Analista senior di l'intelligenza in u campu di a gestione di i risichi di sicurezza, sò un anzianu tenente detective è ufficiale di l'intelligenza in l'agenzie di u Statu francese. A bona pronuncia hè Николай Чинкуини, in russu
There’s a gaping hole in Kyiv’s finances that no amount of tax increases or Western donations will be able to fill
There is no plan in place to fund the Ukrainian budget after 2025.
Even if the war ends by the summer of 2025, it will take some time to reduce military expenditures, leaving European nations on the hook. It’s not clear that European elites have fully understood the political costs, however much longer the war continues.
With intensive, U.S.-brokered negotiations ongoing in Saudi Arabia involving separate Ukrainian and Russian delegations, hopes are rising that the Trump administration will finally be able to bring an end to the war.
But even if the war ends tomorrow, it would be unwise to assume that Ukraine could reduce military spending close to prewar levels.
Ukraine now has almost 900,000 men and women at arms, a threefold increase from peacetime, and that doesn’t take into account irrecoverable losses through death and injury. Estimates vary widely, but the casualty rate is commonly thought to number in the hundreds of thousands, with compensation provided to the injured and families of the deceased.
The war in Ukraine has therefore come at a vast financial cost to that country. Ukraine’s defense spending has risen tenfold since the 2021 budget was announced, when social welfare payments were the country’s biggest expenditure.
This has left a gaping hole in Ukraine’s finances that no amount of tax increases or Western donations will be able to fill over a sustained period without political consequences.
Since 2022, Ukraine has run an average budget deficit of over 22% of GDP. Based on the current exchange rate, Ukraine’s budget shortfall in 2025 amounts to around $41.5 billion. And that assumes defense spending falling slightly this year. In the hopefully unlikely event that war continues to the end of the year, the Ukrainian state would need to revise its budget upwards as it did in 2024.
Today, Ukraine’s domestic revenue, including taxes, excise, and duties, just about covers the cost of the defense effort, which in 2024 accounted for 64% of its total budget expenditure. That includes significant tax increases as the war has gone on. Total tax revenue will have risen by more than 100% since the war started and personal income taxes by over 200%. This in a country in which, according to the Wilson Center, 50% of the population lives at a basic subsistence level.
As Ukraine is cut off from international capital markets, it has had to meet the difference through aid and loans from Western nations.
Put simply, Western donations and loans have paid the salaries of Ukrainian state officials and kept the lights on in their buildings. At the start of the war, donations took the form of free financial aid to meet the country’s budgetary and military needs. According to the Kiel Institute, the United States has provided just above $50 billion in direct budgetary assistance. The European Union provided $51.5 billion in financial assistance – i.e., budgetary support – between 2022 and 2024.
However, since the start of 2024, free aid has progressively shifted to lending as Western governments have felt the political and economic cost of unlimited financial assistance.
So, Ukraine has increasingly resorted to borrowing money. In some regards, that is to be expected. Governments tend to borrow heavily at times of war. The UK only settled its World War II war debts to the United States and Canada in 2006.
Ukrainian debt has therefore soared to over 100% of GDP and, critically, the cost of servicing its debt has tripled, and now makes up the second largest line of expenditure in Ukraine’s budget, after military spending. To put that into context, Ukraine will spend more than twice the amount on servicing its debt in 2025 than it spends on the health of its population. That ratio will only widen the longer the war continues.
Ukraine should just about be able to make ends meet in 2025 thanks to the G7 Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration loan agreed in June 2024. As part of a last-ditch compromise by the outgoing Biden Administration, the $20 billion U.S. contribution to the G7 loan was directed through the World Bank to provide specific project-based support – i.e., to help rebuild power infrastructure – rather than generalized budgetary support.
The crucial point is that I’ve seen no plans for how Ukraine’s budgetary needs will be met from 2026 onward. Even if the war ends tomorrow, Ukraine may still be at risk of running out of money in 2026 if Western donor countries falsely assume that it will be able to return to prewar spending on Day One.
Therefore, the big question is how quickly Ukraine can reduce military spending in 2026 and who will cover the shortfall. To balance the books in 2026, Ukraine would need to reduce its military spending by 80%, or around $41 billion.
But decision-makers in Kyiv may understandably push to maintain a big army against the threat of future Russian aggression. While the huge expenditure in weapons and ammunition from war fighting may fall away, maintaining a standing army, even if its numbers are reduced, would still carry a heavy price. Even if Ukraine’s future budget deficit wasn’t as high as $41 billion, it is easy to imagine that it might be $20 billion.
The International Monetary Fund also doesn’t expect Ukraine to be able to access international lending markets before 2027. That will leave the Ukrainian state reaching out to donor nations for additional funding. With the Trump administration looking to pare back its financial commitments to Ukraine and focus instead on investing, including in minerals, the pressure will be on European states. There is significant political risk here. In the past few days, the Europeans struggled to agree to an additional weapons package of $5 billion for Ukraine. Funding $20 billion in budgetary support to Ukraine in 2026 following a ceasefire this year may still herald a backlash from those on the nationalist left and right who believe the war should have ended in 2022. I assess the UK and Europe would find it economically and politically unsustainable to prop up the war beyond this year without the United States. That’s another reason why European leaders should get behind ongoing peace negotiations [end]
Ian Proud was a member of His Britannic Majesty’s Diplomatic Service from 1999 to 2023. He served as the Economic Counsellor at the British Embassy in Moscow from July 2014 to February 2019. Prior to Moscow, he organized the 2013 G8 Summit in Lough Erne, Northern Ireland, working out of 10 Downing Street. He recently published his memoir, “A Misfit in Moscow: How British diplomacy in Russia failed, 2014-2019”
pertinente mais incomplète affiche de la CGT, pour une journée de manifestations à travers la France, contre racisme et xénophobie
Des manifestations contre racisme et xénophobie sont organisées à travers la France le 22 mars 2025, par des partis de gauche, syndicats et associations.
L’affiche de la CGT est pertinente. Nul ne peut sérieusement nier qu’elle expose des personnalités qui s’inscrivent toutes dans la tradition de l’État français, gouvernement fasciste de Philippe Pétain entre 1940 et 1944.
À l’instar d’un Eric Zemmour, d’autres figures de cette affiche sont de confession juive et origines pieds-noirs. Elles n’ont toujours pas digéré la victoire des peuples d’Afrique du Nord sur le colonialisme français et à ces événements historiques, perçoivent sans doute un écho en Palestine, où l’État israélien commet crimes de guerre, crimes de masse et nettoyage ethnique.
L’affiche me paraît cependant incomplète. Un Bruno Retailleau, qui rappelle tant Philippe Henriot, une grande voix française, emploie sa fonction de préposé à l’intérieur à rejouer la guerre de libération de l’Algérie. Ne pas l’avoir représenté est à mon avis une grave injustice.
Emmanuel Macron, enfin, est certes un politicien d’une profonde vacuité, mais il mérite aussi d’y figurer. Il n’est pas raciste ou xénophobe, car ses aversions sont plutôt sociales. Mais quand son action a du sens politique, destruction des bienfaits sociaux de la résistance, répression des mouvements sociaux, tentative de réhabilitation de Philippe Pétain, soutien hystérique à l’Ukraine contre la Russie, il s’inscrit incontestablement dans la tradition pétainiste. À l’intar des ploutocrates européens qui l’emploient, il est épouvanté par l’inéluctable effondrement de l’hégémonie occidentale.
Si personne ne peut vraiment le qualifier d’homme intelligent, il est cependant malin comme un singe, sait comment faire avaler des couleuvres. Son terrain est facile : il flatte la vanité nationale des Français.
Le racisme et la xénophobie sont corollaires du nationalisme. Quant à la capacité de celui-ci à agglomérer petits bourgeois et ce que Karl Marx appelait Lumpenprolétaires, le philosophe allemand Arthur Schoppenhauer (1788-1860) avait déjà énoncé auparavant
La fierté nationale est la forme la moins coûteuse de fierté. Si un homme est fier de sa nation, cela signifie qu’il n’a aucune qualité dont il puisse être fier. Autrement, il ne pourrait pas faire appel à celles qu’il partage avec des millions de ses concitoyens. L’homme qui possède des qualités personnelles importantes ne verra que trop bien dans quels domaines sa propre nation est déficiente, car ses défauts seront constamment sous ses yeux. Mais tout misérable imbécile qui n’a rien dont il puisse être fier, adopte en dernier recours la fierté de la nation à laquelle il appartient ; il est prêt et heureux de défendre bec et ongles tous les défauts et les folies de la nation, se dédommageant ainsi de sa propre infériorité
Le racisme et la xénophobie sont en France une tradition historique, aujourd’hui revigorés par un déclin inéluctable et vertigineux, les politiques néolibérales que dictent des ploutocrates européens.
chronique alphabétique et nécrologique de l’engagement français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas
Depuis l’allocution d’Emmanuel Macron à propos de la guerre en Ukraine, le 5 mars, les grands médias sont en ordre de marche. Réhabilitation du président en « chef de guerre », patriotisme exacerbé, concert militariste et glorification des industriels de guerre… Mené tambour battant, le SAV du discours présidentiel s’accompagne d’une nouvelle séquence de matraquage patronal contre le « modèle social » et pour « travailler plus » au nom, prétendument, de l’« effort de guerre » : « Pensions ou munitions ? » ; « Les canons ou les allocations ? » Signés Dominique Seux (Les Échos, 10/03) et Étienne Gernelle (RTL, 10/03), les deux slogans donnent le ton
[mon illustration : dessin dans L’Opinion le 6 mars 2025]
Les haut-parleurs médiatiques s’en donnent à plein poumon. « Faire le tri des dépenses budgétaires et sociales au profit de l’impératif militaire », sermonne Nicolas Beytout dans L’Opinion (5/03), dont la Une s’enthousiasme pour « cette rigueur qui vient » : « Concrètement, détaille un second journaliste, il pourrait s’agir de travailler plus longtemps (de quoi torpiller le conclave sur les retraites…), de ne plus indexer les retraites sur l’inflation, de supprimer les dépenses sociales les moins utiles, d’augmenter le taux d’emploi… » Et c’est peu dire que le quotidien entend peser sur les « réformes » envisagées par Emmanuel Macron. « Pas d’échappatoire, il faut réduire les dépenses publiques », prescrit de nouveau Nicolas Beytout deux jours plus tard (7/03), listant les coups de boutoir à imposer « aux collectivités locales et à la sphère sociale » : « âge de la retraite, assurance maladie, chômage, charges sociales, tout devra être questionné. » « Effort de guerre : bientôt la retraite à 70 ans ? », martèle la rédaction, préconisant que la France adopte à cet égard une « Danemark attitude ».
Même tonalité aux Échos (10/03), où Dominique Seux affirme que « travailler plus est le meilleur moyen de financer l’effort nécessaire pour nos armées », tout en suggérant à Emmanuel Macron de se tenir à distance de ce débat – « méthode » oblige –, afin de ne pas offrir « un angle d’attaque trop facile à ses adversaires », lequel risquerait de fragiliser l’impérieux « consensus sur l’effort en faveur des armées. » Saigneur en chef… et conseiller du prince.
Par intérêt bien compris, Le Figaro – propriété du groupe Dassault, fleuron de l’armement français ayant réalisé plus de six milliards d’euros de chiffre d’affaires en 2024 –, ne prend quant à lui aucune pincette dans cette vaste opération de propagande. Tous ses lieutenants sont d’ailleurs sur le pied de guerre. Le 7 mars, Guillaume Tabard et Gaëtan de Capèle parlent d’une seule voix : « Il n’y a pas d’autres solutions que de s’attaquer enfin sérieusement aux dépenses de l’État », écrit le premier, avant que le second enjoigne de « dire la vérité crue, telle qu’elle est, en cessant de tourner autour du pot. La voici : notre sacro-saint modèle social […] ruine consciencieusement le pays et le prive de toute marge de manœuvre financière. » Les discussions syndicales et patronales en cours sur la réforme des retraites imposée au forceps ? « Quel clin d’œil pathétique », se désespère Dupond ; Dupont communie : « Il faut se pincer pour le croire. » Le 9, c’est au tour de l’inénarrable Nicolas Baverez de rédiger modestement le « mode d’emploi » du « réarmement ». Sans surprise, « réorienter […] les dépenses de l’État-providence […] vers la défense » et « renouer avec la croissance, la compétitivité et le plein-emploi » via « la modernisation du pacte social » constituent « la seule solution ». Et ainsi de suite.
« C’est ce comportement collectif de cigale qu’il va falloir payer aujourd’hui »
Dans la matinale de France Info (11/03), face à Manuel Bompard (LFI) qui dénonce une « stratégie du choc » visant à faire accepter des « politiques de régression sociale » la journaliste Salhia Brakhlia joue (très mal) l’ingénue – « Vous pensez à quoi ? » – avant de soutenir mordicus qu’un tel cap « ne vient pas du gouvernement […]. Et ça ne vient pas du président. » Fichtre ! « Face aux défis que soulèvent la menace russe et l’agressivité commerciale américaine, le ministre délégué à l’Europe Benjamin Haddad […] assume de dire aux Français qu’il faudra travailler plus. Assurance chômage, taux d’emploi, retraites par capitalisation… Il faut, selon lui, accélérer les réformes », lisait-on pourtant le même jour dans La Voix du Nord. Et le 6 mars, dans la matinale de RTL, le même ministre déclarait : « Vous ne pouvez pas dire, le mardi : “Il faut continuer à soutenir l’Ukraine, il faut augmenter nos budgets de défense, il faut faire l’autonomie stratégique” et le mercredi, dire […] : “On va revenir à la retraite à 60, 62 ans et on va travailler moins”. […] Quand vous voyez les voisins autour de nous qui travaillent plus, c’est ça aussi qui donne des marges de manœuvre pour pouvoir augmenter nos budgets défense. » Salhia Brakhlia n’a pas bien lu ses fiches 1 …
À sa décharge, il serait injuste de s’écharper sur le suivisme (ou non) des médias dans cette affaire, tant les injonctions à « travailler plus » y sont déclinées sur tous les tons depuis un siècle… en toute « autonomie ». Ainsi, nul besoin qu’Emmanuel Macron dicte aux éditorialistes la ligne à prescrire : homogénéisation libérale oblige, ils le font très bien tous seuls ! Le Monde notamment, qui, par voie d’éditorial, ne résiste pas à « sonner l’heure d’un douloureux réveil budgétaire. […] Le réarmement du pays, bien plus endetté que ses voisins, place l’exécutif dans la situation très délicate d’avoir à remettre à plat les dépenses de l’État, des collectivités locales et de la Sécurité sociale pour trouver des gisements durables d’économies. » (7/03) Ni une ni deux, Françoise Fressoz profite de cette ligne éditoriale officielle pour enfoncer le clou – « le mot “économies” reste […] tabou » –, fustiger « les partenaires sociaux » qui « peinent à prendre la dimension du moment » et, bien sûr, parfaire son opus courtisan : « Depuis sa réélection en 2022, Emmanuel Macron tente, en vain, de convaincre le pays qu’il ne parviendra à préserver son modèle qu’en travaillant plus. » (Le Monde, 12/03)
Au Parisien, c’est François Lenglet qui est appelé en renfort pour dispenser, avec toute la mesure qu’on lui connaît, la leçon de catéchisme – version « revancharde » (9/03) :
François Lenglet :Nous avons affecté les dividendes de la paix à l’État-providence. Son développement a atteint son sommet sous Macron, avec les dispositifs Covid uniques au monde par leur générosité. Avec l’assurance-chômage pour les démissionnaires, les lunettes à zéro euro, le plan Vélo, le pass Culture, le bonus pour faire réparer son grille-pain, les subventions pour faire repriser ses chaussettes… Du délire. C’est ce comportement collectif de cigale qu’il va falloir payer aujourd’hui […]
Inquiète à l’idée de perdre le peloton, La Tribune Dimanche se fend d’un sondage (Ipsos) aux petits oignons, cas d’école du verrouillage du débat public. Interrogés sur les modes de financement du réarmement, les sondés ne disposent que de trois « choix » : « Augmenter le déficit en sortant les dépenses liées au budget de la défense de la règle des 3% » ; « Faire des économies sur d’autres dépenses (éducation, environnement, santé…) » ; « Augmenter le temps de travail ». Et rien d’autre. En guise de deuxième corde au cou – les sondeurs débordent d’idées novatrices pour neutraliser à l’avance d’éventuels désagréments –, Ipsos offre à ses interviewés la possibilité d’approuver ces propositions, de s’y opposer… mais aussi de faire valoir une « approbation de principe car la situation le justifie » ! Vous avez dit « l’opinion, ça se travaille » ? Sauf que patatras ! 49% des sondés sont opposés au sacrifice des services publics (seuls 15% l’approuvent) et 50% n’entendent pas travailler plus (ce à quoi ne consentent que 13% du petit échantillon). Qu’à cela ne tienne pour le directeur de l’hebdomadaire, Bruno Jeudy : « La victoire aime l’effort » titre-t-il son éditorial, dans lequel il affirme que « dans ce contexte qui exacerbe les peurs et les passions, les Français – comme le montre notre sondage – semblent prêts à accepter des sacrifices pour doter notre pays de moyens nécessaires à une augmentation importante du budget militaire et à la garantie d’une paix solide et durable en Ukraine. » Sans doute rattrapé par son inconscient déontologique, il poursuit, un tantinet amer :
Bruno Jeudy :Reste à savoir si, demain, les actionnaires renonceront à une partie de leurs dividendes, les retraités consentiront une désindexation de leur pension sur l’inflation, les jeunes donneront quelques mois pour la réserve militaire, les actifs sacrifieront quelques jours de RTT. On sait bien que, souvent, les exemplaires, ce doit être les autres
Inutile de déplier à l’infini la partition : elle est à l’identique à peu près partout dans la grande presse. Vissée à ses penchants militaires aux accents glucksmaniens, Libération ne peut faire valoir sa « distinction » qu’à travers des filets d’eau tiède. Jonathan Bouchet-Petersen : « En France, si l’augmentation des dépenses militaires devaient abîmer encore un peu plus nos services publics et notre modèle social, ou servir de prétexte à une moindre prise en compte de l’urgence climatique, “l’effet drapeau” dont l’exécutif profite risque d’être de courte durée. » (11/03) Si patronat et gouvernement n’étaient pas déjà KO debout, peu de chance qu’ils survivent à l’uppercut de la directrice adjointe de la rédaction :
Alexandra Schwartzbrod :Le chef de l’État en profiterait-il, au prétexte qu’il faut financer le réarmement du pays, pour étouffer le débat renaissant sur l’opportunité de sa sacro-sainte réforme des retraites et affaiblir le modèle social ? Ce serait dommage. Et un jeu périlleux. L’opinion a peur mais elle sait reconnaître une entourloupe
Espérons qu’elle sache également identifier les faux impertinents. Ainsi, si Libération s’oppose sans ambages à la curée sociale – et le fait savoir, notamment dans son édition du 13 mars où des journalistes dénoncent plus frontalement l’« offensive sur le “si-généreux-modèle-social-français” » et un débat public sous forme de « foire aux idées (de droite) » –, la direction ne cesse de jouer la carte de « la raison ». Pour Alexandra Schwartzbrod en effet (13/03), si le cadrage médiatico-politique est « extrêmement dommage », c’est surtout, au bout du compte, parce qu’il « ne fera pas du bien à une société déjà très clivée » et nuira, par conséquent, à l’impérieux consensus : « Le renforcement de la défense du pays et de l’UE […] se fera d’autant plus facilement qu’il obtiendra l’adhésion du plus grand nombre », avance doctement la co-directrice de Libération, pour mieux camper le rôle d’éditorialiste-prescriptrice : « Les hausses d’impôts […] permettraient, convenablement dosées, de demander un effort aux Français qui en ont les moyens, salariés ou retraités, patrons ou artistes, et aux grandes entreprises. »
« Il faut choisir : se reposer… ou être libre »
Dans un tel climat, il semble pour le moins superflu que le patron du Medef se fatigue à courir les studios de RMC dès potron-minet pour vanter le « modèle danois » de retraite à 70 ans (4/03). L’AFP peut également se dispenser de donner de l’écho aux premières mesquineries patronales venues, parmi lesquelles celles du directeur général de BPI France2, lancées lors de l’interview qui lui fut généreusement accordée dans la matinale de France Culture (5/03). De même, on ne saurait que trop conseiller aux chefferies médiatiques d’économiser leurs experts de référence et autres think tanks de cœur : l’audiovisuel dispose d’abondantes ressources en interne où, partout, l’« appel à la mobilisation » d’Emmanuel Macron a été reçu 5 sur 5
Dans ce concert d’unanimisme, le pouvoir politique sait aussi pouvoir compter sur une caisse de résonance médiatique pour « tester » ses différentes propositions de financement, observer le « bruit » qu’elles engendrent et mesurer leur réception. Quitte à ce que tout et n’importe quoi soit aussi vite périmé qu’écrit ? Le 9 mars par exemple, dans La Tribune dimanche, la journaliste économique Fanny Guinochet fait savoir que « selon nos informations, la préférence de Bercy pour financer les dépenses militaires est de réorienter les fonds du livret A. » Deux jours plus tard (11/03), Le Parisien fait savoir que « le ministère de l’Économie privilégie, selon nos informations, l’assurance vie et l’épargne retraite » avant de lister « les pistes écartées » par Bercy… parmi lesquelles « le livret A, “faiblement compatible” »… De-ci, de-là, en fonction des jours et des humeurs, les grands médias certifient également l’inclinaison du pouvoir pour un « grand emprunt national ». Au rythme où vont les choses, et si tel devait être le cas, ne doutons pas que l’éditocratie saura (nous) mettre la main à la poche. Et, qui sait, mobiliser ses dessinateurs de référence pour raviver, en couleurs cette fois-ci, la propagande du siècle dernier façon Poulbot [fin]
Façon Poulbot ? Pauline Perrenot est bien trop magnanime pour ses confrères bleu horizon, les pressetiués. Ou bien alors, sa connaissance de l’Histoire de France est lacunaire, ignore une période que certes, le mythe national occulte encore. Guerre par procuration, le sang des autres, une aubaine pour la politique réactionnaire du gouvernement, tout est dans cette affiche de l’État français en 1943, pour sauver l’Europe du Bolchevisme
en Anglais, chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia
chronique alphabétique et nécrologique de l’engagement français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas
chronique en Anglais, its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine
La journaliste, qui dédouane également le président de la République, est sans doute passée à côté de la vaste opération de communication qu’orchestrait la PQR il y a moins d’un mois : « Emmanuel Macron prévient les Français qu’ils doivent se préparer à des sacrifices au moment où le Danemark réfléchit à repousser l’âge de la retraite à 70 ans pour financer sa défense », rapportait ainsi Le Progrès (19/02), mais aussi – au mot près – le Dauphiné Libéré (18/02), Le Bien public, Le Journal de Saône et Loire ou encore L’Est Républicain (19/02). Autant de sources que Salhia Brakhlia aurait pu corroborer en lisant sa propre presse locale : « Le Danemark a la cote auprès du pouvoir » (Le Parisien, 20/02). ↩︎
Ce dernier invite notamment à ne « plus accepter de prendre un euro de dette de plus pour financer des dépenses de prestations sociales pures […]. La dette, ça sert à financer les investissements, des canons ou des centrales nucléaires, pas le Doliprane de ma mère ! » ↩︎
The SMO [Special Military Operation] will keep rollin’ on. And as the Europeans want it, to the last Ukrainian
[my illustration: a German prisoner in Stalingrad in January 1943 (Soviet archives)]
Let’s start with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s Road to Damascus moment:
Frankly, it’s a proxy war between nuclear powers, the United States helping Ukraine and Russia, and it needs to come to an end
Now that’s a howler. Jeffrey Sachs to the rescue. Of course, the correct formulation would be “proxy war launched by the United States”. But still: Hallelujah! Such illumination – by proxy – from Heavens Above could never had hit the previous American Secretary of Genocide.
Now cut to panic. Total European panic.
Le Petit Roi, as popular in France as nighttime mosquitoes in a five-star beach resort, has declared that peace in Europe is only possible with a “tamed” Russia – and that Russia is a direct threat to France and Europe.
On Ukraine, he pontificated that peace simply cannot take place under Russian terms or via the – inevitable – Ukrainian surrender.
Le breathless Petit Roi literally went nuclear. He stressed that France possesses a nuclear deterrent – and offered it to the rest of Europe, while insisting that Europe’s future should not be dictated by Moscow or Washington.
Le Petit Roi napoleonically all but declared war on Russia. Well, the fact remains that the overwhelming majority of France would gladly agree that mini-Napoleon should be dispatched to the battlefields in the black soil of Novorossiya right away – where he would surrender in less than 5 minutes, waving a rainbow flag, as he realizes he’s about to be turned into an instant steak tartare.
Now couple this Moliere farce with the fate of the much larger, fatter, pan-European New Model Woke Army regimented by the Fuhrerin SS von der Lugen out of Brussels, allegedly to be financed to the tune of 800 billion euros – money that no one has, and would have to be loaned then repaid with sky-high extorsion interest rates to the usual international financial system vultures.
SS von der Lugen insists Europe is in danger, so the solution is a massive expansion of the military-industrial complex – in practice, buying more overpriced American weapons – and “rearmament”.
Talk about Gotterdammerung on crack.
Were the New Model Woke Army ever come to light, surrender would also be a matter of less than 5 minutes – brandishing rainbow flags – as its woke warriors would face the dire prospect of being Oreshniked to a pile of charcoal grilled burgers.
Add to it the Return of the Nord Stream Saga – with a new plot twist. Sy Hersh conclusively proved that the Nord Streams were bombed under orders of the previous Crash Test Dummy regime in Washington. Now Nord Stream 2, at least, could be back in business via a not-so-secret U.S.-Russia deal involving Gazprom and American oligarchs.
All that while fanatics in Berlin assure right and left they want to explore every possible way to prevent (italics mine) the Nord Stream system from being repaired – because after all no one, especially the new BlackRock chancellor, can deviate from the official policy of destroying the German economy by all means necessary.
Compounding the Kafkaesque scenario, the Prime Minister of Denmark – which is on the brink of losing Greenland “one way or another” to Trump 2.0 – immortalized the words, “peace in Ukraine will be more dangerous than war.” The Polish Prime Minister did not miss a beat, adding that “Europe is stronger than Russia and capable of winning in any military, financial, or economic confrontation.” Europe is in such a “winning” streak now – as the record shows.
All this discombobulated Tower of Babel proves, without a shadow of a doubt, that Europe is geopolitically – and geoeconomically – dead and buried. No Teutonic Gods – complete with fat lady singin’ – will be able to resurrect it.
Flirting with a one-way ticket back to the Stone Age
The notion that Europe is able to pose a military threat to Russia does not even qualify as trashy propaganda for sub-zero IQs. It would take at least a decade to re-militarize Germany as its economy is moribund, serially stabbed by unmanageable energy costs. Russia for its part is protected from a possible nuclear attack by Le Petit Roi’s puny “umbrella” arsenal by the most sophisticated missile defenses in the world.
The Aegis defensive missiles in Poland are relatively worthless – even if their prime danger to Russia remains that the system can be converted to handle offensive missiles. As a whole, the Aegis, Patriot, THAAD-PAC-3, SBIR-HIGH Ground Based Infrared Systems are all relatively useless.
Other than the U.S., NATO simply has no military worth. And Washington under Trump 2.0 simply will not be involved in the next European War.
The U.S. has satellite systems for targeting but no one else in NATO has them. With the U.S. pulling out, and in the event of a hypothetical von der Lugen-led New Woke Army attack against Russia, Russian missiles can knock out all European ports, airports and manufacturing and energy systems in a day max – instantly returning Europe to the stone age.
This applies to England, France, Germany, not to mention assorted chihuahuas: all of NATO. Russia can knock out all British power systems with Zircons launched from a conventional submarine. Stone Age, here we come. Russian hypersonic missiles cannot be intercepted.
Meanwhile, President Putin insists on talking sense to lunatics. At the Collegia of the FSB on February 27, he noted how, “some Western elites are still determined to maintain instability in the world, and these forces will try to disrupt and compromise the dialogue [with the U.S.] that has begun. We see this. We need to take this into account and use all the possibilities of diplomacy and special services to disrupt such attempts.”
As Andrei Martyanov has noted, superpowers have “only two options in the 21st century: either start WWIII which will end with nuclear exchange or find a modus vivendi.” That’s a conversation for adults that automatically excludes the European hospice and the childish tantrums of the cracked actor in Kiev.
The cracked actor never had any (italics mine) cards. He now cuts a pathetic figure, doing somersaults to cling to power, propped by (former) collective West money, weapons and massive propaganda. Now the 404 nation he “created” is losing not only the war but the P.R. war as well.
The former adviser to the head of Zelensky’s office, Oleksiy Arestovych, as slimy as they come, but always with his pulse on reliable info, is convinced that the Ukrainian Army, blind and cross-eyed, can hold out at best for another one and a half to two months without all those American goodies. Without intel data, Kiev’s forces cannot prepare strikes against the Russian federation or conduct reconnaissance and cyber ops.
Country 404 as a whole is now entering Walking Dead territory. Europe, with or without its SS von der Lugen Invincible Armada, does not have the industrial capacity, the financial might, and the military capability to stop the debacle. Russia has already stated that any European “peacekeeping” troops will immediately become legitimate targets.
The spectacular failure of Project Ukraine is a sight to behold. It’s no wonder the current, tawdry, ghastly political “elites” are in total panic. Without Project Ukraine, and without the Mafia protection of His Master’s Voice, they are just, geopolitically, an irrelevant, post-colonial small peninsula on the western borders of fast-integrating Eurasia.
As for Trump 2.0 and the Kremlin already having hit some sort of pre-deal – even before the start of serious negotiations – there’s no evidence yet to corroborate it. According to Russian intel sources, what has been struck is a general agreement on the framework of discussions, and what can be achieved in practice. This initial stage will last at least a few months.
Themes on the table range from lifting sanctions on Russian banks and the use of MIR cards to restoring direct flights and curbing the militarization of the Arctic.
Everything essentially hinges on whether Trump wants – and is able to ensure – a fast endgame in Ukraine while disengaging, slowly but surely, from NATO.
Considering what seems to be his strategic direction, Trump wants to make sure he won’t have to offer Mafia protection to European NATO members if they insist on keep going with their Forever War against Russia. It’s clear that shutting off Starlink and shutting off satellite ISR would lead to a much faster endgame in the battlefield.
The SMO, meanwhile, will keep rollin’ on. And as the Europeans want it, to the last Ukrainian [end]
Until recently, a serious geopolitical working hypothesis was that West Asia and Ukraine were two vectors of the standard Hegemon modus operandi, which is to incite and unleash Forever Wars. Now both wars are united in an Omni-War
Leaked files show top UK military figures conspired to carry out the Kerch bridge bombing, covertly train “Gladio”-style stay-behind forces in Ukraine, and groom the British public for a drop in living standards caused by the proxy war against Russia
President Putin’s plenary session performance (address + Q&A) at the annual Valdai Club meeting in Sochi felt like a high-speed train on cruise control
Une crise sans précédent de la culture de classe est en train de se dérouler sous nos yeux. Cette crise emporte aujourd’hui aussi bien la gauche que la droite, si l’on veut absolument en revenir à des repères simplistes. La classe sociale dominante jouit, mais ne pense plus, ne crée plus. Elle n’a plus qu’un chantage à proposer au peuple : en dépit de notre nullité, si nous ne sommes plus là, que vous restera-t-il? Ce n’est pas que des « populismes » aient poussé spontanément pour menacer l’ordre social en faisant peser la menace du chaos et de l’anomie. Ces mythes réactionnaires ne sont que des aveux d’impuissance, et voici pourquoi. Un nouveau grand texte d’Harold Bernat, agrégé de philosophie et collaborateur de « Quartier Populaire », à lire aujourd’hui sur QG
Longtemps la culture de classe, une culture bourgeoise, a fait le travail pour tenir les hommes en respect et créer les conditions d’une humanisation partagée. Nous assistons pourtant, particulièrement en Europe, spécialement en France, à son exténuation. Une révolution culturelle à bas bruit est en train de tout emporter. Aussi bien l’humanisme abstrait issu des Lumières que le romantisme de réaction, à la fois les philosophies bourgeoises de l’arrachement à la nature que les philosophies bourgeoises de la renaturalisation de l’homme dans une histoire, une langue, une culture. En un mot, une crise sans précédent de la culture de classe dans sa fonction pratico-sociale d’institution des sociétés humaines. Cette crise emporte aussi bien la gauche que la droite pour ceux qui aiment les petits repères simplistes. Mes repères seront Kant et De Maistre.
Culture de masse, culture populaire, culture mondaine, culture de cour, culture artistique, culture du génie, culture humaniste, culture romantique, nous parlons toujours d’une culture de classe qui tenait en respect les hommes et les peuples. Culture pourvoyeuse de sens, de significations imaginaires, d’un ordre socialisé. Tordons d’abord le cou à une croyance naïve qui consiste à penser qu’il existe une culture populaire spontanée et autonome qui ne serait pas une culture de classe ou que cette culture populaire serait écrasée, inhibée, par une culture de masse tombée du ciel de l’industrie culturelle elle-même produite par une classe dominante. Il n’y a pas et il n’y aura jamais de culture spontanée qui émanerait de la terre qui ne ment pas ou de l’esprit d’un peuple spontanément disponible pour une transcription littérale. Comme si la culture n’exigeait aucune maîtrise, aucun travail, aucune exigence, aucune verticalité. La culture serait, dans sa généalogie populaire, d’ailleurs largement mythifiée par la réaction à l’humanisme abstrait, une force disponible depuis le bas. Elle pousserait en continu, fond obscur localisé géographiquement et historiquement mais impensable rationnellement. Ce mythe feint d’oublier que la culture procède toujours du haut vers le bas, elle est descendante.
Arnold Hauser a pu établir, en 1974, dans un excellent livre intitulé Fondements de la sociologie de l’art, qu’aucune forme d’art n’était réellement collective et d’emblée socialisée. Il en va de même de la création culturelle. Chaque forme culturelle particulière prend sa source dans une création individuelle qui se déploie ensuite dans une communauté qui peut se l’approprier a posteriori. La faire sienne. Ce n’est pas parce que l’auteur d’une chanson populaire est anonyme qu’il n’est pas issu d’une classe sociale lettrée. Hauser explique par exemple que le « genre épique populaire » était le fait d’érudits. Il en va de même pour les idylles du Moyen-âge ou les recueils de proverbes dits « populaires ». Comme le rappelle Juan José Sebreli dans La modernité assiégée, Critique du relativisme culturel (Delga, 2020), cette compréhension de classe a prévalu dans toutes les cultures. « La sculpture africaine – tant vantée par les populistes – fut anonyme et là aussi non spontanée ; les sculpteurs noirs appartenaient à des castes consacrées au métier. » Seul le regard colonialiste sur ces œuvres a pu y voir l’expression d’un primitivisme spontanéiste. La plupart de ces œuvres étaient d’ailleurs contemporaines des collectionneurs parisiens, surréalistes, marchands d’art, amateurs alors qu’ils y voyaient l’expression naïve et innocente d’une humanité disparue. Méprise d’une classe qui ne peut pas reconnaître chez l’autre la même logique de classe sans se juger elle-même. Effet miroir pour mieux se persuader qu’il est toujours possible de saisir la culture à son état natif, originaire, primitif. La mauvaise conscience bourgeoise fantasme l’altérité pour s’oublier elle-même. Elle rencontre en réalité d’autres hiérarchies, d’autres verticalités. Une autre culture de classe. Illusion ethnocentrique et incompréhension de la logique de classe de la création culturelle. En d’autres termes, la culture, celle qui donne un sens à nos vies humaines, celle qui structure nos existences, « populaire » ou « élitiste », celle dont on ne peut pas se passer sous peine de dépérir, procède toujours du haut vers le bas. La culture est descendante. Ce n’est ni un mal, ni un bien mais un fait anthropologique. La question est donc de savoir ce qui descend encore quand la classe dominante est culturellement exténuée.
La compréhension de ce fait anthropologique fondamental est essentielle pour saisir la crise de la culture de classe qui est en train de déployer toutes ses conséquences politiques en Europe. Lorsque nous parlons des Lumières, de l’universalisme, d’humanisme ou de la réaction aux Lumières, de romantisme, de particularismes culturels, nous nous situons toujours dans une culture de classe descendante. Kant et De Maistre étaient des bourgeois et leur représentation du monde une représentation de classe. Cela ne veut pas dire qu’ils pensaient mal. Le premier envisage l’homme dans sa capacité originaire à s’arracher à tout particularisme culturel pour signifier son humanité, le second ne pense l’humanité que dans son attachement à des particularités culturelles. Fer de lance de la réaction en France à la fin du XVIIIe siècle, ce dernier écrit, dans ses Considérations sur la France en 1796 : « J’ai vu, dans ma vie des Français, des Italiens, des Russes etc. Je sais même grâce à Montesquieu qu’on peut être Persan mais quant à l’homme, je déclare ne jamais l’avoir rencontré de ma vie ; s’il existe, c’est bien à mon, insu. » Les deux présupposent une culture qui puisse faire sens pour l’homme en tant qu’homme (Kant) ou l’homme en tant que Français, Italien, Russe, pour de Maistre. Tous deux produisent des représentations culturelles extrêmement sophistiquées de l’homme. Ils œuvrent pour donner un sens à la vie humaine. Il est évidemment possible de défendre l’héritage des Lumières et l’humanisme abstrait contre la réaction et l’humanité située, voire de composer dialectiquement avec les deux, ce qu’essaiera de faire Hannah Arendt dans La crise de la culture mais dans les deux cas nous avons affaire à une classe sociale qui n’est pas indifférente culturellement à l’édification d’un sens pour l’homme, une classe sociale bourgeoise qui fait de la question de l’homme une nécessité pour elle, une classe qui œuvre.
Il ne faut pas regretter ce fait social mais partir de lui pour comprendre que l’effondrement anthropologique dont nous parlons aujourd’hui et exclusivement l’effondrement des capacités de la classe dominante, bourgeoise en l’occurrence, à produire encore des individualités capables de créer une culture susceptible d’organiser nos significations sociales, de leur donner un sens. La classe sociale dominante est désoeuvrée. Elle jouit mais ne pense plus, ne crée plus rien. Ce n’est pas que sa parole ne soit plus entendue comme elle cherche pourtant à nous le faire croire. Ce n’est pas non plus que des « populismes » soient sortis spontanément du siècle pour menacer l’ordre social en faisant peser la menace du chaos et de l’anomie. Ces mythes réactionnaires, car ce sont des mythes en réaction d’une impuissance propre, ne sont pas destinés aux peuples qu’ils semblent viser. Ce sont autant d’aveux d’impuissance. « Ne pouvant plus faire descendre une quelconque culture du haut vers le bas, étant incapables de signifier quoi que ce soi, étant engagés dans un survivalisme indifférents aux domaines de l’homme, nous ne pouvons que nous défier brutalement de ce qui nous menace. » Voilà ce qui devrait être énoncé par cette classe qui n’assume plus son rôle, pire, qui en est intellectuellement incapable. En France, elle a cherché à promouvoir une imposture en « président philosophe ». Elle sent en effet confusément que les références qui ont pu lui donner la légitimité d’une domination indiscutable lui échappent désormais. Elle recycle par conséquent les signifiés des Lumières, de la philosophie mais il n’y a plus rien derrière. Le néant. Tout un appareil médiatique est alors nécessaire pour promouvoir ce simulacre dans le temps, le faire tenir. Mais cela ne tient pas, cela ne tient plus. Le « président philosophe » n’était qu’une gidouille grotesque.
Il faut bien comprendre que la bourgeoisie de connivence, nous parlons d’elle, n’a plus que des dadais incultes à offrir en spectacle pour armée de réserve. Elle n’a plus les ressources intellectuelles de sa prétention sociale à la domination. Elle n’est plus capable de gagner, par sa force culturelle propre, sa légitimité politique et sociale. Ne lui reste que la brutalité. Cette impuissance manifeste est évidemment la raison première d’une surenchère défensive de la part de bourgeois culturellement stériles. Cette brutalité est un symptôme. Il s’agit même du symptôme le plus manifeste d’une classe qui a perdu toute vocation à gouverner.
Le phénomène premier est l’effondrement sidérant des classes dominantes. Culturellement, elles sont aujourd’hui incapables de faire ce qu’elles ont toujours fait : organiser la vie humaine en créant des significations imaginaires fécondes pour le plus grand nombre. Leur stérilité stérilise du haut vers le bas. Avec une haine farouche et une méticulosité d’experts, les classes sociales supérieures au pouvoir – ce mot en devient ridicule tant la misère spirituelle y est profonde et la corruption d’une bassesse odieuse – se sont évertuées depuis des années, des décennies, à détruire les espaces, les lieux, les supports qui rendaient possible la compréhension d’un problème qui nous concerne tous : sommes-nous encore capables de signifier ce qui nous arrive ? Avec Kant, De Maistre, Arendt, à ta guise. En guise d’économies justement, proposition vient d’être faite de fermer l’Université de Bordeaux-Montaigne, une semaine en mars 2025. Nous en sommes-là, en France. Cet exemple vaudra pour la myriade de destructions qui prend aujourd’hui le doux nom de progressisme. Il se trouve que le macronisme, cette bouillie salement managériale et prédatrice du commun, cornaquée sans direction par des drogués d’eux-mêmes, n’a fait qu’accélérer la tendance. Ces agents spécialisés du vide demandent encore, dans une fuite en avant qui signe leur démence, un surcroît d’accélération dans le vide. Au nom de l’Europe, de la paix ou des jeux olympiques, allez savoir. La devise Shadoks est appliquée à la lettre : « quand on ne sait pas où l’on va, autant y aller le plus vite possible ». Si au moins ces turbo-zombies proposaient comme chemin à suivre une pataphysique joyeusement désespérée, il y aurait encore quelque chose à penser. La stérilité de cette classe donneuse de leçons la rend pourtant incapable en tout.
Entendons-nous bien. Il y a toujours eu et il y aura toujours des contradictions humaines et ce n’est pas à une classe qui vit aussi des contradictions sociales qu’elle exploite de les régler. Il y aura toujours malfaçon et l’existence de l’homme est de part en part tragique. La condition humaine est ainsi faite. Mais cette malfaçon doit pouvoir se dire, s’exposer, se penser. Toujours. Elle doit pouvoir, d’une époque à l’autre, ajuster ses institutions en fonction des représentations que l’homme se donne à lui-même. Avant d’accuser le « populisme » d’un tel, ou le « complotisme » d’un autre, avant de décider de ne pas penser, il est toujours préférable de se demander pourquoi le bas se défie à ce point du haut. Mieux encore, reste-t-il un haut ? Pour quelles raisons en sommes-nous là, à ce point de brutalité ? Pourquoi des hommes se retrouvent éborgnés alors qu’ils demandent à être reconnus en tant que citoyens ? Il y a bien adresse, demande, attente. Mais la réponse apportée par cette nouvelle classe du vide, culturellement stérile, ne vaut plus rien. Un monologue narcissique, un grand débat autour du nombril président, un pignolage, un néant. Ce n’est pas que les hommes ne l’entendent pas, c’est que la réponse n’est plus une parole. Elle ne fait plus sens, il n’y a donc rien à entendre. C’est un bruit de classe, un bruit de bouche, un bruit de bottes. Il ne s’agit plus de faire droit mais d’imposer son droit, dans le vide, sans justification. « Ordre, ordre, ordre ». Ordre d’un droit qui n’est plus que ordre.
Alors que faire ? Accepter cette révolution à bas bruits qui est en train de nous emporter vers un autre horizon. Nous situer déjà après elle, la dépasser. Pour reprendre le mot de Pasolini dans Les lettres luthériennes en 1975, « les mutations anthropologiques sont irréversibles ». Les mutations du capitalisme ont profondément transformé les classes dominantes et par conséquent les formes culturelles qu’elles ont pu produire. Il n’y aura pas de retour en arrière. Lorsque nous témoignons du vide brutal et de la bêtise obscène de ce qui est supposé occuper le haut de la stratification sociale, nous n’avons aucun espoir d’un changement de la part de ceux que l’on vise. La nullité des dadais de la bourgeoisie incestueuse n’a pas à être corrigée. Elle est fatale. Ce serait d’ailleurs se méprendre sur nos intentions réelles. Il s’agit plutôt d’intérioriser le constat de cette nullité historique, inédite, tout en faisant valoir, face à elle, ce qui est vital pour nous. Oui, cela surprendra les plus nihilistes et les plus résignés, les plus drogués et les plus faux, nous avons encore des exigences à faire valoir en face du vide et de la nullité. Peut-être avons-nous à apprendre à ne plus frémir devant ce vide de significations venu d’en haut. Nous avons encore du chemin à faire de ce côté-là. Comme si, habitués depuis trop longtemps à recueillir une culture produite par d’autres, nous n’arrivions pas vraiment à mesurer à quel point nous avons encore à expérimenter ce vide, à le parcourir, à le signifier, pour nous.
« En dépit de notre nullité manifeste, si nous ne sommes plus là, que vous restera-t-il ? » Tel serait le chantage warholien ultime de cette classe désoeuvrée. Ce chantage ne tient que par notre manque de force pour nous nommer, pour être nous-mêmes les dépositaires des signes susceptibles de nous signifier. C’est aussi ce qu’on appelle encore une culture de classe. La nôtre […]
Je ne consulte la presse bleu horizon que d’un cul distrait et c’est sur les réseaux sociaux que j’apprends qu’aux dernières nouvelles, les pinzuti, ou une grande partie d’entre eux, se sentent submergés
parmi les plus vains et vaniteux, les Français étaient naturellement les plus à même de démontrer de façon éclatante que l’Occident en déclin accéléré n’est plus en capacité à prétendre à une quelconque universalité
Ukrainian hitlerites for ceasefire. Struggle between Zelenskyite opportunists and Azovite strategists. Poroshenko, Zaluzhny, Sodol. 100 million dollar bribes. The angry officers movement
[my illustration: on March 4, 2014, after the West-backed right-wing coup in Kiev, US Secretary of State John Kerry meets representatives of the parliament. Leader of Nazi Svoboda party, Oleh Tyahnybok is second from right. Petro Poroshenko, center, will become in June the new president of Ukraine (US Department of State)]
When it comes to hitler-loving military nationalists, you’d think they’d be lean more towards peace than a former comedian Jewish president who came to government on a peace platform, right? The reality is much more interesting
Enter the fourth reich
Tales of the IV Reich (now renamed Tales of the IV Empire), likely run by an Azov lieutenant, is characterized by more sobriety than other similar channels, which is why I love reading it
Most interestingly, his posts often seem to hint at a sentiment among certain ‘army men’, that the 1991-borders slogan is unrealistic and is leading to the destruction of Ukraine’s finest nationalists through politically-motivated meat storms. Not without the insinuation, of course, that Zelensky is quite happy to see these dangerous competitors die.
The fear of peace
One of the reasons that Tales is worried about endless war is the political pressure it puts on the broader population, which has always been frustratingly disloyal to the aims of radical nationalism.
Tales has always worried about popular demands for peace. Four days before February 24 2022, he was writing paranoid posts about how the west and Russia are trying to pressure Ukraine into implementing the Minsk peace agreements:
Among the participants in the combat actions, I know many disappointed and disoriented people. Some are tired, some have not seen clear changes, some have started families. Not everyone is ready to take up arms again now. Such tendencies are detrimental in the current situation
The implementation of the “Minsk” agreements into the Constitution of Ukraine is worse for us – the Ukrainian right-wing – than a full-scale war. We are accustomed to fighting the Russians – the thousand-year war of freedom-loving Eastern Europeans against the Tatar horde continues to this day. If the Ukrainian authorities are pressured by the Russians and [western – EIU] “partners”, we will get a “war zone” throughout the country. For us, the military veterans there will be no life in such a Ukraine. We will be under constant pressure from the system, with the possibility of being eliminated by amnestied separatist militants, and living in constant fear is not a life anyone wants
If we fiercely resist the Russian army and unite the nation in the fight against the enemy, we cannot lose. Those who are burnt out and stay at home, in case of our defeat, will rot in prison or be killed. Some Ukrainians already believed the Bolsheviks in the 1920s and laid down their arms – they all either died of hunger or lived out their last years in camps
To arms!
On July 13, Tales published a telegram post in response to the calls by popular Ukrainian bloggers for peace through negotiations and compromise in response to Russian rocket strikes on the capital (see my post on the matter). He was also responding to the parliamentarian Artem Dmytruk, who vigorously supported the bloggers.
Medvedchuk refers to the leader of Ukraine’s ‘Opposition Platform for Life’ party, whose main slogan was an end to the war through negotiations, until it was banned in 2022, along with the arrest and deportation of Medvedchuk.
Here’s the post:
If the war continues for another year, the population will bring the Dmytruks to power. So far, the Dmytruks are quite marginal. If it lasts two years, Medvedchuk will return here with the Russian flag. It’s simple
Being in the [frontline] Zaporizhzhia steppes or the command posts of the Donetsk region, you become quite detached from the population: you don’t hear what ordinary citizens of Lviv, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia, or Kyiv are talking about and dreaming of. The fact that a huge number of people supported the Instabloggers (and how many were too embarrassed to write words of support?) irritates those who advocate for the continuation of the war. Because real people with open profiles wrote there, not Moscow bots. There are many of these people, and this must be taken into account. According to my observations, this number is increasing exponentially despite the fabricated results of sociological surveys
The population sees corruption scandals. Constant loss of territories. Endless shelling. Inflation. Decline in the standard of living. Hundreds of new graves in cemeteries. Maimed veterans on the streets. Videos from the military registration and enlistment office. The West’s incomprehensible behavior. Now, there are also extremely uncomfortable conditions with power outages in +35°C heat and prospects of water supply cuts. This list can go on
I’m surprised that people with higher education and quite a high level of intelligence do not see the pattern
Hitlerite civil war
In another recent post, he was openly pessimistic about Ukraine’s military prospects and its western allies:
Once again, for a day, calls to “fight to victory” are spreading through social media following the terrorist attacks by Muscovites in Kyiv and Kryvyi Rih. Here are my thoughts in theses:
Mobilization and a massive influx to the military registration and enlistment offices will not produce modern fighters, missile systems, or the latest strike UAVs. It won’t even add Patriot SAM systems and missiles to them. Unfortunately, even the mobilization of 10 million Ukrainians will not stop the takeoff of strategic fighters in Russia, will not destroy existing nuclear weapons, and will not significantly reduce the population of Russia, its natural resources, etc
Strong entities respond to terrorist acts with double the force. Yesterday in Belgorod, in the evening, windows in residential buildings were shattered, one civilian died, two were slightly injured. Such a “response” personally shakes me with despair and hopelessness. I emphasize once again that our military capabilities can destroy everything living within a 100 km radius from the state border. Special thanks to the tactical level commanders who take responsibility for leveling the Shebekino and Rylsky districts of the Russian Federation. These are young officers up to the battalion commander level. In other words, this is the grassroots initiative of a conscious part of the army, there is no political will for such actions.
We will not be invited to the NATO summit to join the alliance. We are not as cool as Albania. The topic of “Ukraine in NATO” will be a bargaining chip for many years, it will be a reason for wars and political crises. Moreover, in the coming days, NATO will solidify its impotence with a series of resolutions that will exclude the actual unilateral power of the United States in the alliance. The Western establishment is afraid of Trump coming to power, fearing that the war will end.
NATO only needs to allocate 10% of its available weapons, which are gathering dust in warehouses since the alliance is not fighting anyone, and we would defeat the Muscovites. However, Western politicians are stretching this aid over the years, while hundreds of the best Ukrainians are dying and becoming disabled, and Ukrainian cities cease to exist because of the war. They have been juggling planes, high-precision MLRS, and missiles in front of the bloodied faces of Ukrainians for years
Note also his praise for ‘tactical level commanders’ who take initiative in hitting Russian civilian targets. See my recent post about the Sodol drama for more on this emerging caste of young nationalists, which positions itself against the so-called ‘old corrupt Soviet general caste’.
Anyway, given such sorry prospects for winning the war, Tales is clearly hinting that a ceasefire to regroup and strengthen defenses (as well as a good old-fashioned domestic purge) is a better idea than staying in the self-destructive meatgrinder.
I’ve discussed on my substack Evgeny Dyky, the corpulent supposed ex-commander of the violent Aidar Batallion. Among his many achievements, he is also in charge of spending sizeable sums of money on Ukraine’s wartime antarctic research project (read about it here). Otherwise, he spends a great deal of time on the Ukrainian talk-show circuit, explaining viewers how Ukraine’s military industry is just getting started while that of Russia’s has already reached its final peak, and so on and on.
Well, Dyky’s effusive optimism really annoys IV Reich. Yesterday, he posted this:
⚡️ An F-16 that managed to reach Ukraine crashed into a high-rise building in Nizhny Tagil (RF). The pilot was identified as Yevhen Dykyi, a military expert and former platoon commander of the Aidar Battalion (in 2015). According to preliminary reports, the fighter jet could not withstand the pilot’s weight. Another version suggests that the pilot’s unkempt homeless-like beard got tangled in the control stick
Tales’ opinion on the 1991 borders slogan came out more clearly in March of this year. It all started in response to a hit-piece against a popular young commander by ‘the Centre for Countering of Disinformation’, a beautifully-named government-funded organ (my bolding). Here’s the hysterical hit-piece from the CCD:
The CCD logo
Recently, interviews with military personnel have gained immense popularity in the Ukrainian information space, where they talk about the problems they allegedly face at the front: lack of ammunition, incompetent command, mistakes of the country’s leadership, and so on
A striking example of this is a recent interview with the commander of the K2 battalion, Kyrylo Veres, in which he claims that we will not be able to win this war, and his personal victory is when his battalion’s soldiers stop dying. Thus, he is effectively hinting at negotiations and freezing the conflict. Such statements are absolutely unacceptable – they contradict the task set by the Leader of our country: to reach the borders of 1991 at any cost
Obviously, it is high time to move to healthy military censorship – military personnel should be prohibited from giving interviews. Endless whining about the lack of ammunition and “meat assaults” does not bring us any closer to victory but contributes to the spread of defeatist sentiments in society. Moreover, in reality, there are no “meat assaults” in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and the military personnel are fully provided with everything necessary to accomplish the assigned tasks
We remind you that you can always get reliable information about what is happening at the front on the “Unified News” telethon
Commander Veres, the man being criticized. Looks a lot more trustworthy than the angry blue cube
Ah, how times have changed over the past few months. Now even the Great Leader of is indulging in absolutely unacceptable narratives hinting at negotiations and freezing the conflict! But back to the response from Tales:
I have personally known Kyrylo since 2017 to be a decent and dedicated officer, back when he was still a reconnaissance platoon commander in one of the mechanized brigade’s battalions. Over a few years, he rose to become the commander of one of the top battalions in the Armed Forces of Ukraine and received the “Hero’s Star.” We had many joint operations aimed at eliminating the Muscovites and their lackeys while the “defenders against disinformation” were siphoning grants in peaceful Kyiv
Idiots don’t like that the battalion commander wants his personnel to live to see peace in the country and return home alive. This is an absolutely healthy and adequate position for a Ukrainian officer
“What does victory mean to everyone? It’s when my people stop dying. If I said a year ago that victory is when the Russian Federation ends, then I was young and I did not command such a large number of people and did not give orders on who should go into battle and who should not”
The last part is quoting Veres, the lines that made the Center for Countering Disinformation so furious.
The heavyweights
I know some people who regret having voted for Zelensky, who think that previous war-hawk president Petro Poroshenko, with his greater experience dealing with Russia and as a statesman (however reprehensible), wouldn’t have allowed the war to happen in 2022
Poroshenko in his signature black gloves and expensive vyshyvanka (the folk costume no bourgeois nationalist can leave home without)
I think it’s possible that Zelensky’s curious talent for aggravating everyone imaginable played a special role. Recall Zelensky’s wise decision to start reminiscing about soviet Ukraine’s nuclear missile capacity on February 19 2022.
But perhaps more importantly, Poroshenko hasn’t gone away either. He and his party certainly constitution the most powerful remaining opposition force in wartime. Could they be getting ready to attack Zelensky for wasting the army in an unwinnable war instead of preserving its fighting core?
Until his early 2024 removal, Zaluzhny was juicing up head of the army Zaluzhny as an anti-Zelensky icebreaker. And Zaluzhny wrote a 2023 article he wrote in the Economist about how Ukraine has no real prospects of victory against Russia and finds itself in a stalemate position. Zelensky was enraged by this violation of his slogan ‘1991 borders or bust’, and it was this article, along with Zaluzhny’s excessive popularity, that led to his eventual replacement.
It was Poroshenko that signed the Minsk agreements back in 2014 and 2015 to avert Ukraine’s military collapse. Maybe he can do it again, with the help of the ‘Iron General’ Zaluzhny.
Kiev mayor Klitchko – a real heavyweight – also said in a recent western interview that Zelensky should conduct a referendum on peace and abandoning some territories. Klitchko is another open critic of Zelensky’s authoritarianism, and has allied with Poroshenko against Zelensky numerous times in the past. There are rumors he is coordinating actions with him at the moment as well.
The angry officers movement
Opposition heavyweights like Poroshenko, Zaluzhny and Klitchko (don’t laugh about the last one) also have an important base of supporters to draw on – young, confident nationalists in the army.
A crucial fault-line at the moment is that between younger brigade commanders and the generals. The combrigs accuse the generals of sending them on pointless suicide missions because of the political leadership’s ‘obsession with maps’, rather than real strategic objectives. This ‘maps over strategy’ metaphor is often used by Azov spokesmen like Kukharchuk or Krotevych in their interviews with liberal nationalist (anti-Zelensky) media like Ukrainska Pravda.
Indeed, Zelensky must be map-fixated. His key priority is opportunistic – stay in power, keep the aid flowing, desperately showcase small successes. To put off his many days of reckoning.
For instance. with the countless businessmen he has imprisoned, extorted and otherwise enraged. Like the still-jailed Kolomoisky. Or a business partner of Kolomoisky, Bogolyubov, who recently escaped the country and claimed the government tried to extort him of 100 million USD in exchange for legal protection. Or, obviously, the questions society will have towards him after a war that cost the lives of hundreds of thousands, and brought… what?
The young nationalists in the army launched the opening salvo in this increasingly public battle in late June, against General Sodol, who they accused of murderous graphomania. The battle has been rapidly developing in the past few weeks, a topic for a future post. But for now, I’d like to draw attention to Bohdan Krotevych, the Azovite who led the charge against General Sodol.
Krotevych said in a July 26 interview that he is ‘angry’ with Zelensky for apparently never having visited Azov’s headquarters at the frontline, while he does visit other military units. He said he considers this condescension. The interview, titled ‘I am very angry’, has already received a million views
Another major topic of discussion is how Lieutenant Colonel Prokopenko, Commander of the Azov Brigade, is a ‘genius’. This is in turn fairly obviously compared to the stupidity of the generals, who he castigates for wasting human resources in impossible goals, and never learning from their mistakes (unlike the Russians, he stresses). Among other things, Krotevych calls the 2023 counteroffensive ‘retarded’.
A peaceful yet stern reich
He also boasts about hanging out with his close friend Zaluzhny while in England recently. They and their wives met, and Krotevych gifted Zaluzhny an antique British army knife (knives are highly beloved among rightwing nationalists).
Best of all, he cryptically promises that people would be hearing much more from Zaluzhny in the future.
And Zaluzhny’s July 23 speech at the RUSI Land Warfare Conference in London on the topic of ‘Third World War’ made it clear that he’s hardly a democrat:
Society must agree to temporarily give up a number of freedoms for the sake of survival,…
Unfortunately, modern wars are total. They require the efforts not only of the army, but of the whole society. Politicians can and should mobilize society. To do so, they use military and other state resources in a comprehensive way. These resources include the economy, finance, the population, and allies. Such actions will, of course, influence the political processes in the country
Any ceasefire of the type that Zaluzhny, Tales, or Krotevych or the rest may want would be a brutal one. On July 30, Commander Romanov of the Azov brigade published a video stating he had given the order to shoot to kill any civilians attempting to destroy Ukrainian military equipment.
With less energy to spend on the foreign enemy, more to spend on purging the internal enemy. The bloggers won’t be bothering anyone else with their pacifist demands [end]
chronicle: its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine
during her confirmation hearing before the Senate Intelligence Committee, on January 30, 2025 (John McDonnell / AP)
On February 12, 2025, by a 52-48 vote, the Senate confirms Tulsi Gabbard as Director of National Intelligence. Here are some of her words, during her confirmation hearing before the Senate Intelligence Committee, on January 30, 2025
Big changes are needed to address years of failures of America’s intelligence service. Too often intelligence has been false or politicized, leading to wars, foreign policy failures and the misuse of espionage. The bottom line is this must end. President Trump’s reelection is a clear mandate from the American people to break this cycle of failure and the weaponization and politicization of the intelligence community
My opponents are accusing me of being Trump’s puppet, Putin’s puppet, Assad’s puppet, a guru’s puppet, Modi’s puppet. The fact is what truly unsettles my political opponents is I refuse to be their puppet
on Iraq
This disastrous decision led to the deaths of tens of thousands of American soldiers, millions of people in the Middle East, mass migration, destabilisation and undermining of the security and stability of our European allies, the rise of ISIS, strengthening of al-Qaeda and other Islamist jihadist groups and strengthening Iran
on Syria
When as a member of Congress, I learned about President Obama’s, dual programs that he had begun, really to overthrow the regime of Syria and being willing to, through the CIA’s Timber Sycamore program that has now been made public, of working with and arming and equipping al Qaeda in an effort to overthrow that regime, starting yet another regime change war in the Middle East […]
Every American deserves to know that people in our own government were providing support to our sworn enemy, al Qaeda. That should not be acceptable by anyone
Thank you the sudden takeover of Syria by Islamist extremists, Syria is now controlled by al Qaeda offshoot HTS, led by an Islamist Jihadist who danced in the streets on 9/11, and who was responsible for the killing of many American soldiers
on Edward Snowden
Edward Snowden broke the law. I do not agree with or support with all of the information and intelligence that he released, nor the way in which he did it, but released information that exposed egregious, illegal and unconstitutional programs
Ingo Schmidt on how the triumph of liberal democracy and neoliberal globalization became the ideological seed for the AfD
Co-leader of the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party and the party’s candidate for chancellor, Alice Weidel, features on the cover of a 2023 edition of Stern magazine (conceptphoto.info)
On November 6, 2024 German Chancellor Olaf Scholz fired Finance Minister Christian Lindner. Notwithstanding the broad agreement on policy goals, striking a balance between deficit reduction, support for renewable energy and increased arms spending turned out to be impossible. Lindner, a liberal, opted for social cuts; Scholz, a social democrat, wants to avoid them. They had to part ways. After Scholz lost a no-confidence vote, federal elections were scheduled for February 23, 2025. The question that worries everyone from old-school conservatives to new millennium lefties is: How many votes will go to the hard right (if not neo-Nazi) party Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland or AfD). In the last federal elections in 2021, the AfD got 10.4 percent of the total vote. Current polls put them at 20 percent, but nobody knows what will happen on election day. In this new age of uncertainty, polls don’t predict election results as reliably as in the past.
Elections in the East German provinces Brandenburg, Saxony and Thuringia have already shown what hard-right success looks like. They also reveal the inability of the political centre to understand how much it contributed to the rise of a new right. Refashioning totalitarianism theory in the New Cold War climate, centrist politicians and pundits typically portray the success of the new right as the outgrowth of the Nazi and Communist dictatorships that ruled East Germany from 1933 to 1990. West Germany, which was spared Communist rule and, allegedly, shook off the burden of its Nazi past, appears as a role model in this democracy-versus-dictatorship story. Totalitarianism theory could possibly explain why the AfD is more successful, so far at least, in East than in West Germany. But it can’t explain right-wing success in other countries, like France, that were never under Communist rule and know Nazi rule only from occupation, which strengthened anti-fascist traditions in those countries. But even these traditions couldn’t stop the rise of the new right there.
This article offers a different explanation for the hard-right surge in Germany. It shows that German unification in 1990, signalling the triumph of liberal democracy and the onset of neoliberal globalization, unleashed a new form of nationalism—Deutschmark nationalism—which, after mutating into export nationalism for a while, became the ideological seed for the AfD. West Germany, or, more precisely, the economic miracle that was West Germany in the post-war era, served as a role model during German unification. Promoted by West German elites and eagerly embraced by people in East Germany, it raised the expectation of a new economic miracle materializing in the West and extending to the East. However, these hopes were soon disappointed as political unification caused socioeconomic divisions between East and West Germany and, in the early 2000s, a turn to austerity policies that were highly unpopular in the East and the West. Just when it seemed that Germany would weather the world economic crisis of 2008-9 better than other Western countries, and maybe even become the European hegemon, things started falling apart. The Euro-crisis made clear that it was not only politically united Germany that was plagued by massive socioeconomic and geographical divisions but the European Union, too. Continued economic weakness combined with New Cold War marching orders from Washington fed a nostalgia for a supposedly great past—symbolized by the Deutschmark. This nostalgia, I argue, would not have taken root if the left had been able to channel growing discontent into mobilization for a more equitable and less insecure future.
State elections in Brandenburg, Saxony, and Thuringia
State elections don’t typically get international media attention. The September 1, 2024, elections in Thuringia and Saxony did. After all, it was the first time since the downfall of the Nazi-regime that a hard-right party, the AfD, pulled the majority of votes in a German election. It proved a bitter coincidence: The AfD celebrated their victory in Thuringia, obtaining 32.8 percent of the total vote, on the 85th anniversary of the Nazi-invasion of Poland that marked the beginning of the Second World War.
The Conservative Christian Democrats (the Christlich-Demokratische Union or CDU) came in second with 23.6 percent. The parties of the federal government coalition, Social Democrats (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands or SPD), Greens (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) and Liberals (Freie Demokratische Partei or FDP) ended up with single-digit results, the FDP reduced to a mere 1.1 percent. At the time of the election, this was the party of the federal minister of finance. The Left Party (Die Linke), which in the previous election had become the strongest party for the first time in any German state, lost almost 18 percent and came in fourth, even trailing the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht or BSW), a breakaway group from the Left Party.
In Saxony, the AfD won 30.6 percent of the votes, just behind the CDU’s 31.9 percent. As in Thuringia, none of the parties of the federal government coalition achieved double-digit results. The Left Party lost more than half of its vote and ended up with a devastating 4.5 percent. The BSW came in a distant third with 11.8 percent.
Just three weeks after their election victories in Thuringia and Saxony, the AfD scored another success in Brandenburg. Narrowly beaten by the SPD that got 30.9 percent of the total vote, the AfD came in second with 29.2 percent, way ahead of the BSW’s 13.1 percent and the CDU’s 12.1 percent. The Left Party and the Greens obtained less than five percent of the vote, which is the minimum threshold for holding seats in provincial or federal parliament under the mixed-member proportional electoral system. The FDP pulled less than one percent.
Mainstream media fails to explain right-wing success
Barely beaten by the Conservatives in Saxony and the Social Democrats in Brandenburg, the AfD was elected by roughly a third of the electorate in three East German states, becoming the strongest party only in Thuringia. If ever there was a right-wing surge, this was it. Most media reports attributed the phenomenon to widespread dissatisfaction with the federal government, particularly regarding migration, climate policies and the war in Ukraine. Accounts of why the AfD is more popular in the East (approval ratings in the west of Germany range from 8.5 percent in Hamburg and the Saarland to 21 percent in Lower Saxony) focus mostly on disappointments caused by German unification, continuing socioeconomic disparities and a widespread feeling among erstwhile East Germans of being second class citizens. Other explanations invoke the authoritarian heritage of communist rule in East Germany, which is often presented as an extension of the Nazi-regime. Against the two dictatorships in the East, West Germany is presented as a role model of liberal democracy. This as if there hadn’t been considerable continuity between Third Reich and West German elites; as if East Germany’s ruling bureaucracy, despite all its dictatorial wrongs, wasn’t established by antifascists who had been exiled or jailed during the Nazi reign; as if the nationalization of the means of production, despite the wrongs of bureaucratic rule, had not marked a break from the West German capitalism that made West Germany a junior partner in the American Empire; as if West German capitalism had not dictated the terms of unification at the very time that a grassroots movement for democracy unsettled bureaucratic rule in East Germany. The destruction of the East German economy and the integration of the East into existing West German institutions left no room for the aspirations of East Germany’s civil rights movement. Rather than explaining growing support for the new right, media talk about the “peculiarities of the East” reinforces existing frustrations there—frustrations that help shed light on the relative strength, so far at least, of the right-wing surge in the East.
The ‘two-dictatorships’ thesis that pits the East against the liberal democratic West revives the totalitarianism theory that was an integral part of the anti-communist, anti-Soviet consensus during the Cold War. It is now part of the New Cold War ideology that counterposes democracy and authoritarianism. As in the old Cold War, charges of totalitarianism serve to short circuit thinking about alternative economic and political systems, reinforcing the neoliberal creed that there is no alternative to capitalism. The lack of actually existing alternatives is, of course, also one of the reasons for the rise of the new right. Emerging out of an ailing neoliberalism, this right-wing force presents itself as an alternative to the status quo but actually just recasts neoliberalism in a nationalist and racist mould. Replacing neoliberalism’s earlier commitment to corporate globalization in Germany, as elsewhere, neoliberalism is haunted by the spectre of fascism, which, to centrist neoliberals, has everything to do with misled masses unable to understand the virtues of capitalist liberal democracy and nothing to do with capitalist crises that undermine the legitimacy of liberal democracy. Neoliberalism is also haunted by the spectre of communism as ruling classes worry that crisis of legitimacy could extend to capitalism itself. As the neoliberal centre denies the possibility of alternatives and the left generally (not only the Left Party in Germany) appears unable to advance real world alternatives, the growing appetite for change, spurred by recurrent crises wrought by capitalism, settles for right-wing fantasies of a harmonious life in a nation that competes successfully with other countries economically and is freed from job- and welfare-stealing migrants.
The impact of German unification and the rise and decline of neoliberal globalization
Capitalist crises and their exploitation by the right are common phenomena, certainly in the imperialist centres of the world system, but also in the peripheries. But they play out differently in different national contexts. Behind the AfD’s electoral successes in Thuringia and Saxony as well as its broader surge in popularity lie the combined histories of German unification and the rise and decline of neoliberal globalization. The upsurge of the new right is just one of the outcomes of these combined histories. Equally important is the defeat of the federal government coalition and the rout of the FDP, whose leader, former federal Minister of Finance Christian Lindner, promotes austerity policies that stymie government plans to subsidize the transition to non-fossil energies. These policies also lead to a creeping roll-back of social spending—except when it comes to arms spending. Little wonder a government that took office on the promise of something like a Green New Deal lost its credibility almost entirely and called for a federal election scheduled for February 23 of this year.
And then there is the defeat of the Left Party that, despite programmatic commitments to progressive alternatives, is widely seen as the appendage of a lame-duck government in Berlin. At the other end of the political spectrum, the AfD is widely perceived as an oppositional force, even though its program blends austerity, nationalism and militarism in ways that are more extreme but qualitatively not much different from policies advanced by the CDU and the FDP.
In the face of electoral defeat, the federal government, which embraced the US’s New Cold War policies a few weeks after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, also introduced dramatically tougher migration policies. Rather than representing any kind of alternative, as its name purports, the AfD is the black sheep of the establishment family, expressing racist views more radically and bluntly than even the Conservatives. While the Social Democrats, Liberals and Greens are intent on denying such views, they reveal themselves as Western supremacists when it comes to fending off so-called authoritarian threats arising from Russia and China, stirring up longstanding fears in the West that ‘the Russians are coming’ or that ‘Asian hordes’ augur “the decline of the West,” in the words of right-wing intellectual Oswald Spengler.
The hypocrisy of the Greens, who advocate a green transition while supporting the purchase of dirty oil and gas (wherever they can get it ever since the Russian invasion of Ukraine ended Russian gas-flows to Germany), make them a prime target of AfD agitation. But in reality the AfD and the Greens share the fear of Western decline. The AfD engage in fearmongering around the replacement of white people by non-white immigrants and accuse the Greens and their coalition partners in the federal government of accelerating Western decline. But while the Greens may be the prime target of the AfD’s culture war, the truth is that despite significant differences in tone, the Greens and the AfD share a basic consensus on the decline of the West.
AfD success in the east: history holds the key
Encouraged by Glasnost in the Soviet Union, many East Germans took to the streets in the fall of 1989. Under the banner “We Are the People” they demanded democratic reforms of East Germany. Neither unification with West Germany nor a return to a capitalist economy was on their agenda—at least not initially. As protests grew, and especially after the ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED) had opened the border to the West, “We Are the People” was replaced by “We Are One People” more and more often. It was supplemented by the slogan “Germany, United Fatherland,” which is actually a quote from East Germany’s national anthem, written by the communist poet Johannes R. Becher in 1949, at a time when the leaders of the SED still thought a united Germany could be achieved—not necessarily socialist but not aligned on either the US or the Soviet Union. Such hopes were buried by the Cold War, for which the Berlin Wall became a symbol, casting a dark shadow over communist East Germany and allowing capitalist West Germany to present itself as a beacon of freedom. It was in a matter of weeks in the winter of 1989-90 that the abstract possibility became a demand, massively fanned by West German politicians—notably then chancellor Helmut Kohl—and mainstream media, which hinted at the possibility of East Germany adopting the West German Deutschmark. Many East Germans seized on such hints as an irresistible offer. “If the D-Mark comes, we’ll stay here; if it doesn’t come, we’ll go to it” became the next popular protest slogan. Since the opening of the border, thousands of East Germans had gone to the West, creating conditions reminiscent of the times before the wall was built in 1961. Back then, the East German economy lost so many people, most of them young and well-trained, that a collapse of social reproduction became a real threat. The wall stopped the bleeding of the East German economy but inflicted irreparable damage on the legitimacy of the political system.
Almost 30 years later, the opening of the border by the SED-leadership came as a bit of a surprise to West German elites. Yet, they were quick to grasp the possibilities it created. To them, this meant the integration of East Germany into the West German political and economic system, not coexistence with a somehow reformed but still politically independent East Germany. The ‘take over the East’ goal of West German elites and the Deutschmark rush of East German masses fed each other. The civil rights movement that wanted to democratize East Germany was sidelined. Some of the groups active in that movement adjusted to the new zeitgeist quickly, some even entered into an electoral alliance with the East German conservative party, despite their having criticized it as a small but integral part of the SED-regime. Angela Merkel, who would later become chancellor, belonged to one of these East German groups that allied with other conservative-turned-civil-rights groups and the East German CDU. This Alliance for Germany easily won the last East German elections and negotiated the integration of East Germany into West Germany’s institutional structures. On July 1, 1990, the Deutschmark came to the East, three months later the independent state of East Germany vanished into an enlarged West Germany. Most of the Alliance for Germany dissolved into the West German CDU immediately after unification. In December this enlarged CDU won federal elections.
In less than a year the Cold War had come to an end and an entire state had disappeared. However, the hopes pinned on unification, notably the introduction of the Deutschmark, were soon dashed. A year after unification, unemployment, which had existed in communist East Germany primarily in a hidden form, stood at 10.2 percent and rose to over 20 percent in the early 2000s. It didn’t fall below 10 percent until 2014, a quarter of a century after the Berlin Wall fell. Moreover, mass migration from East to West Germany, which the introduction of the Deutschmark was meant to curb, actually accelerated after the arrival of the Deutschmark. From 1990 to 2015, East Germany lost significantly more than one million people, the vast majority during the first two years after unification, and almost all of them of working age. Were it not for this emigration as well as early retirement schemes and retraining schemes for thousands of workers, unemployment in the East would have been even higher than it actually was. Introducing a new form of hidden unemployment, many of the participants in retraining were enrolled in one course after another, often in different fields, until they were old enough for early retirement.
One of the main, if not the main, reasons for the collapse of the East German economy was the Deutschmark. Introduced at a rate of one Mark West for one Mark East, while average productivity of East Germany was estimated to be about a quarter that of West Germany, German monetary union gave private households the boost in purchasing power they so desired. But it made East German firms uncompetitive. Lower wages could not compensate productivity differentials between firms in East Germany and Western countries. The privatization of East Germany’s state-owned firms facilitated the downfall of the East German economy even further. In some cases, Western companies bought East German firms just to shut them down so that they would not become competitors in the future. In other cases, they wanted patents or certain segments of production that they could integrate into their own supply-chains, leaving everything else to be shut down. The closures and cherry-picking of some more desirable segments destroyed the reproduction process of the East German economy even beyond the damage done by rendering it uncompetitive through monetary union.
The result was that bits and pieces of the East German economy became a periphery of production networks controlled by West German corporations. Ironically, the neoliberal restructuring of production processes went hand in hand with massive fiscal transfers from West to East Germany. A price that had to be paid to sustain some level of social cohesion while disappointment that political unification was followed by economic decline and continued social divisions between East and West instead of an Eastern economic miracle following the example of West Germany from the late 1950s to the early 1970s. At some point, a third of East German incomes came from fiscal transfers. As a result, government debt as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) rose from 41.8 percent in 1989 to 61.2 percent in 1999, which is nothing compared to today’s numbers. Yet, back then the lesson that had yet to be learned is that neoliberalism, despite its balanced-budget rhetoric, really is a mix of austerity and tax cuts for the rich that produces increasing debt levels at every slowdown or downturn of the economy. In the 1990s, government debt over 60 percent of GDP was a scandal. Not least because, at the urging of the conservative German government, 60 percent had become the benchmark for membership in the European monetary union, for which the roadmap had been laid out in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty.
Budget deficits, accumulating into government debt, weren’t the only deficit scandal in 1990s Germany. The other was in the current account. From a surplus of 4.6 percent in 1989, the current account dropped to a –1.9 percent deficit in 1991 and remained in deficit territory until 2001. In most other countries, deficits between negative one and negative two percent wouldn’t be a matter of concern. In Germany they were. After all, West German prosperity—the very model East Germans admired so much—had been reliant on export-driven growth, which was always understood as export surpluses. As it turned out, unification in the early 1990s, led to a boom in West Germany as East Germans spent many of their newly acquired Deutschmarks on consumer goods ‘Made in (West) Germany’—despite massive job losses. This boom drove prices up and made German exports less competitive on the world market. At the same time, some of the money from the East German spending spree went to foreign companies. As exports took a hit and imports got a boost, the current account went from positive to negative.
The East was integrated into the West German political system as it existed prior to unification. The Kohl government didn’t agree to any changes suggested by the East German government that formally negotiated unification but really rubberstamped the subordination of East German society to West German institutions. Economic integration was different though. The collapse of the East German economy, triggered by the design of monetary union and privatizations, had a lasting impact on the West German economic model that East Germans had been eager to embrace. The first decade after unification was marked by a twin deficit in government budgets and current accounts. During the unification boom from 1990 to 1993, inflation went up to levels not seen since the oil-price hikes and inflationary struggles between capital and labour from the 1970s to the early 1980s. At that time, however, the West German inflation rate was still below that of other Western countries, whereas in the early 1990s it was amongst the highest
Germany’s continued economic weakness, combined with New Cold War marching orders from Washington, fed a nostalgia for a supposedly great past—symbolized by the Deutschmark
West Germany as a role model
Running continued deficits—let alone a twin deficit—was unthinkable in a country that rebuilt its economy after the Second World War through integration into a world market with rules established and enforced by the US. In this American Empire, West Germany played the role of bulwark against Soviet Communism, including East Germany, and as a showcase of Western capitalism. To succeed in this role, foreign debt, accumulated by the Nazis and inherited by West Germany as legal successor of the Third Reich, was forgiven through the 1953 London Debt Agreement. West Germany also inherited low wages, industrial capacity and new technologies from the Nazi economy that, contrary to widespread assumptions, survived the war largely intact. This gave West German industries a competitive advantage that was further buttressed by favourable exchange rates on which basis West Germany was admitted to the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates in 1952. Reintegration into the world market also allowed West Germany to transition from a coal-based to an oil-based economy. Oil was cheaper than coal but its supplies were controlled by US companies and the American state.
However, being a junior partner in the American Empire turned out to be a much better deal for the German bourgeoisie than its earlier quests for world power. The territory under its direct control was much smaller after two failed power grabs but profits were stellar. Driven by exports, or export surpluses more precisely, the West German economy didn’t require fiscal stimulus and kept growing until the US turned to floating exchange rates, which led to a significant appreciation of the Deutschmark. Further, oil prices exploded in the 1970s. But it was during these turbulences that West Germany consolidated its reputation as a beacon of economic stability. Political management of the crisis, notably codetermination (German lingo for the institutionalized cooperation between unions and employer association), kept wages and inflation lower than in most other Western countries. This helped to sustain export surpluses for much of the 1970s. In turn, export surpluses allowed the government to keep fiscal stimulus and unemployment rates low. Again, this is compared to other Western countries, not compared to the post-war boom.
West Germany’s relative success in managing the economic crises of the 1970s raised some concerns among its allies, who considered this success a case of beggar-thy-neighbour policies. The US pressured the West German government to increase public spending in order to stimulate the world economy. The West German government couldn’t shrug off these US demands entirely. The social democratic party was led by Helmut Schmidt at the time, and some extra spending also appeased the left wing in his own party as well as some unionists. However, calls for a Keynesian fix of the economic crises never overcame the general preference for fiscal prudence and low inflation that marked West German society after two lost wars, each followed by the introduction of a new currency, one of them also by unprecedented hyperinflation. Not entirely without reason, export success after the Second World War was widely attributed to liberal economic principles, conveniently ignoring the fact that this ‘liberalism in one country’ could only work because other economies placed growing demand on the world market.
Export success also created an ersatz-identity that allowed West Germans to repress the horrors of the Nazi regime and the roles most of them had played in these horrors, as perpetrators or bystanders. Social democrats never really fit into this picture. Willy Brandt, who spent the Nazi reign in underground resistance circles and exile and would later become West Germany’s first social democratic chancellor, was seen by many as a traitor. His successor Helmut Schmidt, who had served in the Nazi air force, opposed many of Brandt’s plans for social reform and applied Keynesian policies only in homeopathic doses. He was successfully branded as the one responsible for rising unemployment and inflation by the Conservatives and Liberals. Crossing the floor from SPD to CDU, the Liberals made Helmut Kohl chancellor. Kohl won two elections before unification on the promise of bringing post-war prosperity back. He won another two after unification on the promise of bringing the prosperity to East Germany.
For a long time, Kohl presented himself successfully as the defender of the West German export model and guarantor of the collective identity tied to that model, despite the fact that 1980s West Germany never saw a return to postwar prosperity. Disappointment with his broken promises for a West German economic miracle 2.0 began spreading towards the end of the 1980s. Yet, the disintegration of the SED regime allowed him to renew and extend his promises to the East. The national euphoria that secured his 1990 election victory also saw a transformation of collective identity. West German pride in being export world champion turned into Deutschmark nationalism. Widely shared in the East, where people were happy to get the Deutschmark, and the West, where people saw it as symbol of their postwar achievements, this was not the pure money, or currency, fetishism Karl Marx wrote about in Capital. It had a distinctive nationalist character that was subdued in West Germany’s pre-unification export-identity. With unification, the nationalist seed blossomed. Not only did this help Kohl become the ‘chancellor of unity,’ but it also gave cover to a burst of neo-Nazi attacks on immigrants, leftists and queer people, culminating in arson attacks in Rostock, Mölln and Solingen. The latter two killed eight people, while the attack in Rostock laid a four-day siege on an apartment block inhabited by foreign workers who had been employed in East Germany’s now defunct state-owned economy. The openly neo-Nazi attacks of the early 1990s, later dubbed “baseball bat years,” were followed by a series of murders committed by the National Socialist Underground (NSU) that cost nine immigrants and one cop their lives from 2000 to 2007. The role of the German secret service in covering up, or even facilitating, these murders has never been investigated as key documents remain classified until this day. Hans-Georg Maaßen, head of the secret service from 2012 to 2018, was one of the individuals responsible for blocking investigations of the NSU-murders. He also heads up an ultra-conservative circle, initially inside the CDU and now operating in the right-wing space between the CDU und the AfD.
Exports über alles: Eastern peripheries boost corporate profits
During unification and in the first few years afterwards, nationalism was a mass ideology. It rallied flag-waving masses in the streets, it dominated German politics and inspired Nazi-skinheads to chase people they considered enemies. As it became clear that the hopes for an economic miracle 2.0 would not be realized, street protests receded, most skinheads scaled down their activism and just a few turned to clandestine terrorist attacks. It seemed that nationalism had lost the force it had just recently. However, the entanglements between Nazis and parts of the state apparatuses indicate that while nationalism wasn’t as visible as before, it had not disappeared.
As it turned out, the opening of the Berlin Wall was a key step towards what would later be called neoliberal globalization. As the German bourgeoisie sought its place in a world seemingly governed by the invisible hand of the market—not Soviet planners or the milder version of Western government intervention—nationalism also found a new role as mass ideology. The ideological wind blowing from the ‘real West,’ that is, the United States, rebranded free trade theory going back to the days of David Ricardo as globalization. Sticking closely to Ricardo’s principles, academic globalists argued that firms, if left alone by the state, would specialize in the production of those goods they can produce more cheaply than firms in another country either because they possess more productive technologies or use input factors more plentiful and cheap than in another country. All countries will be better off if firms in each country specialize according to their comparative advantages.
Globalization practitioners talked about entire countries as if they were firms competing against each other. Competitiveness of nation-states became the lodestar of capitalists, and their political executors, who used it to justify the roll-back of wages and social standards in all countries. Their run-the-country-like-a-business propaganda was so persuasive that even working class people whose wages, pensions and public services were cut fell for it in large numbers, electing and re-electing neoliberal globalizers over and over again. At the same time, fear that the policies just voted for would cause a race to the bottom spread in the rich countries that saw parts of their production outsourced to poor countries, where labour was really cheap, while immigrants from such countries would take on jobs in the burgeoning low-wage sectors of the rich countries. Migration, segmented labour markets and a global reserve army of labour, enabling capitalists to engage in global labour arbitrage, were neither part of academic globalization theory nor did they feature in politicians’ globalization propaganda. Absent from public debate, these real-life factors created fears that a new right could build on by portraying economic problems as questions of national identity. Translated into policy terms, that meant a program of keeping immigrants out and capital in. This protectionist backlash against neoliberal globalization, coupled with the rise of a new right ranging from populist to neo-Nazi formations, occurred all over the Global North. It began slowly in the late 1990s and early 2000s while globalization was still expanding, and then gathered steam in the wake of the 2008-9 world financial crisis that marked the end of accumulation driven by globalization. It has accelerated again since the COVID-19 recession as well as the escalating great power politics vis-à-vis Russia and China, which have led to openly imperialist policies couched in the same nationalist ideology which the new right thrives on. The competitive nation-as-corporation ideology and the policies that marked actually unfolding globalization was the breeding ground for today’s strange bedfellowship of globalizers-turned-great-power-warriors and national supremacists of the new right. Theories of unregulated free trade opening the path towards global prosperity were just an ideological tool that was useful as long the integration of more and more countries into the US-dominated world market fuelled capitalist accumulation, and thereby hopes for the eventual trickle-down. It was replaced with the rhetoric of concern for national security and democracy as accumulation ended in a new phase of stagnation.
The German bourgeoisie had already adopted the logic of the state as business competitor after the Second World War when it traded world power ambitions for a junior partner role in the American Empire. Balanced budgets and tight money formed the core of its policies. That, along with competitive advantages inherited from the Nazis or granted by the US, enabled export-driven growth and, ultimately, export surpluses. Despite verbal commitments to liberalism, these policies were mercantilist in substance. Shattered but not derailed by the crises of the 1970s, West Germany’s mercantilist regime of accumulation survived until unification led to a twin deficit, slow growth and socioeconomic divisions between East and West. Unified Germany’s economy stumbled along while the US enjoyed its New Economy boom, even though that turned out to be short-lived, and China attained unprecedented levels of economic growth.
The Kohl government didn’t respond to the bourgeoisie’s growing concerns about economic stagnation in Germany. Neither did it respond to growing dissatisfaction with social conditions among the popular classes. After uniting Germany, Kohl turned to further uniting Europe. Partly, he wanted to demonstrate Germany’s continued commitment to cooperation in the European Union as some European leaders—notably British Prime Minister Thatcher and French President François Mitterrand—had expressed reservations about German unification and worried about a return of German great power ambitions. European monetary union became Kohl’s preferred route to an “ever closer union,” as EU-parlance had it at the time. However, regarding other countries, notably in the Mediterranean, Kohl successfully pushed for tight fiscal and monetary rules—the same kind of rules West German policy makers followed in the postwar period. Under the favourable conditions granted by the US to integrate into the world market, this led to export-driven prosperity. However, other countries didn’t enjoy the same favourable conditions. What would upset governments and people in such countries even more was the fact that Kohl had abandoned the rules he was preaching to other European countries in his very own united Germany
Helmut Kohl at the CDU national party convention in Hamburg, 1973. Photo from Wikimedia Commons
There, European monetary union was widely seen as a top-down capitalist elite project, part of corporate globalization or as a handing over of the beloved Deutschmark to irresponsible Eurocrats and the Club Med, a derogatory term often used in public debates to denounce people in the Mediterranean countries as lazy, spend-thrifty and, worst of all, happily having a good time at the expense of others. Euro-scepticism added to disappointment with the collapse of East Germany’s economy after unification, growing income polarization and fears of job loss all over Germany and a sense of losing national sovereignty to global capital. Unresponsive to any of these concerns, Kohl and his coalition of Conservatives and Liberals eventually lost the 1998 election to the Social Democrats and Greens who formed a coalition government offering a blend of light Keynesianism, green transition and control of financial markets. This is where the German—and international—bourgeoisies got really concerned.
The opening ideological salvos to derail the newly elected government’s plans came from the British tabloid The Sun, calling Oskar Lafontaine, the new finance minister who proposed the introduction of a Tobin tax, “Europe’s most dangerous man.” Next came Madeleine Albright, then US secretary of state, who gave Germany’s Green Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer the choice of joining the bombing campaign against Yugoslavia or having his country isolated from Western allies. Fischer, and the new Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, chose war. Seeing that his opposition to the war wasn’t supported by anyone else in the cabinet, Lafontaine resigned before the bombing began.
A few months later, The Economist called Germany the “Sick man of the Euro.” Coming from the central organ of global capitalism and unrepentant advocate of liberalism since the days when England, not China, was the workshop of the world, this was not just another opinion piece. It was a warning that the international investment community—exactly the CEOs, bankers, brokers and financiers targeted by the then-emerging movement against corporate globalization—lost confidence in the German market and expected pro-business measures to boost their propensity to invest.
After a few months in office, Schröder had to choose between meeting voters’ expectations (job creation, reduction of job insecurities and income inequality) and capitalists’ cost-reduction demands. He chose the capitalists’ side, earning him the nickname Genosse der Bosse (Comrade of the Bosses). In the absence of a social movement from below that could have pushed him to deliver on the election platforms of the SPD and the Greens, this choice might actually better be called caving to capitalist threats of an investment strike. From 2000 to 2005, the Schröder government axed corporate tax rates, exempted capital gains from taxation and lowered equity requirements for credits. The other side of the class divide saw drastic reductions in unemployment benefits, essentially slashing them to the level of welfare payment rates after one year of benefits. At the same time, legal obstacles to employing temporary workers were greatly reduced. Capitalists were thrilled. Profits and asset prices shot up, but capital formation declined during the years pro-business laws were passed.
Reorganizing existing production capacities was more important to corporate executives than creating new capacities. This was not surprising as capacity utilization dropped when the New Economy bubble burst, triggering a downturn of the world economy that kept even booming China below double-digit growth. As it turned out, united Germany did not inherit the export successes of pre-unification West Germany, but was certainly heir to its export dependence.
In the early 2000s, Germany’s current account turned positive again—not because exports grew so strongly (they actually stagnated due to the world economic downturn), but because imports declined owing to weak domestic demand associated with the Schröder government’s neoliberal policies. However, as the world economy bounced back (China saw growth rates of 10-14 percent from 2003 to 2006), German exports grew again. Eventually the reorganization of production processes in the aftermath of German unification paid off. West German corporations now controlled production networks linking corporate headquarters controlling finance, research and development, and capital-intensive parts of actual assembly in the centres with labour intensive production in low-wage areas in the peripheries from Eastern Germany all the way to China. In these networks, East Germany occupied the position of a semi-periphery. On the supply side, German export success in the early 2000s relied on continued wage inequality between centres and peripheries, which doesn’t mean that all workers in the centres earned high wages. The threat to relocate production to the East or the South put the brakes on all wages. The lowering of social standards propelled the growth of low-wage employment, notably in the service sector. Well-paying, permanent jobs began to decrease as a share of total employment even in West Germany. As a result, discontent that was widespread in the East since political unification was followed by economic collapse, and social downgrading began to creep into the West.
2010s: Exporting the Euro-crisis
The export surpluses of the early 2000s relied on the same mercantilism that had generated such surpluses during the postwar prosperity. However, during the postwar period, unprecedented growth rates across the Western, and parts of the non-Western, world made it possible to superimpose a welfare state on a mercantilist economy that didn’t squeeze profit rates but operated with capital’s consent in a way that seemed unthinkable during the age of catastrophe from 1914 to 1945. In the early 2000s, by contrast, successful mercantilism demanded the roll-back of the welfare state. Tragically, the extension of West Germany’s welfare state institutions to East Germany, where they were superimposed on a collapsing economy, created the profit squeeze that was needed to curtail the material protections granted by the welfare state. To sustain competitive advantages gained by scaling back the welfare state, it was imperative to keep wage-growth low even after surging exports pulled the economy out of the slump. Unlike during the period of postwar prosperity, export surpluses didn’t stimulate domestic demand very much. In fact, current account surpluses in the early 2000s, which surged from -1.8 percent in 2000 to 6.7 percent in 2007, were as much driven by rising exports as by weak growth of imports, a clear indicator of the overall sluggishness of domestic demand. Unemployment rates rose from 9.3 percent in 2000 to 12.1 percent in 2005. After that, unemployment went into long-term decline, briefly interrupted by the 2008/9 Great Recession and slowed down by the 2009/15 Euro-crisis, eventually reaching five percent before the 2020 COVID-19 Recession. However, this job growth occurred almost entirely in low wage occupations.
Paradoxically, it was during the Euro-crisis that a wave of “export nationalism” covered up the discontent that was growing, at variable speeds, across Germany. The Deutschmark nationalism that emerged during German unification had taken a hit with the introduction of the Euro. However, when it turned out that the Euro was basically the old Deutschmark under a new name and export surplus levels were reaching unprecedented heights, it almost seemed that the long-awaited return of prosperity was about to materialize. But of course, it wasn’t the same as the postwar prosperity that saw strong growth almost everywhere. The 2010s, by contrast, were a time of stagnation. The rebound after the 2008/9 recession was stronger in Germany than in other countries, but then growth rates fell in line with the one-to-two percent range of other Western countries.
It was during this time of recurrent crises and long-term stagnation that the German government, led by Angela Merkel with the Social Democrats as junior partner, felt compelled to lecture other governments on economic policy. Completely blind to the fact that beggar-thy-neighbour policies are a zero-sum game, the Merkel-government told Southern European countries to impose austerity despite the fact that they were suffering from a sovereign debt crisis due to the end of cheap credit that became available after the creation of the European monetary union, helping to pay for imports from Germany. Merkel also told them that, after a painful but unavoidable period of belt-tightening, they would eventually succeed as export countries like Germany.
The European monetary union’s contradictory character torn between further integrating Europe and spreading German mercantilism shifted entirely to the latter. Southern Europeans, governments and ordinary people, understood that austerity would further subordinate their economies to Germany’s economic dominance. The Brits, like the Germans and the “Frugal Four” (Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden), although not warm to the idea of bailing out crisis-ridden Southern Europeans, were suspicious that Germany’s leading role in handling the crisis would turn the country’s economic dominance into fully-fledged hegemony. Brexit has its origin here. Eastern Europe’s post-communist comprador governments had imposed austerity on their countries in acts of pre-emptive obedience and now felt betrayed as they thought the bailout packages the Merkel government used as a means to impose austerity on the South were actually some sort of welfare package.
Centrifugal forces in the EU were further fuelled when, in face of civil war and foreign interventions in Syria, Merkel unilaterally declared open borders for Syrian refuges and then told EU member states they all had to take their share of refugees. European governments already concerned over Germany’s domineering role in managing the Euro-crisis were dismayed. Public debate within Germany was sharply divided between liberals and leftists applauding Merkel’s humanist stance and right-wingers, including in her own party, warning of an uncontrolled flow of immigrants. Largely unnoticed was the fact that Merkel’s decision to open borders for Syrian refugees was tied to the anti-Russian turn in German foreign policy following the sharp polarization between pro- and anti-Russian forces in Ukraine during and after the Maidan protests in 2014. Most of the Syrian refugees were fleeing the Russian-backed Assad-regime, which was considered an adversary. Opening borders for these refugees set a precedent for the surge of Ukrainian refugees following Russia’s invasion of Eastern Ukraine in 2022. At that point, Merkel, who had already retired, told the media that her government saw the Minsk accords, officially meant to reach a settlement between contending political and military forces within Ukraine, as a means of buying time to arm the Zelensky government.
2020s: Sick man of Europe 2.0
As Ukraine, already torn by civil war, became the scene for a proxy war between NATO-countries and Russia, Germany was firmly subordinated to US foreign policy. Post-communist governments in Germany had, more or less enthusiastically, supported deepening trade relations with Russia. Oil and gas imports might have been the most significant part of German-Russian trade but were certainly not the only one. Torn between allegiance to the US and lucrative business deals with Russia, the German government, now headed by Social Democrat Olaf Scholz, cut its economic ties with Russia after the latter’s invasion of Ukraine. The price to be paid was a further spike in energy prices, on top of the increases attendant on the economic recovery from the COVID-19-recession.
As part of current US efforts to contain China, the German government has been pressured to scale down its trade with China—Germany’s largest trading partner and also a prime outlet for German foreign direct investments. Since Germany’s economy is as much export-driven as export-dependent, the US turn from neoliberal globalization to escalating sanctions and protectionism in the name of national security has caused high levels of uncertainty within the German bourgeoisie. In addition to the return of secular stagnation after the very short post-COVID recovery in the West and the petering out of the China boom, this uncertainty is driving low levels of investment. Inflation, fuelled by post-COVID recovery and rising energy prices, and lower real incomes leading directly to less consumer spending, but also indirectly, as households build up their savings in anticipation of more economic shocks in the future. Meanwhile the Scholz government boosted arms spending while otherwise imposing austerity.
After two years of recession, Germany is again being branded the “sick man of Europe” by The Economist. The last time Germany earned this title the neoliberal turn against the welfare state produced massive current account surpluses, meagre general growth rates and massive social and regional inequalities. The export nationalism that concealed the mounting discontent with neoliberalism was shaken by the US turn from neoliberal globalization to protectionism and militarism. Given its high level of export dependence, Germany was ill prepared for the turn against it, which unleashed pent-up disappointments and anxieties into the political sphere. This happened all over Germany but more so in the East than in the West as regional differences in income, wealth and representation in leadership positions had created widespread feelings of being second class citizens in a politically united Germany.
In the absence of socialist imagination, German politics are haunted by the spectres of the past. An insurgent hard-right pins the labels of communism or Marxism on everything that ever came from the left, Social Democrats, the Greens and, of course, the Left Party, no matter how members, activists and supporters of these parties position themselves on the political spectrum. At the same time, the hard-right wants Germany to leave its Nazi past behind. Downplaying Nazi atrocities, accusing liberals and leftists of burdening Germans with a cult of guilt, they propagate the reclaiming of German national pride and sovereignty from allegedly cosmopolitan elites. Between the very real and growing right and a weak and largely imaginary left, centrist parties that proclaimed the end of history in the heyday of neoliberalism are also shifting to the right. The decline of the Left Party is a mirror image of the rise of the AfD.
Alternative für Deutschland: A child of Deutschmark nationalism
Mainstream media and centrist parties view the new right as if it were some external force inexplicably appearing on the political scene and threatening the liberal order. But this is empirically wrong. Almost all leading figures of the AfD come from conservative West German milieus where they previously held positions in public administration or private businesses. Although they present themselves as anti-establishment rebels, they are establishment people who turned from the centre-right to the hard-right. The AfD also includes party activists who come from militant neo-Nazi groups that have existed on the fringes of West German society since the CDU gave many old Nazis a political home after the downfall of the Third Reich. Making small advances into electoral politics in the late 1960s and again in the 1980s, the neo-Nazis remained marginal until they found common ground with disgruntled conservatives. Deutschmark nationalism served as the ideological bonding material for neo-Nazis and right-of-centre conservatives, and became a rallying point for growing numbers of people dissatisfied with the policies of neoliberal globalization advanced by the centrist parties. It emerged in the tumultuous days after the fall of the Berlin wall as a mass ideology that shaped East and West German politics in the direction of unification. After that, it became an ideological point of reference that allowed for the integration of different political ideas and currents into a new right political project, the AfD.
Riding on the wave of Euro-scepticism that accompanied the Euro crisis, the AfD, founded in 2013, promoted a German exit from the EU, which would also have meant exit from the Euro. However, boosting the Deutschmark nostalgia associated with German-style Euro-scepticism got the newly minted party only so far. What really fuelled the AfD’s take-off was the wave of Syrian refugees coming to Germany (and other EU-countries) in 2015. The party’s approval ratings rose from roughly five percent in its first two years to around 12 percent in the next two years. With the surge in voter approval came a programmatic shift from ‘neoliberalism in one country’ to neoliberalism hidden behind ethnonationalist hate propaganda. Despite advocating for a strong state, the AfD also presents itself as a rebellious party of freedom. This paradox is resolved by portraying cosmopolitan elites, represented most notably by the Greens, as a force dominating state apparatuses and misusing them to bring excessive numbers of foreigners into the country with their cultures that allegedly threaten German people, suppress German heritage and push the economy into decay. Therefore a strong state is needed to defend Germany against foreign incursion and revive its inherent strength
Election poster of the AfD in Thuringia supporting remigration. Photo from Wikimedia Commoms
The Scholz government created the conditions in which the AfD’s self-portrayal as freedom fighters gave the party another boost. The modest Green New Deal platforms on which the SPD and Greens ran their 2021 election campaign didn’t gain enough traction to allow them to form a government, despite support from unions and even, more cautiously, employer associations. To obtain a majority in the Bundestag, SPD and Greens formed an ostensibly unlikely coalition with the FDP, a party mostly focused on cutting taxes and limiting public deficits. These commitments to tax breaks for the rich and austerity for the poor stood in the way of effective state-sponsored energy transition programs. Hence, the Scholz-government was perceived as weak from the start. Things went from bad to worse for the government after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Under pressure from the US, Scholz opted for sanctions against Russia, arms deliveries to Ukraine and a continued increase in arms spending. At a time when the prices of everything from butter to housing were soaring, making it clear that money would still be available for guns but maybe not for butter not only destroyed whatever support the government had before the Ukraine war but also gave the AfD another boost. A year and a half into the war, the SPD was trailing the AfD in federal polls. Picking up widespread, though by no means dominant, unease with arms support for Ukraine and fear of war with Russia, the AfD advocates a negotiated peace settlement between Russia and Ukraine and, more importantly to the AfD, the lifting of sanctions on Russia. For the AfD, urging peace with Russia is not a matter of a principled anti-militarism but a means of reviving German trade with Russia, notably Russian energy imports that are seen as a precondition for economic recovery. To achieve this, Germany has to free itself from the ‘cosmopolitan sell-out elite.’ Whether everybody now supporting the AfD subscribes to the freedom-for-German-supremacy-view is open to debate. What can’t be denied is the fact that many discontented people, whatever their main grievance, are looking to the right, not the left, for alternatives to a failing political centre. Some are also turning to the CDU, which claims to be different from both the AfD and the federal coalition government, without offering anything other than praise for the good old days. That served the party well at times when the German economy could thrive, to a greater or lesser degree, on US-enabled expansion of world markets. With the US protectionist turn, this is no longer possible and the party is torn between centrism and the new right. Current support for the CDU is highly unstable, which could easily work in the AfD’s favour, especially in the absence of persuasive alternatives from the left, which so far have not materialized.
This wasn’t always the case. Something like a left renewal had once seemed to be in the offing in the most unlikely place: East Germany during the transition from state socialism to a peripheral position in an enlarged capitalist Germany. In West Germany, the nationalist wave that came with unification swept away much of the activist left that had rallied thousands—sometimes tens or even hundreds of thousands— of people in the 1980s against the stationing of US nuclear missiles, nuclear power plants, Nazis, and South Africa’s apartheid regime, among other causes. Left circles within the SPD, the Greens and the labour movement weathered the nationalist storm without leaving a mark on German politics. In this political climate, the Party of Democratic Socialism (Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus or PDS) stood out as a beacon of the left.
Emerging from East Germany’s ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED), the PDS became the political home of many East Germans who lost their jobs, social status and cultural identity during the transition to capitalism. Quickly establishing a presence in East Germany’s provincial and municipal parliaments, the party expressed the discomfort of many East Germans who felt like second class citizens under the domination of West German institutions, politicians, corporations and culture. It highlighted East Germany’s socialist heritage, which encompassed commitments to anti-fascism, peace and international solidarity as much as the dictatorship of the politburo, Stasi-surveillance and an overbearing bureaucracy. The party hung itself up in endless debates between those who downplayed or justified East German communism’s dark sides and others who sought to disown that history by embracing liberal principles. Practically, these disputes didn’t make much difference. Upholding socialist principles didn’t stop the party from pragmatically working within the political and economic confines created by unification. At times, this included voting for privatization of public housing and infrastructure. For decades since the party was founded, the contradiction between socialist principles and the subordination to neoliberal policies imposed by the West German bourgeoisie didn’t stop the PDS or its successor organization Die Linke (the Left Party), from becoming something like a catch-all or people’s party in East Germany, a role long held by the CDU und the SPD in West Germany. For years, the PDS/Left Party achieved election results in the mid-20 percent range, peaking at 28 percent in Brandenburg in 2004 and 32 percent in Thuringia in 2019. It was also, and still is, part of various coalition governments in East German states. Until the September 2024 election, the Thuringian government was led by the Left Party’s Bodo Ramelow.
Despite this overall success and despite the party’s fidelity to socialist principles, the social group that wasn’t interested in voting PDS consisted of workers, who still voted CDU in large numbers despite g the CDU’s failed to deliver on its big promises of post-unification prosperity. More recently they shifted to the AfD. Meanwhile, in West Germany, the PDS remained marginal throughout its existence, only attracting activists from various left grouplets. What little remained of left protest milieus after unification was still dominated by a mix of environmentalists, antifas and international solidarity activists who might vote Green, or maybe even SPD, but hardly ever PDS. The old working class milieus that were shrinking with the decline of smokestack industries were still dominated by unionists closer to the SPD than the PDS. This started to change when, under chancellor Schröder, the SPD implemented neoliberal counter-reforms on a scale his conservative predecessor Kohl had avoided throughout his 16-year tenure, despite his supposed commitment to unleashing market forces. Growing frustrations among left social democrats and unionists fed mass demonstrations against Schröder’s SPD and created a social and organizational base (including, most prominently, Schröder’s short-time finance minister Lafontaine) that merged with the PDS into the Left Party in 2007. In the federal elections two years later, the Left Party won 11.9 percent of the vote, then 9.2 percent in the 2017 elections, but fell to 4.9 percent in the 2021 elections. This was a worse result than the 5.1 percent the PDS obtained in 1998, an election that also saw an increased vote for the SPD, which allowed Schröder to succeed Kohl. It is worth noting that the PDS vote came almost entirely from East Germany, which represents less than a quarter of Germany’s total population.
While the PDS mostly maintained peaceful coexistence between socialist theory and market-conforming practice, the Left Party continuously debated whether or not it should join centre-left governments, if given the chance. The bitterness with which party activists argued over this question stood in stark contrast to its actual relevance. In states where the party was relegated to opposition status by poor election results, this status didn’t attract additional voters keen on seeing a principled opposition in parliament. In states where the party joined governments, the results were mixed: sometimes it maintained its vote share in the subsequent election; sometimes it suffered losses. A paradoxical result came about in the Thuringian elections in September 2024: The Left Party lost massively, although, had there been direct elections for the minister-president (a position equivalent to provincial premier in Canada), the Left Party’s Bodo Ramelow would have won the election. This fits into a trend that became visible over the last few years in a number of state elections in East and West Germany. Party loyalties based on shared worldviews wear thin. Elections are often decided based on the media appeal of top politicians, regardless of party affiliation. Remarkably enough, Ramelow, just like Dietmar Woidke, the SPD’s lead candidate in the Brandenburg elections, dropped the name of his party on campaign posters, presenting himself as more of a provincial father figure than a man of the party.
However, rather than signalling the end of ideology, as centrist politicians and postmodern philosophers might have argued before the rise of a very explicitly ideologically committed new right, the focus on limelight politicians pushes democratic debates into the shadows. In the case of the Left Party, it might also have been an attempt to distract from its own image as an organization mired in endless debates not producing any coherent, let alone persuasive, policies. The reasons for permanent internal discord are sociological and ideological. The Left Party was strongest in its early days, when the PDS’s social base still comprised a cross-section of the East German population, although workers remained underrepresented. It also attracted dissident social democrats and unionists from West Germany. To a limited extent, therefore the Left Party had the working class base the PDS never had.
The blend of Keynesian and Marxist ideas around which social democratic dissidents and union leftists organized had been defeated as a significant political current during the crises of the 1970s by the Social Democratic right and corporatist union leaders who put competitiveness of the West German economy over income distribution from profits to wages. In the new millennium, when these currents joined forces with the PDS, they were still sizeable enough to give the newly founded Left Party a boost. But not for long. The smokestack industries around which these left currents were organizing were in continued decline, which made strategies based on that moribund reality obsolete. Moreover, these strategies often stood in the way of mobilizing and organizing the new working classes that emerged in the service sector and, on a much smaller scale, IT, bio tech, and green energy.
As the ranks of the Left Party thinned out with the loss of members coming out of communist East Germany or from West German union and social democratic circles, the party was able to attract new blood mainly in the form of highly educated, often precariously employed, urban dwellers. The shift in membership from old left offspring to the children of neoliberal globalization was paralleled by a geographical shift in electoral support. In urban centres, losses among the party’s old left supporters could be partially compensated; in rural areas, however, where the PDS and the Left Party had always been weak, the party disappeared almost entirely. Often, there isn’t even anyone to put up election campaign posters
Anti-AfD protest in Germany. Photo by strassenstriche.net/Flickr
Unlike the original base of both the PDS and the Left Party, the urban hipsters who joined the Left Party had no old left reference points. Even when they talked about Marx and class they did so with postmodern accents. However, this did not help them to gain sizeable support among the working classes—sometimes lumped together as the “precariat”—that developed in expanding economic sectors. The political offerings of the Left Party seemed to exercise little appeal for both old and potentially new constituencies. The party’s founding basis of unity was opposition to neoliberalism. In the early days this left room for East German concerns about the outcomes of unification—arguably a kind of neoliberal restructuring—with opposition to the neoliberal turn of the Schröder-government in East and West Germany. It also left plenty of room for a variety of goals, from resurrecting the Keynesian welfare state to a multitude of vaguely defined socialisms for the future to opposition without a vision for the future. However, what sufficed to form the Left Party wasn’t enough to sustain and grow it, especially not as it became harder to label government policies neoliberal.
The Great Recession, the COVID-19 pandemic, and commitments to ongoing arms production brought state intervention back to the centre of politics, contrary to the 1990s and early 2000s when politics was dominated by advancing capital mobility and free trade. Back then, ruling elites organized consent of the popular classes, more or less successfully, under the banner of “international competitiveness.” The new watchword “national security” is better at rallying the new right than building support for centrist parties. Left Party intellectuals debated the new political conjuncture under the label “post-neoliberalism,” a word-monster that hints, perhaps unwittingly, at the party’s inability to develop a strategy beyond rejecting neoliberalism. In reaction to the imposition of a party line by its predecessor organization, the PDS and the Left Party allowed a wide range of views. However, members of various organized currents, ranging from social-liberal to communist, tended to talk more about each other than with each other.
Postmodernist philosophers’ contention that the days of master narratives are over was wrong with respect to neoliberalism—if there ever was a master narrative, it was neoliberalism—but it does apply to the Left Party, which could not synthesize different ideas into compelling left policies that could rally growing discontent. Instead, internal debates turned into factional turf wars in a party that resembled an appendix of the Scholz government, costing the Left Party more and more support.
After years of bitter infighting, discontent with declining voter approval and accommodation of government policies led to the split of the federal party caucus and the formation of the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) in January 2024. As its name indicates, the party is entirely built around its frontwoman, who represented the Left Party in the Bundestag from 2009 to 2023. In the BSW, the cacophony that destructively marks the Left Party is replaced by closed-door debates. As in the Communist party of old, membership isn’t open to everyone; applications to join must be approved. Wagenknecht, originally a member of the Communist Platform (one of the organized currents inside the PDS), had shifted to left-Keynesian, pro-welfare state positions. But, years before her split from the Left Party, she began advocating ordoliberal positions—a branch of neoliberal thinking that stresses the role of the state in allowing businesses to compete without being bogged down by monopolies. This German version of neoliberalism has been the hallmark of economic policy and ideology since the early years of West German world market integration. In Wagenknecht’s current adaptation of ordoliberalism, the state guarantees competition, which, in turn, creates a strong economy capable of providing stable employment, social security and a fairer distribution of incomes. She combines this embrace of free markets plus the welfare state with a critique of the European Union as an institution operating in the interest of big corporations and a critique of NATO and US hegemony. Her condemnation of American hegemony appealed to some members of the Left Party, as did her critique of the EU, although her more recent favourable references to ordoliberalism and policies aiming at stricter migration controls were less popular.
The BSW’s outlook is very much shaped by positive memories of West German postwar prosperity. Yet, the party’s advocacy of international cooperation, a position going back to 1970s detente policies, contrasts sharply with orientations of the centrist parties and some currents within her own former party. Demand for a negotiated settlement of the Ukraine war overlaps with AfD positions. However, the AfD considers this a matter of Germany’s national interest that doesn’t preclude support for rearmament and war in other regions, like Gaza most recently. The BSW, on the other hand, sees militarism largely as the US’s last recourse for defending its ailing empire. It remains to be seen how the BSW’s principled opposition to militarism and war can mesh with current negotiations for a coalition government with the CDU and the SPD, both committed to military support for Zelensky in Ukraine and Netanyahu in Israel. Polls suggest that electoral support for the BSW was largely driven by the desire for an anti-war voice in parliament. At the same time, there is considerable support for efforts to keep the AfD out of government, despite all the support the AfD garnered in the fall state elections in East Germany. If this means compromising its anti-militarism, the BSW may, like the Left Party before it, soon be seen as a superfluous appendix of unpopular centrist parties.
After weeks of negotiations, the BSW entered into a coalition government with the SPD in Brandenburg as well as with the CDU and SPD in Thuringia. It also supports a minority government made up of the CDU and the SPD in Saxony. It did all this to keep the AfD out of government positions. Understandable as such efforts are, they have already cost the BSW in the polls. Hovering just above five percent, the BSW may not reach the five-percent threshold for obtaining seats in the upcoming federal elections. The Left Party, standing at 3.5 percent in the polls, will probably fall short. Founded as a project to unify left forces from East and West Germany, its split early last year already signalled the failure of that project. The next election may reduce it to insignificance, leaving lots of room for the AfD [end]
the Germans have bowed down to the US sabotage by Joe Biden administration of Nord Stream pipelines, only to end up with Donald Trump’s America First doctrine in economy and defense
Nohra, in Thüringen, was the first Konzentrationslager [Concentration Camp], opened on March 3, 1933. Arrested and detained without trial, its inmates were political enemies of the Nazi regime: German communist militants. While the concentration camp system was developing, other enemies, like for example unemployed citizens, were interned. Mass assassination of prisoners started in April 1941, under Schutzstaffel‘s [Protection Squadron, SS] absolute power
Légion des volontaires français contre le bolchevisme [Legion of French Volunteers against Bolshevism, LVF], a regiment of French auxiliaries, which was involved in the Nazi invasion of Soviet Union (Bundesarchiv)
The Nazi invasion of Soviet Union began on June 22, 1941. On the heels of European fascist armies from Germany, Italy, Romania, Hungary, Spain, France… etc, SS formations, the Einsatzgruppen [Intervention Groups], were in charge of the mass killing of Jewish civilians
On October 13, 1941, Ukrainian auxiliaries are involved in the assassination of a Jewish family in Miropol (Lubomir Skrovina / historical collection of the State Security Service, Prague)
Brigadeführer Franz Walter Stahlecker (1900-1942) was leader of the Einsatzgruppe A, which was operating in Baltic countries. Reinhard Heydrich (1904-1942) was heading the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA), command of the German police and intelligence
Here is the summary that the first addressed to the latter on January 31, 1942. More than 215,000 Jewish civilians had already been murdered, with the assistance of local nationalist militants in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Ukraine
Released in 2001, Conspiracy movie focuses on Wannsee meeting, Kenneth Branagh as Obergruppenführer Reinhard Heydrich and Stanley Tucci as Obersturmbannführer Adolf Eichmann (1906-1962)
In accordance with orders from Adolf Hitler, Heydrich chaired a meeting in Wannsee, on January 20, 1942. Its purpose was the organization of the Endlösung der Judenfrage [final solution to the Jewish question]
SS Helferinnen [Female Auxiliaries] near Auschwitz Vernichtungslager [Extermination Camp] (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum)
Besides forced labor for the sake of the German industry, the concentration camp system became a tool of genocide
Zyklon B pesticide (antiquearena.com)
The victims of Nazi racist persecutions were notably
6 million Jews,
4.5 million other Soviet civilians,
3.3 million other Soviet service members,
1.8 million other Poles,
between 250.000 and 500.000 Gypsies,
310.000 other Serbs
Operation Iskra, Leningrad, in January 1943 (Vsevolod Tarasevich)
After 1943 Soviet victories in Leningrad, Stalingrad and Kursk, offensive Bagration began on June 22, 1944, destroyed in Belarus the 850,000-strong Nazi Heeresgruppe Mitte [Army Group Center]. The Red Army reached and liberated in Poland, on January 27, 1945, the main concentration camp complex, which was including Monowitz Zwangsarbeitslager [Forced Labor Camp, for the sake of IG Farben chemical firm], Auschwitz and Birkenau Vernichtungslager [Extermination Camps]
In Auschwitz, on January 27, 1945, in the first minutes after their liberation, former inmates fraternize with Soviet servicemen (Boris Fishman / RIA Novosti)
[my illustration: a debris of US ATACMS ballistic missile has fallen on Kursk-Vostochny airfield on November 25, 2023 (Russian defense ministry)]
On March 5, 2022, the wreck of the sailing ship Endurance was found in the depths of the Weddell Sea off the coast of Antarctica. This, of course, was the vessel lost in Ernest Shackelton’s third expedition to Antarctica, which became trapped in the ice and sank in 1915. The story of that expedition is an extraordinary tale of human fortitude – with the Endurance lost to the ice, Shackleton’s crew evacuated to a loose ice flow where they camped for nearly 500 days, drifting about the Antarctic seas, before making a desperate dash across the open ocean in an open 20 foot lifeboat, finally reaching the southern shore of inhospitable and mountainous South Georgia Island, which they then had to cross on foot to reach the safety of a whaling station.
The story itself has an essentially mythic quality to it, with Shackleton’s crew surviving for years on free floating ice floes in the most inhospitable seas on earth. For our purposes, however, it is the story’s coda that is particularly interesting. In Shackleton’s memoirs, he remembered that, upon finally reaching the safety of the Stromness whaling station, one of his first questions was about the war in Europe. When Shackleton first set out on his ill-fated expedition on August 8, 1914, the First World War was less than a week old, and the German Army had just begun its invasion of Belgium. There was little expectation then that the war would proceed as it did, unleashing four years of slaughterous positional warfare that engulfed the continent.
Shackleton, having been adrift at sea for years, clearly did not imagine that the war could still be raging, and asked the commandant of the whaling station “tell me, when was the war over?”
The answer came back: “The war is not over. Millions are being killed. Europe is mad. The world is mad.”
The timing is serendipitous, since the discovery of the Endurance’s wreck, after more than a hundred years, happened to occur only a few weeks after the world again went mad, with the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian War in February 2022. As time continues its inexorable march and the calendar turns yet again, the war is passing through its third full winter. In February, Z-World will be three years old.
Of course, modern communications make it extremely unlikely that anybody could be cut fully out of the loop for years at a time, like Shackleton and his men. Instead of being ignorant as to whether or not the war is over, many of us are exposed on a daily basis to footage of men being killed, buildings being blown up, and vehicles being shredded. Twitter has made it essentially impossible to live under a rock, or on an ice floe, as it were.
If anything, we have the very opposite problem of Shackleton – at least as far as our wartime information infrastructure goes. We are saturated in information, with daily updates tracking advances of a few dozen meters and never ending bombast about new game changing weapons (which seem to change very little), and bluster about “red lines”. This war seems to have an unyielding dynamic on the ground, and no matter how many grand pronouncements we hear that one side or the other is on the verge of collapse, the sprawling front continues to grind up bodies and congeal with bloody positional fighting.
It would seem difficult to believe that a high intensity ground war in Europe with hundreds of miles worth of front could be boring, yet the static and repetitive nature of the conflict is struggling to hold the attention of foreign observers who have little immediately at stake.
My intention here is a radical zoom-out from these demoralizing and fatiguing small scale updates (as valuable as the work of the war mappers is), and consider the aggregate of 2024 – arguing that this year was, in fact, very consequential. Taken as a whole, three very important things happened in 2024 which create a very dismal outlook for Ukraine and the AFU in the new year. More specifically, 2024 brought three important strategic developments:
Russian victory in southern Donetsk which destroyed the AFU’s position on one of the war’s key strategic axes.
The expenditure of carefully husbanded Ukrainian resources on a failed offensive towards Kursk, which accelerated the attrition of critical Ukrainian maneuver assets and substantially dampened their prospects in the Donbas.
The exhaustion of Ukraine’s ability to escalate vis a vis new strike systems from NATO – more broadly, the west has largely run out of options to upgrade Ukrainian capabilities, and the much vaunted delivery of longer range strike systems failed to alter the trajectory of the war on the ground.
Taken together, 2024 revealed a Ukrainian military that is increasingly stretched to the limits, to the point where the Russians were able to largely scratch off an entire sector of front. People continue to wonder where and when the Ukrainian front might begin to break down – I would argue that it *did* break down in the south over the last few months, and 2025 begins with strong Russian momentum that the AFU will be hard pressed to arrest.
Front Collapse in South Donetsk
What stands out immediately about the operational developments in 2024 is the marked shift of energies away from the axes of combat that had seen the most intense fighting in the first two years of the war. In a sense, this war has seen each of its fronts activate in a sequence, one after the other.
After the opening Russian offensive, which boasted as its signature success the capture of the Azov coastline and the linkup of Donetsk and Crimea, the action shifted to the northern front (the Lugansk-Kharkov axis), with Russia fighting a summer offensive which captured Severodonetsk and Lysychansk. This was followed by a pair of Ukrainian counteroffensives in the fall, with a thrust out of Kharkov which pushed the front back over the Oskil, and an operation directed at Kherson which failed to breach Russian defenses but ultimately resulted in a Russian withdrawal in good order over the Dnieper due to concerns over logistical connectivity and an over-extended front. Energies then pivoted yet again to the Central Donbas axis, with the enormous battle around Bakhmut raging through the spring of 2023. This was followed by the failed Ukrainian offensive on Russia’s defenses in Zaporozhia, in the south.
Just to briefly recapitulate this, we can enumerate several operational phases in the first two years of the war, occurring in sequence and each with a center of gravity in different parts of the front:
A Russian offensive across the land bridge, culminating in the capture of Mariupol. (Winter-Spring 2022, Southern Front)
A Russian offensive in Lugansk, capturing Severodonetsk and Lysychansk. (Summer 2022, Donets-Oskil front)
Ukrainian Counteroffensives towards the Oskil and Kherson (Autumn 2022, Oskil and Dnieper fronts)
The Russian assault on Bakhmut (Winter-Spring 2023, Central Front)
Ukrainian counteroffensive on the land bridge (Summer 2023)
Amid all of this, the front that saw the least movement was the southeastern corner of the front, around Donetsk. This was somewhat peculiar. Donetsk is the urban heart of the Donbas – a vast and populous industrial city at the center of a sprawling conurbation, once home to some 2 million people. Even if Russia succeeds in capturing the city of Zaporizhia, Donetsk will be by far the most populous of Ukraine’s former cities to come under Moscow’s control.
In 2014, with the outbreak of the proto-Donbas war, Donetsk was the locus of much of the fighting, with the airport on the city’s northern approach the scene of particularly intense combat. This made it rather strange, then, that at the start of 2024 the Ukrainian Army continued to occupy many of the same positions that they built a decade prior. As intense fighting ebbed and flowed along other sectors of front, Donetsk remained besieged by a web of powerfully held Ukrainian defenses, anchored by heavily fortified urban areas stretching from Toretsk to Ugledar. Early Russian attempts to crack this iron ring open, including an assault on Ugledar in the winter of 2023, met with failure.
The signature operational development of 2024, then, was the re-activation of the Donetsk front, after years of static combat. It is not an exaggeration to say that after years of coagulation, the Russian Army cracked this front wide open in 2024 and Ukraine’s long and strongly held network of urban strongpoints collapsed
Russian Progress on the Donetsk Axis in 2024
The year began with the AFU fighting for its fortress in Avdiivka, where it continued to block the northern approach to Donetsk. At the time, the typical argument that one heard from the Ukrainian side was that the Russian assault on Avdiivka was pyrrhic – that the Russians were capturing the city with exorbitantly costly “meat assaults” that would inevitably sap Russian combat power and exhaust their ability to continue the offensive.
With the full measure of the year behind us, we can definitively say that this is not the case. After the fall of Avdiivka, Russian momentum never seriously slackened, and in fact it was the AFU that appeared to be increasingly exhausted. The Ukrainian breakwater position at Ocheretyne (which had previously been their staging point for counterattacks around Avdiivka) was overrun in a matter of days, and by the early summer the frontline had been pushed out towards the approach to Pokrovsk.
The Russian thrust towards Pokrovsk led many to believe that this city was itself the object of Russian energies, but this was a misread of the operational design. Russia did not need to capture Pokrovsk in 2024 to render it sterile as a logistical hub. Simply by advancing towards the E50 highway, Russian forces were able to cut off Pokrovsk from Ukrainian positions to the south on the Donetsk front, and Pokvrovsk is now a frontline city subject to the full spectrum of overwatch from Russian drones and tube artillery.
By autumn, the Russian advance had put the Ukrainians in a severe salient, creating an unstable chain of positions in Selydove, Kurakhove, Ugledar, and Krasnogorivka. Russia’s advance from Ocheretyne onto the southern approach to Pokrovsk acted like an enormous scythe, isolating the entire southeastern sector of the front and allowing Russian forces to carve through it in the closing months of the year
Russian Operations in 2024, Donetsk Axis
This war has turned the word “collapse” into a devalued buzzword. We are told repeatedly that one side or the other is on the verge of collapse: sanctions will “collapse” the Russian economy, the Wagner uprising of 2023 proved that the Russian political system was “collapsing”, and of course we hear that exorbitant losses have one army or the other on the verge of total failure – which army that may be depends on who you ask.
I would argue, however, that what we saw from October 2024 onward represents a real occurrence of this oft-repeated and discarded word. The AFU suffered a genuine collapse of the southeastern front, with the forces positioned in their strongpoints too attrited and isolated to make a determined defense, Russian fires becoming too heavily concentrated in ever more compressed areas to endure, and no mechanized reserve in the theater available to counterattack or relieve the incessant Russian pressure.
Ukraine does maintain enough drones and concentrated fires to limit a full Russian exploitation – that is, Russia is still not able to maneuver at depth. This gave the Russian advance a particular stop-start quality, leapfrogging from one settlement and fortress to the other. More generally, Russia’s preference to use dispersed small-unit assaults limits the potential for exploitation. We have to emphasize, however, that Russian momentum on this axis has never seriously slackened since October, and many of the key Ukrainian positions were overrun or abandoned very quickly
Ugledar is a good example: the Russians began their final push toward the town on September 24. By September 29, the 72nd Mechanized Brigade began evacuating. By October 1, Ugledar was fully under Russian control. This was a keystone Ukrainian position put in a completely untenable position and it went down in a week. One could argue, of course, that Ugledar held out for years (how then can we say with a straight face that it was captured in a week), but this is precisely the point. In early 2023 Ugledar (with the help of artillery stationed around Kurakhove) successfully repelled a multi-brigade Russian attack in months of heavy fighting. By October 2024, the position was completely untenable and was abandoned almost immediately when attacked.
The Ukrainians did no better trying to hold Kurakhove – previously a critical rear area that served as both a logistical hub and a base of fire for supporting (former) frontline strongpoints like Ugledar and Krasnogorivka. Kurakhove, now under full Russian control, will in turn serve as a base of support for the ongoing Russian push to the west towards Andriivka.
Taking the state of the front holistically, the AFU is currently holding two severe salients at the southernmost end of the line – one around Velyka Novosilka, and another around Andriivka. The former is likely to fall first, as the town has been fully isolated by Russian advances on the flanks. This is not a Bakhmut-like situation, where roads are described as “cut” because they are under Russian fire – in this case, all of the highways into Velyka Novosilka are cut by physical Russian blocking positions, making the loss of the position only a matter of waiting for the Russians to assault it. Further north, a more gentle and less strongly held salient exists between Grodivka and Toretsk. With Toretsk now in the final stages of capture (Ukrainian forces now hold only a small residential neighborhood on the city’s outskirts), the front should level here as well in the coming months.
This leaves the Russians more or less in full control of the approaches to Kostyantinivka and Pokrovsk, which are in many ways the penultimate Ukrainian held positions in Donetsk. Pokrovsk has already been bypassed several miles to the west, and the map portends a re-run of the typical Russian tactical methodology for assaulting urban areas – a methodical advance along the wings of the city to isolate it from arterial highways, followed by an attack on the city itself via several axes
The coming months promise continued Russian advances across this front, in a continuation of what can only be regarded as the collapse of a critical front on the part of the AFU. The Russian Army is advancing to the western border of Donetsk oblast and will ferret the Ukrainians out of their remaining strongpoints at Velyka Novosilka and Andriivka, while pushing into the belly of Pokrovsk. At no point since the fall of Avdiivka have the Ukrainians demonstrated the ability to seriously stymie Russian momentum along this 75 mile front, and the ongoing dissipation of Ukrainian combat resources indicates that little will change in this regard in 2025.
Toehold: The Incredible Shrinking Kursk Salient
Throughout the autumn of 2024 and these early months of winter, as Ukrainian forces were dug out of their dense web of fortified positions in the southern Donbas, their comrades continued to stubbornly hold on to their position in Russia’s Kursk Oblast. The basic shape of Ukraine’s offensive into Kursk is by now well known – billed by Kiev as a gambit to change the psychological trajectory of the war and strike a prestige blow to Russia, the Ukrainian attack had early momentum after achieving initial strategic surprise, but quickly faltered after Ukrainian columns ran into effective Russian blocking positions on the highways out of Sudzha. Efforts to force the roads through Korenovo and Bolshoe Soldatskoe were defeated, and the Ukrainian grouping was left holding on to a modest salient around Sudzha, jutting out into Russia.
Throughout the autumn, Russian counterattacks have focused on chiseling away at the base of the Ukrainian salient – forcing the Ukrainians out of Snagost and pushing them away from Korenovo. The progress here has been incremental, but significant, and by the start of January the “neck” of the Ukrainian salient had been compressed down to a little over nine miles wide, after their initial penetration in the summer had forced a breach of over twenty miles. All told, Ukraine has lost about 50% of the territory that they grabbed in August.
The Russian pressure on the flanks of the salient have amplified many of the qualities that make this position wasteful and dangerous for the AFU. There is limited road connectivity for Ukrainian forces – a problem amplified by the rollback from Snagost, which cost them access to the highway running from Korenovo to Sumy. Apart from a few circuitous side roads, Ukrainian forces only have a single highway – the R200 route – to run material and reinforcements into the pocket, which allows Russian forces to surveil their lines of communication and conduct effective interdiction strikes. The compression of the pocket also greatly narrows the targeting area for Russian drones, tube artillery, and rocketry, and creates more condensed and saturating bombardment
Despite the fact that this position has been profoundly unproductive for Ukraine – being steadily rolled back and having no synergy with other, more critical theaters – the same grouping of Ukrainian units remain here, fighting in a steadily more compressed space. Even more baffling, the Ukrainian grouping consists largely of premiere assets – Mechanized and Air Assault brigades – that could have contributed meaningfully as a reserve in the Donbas over the last three months.
The tactical particulars of the Ukrainian attack are interesting, and there’s ongoing speculation as to its purpose – perhaps it was intended to cover a rotation or withdrawal, to improve tactical positions on the northern edge of the salient, or for inscrutable propaganda purposes. However, these specifics are rather unimportant: attacking out the end of the salient (that is, trying to deepen the penetration into Russia) does nothing to reverse Ukraine’s problems in Kursk. These problems are first, on the tactical level, that the salient has been greatly compressed on the flanks and continues to narrow, and on the strategic level the willful expenditure of valuable mechanized assets on a front that does not impact the critical theaters of the war. More simply, Kursk is a sideshow, and it is a sideshow that has gone wrong even within its own operational logic.
One thing that has been of endless interest, of course, have been the continued rumors of North Korean troops fighting in Kursk. Western intelligence agencies have been adamant about the presence of North Koreans in Kursk. Some people are predisposed to instinctively disbelieve everything that western officialdom says – while I think some skepticism is warranted, I do not automatically assume that they are lying. One recent report lays out what would seem to be a plausible version of this story: that the idea actually originated in Pyongyang, not Moscow, and that a modest number of Korean troops (perhaps 10,000) are embedded with Russian units. The presumption here is that the Koreans hatched the idea as a way to gain combat experience, with the Russians in turn getting auxiliary forces, though of questionable combat effectiveness.
However, it is worth noting that this is not nearly as important as it has been made out to be. Much has been made of the idea that the North Korean presence proves some sort of Russian state of desperation, but this is fairly silly on its face – with more than 1.5 million active personnel in the Russian military, 10,000 Korean troops in Kursk represents a paltry appendage. More importantly, there has been an attempt to portray the North Korean contingent as a major departure point in the war. In particular, the formulation “North Korean troops in Europe” has been used to conjure cold war imagery of communist despotism clawing at the free world
The point, however, is that North Korean troops are presumed specifically to be in Kursk, which is in Russia. This is linked, of course, to the recently concluded mutual defense agreement signed between Moscow and Pyongyang. By attacking into Kursk – widening the front into prewar Russian territory – Ukraine created a defensive combat task for Russia which triggers the possibility of military assistance from North Korea. However much one may wish to link the Korean contingent to Russia’s dreaded “war of aggression”, the force in Kursk is very objectively engaged in the defense of Russian territory, and that makes it possible for Russia to use auxiliary forces – including conscripts and the troops of its allies – to fight there.
Ultimately, then, the presence of North Koreans in Kursk is interesting, but perhaps not very important after all. These troops are not in Ukraine (even under the most maximal definition of the Ukrainian territorial unit), they are not carrying the primary combat load, and they are unequivocally not the problem that the AFU is facing in Kursk. The “big problem” for Ukraine, very simply, is not the presence of some amorphous Korean horde dedicated to spreading Glorious Juche to Europe – it is the loitering of large grouping of their own precious mechanized brigades in a compressed salient, far far away from the Donbas, where they are greatly needed.
Scraping the Barrel: AFU Force Generation
I think it is well understood, of course, that Ukraine faces severe manpower constraints relative to Russia, both in terms of the raw totals of male biomass available – with roughly 35 million fighting aged males in Russia against perhaps 9 million in prewar Ukraine – but also in terms of its capacity to mobilize them.
Ukraine’s mobilization scheme is hampered by both widespread draft evasion (with willingness to serve decreasing as the war has stretched on) and a stubborn unwillingness to draft younger men, aged 18-25. Ukraine is structurally burdened with a deeply imbalanced population structure: there are roughly 60% more Ukrainian men in their 30’s than in their 20’s. Given the relative scarcity of young men, particularly in their early 20’s, the Ukrainian government rightly views this 18-25 year old cohort as a premium demographic cohort that it is loathe to burn away in combat. Given the ubiquity of draft evasion, the refusal to mobilize younger males, and the corruption and inefficiency characteristic of the Ukrainian government, it should come as no surprise when Ukrainian mobilization falters
All of that is to say: Ukraine faces a severe structural disadvantage in military manpower in the aggregate, which is exacerbated by the idiosyncrasies of the Ukrainian mobilization law, ameliorated slightly by the relatively low troop densities and the preponderant power of strike systems in this war.
The argument that I want to make here, however, is that Ukraine’s systemic problems matching Russian manpower have been exacerbated by several developments which specifically became prominent in 2024. In other words, 2024 can and should be marked as the year where Ukrainian manpower constraints became markedly and perhaps irretrievably worse due to specific decisions made in Kiev, and particular developments on the ground.
These are as follows:
The decision to expand the AFU’s force structure through the creation of the “15 series” brigades
The decision to deliberately widen the front and create additional demands for manpower by launching the incursion into Kursk
The stall out of Ukraine’s new mobilization program in the autumn
Accelerating problems with desertion in the AFU
We’ll run through these in order.
An army that is intaking new personnel has to decide between two possible allocations for them. New personnel can be used as replacements to replenish existing frontline units, or they can be used to expand the force structure by creating new units. That much seems fairly obvious, and ideally mobilization will exceed losses and make it possible to do both. Where armies face hard manpower constraints, however – that is, where losses are equal to or greater than intake of men, the decision to expand the force structure can have monumental consequences. The stereotypical example, of course, would be the late-war Wehrmacht, which created premiere new assets in the form of Waffen SS divisions, which received privileged access to recruits and equipment while regular army divisions in the line suffered from a trickle of replacements which could not keep up with losses.
Ukraine, with its garbled force structure, has created a mess through its own attempts to expand its force structure in the face of dwindling strength on the line. Late in 2023, the AFU announced intentions to form an entirely new grouping of brigades – the so-called “15 series”, given their designations as the 150th, 151st, 152nd, 153rd, and 154th Mechanized Brigades. This was followed in 2024 with the appending of the 155th Mechanized Brigade, which was to be trained and equipped in France.
Forming a new grouping of mechanized brigades is essential to the way that Ukraine is presenting its war. Because Ukraine still aims (at least on paper) to recapture all of its Russian held territory, there must always be the illusory possibility of a future offensive, and in order for that illusory possibility to remain, Ukraine must present itself as actively preparing for future offensive operations. Ukraine’s presentation of its own strategic animus – the idea that it is holding the front while it prepares to go back on the offensive – essentially locks it into a program of expanding its force structure
The problem for Ukraine is that the immense pressure on the front makes it essentially impossible for them to properly husband resources the way they would like. Properly training and equipping half a dozen fresh mechanized brigades and holding them in reserve would be very helpful, but they cannot really do this in light of the demands for personnel at the front. These brigades instead become “paper formations” that have a bureaucratic existence, while their organic assets are pulled apart and sucked into the front – stripped down into battalion or company sized elements that can be plugged into sectors of need on the frontline. At the moment, none of the 15 series brigades have seen action as organic units – that is, fighting as themselves.
The decision to allocate personnel to new mechanized brigades (though given stocks of armored vehicles it is questionable whether those designations mean anything) does not necessarily change Ukraine’s manpower balance in the aggregate, but it is certainly an inefficient way to use personnel. To return again to the 155th brigade, one problem noted by Ukrainian analysts was the fact that much of the brigade was formed whole cloth from forcibly mobilized personnel, without a proper cadre of veterans and experienced NCOs – some 75% of the brigade, it turns out, had been mobilized less than two months before arriving in France for training. This fact was certainly instrumental in the mass desertions and the brigade’s poor combat effectiveness.
Given Ukraine’s constraints, the best course of action would undoubtedly be to allocate new personnel and equipment as replacements to build out the depleted veteran brigades on the front lines, plugging in replacements around existing veterans and officers. Kiev, however, prizes the prestige that comes from force expansion and the “shiny new toy” factor of new formations equipped with scarce and valuable equipment like Leopard tanks. These new brigades, though billed as premiere assets, clearly have lower combat effectiveness than existing formations, given their lack of experience, shortage of veteran officers, and low unit cohesion.
In short, Ukraine’s decision to embark on force expansion in the face of significant manpower shortages has exacerbated the problem – both starving veteran units of replacements and concentrating newly mobilized personnel into combat ineffective formations that lack a veteran core, experienced officers, and vital equipment. They have tried, belatedly, to square this circle by parceling out new formations to backstop line brigades, but this is less than ideal – it leads to a patchwork order of battle with lower unit cohesion and a fragmented defense.
Unfortunately, this comes precisely as Ukraine has created additional self-imposed strains on its resources, in particular through its incursion into Kursk. At the moment, elements of at least seven mechanized brigades, two marine infantry brigades, and three air assault brigades are stationed on the Kursk axis. Without going too far into the weeds rehashing Ukraine’s operation here, it’s important to remember that Ukraine – facing extreme pressures on its force generation – voluntarily chose to widen the front into a secondary theater, diverting scarce assets and reducing its own ability to economize forces.
In summary, Ukraine has made deliberate decisions to widen the front and expand its force structure, both of which have been decidedly detrimental to its efforts to economize personnel. This comes precisely as a 2024 effort to ramp up mobilization has come off the rails.
A deadly feedback loop is now at work, with the lack of rotations and the shortage of replacements synergizing to accelerate the burn of Ukrainian personnel. The AFU is unable to regularly rotate units out of combat, and the inadequate flow of replacements causes frontline infantry complements to wear thin. Unable to rotate or reinforce, line brigades resort to cannibalization – scraping support personnel like mortar teams, drivers, and drone operators to fill out frontline positions. This further accelerates losses as brigades fight with thinned out support and fires elements, and makes Ukrainian men more unwilling to enlist – because there is now no guarantee that becoming a drone operator, for example, will save one from being sent to a frontline trench eventually.
Where does this leave us? Ukraine continues to dispose of a very large force, with more than a hundred brigades and hundreds of thousands of men under arms. This force, however, is both substantially outnumbered by the Russian army and in a clear trend of decay. Despite a highly touted attempt to reinvigorate the mobilization apparatus in 2024, the intake of new personnel is clearly too low to offset losses, and the heavy lifting formations in critical sectors of front have seen their strength – particularly in the infantry complements – decline, in some cases to critical levels.
The failure of Ukraine’s 2024 mobilization program has coincided with several strategic choices which have exacerbated manpower concerns – specifically the decision to embark on a program of force expansion even as the AFU voluntarily extended its commitments by opening a new secondary front in Kursk. In other words, Ukraine’s mobilization falls short of its force requirements, and the AFU has also made choices that sabotaged its ability to economize. Units are ground up, replacements come in a paltry trickle, rotations are late or absent, units cannibalize themselves, and angry and weary men desert.
It’s not at all clear that this will lead to a “breaking point”, in the sense that people are anticipating. Ukrainian strike capabilities and the Russian preference for dispersed, leapfrogging assaults limit the potential for grand breakthroughs and exploitation. However, what we saw over the past three months on the southern Donetsk axis offers a preview of what awaits: an exhausted force being steadily rolled back, dug out of its strongpoints, and mauled – covering its retreat with drones but losing position after position. The line holds, until it doesn’t.
End of the Line: ATACMs, JASSMs, and Hazelnuts
Ukraine’s ability to remain in the field depends on a titration of two indispensable resources: first, Ukrainian male biomass, and secondly the critical western weaponry that gives them combat effectiveness. We have evaluated the first: Ukraine is not exactly out of men, but the trends of its mobilization program are poor and personnel shortages are mounting. The trends regarding the second are, if anything, even more foreboding for Kiev.
There are two general dynamics that have emerged, neither of which create an optimistic picture for Ukraine, which we’ll examine in turn. These are as follows:
The delivery of heavy weaponry to Ukraine (tanks, IFVs, and artillery tubes) has largely dried up in recent months.
The west has essentially run out of escalatory weaponry (strike systems) to give, and those systems already given have failed to meaningfully altar the trajectory of the war.
In 2023, building out new mechanized units was the name of the game, with the Pentagon leading a multinational effort to stand up an entire army corps worth of units equipped with Leopards, Challengers, and a whole slew of western IFVs and APCs. When that lovingly assembled grouping bashed its head on a rock in the botched assault on the Zaporizhia line, the United States belatedly and begrudgingly dispatched its own Abrams to backstop the Ukrainian tank force. In 2024, however, deliveries of heavy weapons slowed to a trickle.
The role of the tank in Ukraine has been greatly misunderstood. The vulnerability of tanks to the myriad strike systems of the modern battlefield led some observers to declare that the tank as a weapons system was now obsolete, but this did not really square with the fact that both combatants in this war were eager to deploy as many as possible. Tanks need more critical enablers – more combat engineering, air defense, and electronic warfare support – but they continue to fill an indispensable role and remain an essential item in this war. The failure of Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive showed, if anything, that tanks simply are not “game changing” systems, but mass consumption items – but this has always been the case. The signature quality of iconic tanks like the Sherman and the T34 was that they were numerous
While 2023 was all about building out Ukraine’s mechanized package with tanks, IFVs, and engineering, 2024 has been largely about enhancing Ukraine’s strike capabilities. There have been two separate elements at play – first, the delivery of both air and ground launched systems (most notably the British Storm Shadows and American ATACMs respectively), and secondly the loosening of the rules of engagement to allow Ukraine to strike targets inside pre-war Russia.
This dovetailed, as it turned out, with Ukraine’s operation in Kursk, and in many ways the most direct impact of the Kursk incursion has been to force the west’s hand on the rules of engagement. While Ukraine has long been striking inside Russia with indigenous systems, most notably drones, the White House continued to drag its feet on formal approval for strikes with American systems. By launching a ground assault on Kursk, Ukraine made the decision for them: the United States gave clearance to use ATACMs to support the ground forces in Kursk, and this metastasized into general license to strike Russia with the full range of available systems. This was a poignant reminder that, however we conceive of the proxy-sponsor relationship, Ukraine has some ability to force America’s hand: a classic example of the tail wagging the dog.
In any case, 2024 saw Ukraine and its western backers slowly but surely bash through all the supposed red-lines in this domain: the British breached first with the delivery of Storm Shadows late in 2023, and this was followed by the delivery of ATACMs (with a handful of F16’s to boot), and finally the loosening of the rules of engagement to clear strikes on Russia.
Where does this leave us? There would seem to be three important things to consider.
The west has essentially reached the end of its escalation chain. The only remaining step that they can take would be to supply Ukraine with JASSMs (Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile), which would mark a quantitative but not a meaningful qualitative upgrade to Ukraine’s strike capabilities.
Ukraine’s use of western-supplied strike assets has been dissipated and has not materially improved their situation on the ground.
Russia maintains a dominant strike advantage, both qualitative and quantitative.
Ukraine faces a stark disadvantage in strike capability relative to Russia, in a variety of ways. Russian strike assets are far more numerous and have significant range advantages, but it is also important to take into consideration both Russia’s significantly greater strategic depth and its more dense and relatively unscathed air defense. Unlike Ukraine, which has seen its air defense stretch to the limit with destroyed launchers and a mounting interceptor shortage, Russia’s air defenses have been essentially untouched, as Ukraine has lacked the large numbers of assets required to conduct a proper SEAD/DEAD (Suppression/Destruction of Enemy Air Defense) campaign.
Given this basic calculus, using western strike systems to wage a blow for blow strategic air campaign is bad math for Ukraine. It is generally unwise to engage in a bat fight when your opponent is a bigger man with a much longer bat. Instead, Ukraine’s strike systems should have been leveraged to support ground operations – concentrating strikes spatially and in time to synergize with efforts on the ground. Just as a simple thought experiment, it is not difficult to imagine ATACMs making a difference if they had been available in 2023 and used to saturate Russian rear areas during the assault on the Zaporizhia line – striking in tempo with the mechanized assault to disrupt Russian command and control and prevent reinforcement of critical areas.
Two things need to be noted about the JASSM. First, the JASSM – while offering slightly longer ranges – would essentially serve as a backstop/replacement for the rapidly dwindling ATACMs and particularly the air launched Storm Shadows – instead of Ukraine’s native SU-24s launching Storm Shadows, they would utilize F-16s launching JASSMs. This would not represent a dramatic upgrade in Ukrainian capabilities, but would instead simply serve to maintain a bare minimum Ukrainian strike capability. JASSMs are a replacement for dwindling capabilities, not an augmentation to them.
Secondly, it must be understood that JASSMs are the last stop. We’re now entering the territory, not of artificially constructed red lines, but physical and real limits. Russia has essentially eaten the gifted stocks of ATACMs and Storm Shadows, with little discernable effect on their ability to fight, and JASSMs are the last extant item in the inventories to keep Ukrainian strike capabilities operative. We are at the last rung of the aid ladder.
In the case of JASSMs, however, there are notable downsides for the United States. This is an important case of putting all of one’s eggs in the same technological basket. In 2020, the United States scrapped the development of its conventionally armed Long Range Standoff Missile, making the JASSM – particularly the new extended range variants – the system for the United States, earmarked to play a critical role in future conflicts, particularly in the Pacific. This makes the JASSM an extremely sensitive system, as a centerpiece of American strike capabilities, particularly with the modernization of the Tomahawk system crawling along at a few dozen units per year.
Given the fact that JASSMs are GPS guided, there are real reasons to be reticent about giving Ukraine such a technologically sensitive system. Russian electronic warfare has enjoyed considerable success jamming GPS and disrupting similarly guided American systems. Allowing the Russians to gain familiarity with a keystone American system could wreak havoc on Pentagon war planning – most, if not all of the strike eggs are in this basket, so why let an adversary peek inside?
It’s probable, given what we have seen to this point, that these concerns will ultimately be dismissed and Ukraine will receive a line of JASSMs which will backstop their strike capabilities – but given the size of Ukraine’s F-16 fleet, the scale will be constrained. Furthermore, air launched systems are less optimal for Ukraine, given their dependence on large and easily targeted airfields, in contrast to ground launched systems which are mobile and more easily concealed.
There is also the matter of the new Russian missile system – the now famous Oreshnik, or Hazel Tree. Russia tested the Oreshnik system on a large machining plant in Dnipro on November 21, 2024, which allowed the basic capabilities of the system to be gauged. The Oreshnik is an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile, characterized by its hypersonic capabilities (exceeding Mach-10) and its Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle equipped with six separate warheads, with the potential for submunitions in each. Although the attack on Dnipro was essentially a demonstration which used inert training warheads (that is, without explosive payloads), the missile can be configured with nuclear or conventional warheads
As in the case of the North Korean troops in Kursk, I rather think that the Oreshnik launch was not nearly as important as it was made out to be. The system is expensive and likely impractical for conventional use. I understand the desire to conceive of Oreshnik as a massively powerful conventional weapon – showering its target with half a dozen warheads with the power of an entire flight of Kalibr missiles – but there are several problems with this. The accuracy of the system (the CEP, or “Circular Error Probable” in the technical parlance) is much more consistent with a nuclear delivery system than a conventional one. Furthermore, the problem with using an IRBM for conventional strikes is the danger of miscalculation – foreign adversaries may misinterpret the launch as a nuclear attack and respond appropriately. This is precisely why the Russian government actually alerted the United States to the launch ahead of time – a fine arrangement for a demonstration, but impractical for a weapon that is intended to be used regularly.
We may see another use of the Oreshnik against Ukraine, but ultimately this is unlikely to be a system of consequence in this war. The demonstration in Dnipro was instead likely intended to send a message to Europe – reminding NATO that Russia has the capacity to deliver strikes against European targets that cannot be intercepted. It also serves as a poignant reminder that Europe lacks the equivalent capability, and in essence provides a demonstration of Russia’s ability to launch missiles from far beyond the range of either Ukrainian or European response. The Hazelnut is a tangible reminder of Russia’s strategic depth and strike dominance in Ukraine.
Ultimately, Ukraine will lose the strike game. It’s strike capacity has dwindled, with missiles frittered away in a dissipated air campaign, and though the exhaustion of Storm Shadow and ATACMs stocks can be offset somewhat by JASSMs, Ukraine simply lacks the range or quantities necessary to match Russian capabilities. Needing to do more with less, Ukraine instead diffused its assets and failed to synergize its strikes with ground operations. We are now at the end of the line – after JASSMs, there’s nothing left in western warehouses to upgrade Ukrainian capabilities. Hazelnuts or no, the math on this bat fight is bad for Kiev.
Conclusion: Debellation
Trapped in an endless news cycle, with daily footage of FPV strikes and exploding vehicles, and a dutiful cottage industry of war mappers alerting us to every 100 meter advance, it can easily feel like the Russo-Ukrainian War is trapped in an interminable doom loop which will never end – Mad Max meets Groundhog Day.
What I have endeavored to do here, however, is argue that 2024 actually saw several very important developments which make the coming shape of the war relatively clear. To briefly recapitulate:
Russian forces caved in Ukrainian defenses at depth across an entire critical axis of front. After remaining static for years, Ukraine’s position in Southern Donetsk has been obliterated, with Russian forces advancing through an entire belt of fortified positions, pushing the front into Pokrovsk and Kostayantinivka.
The main Ukrainian gambit on the ground (the incursion into Kursk) failed spectacularly, with the salient being progressively caved in. An entire grouping of critical mechanized formations wasted much of the year fighting on this unproductive and secondary front, leaving Ukrainian positions in the Donbas increasingly threadbare and bereft of reserves.
An attempt by the Ukrainian government to reinvigorate its mobilization program failed, with enlistments quickly trailing off. Decisions to expand the force structure exacerbated the shortage of manpower, and as a result the decay of Ukraine’s frontline brigades has accelerated.
Long awaited western upgrades to Ukraine’s strike capabilities failed to defeat Russian momentum, and stocks of ATACMs and Storm Shadows are nearly exhausted. There are now few options remaining to prop up Ukrainian strike capacity, and no prospect of Ukraine gaining dominance in this dimension of the war.
In short, Ukraine is on the path to debellation – defeat through the total exhaustion of its capacity to resist. They are not exactly out of men and vehicles and missiles, but these lines are all pointing downward. A strategic Ukrainian defeat – once unthinkable to the western foreign policy apparatus and commentariat – is now on the table. Quite interestingly, now that Donald Trump is about to return to the White House, it is suddenly acceptable to speak of Ukrainian defeat. Robert Kagan – a stalwart champion of Ukraine if there ever was one – now says the quiet part out loud:
Ukraine will likely lose the war within the next 12 to 18 months. Ukraine will not lose in a nice, negotiated way, with vital territories sacrificed but an independent Ukraine kept alive, sovereign, and protected by Western security guarantees. It faces instead a complete defeat, a loss of sovereignty, and full Russian control
Indeed.
None of this should be particularly surprising. If anything, it is shocking that my position – that Russia is essentially a very powerful country that was very unlikely to lose a war (which it perceives as existential) right in its own belly – somehow became controversial or fringe. But here we are.
chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia