Analista senior di l'intelligenza in u campu di a gestione di i risichi di sicurezza, sò un anzianu tenente detective è ufficiale di l'intelligenza in l'agenzie di u Statu francese. A bona pronuncia hè Николай Чинкуини, in russu
Lecourt, Olivier, né le 29 juillet 1969, dit Olivye Lekur,
est un ancien, dont le CV est presque aussi long que la liste de mes bavures. Il commença à travailler en 1994, en France, chargé de relation avec la clientèle chez Orange. À la même époque, après quelques années d’avance, j’intégrai la Brigade criminelle du quai des Orfèvres. Il est passé ensuite, en France et en Belgique, par le support informatique, l’enseignement, le journalisme et le médical
Voilà pour la version non abrasive, celle qui figure sur LinkedIn. Après m’être présenté, je lui demandai sur les réseaux sociaux le 3 octobre 2024 si son passeport était français ou belge, mais il ne répond pas. Dans l’expectative, voici le chapitre que je lui dédie
le 27 mars 2024 (réseaux sociaux)
Plus libre sur d’autres plateformes, il clame son ambition de faire tomber les collabos et les criminels du Kremlin, que ses employeurs sont Ukrainiens et Anglais. Vue son objectivité sur les réseaux sociaux, j’imagine que ses employeurs payent mieux que le journalisme indépendant, car parler de criminels depuis Lviv requiert beaucoup de mauvaise foi
Sur ce selfie, Olivier Lecourt arbore en Ukraine un insigne qui imite celui de major (sous-officier) de la Police nationale française, grade ultime des fonctionnaires qui ont commencé gardiens de la paix (réseaux sociaux). Lors de nos quelques échanges et à défaut d’argument sur la question ukrainienne, il apparaît jaloux de ma carrière dans le corps des officiers, inspecteur en civil puis officier de renseignement en contre-terrorisme
Il se présente fondateur de la Wolf Unit [Unité lupine ou Wolfsabteilung, pour ceux qui préfèrent l’Allemand], un groupe franco-ukrainien ou francophone/ukrainien, subordonné à l’IT Army Of Ukraine [Armée informatique d’Ukraine], communauté internationale de cyberguerriers, levée le 26 février 2022 par le vice-premier ministre Mykhailo Fedorov.
C’est donc par essence qu’elle opère pour le gouvernement ukrainien et ses services spéciaux. Ces informaticiens semblent pratiquer surtout l’attaque par déni de service (DDoS) de serveurs russes. Lecourt pourrait bien les organiser contre les cibles francophones
Le 17 octobre 2024, lors de sa participation à un DDoS, un cyberguerrier ukrainien partage la capture d’écran de son terminal sur une chaîne Telegram de l’IT Army
Grâce à la fuite de mails et d’autres documents, le journaliste d’investigation Kit Klarenberg cerne le 16 novembre 2024 un club typiquement britannique de durs-dingues, le Projet Alchimie, aussi appelé Les Vieux, qui semblent avoir plus particulièrement sévi en 2022 et 2023
Le lieutenant général Charlie Stickland, le 11 février 2023 (État-major général des forces armées ukrainiennes)
Ces militaires en activité, universitaires et autres influenceurs, adressaient aux autorités du royaume des notes dans lesquelles ils énonçaient leurs projets de guerre asymétrique en Ukraine, notamment dans le cyberespace. Cela nous rappelle qu’Olivier Lecourt confia le 2 octobre 2024 que ses employeurs étaient Ukrainiens et Anglais
le 3 février 2025 (réseaux sociaux)
Le cyberguerrier se rapatrie début mai 2025, élit domicile à Valenciennes et prend un petit boulot à Lille.
Lecourt est un suiveur, de l’engeance majoritaire en France qu’anime un immense respect de l’autorité administrative. Ses semblables acclamèrent Philippe Pétain à Paris, le 26 avril 1944, pleurèrent Philippe Henriot le 2 juillet, puis acclamèrent Charles de Gaulle le 26 août.
chronique alphabétique et nécrologique de l’engagement français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas
Articles connexes
Pruvate à truvà me, canaglia di l’OTAN, pruvate solu
chronique en Anglais, its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine
chronique en Anglais, censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia
une saga française, entre Ukraine et Lyon, où apparaissent aussi des morceaux de SS de la division Charlemagne et plus récemment, Alice Kerviel, dite Cordier. L’affaire Deranque révèle comme la France est infectée par le pétainisme, en particulier parmi les soutiens d’Israël ou de l’Ukraine, deux théâtres d’opérations où l’Occident tente de ralentir son déclin
En 2025, une nouvelle unité de Français combattant pour l’Ukraine s’est structurée autour d’un noyau de néonazis, ayant pour objectif d’attirer des recrues. Parmi ces volontaires, d’anciens militaires. StreetPress les a identifiés
En Ukraine, les volontaires français pro-ukrainiens et pro-russes se partagent l’imaginaire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Les premiers se revendiquent des collabos de l’Allemagne nazie, les seconds de l’escadrille mythique « Normandie – Niémen »
deux jours après le 10e anniversaire de la débâcle politique et sécuritaire du 13 novembre 2015, une messe célèbre à Verdun l’ancien dirigeant fasciste de l’État français
ce 11 novembre 2025 est l’occasion de souligner comme la façon dont l’Europe sacrifie les conscrits ukrainiens mobilisés de force rappelle le spectaculaire carnage de la 1ère guerre mondiale
c’est par l’agence cosaque de presse PIKA, depuis la République populaire de Lougansk, que le 2 avril 2024, l’ataman Nikolaï Diakonov lance un message à destination de la France
ce papier est le premier des grands médias français qui s’attaque à la question des militants nazis français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, le nouveau danger qu’ils présenteront à terme pour la sûreté intérieure
où nous apprenons que le nazi français Allan Duchézeau, camarade de César Aujard dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, était surnommé Dox, quand il secondait à Paris le leader nazi Marc de Cacqueray Valménier
en Anglais, les indices de la présence d’opérateurs occidentaux, en particulier Français, pris au piège en mars 2022 à Marioupol, dont les forces russes achevèrent la libération en mai
The U.S./Israeli-led war against Iran is illegal, unconstitutional, immoral, and dangerously escalatory. Protestations to the contrary, Iran posed no imminent threat to U.S. national security. The Trump administration’s policy (announced by Pete Hegseth) of “war without mercy” is both unjust and un-American. In America’s proud ideal of the citizen-soldier, this is not who we are. This war is not America first. This is not what we do.
Put bluntly, this war is not in the national interest of patriotic Americans.
We the undersigned of the Eisenhower Media Network (EMN) oppose this murderous war of aggression and hereby call for an immediate ceasefire followed by negotiation and war reparations to be paid for by the aggressors. This war is wrong and it must end.
A War the United States Should Not Wage
President Donald Trump promised the American people he would end wars, not start them. Yet within months of returning to office, his administration launched military strikes against Iran, igniting a conflict that is quickly spiraling into a regional catastrophe.
The United States is once again marching to an ill-conceived war in the Middle East without clear objectives or a clearly defined, realistic path to victory. Unlike previous (and disastrous) wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, this time the American people were not asked to support it. History will be even less kind as it judges the immorality and illegality of this latest war of choice.
The question is not whether the United States can inflict enormous damage on Iran. Of course it can. The real question is whether America can achieve any meaningful result through this war. The answer here is simple: no. There is no reason or cause worth fighting for here.
A War Driven by Israel
Saliently, by Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s own admission, the Israeli government drove the timing and initial targets of this war. This isn’t to say that Israel alone is responsible. Since 1979, large parts of the American foreign policy establishment have been eager for war with Iran. Complicit as well is the military-industrial complex, the fossil fuel industry, and the influence of the exiled Iranian lobby.
A shared desire to enforce American hegemony, aligned with Zionist hegemonic goals of a “greater” Israel, is generating a dynamic that approaches that of Armageddon. Even more frightening is that U.S. and Israeli leaders are citing Biblical passages and alleged Judeo-Christian beliefs in support of this war. It seems we are only a few steps away from the madness of the Crusades.
A War Without Public Support or Understanding
Legitimacy is a major issue here. After two decades of costly and ultimately futile conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the American public has little appetite for another Middle Eastern war. Polling in the first few days of this war found only one in four Americans supported it.
A large-scale war against Iran would be an act of colossal military and political folly. It may require national mobilization — perhaps even conscription. That is politically impossible. The American people will not support a military draft for yet another open-ended conflict in the region.
No Capacity for Ground War
The active-duty U.S. Army today numbers fewer than 500,000 soldiers. Iran is a nation of roughly ninety million people spread across a mountainous territory roughly four times the size of California. Even if the political will existed, the United States lacks the manpower for a major invasion of Iran.
Conquering and occupying such a country would require hundreds of thousands of ground troops and reliable allies willing to fight alongside them.
Those allies do not exist.
Israel, America’s overbearing partner in this conflict, lacks the manpower to deploy large ground forces to Iran. Gulf States have neither the military capability nor the political willingness to undertake such a war.
Already, America and Israel have lost the moral high ground in this war. They have yet more to lose if this war persists.
Air Power Alone Cannot Win
History shows air power alone has never been enough to win a major war.
During the Korean War, General Douglas MacArthur attempted to halt North Korean advances through naval and air power. It failed. Only ground forces ultimately stabilized the front.
In Vietnam, the United States dropped more bombs than were used against Germany and Japan combined during World War II. Yet overwhelming air power could not secure victory.
Technology has improved dramatically since those wars, but the basic nature of war has not changed. Despite decades of talk about a “Revolution in Military Affairs,” wars are still decided by control of territory and the political will of populations.
Bombs alone cannot impose lasting political outcomes. Bombs alone do not spread democracy. However, bombs alone do spread destruction; the conflict began primarily as a destructive and often imprecise air campaign that has resulted in the deaths of hundreds of innocents, which has stiffened the spine of Iranian resistance.
Strategic Exhaustion
America has been engaged in nearly continuous conflict since September 11, 2001. The war in Ukraine, the ongoing U.S.–Israeli destruction of Gaza, and extensive military commitments across the globe have strained American resources.
The U.S. is entering another conflict without being prepared for a long one. Weapons stockpiles are being depleted faster than they can be replenished. Industrial production has not kept pace with demand. Rebuilding the capacity necessary for a prolonged war would take years.
Poor preparation is a recipe for calamitous defeat; meanwhile, the broader the war, the less sustainable it will prove.
Iran Is Ready for This War
Iran, by contrast, has spent decades preparing for precisely this scenario.
Iranian strategy is built around attrition. Rather than trying to match U.S. conventional military power, Iran has invested heavily in asymmetric capabilities — ballistic missiles, drones, cyber warfare, and networks of aligned militias throughout the region.
Instead of seeking decisive battlefield victories, Iran will attempt to impose steady costs on U.S. forces and its allies. U.S. bases across the Middle East, Israeli cities, shipping lanes, and global infrastructure are all potential targets.
Great Power Complications
In an era of great-power competition, regional wars rarely remain isolated. This conflict is happening within a broader geopolitical struggle.
China and Russia have strong incentives to prevent an American-Israeli victory in Iran. Neither wants the U.S. or Israel to dominate the Middle East unchallenged. Both possess advanced missile, radar, and electronic warfare technologies that could assist Iran with intelligence sharing, technological support, and economic backing. Such assistance could significantly complicate U.S. and Israeli operations.
While direct military intervention is unlikely, retaliation for blocking much needed energy supplies to China should be considered. Among other considerations, America remains vulnerable to Chinese restrictions on exports to the U.S. of rare earth minerals and metals. This war may soon dramatically degrade our economy.
The Pattern of American War
There is also a deeper structural problem in the way the United States fights wars.
In Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, American leaders repeatedly entered conflicts without clearly defined political objectives. Goals shifted as conditions changed. Military strategies often bore little relationship to achievable political outcomes.
The result was a recurring pattern: enormous expenditures of blood and treasure without success of any measurable kind. Exploding national deficits were among the chief results of exploding U.S. bombs. That, and millions of dead around the world, as planeloads of caskets draped in American flags returned to the homeland.
With its allies, Americans won World War II because we were united and because we knew what we were fighting for. Right made might, as President Abraham Lincoln once said. Our leaders today believe only that might makes right—and they couldn’t be more wrong.
The Iran War risks becoming the next chapter in that same tragic story of wrong.
Military strategy requires harmony between three elements: the political objective, the resources committed, and the methods used to achieve the goal. When those elements are misaligned, failure becomes almost inevitable.
In this war, the objective remains vague, the resources limited, and the strategy uncertain. That makes one thing certain: defeat.
The Danger of Escalation
The greatest danger now is further escalation.
Already there is discussion of deploying U.S. Special Forces inside Iran to support opposition groups. Such missions begin small but often expand rapidly, as they did in Vietnam and Afghanistan.
The moment American troops begin operating on Iranian soil, the risk of a wider and far more destructive war will increase dramatically. So too will the risk of disastrous, Bay of Pigs-like, operations involving U.S. troops and foreign proxies.
A Moment for Congress to Act
Under the Constitution, the authority to declare war belongs to Congress. That responsibility exists precisely to prevent this nation from drifting into unnecessary and illegal conflicts at the whim of a president enabled and empowered by a misbegotten warrior ethos. America has fought too many wars based on illusions of technological superiority and quick victory. Those illusions have repeatedly collided with reality. And reality always wins over illusion.
A war with Iran will almost certainly follow the same path and continued external attacks will likely strengthen Iran politically. History shows that foreign intervention often unifies societies rather than dividing them.
Congress must now decide whether to continue funding and expanding this disastrous war — $1 billion U.S. per day—or to assert its constitutional role and stop it. The longer the conflict continues, the higher the cost in lives and resources, and the greater the threat to global stability.
Unless American leaders find the spine to stop it, the United States will once again learn that starting a war is easy, but ending one is not. And that fighting a war for the wrong reasons, at the wrong time, with the wrong enemy, is not just foolish, not just indefensible, but a supreme exercise in folly that will deeply harm our country and our prospects as a people.
SIGNERS
Anthony Aguilar, former Ltc. US Army Special Operations Officer, Green Beret
William J. Astore, former Ltc. U.S. Air Force (Ret.)
Michael Baker, former Rear Admiral U.S. Navy (Ret.)
Gregory A. Daddis, former Col. U.S. Army, (Ret.) and West Point professor
Dennis Fritz, former CMD CMSgt U.S. Air Force (Ret.)
Josephine Guilbeau, former U.S. Army All-Source Intel Analyst
Matthew Hoh, former Capt., USMC, Iraq & Foreign Service Officer, Afghanistan (associate VIPS)
Karen Kwiatkowski, former Lt. Col., U.S. Air Force (ret.), at Office of Secretary of Defense watching the manufacture of lies on Iraq, 2001-2003
Dennis Laich, Director of EMN. former Maj. Gen. U.S. Army, (Ret.) & USA Reserve
Adrian R. Lewis, Professor and former U.S. Army, (Ret.)
Ray McGovern, former U.S. Army infantry/intelligence officer & C.I.A. analyst; C.I.A. Presidential briefer (ret.)
Elizabeth Murray, former Deputy National Intelligence Officer for the Near East, National Intelligence Council & C.I.A. political analyst (ret.)
John D. Rosenberger, former Col. U.S. Army, (Ret.)
Coleen Rowley, F.B.I. Special Agent and former Minneapolis Division Legal Counsel (ret.)
Christian Sorensen, Assoc. Director of EMN, former U.S. Air Force Arabic linguist
Ted Strickland, EMN Senior Political Advisor and former Ohio Governor
Brett R. Weimer, former Sgt. Maj. U.S. Army, (Ret.)
Lawrence Wilkerson, EMN Senior Advisor, former Col. U.S. Army, (Ret.)
Ann Wright, Col., U.S. Army (ret.); Foreign Service Officer (resigned in opposition to the war on Iraq)
Eisenhower Media Network is an organization of expert former military, intelligence, and civilian national security officials who have an independent, alternative story to tell
The US-funded ecosystem of Iranian ‘rights groups,’ Israeli operatives, and monarchist activists has become a revolving door of unverifiable statistics and atrocity propaganda
As deadly riots burn Iranian cities, Western media ignores the shocking wave of violence, turning instead to US government-funded NGOs for data. The one-sided portrayal has helped push Trump to the brink of authorizing renewed US attacks
« Économie de guerre », appels au « réarmement », omniprésence des képis médiatiques et de leur lexique militaire, fascination pour l’ordre et la violence : la presse au garde-à-vous semble s’être donné pour mission de nous accoutumer à l’idée de guerre
[mon illustration : sur LCI le 30 novembre 2025, le général à la retraite Nicolas Richoux interroge deux volontaires francophones, un Marocain et un Français, dans les rangs de la 12e brigade, émanation de l’organisation nazie Azov dans la garde nationale ukrainienne (capture d’écran)]
« Je sais que je vais choquer certains lecteurs, mais je suis convaincu que quand tout projet un tant soit peu grandiose a déserté la vie politique, la quête de sens ayant comme la nature horreur du vide, une bonne guerre qui vient remplir ce dernier peut faire l’affaire. » Ces mots sont ceux de Luc Ferry dans les pages du Figaro, jeudi 2 octobre 2025. Le philosophe médiatique et ex-ministre pensait choquer ses lecteurs, mais il n’en fut rien. C’est que la déclaration arrivait sur un terrain médiatique déjà bien préparé, réhabitué à l’idée de guerre, à son iconographie, à son lexique, à son décompte quotidien de morts. Proposer aux jeunes de devenir de la chair à canon pour donner un sens à leur existence ? Au fond, Luc Ferry ne faisait que synthétiser une idée qui, si elle n’était pas encore consensuelle, était au moins redevenue entendable dans la presse française : « une bonne guerre » pouvait remplir le vide.
Dans ce « vide », on retrouve les séquelles de l’idée de « fin de l’histoire » de Francis Fukuyama, à laquelle les chefferies journalistiques avaient largement succombé dans les années 1990. « C’était il y a un quart de siècle. Le mur de Berlin tombait, l’URSS implosait. Marx et le communisme étaient morts, enfin ! », résumait à sa façon Arnaud Leparmentier dans Le Monde (14/10/2014). La planète entière allait transiter pacifiquement vers la démocratie libérale, grâce à ce formidable vecteur qu’est l’économie de marché. Hélas, « tout ne s’est pas passé comme prévu », notait déjà Leparmentier, qui prononçait alors « La fin de la fin de l’histoire ». Bien sûr, tout au long de cette période, la guerre n’avait jamais disparu, et la propagande de guerre encore moins. Mais les guerres étaient le plus souvent « lointaines », « asymétriques », « justes », et menées par des États que l’éditocratie place dans le camp de ses « alliés ». C’est ce qui change pour Leparmentier et ses congénères avec les agressions russes en Ukraine, en 2014 puis 2022. Revenu de ses illusions, le monde journalistique a donc peu à peu reconfiguré son discours autour de « la guerre », se sentant manifestement la mission d’entretenir une « atmosphère ». Banalisés, le « fait militaire » et les appels au « réarmement » s’affichent désormais partout, structurent la pensée éditoriale, distillent leurs angles à travers la presse et bousculent la hiérarchie de l’information. Les médias se sentent une responsabilité : et s’il fallait mobiliser ?
À l’antenne de « C dans l’air » (France 5), début mars 2025, la grand reporter à L’Express, Marion Van Renterghem, voit ainsi d’un très bon œil l’appel d’Emmanuel Macron à renforcer les contingents de réservistes : à ses yeux, le discours du président peut « réintroduire la culture de la guerre, la culture de cette évidence de monde en guerre […] chez des Français qui, comme les Européens, ont vécu dans la naïveté des dividendes de la paix et d’un monde bienheureux de la mondialisation heureuse » (6/03/2025). « L’Europe, qui a pratiqué un désarmement unilatéral […] en cultivant le rêve d’une paix éternelle et d’une guerre impossible, se découvre vulnérable, impuissante et marginalisée dans un monde où la paix est impossible et la guerre omniprésente », écrit trois mois plus tard Nicolas Baverez dans Le Figaro (23/06/2025). France Culture, elle, se demande « Comment préparer les hommes à la guerre ? » (30/10/2025) Et dans une lettre consternante à « madame la guerre » dans laquelle il tient à nous faire part de son « adhésion obligée au réarmement, arrachée sans sommations à [s]on pacifisme moribond », l’inénarrable Luc Le Vaillant entend donner l’exemple : « Nous étions tourneurs de pouces assoupis, nous voilà tenus de nous salir les mains dans les remous des régressions ambiantes et des cruautés flambantes. Ainsi finit cette belle époque que je croyais éternelle. » (Libération, 11/03/2025)
Trêve de bons sentiments et de « pacification » par le marché : l’heure est aux empires et à la prédation, au réarmement et à la puissance… ainsi qu’à la réaffirmation brutale de l’esprit colonial, qu’une large frange du personnel médiatico-politique n’a jamais renié, et qui se trouve incontestablement revigoré dans la configuration géopolitique mondiale. « La planète est en train d’être partagée par trois grandes puissances qui se divisent leurs zones d’influence sur notre dos, parce que nous n’existons pas dans ce schéma, prévient Marion Van Renterghem. Et pour ne pas totalement être dépecé, disparaître ou être vassalisé, il vaut mieux essayer d’être fort et donc de se remettre au boulot ! » Le cap est clair, la nouvelle configuration du capitalisme ressemble à une marche vers la guerre, et certains rêvent à haute voix d’un empire européen. Dans l’orchestre, souvent très loin de leur simple mission d’information, les grands médias jouent la partition la plus simple : sonner le clairon.
Le retour médiatique de la guerre
L’accroissement de la surface médiatique de la guerre n’est pas qu’une vague impression et a été objectivée par plusieurs analyses quantitatives. Elle correspond bien entendu à une réalité : « Dans la nuit du 23 au 24 février 2022, Vladimir Poutine déclenche son “opération militaire spéciale” en Ukraine », retrace la Revue des médias de l’INA : « Les caméras se braquent sur l’Ukraine », car l’événement est « très facile à catégoriser et à raconter d’emblée : il s’agit d’une agression interétatique. Le type de guerres dont on pensait qu’elles n’auraient plus cours dans le monde occidental », explique à la revue la chercheuse Anna Colin Lebedev. Aussi, les chaînes d’information en continu se mettent-elles en ordre de bataille. Entre janvier 2022 et fin décembre 2023, elles « mentionnent le conflit à raison de 22 130 fois en moyenne par semaine », avec des périodes de pics d’attention, et une nette « hyperspécialisation » de LCI, qui représente 52% des mentions totales. Si la revue de l’INA note une baisse importante de la couverture au cours des années suivantes, le sujet continue de dominer l’agenda de toutes les chaînes d’info en mars 2025 (à l’exception de CNews, où elle arrive en troisième place [1]), selon une enquête de Reporters sans frontières fondée sur l’analyse des bandeaux d’informations. La thématique « réarmement et enjeux militaires » est ensuite la deuxième traitée sur LCI (16,8%), la troisième sur BFM-TV (10,3%) et Franceinfo (12,2%), la cinquième sur CNews (7,1%). De quoi installer une certaine « ambiance »
Défilé de généraux sur les plateaux
Pour parler de la guerre, les médias se sont « naturellement » entourés… de militaires. Sur les chaînes d’info, dans les journaux ou à la radio, il est devenu quasi impossible de tomber sur une discussion portant sur l’actualité internationale sans qu’un général en retraite ne soit interrogé. « Nous sommes l’équivalent des médecins au moment du Covid », sourit le général Jérôme Pellistrandi dans L’Express, qui consacre un papier à « Ces généraux français qui crèvent l’écran » (18/02/2023). Le magazine explique que les chaînes, plutôt que de recourir à des journalistes spécialisés, ont préféré recruter ces retraités de l’armée, qui touchent entre 200 et 500 euros par émission. Chacun son espace, et il est bien quadrillé : Jérôme Pellistrandi est le plus souvent sur BFM-TV, Dominique Trinquand passe sur LCI, Jean-Paul Paloméros apparait sur Franceinfo et CNews. Les présentateurs leur donnent du « mon général », et la contradiction en plateau est bien souvent… absente. Dans L’Express toujours, le général Michel Yakovleff « [s’amuse] d’avoir été d’abord sollicité comme “général de l’après-midi”, dans un contexte où les antennes demandaient “du général H24” ». Certains de ces intervenants, comme l’immanquable Michel Goya, se sont constitué au fur et à mesure un capital médiatique conséquent, qu’ils n’hésitent pas à faire fructifier en librairie. Ces invités réguliers sont souvent accompagnés en plateau de « consultants en stratégie », « consultant en géopolitique et défense », renforçant encore davantage cette inclinaison pour les hauts gradés et le savoir stratégique.
Le tropisme doit beaucoup au mode de traitement des conflits et des actualités « militaires » dans les chaînes d’info (et au-delà) : le suivi « en temps réel » et les besoins de remplissage d’antenne favorisent, on le sait bien, le commentaire. Ici spécifiquement, le commentaire « stratégique » à tendance sensationnaliste : état du front, lignes d’avancée/recul, nature de l’armement, rendez-vous diplomatiques… Crédo : « Vivre la guerre de l’intérieur » plutôt que l’analyser. Qui de mieux placé que des militaires pour répondre à ce type de cadrage ?
Cette confusion totale de la figure journaliste/militaire et de « la montée en grade » du second dans l’espace journalistique témoigne d’une confusion de leurs pratiques et contribue à l’homogénéisation des discours, en marginalisant totalement les autres approches de la question – qu’elles viennent du monde universitaire, associatif ou politique. Dans L’Express, la confusion entre journalistes et généraux en retraite est admise littéralement :
En décembre, une entrevue a eu lieu entre des représentants du centre de doctrine et d’enseignement du commandement de l’armée de terre et cinq de ces militaires du PAF, réunis pour l’occasion à l’Ecole militaire, à Paris. Autour de la table, Dominique Trinquand, Michel Goya, Jérôme Pellistrandi, le général Christophe Gomart, le général Nicolas Richoux et « des ceintures noires d’Ukraine » – la formule est de Michel Goya. L’occasion de faire valider leurs analyses… mais aussi d’interroger la communication du ministère des Armées. Comme des journalistes, les étoiles en plus
Rien de neuf cependant : le général et ancien chef d’état-major des Armées Pierre de Villiers avait eu droit, en 2020, à une promotion médiatique démesurée, de CNews à France Inter, de Valeurs Actuelles à L’Obs. On avait pu observer, à l’occasion, le général être interrogé sur toutes sortes de sujets, les budgets, les jeunes de banlieue, le chômage, les réseaux sociaux. Bref, sa construction médiatique l’a peu à peu transformé en « toutologue » comme les autres, invité régulier des matinales ou des magazines du soir, jusqu’à l’envisager (voire l’espérer) comme un candidat pour l’élection présidentielle de 2022.
Position d’autorité, popularité médiatique, confortable complément de retraite voire ambitions politiques, les raisons pour lesquelles ces généraux défilent sur les plateaux ne sont pas bien mystérieuses. Un phénomène de « peopolisation » que l’on a vu à l’œuvre pour d’autres figures médiatiques, en dehors du champ militaire, mais qui, pour le général de Villiers, s’incarne dans une exaltation de l’ordre, de la force et du virilisme. Le pouvoir politique bénéficie lui aussi de cette aura : tout comme les généraux de plateaux, Emmanuel Macron profite selon les médias de « l’effet drapeau » lorsqu’il pose en « chef de guerre ». « L’effet drapeau » est cette expression que les rédactions se repassent pour désigner à mots couverts le « nationalisme ». Lequel ne déplaît guère : « Il me viendrait presque des spasmes de fierté franchouillarde quand je comprends que mon pays râleur et inconséquent pourrait retrouver une centralité perdue. Et que son avantage atomique l’autorise presque à se prétendre le garant du continent », ose Luc Le Vaillant. (Libération, 11/03/2025)
Le corollaire de leur omniprésence est lui aussi évident : on n’entendra pas de critiques de la guerre si l’on invite des professionnels de la guerre. Se dégage ainsi de tous ces plateaux une véritable fascination pour la chose militaire et pour son vocabulaire. Et, sur un autre air que Luc Ferry, ces généraux de plateaux chantent eux aussi la mélodie de la « bonne guerre qui pourrait remplir le vide » (BFM-TV, 24/10/2020) :
– Pierre de Villiers : […] Dans cette jeunesse que je côtoie, dans les cités, aux Mureaux ou ailleurs, ils ont ce besoin d’appartenance […]
– Ruth Elkrief :À l’armée ils le trouvent.
– Pierre de Villiers : […] On reçoit 25 000 jeunes par an […] et on en fait une unité capable d’aller au combat et de mourir si nécessaire pour la France. C’est quand même magnifique, c’est un signe d’espérance. Ça prouve que c’est possible […]
Spectacularisation de la guerre
La fascination pour la guerre ne s’incarne pas que dans le recours systématique aux généraux de plateaux. Elle s’affiche aussi en grand sur les Unes de journaux et de magazines. Les hebdomadaires réactionnaires de milieu de semaine, Le Point en tête, se distinguent particulièrement dans cet exercice. Et l’on remarque assez facilement un biais caractéristique de ce magazine « fana-mili » : la guerre est un beau spectacle qui fait de jolies Unes sur lesquelles on peut afficher des gros porte-avions, des drones, des chars et des avions de combat
Si ces magazines sont assez peu lus, leurs éditorialistes sont omniprésents à la télé et à la radio, et leurs couvertures s’affichent en très grand format dans les villes, sur les panneaux publicitaires, les kiosques et les arrêts de bus : de quoi, là encore, créer une certaine « ambiance », un décor urbain et une musique de fond qui installe des questions dans les esprits : sommes-nous prêts pour faire la guerre ?
L’engouement pour l’armement qui se remarque sur les Unes du Point est un phénomène généralisé. La Croix (10/12/2025) détaille par exemple à ses lecteurs : « Que sait-on des commandes qui devraient être passées en 2026 ? Selon nos informations, elles porteraient sur deux Rafale, quatre systèmes sol-air moyenne portée SPMT-NG, une frégate FDI-Marine, 350 blindés Serval, deux avions patrouilleurs et deux satellites. » Peu importe que ces sigles et ce jargon militaire n’aient aucun sens pour la plupart des lecteurs. De la même façon, Le Figaro tient la chronique régulière des commandes d’armement de l’État, et nous informe en mars 2025 : « Emmanuel Macron annonce que l’armée de l’air et de l’espace “bénéficiera de davantage de commandes de Rafale”. » Peut-être est-il utile ici de rappeler que le Rafale est un avion de combat français construit par Dassault Aviation, du groupe Dassault, lequel est propriétaire du Figaro. Il est aussi bon de se souvenir que la France est le deuxième vendeur d’armes mondial : c’est depuis ce pays que cette presse s’exprime. Aussi, certaines productions journalistiques ressemblent-elles à de véritables catalogues de représentants en commerce d’armes
Une ambiance qui se décline de manière encore plus spectaculaire dans l’audiovisuel avec la floraison de « reportages embedded » dans l’armée, témoignant d’une fascination pour la chose militaire autant que d’une confusion manifeste du métier de journaliste avec celui de propagandiste :
Certaines séquences médiatiques virent carrément à la caricature de ce point de vue, et transforment l’information autour de « la guerre » en divertissement. Exemple avec cette séquence où BFM-TV dans son « forum de Français » invite « William, survivaliste et instructeur de survie » à venir présenter le contenu de « son sac de survie et [à] donne[r] ses conseils en cas de guerre » : le voici qui déballe l’intégralité de son sac, lampe frontale, panneau solaire, gamelle en métal, gourde qui filtre les produits chimiques. « On m’avait parlé d’une arbalète ? » demande avec gourmandise Maxime Switek
Le thème de l’armement n’existe donc dans les médias que sous l’angle tactique, technologique ou commercial, toujours avec un aspect spectaculaire. Les quelques enquêtes journalistiques qui révèlent les dessous opaques des ventes d’armes ou de composants militaires de la France, comme celles du média d’investigation Disclose, sont, elles, très largement snobées par la grande presse. Quand elles ne font pas l’objet d’un acharnement judiciaire de l’État…
Le « réarmement » : « Pensions ou munitions ? »
Installée comme un refrain lancinant, l’atmosphère de guerre induit de nouvelles questions à mettre à l’agenda médiatique : « Sommes-nous prêts matériellement ? » « Sommes-nous prêts “moralement” ? » Les médias formulent telles quelles ces interrogations, soufflées par le pouvoir, qui sont le plus souvent rhétoriques et servent à justifier la hausse continue des dépenses militaires dans des budgets pourtant austéritaires. De nombreux médias se sont ainsi faits les chantres du nécessaire « réarmement » de la France, après les « 30 ans de désarmement » que constitue la période de « fin de l’histoire », des années 1990 à 2020. Le 5 mars 2025, par exemple, Emmanuel Macron pose en « chef de guerre » et annonce lors d’une allocution « des investissements supplémentaires » en matière de défense, « compte tenu de l’évolution des menaces », et le tout « sans augmenter les impôts » (Le Monde, 5/03/2025). Ni une ni deux, les thuriféraires médiatiques du pouvoir reformulent en un faux dilemme qui va se retrouver à travers toute la presse : « Pensions ou munitions ? » chez Dominique Seux (Les Échos, 10/03/2025), « Les canons ou les allocations ? » chez Étienne Gernelle (RTL, 10/03/2025). L’alternative est posée : ce sera des chars ou la sécu ; l’éditocratie préfère les chars. Rebelote en novembre 2025, après les fameuses déclarations du chef d’état-major des Armées, Fabien Mandon, devant les maires de France, à propos de la nécessité « d’accepter de perdre ses enfants » à la guerre. La presse a fait ses choux gras de ce bout de phrase, mais la suite est tout aussi intéressante : il faudrait également « [accepter] de souffrir économiquement parce que les priorités iront à de la production de défense ». Après nous avoir présenté le catalogue, passons aux achats ! « Le chef d’état-major sonne la charge ! », titre Le Parisien (22/10/2025), « Comment le chef d’état-major de l’armée française veut la préparer au choc russe », décrypte Les Échos (6/11/2025). Les déclarations de Fabien Mandon sont mal reçues par « les-Français », les sondages commandés à l’occasion et commentés dans la presse sont chagrins. Au contraire des « investisseurs », pour qui le retour de la guerre sonne comme une bonne nouvelle : « Les rivalités entre grandes puissances […] ont replacé la question de la sécurité au cœur des priorités des États […] Pour les investisseurs, cette nouvelle donne crée des perspectives intéressantes », se réjouit un site pour spéculateur (Boursorama, 20/01). Pour les industriels de la guerre, il y a en effet de quoi se frotter les mains : le 16 janvier, Emmanuel Macron promet « 36 milliards d’euros supplémentaires pour les armées » (La Tribune, 16/01). Et le journal économique de saluer le fait que le président se soit montré « constant » sur le sujet, en doublant le budget défense en 10 ans, « passant de 32,3 milliards d’euros en 2017 à 64 milliards en 2027 ». Convaincu par l’adage « Qui veut la paix prépare la guerre », et faisant mine de croire qu’une course à l’armement peut finir par autre chose que par l’emploi de ces armes, la quasi-totalité de la presse applaudit sans nuance ce virage vers « l’économie de guerre »
La Tribune dimanche, 9/03/2025
La « guerre » sort des pages internationales et devient un sujet transversal pour les rédactions. Les services politique, économie ou social peuvent eux aussi s’y pencher. Ainsi les pages « entreprises » du Monde nous gratifient, en mars 2025, d’un dossier en 5 volets : « Les dépenses militaires, levier de croissance ».
Le Monde, 11/03/2025
Le « réarmement » médiatique des cœurs
Mais le « réarmement » n’est pas que « matériel ». Comme l’indique la première partie de la phrase du général Mandon, il est également « moral ». Ce recours au registre « moral » n’est évidemment que le cache-nez d’une option politique : le nationalisme. Les valeurs morales ici exaltées sont celles du sacrifice pour la nation (« accepter de perdre ses enfants »). Aussi, certains médias se sont-ils donné pour mission de réhabituer « les-Français » à l’idée de guerre. « Les autorités françaises tentent de préparer les esprits à la guerre » résume une dépêche de l’AFP (20/11/2025), « mais le message peine à infuser », regrette Le Télégramme (21/11/2025). « Il faudrait plutôt inquiéter les Français pour préparer une forme d’acceptation des sacrifices nécessaires », avance l’historien Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau dans « C ce soir » (France 5, 21/11/2025), lui qui avait participé à remettre le syntagme « culture de guerre » en circulation au début des années 2000. À ce sujet, David Pujadas s’inquiète (LCI, 20/11/2025) : « Pour refamiliariser [les jeunes] avec l’idée de guerre, est-ce qu’il faut d’abord mettre l’accent sur la mort ? » Voici la fonction du journalisme va-t-en-guerre admise au détour d’une question : nous « refamiliariser » avec l’idée de guerre. Mais sans nous effrayer !
Signe de cette offensive discursive, le terme « réarmement », déjà « matériel » et « moral », va être employé à tort et à travers dans les médias, à nouveau sous l’impulsion du pouvoir politique, pour des sujets qui n’ont qu’un rapport lointain avec la guerre. L’Humanité (5/01) note un « usage obsessionnel du vocabulaire martial : “réarmement démographique”, “réarmement économique”, “réarmement de l’État”, “réarmement civique”, “réarmement industriel”, “réarmement de la nation” », etc. Plus généralement, l’invasion d’un lexique guerrier dans le vocabulaire politico-médiatique se note aussi dans la variété de sujets contre lesquels « nous sommes en guerre » : guerre contre le Covid-19 (France Culture, 19/02/2021) ; guerre contre le narcotrafic (« C ce soir », France 5, 16/12/2025) ; guerre contre le terrorisme (France Culture, 1/10/2021) ; ou encore… guerre contre les moustiques (Arte, 2/09/2025). Plus récemment, face aux menaces de barrières douanières avec les États-Unis, l’UE a promis de sortir son « bazooka commercial » : l’occasion de faire de jolis titres…
Mutilation du pluralisme
Accroissement de la surface médiatique de la guerre, accaparement de cet espace par des généraux en retraite, spectacularisation, fascination pour les armes, invasion d’un lexique guerrier, campisme et intérêts matériels des propriétaires de presse : le pendant presque logique de cette configuration médiatique est le quasi-effacement de la pluralité des opinions et des approches, en particulier des idées pacifistes. Disqualifiées dans le débat public, qu’elles soient formulées par des universitaires ou des politiques, les idées qui divergent du prêt-à-penser belliciste sont renvoyées au mieux à de la faiblesse – des « béatitudes d’enfant gâté » dans les mots de Luc Le Vaillant –, au pire à un esprit « munichois » et capitulard. Challenges prévient dans un édito (23/10/2025) : « Après Hitler, l’esprit de Munich continue de hanter l’Europe… à ses risques et périls face à Poutine ». La Vie (7/05/2024) synthétise le crédo médiatique : « Le réarmement moral pour lutter contre l’esprit de Munich ». Autant de façons de signifier que les idées pacifistes ne sont pas tolérées dans le champ médiatique. Peut-être plus que sur tout autre sujet, les médias verrouillent et ne laissent exister qu’une seule pensée sur la guerre : celle qui prétend préparer la paix en armant les nations jusqu’aux dents.
Aussi, lorsqu’Emmanuel Macron a annoncé le retour d’un service « vraiment militaire », la presse était-elle en joie et à l’unisson : « Lorsque le chef de l’État quel qu’il soit dit “Il y a une menace” – on la voit tous les jours, sur LCI on informe tous les jours, disait alors Renaud Pila, eh bien, on s’engage ! Et les débats philosophico-philosophiques, on pourra les faire le dimanche à 17h ! » « Merci le SNU ! », s’exclame lui Gauthier Vaillant (L’Opinion, 12/01), qui aura finalement servi selon l’éditorialiste « à légitimer le retour d’un service militaire digne de ce nom. […] Trente ans après sa suspension, le retour du service militaire referme la parenthèse des “dividendes de la paix” ». Et L’Opinion s’en réjouit.
Voici dans quelles dispositions du paysage médiatique sont intervenus les guerres en Ukraine, le génocide à Gaza, ou les bombardements de Donald Trump au Venezuela, au Nigeria, au Yémen, en Syrie, en Irak, en Iran, dans les Caraïbes ou dans le Pacifique (AFP, 14/01). « L’opinion ça se travaille » et il est peu de dire que le champ journalistique travaille à nous faire accepter la fatalité de la guerre, en nous faisant baigner dans son atmosphère. Cette presse profondément campiste et focalisée sur les « menaces » russe ou islamiste n’avait toutefois pas anticipé les agissements de l’allié américain contre un territoire affilé à l’espace européen, le Groenland, et s’est vite retrouvée comme un lapin pris dans les phares d’une voiture. Ces derniers développements semblent n’avoir fait que renforcer la conviction des chefferies journalistiques de mettre la guerre et ses manières à l’ordre du jour. BFM-TV, par exemple, a lancé en réaction une nouvelle émission spéciale avec Maxime Switek (21/01). Le titre ? « Quartier Général ». Encore une métaphore militaire, qui sonne comme un aveu involontaire de la façon dont la chaîne envisage son rôle en temps de préparatifs de guerre : un QG de l’armée. Loin, très loin, du métier d’informer [fin]
Dieu se rit des hommes qui se plaignent des conséquences alors qu’ils en chérissent les causes, remarqua très justement Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet. Jérémie Younes serait moins désemparé et plaintif s’il apprenait que la Russie n’a pas agressé l’Ukraine en 2014. Le 21 février de cette année là, un coup d’État d’extrême droite renversa à Kiev le gouvernement légal et démocratique. Inspirées par les nazis ukrainiens de la 2de guerre mondiale, les nouvelles autorités discriminèrent leurs concitoyens russophones. Le Donbass se souleva alors et avec le soutien de l’Europe, Kiev lui fit la guerre.
en Anglais, chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia
chronique alphabétique et nécrologique de l’engagement français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas
chronique en Anglais, its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine
deux jours après le 10e anniversaire de la débâcle politique et sécuritaire du 13 novembre 2015, une messe célèbre à Verdun l’ancien dirigeant fasciste de l’État français
ce 11 novembre 2025 est l’occasion de souligner comme la façon dont l’Europe sacrifie les conscrits ukrainiens mobilisés de force rappelle le spectaculaire carnage de la 1ère guerre mondiale
L’angle sécuritaire a largement dominé le traitement médiatique du mouvement social « Bloquons-tout », organisé partout en France le 10 septembre. Défilé de policiers sur les plateaux télé, focalisation sur les « violences », décompte en direct sur les chaînes d’information en continu du nombre d’interpellations : retour sur un cas d’école de journalisme de préfecture
Depuis l’allocution d’Emmanuel Macron à propos de la guerre en Ukraine, le 5 mars, les grands médias sont en ordre de marche. Réhabilitation du président en « chef de guerre », patriotisme exacerbé, concert militariste et glorification des industriels de guerre… Mené tambour battant, le SAV du discours présidentiel s’accompagne d’une nouvelle séquence de matraquage patronal contre le « modèle social » et pour « travailler plus » au nom, prétendument, de l’« effort de guerre » : « Pensions ou munitions ? » ; « Les canons ou les allocations ? » Signés Dominique Seux (Les Échos, 10/03) et Étienne Gernelle (RTL, 10/03), les deux slogans donnent le ton
As panic-inducing travel advisories and doomsaying media reports prophesy the fall of Mali to an Al Qaeda affiliate attacking fuel convoys, the government has re-secured supply routes and hosted Mali’s first international defense expo in a supposedly besieged capital
BAMEX 25 is Mali’s first international defense expo (screenshot)
Amid a barrage of media reports prophesying the fall of Mali to an Al Qaeda affiliate disrupting its fuel supply by attacking tankers, delegates from ten African countries, Iran, and Turkey attended a defense expo in the capital Bamako from November 11 to 14.
Dismissing this portrayal as a scenario “concocted in the office of foreign intelligence services”, Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Diop insisted that “the fate of Mali, and the destiny of the people in the West African region will not be decided” by the media.
He made these remarks on November 12, addressing a press conference on the sidelines of BAMEX 25, Mali’s first international defense expo, aimed at building “an autonomous security architecture” for Africa in the face of “unprecedented security and geopolitical challenges”.
This expo, he said, is yet another indication of the Malian government’s priority to strengthen its defense and security to combat the threat of terror groups that were spawned across the Sahel by NATO’s destruction of Libya in 2011.
French-spawned terror groups
Mali was among the first and worst affected by these terror groups. Its former colonizer, France, which was a key participant in Libya’s destruction, then deployed its troops, ostensibly to protect Mali. Over the years, its military presence expanded across the Sahel. Alongside, the armed groups also grew in strength, increasing attacks and the area under their control.
This led to a growing perception that French troops in the region were not fighting the terror groups it helped create but guarding its own economic and political interests in maintaining its neocolonial grip over the troubled former colonies.
In 2021, then-prime minister Choguel Kokalla Maïga recalled in an interview the active role played by France in handing over Mali’s territory to terror groups.
“Upon arriving in” the northern town of Kidal in 2013, “France forbade the Malian army from entering. It created an enclave,” and handed it over to Al-Qaeda affiliate Ansar al Dine and Tuareg separatists brought together, he said. Later in 2017, Ansar al Dine coalesced with other terrorist groups to form the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), which became one of the most dangerous groups in the Sahel.
“It’s an enclave controlled by France. They have armed groups trained by French officers. And we have evidence of this,” Maiga added in his 2021 interview. “Mali has no access to Kidal.”
However, the new government retook Kidal in November 2023, less than a year and a half after expelling the French troops.
“On the ground today, terrorist groups are no match for Mali’s defense and security forces,” Diop told reporters at the press conference. “There have been enormous efforts to equip Mali’s defense and security forces, which have achieved resounding successes” against the terror groups, he said, adding that this has “forced them to change their strategy and now attack softer targets.”
Attacks on fuel convoys
Early this September, the JNIM started attacks on drivers and their tankers carrying fuel from the Ivory Coast in the Sikasso region of southern Mali. “Due to disruptions in fuel supplies that are affecting the movement of school staff,” the Education Ministry suspended classes for two weeks on October 26.
“Do Not Travel to Mali for any reason due to crime, terrorism, kidnapping, unrest, and health,” the US State Department said in a travel advisory on October 25. Three days later, the department issued a second alert, insisting that its citizens in Mali “should” leave the country “using commercial aviation, as overland routes to neighboring countries may not be safe for travel due to terrorist attacks along national highways.”
Australia followed suit on October 29, warning, “If you’re in Mali, you should depart immediately using commercial means while the international airport in Bamako remains open and flights are available. If you decide to remain in Mali, be prepared to shelter in place for an extended period.” Italy and Germany also asked their citizens to leave the country.
Amid the panic-inducing travel advisories and doomsaying media reports, Mali’s president, Col. Assimi Goïta, inaugurated the country’s second Lithium mine on November 3, setting Mali en route to becoming Africa’s leading Lithium producer by 2026.
“There have been disruptions in the supply system,” but “the state organized itself, put in place a strategic plan to resume supplies, to ensure the security of convoys … And gradually, you see that hundreds of trucks are arriving every day to resume supplies to Bamako and other localities,” Diop added in his press conference. “As I speak, Mali is able to ensure the supply of hydrocarbons and petroleum products to its population.”
However, two days after the fuel convoys started arriving, France “advised” its citizens on October 7 to leave Mali “as soon as possible using the remaining available commercial flights” because the “security situation has been deteriorating.”
Mali’s first-ever National Electronic Payments Exhibition was organized in the capital that day by the Professional Association of Banks and Financial Institutions of Mali (APBEF-Mali) and the West African Economic and Monetary Union’s Interbank Electronic Payment Group (GIM-UEMOA).
Schools reopened on schedule on November 10. That day, President Goïta inaugurated the Presidential Emergency Hospital Project to upgrade six existing health centers in Bamako to district hospitals by the end of 2026, for which a health budget of USD 349.2 million has been allocated. The inauguration also marked the start of construction of nine new hospitals, including in Bougouni, Bandiagara, and Nioro, where attacks had been reported in the recent past.
Despite these indications of improving security, the UK government claimed on November 13 that “Terrorist group Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) has implemented blockades on key routes throughout Southern and Western Mali, including the capital city of Bamako,” where the international defense expo was underway.
“These blockades are targeting fuel trucks and are enforcing checkpoints for individuals attempting to pass through them. Attacks can occur at any time,” added its travel advisory.
A proxy war
“We must not think we are simply facing terrorist groups,” Diop maintains. “No, this is a proxy war, where certain powers, cowardly and unable to confront us directly, are using terrorist groups and asymmetric forces to fight us … These terrorist groups have drones. Where do they come from? Who manufactures them? Who provides them in areas where people cannot even eat?”
Le Monde had reported last year that Ukrainian authorities are training an armed group to use drones. Spokesperson of Ukraine’s military intelligence, Andriy Yusov, had said in an interview that it provided “information, and not only information,” to armed groups fighting the state in Mali.
Earlier in 2022, Diop had written a letter to the UN Security Council, saying Mali had evidence that France was flying missions in Malian airspace to collect intelligence and airdrop arms and ammunition to terror groups.
Mali’s southern neighbor, Burkina Faso, and eastern neighbor, Niger, have also since accused France of supporting terror groups to destabilize their countries after its troops were expelled following a similar sequence of anti-France protests and popular coups.
“Africa is now the epicenter of terrorism,” Nicolas Lerner, head of France’s General Directorate for External Security (DGSE), told France Inter radio on November 10. Calling it a threat to Europe, he insisted it “directly threatens our interests,” effectively trying to set up the case for another military intervention.
Curiously, he went on to add that while the “JNIM wants the fall of the junta and the installation of authorities who back the establishment of a caliphate,” the group itself “is not necessarily capable of controlling Mali, nor does it actually want to.”
Lerner is “saying … it is not even their intention to take Bamako … How [does he] know their intention? Is it you who gives them this intention? Is it you who commands them? Is it you who decides,” questioned Diop.
“This should help us understand how deep the collusion is today between hybrid forces. These are not terrorists – it is a proxy war. But I can assure you that Mali will endure.”
He reiterated that Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, which have formed the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), are fighting together, convinced that this proxy war is waged on them because they “chose to break the chain of dependency, to break the chain of subjugation to colonial domination.”
He added, “Our countries are being attacked first to break this dynamic and then to prevent other African countries from following this path. And we have understood the political message behind this.” The African Union (AU), however, has not.
“We are not reaching out to the so-called international community to come to our aid”
Amid the chorus by Western countries, the AU’s chairperson, Mahamoud Ali Youssouf, called for “a robust, coordinated, and coherent international response to counter terrorism and violent extremism in the Sahel.”
“No action can be … taken in Mali without Malians, without the consent of the Malian state, without the Malian state requesting it,” Diop retorted, affirming, “we are not reaching out to the so-called international community to come to our aid.”
“This call for international action is all the more worrying since Mali has emerged from this type of paradigm,” he added. Having expelled the French troops and asserted sovereignty, “the new paradigm [in the AES] is to trust ourselves and take charge … to ensure the security of our countries rests first and foremost on the shoulders of the people and leaders of our countries” [end]
France’s recent parliamentary elections indicate a rapid political shift to the right. Africans both on the continent – where several nations remain French neo-colonies – and in France will undoubtedly experience the impact of this in the form of increased exploitation, reactionary immigration policy, and xenophobic oppression
Like dominos, African states are one by one falling outside the shackles of neocolonialism. Chad, Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and now Gabon are saying ‘non’ to France’s longtime domination of African financial, political, economic, and security affairs
A Ukrainian soldier of the 71st Jaeger Brigade prepares a FPV drone, Donetsk region, March 2024 (Efrem Lukatsky / AP)
THE HAGUE, Netherlands — Ukrainian counterintelligence services are investigating the infiltration of Latin American drug cartel members into the country’s International Legion, with operatives seeking advanced drone training to later deploy against rivals and security forces in their home countries.
The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) launched a joint investigation with military intelligence after Mexico’s National Intelligence Center warned in early summer that Mexican volunteers had joined Ukraine’s foreign fighter units specifically to acquire first-person view (FPV) drone capabilities. The probe has since expanded to include Colombian nationals, raising concerns about Ukraine’s inadvertent role as a training ground for transnational criminal organizations.
French outlet Intelligence Online was the first to report the story on Tuesday.
The investigation centers on several Spanish-speaking units within the International Legion, particularly the tactical group “Ethos,” operating in the Donetsk and Kharkiv regions. Ukrainian investigators reportedly suspect that some Mexican and Colombian volunteers intentionally sought placement in drone operator units to later use this training in the service of foreign criminal organizations.
One noteworthy case is that of a Mexican national operating under the alias “Águila-7,” who registered in March 2024 using fraudulent Salvadoran documentation. Posing as a humanitarian volunteer, he completed comprehensive drone training in Lviv while demonstrating exceptional technical expertise that eventually had instructors suspicious.
His extensive technical knowledge, including familiarity with electronic warfare countermeasures and thermal detection avoidance, reportedly stood out. Background investigations later revealed probable connections to Mexico’s elite GAFE special forces, some of whose former personnel have historically transitioned to cartel employment, notably through the ultra-violent Zetas organization.
The infiltration demonstrates remarkable operational sophistication for a nonstate group, with suspects employing false identities, forged documentation and front companies to facilitate their passage into Ukrainian territory and military structures. Intelligence analysts have identified a network of private security firms across Latin America that appear to have coordinated these placements.
Additional cases have emerged involving former FARC guerrillas who infiltrated the system using Panamanian and Venezuelan identity documents. At least three former FARC fighters passed through the International Legion using forged documents, with their relocation reportedly organized by cartel-linked entities.
The revelations highlight Ukraine’s unintended emergence as a premier training ground for modern asymmetric warfare techniques amid its conflict with Russia. Ukrainian authorities have developed comprehensive curricula covering drone manufacturing, tactical deployment, electronic warfare resistance and real-time battlefield coordination. Coincidentally, these capabilities also represent exactly the type of force multiplication that criminal organizations seek.
Mexican cartels are already conducting drone attacks against rivals and security forces domestically, making the acquisition of Ukrainian battlefield-tested tactics particularly concerning for regional security.
An unnamed SBU official told Intelligence Online: “We welcomed volunteers in good faith. But we must now recognize that Ukraine has become a platform for the global dissemination of FPV tactics. Some come here to learn how to kill with a $400 drone, then sell this knowledge elsewhere to the highest bidder” [end]
How are “death travel agencies” organized for those who like to hunt people in foreign lands, and who want to send regular French and Polish units to Ukraine?
in French, an alphabetical obituary chronicle of the French involvement in the Atlanticist ranks in Ukraine, what servile journalists will not tell you
The 70th anniversary of Dien Bien Phu and Algeria’s revolution highlights their profound influence on global decolonization. This longread explores their impact on the Palestinian resistance, shedding light on their shared struggle against colonial oppression and their continuing inspiration to the world
(Fourate Chahal El Rekaby)
Introduction
Revolution is not a dinner party, or writing an essay, or painting a picture, or doing embroidery; it cannot be so refined, so leisurely and gentle
Mao Zedong, 1927 (Zedong 1953)
Colonialism is not a thinking machine, nor a body endowed with reasoning faculties. It is violence in its natural state, and it will only yield when confronted with greater violence
Frantz Fanon, 1961 (Fanon 1967)
Imperialism has laid its body over the world, the head in Eastern Asia, the heart in the Middle East, its arteries reaching Africa and Latin America. Wherever you strike it, you damage it, and you serve the World Revolution
Ghassan Kanafani, 1972 (Kanafani 2023)
This year, 2024, coincides with the 70th Anniversary of the Battle of Dien Bien Phu (May 1954), in which Vietnamese revolutionaries inflicted a crushing defeat on French colonialists. It also marks the 70th birthday of the Algerian revolution, which began in November of the same year. The Algerian and Vietnamese resisted colonial oppression for decades before leading two of the most significant revolutions in the twentieth century, against France (and its local collaborators), which was the second biggest European colonial power in the world at the time and which was also supported by NATO forces. No discussion of decolonisation and anti-imperialism can be complete without understanding the importance of Vietnam and Algeria, and how their revolutionary liberation struggles were (and continue to be) so inspiring to oppressed people all over the world, including the Palestinians.
No one revolution exactly resembles another. This is because all revolutions are rooted in a specific national or regional history, are led by particular social and generational forces, and happen at a given moment in the development of a country. However, revolutions all share a common element, without which they would not be called revolutions: the arrival of a new bloc of classes who take up leadership of the state, or the transition from colonial dependence to national independence. In Lenin’s words (external link), ‘For a revolution to take place, it is usually insufficient for the lower classes not to want to live in the old way; it is also necessary that the upper classes should be unable to live in the old way.’ Despite all the elements that might point to continuity, it is this rupture that marks a revolutionary change.
Against this backdrop and understanding, my objectives in this longread are five-fold:
To share some historical reflections on the Algerian and Vietnamese anti-colonial struggles, so as to bring to light important chapters in anti-colonial history.
To draw connections and parallels between the two struggles, and between them and the ongoing Palestinian liberation struggle, to understand how Palestinians have been inspired by both struggles and at the same time themselves continue to inspire the world with their resolute resistance to Zionist settler-colonialism.
To challenge and debunk attempts to portray a false equivalence between colonisers and those who are colonised.
To highlight transnational solidarities between those who are oppressed and colonised.
To firmly place the Palestinian resistance and liberation struggle within the long line of anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggles going back to the Haitian struggle at the end of the eighteenth century and start of the nineteenth century, when Haitian slaves rebelled against the French empire and established the first Black republic (James 2001)
Colonialism Denies the Colonised Their Own History, National Liberation Re-invents it
National liberation, national renaissance, the restoration of nationhood to the people, commonwealth: whatever may be the headings used or the new formulas introduced, decolonisation is always a violent phenomenon
Frantz Fanon, 1961 (Fanon 1967)
The Algerian independence struggle against French colonialists was one of the most inspiring anti-imperialist revolutions of the twentieth century. It was part of the wave of decolonisation that started after the Second World War in India, China, Cuba, Vietnam and many countries in Africa. It inscribed itself in the spirit of the Bandung Conference and the era of the ‘awakening of the South’, a South that has been subjected for decades (and in many cases for more than a century) to imperialist and capitalist domination under different forms, from protectorates to proper settler colonies (as was the case for Algeria).
Retrospectively, French colonisation of Algeria can be seen as unique, as Algeria was the first Arabic-speaking country to be annexed by the West and one of the first countries in Africa to be officially subjugated by a Western empire, long before the Berlin Conference in 1884, when different European empires (British, French, German, Belgian, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese) met to carve up the continent amongst themselves.
France invaded Algeria in June 1830. The French army was to spend the next 50 years suppressing an insurgency, 15 of them fighting the brilliant, fierce and dedicated resistance leader Abd-El-Kader. France’s war of conquest was conducted without let-up, especially under the command of the ruthless Marshal Bugeaud, who adopted a scorched earth policy (Fisk 2005), committing atrocities ranging from population displacement to land expropriation, massacres, and the infamous enfumades, where the French army eliminated whole tribes through asphyxiation.1
Alongside Marshal Bugeaud’s “pacification” campaign, France actively encouraged colonisation of Algeria by its own population. In a statement before the National Assembly in 1840 Bugeaud said: ‘Wherever there is fresh water and fertile land, there one must locate colons [settlers], without concerning oneself to whom those lands belong’. (This is exactly the approach the Zionists were to apply in Palestine, a century later). By 1841, the number of such colons/settlers already totalled 37,374, in comparison with approximately 3 million indigènes (native peoples) (Horne 2006). By 1926, the number of settlers had reached some 833,000, 15% of the population, and it increased to just under 1 million by 1954.
Colonisation involved the expropriation of the basic factor of production, land, from the indigenous peasantry and its redistribution to the settlers, destroying the foundation of the peasant subsistence economy (Lacheraf 1965). The rural masses fought the encroachment of the colonial army until 1884, but the core of the Algerian rural resistance to colonialism was smashed in 1871, when the big politico-agrarian revolt that had spread over three-quarters of the country was finally crushed. This historic peasant uprising was a reaction to a series of disastrous confiscatory measures during the 1860s that outraged the majority of rural Algerians and led them to fear for their lives and livelihoods. Their situation was made worse by drought, harvest failures, famine, locust invasions and disease, which resulted in the deaths of more than 500,000 victims (around one-fifth of the population). In the period between 1830 and 1870 it is estimated that several million Algerians died (Bennoune 1988, Davis 2007 and Lacheraf 1965).
The Egyptian Marxist Samir Amin has described how the Algerian rural population transformed the colonial conquest into a protracted and devastating war: ‘The collapse of the regency government and the war of extermination undertaken by the French army gave this early period (1830–1884) certain special characteristics, which are not found elsewhere … faced with military power, the urban ruling class was thrown into thorough disarray and could think of no other alternative but flight … as for the peasants, flight was out of the question. Faced with the threat of extermination, they turned the Algerian countryside into the terrain for a fifty-year war which claimed millions of victims‘(Amin 1970).
French colonial rule in Algeria lasted for 132 years (in comparison to 75 years of colonial rule in Tunisia and 44 in Morocco), having a duration and a depth that was unique in the experiences of colonialism in both Africa and the Arab world. In 1881, Algeria was administered for the first time as an integral part of France. With this extension of civilian rule to the country came the application of second-class status to Algeria’s Muslim population. The exclusion of Muslims was reflected at all levels of political representation, anti-Muslim discrimination was built into the electoral system, and the inferior status of Muslims was inscribed in law under the loathsome Code de l’Indigénat of 1881 (McDougall 2006).
After the French success in violently suppressing Algeria’s anti-colonial rebellions, the last of which took place in the 1870s and 1880s, over half a century was to pass before the Algerian resistance movement once again took up the fight, in the shape of Algerian nationalism in its modern form.
8 May 1945: ‘Victory in Europe Day’ and massacres in Algeria
It was at Setifthat my sense of humanity was affronted for the first time by the most atrocious sights. I was sixteen years old. The shock which I felt at the pitiless butchery that caused the deaths of thousands of Muslims, I have never forgotten. From that moment, my nationalism took definite form
Kateb Yacine, Algerian writer and poet (quoted in Horne, 2006)
On 8 May 1945 there were joyful celebrations across Europe as news spread of the Nazi capitulation. France rejoiced at being delivered from a five-year occupation. At precisely the same time, events in Algeria began that would lead to the colonial massacre of thousands of Algerian Muslims over the next two months.
On Victory in Europe Day, while Europeans celebrated, Algerians marched in Setif for independence and an end to colonisation, deploying banners bearing slogans such as ‘For the Liberation of the People, Long Live Free and Independent Algeria!’ They also brandished for the first time what would later become the flag of the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) liberation movement. The French colonial authorities violently repressed the march, triggering a rebellion that led to the murder of 103 Europeans.
The colonial retaliation to these murders was savage. The French military (air, navy and army) bombed several regions, and burnt and razed many villages to the ground in Setif, Guelma and Kherrata. Over the space of two months, the French gendarmerie2 and troops, alongside vengeful settlers, slaughtered tens of thousands of Algerian Muslims, with some estimates as high as 45,000.
The parallels between the Setif, Guelma and Kherrata massacres and the 7 October 2023 Al-Aqsa Flood operation by the Palestinian resistance against Israel, and the pitiless genocidal butchery that followed it, is too stark to ignore. In both cases, resistance whether peaceful or violent, was entirely disallowed, and aspirations for self-determination were crushed with grossly disproportionate force.
At the time (in 1945), one analyst, trying to explain the ‘barbarism’ of the colonised and to justify France’s bloody repression, wrote: ‘The call to violence raises from the mountains a kind of evil genie, a wild and cruel Berber Caliban, whose movements can only be stopped by a force greater than his own. This is the historical and social explanation for the events that took place in Sétif on the very day that victory was celebrated‘ (Gresh 2023).
The same supremacist colonial mindset and the same racist, orientalist and essentialist explanations of why the oppressed and colonised revolt persist today: the Palestinian attacks on 7 October are often put down to the pure evil, irrational savagery and timeless barbarism of medieval and sub-human terrorists, far removed from the political context of more than 75 years of settler colonialism, apartheid and occupation.
The massacres that followed the demonstrations of 8 May 1945 had significant repercussions for the Algerian nationalist movement. For the young generation of militants, the Algerian war had already started and the preparation for armed struggle could no longer be postponed. Most historians agree that the massacres of 1945 were traumatic, marking every Algerian Muslim who lived through the period. Moreover, every Algerian nationalist who was prominent in the FLN traces their revolutionary determination back to May 1945. It will not be surprising if future generations of Palestinian and Arab revolutionaries (of all political tendencies) trace their commitment to liberatory struggle to the genocide that followed the 7 October attacks and the heroic resistance in Gaza, which continues at the time of writing.
Ahmed Ben Bella, an FLN leader and head of the Algerian state from 1962 to 1965, had been a much-decorated sergeant in the 7th Regiment of Algerian Tirailleurs, a unit that distinguished itself in battle in Europe. But it was the events of 1945 that launched him on the path of revolution. He later wrote: ‘The horrors of the Constantine area in May 1945 succeeded in persuading me of the only path: Algeria for the Algerian.’ Similarly, for Mohammed Boudiaf, another revolutionary FLN leader and also a future head of state, the colonial massacres of 1945 led him to reject electoral politics and assimilation and to embrace armed resistance and direct action as the only way to achieve liberation (Evans & Phillips 2007).
The traumatic events of 1945 were the first volleys in the Algerian struggle for independence.
Vietnam’s victory is Algeria’s inspiration
Our actions aim to take the war to them, to let the whole world know that the Algerian people are leading a war of liberation against their European occupiers
The Algerian struggle for independence cannot be divorced from the global context of decolonisation. In 1945, the Arab League was formed, committed to Arab unity. In 1947, India won independence from Britain. In 1949, the Chinese Maoist revolution defeated the Nationalists of Chiang Kai-shek and established the People’s Republic of China. 1955 saw the rise of Arab nationalism/Nasserism and the holding of the Bandung Conference in Indonesia, where 29 non-aligned countries from Africa and Asia challenged colonialism and neocolonialism in a context of Cold War tensions.
The FLN leaders were under no illusion about the scale of the task confronting them, but their confidence was bolstered by the humiliating French defeat in Indochina in May 1954. As Frantz Fanon explained, the great victory of the Vietnamese people at Dien Bien Phu was no longer, strictly speaking, just a Vietnamese victory: ‘Since July 1954, the question which the colonized peoples have asked themselves has been “What must be done to bring about another Dien Bien Phu? How can we manage it?”’ (Fanon 1967).
Fanon was fascinated by what the Vietnamese had achieved at Dien Bien Phu. In his view, the Vietnamese victory over the French in this remote Southeast Asian valley had demonstrated that the colonised could generate the revolutionary violence needed to force decolonisation on the coloniser. News of the Vietnamese victory quickly reverberated across the French empire, shattering the myth of the coloniser’s invincibility and initiating cracks in the empire’s structure. The importance of Dien Bien Phu and its impact on the psyche of colonised people can hardly be overstated. Benyoucef Ben Khedda, president of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic, recalled: ‘In 7th May 1954, the army of Ho Chi Minh inflicted on the French expeditionary corps the humiliating disaster of Dien Bien Phu. This French defeat acted as a powerful catalyst on all those who had been thinking that an insurrection in the short term is by now the only remedy, the only possible strategy. … Direct action took precedence over all other considerations and became the priority of priorities‘ (Ben Khedda 1989).
Ferhat Abbas, who became the first acting president of the newly independent Algerian Republic, cast the Vietnamese victory at Dien Bien Phu in epoch-changing terms, considering it as significant as the French revolutionary army’s victory over the Prussians in the historic battle of Valmy in 1792: ‘Dien Bien Phu was more than just a military victory. This battle is a symbol. It’s the “Valmy” of the colonised peoples. It’s the affirmation of the Asian and African vis-à-vis the European. It is the confirmation of the universality of human rights. At Dien Bien Phu, the French lost the only source of “legitimation” on which their presence turned, that is the right of the strongest [to rule the weakest]’ (Abbas 1962).
Others have described Dien Bien Phu as the Stalingrad of decolonisation (Meaney 2024).
Holding the Imperial Line and Solidarity Between the Colonised
It is not because the Indo-Chinese has discovered a culture of his own that he is in revolt. It is because “quite simply” it was, in more than one way, becoming impossible for him to breathe
Frantz Fanon (Fanon 1967)
It is hard, at a distance of 70 years, to imagine the impact the first Indochina war, and especially Dien Bien Phu, had on the colonial world, particularly France’s overseas colonies, from Algeria to Senegal and from Morocco to Madagascar. A colonial power had been defeated. A regular army had been beaten!
In the 1940s, during the Second World War, when France was invaded and occupied by Nazi Germany, tens of thousands of Algerians, Moroccans, Senegalese, Vietnamese and others bravely joined the battle for its liberation, which they hoped would in turn lead to their own liberation. But when it finally rose from the ruins, France set about restoring its shattered empire in all its colonial pomp. Despite negotiations in Paris between Jean Sainteny and Ho Chi Minh to find a compromise on the question of post-war Vietnam, and despite the victory of the Left, including the Communists, in the November 1946 French elections, the French government nevertheless decided to reconquer Vietnam. Whether it was led by the right, the centre, or the left, or by forces that were religious or secular, and from one republic to another, France continued to cling to its empire, from the Dien Bien Phu valley to the Kasbah of Algiers (Delanoë 2002).
Following the outbreak of the war in December 1946, from 1947 to 1954, tens of thousands of North Africans were sent to fight for France in Indochina (the figure ultimately reaching 123,000), at a time when their own countries were experiencing the first stirrings of the struggle for independence. Once in Vietnam, hundreds of them deserted and joined the Viet-Minh. In doing so, they were responding to Vietnamese appeals for anti-colonial solidarity (Delanoë 2002). One such appeal was made in a letter a minister in Ho Chi Minh’s government sent to the Moroccan independence leader Abd El-Krim, in exile in Cairo, in early 1949. He wrote: ‘Our struggle is your struggle and your struggle is in no way different from ours. Also, the solidarity of the national liberation movements within the framework of the former French empire is capable of putting a final end to French imperialism. Your Excellency, the government of Ho Chi Minh asks you to use your great spiritual authority to ask the soldiers of North Africa to refuse to leave for Viet Nam, and also asks you to appeal to the dockers to boycott French ships‘ (Saaf 1996).
Abd El-Krim, a revolutionary guerilla leader who had defeated the Spanish army in the epic battle of Annual in 1921 and who had set up the short-lived Republic of the Rif (1921-1926) before being ultimately defeated by the French and Spanish through air raids, gas and napalm bombing, self-propelled guns and tens of thousands of recruits from the Empire (Ayache 1990 and Daoud 1999), replied: ‘The victory of colonialism, even at the other end of the world, is our defeat and the failure of our cause. The victory of freedom anywhere in the world is … the signal of the approach of our independence‘ (Saaf 1996).
The succession of setbacks suffered by the French army in Indochina only heightened awareness of the need for solidarity among colonised people. Responding to this need, Algerian dockers working in the ports Oran and Algiers refused to load war material bound for Indochina (Ruscio 2004).
The Vietnamese also asked Abd El-Krim and the Moroccan Communist Party to send them a North African who could establish a psychological warfare network that would encourage North African troops within the French Expeditionary Corps in the Far East (CEFEO) to desert, rally the Vietnamese, and ultimately return to their home countries to fight the French colonisers. This role was taken on by M’hamed Ben Aomar Lahrach (alias Maarouf). A Moroccan, like Abd El-Krim, Maarouf was a trade unionist and a member of the Moroccan Communist Party (Delanoë 2002). At the end of the 1940s, he travelled to Hanoi. He explained his activities with the North African soldiers who either rallied the Viet Minh or were captured as follows: ‘I try to create real villages for my Arab and Kabyle prisoners, I put them in self-contained huts, I manage to give them a life reminiscent of the country. We mustn’t make these guys Vietnamese; we must repatriate them as quickly as possible! They must remain themselves; they will form the cadres of our liberation armies… I won’t let my Moroccan or Algerian deserters die‘ (Delanoë 2002).
In his appeals to North African soldiers fighting on the French side in Vietnam, and in his political education work with North African captives and rallied soldiers, Maarouf’s message was ‘Go back home: these people, like you in Morocco, are fighting for their independence. … Return home and use your fighting spirit to liberate your country’ (Saaf 1996). Above all, he sought to recuperate North Africans who were being used by the French as cannon fodder, and who found themselves lost in this distant Asian country, with the explicit aim of repatriating them as soon as possible to their own countries.
The effectiveness of Maarouf’s work is best demonstrated by the hundreds of Algerian repatriates who became effective military cadres for the Algerian National Liberation Front starting from 1954/55. Maarouf’s activities were truly heroic; they included participating in the arrest of French General De Castries in Dien Bien Phu. Testifying to the high esteem in which he was held, Ho Chi Minh gave him the name Anh Ma, which literally means ‘Brother Horse’, and the Vietnamese awarded him the rank of general, and decorated him with medals (Saaf 1996 and Delanoë 2002).
For France, Dien Bien Phu became a symbol of anachronistic obstinacy leading to catastrophe. For Vietnam, it was a symbol of the recovery of national independence. But Dien Bien Phu was not just an historical event for these two countries alone: throughout the world, the battle was seen as a turning point that heralded the coming of other battles for liberation. The echo of gunshots had barely subsided in the Tonkin valley before it was heard in the Aurès mountains in Algeria. And within less than a year, the ‘wretched of the earth’ gathered in Bandung (Ruscio 2004). As for the colonialists, De Lattre, France’s commander-in-chief, confided to the officer he had put in charge of creating his Vietnamese army, that they had to hold the imperial line: ‘it’s in Tonkin that we are defending our positions in Africa. Everything must be subordinated to this imperative‘ (Goscha 2022).
Today, it is in Gaza that US-led imperialism seeks to defend its global hegemony.
In the US-Israeli attempt to hold the imperial line in Gaza, they are applying similarly brutal methods to those applied by the French in Vietnam, including starvation of the civilian population. The French focused on breaking the Vietnamese’s access to rice, as part of French General Raoul Salan’s order to ‘Starve the adversary’ (Salan later founded the Organisation Armée Secrète (OAS), a clandestine terrorist organisation that sought to prevent Algerian independence). The use of food as a weapon was by no means new. Imperial armies have practised this form of warfare since antiquity. But the French were the first to apply this approach in a twentieth-century war of decolonisation – with terrible consequences for the Vietnamese. In doing so, they collapsed the dividing line between combatants and civilians, and between the home front and the battle front. This was la guerre totale (total war), as advocated by General Lionel-Max Chassin, commander-in-chief of the French air force in Indochina during the early 1950s. Chassin insisted that this was the only way to win a colonial war, arguing that ‘One must starve people to death’ (Goscha 2022). In 1956, Chassin told his superior that he was ‘convinced that had we killed all of the water buffalos, destroyed all of the rice in Indochina, we would have had the Vietnamese at our mercy whenever we wanted’.
Similar logics prevailed in France’s attempt to ‘pacify’ Algeria between 1954 and 1962, and they are now again at work in Israel’s total war on Gaza. In fact, what is taking place today in Gaza is not just a genocide. Although it is almost impossible to find the right terminology to describe the level of destruction and death Israel is unleashing on Palestinians, a plethora of concepts are now being used to understand the enormity of what is taking place: urbicide, scholasticide, domicide, ecocide, and holocide – the annihilation of an entire social and ecological fabric.
Revolutionary Violence and Urban Guerilla Warfare in a Time of Decolonisation
We are advocates of the abolition of war, we do not want war; but war can only be abolished through war, and in order to get rid of the gun, it is necessary to take up the gun
Mao Zedong (Zedong 1967)
Knowing everything that had happened in our country, it was clear for us there was no option but an armed struggle, and that we had to confront the French, and with violence
Zohra Drif (Drif 2017)
The Indochinese and Algerian wars against French colonialism have become foundational to modern politics in both countries. Both independence struggles were to profoundly shape the character of anti-colonial thought over the subsequent decades.
Christopher Goscha argued in his excellent book The Road to Dien Bien Phu that Ho Chi Minh ended up administering two kinds of wartime states, one capable of holding out against the coloniser, in guerilla form, just as the Algerian FLN were to do in North Africa, the other capable of generating the required military and organisational force needed to defeat a Western colonial army in a set-piece battle, of the kind the Chinese communists had created. Thanks to Chinese military assistance and advisers, instruction in modern military science, and the introduction of the draft and mobilisation laws, the Vietnamese communists presided over a military revolution unknown in any other war of decolonisation in the twentieth century (Goscha 2022). Indeed, the Algerian nationalists were not alone in their inability to transition from guerilla warfare to conventional warfare: in no other twentieth-century war of decolonisation was there to be anything like the People’s Army of Vietnam, and there was never to be another Dien Bien Phu. But that did not mean that colonial powers could not be vanquished in other ways, including guerilla warfare.
The Vietnamese anticolonial fight against the French did not take place independently of other events in Asia. The first Indochina war (1945–1954) was taking place in parallel to the Korean war in a context of an expansion of the Cold War in southeast Asia, where the US saw aiding France as a way to fight the Communists. The resumption of the war in Vietnam in 1960 saw the direct entry of the United State into the fray, with its formidable war technology and its belief that its victory was assured. The United States no longer needed the aid of a third country to inflict decisive blows on the Communists in Asia. The American war against Vietnam was to last 15 years before its ‘invincible armada’ was forced to withdraw without glory, leaving behind a devastated country.
The devastation and violence were not unique to Vietnam’s anti-colonial revolutions. The declaration of war in Algeria on 1 November 1954 also initiated one of the longest and bloodiest wars in the history of decolonisation, replete with merciless atrocities (Stora 2004). The FLN leadership had a realistic appreciation of the military balance of power, which starkly favoured France, whose army was the fourth largest in the world at the time. In response to this reality, their strategy was inspired by Ho Chi Minh’s dictum ‘For every nine of us killed we will kill one – in the end you will leave’. The FLN wanted to create a climate of violence and insecurity that would be ultimately intolerable for the French, to internationalise the conflict, and to bring Algeria to the attention of the world (Evans & Phillips 2007). Following this logic, the revolutionary leaders Abane Ramdane and Larbi Ben M’hidi decided to take guerilla warfare into the country’s urban areas, and specifically to launch the battle of Algiers in September 1956.
There is no better way to fully appreciate this key and dramatic moment of sacrifice in the Algerian revolution than watching the classic realist film by Gillo Pontecorvo, The Battle of Algiers, released in 1966. Initially banned in France, the film powerfully reenacts some of the critical moments of the Algerian resistance in the capital and the French crackdown on it. In one dramatic moment, Colonel Mathieu, a thinly disguised General Massu (who had also fought in the first Indochina War), presents the captured FLN leader Larbi Ben M’Hidi at a press conference, where a journalist questions the morality of hiding bombs in women’s shopping baskets. The journalist asks: ‘Don’t you think it is a bit cowardly to use women’s baskets and handbags to carry explosive devices that kill so many people?’ Ben M’hidi replies: ‘And doesn’t it seem to you even more cowardly to drop napalm bombs on defenceless villages, so that there are a thousand times more innocent victims? Give us your bombers, and you can have our baskets’ (quoted in Fisk 2005).
Djamila Bouhired, a revolutionary icon who has become an inspirational figure in the whole Arab world (especially for Palestinians), as well as beyond, was a key figure in the battle of Algiers and was, alongside Zohra Drif, and Samia Lakhdari and her mother, one of the women who planted bombs across the city. After being captured, raped and severely tortured, she heroically challenged her colonial captors and torturers (external link): ‘I know you will sentence me to death but do not forget that by killing me you will not only assassinate freedom in your country, but you will not prevent Algeria from becoming free and independent.’
Zohra Drif, another heroine of the Algerian War of Independence, well-known for her involvement in the Milk Bar Café bombing in 1956, was an integral part of the FLN’s bombing network in Algiers, working with Ali La Pointe, Djamila Bouhired, Hassiba Ben Bouali and Yacef Saâdi, head of the Autonomous Zone of Algiers. She was eventually captured and was sentenced to 20 years of hard labour by the military tribunal of Algiers for terrorism. Drif was imprisoned in the women’s section of Barbarossa prison. In her memoires, she reflected on the role of Djamila Bouhired: ‘They had their Marianne, we had our Djamila … For colonial France, she was “the soul of terrorism”. For us and for all freedom-loving peoples, she became the soul of liberation and the symbol of Algeria at war, beautiful and rebellious’ (Drif 2017).
Bouhired’s heroic struggle, courage, abnegation, sumud (steadfastness) and sacrifice still reverberate in Palestine and still feed the beating heart and inspire the language and imaginaries of resistance, revolution and the struggle for liberation. Bouhired’s mantle was taken up by the Palestinian freedom fighter Leila Khaled, alongside many others.
The urban revolt in Algiers was eventually crushed without mercy, through the resort to torture on a systematic scale to extract information, including fitting electrodes to genitals (Alleg 1958). By October 1957, the FLN network in Algiers was dismantled, after the blowing up of the last remaining leader Ali La Pointe along with Little Omar, Hassiba Ben Bouali, and Hamid Bouhamidi, in their hiding place in the Casbah. Despite this military loss, the FLN had scored a diplomatic victory: France was isolated internationally because of the scandalous methods of repression it used.
The Algerian experience of urban warfare as part of a decolonisation struggle was not an unprecedented one. Over a decade before the FLN set off bombs in Algiers, the Vietnamese had already fought major urban battles in Saigon, Haiphong and Hanoi. They too were brutal affairs, with the French using tanks, artillery and bombers to blast Vietnamese urban positions. Like the Casbah in Algiers, the Old Quarter of Hanoi was ground zero for the battle for that city (1946–1947). During the fighting, the commander-in-chief of France’s Expeditionary Corps in Indochina, General Jean Vally, instructed his subordinates to ‘hit them hard with the cannon and the bomb….in order to put an end to the resistance and to prove to our adversary the overwhelming superiority of our capabilities’ (Goscha 2022). By the end of the battle, Hanoi’s ‘Casbah’ lay in ruins.
The level of violence inflicted by the French across the Red River Plain and the rest of upper Vietnam from January 1951 until mid-1954 had no equivalent in the preceding history of twentieth-century wars of decolonisation. Among the Vietnamese there were more than a million dead, and hundreds of thousands wounded, including victims of torture, while the losses of the French Expeditionary Corps amounted to 130,000 men. Similarly staggering levels of violence were reached in Algeria. Official estimates suggest a million and a half Algerians were killed in the eight-year war that ended in 1962. A quarter of the population (2.35 million) were confined in concentration camps, at least 3 million people (half the rural population) were displaced, around 8,000 villages were destroyed or burned, hundreds of thousands of hectares of forests were burned or defoliated by napalm bombs, cultivable lands were either sown with mines or declared ‘prohibited zones’, and the country’s livestock was decimated (Bourdieu and Sayad 1964; Bennoune 1973).
In both cases (Algeria and Vietnam), the coloniser’s dirty work of vengeance against the colonised’s daring acts of resistance involved furthering and entrenching the dehumanisation of the ‘other’ and casting hate in racialised terms. For the French and their allies, the Vietnamese and the Algerians were no longer a people, they were bandits, criminals and terrorists. One young French soldier who lost a confidant in Vietnam explained what he wanted to do to the Vietnamese: ‘We have to destroy all of them, without any pity for them, they’re real savages’ (Goscha 2022). The practice of torture was endemic within the French army years before French paratroopers ever set foot in Algiers. The same mechanisms and tactics of dehumanisation are now being used by Israel in Palestine, with Israeli generals, officials and media figures describing Palestinians as ‘human animals’, ‘rats’, ‘barbarians’, and ‘terrorists’ to justify their war crimes, torture and genocidal massacres. Colonialism, and its racialisation strategies, has not ended yet.
In Vietnam, Algeria and Palestine, it is not just the armed forces of the colonial powers that have applied these strategies: the colonists/settlers themselves have also played a role. When the elite paratroopers brought in by the French government to crush the uprising in Algiers, marched down the main street of the city, throngs of ecstatic French settlers came out to greet them. Similar scenes took place in Saigon in 1946 when settlers turned out in droves to welcome the soldiers liberating them from ‘native’ rule (Goscha 2022). In both cases, there was a close alliance between the army and the settler communities, which acquiesced in the colonial violence and cruel repression. Likewise, today, Israeli settler society is overwhelmingly in support of the Israeli military’s genocide in Gaza and pursuit of a full-blown war in the whole region. Countless videos and images show Israelis cheering and celebrating the death of Palestinians and explaining how they would like to see them disappear from the lands they have taken away from them.
Palestine: Taking up the mantle of anti-colonial revolution
What am I driving at? At this idea: that no one colonizes innocently, that no one colonizes with impunity either; that a nation which colonizes, that a civilization which justifies colonization—and therefore force—is already a sick civilization, a civilization that is morally diseased…
Aimé Césaire(Césaire 2000)
We remembered all the miseries, all the injustices, our people and the conditions they lived, the coldness with which world opinion looks at our cause, and so we felt that we will not permit them to crush us. We will defend ourselves and our revolution by every way and every means
What do the Algerian and Vietnamese struggles have to do with the Palestinian struggle today? The answer is that the Palestinian liberation struggle must be uncompromisingly situated within the long line of anti-colonial revolutionary efforts. Despite their own specificities and differences, these three struggles need to be understood as such: as anti-colonial struggles for liberation. At the same time, the events in Palestine, including the current genocide, also demonstrate that the colonial world has not yet been fully dismantled.
The sections below focus on the intersections between the Palestinian liberation struggle and its Algerian and Vietnamese counterparts.
Palestine and Algeria: two sisters in the Arab world
I travelled on an Algerian airplane under Algerian protection as if I was an Algerian envoy, not just a Palestinian one. [Boumediene] wanted to tell the world that Palestinian envoy Yasser Arafat wasn’t coming alone but with Algeria by his side
For obvious reasons, there are multiple connections between the Palestinian and Algerian revolutionary liberation struggles. One of them is the deeply racist, inhumane and genocidal settler-colonial experience both nations have been subjected to, uniquely within the Arab region. Sharing this common experience, Palestinian revolutionaries look up to their Algerian brothers and sisters, while the Algerians see in the Palestinian resistance and revolutionary efforts a mirror image of their revolution against the French colonialists. The Algerian FLN inspired the Palestinian strategy of armed struggle (external link) and the union of different political groups under a common banner. It therefore comes as no surprise that the Algerians have assisted the Palestinians since the 1960s in every realm: diplomatic backing, military assistance, and the provision of weapons and financing.
For a big part of the ‘Third World’, especially those countries that were still under the grip of colonial domination, Algeria’s liberation in 1962 provided hope and a model to follow. Its capital Algiers became a Mecca for revolutionaries from all over the world – from Vietnam to Palestine to southern Africa – who desired to bring down the imperialist and colonial order. The 1964 charter of Algiers declared Algeria’s support for the ‘struggles of other people in the world’, including ‘armed struggle’ (Deffarge & Troeller 1972), and independent Algeria went on to provide asylum and financial support to movements all over the world fighting for independence and against racism, colonialism and imperialism.
In the Arab world, the new regime in Algeria established ties with the Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser, and was firmly part of the anti-colonial wave that chased out the French and the British after their pitiful adventure in the Suez in 1956, and which included independence in Tunisia and Morocco also in 1956, and the overthrow of the monarchies in Iraq (1958) and Northern Yemen (1962). In this period, the Palestinians also initiated their first actions to put their country back on the political map, from which it had been removed (Gresh 2012).
The Palestinian liberation movement actively engaged with Algeria in the years after its independence in 1962, at a time when the country was a meeting point for various Afro-Asian liberation movements. The Palestinian writer and politician Muhammad Abu Meizar, who joined Fatah (the Palestinian National Liberation Movement) in 1962, has described how the first Palestinian meeting with the Cuban revolution took place in 1964, when Che Guevara travelled to Algiers. Palestinians at this time were establishing relations with various liberation movements from Africa, Asia and Latin America. It was also from Algeria that the first Palestinian delegation travelled to China in 1965.
Abu Meizar (external link) describes Algeria’s support to the Palestinian struggle at this time: ‘through Algeria, several interactions took place with liberation movements, the Vietnamese, the Chinese, African movements, it was a meeting place. Algeria also hosted one of the most important institutions, the Cherchell Military Academy, where many Palestinians were enrolled. Until that time Fatah had not fired its first shot. However, through Algeria, it made connections with the Moroccans, the Tunisians, the Africans, the Vietnamese, the Chinese, Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Cuba. These were not minor relationships, they were extremely precious, and valuable.’
The Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) opened its office in Algeria in 1965. Its first chairman (1964–1967), Ahmad al-Shukeiri, was known for his ardent support for the Algerian cause: As a representative of Saudi Arabia and then Syria at the United Nations in New York, he played an active role in defending the Algerian revolution from 1955 till 1962, during annual sessions and special meetings. Algeria repaid the debt in kind: the first public support for the Palestinian revolution from any government was from Algeria. It took the form of the cover page of the official newspaper Al-Moudjahid, on 1 January 1965, which bore an article titled ‘The Revolutionaries of the 1st of November Salute the Revolutionaries of the 1st of January’.
During this time, Fatah opened a training camp for Palestinian fighters in Algeria, outside the framework of the Cherchell Military Academy, in coordination with the Algerian Joint Forces Command. A large number of Palestinian volunteers from Europe and the Maghreb, and even from the USA, trained there, some of whom went on to conduct resistance operations, becoming themselves symbols of the liberation struggle, such as Mahmoud al-Hamshari, Ghazi al-Husseini and Abdullah Franji.
Abu Meizar (external link) described Algeria’s support to the Palestinian armed struggle: ‘[In 1967 [w]e secured the first weapons shipment from Algeria to Fatah, with the delivery facilitated by Mohammad Ibrahim al-Ali [Commander of the Syrian Popular Army]. The first plane flew to Damascus loaded with weapons for Fateh. … This was our first weapons deal, but it should be remembered that in the days of Boumediene in 1966, the first official financial support was offered by the Algerian government to Fatah.’
Yasser Arafat, chairman of the PLO from 1969 to 2004, always acknowledged Algeria’s uncompromising and unshakable solidarity with the Palestinian cause, as well as its firm support for pan-Arab war efforts against the Zionist entity. For example, he explained how Algerian President Houari Boumediene sent forces to Egypt to fight in the 1967 Arab–Israeli war. Boumediene also went to Cairo and Damascus to ask what they needed for the war effort, and thereafter visited the Soviet Union to request they send Egypt and Syria tanks and weapons to replace those they had lost. Arafat recounted (external link) the negotiations between Boumediene and the Soviets at this time: ‘They told him they needed more time, and he said if by time they meant money then Algeria would pay. He immediately paid the Soviet Union 200 million dollars which would amount to 2 billion dollars today. He paid to make the Soviet Union expedite the delivery of weapons to Egypt and Syria. No one can forget this.’
After the Naksa (defeat) of 1967, Boumediene declared:
‘History will judge us as traitors and losers … if we accept the defeat … The Arab nation will not kneel. If Israel thinks that it captured the Sinai, the Golan and the west bank, it knows that the Arab depth reaches Algeria … Algeria cannot accept the defeat. Is the Arab nation using all its tremendous human resources? Is it using all the tremendous physical energies it has today … to say that it lost the battle. … The battle is not just a Palestinian battle. It is true that we are far geographically, but we have a role to play.’(Boumaza 2015)
The Algerian troops Boumediene sent remained in Egypt to defend its borders until the 1973 Arab–Israeli war, during which they fought alongside Palestinian troops on the Suez front.
Finally, Algeria’s active support for the Palestinian liberation struggle was also seen in the choice of its capital Algiers as the site for the Declaration of Independence of the State of Palestine in November 1988, announced during the 19th session of the Palestine National Council.
Every day in Gaza there’s another Kham Thien
Like Palestine and Algeria, Palestine and Vietnam have a long history of fraternity. Vietnam’s fight for liberation, which pitted it first against France and then against the United States, inspired Palestinians in their struggle against Israel’s occupation of their lands.
One of the similarities in the Palestinian and Vietnamese struggles is their use of tunnels as a guerilla tactic against a superior and better equipped army. Perhaps inspired by the Chinese communists’ use of tunnels against the Japanese invaders, the Vietnamese first began digging their extensive network of tunnels during the 1940s, to hide from and launch attacks against French colonial troops. The 150-mile-long Cu Chi tunnels, located northwest of Saigon (Ho Chi Minh City), were a strategic stronghold for the Communist guerilla troops, known as Viet Cong (external link). They played a crucial role in the resistance against the American war on Vietnam, including acting as the base of operations for the Tet Offensive in 1968. Today, both the Palestinian and Lebanese resistance movements are using tunnels in their fight against Israel. The tunnels in Gaza serve as a base for the Palestinian resistance, which has used them to inflict significant losses on the Israeli military.
Another parallel between Palestine’s experience and that of Vietnam is the degree of destruction wreaked by their powerful oppressors. For Vietnamese, Israel’s destruction of Gaza today recalls the US bombing raids (external link) in 1972. Then-US President Richard Nixon ordered the bombing of the North Vietnamese capital Hanoi over Christmas 1972. Starting on 18 December and lasting for 12 consecutive days and nights, about 20,000 tonnes of bombs were dropped on Hanoi, as well as on the busy northern port city of Hai Phong and other localities. Hanoi’s Kham Thien neighbourhood suffered the most severe devastation.
These links between Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza and the US war on Vietnam are now being clearly articulated by young Vietnamese activists to introduce the Palestinian cause to new audiences (Dang 2024). The historical echoes of the two wars, including images of the destruction of urban centres (Gaza and Kham Thien), alongside the aggressor states’ violent threats – with Israel declaring it would ‘flatten Gaza’ and the United States declaring it would ‘bomb North Vietnam back to the Stone Age (external link)’ – form part of a reservoir of shared symbols that point to a common history of colonial wars and anti-colonial revolutionary resistance. This shared experience is fuelling a renewed sense of transnational solidarities between the formerly oppressed and currently oppressed peoples.
These solidarities, which are now being renewed, actually go back many years: Vietnam’s support for the Palestinian people and their struggle for liberation was unwavering during the Cold War and into the 1990s. This is undoubtedly because of the belief among the Vietnamese leadership that the Palestinian cause mirrored their own fight for unification and independence against foreign powers. The PLO established relations with North Vietnam in 1968 and set up a resident representative office after the end of the war in Vietnam in 1975. The office soon became the embassy of Palestine in Vietnam. In the 1990s, Vietnam welcomed Palestinian leaders, including Yasser Arafat, on many occasions. On the Palestinian side, the bonds of friendship between the two countries were summed up by Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish (external link) in 1973, as the war in Vietnam entered its final phase with the signing of the Paris Peace Accords:‘In the conscience of the peoples of the world, the torch has been passed from Vietnam to us.’ The PLO was among the small minority of groups and countries of the Global South that openly condemned China for its invasion of Vietnam in 1979.
The Battle is Long, and the Road is Hard
When the prison doors are opened, the real dragon will fly out
Ho Chi Minh (Minh 1967)
A freedom fighter learns the hard way that it is the oppressor who defines the nature of the struggle, and the oppressed is often left no recourse but to use methods that mirror those of the oppressor
Nelson Mandela (Mandela 1994)
Gaza was and will remain the capital of steadfastness, the heart of Palestine that does not stop beating even if the world closes in around us. …So hold on to the land as firmly as roots cling to the soil, for no wind can uproot a people who have chosen to live
In the preceding sections I have argued that the Palestinian liberation struggle needs to be (re)situated within the long trajectory of anti-colonial/anti-imperialist/anti-apartheid struggles, and of decolonisation, including the liberation struggles of Haiti, Vietnam, Cuba, Algeria, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde and South Africa. It is therefore a struggle that should be supported, not demonised. But, as Edward Said once wrote (external link), ‘Palestine is the cruellest, most difficult cause to uphold, not because it is unjust, but because it is just and yet dangerous to speak about…’ Nevertheless, in these times of genocide, we cannot afford to be silent: we must speak about Palestine as honestly and concretely as possible.’
The decolonisation of Palestine would entail the end of occupation, the liquidation of the apartheid regime and the dismantling of Israel as a settler-colonial project. All anti-colonial revolutionaries (whatever their ideology, whether communist, nationalist, religious conservative etc.) have been described by the colonisers and oppressors as terrorists, savages and barbarians. And all colonial powers have responded with savagery and inhumanity to acts of resistance by the oppressed and colonised. It is therefore time we stop entertaining any false equivalence (external link) between the legitimate violence (and right to resist) of the oppressed and colonised (fighting for their own liberation) and the infinitely greater violence of the oppressors and colonisers, which is used solely to enforce an unjust and cruel status quo. The Guyanese revolutionary Walter Rodney articulated this in the following powerful words:
We were told that violence in itself is evil, and that, whatever the cause, it is unjustified morally. By what standard of morality can the violence used by a slave to break his chains be considered the same as the violence of a slave master? By what standards can we equate the violence of blacks who have been oppressed, suppressed, depressed and repressed for four centuries with the violence of white fascists? Violence aimed at the recovery of human dignity and at equality cannot be judged by the same yardstick as violence aimed at maintenance of discrimination and oppression
(Rodney 1969)
In spite of all the horror, apocalyptic destruction and mass slaughter witnessed in Israel’s genocidal assault on Gaza over the last year, by carrying out the 7 October Toufan Al-Aqsa attacks, the Palestinian liberation movement began what may come to be seen as the beginning of the end of Israel’s settler-colonial regime (Pappé 2024). Moreover, despite the targeted assassinations of Hamas and Hezbollah leaders, the resistance forces remain intact and steadfast in the field of battle. Although it is too early to say for sure, what is now taking place in Palestine and Lebanon could turn out to be, like the 8 May 1945 events in Algeria, the first episode in a protracted people’s war to dismantle a settler colony. Hamas has shattered the myth of Israel’s invincibility, and through its heroic resistance in Gaza right now, is asserting itself as the leader of the Palestinian resistance to occupation, apartheid and settler-colonialism, garnering huge sympathy from all over the Arab world and beyond. The unfolding asymmetrical war is not simply a war between Hamas and Israel, it is a Palestinian war of liberation.It is also already a regional war, since Israel and its Western allies (chiefly the US and the UK) are fighting with varying degrees of intensity on five fronts: Gaza/West Bank, Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq/Syria, and Iran.
We need to remember that armed struggle is necessary under certain conditions, and this is the case for occupied Palestine in its struggle against Zionist settler-colonialism. However, it is crucial to subordinate armed struggle to a broader range of revolutionary politics, to ensure it does not become arbitrary or random in its choice of targets. In such an approach, armed struggle can be understood as a tool for mobilising political support and not as a tactic that repels/alienates potential allies. Efficient resistance, as the Pakistani revolutionary scholar Eqbal Ahmad saw it, therefore needs a flexible strategy that mixes different militant and political tactics, based on the position the enemy occupies and the broader political context. In this understanding, violence and nonviolence should not be considered as mutually exclusive strategies standing in a binary opposition, with oppressed peoples needing to choose one or the other. Thus, our analysis of political violence must diverge (external link) from the purely normative/moralistic grounds on which some leftist condemnations of Hamas’s violence are based. Moreover, dismissing anti-colonial resistance because it is Islamist reflects the deeply rooted scourge of Islamophobia, which has unfortunately been internalised by some sections of the Euro-American left.
Since its earliest days, the Palestinian liberation movement has understood the necessity of armed resistance in the face of a cruelly violent colonial, apartheid and occupying regime. At the same time, like its brothers and sisters in Algeria and Vietnam, it also knows that defeating, militarily, a highly sophisticated military power (backed by the US-led imperialist bloc) is an insurmountable task. To succeed and achieve its goals, the Palestinian armed struggle therefore needs to be firmly grounded in a broader revolutionary political strategy and led by a united anti-colonial front.
The truth of this proposition can be illustrated by the Algerian case, and specifically by the approach implemented by Abane Ramdane. Dubbed the architect of the Algerian independence struggle, Ramdane worked to organise the various political and military structures of the Algerian revolution and to create a stronger united front working with other political forces, specifically through the Congress of Soummam in August 1956 (Harbi 2024). It was Ramdane, alongside other brothers in arms, who emphasised the primacy of political action over military operations, but it was also Ramdane who insisted on taking the war to the capital Algiers, in the Battle of Algiers. The Algerian FLN did not win the war against the French militarily, but they did win the more decisive political and diplomatic battles, in terms of isolating and delegitimising the French colonial regime and building strong alliances in the international scene, including at the Bandung Conference in 1955, at pan-African fora, in Europe and at the UN General Assembly in the following years.
Obviously, the global political context has changed dramatically since the 1950s and 1960s. We are no longer living in the era of national liberation and Third-Worldism. Much worse, ours is an era in which international law is openly trampled upon by the most powerful, and in which the Western liberal establishment of human rights and democracy (political, intellectual, cultural and media) is collapsing in front of our eyes and showing its true genocidal and white-supremacist colours. The regional arena is no better: Palestine finds itself surrounded by reactionary and traitorous Arab regimes who have sold out the Palestinian cause to the US and Israel. This extremely challenging climate must be considered when seeking to devise an effective political strategy that can unite the Palestinian anti-colonial forces and efficiently articulate revolutionary tasks at the national, regional and international levels. As part of such a multi-tiered strategy, strengthening Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) efforts is of paramount importance.
Gaza has awakened the world, and Palestine has become the quintessential defining struggle of our times. Palestine is the litmus test for progressive movements and organisations, and it is also a test for each and every one of us. As has been cogently argued by Adam Hanieh, the Palestine liberation struggle is not merely a moral and a human rights issue: it is fundamentally a struggle against US-led imperialism and global fossil capitalism, given that the two pillars of US hegemony in the region and beyond are Israel, a Euro-American settler colony, and the reactionary fossil fuel-rich Gulf monarchies, which are a key nodal point in global fossil capitalism. Palestine is thus a global front against colonialism, imperialism, fossil capitalism, and white supremacy. In this respect, the success of struggles (albeit suppressed and defeated for now) to overthrow the regional reactionary Arab regimes – chiefly the Gulf monarchies, and Egypt and Jordan – is essential for the victory of the Palestinian struggle. At the same time, what Israel’s genocidal war has also revealed, beyond the vacuity of the rule-based international (dis)order, is the moral and political bankruptcy of the Arab regimes, some of which gesticulate while doing nothing, and some of which are actively complicit in Zionist crimes (especially the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and Morocco). This fact has become starkly clear to Arab populations over the last year. This could consolidate their resolve to overthrow these regimes in the coming years (remembering that the Sudanese and Algerian revolutionary slogans of 2018 and 2019 were ‘Let them all fall’).
The stubborn attempts by the French and their allies to hold the imperial line in Indochina in the 1940s and 1950s in order to defend their positions in Africa are mirrored today in the actions of the US, Israel and their allies to hold the imperial line in Palestine and the wider Middle East region against the axis of Resistance, represented by the Islamic Republic of Iran, Hezbollah and its sister organisations in the Lebanese resistance, alongside Hamas and its partners in the Palestinian resistance, as well as by Ansar Allah (known as the Houthis) in the Yemeni government and an assortment of Iraqi resistance groups. It thus becomes clear that for anti-imperialist forces globally, striking imperialism in Palestine and the Middle East is of utmost strategic importance to serve the world revolution, to borrow the words of the Palestinian revolutionary intellectual, poet and political activist Ghassan Kanafani that were quoted at the start of this article.
My purpose throughout this contribution has not been to uncritically glorify or romanticise the various revolutions and forces of anti-colonial resistance, as these have all had their own problems, contradictions, shortcomings and failings. Moreover, the ‘post-colonial’ realities in the ‘independent’ countries that are the focus of this longread point to the pitfalls of national consciousness and the bankruptcy of certain national bourgeoisies, which were masterfully described by Fanon in his Wretched of the Earth. However, rather than adopting a nihilist stance and retrospectively pronouncing these revolutionary efforts not worthwhile, we need to see revolutions as ongoing long-term processes, with ebbs and flows, rather than as events that either succeed or fail at one particular moment.
To make an adequate materialist assessment of revolutionary struggles, it is also important to simultaneously consider the national, regional and international dimensions of such struggles. Transnational solidarity between oppressed and colonised peoples has been, and continues to be, a driving force in changing the world. We are currently witnessing the power and the significance of such South-South solidarity, in the form of Southern countries’ commitment to the Palestinian cause and efforts to isolate the criminal settler regime of Israel. South Africa’s case against Israel for breaching the Genocide Convention at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is one such effort, and it is an historic development: African men and women (with their allies) are shaking white-supremacy and colonialism and, to borrow the words of UN Special Rapporteur Francesca Albanese (external link), ‘fighting to save humanity & the international legal system against the ruthless attacks supported/enabled by most of the West’. Watching them wage this fight ‘will remain one of the defining images of our time. … [it] will make history whatever happens.’ At the Hague we saw representatives of the nation that suffered from, and defeated, apartheid standing up for basic human decency, justice and solidarity, and extending their hand to another nation that is undergoing and resisting colonial oppression and genocide while asserting their rights for freedom and justice. The South (whatever its imperfections and contradictions) is teaching the ‘human-rights- and democracy-loving’ North a lesson in political morality. In their actions, the heirs of Mandela are honouring his memory and underlining the truth of his words: ‘…we know too well that our freedom is incomplete without the freedom of the Palestinians’.3
Many countries in the Global South are supporting South Africa’s case. They include Turkey, Indonesia, Jordan, Brazil, Colombia, Bolivia, Pakistan, Namibia, the Maldives, Malaysia, Cuba, Mexico, Libya, Egypt, Nicaragua, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (made up of 57 members), and the Arab League (made up of 22 members). In contrast, Western powers (the US, UK, Canada, and Germany) back Israel. Germany received a strong rebuke from Namibia, its former colony, shaming its stance of defending Israel’s genocide in Gaza and not learning from its murderous history of committing two genocides in the twentieth century (the genocide of the Herero and Namaqua in Namibia and the Holocaust in Europe). Moreover, Chile and Mexico have called on the International Criminal Court (ICC) to investigate war crimes committed by Israel in Gaza. This, alongside a dozen countries cutting diplomatic ties with Israel and moves by Colombia (and potentially South Africa) to ban exports of coal to Israel, points to a clear demarcation line between North and South (albeit with some unsustainable contradictions, especially when it comes to countries like Jordan and Egypt). These developments strengthen the trend of a move towards a multi-polar world where the South asserts itself politically and economically. We are not yet in a new Bandung phase, but this historical juncture will accelerate the decline (at least ideologically) of the US-led empire and will intensify its contradictions.
The ICJ hearings and the developments that have followed it constitute a serious challenge to the white world (where white is not just a racial category but also an ideological construction), the Western establishment, their crumbling edifice of ‘human rights’ and their ‘universalism’, and may hasten the collapse of the international ‘rules-based’ (dis)order. It is very apparent that Western/Northern bourgeois democracy is undergoing a deep (if not mortal) crisis of legitimacy, and that its global hegemony (in the Gramscian sense) is waning. That explains the clear move towards, and the increasing reliance on, war and the entrenchment of a militarist/genocidal logic. Capitalism-imperialism is entering its openly barbaric stage. As Gramsci wrote (external link): ‘the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear’.
At a time when the international political and economic system blames its victims rather than those who uphold it, diverts any attention away from the mechanisms of domination, and resorts to culturalist (often racist) explanations for its failures, it is crucial for us to immerse ourselves in revolutionary and progressive projects and experiences from the past. We need such clarity of purpose in order to create a break with the long history of plunder, violence and injustice endured by the majority of the planet. This can also help us to overcome the propaganda of an enslaving system that disguises its chains and shackles through the use of benign phrases like the ‘invisible hand of the market’, ‘happy globalisation’, ‘the humanitarian responsibility to protect’ – or ‘Israel has the right to defend itself’.
It is becoming crystal clear that the oppressed majority can no longer breathe in a system that dehumanises people, a system that enshrines super-exploitation, a system that dominates nature and humanity, a system that generates massive inequality and untold poverty, a system that is prone to war and militarisation, and which causes ecological destruction and climate chaos. Luckily, revolts and rebellions that are fundamentally anti-systemic are taking place on all continents and in all regions. But for these episodic and largely geographically confined acts of resistance to succeed, they need to go beyond the local and to reach the global; they need to create enduring alliances in the face of capitalism, colonialism/imperialism, patriarchy and white supremacy.
Can the various contemporary struggles – from the Arab, African, Asian and Latin American uprisings to Black Lives Matter, the resistance of Indigenous communities and the labour movement, and from the movements for climate justice, food sovereignty and peace, to the student encampments, anti-fascism/anti-racism and Palestinian/Lebanese resistance – converge and build strong global alliances that overcome their own contradictions and blind spots? Can they usher in a new moment where we question the colonial foundations of our current predicaments and truly decolonise our politics, economies, cultures and epistemologies? Such an aim is not only possible but necessary, and transnational solidarities and alliances are crucial in the global struggle for the emancipation of the wretched of the earth. Here, we can take inspiration from the past, by looking at the period of decolonisation, Bandung, Third- Worldism, the Tricontinental, and similar internationalist experiences.
Some histories are ignored, others are silenced in order to maintain certain hegemonies and to hide from view an inspiring era of revolutionary connections between struggles for liberation on different continents. We must dig into the past to familiarise ourselves with these histories, learn from them and discern some potential convergences across ongoing struggles. For example, we need to remember, and learn from the fact, that independent Algeria became a powerful symbol of revolutionary struggle and served as a model for different liberation fronts across the globe. With its audacious foreign policy, in the 1960s and 1970s, the Algerian capital become a Mecca for revolutionaries, as discussed above. It was Amilcar Cabral, the revolutionary leader from Guinea-Bissau, who announced at a press conference on the margins of the first Pan-African Festival held in Algiers in 1969: ‘Pick a pen and take note: the Muslims make the pilgrimage to Mecca, the Christians to the Vatican and the national liberation movements to Algiers!’ Likewise, we should take note of the fact that Vietnam’s struggle against US imperialism in the 1960s was also a rallying cause for progressive movements and influenced the upsurge of a global social revolt that led to the protests of 1968.
It is this global perspective on our struggles that we need to emphasise, in order to overcome the many constraints and limitations imposed on our movements and to embrace a radical internationalism that will actively promote solidarity. It is essential that we rediscover the revolutionary heritage of the Arab world, Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Global South, as recorded in the deeds and words of great minds like George Habash, Mahdi Amel, Frantz Fanon, Amilcar Cabral, Thomas Sankara, Walter Rodney, Ghassan Kanafani, Samir Amin, Che Guevara, Ho Chi Minh and Mao Zedong, to mention just a few. We need to revive the ambitious projects of the 1960s that sought emancipation from the imperialist-capitalist system. Building on this revolutionary heritage, being inspired by its insurgent hope and applying its internationalist perspective to the current context is of utmost importance to Palestine, and to other emancipatory struggles all over the world.
In the conclusion to The Wretched, Fanon wrote:
Come, then, comrades; it would be as well to decide at once to change our ways. We must shake off the heavy darkness in which we were plunged and leave it behind. The new day, which is already at hand, must find us firm, prudent and resolute. … Let us waste no time in sterile litanies and nauseating mimicry. Leave this Europe where they are never done talking of Man, yet murder men everywhere they find them, at the corner of every one of their own streets, in all the corners of the globe. … Come, then, comrades, the European game has finally ended; we must find something different. We today can do everything, so long as we do not imitate Europe, so long as we are not obsessed by the desire to catch up with Europe. … For Europe, for ourselves and for humanity, comrades, we must turn over a new leaf, we must work out new concepts and try to set afoot a new man
(Fanon 1967)
In this vein, it is paramount to continue the tasks of decolonisation and delinking from the imperialist-capitalist system, in order to restore our denied humanity. Through resistance to colonial and capitalist logics of appropriation and extraction, new imaginaries and counter-hegemonic alternatives will be born. Let us not surrender. Let us be ‘a generation that rises from our ashes stronger’ (external link). And, to paraphrase a famous saying that is familiar to many Muslims, let us work for radical change as if it will take an eternity to realise but prepare the ground for it as if it is going to happen tomorrow.
As revolutionaries sang at the Pan-African Festival of Algiers in 1969: ‘Down with imperialism, down with colonialism!’ ‘Colonialism, we must fight until we win! Imperialism, we must fight until we win!’4
To which we can add: ‘From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free!’
Notes and sources
Les enfumades was a technique used by the French expeditionary corps during the conquest of Algeria in 1844/45. It consisted of asphyxiating people who had taken refuge or were trapped in a cave, and involved lighting fires in front of the entrance, which consumed the available oxygen and filled the cave with smoke. People annihilated in this way included women and children, with entire tribes killed, numbering thousands of people. ↩︎
A gendarmerie is a military force that has law enforcement duties within a civilian population. The term gendarme is derived from the medieval French gens d’armes (‘men-at-arms’, literally ‘people of arms’). In France and some Francophone nations, the gendarmerie is a branch of the armed forces that is responsible for internal security in parts of the territory (in the case of France, primarily rural areas and small towns), with additional duties as military police for the armed forces. ↩︎
This quote from Nelson Mandela is from a speech he made during the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People, in Pretoria, South Africa, on 4 December 1997. ↩︎
Leaked files show top UK military figures conspired to carry out the Kerch bridge bombing, covertly train “Gladio”-style stay-behind forces in Ukraine, and groom the British public for a drop in living standards caused by the proxy war against Russia
Emails and internal documents reviewed by The Grayzone reveal details of a cabal of British military and intelligence veterans which plotted to escalate and prolong the Ukraine proxy war “at all costs.” Convened under the direction of the British Ministry of Defense in the immediate aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the cell referred to itself as Project Alchemy. As British leadership sabotaged peace talks between Kiev and Moscow, the cell put forward an array of plans “to keep Ukraine fighting” by imposing “strategic dilemmas, costs and frictions upon Russia.”
The leaks obtained by The Grayzone expose a hidden hand behind Britain’s policy in Ukraine, showing in unusually granular detail how it aimed to engineer a long, grinding war through covert operations that stretched the bounds of legality.
Project Alchemy’s proposed schemes spanned every conceivable field of warfare, from cyber attacks to “discreet operations” to outright terrorism. The secret cell even put forward a plan to “aggressively pursue” and “dismantle” independent media outlets – including The Grayzone – through an aggressive campaign of legal harassment and online censorship, so they “would be forced to close.” The incendiary blueprints were fed to the highest levels of the British state and national security structure, where they were apparently well-received.
Founded by a senior British Ministry of Defence official, Project Alchemy is composed of veteran military and intelligence operatives united by a desire for all-out war between the West and Russia. Some have trained Ukrainian forces in clandestine sabotage tactics.
Members of the national security cabal tacitly acknowledged that their proposed operations stretched the bounds of British law. Thus they suggested that London should be “prepared to creatively use the law” to meet its goals, and even be willing to erase “legal restrictions on UK deniable ops” against Russia.
Some of Project Alchemy’s most extreme recommendations have already been implemented, often with calamitous results. These include the cell’s proposal to strike Crimea’s Kerch Bridge, which prompted a Russian escalation that saw punishing attacks on Ukraine’s electricity infrastructure. Alchemy also envisioned the construction of a secret, Gladio-style army of Ukrainian partisan fighters to carry out assassination, sabotage, and terror missions behind enemy lines.
It appears the British premier, Keir Starmer, fell under the influence of the Project Alchemy cabal soon after his election in July, when he eagerly embraced the role of “wartime prime minister.” After pledging to support Ukraine “as long as it takes,” however, Starmer is quietly backing away from the maximalist policy. In Kiev, Ukrainians are left to ponder how their “friends” in London got them into this mess, and why they can not, or will not get them out of it.
The British spooks who gathered around Project Alchemy reasoned that the longer the proxy war continued, the more Russian president Vladimir Putin’s “credibility at home and abroad drops, and his ability to fight NATO is degraded.” Today, Project Alchemy’s gambit has clearly backfired, as Putin remains popular within Russia, while a crumbling Ukrainian army loses territory by the day despite constant re-arming by the West. But the war planners in London remain staunchly committed to escalation, refusing to shelve their diabolical proposals.
Britain takes ‘unilateral lead’ on ‘regime change’ in Russia
Project Alchemy was founded on the personal orders of Lt. General Charlie Stickland, who is charged with “planning, executing and integrating UK led joint and multinational overseas military operations” as the head of Britain’s Permanent Joint Headquarters. Stickland boasts in leaked communications that his family “come from a long line of pirates and buccaneers.” In his email signature, the general identifies himself as an “LGBTQ+ Advocate” in rainbow-colored text.
Stickland and his assistant, Maj. Ed Harris, did not answer The Grayzone’s calls to their personal phones, nor did they respond to detailed questions submitted to them through WhatsApp
🇬🇧 🇳🇴 Lieutenant General Charlie Stickland CB OBE, (Chief of Joint Operations), Minister of the Lords, Baroness Annabel Goldie, and a delegation of senior multinational officers and officials visited Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel being trained in the UK. @Admiral @Permanentpic.twitter.com/rOJ38aRXcL
Stickland convened the first meeting of Project Alchemy’s on February 26, 2022, just days after Russian troops made their initial foray into Ukraine. According to minutes of the gathering, “an assortment of leading academics, authors, strategists, planners, pollsters, comms, data scientists and tech” was on hand to produce a “grand strategy options paper.”
The paper consisted of a series of proposals for the British government to “defeat Putin in Ukraine and set the conditions for the reshaping of an open international order of the future.” Throughout the document, the need to “keep Ukraine fighting” was described as London’s “main effort” in the conflict.
In an email to British military apparatchiks dated March 3 2022, Stickland described Alchemy’s paper as the result of “some mischief I’ve been up to” with “a group of ‘sideways thinkers.’” He expressed satisfaction that “this has been seen by all sorts of people,” including senior British government and military officials, “and landed well”
An Excel document listing potential and confirmed recruits for the effort, authored by project chief Dom Morris, names a number of individuals from the private sector and academia alongside high-ranking army officials. Currently a fellow at King’s College’s “Centre for Grand Strategy,” Morris was listed in the document as a “civilian leader.” The role of “military leader” was to be carried out by Simon Scott, a brigadier in the British army who was appointed O.B.E. in 2013 for his “gallant and distinguished services” in Afghanistan
Information operations were to be headed by a still-to-be determined member of Britain’s 77th Psychological Operations Brigade. Also listed as a participant in information operations was longtime British psychological warfare operative Amil Khan, founder of the “counter-disinformation” analysis firm Valent Projects.
In 2021, The Grayzone revealed how the then-Prince of Wales, King Charles, enlisted Khan’s Valent Projects to astroturf a pseudo-socialist YouTube influencer to attack skeptics of the government’s ham-fisted response to Covid. Previously, Khan participated in the UK Foreign Office’s program to foment regime change in Syria.
Months after Alchemy put Khan forward as a member of its team, The Grayzone exposed him for plotting with celebrity-left journalist Paul Mason to destroy this publication. One leaked email showed Khan proposing a “full nuclear legal [attack] to squeeze [The Grayzone] financially.” The newly-uncovered documents indicate the decision to assail The Grayzone was met with approval from the highest ranks of the British government.
‘Ukraine’s Next Chapter – Elders Grand Strategy Options Paper’
Within Project Alchemy’s covert war room, the obsession with a long war quickly took hold. Members of the cell took their cues from a policy paper Stickland attributed to “The Elders,” which he described as “a group of Fusion players,” referring to the strata of academics and defense industry figures with strong ties to the British military.
An Alchemy document composed under Stickland’s watch and titled, “Ukraine’s Next Chapter – Elders Grand Strategy Options Paper,” suggests that members of the cabal had convinced themselves a “palace coup” inside the Kremlin was inevitable. So long as Russia struggled inside Ukraine, they believed, British intelligence would be granted “the opportunity to challenge” Moscow’s ever-growing “stature as a competent international actor” on the world stage.
“A long war against a small state makes [Putin] look a fool,” the Alchemy paper asserted. “He is obsessed by the end of Ghaddafi – he will want to avoid that… Pressure will pile on from oligarchs as a long war drags on – he will not want to give them excuses to threaten his authority.” The group reasoned that “a long war will affect [Putin’s] international credibility,” as “a failure to quickly defeat Ukraine will seriously… reduce his credibility with new rich friends in Belarus, Hungary, China, India, Middle East, Brazil etc.
“Most importantly,” protracted Russian involvement in Ukraine “will embolden NATO,” Alchemy argued. Convinced that Putin would fail in the eastern Donbas region, triggering a collapse of his government, Project Alchemy members openly fantasized about absorbing Russia into the Western-dominated financial order afterwards under the guise of a “Post Putin Marshall Plan.” Of particular interest was London’s “re-engagement” with Moscow “in global energy and commodity markets,” a seeming reference to the West’s desire for cheap Russian gas and wheat.
“Discreet operations”: reviving ‘Operation Gladio’ terror ops in Ukraine
To accomplish the balkanization of Russia, Project Alchemy’s plotters took inspiration from Operation Gladio, a CIA and NATO-orchestrated covert operation that saw fascist paramilitaries carry out false flag terrorist attacks across Western Europe after World War II in a bid to prevent communism from taking root.
A section detailing potential “discreet operations” in Alchemy’s strategy paper, which stressed the “need to intervene in every way except ‘official,’” explicitly recommended “Stay-behind Gladio handbooks/ Partisan Pamphlets” which would be “updated for Information Age”
Another move Alchemy proposed was to deploy Britain’s “strong” private military [PMC] industry “to out Wagner, Wagner.” In other words, the group aimed to establish a British rival to the Russian mercenary force founded by the now-deceased commander Yevgeny Prigozhin. This objective required the formulation of “a new doctrine, operating concept, and legal framework, for effectively integrating the activities of PMCs and other [non-military] actors.” Under these guidelines, British mercenary firms capable of using “sophisticated weaponry like SAMS, cyber, combat air, drones” would be employed to “operate and train and accompany Ukraine formations.”
These operations were all intended to ultimately be “sponsored and commanded” by the UK government, “using discreet cover” to avoid triggering NATO’s Article 5.
Following the production of their grand strategy paper, Stickland invited his team of “sideways thinkers” at Project Alchemy to submit further proposals for Gladio-style operations. Among the pitches that arrived was a “mission” to “disable the Kerch Bridge in a way that is audacious, and disrupts road and rail access to Crimea and maritime access to the Sea of Azov.” The blueprints of this highly provocative plot were exposed by The Grayzone in October 2022, in the immediate aftermath of the truck bomb attack that crippled the Kerch Bridge.
Alchemy’s team also produced a PowerPoint presentation entitled, “Training a Ukrainian Commando Force to restore Maritime Sovereignty – Elders,” outlining plans to construct a 1,000-strong Ukrainian commando force “trained in Britain by military veterans equipped with British equipment” to “degrade the Russian Navy and open another flank in the fight for Kherson and the south of Ukraine”
Alchemy’s team had been working on the plan for at least three months by the time of the presentation’s submission. “Ukrainians abroad and volunteers inside Ukraine” had already been recruited, in advance of 12 weeks basic training “in the use of all troop weapons including mortars, anti-tank missiles, sniper craft, cliff assault, small craft training, demolitions,” the proposal stated
The plan called for formally integrating the commandos into the Ukrainian Navy. Alchemy boasted that the prospective force “will be a force multiplier and highly mobile,” while Russia’s “outdated doctrine will struggle with a highly motivated and well-equipped naval force conducting hit and run operations and targeting Crimea.”
Moreover, “individuals who are fluent Russian speakers and deemed suitable for covert undercover operations,” including “female operators,” would be “inserted into southern occupied Ukraine and Crimea for intelligence gathering and sabotage of key infrastructure targets.” They would be trained by MI6 officers. For this, Alchemy asked the British government for a total of £73.5 million. “The program is at a high state of readiness. We are ready to go,” the presentation forcefully declared.
The enormous sum was to be paid to Elders Services Ltd that was founded by Alchemy members and registered to an address just 15 miles from Fort Monckton, which was described by former MI6 officer Richard Tomlinson as “the SIS’s field operations training centre.” It is unknown how much money, if any, the firm received from the British government for resuscitating Operation Gladio in Ukraine. Elders Services Ltd shuttered in March 2023 after less than a year of operation, without filing financial accounts.
British spies call for ‘action’ against The Grayzone
Behind the Project Alchemy team’s bravado was a sense that Western hegemony was crumbling on the icy borderlands separating Ukraine from Russia. Referring to the rising BRICS alliance, which gathered in Kazan, Russia this October to challenge the US-dominated financial order, Alchemy planners urged British leadership to “prepare for SWIFT II,” as SWIFT was “going to be destroyed” by the West’s anti-Russia sanctions, “slowly, but inevitably.”
According to Alchemy’s analysts, countries across the globe would naturally “see the need for a non-US alternative” means of safely parking their cash and trading. In a rare show of political sobriety, the British spooks predicted that sanctions on Russia combined with the Ukraine proxy war would impose higher prices on consumer goods and “hit British voters in the pocket.”
This posed “a threat to public support” for the British government’s “hard line” on Ukraine, they warned. “Domestic UK public opinion” would understandably get “fed up” paying more for everyday goods, meaning “pressure grows for a compromise.”
To prepare the British public for the coming storm, Project Alchemy’s plotters proposed what they blandly described as “information operations,” but which could be more accurately described as a blend of domestic state propaganda and malign attacks on disruptive media outlets.
The task they outlined not only included “[dismantling] Russian disinformation infrastructure” by pressuring social media to ban RT and Sputnik, but also targeting critical independent media like The Grayzone.
“A number of actions can be undertaken against these outlets. The most obvious is legal since the content of these media outriders is frequently in contravention of media law in the UK, US and EU,” Alchemy insisted.
“Aggrieved parties currently tend to ignore libel/defamation by these outlets. Were they to aggressively pursue these outlets, it is likely they would be forced to close.”
The Grayzone, it was claimed, had thus far “managed to obscure” its funding – a suggestion that this outlet is covertly funded by Russia or some other enemy state, which is completely false. The paranoid fantasies of British intelligence may explain why this journalist was quizzed on the subject by British counter-terror police when they detained and interrogated him at Luton International Airport in May 2023
Alchemy plotters seek to place Britain at lead of war with Russia
In addition to playing a leading role in media manipulation, Alchemy sought to place Britain at the forefront of the International Criminal Court’s agenda to investigate and prosecute the Russian government for alleged war crimes in Ukraine.
Alchemy suggested London “set international conditions, collection mechanisms and funding for collection of data and evidence” in the proxy conflict, and “provide all possible support, including intelligence” to the ICC “in its efforts to investigate war crimes,” just as British spies did for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
Though not named in the document, high-profile British lawyers, including celebrity Amal Clooney, have since emerged at the forefront of efforts to prosecute Russian officials for war crimes, and establish an ICTY analog. As The Grayzone’s Max Blumenthal reported, Britain played a critical role in the appointment of Amal Clooney’s mentor, Karim Khan, as ICC prosecutor.
Project Alchemy’s provocative proposals appear to have reached the desk of PM Keir Starmer in some form. At NATO’s 75th anniversary summit, Starmer issued his full-throated endorsement of deep strikes by the Ukrainian military into Russia. Echoing the aggressive language found in Alchemy documents, he pledged to “deliver £3 billion worth of support to Ukraine each year… for as long as it takes.”
But as the Ukrainian military’s offensive in Russia’s Kursk region falters, the Biden administration has distanced itself from the calls for striking into the Russian heartland. Fortunately for British leaders hellbent on taking the fight to Moscow, Project Alchemy has ensured that a platter of off-the-books options remains handy.
As Alchemy noted in its grand strategy paper, “The UK seeks always to act multilaterally, but is prepared to take a unilateral lead where achieving multilateral consensus might prove time-consuming or difficult.” Among the war’s covert sponsors, who were safely ensconced over 1,000 miles away from the front lines, it was firmly agreed: “we should attempt at all costs to keep Ukraine fighting” [end]
in French, alphabetical obituary chronicle of French involvement in the Atlanticist ranks in Ukraine, what servile journalists will not tell you.
Especially, where a French-speaking mercenary in Ukraine, Olivier Lecourt, founder from Lviv of a cyber warfare team against Russia, entrusted in October
My employers are Ukrainian and English. My job: to bring down the Kremlin’s collaborators and criminals
Israel’s latest incursion into south Lebanon repeats the same tactical missteps of the past, plunging the occupation army into a familiar quagmire and raising the urgent question: How long can the cycle of failure continue before lessons are finally learned?
(The Cradle)
Once again, history reverberates through the mountains and valleys of south Lebanon.
On 2 October, Israel launched its ‘limited ground incursion’ – a renewed attempt to force Hezbollah behind the Litani River.
But what began with familiar arrogance quickly unraveled into disaster. Three Merkava tanks left smoldering in the dirt, and eight soldiers from the Egoz unit eliminated. Yet, as the sun rose on 13 October, the grim pattern persisted.
Anti-tank fire struck again, wounding 25 Israeli soldiers in separate incidents. Overhead, helicopters cut through the morning sky, ferrying the wounded and the dead from the battlefield to Rambam Hospital in Haifa – each flight a harsh reminder of an offensive spiraling out of control.
Despite its technological edge and attempts at military censorship to hide the extent of the losses, the US-backed Israeli army pushes onward, blind to the lessons carved in its past. Hezbollah’s resistance, precise and unyielding, exposes the same fatal flaws of an aggressor clinging to force.
As this new chapter unfolds, one can’t help but wonder – how many times will the occupation army tread this doomed path before considering Einstein’s warning – that insanity is repeating the same thing over and over, expecting different results.
The Kornet’s hits redefined the battlefield
In the days following 8 October, Hezbollah’s battlefield updates have consistently emphasized one key phrase: direct hits – Israeli radar stations obliterated, military convoys shattered by precise strikes, and armored vehicles reduced to smoldering wreckage.
These operations, carried out in support of the Palestinian resistance in Gaza, have been so devastatingly effective that Tel Aviv invoked military censorship, desperate to conceal the full extent of its losses, as it has been doing throughout the conflict on the northern front over the past year. But behind the phrase “direct hits” lies a weapon few might recognize – the Kornet missile.
Although not always visible to the viewer, the Kornet’s role is unmistakable. First deployed by Hezbollah in 2006, the Kornet transformed into a battlefield game-changer, proving its worth in ambushes against Israeli Merkava tanks.
On 11 August 2006, 24 Merkava tanks rolled into a deadly trap, as if swallowed by the Bermuda Triangle, vanishing under a barrage of Kornet missile fire. By the end of it, 11 tanks lay in ruin – charred remains of Israel’s once-feared armored division.
This decisive moment showcased Hezbollah’s mastery of asymmetric warfare, where small, mobile units equipped with precision-guided Kornets could dismantle Israel’s armored might.
The Merkava, long regarded as the symbol of Israeli dominance in ground warfare, was designed to excel in direct combat. However, in the unforgiving Lebanese terrain, the Kornet missile revealed a critical vulnerability: the Merkava’s reliance on heavy armor, which, despite its thickness, was helpless against the Kornet’s ability to pierce reactive plating.
The missile’s precision focused on the tank’s soft spots – its engine and lower hull – areas that conventional defenses struggled to protect against long-range, guided strikes. The once-formidable Merkava, crippled in its ability to maneuver through Lebanon’s rugged landscape, became an easy target for well-planned ambushes.
Now, with Israeli convoys once again making daily incursions into Lebanon – repeating the very missteps of 2006 – it’s as if history is whispering its warnings, only to be ignored. Israel’s persistence in retracing these familiar steps shows a refusal to reckon with past lessons, locked in a cycle that leads to the same inevitable failures.
Entrapped in the Resistance’s web
The Kornet missile, first deployed by Hezbollah during the 2006 war, has become a defining force in its tactical operations.
This Russian-made, laser-guided anti-tank missile, capable of penetrating up to 1,200 millimeters of reactive armor from distances of up to 5.5 kilometers, turns Israel’s Merkava tanks into unsuspecting prey caught in carefully planned ambushes.
Hezbollah’s elite Radwan special forces, particularly within the Aziz and Nasr units, utilize this weapon with precision, turning each ambush into a coordinated strike that devastates Israel’s most advanced armored forces.
The Kornet’s range allows Hezbollah fighters to strike from concealed positions and swiftly reposition, ensuring they remain elusive in the heat of battle. These units, operating across the varied terrain of southern Lebanon, have made the Kornet indispensable in their strategy of attrition warfare.
Meanwhile, the Badr unit, stationed north of the Litani River, remains vigilant, holding strategic points and using ambushes to deal significant damage to Israeli forces.
The Kornet’s role has expanded beyond targeting armored vehicles, as Hezbollah has creatively adapted it to strike at military installations, including radar stations, blinding Israel’s northern defenses.
This tactical shift has forced military analysts to reconsider the missile’s potential, showing how even a relatively simple weapon can reshape the dynamics of warfare when wielded with ingenuity and precision.
Lifting the ‘Trophy’
Israeli engineers quickly sought solutions to protect their armored vehicles following the significant vulnerabilities exposed in 2006.
By 2007, Rafael Advanced Defense Systems unveiled the Trophy APS, specifically designed to safeguard Merkava Mark 3 and Mark 4 tanks. Equipped with the Elta EL/M-2133 radar, Trophy provides 360-degree detection and launches explosively formed penetrators (EFPs) to intercept incoming threats.
This system enabled Israel to maintain its technological edge, significantly reducing anti-tank missile threats. However, Trophy’s 1.5-second reload time created a narrow but exploitable window – an opportunity Hezbollah quickly seized.
In response to Israel’s technological advancements, Hezbollah sought a way to exploit this reload time. The solution came with the Tharallah Twin Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM) system, equipped with Dehlavieh missiles, an Iranian variant of the Kornet-E.
Designed by Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization, the Dehlavieh, introduced in 2012, boasts a range of 10 kilometers and tandem warheads capable of penetrating 1,200 millimeters of reactive armor.
The Tharallah system fires two missiles in rapid succession. The first missile triggers the Explosive Reactive Armor (ERA), while the second penetrates the main armor, exploiting Trophy’s reload time.
Acquired by Hezbollah in 2015, the Tharallah system is mounted on a quad launcher, configured for both day and night precision strikes.
This clever countermeasure reveals the Axis of Resistance’s strategic ingenuity, turning modest resources into powerful, game-changing tactics – much like a master chess player outwitting an opponent with far superior pieces.
While Israel’s war machine thrives on an endless flow of US dollars, it’s not brute force but creative strategy that shifts the balance of power on the battlefield.
A cake from the Shipunov to Nasrallah
In a little-known detail, revealed during a 2020 interview with Al-Manar TV, Hezbollah’s political advisor Hussein Al-Khalil shared a story that took many by surprise. After the 2006 war, Arkady Shipunov, the renowned Russian designer of the Kornet missile, sent an unexpected gift to Hassan Nasrallah – a cake.
It was more than just a gesture of appreciation; it symbolized SShipunov’spride in how Hezbollah had wielded his creation to devastating effect. The Kornet had proven itself not just as a weapon, but as a game-changer on the battlefield, punctuating Israel’s military vulnerabilities with each direct hit on their once-vaunted Merkava tanks.
This cake, a simple token, carried profound significance as a tribute to the strategic brilliance that turned the Kornet into a symbol of asymmetrical warfare. SShipunov’spride reflected the growing recognition that the Lebanese resistance had showcased the missile’s superiority in a way few had expected.
GGalloway’s echo
As Israel once again finds itself entangled in Lebanon, the echoes of George Galloway’s legendary 2006 Sky News interview with Anna Botting resonate more powerfully than ever. Despite Sky News’s attempts to bottle up the harsh truth of Israel’s military failures, the reality spilled out – undeniable – even as military censorship and media bias worked overtime to obscure it.
Galloway’s biting words, “Look at the other half of the screen” and “Israel is getting a bloody good hiding,” sliced through the carefully crafted media narrative, exposing Israel’s recurring military blunders for what they truly were.
While Botting clung to the narrative of Israeli success, the live footage painted a different picture – Israeli soldiers being carried away after devastating Kornet missile ambushes. It was irrefutable evidence of a tactical failure that no amount of censorship could hide.
‘Not tank country’
Fast forward to 2024, and the scene is eerily familiar. Israeli helicopters, their rotors slicing through the morning air, shuttle the dead and wounded from the battlefield to Rambam Hospital in Haifa, a stark reminder of an offensive spiraling out of control. And still, the same efforts are underway to cover the mounting damage and losses.
As the late Hezbollah Secretary General warned in July, “If your tanks come to southern Lebanon, you will not suffer a shortage of tanks, because you will have no tanks left.”
One can’t help but wonder – how long will it take for Israel to understand, as Einstein warned, that repeating the same actions and expecting a different result is the very definition of insanity? [end]
We are very happy to bring you this excerpt from Colonel Jacques Baud’s latest book, The Russian Art of War: How the West Led Ukraine to Defeat (L’art de la guerre russe : Comment l’Occident conduisit l’Ukraine à l’échec). This is a detailed study of the two-year old conflict in which the West has brutally used the Ukrainians to pursue an old pipedream: the conquest of Russia.
The book is being translated into English, and we will update this page when it is published. In the meantime, we provide a generous excerpt, along with a detailed Table of Contents, to give you a taste of this very important and much-needed book.
Russian Military Thought
Throughout the Cold War period, the Soviet Union saw itself as the spearhead of a historical struggle that would lead to a confrontation between the “capitalist” system and “progressive forces.” This perception of a permanent and inescapable war led the Soviets to study war in a quasi-scientific way, and to structure this thinking into an architecture of military thought that has no equal in the Western world.
The problem with the vast majority of our so-called military experts is their inability to understand the Russian approach to war. It is the result of an approach we have already seen in waves of terrorist attacks—the adversary is so stupidly demonized that we refrain from understanding his way of thinking. As a result, we are unable to develop strategies, articulate our forces, or even equip them for the realities of war. The corollary of this approach is that our frustrations are translated by unscrupulous media into a narrative that feeds hatred and increases our vulnerability. We are thus unable to find rational, effective solutions to the problem.
The way Russians understand conflict is holistic. In other words, they see the processes that develop and lead to the situation at any given moment. This explains why Vladimir Putin’s speeches invariably include a return to history. In the West, we tend to focus on X moment and try to see how it might evolve. We want an immediate response to the situation we see today. The idea that “from the understanding of how the crisis arose comes the way to resolve it” is totally foreign to the West. In September 2023, an English-speaking journalist even pulled out the “duck test” for me: “if it looks like a duck, swims like a duck and quacks like a duck, it’s probably a duck.” In other words, all the West needs to assess a situation is an image that fits their prejudices. Reality is much more subtle than the duck model….
The reason the Russians are better than the West in Ukraine is that they see the conflict as a process; whereas we see it as a series of separate actions. The Russians see events as a film. We see them as photographs. They see the forest, while we focus on the trees. That is why we place the start of the conflict on February 24, 2022, or the start of the Palestinian conflict on October 7, 2023. We ignore the contexts that bother us and wage conflicts we do not understand. That is why we lose our wars…
****
In Russia, unsurprisingly, the principles of the military art of the Soviet forces inspired those currently in use:
readiness to carry out assigned missions;
concentration of efforts on solving a specific mission;
surprise (unconventionality) of military action vis-à-vis the enemy;
finality determines a set of tasks and the level of resolution of each one;
totality of available means determines the way to resolve the mission and achieve the objective (correlation of forces);
coherence of leadership (unity of command);
economy of forces, resources, time and space;
support and restoration of combat capability;
freedom of maneuver.
It should be noted that these principles apply not only to the implementation of military action as such. They are also applicable as a system of thought to other non-operational activities.
An honest analysis of the conflict in Ukraine would have identified these various principles and drawn useful conclusions for Ukraine. But none of the self-proclaimed experts on TV were intellectually able to do so.
Thus, Westerners are systematically surprised by the Russians in the fields of technology (e.g., hypersonic weapons), doctrine (e.g., operative art) and economics (e.g., resilience to sanctions). In a way, the Russians are taking advantage of our prejudices to exploit the principle of surprise. We can see this in the Ukrainian conflict, where the Western narrative led Ukraine to totally underestimate Russian capabilities, which was a major factor in its defeat. That is why Russia did not really try to counter this narrative and let it play out—the belief that we are superior makes us vulnerable….
Correlation of Forces
Russian military thought is traditionally linked to a holistic approach to warfare, which involves the integration of a large number of factors in the development of a strategy. This approach is materialized by the concept of “correlation of forces” (Соотношение сил).
Often translated as “balance of forces” or “ratio of forces,” this concept is only understood by Westerners as a quantitative quantity, limited to the military domain. In Soviet thinking, however, the correlation of forces reflected a more holistic reading of war:
There are several criteria for assessing the correlation of strengths. In the economic sphere, the factors usually compared are gross national product per capita, labor productivity, the dynamics of economic growth, the level of industrial production, particularly in high-tech sectors, the technical infrastructure of the production tool, the resources and degree of qualification of the workforce, the number of specialists and the level of development of theoretical and applied sciences.
In the military field, the factors compared are the quantity and quality of armaments, the firepower of the armed forces, the fighting and moral qualities of the soldiers, the level of staff training, the organization of the troops and their combat experience, the character of the military doctrine and the methods of strategic, operative and tactical thinking.
In the political sphere, the factors that come into consideration are the breadth of the social base of state authority, its organization, the constitutional procedure for relations between the government and legislative bodies, the ability to take operational decisions, and the degree and character of popular support for domestic and foreign policy.
Finally, when assessing the strength of the international movement, the factors taken into consideration are its quantitative composition, its influence with the masses, its position in the political life of each country, the principles and norms of relations between its components and the degree of their cohesion.
In other words, the assessment of the situation is not limited to the balance of forces on the battlefield, but takes into account all the elements that have an impact on the evolution of the conflict. Thus, for their Special Military Operation, the Russian authorities had planned to support the war effort through the economy, without moving to a “war economy” regime. Thus, unlike in Ukraine, there was no interruption in the tax and welfare mechanisms.
This is why the sanctions applied to Russia in 2014 had a double positive effect. The first was the realization that they were not only a short-term problem, but above all a medium- and long-term opportunity. They encouraged Russia to produce goods it had previously preferred to buy abroad. The second was the signal that the West would increasingly use economic weapons as a means of pressure in the future. It therefore became imperative, for reasons of national independence and sovereignty, to prepare for more far-reaching sanctions affecting the country’s economy.
In reality, it has long been known that sanctions do not work. Logically enough, they have had the opposite effect, acting as protectionist measures for Russia, which has thus been able to consolidate its economy, as had been the case after the 2014 sanctions. A sanctions strategy might have paid off if the Russian economy had effectively been the equivalent of the Italian or Spanish economy, i.e., with a high level of debt; and if the entire planet had acted in unison to isolate Russia.
The inclusion of the correlation of forces in the decision-making process is a fundamental difference from Western decision-making processes, which are linked more to a policy of communication than to a rational approach to problems.
This explains, for example, Russia’s limited objectives in the Ukraine, where it does not seek to occupy the entire territory, as the correlation of forces in the western part of the country would be unfavorable.
At every level of leadership, the correlation of forces is part of situation assessment. At the operational level, it is defined as follows:
The result of comparing the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of the forces and resources (sub-units, units, weapons, military equipment, etc.) of one’s own troops (forces) and those of the enemy. It is calculated on an operational and tactical scale throughout the area of operations, in the main and other directions, in order to determine the degree of objective superiority of one of the opposing camps. Force correlation assessment is used to make an informed decision about an operation (battle), and to establish and maintain the necessary superiority over the enemy for as long as possible, when decisions are redefined (modified) during military (combat) operations.
This simple definition is the reason why the Russians committed themselves with forces inferior to those of Ukraine in February 2022, or why they withdrew from Kiev, Kharkov and Kherson in March, September and October 2022.
****
Structure of the Doctrine
The Russians have always attached particular importance to doctrine. Better than the West, they have understood that “a common way of seeing, thinking and acting”—as Marshal Foch put it—gives coherence, while allowing for infinite variations in the conception of operations. Military doctrine is a kind of “common core” that serves as a reference for designing operations.
Russian military doctrine divides military art into three main components: strategy (strategiya), operative art (operativnoe iskoustvo) and tactics (taktika). Each of these components has its own characteristics, very similar to those found in Western doctrines. Using the terminology of French doctrine on the use of forces:
The strategic level is that of conception. The aim of strategic action is to lead the adversary to negotiation or defeat.
The operative level is that of cooperation and coordination of inter-force actions, with a view to achieving a given military objective.
The tactical level, finally, is that of maneuver execution at weapon level as an integral part of the operational maneuver.
These three components correspond to levels of leadership, which translate into leadership structures and the space in which military operations are conducted. For simplicity’s sake, let us say that the strategic level ensures the management of the theater of war (Театр Войны) (TV); a geographically vast entity, with its own command and control structures, within which there are one or more strategic directions. The theater of war comprises a set of theaters of military operations (Театр Военных Действий) (TVD), which represent a strategic direction and are the domain of operative action. These various theaters have no predetermined structure and are defined according to the situation. For example, although we commonly speak of the “war in Afghanistan” (1979-1989) or the “war in Syria” (2015-), these countries are considered in Russian terminology as TVDs and not TVs.
The same applies to Ukraine, which Russia sees as a theater of military operations (TVD) and not a theater of war (TV), which explains why the action in Ukraine is designated as a “Special Military Operation” (Специальная Военная Операция – Spetsial’naya Voyennaya Operatsiya—SVO, or SMO in English abbreviation) and not a “war.”
The use of the word “war” would imply a different structure of conduct than that envisaged by the Russians in Ukraine, and would have other structural implications in Russia itself. Moreover—and this is a central point—as NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg himself acknowledges, “the war began in 2014” and should have been ended by the Minsk Agreements. The SMO is therefore a “military operation” and not a new “war,” as many Western “experts” claim.
****
The Special Military Operation in Ukraine
The Correlation of Forces
Consider all the factors that directly or indirectly influence the conflict. Conversely, as we have seen in Ukraine and elsewhere, Westerners have a much more political reading of the war, and end up mixing the two. This is why communication plays such an essential role in the conduct of war: the perception of the conflict plays an almost more important role than its reality. This is why, in Iraq, the Americans literally invented episodes that glorified their troops.
Russia’s analysis of the situation in February 2022 was undoubtedly considerably more pertinent than that of the West. They knew that a Ukrainian offensive against the Donbass was underway and that it could endanger the government. In 2014-2015, after the massacres in Odessa and Mariupol, the Russian population was very much in favor of intervention. Vladimir Putin’s stubborn clinging to the Minsk Agreements was poorly understood in Russia.
The factors that contributed to Russia’s decision to intervene were twofold: the expected support of Ukraine’s ethnically Russian population (which we will call “Russian-speaking” for convenience) and an economy robust enough to withstand sanctions.
The Russian-speaking population had risen up en masse against the new authorities following the coup d’état of February 2014, whose first decision had been to strip the Russian language of its official status. Kiev tried to backtrack, but in April 2019, the 2014 decision was definitively confirmed.
Since the adoption of the Law on Indigenous Peoples on July 1, 2021, Russian speakers (ethnic Russians) are no longer considered normal Ukrainian citizens and no longer enjoy the same rights as ethnic Ukrainians. They can therefore be expected to offer no resistance to the Russian coalition in the eastern part of the country….
Since March 24, 2021, Ukrainian forces have been stepping up their presence around the Donbass and have increased the pressure against the autonomists with their fire.
Zelensky’s decree of March 24, 2021 for the reconquest of Crimea and the Donbass was the real trigger for the SMO. From that moment on, the Russians understood that if there was military action against them, they would have to intervene. But they also knew that the cause of the Ukrainian operation was NATO membership, as Oleksei Arestovitch had explained. That is why, in mid-December 2021, they were submitting proposals to the USA and NATO on extending the Alliance: their aim was then to remove Ukraine’s motive for an offensive in the Donbass.
The reason for the Russian Special Military Operation (SMO) is indeed the protection of the populations of Donbass; but this protection was necessary because of Kiev’s desire to go through a confrontation to enter NATO. The extension of NATO is therefore only the indirect cause of the conflict in Ukraine. The latter could have spared itself this ordeal by implementing the Minsk Agreements—but what we wanted was a defeat for Russia.
In 2008, Russia intervened in Georgia to protect the Russian minority then being bombed by its government, as confirmed by the Swiss ambassador, Heidi Tagliavini, who was responsible for investigating this event. In 2014, many voices were raised in Russia to demand intervention when the new regime in Kiev had engaged its army against the civilian population of the five autonomist oblasts (Odessa, Dnepropetrovsk, Kharkov, Lugansk and Donetsk) and applied a fierce repression. In 2022, it could be expected that the population of Russia would not understand the government’s inaction, after no efforts were made from the Ukrainian and Western sides to enforce the Minsk Agreements. They knew that they did not have the means to launch an economic retaliation. But they also knew that an economic war against Russia would inevitably backfire on Western countries.
An important element of Russian military and political thinking is its legalistic dimension. The way our media present events, systematically omitting facts that could explain, justify, legitimize or even legalize Russia’s actions. We tend to think that Russia is acting outside any legal framework. For example, our media present the Russian intervention in Syria as having been decided unilaterally by Moscow; whereas it was carried out at the request of the Syrian government, after the West had allowed the Islamic State to move closer to Damascus, as confessed by John Kerry, then Secretary of State. Nevertheless, there is never any mention of the occupation of eastern Syria by American troops, who were never even invited there!
We could multiply the examples, to which our journalists will counter with the war crimes committed by Russian forces. This may well be true, but the simple fact that these accusations are not based on any impartial and neutral investigation (as required by humanitarian doctrine), nor on any international one, since Russia is systematically refused participation, casts a shadow over the honesty of these accusations. For example, the sabotage of the Nord Stream 1 and 2 gas pipelines was immediately attributed to Russia, which was accused of violating international law.
In fact, unlike the West, which advocates a “rules-based international order,” the Russians insist on a “law-based international order.” Unlike the West, they will apply the law to the letter. No more, no less.
The legal framework for Russia’s intervention in Ukraine has been meticulously planned. As this subject has already been covered in one of my previous books, I will not go into details here…
****
The Objectives and Strategy of Russia
On February 23, 2023, Swiss military “expert” Alexandre Vautravers commented on Russia’s objectives in Ukraine:
The aim of the Special Military Operation was to decapitate Ukrainian political and military governance in the space of five, ten, maybe even two weeks. The Russians then changed their plan and their objectives with a number of other failures; so they change their objectives and their strategic orientations almost every week or every month.
The problem is that our “experts” themselves define Russia’s objectives according to what they imagine, only to be able to say that it has not achieved them. So. Let us get back to the facts.
On February 24, 2022, Russia launched its “Special Military Operation” (SMO) in Ukraine “at short notice.” In his televised address, Vladimir Putin explained that its strategic objective was to protect the population of Donbass. This objective can be broken down into two parts:
“demilitarize” the Ukrainian armed forces regrouped in the Donbass in preparation for the offensive against the DPR and LPR; and
“denazify” (i.e. “neutralize”) the ultra-nationalist and neo-Nazi paramilitary militias in the Mariupol area.
The formulation chosen by Vladimir Putin has been very poorly analyzed in the West. It is inspired by the 1945 Potsdam Declaration, which envisaged the development of defeated Germany according to four principles: demilitarization, denazification, democratization and decentralization.
The Russians understand war from a Clausewitzian perspective: war is the pursuit of politics by other means. This then means that they seek to transform operational successes into strategic successes, and military successes into political objectives. So, while the demilitarization evoked by Putin is clearly linked to the military threat to the populations of the Donbass in application of the decree of March 24, 2021, signed by Zelensky.
But this objective conceals a second: the neutralization of Ukraine as a future NATO member. This is what Zelensky understood when he proposed a resolution to the conflict in March 2022. At first, his proposal was supported by Western countries, probably because at this stage they believed that Russia had failed in its bid to take over Ukraine in three days, and that it would not be able to sustain its war effort because of the massive sanctions imposed on it. But at the NATO meeting of March 24, 2022, the Allies decided not to support Zelensky’s proposition.
Nevertheless, on March 27, Zelensky publicly defended his proposal and on March 28, as a gesture of support for this effort, Vladimir Putin eased the pressure on the capital and withdrew his troops from the area. Zelensky’s proposal served as the basis for the Istanbul Communiqué of March 29, 2022, a ceasefire agreement as a prelude to a peace agreement. It was this document that Vladimir Putin presented in June 2023, when an African delegation visited Moscow. It was Boris Johnson’s intervention that prompted Zelensky to withdraw his proposal, exchanging peace and the lives of his men for support “for as long as it takes.”
This version of events—which I have already presented in my previous works—was finally confirmed in early November 2023 by David Arakhamia, then chief negotiator for Ukraine196. He explained that Russia had never intended to seize Kiev.
In essence, Russia agreed to withdraw to the borders of February 23, 2022, in exchange for a ceiling on Ukrainian forces and a commitment not to become a NATO member, along with security guarantees from a number of countries….
Two conclusions can be drawn:
Russia’s objective was not to conquer territory. If the West had not intervened to push Zelensky to withdraw his offer, Ukraine would probably still have its army.
While the Russians intervened to ensure the security and protection of the population of the Donbass, their SMO enabled them to achieve a broader objective, which involves Russia’s security.
This means that, although this objective is not formulated, the demilitarization of Ukraine could open the door to its neutralization. This is not surprising since, conversely, in an interview with the Ukrainian channel Apostrof’ on March 18, 2019, Volodymyr Zelensky’s advisor Oleksei Arestovitch cynically explains that, because Ukraine wants to join NATO, it will have to create the conditions for Russia to attack Ukraine and be definitively defeated.
The problem is that Ukrainian and Western analysis is fueled by their own narratives. The conviction that Russia will lose has meant that no alternative contingency has been prepared. In September 2023, the West, beginning to see the collapse of this narrative and its implementation, tried to move towards a “freeze” in the conflict, without taking into account the opinion of the Russians, who dominate on the ground.
Yet Russia would have been satisfied with a situation such as that proposed by Zelensky in March 2022. What the West wants in September 2023 is merely a pause until an even more violent conflict breaks out, after Ukrainian forces have been rearmed and reconstituted.
****
Ukrainian Strategy
The strategic objective of Volodymyr Zelensky and his team is to join NATO, as a prelude to a brighter future within the EU. It complements that of the Americans (and therefore of the Europeans). The problem is that tensions with Russia, particularly over Crimea, are causing NATO members to put off Ukraine’s participation. In March 2022, Zelensky revealed on CNN that this is exactly what the Americans told him.
Before coming to power in April 2019, Volodymyr Zelensky’s discourse was divided between two antagonistic policies: the reconciliation with Russia promised during his presidential campaign and his goal of joining NATO. He knows that these two policies are mutually exclusive, as Russia does not want to see NATO and its nuclear weapons installed in Ukraine and wanted neutrality or non-alignment.
What is more, he knows that his ultra-nationalist allies will refuse to negotiate with Russia. This was confirmed by Praviy Sektor leader Dmitro Yarosh, who openly threatened him with death in the Ukrainian media a month after his election. Zelensky therefore knew from the start of the election campaign that he would not be able to fulfill his promise of reconciliation, and that there was only one solution left: confrontation with Russia.
But this confrontation could not be waged by Ukraine alone against Russia, and it would need the material support of the West. The strategy devised by Zelensky and his team was revealed before his election in March 2019 by Oleksei Arestovitch, his personal advisor, on the Ukrainian media Apostrof’. Arestovitch explained that it would take an attack by Russia to provoke an international mobilization that would enable Ukraine to defeat Russia once and for all, with the help of Western countries and NATO. With astonishing precision, he described the course of the Russian attack as it would unfold three years later, between February and March 2022. Not only did he explain that this conflict was unavoidable if Ukraine is to join NATO, but he also placed this confrontation in 2021-2022! He outlined the main areas of Western aid:
In this conflict, we will be very actively supported by the West. Weapons. Equipment. Assistance. New sanctions against Russia. Most likely, the introduction of a NATO contingent. A no-fly zone, and so on. In other words, we won’t lose it.
As we can see, this strategy has much in common with the one described by the RAND Corporation at the same time. So much so, in fact, that it is hard not to see it as a strategy strongly inspired by the United States. In his interview, Arestovitch singled out four elements that would become the pillars of the Ukrainian strategy against Russia, and to which Zelensky returned regularly:
International aid and arms supplies,
International sanctions,
NATO intervention,
Creation of a no-fly zone.
It should be noted that these four pillars are understood by Zelensky as promises whose fulfillment is essential to the success of this strategy. In February 2023, Oleksiy Danilov, Secretary of Ukraine’s Defense and National Security Council, declared in The Kyiv Independent that Ukraine’s objective was the disintegration of Russia. The mobilization of Western countries to supply Ukraine with heavy weapons then seems to give substance to this objective, which is consistent with what Oleksiy Arestovich had declared in March 2019.
A few months later, however, it became clear that the equipment supplied to Ukraine was not sufficient to ensure the success of its counter-offensive, and Zelensky asked for additional, better-adapted equipment. At this point, there was a certain amount of Western irritation at these repeated demands. Former British Defense Minister Ben Wallace declared that Westerners “are not Amazon.” In fact, the West does not respect its commitments.
Contrary to what our media and pseudo-military experts tell us, since February 2022, it has been clear that Ukraine cannot defeat Russia on its own. As Obama put it, “Russia [there] will always be able to maintain its escalation dominance.” In other words, Ukraine will only be able to achieve its goals with the involvement of NATO countries. This means that its fate will depend on the goodwill of Western countries. So, we need to maintain a narrative that encourages the West to keep up this effort. This narrative will then become what we call, in strategic terms, its “center of gravity.”
As the months went by, the course of operations showed that the prospect of a Ukrainian victory was becoming increasingly remote, as Russia, far from being weakened, was growing stronger, militarily and economically. Even General Christopher Cavoli, Supreme American Commander Europe (SACEUR), told a US congressional committee that “Russia’s air, naval, space, digital and strategic capabilities have not suffered significant degradation during this war.”
The West, expecting a short conflict, is no longer able to maintain the effort promised to Ukraine. The NATO summit in Vilnius (July 11-12, 2023) ended in partial success for Ukraine. Its membership is postponed indefinitely. Its situation is even worse than it was at the beginning of 2022, since there is no more justification for its entry into NATO than there was before the SMO.
Ukraine then turned its attention to a more concrete objective: regaining sovereignty over its entire 1991 territory.
Thus, the Ukrainian notion of “victory” rapidly evolved. The idea of a “collapse of Russia” quickly faded, as did that of its dismemberment. There was talk of “regime change,” which Zelensky made his objective by forbidding any negotiations as long as Vladimir Putin was in power. Then came the reconquest of lost territories, thanks to the counter-offensive of 2023. But here, too, hopes quickly faded. The plan was simply to cut the Russian forces in two, with a thrust towards the Sea of Azov. But by September 2023, this objective had been reduced to the liberation of three cities.
In the absence of concrete successes, narrative remains the only element Ukraine can rely on to maintain Western attention and willingness to support it. For, as Ben Wallace, ex-Defence Minister, put it in The Telegraph on October 1, 2023: “The most precious commodity is hope.” True enough. But Western appraisal of the situation must be based on realistic analyses of the adversary. However, since the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis, Western analyses have been based on prejudice.
****
The Notion of Victory
Russia operates within a framework of Clausewitzian thinking, in which operational successes are exploited for strategic ends. Operational strategy (“operative art”) therefore plays an essential role in the definition of what is considered a victory.
As we saw during the battle of Bakhmut, the Russians adapted perfectly to the strategy imposed on Ukraine by the West, which prioritizes the defense of every square meter. The Ukrainians thus played into the hands of the attrition strategy officially announced by Russia. Conversely, in Kharkov and Kherson, the Russians preferred to cede territory in exchange for the lives of their men. In the context of a war of attrition, sacrificing potential in exchange for territory, as Ukraine is doing, is the worst strategy of all.
This is why General Zaluzhny, commander of the Ukrainian forces, tried to oppose Zelensky and proposed withdrawing his forces from Bakhmut. But in Ukraine, it is the Western narrative that guides military decisions. Zelensky preferred to follow the path laid out for him by our media, in order to retain the support of Western opinion. In November 2023, General Zaluzhny had to openly admit that this decision was a mistake, because prolonging the war will only favor Russia.
The Ukrainian conflict was inherently asymmetrical. The West wanted to turn it into a symmetrical conflict, proclaiming that Ukraine’s capabilities could be enough to topple Russia. But this was clearly wishful thinking from the outset, and its sole purpose was to justify non-compliance with the Minsk Agreements. Russian strategists have turned it into an asymmetrical conflict.
Ukraine’s problem in this conflict is that it has no rational relationship with the notion of victory. By comparison, the Palestinians, who are aware of their quantitative inferiority, have switched to a way of thinking that gives the simple act of resisting a sense of victory. This is the asymmetrical nature of the conflict that Israel has never managed to understand in 75 years, and which it is reduced to overcoming through tactical superiority rather than strategic finesse. In Ukraine, it is the same phenomenon. By clinging to a notion of victory linked to the recovery of territory, Ukraine has locked itself into a logic that can only lead to defeat.
On November 20, 2023, Oleksiy Danilov, Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council, painted a gloomy picture of Ukrainian prospects for 2024. His speech showed that Ukraine had neither a plan to emerge from the conflict, nor an approach that would associate a sense of victory with that emergence: he was reduced to linking Ukraine’s victory to that of the West. In the West, however, the end of the conflict in Ukraine is increasingly perceived as a military, political, human and economic debacle.
In an asymmetrical situation, each protagonist is free to define his or her own criteria for victory, and to choose from a range of criteria under his or her control. This is why Egypt (1973), Hezbollah (2006), the Islamic State (2017), the Palestinian resistance since 1948 and Hamas in 2023 are victorious, despite massive losses. This seems counter-intuitive to a Western mind, but it is what explains why Westerners are unable to really “win” their wars.
In Ukraine, the political leadership has locked itself into a narrative that precludes a way out of the crisis without losing face. The asymmetrical situation now working to Ukraine’s disadvantage stems from a narrative that has been confused with reality, and has led to a response that is ill-suited to the nature of the Russian operation [end]
Jacques Baud was a member of the Swiss strategic intelligence, a specialist of Eastern European and a former head of the United Nations peace operations doctrine. In NATO, he was involved in programs in Ukraine in 2014 and 2017
chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia
It has been a while since I published anything long-form commenting on the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War, and I confess that writing this article gave me a modicum of trouble. Ukraine’s much anticipated grand summer counteroffensive has now been underway for about eighty days with little to show for it. The summer has seen fierce fighting in a variety of sectors (to be enumerated below), but the contact line has shifted very little. I have been reluctant to publish a discussion of the Ukrainian campaign simply because they have continued to hold assets in reserve, and I did not want to post a premature commentary that went to press right before the Ukrainians showed some new trick or revealed a hidden ace up their sleeve. Sure enough, I wrote the bulk of this article last week, right before Ukraine launched yet another major attempt to force a breach in the Orikhiv sector.
At this point, however, the appearance of some of Ukraine’s last remaining premier brigades, which had previously been held in reserve, confirms that the axes of Ukraine’s attack are concretized. Only time will tell if these precious reserves manage to achieve a breach in the Russian lines, but enough time has passed that we can sketch out what exactly Ukraine has been trying to do, why, and why it has failed to this point.
Part of the problem with narrating the war in Ukraine is the positional and attritional nature of the fighting. People continue to look for bold operational maneuver to break the deadlock, but the reality seems to be that for now some combination of capability and reticence has turned this war into a positional struggle with a plodding offensive pace, which far more resembles the first world war than the second.
Ukraine had aspirations of breaking open this grinding front and reopening mobile operations – escaping the attritional struggle and driving on operationally meaningful targets – but these efforts have so far come to naught. For all the lofty boasts of demonstrating the superior art of maneuver, Ukraine still finds itself trapped in a siege, painfully trying to break open a calcified Russian position without success.
Ukraine may not be interested in a war of attrition, but attrition is certainly interested in Ukraine.
Ukraine’s Strategic Paradigm
For those that have been following the war closely, what follows will probably not be new information, but I think it is worth thinking holistically about Ukraine’s war and the factors that drive their strategic decision making.
For Ukraine, the conduct of the war is shaped by a variety of disturbing strategic asymmetries.
Some of these are obvious, like Russia’s much larger population and military industrial plant, or the fact that Russia’s war economy is indigenous, while Ukraine is entirely reliant on western deliveries of equipment and munitions. Russia can autonomously ramp up armaments production and there are abundant signs from the battlefield that the Russian war economy is beginning to find its groove, with new systems like the Lancet present in increasing abundance, and western sources now admitting that Russia has successfully serialized a domestic version of the Iranian Shahed Drone. Furthermore, Russia has the asymmetrical capacity to strike Ukrainian rear areas to an extent that Ukraine cannot reciprocate, even if they are given the dreaded ATACMs (these will give Ukraine the range to strike operational depth targets in the theater, but they can’t hit facilities in Moscow and Tula the way Russian missiles can strike anywhere in Ukraine)
Medvedev inspects a tank production run
With significant Russian asymmetries in population size, industrial capacity, strike capability, and – let us be blunt – sovereignty and decision-making freedom, an attritional-positional struggle is simply bad math for Ukraine, and yet that is precisely the sort of war in which it has become trapped.
What is important for us to understand, however, is that the strategic asymmetry goes beyond physical capacities like population base, industrial plant, and missile technology, and extends into the realm of strategic objectives and timelines.
Russia’s war has been deliberately framed in a fairly open-ended way, with goals largely tied to the idea of “demilitarizing” Ukraine. In fact, Russia’s territorial objectives remain rather nebulous beyond the 4 annexed oblasts (though it is safe to say that Moscow would like to acquire far more than just these). All that to say, Putin’s government has deliberately framed the war as a military-technical enterprise focused on destroying the Ukrainian armed forces, and has shown itself to be perfectly free to give up territory in the name of operational prudentia.
In contrast, Ukraine has maximalist goals that are explicitly territorial in nature. The Zelensky government has been open about the fact that it aims – however fanciful this may be – to restore the entirety of its 1991 territories, including not just the four mainland oblasts but also Crimea.
The confluence of these two factors – Ukrainian territorial maximalism combined with asymmetrical Russian advantages in a positional-attritional struggle – forces Ukraine to seek a way to break open the front and restore a state of operational fluidity. Remaining locked in a positional struggle is unworkable for Kiev, partially because Russia’s material advantages will inevitably shine through (in a fight between two big guys swinging big bats at each other, bet on the bigger guy with the bigger bat), and partially because a positional war (which amounts essentially to a massive siege) is simply not an efficient way to retake territory.
This leaves Ukraine with no choice but to unfreeze the front and try to restore mobile operations, with an eye towards creating some asymmetry of their own. The only feasible way to accomplish this is to launch an offensive aimed at severing critical lines of Russian communication and supply. Contrary to some suggestions that were popular this spring, a large Ukrainian offensive against Bakhmut or Donetsk simply did not fit the bill.
Frankly, there are only two suitable operational targets for Ukraine. One is Starobils’k – the beating heart at the center of Russia’s Lugansk front. Capturing or screening Svatove and then Starobils’k would create a genuine operational catastrophe for Russia in the north, with cascading effects all the way down to Bakhmut. The second possible target was the land bridge to Crimea, which could be cut by a thrust across lower Zaporizhia towards the Azov coast.
It was probably inevitable that Ukraine would select the Azov option, for a few reasons. The land bridge to Crimea is a more self-contained battlespace – an offensive in Lugansk would occur under the shadow of the Belgorod and Voronezh regions of Russia, making it relatively more difficult to put significant Russian forces out of supply. Perhaps even more significant, however, is Kiev’s complete obsession with Crimea and the Kerch Bridge – targets that hold hypnotic sway in a way that Starobils’k never could.
Again, this may sound like fairly intuitive review, but it’s worth contemplating how and why Ukraine ended up launching an offensive that was widely telegraphed and expected. There was no strategic surprise whatsoever – a definitely real video of GUR chief Budanov smirking didn’t fool anyone. The Russian armed forces certainly weren’t fooled, as they spent months saturating the front with minefields, trenches, firing emplacements, and obstacles. Everyone knew that Ukraine was going to attack toward the Azov Coast, specifically with an eye towards Tokmak and Melitopol, and that’s exactly what they did. A frontal attack against a prepared defense without the element of surprise is generally considered a poor choice, but here is Ukraine not only attempting such an attack but even launching it against a backdrop of global celebration and phantasmagorical expectations
Ukraine’s infantile plea for OPSEC
It’s impossible to make sense of this without understanding the way that Ukraine is shackled by a particular interpretation of the war to this point. Ukraine and its supporters point to two successes in 2022 where Ukraine was able to retake a substantial swathe of territory, in Kharkov and Kherson oblasts. The problem is that neither of these situations is portable to Zaporizhia.
In the case of the Kharkov offensive, Ukraine identified a sector of the Russian front that had been hollowed out and was defended only by a thin screening force. They were able to stage a force and achieve a measure of strategic surprise, due to the thick forests and general paucity of Russian ISR in the area. This is not to mitigate the scale of Ukraine’s success there; it was certainly the best uses of forces available to them and they did exploit a weak section of front. This success is hardly relevant to circumstances in the south today; mobilization has ameliorated Russia’s force generation problems so that they now longer have to make hard choices about what to defend, and the heavily fortified Zaporizhia frontline is nothing like the thinly held front in Kharkov.
The second case study – the Kherson counteroffensive – is even less germane. In this case, Ukrainian leadership is rewriting history in record time. The AFU banged its head on Russian defenses in Kherson for months throughout the summer and autumn last year and took atrocious losses. An entire grouping of AFU brigades was mauled in Kherson without achieving a breakthrough, and this even with Russian forces in a uniquely difficult operational disposition where they had their backs to a river. Kherson was only abandoned months later due to concerns that the Kakhovka dam might fail or be sabotaged (for those keeping score, it did in fact end up failing), and due to Russia’s need at the time to economize forces.
Again, this can easily be misconstrued as arguing that Russia’s withdrawal from Kherson did not matter. Obviously, abandoning a hard-earned bridgehead is a major setback, and retaking west-bank Kherson was a boon for Kiev. But we need to be honest about why it happened, and it plainly did not happen because of Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive – to underscore this, recall that Ukrainian officials openly wondered if the Russian withdrawal was a trickor a trap. The question is simply whether Ukraine’s Kherson offensive is predictive of future offensive success. It is not.
So, we have one case where Ukraine identified a lightly defended section of front and ran through it, and another where Russian troops abandoned a bridgehead due to logistical and force allocation concerns. Neither is particularly relevant to the situation on the Azov coast, and in fact an honest reflection of the AFU’s Kherson Counteroffensive might have given Ukraine second thoughts about a frontal assault on prepared Russian defenses.
Instead, Kharkov and Kherson have both been presented as proof positive that Ukraine can shatter Russian defenses in a straight up fight – in fact, we still have no examples from this war of the AFU defeating strongly held Russian positions, particularly post-mobilization when Russia finally began to resolve its manpower deficiencies. But Ukraine is caught in the grip of its own particular story about this war, which has imparted unearned confidence in its ability to conduct offensive operations. Tragically for mobilized Ukrainian Mykolas, this has dovetailed with a second swagger-producing mythology.
A major selling point for the Ukrainian counteroffensive has been the assessed superiority of the AFU’s big-ticket donations from the west – the main battle tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. Since the first deliveries were announced, there has been no shortage of boasting about the many superior qualities of western models like the Leopards and Challengers. The suggestion has essentially been that skilled Ukrainian tankers are only waiting to be unleashed once they get behind the wheel of superlative western builds. My personal favorite motif has been the practice of dismissing Russian tanks as “Soviet Era” – neglecting to note that the Abrams (designed 1975) and the Leopard 2 (1979) are also Cold War models
A burn out Leopard in Syria
It must be stated, again, that there is nothing wrong with western tanks. The Abrams and the Leopard are fine vehicles, but confidence in their game-changing capabilities stems from a mistaken assumption about the role of armor. It must be appreciated that tanks always have been and always will be mass-consumption items. Tanks blow up. They are disabled. They break down and are captured. Tank forces attrit – much faster than people expect. Given that the brigades prepared for Ukraine’s assault on the Zapo line were significantly understrength in vehicles, it was simply irrational to expect them to have an oversized impact. This is not to say that tanks aren’t important – armor remains critical to modern combat – but in a peer conflict one should always expect to lose armor at a steady clip, especially when the enemy retains fires superiority.
One can see, then how a measure of hubris can easily creep in to Ukrainian thinking, fueled by a healthy dose of desperation and strategic need. Reasoning from a distorted understanding of its successes in Kharkov and Kherson, emboldened by their shiny new toys, and guided by an overriding strategic animus that requires them to unlock the front somehow, the idea of a frontal attack without strategic surprise against a prepared defense really could seem like a good idea. Add in the good old fashioned trope about Russian incompetenceand disorder, and you have all the recipes for an imprudent roll of the dice by Ukraine.
The Misfire
So now we come to the operational minutia. For a variety of reasons, Ukraine has chosen to attempt a frontal assault on Russia’s fortified Zaporizhia front, with the intention of breaching towards the sea of Azov. How can this be accomplished?
We had a few clues early on, accruing from a variety of geographic features and alleged intelligence leaks. In May, the Dreizin Report published what was purported to be a Russian synthesis of Ukraine’s OPORD (Operational Order). An OPORD functions as a broad sketch of an operation’s intended progression, and the document shared by Dreizin was billed as a summary of Russia’s expectation for Ukraine’s offensive (that is, it is not a leak of Ukraine’s internal planning documents, but a leak of Russia’s best guess at Ukraine’s plans).
In any case, in a vacuum it was anybody’s guess as to whether Dreizin’s OPORD was authentic, but we’ve subsequently been able to cross-check it. This is because of the other, even more infamous leak from earlier this spring, which included the Pentagon’s combat power build plan for Ukraine.
NATO was very generous and built Ukraine a mechanized strike package from scratch. However, because this mechanized force was cobbled together with a variety of different systems from all corners of the NATO Cinematic Universe, Ukraine formations are uniquely identifiable by their particular combination of vehicles and equipment. So, for example, the presence of Strykers, Marders, and Challengers indicates the presence of the 82nd Brigade in the field, and so forth.
Thus, despite Ukrainian pretensions of operational security, it’s actually been trivially easy for observers to know which Ukrainian formations are in the field. There have been a few deviations from the script – for example, the 47th Brigade was supposed to field the Frankenstein Slovenian M55 tanks, but in the end the decision was made to send the underpowered M55’s to the northern front and the 47th was deployed with a contingent of Leopard Tanks originally operated by the 33rd Brigade. But these are minor details, and on the whole we’ve had a good sense of when and where specific AFU formations get on the field.
Based on identifiable units, the Dreizin OPORD looks very close to what we actually saw at the onset of the Ukrainian offensive. The Dreizin OPORD called for an assault by the 47th and 65th Brigades on the Russian lines south or Orikhiv, in the sector bounded by Nesterianka and Novoprokopivka. Directly in the middle of this sector is the town of Robotyne, and sure enough that’s where the first big AFU assault came overnight on June 7-8, spearheaded by the 47th Brigade.
Now, from this point it becomes difficult to evaluate the Dreizin OPORD simply because Ukraine’s attack became instantaneously derailed, but one thing we can say is that Dreizin’s source was correct about the order that Ukrainian units would be introduced into battle. Based on this, we can flesh out the OPORD and feel pretty safe wagering that this is what the Ukrainians were hoping to achieve:
Ukraine’s Dream: The Drive to the Sea
The intention seems to have been to force a breach in the Russian line using a concentrated armored assault by the 47th and 65th Brigades, after which a follow on force of the 116th, 117th, and 118th would begin the exploitation phase, driving for the Azov Coast and the towns of Mikhailivka and Vesele to the west. The objective was clearly not to get bogged down in urban fighting attempting to capture places like Tokmak, Berdyansk, or Melitopol, but to bypass them and cut them off by taking up blocking positions on the main roads.
Simultaneously, a lesser – but no less critical – thrust would come out of the Gulyaipole area and drive along the Bilmak axis. This would have the effect of both screening the main advance to the west and wedging the Russian front open, splintering the integrity of the Russian forces caught in the middle. Overall, this is a fairly sensible, if ambitious and uncreative plan. In many ways, this was really the only option.
So what went wrong? Well, conceptually it’s easy. There is no breach. The bulk of the maneuver scheme is dedicated to exploitation – reaching such and such a line, taking up this blocking position, masking that city, and so forth. But what happens when there’s no breach at all? How can such a catastrophe occur, and how can the operation be salvaged when it comes untracked in the opening phase?
Indeed, this is precisely what has happened. Ukraine finds itself stuck on the edge of Russia’s outermost screening line, spending substantial resources trying to capture the small village of Robotyne, and/or bypass it to the east by infiltrating the gap between it and the neighboring village of Verbove. So instead of that rapid breach and turning maneuver towards Melitopol, we get something like this:
Ukrainian Counteroffensive with Mapped Russian Defensive Lines
We could be generous and say that Robotyne is the last village before the Ukrainian attack reaches the main Russian defensive belt, but we’d be lying – they will also have to clear the larger town of Novoprokopivka, two kilometers to the south. Just for reference, here’s a closer look at the mapped Russian defenses in the battlespace, based on the excellent work of Brady Africk
Russian defenses in the Robotyne Sector
The discussion about these emplacements can get a little muddled, simply because it’s not always clear what is meant by that popular phrase “first line of defense.” Clearly there are some defensive works around and in Robotyne, and the Russians chose to fight for the village, so in some sense Robotyne is part of the “first line” – but it is more proper to speak of it as part of what we would call a “screening line”. The first line of continuous fortifications across the front is several kilometers further south, and this is the belt that Ukraine has yet to even reach, let alone breach.
As of this moment, it appears that Russian troops have lost total control of Robotyne but continue to hold the southern half of the village, while Ukrainian troops in the northern half of the village remain subject to heavy Russian shelling. We should probably at this point consider the village to be continuously contested and a feature of the gray zone
Robotyne, in all its glory
Now, a quick note about Robotyne itself and why both sides are so determined to fight for it. It seems rather odd on the surface, given that the Russian preference in 2022 was to make tactical withdrawals under their fires umbrella. This time though, they are fiercely counterattacking to contest Robotyne. The value of the village lies not only in its location on the T-0408 Highway, but also its excellent perch on top of a ridge. Both Robotyne and Novoprokopivka lie on a ridge of elevated ground which is as much as 70 meters higher than the low-lying plain to the east.
What this means is fairly simple; if the AFU presses forward in attempts to bypass the Robotyne-Novoprokopivka position by pushing into the gap between Robotyne and Verbove, it will be vulnerable to fire on the flanks (particularly by ATGMs) by Russian troops on the high ground. We already have seen footage of this, with Ukrainian vehicles being taken in the flank by fire from Robotyne. I am highly skeptical that Ukraine can even attempt an earnest assault on the first defensive belt until they have captured both Robotyne and Novoprokopivka.
This would all be a tough nut to crack under ideal circumstances, with a variety of engineering problems to mediate, obstacles designed to funnel the attacker into firing lanes, perpendicular trenches to allow enfilade fire on advancing Ukrainian columns, and robust defenses on all the major roadways. But these are not the best of circumstances. This is a tired force that has exhausted much of its indigenous combat power, which is attempting to organize the attack using a piecemeal and understrength assault package.
Several factors conspired against the Ukrainian offensive, and synergistically they have created a bona fide military catastrophe for Kiev. Let us enumerate them.
Problem 1: The Hidden Defensive Layer
At this point, we need to acknowledge something that everybody missed about Russia’s defense. I previously expressed high confidence that Ukraine’s forces would be unable to breach the Russian defenses, but I mistakenly believed that the Russian defense would function according to the classic Soviet defense-in-depth principles (elucidated in great detail by the writings of David Glantz, for example)
Idealized Defense in Depth by a Motor Rifle Brigade
Such a defense, put simply, is open to the idea that the enemy will breach the first or even second lines of defense. The purpose of the multilayered (or “echeloned” in the classic terminology) defense is to ensure that the enemy force gets stuck as it tries to break through. It may penetrate the first layer, but as it goes it is continually chewed up by the subsequent belts. The classic example is the Battle of Kursk, where powerful German panzers broke into the Soviet defensive belts but subsequently became stuck as they were ground down. You can think of this as being analogically similar to a Kevlar vest, which uses a web of fibers to stop projectiles: rather than bouncing off, the bullet is caught and its energy is absorbed by the layered fibers.
I was actually quite open to the idea that Ukraine would generate some penetration, but I anticipated them getting stuck in the subsequent belts and sputtering out.
What was missing from this picture – and this is a credit to Russian planning – was an unseen defensive belt forward of the proper trenches and fortifications. This forward belt consisted of extremely dense minefields and strongly held forward positions in the screening line, which the Russians evidently intended to fight for fiercely. Rather than breaking through the first belt and getting stuck in the interstitial areas, the Ukrainians have been repeatedly mauled in the security zone, and the Russians have consistently counterattacked to knock them back when they do manage to get footholds.
In other words, while we expected Russia to fight a defense in depth that absorbed the Ukrainian spearheads and shredded them in the heart of the defense, the Russians have actually shown a strong commitment to defending their forwardmost positions, of which Robotyne is the most famous.
On paper, Robotyne was expected to function as part of a so-called “crumple zone”, or “security zone” – a sort of lightly held buffer that puts the enemy through pre-registered fires before they bump into the first belt of continuous and strongly held defenses. Indeed, a variety of aerial and satellite surveys of the area taken before Ukraine went on the attack showed Robotyne laying well forward of the first solid and continuous Russian fortification belt.
What was missed, it seemed, was the extent to which the Russian defenders had mined the areas on the approach to Robotyne and were committed to defending within the security zone. The scale of the mining certainly seems to have surprised the Ukrainians, and creates a strain on Ukraine’s limited combat engineering capabilities. Even more importantly, the dense mines have created predictable avenues of approach for the Ukrainian forces, which force them to repeatedly run through the same gauntlet of fires and Russian standoff weaponry.
Problem 2: Insufficient Suppression
The signature image of the first great assaults on the Zapo Line has been columns of unsupported maneuver assets, being raked with Russian fires, both ground based (rocketry, ATGMs, and tube artillery) and from air platforms like the Ka-52 Alligator attack helicopter. One of the more startling aspects of these scenes was the way Ukrainian forces would come under heavy fire while still in their marching columns, taking losses before they ever deployed into firing lines to begin their assault proper.
There are myriad reasons for this. One is the now blasé issue of Ukrainian munition shortages. Consider the following items of interest. In the runup to Ukraine’s counteroffensive, Russia waged a heavy counter-preparatory air campaign that knocked out large AFU ammunition dumps. Ukraine’s initial assaults collapse in the face of heavy and unsuppressed Russian fires. The United States decides to transfer cluster munitions to Ukraine because, in the words of the president, “they’re running out of ammunition.” Add in the degradation of Ukrainian air defense, which allows Russian helicopters to operate with great effect along the contact line, and you have a recipe for disaster. Lacking the tubes to suppress Russian fires or the air defense to chase away Russian aircraft, the AFU opened their offensive by disastrously pushing forward unsupported maneuver elements into a hail of fire.
Problem 3: Russian Standoff Weapons
It’s crucial to understand that the Russian toolbox is fundamentally different than it was during the battle for Kherson last year, due to the rapidly expanding production of a variety of Russian standoff weapons – most notably the Lancet and the UMPK glide modifications for gravity bombs.
The proliferation of the Lancet and similar systems means, in a nutshell, that nothing within 30km of the contact line is safe, and this in turn disrupts the AFU’s deployment of critical support assets like air defense and engineering, magnifying their vulnerability to Russian mines and fires. In fact, we’ve increasingly seen Ukrainian artillery use decline in the Robotyne area due to the threat of lancets (they seem to be transferring tubes to other fronts), and the AFU is favoring the use of HIMARS in the suppressive role.
Problem 4: Repetitive Lines of Approach
Because the AFU failed to breach the Robotyne sector on their first attempt, they’ve been forced to continually move up additional units and resources to hammer on the position. This has particular implications, both in the sense that AFU forces must continually traverse the same lines of approach to contact, and in the fact that they are using the same rear area to assemble and stage their assault forces.
This makes the burden on Russian ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) significantly easier, since the AFU has no effective way to disperse or hide the assets that they are bringing forward to the assault. Staged Ukrainian forces and material have been hid repeatedly in the villages immediately behind Orikhiv, like Tavriiske and Omeln’yk, and Russia is able to strike rear area infrastructure like ammunition depots because – to put it simply – there are only so many places these these assets can be staged when you are repeatedly assaulting the same 20km wide sector of front.
We recently had Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Defense Hanna Malair complaining that the 82nd Brigade – newly deployed to the Orikhiv sector – had been hit with a series of Russian airstrikes in its staging areas. According to her, this was because of poor OPSEC revealing the brigade’s location to the Russians. But this really makes very little sense; the entire area of operations around Orikhiv is perhaps 25km deep (from Kopani to Tavriiske) and 20 km wide (from Kopani to Verbove). This is a small area that has seen a huge amount of military traffic along the same roads throughout the summer. The idea that Russia needs insider information to know that they ought to surveil and attack targets in this area is absurd.
Problem 5: Fragile Brigades
It actually takes significantly less damage to “destroy” an operational level unit than people think. A unit can become a combat scratch off at 30% losses (with some variance depending on how those are allocated). This is because when people hear the term “destruction”, they think that means total losses. Sometimes that’s how the word is used in colloquial conversation, but what matters for officers trying to manage an operation is whether or not a formation is combat capable of the tasks being asked of it – and those capabilities can vanish much more quickly than people realize.
This is particularly the case for the Ukrainian mech package, for a variety of reasons. For one, as we discussed in previous articles, these brigades started the fight well understrength (remember, for example, that the Ukrainian 82nd Brigade has only 90 Stryker AFVs, while an American Strkyer Brigade is supposed to have 300). Additionally, the cobbled together nature of these brigades – and the total lack of indigenous sustainment systems like repair and maintenance – means that the Ukrainians will naturally have to cannibalize these vehicles. They’ve already started designating “donor” vehicles that are written off completely to be stripped down for parts. The nexus of these two facts is that Ukraine’s mechanized brigades are understrength on vehicles to begin with, and will have an abysmally poor recovery rate, with hidden attrition behind the scenes due to cannibalization.
What this means is that when we heard admissions by mid-July that Ukraine had already lost 20% of its maneuver assets, there is an associated catastrophic decline in combat capability. The lead brigades – which chewed through 50% or more of their maneuver vehicles – can no longer shoulder combat tasks appropriate for a brigade, and the Ukrainians are forced to feed in their second echelon units prematurely.
At this point, partial elements of at least ten different brigades have been deployed in the Robotyne sector, with the 82nd likely to join them soon. Given that the NATO combat power build plan only included 9 NATO trained brigades, plus a few reconstituted Ukrainian formations, it’s safe to say that blooding all of them over a 71 day fight just to break into the screening line was not in the plan.
Staring at the Abyss
I’ve seen a variety of analysts and writers lately arguing that the insertion of additional Ukrainian units into the Robotyne sector signals the next phase of the operation.
This is nonsense. Ukraine is still mired in the first phase. What has happened is instead that the attrition of their first echelon brigades has forced them to commit their second (and third) wave to complete the tasks of the opening phase. The initial attack, led by the 47th Brigade, was intended to create a breach in the Russian screening line around Robotyne and advance to the main Russian belt further to the south. They failed, and the additional brigades earmarked for exploitation – the 116th, 117th, 118th, 82nd, 33rd, and more – are now being systematically fed in to keep the pressure on.
These brigades have not been destroyed, of course, simply because they are not being committed in their entirety, but rather as subunits. Nevertheless, at this point Ukrainian losses make up the better part of a whole brigade, distributed around the broader package, and over 300 maneuver elements (tanks, IFVs, APCs, etc) have been scratched off.
We need to say this very explicitly. Ukraine has not moved on to the next phase of their operation. They are stuck in the first phase, and have been forced to prematurely commit portions of the second echelon that was earmarked for later action. They are slowly but surely burning through the entire operational grouping, and so far they have not breached Russia’s screening line. The great counteroffensive is turning into a military catastrophe
Now, this does not mean that the operation has failed, simply because it is still ongoing. History teaches us that it is unwise to make definitive pronouncements. Luck and human factors (bravery and intelligence, cowardice and stupidity) always have something to say. However, the trajectory is undeniably towards abject failure at the current moment.
So far, the AFU has shown some adaptability. In particular, we’ve recently seen them shift away from pushing forward unsupported columns of mechanized assets – instead they’ve been leaning on small dismounted units, trying to slowly push forward into the space between Robotyne and Verbove. The move towards dispersal is intended to reduce loss rates, but it also reduces the probability of a dramatic breakthrough even further and marks the temporary abandonment of decisive breaching action in favor of – once again – creeping positional warfare.
We would be remiss if we failed to note that there have been meaningful Russian losses in all of this. We know that the Russian forces in the Robotyne sector have required rotation and reinforcement, including with elite VDV and Naval Infantry units. Russia has taken counterbattery losses, it has lost vehicles in counterattacking action, and men have been killed holding their trenches. The initial assault groups that the Ukrainians threw in had a lot of combat power, and the fighting was very bloody for both sides. It’s not a one-sided shooting gallery, but a high intensity war.
But therein is the crux of the matter – Ukraine seems unable to escape the attritional and positional war that it finds itself in. It sounds all well and good to proclaim a return to “maneuver” warfare, but if there is an inability to breach enemy defenses, this is only an empty boast, and the nature of the struggle remains attritional. When the question becomes “will we breach before we run out of combat power”, you are not maneuvering. You are attriting.
In my series of articles on military history, we’ve looked at a variety of cases where armies tried desperately to unlock the front and restore a state of operational maneuver, but when there is no technical capacity to do so, these intentions do not matter one bit. Nobody wants to be trapped on the wrong side of attritional mathematics, but sometimes what you want does not matter at all. Sometimes attrition is imposed on you.
In the absence of the capabilities required to successfully breach Russia’s prodigious defenses – more ranged fires, more air defense, more ISR, more EW, more combat engineering, more more more – Ukraine is trapped in a rock fight. Two fighters are swinging bats at each other, and Russia is a bigger man with a bigger bat.
Two Bad Copes
Amid a clear misfire and growing strategic disappointment, two new suggestions have increasingly crept into the conversation – “copes”, if you will, that are utilized as a narrative comfort to explain why the Ukrainian operation is actually going just fine (despite nearly universal acknowledgment in the west that the results have been lackluster at best). I would like to briefly address each of these in turn.
Cope 1: “The first stage is the hardest”
You frequently see it argued that all the AFU has to do is break open the Russian screening line, and the remainder of the defenses will fall like dominos. The general thrust of this argument is that the Russians lack reserves and that the subsequent defensive lines are not adequately manned – just break open the first line, and the rest will fall apart.
This is probably a comforting thing to tell oneself, but it’s rather irrational. We could talk, for example, about Russia’s doctrinal schema for defense in depth, which prescribes liberal allocation of reserves at all depths of the defensive system, but it’s probably more fruitful to point at more immediate evidence.
Let us simply consider Russia’s behavior over the last six months. They have spent a tremendous amount of effort constructing echeloned defenses – are we really to believe that they did all this only to waste all their combat power fighting in front of these defenses? Nor is there any evidence that Russia is having trouble supplying the front with manpower at the present moment. We’ve seen continued rotations and redeployments amid an overall process of military enlargement in Russia. Indeed, of the two belligerents, it is Ukraine that seems to be scraping the barrel for manpower.
Cope 2: “Get within firing range”
This is the more fantastical story, and it represents a radical ad-hoc shift of the goalposts. The argument is that Ukraine doesn’t actually need to advance to the sea and physically cut the land bridge, all it has to do is get the Russian supply routes within firing range to cut off Russian troops. This theory has been advance liberally on Twitter X and by personalities like Peter Zeihan (a man who knows nothing about military affairs).
There are many problems with this line of thought, most of which stem from an inflated notion of “fire control.” To put it simply, being “in range” of artillery fire does not imply effective area denial or severed supply lines. If that were the case, Ukraine would be unable to attack out of Orikhiv at all, since the entire axis of approach is within Russian firing range. In Bakhmut, the AFU continued to fight long after their main supply routes came under Russian shelling.
The simple fact is that most military tasks are conducted within range of at least some of the enemy’s ranged fires, and the idea that Russia will collapse if the AFU manages to put a shell on the Azov coastal highway is fairly ridiculous. In fact, Russia’s main rail line is already within range of Ukrainian HIMARS, and the Ukrainians have successfully launched strikes on coastal cities like Berdyansk. Meanwhile, Russia strikes at Ukrainian sustainment infrastructure with regularity – yet neither army has collapsed yet. This is because ranged fires are a tool to improve attritional calculus and further operational goals – they do not magically win wars just by tagging the enemy’s supply roads.
Let’s be charitable though, and indulge this line of thinking. Suppose the Ukrainians managed to advance – not all the way to the coast, but far enough to bring Russia’s main supply routes within range of artillery. What would they do? Wheel up a battery of howitzers, park them at the very front line, and begin firing nonstop at the road? What do you think would happen to those howitzers? Counterbattery systems would surely set upon them. The idea that you can just haul up a big gun and start taking potshots at Russian supply trucks is really quite childish. Putting enemy forces out of supply has always required physically blocking transit, and that’s what Ukraine will have to do if they want to cut Russia’s land bridge.
The Distraction
I am cognizant of the fact that I would be raked over the coals if I failed to discuss a secondary area of Ukrainian effort, farther to the east in Donestk oblast. Here, the Ukrainians have worked their way a good distance up the highway out of the town of Velyka Novosilka capturing several settlements.
The problem with this “other” Ukrainian attack is that it is, in a word, inconsequential. This axis of advance is operationally sterile in a very fundamental way, as it involves pushing groups up a narrow corridor of road that doesn’t lead anywhere important. As in the Robotyne sector, the AFU is still quite some distance from any of the serious Russian fortifications, and to make matters worse the road and settlements on this axis lay along a small river. Rivers, as we know, flow along the floor of the terrain, which means the roadway sits at the bottom of a wadis/embakement/glacis, choose your terminology. In fact, the road network as such consists of nothing except a single-lane roadway on either side of the river
The Sideshow in the East
My reading of this axis is essentially that it was intended as a feint to create some semblance of operational confusion, but when the primary effort on the Orikhiv axis turned into a colossal misfire, the decision was made to continue to press here simply for narrative purposes. Ultimately, this is simply not an axis of advance that can exert a meaningful influence on the wider war. The forces deployed here are relatively miniscule in the grand scope of things, and they aren’t going anywhere important. Certainly, a thin, needlelike penetration is not going to drive more than 80 kilometers down a single lane road to the sea and win the war.
Conclusion: Finger Pointing
One of the surest signs that Ukraine’s counteroffensive has taken a cataclysmic turn is the way Kiev and Washington have already begun to blame each other, conducting a postmortem while the body is still warm. Zelensky has blamed the west for being too slow to deliver the requisite equipment and ammunition, arguing that unacceptable delays allowed the Russians to improve their defenses. This strikes me as rather obscene and ungrateful. NATO built Ukraine a new army from scratch in a process that already required greatly truncating the training times.
On the other hand, western experts have begun to blame Ukraine for supposedly being unable to adopt “combined arms warfare”. This is really a very nonsensical attempt to use jargon (incorrectly) to explain away problems. Combined arms simply means the integration and simultaneous use of various arms like armor, infantry, artillery, and air assets. Claiming that Ukraine and Russia are somehow cognitively or institutionally incapable of this is extremely silly. The Red Army had a complex and extremely thorough doctrine of combined arms operation. One professor at the US Arms School of Advanced Military Studies said: “The single most coherent core of theoretical writings on operational art is still found among the Soviet writers.” The idea that combined arms is some foreign and novel concept to Soviet officers (a caste that includes the Russian and Ukrainian high command) is ridiculous.
This issue is not some sort of Ukrainian doctrinal obstinacy, but a combination of structural factors rooted in the insufficiency of Ukrainian combat power and the changing face of warfare.
It’s frankly a little silly to say that Ukraine needs to learn about “combined arms” when they are very simply lacking important capabilities that would make a successful maneuver campaign possible – namely, adequate ranged fires, a functioning air force (and no, F-16’s will not fix this), engineering, and electronic warfare. The issue very fundamentally is not one of doctrinal flexibility, but of capability. By way of analogy, this is a bit like sending a boxer out to fight with a broken arm, and then critiquing his technique. The problem is not his technique – the problem is that he’s injured and materially weaker than his opponent. So too, the problem for Ukraine is not that they are incapable of coordinating arms, the problem is that their arms are shattered.
Secondly – and this, I admit, is rather shocking to me – western observers do not seem open to the possibility that the accuracy of modern ranged fires (be it Lancet drones, guided artillery shells, or GMLRS rockets) combined with the density of ISR systems may simply make it impossible to conduct sweeping mobile operations, except in very specific circumstances. When the enemy has the capacity to surveil staging areas, strike rear area infrastructure with cruise missiles and drones, precisely saturate approach lines with artillery fire, and soak the earth in mines, how exactly can it be possible to maneuver?
Combined arms and maneuver are predicated on the ability to rapidly concentrate enormous fighting power and attack with great violence at narrow points. This is probably impossible given the density of Russian surveillance, firepower, and the many obstacles they have put up to deny Ukrainian freedom of movement and scleroticize their activity. The main examples of maneuver in recent western memory – the campaigns in Iraq – have only tenuous relevance to circumstances in Zaporizhia.
Ultimately, we have returned to a war of mass – particularly massed ISR assets and fires. The only way Ukraine can maneuver the way they want is to break open the front, and they can only do this with more of everything – more mine clearing equipment, more shells and tubes, more rocketry, more armor. Only mass can crack open a suitable breach in the Russian lines. Otherwise, they are stuck in a positional creep through the dense Russian defenses, and criticizing them for being unable to grasp some sort of magical western notion of “combined arms” is the strangest sort of finger pointing.
So, whence goes the war from here? Well, the obvious question to ask is whether we believe Ukraine will ever have a more potent assault package than the one they started the summer with. The answer clearly seems to be no. It was like pulling teeth to scrape together these understrength brigades – the idea that, following on a defeat in the Battle of Zaporizhia, NATO will somehow put together a more powerful package seems like a stretch. More to the point, we have American officials saying fairly explicitly that this was the best mechanized package Ukraine was going to get.
It does not seem controversial to say that this was Ukraine’s best shot at some sort of genuine operational victory, which at this point seems to be slowly trickling away into modest but materially costly tactical advances. The ultimate implication of this is that Ukraine is unable to escape a war of industrial attrition, which is precisely the sort of war that it cannot win, due to all the asymmetries that we mentioned earlier.
In particular, however, Ukraine cannot win a positional-attritional war because of its own maximalist definition of “winning.” Since Kiev has insisted that it will not give up until it returns its 1991 borders, an inability to dislodge Russian forces poses a particularly nasty problem – Kiev will either need to admit defeat and acknowledge Russian control over the annexed areas, or it will continue to fight obstinately until it is a failed state with nothing left in the tank.
Trapped in a bat fight, with attempts to unlock the front with maneuver coming to naught, what Ukraine needs most is a much bigger bat. The alternative is a totalizing strategic disaster [end]