a loved one perished for no reason.”
https://youtu.be/tncTVsd3O2E
Vezhevatova has a point—no mother would like to see the son she bore and raised die for no reason. But what Vezhevatova and Applebaum fail to see is the reality that the mothers and wives of the men fighting for Russia against Ukraine and the collective west are, in their minds, fighting for Mother Russia’s very survival. The monuments in Volgograd erected to commemorate the heroism of the Russian soldier in defense of his homeland (“Stand to Death”) and the awe-inspiring sight of Mother Russia beckoning her men forward in defense of their homeland (“The Motherland Calls”) is more than simple mythology weaponized for psychological manipulation. It is reflective of a deep patriotism that runs through the blood of most Russian women today.
Vezhevatova has abandoned her country, opting to live abroad while supporting westerners like Applebaum who are content with sacrificing Ukrainian men in the name of furthering western anti-Russian objectives. She has forsaken her homeland. Not so the women of Russia who remain. They know what is at stake. They know, as did their grandmothers before them, what needs to be done, inclusive of the horrible sacrifices that entails.
The statues “Stand to Death” (foreground) and “The Motherland Calls” (background), Volgograd
Meanwhile, Applebaum sits in the relative safety of her writer’s perch, claiming to be a friend of Ukraine all the while urging the men of Ukraine forward to slaughter.
Applebaum’s bloodlust brings to mind a passage from Ernest Hemingway’s 1926 classic novel, The Sun Also Rises. Hemingway touches upon the dichotomy of killing one’s friends in a short conversation between Romero, a Spanish bullfighter, and Lady Brett Ashley, a British widow.
“The bulls are my best friends,” Romero says in Spanish. His words are translated into English by Jake, an American expatriate and friend of Lady Ashley.
“You kill your friends?” Lady Ashley replies.
“Always,” Romero says in English, laughing.
It is the imagery of the bullfight that best describes Anne Applebaum’s desire to see Ukrainians killed in battle against the Russians. She treats the Ukrainian counteroffensive as a blood sport, a dance to the death between a matador and a fighting bull.
Finally the bull charged…
The contemporary Lebanese writer, Malak El Halabi, wrote about her experience watching a bullfight.
[T]o watch the bull enter the arena…To watch one bull surrounded by a matador and his six assistants. To watch the matador confronting the bull with the capote, performing a series of passes, just before the picador on a horse stabs the bull’s neck, weakening the neck muscles and leading to the animal’s first loss of blood…Starting a game with only one side having decided fully to engage in while making sure all the odds will be in the favor of him being a predetermined winner. It was this moment precisely that made me feel part of something immoral. The unfair rules of the game. The indifferent bull being begged to react, being pushed to the edge of fury. The bull, tired and peaceful. The bull, being teased relentlessly. The bull being pushed to a game he isn’t interested in. And the matador getting credits for an unfair game he set.
Yes, I went to watch a bull fight and yes the play of colors is marvelous. The matador’s costume is breathtaking and to be sitting in an arena fills your lungs with the sands of time. But to see the amount of claps the spill of blood is getting was beyond what I can endure. To hear the amount of claps injustice brings is astonishing. You understand a lot about human nature, about the wars taking place every day, about poverty and starvation…You understand a lot about humans’ thirst for injustice and violence as a way to empower hidden insecurities. Replace the bull and replace the matador. And the arena will still be there. And you’ll hear the claps. You’ve been hearing them ever since you opened your eyes.
Finally the bull charged…
Yes, the great Ukrainian counteroffensive has finally begun. The Ukrainian bull has been prodded into the arena by the collective west. The Ukrainian bull, weakened by the provision of inadequate weaponry and filled with the false promise of western support, does not comprehend that he is merely a pawn in a greater game, Eastern European manpower to be married up with NATO technology in a bid to weaken Russia. Maddened by the pain, blinded with fury, the Ukrainian bull sees the red cape…
Finally the bull charged…
Close your eyes, and you can hear the claps of the collective west urging the Ukrainian bull on.
Open your eyes, and you will see Anne Applebaum and her ilk reveling in the blood being spilt, cheering the slaughter and indifferent to the Ukrainian bull’s agony as the Matador slides the blade into his flesh.
Finally the bull charged…
This war will end one day, and when it does, Anne Applebaum and the collective west will have much to answer for [end]
61-year-old Scott Ritter is a former intelligence officer within the US Marine Corps (USMC), then inspector of the United Nations in Iraq. When in 2003, the US and their British minions were about to invade the country under this false pretext, Ritter was claiming that there was no weapon of mass destruction (WMD) there. He was right.
The FBI aided a Ukrainian intelligence effort to ban Twitter users and collect their data, new leaks show. Twitter declined to censor journalists targeted by Ukraine, including The Grayzone’s Aaron Maté
[my illustration]
The Federal Bureau of Investigation has aided a Ukrainian intelligence effort to censor social media users and obtain their personal information, leaked emails reveal.
In March 2022, an FBI Special Agent sent Twitter a list of accounts on behalf of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), Ukraine’s main intelligence agency. The accounts, the FBI wrote, “are suspected by the SBU in spreading fear and disinformation.” In an attached memo, the SBU asked Twitter to remove the accounts and hand over their user data.
The Ukrainian government’s FBI-enabled targets extend to members of the media. The SBU list that the FBI provided to Twitter included my name and Twitter profile. In its response to the FBI, Twitter agreed to review the accounts for “inauthenticity” but raised concerns about the inclusion of me and other “American and Canadian journalists.”
The FBI’s attempt to ban Twitter accounts at the request of Ukrainian intelligence is among the most overt requests for censorship revealed to date in the Twitter Files, a cache of leaked communications from the social media giant.
The FBI’s censorship request was relayed in a March 27th, 2022 email from FBI Special Agent Aleksandr Kobzanets, the Assistant Legal Attaché at the US Embassy in Kyiv, to two Twitter executives. Four FBI colleagues were copied on the exchange.
“Thank you very much for your time to discuss the assistance to Ukraine,” Kobzanets wrote. “I am including a list of accounts I received over a couple of weeks from the Security Service of Ukraine. These accounts are suspected by the SBU in spreading fear and disinformation. For your review and consideration”
The attached document, drafted by Ukraine’s SBU, contained 163 accounts, including mine. (The list is numbered to 175, but some accounts have two corresponding numerical lines).
The listed Twitter profiles, the SBU alleged, have been “used to disseminate disinformation and fake news to inaccurately reflect events in Ukraine, justify war crimes of the Russian authorities on the territory of the Ukrainian state in violation of international law.”
In order “to stop Russian aggression on the information front,” the SBU continued, “we kindly ask you to take urgent measures to block these Twitter accounts and provide us with user data specified during registration.”
The SBU expressed its “gratitude for the existing level of interaction”
In a memo forwarded by the FBI, Ukraine’s SBU asks Twitter to “block” the listed Twitter accounts “and provide us with user data specified during registration.”
If granted, the users on the list would not only have been banned from Twitter but had their phone number, date of birth, and email address disclosed to both the FBI and SBU.
Read the full list of accounts targeted by the FBI and SBU here:
In response, Yoel Roth, Twitter’s then-Head of Trust and Safety, informed Special Agent Kobzanets and his FBI colleagues that Twitter would “review the reported accounts under our Rules.” But he warned that the list included “a few accounts of American and Canadian journalists (e.g. Aaron Mate).” Therefore, Roth said, Twitter’s review would “focus first and foremost on identifying any potential inauthenticity.”
Roth then suggested that he would be open to suspending authentic accounts if it could be proven that they have a hidden tie to a foreign government. Journalists “who cover the conflict with a pro-Russian stance are unlikely to be found in violation of our rules absent other context that might establish some kind of covert/deceptive association between them and a government,” Roth wrote. “Any additional information or context in those areas is of course welcome and appreciated”
Twitter executive Yoel Roth’s response to the FBI’s censorship request flags its inclusion of journalists, “e.g. Aaron Mate.”
In his reply, Kobzanets did not directly acknowledge Roth’s concerns about Ukraine’s FBI-abetted effort to censor journalists. “Understood,” Kobzanets told Roth. “Whatever your review determines and action Twitter deem[s] is appropriate.” He also indicated that the FBI would not meet Roth’s request for any “context” that might establish ties between journalists and a foreign government: “Unlikely there will be any additional information or context.”
Inside Twitter, Roth forwarded the FBI request to two colleagues. “This is the output of our meeting with the FBI last week,” he wrote. “The list of accounts is a mixed bag – there’s some state media mixed in with a bunch of other stuff – but given the context, I think a deep dive here warranted.” (Roth left Twitter in November 2022).
In an email, I asked Special Agent Kobzanets if he had vetted Ukraine’s censorship request list before sending it to Twitter. I also asked Kobzanets if, after being informed by Twitter’s Roth that the FBI was trying to censor journalists on the SBU’s behalf, whether that had prompted any review or revision of his assistance to Ukrainian intelligence. Kobzanets did not respond.
The FBI’s National Press Office also declined to answer questions. Among several queries, I invoked Twitter’s warning that the FBI’s “assistance to Ukraine” entailed censoring journalists, and asked if that has prompted any changes to the bureau’s collaboration with Ukrainian intelligence.
“While we appreciate your inquiry, as a matter of practice we do not confirm, deny, or otherwise comment on specific interactions nor confirm the veracity of correspondence,” an FBI spokesperson wrote.
The FBI officials copied on the Kobzanets’ exchange with Twitter include Elvis Chan, an Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) of the FBI’s San Francisco field office, where he manages its Cyber Branch. Chan was active in the FBI’s contacts with Twitter when the social media giant’s censorship of reporting on Hunter Biden’s laptop shortly before the November 2020 election. (As I recently reported, he was also involved in FBI’s decision to forego a direct inspection of the DNC servers and instead rely on the Hillary Clinton-funded cyber firm CrowdStrike in the bureau’s probe of alleged Russian hacking in 2016).
Of the 163 accounts named by the SBU, 34 were suspended and 20 no longer exist. The rest remain active.
Those marked for censorship by Ukraine but remain online include Russian politicians Gennady Zyuganov, a longtime member of Russia’s Communist Party and parliamentarian who lost to Boris Yeltsin in Russia’s 1996 president election; Dmitry Rogozin, Russia’s former Deputy Prime Minister; and Sergey Mironov, a Russian politician and parliamentarian. The list also includes Russian journalists Vladimir Solovyov, a television news host; and Margarita Simonyan, editor-in-chief of the Russian state-controlled network RT. Several Russian government agencies and media outlets were also listed.
The Ukrainian nationals targeted by the SBU’s suppression request include Anatoly Shariy, a video blogger and politician who fled Ukraine in 2012 and subsequently received European Union asylum; and Andriy Portnov, a Ukrainian lawyer and politician who served as a senior official under Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych until the latter’s ouster in the February 2014 Maidan coup. (Both Shariy and Portnov’s Twitter accounts remain active).
The disclosure of a collaboration on censorship between the FBI and SBU is the latest documented instance of Ukrainian state-tied attempts to target foreign voices. A Ukrainian website known as Myrotvorets maintains a list of what it calls “enemies of Ukraine.” I was recently added to that list along with The Grayzone’s Anya Parampil, as well as the comedian and YouTube host Jimmy Dore. The Myrotvorets database was co-founded by Anton Gerashchenko, former deputy minister at the Ukraine’s Ministry of Internal Affairs, where he now serves as an advisor.
Last year, the global tech/media conference Web Summit withdrew a speaking invitation to The Grayzone’s Max Blumenthal and I after Olena Zelenska, the wife of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, demanded our cancellation. (Another Grayzone colleague, Kit Klarenberg, was recently detained and interrogated about his journalism by British authorities).
News of the FBI’s work with Ukrainian intelligence to censor Twitter users also follows reporting from journalist Lee Fang that the FBI has pressured Facebook to remove accounts and posts deemed by the SBU to be Russian “disinformation.” According to Fang, a senior Ukrainian official in regular contact with the FBI defined “disinformation” in such broad terms that it could mean viewpoints that “simply contradict the Ukrainian government’s narrative.”
after his takeover of Twitter, Elon Musk disclosed the political censorship that the social networking service was previously enforcing on behalf of the FBI
Scotland Yard counter terrorism command (SO15) is embezzling anti-terrorist laws, has already arrested for political reasons one French editor and one British journalist
chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Ukraine against Russia
British counter-terror police detained journalist Kit Klarenberg upon his arrival at London’s Luton airport and subjected him to an extended interrogation about his political views and reporting for The Grayzone
As soon as journalist Kit Klarenberg landed in his home country of Britain on May 17, 2023, six anonymous plainclothes counter-terror officers detained him. They quickly escorted him to a back room, where they grilled him for over five hours about his reporting for this outlet. They also inquired about his personal opinion on everything from the current British political leadership to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
At one point, Klarenberg’s interrogators demanded to know whether The Grayzone had a special arrangement with Russia’s Federal Security Bureau (FSB) to publish hacked material.
During Klarenberg’s detention, police seized the journalist’s electronic devices and SD cards, fingerprinted him, took DNA swabs, and photographed him intensively. They threatened to arrest him if he did not comply.
Klarenberg’s interrogation appears to be London’s way of retaliating for the journalist’s blockbuster reports exposing major British and US intelligence intrigues. In the past year alone, Klarenberg revealed how a cabal of Tory national security hardliners violated the Official Secrets Act to exploit Brexit and install Boris Johnson as prime minister. In October 2022, he earned internationalheadlines with his exposé of British plans to bomb the Kerch Bridge connecting Crimea to the Russian Federation. Then came his report on the CIA’s recruitment of two 9/11 hijackers this April, a viral sensation that generated massive social media attention.
Among Klarenberg’s most consequential exposés was his June 2022 report unmasking British journalist Paul Mason as a UK security state collaborator hellbent on destroying The Grayzone and other media outlets, academics, and activists critical of NATO’s role in Ukraine.
Because Klarenberg’s reporting on Mason relied heavily on leaked emails, Mason falsely accused him of “assisting a Russian state-backed hack-and-leak disinformation campaign.” Mason has also reported the leak of his emails to the British police.
Emma Briant, a self-styled disinformation expert who participated in Mason’s campaign to sabotage NATO critics, dispatched lawyers to demand Klarenberg remove all of his articles that mention her from the internet. The lawyer letters also threatened costly super injunctions to prevent further reporting, and challenged the “authenticity” of the emails’ content.
The cease-and-desist letters additionally leveled false and defamatory allegations against Klarenberg, including that he was personally involved in hacking her email and Twitter account
— Kit Klarenberg 🔻🔻🔻🔻🔻 (@KitKlarenberg) June 13, 2022
Did the bogus and obviously malicious complaints by Paul Mason or Emma Briant prompt the UK police to detain and investigate Klarenberg?
Klarenberg’s reports contain neither falsehoods nor anything approaching “disinformation,” which is precisely why intelligence-linked figures like Mason are so frustrated by their existence. Despite Mason and Briant’s allegations, there is not even hard evidence that Russian hackers were the source of the leaks.
While reporting on leaked material, Klarenberg engaged in the same journalistic practice that the West’s most prominent legacy newspapers, from The New York Times to The Washington Post, depend on to break news themselves. In fact, Thomas Rid, a self-styled disinformation expert and professor of Strategic Studies at Johns Hopkins University, has stated that journalists “should not shy away” from covering the leaks first reported by Klarenberg.
It therefore appears that British authorities did not detain Klarenberg for any legal breaches, but because he reported factual stories that exposed the national security state’s own violations of both domestic and international law, as well as the malign plots of its media lackeys
Interrogated under Counter-Terror provisions, grilled about non-existent Russian ties
Journalist Kit Klarenberg arrived in the UK on May 17 from Belgrade, Serbia, where he lives. He was planning to visit friends and family, but first, he would have to pass through an obstacle course British police laid before him.
As soon as his flight landed at Luton Airport, the pilot announced that border police were “just around the corner,” and asked all passengers to prepare their passports. The police were waiting for Klarenberg at the bottom of the stairs leading passengers from the plane to the tarmac. They immediately led him to a back room and informed him of his detention under Schedule Three, Section Four of the 2019 Counter-Terrorism and Border Act.
Six plainclothes officers surrounded Klarenberg and explained he faced arrest if he refused to answer their questions and hand over his personal electronics. They refused to tell him their names and offered call signs instead.
“I’d been expecting something like this since a police interview request arrived last summer,” Klarenberg told The Grayzone, referring to a communique he received from a senior British detective on July 27, 2022. The email requested Klarenberg report to a station to be questioned about allegations by an unnamed complainant of “offences under the computer misuse act”
A 2022 email from British police requesting his presence for an interrogation session about his journalistic work.
Klarenberg was notified in September of 2022 (see below) that the police investigation had been closed, however.
Back in the interrogation room at Luton, Klarenberg was asked which passports he held in his possession. “They seemed surprised that I only had a British passport with me,” he recalled. The police then grilled him about whether he owned foreign property, which countries he had visited, and why. He was compelled to provide his address in Belgrade, disclose how much he paid for rent, and bizarrely, whether his energy costs were included. The officers then demanded to know why Klarenberg lived in Serbia.
From there, police interrogators homed in on Klarenberg’s work with The Grayzone. “They asked which publications I wrote for, and I told them I wrote for many,” he said. “One even remarked they’d never previously heard of ‘MintPress Zone.’ Their overwhelming, if not exclusive, interest was in The Grayzone.”
The officers asked Klarenberg about articles including his report on the CIA’s recruitment of would-be 9/11 hijackers, as well as his thoughts on 9/11 conspiracy theories.
Then came a blizzard of questions relating to The Grayzone: How much was Klarenberg paid by this publication, how often, and into which bank account? Who owned the site? How much contact did he have with Max Blumenthal, the author of this article and editor of The Grayzone? Had he met Blumenthal in person?
The counter-terror officers then rattled off a series of unfounded questions related to Russia: Does The Grayzone have an agreement of any kind with Russia’s Federal Security Bureau (FSB) to publish hacked material? Has Klarenberg knowingly been in contact with any FSB operatives? Is he in touch with current or former personnel of Russian state media? Who owns The Grayzone and is it sponsored by Russia?
(As has been publicly stated many times, The Grayzone is a fully independent outlet founded by me, Max Blumenthal. Unlike many of our adversaries, this outlet does not accept funding or support from any state, including Russia.)
At this point, the officers took Klarenberg’s bank cards out of the room for an extended period. They also seized his camera memory cards and sims, demanding he provide pin codes to open them. “What was done with my bank cards, I do not know,” he remarked. “The same for the SDs – what they got off these old and barely used cards was unclear.”
Next, Klarenberg’s interrogators asked if he had any journalistic materials on hand, requesting that he “warn” them about the contents and where they were located so they did not hoover it up “by accident.”
He wondered if the question was a public relations stunt devised in response to the media outcry this April over the British counter-terrorism police’s detention of Ernest Moret, a French publisher held and questioned about his views on Emmanuel Macron’s widely despised pension reforms. There was also the chance they wanted him to lead them to sensitive content he had or was planning to cover.
Klarenberg’s police interrogators displayed intense interest in whether he belonged to any press organizations, and if he held a press card or any professional qualifications. They then probed his career trajectory, asking how he entered the world of political journalism and about perceived employment “gaps” in Klarenberg’s professional record.
He was repeatedly grilled on his journey from covering financial issues a decade ago to political and national security reporting. “The police professed confusion at the transition,” despite Klarenberg explaining that he studied politics in university. “The officers repeatedly returned to this point, they clearly felt this didn’t make sense,” he recounted. “Were they probing whether I’d been ‘recruited’ at some point, or had been a ‘sleeper agent’ all along?”
Throughout the interview, the counter-terrorism police probed Klarenberg aggressively on his political affiliations and beliefs. Was he involved in any activist causes in Belgrade? What did he think of the Russian government? Did he have an opinion on Russia’s arrest of Evan Gerskovich of the Wall Street Journal? What did he think of Rishi Sunak? One officer complained incessantly about Keir Starmer being “useless,” prompting Klarenberg to wonder if the comments were a dangle aimed at drawing him out.
When Klarenberg noted that he had publicly criticized Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the police demanded to know if “anyone” from the Russian government had contacted him to complain. “Presumably, they wanted to know if my criticisms had pissed off my ‘controllers’,” Klarenberg said. “Which is a completely ridiculous proposition.”
An extended philosophical discussion about journalism and the public interest followed. “Your work might be interesting to the public,” an officer told Klarenberg, “but it’s not in the public interest.” He insisted that a journalist could be furthering the interests of a hostile state actor in reporting on national security issues.
“I tried to explain that if material can be authenticated, then the material is the source. We are not citing claims from a human source that provided the material, we are reporting on provided source material in a factual way,” Klarenberg said.
After five hours, the counter-terror police seemed to have run out of questions. They had, by this point, seized all Klarenberg’s electronic devices, forced him to provide unlock codes for his phone and tablet, taken his SD cards, and combed through thousands of his personal photos. “Pity whoever drew the short straw and had to stare at length at thousands of shots of brutalist architecture across the world I’ve taken over the years,” he remarked.
Authorities also fingerprinted Klarenberg, subjected him to DNA swabs, and repeatedly photographed him. “As long as your prints have never been found on an IED in Afghanistan, we delete this data in six months,” one cop with a Northern Irish accent claimed.
A week after releasing Klarenberg from detention, police returned his tablet with masking tape over its cameras, along with two memory cards. The police kept one old SD card, mostly containing music, on the grounds it may be “relevant to criminal proceedings.”
He remains under investigation by the British state at the time of publication [end]
Scotland Yard counter terrorism command is embezzling schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000 or other legal pretexts, in order to crack down on political opposition to any interest of UK government or its allies. On April 17, 2023, French publisher Ernest Moret was arrested that way in London, due to his involvement in demonstrations in France against a pension reform. That is not counter-terrorism but pure political police, with dishonest means of coercion. So sad that the same sleuths did not manage to prevent the attack on June 3, 2017, between London Bridge and Borough Market