Nicolas Cinquini

Analista senior di l'intelligenza in u campu di a gestione di i risichi di sicurezza, sò un anzianu tenente detective è ufficiale di l'intelligenza in l'agenzie di u Statu francese. A bona pronuncia hè Николай Чинкуини, in russu

Tag: atlanticism

  • [Sharing] Trump says he wants Ukraine to supply US with rare earths – Reuters

    [actually, a long story]

    WASHINGTON, Feb 3 (Reuters) – U.S. President Donald Trump said on Monday he wants Ukraine to supply the United States with rare earth minerals as a form of payment for financially supporting the country’s war efforts against Russia.

    Trump, speaking to reporters at the White House, said Ukraine was willing, adding that he wants “equalization” from Ukraine for Washington’s “close to $300 billion” in support.

    “We’re telling Ukraine they have very valuable rare earths,” Trump said. “We’re looking to do a deal with Ukraine where they’re going to secure what we’re giving them with their rare earths and other things.”

    It was not immediately clear if Trump was using the term “rare earths” to refer to all types of critical minerals or just to rare earths.

    Rare earths are a group of 17 metals used to make magnets that turn power into motion for electric vehicles, cellphones and other electronics. There are no known substitutes.

    The U.S. Geological Survey considers 50 minerals to be critical, opens new tab for the country’s economy and national defense, including several types of rare earths, nickel and lithium.

    Ukraine contains large deposits of uranium, lithium and titanium, although none are considered to be among the world’s five biggest by volume and the U.S. has its own untapped reserves of those and other critical minerals.

    The U.S. has only one operating rare earths mine and very little processing capacity, although several companies are working to develop projects in the country. China is the world’s largest producer of rare earths and many other critical minerals [end]

    The original article

    Related

    January 4, 2025: in The Atlanticist defeat in Donbass and Ukraine, chronicle

    the Russian forces seize Shevchenko lithium deposit, in Donetsk People’s Republic

    January 2, 2024: The EU Is Willing to Go to War Over Lithium? – Phil Butler, New Eastern Outlook

    the riddle of unhinged EU support for the Zelensky regime in Kyiv is now solved. Anyone inclined can unravel why the Germans, in particular, backstabbed Russia in the Minsk peace boondoggle. Lithium.

    January 28, 2023: The Battle for Ukraine’s Titanium – David Brennan, Newsweek

  • Images du jour : alors, p’tit gars, content d’être soldat ?

    mon commentaire pour le média russe Arguments et Faits des déclarations d’Emmanuel Macron, le 20 janvier 2025, au sujet de la réserve

    Il est toujours plus difficile de prendre Emmanuel Macron au sérieux. Je considère depuis longtemps ses déclarations avec dérision et à quelques 20% d’opinion favorable, son crédit est au plus bas parmi les Français. Il me semble que peu de journalistes ou citoyens ont pris la peine jusqu’à présent de commenter son ambition de mieux détecter et former de jeunes volontaires en renfort des armées.

    Je n’imagine pas un instant que la France puisse rétablir le service militaire tel que je l’ai connu dans les années 80, obligatoire et pour une durée d’un an. L’économie, la sociologie et l’opinion publique s’y opposent

    Son vague projet concerne la réserve. Aujourd’hui, l’armée française compte environ 40 000 réservistes, c’est insignifiant. Alors qu’il quittera le pouvoir en 2027, au plus tard, il en souhaite 80 000 pour 2030 et pour 2035, 100 000, soit un réserviste pour deux militaires d’active. Ce ne serait pas la levée en masse de 1793 (deux volontaires pour un militaire d’active, amalgamés dans les demi-brigades) et seulement dans dix ans. Or il adresse évidemment le contexte international actuel, au moment où le Néerlandais Mark Rutte (OTAN) et l’Estonienne Kaja Kallas (UE), deux autres épées, font des déclarations similaires dans leurs domaines de compétence. Il fait du Macron, c’est à dire de la communication, du vent.

    Nous entendons aussi un débat au sujet d’un maintien de la paix par des troupes occidentales en Ukraine, après un cessez-le-feu. Dans l’expectative de cet hypothétique cessez-le-feu, c’est mettre la charrue très avant les bœufs. Après l’arrivée au pouvoir de Donald Trump et avant des élections en Allemagne, les Européens donnent l’impression de paniquer

    Je pense que le projet stratégique de Macron est aussi peu tangible que ses déclarations au sujet de la réserve. Il essaierait plutôt de stimuler ses partenaires, quand la défaite occidentale paraît inéluctable au Donbass et en Ukraine. Macron personnifie le déclin accéléré de la France. Mon hypothèse est que son agitation est motivée par la crainte de la fin de l’hégémonie occidentale, comment ce déclin accélérera la démolition de la Francafrique et de graves conséquences pour l‘économie de marché en France.

    Articles connexes

    L’engagement français dans les rangs ukrainiens

    chronique alphabétique et nécrologique de l’engagement français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas

    The Atlanticist defeat in Donbass and Ukraine

    en Anglais, chronicle of a new catastrophic NATO venture

    August 1, 2023: African revolution

    France is expelled from its former colonies in West Africa

  • [Sharing] Total Kievan Debellation – Big Serge

    The Russo-Ukrainian War: Year 3

    On March 5, 2022, the wreck of the sailing ship Endurance was found in the depths of the Weddell Sea off the coast of Antarctica. This, of course, was the vessel lost in Ernest Shackelton’s third expedition to Antarctica, which became trapped in the ice and sank in 1915. The story of that expedition is an extraordinary tale of human fortitude – with the Endurance lost to the ice, Shackleton’s crew evacuated to a loose ice flow where they camped for nearly 500 days, drifting about the Antarctic seas, before making a desperate dash across the open ocean in an open 20 foot lifeboat, finally reaching the southern shore of inhospitable and mountainous South Georgia Island, which they then had to cross on foot to reach the safety of a whaling station.

    The story itself has an essentially mythic quality to it, with Shackleton’s crew surviving for years on free floating ice floes in the most inhospitable seas on earth. For our purposes, however, it is the story’s coda that is particularly interesting. In Shackleton’s memoirs, he remembered that, upon finally reaching the safety of the Stromness whaling station, one of his first questions was about the war in Europe. When Shackleton first set out on his ill-fated expedition on August 8, 1914, the First World War was less than a week old, and the German Army had just begun its invasion of Belgium. There was little expectation then that the war would proceed as it did, unleashing four years of slaughterous positional warfare that engulfed the continent.

    Shackleton, having been adrift at sea for years, clearly did not imagine that the war could still be raging, and asked the commandant of the whaling station “tell me, when was the war over?”

    The answer came back: “The war is not over. Millions are being killed. Europe is mad. The world is mad.”

    The timing is serendipitous, since the discovery of the Endurance’s wreck, after more than a hundred years, happened to occur only a few weeks after the world again went mad, with the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian War in February 2022. As time continues its inexorable march and the calendar turns yet again, the war is passing through its third full winter. In February, Z-World will be three years old.

    Of course, modern communications make it extremely unlikely that anybody could be cut fully out of the loop for years at a time, like Shackleton and his men. Instead of being ignorant as to whether or not the war is over, many of us are exposed on a daily basis to footage of men being killed, buildings being blown up, and vehicles being shredded. Twitter has made it essentially impossible to live under a rock, or on an ice floe, as it were.

    If anything, we have the very opposite problem of Shackleton – at least as far as our wartime information infrastructure goes. We are saturated in information, with daily updates tracking advances of a few dozen meters and never ending bombast about new game changing weapons (which seem to change very little), and bluster about “red lines”. This war seems to have an unyielding dynamic on the ground, and no matter how many grand pronouncements we hear that one side or the other is on the verge of collapse, the sprawling front continues to grind up bodies and congeal with bloody positional fighting.

    It would seem difficult to believe that a high intensity ground war in Europe with hundreds of miles worth of front could be boring, yet the static and repetitive nature of the conflict is struggling to hold the attention of foreign observers who have little immediately at stake.

    My intention here is a radical zoom-out from these demoralizing and fatiguing small scale updates (as valuable as the work of the war mappers is), and consider the aggregate of 2024 – arguing that this year was, in fact, very consequential. Taken as a whole, three very important things happened in 2024 which create a very dismal outlook for Ukraine and the AFU in the new year. More specifically, 2024 brought three important strategic developments:

    1. Russian victory in southern Donetsk which destroyed the AFU’s position on one of the war’s key strategic axes.
    2. The expenditure of carefully husbanded Ukrainian resources on a failed offensive towards Kursk, which accelerated the attrition of critical Ukrainian maneuver assets and substantially dampened their prospects in the Donbas.
    3. The exhaustion of Ukraine’s ability to escalate vis a vis new strike systems from NATO – more broadly, the west has largely run out of options to upgrade Ukrainian capabilities, and the much vaunted delivery of longer range strike systems failed to alter the trajectory of the war on the ground.

    Taken together, 2024 revealed a Ukrainian military that is increasingly stretched to the limits, to the point where the Russians were able to largely scratch off an entire sector of front. People continue to wonder where and when the Ukrainian front might begin to break down – I would argue that it *did* break down in the south over the last few months, and 2025 begins with strong Russian momentum that the AFU will be hard pressed to arrest.

    Front Collapse in South Donetsk

    What stands out immediately about the operational developments in 2024 is the marked shift of energies away from the axes of combat that had seen the most intense fighting in the first two years of the war. In a sense, this war has seen each of its fronts activate in a sequence, one after the other.

    After the opening Russian offensive, which boasted as its signature success the capture of the Azov coastline and the linkup of Donetsk and Crimea, the action shifted to the northern front (the Lugansk-Kharkov axis), with Russia fighting a summer offensive which captured Severodonetsk and Lysychansk. This was followed by a pair of Ukrainian counteroffensives in the fall, with a thrust out of Kharkov which pushed the front back over the Oskil, and an operation directed at Kherson which failed to breach Russian defenses but ultimately resulted in a Russian withdrawal in good order over the Dnieper due to concerns over logistical connectivity and an over-extended front. Energies then pivoted yet again to the Central Donbas axis, with the enormous battle around Bakhmut raging through the spring of 2023. This was followed by the failed Ukrainian offensive on Russia’s defenses in Zaporozhia, in the south.

    Just to briefly recapitulate this, we can enumerate several operational phases in the first two years of the war, occurring in sequence and each with a center of gravity in different parts of the front:

    • A Russian offensive across the land bridge, culminating in the capture of Mariupol. (Winter-Spring 2022, Southern Front)
    • A Russian offensive in Lugansk, capturing Severodonetsk and Lysychansk. (Summer 2022, Donets-Oskil front)
    • Ukrainian Counteroffensives towards the Oskil and Kherson (Autumn 2022, Oskil and Dnieper fronts)
    • The Russian assault on Bakhmut (Winter-Spring 2023, Central Front)
    • Ukrainian counteroffensive on the land bridge (Summer 2023)

    Amid all of this, the front that saw the least movement was the southeastern corner of the front, around Donetsk. This was somewhat peculiar. Donetsk is the urban heart of the Donbas – a vast and populous industrial city at the center of a sprawling conurbation, once home to some 2 million people. Even if Russia succeeds in capturing the city of Zaporizhia, Donetsk will be by far the most populous of Ukraine’s former cities to come under Moscow’s control.

    In 2014, with the outbreak of the proto-Donbas war, Donetsk was the locus of much of the fighting, with the airport on the city’s northern approach the scene of particularly intense combat. This made it rather strange, then, that at the start of 2024 the Ukrainian Army continued to occupy many of the same positions that they built a decade prior. As intense fighting ebbed and flowed along other sectors of front, Donetsk remained besieged by a web of powerfully held Ukrainian defenses, anchored by heavily fortified urban areas stretching from Toretsk to Ugledar. Early Russian attempts to crack this iron ring open, including an assault on Ugledar in the winter of 2023, met with failure.

    The signature operational development of 2024, then, was the re-activation of the Donetsk front, after years of static combat. It is not an exaggeration to say that after years of coagulation, the Russian Army cracked this front wide open in 2024 and Ukraine’s long and strongly held network of urban strongpoints collapsed

    Russian Progress on the Donetsk Axis in 2024

    The year began with the AFU fighting for its fortress in Avdiivka, where it continued to block the northern approach to Donetsk. At the time, the typical argument that one heard from the Ukrainian side was that the Russian assault on Avdiivka was pyrrhic – that the Russians were capturing the city with exorbitantly costly “meat assaults” that would inevitably sap Russian combat power and exhaust their ability to continue the offensive.

    With the full measure of the year behind us, we can definitively say that this is not the case. After the fall of Avdiivka, Russian momentum never seriously slackened, and in fact it was the AFU that appeared to be increasingly exhausted. The Ukrainian breakwater position at Ocheretyne (which had previously been their staging point for counterattacks around Avdiivka) was overrun in a matter of days, and by the early summer the frontline had been pushed out towards the approach to Pokrovsk.

    The Russian thrust towards Pokrovsk led many to believe that this city was itself the object of Russian energies, but this was a misread of the operational design. Russia did not need to capture Pokrovsk in 2024 to render it sterile as a logistical hub. Simply by advancing towards the E50 highway, Russian forces were able to cut off Pokrovsk from Ukrainian positions to the south on the Donetsk front, and Pokvrovsk is now a frontline city subject to the full spectrum of overwatch from Russian drones and tube artillery.

    By autumn, the Russian advance had put the Ukrainians in a severe salient, creating an unstable chain of positions in Selydove, Kurakhove, Ugledar, and Krasnogorivka. Russia’s advance from Ocheretyne onto the southern approach to Pokrovsk acted like an enormous scythe, isolating the entire southeastern sector of the front and allowing Russian forces to carve through it in the closing months of the year

    Russian Operations in 2024, Donetsk Axis

    This war has turned the word “collapse” into a devalued buzzword. We are told repeatedly that one side or the other is on the verge of collapse: sanctions will “collapse” the Russian economy, the Wagner uprising of 2023 proved that the Russian political system was “collapsing”, and of course we hear that exorbitant losses have one army or the other on the verge of total failure – which army that may be depends on who you ask.

    I would argue, however, that what we saw from October 2024 onward represents a real occurrence of this oft-repeated and discarded word. The AFU suffered a genuine collapse of the southeastern front, with the forces positioned in their strongpoints too attrited and isolated to make a determined defense, Russian fires becoming too heavily concentrated in ever more compressed areas to endure, and no mechanized reserve in the theater available to counterattack or relieve the incessant Russian pressure.

    Ukraine does maintain enough drones and concentrated fires to limit a full Russian exploitation – that is, Russia is still not able to maneuver at depth. This gave the Russian advance a particular stop-start quality, leapfrogging from one settlement and fortress to the other. More generally, Russia’s preference to use dispersed small-unit assaults limits the potential for exploitation. We have to emphasize, however, that Russian momentum on this axis has never seriously slackened since October, and many of the key Ukrainian positions were overrun or abandoned very quickly

    Ugledar is a good example: the Russians began their final push toward the town on September 24. By September 29, the 72nd Mechanized Brigade began evacuating. By October 1, Ugledar was fully under Russian control. This was a keystone Ukrainian position put in a completely untenable position and it went down in a week. One could argue, of course, that Ugledar held out for years (how then can we say with a straight face that it was captured in a week), but this is precisely the point. In early 2023 Ugledar (with the help of artillery stationed around Kurakhove) successfully repelled a multi-brigade Russian attack in months of heavy fighting. By October 2024, the position was completely untenable and was abandoned almost immediately when attacked.

    The Ukrainians did no better trying to hold Kurakhove – previously a critical rear area that served as both a logistical hub and a base of fire for supporting (former) frontline strongpoints like Ugledar and Krasnogorivka. Kurakhove, now under full Russian control, will in turn serve as a base of support for the ongoing Russian push to the west towards Andriivka.

    Taking the state of the front holistically, the AFU is currently holding two severe salients at the southernmost end of the line – one around Velyka Novosilka, and another around Andriivka. The former is likely to fall first, as the town has been fully isolated by Russian advances on the flanks. This is not a Bakhmut-like situation, where roads are described as “cut” because they are under Russian fire – in this case, all of the highways into Velyka Novosilka are cut by physical Russian blocking positions, making the loss of the position only a matter of waiting for the Russians to assault it. Further north, a more gentle and less strongly held salient exists between Grodivka and Toretsk. With Toretsk now in the final stages of capture (Ukrainian forces now hold only a small residential neighborhood on the city’s outskirts), the front should level here as well in the coming months.

    This leaves the Russians more or less in full control of the approaches to Kostyantinivka and Pokrovsk, which are in many ways the penultimate Ukrainian held positions in Donetsk. Pokrovsk has already been bypassed several miles to the west, and the map portends a re-run of the typical Russian tactical methodology for assaulting urban areas – a methodical advance along the wings of the city to isolate it from arterial highways, followed by an attack on the city itself via several axes

    The coming months promise continued Russian advances across this front, in a continuation of what can only be regarded as the collapse of a critical front on the part of the AFU. The Russian Army is advancing to the western border of Donetsk oblast and will ferret the Ukrainians out of their remaining strongpoints at Velyka Novosilka and Andriivka, while pushing into the belly of Pokrovsk. At no point since the fall of Avdiivka have the Ukrainians demonstrated the ability to seriously stymie Russian momentum along this 75 mile front, and the ongoing dissipation of Ukrainian combat resources indicates that little will change in this regard in 2025.

    Toehold: The Incredible Shrinking Kursk Salient

    Throughout the autumn of 2024 and these early months of winter, as Ukrainian forces were dug out of their dense web of fortified positions in the southern Donbas, their comrades continued to stubbornly hold on to their position in Russia’s Kursk Oblast. The basic shape of Ukraine’s offensive into Kursk is by now well known – billed by Kiev as a gambit to change the psychological trajectory of the war and strike a prestige blow to Russia, the Ukrainian attack had early momentum after achieving initial strategic surprise, but quickly faltered after Ukrainian columns ran into effective Russian blocking positions on the highways out of Sudzha. Efforts to force the roads through Korenovo and Bolshoe Soldatskoe were defeated, and the Ukrainian grouping was left holding on to a modest salient around Sudzha, jutting out into Russia.

    Throughout the autumn, Russian counterattacks have focused on chiseling away at the base of the Ukrainian salient – forcing the Ukrainians out of Snagost and pushing them away from Korenovo. The progress here has been incremental, but significant, and by the start of January the “neck” of the Ukrainian salient had been compressed down to a little over nine miles wide, after their initial penetration in the summer had forced a breach of over twenty miles. All told, Ukraine has lost about 50% of the territory that they grabbed in August.

    The Russian pressure on the flanks of the salient have amplified many of the qualities that make this position wasteful and dangerous for the AFU. There is limited road connectivity for Ukrainian forces – a problem amplified by the rollback from Snagost, which cost them access to the highway running from Korenovo to Sumy. Apart from a few circuitous side roads, Ukrainian forces only have a single highway – the R200 route – to run material and reinforcements into the pocket, which allows Russian forces to surveil their lines of communication and conduct effective interdiction strikes. The compression of the pocket also greatly narrows the targeting area for Russian drones, tube artillery, and rocketry, and creates more condensed and saturating bombardment

    Despite the fact that this position has been profoundly unproductive for Ukraine – being steadily rolled back and having no synergy with other, more critical theaters – the same grouping of Ukrainian units remain here, fighting in a steadily more compressed space. Even more baffling, the Ukrainian grouping consists largely of premiere assets – Mechanized and Air Assault brigades – that could have contributed meaningfully as a reserve in the Donbas over the last three months.

    On January 5, there was a surprise in the form of a renewed Ukrainian attack out of the salient. The internet of course jumped to the conclusion that the AFU was going back over to some sort of general offensive posture in Kursk, but the reality was very underwhelming – something like a battalion sized assault up the axis towards Bolshoe Soldaskoe, which got a few kilometers up the road before it ran out of steam. Ukrainian efforts to jam Russian drones were stymied by the increasing ubiquity of fiber-optic systems, and the Ukrainian attack collapsed within a day

    Kursk Salient – General Situation, January 2025

    The tactical particulars of the Ukrainian attack are interesting, and there’s ongoing speculation as to its purpose – perhaps it was intended to cover a rotation or withdrawal, to improve tactical positions on the northern edge of the salient, or for inscrutable propaganda purposes. However, these specifics are rather unimportant: attacking out the end of the salient (that is, trying to deepen the penetration into Russia) does nothing to reverse Ukraine’s problems in Kursk. These problems are first, on the tactical level, that the salient has been greatly compressed on the flanks and continues to narrow, and on the strategic level the willful expenditure of valuable mechanized assets on a front that does not impact the critical theaters of the war. More simply, Kursk is a sideshow, and it is a sideshow that has gone wrong even within its own operational logic.

    One thing that has been of endless interest, of course, have been the continued rumors of North Korean troops fighting in Kursk. Western intelligence agencies have been adamant about the presence of North Koreans in Kursk. Some people are predisposed to instinctively disbelieve everything that western officialdom says – while I think some skepticism is warranted, I do not automatically assume that they are lying. One recent report lays out what would seem to be a plausible version of this story: that the idea actually originated in Pyongyang, not Moscow, and that a modest number of Korean troops (perhaps 10,000) are embedded with Russian units. The presumption here is that the Koreans hatched the idea as a way to gain combat experience, with the Russians in turn getting auxiliary forces, though of questionable combat effectiveness.

    However, it is worth noting that this is not nearly as important as it has been made out to be. Much has been made of the idea that the North Korean presence proves some sort of Russian state of desperation, but this is fairly silly on its face – with more than 1.5 million active personnel in the Russian military, 10,000 Korean troops in Kursk represents a paltry appendage. More importantly, there has been an attempt to portray the North Korean contingent as a major departure point in the war. In particular, the formulation “North Korean troops in Europe” has been used to conjure cold war imagery of communist despotism clawing at the free world

    The point, however, is that North Korean troops are presumed specifically to be in Kursk, which is in Russia. This is linked, of course, to the recently concluded mutual defense agreement signed between Moscow and Pyongyang. By attacking into Kursk – widening the front into prewar Russian territory – Ukraine created a defensive combat task for Russia which triggers the possibility of military assistance from North Korea. However much one may wish to link the Korean contingent to Russia’s dreaded “war of aggression”, the force in Kursk is very objectively engaged in the defense of Russian territory, and that makes it possible for Russia to use auxiliary forces – including conscripts and the troops of its allies – to fight there.

    Ultimately, then, the presence of North Koreans in Kursk is interesting, but perhaps not very important after all. These troops are not in Ukraine (even under the most maximal definition of the Ukrainian territorial unit), they are not carrying the primary combat load, and they are unequivocally not the problem that the AFU is facing in Kursk. The “big problem” for Ukraine, very simply, is not the presence of some amorphous Korean horde dedicated to spreading Glorious Juche to Europe – it is the loitering of large grouping of their own precious mechanized brigades in a compressed salient, far far away from the Donbas, where they are greatly needed.

    Scraping the Barrel: AFU Force Generation

    I think it is well understood, of course, that Ukraine faces severe manpower constraints relative to Russia, both in terms of the raw totals of male biomass available – with roughly 35 million fighting aged males in Russia against perhaps 9 million in prewar Ukraine – but also in terms of its capacity to mobilize them.

    Ukraine’s mobilization scheme is hampered by both widespread draft evasion (with willingness to serve decreasing as the war has stretched on) and a stubborn unwillingness to draft younger men, aged 18-25. Ukraine is structurally burdened with a deeply imbalanced population structure: there are roughly 60% more Ukrainian men in their 30’s than in their 20’s. Given the relative scarcity of young men, particularly in their early 20’s, the Ukrainian government rightly views this 18-25 year old cohort as a premium demographic cohort that it is loathe to burn away in combat. Given the ubiquity of draft evasion, the refusal to mobilize younger males, and the corruption and inefficiency characteristic of the Ukrainian government, it should come as no surprise when Ukrainian mobilization falters

    Russia, in contrast, has both a much larger pool of potential recruits and a more efficient apparatus for mobilization. In contrast to Ukraine’s scheme of compulsory conscription, Russia has relied on generous sign-on bonuses to solicit volunteers. Russia’s incentive system, to this point, has provided a steady stream of enlistments that has been more than enough to offset Russian losses. Without going too far into the various speculative estimates of Russian casualties, it is widely acknowledged by western military leadership that Russia has significantly more personnel now than it did at the start of the war.

    All of that is to say: Ukraine faces a severe structural disadvantage in military manpower in the aggregate, which is exacerbated by the idiosyncrasies of the Ukrainian mobilization law, ameliorated slightly by the relatively low troop densities and the preponderant power of strike systems in this war.

    The argument that I want to make here, however, is that Ukraine’s systemic problems matching Russian manpower have been exacerbated by several developments which specifically became prominent in 2024. In other words, 2024 can and should be marked as the year where Ukrainian manpower constraints became markedly and perhaps irretrievably worse due to specific decisions made in Kiev, and particular developments on the ground.

    These are as follows:

    1. The decision to expand the AFU’s force structure through the creation of the “15 series” brigades
    2. The decision to deliberately widen the front and create additional demands for manpower by launching the incursion into Kursk
    3. The stall out of Ukraine’s new mobilization program in the autumn
    4. Accelerating problems with desertion in the AFU

    We’ll run through these in order.

    An army that is intaking new personnel has to decide between two possible allocations for them. New personnel can be used as replacements to replenish existing frontline units, or they can be used to expand the force structure by creating new units. That much seems fairly obvious, and ideally mobilization will exceed losses and make it possible to do both. Where armies face hard manpower constraints, however – that is, where losses are equal to or greater than intake of men, the decision to expand the force structure can have monumental consequences. The stereotypical example, of course, would be the late-war Wehrmacht, which created premiere new assets in the form of Waffen SS divisions, which received privileged access to recruits and equipment while regular army divisions in the line suffered from a trickle of replacements which could not keep up with losses.

    Ukraine, with its garbled force structure, has created a mess through its own attempts to expand its force structure in the face of dwindling strength on the line. Late in 2023, the AFU announced intentions to form an entirely new grouping of brigades – the so-called “15 series”, given their designations as the 150th, 151st, 152nd, 153rd, and 154th Mechanized Brigades. This was followed in 2024 with the appending of the 155th Mechanized Brigade, which was to be trained and equipped in France.

    Forming a new grouping of mechanized brigades is essential to the way that Ukraine is presenting its war. Because Ukraine still aims (at least on paper) to recapture all of its Russian held territory, there must always be the illusory possibility of a future offensive, and in order for that illusory possibility to remain, Ukraine must present itself as actively preparing for future offensive operations. Ukraine’s presentation of its own strategic animus – the idea that it is holding the front while it prepares to go back on the offensive – essentially locks it into a program of expanding its force structure

    The problem for Ukraine is that the immense pressure on the front makes it essentially impossible for them to properly husband resources the way they would like. Properly training and equipping half a dozen fresh mechanized brigades and holding them in reserve would be very helpful, but they cannot really do this in light of the demands for personnel at the front. These brigades instead become “paper formations” that have a bureaucratic existence, while their organic assets are pulled apart and sucked into the front – stripped down into battalion or company sized elements that can be plugged into sectors of need on the frontline. At the moment, none of the 15 series brigades have seen action as organic units – that is, fighting as themselves.

    The French-trained 155th brigade forms a useful example. Originally designed as an overweight formation of some 5800 men, equipped with premiere European equipment, the brigade was hemorrhaging personnel from the start, with Ukrainian sources reporting that some 1700 men – many of them forcibly conscripted off the streets of Ukraine – deserted the unit during training and formation. A collapse in the brigade’s leadership – with its commander resigning – made matters even more complicated, and the formation’s first action around Pokrovsk went badly. Now, the brigade is being dismembered, if not formally disbanded, with personnel and vehicles being stripped down and parceled out to bolster neighbor units.

    The decision to allocate personnel to new mechanized brigades (though given stocks of armored vehicles it is questionable whether those designations mean anything) does not necessarily change Ukraine’s manpower balance in the aggregate, but it is certainly an inefficient way to use personnel. To return again to the 155th brigade, one problem noted by Ukrainian analysts was the fact that much of the brigade was formed whole cloth from forcibly mobilized personnel, without a proper cadre of veterans and experienced NCOs – some 75% of the brigade, it turns out, had been mobilized less than two months before arriving in France for training. This fact was certainly instrumental in the mass desertions and the brigade’s poor combat effectiveness.

    Given Ukraine’s constraints, the best course of action would undoubtedly be to allocate new personnel and equipment as replacements to build out the depleted veteran brigades on the front lines, plugging in replacements around existing veterans and officers. Kiev, however, prizes the prestige that comes from force expansion and the “shiny new toy” factor of new formations equipped with scarce and valuable equipment like Leopard tanks. These new brigades, though billed as premiere assets, clearly have lower combat effectiveness than existing formations, given their lack of experience, shortage of veteran officers, and low unit cohesion.

    The simple reality, however, is that replacements for existing brigades are nowhere close to keeping up with burn rates. Frontline units have complained of increasingly dire infantry shortages for months, with some brigades on the Pokrovsk axis reporting that they are down to less than 40% of their allocated infantry complements.

    In short, Ukraine’s decision to embark on force expansion in the face of significant manpower shortages has exacerbated the problem – both starving veteran units of replacements and concentrating newly mobilized personnel into combat ineffective formations that lack a veteran core, experienced officers, and vital equipment. They have tried, belatedly, to square this circle by parceling out new formations to backstop line brigades, but this is less than ideal – it leads to a patchwork order of battle with lower unit cohesion and a fragmented defense.

    Unfortunately, this comes precisely as Ukraine has created additional self-imposed strains on its resources, in particular through its incursion into Kursk. At the moment, elements of at least seven mechanized brigades, two marine infantry brigades, and three air assault brigades are stationed on the Kursk axis. Without going too far into the weeds rehashing Ukraine’s operation here, it’s important to remember that Ukraine – facing extreme pressures on its force generation – voluntarily chose to widen the front into a secondary theater, diverting scarce assets and reducing its own ability to economize forces.

    In summary, Ukraine has made deliberate decisions to widen the front and expand its force structure, both of which have been decidedly detrimental to its efforts to economize personnel. This comes precisely as a 2024 effort to ramp up mobilization has come off the rails.

    Ukraine’s mobilization program suffered from a variety of defects, including gaps and errors in its databases and endemic corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency. Laws passed in 2024 aimed to rectify many of these problems, including through the rollout of an app that would allow draft-eligible men to register and check their status without having to visit recruitment offices. It appeared that matters had come to a head when Zelensky fired several recruitment chiefs in 2023, and there was a real sense of urgency. After some signs of initial promise, it is clear that this intensified mobilization drive has faltered over the autumn and early winter

    There were initially signs of optimism for Ukraine – in the first month after the new mobilization law was passed, there was a surge and the army enlisted 30,000 new personnel. However, by the end of the summer this initial burst of enlistments had faded, and mobilization was again running behind the AFU’s losses. An October briefing from the Ukrainian General Staff confirmed that enlistments had already declined by 40% after the brief surge brought on by the new mobilization law. Around the same time, officials in Odessa (Ukraine’s third largest city) admitted that they were running at only 20% of their mobilization quota.

    The problems are myriad. The new mobilization law led to some initial improvements but has ultimately failed to resolve problems with draft evasion, bureaucratic miscues remain endemic, and employers desperate to retain workers filed an avalanche of employment related draft deferments. Unable to sustain the initial surge of enlistments, Ukraine faces a looming manpower crisis.

    Furthermore, Ukraine’s continued inability to provide either demobilization or timely rotations means that mobilized personnel face the prospect of indefinite service on the frontlines. This is obviously bad for morale, with soldiers contemplating the possibility of years of uninterrupted service, and this in turn drives the desertions that are becoming a mounting problem for the AFU. Some reports indicate that as many as 100,000 Ukrainian troops have deserted by this point, many no doubt driven by the psychological and physical strains of endless combat with no prospect of rotation.

    A deadly feedback loop is now at work, with the lack of rotations and the shortage of replacements synergizing to accelerate the burn of Ukrainian personnel. The AFU is unable to regularly rotate units out of combat, and the inadequate flow of replacements causes frontline infantry complements to wear thin. Unable to rotate or reinforce, line brigades resort to cannibalization – scraping support personnel like mortar teams, drivers, and drone operators to fill out frontline positions. This further accelerates losses as brigades fight with thinned out support and fires elements, and makes Ukrainian men more unwilling to enlist – because there is now no guarantee that becoming a drone operator, for example, will save one from being sent to a frontline trench eventually.

    Where does this leave us? Ukraine continues to dispose of a very large force, with more than a hundred brigades and hundreds of thousands of men under arms. This force, however, is both substantially outnumbered by the Russian army and in a clear trend of decay. Despite a highly touted attempt to reinvigorate the mobilization apparatus in 2024, the intake of new personnel is clearly too low to offset losses, and the heavy lifting formations in critical sectors of front have seen their strength – particularly in the infantry complements – decline, in some cases to critical levels.

    The failure of Ukraine’s 2024 mobilization program has coincided with several strategic choices which have exacerbated manpower concerns – specifically the decision to embark on a program of force expansion even as the AFU voluntarily extended its commitments by opening a new secondary front in Kursk. In other words, Ukraine’s mobilization falls short of its force requirements, and the AFU has also made choices that sabotaged its ability to economize. Units are ground up, replacements come in a paltry trickle, rotations are late or absent, units cannibalize themselves, and angry and weary men desert.

    It’s not at all clear that this will lead to a “breaking point”, in the sense that people are anticipating. Ukrainian strike capabilities and the Russian preference for dispersed, leapfrogging assaults limit the potential for grand breakthroughs and exploitation. However, what we saw over the past three months on the southern Donetsk axis offers a preview of what awaits: an exhausted force being steadily rolled back, dug out of its strongpoints, and mauled – covering its retreat with drones but losing position after position. The line holds, until it doesn’t.

    End of the Line: ATACMs, JASSMs, and Hazelnuts

    Ukraine’s ability to remain in the field depends on a titration of two indispensable resources: first, Ukrainian male biomass, and secondly the critical western weaponry that gives them combat effectiveness. We have evaluated the first: Ukraine is not exactly out of men, but the trends of its mobilization program are poor and personnel shortages are mounting. The trends regarding the second are, if anything, even more foreboding for Kiev.

    There are two general dynamics that have emerged, neither of which create an optimistic picture for Ukraine, which we’ll examine in turn. These are as follows:

    1. The delivery of heavy weaponry to Ukraine (tanks, IFVs, and artillery tubes) has largely dried up in recent months.
    2. The west has essentially run out of escalatory weaponry (strike systems) to give, and those systems already given have failed to meaningfully altar the trajectory of the war.

    In 2023, building out new mechanized units was the name of the game, with the Pentagon leading a multinational effort to stand up an entire army corps worth of units equipped with Leopards, Challengers, and a whole slew of western IFVs and APCs. When that lovingly assembled grouping bashed its head on a rock in the botched assault on the Zaporizhia line, the United States belatedly and begrudgingly dispatched its own Abrams to backstop the Ukrainian tank force. In 2024, however, deliveries of heavy weapons slowed to a trickle.

    The role of the tank in Ukraine has been greatly misunderstood. The vulnerability of tanks to the myriad strike systems of the modern battlefield led some observers to declare that the tank as a weapons system was now obsolete, but this did not really square with the fact that both combatants in this war were eager to deploy as many as possible. Tanks need more critical enablers – more combat engineering, air defense, and electronic warfare support – but they continue to fill an indispensable role and remain an essential item in this war. The failure of Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive showed, if anything, that tanks simply are not “game changing” systems, but mass consumption items – but this has always been the case. The signature quality of iconic tanks like the Sherman and the T34 was that they were numerous

    Unfortunately for Ukraine, deliveries of tanks have dropped off dramatically after the failures of 2023. America’s drawdowns for Ukraine in 2024 were almost entirely devoid of armored vehicles of any kind. Data from the Kiel Institute, which has been meticulous tracking weaponry commitments and deliveries, confirms a sharp dropoff in heavy weapons in 2024. In 2023, Ukraine’s backers pledged 384 tanks. This dropped to just 98 in 2024 – which explains why the new Ukrainian mechanized brigades are perilously light on the equipment indicative of their designations.

    While 2023 was all about building out Ukraine’s mechanized package with tanks, IFVs, and engineering, 2024 has been largely about enhancing Ukraine’s strike capabilities. There have been two separate elements at play – first, the delivery of both air and ground launched systems (most notably the British Storm Shadows and American ATACMs respectively), and secondly the loosening of the rules of engagement to allow Ukraine to strike targets inside pre-war Russia.

    This dovetailed, as it turned out, with Ukraine’s operation in Kursk, and in many ways the most direct impact of the Kursk incursion has been to force the west’s hand on the rules of engagement. While Ukraine has long been striking inside Russia with indigenous systems, most notably drones, the White House continued to drag its feet on formal approval for strikes with American systems. By launching a ground assault on Kursk, Ukraine made the decision for them: the United States gave clearance to use ATACMs to support the ground forces in Kursk, and this metastasized into general license to strike Russia with the full range of available systems. This was a poignant reminder that, however we conceive of the proxy-sponsor relationship, Ukraine has some ability to force America’s hand: a classic example of the tail wagging the dog.

    In any case, 2024 saw Ukraine and its western backers slowly but surely bash through all the supposed red-lines in this domain: the British breached first with the delivery of Storm Shadows late in 2023, and this was followed by the delivery of ATACMs (with a handful of F16’s to boot), and finally the loosening of the rules of engagement to clear strikes on Russia.

    Where does this leave us? There would seem to be three important things to consider.

    1. The west has essentially reached the end of its escalation chain. The only remaining step that they can take would be to supply Ukraine with JASSMs (Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile), which would mark a quantitative but not a meaningful qualitative upgrade to Ukraine’s strike capabilities.
    2. Ukraine’s use of western-supplied strike assets has been dissipated and has not materially improved their situation on the ground.
    3. Russia maintains a dominant strike advantage, both qualitative and quantitative.

    Ukraine faces a stark disadvantage in strike capability relative to Russia, in a variety of ways. Russian strike assets are far more numerous and have significant range advantages, but it is also important to take into consideration both Russia’s significantly greater strategic depth and its more dense and relatively unscathed air defense. Unlike Ukraine, which has seen its air defense stretch to the limit with destroyed launchers and a mounting interceptor shortage, Russia’s air defenses have been essentially untouched, as Ukraine has lacked the large numbers of assets required to conduct a proper SEAD/DEAD (Suppression/Destruction of Enemy Air Defense) campaign.

    Given this basic calculus, using western strike systems to wage a blow for blow strategic air campaign is bad math for Ukraine. It is generally unwise to engage in a bat fight when your opponent is a bigger man with a much longer bat. Instead, Ukraine’s strike systems should have been leveraged to support ground operations – concentrating strikes spatially and in time to synergize with efforts on the ground. Just as a simple thought experiment, it is not difficult to imagine ATACMs making a difference if they had been available in 2023 and used to saturate Russian rear areas during the assault on the Zaporizhia line – striking in tempo with the mechanized assault to disrupt Russian command and control and prevent reinforcement of critical areas.

    Instead, Ukraine’s strike capacity has been largely dissipated in attacks that sometimes achieve success hitting Russian installations but fail to directly support successful operations on the ground. The result is a diffusion of Ukrainian striking power that is less than the sum of its parts. Now, Ukraine has essentially run dry on missiles – of the 500 ATACMs sent by the United States, perhaps 50 are left in Kiev’s stockpiles. Stocks of air launched Storm Shadow missiles are similarly low, and Britain’s commitment to resupply is limited to “a few dozen”

    The last option for the west to backstop Ukrainian strike capability are American JASSMs. While there is a longer-range variant in production (the JASSM-ER, or Extended Range), these are relatively new and expensive and are earmarked for American stocks – it is therefore presumed that the Ukrainians would receive the standard variant. The standard JASSM has slight range advantages over Storm Shadows and ATACMs, at roughly 230 miles. In the event that JASSMs are not given, there is a shorter range system called the SLAM (Standoff Land Attack Missile) with a range of some 170 miles. Both JASSMs and SLAMs would be compatible with Ukrainian F-16s.

    Two things need to be noted about the JASSM. First, the JASSM – while offering slightly longer ranges – would essentially serve as a backstop/replacement for the rapidly dwindling ATACMs and particularly the air launched Storm Shadows – instead of Ukraine’s native SU-24s launching Storm Shadows, they would utilize F-16s launching JASSMs. This would not represent a dramatic upgrade in Ukrainian capabilities, but would instead simply serve to maintain a bare minimum Ukrainian strike capability. JASSMs are a replacement for dwindling capabilities, not an augmentation to them.

    Secondly, it must be understood that JASSMs are the last stop. We’re now entering the territory, not of artificially constructed red lines, but physical and real limits. Russia has essentially eaten the gifted stocks of ATACMs and Storm Shadows, with little discernable effect on their ability to fight, and JASSMs are the last extant item in the inventories to keep Ukrainian strike capabilities operative. We are at the last rung of the aid ladder.

    In the case of JASSMs, however, there are notable downsides for the United States. This is an important case of putting all of one’s eggs in the same technological basket. In 2020, the United States scrapped the development of its conventionally armed Long Range Standoff Missile, making the JASSM – particularly the new extended range variants – the system for the United States, earmarked to play a critical role in future conflicts, particularly in the Pacific. This makes the JASSM an extremely sensitive system, as a centerpiece of American strike capabilities, particularly with the modernization of the Tomahawk system crawling along at a few dozen units per year.

    Given the fact that JASSMs are GPS guided, there are real reasons to be reticent about giving Ukraine such a technologically sensitive system. Russian electronic warfare has enjoyed considerable success jamming GPS and disrupting similarly guided American systems. Allowing the Russians to gain familiarity with a keystone American system could wreak havoc on Pentagon war planning – most, if not all of the strike eggs are in this basket, so why let an adversary peek inside?

    It’s probable, given what we have seen to this point, that these concerns will ultimately be dismissed and Ukraine will receive a line of JASSMs which will backstop their strike capabilities – but given the size of Ukraine’s F-16 fleet, the scale will be constrained. Furthermore, air launched systems are less optimal for Ukraine, given their dependence on large and easily targeted airfields, in contrast to ground launched systems which are mobile and more easily concealed.

    Certainly, JASSMs will never give Ukraine the ability to match Russia’s own strike capacity. After hearing endlessly about how Russia is running out of missiles, it has at last been concluded that this is simply not true, and indeed never was. Recently, Ukrainian defense intelligence admitted that per their own estimates Russia retains about 1,400 long range missiles in its reserves, with a monthly production of roughly 150 units. Russian production of inexpensive Geran drones has also skyrocketed, with Ukrainian intelligence estimating a ceiling as high as 2,000 drones per month.

    There is also the matter of the new Russian missile system – the now famous Oreshnik, or Hazel Tree. Russia tested the Oreshnik system on a large machining plant in Dnipro on November 21, 2024, which allowed the basic capabilities of the system to be gauged. The Oreshnik is an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile, characterized by its hypersonic capabilities (exceeding Mach-10) and its Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle equipped with six separate warheads, with the potential for submunitions in each. Although the attack on Dnipro was essentially a demonstration which used inert training warheads (that is, without explosive payloads), the missile can be configured with nuclear or conventional warheads

    As in the case of the North Korean troops in Kursk, I rather think that the Oreshnik launch was not nearly as important as it was made out to be. The system is expensive and likely impractical for conventional use. I understand the desire to conceive of Oreshnik as a massively powerful conventional weapon – showering its target with half a dozen warheads with the power of an entire flight of Kalibr missiles – but there are several problems with this. The accuracy of the system (the CEP, or “Circular Error Probable” in the technical parlance) is much more consistent with a nuclear delivery system than a conventional one. Furthermore, the problem with using an IRBM for conventional strikes is the danger of miscalculation – foreign adversaries may misinterpret the launch as a nuclear attack and respond appropriately. This is precisely why the Russian government actually alerted the United States to the launch ahead of time – a fine arrangement for a demonstration, but impractical for a weapon that is intended to be used regularly.

    We may see another use of the Oreshnik against Ukraine, but ultimately this is unlikely to be a system of consequence in this war. The demonstration in Dnipro was instead likely intended to send a message to Europe – reminding NATO that Russia has the capacity to deliver strikes against European targets that cannot be intercepted. It also serves as a poignant reminder that Europe lacks the equivalent capability, and in essence provides a demonstration of Russia’s ability to launch missiles from far beyond the range of either Ukrainian or European response. The Hazelnut is a tangible reminder of Russia’s strategic depth and strike dominance in Ukraine.

    Ultimately, Ukraine will lose the strike game. It’s strike capacity has dwindled, with missiles frittered away in a dissipated air campaign, and though the exhaustion of Storm Shadow and ATACMs stocks can be offset somewhat by JASSMs, Ukraine simply lacks the range or quantities necessary to match Russian capabilities. Needing to do more with less, Ukraine instead diffused its assets and failed to synergize its strikes with ground operations. We are now at the end of the line – after JASSMs, there’s nothing left in western warehouses to upgrade Ukrainian capabilities. Hazelnuts or no, the math on this bat fight is bad for Kiev.

    Conclusion: Debellation

    Trapped in an endless news cycle, with daily footage of FPV strikes and exploding vehicles, and a dutiful cottage industry of war mappers alerting us to every 100 meter advance, it can easily feel like the Russo-Ukrainian War is trapped in an interminable doom loop which will never end – Mad Max meets Groundhog Day.

    What I have endeavored to do here, however, is argue that 2024 actually saw several very important developments which make the coming shape of the war relatively clear. To briefly recapitulate:

    1. Russian forces caved in Ukrainian defenses at depth across an entire critical axis of front. After remaining static for years, Ukraine’s position in Southern Donetsk has been obliterated, with Russian forces advancing through an entire belt of fortified positions, pushing the front into Pokrovsk and Kostayantinivka.
    2. The main Ukrainian gambit on the ground (the incursion into Kursk) failed spectacularly, with the salient being progressively caved in. An entire grouping of critical mechanized formations wasted much of the year fighting on this unproductive and secondary front, leaving Ukrainian positions in the Donbas increasingly threadbare and bereft of reserves.
    3. An attempt by the Ukrainian government to reinvigorate its mobilization program failed, with enlistments quickly trailing off. Decisions to expand the force structure exacerbated the shortage of manpower, and as a result the decay of Ukraine’s frontline brigades has accelerated.
    4. Long awaited western upgrades to Ukraine’s strike capabilities failed to defeat Russian momentum, and stocks of ATACMs and Storm Shadows are nearly exhausted. There are now few options remaining to prop up Ukrainian strike capacity, and no prospect of Ukraine gaining dominance in this dimension of the war.

    In short, Ukraine is on the path to debellation – defeat through the total exhaustion of its capacity to resist. They are not exactly out of men and vehicles and missiles, but these lines are all pointing downward. A strategic Ukrainian defeat – once unthinkable to the western foreign policy apparatus and commentariat – is now on the table. Quite interestingly, now that Donald Trump is about to return to the White House, it is suddenly acceptable to speak of Ukrainian defeat. Robert Kagan – a stalwart champion of Ukraine if there ever was one – now says the quiet part out loud:

    Ukraine will likely lose the war within the next 12 to 18 months. Ukraine will not lose in a nice, negotiated way, with vital territories sacrificed but an independent Ukraine kept alive, sovereign, and protected by Western security guarantees. It faces instead a complete defeat, a loss of sovereignty, and full Russian control

    Indeed.

    None of this should be particularly surprising. If anything, it is shocking that my position – that Russia is essentially a very powerful country that was very unlikely to lose a war (which it perceives as existential) right in its own belly – somehow became controversial or fringe. But here we are.

    Carthago delenda est [end]

    The original article

    Related

    The Atlanticist defeat in Donbass and Ukraine

    chronicle of a new catastrophic NATO venture

    Panzer, Marsch

    the saga of NATO Panzerkampfwagen in Donbass and Ukraine

    March 1, 2024, Russo-Ukrainian war: The Deluge – Big Serge

    Z World Turns Two

    August 29, 2023, Escaping Attrition: Ukraine Rolls the Dice – Big Serge

    The Zaporizhia Summer Blockbuster

    June 2, 2023, The Battle of Bakhmut: Postmortem – Big Serge

    Russo-Ukrainian War Update

    April 10, 2023, Russo-Ukrainian War: Leak Biopsy – Big Serge

    A Russian Nesting Doll of Embarrassment

    January 20, 2023, Russo-Ukrainian War : The World Blood Pump – Big Serge

    Gradually, and then Suddenly

    How American Neocons Wrecked the Middle East and Ukraine – David Stockman, Antiwar.com

    This is part 2 of “Why There Is Still No Peace on Earth: Washington’s Folly From The Persian Gulf to Ukraine.”  Read part 1

    Nazism in Ukraine

    its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine

    The Western disinformation about Ukraine

    chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia

  • Le Pen est mort, vive Le Pen

    né en 1928, le militant pétainiste breton Jean-Marie Le Pen est décédé le 7 janvier 2025 dans les grand-bourgeois Hauts de Seine

    Les quelques nécrologies françaises que j’ai lues sont aseptisées, ennuyeuses, ou bien imprégnées des polémiques politiques locales d’un pays où la majorité est à nouveau pétainiste.

    Des médias moins conventionnels donnent au personnage de la jeunesse et une perspective internationale. Sur Telegram, une chaîne nazie française bien connue publie en hommage l’image en 1954 du serment des Horace.

    Les guerres coloniales étaient le contexte de ce mème. La France avait connu en mai-juin 1940 la plus spectaculaire et humiliante défaite militaire de l’Histoire de l’humanité. Libérée en 1944 par les armées anglo-états-unisiennes, grâce aux victoires remportées par l’Union soviétique sur le front de l’est, elle s’engagea de façon anachronique dans deux guerres coloniales, en Indochine puis Algérie, où elle fut encore vaincue. Chef de la France combattante en 1940, Charles de Gaulle fut aussi un libérateur de l’Algérie, mais au début des années 2000, Nicolas Sarkozy a effacé le gaullisme de l’échiquier politique français

    Un canal nazi ukrainien et un autre, fasciste italien, partagent cette photographie du 21 mai 2000. Le tribun pétainiste prit la parole lors du congrès à Lviv, berceau historique du nazisme endémique ukrainien, du Parti social national d’Ukraine (SNPU), dont l’emblème était alors le Wolfangel [crochet à loup], symbole nazi allemand de la 2e guerre mondiale, qu’arbore toujours aujourd’hui l’organisation nazie ukrainienne Azov

    Le symbole est fort, d’un point de vue français, car il était aussi celui de la 2. SS-Panzer-Division, Das Reich, qui nettoya le 10 juin 1944 le village d’Oradour sur Glane, Haute Vienne, où 643 habitants furent assassinés

    Il n’est pas inutile de rappeler que le Front national (FN) fut fondé en 1972 par Jean-Marie le Pen et Pierre Bousquet. Le premier n’avait que 16 ans en 1944, mais le second était un ancien Rottenführer [caporal] de la 33. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS Charlemagne, qui fut formée après que par décret au Journal officiel du 22 juillet 1943, l’État français eut permit les engagements dans la Schutzstaffel (SS)

    Sur un plan plus personnel, Jean-Marie Le Pen était un ami d’Andriy Paroubiy, cofondateur en 1991 du SNPU puis président du parlement ukrainien entre 2016 et 2019

    Ce qui fait de Le Pen un véritable totem de la jeune mouvance fasciste européenne, dont les militants défendent aujourd’hui l’Ukraine et assimilent la Russie à l’Union soviétique, est l’angoisse du grand remplacement et la haine du communisme.

    Plusieurs aspects sont paradoxaux et cocasses. Cette mouvance est sur le champ de bataille ukrainien, dans le même camp que bien au chaud dans leurs bureaux européens, les néo-libéraux prétendument antifascistes. Ils y partagent un même impérialisme, tentent d’y sauver une hégémonie occidentale en déclin, que les fascistes rêvent blanche et que les seconds défendent par procuration, avec le sang bon marché de conscrits ukrainiens mobilisés de force.

    Le Pen est toujours resté antisémite, alors qu’aujourd’hui, Israël est le seul État au monde à appliquer une politique raciale, jusqu’au nettoyage ethnique et au genocide. Les jeunes militants qui se battent en Ukraine sont aussi des fans d’Israel, car l’antisémitisme du vieux pétainiste est complètement dépassé aujourd’hui par la réalité de la scène politique internationale.

    Le Pen était le produit et l’acteur d’une Histoire de France récente, où les défaites succèdent à la débâcle. Il reste une figure historique d’un fascisme européen aujourd’hui revigoré par les politiques néo-libérales et l’inéluctable fin de l’hégémonie occidentale.

    Articles connexes

    L’engagement français dans les rangs ukrainiens

    chronique alphabétique et nécrologique de l’engagement français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas

    19 décembre 2024 (en Anglais) : The Moral Bankruptcy of the West – John J. Mearsheimer

    30 avril 3024 (en Anglais) : Soviet Union crushed Nazi Germany

    30 mai 2023 : Fils de Pétain

    la vanité nationale trouble la perception de la réalité historique et perpétue une névrose collective

  • [Sharing] Report: Ukraine Sent Drones and Drone Operators to HTS Before Offensive That Ousted Assad – Dave DeCamp, Antiwar.com

    HTS, an offshoot of al-Qaeda, is designated by the US as a terror organization

    Ukrainian intelligence had provided Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an offshoot of al-Qaeda, with drone support weeks before the group launched the offensive in Syria that ousted former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, The Washington Post reported Tuesday.

    “Ukrainian intelligence sent about 20 experienced drone operators and about 150 first-person-view drones to the rebel headquarters in Idlib, Syria, four to five weeks ago,” wrote Washington Post columnist David Ignatius.

    While the US has celebrated Assad’s downfall, HTS is still listed by the US as a foreign terrorist organization, and its leader, Abu Mohammad al-Julani, has a $10 million US bounty on his head. That means Ukraine has supplied weapons and intelligence support to a group the US considers a terrorist organization.

    Ukrainian and Russian reports have also reported that a special unit of Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (abbreviated GUR or HUR) had provided support to HTS and was involved in some attacks on Russian bases in Syria.

    “Ukrainian military instructors from the GUR are present… training HTS fighters for combat operations,” Russian Ambassador to the UN Vassily Nebenzia said at the UN after the HTS offensive started.

    The GUR has received significant support from the US over the years. The Washington Post reported last year that the CIA helped build up the GUR and the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) following the 2014 coup that ousted former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych. “GUR was our little baby. We gave them all new equipment and training,” a former US intelligence official who worked in Ukraine told the Post.

    The GUR has also been involved in fighting Russia’s Wagner mercenary force in Africa. In Mali, the GUR provided support for a July ambush that killed 84 Wagner operatives and 47 Malians.

    “The rebels received the necessary information, which enabled a successful military operation against Russian war criminals,” GUR official Andriy Yusov said of the attack. The rebel coalition that launched the attack in Mali included Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin, an affiliate of al-Qaeda [end]

    The original article

    Related

    December 12, 2024: Justice

    in the brand new West-friendly jihadist emirate in former secular Syria

    December 12, 2024: Le choc des mondes

    in French, Allahu akbar, les Russes ; c’est les Russes, frères

    December 12, 2024: More cult than Ed Wood

    Clarissa Ward (CNN) allegedly frees an alleged prisoner in Syria

    December 11, 2024: Syria being dismembered by imperialist powers, British communists warn – Morning Star

    December 10, 2024: oops

    the itinerary of the black flag

    December 9, 2024: Sand Zelenskyy

    in Umayyad mosque

    December 8, 2024: Diversity-friendly Syria

    in the morning of December 8, 2024, two Chechen intersectionality activists pose in Damascus

    December 7, 2024: Abracadabra

    CNN journalists are wizards, able to transform a wanted Jihadist into a nice and moderate Syrian rebel, whose goal is to overthrow Bashar Assad

    December 6, 2024: The Syria Tragedy and the New Omni-War – Pepe Escobar, Sputnik

    Until recently, a serious geopolitical working hypothesis was that West Asia and Ukraine were two vectors of the standard Hegemon modus operandi, which is to incite and unleash Forever Wars. Now both wars are united in an Omni-War

    November 28, 2024: Al’Asad ‘iilaa al’abad

    Give Assad eternal life

    October 1, 2024: Kill this beast

    for Palestine, for Lebanon, for Syria, for the world, justice, peace and harmony

    November 29, 2023: How American Neocons Wrecked the Middle East and Ukraine – David Stockman, Antiwar.com

    This is part 2 of “Why There Is Still No Peace on Earth: Washington’s Folly From The Persian Gulf to Ukraine.”  Read part 1

    January 7, 2023: Freedom fighters are defending Ukraine

    Jihadists in Ukraine, that is for democracy

    November 13, 2022: America’s Neo-Nazi bedfellows in Ukraine are latest in long line of odious allies Washington has used against Russia – Tony Cox, Russia Today

    From pogrom-mongers to Hitlerites to radical Islamists, the US has collaborated with repugnant partners for more than a century

    November 13, 2022: The French debacle on November 13, 2015

    the jihadist operation in Paris, on November 13, 2015, was the collateral damage of the Western support to the so-called Syrian revolution, a Sunni radical uprising against the secular government of Syria, which began in 2011 and that global jihadists joined from worldwide

    August 2, 2022: Gone with the wind

    45 years of Western collusion with evil, from Afghanistan to Ukraine

    November 13, 2020: The path to November 13, 2015

  • [Sharing] McCarthyism, European style: The elite crackdown on Ukraine dissent – Eldar Mamedov, Responsible Statecraft

    Experts lambasted as Kremlin mouthpieces turned out to be right

    As the war between Russia and Ukraine is framed by the ruling politicians and commentators in Europe and America as part of a purported global struggle between democracies and autocracies, the quality of democracy in the West itself has taken a hit.

    The dominant voices advocating for Ukraine’s victory and Russia’s defeat, both defined in maximalist and increasingly unattainable terms, are intent on snuffing out more thoughtful and nuanced perspectives, thus depriving the public of a democratic debate on the existential questions of war and peace.

    In a familiar pattern throughout the West, respected academics who correctly predicted the quagmire Ukraine and the West now find themselves in have been smeared and delegitimized as Kremlin mouthpieces, subjected to harassment, marginalization and ostracism.

    The situation is particularly alarming in Europe. While the Ukraine debate in the U.S. is, to a worrying extent, shaped by pro-militarist think tanks, such as the Atlantic Council, hawkish politicians and neoconservative pundits, a countervailing movement consisting of pro-restraint voices has been growing. They include Defense Priorities, the CATO Institute, publications like The Nation on the left, and The American Conservative on the right, and academics like Stephen Walt, John Mearsheimer, and Jeffrey Sachs, among others. There is more space for alternative voices in American discourse.

    In Europe, by contrast, foreign policy debates tend to simply echo the most hawkish voices inside Washington’s Beltway.

    Sweden is a particularly telling illustration of that trend. After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Swedish government and political class swiftly moved to join NATO. Yet, as one of the leading Swedish international relations scholars Frida Stranne told me in an interview, “No proper debate was held on the key questions, like whether Russia’s aggression against Ukraine indeed was such an immediate security threat for Sweden that it had to ditch the neutral status it enjoyed even during the Cold War?” (I can testify myself, from my work as a senior foreign policy adviser in the European Parliament in early 2022, that even some members of the then-ruling Swedish social-democratic party were aghast at the government running roughshod over alternative views on NATO).

    Further, in a conversation with me, Stranne, while acknowledging that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was “an egregious breach of international law,” pointed to U.S. policies since 2001, such as the invasion of Iraq, noting that they “have helped to undermine international legal principles and set the precedent for other countries acting ‘preemptively’ against perceived threats.”

    In the same interview, she also warned that “a refusal to countenance a negotiated settlement to the war in Ukraine is leading the world perilously close to the brink of a major military conflict between NATO and Russia.”

    While such points are routinely made by fairly mainstream scholars in the U.S., in Sweden they triggered a vicious campaign against Stranne and made her nearly untouchable by the media and in foreign policy circles. Leading media outlets vilified her as a U.S. hater and a “Putinist.”

    Germany is another example of how enforced groupthink led to a marginalization of dissenting perspectives in political debates. What is particularly noteworthy is the speed and radicalism with which the hawks in think tanks, media, and political parties managed to redefine the debate in a country previously known for its now-defunct Ostpolitik, a policy of pragmatic engagement with the Soviet Union and later Russia.

    One of Germany’s most prominent foreign policy experts, Johannes Varwick of the University Halle-Wittenberg, has long defied the trend and advocated for diplomacy. In December 2021, together with a number of high-ranking former military officers, diplomats and academics, he warned that a massive deterioration in relations with Russia could lead to war — due, in part, to the West’s refusal to take seriously Russia’s security concerns, chiefly related to the prospects of NATO’s eastward expansion.

    Yet such views earned Varwick accusations of “serving Russian interests.” As a result, as he told me in an interview, his “ties with the political parties and ministries responsible for conducting Germany’s foreign and security policy were severed.”

    Experts in neutral countries were not spared marginalization as well. Austrian Prof. Gerhard Mangott, one of the most eminent experts on Russia in the German-speaking world, pointed to a “shared responsibility” of Russia, Ukraine, and Western countries for the failure to resolve the post-2014 Ukrainian conflict peacefully. Such analysis, as Mangott told me, led to his “prompt excommunication by the German-speaking scientific community which turned quickly to political activism and became party to the war.”

    The tragic irony, of course, is that these ostracized voices have proved to be correct in most respects about this war.

    When, despite his warnings, the Russian invasion of Ukraine did occur, Varwick, who condemned it as illegal and unacceptable, called for further efforts to find a realistic negotiated solution to the conflict. As he told me, this should “firstly include a neutral status for Ukraine with strong security guarantees for the country. Secondly, there would be territorial changes in Ukraine that would not be recognized under international law but must be accepted as a temporary modus vivendi, and thirdly, the prospect of suspension of some sanctions in the event of a change in Russia’s behavior must be on offer.”

    In March 2022, both Ukraine and Russia were close to a deal broadly along these same parameters. It did not work, because, among other reasons, the West encouraged Ukraine to believe that a military “victory” was possible. The role of then-British Prime Minister Boris Johnson in undermining the talks is now generally acknowledged. What is, however, particularly striking is that Johnson recently himself admitted that he saw the war in Ukraine as a proxy war against Russia — a claim made by Stranne and the Quincy Institute’s Trita Parsi in their 2023 book, in Swedish, “The Illusion of American Peace,” for which they were lambasted for purportedly pushing Russian narratives.

    Fast forward to late 2024, and, faced with growing difficulties on the battlefield, Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky is now signaling that he could go along with some of the elements outlined by Varwick; namely, accepting some de facto territorial losses to prevent even bigger ones should the war continue.

    Today, Ukraine is farther away from achieving anything remotely resembling a military victory than at any point since February 2022. Contrary to the expectations in the U.S. and EU, sanctions neither tanked Russia’s economy nor changed its policies in the ways the West sought.

    In the West itself, political forces that urge negotiations to end the war are ascendant, as evidenced by the election of Donald Trump as president in the United States and the rise of anti-war parties in Germany, France and other EU countries. Public opinion surveys consistently show a preference of the majority of Europeans for a negotiated end to the war.

    The reality is, irrespective of the outcome of the war in Ukraine, a modus vivendi between the West and Russia will have to be reestablished to ensure, in Varwick’s words, “their coexistence in a Cold War 2.0 without a permanent escalation.” Restoring an open democratic debate about this vital issue is long overdue.

    Listening to the experts who have a proven track record of correct analysis would be a necessary first step [end]

    The original article

    Related

    29 novembre 2023 : How American Neocons Wrecked the Middle East and Ukraine – David Stockman, Antiwar.com

    This is part 2 of “Why There Is Still No Peace on Earth: Washington’s Folly From The Persian Gulf to Ukraine.”  Read part 1

    The Atlanticist defeat in Donbass and Ukraine

    chronicle of a new catastrophic NATO venture

    The Western disinformation about Ukraine

    chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Ukraine against Russia

  • Abracadabra

    CNN journalists are wizards, able to transform a wanted Jihadist into a nice and moderate Syrian rebel, whose goal is to overthrow Bashar Assad

    Since Osama bin Laden and Afghanistan in the 80s, the Jihadists are auxiliaries of the West, for the enforcement of Western hegemony. They are usually wrecking havoc in the countries opposed to the US and its stooges. Their relationship is alternately flaming and cooling

    Cooling on September 11, 2001, or when the new Caliphate [a reference to the former Ottoman Caliphate, the new one is also called ISIS], a dissent from al Qaeda in 2013, started threatening Western interests. Cooling when France, one of the most hysterical support of the Islamist uprising against the secular government in Syria, underwent collateral damage on November 13, 2015, in Paris

    Muhammad al Julani was already an executive of the organization when Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, leader of the Islamic State (ISI), Iraqi branch of al Qaeda, detached him in Syria as commander of Jabhat al Nusra [Front for the Conquest of the Levant], its subsidiary there, in the context of the Islamist uprising which had broken in 2011. Out of personal ambition, Baghdadi seceded from al Qaeda in 2013, was appointed leader of a new Caliphate (ISIS) in June 2014, a few weeks after an incredible victory in Mosul, Iraq. Julani did not follow him, remained stand alone leader of al Qaeda in Syria

    In collaboration with Hezbollah, Iran and Russia, Syria managed to defeat the Islamist uprising in 2020, but Turkey and NATO prevented the government from finishing the job. The Jihadists remained in Idlib pocket, under Western umbrella, when other defeated groups, settled in northern Syria, where they became auxiliaries of Recep Erdogan’s Neo-Ottoman Turkey

    Supreme leader of al Qaeda, Ayman al Zawahiri was killed in Afghanistan on July 31, 2022, but the Western strategy in Syria remains crystal clear. Current National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan wrote to Hillary Clinton in 2012

    Al Qaeda is on our side in Syria

    Then Donald Trump’s special envoy to Syria, James Jeffrey added in 2021

    HTS is an asset to the US’s strategy in Idlib

    Hayat Tahrir al Sham [Organization for the Liberation of the Levant, HTS] is the umpteenth rebranding of Julani’s organization in Syria.

    NATO would like to retaliate for the expected Russian victory in Ukraine and after their defeat in Lebanon in November 2024, Israel and the US are seeking to cut Hezbollah’s lines of communications with Iran. Turkey is a NATO member country and Erdogan remains obsessed with his Ottoman fantasies, wants to enforce his protectorate over Syria. Many reasons for a new upturn in the relationship between the Jihadists and their usual Western customers

    After four years of refit and training in northern Syria and Idlib pocket, the rebels unleash a new offensive and CNN writes that jihadist Julani is

    the militant leader of the main group driving the country’s armed opposition.

    Related

    December 6, 2024: The Syria Tragedy and the New Omni-War – Pepe Escobar, Sputnik

    Until recently, a serious geopolitical working hypothesis was that West Asia and Ukraine were two vectors of the standard Hegemon modus operandi, which is to incite and unleash Forever Wars. Now both wars are united in an Omni-War

    November 28, 2024: Al’Asad ‘iilaa al’abad

    Give Assad eternal life

    October 1, 2024: Kill this beast

    for Palestine, for Lebanon, for Syria, for the world, justice, peace and harmony

    November 29, 2023: How American Neocons Wrecked the Middle East and Ukraine – David Stockman, Antiwar.com

    This is part 2 of “Why There Is Still No Peace on Earth: Washington’s Folly From The Persian Gulf to Ukraine.”  Read part 1

    January 7, 2023: Freedom fighters are defending Ukraine

    Jihadists in Ukraine, that is for democracy

    November 13, 2022: America’s Neo-Nazi bedfellows in Ukraine are latest in long line of odious allies Washington has used against Russia – Tony Cox, Russia Today

    From pogrom-mongers to Hitlerites to radical Islamists, the US has collaborated with repugnant partners for more than a century

    November 13, 2022: The French debacle on November 13, 2015

    about the jihadist attacks in Paris, as a collateral damage of the Western support to the so-called Syrian revolution

    August 2, 2022: Gone with the wind

    45 years of Western collusion with evil, from Afghanistan to Ukraine

    November 13, 2020: The path to November 13, 2015

  • [Sharing] EU and NATO are attempting to foment a Ukraine-style coup in Georgia – Thomas Fazi

    They’re applying the Euromaidan playbook all over again

    In a recent article, I predicted that, following the results of last month’s Georgian elections — won by the ruling Georgian Dream party, which advocates friendly political and economic relations with neighbouring Russia — the EU and NATO, desperate to transform Georgia into a second front in their proxy war against Russia, would apply to Georgia the same playbook as they did to Ukraine:

    Just as in the lead-up to the 2014 coup in Kyiv, they’re first denying the legitimacy of the elected government, accusing it of being a Russian pawn. From there, they’re using Western-funded “NGOs” to mobilise the pro-EU minority against the government, while also pushing for sanctions. If the government still doesn’t yield to the pressure, they’ll try to move to the next phase: unrest in parliament and on the streets; a hoped-for police crackdown; and ultimately the toppling of the government and the appearance of a friendly pro-Western alternative. Certainly, influential Western foreign policy think tanks are already predicting exactly this scenario. In a recent article, the Atlantic Council argued that “Georgia’s 2024 parliamentary election has entered its ‘Maidan’ phase” — and that Western governments must “support the Georgian people in both the immediate period ahead and the longer term”. The NATO establishment’s aims couldn’t be clearer

    This is exactly what is happening; however, things are moving faster than I expected. Usually the protests start out peacefully, in order to build support both domestically and abroad, and then move on to the “insurrectionist” phase only if the nonviolent strategy doesn’t yield results. This is what happened with the 2013-14 Euromaidan protests in Ukraine. In Georgia, however, it would appear that they’ve fast-forwarded straight to the latter phase. For several days, the capital Tbilisi has been rocked by violent protests involving molotov cocktails and retrofitted fireworks, and even direct attacks on the Parliament building.

    The official trigger for the protests was the Georgian Dream government bloc’s announcement that it was halting the EU accession talks, a decision that is hardly surprising considering that the EU has been challenging the legitimacy of the elections from the day one, and effectively asking the government to step down as a condition for the continuation of the EU accession process (great diplomacy!). No wonder the government accuses the EU of using the prospect of accession talks to “blackmail” Georgia, and wanting to “organise a revolution in the country”. Recent events have confirmed this.

    Following the violent protests, which have so far met a relatively soft-handed response from police — especially when compared to the standard response of Western security forces to much less violent protests — EU leaders have predictably expressed their solidarity with the demonstrators and ramped up threats against the government. They’re following every step of the Euromaidan script.

    To make matters worse, the country’s staunchly pro-Western president Salome Zourabichvili has refused to step down when her term ends this month, accusing the parliament of being “illegitimate” and calling for new elections. This is the textbook definition of an attempted institutional coup, which Western governments would not hesitate to condemn if the roles were reversed. But Zourabichvili is an EU-NATO proxy — indeed, she’s spent most of her life working as a French diplomat, including as the country’s ambassador to Georgia, and only became a Georgian citizen in 2004 — so anything goes.

    The situation in Georgia is potentially a very explosive one, and the risk of the country turning into another Ukraine — and therefore into another front in the EU-NATO war against Russia — exists. However, the situation in Georgia is also very different. For starters, Georgia fortunately lacks a large neo-Nazi and ultranationalist presence capable of mounting a serious armed insurrection against the government, as Ukraine did. But there also other reasons why fomenting a Ukraine-style coup in Georgia may prove challenging. Not only are most Georgians determined to avoid a Ukrainian scenario, for obvious reasons, but prime minister Kobakhidze has been “coup-proofing” the country for some time. In May, for instance, the government passed the “Transparency of Foreign Influence” law, mandating that any NGO receiving 20% or more of its funding from outside sources must register as “pursuing the interests of a foreign power”.

    So hopefully the Georgian government will succeed in resisting this foreign-funded attack. Yet the mere fact that the EU-NATO establishment is overtly attempting to overthrow a democratically elected government — primarily to destabilise Russia and its near abroad, while intensifying the conflict in Ukraine — serves as a striking example of how far Western leaders have strayed from reason. They have become an existential threat to the entire European continent [end]

    The original article

    Related

    November 28, 2024: Al’Asad ‘iilaa al’abad

    a few days ago, the West-backed Jihadists started an offensive toward Aleppo, in the northwest of Russia-backed Syria

    November 2, 2024: The West is goading Georgia – Thomas Fazi, UnHerd

    Tbilisi has been ensnared by Nato hypocrisy

    March 9, 2023: Atlanticist coup attempt in Georgia

    where protestors are now demanding the resignation of the democratic government

    March 8, 2023: Maidan 2.0 in Georgia?

    The Atlanticist defeat in Donbass and Ukraine

    the ongoing chronicle of a new catastrophic NATO venture

  • [Sharing] How the Strategy of Fighting to the Last Ukrainian Was Sold to the Public as Morally Righteous – Glenn Diesen

    For almost three years, NATO countries have boycotted diplomatic contacts with Russia, even as hundreds of thousands of men have died on the battlefield. The decision by diplomats to reject diplomacy is morally repugnant as diplomacy could have reduced the excess of violence, prevented escalation, and even resulted in a path to peace. However, the political-media elites skilfully sold the rejection of diplomacy to the public as evidence of their moral righteousness.

    This article will first outline how NATO planned for a long war to exhaust Russia and knock it out from the ranks of great powers. Second, this article will demonstrate how the political-media elites communicated that diplomacy is treasonous and war is virtuous. 

    NATO’s Long War

    To exhaust Russia in a long war, the goal was to ensure that the Russians and Ukrainians kill each other for as long as possible. The US Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin outlined the US objective in the Ukraine War as weakening its strategic adversary: “We want to see Russia weakened to the degree that it can’t do the kinds of things that it has done in invading Ukraine”.1 In late March 2022, Zelensky revealed in an interview with the Economist: “There are those in the West who don’t mind a long war because it would mean exhausting Russia, even if this means the demise of Ukraine and comes at the cost of Ukrainian lives”.2

    The Israeli and Turkish mediators confirmed that Russia and Ukraine agreed to the terms of a peaceful settlement in Istanbul, in which Russia would withdraw its forces and Ukraine would restore its neutrality. However, why would the US and its allies accept that Ukraine return to neutrality, when the alternative was to use the powerful proxy army they had built in Ukraine to bleed and weaken Russia?3

    The Turkish Foreign Minister acknowledged that there are “NATO member states that want the war to continue—let the war continue and Russia gets weaker. They don’t care much about the situation in Ukraine”.4 The former Israeli Prime Minister also confirmed that the US and UK “blocked” the peace agreement as there was a “decision by the West to keep striking Putin” to destroy a strategic rival.5 The retired German General, Harald Kujat, a former head of the German Bundeswehr and former chairman of the NATO Military Committee, also argued that this was a war deliberately provoked by NATO, while the US and UK sabotaged all paths to peace “to weaken Russia politically, economically and militarily”.6 Interviews with American and British leaders in March 2022, revealed that a decision had been made for “the conflict to be extended and thereby bleed Putin” as “the only end game now is the end of Putin regime”.7

    Chas Freeman, the former US Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs and Director for Chinese Affairs at the US State Department criticised Washington for the objective to prolong the fighting to “fight to the last Ukrainian”.8 Republican Senator Lindsey Graham argued that the US was in a favourable position as it could fight Russia to the last Ukrainian: “I like the structural path we’re on here. As long as we help Ukraine with the weapons they need and the economic support, they will fight to the last person”.9 Republican leader Mitch McConnell was similarly explicit:

    the most basic reasons for continuing to help Ukraine degrade and defeat the Russian invaders are cold, hard, practical American interests. Helping equip our friends in Eastern Europe to win this war is also a direct investment in reducing Vladimir Putin’s future capabilities to menace America, threaten our allies, and contest our core interests.10

    Senator Mitt Romney argued that financing the war was “the best national defense spending I think we’ve ever done” as “We’re diminishing and devastating the Russian military for a very small amount of money” and “we’re losing no lives in Ukraine”. US Congressman Dan Crenshaw also celebrated the proxy war as “investing in the destruction of our adversary’s military, without losing a single American troop, strikes me as a good idea”.11

    Retired US General Keith Kellogg similarly called for extending the war in Ukraine as knocking out Russia would allow the US to focus on China: “if you can defeat a strategic adversary not using any US troops, you are at the acme of professionalism”. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg shared this logic as he argued defeating Russia on the battlefield will make it easier for the US to focus also on China. Stoltenberg also noted that “if Ukraine wins, then you will have the second biggest army in Europe, the Ukrainian army, battle-hardened, on our side, and we’ll have a weakened Russian army”.12

    Diplomacy as Treason and War as Virtue

    When the decision had been made for a long war, the politicians and media began to construct narratives and a moral case for a long war, which would convince the public that diplomacy is treasonous, and war is virtuous.

    Presenting the world as a struggle of good versus evil lays the foundation for effective war propaganda, as perpetual peace can be achieved by defeating the evil opponent while negotiations entail sacrificing indispensable values and principles. To this end, the Hitler analogy is very effective as diplomacy becomes dangerous appeasement while peace requires military victory. Reminiscent of George Orwell’s “war is peace”, Stoltenberg argues that weapons are the path to peace.

    The Western public was reassured that fuelling the war was required to push Putin to the negotiation table, however, during almost three years of war the West never proposed negotiations. Reading the Western media, one gets the impression that Russia would not negotiate. However, Russia never opposed diplomacy or negotiations, it was the West that shut the door. So-called “peace summits” were held to give the public the impression that governments pursued peace, although Russia was not invited and the stated purpose was to mobilise public opinion and resources against Russia.

    In November 2022, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley argued for starting negotiations with Russia. Ukraine had just captured large swaths of territory in Kherson and Kharkov, and General Milley argued Ukraine would not be in a better position to negotiate a peace deal. General Milley was correct in this assessment, yet he neglected that the principal objective of the war was to keep it going to bleed Russia. General Milley had to walk back his statements that threatened to end the war.13

    The EU almost always advocates for immediate diplomacy and negotiations in conflicts around the world. In Ukraine, the EU’s foreign policy chief at the beginning of the war, Josep Borrell, argued that the war would be won on the battlefield.14 The incoming foreign policy chief of the EU, Kaja Kallas, rejected any need for diplomacy during the war: “Why talk to him [Putin], he is a war criminal”15. Diplomacy now entails sitting in a room with people who agree with you, and pat each other on the shoulder for having isolated the adversary. The EU has completed its transition from a peace project to a geopolitical project.

    Anyone suggesting to restore diplomacy or start negotiations is immediately smeared as a far-left or far-right pro-Russian stooge. It is hardly original to present the opposition to war as taking the side of the adversary, yet the accusation of treason is a powerful instrument to crush dissent. The Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban travelled to Ukraine, Russia, China, and the US (to meet with Trump) to explore the possibility of charting a path to peace. The EU responded by punishing Hungary and the political-media elites sought to delegitimise him as a puppet of Putin. The same script is applied to anyone suggesting to end the war.

    Arguing against the dangerous precedent of “rewarding” Putin’s aggression with territory has been another seemingly moral argument against peace negotiations. However, this argument is based on the false premise that the war began as a territorial dispute. As we learned from the Istanbul peace agreement, Russia agreed to pull back its troops in return for Ukraine restoring its neutrality. Furthermore, the proxy war has been lost and Ukraine will only lose more men and territory with each passing day.   

    The Coming Backlash

    As the Ukrainian frontlines collapse and their causalities subsequently intensify, the Americans are pushing Ukraine to lower its conscription age as sacrificing the youth could keep the war going for a bit longer. The Ukrainian public no longer wants to fight, desertions increase drastically, and “recruitment” consists of grabbing civilians off the streets and throwing them into vans that take them almost directly to the front lines. A recent Gallup poll found that there is not a single oblast in Ukraine where the majority support continuing the war.16

    Oleksyi Arestovych, the former advisor to President Zelensky, predicted in 2019 that the threat of NATO expansion would “provoke Russia to launch a large-scale military operation against Ukraine”. NATO would then use the Ukrainian army to defeat Russia: “In this conflict, we will be very actively supported by the West—with weapons, equipment, assistance, new sanctions against Russia and the quite possible introduction of a NATO contingent, a no-fly zone etc. We won’t lose, and that’s good’.17

    The war did not go as planned and Ukraine is being destroyed, and Arestovych recognises the folly of continuing the war. There is a growing realisation in Ukrainian society that NATO sabotaged the peace to fight Russia to the last Ukrainian. Ukrainians will resent Russia for decades to come, although there will also be hatred against the West. The war propagandists in the Western media will then surely act bewildered and blame Russian propaganda.

    1. G. Carbonaro, ‘U.S. Wants Russia ‘Weakened’ So It Can Never Invade Again’, Newsweek, 25 April 2022. ↩︎
    2. The Economist. ‘Volodymyr Zelensky on why Ukraine must defeat Putin’ The Economist, 27 March 2022. ↩︎
    3. The Minsk Peace Agreement was never intended to be implemented but used as an opportunity to build a large Ukrainian military, which both German and France have admitted. ↩︎
    4. R. Semonsen, ‘Former Israeli PM: West Blocked Russo-Ukraine Peace Deal’, The European Conservative, 7 February 2023. ↩︎
    5. N. Bennett, ‘Bennett speaks out’, YouTube Channel of Naftali Bennett, 4 February 2023. ↩︎
    6. Emma, ‘Russland will verhandeln!’ [Russia wants to negotiate!], Emma, 4 March 2023. ↩︎
    7. N. Ferguson, ‘Putin Misunderstands History. So, Unfortunately, Does the U.S.’, Bloomberg, 22 March 2022. ↩︎
    8. A. Maté, ‘US fighting Russia ‘to the last Ukrainian’: veteran US diplomat’, The Grayzone, 24 March 2022. ↩︎
    9. A. Maté, ‘US, UK sabotaged peace deal because they ‘don’t care about Ukraine’: fmr. NATO adviser’, The Grayzone, 27 September 2022. ↩︎
    10. M. McConnell, ‘McConnell on Zelenskyy Visit: Helping Ukraine Directly Serves Core American Interests’, Mitch McConnell official website, 21 December 2022. ↩︎
    11. L. Lonas, ‘Crenshaw, Greene clash on Twitter: ‘Still going after that slot on Russia Today’’, The Hill, 11 May 2022. ↩︎
    12. T. O’Conner, ‘So, if the United States is concerned about China and wants to pivot towards Asia, then you have to ensure that Putin doesn’t win in in Ukraine’, Newsweek, 21 September 2023. ↩︎
    13. K. Demirjian, Milley tries to clarify his case for a negotiated end to Ukraine war, The Washington Post, 16 November 2022. ↩︎
    14. Foreign Affairs Council: Remarks by High Representative Josep Borrell upon arrival | EEAS, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/foreign-affairs-council-remarks-high-representative-josep-borrell-upon-arrival-1_en ↩︎
    15. “Why talk to Putin? He’s a war criminal” Estonian PM Kaja Kallas, ↩︎
    16. B. Vigers, Half of Ukrainians Want Quick, Negotiated End to War, Gallup, 19 November 2024, Half of Ukrainians Want Quick, Negotiated End to War ↩︎
    17. A. Arestovich, ‘Voennoe Obozrenie’ [Military Review], Apostrof TV, 18 February 2019. ↩︎

    [end]

    The original article

    Related

    October 16, 2024: Sabotage des Friedens – Glenn Diesen, Die Weltwoche

    Warum scheiterten die Verhandlungen von Istanbul im Frühling 2022? Weil der Westen lieber Russland schwächt als die Ukraine rettet

    April 11, 2024: U.S. Government Helps Pro-Ukraine Media Spread Propaganda And Silence American Critics – Lee Fang, RealClearInvestigations

    Media outlets organized with substantial funding and direction from the U.S. government have supported censorship, disseminated disinfo, and sought to silence American critics of the war

    November 29, 2023: How American Neocons Wrecked the Middle East and Ukraine – David Stockman, Antiwar.com

    This is part 2 of “Why There Is Still No Peace on Earth: Washington’s Folly From The Persian Gulf to Ukraine.”  Read part 1

    The Atlanticist defeat in Donbass and Ukraine

    chronicle of a new catastrophic NATO venture

    The Western disinformation about Ukraine

    chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia

  • [Sharing] Leaks expose secret British military cell plotting to ‘keep Ukraine fighting’ – Kit Klarenberg, The Grayzone

    Leaked files show top UK military figures conspired to carry out the Kerch bridge bombing, covertly train “Gladio”-style stay-behind forces in Ukraine, and groom the British public for a drop in living standards caused by the proxy war against Russia

    Emails and internal documents reviewed by The Grayzone reveal details of a cabal of British military and intelligence veterans which plotted to escalate and prolong the Ukraine proxy war “at all costs.” Convened under the direction of the British Ministry of Defense in the immediate aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the cell referred to itself as Project Alchemy. As British leadership sabotaged peace talks between Kiev and Moscow, the cell put forward an array of plans “to keep Ukraine fighting” by imposing “strategic dilemmas, costs and frictions upon Russia.”

    The leaks obtained by The Grayzone expose a hidden hand behind Britain’s policy in Ukraine, showing in unusually granular detail how it aimed to engineer a long, grinding war through covert operations that stretched the bounds of legality.

    Project Alchemy’s proposed schemes spanned every conceivable field of warfare, from cyber attacks to “discreet operations” to outright terrorism. The secret cell even put forward a plan to “aggressively pursue” and “dismantle” independent media outlets – including The Grayzone – through an aggressive campaign of legal harassment and online censorship, so they “would be forced to close.” The incendiary blueprints were fed to the highest levels of the British state and national security structure, where they were apparently well-received.

    Founded by a senior British Ministry of Defence official, Project Alchemy is composed of veteran military and intelligence operatives united by a desire for all-out war between the West and Russia. Some have trained Ukrainian forces in clandestine sabotage tactics. 

    Members of the national security cabal tacitly acknowledged that their proposed operations stretched the bounds of British law. Thus they suggested that London should be “prepared to creatively use the law” to meet its goals, and even be willing to erase “legal restrictions on UK deniable ops” against Russia. 

    Some of Project Alchemy’s most extreme recommendations have already been implemented, often with calamitous results. These include the cell’s proposal to strike Crimea’s Kerch Bridge, which prompted a Russian escalation that saw punishing attacks on Ukraine’s electricity infrastructure. Alchemy also envisioned the construction of a secret, Gladio-style army of Ukrainian partisan fighters to carry out assassination, sabotage, and terror missions behind enemy lines. 

    It appears the British premier, Keir Starmer, fell under the influence of the Project Alchemy cabal soon after his election in July, when he eagerly embraced the role of “wartime prime minister.” After pledging to support Ukraine “as long as it takes,” however, Starmer is quietly backing away from the maximalist policy. In Kiev, Ukrainians are left to ponder how their “friends” in London got them into this mess, and why they can not, or will not get them out of it.

    The British spooks who gathered around Project Alchemy reasoned that the longer the proxy war continued, the more Russian president Vladimir Putin’s “credibility at home and abroad drops, and his ability to fight NATO is degraded.” Today, Project Alchemy’s gambit has clearly backfired, as Putin remains popular within Russia, while a crumbling Ukrainian army loses territory by the day despite constant re-arming by the West. But the war planners in London remain staunchly committed to escalation, refusing to shelve their diabolical proposals.

    Britain takes ‘unilateral lead’ on ‘regime change’ in Russia

    Project Alchemy was founded on the personal orders of Lt. General Charlie Stickland, who is charged with “planning, executing and integrating UK led joint and multinational overseas military operations” as the head of Britain’s Permanent Joint Headquarters. Stickland boasts in leaked communications that his family “come from a long line of pirates and buccaneers.” In his email signature, the general identifies himself as an “LGBTQ+ Advocate” in rainbow-colored text.

    Stickland and his assistant, Maj. Ed Harris, did not answer The Grayzone’s calls to their personal phones, nor did they respond to detailed questions submitted to them through WhatsApp

    Stickland convened the first meeting of Project Alchemy’s on February 26, 2022, just days after Russian troops made their initial foray into Ukraine. According to minutes of the gathering, “an assortment of leading academics, authors, strategists, planners, pollsters, comms, data scientists and tech” was on hand to produce a “grand strategy options paper.” 

    The paper consisted of a series of proposals for the British government to “defeat Putin in Ukraine and set the conditions for the reshaping of an open international order of the future.” Throughout the document, the need to “keep Ukraine fighting” was described as London’s “main effort” in the conflict.

    In an email to British military apparatchiks dated March 3 2022, Stickland described Alchemy’s paper as the result of “some mischief I’ve been up to” with “a group of ‘sideways thinkers.’” He expressed satisfaction that “this has been seen by all sorts of people,” including senior British government and military officials, “and landed well”

    An Excel document listing potential and confirmed recruits for the effort, authored by project chief Dom Morris, names a number of individuals from the private sector and academia alongside high-ranking army officials. Currently a fellow at King’s College’s “Centre for Grand Strategy,” Morris was listed in the document as a “civilian leader.” The role of “military leader” was to be carried out by Simon Scott, a brigadier in the British army who was appointed O.B.E. in 2013 for his “gallant and distinguished services” in Afghanistan

    Information operations were to be headed by a still-to-be determined member of Britain’s 77th Psychological Operations Brigade. Also listed as a participant in information operations was longtime British psychological warfare operative Amil Khan, founder of the “counter-disinformation” analysis firm Valent Projects.

    In 2021, The Grayzone revealed how the then-Prince of Wales, King Charles, enlisted Khan’s Valent Projects to astroturf a pseudo-socialist YouTube influencer to attack skeptics of the government’s ham-fisted response to Covid. Previously, Khan participated in the UK Foreign Office’s program to foment regime change in Syria.

    Months after Alchemy put Khan forward as a member of its team, The Grayzone exposed him for plotting with celebrity-left journalist Paul Mason to destroy this publication. One leaked email showed Khan proposing a “full nuclear legal [attack] to squeeze [The Grayzone] financially.” The newly-uncovered documents indicate the decision to assail The Grayzone was met with approval from the highest ranks of the British government.

    ‘Ukraine’s Next Chapter – Elders Grand Strategy Options Paper’

    Within Project Alchemy’s covert war room, the obsession with a long war quickly took hold. Members of the cell took their cues from a policy paper Stickland attributed to “The Elders,” which he described as “a group of Fusion players,” referring to the strata of academics and defense industry figures with strong ties to the British military.

    An Alchemy document composed under Stickland’s watch and titled, “Ukraine’s Next Chapter – Elders Grand Strategy Options Paper,” suggests that members of the cabal had convinced themselves a “palace coup” inside the Kremlin was inevitable. So long as Russia struggled inside Ukraine, they believed, British intelligence would be granted “the opportunity to challenge” Moscow’s ever-growing “stature as a competent international actor” on the world stage. 

    “A long war against a small state makes [Putin] look a fool,” the Alchemy paper asserted. “He is obsessed by the end of Ghaddafi – he will want to avoid that… Pressure will pile on from oligarchs as a long war drags on – he will not want to give them excuses to threaten his authority.” The group reasoned that “a long war will affect [Putin’s] international credibility,” as “a failure to quickly defeat Ukraine will seriously… reduce his credibility with new rich friends in Belarus, Hungary, China, India, Middle East, Brazil etc.

    “Most importantly,” protracted Russian involvement in Ukraine “will embolden NATO,” Alchemy argued. Convinced that Putin would fail in the eastern Donbas region, triggering a collapse of his government, Project Alchemy members openly fantasized about absorbing Russia into the Western-dominated financial order afterwards under the guise of a “Post Putin Marshall Plan.” Of particular interest was London’s “re-engagement” with Moscow “in global energy and commodity markets,” a seeming reference to the West’s desire for cheap Russian gas and wheat. 

    “Discreet operations”: reviving ‘Operation Gladio’ terror ops in Ukraine

    To accomplish the balkanization of Russia, Project Alchemy’s plotters took inspiration from Operation Gladio, a CIA and NATO-orchestrated covert operation that saw fascist paramilitaries carry out false flag terrorist attacks across Western Europe after World War II in a bid to prevent communism from taking root.

    A section detailing potential “discreet operations” in Alchemy’s strategy paper, which stressed the “need to intervene in every way except ‘official,’” explicitly recommended “Stay-behind Gladio handbooks/ Partisan Pamphlets” which would be “updated for Information Age” 

    Another move Alchemy proposed was to deploy Britain’s “strong” private military [PMC] industry “to out Wagner, Wagner.” In other words, the group aimed to establish a British rival to the Russian mercenary force founded by the now-deceased commander Yevgeny Prigozhin. This objective required the formulation of “a new doctrine, operating concept, and legal framework, for effectively integrating the activities of PMCs and other [non-military] actors.” Under these guidelines, British mercenary firms capable of using “sophisticated weaponry like SAMS, cyber, combat air, drones” would be employed to “operate and train and accompany Ukraine formations.” 

    These operations were all intended to ultimately be “sponsored and commanded” by the UK government, “using discreet cover” to avoid triggering NATO’s Article 5. 

    Following the production of their grand strategy paper, Stickland invited his team of “sideways thinkers” at Project Alchemy to submit further proposals for Gladio-style operations. Among the pitches that arrived was a “mission” to “disable the Kerch Bridge in a way that is audacious, and disrupts road and rail access to Crimea and maritime access to the Sea of Azov.” The blueprints of this highly provocative plot were exposed by The Grayzone in October 2022, in the immediate aftermath of the truck bomb attack that crippled the Kerch Bridge. 

    Alchemy’s team also produced a PowerPoint presentation entitled, “Training a Ukrainian Commando Force to restore Maritime Sovereignty – Elders,” outlining plans to construct a 1,000-strong Ukrainian commando force “trained in Britain by military veterans equipped with British equipment” to “degrade the Russian Navy and open another flank in the fight for Kherson and the south of Ukraine”

    Alchemy’s team had been working on the plan for at least three months by the time of the presentation’s submission. “Ukrainians abroad and volunteers inside Ukraine” had already been recruited, in advance of 12 weeks basic training “in the use of all troop weapons including mortars, anti-tank missiles, sniper craft, cliff assault, small craft training, demolitions,” the proposal stated

    The plan called for formally integrating the commandos into the Ukrainian Navy. Alchemy boasted that the prospective force “will be a force multiplier and highly mobile,” while Russia’s “outdated doctrine will struggle with a highly motivated and well-equipped naval force conducting hit and run operations and targeting Crimea.”

    Moreover, “individuals who are fluent Russian speakers and deemed suitable for covert undercover operations,” including “female operators,” would be “inserted into southern occupied Ukraine and Crimea for intelligence gathering and sabotage of key infrastructure targets.” They would be trained by MI6 officers. For this, Alchemy asked the British government for a total of £73.5 million. “The program is at a high state of readiness. We are ready to go,” the presentation forcefully declared. 

    The enormous sum was to be paid to Elders Services Ltd that was founded by Alchemy members and registered to an address just 15 miles from Fort Monckton, which was described by former MI6 officer Richard Tomlinson as “the SIS’s field operations training centre.” It is unknown how much money, if any, the firm received from the British government for resuscitating Operation Gladio in Ukraine. Elders Services Ltd shuttered in March 2023 after less than a year of operation, without filing financial accounts.

    British spies call for ‘action’ against The Grayzone

    Behind the Project Alchemy team’s bravado was a sense that Western hegemony was crumbling on the icy borderlands separating Ukraine from Russia. Referring to the rising BRICS alliance, which gathered in Kazan, Russia this October to challenge the US-dominated financial order, Alchemy planners urged British leadership to “prepare for SWIFT II,” as SWIFT was “going to be destroyed” by the West’s anti-Russia sanctions, “slowly, but inevitably.” 

    According to Alchemy’s analysts, countries across the globe would naturally “see the need for a non-US alternative” means of safely parking their cash and trading. In a rare show of political sobriety, the British spooks predicted that sanctions on Russia combined with the Ukraine proxy war would impose higher prices on consumer goods and “hit British voters in the pocket.”

    This posed “a threat to public support” for the British government’s “hard line” on Ukraine, they warned. “Domestic UK public opinion” would understandably get “fed up” paying more for everyday goods, meaning “pressure grows for a compromise.”

    To prepare the British public for the coming storm, Project Alchemy’s plotters proposed what they blandly described as “information operations,” but which could be more accurately described as a blend of domestic state propaganda and malign attacks on disruptive media outlets.

    The task they outlined not only included “[dismantling] Russian disinformation infrastructure” by pressuring social media to ban RT and Sputnik, but also targeting critical independent media like The Grayzone.

    “A number of actions can be undertaken against these outlets. The most obvious is legal since the content of these media outriders is frequently in contravention of media law in the UK, US and EU,” Alchemy insisted. 

    “Aggrieved parties currently tend to ignore libel/defamation by these outlets. Were they to aggressively pursue these outlets, it is likely they would be forced to close.”

    The Grayzone, it was claimed, had thus far “managed to obscure” its funding – a suggestion that this outlet is covertly funded by Russia or some other enemy state, which is completely false. The paranoid fantasies of British intelligence may explain why this journalist was quizzed on the subject by British counter-terror police when they detained and interrogated him at Luton International Airport in May 2023

    Alchemy plotters seek to place Britain at lead of war with Russia

    In addition to playing a leading role in media manipulation, Alchemy sought to place Britain at the forefront of the International Criminal Court’s agenda to investigate and prosecute the Russian government for alleged war crimes in Ukraine. 

    Alchemy suggested London “set international conditions, collection mechanisms and funding for collection of data and evidence” in the proxy conflict, and “provide all possible support, including intelligence” to the ICC “in its efforts to investigate war crimes,” just as British spies did for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). 

    Though not named in the document, high-profile British lawyers, including celebrity Amal Clooney, have since emerged at the forefront of efforts to prosecute Russian officials for war crimes, and establish an ICTY analog. As The Grayzone’s Max Blumenthal reported, Britain played a critical role in the appointment of Amal Clooney’s mentor, Karim Khan, as ICC prosecutor. 

    Project Alchemy’s provocative proposals appear to have reached the desk of PM Keir Starmer in some form. At NATO’s 75th anniversary summit, Starmer issued his full-throated endorsement of deep strikes by the Ukrainian military into Russia. Echoing the aggressive language found in Alchemy documents, he pledged to “deliver £3 billion worth of support to Ukraine each year… for as long as it takes.” 

    But as the Ukrainian military’s offensive in Russia’s Kursk region falters, the Biden administration has distanced itself from the calls for striking into the Russian heartland. Fortunately for British leaders hellbent on taking the fight to Moscow, Project Alchemy has ensured that a platter of off-the-books options remains handy.

    As Alchemy noted in its grand strategy paper, “The UK seeks always to act multilaterally, but is prepared to take a unilateral lead where achieving multilateral consensus might prove time-consuming or difficult.” Among the war’s covert sponsors, who were safely ensconced over 1,000 miles away from the front lines, it was firmly agreed: “we should attempt at all costs to keep Ukraine fighting” [end]

    The original article

    Related

    L’engagement français dans les rangs ukrainiens

    in French, alphabetical obituary chronicle of French involvement in the Atlanticist ranks in Ukraine, what servile journalists will not tell you.

    Especially, where a French-speaking mercenary in Ukraine, Olivier Lecourt, founder from Lviv of a cyber warfare team against Russia, entrusted in October

    My employers are Ukrainian and English.
    My job: to bring down the Kremlin’s collaborators and criminals

    October 8, 2022: Ukrainian attack against Crimea bridge

    August 16, 2022: SAS in Crimea