Analista senior di l'intelligenza in u campu di a gestione di i risichi di sicurezza, sò un anzianu tenente detective è ufficiale di l'intelligenza in l'agenzie di u Statu francese. A bona pronuncia hè Николай Чинкуини, in russu
est un militant nazi connu du renseignement, de la police et de la justice
Exemples d’expression politique de Karel Cherel sur les réseaux sociaux en 2020
Selon des sources sûres, il a accompli un premier séjour belliqueux en Ukraine, avant le déclenchement de l’opération militaire spéciale russe : quelques mois en 2018, dans les rangs du régiment nazi Azov. Pour s’y engager, il passa à Lyon par Bastion social, groupe politique que le ministère de l’Intérieur dissolut en avril 2019, puis Gaston Besson, qui faisait office de sergent recruteur en territoire suisse.
Le 24 juin 2022, LCI le présente comme un défenseur de l’Europe, amoureux de l’Ukraine et opposant farouche à la Russie. Il est masqué et seul son prénom est dévoilé
(Capture d’écran)
Le Breton est alors dans les rangs du 1er bataillon de Légion internationale. Sur Telegram, une chaîne française publie le 25 juillet un nouvel entretien. Il s’identifie et quant à sa contribution à la défense de l’Europe, cite Léon Degrelle (1906-1994), leader rexiste [extrême droite catholique] dans les années 30 en Belgique, puis Standartenführer [colonel SS] et commandant de la 28.SS-Freiwilligen-Panzergrenadier-Division, Wallonien [1941-1945]
(Capture d’écran)
Il est devenu spécialiste antichar, a été formé sur le lanceur de missile de fabrication britannique NLAW
(Réseaux sociaux)
Je suppose que la conotation idéologique de son interview a déplu à la hiérarchie de la Légion internationale, car il est ensuite affecté au bataillon Sich, branche militaire du parti nazi Svoboda
J’ai flouté le visage de la future épouse (réseaux sociaux)
Il convole en Ukraine en août 2022. Notez à gauche, sur son épaule droite, les deux grenades croisées, insigne de la Sturmbrigade Dirlewanger (1940-1945), formation disciplinaire des Waffen-SS dont les atrocités ont été tellement abominables, que même les autres SS étaient horrifiés
L’Oberführer SS Oskar Dirlewanger (1895-1945) en 1944 (Bundesarchiv)
Le 5 janvier 2024, la journaliste Cécile Deffontaines publie pour L’Obs le premier article de grand média français qui aborde la question du nazisme parmi les combattants français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine. Cherel y a gagné sa place de haute lutte, y est désigné par un pseudonyme : Chris.
Telle vérole sur le bas clergé, il est interrogé par l’abbé Matthieu Raffray, dans une vidéo publiée le 22 décembre 2024 sur la chaîne YouTube Pour une Foi. Le synopsis dit
Karel, vétéran ukrainien engagé suite à l’appel de Volodymyr Zelensky, nous livre un témoignage poignant sur son parcours, ses combats et son dévouement à son pays. À travers son histoire, il explore les sacrifices, les espoirs et la résilience qui façonnent ceux qui répondent à l’appel de la liberté
L’entretien exhale le parfum musqué des ratlines, filières clandestines de l’église catholique, qui à la fin de la 2de guerre mondiale, évacuèrent quantité de nazis vers l’Amérique latine
Le rat musqué, une créature de Dieu (Grigorii Pisotckii)
Car nous connaissons déjà la foi profonde du militant nazi breton Karel Cherel, les services de renseignement, la police et la justice, aussi
L’abbé Matthieu Raffray le 4 décembre 2023 (magazine pétainiste Livre Noir)
Pour sa part, l’abbé breton radicalisé est royaliste, canal Bourbon, coauteur du slogan bagarre, bagarre, prière, organise des stages pour former des catholiques virils, qu’il appelle à une croisade… spirituelle. Joyeux Noël
La virilité givrée, un Noël 1942 à Stalingrad (mon humble évocation, la photo originale date du début 1943)
Début 2025, l’ancien combattant renforce son identité catholique et bretonne. Le 8 mars, sur un compte de réseaux sociaux où son nom est décliné en Ukrainien –Карель Ширель– il rend hommage à l’ancien curé de Skrigneg -l’abbé Jean-Marie Perrot (1877-1943)- militant nationaliste breton et informateur du Sicherheitsdienst [renseignement SS], qu’il cite
Défiez-vous de la peste du laïcisme qui a tué la France et a déjà empoisonné une partie de la Bretagne. Si Padrig Pearse a pu sauver l’Irlande c’est que c’était un Celte et un chrétien convaincu. Que la jeunesse bretonne marche sur ses pas. Les autres voies ne peuvent mener qu’à la perdition
Une biographie en 2004
Le 12 décembre 1943, le résistant communiste Jean Thépaut dénazifia le saint homme.
Cherel figure en bonne place, parmi leurs représentants en Ukraine, dans un recueil d’oraisons et témoignages de mercenaires français droitardés depuis les années 1960, que les Éditions du Paillon publient le 19 juin
Il continue d’enrichir sa culture, partage le 15 juillet 2025 une vidéo dont le son est de la pop patriotique ukrainienne et l’image fixe, la couverture d’une traduction en 2021, par les éditions suprémacistes états-uniennes Antelope Hill [AH, une coïncidence], des mémoires de Léon Degrelle (1906-1994)
(Réseaux sociaux)
Son sevrage échoue en août. Il craque et regagne l’Ukraine, où il intègre le bataillon Revansh, branche militaire de l’organisation nazie Tradytsiya ta poryadok [Tradition et ordre], dans le groupe qu’ont constitué le Parisien César Aujard, le Lyonnais Gwendal Delange et d’autres nazis français
(Europa Diffusion)
La vie militaire ne l’empêche pas de continuer d’approfondir sa culture. Il attaque une édition récente des mémoires de Jacques Masselin, dit Auvray, ancien milicien de Joseph Darnand, puis SS dans la division Charlemagne. 81 ans, presque jour pour jour, après que l’auteur ait gagné la Pologne, pour s’y faire culbuter par l’Armée rouge, Cherel retrouve en Ukraine une situation militaire à peu près semblable
Le 12 mars 2026, Mediapart révèle comme Quentin Deranque, érigé en martyr par la droite française après sa mort le 14 février, avait exprimé sur X son racisme, son antisémitisme, son fascisme et sa nostalgie du nazisme
Lors d’une soirée le 27 janvier 2022, Cherel buvait des pintes en compagnie de la fille Cordier.
C’est en Français que ses camarades sud-américains annoncent sa mort le 13 novembre 2026. Selon toute vraisemblance, ce fut la veille, dans la région de Zaporojie, qu’il partagea le sort de l’Ukrainien Mykola Zavhorodnii, son chef de peloton dans le bataillon Revansh
chronique alphabétique et nécrologique de l’engagement français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas
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The U.S./Israeli-led war against Iran is illegal, unconstitutional, immoral, and dangerously escalatory. Protestations to the contrary, Iran posed no imminent threat to U.S. national security. The Trump administration’s policy (announced by Pete Hegseth) of “war without mercy” is both unjust and un-American. In America’s proud ideal of the citizen-soldier, this is not who we are. This war is not America first. This is not what we do.
Put bluntly, this war is not in the national interest of patriotic Americans.
We the undersigned of the Eisenhower Media Network (EMN) oppose this murderous war of aggression and hereby call for an immediate ceasefire followed by negotiation and war reparations to be paid for by the aggressors. This war is wrong and it must end.
A War the United States Should Not Wage
President Donald Trump promised the American people he would end wars, not start them. Yet within months of returning to office, his administration launched military strikes against Iran, igniting a conflict that is quickly spiraling into a regional catastrophe.
The United States is once again marching to an ill-conceived war in the Middle East without clear objectives or a clearly defined, realistic path to victory. Unlike previous (and disastrous) wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, this time the American people were not asked to support it. History will be even less kind as it judges the immorality and illegality of this latest war of choice.
The question is not whether the United States can inflict enormous damage on Iran. Of course it can. The real question is whether America can achieve any meaningful result through this war. The answer here is simple: no. There is no reason or cause worth fighting for here.
A War Driven by Israel
Saliently, by Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s own admission, the Israeli government drove the timing and initial targets of this war. This isn’t to say that Israel alone is responsible. Since 1979, large parts of the American foreign policy establishment have been eager for war with Iran. Complicit as well is the military-industrial complex, the fossil fuel industry, and the influence of the exiled Iranian lobby.
A shared desire to enforce American hegemony, aligned with Zionist hegemonic goals of a “greater” Israel, is generating a dynamic that approaches that of Armageddon. Even more frightening is that U.S. and Israeli leaders are citing Biblical passages and alleged Judeo-Christian beliefs in support of this war. It seems we are only a few steps away from the madness of the Crusades.
A War Without Public Support or Understanding
Legitimacy is a major issue here. After two decades of costly and ultimately futile conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the American public has little appetite for another Middle Eastern war. Polling in the first few days of this war found only one in four Americans supported it.
A large-scale war against Iran would be an act of colossal military and political folly. It may require national mobilization — perhaps even conscription. That is politically impossible. The American people will not support a military draft for yet another open-ended conflict in the region.
No Capacity for Ground War
The active-duty U.S. Army today numbers fewer than 500,000 soldiers. Iran is a nation of roughly ninety million people spread across a mountainous territory roughly four times the size of California. Even if the political will existed, the United States lacks the manpower for a major invasion of Iran.
Conquering and occupying such a country would require hundreds of thousands of ground troops and reliable allies willing to fight alongside them.
Those allies do not exist.
Israel, America’s overbearing partner in this conflict, lacks the manpower to deploy large ground forces to Iran. Gulf States have neither the military capability nor the political willingness to undertake such a war.
Already, America and Israel have lost the moral high ground in this war. They have yet more to lose if this war persists.
Air Power Alone Cannot Win
History shows air power alone has never been enough to win a major war.
During the Korean War, General Douglas MacArthur attempted to halt North Korean advances through naval and air power. It failed. Only ground forces ultimately stabilized the front.
In Vietnam, the United States dropped more bombs than were used against Germany and Japan combined during World War II. Yet overwhelming air power could not secure victory.
Technology has improved dramatically since those wars, but the basic nature of war has not changed. Despite decades of talk about a “Revolution in Military Affairs,” wars are still decided by control of territory and the political will of populations.
Bombs alone cannot impose lasting political outcomes. Bombs alone do not spread democracy. However, bombs alone do spread destruction; the conflict began primarily as a destructive and often imprecise air campaign that has resulted in the deaths of hundreds of innocents, which has stiffened the spine of Iranian resistance.
Strategic Exhaustion
America has been engaged in nearly continuous conflict since September 11, 2001. The war in Ukraine, the ongoing U.S.–Israeli destruction of Gaza, and extensive military commitments across the globe have strained American resources.
The U.S. is entering another conflict without being prepared for a long one. Weapons stockpiles are being depleted faster than they can be replenished. Industrial production has not kept pace with demand. Rebuilding the capacity necessary for a prolonged war would take years.
Poor preparation is a recipe for calamitous defeat; meanwhile, the broader the war, the less sustainable it will prove.
Iran Is Ready for This War
Iran, by contrast, has spent decades preparing for precisely this scenario.
Iranian strategy is built around attrition. Rather than trying to match U.S. conventional military power, Iran has invested heavily in asymmetric capabilities — ballistic missiles, drones, cyber warfare, and networks of aligned militias throughout the region.
Instead of seeking decisive battlefield victories, Iran will attempt to impose steady costs on U.S. forces and its allies. U.S. bases across the Middle East, Israeli cities, shipping lanes, and global infrastructure are all potential targets.
Great Power Complications
In an era of great-power competition, regional wars rarely remain isolated. This conflict is happening within a broader geopolitical struggle.
China and Russia have strong incentives to prevent an American-Israeli victory in Iran. Neither wants the U.S. or Israel to dominate the Middle East unchallenged. Both possess advanced missile, radar, and electronic warfare technologies that could assist Iran with intelligence sharing, technological support, and economic backing. Such assistance could significantly complicate U.S. and Israeli operations.
While direct military intervention is unlikely, retaliation for blocking much needed energy supplies to China should be considered. Among other considerations, America remains vulnerable to Chinese restrictions on exports to the U.S. of rare earth minerals and metals. This war may soon dramatically degrade our economy.
The Pattern of American War
There is also a deeper structural problem in the way the United States fights wars.
In Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, American leaders repeatedly entered conflicts without clearly defined political objectives. Goals shifted as conditions changed. Military strategies often bore little relationship to achievable political outcomes.
The result was a recurring pattern: enormous expenditures of blood and treasure without success of any measurable kind. Exploding national deficits were among the chief results of exploding U.S. bombs. That, and millions of dead around the world, as planeloads of caskets draped in American flags returned to the homeland.
With its allies, Americans won World War II because we were united and because we knew what we were fighting for. Right made might, as President Abraham Lincoln once said. Our leaders today believe only that might makes right—and they couldn’t be more wrong.
The Iran War risks becoming the next chapter in that same tragic story of wrong.
Military strategy requires harmony between three elements: the political objective, the resources committed, and the methods used to achieve the goal. When those elements are misaligned, failure becomes almost inevitable.
In this war, the objective remains vague, the resources limited, and the strategy uncertain. That makes one thing certain: defeat.
The Danger of Escalation
The greatest danger now is further escalation.
Already there is discussion of deploying U.S. Special Forces inside Iran to support opposition groups. Such missions begin small but often expand rapidly, as they did in Vietnam and Afghanistan.
The moment American troops begin operating on Iranian soil, the risk of a wider and far more destructive war will increase dramatically. So too will the risk of disastrous, Bay of Pigs-like, operations involving U.S. troops and foreign proxies.
A Moment for Congress to Act
Under the Constitution, the authority to declare war belongs to Congress. That responsibility exists precisely to prevent this nation from drifting into unnecessary and illegal conflicts at the whim of a president enabled and empowered by a misbegotten warrior ethos. America has fought too many wars based on illusions of technological superiority and quick victory. Those illusions have repeatedly collided with reality. And reality always wins over illusion.
A war with Iran will almost certainly follow the same path and continued external attacks will likely strengthen Iran politically. History shows that foreign intervention often unifies societies rather than dividing them.
Congress must now decide whether to continue funding and expanding this disastrous war — $1 billion U.S. per day—or to assert its constitutional role and stop it. The longer the conflict continues, the higher the cost in lives and resources, and the greater the threat to global stability.
Unless American leaders find the spine to stop it, the United States will once again learn that starting a war is easy, but ending one is not. And that fighting a war for the wrong reasons, at the wrong time, with the wrong enemy, is not just foolish, not just indefensible, but a supreme exercise in folly that will deeply harm our country and our prospects as a people.
SIGNERS
Anthony Aguilar, former Ltc. US Army Special Operations Officer, Green Beret
William J. Astore, former Ltc. U.S. Air Force (Ret.)
Michael Baker, former Rear Admiral U.S. Navy (Ret.)
Gregory A. Daddis, former Col. U.S. Army, (Ret.) and West Point professor
Dennis Fritz, former CMD CMSgt U.S. Air Force (Ret.)
Josephine Guilbeau, former U.S. Army All-Source Intel Analyst
Matthew Hoh, former Capt., USMC, Iraq & Foreign Service Officer, Afghanistan (associate VIPS)
Karen Kwiatkowski, former Lt. Col., U.S. Air Force (ret.), at Office of Secretary of Defense watching the manufacture of lies on Iraq, 2001-2003
Dennis Laich, Director of EMN. former Maj. Gen. U.S. Army, (Ret.) & USA Reserve
Adrian R. Lewis, Professor and former U.S. Army, (Ret.)
Ray McGovern, former U.S. Army infantry/intelligence officer & C.I.A. analyst; C.I.A. Presidential briefer (ret.)
Elizabeth Murray, former Deputy National Intelligence Officer for the Near East, National Intelligence Council & C.I.A. political analyst (ret.)
John D. Rosenberger, former Col. U.S. Army, (Ret.)
Coleen Rowley, F.B.I. Special Agent and former Minneapolis Division Legal Counsel (ret.)
Christian Sorensen, Assoc. Director of EMN, former U.S. Air Force Arabic linguist
Ted Strickland, EMN Senior Political Advisor and former Ohio Governor
Brett R. Weimer, former Sgt. Maj. U.S. Army, (Ret.)
Lawrence Wilkerson, EMN Senior Advisor, former Col. U.S. Army, (Ret.)
Ann Wright, Col., U.S. Army (ret.); Foreign Service Officer (resigned in opposition to the war on Iraq)
Eisenhower Media Network is an organization of expert former military, intelligence, and civilian national security officials who have an independent, alternative story to tell
The US-funded ecosystem of Iranian ‘rights groups,’ Israeli operatives, and monarchist activists has become a revolving door of unverifiable statistics and atrocity propaganda
As deadly riots burn Iranian cities, Western media ignores the shocking wave of violence, turning instead to US government-funded NGOs for data. The one-sided portrayal has helped push Trump to the brink of authorizing renewed US attacks
Fighter with Azov Battalion insignia (source: Telegram of Oleksii “Reins” Konsul, member of the 3rd Assault Brigade)
On September 27, 2023, the Museum of the History of Kyiv was crowded. Around 200 people—including active Ukrainian military personnel, journalists, cultural figures, and politicians—came to the opening of an exhibition titled Storms of Steel, a reference to the 1920 memoir of the radical German nationalist Ernst Jünger.
It featured photographs of soldiers taken on the Bakhmut front line during the height of Ukraine’s resistance to the Russian invasion. These soldiers belong to the 3rd Assault Brigade—one of the elite units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, which was formed in the early days of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The unit traces its origins to the ultra-nationalist Azov movement and is composed of veterans of the Azov Battalion, which was established in 2014 and took part in the war in the Donbas. Between 2018 and 2024, U.S. Congress banned the organization from receiving funding, arms, training, and other forms of support due to its documented neo-Nazi affiliations and concerns regarding human rights violations.
The founder and current commander of the 3rd Assault Brigade is Andriy Biletskyi, a far-right ideologue and central figure in the Azov movement. Biletskyi is the author of the openly racist 2013 pamphlet The Word of the White Leader and the founder of several neo-Nazi organizations, including Patriot of Ukraine and the National-Social Assembly.
A key feature of the exhibit was that the soldiers reenacted historical photos, particularly of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). Founded in 1942, it fought for an independent Ukrainian state. However, it also took part in the ethnic cleansing of tens of thousands of Poles in Western Ukraine, and some of its members served in Ukrainian auxiliary police units that facilitated the Nazi Holocaust
Viewers familiar with the iconography of the Third Reich might have raised eyebrows at one particular video shown during the opening of the exhibition. It featured a close-up of the back of the head of a 3rd Assault Brigade fighter known by the call sign “Martyn.” Tattooed on his head was a symbol resembling the Wolfsangel, the divisional insignia of several Waffen-SS units, including the infamous 2nd SS “Das Reich” Panzer Division. Azov affiliates often refer to a variant of this symbol as the “Idea of the Nation,” denying any direct associations with Nazism. Yet it is noteworthy that this same symbol is used by a neo-Nazi organization in Finland
Visitors at the opening ceremony of the Storms of Steel exhibition in Kyiv look at the head of “Martyn” (source: Ukrinform)
Some of the fighters featured in the exhibition attended the opening. Among them was Aleksei Kozhemyakin, known by his call signs “Kolovrat” and “Barsik,” a platoon commander in the 3rd Assault Brigade. Kozhemyakin is a far-right Russian national. He allegedly came to Ukraine in 2015, joined the Azov Battalion and has been fighting on the Ukrainian side ever since. According to the SOVA Center, he served several years in prison for assaulting a man from Azerbaijan in Syktyvkar, Russia in 2005. He was also suspected of desecrating a Jewish cultural center in the same city.
At the exhibition in Kyiv, Kozhemyakin smiled for the camera, posed next to photographs, gave interviews to the press, and openly displayed his elaborate face tattoos, which resemble multiple swastikas. Other tattoos, hidden beneath his olive-green T-shirt, include a giant swastika and a portrait of Adolf Hitler at the center. Notably, in one of the photographs on display, Kozhemyakin participated in the reenactment of a group portrait featuring a unit of Ukrainian Nazi collaborators. The exhibition caption referred to the group simply as the “Division ‘Galicia’”
Aleksei ‘Kolovrat’ Kozhemyakin looks at a photo of himself. Exhibition opening in Kyiv, September 27, 2023 (source: Vechirnii Kyiv)
Such a caption might confuse those unfamiliar with the history of the Second World War in Ukraine. But historians know exactly what this refers to: the 14th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS (1st Galician), created by Nazi Germany in 1943 and composed of Ukrainian volunteers. Its fighters swore allegiance to Hitler and were subordinate to SS Chief Heinrich Himmler. They defended the interests of Nazi Germany—including by brutally suppressing anti-Nazi resistance movements in Slovakia and Yugoslavia. After the Division was crushed by the Red Army near Brody, it was replenished with Ukrainian men who had served in various police formations complicit in Nazi war crimes.
A Tour Across the European Union
The Storms of Steel exhibition’s status as a major cultural event in wartime Ukraine was underscored by the presence of high-level officials at its opening. They included then-acting Minister of Culture and Information Policy Rostyslav Karandeyev, who praised the exhibition, noting , “I am convinced that this project will carry an extremely important patriotic and educational mission”
Rostyslav Karandeyev during Storms of Steel opening ceremony (source: Ukrinform)
The exhibition caused a sensation. It was covered by leading Ukrainian media and became a popular venue for patriotic lessons for Ukrainian students, both in the capital and in other cities where local museums hosted it. Public discourse surrounding the exhibition was marked by a deafening silence about the fact that it glorifies Ukrainian Nazi collaborators and equates them with today’s fighters of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
It was clear that Ukrainian officials were fond of this militarized “patriotic project,” as they decided to support it at the state level. The exhibition was reproduced on large banners framed in the colors of the Ukrainian national flag and taken on tour across Europe. It is no coincidence that the exhibition was hosted by countries that are not only among the most fervent supporters of Ukraine in its resistance to Russian aggression, but also those currently reckoning with their own communist past while simultaneously struggling to confront the legacy of their collaboration with the Nazis.
One of those countries was Lithuania. On August 23, 2024, to mark Ukraine’s Independence Day, the exhibition was ceremoniously opened at Vilnius Town Hall Square, one of the most popular tourist spots in the Lithuanian capital. The ceremony featured Sandra Adomavičiūtė, head of the Atviras Lietuvos Fondas (Open Lithuania Foundation), an organization funded by philanthropist George Soros. This suggests that the progressive group in question likely did not devote sufficient time to thoroughly examine the content of the exhibition they chose to promote. This also reflects a broader pattern of uncritical engagement by some Western actors with Ukraine’s current humanitarian and cultural policies, which are increasingly shaped by an ethnonationalist agenda and promoting controversial historical figures.
Adding official weight to the event was the presence of Viktor Hamotskyi, Ukraine’s chargé d’affaires in Lithuania. Commenting on the exhibition, he stated: “Each face in these photographs tells its own story—the story of the unbroken, who stand shoulder to shoulder with those who defended Ukraine a century ago.” The exhibition was announced on the official website of the Embassy of Ukraine in the Republic of Lithuania
Storms of Steel exhibition opening ceremony in Vilnius. August 23, 2024 (photo credit: Nail Garejev)
In March 2024, Storms of Steel had already been displayed at the Vytautas the Great War Museum in Kaunas, Lithuania. In both Kaunas and Vilnius, photographs of the Waffen-SS Galicia Division were included as part of the exhibit — with the same deliberately coy captions, omitting any mention of whom the Division served under or against whom it fought during World War II.
One Lithuanian media outlet even published a feature on the exhibition, in which two of the five “historical” photographs presented showed members of the Division. Neither the author of the piece nor the editorial board provided any comment on this telling “detail.”
In April 2025, the exhibition — again including the Waffen-SS Galicia Division photographs — opened at the Baltic Defense College in Tartu, Estonia, a NATO-accredited education and training facility. According to the College’s official social media, the exhibition will remain on display there until June 2026
Storms of Steel exhibition at The Baltic Defense College (source: BDC Facebook)
Timing Matters
The Storms of Steel exhibition at the Kyiv History Museum might have been just another of the countless military‑patriotic events desperately trying to instrumentalize historical myths to mobilize society against Ukraine’s “eternal enemy”—Russia. But the timing made it unique.
Its opening coincided with a full‑blown political scandal in Canada that garnered international attention. On September 22, 2023, Yaroslav Hunka, a 98-year-old Ukrainian‑Canadian veteran of the Waffen‑SS Galicia Division, received a standing ovation in the Canadian Parliament.
Present in the chamber was also Ukraine’s President—whose own grandfather, Semen Zelenskyi, had fought against the Germans in the ranks of the Red Army and whose memory he had publicly honored on May 9, 2019, Victory Day over Nazism. Until recently, it had been an official state holiday in Ukraine. The enthusiasm with which Zelensky applauded Hunka strongly suggested that he had little idea which army Hunka had actually served in
Volodymyr Zelensky at the grave of his grandfather, a Red Army veteran. May 9, 2019 (source: Volodymyr Zelensky’s Facebook page)
But Hunka’s past quickly became the subject of intense media scrutiny, sparking not only the resignation of Canada’s House Speaker, but also a broader public debate about the history of postwar Canada as a safe haven for numerous Nazi collaborators. Calls spread for the release of all reports of the Deschênes Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals in Canada, a federal investigation into suspected Nazi collaborators admitted to Canada. However, the Ukrainian Canadian Congress strongly opposed the publication of the reports.
Ukrainian officials, for their part, opted to refrain from any statements that might further inflame the situation surrounding Hunka. Yet inside Ukraine, a public debate did take place. Some prominent public figures, politicians, and local authorities openly lionized Hunka, portraying the Waffen-SS Galicia Division as part of Ukraine’s “national liberation movement.” Members of the far-right Svoboda party, including those who serve in the military now, launched a social media flash mob in support of Yaroslav Hunka.
In ultranationalist circles, the view that the campaign to “discredit” Hunka is “Ukrainophobic” and orchestrated by the “Jewish slanderers” has gained popularity. Meanwhile, members of the Avangard far-right group, now part of the 3rd Assault Brigade, have not hesitated to use antisemitic rhetoric, accusing Jewish organizations in Canada and worldwide of fueling this campaign.
Moreover, on September 28 — just one day after the Kyiv exhibition’s opening — the Center for Countering Disinformation, a body under Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council reporting to Zelensky, issued a statement whitewashing the Division, claiming–falsely–that “the Nuremberg Tribunal did not find the unit guilty of any war crimes.” What the statement conspicuously omitted was that the entire SS—including the Waffen‑SS—had been declared a criminal organization, and that the Waffen-SS Galicia Division had never been subject to any separate Nuremberg review.
Thus, the central Ukrainian authorities not only failed to condemn the glorification of the Waffen‑SS Galicia Division but actively enabled it—even during the Hunka scandal
A relative of Yaroslav Hunka receives the Yaroslav Stetsko “For Services to Ternopil Region” Medal from the Ternopil Regional Council (photo credit: Oleh Syrotiuk)
The Problem is Deeper
The stance taken by Ukraine’s Center for Countering Disinformation on the Hunka affair shows clearly that the country’s political leadership has no intention of clashing with the military‑nationalist milieu, which has turned the Waffen‑SS Galicia Division into an object of cult worship. And this is not just about the 3rd Assault Brigade, which featured photos of the Division’s members in its exhibition. The official Facebook page of the Command of the Ground Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine promoted the exhibition, mentioning Waffen‑SS Galicia Division participants alongside other Ukrainian military formations, including the Army of the Ukrainian People’s Republic, which existed from 1917 to 1921.
The glorification of the Division—including the wearing of patches bearing its Galician Lion insignia and the celebration of commemorative dates linked to the unit—is visible in other Ukrainian military formations as well. These include the 1st Separate Assault Regiment “Dmytro Kotsiubailo” (the “Da Vinci Wolves”), the 49th Separate Assault Battalion Karpatska Sich, the Kraken special unit under Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence, the 12th Special Forces Brigade Azov, and fighters from Svoboda, currently serving in various units
Svoboda Party members and active military personnel wearing patches resembling the insignia of the Waffen-SS Division Galicia (source: Svoboda of Lviv Oblast Telegram)
But the glorification of Ukrainian collaboration with Nazi Germany during World War II is part of a broader phenomenon: Nazi revisionism is woven into the military culture of contemporary war-torn Ukraine. Its core idea is to portray Nazi Germany as the lesser evil in contrast to Stalin’s “prison of nations” that “oppressed Ukrainian national aspirations.” Some go even further and praise Hitler’s war against the Soviet Union and compare it to the current confrontation between Ukraine—supported by Western countries—and Russia as a continuation of the “civilizational struggle” between Europe and Asia.
A vivid example of this extreme position is expressed by the Artiom ‘Uragan’ Krasnolutsky who currently holds a command position in the 3rd Assault Brigade. On May 9, which is celebrated in Russia and other post-Soviet countries as Victory Day in the Great Patriotic War, he wrote on his social media:
Adolf Hitler did not sign the capitulation. The echoes of that war are still clearly heard today—in some places, even the flags remain unchanged. It is a war of the multicultural horde against White people—the eternal struggle between light and darkness, life and death. A sacred crusade of the Übermensch for the triumph of the great over the grotesque. Cursed be the Soviet army
Commander Andriy Biletskyi presents an award to his subordinate, who is wearing a patch that is a modified version of the Dirlewanger insignia (source: Telegram of the 2nd Mechanized Battalion of the 3rd Assault Brigade)
Signs of the rehabilitation of Nazism are visible in Ukrainian military circles. This is manifested, in particular, in the use of Nazi symbols. For example, the Vedmedi Assault Group, under the 36th Coastal Defense Brigade, uses SS bolts on its insignia alongside the SS motto Meine Ehre heißt Treue (“My Honor is Loyalty”).
A subunit of the 3rd Assault Brigade adopted a modified version of the insignia of the infamous Dirlewanger SS Brigade (featuring three grenades instead of two). Meanwhile, fighters of the Karpatska Sich often wear patches, shirts, flags, and other items emblazoned with the insignia of the 3rd SS Panzer Division “Totenkopf”—notorious for its brutality and numerous war crimes, including the massacres at Le Paradis and Chasselay. The 422nd Battalion of Unmanned Systems not only adopted the title Luftwaffe but also uses the same eagle emblem employed by Nazi Germany’s air force
Fighters of the Carpathian Sich 49th Infantry Battalion. (source: Facebook of Ruslan Andriiko (second from right))
In 2023, a Ukrainian unit named Nachtigall was created. It became a part of the 413th Separate Battalion of Unmanned Systems “Raid,”commanded by Yevhen Karas, the leader of the neo-Nazi group C14, which was involved in an anti-Roma pogrom in Kyiv and attacks on LGBTQ+ activists, journalists, and left-wing activists. The name of this unit explicitly referencing the Nachtigall Battalion, formed by the German Abwehr in 1941 from ethnic Ukrainians, mainly members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). One of its commanders was Roman Shukhevych, who later led the UPA. The battalion participated in anti‑Jewish pogroms in Vinnytsia Oblast in the summer of 1941. The following year, the Germans restructured it into Schutzmannschaft Battalion 201, which carried out crimes against anti‑Nazi resistance groups and civilians, including Jews, in Belarus
A soldier of the Nachtigall Battalion during a military operation in the Kursk region, Russia (source: “Ptakh na ymennia Nakhtihal” Telegram)
Some Ukrainian soldiers even choose call signs with Nazi associations. For example, Vadym Voroshylov, a celebrated Ukrainian ace pilot, openly explains the meaning of his call sign, “Karaya”—taken from Erich Hartmann, the most successful Luftwaffe ace of the Third Reich. He has said he thought it would be a great way to “troll” Russians.
It is important to emphasize that the use of Nazi symbols and names that evoke associations with Nazi Germany is not merely a problem of isolated units or individual soldiers. Due to the ongoing war, the Armed Forces of Ukraine enjoy the highest levels of public trust in Ukrainian society. In public discourse, the army is glorified and celebrated, receiving people’s material and moral support. A moratorium on criticism of servicemen is widely perceived as an inherent part of the gratitude owed to those defending the country from Russian aggression.
As a result, there is an almost total absence of public criticism regarding the use of Nazi symbols within the military. A conspiracy of silence surrounds this issue. At the same time, any attempt to initiate public discussion on the topic is promptly and unequivocally dismissed as “Russian propaganda” and as enabling Vladimir Putin’s narrative of “denazification,” which served as one of the pretexts for the war against Ukraine. Therefore, those who raise the issue face harsh criticism and are accused of being unpatriotic—or even of “betraying the homeland.”
This witch-hunt contributes to the gradual legitimization of Nazi apologia in Ukrainian society as a whole. One of the key tools in this process is merchandise—T-shirts, mugs, patches, caps, keychains, notebooks, and similar items—that certain brigades and individual soldiers sell for fundraising purposes. Another mechanism involves youth-oriented initiatives, including military and medical training sessions, patriotic camps, cultural events, and so-called “lessons in courage” conducted in public schools by soldiers, veterans, and members of affiliated far-right youth organizations
Merchandise of the Luftwaffe-422nd Battalion of Unmanned Systems featuring the eagle used by the German Air Force under the Nazis (source: Instagram of Luftwaffe)
Some brigades that use Nazi symbols effectively have their own youth organizations. The largest of these is Centuria, which has chapters across Ukraine and even abroad, including in Germany. Originally founded as a paramilitary youth wing of the Azov movement, it has effectively come under the patronage of the 3rd Assault Brigade and now trains future fighters for it. Members of Centuria, like their mentors, glorify the Waffen-SS Division Galicia
A knife-fighting tournament organized by Centuria in Ivano-Frankivsk to mark the anniversary of the founding of the Waffen-SS Division Galicia. April 2025 (source: Telegram of Centuria)
Notably, the use and promotion of Nazi symbols in Ukraine is not merely a matter of responsible engagement with history. It directly contradicts Ukraine’s own memory laws passed in 2015, which ban and criminalize the “propaganda of the National Socialist regime.” More importantly, it constitutes a desecration of the memory of the millions murdered, maimed, and deported by the Nazis and their allies—and an insult to the millions, including over six million Ukrainians, who fought against Nazism in the ranks of the Red Army.
This minimization of Nazi crimes not only distances Ukraine from European culture of memory—a culture built on the condemnation of Nazism and the commemoration of its victims. It also undermines the very future of Ukraine, a country whose political and military leaders insist they are fighting for democracy [end]
Marta Havryshko is Dr. Thomas Zand Visiting Assistant Professor in Holocaust Pedagogy and Antisemitism Studies, Strassler Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies at Clark University
its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine and Baltic States, how NATO has supported Nazism in eastern Europe, chronicle
chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia
Abstract: This study analyses the nature and extent of involvement by neo-Nazi and other far-right Ukrainian organisations in the Donbas war (2014-2022) and the Odesa massacre (2014). This issue is highly politicised with contrasting narratives. The Russian and Donbas separatist governments, as well as their media, have contended that Ukraine has been a Nazi or neo-Nazi regime since a fascist coup took place in 2014, while Ukrainian and Western governments and media have maintained that such elements in the Ukrainian far-right were marginal, trivial, even non-existent. The article interrogates the historical record with primary sources in the three most relevant languages—Ukrainian, Russian, and English. The investigation reveals crucial far-right involvement in both the early stages of the war in Donbas and the Odesa massacre. Although the percentage of far-right supporters and fighters in Ukraine was relatively small, they exercised disproportionate influence in the country due to their greater reliance on violence and armed formations. The Russian government, however, exaggerated the role of the neo-Nazis in Ukraine to publicly justify the illegal invasion in February 2022.
Introduction
This study analyses the nature and extent of involvement by neo-Nazi and other far-right Ukrainian organisations during both the Donbas war from its start in April 2014 until the Russian invasion in February 2022 and the Odesa massacre on 2 May 2014. Other than the Maidan massacre in February 2014, these were the most significant and contested cases of political violence in Ukraine from its independence in 1991 to the commencement of the Russia-Ukraine war on 24 February 2022.1 The role of far-right Ukrainian groups during these major episodes of political violence is controversial because they are beset by duelling, self-serving narratives. Russian President Vladimir Putin has claimed that the principal goal of the invasion is to “denazify” Ukraine.2 But well before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, there have been several overt and covert Russian military interventions here, including the annexation of the Crimean peninsula and direct support for pro-Russian insurgencies in the Donbas region, particularly in August 2014 and February 2015. Following the overthrow of the pro-Russian Ukrainian government in February 2014, the United States and other Western governments have consistently opposed Russia’s interventions and backed the current central government of Ukraine. In addition to political support, financial and military assistance has been provided, including training during the Obama presidency.3 To justify this support, the US and other Western governments disputed any real power or even the existence of neo-Nazi armed formations in Ukraine or claimed that they abandoned their far-right elements. Understanding the contested issue of far-right involvement in the Donbas war (2014-2022) and the Odesa massacre (2014) is valuable not only for elucidating intrinsically important historical episodes of political violence but also due to the contemporary relevance given the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war.
This article proceeds in five sections. The first section highlights the contribution of our study by describing the weakness of the extant academic literature and our methodological approach to filling in important lacunae in the research landscape. The second section details the duelling of contemporary narratives over the political violence by the far-right in the war in Donbas and in the Odesa massacre. The third and fourth sections develop qualitative case studies with process tracing to illuminate the role of the far-right in the Donbas war and the Odesa massacre. The fifth section presents the conclusion.
Developing the Extant Literature
Research on the far-right in Ukraine since the Euromaidan has been spotty. Studies on neo-Nazi and other far-right organisations in Ukraine following the Euromaidan have been limited in quantity, quality, and scope. Most studies have been produced by researchers outside academe in partisan think tanks or non-government organisations, as well as by journalists who did not subject their work to peer review.4 Such assessments are more likely to be politically driven and less likely to exhibit methodological rigour, even professionalism. For example, Anton Shekhovtsov, the former leader of the Crimean branch of the pro-Russian far-right Eurasian Youth Union, likened the Trade Union building arson attack during the Odesa massacre on 2 May 2014, to his killing of Colorado potato beetles by collecting them in a box and burning them alive. He directly inferred that this was a massacre with far-right involvement but omitted this in his publications.5 Other works have relied on narrow metrics such as the vote-share of far-right parties in Ukraine, without assessing the violence itself in terms of the perpetrators and effects.6 Some researchers have claimed that the presence of Russian speakers in the Azov regiment and other neo-Nazi-led armed formations is evidence of their relative tolerance and asserted that the Azov regiment had moderated by abandoning its far-right roots.7 Such analyses have tended to uncritically rely on Ukrainian and Western government narratives, accepting their claims at face value.
By contrast, other studies suggest a greater degree of far-right involvement in Ukrainian political violence. One quantitative study found that far-right groups in Ukraine, such as Svoboda and Right Sector, fielded the most violent perpetrators and committed the lion’s share of attacks.8 That study is restricted temporally, however, to the 2014 Maidan protests, which led to the violent overthrow of the relatively pro-Russian government and ultimately spiralled into the civil war in Donbas, the Russian annexation of Crimea, and Russian military interventions in these regions of Ukraine.9 Similarly, qualitative studies have presented evidence in the form of videos, eyewitness testimonies, confessions, and forensic examinations of Svoboda and Right Sector involvement in the Maidan massacre.10 Some other studies have focused on specific aspects of the far-right paramilitary and other armed formations during the war in Donbas.11 One academic publication is specifically devoted to the Odesa massacre, which is called “The Odesa Tragedy,” though it concentrates on the public perceptions rather than the perpetrators and their consequences.12 This list of prior works is intended to be illustrative rather than exhaustive. The research landscape around these issues is growing, but uneven in scope and reliability; a lacuna remains in the literature in terms of evaluating rigorously, comprehensively, and dispassionately the nature and extent of far-right involvement in the Donbas war and Odesa massacre, which matters in terms of our understanding of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and political violence more generally.
To elucidate this understudied topic of the far-right in Ukraine, this study makes substantial use of primary source materials in Ukrainian and Russian—the main languages in Ukraine—as well as in English. This linguistic capability is conducive to a more nuanced, accurate assessment. Methodologically, the two case studies employ qualitative process tracing with the benefit of fluency in all three languages.13 The substantive focus and period of analysis are both tightly bounded; the role of the far-right on the Russian side and in the Russia-Ukraine war since February 2022, as well as during the Euromaidan, are weighty topics explored in our other works but fall outside the scope of this study.
The term “far-right” denotes ultranationalists and both racial and ethnic supremacists in accordance with prior scholarship.14 The term “neo-Nazi” refers to far-right organisations that revamp elements of Nazi ideology, particularly its racial and ethnic supremacism, and use symbols associated with Nazi Germany or their stylised versions. As with Nazis, neo-Nazi organisations represent a form of fascism. Major neo-Nazi organisations in Ukraine during the time period covered by this study include the Social-National Assembly, its paramilitary wing Patriot of Ukraine, the National Corps, the White Hammer, and C14. Also included in the analysis are paramilitary and other armed formations organised and led formally or informally by these neo-Nazi organisations, such as the Azov battalion and regiment. Admittedly, militant groups are known to exhibit ideological heterogeneity.15 Within the political violence literature, a burgeoning area of research emphasises that members of the rank-and-file may be motivated by a variety of factors that diverge from the leadership, leading to a principal-agent problem.16 In this study, we classify organisations as neo-Nazi, or at least neo-Nazi-led, when commanders are neo-Nazi, even if not all members can be presumed to share this exact ideology.
A prominent example is Andriy Biletsky, the leader of Patriot of Ukraine and the Social-National Assembly (SNA), both of which were transformed along with the Azov battalion and regiment veterans into the National Corps Party in 2016. He called the ideology of Patriot of Ukraine and SNA “Social Nationalism.” In a collection of his articles published in 2013, he described that social nationalism, as the name suggests, combines elements of ultranationalism of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists with elements of national socialism and called both radical nationalism and national socialism “great ideas.” He wrote that social nationalism is based on “Sociality, Racism, and Great Power.”17 Specifically, it is based on the ideas that the “white race” is “superior” to other races and is the foundation of the Aryan Ukrainian nation; the Ukrainian nation is a “blood-racial community”; and that “the historical mission of our Nation (…) is to head and lead the White Peoples of the world in the last crusade for their existence, a march against the Semitic-led subhumans.”18 Biletsky openly made antisemitic and racist statements, such as his claim that the Jew is “an economic and political parasite.” He saw “a serious clash of native European peoples with foreign colonisers, mainly of African and Muslim origin” and believed that “an ethnic civil war can be won by the native Europeans only under the banner of the New Right National Revolutions.”19
Biletsky was called the “White Leader” and his writings were published by both SNA and Patriot of Ukraine. He was the first commander of the Azov battalion, which was organised and led by Patriot of Ukraine and SNA in May 2014. Patriot of Ukraine, SNA, and the Azov battalion all used a symbol resembling a stylised swastika and Wolfsangel. Azov commanders and their historian, who himself serves in Azov, called the symbol the “Idea of the Nation” and claimed that it is an ancient Ukrainian symbol, even though it was created in 1992 for the Social National Party of Ukraine (SNPU). The creator of this symbol acknowledged that it was called “Idea of the Nation” to represent the radical nationalist ideas of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). He also admitted that SNPU deliberately chose this symbol with the Latin letter N, instead of the equivalent Ukrainian Cyrillic letter, fully aware of its resemblance to Nazi symbols and association with the swastika for many Ukrainians, in particular in Lviv. As with other extremist groups that rebrand out of political expedience, the Social National Party of Ukraine changed its name to Svoboda in 2014, because the Nazi association was politically inconvenient.20 However, this symbol was retained by the SNA and by Patriot of Ukraine, whose Kharkiv branch split from SNPU because of these changes.21 The Azov battalion and its propaganda magazine, which was named Black Sun, also used the Black Sun symbol, an ideological symbol used by Nazis and various neo-Nazi organisations. In addition, groups and individuals—including Patriot of Ukraine, SNA, National Corps, and Azov battalion and regiment leaders, commanders, and members—have displayed on their uniforms various neo-Nazi and Nazi symbols, such as the swastika, the SS sign, and 88 (Heil Hitler code). These, along with Hitler images, Nazi flags, and Totenkopf have also been seen in the form of patches, photographs, flags, and tattoos.
Although the term far-right incorporates both ultranationalist and neo-Nazi organisations, they are not ideologically identical despite their frequent overlap. This study empirically investigates the role of Ukrainian ultra-nationalist organisations such as Svoboda, the Right Sector, the Ukrainian National Assembly–Ukrainian People’s Self-Defence (UNA-UNSO), and Bratstvo; neo-Nazi organisations such as the Social-National Assembly, Patriot of Ukraine, the White Hammer, and C14; and various other paramilitary formations, special police forces, and National Guard units organised and controlled to various extents by them. These armed units include the Azov battalion and regiment, Dnipro, Donbas, Aidar, Sich, Carpathian Sich, OUN, and St. Mary’s battalions, and the Ukrainian Volunteer Corps. To assess these actors, this study analysed thousands of Russian and Ukrainian primary sources: online recordings of live broadcasts, videos of the armed conflict in Donbas and Odesa, and information posted on websites and social media by far-right organisations, their armed units, and activists. It also analysed media reports in Ukrainian, Russian, and English from diverse outlets such as Ukrainska pravda, Strana, BBC, The Guardian, The Washington Post, The New York Times, YouTube, Telegram, V Kontakte, Facebook, and Twitter. To mitigate bias, the authors analysed the primary source materials rather than relying on secondary interpretations.
The Conflicting Narratives
Assessments of the far-right in Ukraine have been wracked by self-serving and thus unreliable perspectives. Russian and separatist leaders, as well as the media, have described the post-Maidan violence in Ukraine, especially in Donbas and Odesa, as perpetrated by “fascists” and “Nazis” akin to genocidal massacres against Jews, Belarusians, Russians, and Ukrainians during the Holocaust and World War Two.22 They often called the Odesa massacre the “Odesa Khatyn,” a reference to the large-scale massacre of Belarusian villagers in 1943 by the Nazis and an auxiliary police battalion, which was based on a paramilitary formation of the Melnyk faction of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists. Based on this narrative, President Putin and his allies have claimed that invading Ukraine is not only justified, but “inevitable” to counter the “Nazi” or “Neo-Nazi regime” in Kyiv.23 Putin and his government thus declared the “de-Nazification” of Ukraine as a key goal of “the special military operation” launched in February 2022.24 This perspective—in its entirety—is widely assailed in the West.25
By contrast, the Ukrainian and Western governments and the media tend to claim that the far-right—including neo-Nazis—is marginal, even non-existent in Ukraine.26 They argue that since Euromaidan, Ukrainian fighters have almost entirely—if not entirely—shed their far-right elements, particularly neo-Nazi. To this end, it is a common point that the Azov Battalion ceased to be led by the neo-Nazi Patriot of Ukraine, a paramilitary wing of the SNA, since integrating into the National Guard as one of its regiments. Kyiv has stressed that the integration of Azov in November 2014 is proof of its transition to moderation and the absence of extremist fighters post-Maidan.27 Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky awarded “Hero of Ukraine” titles in 2022 to prominent Azov leaders such as regiment commander Denys Prokopenko, deputy commander Sviatoslav Palamar, and senior officer Oleh Khomenko.28 After the commencement of the Russia-Ukraine war in February 2022, many Western media outlets, politicians, government officials, and academics adopted this stance that Azov and other controversial Ukrainian fighters on the far-right had not only abandoned extremist elements, but were heroes against Russia’s illegal invasion.29
The Indexing Theory of political communications emphasises that Western media follow narratives of its governments in covering foreign conflicts, including in post-communist countries.30 In some cases, Western media may have taken their cues directly from the Ukrainian government. After the Odesa massacre on 2 May 2014, the Foreign Ministry of Ukraine blamed the arson attack on provocateurs that were “paid generously by the Russian special services”, and the New York Times immediately adopted the same line that pro-Russia groups may have been responsible for torching the building.31 The Western narrative of the far-right in Ukraine since the Euromaidan is not without controversy. Volodymyr Ishchenko, a Ukrainian sociologist who specialises in the far-right in Ukraine, concludes: “The dominant narrative since Maidan in Ukrainian and much of the Western public spheres has been systematically downplaying the problem” by arguing that “the Ukrainian far-right” is “small and marginal.” He stated that “often, the far-right is just ignored.”32
Notably, Western concerns over far-right fighters in Ukraine were more prevalent before the February 2022 invasion. For example, The Nation described Azov in 2018 as “pro-Nazi, as evidenced by its regalia, slogans, and programmatic statements.”33 In 2019, Radio Free Europe called Azov “far-right.”34 In 2020, The Guardian referred to Azov as a “neo-Nazi extremist movement.”35 Consistent with Indexing Theory, such coverage of the neo-Nazis in Ukraine before the February 2022 Russian invasion overlapped with similar expressions by Western governments. In its 2018 Human Rights report, the US State Department called the political wing of the Azov Regiment “a hate group.”36 In 2019, ambassadors from G7 countries warned against “extreme political movements in Ukraine, whose violent actions are worrying in themselves.” The warnings referred specifically to the Azov movement and its violence during the 2019 presidential elections.37 The US Congress has displayed longstanding ambivalence over its designation of Azov. In 2018, forty Congress members signed a letter to the State Department with the request to designate Azov as a terrorist organisation because of its links to terrorist attacks in multiple countries and its recruitment of neo-Nazis in its ranks.38 A defence appropriations bill amendment was adopted by the entire US Congress in 2018, which banned US government funding and training of the Azov regiment due to concerns over its neo-Nazi views and members. Such concerns had been expressed by American officials for several years after the Euromaidan. The amendment was first unanimously adopted by the US House of Representatives in 2015. Congressman John Conyers put it bluntly, “I am grateful that the House of Representatives unanimously passed my amendments last night to ensure that our military does not train members of the repulsive neo-Nazi Azov Battalion.”39 Under pressure from the Pentagon, however, Congress subsequently removed this first amendment. A similar amendment, proposing a ban on US military assistance to radical nationalist and neo-Nazi organisations, voluntary police, and paramilitary formations under their command, was blocked in Congress in 2014.40
In general, however, American and European governments have been careful not to issue public statements against the far-right in Ukraine or to call attention to it. This hesitancy began after the Euromaidan and became starker following the February 2022 Russian invasion. Indeed, Western governments and media increasingly whitewashed the empirical record to present the Ukrainian far-right formations as categorically moderate in order to boost international support. In June 2024, the US State Department stated that the Azov brigade was eligible to receive US weapons under the “Leahy Law” because it was cleared of human rights violations. It made this determination after claiming that the Azov brigade is a new unit that is not subject to the previous Congressional ban, even though in reality this brigade was created on the basis of the Azov regiment, celebrated the 10th anniversary of the Azov battalion creation as its own anniversary, and is led by original Azov battalion commanders.41 However, a subsequent amendment, which was included in the US defence bill which was passed by the US House of Representatives, specifically stated that “none of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available by this Act may be used to provide arms, training, intelligence, or other assistance to the Azov Battalion, the Third Separate Assault Brigade, or any successor organisation.”42
Such instrumental portrayals of allies are not limited to this conflict. Other recent cases of political violence have also featured public relations campaigns by governments and media to present allies as arguably more moderate than their history and contemporary ideology indicate. For example, in the Syrian war, anti-Assad jihadist organisations allied with the West were euphemistically referred to as “rebels,” sometimes “moderate” ones, even when they fought under the direction of a Foreign Terrorist Organisation, as designated by the US State Department.43 A large body of literature within terrorism studies has found that the labelling of violent perpetrators by governments and media is not value-neutral, but expedient to serve political agendas.44 Particularly in these controversial cases of political violence, academe can play an important role in interrogating the empirical record to adjudicate the truth.45
The Far-Right in the Donbas War
Research within the field of terrorism studies has repeatedly noted the difficulty of determining the ideological beliefs of participants in political violence.46 However, fine-grained knowledge of the organisations can substantially increase confidence. Svoboda and the main organisations that remained within the Right Sector after the Euromaidan were widely understood as far-right for maintaining ultra-nationalist and ethnically supremacist views. They openly described themselves as the natural successors of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), inspired by the notorious OUN leader and Nazi collaborator, Stepan Bandera.47 Along with the UNA-UNSO, these organisations used the “Glory to Ukraine! Glory to the Heroes!” slogan, the official greeting of the Bandera faction of the OUN (OUN-B). This greeting, along with a fascist-style hand salute, was modelled on greetings and salutes of other well-known fascist parties in European history, from the Nazi party in Germany to the Ustashe party in Croatia.48 The Right Sector also adopted its red and black flag from the OUN-B and the UPA, which symbolized Ukrainian blood and soil, which were also pervasive in Nazi ideology and flags.49 But the existence of these symbols alone offers weak evidence of far-right influence in the Donbas war without understanding the cultural and historical context.
The violent overthrow of the Viktor Yanukovych government by means of the Maidan massacre triggered the resurgence of separatism in Donbas.50 After his overthrow in February 2014, far-right parties and organisations in Ukraine expanded and organised their armed formations. Along with Ihor Kolomoisky, an oligarch who became the head of the Dnipropetrovsk regional administration, the Right Sector was instrumental in the formation of the Dnipro battalion in the spring of 2014.51 The Azov battalion, notorious for its use of neo-Nazi symbols in its official insignia, was also organised in the spring of 2014 and led by the SNA and the Patriot of Ukraine with the involvement of the Radical Party. As mentioned, “White Leader” Andrii Biletsky was the first commander of Azov.52 Based in Mariupol, the St. Mary’s battalion was formed in the fall of 2014 and led by the far-right Bratstvo party, which is described by its leader (Dmytro Korchynsky) as the “Christian Taliban.”53 Around this time, the Aidar battalion, nominally subordinated to the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, was formed by the Maidan Self-Defence. One of its platoons was led by the White Hammer, a neo-Nazi organisation belonging to the Right Sector during the Euromaidan. Ilia Kiva, a Right Sector member, was the commander of another volunteer police battalion. A previously convicted criminal with a swastika tattoo became the commander of the Tornado Company, a special police unit. He and seven other members of his company were arrested and convicted for various crimes in the warzone, such as torturing detainees. A Nazi-style flag with a swastika was found in their prison cell.54 These units were all under the formal jurisdiction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the National Guard, or the Ministry of Defence. From the start of their formation, they remained under de facto command of radical nationalist or neo-Nazi organisations. These armed formations sprouted up in the early stages of the conflict in Donbas and were stationed there in an attempt to suppress pro-Russian separatism in the region by force. The Right Sector and the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists actively organised various militia and paramilitary units that were not subordinate to the central government of Ukraine. The Volunteer Ukrainian Corps, the largest paramilitary formation, was formed and led by the Right Sector specifically for the war in Donbas, though it also included battalions in Western Ukraine.55
The paramilitary formations, special police, and National Guard units, organised and led by far-right organisations such as the Right Sector, the Social National Assembly, Patriot of Ukraine, Svoboda, C14, and Bratstvo, constituted a small minority of Ukrainian fighters in the Donbas. Based on reports, we estimate the number of members of radical nationalist and neo-Nazi organisations who served in various far right-led, regular, and other armed formations in the Donbas, at around five thousand. This estimate is conservative and represents just one percent of approximately 400,000 people who participated in this war on the side of the central government.56 Additional metrics of influence, however, are also important to consider.
Despite their relatively small numbers, far-right fighters exercised disproportionate influence in the Donbas civil war, particularly in the early stages before the first direct Russian military intervention in August 2014. Far-right Ukrainian groups proliferated after the Euromaidan because they were eager to fight and were responsible for a disproportionate level of violence, especially against civilians and prisoners of war in Mariupol and Krasnoarmiisk. Far-right organisations and far-right-linked battalions thus played a crucial role in escalating the armed conflict in the Donbas. Svoboda and C14, an avowedly neo-Nazi group affiliated with Svoboda until the summer of 2014, organised and led the Sich battalion from June 2014 onwards.57 Meanwhile, the Right Sector carried out a deadly attack on a separatist checkpoint in Sloviansk on 20 April 2014. While Ukrainian and Western media denied far-right involvement in these events, the evidence to the contrary includes business cards linked to far-right members found after the attack. As well, Ukrainian court proceedings revealed that the weapons used by the Right Sector checkpoint attackers were the same as the snipers from this group who killed and wounded police during the Maidan.58 And two years after the attack on the separatist checkpoint, Dmytro Yarosh—the leader of the Right Sector—admitted his personal involvement in thisattack.59 Oleksandr Turchynov, then acting president of Ukraine, and Kolomoisky’s deputy in the Dnipropetrovsk regional administration, reportedly orchestrated this Right Sector operation, aimed to seize and destroy a television transmitter near Sloviansk, several days after this area was seized by the Strelkov-led armed group of Russian nationalists and Ukrainian separatists.60 This attack by the Right Sector constituted a major escalation of the conflict in Donbas because it broke both the Geneva Agreement signed on 17 April 2014 by Ukraine, Russia, the EU, and the US for a peaceful resolution of the conflict, as well as the Orthodox Easter truce between the Ukrainian government and separatists in Donbas.
Far right-led armed formations were also behind many other violent attacks in the Donbas, further escalating the conflict into a civil war. Videos, media reports, and admissions from commanders and other members of the Azov and Dnipro battalions indicate that they participated in the storming of the district police headquarters in Mariupol on 9 May 2014. Approximately ten people, including at least one protester, were killed.61 Analysis of online video streams, media reports, and Ukrainian government documents, also make clear that Azov played a major role in taking back the city of Mariupol from the control of separatists in June 2014.62 The Dnipro battalion, along with other units, seized civilians in the Donetsk Region to prevent the separatist referendum on 11 May 2014. Videos show them shooting unarmed pro-separatist protesters with Kalashnikovs, killing two locals. The Ukrainian government denied the presence of the Dnipro battalion, but it was confirmed by other credible sources, including admissions by battalion members in videos, like Volodymyr Parasiuk’s statement on social media, who became the People’s Deputy of Ukraine.63
The far-right-led armed formations perpetrated a disproportionate amount of violence in the first few months of the Donbas conflict and thus played a major role in escalating it into a larger civil war because the radical nationalist and neo-Nazi-led groups were far more willing to use force at that time. The Ukrainian armed forces, the security service, police and National Guard units were more reluctant to use force against the separatists in Donbas because their commanders and members were publicly blamed by the new government for attempting to forcefully suppress the Maidan protests—and in particular, for the Maidan massacre. Because the new Maidan government came to power through violence, which included the killing of police and protesters, it lacked legitimacy among many military, police, and SBU members in the Donbas region during this initial period of the conflict. Further, compared to the newly ascendant far-right groups in the aftermath of Euromaidan, the regular Ukrainian armed forces, the security service, the police and National Guard units were known for lower morale and higher desertions. Examples of this included the Donetsk SBU Alfa commander and Luhansk Berkut members, who joined the separatists.64
The relative role of the far-right in the political violence was not constant; it began to decline in the Donbas when newly elected president Petro Poroshenko ordered the Ukrainian military, SBU, police, and National Guard to wield lethal force against the separatists and launch the offensive in June 2014.65 The war was most intense and violent in 2014 and 2015, but the fighting declined significantly following the Minsk Agreements in 2015. However, ultra-nationalist and neo-Nazi fighters continued to exert a non-trivial role, even after the Ukrainian military intensified its operations in Donbas and purported to moderate the far-right fighters. After its formal incorporation into the National Guard of Ukraine, the Azov regiment and its commanders maintained a close organisational and ideological relationship with the neo-Nazi National Corps party. This party was formed by the Azov battalion founder and the first commander on the basis of neo-Nazi SNA and Patriot of Ukraine, and it included many Azov battalion and regiment veterans. The Azov regiment functioned as a military wing of the National Corps, which, in essence, represented overlapping elements of the same Azov movement.66 Indeed, Azov regiment commanders shared a neo-Nazi background and had served in the neo-Nazi-led Azov battalion.67 In other words, the rebranding from “battalion” to “regiment” did not alter the key personnel.68 For example, Azov regiment commander Denys Prokopenko was a member of the neo-Nazi White Boys Club, which was formed by the ultras of the Dynamo Kyiv football club. This group of ultras displayed various Nazi symbols and the Nazi salute on their social media and during football games. His Azov battalion platoon had used the Totenkopf insignia of the Nazi SS.69 Andriy Biletsky became the commander of the Third Assault Brigade, which was created by veterans of the Azov battalion and regiment and activists of his neo-Nazi group, the National Corps.70 In 2023, he stated in an interview with Ukrainian media that the united Azov movement included this Azov brigade under his command along with the Azov regiment and the Kraken unit.71 Such admissions in Ukrainian media highlighting enduring far-right allegiances seldom make their way into the Western press.
Importantly, Azov commanders never publicly renounced their neo-Nazi views, symbols, and organisations. In fact, Azov leaders routinely denied in media interviews that they, their units, and organisations, were neo-Nazi, claiming that the well-documented Nazi symbols were fakes or Russian propaganda. Our research of Ukrainian social media as well as other researchers of the far-right in Ukraine, such as Lev Golinkin and Moss Robeson, have identified over one hundred cases of Nazi and neo-Nazi displays by at least several hundred Azov commanders and other members from 2014 to 2022. This number includes displays on uniforms, patches, photographs, flags, and tattoos of neo-Nazi and Nazi symbols, such as the swastika, SS sign, 88 (Heil Hitler code), Hitler images, Nazi flags, and Totenkopf, and a fascist hand salute.72 The continued relevance of far-right extremism in Azov was evident at the very top. Arsen Avakov, the Minister of Internal Affairs, was personally involved in the Azov battalion formation and its later expansion to a regiment.73 President Petro Poroshenko circulated photographs awarding Ukrainian national medals and commendations to some of the most well-known neo-Nazis in Azov.74 The Nazi connection to Azov was clearly not due to a loss of agency control.
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch reported that Azov was involved in many cases of torture, illegal detention, and disappearances during the war in Donbas.75 The impact of these far-right organisations cannot be measured strictly in terms of the direct physical effects, as terrorism researchers have emphasised in many other contexts.76 Ultra-nationalist and neo-Nazi organisations were instrumental in blocking or “spoiling” a peaceful resolution of the armed conflict in Donbas, another well-established source of leverage for extremists.77 Far-right groups such as the Right Sector, Svoboda, and the Radical Party opposed the adoption by the parliament of Constitutional amendments based on provisions from the Minsk Agreements.78 To this end, Svoboda activists launched a grenade attack on 31 August 2015 in front of the Ukrainian parliament, killing four and wounding dozens of policemen and National Guard troops, which helped to block these amendments, undercutting the logic of implementation.79
Far-right groups also challenged the implementation of President Volodymyr Zelensky’s electoral promise to peacefully resolve the Donbas war.80 In October 2019, Zelensky travelled to a front-line position in Donbas to personally convince the Azov fighters to stop blocking the implementation of the Minsk agreements by withdrawing along with separatist troops from the frontline, as he agreed during the summit with Putin and German and French leaders in Paris. But video of the encounter shows that Zelensky was taunted by activists of this neo-Nazi organisation who flouted his appeal.81 According to the Associated Press, thousands of far-right and nationalist activists shouting the far-right OUN and UPA slogan “Glory to Ukraine. Glory to the Heroes” marched through Kyiv protesting against a peace plan for eastern Ukraine.82
The radical flank threatened Zelensky for implementing Minsk on other occasions as well. In May 2019, Dmytro Yarosh, the former Right Sector leader, publicly threatened to hang the new Ukrainian president on a tree if he fulfilled his election promise of a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Donbas.83 In 2021, Yarosh, the commander of the Ukrainian Volunteer Army organised by the Right Sector, was appointed Adviser to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Valerii Zaluzhnyi.84 In the same year, videos, photos, and Ukrainian media reports show police standing down while neo-Nazi and other far-right protesters attacked the Office of the President of Ukraine and painted swastikas on its walls.85 The Russia scholar Stephen F. Cohen concluded that Zelensky “can’t go forward with peace negotiations” because “crazy fascist movements” in Ukraine “literally threatened his life.”86 Although far-right peace rejectionists posed political problems for Zelensky, they were also known to work closely with him. An activist of the neo-Nazi Patriot of Ukraine and former deputy commander of the Azov regiment was appointed the acting head of the National Police of Ukraine during the Poroshenko presidency and then became a deputy minister of Internal Affairs during the Zelensky presidency.87 Prime Minister Oleksii Honcharuk spoke at a “veterans party” organised by a front organisation for the neo-Nazi C14 with a stylised swastika of a neo-Nazi rock band behind him.88 The advisory council of the Ministry of Veteran Affairs under Zelensky retained activists of this neo-Nazi group, including those charged with assassinating the prominent opposition journalist, Oles Buzyna, in 2015.89
In sum, ultra-nationalist and neo-Nazi militant organisations were deeply involved on the side of the central government throughout the Donbas conflict. Although representing a small fraction of Ukrainian forces throughout the conflict, they committed a disproportionate amount of violence, particularly before President Poroshenko ordered the Ukrainian military to increase its use of force against the separatists in the summer of 2014. The much-touted absorption of Azov and other extreme right-wing militia under the official Ukrainian National Guard, police, and military command did not change either their command or their ideological displays. Many of the fighters worked closely with the Kyiv political leadership across administrations, when not using de facto veto power to block peaceful resolution of the conflict in this region.
This interpretation departs from others that rely strictly on vote-share as the proxy for far-right influence. The influence of the far-right in Ukraine after the Maidan far exceeded its electoral support and membership. Svoboda and Right Sector leaders each won only one percent of the votes in the snap presidential elections in May 2014. In the parliamentary elections of October 2014, Svoboda narrowly failed to clear the five percent threshold, receiving 4.7 percent. The Right Sector fared even worse, receiving only two percent of the votes. Ruslan Koshulynsky, one of Svoboda leaders, who was backed by the Right Sector, OUN, and C14, received only 1.7 percent of the votes in the 2019 presidential elections, while Svoboda won 2.2 percent of the votes in the 2019 parliamentary elections. These weak electoral results indicate the limited national support of the far-right in Ukraine, but not its outsized role in the Donbas conflict.
The Far-Right in the Odesa Massacre
Other than the Donbas war, the Odesa massacre was the most significant and deadly instance of political violence after the Maidan massacre in Ukraine since its independence in 1991 until the Russia-Ukraine war in February 2022. The violence took place on 2 May 2014, between a “United Ukraine” rally and pro-Russian separatists, carried out with petrol bombs, gunfire, and rock-throwing, which ended up killing 48 people, primarily separatist protesters.90 The vast majority of the fatalities took place in the Trade Unions House, where 42 separatist activists and employees (forty men, seven women, and one boy) were killed when the building was set ablaze.91
This massacre contributed to the escalation of the separatist conflict in Donbas into the civil war. As noted, the massacre was presented by separatist and Russian leaders and the media as akin to the Nazi massacre of Khatyn in Belarus, and many Odesa separatists joined the separatist forces in Donbas. Despite the importance of this massacre, the International Advisory Panel of the Council of Europe, among other international authorities, has noted that the Ukrainian government failed to properly investigate and prosecute those responsible.92 To ascertain the role of far-right groups in the Odesa massacre, a broad range of key information resources can be analysed, including videos and recordings of live broadcasts of the political violence (and the lead-up to it); published reports; primary source media in Ukrainian, Russian, and English; statements of responsibility; interviews; and testimonies from participants and eyewitnesses on both sides, as well as police commanders.
On 1 May 2014, the day before the mass violence, separatists protested in Odesa to demand a referendum on the newly installed government in Kyiv, which they blamed on far-right activists and Western interference.93 Based on testimonies from a special parliamentary commission report in the immediate aftermath of the May 2014 massacre, Ukrainian and regional government officials planned to use far-right activists and the Maidan Self-Defence to suppress the separatists in the Odesa region and disperse those who were encamped near the Trade Union building.94 Extensive evidence indicates that the police and firefighters were ordered by their superiors to stand by and not interfere during attacks. For instance, a special plan to deal with mass disturbances launched by the Odesa regional police was not authorised, reportedly because of decisions at the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ top level.95 Similarly, top regional officials of the police and other law enforcement agencies were ordered to attend a meeting with their national counterparts before and during the start of the clashes.96 The presence of Andriy Parubiy and five hundred Maidan Self-Defence members, who deployed from Kyiv to Odesa on the eve of the massacre, further suggests that the violent dispersal of the separatist camp by far-right activists was orchestrated by top government leaders.97 Parubiy was a founder and leader of the neo-Nazi Patriot of Ukraine, a paramilitary wing of the Social National Party of Ukraine in the 1990s. He was the head of the Maidan Self-Defence during the Euromaidan and headed the National Security and Defence Council at the time of the Odesa massacre. The State Bureau of Investigations of Ukraine launched a criminal investigation into Parubiy for the Odesa massacre soon after he was replaced as the ex-head of the Ukrainian parliament following the early parliamentary elections in 2019.98 One of the participants acknowledged in an Israeli documentary that he engaged in “provocations” in the Odesa massacre under the command of Parubiy, who had issued orders to attack the separatists and “burn everything.” We assess this acknowledgement as credible because he was filmed along with Maidan activists in the left wing of the Trade Union building in Odesa when the deadly fire began to burn the central entrance.99 He and five other Georgian ex-military members also stated in American, Italian, and Israeli TV documentaries, Russian media interviews, on Macedonian TV, in depositions to Berkut lawyers for the Maidan massacre trial, and in testimonies to the Prosecutor General Office of Belarus for the Prosecutor General Office of Ukraine investigation that their groups of Georgian, Baltic, and far-right-linked Ukrainian snipers received weapons, payments, and orders from specific Maidan and Georgian politicians, including Parubiy, to engage in a mass killing of police and protesters.100 The Maidan massacre trial subsequently confirmed their identities.101
A march led by the Right Sector and football ultras on 2 May 2014 was used as cover to implement this plan to destroy and burn the separatist tent camp.102 The SBU in the Odesa Region received advanced information about planned “provocations” and violent clashes between football ultras and pro-Russian separatists on game day between the Odesa and Kharkiv teams on 2 May. A special train transported hundreds of football ultras from Kharkiv to Odesa.103 Football ultras in Ukraine were notorious for displaying neo-Nazi symbols and expressing neo-Nazi slogans during games and have historically linked up with the Right Sector and other far-right organisations, as during the Maidan protests.104 Both the Right Sector and football ultras in Odesa and Kharkiv were dominated by the neo-Nazi Social National Assembly/Patriot of Ukraine, which organised the Azov battalion right after the Odesa massacre.
Odeska Druzhyna, a small separatist organisation in Odesa, was present among other separatist activists based on evidence from internet streams, videos, testimonies of participants and eyewitnesses, and special parliamentary commission reports.105 Odeska Druzhyna used identifiable red tape labels, and were not Right Sector agent provocateurs, as the Russian media and separatists claimed. However, the Ukrainian government and media also mischaracterised the involvement of Odeska Druzhyna by overstating its coordination with other separatist activists.106 The balance of forces was asymmetric; the groups of numerically superior activists of the Right Sector from Odesa and Kharkiv led by the neo-Nazi Social National Assembly/Patriot of Ukraine, far-right football ultras, and Maidan Self-Defence units from Odesa and other regions attacked the separatists. Numerically disadvantaged, the latter took cover behind a police cordon.107
An Odeska Druzhyna activist was filmed shooting in the direction of the far-right protesters with an AK-74-type assault rifle.108 The official investigation and the May 2 Group maintained that a Right Sector activist was killed by this separatist group member with a 5.45mm calibre bullet.109 However, leaked forensic medical expert reports describe a 5.65mm calibre bullet extracted from his body.110 This bullet reportedly disappeared and reappeared during the investigation. The fact that it did not match bullet samples of any legally registered firearms, the weak sound of the gunshots, as well as the lack of a recoil observed in the videos of the shooting, also suggest that the far-right protester may not have been killed by this separatist, who maintained that the weapon seen in the video was a movie studio prop.111 The killing of the Right Sector activist was not visible in that video nor in any videos of clashes. The investigation and various videos at the scene did not reveal the exact time or location of his killing, or the direction of the gunshot. An Odesa deputy police chief, who was filmed around the time of this killing before he himself was wounded, stated that he saw snipers in camouflage shooting from the second floor of a hotel there. He relayed that they killed this Right Sector activist and the second protester in order to blame the separatists for their killing and provoke a violent response against the separatists.112 Videos filmed before and after his shooting suggest that the second pro-Maidan activist was killed around the same time in the same area during the violent clashes with separatists and shooting from a Kalashnikov-type weapon by one of the separatists.113 However, the government forensic examination determined that he was killed by a bullet from a pneumatic sport-type weapon. Nobody was charged with his killing, and the moment and other circumstances of his killing remain not publicly known.114
In the clashes that followed the killings of these two pro-government protesters, four separatist protesters were killed and many other separatist protesters, policemen and at least one local journalist were wounded. The forensic examination determined that three separatists were killed with hunting ammunition.115 A pro-government activist was filmed shooting with a hunting rifle in the direction of these separatists.116 This pro-government activist was later identified by the Minister of Internal Affairs as a Right Sector member.117 The government investigation charged him with killing at least one of the separatists. However, he was released from arrest and his trial was suspended indefinitely because of threats by the Right Sector and other far-right activists against judges during his trial.118 Evidence—including a recorded phone call—revealed that the events on May 2nd were coordinated by the Odesa regional administration official in charge of law enforcement agencies, and involved the participation of the Maidan Self-Defence commander, Right Sector activists, football ultras, and Maidan Self-Defence units.119 They attacked and burned the tent camp of various separatist organisations, whose activists and supporters then escaped to the nearby Trade Union building and tried to barricade the main entrance doors. Videos, internet streams, and testimonies of eyewitnesses show that attackers threw Molotov cocktails and burning tyres at the main entrance, set the entrance doors on fire, and blocked other exits. Videos, recorded calls to firefighters, and eyewitness reports reveal that the fire and thick smoke started from those burning tyres and Molotov cocktails thrown at the main entrance.120 The evidence does not support claims that the separatist protesters killed in this incident were Russian citizens, that they burned themselves by throwing Molotov cocktails from the roof of the Trade Union building or inside of the building, or that there was no far-right involvement in their killing.
After initial denials, the May 2 Group admitted that the deadly fire started at the main entrance. The May 2 Group was a nominally independent association of mainly journalists, formed after the massacre supposedly to investigate it. It was created with the involvement of the Governor of the Odesa region who was appointed by Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko within a week of the massacre.121 This governor represented not only the central government, but also the Kolomoisky’s oligarchic network, which financed the Right Sector volunteers from the Volyn Region in the Azov battalion and the Right Sector-led Dnipro battalion.122 The Azov battalion was organised by the neo-Nazi SNA and its paramilitary wing, Patriot of Ukraine, which dominated the Right Sector in Odesa and Kharkiv, a few days after the Odesa massacre. But the May 2 Group still claimed that it was impossible to determine who started the fire because both sides were throwing Molotov cocktails. However, there is no public evidence of Molotov cocktails being thrown by separatists at the main entrance; on the contrary, numerous videos feature the far-right protesters throwing Molotov cocktails and burning tyres into the Trade Union building at that time.123
Within Ukraine, far-right activists—particularly from the Right Sector and the SNA— were notorious for using tyres and Molotov cocktails to burn public buildings. Forensic examinations in the government investigation, recordings of radiocommunications by SBU Alfa group, an unpublished admission by a far-right activist to a French journalist, and an academic study determined that the Trade Union headquarters in Kyiv were burned by Maidan activists, including far-right ones, in order to stop its takeover by the Security Service of Ukraine Alfa unit.124 Far-right protesters also started fires by burning tyres in the Inter TV channel building and threatened to burn down the parliament of Ukraine, the Lutsk City Council, the Sviatoshyn District Court that heard the Maidan massacre case, the Constitutional Court, and Inter and 112 Ukraina TV channels buildings by placing tyres next to their entrances.125 Prior usage of the same tactics by the far-right increases the likelihood of their direct involvement.
Analysis of online video streams, government investigation findings, May 2 Group reports, forensic medical examinations, eyewitness testimonies, and other evidence strongly indicate that 42 people perished as a result of the fire, smoke, and from trying to jump from the upper floors of the Trade Union building with far-right activists beating them on the ground and blocking the exits.. The victims were unarmed and included mainly separatists, their supporters, and several employees, in particular women, who were in the building at the time.126 Some of the strongest evidence of far-right involvement in the arson attack comes from the far-right itself, in the form of credit claiming. A growing body of research within terrorism studies focuses on credit claiming. An important finding is that perpetrators are far more likely to deny responsibility for their attacks than to take credit for ones that they did not perpetrate.127 This is particularly true when the targets are civilians. Nonetheless, many extremist groups do claim credit for civilian attacks.128 Statements posted by the Right Sector, the SNA, and the neo-Nazi Misanthropic Division on their websites and social media sites admitted the involvement of their organisations in the massacre. The Right Sector celebrated on its website the massacre by describing it as “another bright page in our fatherland’s history.” Claiming responsibility for the slaughter, it wrote: “In the first minutes of the battle, the ‘Right Sector’ activist was seriously wounded in the stomach. Several more PS [Right Sector] activists received injuries of varying degrees of severity. However, this did not prevent the rest of the PS fighters, together with football fans, from repelling the attack of pro-Russian provocateurs, and as a result, they successfully countered attempts to seize buildings in Odesa. Standing shoulder to shoulder, Odesa activists, football fans and ‘Right Sector’ fighters defeated the forces of pro-Russian mercenaries. Order has been restored in Odesa.”129 The Right Sector—which was dominated in Odesa and Kharkiv by the Social National Assembly and its paramilitary wing, Patriot of Ukraine—and the neo-Nazi Misanthropic Division (which joined the Azov battalion after the massacre) admitted on the social media platform V Kontakte and in other public statements that the fire was set deliberately.130
The official investigation of the Odesa massacre was a farce. Nobody was found guilty of perpetrating this mass killing. As noted, the Right Sector shooter was initially arrested but then released. Only separatists were among those arrested and tried for the Odesa massacre. The Odesa massacre trial of separatists resulted in their acquittal by a local court. The Ukrainian court based its decision on the lack of evidence in support of prosecution charges. Even the verdict acknowledged both the weakness of the investigation into the perpetrators and the role of Parubiy and other government officials.131 The Council of Europe and the UN Special Commission reports also noted the destruction of evidence.132 A report by the special commission of the Council of Europe found that the Ukrainian government’s investigation of the Odesa Massacre was inadequate, politically selective, and featured the falsification of evidence, despite the existence of video footage showing who threw the Molotov cocktails at the building.133
The Ukrainian media cited SBU sources that a far-right activist, who headed the Right Sector in Odesa during the Odesa Massacre, was a secret agent of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and that he and far-right associates were paid by SBU to attack opposition politicians, threaten judges, and conduct other illegal actions.134 This would be consistent with the fact that the Right Sector was not investigated for the Odesa massacre even though the Right Sector publicly admitted involvement. His secret collaboration with SBU would also be consistent with the fact that SBU and the Prosecutor General Office refused to charge him for killing another person in Odesa in 2018. Moreover, in 2020, the SBU gave this far-right activist the status of a victim in this case, even though he streamed this killing on his social media account and the police investigation determined that he was the killer.135 In this sense, the Odesa massacre was not entirely anomalous; it featured post-Maidan far-right involvement with apparent support from high-level political leaders in a corrupt country where investigations and media have inconsistently followed the evidence.
Conclusion
This study assesses the role of the far-right in post-Maidan Ukraine, specifically, in the Donbas war and the Odesa massacre. These were two of the biggest episodes of political violence in the country leading up to the February 2022 Russian invasion. This area of research is worth close investigation because it represents intrinsically important episodes of political violence that have not attracted objective analysis based on available primary sources in Ukrainian, Russian, and English. Investigating the role of the far-right is also timely because the far-right in Ukraine is riven by duelling, self-serving contemporary narratives.
The predominant narratives propagated by governments and the mainstream media in Ukraine, the West, Russia, and separatist-controlled Donbas, concerning the role of the far-right in the war in Donbas and the Odesa massacre, have evidently been partisan. Contrary to the Russian government, separatists, and associated media, the Ukrainian government and military are not Nazi or even neo-Nazi. There were no neo-Nazis among the upper echelon of the Ukrainian government. President Zelensky is certainly not a Jewish neo-Nazi. He tried to placate and mainstream the far-right for political reasons, but has no observable personal affinity to that extreme ideology.
Neo-Nazis constituted only about one percent of the Ukrainian forces before the Russian invasion in 2022, and there is weak electoral support for neo-Nazi parties throughout the country. Similarly, the policy of glorification of the OUN-UPA, their leaders, such as Stepan Bandera, and the adoption and use of their “Glory to Ukraine! Glory to the Heroes!” greeting by the state and the military, including Zelensky, do not make Ukraine a Nazi state. While the OUN and the UPA were far-right terrorist organisations, which collaborated with Nazi Germany and perpetrated the mass murders of Jews, Poles, and Ukrainians, they were not Nazis. Ukrainians could not join the Nazi party because Hitler and other Nazi leaders regarded Ukrainians as racially inferior and opposed independence of Ukraine while also dismissing the attempt to create even a puppet state by the Bandera faction of the OUN in Lviv shortly after the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union. Thus, Putin cannot credibly justify the illegal invasion in February 2022 as a war to “de-Nazify” the “Nazi regime.”136 The power of the far-right and the glorification of the OUN and the UPA in Ukraine under Poroshenko and Zelensky were exaggerated and exploited by the Russian leaders to justify the invasion.
But the West’s efforts to whitewash the far-right in Ukraine also rests on empirically shaky grounds. Despite their relatively small numbers militarily and politically, the far-right in Ukraine exercised outsized power. The far-right organisations, volunteer battalions, and paramilitary units organised and led by them played, along with separatists and Russian nationalists, a significant role in starting and escalating the incipient civil war in the Donbas and then impeding its peaceful resolution. Even after technically integrated into the official Ukrainian forces, Azov and other far-right groups continued to harbour extremist views. Often brandishing the same extremist symbols, the core leaders and members remained and even ascended within the police, military, and security services during the Donbas war. Western media accounts have drawn heavily from biased Ukrainian sources, including “official” investigations and the May 2 Group. Across numerous primary sources in Ukrainian, Russian, and English, we find evidence that the Right Sector, Social-National Assembly, its paramilitary wing Patriot of Ukraine, and groups of far-right football ultras from Odesa and Kharkiv played a critical role in the Odesa massacre against separatist protesters on 2 May 2014. Neo-Nazi SNA/Patriot of Ukraine, which dominated the Right Sector in Odesa and Kharkiv, organised the Azov battalion right after this massacre.
Despite the lack of international consensus over the definition of terrorism, a common interpretation is the use of violence by non-state actors aimed at creating fear for political ends, particularly when the targets are civilians.137 Depending on one’s definition, some attacks within the episodes of political violence covered in this study, such as the Odesa massacre, could, therefore, arguably be classified as terrorism. What is clear is that neither of the duelling narratives accurately captures the role of the far-right. This study has helped to fill that research lacuna by making use of substantial primary source materials in Ukrainian, Russian, and English. Besides the Maidan massacre, the Donbas war and the Odesa massacre are the two most substantial episodes of political violence from the independence of Ukraine in 1991 to the February 2022 illegal Russian invasion [end]
Ivan Katchanovski is a Ukrainian and Canadian political scientist. He teaches at the School of Political Studies and the Conflict Studies and Human Rights Program at the University of Ottawa in Canada. He specialises primarily in politics, conflicts, political violence, and the far right in Ukraine. His academic publications include five books, 21 articles in peer-reviewed journals, and twelve book chapters.
Max Abrahms is a professor of public policy and political science at Northeastern University, where he specialises in international security. Abrahms has published extensively in leading academic and popular outlets such as International Organization, International Security, International Studies Quarterly, Security Studies, Comparative Political Studies, Harvard Business Review, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, New York Times, Washington Post, USA Today, Newsweek, The Atlantic, and Los Angeles Times.
I disagree with the authors on two points
Stepan Bandera & friends were Nazis. How can the authors identify some neo-Nazis in modern Ukraine, while not regarding their historical mentors as Nazis ? Before WW2, they were praising either Adolf Hitler or Benito Mussolini. Their political project was authoritarian, racist and criminal. They were dreaming of ethnic cleansing. De facto during WW2, they committed mass killing of Jews and Poles.
Terrorism is not restricted to non-state actors. Terrorism is violent action to terror civilians, in order to achieve a common political goal. This is not even a value judgement, but Hiroshima bombing was terrorism. The Israeli targeting and mass killing of civilians, in the prospect of ethnic cleansing in Gaza, is terrorism.
chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia
Endnotes
Arel, Dominique and Jesse Driscoll. 2023. Ukraine’s Unnamed War. Before the Russian Invasion of 2022. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Black, J.L. and Michael Johns (Eds.). 2016. The Return of the Cold War: Ukraine, the West and Russia. Abingdon: Routledge; Hahn, Gordon M. 2018. Ukraine Over the Edge: Russia, the West and the “New Cold War.” Jefferson, NC: McFarland Books; Katchanovski, Ivan. 2016a. “The Separatist War in Donbas: A Violent Break-up of Ukraine?” European Politics and Society, 17 (4), 473-489; Kudelia, Serhiy. 2016. “The Donbas Rift.” Russian Politics & Law, 54 (1), 5-27; Pikulicka-Wilczewska, Agnieszka and Richard Sakwa (Eds.). 2015. Ukraine and Russia: People, Politics, Propaganda and Perspectives. Bristol: E-International Relations; Sakwa, Richard. 2015. Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands. London: I.B.Tauris. ↩︎
Danciu, Gabriela-Cătălina. 2023. “A Perspective on Justifying the Ukraine–Russia War. Elements Of Propaganda.” International Journal of Social and Educational Innovation, 10 (19), 224-239; “Address by the President of the Russian Federation” (2022, February 24) http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843. ↩︎
Black, J.L. and Michael Johns (Eds.). 2016. The Return of the Cold War: Ukraine, the West and Russia. Abingdon: Routledge; Katchanovski, Ivan. 2023a. “The Maidan Massacre Trial and Investigation Revelations and Their Implications for the Ukraine-Russia War and Relations.” Russian Politics, 8 (2),181-205. ↩︎
See, for example, Colborne, Michael. 2022. From the Fires of War: Ukraine’s Azov Movement and the Global Far Right, Stuttgart: Ibidem; Davidzon, Vladislav. 2023. “The Search for Neo-Nazis Under the Bedsheets Reflects American Progressive Hysteria, Not Ukrainian Reality.” Tablet Magazine, July. ↩︎
Umland, Andreas. 2019. “Irregular Militias and Radical Nationalism in PostEuromaydan Ukraine: The Prehistory and Emergence of the “Azov” Battalion in 2014.” Terrorism and Political Violence, 31 (1), 105- 131. ↩︎
Umland, Andreas. 2020. ‘The Far Right in Pre- and Post-Euromaidan Ukraine: From Ultra-Nationalist Party Politics to Ethno-Centric Uncivil Society.’ Demokratizatsiya, 28 (2), 247-268. ↩︎
Ishchenko, Volodymyr. 2016. “Far right participation in the Ukrainian Maidan protests: an attempt of systematic estimation.” European Politics and Society, 17 (4), 453-472. ↩︎
Hahn, Gordon M. 2018. Ukraine Over the Edge: Russia, the West and the “New Cold War.” Jefferson, NC: McFarland Books; Katchanovski, Ivan. 2016b. “The Maidan Massacre in Ukraine: A Summary of Analysis, Evidence, and Findings.” In The Return of the Cold War: Ukraine, the West and Russia, eds. J.L. Black and Michael Johns. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 220-224; Katchanovski, Ivan. 2020. “The far right, the Euromaidan, and the Maidan massacre in Ukraine.” Journal of Labor and Society, 23 (1), 5-29; Katchanovski, 2023a; Katchanovski, Ivan. 2023b. “The “Snipers’ Massacre” on the Maidan in Ukraine.” Cogent Social Sciences, 9 (2); Katchanovski, Ivan. 2024. The Maidan Massacre in Ukraine. London: Palgrave Macmillan. ↩︎
Khalil Mutallimzada and Kristian Steiner, (2022), Fighters’ motivations for joining extremist groups: Investigating the attractiveness of the Right Sector’s Volunteer Ukrainian Corps. European Journal of International Security, 1–23. Ilmari Käihkö, (2018), A nation-in-the-making, in arms: control of force, strategy and the Ukrainian Volunteer Battalions. Defence Studies 18:2, 147–166; Tetyana Malyarenko and David J. Galbreath, (2016), Paramilitary motivation in Ukraine: beyond integration and abolition, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 16:1, 113–138. ↩︎
Hale, Henry E., Oxana Shevel and Olga Onuch. 2018. “Believing Facts in the Fog of War: Identity, Media and Hot Cognition in Ukraine’s 2014 Odesa Tragedy.” Geopolitics, 23 (4), 851-881. A poll commissioned for that study found that 44% of Ukrainians believed that this mass killing was committed by provocateurs from Russia, while 11% blamed pro-Russian residents of Odesa. Ten percent of the respondents said that the Odesa massacre was perpetrated by “Ukrainian nationalists from Odesa” and 3% by “pro-Ukrainian” residents of Odesa. ↩︎
Van Evera, Stephen. 1997. Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. ↩︎
Griffin, Roger with Matthew Feldman (Eds.). 2003. Fascism: Critical Concepts in Political Science. London: Routledge. ↩︎
Brahimi, Alia. “Ideology and terrorism.” The Oxford handbook of terrorism (2019): 298. ↩︎
See, for example, Jadoon, Amira, Andrew Mines, and Daniel Milton. “Targeting quality or quantity? The divergent effects of targeting upper verses lower tier leaders of militant organizations.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 67, no. 5 (2023): 1007-1031; Schram, Peter. “Self-managing terror: Resolving agency problems with diverse teams.” Games and Economic Behavior 130 (2021): 240-257; Abrahms, Max, and Philip BK Potter. “Explaining terrorism: Leadership deficits and militant group tactics.” International Organization 69, no. 2 (2015): 311-342; Popovic, Milos. “The perils of weak organization: Explaining loyalty and defection of militant organizations toward Pakistan.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 38, no. 11 (2015): 919-937. ↩︎
Biletsky 2013; Biletsky, Andriy. “Nedochytanyi Franko.” Patriot Ukrainy, (2008). https://web.archive.org/web/20101120085407/http://patriotukr.org.ua/index.php?rub=stat&id=409. Also, please note that the ADL has adopted the spelling of “antisemitism” instead of “anti-Semitism.” After reviewing the history and consulting with other leading experts, they determined that this is the best way to refer to hatred toward Jews, so we have adopted the same spelling convention here. ↩︎
Clarke, Colin P. “The Terrorist Diaspora.” Testimony, House Homeland Security Committee Task Force on Denying Terrorists Entry into the United States (2017). ↩︎
Boyd-Barrett, Oliver. 2016. Western Mainstream Media and the Ukraine Crisis: A Study in Conflict Propaganda. New York: Routledge. ↩︎
Some researchers and Zelensky have cited the presence of Russian-speakers in the Azov regiment and other neo-Nazi-led armed formations as evidence of their relative tolerance and moderation and argued that the Azov regiment distanced itself from its far-right roots. (See Umland 2019; “Zelensky refutes Russian propaganda claim that Azov Regiment is ‘neo-Nazi.’” The New Voice of Ukraine (2022, May 2), https://news.yahoo.com/zelensky-refutes-russian-propaganda-claim-131100438.html. However, these formations were organized and led by neo-Nazi organizations, which had a racist ideology and cast themselves as defenders of the White race. For this reason, they included not only large numbers of Russian speakers from Ukraine but also neo-Nazis from Russia, Belarus, and the Western countries, such as Australia, Sweden, and the US. ↩︎
“Ukraine war: Ros Atkins on… Putin’s false ‘Nazi’ claims.” BBC, (2022, March 26) https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-europe-60853404; Five Azovstal defenders were awarded the title of Heroes of Ukraine. Svidomi, (2022, October 3). https://svidomi.in.ua/en/page/five-azovstal-defenders-were-awarded-the-title-of-heroes-of-ukraine. Loyd, Anthony. “‘Nonsense’: Heroes of Mariupol Denied US Weapons Over neo-Nazi Past.” Times, (2024 May 2). https://www.thetimes.com/world/russia-ukraine-war/article/nonsense-heroes-of-mariupol-denied-us-weapons-over-neo-nazi-past-kwnr0r0pw; “Boris Johnson Praises Nazi Azov Battalion,” YouTube. (2024, May 23). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_6g7i-4wswk. There was similar systematic and politically motivated whitewashing of the far-right in Ukraine in Wikipedia, especially, after the Russian invasion. A small number of Wikipedia editors systematically whitewashed neo-Nazi and other far-right parties, organizations, and their leaders, such as Azov regiment, Patriot of Ukraine, Svoboda, National Corps, the OUN, the UPA, Stepan Bandera, Roman Shukhevych, etc. They removed or deliberately excluded scholarly studies and other evidence of the extremist ideology and involvement in mass murder of the far-right, such as the Maidan and Odesa massacres, the Holocaust, and the Lviv pogrom in Ukraine and smeared in biographical entries scholars and other experts whose studies show such ideology and political violence by the far-right in Ukraine. (See, for example, Azov Brigade, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Azov_Brigade; Patriot of Ukraine, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patriot_of_Ukraine; 2014 Odesa clashes, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014_Odesa_clashes; Far-right politics in Ukraine, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Far-right_politics_in_Ukraine. They included editors who misrepresented the Holocaust in Poland using similar tactics in Wikipedia, which is unreliable but widely accessed source, compared to academic studies (Grabowski, Jan, and Shira Klein. 2023. “Wikipedia’s Intentional Distortion of the History of the Holocaust.” Journal of Holocaust Research 37 (2): 133–90). ↩︎
Katchanovski, Ivan and Alicen Morley. 2012. “Politics of US Television Coverage of Post-Communist Countries.” Problems of Post-Communism, 59 (1), 15-30. ↩︎
Bhatia, Michael. 2008. “Fighting words: naming terrorists, bandits, rebels and other violent actors, ”Third World Quarterly, 26 (1), 5-22; Schmid, Alex P. 2012. “The revised academic consensus definition of terrorism.” Perspectives on Terrorism, 6 (2), 158-159; Ganor, Boaz. 2002. “Defining terrorism: Is one man’s terrorist another man’s freedom fighter?” Police Practice and Research, 3 (4), 287-304. ↩︎
Although the focus of this analysis is on the portrayal of the far-right in Ukraine, a related narrative dispute has been over whether to characterise the conflict in the Donbas as a civil war. The Ukrainian and Western governments and the media described the war in Donbas as an interstate war between Russia and Ukraine or a hybrid war while denying that there was a civil war. By contrast, the Russian and Donbas separatist governments and associated media denied any Russian military involvement in the war and called it a purely civil war. The majority of scholars and datasets such as the Correlates of War Project and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program classified it as a civil war or an intrastate conflict, while also noting the Russian military interventions in Donbas prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in See, for example, Arel and Driscoll 2023; Black and Johns 2016; Hahn 2018; Katchanovski 2016a; Kudelia 2016. ↩︎
Abrahms, Max. “What terrorists really want: Terrorist motives and counterterrorism strategy.” International Security 32, no. 4 (2008): 78-105. ↩︎
Rossolinski-Liebe, Grzegorz. 2014. Stepan Bandera: The life and afterlife of a Ukrainian nationalist. Stuttgart: Ibidem. ↩︎
Yeomans, Rory, (Ed.). 2016. The Utopia of Terror: Life and Death in Wartime Croatia. Rochester: University of Rochester Press; Katchanovski, Ivan. 2015. “Terrorists or National Heroes? Politics and Perceptions of the OUN and the UPA in Ukraine.” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 48 (2-3), 217-228. ↩︎
Rudling, Per Anders. 2011. “The OUN, the UPA and the Holocaust. A Study in the Manufacturing of Historical Myths.” Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies, #2107, Center for Russian and East European Studies, Pittsburgh University. ↩︎
See Katchanovski, 2016a; Katchanovski, Ivan. 2006. Cleft Countries: Regional Political Divisions and Cultures in Post-Soviet Ukraine and Moldova. Stuttgart: Ibidem. ↩︎
Umland, Andreas. 2019. “Irregular Militias and Radical Nationalism in PostEuromaydan Ukraine: The Prehistory and Emergence of the “Azov” Battalion in 2014.” Terrorism and Political Violence, 31 (1), 105-131. ↩︎
Mueller, John E. 2006. Overblown: How politicians and the terrorism industry inflate national security threats, and why we believe them. New York: Simon and Schuster; Abrahms, Max. 2006. “Why terrorism does not work.” International Security, 31 (2), 42-78. ↩︎
Kydd, Andrew, and Barbara F. Walter. 2002. “Sabotaging the peace: The politics of extremist violence.” International Organization, 56 (2), 263-296. ↩︎
“Zvit tymchasovoi slidchoi komisii Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy z pytan rozsliduvannia faktiv zahybeli hromadian u mistakh Odesi, Nariupoli, a takozh inshykh mistakh Donetskoi ta Luhanskoi oblastei Ukrainy.” (2014, September 5). Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy. http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=52134↩︎
Abrahms, Max, and Justin Conrad. “The strategic logic of credit claiming: A new theory for anonymous terrorist attacks.” Security Studies 26, no. 2 (2017): 279-304. ↩︎
Schmid, Alex. “Terrorism-the definitional problem.” Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 36 (2004): 375; Schmid, Alex P. “The definition of terrorism.” In The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, pp. 39-157. Routledge, 2011; Schmid, Alex P. “Discussion 1-Revisiting the wicked problem of defining terrorism.” Terrorism: Its Past, Present & Future Study A Special Issue to Commemorate CSTPV at 25 (2020): 3. ↩︎