Nicolas Cinquini

Analista senior di l'intelligenza in u campu di a gestione di i risichi di sicurezza, sรฒ un anzianu tenente detective รจ ufficiale di l'intelligenza in l'agenzie di u Statu francese. A bona pronuncia hรจ ะะธะบะพะปะฐะน ะงะธะฝะบัƒะธะฝะธ, in russu

Tag: bigserge

  • Flash: Ukraine manages to damage Crimea bridge

    French State radio station RFI reveals that without knowledge or consent of the national legislature, active-duty military personnel are deployed in Ukraine. Their mission is involving maintaining French military equipment and training Ukrainian non-commissioned officers in close proximity to the combat zone. That secret operation is codenamed Volia and based in Poland, its official cover is known as Gerfaut

    On November 17, 2026, with British support in intelligence and EW, scores of cruise missiles and drones manage before dawn to overwhelm air defense in Kerch and damage the Crimea bridge, a symbolic target.

    in The Atlanticist defeat in Donbass and Ukraine

    chronicle of a new catastrophic NATO venture

    Related

    Panzer, Marsch

    the saga of NATO Panzerkampfwagen in Donbass and Ukraine

    November 11, 2025: Der Krieg

    in French, November 11, 2025 is an opportunity to highlight how the way Europe is sacrificing forcibly mobilized Ukrainian conscripts is reminiscent of the spectacular carnage of WW1

    August 2, 2025: Russophrenia: the Westโ€™s favourite delusion about Russia โ€“ Brian McDonald

    Ten years after I coined the term, the mediaโ€™s still convinced Russia is both collapsing, and conquering the world

    May 9, 2025: Victory Day

    January 9, 2025: Total Kievan Debellation โ€“ Big Serge

    The Russo-Ukrainian War: Year 3

    March 1, 2024: Russo-Ukrainian war: The Deluge โ€“ Big Serge

    Z World Turns Two

    December 12, 2023: The Atlanticist ยซ counter-offensive ยป

    the last NATO attempt to avoid defeat in its proxy war in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia

    August 29, 2023: Escaping Attrition: Ukraine Rolls the Dice โ€“ Big Serge

    The Zaporizhia Summer Blockbuster

    June 2, 2023: The Battle of Bakhmut: Postmortem โ€“ Big Serge

    Russo-Ukrainian War Update

    May 20, 2023: Countdown of the Atlanticist defeat in Bakhmut

    January 20, 2023: Russo-Ukrainian War : The World Blood Pump โ€“ Big Serge

    Gradually, and then Suddenly

    November 29, 2023: How American Neocons Wrecked the Middle East and Ukraine โ€“ David Stockman, Antiwar.com

    This is part 2 of โ€œWhy There Is Still No Peace on Earth: Washingtonโ€™s Folly From The Persian Gulf to Ukraine.โ€  Read part 1

    Nazism in Ukraine

    its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine, chronicle

    The Western disinformation about Ukraine

    chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia

    Music

    https://youtu.be/JQUiYm6iK7c
  • [Sharing] Living Dangerously – Big Serge

    Russo-Ukrainian War: Autumn 2025

    The Russo-Ukrainian War seems to have been engineered in a laboratory to frustrate people with repetition and analytic paralysis. Headlines appear to be circulating on a choreographed loop, all the way down to the place names. Kaja Kallas at the European Commission recently announced, without a hint of irony, that Europeโ€™s new sanctions package – the 19th one – is the toughest yet. Ukraineโ€™s supporters are insisting that Tomahawk missiles are the weapons system that will finally change the game and break the war decisively in Kievโ€™s favor – reiterating the same grandiose claims that they made about GMLRS, and Leopards, and Abrams, and F-16s, and Storm Shadows, and ATACMS, and virtually every other piece of military hardware in NATOโ€™s inventories. On the ground, Russia is attacking settlements named Pokrovsk and Pokrovsโ€™ke; it recently captured Toretsk and Torsโ€™ke and is now attacking Toretsโ€™ke. The more things change, the more things stay the same.

    The analytic frameworks applied to the war have also changed relatively little, buried and obfuscated by the nebulous concept of attrition. On the Ukrainian side, there is continued insistence that Russia is suffering exorbitant losses and straining under the pressure of Ukrainian deep strikes, while Ukrainian setbacks are blamed in large part on the failure of the United States to expand its largesse and give Ukraine everything it needs. Many pro-Russian lines of thinking mirror this and suppose that the AFU is on the verge of disintegration, while the Kremlin is accused of failing to โ€œtake the gloves offโ€, particularly in regards to the Ukrainian energy grid, Dnieper bridges, and dams.

    The result is a very strange sort of war. This is an extraordinarily high-intensity ground war. Both armies remain in the field, holding hundreds of miles of continuous front after years of bloody fighting. Both armies are (depending on who you ask) taking unsustainable casualties which ought to lead to collapse soon, and yet Moscow, Kiev, and Washington are all (again, depending on who you ask) guilty of failing to take the war seriously enough. All of this is maddeningly repetitive, and one could be forgiven for tuning out entirely. Even the diplomatic tango between Trump, Zelensky, and Putin, after delivering a few entertaining moments, failed to really move the needle in any discernable direction.

    Few would argue that the trajectory of the war changed in an obviously dramatic way in 2025, and it is important to avoid the worn out and clichรฉd language about โ€œturning pointsโ€ or โ€œcollapseโ€ or any such silly thing. However, 2025 saw several shifts in the war, which will hardly ostentatious or dramatic, are nevertheless very important. 2025 has been the first year of the war in which Ukraine launched no ground offensives or proactive operations of its own. This fact is not only a hint at the threadbare state of Ukraineโ€™s ground forces, but also a testament to the way Russian forces transformed โ€œattritionโ€ from a buzzword into a method of persistent pressure across a variety of axes this year.

    In lieu of initiative on the ground, and facing a slow but relentless rollback of their defenses in the Donbas, the theory of Ukrainian victory has shifted in an unacknowledged but dramatic way. After years of insisting that it would achieve maximal territorial integrity – an outcome which would require the total and decisive defeat of Russiaโ€™s ground forces – Ukraine has reframed its path to victory mainly as a process of inflicting strategic costs on Russia that mount until the Kremlin agrees to a ceasefire. Consequentially, the debate about arming Ukraine has shifted from a conversation about armor and artillery – equipment useful for retaking lost territories – to a discussion about deep striking weapons like Tomahawks, which can be used to shoot at Russian oil refineries and energy infrastructure. In short, rather than move to prevent Russian from achieving immediate operational objectives in the Donbas, Ukraine and its sponsors are now seeking ways to make Russia pay a price such that victory on the ground is no longer worth it. It is unclear whether they have thought about what price Ukraine will pay in the exchange. Perhaps they do not care.

    About Tomahawks

    Notwithstanding Ukraineโ€™s attempts to jumpstart indigenous production, it is inevitable that Ukrainian capabilities will be largely determined by the largesse of western sponsors. This aspect of the war took a sudden turn at the beginning of the October when fresh reporting began to circulate that Tomahawk missiles might be on the table for Ukraine. Tomahawks have always been on Ukraineโ€™s wish list (given that the Ukrainian wish list as such consists of essentially all the military equipment in NATOโ€™s combined inventories) but this was the first reporting that they might be under serious consideration.

    As is frequently the case, the discussion spiraled away from realistic grounding, with some suggesting that the Tomahawk would be a โ€œgame changerโ€ for Ukraine (where have we heard that before?) and the pro-Russian sphere dismissing it as an irrelevant distraction. Thereโ€™s a tendency to focus on the quality of American weapons systems, casting them as either unrivaled technological marvels or overhyped and overpriced baubles, but this is generally not productive and largely irrelevant to the matter at hand. The Tomahawk, broadly speaking, is exactly as advertised, and provides proven and reliable strike capability at strategic depths in excess of 1,000 miles. In role, range, and payload it is essentially an analog to Russiaโ€™s Kalibr missiles (I am begging the enthusiasts to note the phrase โ€œessentially an analogโ€ rather than rake me over the coals over the different guidance systems and other technical minutia). Such a system will always be valuable and would obviously improve Ukraineโ€™s deep strike capabilities.

    The โ€œproblemโ€ with Tomahawks does not relate to any โ€œproblemโ€ with the missile itself, but with its availability and Ukraineโ€™s technical capability to launch them. The Tomahawk is conventionally a ship-launched missile (there is no extant air-launched variant) with a few novel options for ground launch. Ukraine, obviously, would require ground launch systems, and the problem is that these systems are essentially brand new and available in very limited quantities: more importantly, American service branches are in the process of trying to build out these capabilities throughout the decade. Providing ground-launchable Tomahawks to Ukraine in any meaningful numbers would therefore essentially require the US Army and Marines to scrap their own force buildout plans.

    There are two basic options for ground launching Tomahawks. One of these is the US Armyโ€™s MRC (Mid-Range Capability) Launcher, dubbed the Typhon. This is an enormous tractor-trailer launcher with four launch tubes, first delivered in 2023. It has an enormous footprint – so large, apparently, that the Army is already asking for a smaller replacement – and is intended to give the Army an organic fires component in the gap between the shorter range Precision Strike Missile and hypersonic systems (which do not yet exist). The critical fact is this: the Army intends to field a total of five Typhon batteries by 2028, of which two have been delivered so far. Each battery consists in turn of four launchers, implying that eight out of a planned twenty launchers have been delivered. Even more importantly, both of the currently operational batteries are already deployed, with one in the Philippines and one in Japan. These systems are being actively used in exercises and trials, including an exercise this summer in Australia

    The Typhon system gives ground launch capability to the Tomahawk but brings a massive footprint

    The situation with the Marine Corpsโ€™ launch system is quite similar, although the launch platforms themselves could not be more different. Unlike the lumbering Typhon tractor trailer, the Marines are fielding a significantly more lithe and compact LMSL system, with the tradeoff of a single launch tube compared to the Typhonโ€™s four. What matters is not so much the technical differences, as the fact that the Marines – like the Army – only received their first deliveries in 2023, and they are currently in the process of building out the force. In the case of the marines, the goal is to have a Tomahawk battalion built out by 2030. In fact, the production contract came into effect as recently as 2025.

    What does all of that mean? It means that, although the Tomahawk itself is a fine missile, the systems for ground launch are so new and available in such limited quantities that equipping Ukraine with Tomahawks would require either the US Army or the Marines to materially alter their force structure in the near term (through 2030, essentially). These are essentially the opposite of much of the gear thatโ€™s been given to Ukraine to this point: far from being inventories of older systems that can be earmarked as surplus or tabbed for replacement, Tomahawk ground launch is a brand new capability that is in the middle of deployment and buildout for the first time.

    This is, of course, a layered complication on top of Tomahawk quantities in and of themselves. The issue of Tomahawk availability is both over and under emphasized, depending on the context. The United States has something like 4,000 Tomahawks in its inventories (although half of these are currently inside their cells on American ships), so it is not quite correct to say (as some have) that America is running out of these critical weapons. The issue is that production rates are relatively anemic (generally between 55 and 90 per year) and are fail to replenish the expenditure from even relatively brief strike campaigns, such as the repeated strikes on Yemen. Broadly speaking, then, the issue is not so much that the United States is in immediate danger of running out of Tomahawks, but that procurement schedules are so slow that even relatively minor expenditures can erase multiple years worth of deliveries.

    It may be useful, then, to consider Tomahawks in comparison to the ATACMS missiles which have already been provided to Ukraine. Unlike the Tomahawk, the ATACMS is a system which has already been tabbed for replacement, with the Precision Strike Missile in the early phases of its rollout. ATACMS were also compatible with launch systems that Ukraine already had. In comparison to Tomahawks, then, ATACMS are both vastly more strategically expendable, produced in larger numbers, and easier to deploy. Despite all these points in their favor, the United States provided Ukraine with just 40 ATACMS. Even if the Army could be pressured into handing over one or two of its brand new Typhon launchers, it is difficult to imagine that more than few dozen Tomahawks could be spared for Ukraine: a token inventory far too small to wage a sustained strike campaign in the Russian heartland

    Peace, Sponsored by Raytheon

    Given that Tomahawks for Ukraine would be measured in the dozens, rather than the hundreds, itโ€™s worth asking whether this could actually change anything for the AFU at the front. The answer is clearly no in the long run, but it would be unwise to dismiss the possibility that even a limited tranche of Tomahawks (letโ€™s say 40 to 50 missiles) could help alleviate pressure on Ukrainian forces at the front, provided they were used appropriately. A short term boost to Ukrainian strike capabilities, if deployed against Russian rear areas, could force further dispersal and rationing of Russian assets and temporarily stall Russiaโ€™s emerging multi-axis offensive. This could defer the loss of key positions until early 2026. This presumes, however, that the Ukrainians would be content to use Tomahawks against operational targets. In reality, Ukraine can never seem to resist lobbing missiles at targets that have little bearing on the front, like the Kerch Bridge. Indeed, a failure to synergize strikes at depth with operations on the ground is a major reason why the ATACMS achieved so little.

    On the other side of this equation, it is a common complaint from the Russian perspective that Moscow has done too little to โ€œdeterโ€ the United States from empowering Ukraineโ€™s strike campaign – both by directly providing munitions and supplying the planning, ISR, and guidance systems. This, however, rather misses the point. Russia has done nothing of note to deter the United States because both Moscow and Washington understand fully that there is essentially no appetite (on either side) for a direct confrontation. In the (sensible) absence of a willingness to strike back at NATO targets, there is really nothing Russia can do to deter beyond maintaining its own retaliatory capabilities. The issue is not that Russia has failed to actively deter, but that there is nothing they could do even if they wanted to.

    The basic pattern here is well established. The United States has done what it can to backstop Ukrainian strike capabilities, but it has held them at a level where Ukraineโ€™s damage output falls far short of decisive levels. So long as that is the case, Russia has clearly demonstrated that it will simply eat the punches and retaliate against *Ukraine*. Hence, when the United States helps Ukraine target Russian oil facilities, it is Ukraine that receives the reprisal, and it is Ukraine which has its natural gas production annihilated as the winter approaches. In a sense, neither side is really trying to deter the other at all. The United States has raised the cost of this war for Russia, but not enough to create any real pressure for Moscow to end the conflict; in response, Russia punishes Ukraine, which is something the United States does not really care about. The result is a sort of geostrategic Picture of Dorian Gray, where the United States vicariously inflicts cathartic damage on Russia, but Ukraine accrues all the soul damage.

    In the case of Tomahawks, the risk-reward calculus is just not there. Tomahawks are a strategically invaluable asset that the United States cannot afford to hand out like candy. Even if the launch systems could be provided (highly doubtful), the missiles could not be made available in sufficient quantities to make a difference. The range of the missiles, however, significantly raises the probability of miscalculation or uncontrolled escalation. Ukraine shooting American missiles at energy infrastructure in Belgorod or Rostov is one thing; shooting them at the Kremlin is another thing entirely.

    There is, however, another aspect of this which seems to be garnering little attention. The biggest risk of sending Tomahawks is not that the Ukrainians will blow up the Kremlin and start World War Three. The bigger risk is that the Tomahawks are used, and Russia simply moves on after eating the strikes. Tomahawks are arguably one of the last – if not *the* last – rung in the escalation ladder for the USA. We have rapidly run through the chain of systems that can be given to the AFU, and little remains except a few strike systems like the Tomahawk or the JASSM. Ukraine has generally received everything it has asked for. In the case of Tomahawks, however, the United States is running the most serious risk of all: what if the Russians simply shoot down some of the missiles and eat the rest of the strikes? Itโ€™s immaterial whether the Tomahawks damage Russian powerplants or oil refineries. If Tomahawks are delivered and consumed without seriously jarring Russian nerves, the last escalatory card will have been played. If Russia perceives that America has reached the limits of its ability to raise the costs of the war for Russia, it undercuts the entire premise of negotiations. More simply put, Tomahawks are most valuable as an asset to threaten with.

    Reading between the lines of President Trumpโ€™s public statements recently, it seems likely that he has rationally weighed these considerations. Publicly, he used the threat of Tomahawks to try and force Russia to keep negotiating, and heโ€™s received a commitment for another meeting with Putin for his trouble (more on that later). He has now, for the time being, shelved the Tomahawk plan, commenting that โ€œwe need themโ€ and applying the usual Trumpian linguistic style to the broadly accepted issue of inventories which I have outlined here. Tomahawks are simply more valuable to the United States as a tool to threaten escalation, rather than as an actual kinetic asset in Ukrainian hands, and so long as Trump keeps his powder dry he can re-raise the issue later.

    Ultimately, perhaps, this discussion is not about Tomahawks at all. These missiles, rather, are simply a totem which demonstrate two important dovetailing points. First, that American resources are not infinite, and as the United States reaches deeper into its bag to help Ukraine, it begins to grab at strategically critical assets that the US military simply cannot spare. Secondly, we must remember that Americaโ€™s policy in Ukraine is a game of titration, with Washington probing the limits of Russiaโ€™s willingness to โ€œeat the strikesโ€ without allowing the reprisal violence to spill out of Ukraine.

    The Big Banana: Russiaโ€™s Operational Schema

    At this point, itโ€™s becoming increasingly difficult to say anything meaningful about the actual operational progression on the ground. There are several reasons for this. First and foremost, the war has now gone on so long and is consistently moving at such an apparently glacial pace that most people simply do not care at this point whether Russia holds Yampil or not, or whether they have advanced past the rail line in Pokrovsk. There is severe fatigue (or perhaps boredom is the better word) with the status of an interminable sequence of apparently small settlements, industrial complexes, and forestry plantations, and as a result most people have essentially checked out. Not the least among these must surely be President Trump, who apparently chucked Zelenskyโ€™s map of the frontline and complained that he was tired of being shown the same maps over and over again.

    On the other hand, we have the true obsessives who continue to dutifully follow the frontlines regularly and are voluntarily intaking daily updates. We end up with a bifurcated system where some people are still highly plugged in to the micro movements on the battlefield, but most people just donโ€™t care, and we can hardly blame the latter. I think it would be profitable, then, to think about the broader Russian operational scheme, what it has achieved, and what it aims to achieve in the coming year. This is probably more interesting and less repetitious than fixating on the exact positioning within Pokrovsk or Kupyansk.

    There are two larger points that I think are worth making before we look at some specifics.

    First and foremost, much of the battlefield analysis that comes out (particularly from western analysts) makes firm pronouncements as to what constitutes Russiaโ€™s โ€œprimaryโ€ and โ€œsecondaryโ€ efforts, but these are essentially interpolated and frequently incorrect. For example, itโ€™s become a fairly mainstream conception that Russiaโ€™s โ€œprimaryโ€ point of effort right now is the capture of Pokrovsk, but this does not actually seem supported by Russian actions. There is no particular advantage to be gained for Russia by pushing to capture Pokrovsk as soon as possible – the city is already in a stranglehold partial encirclement. To be sure, Pokrovsk *was* a major logistic hub for Ukrainian forces, but it can no longer serve that role and was sterilized as a transit hub months ago, once it became a frontline city. The opposite side of this coin is that other Russian axes of advance, particularly in southern Donetsk and the bend of the Donets River, are dismissed as โ€œsecondaryโ€ efforts. This is a major mistake, and I will attempt to show that these are critical advances where Russia is shaping the battlefield to its advantage for follow on operations.

    Secondly, it should be understood and appreciated that Ukraine has lost essentially all battlefield initiative. In 2024, the AFU was able to assembled a mechanized reserve and launch their operation into Kursk. This operation ultimately failed and resulted in severe Ukrainian losses, but this is unrelated to the fact that Ukraine was still able to accumulate forces and pursue offensive operations on its own initiative. In 2025, however, Ukraine has been in a permanent state of reactivity. This was the first year of the war in which Ukraine did not launch any proactive operations or counteroffensives of its own, and Ukrainian hopes have instead pivoted to their strategic strike campaign against Russian oil facilities.

    In a larger sense, the effect of attrition can be seen year by year with the shrinking scope of Ukraineโ€™s proactive operations. In 2022, Ukraine was able to launch a pair of widely separated offensives which yielded modest successes: an offensive out of Kharkov rolled the front back over the Oskil River (though it failed to collapse the Lugansk shoulder), meanwhile, a series of battles outside of Kherson failed to break through the Russian lines, but they did play a role in persuading the Russians to abandon their bridgehead over the Dnieper. The point of course is not to once again autopsy these offensives, but to point out that there were two of them, that they were meaningful in scale, and they did result in important territorial gains for Ukraine. In 2023, by contrast, Ukraine launched a single theater-level offensive in the south, which failed. In 2024, we got the Kursk operation: smaller and less lavishly equipped than 2023โ€™s Zaoprizhia offensive, and aimed at a peripheral theater. This year, there were no proactive Ukrainian operations at all. There is a very clear pattern at play here, with Ukraineโ€™s offensive punch progressively shrinking before disappearing entirely in 2025. This was a year of essentially uninterrupted Russian initiative

    Putting Ukraine permanently on the backfoot is a significant Russian achievement, and it is owed to a few converging factors. Obviously, the attrition of Ukrainian forces is a major factor. Weโ€™ve gone through the flailing Ukrainian mobilization, the cannibalization of its forces, and the general lack of reserves in detail on several occasions, and thereโ€™s no need to retread that ground here. Suffice it to say, Ukraineโ€™s ability to husband forces for offensive operations appears to be severely degraded. Russia has exacerbated this problem by pressing steadily on a variety of different axes. At the moment, there are no fewer than seven Russian axes of attack, pressuring a slew of cities all along the line. This creates a series of defensive emergencies, maintains the burn rate on Ukrainian forces, and fixes them on the line. Finally, in a point to be detailed shortly, Russian advances have begun unraveling Ukraineโ€™s logistic connectivity, which puts strain on supply and prevents the concentration and accumulation of forces

    Eastern Ukraine: Approximate Situation and Axes of Russian Advance

    Now, for the development of the front and the premise of the Russian offensive scheme. The main point that I want to impress is essentially as follows: rather than fixating on Pokrovsk, Russiaโ€™s advances across Southern Donetsk and on the inner bend of the Donets River ought to be thought of as vital operations which have severely disrupted the coherence of both the Ukrainian front and their logistics. This has the triple effect of preventing the Ukrainians from launching offensives of their own, accelerating the attrition of Ukrainian forces, and shaping the front for the coming operation to capture the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration.

    To begin, letโ€™s consider the progress that Russia has made in southern Donetsk, both in raw territorial terms and its implications for Ukrainian logistic connectivity. To demonstrate this, Iโ€™ve pulled maps from DeepState (again, a Ukrainian mapping enterprise) for August 2023 (when Ukraine was attempting its counterattack out of Orikhiv) and for October 20th, the week of this writing. I have noted both the length of the southern front (obviously a linear approximate, as the actual front has many bends and bulges) and highlighted the key highways that Ukraine uses to run the backbone of its logistics

    The Southern Front: 2023 vs 2025

    Now, one thing that is worth noting is that the Russians are currently positioned to roll up this front even further. Ukrainian defensive lines are primarily oriented towards on a north-south axis. Once Russian forces cleared Kurakhove, they entered the seams in these defensive lines – that is to say, they are advancing laterally along the face of the prepared defenses, rather than trying to bash through them from the front. This is one reason why their progress has been relatively steady and uninterrupted. Now approaching the โ€œelbowโ€ in the lines, where they pivot southward, and having crossed the Yanchur River, the Russians are entering a substantial space that lacks meaningful prepared defenses. Using the Military Summary map (Ukrainian fortifications are mapped with yellow dots), the void in the defense is fairly obvious as the Russians work their way into the elbow of the line

    Apart from the obvious development of note here – that Russian forces have, to this point, rolled up roughly half the length of the southern front and are positioned to roll up another ten to fifteen miles – we want to note two things which are emblematic of the way the war is going for Ukraine, but curiously receive little attention. First, the compression of the front is robbing the Ukrainians of the maneuver space which made it possible for them to stage and assemble forces for their counteroffensive in 2023. Two years ago, there was a wide, lateral buffer zone around the Ukrainian staging area in Orikhiv, and Ukrainian forces had access to multiple highways where they could disperse forces in their marching columns and run their logistics.

    Today, that buffer zone is gone, as is the easy access to several of the branch highways. The Russian advance, which started with the breakthrough at Ugledar and Kurakhove last year and which has now rolled up some 50 miles of front, has essentially sterilized Ukraineโ€™s capacity to attack in the south, because they have neither the space nor the roads to safely accumulate forces here. It has also shattered the interconnectivity of Ukrainian logistics: rather than having several highways to shuttle troops and material to the east, Ukraine now has to support several disconnected logistic fronts with individual highways. More to the point, there is no longer a single Donetsk โ€œfrontโ€ to speak of, but rather a series of logistic fronts: one in the south, around Orikhiv, another at Pokrovsk, and the largest one in the Slovyansk Banana. These are lacking lateral connectivity to each other for the Ukrainians due to the wedges that the Russians have forced in the front, particularly in the south, funneling logistics and reinforcements down individuated corridors.

    The bigger issue, however, lies farther north on the Pokrovsk and Donets axes, and in the way that they synergize. People who are focusing, to the exclusion of all else, on when and how Russia will capture Pokrovsk are failing to see the bigger picture, and indeed are not even trying to understand it.

    The ultimate Russian operational objective (in this phase of the war, at least) is the belt of cities which runs in an arc from Slovyansk to Kostyantinivka, which I affectionately call โ€œthe Slovyansk Bananaโ€ due to its curved shape. A cursory look at the map shows us why the very operations that are being dismissed as secondary efforts are in fact critical axes of Russian effort which are shaping the battlefield for the attack on the Banana

    There are two very important facts about the Banana, from the perspective of operational geography. The first is that, although the combined mass of the agglomeration is far larger than any of the urban areas that have been fought over to this point, the Banana is relatively difficult to defend because it sits on the floor of a river valley: the Kazennyi Torets flows through all the cities in the Banana before it flows into the Donets. Russian forces approaching the city from the southwest, the east, and the north will all be advancing along the high ground that overlooks the cities on the floor.

    The second important fact about the Banana is that, despite its size, it is supported by just two highways which approach from the southwest and northwest respectively, funneling into the Banana like a wedge. Taking the northern highway/MSR (the E40 highway) as an example, we see that Russiaโ€™s operations inside the Donets bend are hardly secondary efforts: they are vital shaping operations linked to the integrity of the Banana. The E40 highway tracks the Donets bend very closely (it generally stays within five miles of the river. If the Russians sustain their progress north of the Donets and reach the river at Bogorodychne or Svyatogirsk, it will not only put E40 under persistent drone attack but also curl the defensive line behind the Banana, to say nothing of the enormous pressure on the Siversk salient.

    On the Pokrovsk front as well, Russiaโ€™s progress is being misinterpreted. After their breakthrough at the end of the summer, Russian forces have consolidated the bulge north of Pokrovsk (despite weeks of Ukrainian counterattacks) and are steadily working their way towards Raisโ€™ke and Sergiivka. This is not about Pokrovsk at all – reaching Raisโ€™ke would put Russian forces directly in the backfield of Kostyantinivka, on the supply lines to the underside of the Banana.

    I am not suggesting at all that Russian forces are on the verge of some great offensive surge that will carry them into the heart of the Banana instantly. However, there is a fairly well established Russian operational methodology in this war, which involves working their way methodically into Ukraineโ€™s logistical lanes and seams, segmenting the front and strangulating their strongpoints, forcing them to supply frontline strongholds with single file logistics and dirt roads. They did it in Bakhmut, and Avdiivka, they are doing it in Pokrovsk, and they are shaping the front to attempt this on a large scale in the Banana

    Assault on the Banana: Coming 2026

    The general point that we are trying to make here is that dismissing Russian advances in the Serebryanka Forest, the emerging bulge north of Pokrovsk, and their move into the Donets Bend as โ€œsecondary effortsโ€ is mistaken. Zooming out to the appropriate scale shows that these are concentric operations, shaping the front for a 2026 assault on the Banana – moving towards the E40 road from the north, bending the defensive shield around Siversk, and working into the underbelly of the Banana through Raisโ€™ke.

    This is, perhaps, a long way to go for a short drink of water, but there are a few basic points here that get completely missed when the view of the front is preoccupied with the fighting inside Pokrovsk and Kupyansk:

    1. Russiaโ€™s advance out of Kurakhove across the southern front is not a secondary axis. They have rolled up half of the southern front, condensing Ukrainian forces into a compact space which sterilizes their ability to attack in the south.
    2. Broad Russian pressure across a half-dozen axes maintained a steady burn rate on Ukrainian forces and prevented the accumulation of forces for proactive operations. 2025 has been the first year of the war in which Ukraine has not launched any offensive operations on its own initiative.
    3. Advances in the Donets bend and the interstitial space between Pokrovsk and Kostyantinivka are not subsidiary or secondary operations: they are critical shaping operations that are moving concentrically toward the Banana.

    To be frank, the general mood of optimism in the Ukrainian infosphere, which lasted for much of the summer, struck me as remarkably odd. The frontline has yielded no real good news for Ukraine at any point this year. Beyond the broader strategic point, that Ukraine has lost the initiative and does not seem capable of getting it back, Russia is in the process of capturing two important urban centers (Russian troops are in the city centers of Pokrovsk and Kupyansk), it has begun the assault on at leas two more (Lyman and Kostyantinivka), it has rolled up half of the southern front, and cleared most of the inner Donets-Oskil bend. The Banana is on deck for 2026.

    Ukraineโ€™s Cost Theory of Victory

    One thing that has become apparent over the last year is that Kiev has abandoned previous notions of outright victory on the battlefield and adopted a new strategic framework predicated on imposing unacceptable costs on Russia, so that Moscow will agree to freeze the conflict.

    This is a subtle and unspoken yet extremely important distinction. It is easy to miss, because both Ukrainian leadership and Ukraineโ€™s western backers continue to speak of Ukrainian โ€œvictoryโ€ and the possibility of Ukraine โ€œwinningโ€ the war. What is crucial to understand is that the โ€œvictoryโ€ that they speak of now is categorically different than the victory of 2022 and 2023. In the first years of the war, it was possible to at least speak of Ukraine taking the initiative to advance on the ground and retake territory. There were concrete examples of Ukrainian offensives in 2022, and the battle in Zaporizhia – although unsuccessful – showed that it was at least possible for Ukraine to attempt a proper mechanized offensive.

    Therefore, in the first years of the war, when leaders in Kiev and Brussels and London and Washington spoke of Ukrainian victory, they essentially meant the defeat of the Russian ground forces and the reconquest of much (or all) of the Donbas. The Kursk Operation of 2024 began to split the difference: Ukraine still had some resources to mount proactive operations, but these operations were no longer aimed at the dense eastern front and instead aimed at relatively soft subsidiary fronts with an eye to out-levering the Russians.

    Today, with the Ukrainian army stuck in a permanent state of reactivity and slowly receding defense, it no longer makes any sense to speak of Ukrainian victory in the most straightforward sense, which is to say victory on the battlefield – no matter how tenaciously or bravely the Ukrainian rank and file continues to fight in essentially intolerable circumstances. Instead, Ukrainian โ€œvictoryโ€ has been transmogrified to mean essentially that Russia absorbs such exorbitant costs that it agrees to some sort of ceasefire without preconditions.

    The costs to be imposed on Russia are implicitly assumed to be a mixture of battlefield casualties and damage to strategic assets inflicted by Ukrainian air strikes, and in regards to the latter Ukraine seems to be particularly placing its hopes in a strategic strike campaign against Russian oil. Ukraineโ€™s attempts to disable Russian oil production and refining have dovetailed with ever more aggressive sanctions from the United States against Russian fossil fuel exports – although it is worth noting that the limited price response to these sanctions indicates that markets expect that Russian oil will continue to flow.

    Trumpโ€™s suggestion that Tomahawks may be on the table for Ukraine must be seen as a constituent element of this new strategy and theory of victory. And this, ultimately, is very important to understand. Tomahawks are not being bandied about because anybody (in Kiev or Washington) believes that 50 cruise missiles will allow Ukraine to defeat the Russian Army and recapture the Donbas. Tomahawks were mentioned because the Ukrainian alliance is threatening to cripple the Russian fossil fuels industry (through a mixture of sanctions and kinetic strikes on production facilities) unless Putin agrees to a ceasefire.

    This is why it is wrong to be surprised that Trump abruptly cancelled his meeting with Putin and instead announced more sanctions. Thereโ€™s nothing abrupt or erratic about this. Threats to Russian oil are now, without exaggeration, the main lever that the Ukrainian bloc has against Russia. It certainly should not have been a surprise that the Kremlin, which has reiterated the same fundamental war aims since day one, was not excited about coming to Budapest to freeze the conflict, and neither should it surprise us that Trump would instead prefer to pull harder on the oil lever. The two powers are playing entirely different games: Russia is slow-walking negotiations while it advances on the ground, and the United States is playing a pain game designed to raise the costs for Russia

    We have fundamentally reached an impasse when it comes to negotiations. For Moscow, negotiations with the United States are essentially a way to string Washington along. Moscow feels that it is winning on the ground, therefore a diplomatic impasse suits Russian interests. When western leadership complains that Russia does not seem interested in ending the war, they are correct, but they are missing the point. Russia is not interested in ending the war right now because doing so would not serve Russian interests. The Banana is in the crosshairs, and a ceasefire now would be an egregious compromise when victory on the ground is in sight.

    The sense of urgency that Washington feels to end the war – mainly by yanking furiously on the oil lever until the Kremlin cries uncle – stems from the fact that this is now the only sort of victory that Ukraine can hope to win. The ground war has been written off as a total loss, and all that remains is to lob missiles and drones at Russian refineries, sanction Russian firms and banks, and harass shadow tankers until the costs become intolerable. The longer the Ukrainian ground forces can hold the line the better, but this is merely a matter of limiting the downside. The fact that Russia can retaliate disproportionately against Ukraine barely factors into this thinking.

    The key point here, however, is that the concept of Ukrainian victory has been completely transformed. There is now no real discussion of how Ukraine can win on the ground. For the Ukrainian bloc, the war is no longer a contest against the Russian Army, but a more abstract contest against Russiaโ€™s willingness to incur strategic costs. Rather than preventing Russian capture of the Donbas, the west is testing how much Putin is willing to pay for it. If history is any guide, a game predicated on outlasting Russiaโ€™s strategic endurance and willingness to fight is a very bad game to play indeed [end]

    The original article

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    Gradually, and then Suddenly

  • [Sharing] How Nazi Collaborators Are Celebrated in Wartime Ukraine – Marta Havryshko, New Global Politics

    On September 27, 2023, the Museum of the History of Kyiv was crowded. Around 200 peopleโ€”including active Ukrainian military personnel, journalists, cultural figures, and politiciansโ€”came to the opening of an exhibition titled Storms of Steel, a reference to the 1920 memoir of the radical German nationalist Ernst Jรผnger.

    It featured photographs of soldiers taken on the Bakhmut front line during the height of Ukraineโ€™s resistance to the Russian invasion. These soldiers belong to the 3rd Assault Brigadeโ€”one of the elite units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, which was formed in the early days of Russiaโ€™s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The unit traces its origins to the ultra-nationalist Azov movement and is composed of veterans of the Azov Battalion, which was established in 2014 and took part in the war in the Donbas. Between 2018 and 2024, U.S. Congress banned the organization from receiving funding, arms, training, and other forms of support due to its documented neo-Nazi affiliations and concerns regarding human rights violations.

    The founder and current commander of the 3rd Assault Brigade is Andriy Biletskyi, a far-right ideologue and central figure in the Azov movement. Biletskyi is the author of the openly racist 2013 pamphlet The Word of the White Leader and the founder of several neo-Nazi organizations, including Patriot of Ukraine and the National-Social Assembly.

    A key feature of the exhibit was that the soldiers reenacted historical photos, particularly of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). Founded in 1942, it fought for an independent Ukrainian state. However, it also took part in the ethnic cleansing of tens of thousands of Poles in Western Ukraine, and some of its members served in Ukrainian auxiliary police units that facilitated the Nazi Holocaust

    Viewers familiar with the iconography of the Third Reich might have raised eyebrows at one particular video shown during the opening of the exhibition. It featured a close-up of the back of the head of a 3rd Assault Brigade fighter known by the call sign โ€œMartyn.โ€ Tattooed on his head was a symbol resembling the Wolfsangel, the divisional insignia of several Waffen-SS units, including the infamous 2nd SS โ€œDas Reichโ€ Panzer Division. Azov affiliates often refer to a variant of this symbol as the โ€œIdea of the Nation,โ€ denying any direct associations with Nazism. Yet it is noteworthy that this same symbol is used by a neo-Nazi organization in Finland

    Some of the fighters featured in the exhibition attended the opening. Among them was Aleksei Kozhemyakin, known by his call signs โ€œKolovratโ€ and โ€œBarsik,โ€ a platoon commander in the 3rd Assault Brigade. Kozhemyakin is a far-right Russian national. He allegedly came to Ukraine in 2015, joined the Azov Battalion and has been fighting on the Ukrainian side ever since. According to the SOVA Center, he served several years in prison for assaulting a man from Azerbaijan in Syktyvkar, Russia in 2005. He was also suspected of desecrating a Jewish cultural center in the same city.

    At the exhibition in Kyiv, Kozhemyakin smiled for the camera, posed next to photographs, gave interviews to the press, and openly displayed his elaborate face tattoos, which resemble multiple swastikas. Other tattoos, hidden beneath his olive-green T-shirt, include a giant swastika and a portrait of Adolf Hitler at the center. Notably, in one of the photographs on display, Kozhemyakin participated in the reenactment of a group portrait featuring a unit of Ukrainian Nazi collaborators. The exhibition caption referred to the group simply as the โ€œDivision โ€˜Galiciaโ€™โ€

    Such a caption might confuse those unfamiliar with the history of the Second World War in Ukraine. But historians know exactly what this refers to: the 14th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS (1st Galician), created by Nazi Germany in 1943 and composed of Ukrainian volunteers. Its fighters swore allegiance to Hitler and were subordinate to SS Chief Heinrich Himmler. They defended the interests of Nazi Germanyโ€”including by brutally suppressing anti-Nazi resistance movements in Slovakia and Yugoslavia. After the Division was crushed by the Red Army near Brody, it was replenished with Ukrainian men who had served in various police formations complicit in Nazi war crimes.

    A Tour Across the European Union

    The Storms of Steel exhibitionโ€™s status as a major cultural event in wartime Ukraine was underscored by the presence of high-level officials at its opening. They included then-acting Minister of Culture and Information Policy Rostyslav Karandeyev, who praised the exhibition, noting , โ€œI am convinced that this project will carry an extremely important patriotic and educational missionโ€

    The exhibition caused a sensation. It was covered by leading Ukrainian media and became a popular venue for patriotic lessons for Ukrainian students, both in the capital and in other cities where local museums hosted it. Public discourse surrounding the exhibition was marked by a deafening silence about the fact that it glorifies Ukrainian Nazi collaborators and equates them with todayโ€™s fighters of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

    It was clear that Ukrainian officials were fond of this militarized โ€œpatriotic project,โ€ as they decided to support it at the state level. The exhibition was reproduced on large banners framed in the colors of the Ukrainian national flag and taken on tour across Europe. It is no coincidence that the exhibition was hosted by countries that are not only among the most fervent supporters of Ukraine in its resistance to Russian aggression, but also those currently reckoning with their own communist past while simultaneously struggling to confront the legacy of their collaboration with the Nazis.

    One of those countries was Lithuania. On August 23, 2024, to mark Ukraineโ€™s Independence Day, the exhibition was ceremoniously opened at Vilnius Town Hall Square, one of the most popular tourist spots in the Lithuanian capital. The ceremony featured Sandra Adomaviฤiลซtฤ—, head of the Atviras Lietuvos Fondas (Open Lithuania Foundation), an organization funded by philanthropist George Soros. This suggests that the progressive group in question likely did not devote sufficient time to thoroughly examine the content of the exhibition they chose to promote. This also reflects a broader pattern of uncritical engagement by some Western actors with Ukraineโ€™s current humanitarian and cultural policies, which are increasingly shaped by an ethnonationalist agenda and promoting controversial historical figures.

    Adding official weight to the event was the presence of Viktor Hamotskyi, Ukraineโ€™s chargรฉ dโ€™affaires in Lithuania. Commenting on the exhibition, he stated: โ€œEach face in these photographs tells its own storyโ€”the story of the unbroken, who stand shoulder to shoulder with those who defended Ukraine a century ago.โ€ The exhibition was announced on the official website of the Embassy of Ukraine in the Republic of Lithuania

    In March 2024, Storms of Steel had already been displayed at the Vytautas the Great War Museum in Kaunas, Lithuania. In both Kaunas and Vilnius, photographs of the Waffen-SS Galicia Division were included as part of the exhibit โ€” with the same deliberately coy captions, omitting any mention of whom the Division served under or against whom it fought during World War II.

    One Lithuanian media outlet even published a feature on the exhibition, in which two of the five โ€œhistoricalโ€ photographs presented showed members of the Division. Neither the author of the piece nor the editorial board provided any comment on this telling โ€œdetail.โ€

    In April 2025, the exhibition โ€” again including the Waffen-SS Galicia Division photographs โ€” opened at the Baltic Defense College in Tartu, Estonia, a NATO-accredited education and training facility. According to the Collegeโ€™s official social media, the exhibition will remain on display there until June 2026

    Timing Matters

    The Storms of Steel exhibition at the Kyiv History Museum might have been just another of the countless militaryโ€‘patriotic events desperately trying to instrumentalize historical myths to mobilize society against Ukraineโ€™s โ€œeternal enemyโ€โ€”Russia. But the timing made it unique.

    Its opening coincided with a fullโ€‘blown political scandal in Canada that garnered international attention. On September 22, 2023, Yaroslav Hunka, a 98-year-old Ukrainianโ€‘Canadian veteran of the Waffenโ€‘SS Galicia Division, received a standing ovation in the Canadian Parliament.

    Present in the chamber was also Ukraineโ€™s Presidentโ€”whose own grandfather, Semen Zelenskyi, had fought against the Germans in the ranks of the Red Army and whose memory he had publicly honored on May 9, 2019, Victory Day over Nazism. Until recently, it had been an official state holiday in Ukraine. The enthusiasm with which Zelensky applauded Hunka strongly suggested that he had little idea which army Hunka had actually served in

    But Hunkaโ€™s past quickly became the subject of intense media scrutiny, sparking not only the resignation of Canadaโ€™s House Speaker, but also a broader public debate about the history of postwar Canada as a safe haven for numerous Nazi collaborators. Calls spread for the release of all reports of the Deschรชnes Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals in Canada, a federal investigation into suspected Nazi collaborators admitted to Canada. However, the Ukrainian Canadian Congress strongly opposed the publication of the reports.

    Ukrainian officials, for their part, opted to refrain from any statements that might further inflame the situation surrounding Hunka. Yet inside Ukraine, a public debate did take place. Some prominent public figures, politicians, and local authorities openly lionized Hunka, portraying the Waffen-SS Galicia Division as part of Ukraineโ€™s โ€œnational liberation movement.โ€ Members of the far-right Svoboda party, including those who serve in the military now, launched a social media flash mob in support of Yaroslav Hunka.

    In ultranationalist circles, the view that the campaign to โ€œdiscreditโ€ Hunka is โ€œUkrainophobicโ€ and orchestrated by the โ€œJewish slanderersโ€ has gained popularity. Meanwhile, members of the Avangard far-right group, now part of the 3rd Assault Brigade, have not hesitated to use antisemitic rhetoric, accusing Jewish organizations in Canada and worldwide of fueling this campaign.

    Moreover, on September 28 โ€” just one day after the Kyiv exhibitionโ€™s opening โ€” the Center for Countering Disinformation, a body under Ukraineโ€™s National Security and Defense Council reporting to Zelensky, issued a statement whitewashing the Division, claimingโ€“falselyโ€“that โ€œthe Nuremberg Tribunal did not find the unit guilty of any war crimes.โ€ What the statement conspicuously omitted was that the entire SSโ€”including the Waffenโ€‘SSโ€”had been declared a criminal organization, and that the Waffen-SS Galicia Division had never been subject to any separate Nuremberg review.

    Thus, the central Ukrainian authorities not only failed to condemn the glorification of the Waffenโ€‘SS Galicia Division but actively enabled itโ€”even during the Hunka scandal

    The Problem is Deeper

    The stance taken by Ukraineโ€™s Center for Countering Disinformation on the Hunka affair shows clearly that the countryโ€™s political leadership has no intention of clashing with the militaryโ€‘nationalist milieu, which has turned the Waffenโ€‘SS Galicia Division into an object of cult worship. And this is not just about the 3rd Assault Brigade, which featured photos of the Divisionโ€™s members in its exhibition. The official Facebook page of the Command of the Ground Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine promoted the exhibition, mentioning Waffenโ€‘SS Galicia Division participants alongside other Ukrainian military formations, including the Army of the Ukrainian Peopleโ€™s Republic, which existed from 1917 to 1921.

    The glorification of the Divisionโ€”including the wearing of patches bearing its Galician Lion insignia and the celebration of commemorative dates linked to the unitโ€”is visible in other Ukrainian military formations as well. These include the 1st Separate Assault Regiment โ€œDmytro Kotsiubailoโ€ (the โ€œDa Vinci Wolvesโ€), the 49th Separate Assault Battalion Karpatska Sich, the Kraken special unit under Ukraineโ€™s Main Directorate of Intelligence, the 12th Special Forces Brigade Azov, and fighters from Svoboda, currently serving in various units

    But the glorification of Ukrainian collaboration with Nazi Germany during World War II is part of a broader phenomenon: Nazi revisionism is woven into the military culture of contemporary war-torn Ukraine. Its core idea is to portray Nazi Germany as the lesser evil in contrast to Stalinโ€™s โ€œprison of nationsโ€ that โ€œoppressed Ukrainian national aspirations.โ€ Some go even further and praise Hitlerโ€™s war against the Soviet Union and compare it to the current confrontation between Ukraineโ€”supported by Western countriesโ€”and Russia as a continuation of the โ€œcivilizational struggleโ€ between Europe and Asia.

    A vivid example of this extreme position is expressed by the Artiom โ€˜Uraganโ€™ Krasnolutsky who currently holds a command position in the 3rd Assault Brigade. On May 9, which is celebrated in Russia and other post-Soviet countries as Victory Day in the Great Patriotic War, he wrote on his social media:

    Adolf Hitler did not sign the capitulation. The echoes of that war are still clearly heard todayโ€”in some places, even the flags remain unchanged. It is a war of the multicultural horde against White peopleโ€”the eternal struggle between light and darkness, life and death. A sacred crusade of the รœbermensch for the triumph of the great over the grotesque. Cursed be the Soviet army

    Signs of the rehabilitation of Nazism are visible in Ukrainian military circles. This is manifested, in particular, in the use of Nazi symbols. For example, the Vedmedi Assault Group, under the 36th Coastal Defense Brigade, uses SS bolts on its insignia alongside the SS motto Meine Ehre heiรŸt Treue (โ€œMy Honor is Loyaltyโ€).

    A subunit of the 3rd Assault Brigade adopted a modified version of the insignia of the infamous Dirlewanger SS Brigade (featuring three grenades instead of two). Meanwhile, fighters of the Karpatska Sich often wear patches, shirts, flags, and other items emblazoned with the insignia of the 3rd SS Panzer Division โ€œTotenkopfโ€โ€”notorious for its brutality and numerous war crimes, including the massacres at Le Paradis and Chasselay. The 422nd Battalion of Unmanned Systems not only adopted the title Luftwaffe but also uses the same eagle emblem employed by Nazi Germanyโ€™s air force

    In 2023, a Ukrainian unit named Nachtigall was created. It became a part of the 413th Separate Battalion of Unmanned Systems โ€œRaid,โ€commanded by Yevhen Karas, the leader of the neo-Nazi group C14, which was involved in an anti-Roma pogrom in Kyiv and attacks on LGBTQ+ activists, journalists, and left-wing activists. The name of this unit explicitly referencing the Nachtigall Battalion, formed by the German Abwehr in 1941 from ethnic Ukrainians, mainly members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). One of its commanders was Roman Shukhevych, who later led the UPA. The battalion participated in antiโ€‘Jewish pogroms in Vinnytsia Oblast in the summer of 1941. The following year, the Germans restructured it into Schutzmannschaft Battalion 201, which carried out crimes against antiโ€‘Nazi resistance groups and civilians, including Jews, in Belarus

    Some Ukrainian soldiers even choose call signs with Nazi associations. For example, Vadym Voroshylov, a celebrated Ukrainian ace pilot, openly explains the meaning of his call sign, โ€œKarayaโ€โ€”taken from Erich Hartmann, the most successful Luftwaffe ace of the Third Reich. He has said he thought it would be a great way to โ€œtrollโ€ Russians.

    It is important to emphasize that the use of Nazi symbols and names that evoke associations with Nazi Germany is not merely a problem of isolated units or individual soldiers. Due to the ongoing war, the Armed Forces of Ukraine enjoy the highest levels of public trust in Ukrainian society. In public discourse, the army is glorified and celebrated, receiving peopleโ€™s material and moral support. A moratorium on criticism of servicemen is widely perceived as an inherent part of the gratitude owed to those defending the country from Russian aggression.

    As a result, there is an almost total absence of public criticism regarding the use of Nazi symbols within the military. A conspiracy of silence surrounds this issue. At the same time, any attempt to initiate public discussion on the topic is promptly and unequivocally dismissed as โ€œRussian propagandaโ€ and as enabling Vladimir Putinโ€™s narrative of โ€œdenazification,โ€ which served as one of the pretexts for the war against Ukraine. Therefore, those who raise the issue face harsh criticism and are accused of being unpatrioticโ€”or even of โ€œbetraying the homeland.โ€

    This witch-hunt contributes to the gradual legitimization of Nazi apologia in Ukrainian society as a whole. One of the key tools in this process is merchandiseโ€”T-shirts, mugs, patches, caps, keychains, notebooks, and similar itemsโ€”that certain brigades and individual soldiers sell for fundraising purposes. Another mechanism involves youth-oriented initiatives, including military and medical training sessions, patriotic camps, cultural events, and so-called โ€œlessons in courageโ€ conducted in public schools by soldiers, veterans, and members of affiliated far-right youth organizations

    Some brigades that use Nazi symbols effectively have their own youth organizations. The largest of these is Centuria, which has chapters across Ukraine and even abroad, including in Germany. Originally founded as a paramilitary youth wing of the Azov movement, it has effectively come under the patronage of the 3rd Assault Brigade and now trains future fighters for it. Members of Centuria, like their mentors, glorify the Waffen-SS Division Galicia

    Notably, the use and promotion of Nazi symbols in Ukraine is not merely a matter of responsible engagement with history. It directly contradicts Ukraineโ€™s own memory laws passed in 2015, which ban and criminalize the โ€œpropaganda of the National Socialist regime.โ€ More importantly, it constitutes a desecration of the memory of the millions murdered, maimed, and deported by the Nazis and their alliesโ€”and an insult to the millions, including over six million Ukrainians, who fought against Nazism in the ranks of the Red Army.

    This minimization of Nazi crimes not only distances Ukraine from European culture of memoryโ€”a culture built on the condemnation of Nazism and the commemoration of its victims. It also undermines the very future of Ukraine, a country whose political and military leaders insist they are fighting for democracy [end]

    The original article

    Marta Havryshko is Dr. Thomas Zand Visiting Assistant Professor in Holocaust Pedagogy and Antisemitism Studies, Strassler Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies at Clark University

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    June 2, 2023: The Battle of Bakhmut: Postmortem โ€“ Big Serge

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  • [Sharing] It’s Official: Ukraine Conflict is British ‘Proxy War’ – Kit Klarenberg

    On March 29th, the New York Times published a landmark investigation exposing how the US was โ€œwovenโ€ into Ukraineโ€™s battle with Russia โ€œfar more intimately and broadly than previously understood,โ€ with Washington almost invariably serving as โ€œthe backbone of Ukrainian military operations.โ€ The outlet went so far as to acknowledge the conflict was a โ€œproxy warโ€ – an irrefutable reality hitherto aggressively denied in the mainstream – dubbing it a โ€œrematchโ€ of โ€œVietnam in the 1960s, Afghanistan in the 1980s, Syria three decades later.โ€

    That the US has since February 2022 supplied Ukraine with extraordinary amounts of weaponry, and been fundamental to the planning of many of Kievโ€™s military operations large and small, is hardly breaking news. Indeed, elements of this relationship have previously been widely reported, with White House apparatchiks occasionally admitting to Washingtonโ€™s role. Granular detail on this assistance provided by the New York Times probe is nonetheless unprecedented. For example, a dedicated intelligence fusion centre was secretly created at a vast US military base in Germany.

    Dubbed โ€œTask Force Dragonโ€, it united officials from every major US intelligence agency, and โ€œcoalition intelligence officersโ€, to produce extensive daily targeting information on Russian โ€œbattlefield positions, movements and intentionsโ€, to โ€œpinpointโ€ and โ€œdetermine the ripest, highest-value targetsโ€ for Ukraine to strike using Western-provided weapons. The fusion centre quickly became โ€œthe entire back office of the war.โ€ A nameless European intelligence chief was purportedly โ€œtaken aback to learn how deeply enmeshed his NATO counterparts had becomeโ€ in the conflictโ€™s โ€œkill chainโ€:

    An early proof of concept was a campaign against one of Russiaโ€™s most-feared battle groups, the 58th Combined Arms Army. In mid-2022, using American intelligence and targeting information, the Ukrainians unleashed a rocket barrage at the headquarters of the 58th in the Kherson region, killing generals and staff officers inside. Again and again, the group set up at another location; each time, the Americans found it and the Ukrainians destroyed it

    Several other well-known Ukrainian broadsides, such as an October 2022 drone barrage on the port of Sevastopol, are now revealed by the New York Times to have been the handiwork of Task Force Dragon. Meanwhile, the outlet confirmed that each and every HIMARS strike conducted by Kiev was entirely dependent on the US, which supplied coordinates, and advice on โ€œpositioning [Kievโ€™s] launchers and timing their strikes.โ€ Local HIMARS operators also required special electronic key [cards]โ€ to fire the missiles, โ€œwhich the Americans could deactivate anytime.โ€

    Yet, the investigationโ€™s most striking passages highlight Londonโ€™s principal role in influencing and managing Ukrainian – and by extension US – actions and strategy in the conflict. Both direct references and unambiguous insinuations littered throughout point ineluctably to the conclusion that the โ€œproxy warโ€ is of British concoction and design. If rapprochement between Moscow and Washington succeeds, it would represent the most spectacular failure to date of Britainโ€™s concerted post-World War II conspiracy to exploit American military might and wealth for its own purposes.

    โ€˜Prevailing Wisdomโ€™

    A particularly revealing section of the New York Times probe details the execution of Ukraineโ€™s August 2022 counteroffensive, targeting Kharkov and Kherson. Unexpectedly finding limited resistance from hollowed out Russian positions in these areas, Task Force Dragonโ€™s US military lead Lieutenant General Christopher T. Donahue urged Ukraineโ€™s field commander Major General Andrii Kovalchuk to keep pushing, and seize even further territory. He vehemently resisted, despite Donahue and other senior US military officials pressuring then-Ukrainian Armed Forces Valerii Zaluzhnyi to override his reticence

    Maps of Ukraineโ€™s 2022 counteroffensive advances

    Subsequently, the sense among Kievโ€™s foreign puppet masters that a golden opportunity to inflict an even more egregious blow on the Russians had been lost was pervasive. Irate, then-British defence minister Ben Wallace asked Donahue what he would do if Kovalchuk were his subordinate. โ€œHe would have already been fired,โ€ Donahue said. Wallace succinctly responded, โ€œI got this.โ€ At his direct demand, Kovalchuk was duly defenestrated. As the New York Times explains, the British โ€œhad considerable cloutโ€ in Kiev and hands-on influence over Ukrainian officials.

    This was because, โ€œunlike the Americans,โ€ Britain had formally inserted teams of military officers into the country, to advise Ukrainian officials directly. Still, despite Kiev failing to fully capitalise as desired by London and Washington, the 2022 counteroffensiveโ€™s success produced widespread โ€œirrational exuberanceโ€. Planning for a followup the next year thus โ€œbegan straightaway.โ€ The โ€œprevailing wisdomโ€ within Task Force Dragon was this counteroffensive โ€œwould be the warโ€™s lastโ€, with Ukraine claiming โ€œoutright triumphโ€, or Russia being โ€œforced to sue for peace.โ€ 

    Zelensky boasted internally, โ€œweโ€™re going to win this whole thing.โ€ The plan was for Ukrainian forces to cut off Russiaโ€™s land-bridge to Crimea, before seizing the peninsula outright. As the New York Times records though, Pentagon officials were considerably less enthused about Kievโ€™s prospects. This scepticism seeped out into the public sphere in April 2023 via the Pentagon Leaks. One document warned Ukraine would fall โ€œwell shortโ€ of its goals in the counteroffensive, forecasting โ€œmodest territorial gainsโ€ at most.

    The leaked intelligence assessment attributed this to โ€œshortfallsโ€ in Ukraineโ€™s โ€œforce generation and sustainmentโ€, and extensive Russian defences constructed following their retreat from Kherson. It cautioned โ€œenduring Ukrainian deficiencies in training and munitions supplies probably will strain progress and exacerbate casualties.โ€ The New York Times notes Pentagon officials moreover โ€œworried about [Kievโ€™s] ability to supply enough weapons for the counteroffensive,โ€ and wondered if the Ukrainians โ€œin their strongest possible position, should consider cutting a deal.โ€

    Even Task Force Dragonโ€™s Lieutenant General Donahue had doubts, advocating โ€œa pauseโ€ of a year or more for โ€œbuilding and training new brigades.โ€ Yet, intervention by the British was, per the New York Times, sufficient to neutralise internal opposition to a fresh counteroffensive in the spring. The British argued, โ€œif the Ukrainians were going to go anyway, the coalition needed to help them.โ€ Resultantly, enormous quantities of exorbitantly expensive, high-end military equipment were shipped to Kiev by almost every NATO member state for the purpose

    Western-supplied tanks obliterated during Ukraineโ€™s 2023 counteroffensive

    The counteroffensive was finally launched in June 2023. Relentlessly blitzed by artillery and drones from day one, tanks and soldiers were also routinely blown to smithereens by expansive Russian-laid minefields. Within a month, Ukraine had lost 20% of its Western-provided vehicles and armor, with nothing to show for it. When the counteroffensive fizzled out at the end of 2023, just 0.25% of territory occupied by Russia in the initial phase of the invasion had been regained. Meanwhile, Kievโ€™s casualties may have exceeded 100,000.

    โ€˜Knife Edgeโ€™

    The New York Times reports that โ€œthe counteroffensiveโ€™s devastating outcome left bruised feelings on both sides,โ€ with Washington and Kiev blaming each other for the catastrophe. A Pentagon official claims โ€œthe important relationships were maintained, but it was no longer the inspired and trusting brotherhood of 2022 and early 2023.โ€ Given Britainโ€™s determination to โ€œkeep Ukraine fighting at all costsโ€, this was bleak news indeed, threatening to halt all US support for the proxy war.

    Still, there was one last perceived ace up Londonโ€™s sleeve to keep Washington invested in the proxy conflict, and potentially escalate it into all-out hot war with Moscow. The New York Times reports that in March 2023, the US discovered Kiev โ€œwas furtively planning a ground operation into southwest Russia.โ€ The CIAโ€™s Ukraine chief confronted General Kyrylo Budanov, warning โ€œif he crossed into Russia, he would do so without American weapons or intelligence support.โ€ He did so anyway, โ€œonly to be forced back.โ€

    Rather than deterring further incursions, Ukraineโ€™s calamitous intervention in Russiaโ€™s Bryansk region was a โ€œforeshadowingโ€ of Kievโ€™s all-out invasion of Kursk on August 6th that year. The New York Times records how from Washingtonโ€™s perspective, the operation โ€œwas a significant breach of trust.โ€ For one, โ€œthe Ukrainians had again kept them in the darkโ€ – but worse, โ€œthey had secretly crossed a mutually agreed-upon line.โ€ Kiev was using โ€œcoalition-supplied equipmentโ€ on Russian territory, breaching โ€œrules laid downโ€ when limited strikes inside Russia were greenlit months earlier.

    As this journalist has exposed, Ukraineโ€™s Kursk folly was a British invasion in all but name. London was central to its planning, provided the bulk of the equipment deployed, and deliberately advertised its involvement. As The Times reported at the time, the goal was to mark Britain as a formal belligerent in the proxy war, in the hope other Western countries – particularly the US – would follow suit, and โ€œsend more equipment and give Kyiv more leeway to use them in Russiaโ€

    Initially, US officials keenly distanced themselves from the Kursk incursion. Empire house journal Foreign Policy reported that the Biden administration was not only enormously unhappy โ€œto have been kept out of the loop,โ€ but โ€œskeptical of the military logicโ€ behind the โ€œcounterinvasionโ€. In a further rebuke, on August 16th Washington prohibited Ukraineโ€™s use of British-made, long-range Storm Shadow missiles against Russian territory. Securing wider Western acquiescence to such strikes was reportedly also a core objective behind Kievโ€™s occupation of Kursk.

    However, once Donald Trump prevailed in the November 2024 presidential election, Biden was encouraged to use his โ€œlast, lame-duck weeksโ€ to make โ€œa flurry of moves to stay the courseโ€ฆand shore up his Ukraine project.โ€ In the process, per the New York Times, he โ€œcrossed his final red line,โ€ allowing ATACMS and Storm Shadow strikes deep inside Russia, while permitting US military advisers to leave Kiev โ€œfor command posts closer to the fighting.โ€

    Fast forward to today, and the Kursk invasion has ended in utter disaster, with the few remaining Ukrainian forces not captured or killed fleeing. Meanwhile, Bidenโ€™s flailing, farewell red line breaches have failed to tangibly shift the battlefield balance in Kievโ€™s favour at all. As the New York Times acknowledges, the proxy warโ€™s continuation โ€œteeters on a knife edge.โ€ There is no knowing what British intelligence might have in store to prevent long-overdue peace prevailing at last, but the consequences could be world-threatening [end]

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    The Russo-Ukrainian War: Year 3

    On March 5, 2022, the wreck of the sailing ship Endurance was found in the depths of the Weddell Sea off the coast of Antarctica. This, of course, was the vessel lost in Ernest Shackeltonโ€™s third expedition to Antarctica, which became trapped in the ice and sank in 1915. The story of that expedition is an extraordinary tale of human fortitude – with the Endurance lost to the ice, Shackletonโ€™s crew evacuated to a loose ice flow where they camped for nearly 500 days, drifting about the Antarctic seas, before making a desperate dash across the open ocean in an open 20 foot lifeboat, finally reaching the southern shore of inhospitable and mountainous South Georgia Island, which they then had to cross on foot to reach the safety of a whaling station.

    The story itself has an essentially mythic quality to it, with Shackletonโ€™s crew surviving for years on free floating ice floes in the most inhospitable seas on earth. For our purposes, however, it is the storyโ€™s coda that is particularly interesting. In Shackletonโ€™s memoirs, he remembered that, upon finally reaching the safety of the Stromness whaling station, one of his first questions was about the war in Europe. When Shackleton first set out on his ill-fated expedition on August 8, 1914, the First World War was less than a week old, and the German Army had just begun its invasion of Belgium. There was little expectation then that the war would proceed as it did, unleashing four years of slaughterous positional warfare that engulfed the continent.

    Shackleton, having been adrift at sea for years, clearly did not imagine that the war could still be raging, and asked the commandant of the whaling station โ€œtell me, when was the war over?โ€

    The answer came back: โ€œThe war is not over. Millions are being killed. Europe is mad. The world is mad.โ€

    The timing is serendipitous, since the discovery of the Enduranceโ€™s wreck, after more than a hundred years, happened to occur only a few weeks after the world again went mad, with the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian War in February 2022. As time continues its inexorable march and the calendar turns yet again, the war is passing through its third full winter. In February, Z-World will be three years old.

    Of course, modern communications make it extremely unlikely that anybody could be cut fully out of the loop for years at a time, like Shackleton and his men. Instead of being ignorant as to whether or not the war is over, many of us are exposed on a daily basis to footage of men being killed, buildings being blown up, and vehicles being shredded. Twitter has made it essentially impossible to live under a rock, or on an ice floe, as it were.

    If anything, we have the very opposite problem of Shackleton – at least as far as our wartime information infrastructure goes. We are saturated in information, with daily updates tracking advances of a few dozen meters and never ending bombast about new game changing weapons (which seem to change very little), and bluster about โ€œred linesโ€. This war seems to have an unyielding dynamic on the ground, and no matter how many grand pronouncements we hear that one side or the other is on the verge of collapse, the sprawling front continues to grind up bodies and congeal with bloody positional fighting.

    It would seem difficult to believe that a high intensity ground war in Europe with hundreds of miles worth of front could be boring, yet the static and repetitive nature of the conflict is struggling to hold the attention of foreign observers who have little immediately at stake.

    My intention here is a radical zoom-out from these demoralizing and fatiguing small scale updates (as valuable as the work of the war mappers is), and consider the aggregate of 2024 – arguing that this year was, in fact, very consequential. Taken as a whole, three very important things happened in 2024 which create a very dismal outlook for Ukraine and the AFU in the new year. More specifically, 2024 brought three important strategic developments:

    1. Russian victory in southern Donetsk which destroyed the AFUโ€™s position on one of the warโ€™s key strategic axes.
    2. The expenditure of carefully husbanded Ukrainian resources on a failed offensive towards Kursk, which accelerated the attrition of critical Ukrainian maneuver assets and substantially dampened their prospects in the Donbas.
    3. The exhaustion of Ukraineโ€™s ability to escalate vis a vis new strike systems from NATO – more broadly, the west has largely run out of options to upgrade Ukrainian capabilities, and the much vaunted delivery of longer range strike systems failed to alter the trajectory of the war on the ground.

    Taken together, 2024 revealed a Ukrainian military that is increasingly stretched to the limits, to the point where the Russians were able to largely scratch off an entire sector of front. People continue to wonder where and when the Ukrainian front might begin to break down – I would argue that it *did* break down in the south over the last few months, and 2025 begins with strong Russian momentum that the AFU will be hard pressed to arrest.

    Front Collapse in South Donetsk

    What stands out immediately about the operational developments in 2024 is the marked shift of energies away from the axes of combat that had seen the most intense fighting in the first two years of the war. In a sense, this war has seen each of its fronts activate in a sequence, one after the other.

    After the opening Russian offensive, which boasted as its signature success the capture of the Azov coastline and the linkup of Donetsk and Crimea, the action shifted to the northern front (the Lugansk-Kharkov axis), with Russia fighting a summer offensive which captured Severodonetsk and Lysychansk. This was followed by a pair of Ukrainian counteroffensives in the fall, with a thrust out of Kharkov which pushed the front back over the Oskil, and an operation directed at Kherson which failed to breach Russian defenses but ultimately resulted in a Russian withdrawal in good order over the Dnieper due to concerns over logistical connectivity and an over-extended front. Energies then pivoted yet again to the Central Donbas axis, with the enormous battle around Bakhmut raging through the spring of 2023. This was followed by the failed Ukrainian offensive on Russiaโ€™s defenses in Zaporozhia, in the south.

    Just to briefly recapitulate this, we can enumerate several operational phases in the first two years of the war, occurring in sequence and each with a center of gravity in different parts of the front:

    • A Russian offensive across the land bridge, culminating in the capture of Mariupol. (Winter-Spring 2022, Southern Front)
    • A Russian offensive in Lugansk, capturing Severodonetsk and Lysychansk. (Summer 2022, Donets-Oskil front)
    • Ukrainian Counteroffensives towards the Oskil and Kherson (Autumn 2022, Oskil and Dnieper fronts)
    • The Russian assault on Bakhmut (Winter-Spring 2023, Central Front)
    • Ukrainian counteroffensive on the land bridge (Summer 2023)

    Amid all of this, the front that saw the least movement was the southeastern corner of the front, around Donetsk. This was somewhat peculiar. Donetsk is the urban heart of the Donbas – a vast and populous industrial city at the center of a sprawling conurbation, once home to some 2 million people. Even if Russia succeeds in capturing the city of Zaporizhia, Donetsk will be by far the most populous of Ukraineโ€™s former cities to come under Moscowโ€™s control.

    In 2014, with the outbreak of the proto-Donbas war, Donetsk was the locus of much of the fighting, with the airport on the cityโ€™s northern approach the scene of particularly intense combat. This made it rather strange, then, that at the start of 2024 the Ukrainian Army continued to occupy many of the same positions that they built a decade prior. As intense fighting ebbed and flowed along other sectors of front, Donetsk remained besieged by a web of powerfully held Ukrainian defenses, anchored by heavily fortified urban areas stretching from Toretsk to Ugledar. Early Russian attempts to crack this iron ring open, including an assault on Ugledar in the winter of 2023, met with failure.

    The signature operational development of 2024, then, was the re-activation of the Donetsk front, after years of static combat. It is not an exaggeration to say that after years of coagulation, the Russian Army cracked this front wide open in 2024 and Ukraineโ€™s long and strongly held network of urban strongpoints collapsed

    Russian Progress on the Donetsk Axis in 2024

    The year began with the AFU fighting for its fortress in Avdiivka, where it continued to block the northern approach to Donetsk. At the time, the typical argument that one heard from the Ukrainian side was that the Russian assault on Avdiivka was pyrrhic – that the Russians were capturing the city with exorbitantly costly โ€œmeat assaultsโ€ that would inevitably sap Russian combat power and exhaust their ability to continue the offensive.

    With the full measure of the year behind us, we can definitively say that this is not the case. After the fall of Avdiivka, Russian momentum never seriously slackened, and in fact it was the AFU that appeared to be increasingly exhausted. The Ukrainian breakwater position at Ocheretyne (which had previously been their staging point for counterattacks around Avdiivka) was overrun in a matter of days, and by the early summer the frontline had been pushed out towards the approach to Pokrovsk.

    The Russian thrust towards Pokrovsk led many to believe that this city was itself the object of Russian energies, but this was a misread of the operational design. Russia did not need to capture Pokrovsk in 2024 to render it sterile as a logistical hub. Simply by advancing towards the E50 highway, Russian forces were able to cut off Pokrovsk from Ukrainian positions to the south on the Donetsk front, and Pokvrovsk is now a frontline city subject to the full spectrum of overwatch from Russian drones and tube artillery.

    By autumn, the Russian advance had put the Ukrainians in a severe salient, creating an unstable chain of positions in Selydove, Kurakhove, Ugledar, and Krasnogorivka. Russiaโ€™s advance from Ocheretyne onto the southern approach to Pokrovsk acted like an enormous scythe, isolating the entire southeastern sector of the front and allowing Russian forces to carve through it in the closing months of the year

    Russian Operations in 2024, Donetsk Axis

    This war has turned the word โ€œcollapseโ€ into a devalued buzzword. We are told repeatedly that one side or the other is on the verge of collapse: sanctions will โ€œcollapseโ€ the Russian economy, the Wagner uprising of 2023 proved that the Russian political system was โ€œcollapsingโ€, and of course we hear that exorbitant losses have one army or the other on the verge of total failure – which army that may be depends on who you ask.

    I would argue, however, that what we saw from October 2024 onward represents a real occurrence of this oft-repeated and discarded word. The AFU suffered a genuine collapse of the southeastern front, with the forces positioned in their strongpoints too attrited and isolated to make a determined defense, Russian fires becoming too heavily concentrated in ever more compressed areas to endure, and no mechanized reserve in the theater available to counterattack or relieve the incessant Russian pressure.

    Ukraine does maintain enough drones and concentrated fires to limit a full Russian exploitation – that is, Russia is still not able to maneuver at depth. This gave the Russian advance a particular stop-start quality, leapfrogging from one settlement and fortress to the other. More generally, Russiaโ€™s preference to use dispersed small-unit assaults limits the potential for exploitation. We have to emphasize, however, that Russian momentum on this axis has never seriously slackened since October, and many of the key Ukrainian positions were overrun or abandoned very quickly

    Ugledar is a good example: the Russians began their final push toward the town on September 24. By September 29, the 72nd Mechanized Brigade began evacuating. By October 1, Ugledar was fully under Russian control. This was a keystone Ukrainian position put in a completely untenable position and it went down in a week. One could argue, of course, that Ugledar held out for years (how then can we say with a straight face that it was captured in a week), but this is precisely the point. In early 2023 Ugledar (with the help of artillery stationed around Kurakhove) successfully repelled a multi-brigade Russian attack in months of heavy fighting. By October 2024, the position was completely untenable and was abandoned almost immediately when attacked.

    The Ukrainians did no better trying to hold Kurakhove – previously a critical rear area that served as both a logistical hub and a base of fire for supporting (former) frontline strongpoints like Ugledar and Krasnogorivka. Kurakhove, now under full Russian control, will in turn serve as a base of support for the ongoing Russian push to the west towards Andriivka.

    Taking the state of the front holistically, the AFU is currently holding two severe salients at the southernmost end of the line – one around Velyka Novosilka, and another around Andriivka. The former is likely to fall first, as the town has been fully isolated by Russian advances on the flanks. This is not a Bakhmut-like situation, where roads are described as โ€œcutโ€ because they are under Russian fire – in this case, all of the highways into Velyka Novosilka are cut by physical Russian blocking positions, making the loss of the position only a matter of waiting for the Russians to assault it. Further north, a more gentle and less strongly held salient exists between Grodivka and Toretsk. With Toretsk now in the final stages of capture (Ukrainian forces now hold only a small residential neighborhood on the cityโ€™s outskirts), the front should level here as well in the coming months.

    This leaves the Russians more or less in full control of the approaches to Kostyantinivka and Pokrovsk, which are in many ways the penultimate Ukrainian held positions in Donetsk. Pokrovsk has already been bypassed several miles to the west, and the map portends a re-run of the typical Russian tactical methodology for assaulting urban areas – a methodical advance along the wings of the city to isolate it from arterial highways, followed by an attack on the city itself via several axes

    The coming months promise continued Russian advances across this front, in a continuation of what can only be regarded as the collapse of a critical front on the part of the AFU. The Russian Army is advancing to the western border of Donetsk oblast and will ferret the Ukrainians out of their remaining strongpoints at Velyka Novosilka and Andriivka, while pushing into the belly of Pokrovsk. At no point since the fall of Avdiivka have the Ukrainians demonstrated the ability to seriously stymie Russian momentum along this 75 mile front, and the ongoing dissipation of Ukrainian combat resources indicates that little will change in this regard in 2025.

    Toehold: The Incredible Shrinking Kursk Salient

    Throughout the autumn of 2024 and these early months of winter, as Ukrainian forces were dug out of their dense web of fortified positions in the southern Donbas, their comrades continued to stubbornly hold on to their position in Russiaโ€™s Kursk Oblast. The basic shape of Ukraineโ€™s offensive into Kursk is by now well known – billed by Kiev as a gambit to change the psychological trajectory of the war and strike a prestige blow to Russia, the Ukrainian attack had early momentum after achieving initial strategic surprise, but quickly faltered after Ukrainian columns ran into effective Russian blocking positions on the highways out of Sudzha. Efforts to force the roads through Korenovo and Bolshoe Soldatskoe were defeated, and the Ukrainian grouping was left holding on to a modest salient around Sudzha, jutting out into Russia.

    Throughout the autumn, Russian counterattacks have focused on chiseling away at the base of the Ukrainian salient – forcing the Ukrainians out of Snagost and pushing them away from Korenovo. The progress here has been incremental, but significant, and by the start of January the โ€œneckโ€ of the Ukrainian salient had been compressed down to a little over nine miles wide, after their initial penetration in the summer had forced a breach of over twenty miles. All told, Ukraine has lost about 50% of the territory that they grabbed in August.

    The Russian pressure on the flanks of the salient have amplified many of the qualities that make this position wasteful and dangerous for the AFU. There is limited road connectivity for Ukrainian forces – a problem amplified by the rollback from Snagost, which cost them access to the highway running from Korenovo to Sumy. Apart from a few circuitous side roads, Ukrainian forces only have a single highway – the R200 route – to run material and reinforcements into the pocket, which allows Russian forces to surveil their lines of communication and conduct effective interdiction strikes. The compression of the pocket also greatly narrows the targeting area for Russian drones, tube artillery, and rocketry, and creates more condensed and saturating bombardment

    Despite the fact that this position has been profoundly unproductive for Ukraine – being steadily rolled back and having no synergy with other, more critical theaters – the same grouping of Ukrainian units remain here, fighting in a steadily more compressed space. Even more baffling, the Ukrainian grouping consists largely of premiere assets – Mechanized and Air Assault brigades – that could have contributed meaningfully as a reserve in the Donbas over the last three months.

    On January 5, there was a surprise in the form of a renewed Ukrainian attack out of the salient. The internet of course jumped to the conclusion that the AFU was going back over to some sort of general offensive posture in Kursk, but the reality was very underwhelming – something like a battalion sized assault up the axis towards Bolshoe Soldaskoe, which got a few kilometers up the road before it ran out of steam. Ukrainian efforts to jam Russian drones were stymied by the increasing ubiquity of fiber-optic systems, and the Ukrainian attack collapsed within a day

    Kursk Salient – General Situation, January 2025

    The tactical particulars of the Ukrainian attack are interesting, and thereโ€™s ongoing speculation as to its purpose – perhaps it was intended to cover a rotation or withdrawal, to improve tactical positions on the northern edge of the salient, or for inscrutable propaganda purposes. However, these specifics are rather unimportant: attacking out the end of the salient (that is, trying to deepen the penetration into Russia) does nothing to reverse Ukraineโ€™s problems in Kursk. These problems are first, on the tactical level, that the salient has been greatly compressed on the flanks and continues to narrow, and on the strategic level the willful expenditure of valuable mechanized assets on a front that does not impact the critical theaters of the war. More simply, Kursk is a sideshow, and it is a sideshow that has gone wrong even within its own operational logic.

    One thing that has been of endless interest, of course, have been the continued rumors of North Korean troops fighting in Kursk. Western intelligence agencies have been adamant about the presence of North Koreans in Kursk. Some people are predisposed to instinctively disbelieve everything that western officialdom says – while I think some skepticism is warranted, I do not automatically assume that they are lying. One recent report lays out what would seem to be a plausible version of this story: that the idea actually originated in Pyongyang, not Moscow, and that a modest number of Korean troops (perhaps 10,000) are embedded with Russian units. The presumption here is that the Koreans hatched the idea as a way to gain combat experience, with the Russians in turn getting auxiliary forces, though of questionable combat effectiveness.

    However, it is worth noting that this is not nearly as important as it has been made out to be. Much has been made of the idea that the North Korean presence proves some sort of Russian state of desperation, but this is fairly silly on its face – with more than 1.5 million active personnel in the Russian military, 10,000 Korean troops in Kursk represents a paltry appendage. More importantly, there has been an attempt to portray the North Korean contingent as a major departure point in the war. In particular, the formulation โ€œNorth Korean troops in Europeโ€ has been used to conjure cold war imagery of communist despotism clawing at the free world

    The point, however, is that North Korean troops are presumed specifically to be in Kursk, which is in Russia. This is linked, of course, to the recently concluded mutual defense agreement signed between Moscow and Pyongyang. By attacking into Kursk – widening the front into prewar Russian territory – Ukraine created a defensive combat task for Russia which triggers the possibility of military assistance from North Korea. However much one may wish to link the Korean contingent to Russiaโ€™s dreaded โ€œwar of aggressionโ€, the force in Kursk is very objectively engaged in the defense of Russian territory, and that makes it possible for Russia to use auxiliary forces – including conscripts and the troops of its allies – to fight there.

    Ultimately, then, the presence of North Koreans in Kursk is interesting, but perhaps not very important after all. These troops are not in Ukraine (even under the most maximal definition of the Ukrainian territorial unit), they are not carrying the primary combat load, and they are unequivocally not the problem that the AFU is facing in Kursk. The โ€œbig problemโ€ for Ukraine, very simply, is not the presence of some amorphous Korean horde dedicated to spreading Glorious Juche to Europe – it is the loitering of large grouping of their own precious mechanized brigades in a compressed salient, far far away from the Donbas, where they are greatly needed.

    Scraping the Barrel: AFU Force Generation

    I think it is well understood, of course, that Ukraine faces severe manpower constraints relative to Russia, both in terms of the raw totals of male biomass available – with roughly 35 million fighting aged males in Russia against perhaps 9 million in prewar Ukraine – but also in terms of its capacity to mobilize them.

    Ukraineโ€™s mobilization scheme is hampered by both widespread draft evasion (with willingness to serve decreasing as the war has stretched on) and a stubborn unwillingness to draft younger men, aged 18-25. Ukraine is structurally burdened with a deeply imbalanced population structure: there are roughly 60% more Ukrainian men in their 30โ€™s than in their 20โ€™s. Given the relative scarcity of young men, particularly in their early 20’s, the Ukrainian government rightly views this 18-25 year old cohort as a premium demographic cohort that it is loathe to burn away in combat. Given the ubiquity of draft evasion, the refusal to mobilize younger males, and the corruption and inefficiency characteristic of the Ukrainian government, it should come as no surprise when Ukrainian mobilization falters

    Russia, in contrast, has both a much larger pool of potential recruits and a more efficient apparatus for mobilization. In contrast to Ukraineโ€™s scheme of compulsory conscription, Russia has relied on generous sign-on bonuses to solicit volunteers. Russiaโ€™s incentive system, to this point, has provided a steady stream of enlistments that has been more than enough to offset Russian losses. Without going too far into the various speculative estimates of Russian casualties, it is widely acknowledged by western military leadership that Russia has significantly more personnel now than it did at the start of the war.

    All of that is to say: Ukraine faces a severe structural disadvantage in military manpower in the aggregate, which is exacerbated by the idiosyncrasies of the Ukrainian mobilization law, ameliorated slightly by the relatively low troop densities and the preponderant power of strike systems in this war.

    The argument that I want to make here, however, is that Ukraineโ€™s systemic problems matching Russian manpower have been exacerbated by several developments which specifically became prominent in 2024. In other words, 2024 can and should be marked as the year where Ukrainian manpower constraints became markedly and perhaps irretrievably worse due to specific decisions made in Kiev, and particular developments on the ground.

    These are as follows:

    1. The decision to expand the AFUโ€™s force structure through the creation of the โ€œ15 seriesโ€ brigades
    2. The decision to deliberately widen the front and create additional demands for manpower by launching the incursion into Kursk
    3. The stall out of Ukraineโ€™s new mobilization program in the autumn
    4. Accelerating problems with desertion in the AFU

    Weโ€™ll run through these in order.

    An army that is intaking new personnel has to decide between two possible allocations for them. New personnel can be used as replacements to replenish existing frontline units, or they can be used to expand the force structure by creating new units. That much seems fairly obvious, and ideally mobilization will exceed losses and make it possible to do both. Where armies face hard manpower constraints, however – that is, where losses are equal to or greater than intake of men, the decision to expand the force structure can have monumental consequences. The stereotypical example, of course, would be the late-war Wehrmacht, which created premiere new assets in the form of Waffen SS divisions, which received privileged access to recruits and equipment while regular army divisions in the line suffered from a trickle of replacements which could not keep up with losses.

    Ukraine, with its garbled force structure, has created a mess through its own attempts to expand its force structure in the face of dwindling strength on the line. Late in 2023, the AFU announced intentions to form an entirely new grouping of brigades – the so-called โ€œ15 seriesโ€, given their designations as the 150th, 151st, 152nd, 153rd, and 154th Mechanized Brigades. This was followed in 2024 with the appending of the 155th Mechanized Brigade, which was to be trained and equipped in France.

    Forming a new grouping of mechanized brigades is essential to the way that Ukraine is presenting its war. Because Ukraine still aims (at least on paper) to recapture all of its Russian held territory, there must always be the illusory possibility of a future offensive, and in order for that illusory possibility to remain, Ukraine must present itself as actively preparing for future offensive operations. Ukraineโ€™s presentation of its own strategic animus – the idea that it is holding the front while it prepares to go back on the offensive – essentially locks it into a program of expanding its force structure

    The problem for Ukraine is that the immense pressure on the front makes it essentially impossible for them to properly husband resources the way they would like. Properly training and equipping half a dozen fresh mechanized brigades and holding them in reserve would be very helpful, but they cannot really do this in light of the demands for personnel at the front. These brigades instead become โ€œpaper formationsโ€ that have a bureaucratic existence, while their organic assets are pulled apart and sucked into the front – stripped down into battalion or company sized elements that can be plugged into sectors of need on the frontline. At the moment, none of the 15 series brigades have seen action as organic units – that is, fighting as themselves.

    The French-trained 155th brigade forms a useful example. Originally designed as an overweight formation of some 5800 men, equipped with premiere European equipment, the brigade was hemorrhaging personnel from the start, with Ukrainian sources reporting that some 1700 men – many of them forcibly conscripted off the streets of Ukraine – deserted the unit during training and formation. A collapse in the brigadeโ€™s leadership – with its commander resigning – made matters even more complicated, and the formationโ€™s first action around Pokrovsk went badly. Now, the brigade is being dismembered, if not formally disbanded, with personnel and vehicles being stripped down and parceled out to bolster neighbor units.

    The decision to allocate personnel to new mechanized brigades (though given stocks of armored vehicles it is questionable whether those designations mean anything) does not necessarily change Ukraineโ€™s manpower balance in the aggregate, but it is certainly an inefficient way to use personnel. To return again to the 155th brigade, one problem noted by Ukrainian analysts was the fact that much of the brigade was formed whole cloth from forcibly mobilized personnel, without a proper cadre of veterans and experienced NCOs – some 75% of the brigade, it turns out, had been mobilized less than two months before arriving in France for training. This fact was certainly instrumental in the mass desertions and the brigadeโ€™s poor combat effectiveness.

    Given Ukraine’s constraints, the best course of action would undoubtedly be to allocate new personnel and equipment as replacements to build out the depleted veteran brigades on the front lines, plugging in replacements around existing veterans and officers. Kiev, however, prizes the prestige that comes from force expansion and the โ€œshiny new toyโ€ factor of new formations equipped with scarce and valuable equipment like Leopard tanks. These new brigades, though billed as premiere assets, clearly have lower combat effectiveness than existing formations, given their lack of experience, shortage of veteran officers, and low unit cohesion.

    The simple reality, however, is that replacements for existing brigades are nowhere close to keeping up with burn rates. Frontline units have complained of increasingly dire infantry shortages for months, with some brigades on the Pokrovsk axis reporting that they are down to less than 40% of their allocated infantry complements.

    In short, Ukraineโ€™s decision to embark on force expansion in the face of significant manpower shortages has exacerbated the problem – both starving veteran units of replacements and concentrating newly mobilized personnel into combat ineffective formations that lack a veteran core, experienced officers, and vital equipment. They have tried, belatedly, to square this circle by parceling out new formations to backstop line brigades, but this is less than ideal – it leads to a patchwork order of battle with lower unit cohesion and a fragmented defense.

    Unfortunately, this comes precisely as Ukraine has created additional self-imposed strains on its resources, in particular through its incursion into Kursk. At the moment, elements of at least seven mechanized brigades, two marine infantry brigades, and three air assault brigades are stationed on the Kursk axis. Without going too far into the weeds rehashing Ukraineโ€™s operation here, itโ€™s important to remember that Ukraine – facing extreme pressures on its force generation – voluntarily chose to widen the front into a secondary theater, diverting scarce assets and reducing its own ability to economize forces.

    In summary, Ukraine has made deliberate decisions to widen the front and expand its force structure, both of which have been decidedly detrimental to its efforts to economize personnel. This comes precisely as a 2024 effort to ramp up mobilization has come off the rails.

    Ukraineโ€™s mobilization program suffered from a variety of defects, including gaps and errors in its databases and endemic corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency. Laws passed in 2024 aimed to rectify many of these problems, including through the rollout of an app that would allow draft-eligible men to register and check their status without having to visit recruitment offices. It appeared that matters had come to a head when Zelensky fired several recruitment chiefs in 2023, and there was a real sense of urgency. After some signs of initial promise, it is clear that this intensified mobilization drive has faltered over the autumn and early winter

    There were initially signs of optimism for Ukraine – in the first month after the new mobilization law was passed, there was a surge and the army enlisted 30,000 new personnel. However, by the end of the summer this initial burst of enlistments had faded, and mobilization was again running behind the AFUโ€™s losses. An October briefing from the Ukrainian General Staff confirmed that enlistments had already declined by 40% after the brief surge brought on by the new mobilization law. Around the same time, officials in Odessa (Ukraineโ€™s third largest city) admitted that they were running at only 20% of their mobilization quota.

    The problems are myriad. The new mobilization law led to some initial improvements but has ultimately failed to resolve problems with draft evasion, bureaucratic miscues remain endemic, and employers desperate to retain workers filed an avalanche of employment related draft deferments. Unable to sustain the initial surge of enlistments, Ukraine faces a looming manpower crisis.

    Furthermore, Ukraineโ€™s continued inability to provide either demobilization or timely rotations means that mobilized personnel face the prospect of indefinite service on the frontlines. This is obviously bad for morale, with soldiers contemplating the possibility of years of uninterrupted service, and this in turn drives the desertions that are becoming a mounting problem for the AFU. Some reports indicate that as many as 100,000 Ukrainian troops have deserted by this point, many no doubt driven by the psychological and physical strains of endless combat with no prospect of rotation.

    A deadly feedback loop is now at work, with the lack of rotations and the shortage of replacements synergizing to accelerate the burn of Ukrainian personnel. The AFU is unable to regularly rotate units out of combat, and the inadequate flow of replacements causes frontline infantry complements to wear thin. Unable to rotate or reinforce, line brigades resort to cannibalization – scraping support personnel like mortar teams, drivers, and drone operators to fill out frontline positions. This further accelerates losses as brigades fight with thinned out support and fires elements, and makes Ukrainian men more unwilling to enlist – because there is now no guarantee that becoming a drone operator, for example, will save one from being sent to a frontline trench eventually.

    Where does this leave us? Ukraine continues to dispose of a very large force, with more than a hundred brigades and hundreds of thousands of men under arms. This force, however, is both substantially outnumbered by the Russian army and in a clear trend of decay. Despite a highly touted attempt to reinvigorate the mobilization apparatus in 2024, the intake of new personnel is clearly too low to offset losses, and the heavy lifting formations in critical sectors of front have seen their strength – particularly in the infantry complements – decline, in some cases to critical levels.

    The failure of Ukraineโ€™s 2024 mobilization program has coincided with several strategic choices which have exacerbated manpower concerns – specifically the decision to embark on a program of force expansion even as the AFU voluntarily extended its commitments by opening a new secondary front in Kursk. In other words, Ukraineโ€™s mobilization falls short of its force requirements, and the AFU has also made choices that sabotaged its ability to economize. Units are ground up, replacements come in a paltry trickle, rotations are late or absent, units cannibalize themselves, and angry and weary men desert.

    Itโ€™s not at all clear that this will lead to a โ€œbreaking pointโ€, in the sense that people are anticipating. Ukrainian strike capabilities and the Russian preference for dispersed, leapfrogging assaults limit the potential for grand breakthroughs and exploitation. However, what we saw over the past three months on the southern Donetsk axis offers a preview of what awaits: an exhausted force being steadily rolled back, dug out of its strongpoints, and mauled – covering its retreat with drones but losing position after position. The line holds, until it doesnโ€™t.

    End of the Line: ATACMs, JASSMs, and Hazelnuts

    Ukraineโ€™s ability to remain in the field depends on a titration of two indispensable resources: first, Ukrainian male biomass, and secondly the critical western weaponry that gives them combat effectiveness. We have evaluated the first: Ukraine is not exactly out of men, but the trends of its mobilization program are poor and personnel shortages are mounting. The trends regarding the second are, if anything, even more foreboding for Kiev.

    There are two general dynamics that have emerged, neither of which create an optimistic picture for Ukraine, which weโ€™ll examine in turn. These are as follows:

    1. The delivery of heavy weaponry to Ukraine (tanks, IFVs, and artillery tubes) has largely dried up in recent months.
    2. The west has essentially run out of escalatory weaponry (strike systems) to give, and those systems already given have failed to meaningfully altar the trajectory of the war.

    In 2023, building out new mechanized units was the name of the game, with the Pentagon leading a multinational effort to stand up an entire army corps worth of units equipped with Leopards, Challengers, and a whole slew of western IFVs and APCs. When that lovingly assembled grouping bashed its head on a rock in the botched assault on the Zaporizhia line, the United States belatedly and begrudgingly dispatched its own Abrams to backstop the Ukrainian tank force. In 2024, however, deliveries of heavy weapons slowed to a trickle.

    The role of the tank in Ukraine has been greatly misunderstood. The vulnerability of tanks to the myriad strike systems of the modern battlefield led some observers to declare that the tank as a weapons system was now obsolete, but this did not really square with the fact that both combatants in this war were eager to deploy as many as possible. Tanks need more critical enablers – more combat engineering, air defense, and electronic warfare support – but they continue to fill an indispensable role and remain an essential item in this war. The failure of Ukraineโ€™s 2023 counteroffensive showed, if anything, that tanks simply are not โ€œgame changingโ€ systems, but mass consumption items – but this has always been the case. The signature quality of iconic tanks like the Sherman and the T34 was that they were numerous

    Unfortunately for Ukraine, deliveries of tanks have dropped off dramatically after the failures of 2023. Americaโ€™s drawdowns for Ukraine in 2024 were almost entirely devoid of armored vehicles of any kind. Data from the Kiel Institute, which has been meticulous tracking weaponry commitments and deliveries, confirms a sharp dropoff in heavy weapons in 2024. In 2023, Ukraineโ€™s backers pledged 384 tanks. This dropped to just 98 in 2024 – which explains why the new Ukrainian mechanized brigades are perilously light on the equipment indicative of their designations.

    While 2023 was all about building out Ukraineโ€™s mechanized package with tanks, IFVs, and engineering, 2024 has been largely about enhancing Ukraineโ€™s strike capabilities. There have been two separate elements at play – first, the delivery of both air and ground launched systems (most notably the British Storm Shadows and American ATACMs respectively), and secondly the loosening of the rules of engagement to allow Ukraine to strike targets inside pre-war Russia.

    This dovetailed, as it turned out, with Ukraineโ€™s operation in Kursk, and in many ways the most direct impact of the Kursk incursion has been to force the westโ€™s hand on the rules of engagement. While Ukraine has long been striking inside Russia with indigenous systems, most notably drones, the White House continued to drag its feet on formal approval for strikes with American systems. By launching a ground assault on Kursk, Ukraine made the decision for them: the United States gave clearance to use ATACMs to support the ground forces in Kursk, and this metastasized into general license to strike Russia with the full range of available systems. This was a poignant reminder that, however we conceive of the proxy-sponsor relationship, Ukraine has some ability to force Americaโ€™s hand: a classic example of the tail wagging the dog.

    In any case, 2024 saw Ukraine and its western backers slowly but surely bash through all the supposed red-lines in this domain: the British breached first with the delivery of Storm Shadows late in 2023, and this was followed by the delivery of ATACMs (with a handful of F16โ€™s to boot), and finally the loosening of the rules of engagement to clear strikes on Russia.

    Where does this leave us? There would seem to be three important things to consider.

    1. The west has essentially reached the end of its escalation chain. The only remaining step that they can take would be to supply Ukraine with JASSMs (Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile), which would mark a quantitative but not a meaningful qualitative upgrade to Ukraineโ€™s strike capabilities.
    2. Ukraineโ€™s use of western-supplied strike assets has been dissipated and has not materially improved their situation on the ground.
    3. Russia maintains a dominant strike advantage, both qualitative and quantitative.

    Ukraine faces a stark disadvantage in strike capability relative to Russia, in a variety of ways. Russian strike assets are far more numerous and have significant range advantages, but it is also important to take into consideration both Russiaโ€™s significantly greater strategic depth and its more dense and relatively unscathed air defense. Unlike Ukraine, which has seen its air defense stretch to the limit with destroyed launchers and a mounting interceptor shortage, Russiaโ€™s air defenses have been essentially untouched, as Ukraine has lacked the large numbers of assets required to conduct a proper SEAD/DEAD (Suppression/Destruction of Enemy Air Defense) campaign.

    Given this basic calculus, using western strike systems to wage a blow for blow strategic air campaign is bad math for Ukraine. It is generally unwise to engage in a bat fight when your opponent is a bigger man with a much longer bat. Instead, Ukraineโ€™s strike systems should have been leveraged to support ground operations – concentrating strikes spatially and in time to synergize with efforts on the ground. Just as a simple thought experiment, it is not difficult to imagine ATACMs making a difference if they had been available in 2023 and used to saturate Russian rear areas during the assault on the Zaporizhia line – striking in tempo with the mechanized assault to disrupt Russian command and control and prevent reinforcement of critical areas.

    Instead, Ukraineโ€™s strike capacity has been largely dissipated in attacks that sometimes achieve success hitting Russian installations but fail to directly support successful operations on the ground. The result is a diffusion of Ukrainian striking power that is less than the sum of its parts. Now, Ukraine has essentially run dry on missiles – of the 500 ATACMs sent by the United States, perhaps 50 are left in Kievโ€™s stockpiles. Stocks of air launched Storm Shadow missiles are similarly low, and Britainโ€™s commitment to resupply is limited to โ€œa few dozenโ€

    The last option for the west to backstop Ukrainian strike capability are American JASSMs. While there is a longer-range variant in production (the JASSM-ER, or Extended Range), these are relatively new and expensive and are earmarked for American stocks – it is therefore presumed that the Ukrainians would receive the standard variant. The standard JASSM has slight range advantages over Storm Shadows and ATACMs, at roughly 230 miles. In the event that JASSMs are not given, there is a shorter range system called the SLAM (Standoff Land Attack Missile) with a range of some 170 miles. Both JASSMs and SLAMs would be compatible with Ukrainian F-16s.

    Two things need to be noted about the JASSM. First, the JASSM – while offering slightly longer ranges – would essentially serve as a backstop/replacement for the rapidly dwindling ATACMs and particularly the air launched Storm Shadows – instead of Ukraineโ€™s native SU-24s launching Storm Shadows, they would utilize F-16s launching JASSMs. This would not represent a dramatic upgrade in Ukrainian capabilities, but would instead simply serve to maintain a bare minimum Ukrainian strike capability. JASSMs are a replacement for dwindling capabilities, not an augmentation to them.

    Secondly, it must be understood that JASSMs are the last stop. Weโ€™re now entering the territory, not of artificially constructed red lines, but physical and real limits. Russia has essentially eaten the gifted stocks of ATACMs and Storm Shadows, with little discernable effect on their ability to fight, and JASSMs are the last extant item in the inventories to keep Ukrainian strike capabilities operative. We are at the last rung of the aid ladder.

    In the case of JASSMs, however, there are notable downsides for the United States. This is an important case of putting all of oneโ€™s eggs in the same technological basket. In 2020, the United States scrapped the development of its conventionally armed Long Range Standoff Missile, making the JASSM – particularly the new extended range variants – the system for the United States, earmarked to play a critical role in future conflicts, particularly in the Pacific. This makes the JASSM an extremely sensitive system, as a centerpiece of American strike capabilities, particularly with the modernization of the Tomahawk system crawling along at a few dozen units per year.

    Given the fact that JASSMs are GPS guided, there are real reasons to be reticent about giving Ukraine such a technologically sensitive system. Russian electronic warfare has enjoyed considerable success jamming GPS and disrupting similarly guided American systems. Allowing the Russians to gain familiarity with a keystone American system could wreak havoc on Pentagon war planning – most, if not all of the strike eggs are in this basket, so why let an adversary peek inside?

    Itโ€™s probable, given what we have seen to this point, that these concerns will ultimately be dismissed and Ukraine will receive a line of JASSMs which will backstop their strike capabilities – but given the size of Ukraineโ€™s F-16 fleet, the scale will be constrained. Furthermore, air launched systems are less optimal for Ukraine, given their dependence on large and easily targeted airfields, in contrast to ground launched systems which are mobile and more easily concealed.

    Certainly, JASSMs will never give Ukraine the ability to match Russiaโ€™s own strike capacity. After hearing endlessly about how Russia is running out of missiles, it has at last been concluded that this is simply not true, and indeed never was. Recently, Ukrainian defense intelligence admitted that per their own estimates Russia retains about 1,400 long range missiles in its reserves, with a monthly production of roughly 150 units. Russian production of inexpensive Geran drones has also skyrocketed, with Ukrainian intelligence estimating a ceiling as high as 2,000 drones per month.

    There is also the matter of the new Russian missile system – the now famous Oreshnik, or Hazel Tree. Russia tested the Oreshnik system on a large machining plant in Dnipro on November 21, 2024, which allowed the basic capabilities of the system to be gauged. The Oreshnik is an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile, characterized by its hypersonic capabilities (exceeding Mach-10) and its Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle equipped with six separate warheads, with the potential for submunitions in each. Although the attack on Dnipro was essentially a demonstration which used inert training warheads (that is, without explosive payloads), the missile can be configured with nuclear or conventional warheads

    As in the case of the North Korean troops in Kursk, I rather think that the Oreshnik launch was not nearly as important as it was made out to be. The system is expensive and likely impractical for conventional use. I understand the desire to conceive of Oreshnik as a massively powerful conventional weapon – showering its target with half a dozen warheads with the power of an entire flight of Kalibr missiles – but there are several problems with this. The accuracy of the system (the CEP, or โ€œCircular Error Probableโ€ in the technical parlance) is much more consistent with a nuclear delivery system than a conventional one. Furthermore, the problem with using an IRBM for conventional strikes is the danger of miscalculation – foreign adversaries may misinterpret the launch as a nuclear attack and respond appropriately. This is precisely why the Russian government actually alerted the United States to the launch ahead of time – a fine arrangement for a demonstration, but impractical for a weapon that is intended to be used regularly.

    We may see another use of the Oreshnik against Ukraine, but ultimately this is unlikely to be a system of consequence in this war. The demonstration in Dnipro was instead likely intended to send a message to Europe – reminding NATO that Russia has the capacity to deliver strikes against European targets that cannot be intercepted. It also serves as a poignant reminder that Europe lacks the equivalent capability, and in essence provides a demonstration of Russiaโ€™s ability to launch missiles from far beyond the range of either Ukrainian or European response. The Hazelnut is a tangible reminder of Russiaโ€™s strategic depth and strike dominance in Ukraine.

    Ultimately, Ukraine will lose the strike game. Itโ€™s strike capacity has dwindled, with missiles frittered away in a dissipated air campaign, and though the exhaustion of Storm Shadow and ATACMs stocks can be offset somewhat by JASSMs, Ukraine simply lacks the range or quantities necessary to match Russian capabilities. Needing to do more with less, Ukraine instead diffused its assets and failed to synergize its strikes with ground operations. We are now at the end of the line – after JASSMs, thereโ€™s nothing left in western warehouses to upgrade Ukrainian capabilities. Hazelnuts or no, the math on this bat fight is bad for Kiev.

    Conclusion: Debellation

    Trapped in an endless news cycle, with daily footage of FPV strikes and exploding vehicles, and a dutiful cottage industry of war mappers alerting us to every 100 meter advance, it can easily feel like the Russo-Ukrainian War is trapped in an interminable doom loop which will never end – Mad Max meets Groundhog Day.

    What I have endeavored to do here, however, is argue that 2024 actually saw several very important developments which make the coming shape of the war relatively clear. To briefly recapitulate:

    1. Russian forces caved in Ukrainian defenses at depth across an entire critical axis of front. After remaining static for years, Ukraineโ€™s position in Southern Donetsk has been obliterated, with Russian forces advancing through an entire belt of fortified positions, pushing the front into Pokrovsk and Kostayantinivka.
    2. The main Ukrainian gambit on the ground (the incursion into Kursk) failed spectacularly, with the salient being progressively caved in. An entire grouping of critical mechanized formations wasted much of the year fighting on this unproductive and secondary front, leaving Ukrainian positions in the Donbas increasingly threadbare and bereft of reserves.
    3. An attempt by the Ukrainian government to reinvigorate its mobilization program failed, with enlistments quickly trailing off. Decisions to expand the force structure exacerbated the shortage of manpower, and as a result the decay of Ukraineโ€™s frontline brigades has accelerated.
    4. Long awaited western upgrades to Ukraineโ€™s strike capabilities failed to defeat Russian momentum, and stocks of ATACMs and Storm Shadows are nearly exhausted. There are now few options remaining to prop up Ukrainian strike capacity, and no prospect of Ukraine gaining dominance in this dimension of the war.

    In short, Ukraine is on the path to debellation – defeat through the total exhaustion of its capacity to resist. They are not exactly out of men and vehicles and missiles, but these lines are all pointing downward. A strategic Ukrainian defeat – once unthinkable to the western foreign policy apparatus and commentariat – is now on the table. Quite interestingly, now that Donald Trump is about to return to the White House, it is suddenly acceptable to speak of Ukrainian defeat. Robert Kagan – a stalwart champion of Ukraine if there ever was one – now says the quiet part out loud:

    Ukraine will likely lose the war within the next 12 to 18 months. Ukraine will not lose in a nice, negotiated way, with vital territories sacrificed but an independent Ukraine kept alive, sovereign, and protected by Western security guarantees. It faces instead a complete defeat, a loss of sovereignty, and full Russian control

    Indeed.

    None of this should be particularly surprising. If anything, it is shocking that my position – that Russia is essentially a very powerful country that was very unlikely to lose a war (which it perceives as existential) right in its own belly – somehow became controversial or fringe. But here we are.

    Carthago delenda est [end]

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  • [Sharing] Russo-Ukrainian war: The Deluge – Big Serge

    Z World Turns Two

    As the calendar barrels into another year and we tick away the days of February, notable anniversaries are marked off in sequence. It is now 2/22/2022 +2: two years since Putinโ€™s address on the historic status of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions, followed on 2/24/2022 by the commencement of the Special Military Operation and the spectacular resumption of history.

    The nature of the war changed dramatically after a kinetic and mobile opening phase. With the collapse of the negotiation process (whether thanks to Boris Johnson or not), it became clear that the only way out of the conflict would be through the strategic defeat of one party by the other. Thanks to a pipeline of western support (in the form of material, financial aid, and ISR and targeting assistance) which allowed Ukraine to transcend its rapidly evaporating indigenous war economy, it became clear that this would be a war of industrial attrition, rather than rapid maneuver and annihilation. Russia began to mobilize resources for this sort of attritional war in the Autumn of 2022, and since then the war has attained its present quality – that of a firepower intensive but relatively static positional struggle.

    The nature of this attritional-positional war lends itself to analytic ambiguity, because it denies the most attractive and obvious signs of victory and defeat in large territorial changes. Instead, a whole host of anecdotal, small scale positional analysis, and foggy data has to suffice, and this can be easily misconstrued or misunderstood. Ukraineโ€™s supporters point to nominally small scale advances to support their notion that Russia is suffering cataclysmic casualties to capture small villages. This suggests that Russia is winning meaningless, pyrrhic victories which will lead to its exhaustion, so long as Ukraine receives everything it asks for from the west. At the same time, the Z-sphere points to these same battles as evidence that Ukraine can no longer hold even its most heavily defended fortress cities.

    What I intend to argue here is that 2024 will be highly decisive for the war, as the year in which Ukrainian strategic exhaustion begins to show out at the same time that Russiaโ€™s strategic investments begin to pay off on the battlefield. This is the way of such an attritional conflict, which burdens armies with cumulative and constant stressors in a test of their recuperative powers. Wear and tear and the raging of the waters will erode and burden the dike until it bursts. And then the deluge comes.

    Avdiivka: Tactical Overmatch

    The signature operational development of 2024 is at this point clearly the complete Russian capture of Avdiivka. The strategic significance of Avdiivka has itself been subject to debate, with some dismissing it as little more than a dingy suburb of Donetsk, targeted to give Putin a symbolic victory on the eve of Russian elections.

    In fact, Avdiivka is clearly a locale with great operational significance. A Ukrainian fortress since the beginning of the Donbass War in 2014, Avdiivka served as a keystone blocking position for the AFU on the doorstep of Donetsk, sitting on a major supply corridor. Its capture creates space for Russia to begin a multi-pronged advance on next-phase Ukrainian strongholds like Konstantinivka and Pokrovsk (more on that later) and pushes Ukrainian artillery away from Donetsk.

    The subject that would seem to be of particular importance, however, was the manner in which Russia captured Avdiivka. The struggle amid the wreckage of an industrial city provided something of a Rorschach test for the war, with some seeing the battle as yet another application of Russian โ€œmeat assaultsโ€, overwhelming the AFU defenders with mass amid horrific casualties

    This story does not hold up to scrutiny, as I would like to demonstrate from a variety of angles. First, we can try to gauge casualties. This is always difficult to do with a high degree of accuracy, but it would be useful to look for abnormalities or spikes in Russian loss patterns. The most widely accepted source for this would be the Mediazona casualty tracker (an explicitly anti-Putinist media project operated out of the west).

    When one goes to examine the Mediazona counts, an interesting discrepancy manifests itself. The summary text notes that a four-month battle for Avdiivka has recently concluded, and Mediazona states: โ€œWe are seeing significant growth of Russian casualties since mid-October.โ€ This is actually quite odd, because their data shows the literal opposite. Since October 10 (the day of the first major Russian mechanized assault on Avdiivka), Mediazona has counted an average of 48 Russian casualties per day, which is actually significantly less than the burn rate earlier in the year. In contrast, Mediazona counted 80 casualties per day on average from January 1 to October 9. This period, of course, includes heavy fighting in Bakhmut, so if one takes the period between the end of the Battle of Bakhmut and the beginning of the Battle of Avdiivka (May 20 to October 9) one finds an average of 60 Russian casualties per day. A time series of Mediazonaโ€™s weekly confirmed casualties also shows a downward trend, making one wonder how they can feel comfortable claiming that the action in Avdiivka has raised the burn rate

    Furthermore, Ukrainian sources on the ground emphasized that the Russian assault in Avdiivka was quite certainly not a mere function of mass, and noted effective Russian small unit tactics with a powerful fire support. One Ukrainian officer told Politico: โ€œThatโ€™s how they work in Avdiivka โ€” artillery levels everything to the ground, and then professional landing troops come in small groups.โ€ Another officer described Russian small unit assaults (5 to 7 men) occurring at night. All of this is inconsistent with the trope about Russian โ€œhuman waveโ€ assaults – which, we should note, have never been caught on camera. Given the Ukrainian fondness for sharing combat footage, oughtnโ€™t we expect to see some alleged evidence of these Russian waves being mowed down?

    All this is to say, the claim that Russia (yet again) suffered catastrophic losses in Avdiivka is simply not supported. Like a previous analysis in which I showed that Russian armor losses were not rising or showing abnormal patterns, we yet again have a major Russian assault failing to cause a spike in the loss data. This is not to deny that Russia has suffered casualties. The operation at Avdiivka was a high intensity, four month battle. Men are killed and vehicles are destroyed in such affairs, but there is little evidence that this occurred at abnormal or alarming rates for the Russian Armed Forces.

    Now, youโ€™re certainly free to make your own judgements, and I have no doubt that the belief in massive Russian casualties and human wave assaults will endure. However, to believe this, you must make an epistemological leap of faith – believing that the wasteful human waves exist despite Ukrainian fighters testifying to the opposite, and that Russian casualties have risen in a way that is somehow invisible to trackers like Warspotting and Mediazona.

    In contrast, Avdiivka stands out as the first major engagement of the war where Ukraineโ€™s growing material shortages have been acutely felt. After burning through much of their accumulated stock (including the large batch of shells purchased from South Korea by the United States), the AFU felt a glaring and painful artillery shortage in Avdiivka. Complaints about โ€œshell hungerโ€ were a motif of the coverage of the battle. Of course, weโ€™ve heard about the growing shell shortage for months (and it is known that Ukraine simply does not have enough tubes to cover the entire front), but Avdiivka stands out as a keystone position, important enough for Ukraine to scramble premier assets to reinforce it, where they simply could not provide an adequate base of fire

    Avdiivka

    In the absence of adequate artillery, Ukraine has increasingly tried to lean on FPV drones as a substitute. There is a certain strategic logic to this, in that small drones can be manufactured in distributed facilities and do not require the capital intensive production centers (vulnerable to Russian strike systems) that artillery shells do.

    However, drones are clearly not a panacea to Ukraineโ€™s problems. In the simple technical sense, the destructive power of an FPV drone (which usually carries the warhead of a rocket propelled grenade) pales in comparison to an artillery shell and is thus unsuitable for suppressive fire or the reduction of strongpoints. Drones are also subject to disruptions from weather and electronic warfare in ways that artillery is not. More importantly, however, Ukraine is simply losing the drone race. Ukraineโ€™s achievements ramping up drone production in wartime are genuinely impressive, but the countryโ€™s industrial base is still far smaller and more vulnerable than Russiaโ€™s, and Russiaโ€™s drone production is starting to widely outstrip Ukraineโ€™s. Ukraineโ€™s weakness in other arms prompted them to be the first party to lean heavily on FPVs, but that early lead has been lost.

    So, drones clearly offer a lethal and important battlefield expedient, but they are neither a genuine replacement for artillery nor an arm of clear advantage for Ukraine. The result was a Ukrainian defense in Avdiivka that was substantially outgunned. The problem was compounded by the rapid proliferation of Russian air dropped glide bombs, alongside the degradation of Ukraineโ€™s air defense. This allowed the Russian air force to operate around Avdiivka with something approaching impunity, dropping hundreds of glide bombs with the power to – unlike artillery shells, let alone tiny FPV warheads – level the fortified concrete blocks that normally make Soviet vintage cities so durable in urban fighting.

    Thus, Avdiivka unfolded along a pattern that is now becoming very familiar, and indicates the emerging Russian preference for assaulting cities, at least of this mid-sized fortress variety. Once again the operation focused in its preliminary phase on flaring out Russian control over the flanks, beginning with the large mechanized assault in early November which secured positions on the railway line to the north of the city. Again (as in the case of Bakhmut and Lysychansk-Severodonetsk) there was an expectation among some that Russia would attempt to encircle the city, but this still does not look feasible in the current operating environment under the nexus of fires and ISR. Instead, positions on the flank allowed the Russians to launch concentric attacks into the city, entering on multiple axes that compressed the Ukrainian defenders into a tight interior position, where Russian fire could be heavily concentrated

    Concentric Attack on Avdiivka: February 7-14 (Base Map courtesy of Kalibrated Maps)

    The particular combination of concentric attack and overwhelming Russian fires led to a very rapid end to the battle once the Russian push into the city proper began. While the creep around the flanks occurred in a sequence of on and off pushes through the winter, the concentric crush on the city lasted scarcely more than a week. On February 7-8 the Russians achieved breakthroughs in both the northern and southern suburbs, and by February 14 the Ukrainians were in retreat. A few pockets of resistance would linger for only a few days.

    Despite statements alleging that they had conducted an โ€œorderly withdrawalโ€, there is abundant evidence that the Ukrainians were taken aback by the tempo of the Russian assault, and the evacuation was hastily organized and only partially completed. A large number of personnel were unable to escape and are now POWs, and it is clear that Ukraine did not have time or energies to evacuate the wounded, instead ordering that they simply be left behind. The general picture is of a chaotic and ad-hoc retreat from the city, not an orderly and pre-planned withdrawal.

    The issue for Ukraine now goes beyond the loss of Avdiivka and the opportunities that this will create for Russia. Ukraine now has proof of failure on both the attack and the defense in operations where they concentrated significant forces. Their counteroffensive on Russiaโ€™s Zaporhzia Line was a catastrophic failure, wasting much of the AFUโ€™s carefully husbanded mechanized package, and now they have a failed defense on their hands in Avdiivka, despite fighting out of a well prepared fortress and scrambling reserves into the sector to reinforce the defense.

    The question now becomes fairly simple: if Ukraine failed to attack successfully over the summer, if they could not defend Bakhmut, and if they cannot defend in Avdiivka, is there anywhere that they can find a battlefield success? The dam is leaking. Can Ukraine plug it before it collapses?

    Russiaโ€™s Full Court Press

    Ukraineโ€™s force structure is always notoriously difficult to parse out, due to their propensity for ad-hoc battlegroups and their practice of piecemeal allocation of forces to resident brigade commands (turning brigade headquarters into the cups in a shell game). Truth be told, Ukrainian ORBAT and force allocation is in a class all its own – to try and get a handle on it, you can do no better than Matt Daviesโ€™ excellent work over on X dot com. This generally makes the AFUโ€™s organization and force generation more opaque and more difficult to parse out than Russiaโ€™s, for example. While Russia employs conventional army level groupings, Ukraine does not, and indeed lacks any organic commands above the brigade level.

    That being said, the basic picture is one of three Ukrainian โ€œOperational Strategic Groupingsโ€, which are vaguely akin to army groups. These are, from north to south, Operation Strategic Groupings (OSGs) Khortytsia, Tavriya, and Odessa. Against these are arrayed four Russian Army Groups – from north to south, these are Army Groups West, Center, East, and Dnieper. Assessing the total line strength is always difficult, largely because we do not always have good insight into the actual combat rating of these units. However, we can make estimates of paper strength. Based on deployment information from the Project Owl Ukraine Control Map and the Militaryland Deployment Map, we can estimate that the nominal strength in the theater right now is some 33 Division Equivalents for Ukraine against perhaps 50 DEs for Russia – a significant, but not utterly overwhelming Russian advantage. We get a picture something like this (Ukrainian Army level formations are absent because they do not exist)

    Ukrainian Theater Army and Group Level Commands (Base Control Map provided by Kalibrated Maps)

    At the moment, Russia is grinding slowly forward on almost every axis in the theater. This has both strategic/attritional implications, in that the Ukrainians are forced to continually burn reserves while being denied the ability to rotate and reconstitute units, but there is also a clear operational formulation occurring.

    The Russian maneuver scheme must be held in reference to their minimum end state objectives – namely, the capture of the remaining Donbas urban agglomerations around Slovyansk and Kramatorsk (though we should not assume that the war or Russian ambitions end there). At the moment, there are several major axes of advance, which I am labelling as follows

    Russian Axes of Attack (Base Control Map provided by Kalibrated Maps)

    The intention of these thrusts is fairly obvious. In the center of the front, Russian advances on the Avdiivka and Chasiv Yar axes converge on the critical Ukrainian hub of Konstyantinivka, the capture of which is one of the absolute prerequisites for any serious attempt to move on the Kramatorsk agglomeration. Russian bases of control around Avdiivka and Bakhmut provide the necessary space to begin a two-pronged operation towards Konstyantinivka, bypassing and enveloping the strongly held Ukrainian fortress of Toretsk. (See the map below, which I made in December before the capture of Avdiivka)

    Concentric Operation toward Konstyantinikva (Base map from Suriyak)

    Meanwhile, continued Russian pressure on the northern front (via a slow squeeze on the city of Kupyansk, at the top of the Oskil line as well as operations towards Lyman on the Zherebets axis) provide a base of progress towards the other operational perquisite for Kramatorsk, which is the Russian recapture of the north bank of the Donets River, up to the confluence of the Oskil at Izyum

    Russiaโ€™s North Donetsk Campaign

    Meanwhile, on the more southerly axes, Russia continues to expand its zone of control after the capture of Marinka, likely with the aim of developing momentum towards Kurakhove, which would put the Ukrainian fortress of Ugledar in a more severe salient. Ugledar remains a thorn in Russiaโ€™s side, in that it lies uncomfortable close to Russian rail lines into the land bridge. Russia is also attacking the Ukrainian held Robotyne salient (the sparse fruits of Ukraineโ€™s counteroffensive). While these attacks have, as we have mentioned, attritional benefits by way of pinning Ukrainian forces in the line, it seems likely that Russia would aim to recapture the Robotyne salient to preempt any Ukrainian designs of using it as a springboard for a future attempt to restart operations towards Tokmak. Thus, these southern operations have both attritive effects and offer the potential of preventatively neutralizing useful Ukrainian staging points

    Overall, the broad operational situation suggests that Russia is developing offensive momentum across the entire theater. This will have deleterious effects on Ukrainian combat power by preventing rotation, reconstitution, and lateral troop redeployment, while sucking in the dwindling Ukrainian reserves. Shoigu recently made an uncharacteristically bold statement that the AFU was committing much of its remaining reserves:

    “After the collapse of the counteroffensive, the Ukrainian army command has been trying to stabilize the situation at the expense of the remaining reserves and prevent the collapse of the frontline.โ€

    This is, if not totally verifiable, at least notable given his general reticence to make sweeping statements about the state of the war.

    In the near term (meaning the spring and summer months) we should expect Russia to progress towards the following intermediate operational goals:

    • Developing a concentric offensive towards the Ukrainian agglomerations around Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Kontyantinivka
    • An offensive along the Zherebets-Oskil line towards Lyman, to capture or screen the Donetsk River line as a prerequisite for an operation against Kramatorsk
    • Continued assaults towards Kurakhove in preparation for the liqudiation of the Ugledar salient
    • Preventative attacks towards the Orakhiv axis to prevent future Ukrainian attempts to exploit the Robotyne salient

    Farwell Zaluzhny

    Against the backdrop of Ukraineโ€™s defeat at Avidiivka, President Zelensky began a long expected command overhaul when he fired Commander in Chief Valery Zaluzhny and replaced him the the commander of the ground forces, Oleksandr Syrski.

    There a variety of amusing ethnic and political subplots to this, particularly the longstanding tensions between Zelensky and Zaluzhny, the many ridiculous rumors that Zaluzhny had become a political rival to Zelensky and might be the lead figure in a military takeover of the government, and the rather ironic fact that the new top man, Syrski, is a Russian born less than fifty miles outside of Moscow, who ended up in Ukrainian service simply because his unit was posted near Kharkov when the Soviet Union fell, and he opted not to resign his command.

    This is all very interesting, of course, and perhaps might help demonstrate that the relationship between these countries is far more convoluted and nuanced that most westerners assume. What matters for our purposes, however, is the military implications

    Farewell, Sweet Prince

    What we should say about Zaluzhny is that, while he was not really Ukraineโ€™s biggest problem, he did not have the answers. Zaluzhny displayed a bizarre timidity, particularly throughout the Battle of Bakhmut and the Ukrainian Counteroffensive. We constantly heard about Zaluzhnyโ€™s reservations and opposition to Ukrainian plans – he was against the costly defense of Bakhmut, skeptical of the attack out of Orikhiv, and so forth. There was even a rumor that Zaluzhny told Zelensky that the counteroffensive had failed already in the opening weeks of the operation.

    The problem with all of this is simple: Zaluzhny cannot have it both ways. He seemed to be positioning himself as a voice of caution and reason, distancing himself from operations on the ground, while allowing those operations to go forward anyway. Over the summer, supposedly at the same time that Zaluzhny had concluded that the counteroffensive was failing, he continued to push Ukrainian mechanized forces into the Russian defenses in small, company sized battlegroups.

    Ultimately, Zaluzhny strikes one as a non-entity: skeptical of Ukrainian battle plans, but willing to implement them anyway without offering alternatives of his own. In particular, his hesitation led the Ukrainian counteroffensive to devolve into a sequence of wasteful probing attacks which lacked the mass to achieve a decisive result and inevitably spiraled into a slow motion trainwreck. A commander who complains about battleplans while implementing them anyway is begging an obvious question: what is it that you do around here, anyway?

    In contrast, Syrski is a man who clearly exerts some will on the battlefield, for good or ill. His preference for commitment and combat has resulted in several of Ukraineโ€™s ugliest defeats – he is, after all, the architect of the Bakhmut defense and the firebag at Lysychansk. But heโ€™s also the showrunner for Ukraineโ€™s signature military success to this point, in the 2022 Kharkov Counteroffensive, where he successfully exploited a badly hollowed out section of Russian front and recaptured important positions over the Oskil

    Syrski (2nd from left) checks the situation map

    Syrski may very well lead Ukraine to disaster. He has shown a tolerance for casualties that could easily break the AFUโ€™s back, and a preference for generating horrible, grinding positional defense. But Syrski at least has a propensity to look for decision points, unlike Zaluzhny, who seemed content to slowly wither away in positional battle against a superior foe. Aggression could easily cause disaster for Ukraine, but time had clearly run out on Zaluzhnyโ€™s way of war.

    Outgunned: Ukraine and the Arms Race

    The Russo-Ukrainian War is one of industrial attrition. Despite a variety of theories about this or that game changing weapon, clever maneuver scheme, or superior western training, the reality of this war for the last 18 months has been one of grinding and laborious industrial war, battering through fixed defenses in a maelstrom of concrete, steel, and high explosives. The central problem for Ukraine is fairly simple: Russian force generation is reaching the liftoff point, which will interminably shift combat power in Russiaโ€™s favor.

    As artillery shells have become the totem item in this war, a commentary on the state of the artillery race is certainly warranted. Ukraine managed to build a large inventory of shells in preparation for its 2023 summer offensive, partially through careful husbanding of resources and partially through the United States tapping a few remaining reservoirs, like South Korea. After expending much of that stockpile in high intensity operations through the summer, the artillery advantage has once again swung heavily in favor of Russia, and โ€œshell hungerโ€ has become a ubiquitous complaint for Kiev.

    In particular, Zelensky has recently begun to complain of what he calls an โ€œartificial shortageโ€, blaming the Republican opposition in the US Congress for Ukraineโ€™s supply difficulties. Zelensky is wrong. The shortage is real, and not easily fixed.

    After burning through excess stocks, Ukraineโ€™s long-term supply has increasingly come to hinge on attempts to expand production in Europe and the United States. However, this plan is foundering on three separate rocks: 1) industry has been much slower to ramp up than expected; 2) even the expanded production targets are too low to win the war for Ukraine; and 3) even if adequate ammunition could be procured, Ukraine would quickly run into problems with barrel availability.

    Thus far, the United States has been much more successful ramping up production than has Europe. While American targets have been revised several times, it now looks like the United States will produce something like 500,000 shells in 2024, which is a good number given the state of the American industrial plant and issues with labor shortages. The European Union initially hoped to deliver 1 million shells on an annualized basis, but they appear to be far short of this number. Europe faces a variety of problems, like labor shortages, exorbitant energy costs, and a consensus driven decision making culture that is slow to allocate significant resources. The European practice of small orders placed by individual member states also leaves manufacturers hesitant to make large investments in new production lines. Or, as one Belgian general put it: โ€œWeโ€™re in deep shit.โ€

    Letโ€™s say that the USA and Europe both fulfill their current targeted deliveries to Ukraine in their entirety. What would that amount to? A recent study from two German analysts at the European Council on Foreign Relations estimated that, in the optimist scenario, the USA and Europe can supply Ukraine with approximately 1.3 million rounds of ammunition on an annualized basis. That would give Ukraine a budget of about 3,600 shells per day – enough to sustain moderate intensity, but far below what they need

    The primary means of physical destruction

    Last year, Ukrainian Minister of Defense Reznikov said that Ukraine would require nearly 12,000 shells per day to โ€œsuccessfully execute battlefield tasksโ€, particularly offensive actions. That works out to more than 350,000 shells per month – more than three times what the NATO bloc is hoping to produce. Obviously that large number is unrealistic, but a recent study from the Estonian Ministry of Defense estimated that at minimum Ukraine will need 200,000 shells per month (Roughly 6,600 per day). At the estimated long-run availability of 3,600 per day, Ukraine can have some basic functionality, but they will find it difficult to accumulate a stockpile to allow higher intensity offensive operations.

    This runs into an additional, follow on problem, which is that simply pumping shells into Ukraine is not enough. Solving the shell shortage will exacerbate the barrel shortage. Artillery barrels, needless to say, wear out from extended use. Using a rule of thumb number which says that a howitzer barrel has a lifespan of about 2,500 shots, this means that Ukraine would be wearing out somewhere between 125-150 guns per month, assuming they could actually shoot as much as Reznikov wants. This would create yet another sustainment bottleneck, complicated by the fact that Ukraine has at least 17 different platforms in use.

    Meanwhile, what of the Russians? Itโ€™s clear that Russiaโ€™s pool of shells has been vastly underestimated. First we have the news that North Korean deliveries have been far larger than initially expected; instead of 1 million, itโ€™s something more like 3 million with deliveries ongoing. This number is dampened by the fact that some of the North Korean shells are defective (from long stays in depots and cannibalization), but the sheer size of the delivery canโ€™t be ignored. Meanwhile, indigenous Russian production has skyrocketed, with the Estonians estimating some 3.5 million shells produced in 2023 for the Russians, with a figure of 4.5 million expected in 2024. Including North Korean shells, it seems highly likely that Russian can easily sustain a firing rate of up to 12,000 shells per day, with surge capacity in reserve

    The upshot of all this is essentially that, even if the European production surge occurs on schedule, thereโ€™s at least a 3-1 advantage (potentially 5-1) in Russian artillery fire thatโ€™s baked into the calculus of this war, occurring alongside a substantial western acknowledged ramp up in Russian production of strike systems like cruise missiles, Geran drones, Lancets, and glide bombs of both greater power and greater range. A recent publication from the Royal United Services Institute noted that Russia can deliver 1,500 tanks (both new build and retrofitted depot stocks) and 3,000 armored vehicles per year – the report also notes that Russian stocks of Iskander and Kalibr missiles have grown significantly over the last year.

    The standard argument – the sort of โ€œTheory of Ukrainian Victoryโ€ – rests on the idea of disproportionate, catastrophic Russian casualties, and both sides love to throw around that cherished word โ€œloss ratios.โ€ However, this rather tends to obfuscate the issue. The most important question is simple whether an armyโ€™s relative combat power is growing or shrinking over time – that is, whether its ability to generate forces is greater than its rate of burn – can it reconstitute attrited units in a timely manner, generate replacements, recover, repair, and replace broken equipment, and so forth. The prototypical example of this is of course the Nazi-Soviet War. Despite the fact that the Germans enjoyed favorable โ€œloss ratiosโ€ throughout most of the war, the ratio of combat power consistently grew in the USSRโ€™s favor due to their vastly superior force generation powers. Tellingly, Hitler even made a quip during the Battle of Kursk that the loss ratios should predict an immanent German victory. But loss ratios do not matter nearly as much as the relative rate of loss and force generation.

    Given that Russian casualties are obviously far below the phantasmagorical hundreds of thousands suggested by western Media and Ukrainian propogandists, it has become clear that Russia is generating more force over time. Estonian intelligence estimated that Russia can properly train, equip, and deploy roughly 130,000 additional troops every six months, which is more than adequate to overcome current loss rates. As if to emphasize the point, RUSI notes that the Russian grouping of forces in Ukraine (that is, only those forces deployed in theater at the moment) rose from 360,000 to 470,000 over the last year.

    So, Russian force generation is growing over time, and not simply regenerating losses. Meanwhile, Ukrainian forces are increasingly undermanned, with understrength brigades asked to perform increasingly heavy lift. We know that Ukrainian reserves are running low. This was clearly demonstrated in Avdiivka, when the AFU scrambled brigades from other fronts (like the 47th Mechanized) that had been fighting all summer, indicating that there was a lack of adequate strategic reserves, and then throwing in the elite 3rd Assault Brigade in the closing days of the battle to try and stem the bleeding. Meanwhile, formations like the 110th Mechanized, which had been fighting in Avdiivka for months, were essentially burned off entirely because they could not be rotated out. Russia conducts regular troop rotations, while Ukrainian forces remain on the line due to the lack of replacements.

    So, here we are. The current Theory of Ukrainian Victory is exhausted, intending as it did to leverage western ISR, training, and surplus equipment to deliver disproportionate casualties on Russia. 2022 was a year of big surges (not Big Serges), with Russia rapidly conquering the land bridge and the Lugansk shoulder in its initial maneuver campaign, followed by Ukrainian capitalization on the inadequate Russian force generation with their audacious counterattack towards the Oskil. But 2023 was different – Ukraine had a significant window of opportunity, flush with western equipment, training, and planning assistance while Russiaโ€™s mobilization ground into gear. That strategic window yielded nothing. Instead, Ukraine burned off valuable resources defending Bakhmut and then bashed uselessly against a well shaped and well defended Russian line in the south. Now the window is closed, and Russian force generation is inexorably rising, threatening Ukraine with the deluge of total strategic overmatch.

    Ukraine is facing strategic defeat, and the only way out is to go all in – not only for Ukraine, in the form of a more radical and totalizing mobilization plan, but for its partners too, who will have to adopt a quasi-war economy and devote radically more resources to arming and training the AFU.

    There are signs that Ukraine might be ready to take that plunge, from Zelenskyโ€™s claim that the army is asking for 500,000 more men, to the ongoing deliberation over an expanded draft, to comments about the need for โ€œtotal mobilizationโ€ and laws against capital flight (to prevent men from fleeing the country with their money). This is only natural; due to Russiaโ€™s vastly superior resource base, Ukraine can only hope to match them with a totalizing and far more extractive mobilization policy

    Russiaโ€™s Secret Weapon: Bombs

    That leaves the NATO partners. Even if Ukraine adopts a radical mobilization policy, it lacks the indigenous capacity to train them, let alone arm them. Without the NATO training pipeline and robust material support, a Ukrainian total mobilization (even if it were possible with Ukraineโ€™s limited state capacity) would serve only to inflate casualties and burn off what is left of the nationโ€™s demographic base. With even a stable level of Ukraine aid struggling to get through an American congress that is suffering from Ukraine fatigue and a host of domestic crises, it seems unlikely that any by the Baltic States are in the mood to double down and begin sending daily trains full of material to Kiev.

    And so, we once again return to the motif of strategic exhaustion. 2022 was the year of wild swings as the front stabilized into a conveniently shaped and easily supplied Russian position, and 2023 was the year of Ukraineโ€™s strategic window of opportunity, frittered away at Bakhmut and Robotyne. 2024 is the year that Russiaโ€™s swelling force generation reaches a climax and the war turns in an obvious and irreversible way against Ukraine.

    The great German soldier and author Ernst Jรผnger had the following comment on the prospect of war with Russia:

    When Spengler warned against any invasion of Russia for reasons of space, he was, as we have since seen, right. Even more questionable become each of these invasions for metaphysical reasons, insofar as one approaches one of the great sufferers, a titan, a genius of suffering power. In its aura, in its sphere of influence, one will become acquainted with pain in a way that far exceeds any imagination.

    Much is always made of Russiaโ€™s propensity for โ€œsufferingโ€, with interpretations ranging from a romantic Russian-patriotic notion of sacrifice for the motherland to an anti-Russian criticism of the Russian tolerance for casualties. Perhaps it means both: the individual Russian soldier is more willing to sit in a freezing trench and trade shells than his adversary, and the Russian state and people are able to lose more and last longer in the aggregate.

    I rather think, however, that Jรผngerโ€™s metaphysical โ€œtitan of sufferingโ€ is not so metaphysical at all. It rather refers to a mundane power of the Russian state, namely its excellence and willingness across the centuries to mobilize huge numbers of men and material for war, at the expense of other social goals. War with Russia sucks. It means mass casualties, cold trenches, scarred earth, and long nights of shelling. The Ukrainians have coped with this as well as anyone (because they are themselves quasi-Russian, however much they deny it), but it is an awful thing to trade shells for years on end. The Russian power of suffering is to willingly fight wars that devolve into bat fights, knowing they have a bigger bat.

    The window of strategic opportunity has closed for Ukraine, and now opens wide for Russia. The earth opens wide for the dead [end]

    The original article

    related

    The Atlanticist defeat in Donbass andย Ukraine

    chronicle of a new catastrophic NATO venture

    The Atlanticist counter-offensive

    the last NATO attempt to avoid defeat in its proxy war in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia

    Countdown of the Atlanticist defeat in Bakhmut

    a so predictable chronicle

  • The Atlanticist defeat in Donbass and Ukraine

    chronicle

    During his annual end-of-year press conference, on December 14, 2023, Vladimir Putin states

    There will be peace when we achieve our goals. They don’t change. Let me remind you what we talked about – the denazification and demilitarization of Ukraine, its neutral status

    Historical benchmarks

    Around an ancient Cossack core in 1654, established after a revolt against the Polishโ€“Lithuanian Commonwealth and the consecutive allegiance to the Russian Czar, the Russian authorities added new territories to Ukraine. After the Russian revolution, especially, Vladimir Lenin assigned in 1922 the Russian regions of Odessa, Nikolaev, Kherson, Zaporozhye, Donetsk, Lugansk and Kharkov, to the new Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. These are the current battlefield. After the Soviet victory over Nazism in 1945, Joseph Stalin added western territories, especially Lviv, which are still the hotbed of the modern Ukrainian Nazism.

    Soviet Union was dissolved in 1991 and Ukraine became independent. The 2010 presidential election highlighted the rift between eastern Ukraine and the nationalists, right-wing and pro European Union, in the west, who lost

    Ukraine was still an associate member of the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States, former Soviet Union). Elected president Viktor Yanukovych was negotiating a free trade agreement with the European Union, but on February 25, 2013, Jose Manuel Barroso, president of the European Commission, stated that its enforcement required that Ukraine quit its association with the CIS. On November 21, Yanukovych put the signature of the agreement on hold. In Lviv, Western Ukraine, protestors started chanting

    for the EU, death to the enemies, dirty Russian speakers on the gallows

    Their sponsor was Oleh Tyahnybok, leader of Nazi Svoboda [Liberty] party. First a few and peaceful in Kiev, the protestors were 500,000 on Maidan square on December 1, the most from the west, around a Nazi and bellicose core. US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, Victoria Nuland visited Kiev on December 5, supported the protestors. The economy was deteriorating, Ukraine was asking for financial support. Europe refused, Russia agreed. On December 17, 2013, a new deal was signed with Russia

    On Maidan square, on February 18, 2014, shots targeted the riot police and the protestors, the situation escalated to a bloodbath. On February 21, Yanukovych signed an agreement with the leaders of the parliamentary opposition and left the country. 103 protestors and 13 police officers had died. The Nazis held one third of the interim government, notably defense. NATO had achieved a rightist coup in Ukraine

    On February 27, 2014, Russia took action in Crimea, the last region that a Soviet leader had assigned to Ukraine, in 1954. The armed forces secured without fighting the Russian naval base in Sevastopol and the Russian-speaking population all over the peninsula

    On March 11, 2014, the 2010 elected local legislative body, Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, proclaimed its independence. On March 16, through referendum, 96.77% voters supported the reunification of Crimea with Russia.

    Pro-Europe citizens and Nazi militants had rebelled late 2013, in the west and Kiev, against the legal government of Ukraine. Pro-Yanukovych and pro-Russia citizens, rose up in Donbass against the Russophobia of the new authorities. On April 6, 2014, activists seized in Lugansk the headquarters of the Ukrainian State security (SBU). On April 7, they occupied in Donetsk the building of the Ukrainian regional administration. They were demanding either autonomy within a federal Ukraine or incorporation to Russia. Donetsk Peopleโ€™s Republic (DNR) and Lugansk People’s Republic (LNR) were founded on April 8

    On May 2, in order to deter federalism in Odessa, nationalist thugs set ablaze the Trade Unions House and slaughtered 48 Russian-speaking activists. The new Ukrainian authorities disowned as terrorists the autonomy partisans, sent against Donbass the loyal members of the armed forces and Nazi militants, legalized meanwhile as paramilitary formations, like Azov battalion. The Ukrainian forces started deliberately shelling civilian areas. These terrorist attacks were the beginning of the war in Donbass

    For the first time, on May 26, 2014, the Ukrainian armed forces shelled Donetsk airport. On June 2, air strikes targeted Lugansk, where 8 civilians were killed and 28 injured.

    On September 5, 2014, representatives from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Ukraine, Russia and both new Peopleโ€™s Republics, signed in Minsk, Belarus, a first protocol for ceasefire. Another agreement was signed on February 15, 2015, but its guarantors, Angela Merkel and Franรงois Hollande, for Germany and France, will have confessed years later that the agreements were a scam, an attempt to buy Ukraine time, in order for NATO to reinforce the Ukrainian military power

    Volodymyr Zelenskyy is not necessarily a Nazi, rather a former professional actor and an opportunist. He has been elected on May 20, 2019, on the promise of peace in Donbass, but quickly, the Nazi deep State taught him what should be his policy if he loved life. He did not disarm the Nazi paramilitary formations nor implement Minsk agreements. Former US intelligence officer Scott Ritter told that story in March 2022

    https://youtu.be/WPc8SRmSSMo

    Zelenskyy is indeed enjoying life and through the endemic corruption, has earned several hundred million dollars in four years

    The Ukrainian membership of NATO was more seriously raised in the West, while the terrorist shelling were worsening in Donbass, when on February 24, 2022, Russia started a special military operation, to liberate Donbass, denazify and demilitarize Ukraine

    The Russian offensive threatened Kiev and Kharkov, in order to divert the Ukrainian forces from Donbass, where Mariupol was encircled on March 11

    Bilateral talks began as soon as February 28, in Belarus and Turkey, but Ukraine withdrawn late March, after the US and UK had vetoed peace and promised full logistic support. The neocons and their European lackeys were regarding that new proxy war as an opportunity of strategic victory. Their wet dream was to dismember Russia and subdue China

    But the Russian and republican [from Donetsk People’s Republic, DNR] forces completed on May 20 the liberation of Mariupol. The West lost the war at that point.

    On September 27, a US secret operation sabotaged Nord Stream pipelines, in order to secure the loyalty of its European lackeys. Through referendums the same day, the inhabitants of Kherson, Zaporozhye, Donetsk and Lugansk, voted for their reunification with Russia

    Ukraine had mobilized and while in September, its numerical superiority was temporarily 3 to 1, counterattacked with success in Kharkov region. At the other end of the battlefield, Russia was unable to ensure the supply through the dniepr of its forces in Kherson, which was evacuated in November.

    In October, another major battle began in DNR, where the Russian fighters of Wagner PMC (Private Military Company) attacked Bakhmut. Zelenskyy was regarding the city as a symbol of resistance and the Atlanticist cannon fodder was thrown through the crossfire of a superior Russian artillery. Although outnumbered, Wagner managed to crush the garrison and its reinforcements, completed the cleansing of the city on May 20, 2023, one year after the Russian victory in Mariupol

    NATO countries were flooding Ukraine with high technology, air defense systems, tanks, armored vehicles, artillery and ammunition. The long advertised counter-offensive began on June 4, 2023. The axis of attacks, between Zaporozhye region and Donetsk People’s Republic, suggested the strategic goals. The Atlanticist ambition was to reach Azov sea, to cut Crimea from mainland Russia

    But the counter-offensive failed, the Atlanticist forces did not even managed to break through the first Russian defensive lines. A now iconic picture is showing wrecks, one German Leopard 2A6 tank and several US Bradley infantry fighting vehicles (IFV), near Rabotino, Zaporozhye region, on June 9

    In December, Russia is completing the cleansing of Marinka, a town in Donetsk southwestern suburb, where the Atlanticist forces were entrenched since 2014

    NATO countries have depleted their own military stocks, but the Russian firepower has never been matched. The information is secret but several clues are suggesting that about 500,000 Ukrainian fighters may have been killed since February 24, 2022. Serious analysis are concluding that the Russian casualties are much lower.

    It took the arrogant Western leaders 6 months to admit the failure of the counter-offensive. Ukraine is widening the mobilization criteria, military police is chasing draft-dodgers. Zelenskyy traveled once more to Washington DC on December 12, 2023, begged for more military support, but the US Congress departed without a deal with Joe Biden’s administration.

    Will the carnage go on ?

    • December 19, 2023

    According to Sergey Shoigu, the Russian defense minister, Ukraine has received $203 billion worth aid. The military deliveries have come from 15 countries,

    • 28 planes,
    • 87 helicopters,
    • 23,000 drones,
    • 5,220 armored vehicles,
    • 1,300 artillery systems,
    • 2,650,000 155 and 122 mm shells.

    NATO service members are controlling Ukrainian air defense, tactical missiles systems and Western multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS). 410 Western spacecraft are operating in the interests of Ukraine. Since February 24, 2022, the Atlanticist losses amount to

    • 383,000 killed and wounded fighters,
    • 553 planes,
    • 259 helicopters,
    • 14,000 armored vehicles,
    • 8,500 artillery systems
    • December 26, 2023

    Around 3:00 am, the Atlanticist forces attack Feodosia harbor, on the southeastern coast of Crimea. Jets launch two Storm Shadow cruise missiles from Nikolaev region, west of the Dnieper. One at least hits and sinks the Novocherkassk, a Ropucha-class landing ship which was docked for reparation.

    • December 29, 2023

    The Russian strategic strikes are almost daily but according to the Ukrainian authorities, the operation is a record this morning, with 5 hypersonic, 90 cruise and 14 ballistic missiles, 36 kamikaze drones. Military value targets are attacked all over Ukraine

    A technical improvement appears in an amateur video : one cruise missile is dropping flares, in order to counter infrared homing air defense.

    • December 30, 2023

    One day after a massive Russian strategic operation all over Ukraine, the Atlanticist forces commit the terrorist shelling of Belgorod, which is about 35 km north of the border. The cluster rockets, some from Czech Republic, fall among civilians, at the center of the city, where no troops are garrisoned, no military nor industrial facilities are set. 21 civilians, including three children, are killed, according to a preliminary toll. More than one hundred are injured

    Russia is always targeting military value sites, is never targeting civilians. In contrast, Ukraine is deliberately targeting civilians in Donbass since 2014. In retaliation for a strategic operation that has undoubtedly killed many service members, likely including Western operatives, the Atlanticist forces enforce their usual terrorist strategy. The US State Department comments in the afternoon

    The United States does not encourage or enable such attacks

    In the evening, one Russian cruise missile strikes the Kharkiv Palace, which is hosting foreign military personnel

    According later to the Russian defense ministry, the targeted strike has also liquidated members of the Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR), who had planned the terrorist attack in Belgorod.

    • January 1, 2024

    As usual on New Year’s Eve, the Atlanticist artillery deliberately targets civilians in downtown Donetsk city. Anti-personnel ammunition, rockets and NATO cluster 155 mm shells, fall right after midnight, some on Lenin square, where fortunately, no mass celebration has been scheduled. Four civilians are killed

    One symbolic strategic strike before dawn, one Russian Geran [Geranium] kamikaze drone burns the house in Lviv, western Ukraine, which was a museum in tribute to Nazi war criminal Roman Shukhevych (1907-1950)

    Fascist militant, auxiliary from 1941 of the Abwehr [German military intelligence], then officer until 1943 within the Schutzmannschaft [auxiliary police], against anti-Nazis partisans, he became commander in August 1943 of the UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army), a nationalist paramilitary formation which until 1945, with benevolence of the German occupiers, slaughtered at least 50,000, perhaps 100,000 Polish civilians, fought the victorious Red Army until 1950, for the benefit of the Germans until 1945, later as proxy of the Anglo-US intelligence.

    • January 2, 2024

    Russia is conducting in the morning a new massive strategic operation all over Ukraine. Especially in Kiev, kamikaze drones, hypersonic and cruise missiles hit air defense systems, command posts, military factories and warehouses

    As usual, amateur videos show how air defense missiles (SAM), US and German ones, fall back in the city and damage civilian buildings.

    As retaliation in the evening, the Atlanticist forces target once more Belgorod, but the Russian air defense manage to shoot down 9 ballistic missiles and 300 mm rockets, which fall outside the city.

    • January 3, 2024

    The French foreign affairs ministry refuses to condemn the deliberate Ukrainian strikes against civilians in Belgorod, is calling them legitimate defense

    Dmitry Medvedev is Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of Russia. He reacts on Telegram to the French statement

    We never liked the French.
    Like frogs, they fought with us. And in general, theseโ€ฆ p-ry
    [fagots] (not pioneers like) [reference to the battle of the Berezina].
    And now we are convinced of that. Written by the French Foreign Ministry. A strike on Belgorod using cluster munitions is the โ€œright to self-defense.โ€
    Scum. Bastards. Freaks

    130 years after their catastrophic defeat in Russia, most French would have embraced any winners of WW2 and some fought in the Nazi ranks, while Soviet Union was scoring 80% of the German military losses

    The legacy of Philippe Pรฉtain, French fascist leader during WW2, is currently predominant in France and Emmanuel Macron is a perfect illustration of that inclination, with traditional arrogance and cowardice

    Moreover, the deliberate slaughter of civilians is a usual way of waging war for the French, like in Algeria, which was fighting for its independence between 1954 and 1962, fortunately won.โ€‚

    • January 10, 2024

    After sundown, a Russian strike demilitarizes [Russian euphemism] the Park Hotel, which is hosting foreign fighters in Kharkov

    The official final toll will be 13 injured victims. These are likely civilians, because the Ukrainian authorities are always hiding the military losses due to Russian strategic attacks, a way to falsely substantiate that Russia would target civilians.

    • January 16, 2024

    In the evening, a Russian strike knocks down in Kharkov region a former obstetric clinic which is hosting foreign military personnel, whose core is French, according later to the statement of the Russian defense ministry, which assesses that about 60 have been killed. No fatality, according to the Ukrainian authorities, which are never conceding the military losses due to the Russian strategic strikes.

    • January 18, 2024

    The target two days before seems more serious than the individual mercenaries whom I am usually listing. The French ambassador is summoned to the Russian ministry of foreign affairs. The strategic strike in Kharkov region was a message to a country, which despite the failure of the proxy war against Russia, is still strengthening its military ties with Ukraine. The missive was not addressed to French or international public opinion but to the French government, would be without substance if the losses were not real. These were rather operatives, whom the French government had commissioned, whatever their formal status in Ukraine.

    • January 19, 2024

    The Russian foreign affairs ministry states that

    the French ambassador to Russia was presented with the facts of Franceโ€™s involvement in the Ukraine conflict

    • January 20, 2024

    The Russian fighters are also advancing west of Artemovsk, former Bakhmut, Donetsk Peopleโ€™s Republic. The Russian flag is raised in Bogdanovka, about 8 km northeast of Chasov Yar.

    • January 21, 2024

    The Atlanticist artillery targets on Sunday morning a market in Donetsk city. The shells fall in Tekstilshchik and Kirovsky districts, where according later to the provisional toll, 25 civilians have been killed

    From Krasnogorovka and Kurakhovo, at 20 km and 40 km west of downtown Donetsk, a dozen 152 and NATO 155 mm shells have been fired.

    Ukraine is deliberately shelling civilians in Donbass for 9 years, 7 months and 26 days. As a retaliation since February 2022 for the Russian special military operation for liberation of Donbass, denazification and demilitarization of Ukraine, these terrorist attacks are often carried out with NATO weapons and ammunition.

    • January 24, 2024

    At 11:00 am, a Russian Ilyushin 76 crashes in Belgorod border region. An amateur video is showing flames during the fall down

    The Ukrainian authorities are controlling all national media, which first boast that the Ukrainian air defense has shot down the plane. Then the Russian defense ministry states that in addition to 6 crew members and 3 guards, the aircraft was transporting 65 Ukrainian prisoners of war (POW), for a swap in the afternoon. Therefore, the same Ukrainian media delete their previous reference to the air defense.

    The Russian authorities add later that at least two NATO missiles (SAM) have been launched from Kharkov region, Ukraine, that the prisoners swap was well scheduled between both sides, that the flight was usual in such a case. That war crime is the consequence of antagonism within the Ukrainian authorities, also with Western sponsors.

    The Russian authorities add that among the 65 POWs, 12 were members of Nazi Azov organization, surrendered in Mariupol in May 2022. On July 28, 2022, already, the Atlanticist forces deliberately shelled the pretrial detention center in Yelenovka, Donetsk Peopleโ€™s Republic, killed 53 inmates, who had been taken prisoners in Mariupol.

    In his daily evening address to the public, 12 hours after the crash, Volodymyr Zelenskyy attempts to defuse the foreseeable crisis

    It is obvious that the Russians are playing with the lives of Ukrainian prisoners, with the feelings of their relatives and with the emotions of our society. It is necessary to establish all clear facts. As much as possible, given that the plane crash happened on Russian territory โ€“ beyond our control

    International investigation is the workaround. Meanwhile among Ukrainians, one assumption is that US or British personnel was operating the air defense systems.

    • January 29, 2024

    In the evening, Russia strikes the oil depot in Zmiev, about 40 km south of downtown Kharkov.

    • January 31, 2024

    In the afternoon, the Russian air defense shoots down 20 Atlanticist missiles which are targeting Crimea.

    • February 1, 2024

    Between 3:40 and 3:50 am, three Atlanticist unmanned surface vehicles (USV) manage to hit off Crimea the Molniya [Lightning] class Ivanovets missile corvette, which sinks.

    • February 3, 2024

    Ukraine and its Western sponsors commit a new terrorist massacre in Donbass. In Lisichansk, Lugansk Peopleโ€™s Republic, the Atlanticist artillery shells and levels a bakery-cafรฉ, full of customers and families on Saturday afternoon. The weapons are US High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) or French Lance-roquettes unitaire (LRU). Their fire is accurate and the target is deliberate

    At midnight, the rescuers are still working on the site. 20 dead victims have already been recovered. Many more people may still be under the rubble.

    • February 8, 2024

    Due to the Atlanticist defeat in Donbass and Ukraine, Valerii Zaluzhnyi is replaced as chief of staff with Oleksandr Syrskyi, commander of the ground forces

    Near midnight in Germany, BILD discloses the Nazi grandfather of Annalena Baerbock, the warmongering German foreign affairs minister

    For some reason, everyone had the illusion that Russia could be defeated on the battlefield. Because of arrogance, because of a pure heart, but not because of a great mind

    Tucker Carlson publishes later his interview of Vladimir Putin, recorded in the Kremlin on February 6.

    • February 11, 2024

    The situation has become serious in Avdeevka for the Atlanticist garrison, that the Ukrainian command, according to Forbes, may have reinforced with one of its best formations, the 3rd assault brigade, military branch of Nazi Azov organization

    Situation map in Avdeevka on February 11, 2024 (RYBAR)

    That would be the first strategic consequence of Oleksandr Syrskyi appointment as chief of staff. Despite defeat in Bakhmut in May 2022, he would agree to send more cannon fodder under the crossed fire of a superior Russian artillery.

    • February 14, 2024

    The Anglo-Ukrainian naval forces achieve a new success in the Black Sea. Before dawn, six USVs attack off Crimea the Ropucha-I-class Tsezar Kunikov landing ship. Two drones are destroyed but four others hit the target, which sinks

    On social networks, Ukraine supporters are boasting that the ship is sunk for the death anniversary of the historical figure she is named after

    Major Tsezar Kunikov (1909-1943) is a Hero of the Soviet Union. Fighter within the naval infantry, he was killed on February 14, 1943, against the Nazi armies.

    • February 15, 2024

    As a retaliation for their defeat on the battlefield, the Atlanticist forces perpetrate once more the terrorist shelling of Belgorod, Russia, about 40 km north of Ukraine. The weapons are Czech multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), the ammunition are 122 mm rockets that Serbia has delivered. The Russian air defense manages to shoot 14 down, but 4 reach the city. According to the provisional toll, 7 civilians are killed, including one baby

    An amateur video surfaces from an armored vehicle, is showing Azov fighters who leave Avdeevka in hurry, under artillery fire. The Russian forces are threatening the garrison with encirclement and reports are appearing on social networks, about losses within the 3rd assault brigade, emanation of the Nazi organization in the Ukrainian regular army.

    • February 16, 2024

    Fighters of the 114th Russian brigade have raised the victory banner at the western gate of Avdeevka, where Volodymyr Zelenskyy took a selfie on December 29, 2023

    The Ukrainian Pravda [Truth] quotes Oleksandr Borodin, press officer of the 3rd assault brigade

    Borodin added that defensive operations in some areas are being conducted in a 360-degree area of engagement from the Russians. He specified that this does not mean encirclement

    • February 17, 2024

    Russian fighters raise the flag on Avdeevka coke plant. In the evening, the Nazi elite of the Ukrainian army has been crushed and the city is also cleansed. The Atlanticist forces had built there a fortress, 15 km north of downtown Donetsk, were deliberately shelling civilians since 2014

    (RYBAR)
    • February 28, 2024

    The Atlanticist defenses are collapsing west of Avdeevka, Donetsk Peopleโ€™s Republic, where the Russian forces are liberating Berdichi, Orlovka and Tonenkoye villages

    (RYBAR)
    • March 3, 2024

    The Russian naval infantry, 155th brigade, is cleansing Novomikhailovka, about 40 km southwest of downtown Donetsk

    • March 5, 2024

    Once more, a pack of Ukrainian USVs manages to sink a Russian ship in the Black Sea. One drone is destroyed but before 3 am, 5 others hit the Sergei Kotov, a patrol ship which is operating south of the Crimea bridge

    The same day, the Russian defense ministry releases pictures from [Sergey] Shoigu’s greenhouse, a factory which is growing Geran [Geranium] strategic kamikaze drones

    • March 8, 2024

    The citizens are not rushing to defend the Ukrainian democracy. Actually, the draft dodgers are trying to leave the country

    In Chernivtsi region, southwestern Ukraine, the border guards (DPSU) and State security (SBU) arrest 34 men, who inside a truck, attempt to reach Romania. Between 25 and 40 years old, they flee the threat of mobilization. Most Ukrainians are not eager to die for the proxy war that NATO is conducting with their blood, in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia. Moreover, Ukraine is not a democracy. Volodymyr Zelenskyy has banned left political parties on March 20, 2022. The State is censoring and controlling all media.

    • March 9, 2024
    • March 10, 2024

    Quickly after the beginning of the special military operation then the Anglo-US sabotage of peace talks, two years ago, Russia has enforced an attrition war, that Ukraine cannot win and which is a carnage for the Ukrainian cannon fodder. The Russian advantage is fire power, which is decisive.

    Russian hackers managed in February to seize the list of fatalities since June 2022, within Sich battalion, a Nazi formation in the 93rd Ukrainian mechanized brigade. Only 14% have died through another cause that a Russian shelling. Early 2024, the Russian artillery is able to achieve up to 12,000 shots per day, while according to Kiev, the Atlanticist forces do not exceed 2,000 shells.

    Even if the West boosted its ammunition shipment, Ukraine would never match the number of Russian howitzers. Moreover, Russian air force has began to widely drop glide bombs, which are devastating

    • March 12, 2024

    The Russian army, border guards and State security agency (FSB) trounce Atlanticist troops which attempt to conduct a raid in Belgorod region

    With the support of tanks, the assailants are small groups of Russian Nazi exiles, members of the Russian Volunteer Corps (Russkiy dobrovolโ€™cheskiy korpus, RDK), subordinate to the Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR). The goal of such operations are propaganda and to terrorize Russian civilians. The first one was conducted in Bryansk region on March 2, 2023, others thereafter. The motive is now that the Russian presidential election will be hold at the end of the week.

    • March 15, 2024

    One Iskander ballistic missile wipes out in Odessa the staff of Tsunami battalion, a combat formation within the Ukrainian national police. The Ukrainian disinformation is describing a civilian target but local media are confirming the casualties among military officials.

    • March 21, 2024

    Before dawn, Russia strikes the facilities of the Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR), which are scattered in Kiev, in an attempt to avoid being targeted.

    • March 22, 2024

    In the morning, Russia conducts a wide strategic operation across Ukraine. According to Volodymyr Zelenskyy, about 90 cruise missiles and 60 Geran drones are committed. Actually, some of these objects are used to deceive the Atlanticist air defense and the Ukrainian propaganda could also count its own missiles, which are usually missing their targets and falling to the ground

    Anyway, several energy facilities are hit, including Dnipro hydroelectrical power plant (DHES), in Zaporozhye

    In the evening in Krasnogorsk, Moscow northwestern suburb, gunmen burst in Crocus City Hall, where a concert is scheduled a few minutes later, slaughter the spectators, set ablaze the building. More than one hundred victims die.

    • March 23, 2024

    Usual news agency of the Caliphate, Amaq takes credit, publishes pictures that the perpetrators have sent to the organization. But the Russian security agency (FSB) and Chechen Akhmat regiment manage to intercept in Bryansk region and take alive four Tajik terrorists, who are attempting to seek safety in Ukraine. They confess that they attacked the auditorium for money.

    Jihadists are the auxiliaries of the Atlanticist policies for 45 years and their terrorist attacks in the West have always been the collateral damage of these policies. Some Jihadists are already fighting under command of the Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR) and on March 7, the US embassy to Russia has issued a security alert over public gatherings

    For Andrew Napolitanoโ€™s Judging Freedom, former CIA analyst Larry Johnson is explaining the best theory so far. The terrorist attack in Moscow is a Ukrainian plot. Increasingly frustrated by unauthorized, Ukrainian blatant actions, the US knows it, were terrified for weeks.

    • March 24, 2023

    The four terrorists are taken to the Investigative Committee and later, appear before the court, over their pretrial detention.

    • March 25, 2024

    With hypersonic missiles, according to Ukraine, Russia strikes Kiev, wipes out some US Patriot air defense systems and levels buildings where are working officials of the Ukrainian security agency (SBU)

    The particularity of hypersonic missiles is that air warning sirens sound after the strike. In Bryansk border region, the governor awards the officers who have arrested alive the four Tajik terrorists, prevented them from seeking refuge in Ukraine

    • March 26, 2024

    ISIS or Ukraine ?

    Of course Ukraine

    the Secretary of the Russian Security Council, Nikolai Patrushev, replies to journalists, about the terrorist attack on March 22, in Krasnogorsk, that Ukraine has subcontracted with remnants of the Caliphate

    Director of the security agency (FSB), Alexander Bortnikov, adds that Kyrylo Budanov, head of the Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR), is a legitimate target

    One Iskander ballistic missile destroys an Atlanticist command Bunker in the southern vicinity (48ยฐ34’38.5″N 37ยฐ51’28.3″E) of Chasov Yar, Donetsk People’s Republic. Russian sources clarify that it was sheltering regular officers from NATO countries, notably the US and Poland

    Later, Polish staff and media tell that brigadier general Adam Marczak, Eurocorps deputy chief of staff, has died unexpectedly of natural causes, in his free time. To survive an Iskander direct hit would be indeed unnatural. Vacation in a Bunker was not a good idea

    In the evening, the Atlanticist forces target once more downtown Belgorod, but the Russian air defense manages to shoot down 18 rockets. US independent journalist Patrick Lancaster is there and reports.

    • April 2, 2024

    In the morning, the Atlanticist forces carry out a strategic operation in Russia. Drones strike several targets, including an industrial facility in Yelabuga, Tatarstan, about 1,200 km from the front line in Ukraine or Donbass. In that case, the weapon is a converted Aeroprakt A-22 Foxbat light aircraft

    The facility could be related to the production of Russian Geran [Geranium] strategic drones (cf. supra, March 5, 2024). In order to avoid air defense, the route has been obviously elaborated with assistance of NATO space intelligence.

    • April 7, 2024

    Ukraine resumes its nuclear blackmail, the attacks against Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), in Energodar. Several drones hit the facility. Three employees are injured. Such a terrorist campaign was already conducted in the Summer 2022.

    • April 12, 2024

    In a video for the Daily Mail, former UK prime minister Bojo [Boris Johnson] confesses the motive for the Western proxy war in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia

    With Ukrainian cities once again being pounded to rubble and the casualties mounting, I’m afraid I have to ask once again : why the hell we are being so slow in giving those heroic Ukrainians the weapons they so desperately need ? Because if Ukraine falls, it will be a catastrophe for the West, it will be the end of Western hegemony and we will have no one to blame but ourselves

    It will

    • April 17, 2024

    Up to three missiles, according to Ukraine, flatten a hotel in Chernigov, northeast

    As usual, the target was military. Photos of the rescue operation are showing military furniture in the rubble. Journalist and Nazi political figure, Ihor Mosiychuk discloses on social networks that dozens service members have been killed or injured. But as usual, the Ukrainian propaganda and its Western proxies are claiming that the target would have been civilian, concede 18 dead, likely civilian collateral damage, hide the military casualties.

    • April 23, 2024

    In a continuous effort to replenish the military ranks after huge losses, Ukraine temporarily blocks men aged 18 to 60 from accessing consular services, in order to force them to repatriate

    The United Nations have counted more than 6 million Ukrainian refugees abroad, whose many are draft dodgers.

    • April 24, 2024

    During a press conference, US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan discloses that by order of Joe Biden, first ATACMS have been supplied to Ukraine in March. The Army Tactical Missile System is a long range tactical ballistic missile that the already delivered HIMARS can launch, one ATACMS per HIMARS. He believes that the Atlanticist forces will use it within Ukraine, which in his mind is including Donbass and Crimea, not against Russia

    Here is the analysis of Scott Ritter

    The pro-Ukrainian social media is ablaze with posts proclaiming doom and gloom for Russia now that the US government has signed off on providing Ukraine with long-range (up to 300 kilometers) ATACM missiles.

    While there is no doubt that a weapon of this accuracy and range will complicate Russian military operations, exposing critical command and control and logistics hubs to attack, as well as put critical civilian infrastructure, such as the Crimea Bridge, at risk, ATACMs is not the game changer the US and Ukraine is proclaiming it to be.

    First and foremost, the ATACMs will be introduced into a deteriorating military reality where Russia enjoys superiority and/or supremacy in terms of control of the battle space, both at the front, and well into the Ukrainian rear areas.

    Ukraine will have a hard time building up the logistical support infrastructure needed to make ATACMs a viable weapon system in the face of Russian deep interdiction capabilities. As a result, while Ukraine may enjoy the occasional ATACMs success, the ability to thoroughly integrate ATACMs into a cohesive fire support system will not be possible.

    Another key factor is that the guidance system used by ATACMsโ€”and inertial/GPS hybridโ€”is very similar to that used on the HIMARS. Russia has already fielded electronic warfare capabilities which have severely restricted the performance of HIMARS. It is anticipated that Russia will similarly suppress ATACMs.

    Lastly, Russian air defense systems have shown a remarkable ability to adapt to new threats, such as HIMARS and the Storm Shadow/SCALP cruise missiles. It is anticipated that a firing solution to ATACMs will be developed shortly after the first missiles are employed against Russian forces.

    In short, the ATACMs will go the way of all previous examples of western โ€œwonder weaponsโ€โ€”much ado about nothing

    • May 8, 2024

    The West celebrates today Victory in Europe. Tomorrow will be Victory Day in Russia, the anniversary of the Soviet victory over German Nazism and European fascism. With the assistance of Gazprom workers from Rostov, the Eternal Flame has been restored, is now lit in Avdeevka, Donetsk People’s Republic, Donbass, Russia. The Russian forces achieved the liberation of the city on February 17 (cf. supra).

    • May 10, 2024

    Russia is of course silent when Ukraine reports a Russian offensive south of Belgorod, a Russian city which is a usual target of terrorism, the deliberate Atlanticist shelling of its civilians (cf. supra, December 30, 2023)

    The Russian forces are indeed carrying out offensive operations. Their scale is still unknown when Volodymyr Zelenskyy announces a fierce battle there. Kharkov is threatened and the RDK, a formation of Russian Nazi exiles under command of the Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR), is showing on social networks that it has been sent as reinforcement in the sector

    • May 11, 2024

    Second day, a Russian offensive is indeed developing toward Kharkov. Russia has previously formed in April a new group of forces, called North. Its mark is Gungnir rune, Odin’s spear

    • May 12, 2024

    As usual, the Atlanticist forces are retaliating for their defeat on the battlefield with the deliberate shelling of civilians. In Belgorod, in the rear of the Russian offensive toward Kharkov, a residential building collapses as the result of an Atlanticist strike

    The explosion was powerful, right at the base of the building, not the impact of a 122 mm rocket. Russian Investigative Committee opens a criminal case for terrorism. The detectives will find what weapon was used.

    • May 16, 2024

    For the first time since the beginning of the Russian special military operation for liberation of Donbass, demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine, mathematical model Wartears assesses that more than 500,000 Atlanticist fighters have been killed in the proxy war that NATO is conducting against Russia. Dead in vain for the fantasy of protracting Western hegemony.

    • May 23, 2024

    Atlanticist drones attack and cause damage to Russian Voronezh-DM early warning radars at Baronovsky station, Krasnodar region, 600 km from the front. Their purpose is the detection of a strategic nuclear attack. Austrian colonel Markus Reisner clarifies that these radars are working for altitudes from 2,000 to 6,000 km, while Ukrainian ballistic weapons are flying at a maximum height of 60 km. What is the goal of such a strike ?

    • June 6, 2024

    To celebrate the 80th anniversary of the Normandy landings, Emmanuel Macron had the bad taste to invite Volodymyr Zelenskyy, representative of a country at ethnic war since the far-right coup in 2014, who unlike his electoral promises but under pressure from a Nazi deep state, did not end the conflict, a revisionist country which is paying tribute to the fascists who fought in the ranks of the III. Reich

    With the invitation of Germany since 2004 and now Ukraine, the anniversary of D-Day is a vulgar Atlanticist show, the cringe spectacle of veterans who are still attending it. Through his personality, Macron accentuates its vulgarity.

    • June 7, 2024

    That photo is showing the disgrace of the forced mobilization of cannon fodder, in order to feed the Western proxy war in Ukraine. The collapse of the Western hegemony is mechanical, the result of demography, economyโ€ฆ etc Pushed to its limits, NATO is also showing what are its values, those of unhealthy thugs like Emmanuel Macron, who is contributing to sending these elders to the meat grinder, when he has never carried a rifle in his own life. What is the difference between these recruits and the Nazi Volkssturm at the end of WW2 ?

    • June 14, 2024

    In the context of NATO defeat on the battlefield, Vladimir Putin offers a fair peace. The causes of the 10-year war and Russia achievements on the battlefield dictate the conditions for such a peace:

    • Ukraine should withdraw from Donetsk and Lugansk Peopleโ€™s Republics, Kherson and Zaporozhye regions, where the drawing into Russia got a landslide victory through referendum in September 2022,
    • Ukraine should not join NATO,
    • Ukraine should not get nuclear weapons,
    • The West should lift the Ukraine-related sanctions on Russia and recognize the new territories of the Russian Federation, including Crimea.

    Putin warns that the continuation of the conflict will increase the Russian gains and harden the conditions for peace.

    • June 23, 2024

    From Nikolaev, Ukraine, the Atlanticist forces target Sevastopol, Crimea, 190 km to the southeast. The Russian air defense manages to shoot down five US ATACMS ballistic missiles, but one cluster warhead explodes above crowded Uchkuevka beach, in Sevastopol northern suburb. According to the provisional toll, five victims, including three children, are killed, 146 more are injured

    As usual, the US intelligence was involved. From NATO Aviano air base, Italy, one US RQ-4 Global Hawk drone was circling above the Black Sea, about 200 km south of Yalta, Crimea. At the time of the attack, the drone momentarily turned off its radar transponder.

    • July 8, 2024

    During Russian strategic strikes all over Ukraine, a hospital for children is hit in Kiev. The Ukrainian propaganda and its stooges in Western mainstream media are telling that Russia would have targeted it. That is a blatant lie. An amateur video is clearly showing that the missile was actually a US AMRAAM (advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile), that the Atlanticist air defense is using and which fell back after a failed interception.

    • August 4, 2024

    In a brand new show, Volodymyr Zelenskyy displays some Ukrainian F-16s fighters. Ukraine should receive a few dozen jets in the coming months, from Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands

    From HIMARS to Abrams, after two years, five months, eight days and several previous Western Wunderwaffen [wonder weapons], a few dozen F-16s will not be game changers. In order to preserve them, Ukraine could use them in the deep of the territory, to intercept the drones and missiles of the Russian strategic operations. Why is that ? Since the Atlanticist propaganda is usually claiming that the air defense is managing to shoot down all hostile targets.

    • August 7, 2024

    It reminds December 1944. The bulk of the European fascist armies had irretrievably lost against Soviet Union and in a far-fetched attempt to reach a separate peace with Anglo-US allies, Nazi Germany attacked on the west front, in the Bulge. The operation code name was Wacht am Rhein

    While Ukraine is unable to contain the Russian onslaught in Donbass, where its manpower is irretrievably decimated, the Atlanticist forces started attacking toward Kursk on August 6, in a foolish attempt to terrorize Russian civilians, ward off defeat with a PR stunt and quickly gain territories through a less defended Russian border region, in the prospect of negotiations that the Western puppet is starting evoking

    Launched on December 16, 1944, Wacht am Rhein stalled by Christmas. The Allies brought reinforcements and the assailants lost all previous gains in January 1945. I guess that the conclusion will be quicker in Russia

    On August 7, an Atlanticist drone targets in Kursk region the car of Russian war correspondent Evgeny Poddubny, who manages to survive

    • August 11, 2024

    While Ukraine is unable to contain the Russian onslaught in Donbass, where its manpower is irretrievably decimated, while its diversionary offensive has stalled five days after its launching toward Kursk, the Atlanticist forces target for the umpteenth time Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), in Energodar, as often in case of military failure

    One Ukrainian drone has hit the cooling systems facility. The Russian authorities of Zaporozhye region clarify that all six power units of the plant are hence in cold shutdown, that there is no threat of steam explosion or other consequences, while employees of the emergency situations ministry are extinguishing the blaze.

    Spokeswoman of the Russian foreign affairs ministry, Maria Zakharova comments

    Where is Rafael Grossi and the entire IAEA ? Where is at least some imitation of the work of this UN structure in this critical area ?

    Meanwhile, Volodymyr Zelenskyy finds no better inspiration than an episode of the US series The Simpsons, claims on social networks that the Russians would burn tires at ZNPP.

    • August 26, 2024

    Russia conducts once more a strategic operation all over Ukraine. According to the command of the Ukrainian air forces, the missiles/drones strikes are the greatest so far of the Russian special military operation

    Ukraine is indeed using its new F-16s (cf. supra, August 4, 2024) in the deep of its territory, to intercept the Russian drones and missiles. By the way, the Ukrainian air defense shoots one down

    Apparently, the Russian targets are mostly energy infrastructure. For several weeks, the Ukrainian authorities are highlighting that next winter will be harder in the country than the previous one.

    • August 30, 2024

    Due to the previous days events, Volodymyr Zelenskyy sacks Mykola Oleshchuk, commander of the air forces. And for its failure on the battlefield, Ukraine retaliates as usual against civilians

    In the evening, 40 Czech rockets indiscriminately target civilian neighborhoods in Belgorod and its suburb. The Russian air defense shoots 30 of them down. Five people are killed, dozens others injured.

    • September 3, 2024

    Several Russian Iskander ballistic missiles hit in Poltava the buildings of Ukrainian army’s 179th Training Center of Signal Troops [Ukrainian source]. The target was a gathering of electronic warfare specialists

    As usual, Volodymyr Zelenskyy lies, states that the missiles targeted an educational institution and a nearby hospital. Some Western media and politicians, like Bundesministerin des Auswรคrtigen [federal foreign affairs minister] Annalena Baerbock, are peddling that deceit.

    In the evening, the official Ukrainian provisional toll counts 51 killed people and 200 injured others. But a few hour before, Ukrainian far-right politician and journalist Ihor Mosiychuk has already conceded 190 dead. My guess is that the Ukrainian authorities, as usual, are reporting civilian deaths, likely civilian employees of the military facility. The delta would be the number of killed service members.

    • September 10, 2024

    The Russian forces start counterattacking against the Atlanticist bulge in Kursk region.

    • September 17, 2024

    Fighters of the 114th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade, Vostok, raise their victory banner in liberated Ukrainsk, Donetsk People’s Republic, of which these men are native.

    • September 19, 2024

    In der Region Kursk brennen noch immer deutsche Panzer.

    • September 20, 2024

    US military analyst Big Serge reports

    Russian forces in Kursk reached the village of Sverdlikovo, which sits on the line of communication to the Ukrainian units attacking on the Korenovo axis. The western half of the Ukrainian salient is about to be pinched off, leaving just the position around Sudzha

    • September 24, 2024

    The Russian forces have started storming Ugledar, that Ukraine was still occupying in Donetsk Peopleโ€™s Republic. According to reliable military analysts, the Ukrainian 72nd mechanized brigade may be annihilated there

    (RYBAR)
    • October, 1, 2024

    The Russian forces complete the liberation of Ugledar, Donetsk People’s Republic. According to reports the day before, the Ukrainian command has authorized the escape from encirclement of the remaining elements of the 72nd mechanized brigade

    The coal mining town was an Atlanticist fortress on the front line since January 2023.

    • October 31, 2024

    The New York Times notes

    […] In October, Russia made its largest territorial gains since the summer of 2022 […] Over the past month, Russian forces have seized more than 160 square miles of land in Ukraineโ€™s eastern Donbas region […] Half of Russiaโ€™s territorial gains in Ukraine so far this year were made in the past three months alone […]

    • November 6, 2024

    In the evening, after the landslide victory of Donald Trump in the US presidential election, social democrat chancellor Olaf Scholz dismisses Christian Lindner, his neoliberal finance minister. Thatโ€™s the collapse of the government coalition in Germany

    (Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen)

    The Germans have bowed down to the US sabotage by Joe Biden administration of Nord Stream pipelines, only to end up with Donald Trumpโ€™s America First doctrine in economy and defense. Olaf Scholz is the fall guy.

    • November 7, 2024

    According to the Telegraph, Donald Trump will propose freezing the battlefield in Donbass and Ukraine

    A buffer zone would be created along the former front line. Troops from the European Union and UK would patrol it. During 20 years, Ukraine would not seek to join NATO, but the US would carry on with the shipment of weapons.

    • November 17, 2024

    In the early morning, Russia conducts once more a large strategic operation all over Ukraine. According to Kiev, 120 missiles and 90 long range drones are engaged. The targets are military facilities and energy infrastructure

    According to the New York Times in the evening, Joe Biden would have agreed, twelve days after Donald Trumpโ€™s victory and two months before his ousting from the White House, with ATACMS (cf. supra, April 24, 2024) strikes in Russia. As usual, the decision of the senile thug will not change the game, only escalate the conflict

    At the same time, Sergey Lavrov arrives in Rio de Janeiro for the G20 summit, which is lasting two days, until Tuesday, November 19

    The reasoning of Russia over potential strategic strikes on its territory is clear. The range of the Western missiles is one aspect. But in order to select targets, Ukraine needs intelligence that only NATO satellites are able to collect. That is why such strategic strikes would be regarded as NATO attack. Vladimir Putin stated on September 12

    There is an attempt to substitute concepts. Because the issue is not about allowing or prohibiting the Kiev regime from carrying out strikes on Russian territory. It is already doing so, with drones and other means. But when it comes to using Western-made long-range precision weapons, the story is completely different. I have already said this and any expert, Russian or Western, will confirm it. The Ukrainian army is not capable of carrying out strikes with Western long-range precision weapons [โ€ฆ] That is possible only by using data from spy satellites that Ukraine does not have. These data are from satellites belonging to the EU or the United States, in short, NATO satellites. Secondly, and this is very important, the flight programs of these missiles can be elaborated only by NATO countries military. The issue is therefore not about allowing or not allowing the Ukrainian regime to carry out strikes against Russia with these weapons, but about deciding whether NATO countries are directly involved in the military conflict [โ€ฆ]

    In its proxy war, the West was regarding Russia as a frog in boiling water. But Russia is now fed up with that game.

    • November 18, 2024

    One tragic but usual anecdote : during Russian strikes, a missile hits a residential building in Odessa and at least ten civilians are killed. Most Western media are immediately parroting the Ukrainian disinformation, which is claiming that Russia would have targeted the victims

    But Russia is never targeting civilians and the evidence of the gross lie surfaces later on social networks, where a Ukrainian witness shares his video of debris. The missile was clearly US, from a Patriot air defense system.

    • November 19, 2024

    According later to the Ukrainian defense ministry, US ATACMS ballistic missiles targeted in the early morning an ammunition depot in Karachev, about 115 km from the border, Bryansk region, Russia

    The Russian defense ministry confirms, clarifies that the air defense destroyed 5 ATACMS in the air. A sixth one was damaged and debris fell on a military facility.

    The same day, Vladimir Putin approves changes to the nuclear doctrine of Russia. The attack from a non-nuclear state, if backed by a nuclear power, will be henceforth regarded as a joint assault on Russia and a condition under which Russia will consider using its nuclear arsenal.

    • November 20, 2024

    The Atlanticist forces attack Kursk region, Russia, with up to 12 NATO missiles. According later to Russian sources on the ground and British media quoting Western informants, some of the weapons were British Storm Shadows and/or French SCALPs, actually the same cruise missile. Downing Street refuses to comment, so the information are true

    On a Ukrainian aerial video, missiles have saturated a tiny area on Baryatinsky estate, perhaps a command post, in Maryino village

    US embassy in Kiev closed before the strikes and for fear of strong Russian retaliation, other Western diplomatic offices shut after their execution.

    • November 21, 2024

    As warning, Russia uses in the early morning one ballistic missile, this time with conventional load. The target is a military factory in Dnipro, where a CCTV video is clearly showing the entries of six distinct projectiles. The missile may be one Rubezh [Frontier] ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile), which instead of conventional warheads, can carry four nuclear ones, 300 kt TNT equivalent each, 20 Hiroshimas

    In an evening address, Vladimir Putin clarifies that Russia used in the morning a new missile system called Oreshnik [Hazel]. The hypersonic intermediate-range ballistic missile (hypersonic IRBM) is flying at a speed close to Mach 10. Its 5,000 km range makes it suitable for the treatment of targets in Europe

    He adds

    We are considering ourselves entitled to use our weapons against military facilities of those countries which are allowing to use their weapons against our facilities, and in case of an escalation of aggressive actions, we will respond decisively and in mirror-like manner

    • November 26, 2024

    The Russian defense ministry describes the latest attacks of NATO missiles in Kursk region. On 23, five US ATACMS were aimed at the positions near Lotarevka of a S-400 air defense division. Three were destroyed in the air, two others reached their target. A radar system was damaged. On 25, eight ATACMS targeted Vostochny airfield, in Kursk eastern suburb. Seven were shot down, one other damaged some infrastructure.

    • November 27, 2024

    The Associated Press discloses that Joe Bidenโ€™s administration is urging Ukraine to quickly increase the size of its military by drafting more men and revamping its mobilization laws to allow for the conscription of citizens as young as 18.

    • December 13, 2024

    Via confidential documents from a German security agency, der Spiegel reports that unidentified drones have been sighted in recent weeks over sensitive industry locations and in the evening hours of December 3 and 4, over the US air base in Ramstein

    One of the targets is the Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrik [BASF], flagship of the chemical industry in Germany.

    • December 17, 2024

    In the early morning in Moscow, a bomb attack kills Igor Kirillov and his driver. The lieutenant general was commanding the Russian NBC protection troops. He was leading the investigations about US military biological laboratories in Ukraine

    According later to the Associated Press and one of its anonymous Ukrainian sources, the Ukrainian security agency (SBU) has conducted the attack. Through dirty atavism, Western mainstream media, a coterie of mercantile, dishonest, fetid and whorish stooges, are parroting fake news from the Ukrainian propaganda, which is claiming to the contrary, that Russian troops would have carried out chemical attacks on the battlefield.

    • December 18, 2024

    The Russian security agency (FSB) identifies and arrests the man who planted the bomb which killed general Igor Kirillov

    Akhmad Kurbanov is a textbook case: 29-year-old Uzbekistan national, whom his Ukrainian handler promised $100 k and a residence permit in a NATO country.

    What else could Joe Biden’s administration and its European stooges commit, in order to escalate the conflict before Donald Trump’s inauguration on January 20.

    • January 4, 2025

    In 2021, European Lithium, an Australian company, has secured rights to Shevchenko deposit, one of the largest in Europe, in the vicinity of Kurakhovo, Donetsk People’s Republic

    But the Russian forces completed the liberation of the town on January 3, 2025, seize the lithium deposit the day after

    Key component in the production of batteries, electric vehicles and smartphones, lithium is one of the motives of the proxy war that the West is conducting since 2014 in Donbass, against Russia.

    • January 11, 2025

    Fighters with the 4th company / 3rd battalion / 109th rifle regiment raise their flag on the mine waste heap, in the market area of Dzerzhynsk, Donetsk People’s Republic

    In the evening, the Russian forces are controlling 95% of the city, that the Atlanticist authorities renamed Toretsk, under the 2016 decommunization law in 2016

    • January 15, 2025

    In an advert, the SBU (Ukrainian State security agency) identify and arrest young characters who covertly monitor a serviceman and burn a military vehicle

    That campaign means that the antifascist resistance has gained an operational value which is alarming Atlanticist authorities whose defeat is inevitable in Donbass and Ukraine

    At his Senate confirmation hearing the same day, next US Secretary of State Marco Rubio emphasizes that

    The problem with Ukraine is not that theyโ€™re running out of money, but that theyโ€™re running out of people

    Most conscripts are mobilized by force and consumed as cannon fodder in a lost war. Moreover, its Western sponsors are weighing on Ukraine to lower draft age to 18. In that context, military vehicles, preferably Territorial Centers of Recruitment and Social Supportโ€˜s (TCC) ones, are often burning in the Ukrainian cities.

    • January 18, 2025

    Around noon, on January 17, 2025, two Russian missiles, likely Iskander ballistic ones, struck an air force college in Krivoy Rog, southern Ukraine, west of Dnieper river

    In the afternoon, an X user paid tribute to Jeppe Hansen, a Danish serviceman killed during the strikes in Krivoy Rog. But the X account of the relative was later deleted. Hansen was holder on LinkedIn of an account which according to Google cache, had been created with its profile picture more than one year ago. On January 18, the erasure of that LinkedIn account, after I have read it, confirms his death and the wish of Western authorities to censor these information

    After a bachelor degree in medialogy, he studied at the Royal Danish Defense College from 2017 to 2020, got an air force officer diploma. Within the Royal Danish Air Force since 2021, his last function was cyber case manager.

    Alongside Belgium and the Netherlands (cf. supra, August 4, 2024), Denmark started delivering F-16 fighter aircraft to Ukraine in August 2024.

    • January 31, 2025

    On August 6, 2024, in a foolish attempt to terrorize Russian civilians, ward off defeat with a PR stunt and quickly gain territories through a less defended Russian border region, the Atlanticist forces started toward Kursk an offensive (cf. supra, August 7, 2024) which from its beginning, was promised the same success than German Nazi operation Wacht am Rhein, in December 1944, Belgian Ardennes.

    Clues of war crimes against Russian civilians have surfaced quickly. One case is now formal, with the indictment today of Evgeny Fabrisenko. Between September 28 and November 24 2024, with three comrades, he slaughtered 11 men and 11 women in Russkoe Porechnoye, a village about 20 km from Ukraine border. Eight women were raped before their murders. The criminals were acting under control of the commander of 11th coy / 4th battalion / 92nd Ukrainian mechanized brigade, who had ordered them to kill all civilians

    While the Russian army was counterattacking, Fabrisenko was later captured and confessed the crimes. In detailed admission, he told the investigators the place where the criminals had concealed the corpses

    In the evening, at the other end of the battlefield, one Russian Iskander ballistic missile hits Odessa Bristol hotel, which according to the Russian intelligence, is hosting foreign military personnel and a strategic meeting.

    • February 1, 2025

    The day after Russian investigators disclosed Ukrainian war crimes against Russian civilians in Kursk region (cf. supra), in order to create a smokescreen, the Atlanticist forces perpetrate a new one and falsely accuse Russia, new episode in a long series of false flags, this time in Sudzha, same Kursk region.

    • February 12, 2025

    In Washington, the Senate confirms Tulsi Gabbard, a staunch opponent so far to proxy wars, as Director of National Intelligence. Meanwhile, at NATO headquarters in Brussels, new Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth states that the US does not support the membership of Ukraine, where no US troops will be deployed. He adds that potential European peacekeepers should not be covered under NATO article 5

    A bitter disavowal for Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who has told the British Ecomonist, in an interview published the same day, that in such case, Ukraine would build NATO on its territory.

    • February 14, 2025

    At around 1:50 am, local time, less than two days after Donald Trump thrown Volodymyr Zelenskyy under the bus (cf. supra), while a security conference is held in Munich and near negotiations between US and Russia are raised, a drone strikes the confinement of reactor #4 at Chernobyl nuclear power plant (NPP)

    Ukraine accuses Russia. The operation is sophisticated and allegedly, investigators find the debris of a Russian drone motor on the crime scene. But the fear of a nuclear incident is a usual psychological leverage of the Ukrainian authorities, who shelled Zaporozhye NPP (ZNPP, cf. supra, April 7, 2024). The attack is obviously a false flag.

    • February 18, 2025

    The day after Emmanuel Macron attempted to create a diversion through the meeting in Paris of European leaders opposed to the prospects for peace that the victory of Donald Trump is fostering, Russian and US diplomats meet in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia

    Foreign affairs minister Sergey Lavrov and Secretary of State Marco Rubio agree on the goal of normalizing their relation and to appoint teams to work for peace in Ukraine. Later in a press conference, Lavrov clarifies as a comment to the meeting in Paris that the deployment of Western troops in Ukraine is unacceptable.

    • February 21, 2025

    As the third anniversary of the Russian special military operation for liberation of Donbass, demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine, is approaching, the Danish parliament gives a standing ovation to a Ukrainian serviceman, Dmytro Kanuper

    The hero is member of the 12th special [police] brigade, emanation of Azov Nazi organization in the Ukrainian national guard. The social networks are showing that he is usually bearing a patch of the Misanthropic Division, an international Nazi brotherhood, founded and based in Ukraine since 2013. I guess that in their tiny country, some Danes are still fantasizing about the supremacy of the Nordic race. As logistical personnel for F-16 fighter aircraft that Denmark is delivering to Ukraine, one Danish serviceman was already killed (cf. supra, January 18, 2025)

    During WW2, while Denmark was under protection of the Reich, 6,000 Danes enrolled in the SS, with complacency of the Danish government, against Soviet Union. Fortunately, they died or lost the war. The Danish case is somehow neurotic, but like Boris Johnson explained it (cf. supra, April 12, 2024), all Europe, especially UK and France, is terrified from the collapse of the Western hegemony. 80 years after the failure of European fascist armies on the same battlefield, against Bolshevism, Europe cannot acknowledge defeat in Ukraine, against Russia. In the context of its decline, through its desperate support to Nazi organizations in Ukraine, its complacency with Israeli war crimes, mass killing and ethnic cleansing in Palestine, Europe is also losing its honor.

    • February 28, 2025

    In Washington, Volodymyr Zelenskyy has a public argument with Donald Trump and Vice President JD Vance. His visit is cut short as he is kicked off the White House. Later, Trump writes

    We had a very meaningful meeting in the White House today. Much was learned that could never be understood without conversation under such fire and pressure. Itโ€™s amazing what comes out through emotion, and I have determined that President Zelenskyy is not ready for Peace if America is involved, because he feels our involvement gives him a big advantage in negotiations. I donโ€™t want advantage, I want PEACE. He disrespected the United States of America in its cherished Oval Office. He can come back when he is ready for Peace

    • March 3, 2025

    Three days after Volodymyr Zelenskyy was kicked off the White House, the US suspends all military aid to Ukraine. The support would resume if Donald Trump determined that Ukraine had demonstrated a commitment to peace negotiations with Russia. The order is affecting more than $1 billion in arms and ammunition in the pipeline.

    • March 5, 2025

    The Financial Times reports that the US has cut off intelligence sharing, frozen dedicated channels with Ukraine

    In the evening, as a reply to the latest lies and boasts of Emmanuel Macron (in French) on French TV, Russia demilitarized in Krivoy Rog, Ukraine, a hotel which was hosting foreign service members, likely French and British ones.

    • March 7, 2025

    British Reuters agency and most Western mainstream media are alarmed, because the news from Kursk are pretty bad for the Atlanticist side. The Ukrainian offensive (cf. supra, August 7, 2024) began like Wacht am Rhein, when Adolf Hitler staked everything late 1944 in the Belgian Ardennes. It may end like Stalingrad, when a European fascist army was encircled late 1942, then crushed

    Russia is threatening to encircle the Atlanticist forces still involved in Kursk region and their lines of communication with Ukraine are almost cut. The New York Post reports that according to anonymous Ukrainian sources, their troops may attempt to retreat within two weeks from the Russian territory, in order to avoid annihilation

    Situation map in Kursk region in the evening of March 7, 2025 (RYBAR)

    Without real strategic goal, the offensive was a PR operation, a Western way of doing stuff nowadays. Its inevitable failure may shatter the Atlanticist morale, while the military situation is not better in Donbass.

    • March 8, 2025

    600 Russian elite volunteers burst out behind the enemy lines and wreck havoc on Atlanticist defense north of Sudzha, the Russian town that Ukraine is occupying since August 2024 in Kursk region, 12 km east of the border. That is operation Potok [Flow]

    With special equipment, they have navigated over 15 km through a 1.4-meter-wide pipe, where the gas was pumped out and oxygen, injected.

    • March 12, 2025

    A serviceman with the 11th Guards Air Assault brigade raises the flag in Mirny, which has been cleansed, 6 km east of Sudzha, the Russian town that the Atlanticist forces were occupying since August 2024 (cf. supra, August 7, 2024) in Kursk region, 12 km east of the border.

    After the US-Ukrainian proposal on March 11 for a ceasefire that Russia is expected to reject, US intelligence and ammunition support to Ukraine has resumed.

    • March 13, 2025

    The Russian forces complete the cleansing of Sudzha

    • March 18, 2025

    Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin talk on the phone, agree on the project of a lasting peace in Ukraine, that the conflict should never have started, should have been ended long ago through sincere peace efforts. Putin backs Trumpโ€™s idea of a mutual 30-day moratorium on strikes against energy infrastructure

    The European leaders are fussing, attempt to be heard, but nobody cares about what they are thinking or expecting over Ukraine. Europe is sidelined because it is nothing, but an unhealthy bunch.

    In an interview later with Fox News, the US president discloses that 2,500 Atlanticist troopers are still encircled in Russian Kursk region. One source from the anti fascist resistance in Ukraine has already reported a few days ago that about 30 NATO operatives are among them.

    • March 19, 2025

    Over Sumy region, Ukraine, the Russian air defense manages to shoot down one Atlanticist jet fighter, likely a F-16. According to not yet officially confirmed reports, the kill is the result of an ambush

    A F-16 was spotted the day before in the same area, where it was flying in support to the Atlanticist operations at the border with Kursk region. One S-400 air defense system is now in a good position to pick the prey, that the radar of a Su-35 jet fighter is illuminating.

    Another F-16 was shot down on August 26, 2024 (cf. supra), but that was the work of the Ukrainian air defense

    In the night, among other strategic strikes in the country, Geran drones pound the railway hub in Kirovograd, central Ukraine.

    • March 20, 2025
    (RYBAR)

    In the early morning, as part of a broader air offensive in Russia, a Ukrainian heavy drones swarm targets Engels-2 strategic bomber airbase, in Saratov region, more than 600 km from the front line

    The Russian authorities state later that the air defense has shot down 132 drones, including 54 in Saratov region, where due to debris or direct hits, a dozen people have been injured

    Western media are reporting a blaze there, but several hours after the attack NASA FIRMS (Fire Information for Resource Management System) has detected zero thermal anomaly at Engels-2 strategic bomber airbase

    The Russian authorities are pretty not experts in Western PR, while the Atlanticist ones in Ukraine are paying an army of operatives, in order to misinform the West, notably in the context of military operations like that one

    Besides, called Stalingrad Falcons, a Russian formation of Geran drone pilots releases a video where embedded cameras are showing their successful attack the day before of the railway hub in Kirovograd (cf. supra, March 19)

    https://youtube.com/watch?v=iN7t-G2n2Hk%3Ffeature%3Doembed

    Finally for today, Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, challenges on X Friedrich Merz, next German Kanzler

    Future Chancellor Merz accuses Russia of waging war in Europe and targeting Germany with arson, contract killings & disinformation. Youโ€™re not in power yet but already lying like Goebbels. Nazi Germany attacked us like this from 1941-1945. We know how it ended. Bad start, Fritz!

    I guess that he addresses more broadly the madness of most European leaders, a pathology that I am watching as the atavistic legacy of more than two centuries of fanatical nationalism.

    • March 22, 2025

    In order to fat a skinned army, Ukraine is enforcing since February 11, 2025, a new program to encourage youngsters to enlist for the meat grinder

    Titled The Generation That Decides Now, it is offering several benefits to 18- to 24-year-olds: higher bonuses than other troopers and a service period of just one year, while the others are indefinitely in the ranks

    Ukraine was already mobilizing the elders, easy targets of the forced mobilization (cf. supra, January 15, 2025), because they are running slower. If it managed to lower the age limit to 16 years old, it would match the ambition of the Volkssturm [Peopleโ€™s assault], the last batch of cannon fodder in Nazi Germany.

    • March 27, 2025

    The Russian forces are completing the cleansing of the territory that the Atlanticist soldiery has occupied in Kursk region, during the failed offensive (cf. supra, August 7, 2024) which began on August 6, 2024

    War crimes against Russian civilians were already established on January 31, 2025 (cf. supra), with the indictment of a Ukrainian serviceman who has confessed the 22 murders that his squad had committed in Russkoe Porechnoyethe.

    Such atrocities were widespread, as the Russian victory has already revealed dozens more corpses of civilians in the liberated areas. On Telegram, I have watched several videos from these crime scenes. The bodies are already in advanced state of decay, are still showing clear evidences of deliberate murders. The victims were of all ages and both genders.

    • March 28, 2025

    In the evening, Russia targets Bartolomeo hotel in Dnipro, a scenic resort on Dnieper river, known for its pirate ship-themed design. Later, the Ukrainian authorities report 4 dead victims and 15 injured ones

    As usual in case of Russian strategic strikes, I think that the official toll counts civilian collateral casualties but forgets military ones, especially Western stowaways.

    • April 9, 2025

    For RIA Novosti, Sergey Bobylev takes that splendid photo of Chechen fighters with Kashtana battalion tactical group, who are deploying a D-20 152 mm howitzer in Kursk region, where the Russian army is expelling the last Atlanticist elements.

    • April 12, 2025

    Ukraine acknowledges the loss in combat mission the same day of another F-16 and pays tribute to pilot Pavlo Ivanov

    According to the Ukrainian edition of the BBC and its anonymous official Ukrainian source, Russian missiles, either ground or air-launched, shot down the NATO fighter jet

    Meanwhile, Russia and its friends are celebrating worldwide the 64th anniversary of the first space flight.

    • April 13, 2025

    In the morning, two Russian Iskander ballistic missiles strike in downtown Sumy the Congress Center and the Bank Academy, where Atlanticist military meetings are held

    Sadly, collateral casualties are heavy. About one hundred civilians are injured or killed, according to the Ukrainian authorities.

    • April 14, 2025

    In reaction to the Russian strategic strikes against military targets in Sumy, on April 13, 2025 (cf. supra), the emotion caused by their civilian collateral casualties, Friedrich Merz confirms his readiness to deliver German Taurus cruise missiles to Ukraine, what the incumbent chancellor Olaf Scholz has so far refused.

    Merz should be appointed on May 6, clarifies that these new weapons should enable Ukraine to take the lead, by targeting for example the Crimea bridge. He thinks that the West should not make peace offers to Russia, rather that Vladimir Putin should acknowledge the hopelessness of this war.

    His strategic analysis is totally wrong. Russia is winning. The Atlanticist offensive (cf. supra, August 7, 2024) failed in Kursk region and Russia is inexorably advancing in Donbass. The more the war will last, the more the Western defeat will be cruel. Taurus missiles would not be more game changers than the previous Wunderwaffen, like HIMARS or Leopard Panzerkampfwagen. Last but not the least: since the Russian gains in Zaporozhye and Kherson regions, the Crimea bridge is not a major line of supply

    Actually, the German missiles would appear as the modern version of WW2 Vergeltungswaffen [retaliatory weapons, V-1 and V-2]. Merz is a reactionary politician and a revanchist German grocer. Germany should once for all accept its defeat against Soviet Union in 1945.

    How interesting is the same day the statement of Kaja Kallas, vice-president of the European Union for foreign affairs, a dumb politician from Estonia, which as a Baltic country, was during WW2 a nest of Nazi auxiliaries. She warns any leader who would attend on May 9 in Moscow the celebration of the 80th anniversary of the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany.

    • April 19, 2025

    Vladidmir Putin states

    For humanitarian consideration, from 6:00 PM until midnight, the Russian Federation declares an Easter truce. I order for this period to stop all the hostilities

    • April 23, 2025

    The European divas sabotage the negotiations for peace in Ukraine. A meeting between NATO countries is scheduled today in London. But at the last moment, Volodymyr Zelenskyy warns through the press that he is refusing the loss of Crimea, yet a lesser evil given the military situation. Consequently, Secretary of State Marco Rubio waives the trip, what also triggers cancellation for the European foreign ministers.

    What devil could have inspired the Ukrainian comedian? While visiting Madagascar, in the wake of his colony in Mayotte, Ursula von der Leyen’s spokesman Emmanuel Macron makes that known via his ร‰lysรฉe palace

    Ukraine’s territorial integrity and European vocation are demands of Europe

    His Special Envoy Keith Kellogg should travel to Moscow later in the week and Donald Trump writes on social media

    [โ€ฆ] The situation for Ukraine is dire – He [Zelenskyy] can have Peace or, he can fight for another three years before losing the whole Country [โ€ฆ]

    It is hard to better summarize the military situation, which by tradition in war, dictates the direction of peace negotiations. Its dogmatic opposition to peace and its inability to accept the ground reality are illustrating how the corrupt European Union is today nothing more than a tool for the demented neocon US deep state. I am very optimistic because convinced Europe will pay dearly for that.

    • April 24, 2025

    After midnight, Russia reminds ground reality through strategic strikes all over Ukraine. According to the Ukrainian authorities, 215 drones, cruise and ballistic missiles are involved in the attack

    In Kiev, where the civilian collateral fatalities amount to nine people, the targets are air defense systems and transport infrastructure. Russia clarifies that all are hit.

    • April 25, 2025

    Today is an anniversary; 80 years ago, US and Soviet troops achieved their junction on Elbe river, in Torgau

    In the afternoon, Vladimir Putin meets Steve Witkoff, Special Envoy of Donald Trump. Their talk last three hours in the Kremlin

    Just before, in an attempt in the morning to sabotage the negotiations, the Ukrainian secret services assassinated lieutenant general Yaroslav Moskalik, a member of the Russian general staff, through a car bomb attack in Balashikha, Moscow suburb

    The car owner is named Ignat Kuzin, native of Sumy. He lived six months as neighbor of the victim and left a few days before for Turkey. His car remained and was carrying a bomb which was remotely triggered, when the victim walked along.

    • April 26, 2025

    Chief of the General Staff, Valery Gerasimov reports to Vladimir Putin that the Russian army has completed the cleansing of Kursk region

    He pays also tribute to the Korean troops which have fought there shoulder to shoulder with the Russian ones, thus officially acknowledges their involvement in the battle. That confirmation will exacerbate the fear among Western leaders of the yellow peril

    Volodymyr Zelenskyy attends the funeral of pope Francis for the sole purpose of meeting Donald Trump in Rome. For the Times, British cartoonist Peter Brookes is pretty not optimistic

    But the US president gives him a 15-minutes conversation and the promise of a longer one after the ceremony.

    • April 28, 2025

    On April 28, 2025, Russia releases several videos which are showing North Korean soldiers who were training or fighting alongside Russian comrades in Russian Kursk region, where the last Atlanticist troops were wiped out two days before (cf. supra). Vladimir Putin States

    We will always honor the Korean heroes who gave their lives for Russia, for our common freedom, on an equal basis with their Russian brothers in arms

    On June 18, 2024, in accordance with article 51 of the UN Charter, Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un signed a Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, which was enforced on December 4, after ratification in both countries

    Musical interlude
    • May 5, 2025

    Donald Trump is an erratic character and above all, the errand boy of Israel. Ukraine is boring him because he is not strong enough to be able to contribute to the resolution of the conflict

    After the signature with Ukraine, on April 30, of the so-called Mineral Resources Agreement, which is just hot air, since Russia is controlling most of Donbass, he decides to ignore the main Russian demand: the Ukrainian waiver of Crimea, Donetsk, Kherson, Lugansk and Zaporozhye.

    Hence, according to the rumor, Russia is ready to alter its strategy, in order to end the conflict in less than two months. Its technical aspects are the annihilation of the current Ukrainian authorities and the destruction of all critical infrastructure. What the US would have done three years ago.

    • May 9, 2025

    Each year, Soviet Union and now Russia are celebrating on May 9 their victory over European fascist armies. 2025 is its 80th anniversary. Despite the pettiness of the European Union and its Baltic states, 29 foreign leaders attend the ceremony, notably from Brazil, Burkina Faso, China, Cuba, Egypt, Serbia, Slovakia, Venezuela and Vietnam. Several foreign detachments parade alongside the Russian army, notably from China, Egypt and Vietnam

    The apparent reason for the European bad mood is the war in Donbass and Ukraine, that the hypocrites have pretended to discover in 2022, when the Russian Special Military Operation was the result of the Western shenanigans since 2014 in Ukraine and Donbass, to trigger a proxy war against Russia. Nazi paramilitary formations are fighting again in the Atlanticist ranks and Russia is once more winning

    Here at left, on February 18, 2024, Gwendal Delange was a French Nazi volunteer in the ranks of the 3rd assault brigade, emanation of Azov organization in the Ukrainian regular army. He is currently fighting within a proud Nazi French squad of the International Legion (social media)

    That impeding victory and the guests at the celebration of the previous one in 1945 are illustrating a changing world. The imperialism is losing and the Western hegemony comes to its end. And that is the actual reason for the anger of the European Union

    • May 11, 2025

    While Emmanuel Macron seems every day more hysterical, the Europeans have issued an ultimatum: new sanctions unless Russia agrees to cease fire for one month from May 12. Their wet dream is then the official commitment in Ukraine of British and French troops. As we already know, Russia is retaining the option of resolving the conflict in less than two months, through a decisive strategic campaign which would wipe out the Ukrainian leadership and destroy all critical infrastructure (cf. supra, May 5)

    Instead, at the end after midnight of a Russian unilateral 3-day truce in memory of the Soviet victory over European fascist armies, Vladimir Putin offers to resume direct negotiations with Ukraine, on May 15, in Istanbul. The US and UK sabotaged them more than three years ago, at the beginning of the Russian Special Military Operation.

    • May 16, 2025

    The Russian plenipotentiaries arrived in Istanbul the day before. Under the aegis of the Turkish foreign minister, they meet a Ukrainian delegation for the first time since 2022, when the US and UK sabotaged the previous peace negotiations

    In order to implement a ceasefire, Russia is demanding that the defeated Atlanticist troops withdraw first from the positions they are still occupying in Donetsk, Kherson, Lugansk and Zaporozhye regions.

    • May 24, 2025

    In the early morning, more than 250 Geran drones and Iskander ballistic missiles target Kiev, according to Ukraine. The Russian defense ministry confirms later a raid on a Patriot air defense system, a radio intelligence center and a military factory

    The Ukrainian air force comments that the last version of the Iskander is harder to intercept, because the missile is no longer following a simple ballistic trajectory and is dropping radar decoys.

    • May 31, 2025

    As part of a large Atlanticist terrorist campaign in the Russian territories which are bordering Ukraine, a bomb attack triggers in the evening the derailment of a passengers train from Klimovo, Bryansk region, to Moscow. Seven victims die.

    • June 1, 2025

    The Ukrainian secret services carry out in the morning a wide drones attack on strategic bombers airbases all over Russia

    The UAVs are truck-borne and take off close to the targets. On the car parks, Russian truck drivers are filmed climbing onto the launchers and trying to disrupt them with stones and other improvised means. But the vehicles are also booby-trapped

    • June 7, 2025

    During a new meeting on June 2 in Istanbul, Russia and Ukraine agreed on a new prisoners swap. Moreover, Russia offered the repatriation of the corpses of 6,000 fallen Ukrainian soldiers. As agreed, a first batch of 1,212 bodies arrives on June 7 in refrigerated vehicles at the planned exchange point in Belarus. But then, Volodymyr Zelenskyy refuses to collect them. The corpses of fighters whom Ukraine is likely regarding as missing in action (MIA) would indeed enlighten the terrible Atlanticist casualties

    Money is the main reason for the Ukrainian procrastination. 6,000 confirmed killed in action (KIA) would amount to 90 billion Hryvnias (โ‚ฌ 1,903,770,000) in compensation for the families. That is 10% of the annual defense budget and much money for the corrupted Ukrainian plutocrats. Ukraine is acknowledging so far a few dozen thousands KIAs, when the losses are actually close to one million.

    • July 1, 2025

    The Iranian victory in a 12-day war that Israel started in June has worsened the depletion of the US military stockpile. Therefore, the White House announces a pause in the shipment to Ukraine of critical ammunition and equipment.

    • July 4, 2025

    In the early morning, Russia strikes toughly the Atlanticist military-industrial complex (MIC) in Kiev, with hundreds of drones, cruise and ballistic missiles

    The operation is surgical and the Ukrainian authorities declare only one dead. Since they are never disclosing military losses during Russian strategic strikes, that means one dead civilian.

    • July 9, 2025

    In the early morning, Russia conducts, according to Ukraine, the most massive strategic operation so far against the Atlanticist military-industrial complex (MIC), with 728 drones and 13 missiles. The mains targets are military bases in Lutsk and Zhytomyr, western Ukraine

    • July 10, 2025

    In Kiev, a gunman shoots dead Ivan Voronich, colonel within the State security agency (SBU). According to the rumor, the target was involved in secret operations on Russian territory.

    • July 11, 2025

    Generalmajor Christian Freuding is heading the Planning and Command Staff within the German defense ministry. He was publicly enthused about the offensive that the Atlanticist forces started in Russian Kursk region (cf. supra, August 7, 2024). Alas, he may think, the operation met the same fate than Wacht am Rhein, in 1944, in the Belgian Ardennes

    Freuding is once more in Kiev, where an agreement is signed. Germany is henceforth financing the Ukrainian production of long-range missiles. His wording is unclear. For the Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen, the Generalmajor explains

    We [sic] need weapons systems that can reach deep into Russian territory, capable of attacking command facilities, airfields and aircraft

    After the successive defeats of HIMARS (from June 2022), Panzerkampfwagen (from March 2023), F-16 (from August 2024, cf. supra) and various NATO-supplied air defense systems, what kind of Wundervergeltungswaffen will soon be deployed?

    Is Germany once more at war against Russia?

    • July 13, 2025
    • July 14, 2025

    To sum up the diplomatic situation, Russia has already articulated its conditions for a ceasefire: withdrawal of the Atlanticist forces from the positions they are still occupying in Donetsk, Kherson, Lugansk and Zaporozhye regions. Alas, the West is not yet ready to acknowledge its military defeat

    For lack of stomach, Donald Trump has lost interest in Ukraine. However he is angry about the success of the almost daily strategic strikes that Russia is conducting against the Ukrainian military-industrial complex (MIC)

    On July 14, 2025, the US president announces the close shipment to Ukraine of 17 Patriot air defense systems, but clarifies that the European Union will pay for them

    • July 17, 2025

    While Germany is rattling its sabers against Russia (cf. supra, July 11), France files for bankruptcy protection and historian Emmanuel Todd is forced to resort to psychiatry to understand the side effects of the Western decline. He concludes that Russia is the target of erotomaniac fantasies of Emmanuel Macron and his lackeys

    Today is also an anniversary. In the course of Soviet operation Bagration, which over summer 1944, killed about 750,000 Nazi fighters and destroyed the Heeresgruppe Mitte, 57,000 German POWs were granted the opportunity to parade in Moscow, before their summer camp in Siberia.

    • July 26, 2025

    Krasnoarmeysk [Red Army], that the new Ukrainian authorities renamed Pokrovsk in 2016, is a coal-mining town and a major communication hub, in the part that the Atlanticist troops are still occupying in Donetsk Peopleโ€™s Republic

    The Russian assault troops reached the southern limits of Krasnoarmeysk on July 22. Stosstruppen [German shock troops during WW1, detachments which are infiltrating the defenses] are wrecking havoc among defenders deeper in the town.

    • July 29, 2025

    With the greatest of pleasure, the Russian foreign intelligence agency (SVR) discloses what it has found out

    A few days before, the US and UK have organized a secret meeting in an Alpine resort. The guests were Andriy Yermak, head of the Office of the President of Ukraine, Kyrylo Budanov, head of the Ukrainian military intelligence (HUR), and Valerii Zaluzhnyi, former chief of staff and current ambassador to UK. The Anglo-muricans have announced their will to replace Volodymyr Zelenskyy with Valerii Zaluzhnyi, as President of Ukraine. Yermak and Budanov have agreed.

    On July 27, Zaluzhnyi was indeed championed in the Ukrainian edition of US Vogue magazine

    Combat General, former Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and currently the Ambassador of Ukraine to the United Kingdom, Valeriy Zaluzhny, in his column reflects on the roots of identity, the power of unity and the most important historical lessons that Ukrainians are forced to learn right now [โ€ฆ]

    • July 31, 2025

    To conclude a siege which began in April 2024, Russian paratroopers complete in the morning the cleansing of the last neighborhoods that the Atlanticist troops were holding in Chasov Yar, 15 km west of Artemovsk, which was liberated in May 2023. The ruins of the fortified town are 15 km northeast of Konstantinovka, that the enemy is still occupying in Donetsk People’s Republic

    • August 11, 2025

    In Donetsk Peopleโ€™s Republic, the Russian forces achieve a 10-km-deep breakthrough between Krasnoarmeysk (Pokrovsk) and Konstantinovka, cut the highway between Dobropolie and Kramatorsk

    According to unofficial reports, the Russian vanguards are platoons of motorbikes, who are advancing at high speed through undefended areas, behind the original front line. The Ukrainian and Western commentators are alarmed because so far, the Atlanticist command has no more troops in the sector to counter the threat of encirclement.

    • August 13, 2025

    Both sides confirm that elements of the 1st Army Corps are henceforth involved in Krasnoarmeysk sector, in an attempt to contain the Russian breakthrough

    Under command of Azov, that corps is consisting of several brigades, combined around the 12th, emanation of the Nazi organization in the Ukrainian national guard. These are reinforcements and likely, disciplinary forces, to prevent other troops from retreating

    Meanwhile, according to a video, a Russian laser air defense system has managed, for the first time in operation, to shoot down a Ukrainian drone.

    • August 15, 2025

    Vladimir Putin travels to Anchorage, Alaska, where far from the European brats, he meets Donald Trump

    Behind closed doors, they negotiate during two hours and a half over the war in Donbass and Ukraine. They do not reach a ceasefire settlement but agree on most points [Trump], should meet again soon, likely in Moscow.

    • August 17, 2025

    Ukrainian journalist Yefrem Lukatsky discloses a new Wunderwaffe. The FP-5 Flamingo is a cruise missile with a range of 3,000 km, looks a bit like a WW2 Vergeltungswaffe-1

    According to the Ukrainian propaganda that Western mainstream media are parroting, a Ukrainian startup company, Fire Point, has developed and is producing the weapon

    The new Wunderwaffe is actually a British joke. Its design and capabilities are obviously showing a British FP-5, that Milanion Group displayed in February. The missile is likely shipped in spare parts, then assembled in Ukraine.

    • August 18, 2025

    Nobel Peace Prize is the last obsession of Donald Trump, who three days after his meeting with Vladimir Putin in Anchorage, hosts Volodymyr Zelenskyy and a bunch of European leaders in the White House

    The choreography of the gathering in DC of daddy Trump’s stooges is a psychological work, a catharsis, in order for the West to finally recognize its defeat in Ukraine.

    • August 20, 2025

    In partnership with other hackers groups, Killnet has carried out a campaign with a viral solution called Nyuans [Nuance], claims the collection of terabytes from the general staff of Ukraine: military losses and other sensitive data

    The hackers disclose today verifiable lists of Ukrainian military casualties. The sum is beyond all expectations. Since February 2022, Ukraine would have lost more than 1.7 million KIAs and MIAs:

    2022: 118.5 thousand;

    [mobile warfare]

    2023: 405.4 thousand;

    [development of Russian attrition strategy and tactics, battle for Artemovsk (Bakhmut), failed Atlanticist counteroffensive in Zaporozhye region and Donetsk Peopleโ€™s Republic]

    2024: 595 thousand;

    [battle for Avdeevka, emergence of Russian glide bombs, failed Atlanticist offensive in Kursk region]

    2025: 621 thousand, so far

    [slow Russian steamroller in Donetsk Peopleโ€™s Republic].

    • August 22, 2025

    CNN publishes a splendid graphic about the scale of Russian strategic operations with kamikaze drones.

    • September 2, 2025

    On August 30, 2025, in Lviv, the historical hotbed and still fruitful womb of the Ukrainian endemic Nazism, a gunman shot dead Andriy Parubiy, a Nazi militant and former chairman of the Ukrainian parliament. Arrested the day before, a suspect appears today before the court

    Mykhailo Stselnikov states that he acted in revenge against the Ukrainian authorities for the death of his son, killed in the Atlanticist ranks in Donetsk Peopleโ€™s Republic in May 2023. He clarifies that his target was Parubiy because both were living in Lviv, that if he has been resident of Vinnitsa, he would have shot former president Petro Poroshenko.

    • September 7, 2025

    Prime minister Yulia Svyrydenko shows the aftermath on social media. In the early morning, during a usual wave of surgical strikes all over Ukraine, Russia has targeted the cabinet room in Kiev

    I guess that henceforth, the Ukrainian government will be much more aware of the situation on the ground. In an expression of their own arrogance, the European politicians and mainstream media are outraged at the blaze of an institution, less shocked by the death in vain of 1.7 million soldiers (cf. supra, August 20), often mobilized against their will.

    • September 9, 2025

    Now Corsican, ยซ French State Security ยป has long since ceased to interest me and on the contrary, I am even reputed to be ยซ undermining ยป it. Others have ยซ started the career ยป, as the Marseillaise is saying, suffer now a cruel setback. That happens even to the best ones. But the allies are not happy. France may deny the leaks, but they know the data is authentic

    Members of Killnet group (cf. supra, August 20), Russian computer aces, have managed to collect sensitive information from the French administration: minutes and other documents of secret meetings on Ukraine between France, Poland, Romania, and UK. Including a map dated April 28, 2025, intended for the French military headquarters, which is made public on the web today.

    Alongside the document, which anyone can consult, the hackers have produced a summary of the Coalition of the Willing project, so dear to Emmanuel Macron. For Russia, the entire Donbass, as well as Kherson and Zaporozhye regions, up to the ceasefire line; for France, mineral resources in Zhytomyr, Kharkov, and Sumy; for Poland and Romania, Odessa and border regions; UK would be satisfied with logistics platforms throughout; 50,000 troops would package the Western spoils

    But Russia has already said and continues to repeat that it will not tolerate NATO troops on the current territory of Ukraine. Besides in France, since August 31, Thierry Burkhard is no longer Chief of the General Staff.

    • September 12, 2025

    Eleven days after the fake news that Western mainstream media spread, upon lies from the European commission about an alleged GPS jamming from Russia, two days after the alleged incursion of Russian drones in Poland, German magazine der Spiegel publishes a splendid cover

    The Drone warrior

    Putin’s attacks and the new threat from cheap, remote-controlled weapons

    If the UAVs over Poland were part of a false flag operation, that would be its pyschological goal. Anyway, the Russian drones, strategic and tactical ones, are indeed defeating NATO in Donbass and Ukraine.

    • September 27, 2025

    After Poland, an epidemic of paranoia is striking Europe. Mainstream media are frantically reporting the alleged incursions. Drones โ€”obviously Russian, who else ?โ€” are being detected above military and industrial facilities in Denmark, France, Germanyโ€ฆ etc

    • October 17, 2025

    In a video from downtown Krasnoarmeysk -that Kiev is naming Pokrovsk, in Donetsk Peopleโ€™s Republic- two Atlanticist fighters surrender to a Russian drone

    The same day, Volodymyr Zelenskyy is once more in the White House, where Donald Trump replies

    Hopefully, we will be able to end the war without thinking about Tomahawks

    In the collective mind of most supporters of the Atlanticist side in Ukraine, these US cruise missiles are the brand new Wundervergeltungswaffen. The technocratic stupidity is a serious issue in the declining West, especially imploding Europe.

    In the case of Atlanticist strategic strikes with Tomahawks, Russia would not cancel its victorious campaign on the front line, will rather flatten Ukraine, at the very leastโ€ฆ What the US would have done at the beginning of their operations, 44 months ago.

    • November 20, 2025

    Vladimir Putin visits the headquarter of Zapad [West] group of forces, where chief of staff Valery Gerasimov reports the complete cleansing of Kupyansk, Kharkov region.

    • November 21, 2025

    After Donald Trump has proposed an umpteenth peace initiative that once more, Europeans and Volodymyr Zelensky are so far rejecting, Vladimir Putin comments

    Russia is ready for peace negotiations, but is also satisfied with the current dynamics of the special military operation, which is leading to the achievement of objectives by military means

    According to two US sources, via Reuters, Washington has threatened to cut off intelligence sharing and weapons supplies if Kiev does not accept that plan by November 27.

    • November 23, 2025

    Russian troops take control of the last occupied neighborhoods of Krasnoarmeysk, that Kiev is naming Pokrovsk, in Donetsk People’s Republic. That liberation also seals the encirclement of several thousand Atlanticist fighters in Myrnograd, a few km to the east.

    • November 28, 2025

    Ukrainian naval drones (USV) attack civilian tankers in the Black Sea, off Turkish coasts. Both are flying the flag of Gambia and were empty when targeted. Kairos was sailing from India to Russia and Virat was holding there for orders

    Kiev does not take credit and most Western media are legitimating these acts of piracy, because both are vessels of the so-called shadow fleet, a list of ships which are transporting Russian oil despite Western sanctions.

    • December 9, 2025

    UK announces for the first time the death of an active British serviceman in Ukraine, injured in the morning

    in a tragic accident whilst observing Ukrainian forces test a new defensive capability, away from the front lines

    The government wants its audience not to believe that the fatality would have been the result of a long-range Russian strike or the involvement in combat operation. One fact is henceforth consensual: there are active British service members in Ukraine.

    • December 11, 2025

    In Donetsk People’s Republic, the Russian army completes the liberation of Seversk, another link in the Atlanticist fortified lines in Donbass.

    • December 27, 2025

    In Donetsk People’s Republic, 34 days after the liberation of Krasnoarmeysk (cf. supra, November 23, 2025), the Russian army completes the cleansing of the nearby pocket in Dimitrov, that Kiev was calling Myrnograd

    The same day in Zaporozhye region, the Atlanticist troops lose the last neighborhoods of Gulyaipole.

    • December 29, 2025

    During his Christmas Eve address on December 24, Volodymyr Zelenskyy declared

    Today we all have one dream. And we make one wish for everyone: Let him [Vladimir Putin] croak

    In the night of December 28-29, in an obvious attempt to trigger harsh Russian retaliation and sabotage the peace negotiations through US mediation, when Donald Trump has publicly acknowledged that the West has lost the war, 91 Ukrainian drones target the dacha of Vladimir Putin on the shores of lake Uzhin, in Novgorod region

    The aircraft are launched to the north from Chernigov and Sumy, in northern Ukraine. 49 are quickly shot down in Bryansk border region, one more in Smolensk. 41, finally, over Novgorod, where the specific site is strongly protected.

    • December 31, 2025

    Donald Trump is a real moron. That pedophile pig dares to question Vladimir Putin’s word regarding the attack in Novgorod region two days before, on the grounds that no Ukrainian drone came within 50 km of the dacha. The distance between their launch points and the target was 700 km. I am delighted they were shot down en route. In the context of critical negotiations, a proud man would strongly blame Volodydymyr Zelenskyy, but cowardice is Trump’s main character trait

    Zelenskyy lied because he has always lied on everything. After Ukraine, France was the first country to deny the facts, based on assessment of its intelligence agencies, when French intelligence was not even able to thwart the jihadist attacks in Paris on November 13, 2015. Emmanuel Macron is obviously a little whore, the errand boy of European and US neocon plutocrats. More broadly, the pinzuti [French, in Corsican] are often fearful, petty, coward, incompetent and arrogant. The French presstitutes have been spreading the Western disinformation a few hours before the complete report. I had a lot of fun, watching how these demi-mondaines were happy to find their Daddy again, when Trump laconically denied the attack.

    • January 15, 2026

    Early morning, a CCTV camera grants us a symbolic picture

    While strategic attacks are methodically degrading the Ukrainian energetic system, a Russian drone strikes in Lviv, a few meter from the statue that the city erected in 2007 as tribute to WW2 Nazi criminal Stepan Bandera.

    • February 6, 2026

    In the morning in Moscow, a gunman shoots at Vladimir Alekseyev, deputy head of the military intelligence (GRU), who survives

    According on social media to Ukrainian Nazi militant Denys Prokopenko, current commander of the 1st Army Corps and loser in Mariupol in May 2022, Alekseyev was heading the Russian negotiators when Azov garrison surrendered in Azovstal.

    • February 7, 2026

    In the early morning, Russia conducts a heavy strategic raid with 447 drones and missiles, according to Ukraine

    In the case of the assassination attempt of lieutenant general Alekseyev, a suspect has been identified, arrested in Dubai and brought back in Russia.

    • February 8, 2026

    The Russian security agencies have managed to identify and dismantle the enemy cell in less than 36 hours after the attack in Moscow (cf. supra, February 6) against Vladimir Alekseyev.

    The shooter, Lyubomyr Korba, is Ukrainian, received also Russian citizenship. The Ukrainian intelligence sent him in Moscow in 2025. After the attack, he fled to the United Arab Emirates, where he was arrested on February 7

    Russian, Viktor Vasin was a political supporter of Alexei Navalny. Logistics provider in the cell, he was arrested in Moscow on February 7.

    Russian, Zinaida Serebritskaya was the intelligence agent, rather for money. Living in the same residential complex, she was monitoring the target for a long time and managed to flee to Ukraine after the attack.

    • February 21, 2026

    Around midnight, on February 20-21, a machine building plant is struck in Votkinsk, Udmurtia Republic, Russia, some 1,300 km from Ukraine. The facility is one of the most important Russian strategic missile production site. Due to fog of war, the real impact is not known to the general public

    Former intelligence officer within the US Marine Corps (USMC), then famous inspector of the United Nations in Iraq, Scott Ritter knows reliable Russian sources and on 22, will provide details about the function of the damaged workshop.

    At Munich Security Conference, one week before the attack, neocon Secretary of State Marco Rubio pushed for a new era of Western imperialism. And presto, a UK-designed cruise missile (cf. supra, August 17, 2025), partially built in western Europe, targets and damages -thanks to US intelligence- a critical strategic facility in the heart of Russia.

    Like the Ukrainian attack in May 2024 -under Joe Biden administration- against early warning radars at Baronovsky station, Krasnodar region (cf supra, May 23, 2024), the Atlanticist operation is driven by considerations wider than the defense of Ukraine.

    • March 23, 2026

    In the early hours of the morning, Ukrainian drones strike an oil storage depot in Primorsk, Leningrad region, the largest Russian oil export terminal, on Baltic Sea

    Vladimir Putin is contested over the conduct of the war in Ukraine. He is an amorous suitor of the West and Europe; that is his only weakness. But Iran is showing him the way.

    • March 25, 2026

    In the morning, the defense ministry of Lithuania states

    In the past 48 hours, drones have crashed in the territories of all three Baltic states: a clear indication that Russiaโ€™s war against Ukraine is generating wider regional risk

    The facts and the tone confirm that as analyzed on March 23, in order to attack Primorsk (cf. supra), the Ukrainian drones flew safely over Poland and the Baltic States, all NATO members. They broke into the Russian airspace from Estonia.

    • April 28, 2026

    The previous night, for the third time since April 16, Ukrainian drones struck Tuapse oil refinery and terminal on the Black Sea, in Krasnodar region

    The refinery suspended operations indefinitely. Blazes and contamination are an environmental disaster.

    • May 24, 2026

    From midnight, as retaliation for the Ukrainian terrorist attack which slaughtered 21 sleeping teenagers in a boarding college on May 22, Russia is punishing the Atlanticist regime

    According later to the Ukrainian authorities, the punishment consisted of 690 drones and missiles. The Russian defense ministry confirms the use of ballistic, cruise and hypersonic missiles, including Iskander, Kinzhal, Tsirkon and Oreshnik. The targets were headquarters, military factories and warehouses, in Kiev and other cities. As usual, Ukrainian air defense missiles missed interception and fell back

    They remained silent when a Ukrainian terrorist attack slaughtered 21 teenagers in Starobelsk two days before. The European leaders are howling after four civilians died, when 690 Russian drones and missiles struck military targets across Ukraine. Of course, the Atlanticist regime never discloses the military casualties of the Russian strategic strikes. I hope that many European secret military operators were wiped out.

    • June 12, 2026

    Russia has warned since the beginning of its special military operation in Donbass and Ukraine. But Joe Biden denied and lied. Servile Western media decried that reality as a conspiracy theory. On December 17, 2024, the Ukrainian security agency (SBU) assassinated in Moscow lieutenant general Igor Kirillov, who was leading the Russian investigation on that matter

    Still Director of National Intelligence for a few more weeks, Tulsi Gabbard discloses declassified documents which are proving that the previous administration has funded more than 120 secret biolabs in over 30 countries. 40 were in Ukraine. Research was conducted on dangerous pathogens, including the acquisition of new functions.

    • June 18, 2026

    A massive Ukrainian strategic operation targets Moscow, where the air defense shoots almost 200 drones down. A few ones hit however the local refinery (MNPZ)

    Images are impressive and the aftermath, smoky. The attack is also a PR operation, in order to lift up deteriorated Ukrainian spirits and help Volodymyr Zelenskyy, when he attempts to convince Donald Trump that the tide would be turning. Actually in Donetsk People’s Republic, the Russian army is close to liberate Krasny Liman and Konstantinovka.

    The same day, the German weekly magazine Spiegel discloses its new cover

    Our War Against Russia
    85 years ago, Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union. How the crimes continue to have an impact on families and politics

    The article is recalling the crimes that 10 million German soldiers committed in Soviet Union. But in the context of a new East Front in Europe against Russia, the title is controversial in Germany.

    • June 24, 2026

    Under any pretext, Emmanuel Macron is pursuing his obsessive plan to deploy French troops to Ukraine. Online publication Intelligence Online discloses that under the guise of training, French service members from the rรฉgiment de cyberdรฉfense are operating there, within the Ukrainian security agency (SBU)

    Russia has consistently warned that it is not tolerating Western troops in Ukraine. The Iskander ballistic missile which may land on the heads of these cyber-warriors will be anything but virtual.

    Later, French officials deny, are of course lying. As with the Franco-Ukrainian support to jihadist groups in the Sahel, that was supposed to be a secret operation.

    • June 26, 2026

    Executive body of the European Union, the Commission, recommends to exclude the Ukrainian males of fighting age from the protection granted to refugees.

    A few days before, Russian hackers (cf. supra, August 20, 2025) have updated the information collected from the Ukrainian bureaucracy: the Ukrainian military fatalities since 2022 are largely exceeding 2 million

    The non-elected European technocrats are planning to protract their proxy war to the last Ukrainian.

    • July 3, 2026

    70 km north of Donetsk, the Russian army has completed the liberation of Konstantinovka, that Ukraine started fortifying in 2014; has broken the last Atlanticist defensive line in Donbass, less than 35 km southeast of Kramatorsk

    • July 6, 2026

    In the early morning, Russia destroys an ammunition depot which was concealed in a residential area of Vyshneve, Kiev western suburb

    The secondary explosions of NATO anti-aircraft missiles and depleted uranium (DU) shells level some nearby buildings.

    • July 16, 2026

    Once more, Russia and Ukraine swap the bodies of fallen fighters.

    • July 21, 2026

    On July 15, Volodymyr Zelenskyy sacked defense minister Mykhailo Fedorov, who wanted to replace the chief of staff. That triggered public protests and anger within the army. Chief of staff Oleksandr Syrskyi is eventually fired today

    His replacement is Mykhailo Drapatyi, who major on May 9, 2014, was commanding the mechanized battalion which crushed the barricades that the Russian-speaking citizens had erected to defend Mariupol, in Donetsk People’s Republic

    Russia has charged him with various war crimes against civilians in Donbass.

    • July 24, 2026

    In Kapitanovka, Kiev western suburb, several Iskander ballistic missiles demilitarize a weapons exhibition on an outdoor firing range

    At the time of the strikes, the event is gathering 300 guests from Ukraine and the West, including officials from army and intelligence, international drone developers and manufacturers.

    • August 19, 2026

    The amateur video surfaces on social media. The location is Kamianske, Dnepropetrovsk region

    On her knees, the woman begs TCC recruitment sergeants not to abduct her husband. That is a usual scene in Ukraine of forced mobilization, also called busification.

    • August 21, 2026

    In Lviv, a draft dodger stabs one TCC recruitment sergeant to death.

    • August 22, 2026

    Mathias Dรถpfner, the CEO of German Axel Springer mass media company and a pro-Israel zealot, makes the cover of the weekly British Spectator conservative magazine with an article titled

    Thereโ€™s still time to save the West

    He is regarding the West as an idea, a way of life, which has become an invalid and should be strengthened. As the sketch is showing, the bad guys are Russia and China, whom I am rather regarding as the standard bearers of a new multipolar world.

    Well, after five centuries of colonialism and imperialism, the invention of fascism and two world wars, the Western hegemony is crumbling. Moreover, the genocide that Israel is committing in Palestine is very adverse publicity.

    That mechanical and inevitable phenomenon is terrifying Boris Johnson too (cf. supra, April 12, 2024). Decadence is not the point. Europe could complete the dismantling of welfare and build armies instead, but one fact remains: the others are becoming stronger in all fields

    Even geniuses like Donald Trump or Emmanuel Macron will not be able to turn the tide. Russia is winning in Ukraine and Iran, in the Gulf.

    Mathias Dรถpfner is the kind of German who believes that an extreme support to Israel would clean his breed from the Nazi crimes, from one genocide to another. Moreover, he has not accepted the victory of Soviet Union over Nazi Germany and is fantasizing about a revenge against Russia. Calm down, Heini Kraut.

    • August 26, 2026

    Volodymyr Zelenskyy entrusts Andriy Biletsky and Denys Prokopenko, two Nazi Azov executives, with the defense of the still occupied part of Donbass, the positions that Ukraine is still holding in Donetsk People’s Republic

    After having honored and awarded them, in order to consolidate his fragile power, he sends them and their troops to the meat grinder.

    • August 28, 2026

    For 48 hours, night and day, Russia is striking Kiev region over and over. In the evening, a warehouse is hit in Myla, western suburb

    There, Fire Point company was secretly storing components for drones. Secondary explosions kill dozens civilians in the vicinity.

    • September 1, 2026

    Volodymyr Zelenskyy threatens to shoot down civilian airliners in the Russian airspace

    The crook should remember what Vladimir Putin stated on September 24, 1999. The Russians would correct the Ukrainian terrorist in the toilets.

    • September 4, 2026

    A lonely drone strikes the office in downtown Kiev of Oleksandr Poklad, the acting head of the State security agency (SBU). Volodymyr Zelenskyy claims right away that the attack is Russian, but both the target and its treatment would be an unusual way of working for Russia

    The firework is rather the escalation of an obscure dispute between spooks, which has already resulted in violent deaths over the past few days. The adversary of the SBU is the military intelligence (HUR) and its horde of Russian Nazi activists (RDK), who have found refuge in Ukraine after the 2014 West-backed right-wing coup in Kiev. Chief of Zelenkyy’s office, Kyrylo Budanov is supporting the HUR, that he was heading until January 2026.

    • September 16, 2026

    UK defense ministry discloses the name of a British serviceman who was killed in Ukraine on Saturday, September 12. Major Paul Wilks, 40 years old, was member of the Intelligence Corps from his graduation at Sandhurst academy in 2012. He has been deployed on multiple operational tours, including to Afghanistan

    The official cause of his death is a road traffic accident. A Russian drone may have committed a right-of-way violation

    After a first death declaration on December 9, 2025 (cf. supra) -another accident– Wilks is the second official fallen British serviceman in Ukraine.

    • October 14, 2026

    There was a sort of mysterious glitch (cf. supra, March 5, 2025) the night before in Ukraine and here is the new official prayer under Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s regime

    Starlink unser im Himmel,
    geheiligt werde dein Name,
    deine Verbindung komme

    Meanwhile, the stooge of the European proxy war is begging for help in London.

    • November 16, 2026

    French State radio station RFI reveals that without knowledge or consent of the national legislature, active-duty military personnel are deployed in Ukraine. Their mission is involving maintaining French military equipment and training Ukrainian non-commissioned officers in close proximity to the combat zone. That secret operation is codenamed Volia and based in Poland, its official cover is known as Gerfaut.

    • November 17, 2026

    With British support in intelligence and EW, scores of cruise missiles and drones manage before dawn to overwhelm air defense in Kerch and damage the Crimea bridge, a symbolic target.

    Music

    https://youtu.be/y25dK6rytZM
  • [Sharing] Escaping Attrition: Ukraine Rolls the Dice – Big Serge

    The Zaporizhia Summer Blockbuster

    It has been a while since I published anything long-form commenting on the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War, and I confess that writing this article gave me a modicum of trouble. Ukraineโ€™s much anticipated grand summer counteroffensive has now been underway for about eighty days with little to show for it. The summer has seen fierce fighting in a variety of sectors (to be enumerated below), but the contact line has shifted very little. I have been reluctant to publish a discussion of the Ukrainian campaign simply because they have continued to hold assets in reserve, and I did not want to post a premature commentary that went to press right before the Ukrainians showed some new trick or revealed a hidden ace up their sleeve. Sure enough, I wrote the bulk of this article last week, right before Ukraine launched yet another major attempt to force a breach in the Orikhiv sector.

    At this point, however, the appearance of some of Ukraineโ€™s last remaining premier brigades, which had previously been held in reserve, confirms that the axes of Ukraineโ€™s attack are concretized. Only time will tell if these precious reserves manage to achieve a breach in the Russian lines, but enough time has passed that we can sketch out what exactly Ukraine has been trying to do, why, and why it has failed to this point.

    Part of the problem with narrating the war in Ukraine is the positional and attritional nature of the fighting. People continue to look for bold operational maneuver to break the deadlock, but the reality seems to be that for now some combination of capability and reticence has turned this war into a positional struggle with a plodding offensive pace, which far more resembles the first world war than the second.

    Ukraine had aspirations of breaking open this grinding front and reopening mobile operations – escaping the attritional struggle and driving on operationally meaningful targets – but these efforts have so far come to naught. For all the lofty boasts of demonstrating the superior art of maneuver, Ukraine still finds itself trapped in a siege, painfully trying to break open a calcified Russian position without success.

    Ukraine may not be interested in a war of attrition, but attrition is certainly interested in Ukraine.

    Ukraineโ€™s Strategic Paradigm

    For those that have been following the war closely, what follows will probably not be new information, but I think it is worth thinking holistically about Ukraineโ€™s war and the factors that drive their strategic decision making.

    For Ukraine, the conduct of the war is shaped by a variety of disturbing strategic asymmetries.

    Some of these are obvious, like Russiaโ€™s much larger population and military industrial plant, or the fact that Russiaโ€™s war economy is indigenous, while Ukraine is entirely reliant on western deliveries of equipment and munitions. Russia can autonomously ramp up armaments production and there are abundant signs from the battlefield that the Russian war economy is beginning to find its groove, with new systems like the Lancet present in increasing abundance, and western sources now admitting that Russia has successfully serialized a domestic version of the Iranian Shahed Drone. Furthermore, Russia has the asymmetrical capacity to strike Ukrainian rear areas to an extent that Ukraine cannot reciprocate, even if they are given the dreaded ATACMs (these will give Ukraine the range to strike operational depth targets in the theater, but they canโ€™t hit facilities in Moscow and Tula the way Russian missiles can strike anywhere in Ukraine)

    Medvedev inspects a tank production run

    With significant Russian asymmetries in population size, industrial capacity, strike capability, and – let us be blunt – sovereignty and decision-making freedom, an attritional-positional struggle is simply bad math for Ukraine, and yet that is precisely the sort of war in which it has become trapped.

    What is important for us to understand, however, is that the strategic asymmetry goes beyond physical capacities like population base, industrial plant, and missile technology, and extends into the realm of strategic objectives and timelines.

    Russiaโ€™s war has been deliberately framed in a fairly open-ended way, with goals largely tied to the idea of โ€œdemilitarizingโ€ Ukraine. In fact, Russiaโ€™s territorial objectives remain rather nebulous beyond the 4 annexed oblasts (though it is safe to say that Moscow would like to acquire far more than just these). All that to say, Putinโ€™s government has deliberately framed the war as a military-technical enterprise focused on destroying the Ukrainian armed forces, and has shown itself to be perfectly free to give up territory in the name of operational prudentia.

    In contrast, Ukraine has maximalist goals that are explicitly territorial in nature. The Zelensky government has been open about the fact that it aims – however fanciful this may be – to restore the entirety of its 1991 territories, including not just the four mainland oblasts but also Crimea.

    The confluence of these two factors – Ukrainian territorial maximalism combined with asymmetrical Russian advantages in a positional-attritional struggle – forces Ukraine to seek a way to break open the front and restore a state of operational fluidity. Remaining locked in a positional struggle is unworkable for Kiev, partially because Russiaโ€™s material advantages will inevitably shine through (in a fight between two big guys swinging big bats at each other, bet on the bigger guy with the bigger bat), and partially because a positional war (which amounts essentially to a massive siege) is simply not an efficient way to retake territory.

    This leaves Ukraine with no choice but to unfreeze the front and try to restore mobile operations, with an eye towards creating some asymmetry of their own. The only feasible way to accomplish this is to launch an offensive aimed at severing critical lines of Russian communication and supply. Contrary to some suggestions that were popular this spring, a large Ukrainian offensive against Bakhmut or Donetsk simply did not fit the bill.

    Frankly, there are only two suitable operational targets for Ukraine. One is Starobilsโ€™k – the beating heart at the center of Russiaโ€™s Lugansk front. Capturing or screening Svatove and then Starobilsโ€™k would create a genuine operational catastrophe for Russia in the north, with cascading effects all the way down to Bakhmut. The second possible target was the land bridge to Crimea, which could be cut by a thrust across lower Zaporizhia towards the Azov coast.

    It was probably inevitable that Ukraine would select the Azov option, for a few reasons. The land bridge to Crimea is a more self-contained battlespace – an offensive in Lugansk would occur under the shadow of the Belgorod and Voronezh regions of Russia, making it relatively more difficult to put significant Russian forces out of supply. Perhaps even more significant, however, is Kievโ€™s complete obsession with Crimea and the Kerch Bridge – targets that hold hypnotic sway in a way that Starobilsโ€™k never could.

    Again, this may sound like fairly intuitive review, but itโ€™s worth contemplating how and why Ukraine ended up launching an offensive that was widely telegraphed and expected. There was no strategic surprise whatsoever – a definitely real video of GUR chief Budanov smirking didnโ€™t fool anyone. The Russian armed forces certainly werenโ€™t fooled, as they spent months saturating the front with minefields, trenches, firing emplacements, and obstacles. Everyone knew that Ukraine was going to attack toward the Azov Coast, specifically with an eye towards Tokmak and Melitopol, and thatโ€™s exactly what they did. A frontal attack against a prepared defense without the element of surprise is generally considered a poor choice, but here is Ukraine not only attempting such an attack but even launching it against a backdrop of global celebration and phantasmagorical expectations

    Ukraine’s infantile plea for OPSEC

    Itโ€™s impossible to make sense of this without understanding the way that Ukraine is shackled by a particular interpretation of the war to this point. Ukraine and its supporters point to two successes in 2022 where Ukraine was able to retake a substantial swathe of territory, in Kharkov and Kherson oblasts. The problem is that neither of these situations is portable to Zaporizhia.

    In the case of the Kharkov offensive, Ukraine identified a sector of the Russian front that had been hollowed out and was defended only by a thin screening force. They were able to stage a force and achieve a measure of strategic surprise, due to the thick forests and general paucity of Russian ISR in the area. This is not to mitigate the scale of Ukraineโ€™s success there; it was certainly the best uses of forces available to them and they did exploit a weak section of front. This success is hardly relevant to circumstances in the south today; mobilization has ameliorated Russiaโ€™s force generation problems so that they now longer have to make hard choices about what to defend, and the heavily fortified Zaporizhia frontline is nothing like the thinly held front in Kharkov.

    The second case study – the Kherson counteroffensive – is even less germane. In this case, Ukrainian leadership is rewriting history in record time. The AFU banged its head on Russian defenses in Kherson for months throughout the summer and autumn last year and took atrocious losses. An entire grouping of AFU brigades was mauled in Kherson without achieving a breakthrough, and this even with Russian forces in a uniquely difficult operational disposition where they had their backs to a river. Kherson was only abandoned months later due to concerns that the Kakhovka dam might fail or be sabotaged (for those keeping score, it did in fact end up failing), and due to Russiaโ€™s need at the time to economize forces.

    Again, this can easily be misconstrued as arguing that Russiaโ€™s withdrawal from Kherson did not matter. Obviously, abandoning a hard-earned bridgehead is a major setback, and retaking west-bank Kherson was a boon for Kiev. But we need to be honest about why it happened, and it plainly did not happen because of Ukraineโ€™s summer counteroffensive – to underscore this, recall that Ukrainian officials openly wondered if the Russian withdrawal was a trick or a trap. The question is simply whether Ukraineโ€™s Kherson offensive is predictive of future offensive success. It is not.

    So, we have one case where Ukraine identified a lightly defended section of front and ran through it, and another where Russian troops abandoned a bridgehead due to logistical and force allocation concerns. Neither is particularly relevant to the situation on the Azov coast, and in fact an honest reflection of the AFUโ€™s Kherson Counteroffensive might have given Ukraine second thoughts about a frontal assault on prepared Russian defenses.

    Instead, Kharkov and Kherson have both been presented as proof positive that Ukraine can shatter Russian defenses in a straight up fight – in fact, we still have no examples from this war of the AFU defeating strongly held Russian positions, particularly post-mobilization when Russia finally began to resolve its manpower deficiencies. But Ukraine is caught in the grip of its own particular story about this war, which has imparted unearned confidence in its ability to conduct offensive operations. Tragically for mobilized Ukrainian Mykolas, this has dovetailed with a second swagger-producing mythology.

    A major selling point for the Ukrainian counteroffensive has been the assessed superiority of the AFUโ€™s big-ticket donations from the west – the main battle tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. Since the first deliveries were announced, there has been no shortage of boasting about the many superior qualities of western models like the Leopards and Challengers. The suggestion has essentially been that skilled Ukrainian tankers are only waiting to be unleashed once they get behind the wheel of superlative western builds. My personal favorite motif has been the practice of dismissing Russian tanks as โ€œSoviet Eraโ€ – neglecting to note that the Abrams (designed 1975) and the Leopard 2 (1979) are also Cold War models

    A burn out Leopard in Syria

    It must be stated, again, that there is nothing wrong with western tanks. The Abrams and the Leopard are fine vehicles, but confidence in their game-changing capabilities stems from a mistaken assumption about the role of armor. It must be appreciated that tanks always have been and always will be mass-consumption items. Tanks blow up. They are disabled. They break down and are captured. Tank forces attrit – much faster than people expect. Given that the brigades prepared for Ukraineโ€™s assault on the Zapo line were significantly understrength in vehicles, it was simply irrational to expect them to have an oversized impact. This is not to say that tanks arenโ€™t important – armor remains critical to modern combat – but in a peer conflict one should always expect to lose armor at a steady clip, especially when the enemy retains fires superiority.

    One can see, then how a measure of hubris can easily creep in to Ukrainian thinking, fueled by a healthy dose of desperation and strategic need. Reasoning from a distorted understanding of its successes in Kharkov and Kherson, emboldened by their shiny new toys, and guided by an overriding strategic animus that requires them to unlock the front somehow, the idea of a frontal attack without strategic surprise against a prepared defense really could seem like a good idea. Add in the good old fashioned trope about Russian incompetence and disorder, and you have all the recipes for an imprudent roll of the dice by Ukraine.

    The Misfire

    So now we come to the operational minutia. For a variety of reasons, Ukraine has chosen to attempt a frontal assault on Russiaโ€™s fortified Zaporizhia front, with the intention of breaching towards the sea of Azov. How can this be accomplished?

    We had a few clues early on, accruing from a variety of geographic features and alleged intelligence leaks. In May, the Dreizin Report published what was purported to be a Russian synthesis of Ukraineโ€™s OPORD (Operational Order). An OPORD functions as a broad sketch of an operationโ€™s intended progression, and the document shared by Dreizin was billed as a summary of Russiaโ€™s expectation for Ukraineโ€™s offensive (that is, it is not a leak of Ukraineโ€™s internal planning documents, but a leak of Russiaโ€™s best guess at Ukraineโ€™s plans).

    In any case, in a vacuum it was anybodyโ€™s guess as to whether Dreizinโ€™s OPORD was authentic, but weโ€™ve subsequently been able to cross-check it. This is because of the other, even more infamous leak from earlier this spring, which included the Pentagonโ€™s combat power build plan for Ukraine.

    NATO was very generous and built Ukraine a mechanized strike package from scratch. However, because this mechanized force was cobbled together with a variety of different systems from all corners of the NATO Cinematic Universe, Ukraine formations are uniquely identifiable by their particular combination of vehicles and equipment. So, for example, the presence of Strykers, Marders, and Challengers indicates the presence of the 82nd Brigade in the field, and so forth.

    Thus, despite Ukrainian pretensions of operational security, itโ€™s actually been trivially easy for observers to know which Ukrainian formations are in the field. There have been a few deviations from the script – for example, the 47th Brigade was supposed to field the Frankenstein Slovenian M55 tanks, but in the end the decision was made to send the underpowered M55โ€™s to the northern front and the 47th was deployed with a contingent of Leopard Tanks originally operated by the 33rd Brigade. But these are minor details, and on the whole weโ€™ve had a good sense of when and where specific AFU formations get on the field.

    Based on identifiable units, the Dreizin OPORD looks very close to what we actually saw at the onset of the Ukrainian offensive. The Dreizin OPORD called for an assault by the 47th and 65th Brigades on the Russian lines south or Orikhiv, in the sector bounded by Nesterianka and Novoprokopivka. Directly in the middle of this sector is the town of Robotyne, and sure enough thatโ€™s where the first big AFU assault came overnight on June 7-8, spearheaded by the 47th Brigade.

    Now, from this point it becomes difficult to evaluate the Dreizin OPORD simply because Ukraineโ€™s attack became instantaneously derailed, but one thing we can say is that Dreizinโ€™s source was correct about the order that Ukrainian units would be introduced into battle. Based on this, we can flesh out the OPORD and feel pretty safe wagering that this is what the Ukrainians were hoping to achieve:

    Ukraine’s Dream: The Drive to the Sea

    The intention seems to have been to force a breach in the Russian line using a concentrated armored assault by the 47th and 65th Brigades, after which a follow on force of the 116th, 117th, and 118th would begin the exploitation phase, driving for the Azov Coast and the towns of Mikhailivka and Vesele to the west. The objective was clearly not to get bogged down in urban fighting attempting to capture places like Tokmak, Berdyansk, or Melitopol, but to bypass them and cut them off by taking up blocking positions on the main roads.

    Simultaneously, a lesser – but no less critical – thrust would come out of the Gulyaipole area and drive along the Bilmak axis. This would have the effect of both screening the main advance to the west and wedging the Russian front open, splintering the integrity of the Russian forces caught in the middle. Overall, this is a fairly sensible, if ambitious and uncreative plan. In many ways, this was really the only option.

    So what went wrong? Well, conceptually itโ€™s easy. There is no breach. The bulk of the maneuver scheme is dedicated to exploitation – reaching such and such a line, taking up this blocking position, masking that city, and so forth. But what happens when thereโ€™s no breach at all? How can such a catastrophe occur, and how can the operation be salvaged when it comes untracked in the opening phase?

    Indeed, this is precisely what has happened. Ukraine finds itself stuck on the edge of Russiaโ€™s outermost screening line, spending substantial resources trying to capture the small village of Robotyne, and/or bypass it to the east by infiltrating the gap between it and the neighboring village of Verbove. So instead of that rapid breach and turning maneuver towards Melitopol, we get something like this:

    Ukrainian Counteroffensive with Mapped Russian Defensive Lines

    We could be generous and say that Robotyne is the last village before the Ukrainian attack reaches the main Russian defensive belt, but weโ€™d be lying – they will also have to clear the larger town of Novoprokopivka, two kilometers to the south. Just for reference, hereโ€™s a closer look at the mapped Russian defenses in the battlespace, based on the excellent work of Brady Africk

    Russian defenses in the Robotyne Sector

    The discussion about these emplacements can get a little muddled, simply because itโ€™s not always clear what is meant by that popular phrase โ€œfirst line of defense.โ€ Clearly there are some defensive works around and in Robotyne, and the Russians chose to fight for the village, so in some sense Robotyne is part of the โ€œfirst lineโ€ – but it is more proper to speak of it as part of what we would call a โ€œscreening lineโ€. The first line of continuous fortifications across the front is several kilometers further south, and this is the belt that Ukraine has yet to even reach, let alone breach.

    As of this moment, it appears that Russian troops have lost total control of Robotyne but continue to hold the southern half of the village, while Ukrainian troops in the northern half of the village remain subject to heavy Russian shelling. We should probably at this point consider the village to be continuously contested and a feature of the gray zone

    Robotyne, in all its glory

    Now, a quick note about Robotyne itself and why both sides are so determined to fight for it. It seems rather odd on the surface, given that the Russian preference in 2022 was to make tactical withdrawals under their fires umbrella. This time though, they are fiercely counterattacking to contest Robotyne. The value of the village lies not only in its location on the T-0408 Highway, but also its excellent perch on top of a ridge. Both Robotyne and Novoprokopivka lie on a ridge of elevated ground which is as much as 70 meters higher than the low-lying plain to the east.

    What this means is fairly simple; if the AFU presses forward in attempts to bypass the Robotyne-Novoprokopivka position by pushing into the gap between Robotyne and Verbove, it will be vulnerable to fire on the flanks (particularly by ATGMs) by Russian troops on the high ground. We already have seen footage of this, with Ukrainian vehicles being taken in the flank by fire from Robotyne. I am highly skeptical that Ukraine can even attempt an earnest assault on the first defensive belt until they have captured both Robotyne and Novoprokopivka.

    This would all be a tough nut to crack under ideal circumstances, with a variety of engineering problems to mediate, obstacles designed to funnel the attacker into firing lanes, perpendicular trenches to allow enfilade fire on advancing Ukrainian columns, and robust defenses on all the major roadways. But these are not the best of circumstances. This is a tired force that has exhausted much of its indigenous combat power, which is attempting to organize the attack using a piecemeal and understrength assault package.

    Several factors conspired against the Ukrainian offensive, and synergistically they have created a bona fide military catastrophe for Kiev. Let us enumerate them.

    Problem 1: The Hidden Defensive Layer

    At this point, we need to acknowledge something that everybody missed about Russiaโ€™s defense. I previously expressed high confidence that Ukraineโ€™s forces would be unable to breach the Russian defenses, but I mistakenly believed that the Russian defense would function according to the classic Soviet defense-in-depth principles (elucidated in great detail by the writings of David Glantz, for example)

    Idealized Defense in Depth by a Motor Rifle Brigade

    Such a defense, put simply, is open to the idea that the enemy will breach the first or even second lines of defense. The purpose of the multilayered (or โ€œechelonedโ€ in the classic terminology) defense is to ensure that the enemy force gets stuck as it tries to break through. It may penetrate the first layer, but as it goes it is continually chewed up by the subsequent belts. The classic example is the Battle of Kursk, where powerful German panzers broke into the Soviet defensive belts but subsequently became stuck as they were ground down. You can think of this as being analogically similar to a Kevlar vest, which uses a web of fibers to stop projectiles: rather than bouncing off, the bullet is caught and its energy is absorbed by the layered fibers.

    I was actually quite open to the idea that Ukraine would generate some penetration, but I anticipated them getting stuck in the subsequent belts and sputtering out.

    What was missing from this picture – and this is a credit to Russian planning – was an unseen defensive belt forward of the proper trenches and fortifications. This forward belt consisted of extremely dense minefields and strongly held forward positions in the screening line, which the Russians evidently intended to fight for fiercely. Rather than breaking through the first belt and getting stuck in the interstitial areas, the Ukrainians have been repeatedly mauled in the security zone, and the Russians have consistently counterattacked to knock them back when they do manage to get footholds.

    In other words, while we expected Russia to fight a defense in depth that absorbed the Ukrainian spearheads and shredded them in the heart of the defense, the Russians have actually shown a strong commitment to defending their forwardmost positions, of which Robotyne is the most famous.

    On paper, Robotyne was expected to function as part of a so-called โ€œcrumple zoneโ€, or โ€œsecurity zoneโ€ – a sort of lightly held buffer that puts the enemy through pre-registered fires before they bump into the first belt of continuous and strongly held defenses. Indeed, a variety of aerial and satellite surveys of the area taken before Ukraine went on the attack showed Robotyne laying well forward of the first solid and continuous Russian fortification belt.

    What was missed, it seemed, was the extent to which the Russian defenders had mined the areas on the approach to Robotyne and were committed to defending within the security zone. The scale of the mining certainly seems to have surprised the Ukrainians, and creates a strain on Ukraineโ€™s limited combat engineering capabilities. Even more importantly, the dense mines have created predictable avenues of approach for the Ukrainian forces, which force them to repeatedly run through the same gauntlet of fires and Russian standoff weaponry.

    Problem 2: Insufficient Suppression

    The signature image of the first great assaults on the Zapo Line has been columns of unsupported maneuver assets, being raked with Russian fires, both ground based (rocketry, ATGMs, and tube artillery) and from air platforms like the Ka-52 Alligator attack helicopter. One of the more startling aspects of these scenes was the way Ukrainian forces would come under heavy fire while still in their marching columns, taking losses before they ever deployed into firing lines to begin their assault proper.

    There are myriad reasons for this. One is the now blasรฉ issue of Ukrainian munition shortages. Consider the following items of interest. In the runup to Ukraineโ€™s counteroffensive, Russia waged a heavy counter-preparatory air campaign that knocked out large AFU ammunition dumps. Ukraineโ€™s initial assaults collapse in the face of heavy and unsuppressed Russian fires. The United States decides to transfer cluster munitions to Ukraine because, in the words of the president, โ€œtheyโ€™re running out of ammunition.โ€ Add in the degradation of Ukrainian air defense, which allows Russian helicopters to operate with great effect along the contact line, and you have a recipe for disaster. Lacking the tubes to suppress Russian fires or the air defense to chase away Russian aircraft, the AFU opened their offensive by disastrously pushing forward unsupported maneuver elements into a hail of fire.

    Problem 3: Russian Standoff Weapons

    Itโ€™s crucial to understand that the Russian toolbox is fundamentally different than it was during the battle for Kherson last year, due to the rapidly expanding production of a variety of Russian standoff weapons – most notably the Lancet and the UMPK glide modifications for gravity bombs.

    The Lancet in particular has been a star performer – there are claims that the trusty little loitering munition is responsible for nearly half of Russiaโ€™s artillery kills – and has filled a crucial capability gap that troubled the Russian army episodically throughout the first year of the war. Contrary to some western assessments that Russia simply could not manufacture drones in sufficient quantities, production of the Lancet has been successfully ramped up in a short period of time, and mass production of other systems like the Geran are coming online as well

    A Thing of Beauty: Zala Lancet

    The proliferation of the Lancet and similar systems means, in a nutshell, that nothing within 30km of the contact line is safe, and this in turn disrupts the AFUโ€™s deployment of critical support assets like air defense and engineering, magnifying their vulnerability to Russian mines and fires. In fact, weโ€™ve increasingly seen Ukrainian artillery use decline in the Robotyne area due to the threat of lancets (they seem to be transferring tubes to other fronts), and the AFU is favoring the use of HIMARS in the suppressive role.

    Problem 4: Repetitive Lines of Approach

    Because the AFU failed to breach the Robotyne sector on their first attempt, theyโ€™ve been forced to continually move up additional units and resources to hammer on the position. This has particular implications, both in the sense that AFU forces must continually traverse the same lines of approach to contact, and in the fact that they are using the same rear area to assemble and stage their assault forces.

    This makes the burden on Russian ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) significantly easier, since the AFU has no effective way to disperse or hide the assets that they are bringing forward to the assault. Staged Ukrainian forces and material have been hid repeatedly in the villages immediately behind Orikhiv, like Tavriiske and Omelnโ€™yk, and Russia is able to strike rear area infrastructure like ammunition depots because – to put it simply – there are only so many places these these assets can be staged when you are repeatedly assaulting the same 20km wide sector of front.

    We recently had Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Defense Hanna Malair complaining that the 82nd Brigade – newly deployed to the Orikhiv sector – had been hit with a series of Russian airstrikes in its staging areas. According to her, this was because of poor OPSEC revealing the brigadeโ€™s location to the Russians. But this really makes very little sense; the entire area of operations around Orikhiv is perhaps 25km deep (from Kopani to Tavriiske) and 20 km wide (from Kopani to Verbove). This is a small area that has seen a huge amount of military traffic along the same roads throughout the summer. The idea that Russia needs insider information to know that they ought to surveil and attack targets in this area is absurd.

    Problem 5: Fragile Brigades

    It actually takes significantly less damage to โ€œdestroyโ€ an operational level unit than people think. A unit can become a combat scratch off at 30% losses (with some variance depending on how those are allocated). This is because when people hear the term โ€œdestructionโ€, they think that means total losses. Sometimes thatโ€™s how the word is used in colloquial conversation, but what matters for officers trying to manage an operation is whether or not a formation is combat capable of the tasks being asked of it – and those capabilities can vanish much more quickly than people realize.

    This is particularly the case for the Ukrainian mech package, for a variety of reasons. For one, as we discussed in previous articles, these brigades started the fight well understrength (remember, for example, that the Ukrainian 82nd Brigade has only 90 Stryker AFVs, while an American Strkyer Brigade is supposed to have 300). Additionally, the cobbled together nature of these brigades – and the total lack of indigenous sustainment systems like repair and maintenance – means that the Ukrainians will naturally have to cannibalize these vehicles. Theyโ€™ve already started designating โ€œdonorโ€ vehicles that are written off completely to be stripped down for parts. The nexus of these two facts is that Ukraineโ€™s mechanized brigades are understrength on vehicles to begin with, and will have an abysmally poor recovery rate, with hidden attrition behind the scenes due to cannibalization.

    What this means is that when we heard admissions by mid-July that Ukraine had already lost 20% of its maneuver assets, there is an associated catastrophic decline in combat capability. The lead brigades – which chewed through 50% or more of their maneuver vehicles – can no longer shoulder combat tasks appropriate for a brigade, and the Ukrainians are forced to feed in their second echelon units prematurely.

    At this point, partial elements of at least ten different brigades have been deployed in the Robotyne sector, with the 82nd likely to join them soon. Given that the NATO combat power build plan only included 9 NATO trained brigades, plus a few reconstituted Ukrainian formations, itโ€™s safe to say that blooding all of them over a 71 day fight just to break into the screening line was not in the plan.

    Staring at the Abyss

    Iโ€™ve seen a variety of analysts and writers lately arguing that the insertion of additional Ukrainian units into the Robotyne sector signals the next phase of the operation.

    This is nonsense. Ukraine is still mired in the first phase. What has happened is instead that the attrition of their first echelon brigades has forced them to commit their second (and third) wave to complete the tasks of the opening phase. The initial attack, led by the 47th Brigade, was intended to create a breach in the Russian screening line around Robotyne and advance to the main Russian belt further to the south. They failed, and the additional brigades earmarked for exploitation – the 116th, 117th, 118th, 82nd, 33rd, and more – are now being systematically fed in to keep the pressure on.

    These brigades have not been destroyed, of course, simply because they are not being committed in their entirety, but rather as subunits. Nevertheless, at this point Ukrainian losses make up the better part of a whole brigade, distributed around the broader package, and over 300 maneuver elements (tanks, IFVs, APCs, etc) have been scratched off.

    We need to say this very explicitly. Ukraine has not moved on to the next phase of their operation. They are stuck in the first phase, and have been forced to prematurely commit portions of the second echelon that was earmarked for later action. They are slowly but surely burning through the entire operational grouping, and so far they have not breached Russiaโ€™s screening line. The great counteroffensive is turning into a military catastrophe

    Now, this does not mean that the operation has failed, simply because it is still ongoing. History teaches us that it is unwise to make definitive pronouncements. Luck and human factors (bravery and intelligence, cowardice and stupidity) always have something to say. However, the trajectory is undeniably towards abject failure at the current moment.

    So far, the AFU has shown some adaptability. In particular, weโ€™ve recently seen them shift away from pushing forward unsupported columns of mechanized assets – instead theyโ€™ve been leaning on small dismounted units, trying to slowly push forward into the space between Robotyne and Verbove. The move towards dispersal is intended to reduce loss rates, but it also reduces the probability of a dramatic breakthrough even further and marks the temporary abandonment of decisive breaching action in favor of – once again – creeping positional warfare.

    We would be remiss if we failed to note that there have been meaningful Russian losses in all of this. We know that the Russian forces in the Robotyne sector have required rotation and reinforcement, including with elite VDV and Naval Infantry units. Russia has taken counterbattery losses, it has lost vehicles in counterattacking action, and men have been killed holding their trenches. The initial assault groups that the Ukrainians threw in had a lot of combat power, and the fighting was very bloody for both sides. Itโ€™s not a one-sided shooting gallery, but a high intensity war.

    But therein is the crux of the matter – Ukraine seems unable to escape the attritional and positional war that it finds itself in. It sounds all well and good to proclaim a return to โ€œmaneuverโ€ warfare, but if there is an inability to breach enemy defenses, this is only an empty boast, and the nature of the struggle remains attritional. When the question becomes โ€œwill we breach before we run out of combat powerโ€, you are not maneuvering. You are attriting.

    In my series of articles on military history, weโ€™ve looked at a variety of cases where armies tried desperately to unlock the front and restore a state of operational maneuver, but when there is no technical capacity to do so, these intentions do not matter one bit. Nobody wants to be trapped on the wrong side of attritional mathematics, but sometimes what you want does not matter at all. Sometimes attrition is imposed on you.

    In the absence of the capabilities required to successfully breach Russiaโ€™s prodigious defenses – more ranged fires, more air defense, more ISR, more EW, more combat engineering, more more more – Ukraine is trapped in a rock fight. Two fighters are swinging bats at each other, and Russia is a bigger man with a bigger bat.

    Two Bad Copes

    Amid a clear misfire and growing strategic disappointment, two new suggestions have increasingly crept into the conversation – โ€œcopesโ€, if you will, that are utilized as a narrative comfort to explain why the Ukrainian operation is actually going just fine (despite nearly universal acknowledgment in the west that the results have been lackluster at best). I would like to briefly address each of these in turn.

    Cope 1: โ€œThe first stage is the hardestโ€

    You frequently see it argued that all the AFU has to do is break open the Russian screening line, and the remainder of the defenses will fall like dominos. The general thrust of this argument is that the Russians lack reserves and that the subsequent defensive lines are not adequately manned – just break open the first line, and the rest will fall apart.

    This is probably a comforting thing to tell oneself, but itโ€™s rather irrational. We could talk, for example, about Russiaโ€™s doctrinal schema for defense in depth, which prescribes liberal allocation of reserves at all depths of the defensive system, but itโ€™s probably more fruitful to point at more immediate evidence.

    Let us simply consider Russiaโ€™s behavior over the last six months. They have spent a tremendous amount of effort constructing echeloned defenses – are we really to believe that they did all this only to waste all their combat power fighting in front of these defenses? Nor is there any evidence that Russia is having trouble supplying the front with manpower at the present moment. Weโ€™ve seen continued rotations and redeployments amid an overall process of military enlargement in Russia. Indeed, of the two belligerents, it is Ukraine that seems to be scraping the barrel for manpower.

    Cope 2: โ€œGet within firing rangeโ€

    This is the more fantastical story, and it represents a radical ad-hoc shift of the goalposts. The argument is that Ukraine doesnโ€™t actually need to advance to the sea and physically cut the land bridge, all it has to do is get the Russian supply routes within firing range to cut off Russian troops. This theory has been advance liberally on Twitter X and by personalities like Peter Zeihan (a man who knows nothing about military affairs).

    There are many problems with this line of thought, most of which stem from an inflated notion of โ€œfire control.โ€ To put it simply, being โ€œin rangeโ€ of artillery fire does not imply effective area denial or severed supply lines. If that were the case, Ukraine would be unable to attack out of Orikhiv at all, since the entire axis of approach is within Russian firing range. In Bakhmut, the AFU continued to fight long after their main supply routes came under Russian shelling.

    The simple fact is that most military tasks are conducted within range of at least some of the enemyโ€™s ranged fires, and the idea that Russia will collapse if the AFU manages to put a shell on the Azov coastal highway is fairly ridiculous. In fact, Russiaโ€™s main rail line is already within range of Ukrainian HIMARS, and the Ukrainians have successfully launched strikes on coastal cities like Berdyansk. Meanwhile, Russia strikes at Ukrainian sustainment infrastructure with regularity – yet neither army has collapsed yet. This is because ranged fires are a tool to improve attritional calculus and further operational goals – they do not magically win wars just by tagging the enemyโ€™s supply roads.

    Letโ€™s be charitable though, and indulge this line of thinking. Suppose the Ukrainians managed to advance – not all the way to the coast, but far enough to bring Russiaโ€™s main supply routes within range of artillery. What would they do? Wheel up a battery of howitzers, park them at the very front line, and begin firing nonstop at the road? What do you think would happen to those howitzers? Counterbattery systems would surely set upon them. The idea that you can just haul up a big gun and start taking potshots at Russian supply trucks is really quite childish. Putting enemy forces out of supply has always required physically blocking transit, and thatโ€™s what Ukraine will have to do if they want to cut Russiaโ€™s land bridge.

    The Distraction

    I am cognizant of the fact that I would be raked over the coals if I failed to discuss a secondary area of Ukrainian effort, farther to the east in Donestk oblast. Here, the Ukrainians have worked their way a good distance up the highway out of the town of Velyka Novosilka capturing several settlements.

    The problem with this โ€œotherโ€ Ukrainian attack is that it is, in a word, inconsequential. This axis of advance is operationally sterile in a very fundamental way, as it involves pushing groups up a narrow corridor of road that doesnโ€™t lead anywhere important. As in the Robotyne sector, the AFU is still quite some distance from any of the serious Russian fortifications, and to make matters worse the road and settlements on this axis lay along a small river. Rivers, as we know, flow along the floor of the terrain, which means the roadway sits at the bottom of a wadis/embakement/glacis, choose your terminology. In fact, the road network as such consists of nothing except a single-lane roadway on either side of the river

    The Sideshow in the East

    My reading of this axis is essentially that it was intended as a feint to create some semblance of operational confusion, but when the primary effort on the Orikhiv axis turned into a colossal misfire, the decision was made to continue to press here simply for narrative purposes. Ultimately, this is simply not an axis of advance that can exert a meaningful influence on the wider war. The forces deployed here are relatively miniscule in the grand scope of things, and they arenโ€™t going anywhere important. Certainly, a thin, needlelike penetration is not going to drive more than 80 kilometers down a single lane road to the sea and win the war.

    Conclusion: Finger Pointing

    One of the surest signs that Ukraineโ€™s counteroffensive has taken a cataclysmic turn is the way Kiev and Washington have already begun to blame each other, conducting a postmortem while the body is still warm. Zelensky has blamed the west for being too slow to deliver the requisite equipment and ammunition, arguing that unacceptable delays allowed the Russians to improve their defenses. This strikes me as rather obscene and ungrateful. NATO built Ukraine a new army from scratch in a process that already required greatly truncating the training times.

    On the other hand, western experts have begun to blame Ukraine for supposedly being unable to adopt โ€œcombined arms warfareโ€. This is really a very nonsensical attempt to use jargon (incorrectly) to explain away problems. Combined arms simply means the integration and simultaneous use of various arms like armor, infantry, artillery, and air assets. Claiming that Ukraine and Russia are somehow cognitively or institutionally incapable of this is extremely silly. The Red Army had a complex and extremely thorough doctrine of combined arms operation. One professor at the US Arms School of Advanced Military Studies said: โ€œThe single most coherent core of theoretical writings on operational art is still found among the Soviet writers.โ€ The idea that combined arms is some foreign and novel concept to Soviet officers (a caste that includes the Russian and Ukrainian high command) is ridiculous.

    This issue is not some sort of Ukrainian doctrinal obstinacy, but a combination of structural factors rooted in the insufficiency of Ukrainian combat power and the changing face of warfare.

    Itโ€™s frankly a little silly to say that Ukraine needs to learn about โ€œcombined armsโ€ when they are very simply lacking important capabilities that would make a successful maneuver campaign possible – namely, adequate ranged fires, a functioning air force (and no, F-16โ€™s will not fix this), engineering, and electronic warfare. The issue very fundamentally is not one of doctrinal flexibility, but of capability. By way of analogy, this is a bit like sending a boxer out to fight with a broken arm, and then critiquing his technique. The problem is not his technique – the problem is that heโ€™s injured and materially weaker than his opponent. So too, the problem for Ukraine is not that they are incapable of coordinating arms, the problem is that their arms are shattered.

    Secondly – and this, I admit, is rather shocking to me – western observers do not seem open to the possibility that the accuracy of modern ranged fires (be it Lancet drones, guided artillery shells, or GMLRS rockets) combined with the density of ISR systems may simply make it impossible to conduct sweeping mobile operations, except in very specific circumstances. When the enemy has the capacity to surveil staging areas, strike rear area infrastructure with cruise missiles and drones, precisely saturate approach lines with artillery fire, and soak the earth in mines, how exactly can it be possible to maneuver?

    Combined arms and maneuver are predicated on the ability to rapidly concentrate enormous fighting power and attack with great violence at narrow points. This is probably impossible given the density of Russian surveillance, firepower, and the many obstacles they have put up to deny Ukrainian freedom of movement and scleroticize their activity. The main examples of maneuver in recent western memory – the campaigns in Iraq – have only tenuous relevance to circumstances in Zaporizhia.

    Ultimately, we have returned to a war of mass – particularly massed ISR assets and fires. The only way Ukraine can maneuver the way they want is to break open the front, and they can only do this with more of everything – more mine clearing equipment, more shells and tubes, more rocketry, more armor. Only mass can crack open a suitable breach in the Russian lines. Otherwise, they are stuck in a positional creep through the dense Russian defenses, and criticizing them for being unable to grasp some sort of magical western notion of โ€œcombined armsโ€ is the strangest sort of finger pointing.

    So, whence goes the war from here? Well, the obvious question to ask is whether we believe Ukraine will ever have a more potent assault package than the one they started the summer with. The answer clearly seems to be no. It was like pulling teeth to scrape together these understrength brigades – the idea that, following on a defeat in the Battle of Zaporizhia, NATO will somehow put together a more powerful package seems like a stretch. More to the point, we have American officials saying fairly explicitly that this was the best mechanized package Ukraine was going to get.

    It does not seem controversial to say that this was Ukraineโ€™s best shot at some sort of genuine operational victory, which at this point seems to be slowly trickling away into modest but materially costly tactical advances. The ultimate implication of this is that Ukraine is unable to escape a war of industrial attrition, which is precisely the sort of war that it cannot win, due to all the asymmetries that we mentioned earlier.

    In particular, however, Ukraine cannot win a positional-attritional war because of its own maximalist definition of โ€œwinning.โ€ Since Kiev has insisted that it will not give up until it returns its 1991 borders, an inability to dislodge Russian forces poses a particularly nasty problem – Kiev will either need to admit defeat and acknowledge Russian control over the annexed areas, or it will continue to fight obstinately until it is a failed state with nothing left in the tank.

    Trapped in a bat fight, with attempts to unlock the front with maneuver coming to naught, what Ukraine needs most is a much bigger bat. The alternative is a totalizing strategic disaster [end]

    The original article

    Related

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  • [Sharing] The Battle of Bakhmut: Postmortem – Big Serge

    Russo-Ukrainian War Update

    On May 20th, PMC Wagner forced Ukrainian troops out of their last remaining position within the city limits of Bakhmut, consequentially bringing about the nominal end of the largest battle of the 21st century (so far). Bakhmut has been the most substantial locus of military operations in Ukraine for most of the past nine months. Combat there took on a frustrating tempo, with progress often measured in single city blocks. This was a battle that was extremely violent and bloody, but at times agonizingly slow and seemingly indecisive. After countless updates in which nothing of note seemed to have happen, many people were surely beginning to roll their eyes at the very mention of Bakhmut. Consequentially, the abrupt capture of the city by Wagner in May (rather predictably, the final 25% of the city fell very quickly relative to the rest) seemed a bit surreal. To many it likely seemed that Bakhmut would never end – and then, suddenly, it did.

    Bakhmut, like most high-intensity urban battles, exemplifies the apocalyptic potential of modern combat. Intense bombardment reduced large portions of the city to rubble, lending the impression that Wagner and the AFU were not so much fighting over the city as its carcass.

    The slow pace and extreme destruction has made this battle a rather difficult one to parse out. It all seems so senseless – even within the unique paradigm of war-making. In the absence of an obvious operational logic, observers on both sides have been eager to construct theories of how the battle was actually a brilliant example of four-dimensional chess. In particular, you can easily find arguments from both pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian commentators claiming that Bakhmut was used as a trap to draw in the other sideโ€™s manpower and material for destruction, while buying time to accumulate fighting power

    Pro-Ukrainian sources are adamant that a huge amount of Russian combat power was destroyed in Bakhmut, while the AFU received western armor and training to build out a mechanized package to go back on the offensive. Pro-Russian writers similarly seem convinced that the AFU burned a huge amount of manpower, while the Russian army preserved its strength by letting Wagner do most of the fighting.

    Clearly, they cannot both be correct.

    In this article, I would like to take a holistic survey of the Battle of Bakhmut and adjudicate the evidence. Which army was really destroyed in this โ€œstrategically insignificantโ€ city? Which army was being profligately wasteful of its manpower? And most importantly – why did this middling city become the site of the largest battle of the century? Homicide was committed, but nobody can agree on who murdered whom. So, let us conduct an autopsy.

    The Road to the Death Pit

    The Battle of Bakhmut lasted for so long that it can be easy to forget how the front ended up there, and how Bakhmut fits into the operations in the summer of 2022. Russian operations in the summer were focused on the reduction of the Ukrainian salient around Lysychansk and Severodonetsk, and came to a climactic head when Russian forces broke open the heavy defended Ukrainian stronghold of Popasna, encircled a pocket of Ukrainian forces around Zolote, and approached the Bakhmut-Lysychansk highway. The actual fall of the Lysychansk-Severodonetsk urban agglomeration came relatively quickly, with Russian forces threatening to encircle the entire bag and forcing a Ukrainian withdrawal.

    Just for reference, here is what the frontline in the central Donbas looked like on May 1, 2022, courtesy of MilitaryLand

    In this context, Bakhmut already threatened to become a major battleground. It lay at a literal crossroad directly in the center of the Ukrainian salient. As Ukrainian positions in Lysychansk, Popasna, and Svitlodarsk were broken open, the axes of Russian advance converged on Bakhmut.

    Ukrainian forces greatly needed to stabilize the front, and establish a stable blocking position, and there was really nowhere else to do this except at Bakhmut. Between Lysychansk and Bakhmut there are no sufficiently robust urban areas to anchor the defense, and there was absolutely no question of failing to adequately defend Bakhmut, for a few reasons that we can enumerate:

    1. Bakhmut is in the central position in this sector of front, and its loss would both threaten Siversk with envelopment and allow Russian forces to bypass the well fortified and strongly held defenses at Toretsk.
    2. The Russian strategic objective at Slavyansk-Kramatorsk cannot be successfully defended if the Russian army controls both the heights to the east (in the Bakhmut area) and Izyum.

    Bakhmut itself, meanwhile, was a defensible urban area with dominating heights in its rear, multiple routes of supply, good linkages to other sectors of front, and a peripheral belt of smaller urban areas protecting its flanks.

    This set up a rather obvious operational decision for Ukrainian forces. The choice was, all things considered, to either commit reserves to stabilize the front at Bakhmut (a strong and operational vital defensive anchor) or risk letting Russia bypass and sweep away an entire belt of defenses in places like Siversk and Toretsk. Asked to choose between a reasonably good option and an extremely bad option, there was no great controversy in the deciding.

    Falling back from the loss of their eastern defensive belt, Ukraine needed to stabilize the front somewhere, and the only suitable place was Bakhmut – so this is where Ukrainian reserves were sent in force, and the AFU chose to fight. Operational logic, indifferent to those things that normally recommend cities to us as โ€œimportantโ€, decreed that the Styx should flow through Bakhmut.

    Russia came to meet this challenge – bringing as their spearhead a mercenary group, staffed by convicts, wielding shovels, run by a bald caterer. What could go wrong?

    Operational Progression

    Because the general impression of Bakhmut is characterized by urban combat, it can be easy to forget that most of the battle took place outside the city itself, in the exurbs and fields around the urban center. The approach to Bakhmut is cluttered with a ring of smaller villages (places like Klynove, Pokrovsโ€™ke, and Zaitseve) from which the AFU was able to fight a tenacious defense with the support of artillery in the city itself.

    While Russian forces nominally reached the approach to Bakhmut late in June (even before Lysychansk was captured) and the city came under the extremes of shelling range, they did not immediately begin a concerted push to reach it. On August 1, the first assaults on the outer belt of villages began, and the Russian Ministry of Defense stated in its briefings that โ€œbattles for Bakhmutโ€ had begun. This date is the most logical starting date for historiographical purposes, so we may firmly say that the Battle of Bakhmut was fought from August 1, 2022 to May 20, 2023 – a total of 293 days.

    The first two months of the battle saw the Russian capture of most of the settlements east of the T0513 highway south of the city and the T1302 highway to the north, stripping Bakhmut and Soledar of most of their eastern buffer zones and pushing the line of contact right up to the edge of the urban areas proper

    Phase 1: The Outer Belt

    At this point, the frontlines largely froze up for the remainder of the year, before Wagner set the stage for further advances with the capture of the small village of Yakovlivka, to the north of Soledar. This success can be construed as the first domino in a chain of events which led to Ukrainian defeat in Bakhmut.

    Soledar itself serves a unique and critical role in the operational geography of Bakhmut. Laid out in a relatively long and thin strip, Soledar and its suburbs form a continuous urban shield stretching from the T0513 highway (which runs north to Siversk) all the way to the T0504 road (running east to Popasna). This makes Soledar a natural satellite stronghold which defends Bakhmut across nearly ninety degrees of approach. Soledar is also liberally gifted with industrial build, including the salt mine for which it is named, which makes it a relatively friendly place to wage a static defense, full of deep places and strong walls.

    Wagnerโ€™s capture of Yakovlivka on December 16, however, marked the first sign that the defense of Soledar was in trouble. Yakovlikva sits on an elevated position to the northeast of Soledar, and its capture gave Wagner a powerful position atop Soledarโ€™s flank. The Ukrainians recognized this, and Soledar was powerfully reinforced in response to the loss of Yakovlivka and the anticipated oncoming assault. The capture of Bakhmutske on December 27 (a suburb of Soledar directly on its southern approach) set the stage for a successful assault.

    The attack on Soledar ended up being relatively fast and extremely violent, characterized by intense levels of Russian artillery support. The assault began almost immediately after the loss of Bakhmutske on December 27th, and by January 10th Ukraineโ€™s cohesive defense had been shattered. Ukrainian leadership, of course, denied losing the town and wove a story about glorious counterattacks, but even the Institute for the Study of War (a propaganda arm of the US State Department) later admitted that Russia had captured Soledar by January 11th.

    The loss of Soledar, in combination with the early January capture of Klischiivka to the south, put Wagner in a position to begin a partial envelopment of Bakhmut

    Phase 2: Clearing the Flanks

    It was at this point that the discussion shifted towards a potential Russian encirclement of Bakhmut. To be sure, the Russian wings did expand rapidly around the city, placing it in a firebag, but there was never a concerted effort to take the city into a proper encirclement. The Russian advance subsided on the approach to Ivanivske in the south, and over the vital M03 highway in the north.

    A genuine encirclement was probably never in the cards, mainly because of the complication of Chasiv Yar – a strongly held rear area stronghold. To fully encircle Bakhmut, Russian forces would have been forced to choose between two difficult options: either blockade the road from Chasiv Yar to Bakhmut, or flare the envelopment wide enough to take Chasiv Yar into the pocket as well. Either option would have greatly complicated the operation, and so Bakhmut was never genuinely encircled.

    What the Russians did succeed in doing, however, was establish dominant position on the flanks which accrued three significant advantages. First, they were able to direct fire on Bakhmutโ€™s remaining supply lines. Secondly, they were able to pummel Bakhmut itself with intense artillery fire from a variety of axes. Third – and perhaps most importantly – they were able to assault the Bakhmut urban center itself from three different directions. This, in the end, greatly hastened the fall of the city. By April, it was clear that the focus had shifted from expanding the envelopment on the flanks to assaulting Bakhmut itself, and it was reported that Russian regular units had taken custody of the flanks so that Wagner could clear the city

    Phase 3: Flaring the Wings

    Fighting throughout April and early May at last shifted to the struggle in the urban center. AFU units in the city ultimately proved incapable of stopping Wagnerโ€™s advance, largely due to tight Russian fires coordination and the cramped confines of the Ukrainian defense – with Wagner advancing into the city from three axes, the firing grids for Russian artillery became very narrow, and the AFUโ€™s static defense – while bravely contested – was slowly ground down.

    By early May, it was clear that the city would fall soon, with the AFU desperately holding on to the western edge of the city. Attention soon shifted, however, to a Ukrainian counterattack on the flanks.

    This became a rather classic instance of events on the ground being outrun by the narrative. There had been rumors of an impending Ukrainian counterattack circulating for quite some time, advanced by both Ukrainian and Russian sources. Ukrainian channels were predicated on the idea that General Oleksandr Syrskyi (commander of AFU ground forces) had hatched a scheme to draw the Russians into Bakhmut before launching a counterattack on the wings. This idea was seemingly corroborated frantic warnings from Wagner head Yevgeny Prigozhin that the Ukrainians had massed enormous forces in the rear areas behind Bakhmut which would be unleashed to counter-encircle the city.

    In any case, the spring months came and went without any astonishing AFU counterattack, and all manner of material shortages and weather delays were blamed. Then, on May 15, all hell seemed to be breaking loose. The AFU finally attacked, and Prigozhin screeched that the situation on the flanks was approaching the worst case scenario.

    In fact, what happened was rather anticlimactic. The AFU did bring a hefty grouping of units to play, including several of their best and most veteran formations. These included units from:

    • The 56th Brigade
    • The 57th Mechanized Brigade
    • The 67th Mechanized Brigade
    • The 92nd Mechanized Brigade
    • The 3rd Assault Brigade (Azov)
    • The 80th Air Assault Brigade
    • The 5th Assault Brigade

    This sizeable strike package attacked a handful of mediocre Russian Motor Rifle brigades, achieved a bit of initial success, and culminated with heavy losses. Despite Prigozhinโ€™s assertion that the Russian regulars abandoned their posts and left the Russian wings undefended, we later learned that these forces – including mobilized motor rifle units – doggedly defended their positions and only withdrew under orders from above. These withdrawals (distances of a few hundred meters at most) brought the Russian defensive line to strongly held positions along a series of canals and reservoirs, which the AFU was unable to push through.

    Now, this is not to say that Russia did not suffer losses defending against a tenacious Ukrainian attack. The 4th Motor Rifle Brigade, which was largely responsible for the successful defense outside Klishchiivka, was badly chewed up, its commander was killed, and it had to be promptly rotated out. However, the offensive potential of the Ukrainian assault package was exhausted, and there have been no follow on attempts in the past two weeks

    The Final Act: Ukraineโ€™s Counterattack

    In the end, the vaunted Syrskyi plan looked rather lame. The counterattack did successfully unblock a few key roads out of Bakhmut, but it did nothing to prevent Wagner from finalizing the capture of the city, it burned through the combat power of several premier brigades, and on May 20th the last Ukrainian positions in the city were liquidated.

    So. This was a strange battle. An agonizingly slow creep around the flanks of the city, a materializing threat of encirclement, and a sudden concentration of Wagnerโ€™s combat energy in the city itself – all taking place under threats of an enormous counteroffensive by the AFU, which turned out to be ineffective and ephemeral.

    Itโ€™s not obvious, then, how this battle suited the operational logic of either army, nor that anyone would come away fully satisfied. Ukraine obviously lost the battle in nominal terms, but the Russian advance seemed so slow and Bakhmut so strategically random (at least superficially) that Wagnerโ€™s success can be portrayed as a pyrrhic victory. To fully adjudicate the Battle of Bakhmut, we need to contemplate relative losses and expenditure of combat power.

    The Butcherโ€™s Bill

    Estimating combat losses in Ukraine is a difficult task, largely because โ€œofficialโ€ casualty estimates are often patently absurd. This leaves us with a need to fumble for reasonable figures using proxies and ancillary information. One such important source of knowledge is deployments data – we can get a general sense of the burn rate by the scale and frequency of unit allocation. In this particular case, however, we find that unit deployments are somewhat difficult to work with. Letโ€™s parse through this.

    First and foremost, we need to grapple with the incontrovertible fact that a huge share of the Ukrainian military was deployed at Bakhmut at one point or another. The Telegram Channel Grey Zone compiled a list of all the Ukrainian units that were positively identified (usually by social media posts or AFU updates) as being deployed in Bakhmut throughout the nine month battle (that is, they were not there all at once)

    This is an absolutely enormous commitment (37 brigades, 2 regiments, and 18 separate battalions (plus irregular formations like the Georgian Legion) which indicates obviously severe losses (for what itโ€™s worth, the pro-Ukrainian MilitaryLand Deployment Map admits a similarly titanic Ukrainian deployment in Bakhmut). However, this does not really get us close to accurately assessing losses, largely because Ukraineโ€™s Order of Battle (ORBAT) is a bit confused. Ukraine frequently parcels out units below the brigade level (for example, their artillery brigades never deploy as such) and they have a bad habit of unit cannibalization.

    Doing some extremely rough back of the envelop math, minimal scratching off of just the 37 brigades could easily have pushed Ukraine past 25,000 casualties, but there are all manner of shaky assumptions here. First, this assumes that Ukraine withdraws its brigades when they reach combat ineffective loss levels (15% would be a placeholder number here), which isnโ€™t necessarily true – there is precedent for the AFU leaving troops in place to die, especially from lower quality units like Territorial Defense. In fact, an Australian volunteer (interview linked later on) claimed that the 24th mechanized brigade suffered 80% casualties in Bakhmut, so itโ€™s possible that a great many of these brigades were chewed up beyond task ineffectiveness levels (that is, they were not correctly rotated out) but were instead destroyed entirely. A recent article in the New Yorker, for example, interviewed survivors of a battalion that was almost entirely wiped out. In another instance, a retired Marine Colonel said that units at the frontline routinely suffer 70% casualties.

    We can say a few things for certain. First, that Ukraine had an extremely high burn rate which forced it to commit nearly a third of its total ORBAT. Secondly, we know that at least some of these formations were left at the front until they were destroyed. Finally, we can definitively say that pro-Ukrainian accounts are incorrect (or maybe lying) when they say that the defense at Bakhmut was conducted to buy time for Ukraine to build up strength in the rear. We know this first and foremost because Bakhmut insatiably sucked in additional units, and secondly because this burn included a large number of Ukraineโ€™s premier and veteran forces, including fully a dozen assault, airborne, and armored brigades.

    Thereโ€™s another problem with the ORBAT approach to casualties, however, and this concerns Wagner. You see, one of our objectives here is to try to get a sense of the comparative rates of loss, and ORBAT simply isnโ€™t a good way to do this in the particular case of Bakhmut. This is because the battle was mostly fought from the Russian side by the Wagner Group, which is a huge formation with an opaque internal structure.

    Whereas on the Ukrainian side we can enumerate a long list of formations that fought at Bakhmut, on the Russian side we just put the 50,000 strong Wagner Group. Wagner of course has internal sub-formations and rotations, but these are not visible to those of us on the outside, and so we cannot get a sense of Wagnerโ€™s internal ORBAT or force commitment. We understand generally that Wagner has a structure of assault detachments (probably a battalion equivalent), platoons, and squads, but we do not have a sense of where these units are deployed in real time or how quickly they are rotated or burned through. Sadly, when Prigozhin went in front of cameras he brought maps without unit dispositions on them, leaving ORBAT nerds squinting in vain trying to extract useful information. So, lacking good insight into Wagnerโ€™s deployments, we are unable to make an adequate comparison to the bloated Ukrainian ORBAT in Bakhmut.

    There are other ways that we can get at the casualties, however. The Russian dissident (that is, anti-Putin) organization Mediazona tracks Russian losses by tabulating obituaries, death announcements on social media, and official announcements. For the entire period of the Battle of Bakhmut (August 1 – May 20), they counted 6,184 total deaths among PMC personnel, inmates, and airborne forces (these three categories accounting for most of the Russian force in Bakhmut).

    Meanwhile, Prigozhin claimed that Wagner had suffered 20,000 KIA in Bakhmut while inflicting 50,000 KIA on the Ukrainians. Concerning the first number – the context of this claim was an interview in which he was lambasting the Russian Ministry of Defense (as is his habit), and he has an incentive to overstate Wagnerโ€™s losses (since he is trying to play up Wagnerโ€™s sacrifice for the Russian people).

    So, here is where we are at with Wagner losses. We have a โ€œfloorโ€, or absolute minimum of a little over 6,000 KIA (these being positively identified by name) with a significant upward margin of error , and something like a ceiling of 20,000. The number that I have been working with is approximately 17,000 total Wagner KIA in the Bakhmut operation (with a min-max range of 14,000 and 20,000, respectively)

    However, something we need to consider is the composition of these forces. Among the positively identified KIA, convicts outnumber professional PMC operators by about 2.6 to 1 (that is, Wagnerโ€™s dead would be about 73% convicts). According to the Pentagon, however (taken with a large grain of salt), nearly 90% of Wagnerโ€™s losses are convicts. Taking a conservative 75/25 split and rounding the numbers to make them pretty, my estimate is that Wagner lost about 13,000 convicts and 4,000 professional operators. Adding in VDV losses and motorized rifle units fighting on the flanks, and total Russian KIA in Bakhmut are likely on the order of 20-22,000.

    So, what about Ukrainian losses? The major outstanding question remains: who is on the right end of the loss ratios?

    Ukrainian commentators consistently ask us to believe that Russian losses were far worse due to their use of โ€œhuman waveโ€ attacks. There are several reasons why this can be dismissed.

    First, we have to acknowledge that after nine months of combat we have not yet seen a single video showing one of these purported human waves (that is, Wagner convicts attacking in a massed formation). Keeping in mind that Ukraine loves to share footage of embarrassing Russian mistakes, that they have no qualms about sharing gory war porn, and that this is a war being fought with thousands of eyes in the sky in the form of reconnaissance drones, it must strike us as curious that not one of these alleged human wave attacks has yet been caught on camera. When videos are shared purporting to show human waves, they invariably show small groups of 6-8 infantry (we call this a squad, not a human wave).

    However, the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. That being said, the โ€œhuman waveโ€ narrative has been contradicted on multiple occasions. Just for starters, General Syrskyi himself contradicted the human wave narrative and said that Wagnerโ€™s methodology is to push small assault groups forward under intense artillery cover. Witnesses from the front concur. An Australian Army Veteran volunteering in Ukraine gave a very interesting interview in which he downplayed Wagner casualties and instead emphasized that โ€œUkraine is taking way too many casualtiesโ€ – he later adds that the 24th brigade suffered 80% casualties in Bakhmut. He also notes that Wagner favors infiltration groups and small units – the veritable opposite of massed human waves.

    I found this article from the Wall Street Journal to be nicely emblematic of the human wave issue. It contains the obligatory claim of human wave tactics – โ€œThe enemy pays no attention to huge losses of its personnel and continues the active assault. The approaches to our positions are simply littered with the bodies of the adversaryโ€™s dead soldiers.โ€ This description, however, comes from the bureaucratic apparatus at the Ministry of Defense. What about people on the ground? A Ukrainian officer at the front says: โ€œSo far, the exchange rate of trading our lives for theirs favors the Russians. If this goes on like this, we could run out.โ€

    Ultimately, itโ€™s difficult to believe that the kill ratio favors Ukraine for the simple reason that the Russians have enjoyed a tremendous advantage in firepower. Ukrainian soldiers speak freely about Russiaโ€™s enormous superiority in artillery, and at one point it was suggested that the AFU was outgunned by ten to one. The New Yorkerโ€™s interview subjects claimed that their battalionโ€™s mortar section had a ration of a mere five shells per day!

    The enormous Russian advantage in artillery and standoff weaponry suggests the a-priori assumption that the AFU would be taking horrific casualties, and indeed thatโ€™s what we hear from myriad sources at the front. Then, of course, there was the shocking February claim by a former US Marine in Bakhmut that the life expectancy at the front line was a mere four hours.

    All of this is really ancillary to the larger point. The enormous inventory of AFU units that were churned through Bakhmut included something on the order of 160,000 total personnel. Taking loss rates of between 25 and 30% (roughly on par with Wagnerโ€™s burn rate), itโ€™s clear that Ukraineโ€™s losses were extreme. I believe total irretrievable losses for Ukraine in Bakhmut were approximately 45,000, with some +/- 7,000 margin of error.

    So, my current working estimates for losses in the Battle of Bakhmut are some 45,000 for Ukraine, 17,0000 for Wagner, and 5,000 for other Russian forces.

    But perhaps even this misses the point.

    Ukraine was losing its army, Russia was losing its prison population.

    Adjudicating the Battle of Bakhmut is relatively easy when one looks at what units were brought to the table. Bakhmut burned through an enormous portion of the AFUโ€™s inventory, including many of its veteran assault brigades, while virtually none of Russiaโ€™s conventional forces were damaged (with the notable exception of the Motor Rifle brigades that defeated the Ukrainian counterattack). Even the Pentagon has admitted that the vast majority of Russian casualties in Ukraine were convicts.

    Now, this is all rather cynical – nobody can deny it. But from the unsentimental calculus of strategic logic, Russia churned through its single most disposable military asset, leaving its regular ORBAT not only completely intact, but actually larger than it was last year.

    Meanwhile, Ukraine was left with virtually no indigenous offensive power – the only way it can conduct offensive operations is with a mechanized package built from scratch by NATO. For all Ukraineโ€™s bluster, the force commitment at Bakhmut left it unable to undertake any proactive operations all through the winter and spring, its multi-brigade counterattack at Bakhmut lamely fizzled out, and it left its supporters grasping at straws about an immanent counteroffensive to encircle Wagner by a reserve army that doesnโ€™t exist. It was even reduced to sending small flying columns into Belgorod Oblast to launch terror raids, only to have them blown up – discovering that the Russian border is in fact crawling with forces of the very much intact Russian army.


    I think that ultimately, neither army anticipated that Bakhmut would become the focal point of such high intensity combat, but the arrival of Ukrainian reserves in force created a unique situation. Russia was beginning a process of major force generation (with mobilization beginning in September), and the gridlocked, slow moving, Verdun-like environs of Bakhmut offered a good place for Wagner to bear the combat load while much of the regular Russian forces underwent expansion and refitting.

    Ukraine, meanwhile, fell into the sunk cost fallacy and began to believe its own propaganda about โ€œFortress Bakhmutโ€, and allowed brigade after brigade to be sucked in, turning the city and its environs into a killing zone.

    Now that Bakhmut is lost (or as Zelensky put it, exists โ€œonly in our heartsโ€), Ukraine faces an operational impasse. Bakhmut was after all a very good place to fight a static defense. If the AFU could not hold it, or even produce a favorable loss exchange, can a strategy of holding static fortified belts really be deemed viable? Meanwhile, the failure of the Syrskyi plan and the defeat of a multi-brigade counterattack by Russian motor rifle brigades casts serious doubt on Ukraineโ€™s ability to advance on strongly held Russian positions.

    Ultimately, both Ukraine and Russia traded for time in Bakhmut, but whereas Russia put up a PMC which primarily lost convicts, Ukraine bought time by chewing up a significant amount of its combat power. They bought time – but time to do what? Can Ukraine do anything that will be worth the lives it spent in Bakhmut, or was it all just blood for the blood god? [end]

    The original article

    Related

    Countdown of the Atlanticist defeat in Bakhmut

    a so predictable chronicle

    The Atlanticist counter-offensive

    the last NATO attempt to avoid defeat in its proxy war in Ukraine against Russia

  • [Sharing] Russo-Ukrainian War: Leak Biopsy – Big Serge

    A Russian Nesting Doll of Embarrassment

    […] If they [the leaked classified US military intelligence document] are indeed authentic (and it appears that they are), they offer important insight into force generation and combat power in Ukraine – and perhaps even more importantly, into the intelligence framework that the Pentagon is working with. None of the items adduced paint a particularly rosy picture for either the AFU or its benefactors on the Atlantic seaboard […]

    Ukrainian Force Generation

    The most significant implication of the documents is simple: Ukraineโ€™s combat power is significantly degraded, and in particular their mechanized units and artillery forces are in very rough shape.

    The relevant material here in particular is a page entitled โ€œUS Allied & Partner UAF Combat Power Buildโ€, which details the force generation, training, and equipment tranches that will create the mechanized package which Ukraine will use in its spring offensive. The plan calls for a force of twelve nominal brigades, nine of which will be equipped by NATO and three internally generated by the Ukrainians. The leak does not offer insight into the three Ukrainian brigades, but the intended complement of the nine NATO brigades is meticulously listed).

    All told, the combat power build calls for these brigades to field a total of 253 tanks, 381 Infantry Fighting Vehicles, 480 Armored Personnel Carriers, and 147 artillery pieces. This implies that these will be brigades in name only, and will in fact be far understrength. Parceling these systems out across nine brigades will give an average strength of a mere 28 tanks per brigade, along with some 95 IFVs/APCs and 16 artillery tubes. Compare this to a US Army Armored Brigade Combat Team, which would have almost 90 tanks and almost 200 IFVs/APCs. An American Stryker Brigade (a lighter, rapidly deployable formation) would have about 300 Strykers – the Ukrainian 82nd Brigade is listed to receive only 90.

    In combat power terms, therefore, these new brigades are going to be far understrength. Their tank strength, far from being full brigade level, amounts to less than an American armored battalion.

    Another key aspect of the force build document is the training schedules. This document dates from the beginning of March, at which point five of the nine brigades were listed at โ€œTraining 0% Completeโ€. Only one of the brigades was more than halfway trained, rated at 60% complete. Despite this, six out of nine were scheduled to be ready by the end of March and the remainders by the end of April. This can only be achieved with significantly truncated training times, and these are detailed in the document. Leopard tank training, for example, is listed at only six weeks. Just for context, American tankers can pencil in 22 weeks of training for the Abrams […]

    We have known for quite some time that Ukraine is facing a critical shell shortage, but the leaked documents reveal just how acute this issue is. Ukraineโ€™s usage rate is very low right now – the report claims only 1,104 shells had been expended in the previous 24 hours – compare this to the 20,000 or so shells that the Russian army is firing on a daily basis. Even more alarming for Ukraine is the note that they have only 9,788 shells on hand.

    Even with a low burn rate that leaves the AFU massively outgunned, they have enough on hand to sustain combat for a little over a week, and they rely on a trickle of deliveries from the USA to keep these stocks stable. The report noted a shipment of 1,840 shells departing in the next 24 hours. Batches of this size are obviously insufficient for Ukraine to build up its stocks, and can only serve to backstop and replenish daily expenditure. There is no possibility of America quickly ramping up the size of these deliveries, because a mere 14,000 shells are produced per month. US officials hope to get this number up to 20,000 this year, but this is still below Ukraineโ€™s current burn rate […]

    The American Analytic Framework

    […] The Pentagon does not seem to have a strong sense of Ukrainian unit strength, location, or activities. They also list their assessed Ukrainian KIA at a mere 16k-17.5k. This is an absurdly low number – where could they have gotten it? In fact, it is a direct copy-paste of the casualty numbers reported publicly by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.

    The fact that the Pentagon does not seem to have any independently generated intelligence about the Ukrainian army is shocking. They seem to have be relying on Ukrainian propaganda numbers and publicly available deployments data, like the open source Deployment Map. For the record, this is not a knock on the Deployment Map site – I use this resource frequently and find it very useful. The point, of course, is that the Pentagon, with its nearly unlimited resources, does not seem to have any unique insight or intelligence streams of its own in this regard. They gesture vaguely at the map and mutter, โ€œthereโ€™s probably a brigade or two in this area, maybe 8,000 men. Or 4,000. We donโ€™t really know.โ€ In fact, all of their axis strength assessments for Ukraine have a 100% margin of error (that is, the upper limit of the range is double the lower limit).

    One can only conclude that the tail is wagging the dog. The Ukrainians are able to extract material, training, and cash from the west, but there is little accountability or honest information flow in return. There were hints of this earlier in the war – that Ukraine is a sort of black box which sucks in resources but does not communicate honestly in return; American officials have complained (and Ukrainian leaders have confirmed) that Kiev simply does not tell DC all that much. Apparently this remains an issue well over a year into the conflict. One particularly alarming footnote in the leaked documents states:

    “We have low confidence in Russian (RUS) And Ukrainian (UKR) attrition rates and inventories because of information gaps, OPSEC and IO efforts, and potential bias in UKR information sharing.“

    Good grief […]

    Air Defense at the Brink

    One last major revelation from the leak is the greatly degraded state of Ukrainian air defense. Very simply, Ukraine is quickly running out of munitions, especially for its critical S-300 and BUK systems, and it can only endure two or three more wave strikes before breaking completely.

    Air defense systems can be complicated to talk about for people who arenโ€™t familiar with the nomenclature. This is because there are a large number of different systems required for a modern air defense, which must be โ€œlayeredโ€ with different systems that intercept targets at various altitudes, phases of flight, and trajectories. The conversation can quickly become even more muddled because the launch systems have both a Russian designation and a NATO designation, and their munitions have different designations still – just for example, the air defense system which the Russians call the S-300 is designated the SA-10 by NATO, and it fires a variety of different interceptor missiles which have their own names, like the 9M83. Multiply this by the many different types of air defense systems currently in use in Ukraine, and you can see how it can easily decay into a morass of acronyms and serial numbers.

    In any case, the key thing to understand about air defense systems is the layering aspect – if one node in the layer fails, not only does one lose full spectrum coverage, but the burn rate on the remaining systems increases because they are now bearing an undue load. Ukraine is now almost completely out of interceptors for the S-300 and BUK systems, which comprise almost all of its medium to long range defense. At the current burn rate, they are projected to run out by the first week of May and have had to make hard choices about where and what to defend. There is no prospect of acquiring more interceptors for these systems because they are manufactured in Russia […]

    Conclusion: Asleep at the Wheel

    […] There does not seem to be any long term plan to sustain Ukraineโ€™s war. The Pentagonโ€™s procurement plans do not indicate any real intent to ramp up production of key systems. For FY2024, they have ordered a modest 5,016 GMLRS – the missiles launched by the famous HIMARS system. Ukraine has already fired nearly 10,000 GMLRS, making this yet another system where Ukrainian expenditures vastly exceed supply.

    To salvage the situation, Kiev must place its hopes on one desperate dice roll with a mechanized attack package comprised of half-strength brigades wielding a disparate inventory of different vehicles and systems. This Frankensteinโ€™s monster of armies – sewn together with a bevy of different tanks, IFVs, APCs, and artillery systems drawn from all corners of the NATO alliance, will likely be asked to smash through the heavily fortified and robustly manned Russian lines in the south, where it will be pulverized and become only so much more mulch for the Pontic Steppe [end]

    The full article

    my related piece

    Countdown of the Atlanticist defeat in Bakhmut