Analista senior di l'intelligenza in u campu di a gestione di i risichi di sicurezza, sò un anzianu tenente detective è ufficiale di l'intelligenza in l'agenzie di u Statu francese. A bona pronuncia hè Николай Чинкуини, in russu
beau et raccord, puisque les droitardéspinzuti sont des pétainistes ataviques, sinon congénitaux
Dresden bleibt deutsch fait écho au Berlin bleibt deutsch d’avril 1945 (capture d’écran)
Dans un défilé politique hier à Lyon, capitale des Gaules, la fine fleur du pétainisme français, sur place ou en soutien dans les médias, rendit hommage à Quentin Deranque, petit ange parti trop tôt
(Réseaux sociaux fascistes français)
Était présent par exemple dans la rue Marc de Cacqueray Valménier, ex chef à Paris des ex Zouaves. Ancien du Figaro et éditocrasse sur CNEWS, la chaîne de propagande de Vincent Bolloré, Ivan Rioufol ne tarit pas d’éloges sur la belle jeunesse que voilà. En solidarité, la majorité Les Républicains avait fait afficher le portrait du défunt sur la façade de l’Hôtel de région
https://youtu.be/CP2GYur6BnM
Un autre hommage nous parvient ce 22 février de Dresde, celui musical de nazis allemands. C’est beau et raccord, puisque les droitardéspinzuti sont des pétainistes ataviques, sinon congénitaux
Dreiundzwanzig Jahre Quentin war einer von uns Er kämpfte für sein Vaterland mit Brüdern Für die Freiheit und die Rekonquista von Europa Wie Kreuzritter in Tolosa Nur im den Hinterhalt zu schlagen Una cosa gloriosa
Listen, I shout it out to every European brother Be loud, be proud, we fight for each other So many more died to illegals or antifa We’ll never forget our revenge It is getting ya
Raus auf die Straße, Blaulichtattacke Trau dich und mache mit Gesicht oder Maske Die Kameraden sterben auch für dich, also erwache Auch mich kann es treffen Unsere Pflicht ist jetzt Rache
Zusammen streiten, zusammen kämpfen Durch dunkle Zeiten,wir bis zum Ende Wegbereiter werden Legenden Ihr Heldennut lebt in uns weiter
Quentin Deranque, militant d’extrême droite, est mort le 14 février à Lyon après une rixe avec des antifascistes. Très bien implanté dans la mouvance, il était l’un des fondateurs du groupuscule berjallien Allobroges Bourgoin
deux jours après le 10e anniversaire de la débâcle politique et sécuritaire du 13 novembre 2015, une messe célèbre à Verdun l’ancien dirigeant fasciste de l’État français
Le contexte : dans la métropole lyonnaise, un climat de terreur et de violence entretenu par l’extrême droite depuis 15 ans
On entend ces derniers jours les éditorialistes renvoyer dos à dos la violence de l’extrême droite et de l’extrême gauche, comme si ce n’était pas la première qui engendrait la riposte. Personne ne rappelle qu’à Lyon, c’est la terreur fasciste qui règne depuis de longues années, en toute impunité. Le média Rue 89 a recensé 102 agressions de groupuscules fascistes dans la capitale des Gaules entre 2010 et 2025. 70% d’entre elles restent impunies. Voici une liste non exhaustive d’affaires marquantes dont vous n’entendrez pas parler à la télé :
Mars 2010 : peu avant minuit, trois militants libertaires de la CNT sont agressés par une douzaine d’individus. Des néo-nazis les attendaient à la sortie d’un restaurant pour leur tendre une embuscade, et les tabassent à coup de bâton et de bouteilles en criant « Lyon est fasciste » et « Sieg Heil ». C’est le début d’une campagne de terreur méthodique et organisée de l’extrême droite pour conquérir la ville et détruire tout le tissu militant de gauche local.
Janvier 2011, à Villeurbanne, en banlieue de Lyon. Un couple qui rentre d’un concert subit un guet-apens par 9 néo-nazis qui les ont suivi. Ils les tabassent à coups de batte de baseball et de barres de fer. La jeune femme reçoit un coup dans la tempe et s’effondre. Son copain tente de la protéger, il est roué de coups au sol avec une extrême violence au sol, et laissé pour mort. Ils gardent des séquelles à vie : épilepsie pour lui, traumatisme pour elle.
Avril 2011 : les Identitaires lyonnais officialisent l’ouverture d’un local dans le Vieux Lyon, qui deviendra le QG du fascisme de toute la région : « la Traboule ». Quelques jours plus tard, une quinzaine de néo-nazis armés de barres de fer lancent une expédition punitive dans le quartier, depuis ce lieu. Ils vont s’approprier tout le quartier, qui devient une zone dangereuse pour les militants de gauche et les personnes non-blanches.
Mai 2011 : 500 identitaires organisent une « marche des cochons » contre l’Islam. Ils attaquent un bar et détruisent la devanture d’un kebab en faisant des saluts nazis.
A partir du mois de mai, chaque fin de semaine, des dizaines de néonazis sortent armés de barres de fer de « la Traboule » et se déplacent en cortège dans le quartier pendant des heures, frappant quiconque ne leur revient pas. Ils démontent aussi les plaques de la rue Juiverie, taguent « Hitler n’a pas fini le travail » et saccagent un bar oriental.
Entre 2010 et 2013, le nombre d’attaques d’extrême droite explose dans la ville, après l’ouverture de locaux et de salles d’entraînement d’extrême droite. Selon le collectif Vigilance 69, les groupes néofascistes sont à l’origine de quarante agressions physiques rien que ces trois années, représentant cinq cents jours d’incapacité totale de travail uniquement à Lyon !
Février 2014. Une bande de 5 néo-nazis attaque des adolescents mineurs, dans la rue. Ils croient avoir reconnu « des antifas ». Les nostalgiques d’Hitler sortent des couteaux. Deux jeunes sont poignardés dans le dos. Et tabassés.
Avril 2018, des dizaines de membres du Bastion social, un groupuscule néofasciste, organisent une descente devant un concert contre le racisme, et cognent des participants. Non seulement la justice ne poursuivra qu’un seul des fascistes arrêté sur place – les 8 autres ayant bénéficié d’un « non lieu » inexplicable – mais un antifasciste qui n’avait fait que s’interposer lors de cette agression se retrouve condamné.
Février 2019 : des dizaines de néo-nazis attaquent une manifestation de Gilets jaunes qui portaient une banderole « fachés mais pas fachos » avec des fumigènes, des engins explosifs, des ceinturons et des bâtons. Deux semaines plus tôt, une trentaine de militants d’extrême droite et de hooligans avait déjà chargé un cortège de Gilets jaunes, causant de nombreux blessés.
Juillet 2019, après la victoire de leur équipe de football, les supporters algériens qui font la fête dans la rue sont attaqués par des néo-nazis, à coups de barres de fer, aux cris de « sales bougnoules ». La police tire des balles en caoutchouc vers les supporters agressés, un jeune est éborgné.
Décembre 2019, une vingtaine d’individus cagoulés, armés de fumigènes et de barres de fer attaquent le bar « La pinte douce », considéré comme un repaire de gauche. Il est entièrement dévasté, et devra fermer peu après. Il avait été attaqué quelques mois plus tôt à coups de bélier. Sur Telegram, l’extrême droite revendique ces actions.
Avril 2021, une cinquantaine de fascistes attaquent la marche des fiertés à coups de marteau et de couteau. Dans le même temps et toujours à Lyon, un groupe fasciste Turc, les « Loups Gris » tente de s’en prendre à la manifestation de commémoration du génocide arménien.
Mars 2021, une poignée de néo-nazis déambulent dans les rues de Lyon, à grand renfort de virilisme et de slogans nationalistes. Ils s’arrêtent devant les vitrines de La Plume Noire, une librairie dont le local sert à distribuer de la nourriture aux plus précaires. Ils fracassent la vitrine et taguent des croix celtiques. Tout est revendiqué en vidéo par l’extrême droite. La librairie a de nouveau été la cible de dégradations ces derniers jours.
Juin 2022, Adrien Lasalle, 25 ans, figure de l’extrême droite locale et cadre de Génération identitaire, donne des coups de couteau à deux personnes qui collaient des affiches pour le candidat de gauche Raphaël Arnault, dans le cadre des législatives. Une victime est touchée au cou, une autre esquive et se fait entailler le bras.
Octobre 2022, 5 néonazis, dont Sinisha Milinov, porte-parole des Remparts Lyon, l’organisation créée après la dissolution de Génération Identitaire, attaquent deux Maghrébins à la sortie d’une boîte de nuit. Ryad et Alexis reçoivent 12 coups de couteau. 25 points de suture au visage pour Alexis après un coup destiné à le défigurer. Il a failli mourir et dû être opérée en urgence. Son ami est blessé à l’œil.
Décembre 2022, un soir de match France-Maroc, des dizaines de militants néonazis attaquent des supporters marocains aux cris de « on est chez nous » et « la France aux français ». L’un d’eux, vêtu de noir, frappe avec une masse, un outil qui peut tuer quelqu’un (notre photo). La scène se déroule sous l’œil bienveillant des forces de l’ordre. Les témoins sur place assurent que les agresseurs ont pu se replier derrière la ligne de policiers, qui les ont laissé repartir, avant de tirer au LBD sur la foule qui ripostait.
Le même mois, un jeune homme qui distribue des tracts contre les locaux d’extrême droite est tabassé en plein jour.
Novembre 2023 à Lyon, une milice armée d’une cinquantaine de néo-nazis attaque une conférence organisée par le collectif Palestine 69 à coups de battes, de barres de fer, de bâtons et d’engins incendiaires. 6 personnes sont blessées, des dizaines de traumatisés. « On a cru que notre heure était venue », confie une participante.
Décembre 2023, au petit matin devant un bar lyonnais. Un groupe d’une dizaine d’individus d’extrême droite passe à tabac deux personnes d’origine maghrébine en leur criant « Sales bougnoules, bientôt, il n’y aura plus de Musulmans en France ».
Juin 2024, après une manifestation contre l’extrême droite, 50 néo-nazis organisent une descente dans la Croix Rousse, quartier réputé pour être marqué à gauche. Ce cortège scande « on est nazi putain », et attaque des terrasses de bar à coup de chaînes de vélo et ceinturons. Plusieurs blessés.
Dans ce même quartier, on recense deux attaques contre Radio canut, une radio militante, en 2017 et 2018, cinq attaques contre le local du Parti communiste français entre 2013 et 2018, et des descentes régulières contre les bars de gauche, librairies ou locaux.
Septembre 2025, dans le quartier de la Croix-Rousse à Lyon, la chanteuse et chorégraphe Dorothée Munyaneza, le musicien Ben LaMar Gay et le poète Julianknxx ont été frappé-es et insulté-es parce que noir-es : « Nous, on aime Trump ! Est-ce que vous aimez Donald Trump ? Sale n**** rentrez chez vous ! »
Cette liste déjà terrifiante est loin d’être complète. Pas un mois ne passe à Lyon sans une nouvelle agression. Et depuis ce recensement, d’autres affaires graves ont eu lieu en région Lyonnaise. Le 6 janvier 2026, des promeneurs découvraient un corps sous une couche de glace, dans un étang gelé du Rhône. La victime était un jeune homme d’origine maghrébine, âgé de 20 ans. Depuis, une information judiciaire a été ouverte pour « meurtre commis en raison de la race, l’ethnie, la nation ou la religion ». Le 19 janvier, un lycéen syrien de 17 ans était lacéré au visage à Décines-Charpieu, par trois individus cagoulés. Le parquet de Lyon ouvrait une enquête pour violences aggravées à caractère raciste. Il faut souligner que dans l’écrasante majorité des cas, la police n’arrête aucun auteur, les enquêtes ne sont pas menées, et parfois même, les plaintes sont refusées. Dans d’autres cas, les victimes ne portent pas plainte par peur ou refus, et les agressions ne sont donc pas comptabilisées. Lors des rares affaires donnant lieu à un procès, les magistrats font tout pour épargner les militants d’extrême droite, avec des poursuites et des peines minimales.
C’est dans ce contexte qu’ont émergé les collectifs antifascistes lyonnais : c’est tout simplement une question de survie. Quand l’extrême droite sème la terreur, dispose de locaux, et que les autorités laissent faire, que reste-t-il ? C’est la brutalisation maximale de la société et les attaques racistes de l’extrême droite qui nourrissent l’autodéfense populaire. Jamais l’inverse.
La rixe fatale initiée par Quentin Deranque et ses amis fascistes le 12 février n’est, finalement, que le dernier épisode de cette série dramatique, qui a détruit des dizaines de vies. Non seulement les antifascistes ne font que répondre, mais ils ont été très courageux de relever la tête dans un contexte aussi violent. Pourtant, vous n’entendrez jamais parlez de la centaine d’attaques qui ont précédé cette affaire durant les 15 dernières années [fin]
Quentin Deranque, militant d’extrême droite, est mort le 14 février à Lyon après une rixe avec des antifascistes. Très bien implanté dans la mouvance, il était l’un des fondateurs du groupuscule berjallien Allobroges Bourgoin
deux jours après le 10e anniversaire de la débâcle politique et sécuritaire du 13 novembre 2015, une messe célèbre à Verdun l’ancien dirigeant fasciste de l’État français
Quentin Deranque, militant d’extrême droite, est mort le 14 février à Lyon après une rixe avec des antifascistes. Très bien implanté dans la mouvance, il était l’un des fondateurs du groupuscule berjallien Allobroges Bourgoin
Troisième plus grosse ville de l’Isère, Bourgoin-Jallieu (38) et ses près de 56.000 habitants abritent depuis mai 2025 un groupuscule néofasciste, les Allobroges Bourgoin. Quentin Deranque, militant d’extrême droite aux multiples accointances radicales et décédé des suites d’une rixe avec des antifascistes à Lyon (69) le 14 février, était, selon un portrait plus qu’élogieux du « Figaro », l’un des co-fondateurs de ce groupuscule berjallien.
Le groupuscule sort du bois pile à temps pour l’édition 2025 du défilé néofasciste du C9M, qui rassemble à Paris des militants radicaux de toute l’Europe pour rendre hommage à un militant néofasciste décédé en 1994. Édition à l’occasion de laquelle des nervis violents ont effectué des saluts nazis, comme l’avait révélé « Libération ».
Présence au C9M
Cinq jours avant la manifestation, les Allobroges s’étaient fendus d’un communiqué expliquant vouloir « agir au niveau local pour permettre aux Berjalliens déterminés de défendre leur peuple ». Et de conclure avec une citation de Jean-Marie Le Pen. Cette action au niveau local est toutefois restée assez vague depuis mai 2025, les Allobroges ne revendiquant au final pas grand-chose
Mediapart a révélé que Quentin Deranque était présent au C9M 2025, ici au centre de l’image avec un pantalon beige (Exif-Recherche)Également présent sur cette photo du défilé, toujours avec un pantalon beige (Exif-Recherche)
Une présence au C9M bien sûr, où Quentin Deranque a été identifié par Mediapart défilant fièrement avec le reste de son groupuscule juste derrière ses anciens camarades, les néofascistes de Lyon populaire, récemment renommés Audace après leur dissolution par le gouvernement en juin 2025. Ceux-ci arboraient des cache-cous couleur bordeaux, dérobés aux militants de la Jeune garde Lyon lors d’un guet-apens tendu au groupe antifasciste après une manifestation.
« Croix celtiques sur un feu tricolore »
Une randonnée, en juin 2025, organisée par l’Active Club Dauphiné, branche locale de ce mouvement où se retrouvent tous types de militants radicaux autour, principalement, de la baston, le tout saupoudré de références néofascistes. Avec les Allobroges Bourgoin, des Parisiens des Hussards, groupuscule héritier du Groupe union défense et impliqué dans l’attaque d’un syndicaliste parisien aux cris de « Paris est nazi, Lyon est nazi aussi ».
Mais aussi des Perpignanais d’Unité sud, les néofascistes de Valyor Chambéry ou encore l’Active Club Carpentras. Les Allobroges entretiennent aussi des liens avec les hooligans locaux des Bourgoin defenders, actifs depuis 2023 et eux aussi très liés aux autres groupuscules néofascistes de la région. « Ils ont bien tagué quelques croix celtiques sur un feu tricolore, mais ils ne sont pas plus visibles que ça. Le maximum de leur activité, ça a dû être un collage en hommage à Jean-Marie Le Pen dans le centre-ville », analyse un Berjallien attentif. Il ajoute :
La ruralité alentour est plus propice aux réunions discrètes, mais ils sont surtout actifs quand les militants d’Audace Lyon ou des Bayards Grenoble sont dans le coin
Dans la mouvance néofasciste, la tendance est à une esthétique pseudo-latine dans les noms et les logos des groupuscules. Les Allobroges ont choisi une référence à la tribu gauloise locale qui résidait dans le Nord-Isère. Un nom qui signifie « ceux qui viennent d’un autre pays », choix ironique au vu des positions suprémacistes et radicalement anti-immigration du groupuscule… [fin]
deux jours après le 10e anniversaire de la débâcle politique et sécuritaire du 13 novembre 2015, une messe célèbre à Verdun l’ancien dirigeant fasciste de l’État français
Featuring SS symbols and swastika tattoos, a unit of French neo-Nazis is reportedly recruiting soldiers to fight alongside the Ukrainian army
Reports indicate that French neo-Nazis have been fighting alongside Ukrainian armed forces since 2022 (Roman Chop / AP)
Using Nazi symbols, SS references, and battle names from the Nazi era: In 2025, a unit of French volunteers in Ukraine is consisting largely of neo-Nazis, according to research by French online newspaper Streetpress. The group’s aim is reportedly to recruit new fighters, including former soldiers of the French army.
Among other things, the starting point for the investigation is a photograph published in September 2025, showing approximately 20 armed men in uniform, gathered around an armored vehicle. The image was distributed via Instagram and forwarded in far-right networks. Openly Nazi references appeared in the comments, including the term « Einsatzgruppen » — the name given to the mobile killing squads of the Nazi regime responsible for the mass murder of Jews, Roma, and political opponents during the Second World War.
From the Foreign Legion to the Nazi unit
According to Streetpress, the author of this comment is a French neo-Nazi from Lyon, who is going by the pseudonym « Kenneth » [Gwendal Delange] and has been mentioned in several media reports. The man reportedly has swastikas and SS emblems tattooed on him and traveled to Ukraine as early as 2022. In the spring of 2023, he was joined by other French citizens, including a far-right hooligan [César Aujard] suspected of involvement in an attack on a parliamentary staffer from the left-wing party La France Insoumise, and a former activist [Allan Duchézeau] from the far-right student organization Groupe Union Défense (GUD), with a history in the French Foreign Legion.
The presence of French neo-Nazis on the Ukrainian side is not new but intensified significantly in 2025, reports Streetpress. The group has grown to the point where it has formed its own unit, which initially operated under the name « War Agressive », later renaming itself « Légion pirates ». The unit is reportedly affiliated with the Ukrainian battalion « Revanche », which has links to the ultranationalist Orthodox party Tradition and Order. A Frenchman involved described the group to Streetpress as a « fascist battalion ».
Through its local organization, the group is also functioning as a recruitment network. Members of the « Légion pirates » have repeatedly called for applications on social media in recent months. Outwardly, the unit is presenting itself as part of the Ukrainian military intelligence service GUR and is portraying itself as a special forces unit. In reality, its true role remains unclear. According to the fighters themselves, their operations are primarily limited to reconnaissance missions.
References to Waffen-SS Division
According to Streetpress, several former members of the French armed forces are among the newly recruited fighters, including a former paratrooper in the Foreign Legion [Ylian Fort]. Also present are avowed neo-Nazis who are openly displaying SS emblems and swastikas. Some are combining both profiles: One of the fighters is calling himself « Charlemagne » [my chapter about him] — an allusion to the French Waffen-SS division of the same name during World War II — and previously served in the 13th Mountain Battalion of the French Army. Since arriving in Ukraine in the summer of 2025, he has had a swastika tattooed on his chest. Another fighter, who goes by the name « Roque » [my chapter about him], also served in the Foreign Legion and can be seen with Nazi symbols on his uniform and equipment.
The French Ministry of Defense declined to comment on specific individuals, but confirmed that the men in question are no longer serving in the French army.
Streetpress pays particular attention to the profile of another fighter with the nom de guerre « Malo » [Gwendal Cohin Pourajaud]. He is a former far-right activist who was convicted in 2021 for his involvement in violence at a campaign event for then-presidential candidate Éric Zemmour. During a house search at the time, investigators seized a flag associated with the Ukrainian far right. After stints with the groups Zouaves Paris and GUD, he traveled to Ukraine in the summer of 2025 to join the Pirate Legion. He told Streetpress that he was « proud to defend the interests of the Ukrainian people and fight against communism in the east ».
French security authorities are following these developments with growing concern. The Interior Ministry stated that it is paying « special attention » to the individuals in question, as their combat experience could pose a threat to internal security if they were to return to France. Shortly after the start of the Russian attack on Ukraine, the investigative media outlet Mediapart reported on similar concerns, drawing parallels to the return of jihadist fighters from the Syrian war. At that time, authorities counted around 150 French citizens in Ukraine, including approximately 30 from the far-right scene. In April 2023, two French neo-Nazis [Guillaume Andreoni and Alan Vigneron] were arrested upon their return from Ukraine – they were carrying magazines for assault rifles and military optics. After a brief period in custody, both returned to the front lines.
According to the report, some of the identified neo-Nazis are using the freedom of movement within the Schengen Area to make regular trips to France and other European countries. One of the fighters [Gwendal Delange] returned to France for a time and later appeared at large nationalist demonstrations in Poland. Another [Gwendal Cohin Pourajaud] was seen working as a steward at a far-right demonstration in Paris in early 2026.
Left-wing politicians as targets for shooting practice
Particularly alarming are the posts on social media in which individual fighters are expressing violent fantasies against left-wing parties and anti-fascist activists. For example, a member of the group from Ukraine [Roque] published photos of shooting exercises in which targets were marked with the abbreviations of left-wing parties as well as the name of anti-fascist Clément Méric, who was killed by a right-wing extremist in 2013.
Besides the « Légion pirates », research indicates another, smaller group of French neo-Nazis is existing in Ukraine [within the ranks of the 1st International Legion battalion], calling itself the « Légion des volontaires français » – a reference to the collaborationist unit of the same name which fought alongside the Wehrmacht in World War II. Former French soldiers are also said to be active in this group. In the summer of 2025, a member of that group, who went by the nom de guerre « Kapo » [Kevin Lazzari] – another term from the Nazi concentration camp system – was reportedly killed [end]
in French, alphabetical and obituary-like chronicle of the French involvement in the Atlanticist ranks in Ukraine, what servile journalists won’t tell you
En 2025, une nouvelle unité de Français combattant pour l’Ukraine s’est structurée autour d’un noyau de néonazis, ayant pour objectif d’attirer des recrues. Parmi ces volontaires, d’anciens militaires. StreetPress les a identifiés
En Ukraine, les volontaires français pro-ukrainiens et pro-russes se partagent l’imaginaire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Les premiers se revendiquent des collabos de l’Allemagne nazie, les seconds de l’escadrille mythique « Normandie – Niémen »
L’angle sécuritaire a largement dominé le traitement médiatique du mouvement social « Bloquons-tout », organisé partout en France le 10 septembre. Défilé de policiers sur les plateaux télé, focalisation sur les « violences », décompte en direct sur les chaînes d’information en continu du nombre d’interpellations : retour sur un cas d’école de journalisme de préfecture
[mon illustration : le 18 septembre 2025, des manifestants pacifiques affrontent les tirs de grenades lacrymogènes (réseaux sociaux)]
Préparer les esprits au « chaos » est l’une des pratiques structurantes du journalisme de préfecture à l’approche d’un mouvement social. La mobilisation « Bloquons tout » n’a pas fait exception. De scénarios noirs en notes des renseignements, en passant par les outrances de l’éditocratie, « l’information » avant le 10 septembre s’est écrite sur le ton de la peur des jours durant. À mesure que les « pythies médiatiques des violences » (Arrêt sur images, 10/09) se répandaient de plateaux en colonnes de journaux, la pression montait. « Les black blocs débarqueront de toute l’Europe, annonçait sur RMC (9/09) la militante identitaire – et chroniqueuse de la chaîne – Juliette Briens. Un mercredi en France quoi ! […] L’armada sera de sortie, des feux de poubelles, des feux de voiture ! […] Le chaos est bon à toutes les occasions dans ce pays ! » Nous n’en étions pourtant qu’aux prémices d’une nouvelle séquence exemplaire de journalisme de préfecture : le jour J, la co-production de l’information avec la police allait atteindre des proportions spectaculaires.
L’info au rythme de la préfecture
Il est 6h30 ce mercredi 10 septembre et BFM-TV prévient déjà : « Le pays est quadrillé par les forces de l’ordre. » Le bandeau appuie le propos du présentateur avec le chiffre annoncé la veille par le ministère de l’Intérieur : « 80 000 forces de l’ordre mobilisées ». Dans la foulée, la journaliste Perrine Storme lance « les premières images de la manifestation ». En l’occurrence, ce sont des images… d’interpellations : une dizaine de personnes plaquées contre un mur ou maintenues assises par des policiers, porte d’Italie à Paris. Retour plateau, le journaliste Dominique Tenza fait état d’une « trentaine d’interpellations, les premières donc » : c’est le début du décompte qui va rythmer la journée.
Sur toutes les chaînes d’information, les bandeaux défilent pour nous informer, minute par minute, du nombre d’interpellations. Une pratique que les médias n’interrogent plus, devenue le principal thermomètre journalistique pour suivre en direct le cours d’une mobilisation sociale
Aux yeux des chefferies éditoriales, cette pratique présente d’emblée plusieurs « avantages » : « objectiver l’événement », avec un chiffre évolutif provenant de sources qu’il ne s’agit pas de contester – la police ou le ministère de l’Intérieur. Et « meubler l’antenne » à peu de frais, en déléguant de fait une partie de la production de l’information – en l’occurrence, à la police ou au ministère de l’Intérieur. Participant de la co-production de la peur, la pratique est en outre un puissant ressort du journalisme de démobilisation, au service de la communication du pouvoir. « Le ministère et les autorités alimentent régulièrement les rédactions, notamment du nombre d’interpellations », rapporte benoîtement la cheffe du service politique de BFM-TV Marie Chantrait, en milieu d’après-midi. « Bruno Retailleau ne cesse de communiquer sur les incidents, le bilan des interpellations pour prolonger cette idée d’un ministère en action », remarque à son tour Le Parisien (11/09), sans pour autant préciser les conditions du succès de cette « idée » : des médias aux ordres. Un rôle d’ailleurs parfaitement tenu par BFM-TV, exemplaire en la matière.
Il est 6h50 quand de nouvelles images arrivent sur le plateau. Ce sont encore des images d’interpellations. Nous sommes cette fois porte de Bagnolet, à Paris, et la reporter sur place commente : « Présence musclée des forces de l’ordre, une dizaine de camionnettes de police, les forces de l’ordre sont très présentes. Ils se détachent par petits groupes pour interpeller des personnes qui pourraient être menaçantes. Vous voyez, on voit la Brav-M, qui fait des interpellations tout autour de la porte de Bagnolet… »
200 interpellations à 10h35, 295 à 13h, 400 à 19h…. Ces chiffres défilent inlassablement sur les bandeaux et structurent les discussions en plateaux, qui y voient la marque d’un ministère « en action », « efficace », et non pas la mesure de l’intensité de la répression. Comme les bandeaux ne suffisaient pas, les chiffres sont aussi relayés sur le compte X de la chaîne : au cours de la journée, pas moins de vingt tweets donnent le décompte des interpellations, soit plus d’un par heure… BFM-TV s’avère plus efficace que les services comm’ des préfectures !
« La police vous parle à toute heure »
À cela s’ajoute l’omniprésence de Bruno Retailleau, dont les moindres faits et gestes sont médiatisés. Dès 7h30, BFM-TV diffuse des images muettes de l’arrivée du ministre à Rungis, devant un plan de sécurité et entouré de hauts gradés. La journaliste-présentatrice rappelle à sa place les consignes «d’extrême fermeté » et les « dizaines d’interpellations » déjà menées. Et le cirque continue. Dominique Tenza : « Vous découvrez en direct ces images à Toulouse, avec un feu aux abords de la gare, et là encore, juste à côté, un véhicule de police. Conformément aux consignes données par Bruno Retailleau, les forces de sécurité sont déployées sur le terrain au moindre incident. » Quelques heures plus tard, c’est au tour de Julien Arnaud de « teaser » : « Bruno Retailleau dans quelques instants va s’exprimer, il y a un affichage important depuis ce matin pour montrer que la situation est tenue. » Et BFM-TV s’en assure. Aussi la conférence de presse du ministre démissionnaire est-elle diffusée en direct et en grande pompe : « priorité au direct », sur toutes les antennes
Le cadrage est « co-produit », la composition des plateaux aussi. Peu après 8h, le lieutenant-colonel Coiffard, porte-parole de la gendarmerie nationale, est le premier d’une très longue série de représentants des « forces de l’ordre », syndicalistes policiers et porte-parole, qui vont se succéder toute la journée sur BFM-TV. Entre 8h et 19h, ils ne seront pas moins de neuf à défiler en plateau. 9h06 ? Éric Henry, délégué national Alliance Police. 10h19 ? Fabien Vanhemelryck, secrétaire général Alliance Police. 11h20, Olivier Hourcau, délégué Alliance Police, pour changer. La journée peut se compter en heures, en nombre d’interpellations ou bien en porte-parole d’Alliance Police, reçus en toute déférence par les intervieweurs. À 13h27, voici Agathe Foucault, porte-parole de la police nationale. Puis à 13h51, Yves Assioma, superviseur national Alliance Police, ça faisait longtemps. À 14h04, un chroniqueur plus permanent s’installe, Maurice Signolet, ancien commissaire divisionnaire, en plateau jusqu’à 15h30. À 16h50, le lieutenant-colonel Coiffard est de retour ! Enfin à 17h50, Frédéric Lauze, secrétaire général du syndicat des commissaires de la Police nationale, en plateau jusqu’à 19h. La police vous parle en direct toute la journée sur BFM-TV. Cet entre-soi donne lieu à d’interminables causeries qui, pour ordinaires qu’elles soient, n’en participent pas moins du climat médiatique anxiogène, entre normalisation du maintien de l’ordre et surenchère répressive. Exemple avec cet échange entre trois acteurs interchangeables, en l’occurrence deux journalistes et un syndicaliste policier :
– Apolline de Malherbe :On voit ce jeune qui monte sur une voiture de police, pourquoi on l’arrête pas à ce moment-là ?
– Éric Henry (Alliance Police) :Cette scène est extrêmement choquante évidemment pour mes collègues. La première des choses c’est déjà d’assurer leur intégrité physique, leur sécurité, puisque comme vous le voyez, ils sont en sous-nombre face à des jeunes qui sont excités, déterminés à s’en prendre à eux […]. On est en difficulté pour […] éviter une surenchère et que…
– Apolline de Malherbe :Ce qui est très compliqué comme vous dites, c’est qu’ils sont à la fois en nombre partout en France, mais parfois en sous-effectif dans des petits points en particulier…
– Stephan Bureau :Est-ce que ce n’est pas l’objet justement que de provoquer une réaction – parce qu’on voit tout le monde avec son téléphone à la main – et d’avoir l’image ?
– Apolline de Malherbe :Il faut donc beaucoup de sang froid…
– Stephan Bureau :Exactement, parce que les policiers, dans le fond, on les provoque dans l’espoir qu’il se passe quelque chose et qu’on puisse documenter ce quelque chose.
– Éric Henry : […] Si jamais y’avait une sortie d’armes parce que leur intégrité physique voire leur vie est en danger… dans l’hypothèse… enfin… si les conditions n’étaient pas réunies par rapport à l’utilisation d’une arme inappropriée, derrière, c’est le tourniquet administratif et judiciaire. […] Ce qu’on va appeler une bavure policière, avec toutes les conséquences et la reprise par certains partis politiques, qui sont les mêmes incubateurs de ce « cassons tout », « bloquons tout », et derrière, la mise à mal de l’institution policière et tous les clichés qu’on connaît
Ou comment légitimer en direct, et par anticipation, la « bavure policière »…
Une ambiance permise par le dispositif : outre les interviews politiques et les chroniqueurs maison, les « invités policiers » seront – quasiment – les seuls à intervenir en plateau ce jour-là. Ordinaire pour cette « télé-préfecture », la journée se conclura en apothéose avec un dixième invité « police »… et non des moindres : l’ancien préfet de Paris Didier Lallement, réputé pour avoir (durement et massivement) réprimé le mouvement des Gilets jaunes et reçu conséquemment avec tous les égards par Marc Fauvelle : « Je vous rappelle les chiffres au niveau national, 175 000 participants, 473 interpellations dans toute la France. Et puis également autres chiffres, 267 incendies de voie publique, et 13 policiers blessés. Didier Lallement, bonsoir… »
Des « bons » mots (de la police) aux « bons » chiffres (du ministère)
Verrouillé de A à Z, le cadrage sécuritaire se double d’un recours permanent au lexique policier. Outre les traditionnels « éléments radicaux » pour désigner (et criminaliser) les manifestants – une expression omniprésente à l’antenne de CNews, notamment –, on entend parler de « fauteurs de troubles », de « casseurs », d’« ultra-gauche », de « maîtrise des individus masqués », de « points de fixation », de « journée à haut risque », d’« actions violentes » recensées en « zone gendarmerie » ou en « zone police », mais aussi de « débordements » ou de « dispersion » indistinctement selon l’énonciateur, policier… ou journaliste, tous deux reconvertis en gardiens de l’ordre.
Totalement normalisé dans les récits journalistiques, le point de vue policier ne subit aucun accroc. En particulier lorsqu’un plateau est sous bonne garde de Dominique Rizet, l’inénarrable « consultant police-justice » de BFM-TV. Tout au long du 10 septembre, ce grand professionnel à l’« objectivité totale », selon ses mots, s’est une nouvelle fois illustré par une série de prescriptions langagières. Alors que les gaz lacrymogènes pleuvent sur les images qui défilent derrière lui, il tempère : « Cette expression de “gazer les manifestants”, c’est pas très joli. Puis ça rappelle une triste époque. » Quelques minutes plus tard, tandis que le plateau observe une violente charge policière dans le quartier des Halles, à Paris, Dominique Rizet indique les mots à éviter… et ceux qu’il faut leur préférer pour décrire la situation :
Dominique Rizet :Les manifestants ne voulaient pas reculer donc les policiers ont fait… on appelle ça un bond offensif. Et pas des charges. […] La police aime pas qu’on… Donc des bonds offensifs, pour éloigner les manifestants. Donc on les écarte et puis ensuite, il y a cette distribution de gaz lacrymogène qui dissuade les plus tenaces
Comme on « distribue » des bonbons, en somme.
Aux bons mots s’ajoutent les bons chiffres. Et en la matière encore, BFM-TV n’en démord pas : la voix du ministère est sacrée. Peu après 17h, alors que le bilan qu’annonçait ce dernier à la mi-journée (29 000 manifestants) est aisément contestable au vu des défilés massifs filmés par les manifestants eux-mêmes partout en France et diffusés sur les réseaux sociaux, les journalistes s’empressent de communiquer leurs conclusions (tirées d’avance) :
– Amandine Atalaya :Si vous voulez un ordre d’idée avec ce chiffre dont on dispose pour l’instant de 29 000 manifestants…
– Olivier Truchot :C’est très faible !
– Amandine Atalaya :Il est très faible ! Et qui va être ajusté mais… Pour avoir un ordre d’idée par exemple, le 1er mai 2025 […], c’est 157 000 personnes selon la police, 300 000 selon les syndicats, ça fait cinq fois moins pour l’instant. Et par rapport aux grandes manifestations des retraites, […] les grandes journées, c’était 600 000 selon la police et 2 millions selon les manifestants, on est à vingt fois moins ! […]
– Olivier Truchot :Donc en termes de mobilisation physique, c’est pas très impressionnant.
– Amandine Atalaya :Vraiment je suis purement factuelle ! On ne peut pas dire que ce soit un succès en termes de nombre de personnes dans la rue aujourd’hui
Tellement « factuelle » que moins d’une heure et demie plus tard, elle sera sévèrement contredite par… le ministère de l’Intérieur, qui réactualise son décompte en évoquant 175 000 manifestants. Un bilan qui plus est contesté par d’autres sources – inaudibles le jour J à l’antenne de BFM-TV –, à l’instar de la CGT, évoquant « plus de 250 000 personnes » dans les rues partout en France. Un naufrage qui n’est pas sans rappeler celui d’une autre experte ès journalisme : Géraldine Woessner, la rédactrice en chef du Point. Sur la base des 29 000 manifestants annoncés par le ministère de l’Intérieur, cette dernière décréta « un flop mémorable » sur X, à 16h27. Deux heures plus tard, son inconscient déontologique lui commanda cette légère modification : « Update, avec le chiffre à 17 heures : 175 000 participants. » Un « flop mémorable », c’est le cas de le dire. Reste que cette propension à s’abreuver uniquement aux sources officielles, dont la communication n’est a priori pas contestable aux yeux des rédactions, aura une nouvelle fois appuyé le récit de « l’échec de la mobilisation »… que les éditocrates souhaitaient tant voir advenir.
Avides de spectacle, les principales télévisions se sont ruées comme de coutume sur la moindre étincelle. Aussi, lorsque peu après 16h, des reporters captent des images d’un restaurant en feu à Paris, c’est la cohue. Et certaines envoient valser la rigueur. CNews au premier chef, qui l’assure sur X dans un post toujours en ligne : « Les manifestants ont mis le feu à une brasserie et à un immeuble dans le centre de Paris, à Châtelet. » Sauf que patatras : en plus des témoignages de manifestants – qui évoquent immédiatement un départ de feu causé par une grenade lacrymogène –, la procureure de Paris évoque à demi-mot la responsabilité de la police une heure plus tard, ce que confirmera le parquet de Paris le lendemain
Mais à l’instant T, le feu n’échauffe que trop les esprits échaudés de CNews : « Voilà à quoi ça mène !, s’indigne la présentatrice Nelly Daynac. Des responsabilités sans doute d’un cocktail molotov qui a été lancé comme ça. Ou euh… Non mais enfin… ou d’une poubelle qui a été brûlée à proximité. » Une journaliste appelle-t-elle timidement à la vigilance ? Le plateau passe la recommandation par pertes et profits :
– Yoann Usai :L’incendiaire, lui, va probablement rentrer tranquillement ce soir chez lui ! Sauf s’il a été interpellé mais a priori, il y a peu de chance qu’il le soit.
– Nelly Daynac :Et il sera peut-être fier de son œuvre !
– Yoann Usai :Il sera fier de son œuvre naturellement, il va dormir bien au chaud ce soir. […]
– Nelly Daynac :Ce sont des pyromanes en fait, vous le disiez tout à l’heure. Des incendiaires.
– Yoann Usai :Des criminels ! Des criminels !
– Nelly Daynac :Des criminels qui prennent plaisir, comme ceux qui mettent le feu aux forêts l’été et se délectent sans doute après de ce qu’ils ont causé comme méfaits
Sans doute l’Arcom se délectera-t-elle d’une telle séquence…
Poussant la désinformation à son paroxysme, CNews n’est toutefois pas la seule chaîne à s’être ralliée aussi spontanément que naturellement à la thèse des « manifestants incendiaires ». Sur Franceinfo, un reporter parle d’« un restaurant […] qui a été pris pour cible » avant de faire marche arrière moins d’une demi-heure plus tard, évoquant « plusieurs charges de la police à l’aide de grenades lacrymogènes » dont « une […] a atterri sur des végétaux et sur la façade de ce restaurant ». Même tentation sur LCI, où en dépit des avertissements de la présentatrice, le consultant Guillaume Farde ne résiste pas à livrer les conclusions qui « s’imposent » :
– Marie-Aline Méliyi :On est sûr du coupable ? Parce qu’on se disait qu’il fallait un peu de prudence pour savoir si c’était directement lié à ce mouvement…
– Guillaume Farde :En tout cas, c’est en marge de. Et sans évidemment présumer des conclusions de l’enquête […], il y a un mode opératoire et des précédents. Ça, on peut au moins le dire. Le mode opératoire, c’est que l’ultra-gauche signe sa présence par le recours à l’incendie volontaire
La suspicion est jetée et la désinformation fait son œuvre. Au 20h de TF1 également, où la rédaction, pourtant en possession a minima des déclarations de la Procureure – diffusées trois heures plus tôt –, laisse éhontément planer le doute : « À Paris en marge d’affrontements, la façade d’un immeuble, en flammes. Le feu est parti de ce restaurant. Une enquête est en cours », se contente de relater la voix-off, au terme d’un sujet axé sur les violences…. des manifestants. Grossier, le sous-entendu confine à la manipulation. Et concerne de nombreux autres médias : à la Une de La Voix du Nord, sur les écrans des chaînes d’info ou pour illustrer les gros-titres des 20h, les images de ce restaurant en flammes sont largement surexposées sans être pour autant systématiquement remises en contexte ni commentées pendant leur diffusion. Comment un téléspectateur non averti, baignant par ailleurs dans un récit médiatique polarisé par l’inventaire des « violences » des « casseurs », peut-il interpréter ces images autrement qu’étant de la responsabilité des manifestants ?
Violences policières nulle part, célébration de l’ordre partout
Car une chose est sûre : des chaînes d’information aux 20h en passant par les grandes radios, le terme « violence » n’est rattaché qu’aux personnes mobilisées. Tout au long de la journée, alors que des vidéos de violences policières sont diffusées sur les réseaux sociaux – captées y compris par les reporters des médias mainstream –, aucun média audiovisuel, à notre connaissance, n’en fait réellement état. Des journalistes indépendants et le compte X « ViolencesPolicières.fr » ont beau recenser des dizaines de preuves à charges, les vidéos ne sont pas diffusées par les grands médias, et encore moins répertoriées au registre des « violences » par les commentateurs.
En lieu et place, les commentateurs célèbrent l’action du ministère de l’Intérieur. Outre le fait qu’aucun questionnement critique n’ait droit de cité concernant le dispositif militarisé du maintien de l’ordre (effectifs totalement exubérants, armes de guerre utilisées, surveillance de masse par drones, etc.), on assiste à la chronique satisfaite de la répression. En amont, pendant et en aval de la journée de mobilisation.
Sur Franceinfo la veille du 10 septembre, la description du « dispositif » policier mis en place par Bruno Retailleau a tenu lieu d’information « en continu ». Interroger sa politique agressive et la criminalisation du mouvement social ? Hors sujet pour le service public, où la journaliste « Société » Audrey Goutard remplit plutôt le rôle de porte-parole du ministère de l’Intérieur : « 80 000 policiers vont être mis sur le terrain […], mobiles, adaptables, qui sont là pour deux points : la capacité de s’adapter et la capacité de répondre immédiatement s’il y a des actes de violence avec des interpellations. Répression, répression, répression. C’est le mot d’ordre, effectivement, de Bruno Retailleau face à cette violence »… à ce stade imaginaire. Même tonalité au 20h de France 2 (9/09), que Samuel Gontier a qualifié d’« ode à la répression » anticipée (Bluesky, 9/09), notamment en réaction à cette pépite signée Léa Salamé – « Plus mobiles, mieux renseignées, comment les forces de l’ordre ont appris des Gilets jaunes à être plus efficaces » – qui valut à la présentatrice son premier communiqué syndical déplorant que « France 2 se met[te][…] explicitement du côté de la police ».
Le 10 septembre sur LCI, les journalistes se délectent en continu d’images de CRS saturant les rues et les écrans. « Un dispositif conséquent, s’enthousiasme la présentatrice Marie-Aline Méliyi, vous le voyez à Paris, pour contenir les individus qui ont envie de semer le chaos et le désordre. Christophe Miette, vous êtes secrétaire national SCSI-CFDT, syndicat des cadres de la sécurité intérieure, on voit l’intérêt d’avoir anticipé avec un dispositif conséquent. » Ce n’était pas une question…
Ou encore un peu plus tôt :
– Marie-Aline Méliyi :Valérie Nataf, on voit en tout cas, la preuve par l’image, jusqu’ici et on espère qu’il n’y aura pas de débordement, que le dispositif très important mis par Bruno Retailleau fait ses preuves.
– Valérie Nataf :Oui, absolument. Il tient toutes ses promesses
Alléluia.
Au 20h de TF1, le soir-même, la rédaction parle d’une « stratégie efficace » en énumérant ses bienfaits : « 80 000 policiers et gendarmes déployés, des véhicules blindés sont même entrés en action pour déblayer. Les blocages, comme celui-ci à Marseille, sont presque instantanément débloqués par les forces de l’ordre. » Sur BFM-TV, la cheffe du service police-justice Pauline Revenaz s’enthousiasmait dès 8h du matin : « Les forces de l’ordre sont extrêmement mobilisées et très réactives ! » N’en jetez plus !
Au vu de la tonalité générale, on ne s’étonnera pas de retrouver les mêmes rengaines sur les ondes des matinales le lendemain. Ainsi de CNews, qui commence très fort, dès 6h, avec un sondage CSA réalisé en collaboration avec deux autres titres Bolloré, Europe 1 et le JDD : « Faites-vous confiance à la justice française pour punir les auteurs de violences (vols, agressions, meurtres) ? » Thomas Bonnet, journaliste politique, se fend d’une analyse « d’actualité » : « On verra désormais quelles seront les condamnations pour ceux qui hier s’en sont pris aux forces de l’ordre, ont dégradé du mobilier urbain, mais on est malheureusement obligés d’anticiper et de se dire qu’elles vont sans doute être encore une fois assez légères. » La presse Bolloré est en campagne pour des condamnations plus lourdes.
Sans doute en manque de parole policière, Apolline de Malherbe sollicite un délégué Alliance Police sur RMC pour mieux refaire le film : « Comment s’est déroulée la journée globalement ? Le ministre de l’Intérieur s’est réjoui que les bloqueurs n’arrivent pas à bloquer », se félicite d’entrée la journaliste. Presqu’en même temps sur RTL, Thomas Sotto lance la grande interview : « Il est 8h17, blocages, incendies, tentatives d’intrusion, routes et trains bloqués, quel est le vrai bilan de la journée “Bloquons tout en France ” ? Pour le savoir, Marc-Olivier Fogiel, vous avez invité ce matin le patron de la gendarmerie, Hubert Bonneau. » Fogiel : « Merci mon général, merci d’être là »
En face, Europe 1 se charge de faire entendre la préfecture. L’invité de Sonia Mabrouk est Laurent Nuñez, préfet de police de Paris. Première question de Mabrouk :
Sonia Mabrouk :Au lendemain du mouvement “Bloquons tout”, qui ressemblait d’avantage à un mouvement “Cassons tout”, qui a donné lieu à des violences, des heurts, entre forces de l’ordre et groupuscules masqués avec slogans antifa, propalestiniens, on va en parler, mais d’abord : de quel bilan définitif vous disposez ce matin aussi bien en termes d’interpellations, de gardes à vue, et aussi de policiers ou de forces de l’ordre blessés ?
Et sur TF1, dans la matinale de Bruce Toussaint, l’éditorialiste Alba Ventura dépeint un pays à feu et à sang : « Ce qui a sauté aux yeux, ce sont ces scènes de violences. On a vu à Rennes un bus incendié, des barrages sur les routes, tentatives d’intrusion à la gare du Nord, à la gare Marseille Saint-Charles ce sont des bouteilles de verres qui ont été jetées, des pillages et puis tous ces gens cagoulés, en capuche, venus semer le chaos et affronter les forces de l’ordre… Bloquons tout a été noyauté par l’extrême gauche, l’ultra gauche, accompagnées des casseurs de banlieues. »
C’est sans doute cela, « l’ensauvagement » médiatique.
Si les reportages et l’exposé des revendications n’ont pas fait systématiquement défaut, l’angle sécuritaire aura outrageusement dominé le traitement journalistique du 10 septembre. Et le journalisme de préfecture a paradé sur toutes les ondes : au ministère de l’Intérieur, le cadrage ; aux syndicalistes policiers, le commentaire en direct ; à la Préfecture, l’analyse des événements. « C’est pas une manifestation populaire, ce sont des actes de délinquance qui sont extrêmement graves, qu’il faut traiter comme des actes de délinquance », résume Nicolas Bouzou sur LCI. Dépolitiser et criminaliser la contestation sociale : telle est la tâche des acteurs répressifs, auxquels les médias dominants apportent tout leur concours [fin]
Depuis l’allocution d’Emmanuel Macron à propos de la guerre en Ukraine, le 5 mars, les grands médias sont en ordre de marche. Réhabilitation du président en « chef de guerre », patriotisme exacerbé, concert militariste et glorification des industriels de guerre… Mené tambour battant, le SAV du discours présidentiel s’accompagne d’une nouvelle séquence de matraquage patronal contre le « modèle social » et pour « travailler plus » au nom, prétendument, de l’« effort de guerre » : « Pensions ou munitions ? » ; « Les canons ou les allocations ? » Signés Dominique Seux (Les Échos, 10/03) et Étienne Gernelle (RTL, 10/03), les deux slogans donnent le ton
chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine against Russia
Ingo Schmidt on how the triumph of liberal democracy and neoliberal globalization became the ideological seed for the AfD
Co-leader of the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party and the party’s candidate for chancellor, Alice Weidel, features on the cover of a 2023 edition of Stern magazine (conceptphoto.info)
On November 6, 2024 German Chancellor Olaf Scholz fired Finance Minister Christian Lindner. Notwithstanding the broad agreement on policy goals, striking a balance between deficit reduction, support for renewable energy and increased arms spending turned out to be impossible. Lindner, a liberal, opted for social cuts; Scholz, a social democrat, wants to avoid them. They had to part ways. After Scholz lost a no-confidence vote, federal elections were scheduled for February 23, 2025. The question that worries everyone from old-school conservatives to new millennium lefties is: How many votes will go to the hard right (if not neo-Nazi) party Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland or AfD). In the last federal elections in 2021, the AfD got 10.4 percent of the total vote. Current polls put them at 20 percent, but nobody knows what will happen on election day. In this new age of uncertainty, polls don’t predict election results as reliably as in the past.
Elections in the East German provinces Brandenburg, Saxony and Thuringia have already shown what hard-right success looks like. They also reveal the inability of the political centre to understand how much it contributed to the rise of a new right. Refashioning totalitarianism theory in the New Cold War climate, centrist politicians and pundits typically portray the success of the new right as the outgrowth of the Nazi and Communist dictatorships that ruled East Germany from 1933 to 1990. West Germany, which was spared Communist rule and, allegedly, shook off the burden of its Nazi past, appears as a role model in this democracy-versus-dictatorship story. Totalitarianism theory could possibly explain why the AfD is more successful, so far at least, in East than in West Germany. But it can’t explain right-wing success in other countries, like France, that were never under Communist rule and know Nazi rule only from occupation, which strengthened anti-fascist traditions in those countries. But even these traditions couldn’t stop the rise of the new right there.
This article offers a different explanation for the hard-right surge in Germany. It shows that German unification in 1990, signalling the triumph of liberal democracy and the onset of neoliberal globalization, unleashed a new form of nationalism—Deutschmark nationalism—which, after mutating into export nationalism for a while, became the ideological seed for the AfD. West Germany, or, more precisely, the economic miracle that was West Germany in the post-war era, served as a role model during German unification. Promoted by West German elites and eagerly embraced by people in East Germany, it raised the expectation of a new economic miracle materializing in the West and extending to the East. However, these hopes were soon disappointed as political unification caused socioeconomic divisions between East and West Germany and, in the early 2000s, a turn to austerity policies that were highly unpopular in the East and the West. Just when it seemed that Germany would weather the world economic crisis of 2008-9 better than other Western countries, and maybe even become the European hegemon, things started falling apart. The Euro-crisis made clear that it was not only politically united Germany that was plagued by massive socioeconomic and geographical divisions but the European Union, too. Continued economic weakness combined with New Cold War marching orders from Washington fed a nostalgia for a supposedly great past—symbolized by the Deutschmark. This nostalgia, I argue, would not have taken root if the left had been able to channel growing discontent into mobilization for a more equitable and less insecure future.
State elections in Brandenburg, Saxony, and Thuringia
State elections don’t typically get international media attention. The September 1, 2024, elections in Thuringia and Saxony did. After all, it was the first time since the downfall of the Nazi-regime that a hard-right party, the AfD, pulled the majority of votes in a German election. It proved a bitter coincidence: The AfD celebrated their victory in Thuringia, obtaining 32.8 percent of the total vote, on the 85th anniversary of the Nazi-invasion of Poland that marked the beginning of the Second World War.
The Conservative Christian Democrats (the Christlich-Demokratische Union or CDU) came in second with 23.6 percent. The parties of the federal government coalition, Social Democrats (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands or SPD), Greens (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) and Liberals (Freie Demokratische Partei or FDP) ended up with single-digit results, the FDP reduced to a mere 1.1 percent. At the time of the election, this was the party of the federal minister of finance. The Left Party (Die Linke), which in the previous election had become the strongest party for the first time in any German state, lost almost 18 percent and came in fourth, even trailing the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht or BSW), a breakaway group from the Left Party.
In Saxony, the AfD won 30.6 percent of the votes, just behind the CDU’s 31.9 percent. As in Thuringia, none of the parties of the federal government coalition achieved double-digit results. The Left Party lost more than half of its vote and ended up with a devastating 4.5 percent. The BSW came in a distant third with 11.8 percent.
Just three weeks after their election victories in Thuringia and Saxony, the AfD scored another success in Brandenburg. Narrowly beaten by the SPD that got 30.9 percent of the total vote, the AfD came in second with 29.2 percent, way ahead of the BSW’s 13.1 percent and the CDU’s 12.1 percent. The Left Party and the Greens obtained less than five percent of the vote, which is the minimum threshold for holding seats in provincial or federal parliament under the mixed-member proportional electoral system. The FDP pulled less than one percent.
Mainstream media fails to explain right-wing success
Barely beaten by the Conservatives in Saxony and the Social Democrats in Brandenburg, the AfD was elected by roughly a third of the electorate in three East German states, becoming the strongest party only in Thuringia. If ever there was a right-wing surge, this was it. Most media reports attributed the phenomenon to widespread dissatisfaction with the federal government, particularly regarding migration, climate policies and the war in Ukraine. Accounts of why the AfD is more popular in the East (approval ratings in the west of Germany range from 8.5 percent in Hamburg and the Saarland to 21 percent in Lower Saxony) focus mostly on disappointments caused by German unification, continuing socioeconomic disparities and a widespread feeling among erstwhile East Germans of being second class citizens. Other explanations invoke the authoritarian heritage of communist rule in East Germany, which is often presented as an extension of the Nazi-regime. Against the two dictatorships in the East, West Germany is presented as a role model of liberal democracy. This as if there hadn’t been considerable continuity between Third Reich and West German elites; as if East Germany’s ruling bureaucracy, despite all its dictatorial wrongs, wasn’t established by antifascists who had been exiled or jailed during the Nazi reign; as if the nationalization of the means of production, despite the wrongs of bureaucratic rule, had not marked a break from the West German capitalism that made West Germany a junior partner in the American Empire; as if West German capitalism had not dictated the terms of unification at the very time that a grassroots movement for democracy unsettled bureaucratic rule in East Germany. The destruction of the East German economy and the integration of the East into existing West German institutions left no room for the aspirations of East Germany’s civil rights movement. Rather than explaining growing support for the new right, media talk about the “peculiarities of the East” reinforces existing frustrations there—frustrations that help shed light on the relative strength, so far at least, of the right-wing surge in the East.
The ‘two-dictatorships’ thesis that pits the East against the liberal democratic West revives the totalitarianism theory that was an integral part of the anti-communist, anti-Soviet consensus during the Cold War. It is now part of the New Cold War ideology that counterposes democracy and authoritarianism. As in the old Cold War, charges of totalitarianism serve to short circuit thinking about alternative economic and political systems, reinforcing the neoliberal creed that there is no alternative to capitalism. The lack of actually existing alternatives is, of course, also one of the reasons for the rise of the new right. Emerging out of an ailing neoliberalism, this right-wing force presents itself as an alternative to the status quo but actually just recasts neoliberalism in a nationalist and racist mould. Replacing neoliberalism’s earlier commitment to corporate globalization in Germany, as elsewhere, neoliberalism is haunted by the spectre of fascism, which, to centrist neoliberals, has everything to do with misled masses unable to understand the virtues of capitalist liberal democracy and nothing to do with capitalist crises that undermine the legitimacy of liberal democracy. Neoliberalism is also haunted by the spectre of communism as ruling classes worry that crisis of legitimacy could extend to capitalism itself. As the neoliberal centre denies the possibility of alternatives and the left generally (not only the Left Party in Germany) appears unable to advance real world alternatives, the growing appetite for change, spurred by recurrent crises wrought by capitalism, settles for right-wing fantasies of a harmonious life in a nation that competes successfully with other countries economically and is freed from job- and welfare-stealing migrants.
The impact of German unification and the rise and decline of neoliberal globalization
Capitalist crises and their exploitation by the right are common phenomena, certainly in the imperialist centres of the world system, but also in the peripheries. But they play out differently in different national contexts. Behind the AfD’s electoral successes in Thuringia and Saxony as well as its broader surge in popularity lie the combined histories of German unification and the rise and decline of neoliberal globalization. The upsurge of the new right is just one of the outcomes of these combined histories. Equally important is the defeat of the federal government coalition and the rout of the FDP, whose leader, former federal Minister of Finance Christian Lindner, promotes austerity policies that stymie government plans to subsidize the transition to non-fossil energies. These policies also lead to a creeping roll-back of social spending—except when it comes to arms spending. Little wonder a government that took office on the promise of something like a Green New Deal lost its credibility almost entirely and called for a federal election scheduled for February 23 of this year.
And then there is the defeat of the Left Party that, despite programmatic commitments to progressive alternatives, is widely seen as the appendage of a lame-duck government in Berlin. At the other end of the political spectrum, the AfD is widely perceived as an oppositional force, even though its program blends austerity, nationalism and militarism in ways that are more extreme but qualitatively not much different from policies advanced by the CDU and the FDP.
In the face of electoral defeat, the federal government, which embraced the US’s New Cold War policies a few weeks after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, also introduced dramatically tougher migration policies. Rather than representing any kind of alternative, as its name purports, the AfD is the black sheep of the establishment family, expressing racist views more radically and bluntly than even the Conservatives. While the Social Democrats, Liberals and Greens are intent on denying such views, they reveal themselves as Western supremacists when it comes to fending off so-called authoritarian threats arising from Russia and China, stirring up longstanding fears in the West that ‘the Russians are coming’ or that ‘Asian hordes’ augur “the decline of the West,” in the words of right-wing intellectual Oswald Spengler.
The hypocrisy of the Greens, who advocate a green transition while supporting the purchase of dirty oil and gas (wherever they can get it ever since the Russian invasion of Ukraine ended Russian gas-flows to Germany), make them a prime target of AfD agitation. But in reality the AfD and the Greens share the fear of Western decline. The AfD engage in fearmongering around the replacement of white people by non-white immigrants and accuse the Greens and their coalition partners in the federal government of accelerating Western decline. But while the Greens may be the prime target of the AfD’s culture war, the truth is that despite significant differences in tone, the Greens and the AfD share a basic consensus on the decline of the West.
AfD success in the east: history holds the key
Encouraged by Glasnost in the Soviet Union, many East Germans took to the streets in the fall of 1989. Under the banner “We Are the People” they demanded democratic reforms of East Germany. Neither unification with West Germany nor a return to a capitalist economy was on their agenda—at least not initially. As protests grew, and especially after the ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED) had opened the border to the West, “We Are the People” was replaced by “We Are One People” more and more often. It was supplemented by the slogan “Germany, United Fatherland,” which is actually a quote from East Germany’s national anthem, written by the communist poet Johannes R. Becher in 1949, at a time when the leaders of the SED still thought a united Germany could be achieved—not necessarily socialist but not aligned on either the US or the Soviet Union. Such hopes were buried by the Cold War, for which the Berlin Wall became a symbol, casting a dark shadow over communist East Germany and allowing capitalist West Germany to present itself as a beacon of freedom. It was in a matter of weeks in the winter of 1989-90 that the abstract possibility became a demand, massively fanned by West German politicians—notably then chancellor Helmut Kohl—and mainstream media, which hinted at the possibility of East Germany adopting the West German Deutschmark. Many East Germans seized on such hints as an irresistible offer. “If the D-Mark comes, we’ll stay here; if it doesn’t come, we’ll go to it” became the next popular protest slogan. Since the opening of the border, thousands of East Germans had gone to the West, creating conditions reminiscent of the times before the wall was built in 1961. Back then, the East German economy lost so many people, most of them young and well-trained, that a collapse of social reproduction became a real threat. The wall stopped the bleeding of the East German economy but inflicted irreparable damage on the legitimacy of the political system.
Almost 30 years later, the opening of the border by the SED-leadership came as a bit of a surprise to West German elites. Yet, they were quick to grasp the possibilities it created. To them, this meant the integration of East Germany into the West German political and economic system, not coexistence with a somehow reformed but still politically independent East Germany. The ‘take over the East’ goal of West German elites and the Deutschmark rush of East German masses fed each other. The civil rights movement that wanted to democratize East Germany was sidelined. Some of the groups active in that movement adjusted to the new zeitgeist quickly, some even entered into an electoral alliance with the East German conservative party, despite their having criticized it as a small but integral part of the SED-regime. Angela Merkel, who would later become chancellor, belonged to one of these East German groups that allied with other conservative-turned-civil-rights groups and the East German CDU. This Alliance for Germany easily won the last East German elections and negotiated the integration of East Germany into West Germany’s institutional structures. On July 1, 1990, the Deutschmark came to the East, three months later the independent state of East Germany vanished into an enlarged West Germany. Most of the Alliance for Germany dissolved into the West German CDU immediately after unification. In December this enlarged CDU won federal elections.
In less than a year the Cold War had come to an end and an entire state had disappeared. However, the hopes pinned on unification, notably the introduction of the Deutschmark, were soon dashed. A year after unification, unemployment, which had existed in communist East Germany primarily in a hidden form, stood at 10.2 percent and rose to over 20 percent in the early 2000s. It didn’t fall below 10 percent until 2014, a quarter of a century after the Berlin Wall fell. Moreover, mass migration from East to West Germany, which the introduction of the Deutschmark was meant to curb, actually accelerated after the arrival of the Deutschmark. From 1990 to 2015, East Germany lost significantly more than one million people, the vast majority during the first two years after unification, and almost all of them of working age. Were it not for this emigration as well as early retirement schemes and retraining schemes for thousands of workers, unemployment in the East would have been even higher than it actually was. Introducing a new form of hidden unemployment, many of the participants in retraining were enrolled in one course after another, often in different fields, until they were old enough for early retirement.
One of the main, if not the main, reasons for the collapse of the East German economy was the Deutschmark. Introduced at a rate of one Mark West for one Mark East, while average productivity of East Germany was estimated to be about a quarter that of West Germany, German monetary union gave private households the boost in purchasing power they so desired. But it made East German firms uncompetitive. Lower wages could not compensate productivity differentials between firms in East Germany and Western countries. The privatization of East Germany’s state-owned firms facilitated the downfall of the East German economy even further. In some cases, Western companies bought East German firms just to shut them down so that they would not become competitors in the future. In other cases, they wanted patents or certain segments of production that they could integrate into their own supply-chains, leaving everything else to be shut down. The closures and cherry-picking of some more desirable segments destroyed the reproduction process of the East German economy even beyond the damage done by rendering it uncompetitive through monetary union.
The result was that bits and pieces of the East German economy became a periphery of production networks controlled by West German corporations. Ironically, the neoliberal restructuring of production processes went hand in hand with massive fiscal transfers from West to East Germany. A price that had to be paid to sustain some level of social cohesion while disappointment that political unification was followed by economic decline and continued social divisions between East and West instead of an Eastern economic miracle following the example of West Germany from the late 1950s to the early 1970s. At some point, a third of East German incomes came from fiscal transfers. As a result, government debt as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) rose from 41.8 percent in 1989 to 61.2 percent in 1999, which is nothing compared to today’s numbers. Yet, back then the lesson that had yet to be learned is that neoliberalism, despite its balanced-budget rhetoric, really is a mix of austerity and tax cuts for the rich that produces increasing debt levels at every slowdown or downturn of the economy. In the 1990s, government debt over 60 percent of GDP was a scandal. Not least because, at the urging of the conservative German government, 60 percent had become the benchmark for membership in the European monetary union, for which the roadmap had been laid out in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty.
Budget deficits, accumulating into government debt, weren’t the only deficit scandal in 1990s Germany. The other was in the current account. From a surplus of 4.6 percent in 1989, the current account dropped to a –1.9 percent deficit in 1991 and remained in deficit territory until 2001. In most other countries, deficits between negative one and negative two percent wouldn’t be a matter of concern. In Germany they were. After all, West German prosperity—the very model East Germans admired so much—had been reliant on export-driven growth, which was always understood as export surpluses. As it turned out, unification in the early 1990s, led to a boom in West Germany as East Germans spent many of their newly acquired Deutschmarks on consumer goods ‘Made in (West) Germany’—despite massive job losses. This boom drove prices up and made German exports less competitive on the world market. At the same time, some of the money from the East German spending spree went to foreign companies. As exports took a hit and imports got a boost, the current account went from positive to negative.
The East was integrated into the West German political system as it existed prior to unification. The Kohl government didn’t agree to any changes suggested by the East German government that formally negotiated unification but really rubberstamped the subordination of East German society to West German institutions. Economic integration was different though. The collapse of the East German economy, triggered by the design of monetary union and privatizations, had a lasting impact on the West German economic model that East Germans had been eager to embrace. The first decade after unification was marked by a twin deficit in government budgets and current accounts. During the unification boom from 1990 to 1993, inflation went up to levels not seen since the oil-price hikes and inflationary struggles between capital and labour from the 1970s to the early 1980s. At that time, however, the West German inflation rate was still below that of other Western countries, whereas in the early 1990s it was amongst the highest
Germany’s continued economic weakness, combined with New Cold War marching orders from Washington, fed a nostalgia for a supposedly great past—symbolized by the Deutschmark
West Germany as a role model
Running continued deficits—let alone a twin deficit—was unthinkable in a country that rebuilt its economy after the Second World War through integration into a world market with rules established and enforced by the US. In this American Empire, West Germany played the role of bulwark against Soviet Communism, including East Germany, and as a showcase of Western capitalism. To succeed in this role, foreign debt, accumulated by the Nazis and inherited by West Germany as legal successor of the Third Reich, was forgiven through the 1953 London Debt Agreement. West Germany also inherited low wages, industrial capacity and new technologies from the Nazi economy that, contrary to widespread assumptions, survived the war largely intact. This gave West German industries a competitive advantage that was further buttressed by favourable exchange rates on which basis West Germany was admitted to the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates in 1952. Reintegration into the world market also allowed West Germany to transition from a coal-based to an oil-based economy. Oil was cheaper than coal but its supplies were controlled by US companies and the American state.
However, being a junior partner in the American Empire turned out to be a much better deal for the German bourgeoisie than its earlier quests for world power. The territory under its direct control was much smaller after two failed power grabs but profits were stellar. Driven by exports, or export surpluses more precisely, the West German economy didn’t require fiscal stimulus and kept growing until the US turned to floating exchange rates, which led to a significant appreciation of the Deutschmark. Further, oil prices exploded in the 1970s. But it was during these turbulences that West Germany consolidated its reputation as a beacon of economic stability. Political management of the crisis, notably codetermination (German lingo for the institutionalized cooperation between unions and employer association), kept wages and inflation lower than in most other Western countries. This helped to sustain export surpluses for much of the 1970s. In turn, export surpluses allowed the government to keep fiscal stimulus and unemployment rates low. Again, this is compared to other Western countries, not compared to the post-war boom.
West Germany’s relative success in managing the economic crises of the 1970s raised some concerns among its allies, who considered this success a case of beggar-thy-neighbour policies. The US pressured the West German government to increase public spending in order to stimulate the world economy. The West German government couldn’t shrug off these US demands entirely. The social democratic party was led by Helmut Schmidt at the time, and some extra spending also appeased the left wing in his own party as well as some unionists. However, calls for a Keynesian fix of the economic crises never overcame the general preference for fiscal prudence and low inflation that marked West German society after two lost wars, each followed by the introduction of a new currency, one of them also by unprecedented hyperinflation. Not entirely without reason, export success after the Second World War was widely attributed to liberal economic principles, conveniently ignoring the fact that this ‘liberalism in one country’ could only work because other economies placed growing demand on the world market.
Export success also created an ersatz-identity that allowed West Germans to repress the horrors of the Nazi regime and the roles most of them had played in these horrors, as perpetrators or bystanders. Social democrats never really fit into this picture. Willy Brandt, who spent the Nazi reign in underground resistance circles and exile and would later become West Germany’s first social democratic chancellor, was seen by many as a traitor. His successor Helmut Schmidt, who had served in the Nazi air force, opposed many of Brandt’s plans for social reform and applied Keynesian policies only in homeopathic doses. He was successfully branded as the one responsible for rising unemployment and inflation by the Conservatives and Liberals. Crossing the floor from SPD to CDU, the Liberals made Helmut Kohl chancellor. Kohl won two elections before unification on the promise of bringing post-war prosperity back. He won another two after unification on the promise of bringing the prosperity to East Germany.
For a long time, Kohl presented himself successfully as the defender of the West German export model and guarantor of the collective identity tied to that model, despite the fact that 1980s West Germany never saw a return to postwar prosperity. Disappointment with his broken promises for a West German economic miracle 2.0 began spreading towards the end of the 1980s. Yet, the disintegration of the SED regime allowed him to renew and extend his promises to the East. The national euphoria that secured his 1990 election victory also saw a transformation of collective identity. West German pride in being export world champion turned into Deutschmark nationalism. Widely shared in the East, where people were happy to get the Deutschmark, and the West, where people saw it as symbol of their postwar achievements, this was not the pure money, or currency, fetishism Karl Marx wrote about in Capital. It had a distinctive nationalist character that was subdued in West Germany’s pre-unification export-identity. With unification, the nationalist seed blossomed. Not only did this help Kohl become the ‘chancellor of unity,’ but it also gave cover to a burst of neo-Nazi attacks on immigrants, leftists and queer people, culminating in arson attacks in Rostock, Mölln and Solingen. The latter two killed eight people, while the attack in Rostock laid a four-day siege on an apartment block inhabited by foreign workers who had been employed in East Germany’s now defunct state-owned economy. The openly neo-Nazi attacks of the early 1990s, later dubbed “baseball bat years,” were followed by a series of murders committed by the National Socialist Underground (NSU) that cost nine immigrants and one cop their lives from 2000 to 2007. The role of the German secret service in covering up, or even facilitating, these murders has never been investigated as key documents remain classified until this day. Hans-Georg Maaßen, head of the secret service from 2012 to 2018, was one of the individuals responsible for blocking investigations of the NSU-murders. He also heads up an ultra-conservative circle, initially inside the CDU and now operating in the right-wing space between the CDU und the AfD.
Exports über alles: Eastern peripheries boost corporate profits
During unification and in the first few years afterwards, nationalism was a mass ideology. It rallied flag-waving masses in the streets, it dominated German politics and inspired Nazi-skinheads to chase people they considered enemies. As it became clear that the hopes for an economic miracle 2.0 would not be realized, street protests receded, most skinheads scaled down their activism and just a few turned to clandestine terrorist attacks. It seemed that nationalism had lost the force it had just recently. However, the entanglements between Nazis and parts of the state apparatuses indicate that while nationalism wasn’t as visible as before, it had not disappeared.
As it turned out, the opening of the Berlin Wall was a key step towards what would later be called neoliberal globalization. As the German bourgeoisie sought its place in a world seemingly governed by the invisible hand of the market—not Soviet planners or the milder version of Western government intervention—nationalism also found a new role as mass ideology. The ideological wind blowing from the ‘real West,’ that is, the United States, rebranded free trade theory going back to the days of David Ricardo as globalization. Sticking closely to Ricardo’s principles, academic globalists argued that firms, if left alone by the state, would specialize in the production of those goods they can produce more cheaply than firms in another country either because they possess more productive technologies or use input factors more plentiful and cheap than in another country. All countries will be better off if firms in each country specialize according to their comparative advantages.
Globalization practitioners talked about entire countries as if they were firms competing against each other. Competitiveness of nation-states became the lodestar of capitalists, and their political executors, who used it to justify the roll-back of wages and social standards in all countries. Their run-the-country-like-a-business propaganda was so persuasive that even working class people whose wages, pensions and public services were cut fell for it in large numbers, electing and re-electing neoliberal globalizers over and over again. At the same time, fear that the policies just voted for would cause a race to the bottom spread in the rich countries that saw parts of their production outsourced to poor countries, where labour was really cheap, while immigrants from such countries would take on jobs in the burgeoning low-wage sectors of the rich countries. Migration, segmented labour markets and a global reserve army of labour, enabling capitalists to engage in global labour arbitrage, were neither part of academic globalization theory nor did they feature in politicians’ globalization propaganda. Absent from public debate, these real-life factors created fears that a new right could build on by portraying economic problems as questions of national identity. Translated into policy terms, that meant a program of keeping immigrants out and capital in. This protectionist backlash against neoliberal globalization, coupled with the rise of a new right ranging from populist to neo-Nazi formations, occurred all over the Global North. It began slowly in the late 1990s and early 2000s while globalization was still expanding, and then gathered steam in the wake of the 2008-9 world financial crisis that marked the end of accumulation driven by globalization. It has accelerated again since the COVID-19 recession as well as the escalating great power politics vis-à-vis Russia and China, which have led to openly imperialist policies couched in the same nationalist ideology which the new right thrives on. The competitive nation-as-corporation ideology and the policies that marked actually unfolding globalization was the breeding ground for today’s strange bedfellowship of globalizers-turned-great-power-warriors and national supremacists of the new right. Theories of unregulated free trade opening the path towards global prosperity were just an ideological tool that was useful as long the integration of more and more countries into the US-dominated world market fuelled capitalist accumulation, and thereby hopes for the eventual trickle-down. It was replaced with the rhetoric of concern for national security and democracy as accumulation ended in a new phase of stagnation.
The German bourgeoisie had already adopted the logic of the state as business competitor after the Second World War when it traded world power ambitions for a junior partner role in the American Empire. Balanced budgets and tight money formed the core of its policies. That, along with competitive advantages inherited from the Nazis or granted by the US, enabled export-driven growth and, ultimately, export surpluses. Despite verbal commitments to liberalism, these policies were mercantilist in substance. Shattered but not derailed by the crises of the 1970s, West Germany’s mercantilist regime of accumulation survived until unification led to a twin deficit, slow growth and socioeconomic divisions between East and West. Unified Germany’s economy stumbled along while the US enjoyed its New Economy boom, even though that turned out to be short-lived, and China attained unprecedented levels of economic growth.
The Kohl government didn’t respond to the bourgeoisie’s growing concerns about economic stagnation in Germany. Neither did it respond to growing dissatisfaction with social conditions among the popular classes. After uniting Germany, Kohl turned to further uniting Europe. Partly, he wanted to demonstrate Germany’s continued commitment to cooperation in the European Union as some European leaders—notably British Prime Minister Thatcher and French President François Mitterrand—had expressed reservations about German unification and worried about a return of German great power ambitions. European monetary union became Kohl’s preferred route to an “ever closer union,” as EU-parlance had it at the time. However, regarding other countries, notably in the Mediterranean, Kohl successfully pushed for tight fiscal and monetary rules—the same kind of rules West German policy makers followed in the postwar period. Under the favourable conditions granted by the US to integrate into the world market, this led to export-driven prosperity. However, other countries didn’t enjoy the same favourable conditions. What would upset governments and people in such countries even more was the fact that Kohl had abandoned the rules he was preaching to other European countries in his very own united Germany
Helmut Kohl at the CDU national party convention in Hamburg, 1973. Photo from Wikimedia Commons
There, European monetary union was widely seen as a top-down capitalist elite project, part of corporate globalization or as a handing over of the beloved Deutschmark to irresponsible Eurocrats and the Club Med, a derogatory term often used in public debates to denounce people in the Mediterranean countries as lazy, spend-thrifty and, worst of all, happily having a good time at the expense of others. Euro-scepticism added to disappointment with the collapse of East Germany’s economy after unification, growing income polarization and fears of job loss all over Germany and a sense of losing national sovereignty to global capital. Unresponsive to any of these concerns, Kohl and his coalition of Conservatives and Liberals eventually lost the 1998 election to the Social Democrats and Greens who formed a coalition government offering a blend of light Keynesianism, green transition and control of financial markets. This is where the German—and international—bourgeoisies got really concerned.
The opening ideological salvos to derail the newly elected government’s plans came from the British tabloid The Sun, calling Oskar Lafontaine, the new finance minister who proposed the introduction of a Tobin tax, “Europe’s most dangerous man.” Next came Madeleine Albright, then US secretary of state, who gave Germany’s Green Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer the choice of joining the bombing campaign against Yugoslavia or having his country isolated from Western allies. Fischer, and the new Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, chose war. Seeing that his opposition to the war wasn’t supported by anyone else in the cabinet, Lafontaine resigned before the bombing began.
A few months later, The Economist called Germany the “Sick man of the Euro.” Coming from the central organ of global capitalism and unrepentant advocate of liberalism since the days when England, not China, was the workshop of the world, this was not just another opinion piece. It was a warning that the international investment community—exactly the CEOs, bankers, brokers and financiers targeted by the then-emerging movement against corporate globalization—lost confidence in the German market and expected pro-business measures to boost their propensity to invest.
After a few months in office, Schröder had to choose between meeting voters’ expectations (job creation, reduction of job insecurities and income inequality) and capitalists’ cost-reduction demands. He chose the capitalists’ side, earning him the nickname Genosse der Bosse (Comrade of the Bosses). In the absence of a social movement from below that could have pushed him to deliver on the election platforms of the SPD and the Greens, this choice might actually better be called caving to capitalist threats of an investment strike. From 2000 to 2005, the Schröder government axed corporate tax rates, exempted capital gains from taxation and lowered equity requirements for credits. The other side of the class divide saw drastic reductions in unemployment benefits, essentially slashing them to the level of welfare payment rates after one year of benefits. At the same time, legal obstacles to employing temporary workers were greatly reduced. Capitalists were thrilled. Profits and asset prices shot up, but capital formation declined during the years pro-business laws were passed.
Reorganizing existing production capacities was more important to corporate executives than creating new capacities. This was not surprising as capacity utilization dropped when the New Economy bubble burst, triggering a downturn of the world economy that kept even booming China below double-digit growth. As it turned out, united Germany did not inherit the export successes of pre-unification West Germany, but was certainly heir to its export dependence.
In the early 2000s, Germany’s current account turned positive again—not because exports grew so strongly (they actually stagnated due to the world economic downturn), but because imports declined owing to weak domestic demand associated with the Schröder government’s neoliberal policies. However, as the world economy bounced back (China saw growth rates of 10-14 percent from 2003 to 2006), German exports grew again. Eventually the reorganization of production processes in the aftermath of German unification paid off. West German corporations now controlled production networks linking corporate headquarters controlling finance, research and development, and capital-intensive parts of actual assembly in the centres with labour intensive production in low-wage areas in the peripheries from Eastern Germany all the way to China. In these networks, East Germany occupied the position of a semi-periphery. On the supply side, German export success in the early 2000s relied on continued wage inequality between centres and peripheries, which doesn’t mean that all workers in the centres earned high wages. The threat to relocate production to the East or the South put the brakes on all wages. The lowering of social standards propelled the growth of low-wage employment, notably in the service sector. Well-paying, permanent jobs began to decrease as a share of total employment even in West Germany. As a result, discontent that was widespread in the East since political unification was followed by economic collapse, and social downgrading began to creep into the West.
2010s: Exporting the Euro-crisis
The export surpluses of the early 2000s relied on the same mercantilism that had generated such surpluses during the postwar prosperity. However, during the postwar period, unprecedented growth rates across the Western, and parts of the non-Western, world made it possible to superimpose a welfare state on a mercantilist economy that didn’t squeeze profit rates but operated with capital’s consent in a way that seemed unthinkable during the age of catastrophe from 1914 to 1945. In the early 2000s, by contrast, successful mercantilism demanded the roll-back of the welfare state. Tragically, the extension of West Germany’s welfare state institutions to East Germany, where they were superimposed on a collapsing economy, created the profit squeeze that was needed to curtail the material protections granted by the welfare state. To sustain competitive advantages gained by scaling back the welfare state, it was imperative to keep wage-growth low even after surging exports pulled the economy out of the slump. Unlike during the period of postwar prosperity, export surpluses didn’t stimulate domestic demand very much. In fact, current account surpluses in the early 2000s, which surged from -1.8 percent in 2000 to 6.7 percent in 2007, were as much driven by rising exports as by weak growth of imports, a clear indicator of the overall sluggishness of domestic demand. Unemployment rates rose from 9.3 percent in 2000 to 12.1 percent in 2005. After that, unemployment went into long-term decline, briefly interrupted by the 2008/9 Great Recession and slowed down by the 2009/15 Euro-crisis, eventually reaching five percent before the 2020 COVID-19 Recession. However, this job growth occurred almost entirely in low wage occupations.
Paradoxically, it was during the Euro-crisis that a wave of “export nationalism” covered up the discontent that was growing, at variable speeds, across Germany. The Deutschmark nationalism that emerged during German unification had taken a hit with the introduction of the Euro. However, when it turned out that the Euro was basically the old Deutschmark under a new name and export surplus levels were reaching unprecedented heights, it almost seemed that the long-awaited return of prosperity was about to materialize. But of course, it wasn’t the same as the postwar prosperity that saw strong growth almost everywhere. The 2010s, by contrast, were a time of stagnation. The rebound after the 2008/9 recession was stronger in Germany than in other countries, but then growth rates fell in line with the one-to-two percent range of other Western countries.
It was during this time of recurrent crises and long-term stagnation that the German government, led by Angela Merkel with the Social Democrats as junior partner, felt compelled to lecture other governments on economic policy. Completely blind to the fact that beggar-thy-neighbour policies are a zero-sum game, the Merkel-government told Southern European countries to impose austerity despite the fact that they were suffering from a sovereign debt crisis due to the end of cheap credit that became available after the creation of the European monetary union, helping to pay for imports from Germany. Merkel also told them that, after a painful but unavoidable period of belt-tightening, they would eventually succeed as export countries like Germany.
The European monetary union’s contradictory character torn between further integrating Europe and spreading German mercantilism shifted entirely to the latter. Southern Europeans, governments and ordinary people, understood that austerity would further subordinate their economies to Germany’s economic dominance. The Brits, like the Germans and the “Frugal Four” (Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden), although not warm to the idea of bailing out crisis-ridden Southern Europeans, were suspicious that Germany’s leading role in handling the crisis would turn the country’s economic dominance into fully-fledged hegemony. Brexit has its origin here. Eastern Europe’s post-communist comprador governments had imposed austerity on their countries in acts of pre-emptive obedience and now felt betrayed as they thought the bailout packages the Merkel government used as a means to impose austerity on the South were actually some sort of welfare package.
Centrifugal forces in the EU were further fuelled when, in face of civil war and foreign interventions in Syria, Merkel unilaterally declared open borders for Syrian refuges and then told EU member states they all had to take their share of refugees. European governments already concerned over Germany’s domineering role in managing the Euro-crisis were dismayed. Public debate within Germany was sharply divided between liberals and leftists applauding Merkel’s humanist stance and right-wingers, including in her own party, warning of an uncontrolled flow of immigrants. Largely unnoticed was the fact that Merkel’s decision to open borders for Syrian refugees was tied to the anti-Russian turn in German foreign policy following the sharp polarization between pro- and anti-Russian forces in Ukraine during and after the Maidan protests in 2014. Most of the Syrian refugees were fleeing the Russian-backed Assad-regime, which was considered an adversary. Opening borders for these refugees set a precedent for the surge of Ukrainian refugees following Russia’s invasion of Eastern Ukraine in 2022. At that point, Merkel, who had already retired, told the media that her government saw the Minsk accords, officially meant to reach a settlement between contending political and military forces within Ukraine, as a means of buying time to arm the Zelensky government.
2020s: Sick man of Europe 2.0
As Ukraine, already torn by civil war, became the scene for a proxy war between NATO-countries and Russia, Germany was firmly subordinated to US foreign policy. Post-communist governments in Germany had, more or less enthusiastically, supported deepening trade relations with Russia. Oil and gas imports might have been the most significant part of German-Russian trade but were certainly not the only one. Torn between allegiance to the US and lucrative business deals with Russia, the German government, now headed by Social Democrat Olaf Scholz, cut its economic ties with Russia after the latter’s invasion of Ukraine. The price to be paid was a further spike in energy prices, on top of the increases attendant on the economic recovery from the COVID-19-recession.
As part of current US efforts to contain China, the German government has been pressured to scale down its trade with China—Germany’s largest trading partner and also a prime outlet for German foreign direct investments. Since Germany’s economy is as much export-driven as export-dependent, the US turn from neoliberal globalization to escalating sanctions and protectionism in the name of national security has caused high levels of uncertainty within the German bourgeoisie. In addition to the return of secular stagnation after the very short post-COVID recovery in the West and the petering out of the China boom, this uncertainty is driving low levels of investment. Inflation, fuelled by post-COVID recovery and rising energy prices, and lower real incomes leading directly to less consumer spending, but also indirectly, as households build up their savings in anticipation of more economic shocks in the future. Meanwhile the Scholz government boosted arms spending while otherwise imposing austerity.
After two years of recession, Germany is again being branded the “sick man of Europe” by The Economist. The last time Germany earned this title the neoliberal turn against the welfare state produced massive current account surpluses, meagre general growth rates and massive social and regional inequalities. The export nationalism that concealed the mounting discontent with neoliberalism was shaken by the US turn from neoliberal globalization to protectionism and militarism. Given its high level of export dependence, Germany was ill prepared for the turn against it, which unleashed pent-up disappointments and anxieties into the political sphere. This happened all over Germany but more so in the East than in the West as regional differences in income, wealth and representation in leadership positions had created widespread feelings of being second class citizens in a politically united Germany.
In the absence of socialist imagination, German politics are haunted by the spectres of the past. An insurgent hard-right pins the labels of communism or Marxism on everything that ever came from the left, Social Democrats, the Greens and, of course, the Left Party, no matter how members, activists and supporters of these parties position themselves on the political spectrum. At the same time, the hard-right wants Germany to leave its Nazi past behind. Downplaying Nazi atrocities, accusing liberals and leftists of burdening Germans with a cult of guilt, they propagate the reclaiming of German national pride and sovereignty from allegedly cosmopolitan elites. Between the very real and growing right and a weak and largely imaginary left, centrist parties that proclaimed the end of history in the heyday of neoliberalism are also shifting to the right. The decline of the Left Party is a mirror image of the rise of the AfD.
Alternative für Deutschland: A child of Deutschmark nationalism
Mainstream media and centrist parties view the new right as if it were some external force inexplicably appearing on the political scene and threatening the liberal order. But this is empirically wrong. Almost all leading figures of the AfD come from conservative West German milieus where they previously held positions in public administration or private businesses. Although they present themselves as anti-establishment rebels, they are establishment people who turned from the centre-right to the hard-right. The AfD also includes party activists who come from militant neo-Nazi groups that have existed on the fringes of West German society since the CDU gave many old Nazis a political home after the downfall of the Third Reich. Making small advances into electoral politics in the late 1960s and again in the 1980s, the neo-Nazis remained marginal until they found common ground with disgruntled conservatives. Deutschmark nationalism served as the ideological bonding material for neo-Nazis and right-of-centre conservatives, and became a rallying point for growing numbers of people dissatisfied with the policies of neoliberal globalization advanced by the centrist parties. It emerged in the tumultuous days after the fall of the Berlin wall as a mass ideology that shaped East and West German politics in the direction of unification. After that, it became an ideological point of reference that allowed for the integration of different political ideas and currents into a new right political project, the AfD.
Riding on the wave of Euro-scepticism that accompanied the Euro crisis, the AfD, founded in 2013, promoted a German exit from the EU, which would also have meant exit from the Euro. However, boosting the Deutschmark nostalgia associated with German-style Euro-scepticism got the newly minted party only so far. What really fuelled the AfD’s take-off was the wave of Syrian refugees coming to Germany (and other EU-countries) in 2015. The party’s approval ratings rose from roughly five percent in its first two years to around 12 percent in the next two years. With the surge in voter approval came a programmatic shift from ‘neoliberalism in one country’ to neoliberalism hidden behind ethnonationalist hate propaganda. Despite advocating for a strong state, the AfD also presents itself as a rebellious party of freedom. This paradox is resolved by portraying cosmopolitan elites, represented most notably by the Greens, as a force dominating state apparatuses and misusing them to bring excessive numbers of foreigners into the country with their cultures that allegedly threaten German people, suppress German heritage and push the economy into decay. Therefore a strong state is needed to defend Germany against foreign incursion and revive its inherent strength
Election poster of the AfD in Thuringia supporting remigration. Photo from Wikimedia Commoms
The Scholz government created the conditions in which the AfD’s self-portrayal as freedom fighters gave the party another boost. The modest Green New Deal platforms on which the SPD and Greens ran their 2021 election campaign didn’t gain enough traction to allow them to form a government, despite support from unions and even, more cautiously, employer associations. To obtain a majority in the Bundestag, SPD and Greens formed an ostensibly unlikely coalition with the FDP, a party mostly focused on cutting taxes and limiting public deficits. These commitments to tax breaks for the rich and austerity for the poor stood in the way of effective state-sponsored energy transition programs. Hence, the Scholz-government was perceived as weak from the start. Things went from bad to worse for the government after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Under pressure from the US, Scholz opted for sanctions against Russia, arms deliveries to Ukraine and a continued increase in arms spending. At a time when the prices of everything from butter to housing were soaring, making it clear that money would still be available for guns but maybe not for butter not only destroyed whatever support the government had before the Ukraine war but also gave the AfD another boost. A year and a half into the war, the SPD was trailing the AfD in federal polls. Picking up widespread, though by no means dominant, unease with arms support for Ukraine and fear of war with Russia, the AfD advocates a negotiated peace settlement between Russia and Ukraine and, more importantly to the AfD, the lifting of sanctions on Russia. For the AfD, urging peace with Russia is not a matter of a principled anti-militarism but a means of reviving German trade with Russia, notably Russian energy imports that are seen as a precondition for economic recovery. To achieve this, Germany has to free itself from the ‘cosmopolitan sell-out elite.’ Whether everybody now supporting the AfD subscribes to the freedom-for-German-supremacy-view is open to debate. What can’t be denied is the fact that many discontented people, whatever their main grievance, are looking to the right, not the left, for alternatives to a failing political centre. Some are also turning to the CDU, which claims to be different from both the AfD and the federal coalition government, without offering anything other than praise for the good old days. That served the party well at times when the German economy could thrive, to a greater or lesser degree, on US-enabled expansion of world markets. With the US protectionist turn, this is no longer possible and the party is torn between centrism and the new right. Current support for the CDU is highly unstable, which could easily work in the AfD’s favour, especially in the absence of persuasive alternatives from the left, which so far have not materialized.
This wasn’t always the case. Something like a left renewal had once seemed to be in the offing in the most unlikely place: East Germany during the transition from state socialism to a peripheral position in an enlarged capitalist Germany. In West Germany, the nationalist wave that came with unification swept away much of the activist left that had rallied thousands—sometimes tens or even hundreds of thousands— of people in the 1980s against the stationing of US nuclear missiles, nuclear power plants, Nazis, and South Africa’s apartheid regime, among other causes. Left circles within the SPD, the Greens and the labour movement weathered the nationalist storm without leaving a mark on German politics. In this political climate, the Party of Democratic Socialism (Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus or PDS) stood out as a beacon of the left.
Emerging from East Germany’s ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED), the PDS became the political home of many East Germans who lost their jobs, social status and cultural identity during the transition to capitalism. Quickly establishing a presence in East Germany’s provincial and municipal parliaments, the party expressed the discomfort of many East Germans who felt like second class citizens under the domination of West German institutions, politicians, corporations and culture. It highlighted East Germany’s socialist heritage, which encompassed commitments to anti-fascism, peace and international solidarity as much as the dictatorship of the politburo, Stasi-surveillance and an overbearing bureaucracy. The party hung itself up in endless debates between those who downplayed or justified East German communism’s dark sides and others who sought to disown that history by embracing liberal principles. Practically, these disputes didn’t make much difference. Upholding socialist principles didn’t stop the party from pragmatically working within the political and economic confines created by unification. At times, this included voting for privatization of public housing and infrastructure. For decades since the party was founded, the contradiction between socialist principles and the subordination to neoliberal policies imposed by the West German bourgeoisie didn’t stop the PDS or its successor organization Die Linke (the Left Party), from becoming something like a catch-all or people’s party in East Germany, a role long held by the CDU und the SPD in West Germany. For years, the PDS/Left Party achieved election results in the mid-20 percent range, peaking at 28 percent in Brandenburg in 2004 and 32 percent in Thuringia in 2019. It was also, and still is, part of various coalition governments in East German states. Until the September 2024 election, the Thuringian government was led by the Left Party’s Bodo Ramelow.
Despite this overall success and despite the party’s fidelity to socialist principles, the social group that wasn’t interested in voting PDS consisted of workers, who still voted CDU in large numbers despite g the CDU’s failed to deliver on its big promises of post-unification prosperity. More recently they shifted to the AfD. Meanwhile, in West Germany, the PDS remained marginal throughout its existence, only attracting activists from various left grouplets. What little remained of left protest milieus after unification was still dominated by a mix of environmentalists, antifas and international solidarity activists who might vote Green, or maybe even SPD, but hardly ever PDS. The old working class milieus that were shrinking with the decline of smokestack industries were still dominated by unionists closer to the SPD than the PDS. This started to change when, under chancellor Schröder, the SPD implemented neoliberal counter-reforms on a scale his conservative predecessor Kohl had avoided throughout his 16-year tenure, despite his supposed commitment to unleashing market forces. Growing frustrations among left social democrats and unionists fed mass demonstrations against Schröder’s SPD and created a social and organizational base (including, most prominently, Schröder’s short-time finance minister Lafontaine) that merged with the PDS into the Left Party in 2007. In the federal elections two years later, the Left Party won 11.9 percent of the vote, then 9.2 percent in the 2017 elections, but fell to 4.9 percent in the 2021 elections. This was a worse result than the 5.1 percent the PDS obtained in 1998, an election that also saw an increased vote for the SPD, which allowed Schröder to succeed Kohl. It is worth noting that the PDS vote came almost entirely from East Germany, which represents less than a quarter of Germany’s total population.
While the PDS mostly maintained peaceful coexistence between socialist theory and market-conforming practice, the Left Party continuously debated whether or not it should join centre-left governments, if given the chance. The bitterness with which party activists argued over this question stood in stark contrast to its actual relevance. In states where the party was relegated to opposition status by poor election results, this status didn’t attract additional voters keen on seeing a principled opposition in parliament. In states where the party joined governments, the results were mixed: sometimes it maintained its vote share in the subsequent election; sometimes it suffered losses. A paradoxical result came about in the Thuringian elections in September 2024: The Left Party lost massively, although, had there been direct elections for the minister-president (a position equivalent to provincial premier in Canada), the Left Party’s Bodo Ramelow would have won the election. This fits into a trend that became visible over the last few years in a number of state elections in East and West Germany. Party loyalties based on shared worldviews wear thin. Elections are often decided based on the media appeal of top politicians, regardless of party affiliation. Remarkably enough, Ramelow, just like Dietmar Woidke, the SPD’s lead candidate in the Brandenburg elections, dropped the name of his party on campaign posters, presenting himself as more of a provincial father figure than a man of the party.
However, rather than signalling the end of ideology, as centrist politicians and postmodern philosophers might have argued before the rise of a very explicitly ideologically committed new right, the focus on limelight politicians pushes democratic debates into the shadows. In the case of the Left Party, it might also have been an attempt to distract from its own image as an organization mired in endless debates not producing any coherent, let alone persuasive, policies. The reasons for permanent internal discord are sociological and ideological. The Left Party was strongest in its early days, when the PDS’s social base still comprised a cross-section of the East German population, although workers remained underrepresented. It also attracted dissident social democrats and unionists from West Germany. To a limited extent, therefore the Left Party had the working class base the PDS never had.
The blend of Keynesian and Marxist ideas around which social democratic dissidents and union leftists organized had been defeated as a significant political current during the crises of the 1970s by the Social Democratic right and corporatist union leaders who put competitiveness of the West German economy over income distribution from profits to wages. In the new millennium, when these currents joined forces with the PDS, they were still sizeable enough to give the newly founded Left Party a boost. But not for long. The smokestack industries around which these left currents were organizing were in continued decline, which made strategies based on that moribund reality obsolete. Moreover, these strategies often stood in the way of mobilizing and organizing the new working classes that emerged in the service sector and, on a much smaller scale, IT, bio tech, and green energy.
As the ranks of the Left Party thinned out with the loss of members coming out of communist East Germany or from West German union and social democratic circles, the party was able to attract new blood mainly in the form of highly educated, often precariously employed, urban dwellers. The shift in membership from old left offspring to the children of neoliberal globalization was paralleled by a geographical shift in electoral support. In urban centres, losses among the party’s old left supporters could be partially compensated; in rural areas, however, where the PDS and the Left Party had always been weak, the party disappeared almost entirely. Often, there isn’t even anyone to put up election campaign posters
Anti-AfD protest in Germany. Photo by strassenstriche.net/Flickr
Unlike the original base of both the PDS and the Left Party, the urban hipsters who joined the Left Party had no old left reference points. Even when they talked about Marx and class they did so with postmodern accents. However, this did not help them to gain sizeable support among the working classes—sometimes lumped together as the “precariat”—that developed in expanding economic sectors. The political offerings of the Left Party seemed to exercise little appeal for both old and potentially new constituencies. The party’s founding basis of unity was opposition to neoliberalism. In the early days this left room for East German concerns about the outcomes of unification—arguably a kind of neoliberal restructuring—with opposition to the neoliberal turn of the Schröder-government in East and West Germany. It also left plenty of room for a variety of goals, from resurrecting the Keynesian welfare state to a multitude of vaguely defined socialisms for the future to opposition without a vision for the future. However, what sufficed to form the Left Party wasn’t enough to sustain and grow it, especially not as it became harder to label government policies neoliberal.
The Great Recession, the COVID-19 pandemic, and commitments to ongoing arms production brought state intervention back to the centre of politics, contrary to the 1990s and early 2000s when politics was dominated by advancing capital mobility and free trade. Back then, ruling elites organized consent of the popular classes, more or less successfully, under the banner of “international competitiveness.” The new watchword “national security” is better at rallying the new right than building support for centrist parties. Left Party intellectuals debated the new political conjuncture under the label “post-neoliberalism,” a word-monster that hints, perhaps unwittingly, at the party’s inability to develop a strategy beyond rejecting neoliberalism. In reaction to the imposition of a party line by its predecessor organization, the PDS and the Left Party allowed a wide range of views. However, members of various organized currents, ranging from social-liberal to communist, tended to talk more about each other than with each other.
Postmodernist philosophers’ contention that the days of master narratives are over was wrong with respect to neoliberalism—if there ever was a master narrative, it was neoliberalism—but it does apply to the Left Party, which could not synthesize different ideas into compelling left policies that could rally growing discontent. Instead, internal debates turned into factional turf wars in a party that resembled an appendix of the Scholz government, costing the Left Party more and more support.
After years of bitter infighting, discontent with declining voter approval and accommodation of government policies led to the split of the federal party caucus and the formation of the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) in January 2024. As its name indicates, the party is entirely built around its frontwoman, who represented the Left Party in the Bundestag from 2009 to 2023. In the BSW, the cacophony that destructively marks the Left Party is replaced by closed-door debates. As in the Communist party of old, membership isn’t open to everyone; applications to join must be approved. Wagenknecht, originally a member of the Communist Platform (one of the organized currents inside the PDS), had shifted to left-Keynesian, pro-welfare state positions. But, years before her split from the Left Party, she began advocating ordoliberal positions—a branch of neoliberal thinking that stresses the role of the state in allowing businesses to compete without being bogged down by monopolies. This German version of neoliberalism has been the hallmark of economic policy and ideology since the early years of West German world market integration. In Wagenknecht’s current adaptation of ordoliberalism, the state guarantees competition, which, in turn, creates a strong economy capable of providing stable employment, social security and a fairer distribution of incomes. She combines this embrace of free markets plus the welfare state with a critique of the European Union as an institution operating in the interest of big corporations and a critique of NATO and US hegemony. Her condemnation of American hegemony appealed to some members of the Left Party, as did her critique of the EU, although her more recent favourable references to ordoliberalism and policies aiming at stricter migration controls were less popular.
The BSW’s outlook is very much shaped by positive memories of West German postwar prosperity. Yet, the party’s advocacy of international cooperation, a position going back to 1970s detente policies, contrasts sharply with orientations of the centrist parties and some currents within her own former party. Demand for a negotiated settlement of the Ukraine war overlaps with AfD positions. However, the AfD considers this a matter of Germany’s national interest that doesn’t preclude support for rearmament and war in other regions, like Gaza most recently. The BSW, on the other hand, sees militarism largely as the US’s last recourse for defending its ailing empire. It remains to be seen how the BSW’s principled opposition to militarism and war can mesh with current negotiations for a coalition government with the CDU and the SPD, both committed to military support for Zelensky in Ukraine and Netanyahu in Israel. Polls suggest that electoral support for the BSW was largely driven by the desire for an anti-war voice in parliament. At the same time, there is considerable support for efforts to keep the AfD out of government, despite all the support the AfD garnered in the fall state elections in East Germany. If this means compromising its anti-militarism, the BSW may, like the Left Party before it, soon be seen as a superfluous appendix of unpopular centrist parties.
After weeks of negotiations, the BSW entered into a coalition government with the SPD in Brandenburg as well as with the CDU and SPD in Thuringia. It also supports a minority government made up of the CDU and the SPD in Saxony. It did all this to keep the AfD out of government positions. Understandable as such efforts are, they have already cost the BSW in the polls. Hovering just above five percent, the BSW may not reach the five-percent threshold for obtaining seats in the upcoming federal elections. The Left Party, standing at 3.5 percent in the polls, will probably fall short. Founded as a project to unify left forces from East and West Germany, its split early last year already signalled the failure of that project. The next election may reduce it to insignificance, leaving lots of room for the AfD [end]
the Germans have bowed down to the US sabotage by Joe Biden administration of Nord Stream pipelines, only to end up with Donald Trump’s America First doctrine in economy and defense
The 70th anniversary of Dien Bien Phu and Algeria’s revolution highlights their profound influence on global decolonization. This longread explores their impact on the Palestinian resistance, shedding light on their shared struggle against colonial oppression and their continuing inspiration to the world
(Fourate Chahal El Rekaby)
Introduction
Revolution is not a dinner party, or writing an essay, or painting a picture, or doing embroidery; it cannot be so refined, so leisurely and gentle
Mao Zedong, 1927 (Zedong 1953)
Colonialism is not a thinking machine, nor a body endowed with reasoning faculties. It is violence in its natural state, and it will only yield when confronted with greater violence
Frantz Fanon, 1961 (Fanon 1967)
Imperialism has laid its body over the world, the head in Eastern Asia, the heart in the Middle East, its arteries reaching Africa and Latin America. Wherever you strike it, you damage it, and you serve the World Revolution
Ghassan Kanafani, 1972 (Kanafani 2023)
This year, 2024, coincides with the 70th Anniversary of the Battle of Dien Bien Phu (May 1954), in which Vietnamese revolutionaries inflicted a crushing defeat on French colonialists. It also marks the 70th birthday of the Algerian revolution, which began in November of the same year. The Algerian and Vietnamese resisted colonial oppression for decades before leading two of the most significant revolutions in the twentieth century, against France (and its local collaborators), which was the second biggest European colonial power in the world at the time and which was also supported by NATO forces. No discussion of decolonisation and anti-imperialism can be complete without understanding the importance of Vietnam and Algeria, and how their revolutionary liberation struggles were (and continue to be) so inspiring to oppressed people all over the world, including the Palestinians.
No one revolution exactly resembles another. This is because all revolutions are rooted in a specific national or regional history, are led by particular social and generational forces, and happen at a given moment in the development of a country. However, revolutions all share a common element, without which they would not be called revolutions: the arrival of a new bloc of classes who take up leadership of the state, or the transition from colonial dependence to national independence. In Lenin’s words (external link), ‘For a revolution to take place, it is usually insufficient for the lower classes not to want to live in the old way; it is also necessary that the upper classes should be unable to live in the old way.’ Despite all the elements that might point to continuity, it is this rupture that marks a revolutionary change.
Against this backdrop and understanding, my objectives in this longread are five-fold:
To share some historical reflections on the Algerian and Vietnamese anti-colonial struggles, so as to bring to light important chapters in anti-colonial history.
To draw connections and parallels between the two struggles, and between them and the ongoing Palestinian liberation struggle, to understand how Palestinians have been inspired by both struggles and at the same time themselves continue to inspire the world with their resolute resistance to Zionist settler-colonialism.
To challenge and debunk attempts to portray a false equivalence between colonisers and those who are colonised.
To highlight transnational solidarities between those who are oppressed and colonised.
To firmly place the Palestinian resistance and liberation struggle within the long line of anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggles going back to the Haitian struggle at the end of the eighteenth century and start of the nineteenth century, when Haitian slaves rebelled against the French empire and established the first Black republic (James 2001)
Colonialism Denies the Colonised Their Own History, National Liberation Re-invents it
National liberation, national renaissance, the restoration of nationhood to the people, commonwealth: whatever may be the headings used or the new formulas introduced, decolonisation is always a violent phenomenon
Frantz Fanon, 1961 (Fanon 1967)
The Algerian independence struggle against French colonialists was one of the most inspiring anti-imperialist revolutions of the twentieth century. It was part of the wave of decolonisation that started after the Second World War in India, China, Cuba, Vietnam and many countries in Africa. It inscribed itself in the spirit of the Bandung Conference and the era of the ‘awakening of the South’, a South that has been subjected for decades (and in many cases for more than a century) to imperialist and capitalist domination under different forms, from protectorates to proper settler colonies (as was the case for Algeria).
Retrospectively, French colonisation of Algeria can be seen as unique, as Algeria was the first Arabic-speaking country to be annexed by the West and one of the first countries in Africa to be officially subjugated by a Western empire, long before the Berlin Conference in 1884, when different European empires (British, French, German, Belgian, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese) met to carve up the continent amongst themselves.
France invaded Algeria in June 1830. The French army was to spend the next 50 years suppressing an insurgency, 15 of them fighting the brilliant, fierce and dedicated resistance leader Abd-El-Kader. France’s war of conquest was conducted without let-up, especially under the command of the ruthless Marshal Bugeaud, who adopted a scorched earth policy (Fisk 2005), committing atrocities ranging from population displacement to land expropriation, massacres, and the infamous enfumades, where the French army eliminated whole tribes through asphyxiation.1
Alongside Marshal Bugeaud’s “pacification” campaign, France actively encouraged colonisation of Algeria by its own population. In a statement before the National Assembly in 1840 Bugeaud said: ‘Wherever there is fresh water and fertile land, there one must locate colons [settlers], without concerning oneself to whom those lands belong’. (This is exactly the approach the Zionists were to apply in Palestine, a century later). By 1841, the number of such colons/settlers already totalled 37,374, in comparison with approximately 3 million indigènes (native peoples) (Horne 2006). By 1926, the number of settlers had reached some 833,000, 15% of the population, and it increased to just under 1 million by 1954.
Colonisation involved the expropriation of the basic factor of production, land, from the indigenous peasantry and its redistribution to the settlers, destroying the foundation of the peasant subsistence economy (Lacheraf 1965). The rural masses fought the encroachment of the colonial army until 1884, but the core of the Algerian rural resistance to colonialism was smashed in 1871, when the big politico-agrarian revolt that had spread over three-quarters of the country was finally crushed. This historic peasant uprising was a reaction to a series of disastrous confiscatory measures during the 1860s that outraged the majority of rural Algerians and led them to fear for their lives and livelihoods. Their situation was made worse by drought, harvest failures, famine, locust invasions and disease, which resulted in the deaths of more than 500,000 victims (around one-fifth of the population). In the period between 1830 and 1870 it is estimated that several million Algerians died (Bennoune 1988, Davis 2007 and Lacheraf 1965).
The Egyptian Marxist Samir Amin has described how the Algerian rural population transformed the colonial conquest into a protracted and devastating war: ‘The collapse of the regency government and the war of extermination undertaken by the French army gave this early period (1830–1884) certain special characteristics, which are not found elsewhere … faced with military power, the urban ruling class was thrown into thorough disarray and could think of no other alternative but flight … as for the peasants, flight was out of the question. Faced with the threat of extermination, they turned the Algerian countryside into the terrain for a fifty-year war which claimed millions of victims‘(Amin 1970).
French colonial rule in Algeria lasted for 132 years (in comparison to 75 years of colonial rule in Tunisia and 44 in Morocco), having a duration and a depth that was unique in the experiences of colonialism in both Africa and the Arab world. In 1881, Algeria was administered for the first time as an integral part of France. With this extension of civilian rule to the country came the application of second-class status to Algeria’s Muslim population. The exclusion of Muslims was reflected at all levels of political representation, anti-Muslim discrimination was built into the electoral system, and the inferior status of Muslims was inscribed in law under the loathsome Code de l’Indigénat of 1881 (McDougall 2006).
After the French success in violently suppressing Algeria’s anti-colonial rebellions, the last of which took place in the 1870s and 1880s, over half a century was to pass before the Algerian resistance movement once again took up the fight, in the shape of Algerian nationalism in its modern form.
8 May 1945: ‘Victory in Europe Day’ and massacres in Algeria
It was at Setifthat my sense of humanity was affronted for the first time by the most atrocious sights. I was sixteen years old. The shock which I felt at the pitiless butchery that caused the deaths of thousands of Muslims, I have never forgotten. From that moment, my nationalism took definite form
Kateb Yacine, Algerian writer and poet (quoted in Horne, 2006)
On 8 May 1945 there were joyful celebrations across Europe as news spread of the Nazi capitulation. France rejoiced at being delivered from a five-year occupation. At precisely the same time, events in Algeria began that would lead to the colonial massacre of thousands of Algerian Muslims over the next two months.
On Victory in Europe Day, while Europeans celebrated, Algerians marched in Setif for independence and an end to colonisation, deploying banners bearing slogans such as ‘For the Liberation of the People, Long Live Free and Independent Algeria!’ They also brandished for the first time what would later become the flag of the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) liberation movement. The French colonial authorities violently repressed the march, triggering a rebellion that led to the murder of 103 Europeans.
The colonial retaliation to these murders was savage. The French military (air, navy and army) bombed several regions, and burnt and razed many villages to the ground in Setif, Guelma and Kherrata. Over the space of two months, the French gendarmerie2 and troops, alongside vengeful settlers, slaughtered tens of thousands of Algerian Muslims, with some estimates as high as 45,000.
The parallels between the Setif, Guelma and Kherrata massacres and the 7 October 2023 Al-Aqsa Flood operation by the Palestinian resistance against Israel, and the pitiless genocidal butchery that followed it, is too stark to ignore. In both cases, resistance whether peaceful or violent, was entirely disallowed, and aspirations for self-determination were crushed with grossly disproportionate force.
At the time (in 1945), one analyst, trying to explain the ‘barbarism’ of the colonised and to justify France’s bloody repression, wrote: ‘The call to violence raises from the mountains a kind of evil genie, a wild and cruel Berber Caliban, whose movements can only be stopped by a force greater than his own. This is the historical and social explanation for the events that took place in Sétif on the very day that victory was celebrated‘ (Gresh 2023).
The same supremacist colonial mindset and the same racist, orientalist and essentialist explanations of why the oppressed and colonised revolt persist today: the Palestinian attacks on 7 October are often put down to the pure evil, irrational savagery and timeless barbarism of medieval and sub-human terrorists, far removed from the political context of more than 75 years of settler colonialism, apartheid and occupation.
The massacres that followed the demonstrations of 8 May 1945 had significant repercussions for the Algerian nationalist movement. For the young generation of militants, the Algerian war had already started and the preparation for armed struggle could no longer be postponed. Most historians agree that the massacres of 1945 were traumatic, marking every Algerian Muslim who lived through the period. Moreover, every Algerian nationalist who was prominent in the FLN traces their revolutionary determination back to May 1945. It will not be surprising if future generations of Palestinian and Arab revolutionaries (of all political tendencies) trace their commitment to liberatory struggle to the genocide that followed the 7 October attacks and the heroic resistance in Gaza, which continues at the time of writing.
Ahmed Ben Bella, an FLN leader and head of the Algerian state from 1962 to 1965, had been a much-decorated sergeant in the 7th Regiment of Algerian Tirailleurs, a unit that distinguished itself in battle in Europe. But it was the events of 1945 that launched him on the path of revolution. He later wrote: ‘The horrors of the Constantine area in May 1945 succeeded in persuading me of the only path: Algeria for the Algerian.’ Similarly, for Mohammed Boudiaf, another revolutionary FLN leader and also a future head of state, the colonial massacres of 1945 led him to reject electoral politics and assimilation and to embrace armed resistance and direct action as the only way to achieve liberation (Evans & Phillips 2007).
The traumatic events of 1945 were the first volleys in the Algerian struggle for independence.
Vietnam’s victory is Algeria’s inspiration
Our actions aim to take the war to them, to let the whole world know that the Algerian people are leading a war of liberation against their European occupiers
The Algerian struggle for independence cannot be divorced from the global context of decolonisation. In 1945, the Arab League was formed, committed to Arab unity. In 1947, India won independence from Britain. In 1949, the Chinese Maoist revolution defeated the Nationalists of Chiang Kai-shek and established the People’s Republic of China. 1955 saw the rise of Arab nationalism/Nasserism and the holding of the Bandung Conference in Indonesia, where 29 non-aligned countries from Africa and Asia challenged colonialism and neocolonialism in a context of Cold War tensions.
The FLN leaders were under no illusion about the scale of the task confronting them, but their confidence was bolstered by the humiliating French defeat in Indochina in May 1954. As Frantz Fanon explained, the great victory of the Vietnamese people at Dien Bien Phu was no longer, strictly speaking, just a Vietnamese victory: ‘Since July 1954, the question which the colonized peoples have asked themselves has been “What must be done to bring about another Dien Bien Phu? How can we manage it?”’ (Fanon 1967).
Fanon was fascinated by what the Vietnamese had achieved at Dien Bien Phu. In his view, the Vietnamese victory over the French in this remote Southeast Asian valley had demonstrated that the colonised could generate the revolutionary violence needed to force decolonisation on the coloniser. News of the Vietnamese victory quickly reverberated across the French empire, shattering the myth of the coloniser’s invincibility and initiating cracks in the empire’s structure. The importance of Dien Bien Phu and its impact on the psyche of colonised people can hardly be overstated. Benyoucef Ben Khedda, president of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic, recalled: ‘In 7th May 1954, the army of Ho Chi Minh inflicted on the French expeditionary corps the humiliating disaster of Dien Bien Phu. This French defeat acted as a powerful catalyst on all those who had been thinking that an insurrection in the short term is by now the only remedy, the only possible strategy. … Direct action took precedence over all other considerations and became the priority of priorities‘ (Ben Khedda 1989).
Ferhat Abbas, who became the first acting president of the newly independent Algerian Republic, cast the Vietnamese victory at Dien Bien Phu in epoch-changing terms, considering it as significant as the French revolutionary army’s victory over the Prussians in the historic battle of Valmy in 1792: ‘Dien Bien Phu was more than just a military victory. This battle is a symbol. It’s the “Valmy” of the colonised peoples. It’s the affirmation of the Asian and African vis-à-vis the European. It is the confirmation of the universality of human rights. At Dien Bien Phu, the French lost the only source of “legitimation” on which their presence turned, that is the right of the strongest [to rule the weakest]’ (Abbas 1962).
Others have described Dien Bien Phu as the Stalingrad of decolonisation (Meaney 2024).
Holding the Imperial Line and Solidarity Between the Colonised
It is not because the Indo-Chinese has discovered a culture of his own that he is in revolt. It is because “quite simply” it was, in more than one way, becoming impossible for him to breathe
Frantz Fanon (Fanon 1967)
It is hard, at a distance of 70 years, to imagine the impact the first Indochina war, and especially Dien Bien Phu, had on the colonial world, particularly France’s overseas colonies, from Algeria to Senegal and from Morocco to Madagascar. A colonial power had been defeated. A regular army had been beaten!
In the 1940s, during the Second World War, when France was invaded and occupied by Nazi Germany, tens of thousands of Algerians, Moroccans, Senegalese, Vietnamese and others bravely joined the battle for its liberation, which they hoped would in turn lead to their own liberation. But when it finally rose from the ruins, France set about restoring its shattered empire in all its colonial pomp. Despite negotiations in Paris between Jean Sainteny and Ho Chi Minh to find a compromise on the question of post-war Vietnam, and despite the victory of the Left, including the Communists, in the November 1946 French elections, the French government nevertheless decided to reconquer Vietnam. Whether it was led by the right, the centre, or the left, or by forces that were religious or secular, and from one republic to another, France continued to cling to its empire, from the Dien Bien Phu valley to the Kasbah of Algiers (Delanoë 2002).
Following the outbreak of the war in December 1946, from 1947 to 1954, tens of thousands of North Africans were sent to fight for France in Indochina (the figure ultimately reaching 123,000), at a time when their own countries were experiencing the first stirrings of the struggle for independence. Once in Vietnam, hundreds of them deserted and joined the Viet-Minh. In doing so, they were responding to Vietnamese appeals for anti-colonial solidarity (Delanoë 2002). One such appeal was made in a letter a minister in Ho Chi Minh’s government sent to the Moroccan independence leader Abd El-Krim, in exile in Cairo, in early 1949. He wrote: ‘Our struggle is your struggle and your struggle is in no way different from ours. Also, the solidarity of the national liberation movements within the framework of the former French empire is capable of putting a final end to French imperialism. Your Excellency, the government of Ho Chi Minh asks you to use your great spiritual authority to ask the soldiers of North Africa to refuse to leave for Viet Nam, and also asks you to appeal to the dockers to boycott French ships‘ (Saaf 1996).
Abd El-Krim, a revolutionary guerilla leader who had defeated the Spanish army in the epic battle of Annual in 1921 and who had set up the short-lived Republic of the Rif (1921-1926) before being ultimately defeated by the French and Spanish through air raids, gas and napalm bombing, self-propelled guns and tens of thousands of recruits from the Empire (Ayache 1990 and Daoud 1999), replied: ‘The victory of colonialism, even at the other end of the world, is our defeat and the failure of our cause. The victory of freedom anywhere in the world is … the signal of the approach of our independence‘ (Saaf 1996).
The succession of setbacks suffered by the French army in Indochina only heightened awareness of the need for solidarity among colonised people. Responding to this need, Algerian dockers working in the ports Oran and Algiers refused to load war material bound for Indochina (Ruscio 2004).
The Vietnamese also asked Abd El-Krim and the Moroccan Communist Party to send them a North African who could establish a psychological warfare network that would encourage North African troops within the French Expeditionary Corps in the Far East (CEFEO) to desert, rally the Vietnamese, and ultimately return to their home countries to fight the French colonisers. This role was taken on by M’hamed Ben Aomar Lahrach (alias Maarouf). A Moroccan, like Abd El-Krim, Maarouf was a trade unionist and a member of the Moroccan Communist Party (Delanoë 2002). At the end of the 1940s, he travelled to Hanoi. He explained his activities with the North African soldiers who either rallied the Viet Minh or were captured as follows: ‘I try to create real villages for my Arab and Kabyle prisoners, I put them in self-contained huts, I manage to give them a life reminiscent of the country. We mustn’t make these guys Vietnamese; we must repatriate them as quickly as possible! They must remain themselves; they will form the cadres of our liberation armies… I won’t let my Moroccan or Algerian deserters die‘ (Delanoë 2002).
In his appeals to North African soldiers fighting on the French side in Vietnam, and in his political education work with North African captives and rallied soldiers, Maarouf’s message was ‘Go back home: these people, like you in Morocco, are fighting for their independence. … Return home and use your fighting spirit to liberate your country’ (Saaf 1996). Above all, he sought to recuperate North Africans who were being used by the French as cannon fodder, and who found themselves lost in this distant Asian country, with the explicit aim of repatriating them as soon as possible to their own countries.
The effectiveness of Maarouf’s work is best demonstrated by the hundreds of Algerian repatriates who became effective military cadres for the Algerian National Liberation Front starting from 1954/55. Maarouf’s activities were truly heroic; they included participating in the arrest of French General De Castries in Dien Bien Phu. Testifying to the high esteem in which he was held, Ho Chi Minh gave him the name Anh Ma, which literally means ‘Brother Horse’, and the Vietnamese awarded him the rank of general, and decorated him with medals (Saaf 1996 and Delanoë 2002).
For France, Dien Bien Phu became a symbol of anachronistic obstinacy leading to catastrophe. For Vietnam, it was a symbol of the recovery of national independence. But Dien Bien Phu was not just an historical event for these two countries alone: throughout the world, the battle was seen as a turning point that heralded the coming of other battles for liberation. The echo of gunshots had barely subsided in the Tonkin valley before it was heard in the Aurès mountains in Algeria. And within less than a year, the ‘wretched of the earth’ gathered in Bandung (Ruscio 2004). As for the colonialists, De Lattre, France’s commander-in-chief, confided to the officer he had put in charge of creating his Vietnamese army, that they had to hold the imperial line: ‘it’s in Tonkin that we are defending our positions in Africa. Everything must be subordinated to this imperative‘ (Goscha 2022).
Today, it is in Gaza that US-led imperialism seeks to defend its global hegemony.
In the US-Israeli attempt to hold the imperial line in Gaza, they are applying similarly brutal methods to those applied by the French in Vietnam, including starvation of the civilian population. The French focused on breaking the Vietnamese’s access to rice, as part of French General Raoul Salan’s order to ‘Starve the adversary’ (Salan later founded the Organisation Armée Secrète (OAS), a clandestine terrorist organisation that sought to prevent Algerian independence). The use of food as a weapon was by no means new. Imperial armies have practised this form of warfare since antiquity. But the French were the first to apply this approach in a twentieth-century war of decolonisation – with terrible consequences for the Vietnamese. In doing so, they collapsed the dividing line between combatants and civilians, and between the home front and the battle front. This was la guerre totale (total war), as advocated by General Lionel-Max Chassin, commander-in-chief of the French air force in Indochina during the early 1950s. Chassin insisted that this was the only way to win a colonial war, arguing that ‘One must starve people to death’ (Goscha 2022). In 1956, Chassin told his superior that he was ‘convinced that had we killed all of the water buffalos, destroyed all of the rice in Indochina, we would have had the Vietnamese at our mercy whenever we wanted’.
Similar logics prevailed in France’s attempt to ‘pacify’ Algeria between 1954 and 1962, and they are now again at work in Israel’s total war on Gaza. In fact, what is taking place today in Gaza is not just a genocide. Although it is almost impossible to find the right terminology to describe the level of destruction and death Israel is unleashing on Palestinians, a plethora of concepts are now being used to understand the enormity of what is taking place: urbicide, scholasticide, domicide, ecocide, and holocide – the annihilation of an entire social and ecological fabric.
Revolutionary Violence and Urban Guerilla Warfare in a Time of Decolonisation
We are advocates of the abolition of war, we do not want war; but war can only be abolished through war, and in order to get rid of the gun, it is necessary to take up the gun
Mao Zedong (Zedong 1967)
Knowing everything that had happened in our country, it was clear for us there was no option but an armed struggle, and that we had to confront the French, and with violence
Zohra Drif (Drif 2017)
The Indochinese and Algerian wars against French colonialism have become foundational to modern politics in both countries. Both independence struggles were to profoundly shape the character of anti-colonial thought over the subsequent decades.
Christopher Goscha argued in his excellent book The Road to Dien Bien Phu that Ho Chi Minh ended up administering two kinds of wartime states, one capable of holding out against the coloniser, in guerilla form, just as the Algerian FLN were to do in North Africa, the other capable of generating the required military and organisational force needed to defeat a Western colonial army in a set-piece battle, of the kind the Chinese communists had created. Thanks to Chinese military assistance and advisers, instruction in modern military science, and the introduction of the draft and mobilisation laws, the Vietnamese communists presided over a military revolution unknown in any other war of decolonisation in the twentieth century (Goscha 2022). Indeed, the Algerian nationalists were not alone in their inability to transition from guerilla warfare to conventional warfare: in no other twentieth-century war of decolonisation was there to be anything like the People’s Army of Vietnam, and there was never to be another Dien Bien Phu. But that did not mean that colonial powers could not be vanquished in other ways, including guerilla warfare.
The Vietnamese anticolonial fight against the French did not take place independently of other events in Asia. The first Indochina war (1945–1954) was taking place in parallel to the Korean war in a context of an expansion of the Cold War in southeast Asia, where the US saw aiding France as a way to fight the Communists. The resumption of the war in Vietnam in 1960 saw the direct entry of the United State into the fray, with its formidable war technology and its belief that its victory was assured. The United States no longer needed the aid of a third country to inflict decisive blows on the Communists in Asia. The American war against Vietnam was to last 15 years before its ‘invincible armada’ was forced to withdraw without glory, leaving behind a devastated country.
The devastation and violence were not unique to Vietnam’s anti-colonial revolutions. The declaration of war in Algeria on 1 November 1954 also initiated one of the longest and bloodiest wars in the history of decolonisation, replete with merciless atrocities (Stora 2004). The FLN leadership had a realistic appreciation of the military balance of power, which starkly favoured France, whose army was the fourth largest in the world at the time. In response to this reality, their strategy was inspired by Ho Chi Minh’s dictum ‘For every nine of us killed we will kill one – in the end you will leave’. The FLN wanted to create a climate of violence and insecurity that would be ultimately intolerable for the French, to internationalise the conflict, and to bring Algeria to the attention of the world (Evans & Phillips 2007). Following this logic, the revolutionary leaders Abane Ramdane and Larbi Ben M’hidi decided to take guerilla warfare into the country’s urban areas, and specifically to launch the battle of Algiers in September 1956.
There is no better way to fully appreciate this key and dramatic moment of sacrifice in the Algerian revolution than watching the classic realist film by Gillo Pontecorvo, The Battle of Algiers, released in 1966. Initially banned in France, the film powerfully reenacts some of the critical moments of the Algerian resistance in the capital and the French crackdown on it. In one dramatic moment, Colonel Mathieu, a thinly disguised General Massu (who had also fought in the first Indochina War), presents the captured FLN leader Larbi Ben M’Hidi at a press conference, where a journalist questions the morality of hiding bombs in women’s shopping baskets. The journalist asks: ‘Don’t you think it is a bit cowardly to use women’s baskets and handbags to carry explosive devices that kill so many people?’ Ben M’hidi replies: ‘And doesn’t it seem to you even more cowardly to drop napalm bombs on defenceless villages, so that there are a thousand times more innocent victims? Give us your bombers, and you can have our baskets’ (quoted in Fisk 2005).
Djamila Bouhired, a revolutionary icon who has become an inspirational figure in the whole Arab world (especially for Palestinians), as well as beyond, was a key figure in the battle of Algiers and was, alongside Zohra Drif, and Samia Lakhdari and her mother, one of the women who planted bombs across the city. After being captured, raped and severely tortured, she heroically challenged her colonial captors and torturers (external link): ‘I know you will sentence me to death but do not forget that by killing me you will not only assassinate freedom in your country, but you will not prevent Algeria from becoming free and independent.’
Zohra Drif, another heroine of the Algerian War of Independence, well-known for her involvement in the Milk Bar Café bombing in 1956, was an integral part of the FLN’s bombing network in Algiers, working with Ali La Pointe, Djamila Bouhired, Hassiba Ben Bouali and Yacef Saâdi, head of the Autonomous Zone of Algiers. She was eventually captured and was sentenced to 20 years of hard labour by the military tribunal of Algiers for terrorism. Drif was imprisoned in the women’s section of Barbarossa prison. In her memoires, she reflected on the role of Djamila Bouhired: ‘They had their Marianne, we had our Djamila … For colonial France, she was “the soul of terrorism”. For us and for all freedom-loving peoples, she became the soul of liberation and the symbol of Algeria at war, beautiful and rebellious’ (Drif 2017).
Bouhired’s heroic struggle, courage, abnegation, sumud (steadfastness) and sacrifice still reverberate in Palestine and still feed the beating heart and inspire the language and imaginaries of resistance, revolution and the struggle for liberation. Bouhired’s mantle was taken up by the Palestinian freedom fighter Leila Khaled, alongside many others.
The urban revolt in Algiers was eventually crushed without mercy, through the resort to torture on a systematic scale to extract information, including fitting electrodes to genitals (Alleg 1958). By October 1957, the FLN network in Algiers was dismantled, after the blowing up of the last remaining leader Ali La Pointe along with Little Omar, Hassiba Ben Bouali, and Hamid Bouhamidi, in their hiding place in the Casbah. Despite this military loss, the FLN had scored a diplomatic victory: France was isolated internationally because of the scandalous methods of repression it used.
The Algerian experience of urban warfare as part of a decolonisation struggle was not an unprecedented one. Over a decade before the FLN set off bombs in Algiers, the Vietnamese had already fought major urban battles in Saigon, Haiphong and Hanoi. They too were brutal affairs, with the French using tanks, artillery and bombers to blast Vietnamese urban positions. Like the Casbah in Algiers, the Old Quarter of Hanoi was ground zero for the battle for that city (1946–1947). During the fighting, the commander-in-chief of France’s Expeditionary Corps in Indochina, General Jean Vally, instructed his subordinates to ‘hit them hard with the cannon and the bomb….in order to put an end to the resistance and to prove to our adversary the overwhelming superiority of our capabilities’ (Goscha 2022). By the end of the battle, Hanoi’s ‘Casbah’ lay in ruins.
The level of violence inflicted by the French across the Red River Plain and the rest of upper Vietnam from January 1951 until mid-1954 had no equivalent in the preceding history of twentieth-century wars of decolonisation. Among the Vietnamese there were more than a million dead, and hundreds of thousands wounded, including victims of torture, while the losses of the French Expeditionary Corps amounted to 130,000 men. Similarly staggering levels of violence were reached in Algeria. Official estimates suggest a million and a half Algerians were killed in the eight-year war that ended in 1962. A quarter of the population (2.35 million) were confined in concentration camps, at least 3 million people (half the rural population) were displaced, around 8,000 villages were destroyed or burned, hundreds of thousands of hectares of forests were burned or defoliated by napalm bombs, cultivable lands were either sown with mines or declared ‘prohibited zones’, and the country’s livestock was decimated (Bourdieu and Sayad 1964; Bennoune 1973).
In both cases (Algeria and Vietnam), the coloniser’s dirty work of vengeance against the colonised’s daring acts of resistance involved furthering and entrenching the dehumanisation of the ‘other’ and casting hate in racialised terms. For the French and their allies, the Vietnamese and the Algerians were no longer a people, they were bandits, criminals and terrorists. One young French soldier who lost a confidant in Vietnam explained what he wanted to do to the Vietnamese: ‘We have to destroy all of them, without any pity for them, they’re real savages’ (Goscha 2022). The practice of torture was endemic within the French army years before French paratroopers ever set foot in Algiers. The same mechanisms and tactics of dehumanisation are now being used by Israel in Palestine, with Israeli generals, officials and media figures describing Palestinians as ‘human animals’, ‘rats’, ‘barbarians’, and ‘terrorists’ to justify their war crimes, torture and genocidal massacres. Colonialism, and its racialisation strategies, has not ended yet.
In Vietnam, Algeria and Palestine, it is not just the armed forces of the colonial powers that have applied these strategies: the colonists/settlers themselves have also played a role. When the elite paratroopers brought in by the French government to crush the uprising in Algiers, marched down the main street of the city, throngs of ecstatic French settlers came out to greet them. Similar scenes took place in Saigon in 1946 when settlers turned out in droves to welcome the soldiers liberating them from ‘native’ rule (Goscha 2022). In both cases, there was a close alliance between the army and the settler communities, which acquiesced in the colonial violence and cruel repression. Likewise, today, Israeli settler society is overwhelmingly in support of the Israeli military’s genocide in Gaza and pursuit of a full-blown war in the whole region. Countless videos and images show Israelis cheering and celebrating the death of Palestinians and explaining how they would like to see them disappear from the lands they have taken away from them.
Palestine: Taking up the mantle of anti-colonial revolution
What am I driving at? At this idea: that no one colonizes innocently, that no one colonizes with impunity either; that a nation which colonizes, that a civilization which justifies colonization—and therefore force—is already a sick civilization, a civilization that is morally diseased…
Aimé Césaire(Césaire 2000)
We remembered all the miseries, all the injustices, our people and the conditions they lived, the coldness with which world opinion looks at our cause, and so we felt that we will not permit them to crush us. We will defend ourselves and our revolution by every way and every means
What do the Algerian and Vietnamese struggles have to do with the Palestinian struggle today? The answer is that the Palestinian liberation struggle must be uncompromisingly situated within the long line of anti-colonial revolutionary efforts. Despite their own specificities and differences, these three struggles need to be understood as such: as anti-colonial struggles for liberation. At the same time, the events in Palestine, including the current genocide, also demonstrate that the colonial world has not yet been fully dismantled.
The sections below focus on the intersections between the Palestinian liberation struggle and its Algerian and Vietnamese counterparts.
Palestine and Algeria: two sisters in the Arab world
I travelled on an Algerian airplane under Algerian protection as if I was an Algerian envoy, not just a Palestinian one. [Boumediene] wanted to tell the world that Palestinian envoy Yasser Arafat wasn’t coming alone but with Algeria by his side
For obvious reasons, there are multiple connections between the Palestinian and Algerian revolutionary liberation struggles. One of them is the deeply racist, inhumane and genocidal settler-colonial experience both nations have been subjected to, uniquely within the Arab region. Sharing this common experience, Palestinian revolutionaries look up to their Algerian brothers and sisters, while the Algerians see in the Palestinian resistance and revolutionary efforts a mirror image of their revolution against the French colonialists. The Algerian FLN inspired the Palestinian strategy of armed struggle (external link) and the union of different political groups under a common banner. It therefore comes as no surprise that the Algerians have assisted the Palestinians since the 1960s in every realm: diplomatic backing, military assistance, and the provision of weapons and financing.
For a big part of the ‘Third World’, especially those countries that were still under the grip of colonial domination, Algeria’s liberation in 1962 provided hope and a model to follow. Its capital Algiers became a Mecca for revolutionaries from all over the world – from Vietnam to Palestine to southern Africa – who desired to bring down the imperialist and colonial order. The 1964 charter of Algiers declared Algeria’s support for the ‘struggles of other people in the world’, including ‘armed struggle’ (Deffarge & Troeller 1972), and independent Algeria went on to provide asylum and financial support to movements all over the world fighting for independence and against racism, colonialism and imperialism.
In the Arab world, the new regime in Algeria established ties with the Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser, and was firmly part of the anti-colonial wave that chased out the French and the British after their pitiful adventure in the Suez in 1956, and which included independence in Tunisia and Morocco also in 1956, and the overthrow of the monarchies in Iraq (1958) and Northern Yemen (1962). In this period, the Palestinians also initiated their first actions to put their country back on the political map, from which it had been removed (Gresh 2012).
The Palestinian liberation movement actively engaged with Algeria in the years after its independence in 1962, at a time when the country was a meeting point for various Afro-Asian liberation movements. The Palestinian writer and politician Muhammad Abu Meizar, who joined Fatah (the Palestinian National Liberation Movement) in 1962, has described how the first Palestinian meeting with the Cuban revolution took place in 1964, when Che Guevara travelled to Algiers. Palestinians at this time were establishing relations with various liberation movements from Africa, Asia and Latin America. It was also from Algeria that the first Palestinian delegation travelled to China in 1965.
Abu Meizar (external link) describes Algeria’s support to the Palestinian struggle at this time: ‘through Algeria, several interactions took place with liberation movements, the Vietnamese, the Chinese, African movements, it was a meeting place. Algeria also hosted one of the most important institutions, the Cherchell Military Academy, where many Palestinians were enrolled. Until that time Fatah had not fired its first shot. However, through Algeria, it made connections with the Moroccans, the Tunisians, the Africans, the Vietnamese, the Chinese, Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Cuba. These were not minor relationships, they were extremely precious, and valuable.’
The Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) opened its office in Algeria in 1965. Its first chairman (1964–1967), Ahmad al-Shukeiri, was known for his ardent support for the Algerian cause: As a representative of Saudi Arabia and then Syria at the United Nations in New York, he played an active role in defending the Algerian revolution from 1955 till 1962, during annual sessions and special meetings. Algeria repaid the debt in kind: the first public support for the Palestinian revolution from any government was from Algeria. It took the form of the cover page of the official newspaper Al-Moudjahid, on 1 January 1965, which bore an article titled ‘The Revolutionaries of the 1st of November Salute the Revolutionaries of the 1st of January’.
During this time, Fatah opened a training camp for Palestinian fighters in Algeria, outside the framework of the Cherchell Military Academy, in coordination with the Algerian Joint Forces Command. A large number of Palestinian volunteers from Europe and the Maghreb, and even from the USA, trained there, some of whom went on to conduct resistance operations, becoming themselves symbols of the liberation struggle, such as Mahmoud al-Hamshari, Ghazi al-Husseini and Abdullah Franji.
Abu Meizar (external link) described Algeria’s support to the Palestinian armed struggle: ‘[In 1967 [w]e secured the first weapons shipment from Algeria to Fatah, with the delivery facilitated by Mohammad Ibrahim al-Ali [Commander of the Syrian Popular Army]. The first plane flew to Damascus loaded with weapons for Fateh. … This was our first weapons deal, but it should be remembered that in the days of Boumediene in 1966, the first official financial support was offered by the Algerian government to Fatah.’
Yasser Arafat, chairman of the PLO from 1969 to 2004, always acknowledged Algeria’s uncompromising and unshakable solidarity with the Palestinian cause, as well as its firm support for pan-Arab war efforts against the Zionist entity. For example, he explained how Algerian President Houari Boumediene sent forces to Egypt to fight in the 1967 Arab–Israeli war. Boumediene also went to Cairo and Damascus to ask what they needed for the war effort, and thereafter visited the Soviet Union to request they send Egypt and Syria tanks and weapons to replace those they had lost. Arafat recounted (external link) the negotiations between Boumediene and the Soviets at this time: ‘They told him they needed more time, and he said if by time they meant money then Algeria would pay. He immediately paid the Soviet Union 200 million dollars which would amount to 2 billion dollars today. He paid to make the Soviet Union expedite the delivery of weapons to Egypt and Syria. No one can forget this.’
After the Naksa (defeat) of 1967, Boumediene declared:
‘History will judge us as traitors and losers … if we accept the defeat … The Arab nation will not kneel. If Israel thinks that it captured the Sinai, the Golan and the west bank, it knows that the Arab depth reaches Algeria … Algeria cannot accept the defeat. Is the Arab nation using all its tremendous human resources? Is it using all the tremendous physical energies it has today … to say that it lost the battle. … The battle is not just a Palestinian battle. It is true that we are far geographically, but we have a role to play.’(Boumaza 2015)
The Algerian troops Boumediene sent remained in Egypt to defend its borders until the 1973 Arab–Israeli war, during which they fought alongside Palestinian troops on the Suez front.
Finally, Algeria’s active support for the Palestinian liberation struggle was also seen in the choice of its capital Algiers as the site for the Declaration of Independence of the State of Palestine in November 1988, announced during the 19th session of the Palestine National Council.
Every day in Gaza there’s another Kham Thien
Like Palestine and Algeria, Palestine and Vietnam have a long history of fraternity. Vietnam’s fight for liberation, which pitted it first against France and then against the United States, inspired Palestinians in their struggle against Israel’s occupation of their lands.
One of the similarities in the Palestinian and Vietnamese struggles is their use of tunnels as a guerilla tactic against a superior and better equipped army. Perhaps inspired by the Chinese communists’ use of tunnels against the Japanese invaders, the Vietnamese first began digging their extensive network of tunnels during the 1940s, to hide from and launch attacks against French colonial troops. The 150-mile-long Cu Chi tunnels, located northwest of Saigon (Ho Chi Minh City), were a strategic stronghold for the Communist guerilla troops, known as Viet Cong (external link). They played a crucial role in the resistance against the American war on Vietnam, including acting as the base of operations for the Tet Offensive in 1968. Today, both the Palestinian and Lebanese resistance movements are using tunnels in their fight against Israel. The tunnels in Gaza serve as a base for the Palestinian resistance, which has used them to inflict significant losses on the Israeli military.
Another parallel between Palestine’s experience and that of Vietnam is the degree of destruction wreaked by their powerful oppressors. For Vietnamese, Israel’s destruction of Gaza today recalls the US bombing raids (external link) in 1972. Then-US President Richard Nixon ordered the bombing of the North Vietnamese capital Hanoi over Christmas 1972. Starting on 18 December and lasting for 12 consecutive days and nights, about 20,000 tonnes of bombs were dropped on Hanoi, as well as on the busy northern port city of Hai Phong and other localities. Hanoi’s Kham Thien neighbourhood suffered the most severe devastation.
These links between Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza and the US war on Vietnam are now being clearly articulated by young Vietnamese activists to introduce the Palestinian cause to new audiences (Dang 2024). The historical echoes of the two wars, including images of the destruction of urban centres (Gaza and Kham Thien), alongside the aggressor states’ violent threats – with Israel declaring it would ‘flatten Gaza’ and the United States declaring it would ‘bomb North Vietnam back to the Stone Age (external link)’ – form part of a reservoir of shared symbols that point to a common history of colonial wars and anti-colonial revolutionary resistance. This shared experience is fuelling a renewed sense of transnational solidarities between the formerly oppressed and currently oppressed peoples.
These solidarities, which are now being renewed, actually go back many years: Vietnam’s support for the Palestinian people and their struggle for liberation was unwavering during the Cold War and into the 1990s. This is undoubtedly because of the belief among the Vietnamese leadership that the Palestinian cause mirrored their own fight for unification and independence against foreign powers. The PLO established relations with North Vietnam in 1968 and set up a resident representative office after the end of the war in Vietnam in 1975. The office soon became the embassy of Palestine in Vietnam. In the 1990s, Vietnam welcomed Palestinian leaders, including Yasser Arafat, on many occasions. On the Palestinian side, the bonds of friendship between the two countries were summed up by Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish (external link) in 1973, as the war in Vietnam entered its final phase with the signing of the Paris Peace Accords:‘In the conscience of the peoples of the world, the torch has been passed from Vietnam to us.’ The PLO was among the small minority of groups and countries of the Global South that openly condemned China for its invasion of Vietnam in 1979.
The Battle is Long, and the Road is Hard
When the prison doors are opened, the real dragon will fly out
Ho Chi Minh (Minh 1967)
A freedom fighter learns the hard way that it is the oppressor who defines the nature of the struggle, and the oppressed is often left no recourse but to use methods that mirror those of the oppressor
Nelson Mandela (Mandela 1994)
Gaza was and will remain the capital of steadfastness, the heart of Palestine that does not stop beating even if the world closes in around us. …So hold on to the land as firmly as roots cling to the soil, for no wind can uproot a people who have chosen to live
In the preceding sections I have argued that the Palestinian liberation struggle needs to be (re)situated within the long trajectory of anti-colonial/anti-imperialist/anti-apartheid struggles, and of decolonisation, including the liberation struggles of Haiti, Vietnam, Cuba, Algeria, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde and South Africa. It is therefore a struggle that should be supported, not demonised. But, as Edward Said once wrote (external link), ‘Palestine is the cruellest, most difficult cause to uphold, not because it is unjust, but because it is just and yet dangerous to speak about…’ Nevertheless, in these times of genocide, we cannot afford to be silent: we must speak about Palestine as honestly and concretely as possible.’
The decolonisation of Palestine would entail the end of occupation, the liquidation of the apartheid regime and the dismantling of Israel as a settler-colonial project. All anti-colonial revolutionaries (whatever their ideology, whether communist, nationalist, religious conservative etc.) have been described by the colonisers and oppressors as terrorists, savages and barbarians. And all colonial powers have responded with savagery and inhumanity to acts of resistance by the oppressed and colonised. It is therefore time we stop entertaining any false equivalence (external link) between the legitimate violence (and right to resist) of the oppressed and colonised (fighting for their own liberation) and the infinitely greater violence of the oppressors and colonisers, which is used solely to enforce an unjust and cruel status quo. The Guyanese revolutionary Walter Rodney articulated this in the following powerful words:
We were told that violence in itself is evil, and that, whatever the cause, it is unjustified morally. By what standard of morality can the violence used by a slave to break his chains be considered the same as the violence of a slave master? By what standards can we equate the violence of blacks who have been oppressed, suppressed, depressed and repressed for four centuries with the violence of white fascists? Violence aimed at the recovery of human dignity and at equality cannot be judged by the same yardstick as violence aimed at maintenance of discrimination and oppression
(Rodney 1969)
In spite of all the horror, apocalyptic destruction and mass slaughter witnessed in Israel’s genocidal assault on Gaza over the last year, by carrying out the 7 October Toufan Al-Aqsa attacks, the Palestinian liberation movement began what may come to be seen as the beginning of the end of Israel’s settler-colonial regime (Pappé 2024). Moreover, despite the targeted assassinations of Hamas and Hezbollah leaders, the resistance forces remain intact and steadfast in the field of battle. Although it is too early to say for sure, what is now taking place in Palestine and Lebanon could turn out to be, like the 8 May 1945 events in Algeria, the first episode in a protracted people’s war to dismantle a settler colony. Hamas has shattered the myth of Israel’s invincibility, and through its heroic resistance in Gaza right now, is asserting itself as the leader of the Palestinian resistance to occupation, apartheid and settler-colonialism, garnering huge sympathy from all over the Arab world and beyond. The unfolding asymmetrical war is not simply a war between Hamas and Israel, it is a Palestinian war of liberation.It is also already a regional war, since Israel and its Western allies (chiefly the US and the UK) are fighting with varying degrees of intensity on five fronts: Gaza/West Bank, Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq/Syria, and Iran.
We need to remember that armed struggle is necessary under certain conditions, and this is the case for occupied Palestine in its struggle against Zionist settler-colonialism. However, it is crucial to subordinate armed struggle to a broader range of revolutionary politics, to ensure it does not become arbitrary or random in its choice of targets. In such an approach, armed struggle can be understood as a tool for mobilising political support and not as a tactic that repels/alienates potential allies. Efficient resistance, as the Pakistani revolutionary scholar Eqbal Ahmad saw it, therefore needs a flexible strategy that mixes different militant and political tactics, based on the position the enemy occupies and the broader political context. In this understanding, violence and nonviolence should not be considered as mutually exclusive strategies standing in a binary opposition, with oppressed peoples needing to choose one or the other. Thus, our analysis of political violence must diverge (external link) from the purely normative/moralistic grounds on which some leftist condemnations of Hamas’s violence are based. Moreover, dismissing anti-colonial resistance because it is Islamist reflects the deeply rooted scourge of Islamophobia, which has unfortunately been internalised by some sections of the Euro-American left.
Since its earliest days, the Palestinian liberation movement has understood the necessity of armed resistance in the face of a cruelly violent colonial, apartheid and occupying regime. At the same time, like its brothers and sisters in Algeria and Vietnam, it also knows that defeating, militarily, a highly sophisticated military power (backed by the US-led imperialist bloc) is an insurmountable task. To succeed and achieve its goals, the Palestinian armed struggle therefore needs to be firmly grounded in a broader revolutionary political strategy and led by a united anti-colonial front.
The truth of this proposition can be illustrated by the Algerian case, and specifically by the approach implemented by Abane Ramdane. Dubbed the architect of the Algerian independence struggle, Ramdane worked to organise the various political and military structures of the Algerian revolution and to create a stronger united front working with other political forces, specifically through the Congress of Soummam in August 1956 (Harbi 2024). It was Ramdane, alongside other brothers in arms, who emphasised the primacy of political action over military operations, but it was also Ramdane who insisted on taking the war to the capital Algiers, in the Battle of Algiers. The Algerian FLN did not win the war against the French militarily, but they did win the more decisive political and diplomatic battles, in terms of isolating and delegitimising the French colonial regime and building strong alliances in the international scene, including at the Bandung Conference in 1955, at pan-African fora, in Europe and at the UN General Assembly in the following years.
Obviously, the global political context has changed dramatically since the 1950s and 1960s. We are no longer living in the era of national liberation and Third-Worldism. Much worse, ours is an era in which international law is openly trampled upon by the most powerful, and in which the Western liberal establishment of human rights and democracy (political, intellectual, cultural and media) is collapsing in front of our eyes and showing its true genocidal and white-supremacist colours. The regional arena is no better: Palestine finds itself surrounded by reactionary and traitorous Arab regimes who have sold out the Palestinian cause to the US and Israel. This extremely challenging climate must be considered when seeking to devise an effective political strategy that can unite the Palestinian anti-colonial forces and efficiently articulate revolutionary tasks at the national, regional and international levels. As part of such a multi-tiered strategy, strengthening Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) efforts is of paramount importance.
Gaza has awakened the world, and Palestine has become the quintessential defining struggle of our times. Palestine is the litmus test for progressive movements and organisations, and it is also a test for each and every one of us. As has been cogently argued by Adam Hanieh, the Palestine liberation struggle is not merely a moral and a human rights issue: it is fundamentally a struggle against US-led imperialism and global fossil capitalism, given that the two pillars of US hegemony in the region and beyond are Israel, a Euro-American settler colony, and the reactionary fossil fuel-rich Gulf monarchies, which are a key nodal point in global fossil capitalism. Palestine is thus a global front against colonialism, imperialism, fossil capitalism, and white supremacy. In this respect, the success of struggles (albeit suppressed and defeated for now) to overthrow the regional reactionary Arab regimes – chiefly the Gulf monarchies, and Egypt and Jordan – is essential for the victory of the Palestinian struggle. At the same time, what Israel’s genocidal war has also revealed, beyond the vacuity of the rule-based international (dis)order, is the moral and political bankruptcy of the Arab regimes, some of which gesticulate while doing nothing, and some of which are actively complicit in Zionist crimes (especially the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and Morocco). This fact has become starkly clear to Arab populations over the last year. This could consolidate their resolve to overthrow these regimes in the coming years (remembering that the Sudanese and Algerian revolutionary slogans of 2018 and 2019 were ‘Let them all fall’).
The stubborn attempts by the French and their allies to hold the imperial line in Indochina in the 1940s and 1950s in order to defend their positions in Africa are mirrored today in the actions of the US, Israel and their allies to hold the imperial line in Palestine and the wider Middle East region against the axis of Resistance, represented by the Islamic Republic of Iran, Hezbollah and its sister organisations in the Lebanese resistance, alongside Hamas and its partners in the Palestinian resistance, as well as by Ansar Allah (known as the Houthis) in the Yemeni government and an assortment of Iraqi resistance groups. It thus becomes clear that for anti-imperialist forces globally, striking imperialism in Palestine and the Middle East is of utmost strategic importance to serve the world revolution, to borrow the words of the Palestinian revolutionary intellectual, poet and political activist Ghassan Kanafani that were quoted at the start of this article.
My purpose throughout this contribution has not been to uncritically glorify or romanticise the various revolutions and forces of anti-colonial resistance, as these have all had their own problems, contradictions, shortcomings and failings. Moreover, the ‘post-colonial’ realities in the ‘independent’ countries that are the focus of this longread point to the pitfalls of national consciousness and the bankruptcy of certain national bourgeoisies, which were masterfully described by Fanon in his Wretched of the Earth. However, rather than adopting a nihilist stance and retrospectively pronouncing these revolutionary efforts not worthwhile, we need to see revolutions as ongoing long-term processes, with ebbs and flows, rather than as events that either succeed or fail at one particular moment.
To make an adequate materialist assessment of revolutionary struggles, it is also important to simultaneously consider the national, regional and international dimensions of such struggles. Transnational solidarity between oppressed and colonised peoples has been, and continues to be, a driving force in changing the world. We are currently witnessing the power and the significance of such South-South solidarity, in the form of Southern countries’ commitment to the Palestinian cause and efforts to isolate the criminal settler regime of Israel. South Africa’s case against Israel for breaching the Genocide Convention at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is one such effort, and it is an historic development: African men and women (with their allies) are shaking white-supremacy and colonialism and, to borrow the words of UN Special Rapporteur Francesca Albanese (external link), ‘fighting to save humanity & the international legal system against the ruthless attacks supported/enabled by most of the West’. Watching them wage this fight ‘will remain one of the defining images of our time. … [it] will make history whatever happens.’ At the Hague we saw representatives of the nation that suffered from, and defeated, apartheid standing up for basic human decency, justice and solidarity, and extending their hand to another nation that is undergoing and resisting colonial oppression and genocide while asserting their rights for freedom and justice. The South (whatever its imperfections and contradictions) is teaching the ‘human-rights- and democracy-loving’ North a lesson in political morality. In their actions, the heirs of Mandela are honouring his memory and underlining the truth of his words: ‘…we know too well that our freedom is incomplete without the freedom of the Palestinians’.3
Many countries in the Global South are supporting South Africa’s case. They include Turkey, Indonesia, Jordan, Brazil, Colombia, Bolivia, Pakistan, Namibia, the Maldives, Malaysia, Cuba, Mexico, Libya, Egypt, Nicaragua, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (made up of 57 members), and the Arab League (made up of 22 members). In contrast, Western powers (the US, UK, Canada, and Germany) back Israel. Germany received a strong rebuke from Namibia, its former colony, shaming its stance of defending Israel’s genocide in Gaza and not learning from its murderous history of committing two genocides in the twentieth century (the genocide of the Herero and Namaqua in Namibia and the Holocaust in Europe). Moreover, Chile and Mexico have called on the International Criminal Court (ICC) to investigate war crimes committed by Israel in Gaza. This, alongside a dozen countries cutting diplomatic ties with Israel and moves by Colombia (and potentially South Africa) to ban exports of coal to Israel, points to a clear demarcation line between North and South (albeit with some unsustainable contradictions, especially when it comes to countries like Jordan and Egypt). These developments strengthen the trend of a move towards a multi-polar world where the South asserts itself politically and economically. We are not yet in a new Bandung phase, but this historical juncture will accelerate the decline (at least ideologically) of the US-led empire and will intensify its contradictions.
The ICJ hearings and the developments that have followed it constitute a serious challenge to the white world (where white is not just a racial category but also an ideological construction), the Western establishment, their crumbling edifice of ‘human rights’ and their ‘universalism’, and may hasten the collapse of the international ‘rules-based’ (dis)order. It is very apparent that Western/Northern bourgeois democracy is undergoing a deep (if not mortal) crisis of legitimacy, and that its global hegemony (in the Gramscian sense) is waning. That explains the clear move towards, and the increasing reliance on, war and the entrenchment of a militarist/genocidal logic. Capitalism-imperialism is entering its openly barbaric stage. As Gramsci wrote (external link): ‘the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear’.
At a time when the international political and economic system blames its victims rather than those who uphold it, diverts any attention away from the mechanisms of domination, and resorts to culturalist (often racist) explanations for its failures, it is crucial for us to immerse ourselves in revolutionary and progressive projects and experiences from the past. We need such clarity of purpose in order to create a break with the long history of plunder, violence and injustice endured by the majority of the planet. This can also help us to overcome the propaganda of an enslaving system that disguises its chains and shackles through the use of benign phrases like the ‘invisible hand of the market’, ‘happy globalisation’, ‘the humanitarian responsibility to protect’ – or ‘Israel has the right to defend itself’.
It is becoming crystal clear that the oppressed majority can no longer breathe in a system that dehumanises people, a system that enshrines super-exploitation, a system that dominates nature and humanity, a system that generates massive inequality and untold poverty, a system that is prone to war and militarisation, and which causes ecological destruction and climate chaos. Luckily, revolts and rebellions that are fundamentally anti-systemic are taking place on all continents and in all regions. But for these episodic and largely geographically confined acts of resistance to succeed, they need to go beyond the local and to reach the global; they need to create enduring alliances in the face of capitalism, colonialism/imperialism, patriarchy and white supremacy.
Can the various contemporary struggles – from the Arab, African, Asian and Latin American uprisings to Black Lives Matter, the resistance of Indigenous communities and the labour movement, and from the movements for climate justice, food sovereignty and peace, to the student encampments, anti-fascism/anti-racism and Palestinian/Lebanese resistance – converge and build strong global alliances that overcome their own contradictions and blind spots? Can they usher in a new moment where we question the colonial foundations of our current predicaments and truly decolonise our politics, economies, cultures and epistemologies? Such an aim is not only possible but necessary, and transnational solidarities and alliances are crucial in the global struggle for the emancipation of the wretched of the earth. Here, we can take inspiration from the past, by looking at the period of decolonisation, Bandung, Third- Worldism, the Tricontinental, and similar internationalist experiences.
Some histories are ignored, others are silenced in order to maintain certain hegemonies and to hide from view an inspiring era of revolutionary connections between struggles for liberation on different continents. We must dig into the past to familiarise ourselves with these histories, learn from them and discern some potential convergences across ongoing struggles. For example, we need to remember, and learn from the fact, that independent Algeria became a powerful symbol of revolutionary struggle and served as a model for different liberation fronts across the globe. With its audacious foreign policy, in the 1960s and 1970s, the Algerian capital become a Mecca for revolutionaries, as discussed above. It was Amilcar Cabral, the revolutionary leader from Guinea-Bissau, who announced at a press conference on the margins of the first Pan-African Festival held in Algiers in 1969: ‘Pick a pen and take note: the Muslims make the pilgrimage to Mecca, the Christians to the Vatican and the national liberation movements to Algiers!’ Likewise, we should take note of the fact that Vietnam’s struggle against US imperialism in the 1960s was also a rallying cause for progressive movements and influenced the upsurge of a global social revolt that led to the protests of 1968.
It is this global perspective on our struggles that we need to emphasise, in order to overcome the many constraints and limitations imposed on our movements and to embrace a radical internationalism that will actively promote solidarity. It is essential that we rediscover the revolutionary heritage of the Arab world, Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Global South, as recorded in the deeds and words of great minds like George Habash, Mahdi Amel, Frantz Fanon, Amilcar Cabral, Thomas Sankara, Walter Rodney, Ghassan Kanafani, Samir Amin, Che Guevara, Ho Chi Minh and Mao Zedong, to mention just a few. We need to revive the ambitious projects of the 1960s that sought emancipation from the imperialist-capitalist system. Building on this revolutionary heritage, being inspired by its insurgent hope and applying its internationalist perspective to the current context is of utmost importance to Palestine, and to other emancipatory struggles all over the world.
In the conclusion to The Wretched, Fanon wrote:
Come, then, comrades; it would be as well to decide at once to change our ways. We must shake off the heavy darkness in which we were plunged and leave it behind. The new day, which is already at hand, must find us firm, prudent and resolute. … Let us waste no time in sterile litanies and nauseating mimicry. Leave this Europe where they are never done talking of Man, yet murder men everywhere they find them, at the corner of every one of their own streets, in all the corners of the globe. … Come, then, comrades, the European game has finally ended; we must find something different. We today can do everything, so long as we do not imitate Europe, so long as we are not obsessed by the desire to catch up with Europe. … For Europe, for ourselves and for humanity, comrades, we must turn over a new leaf, we must work out new concepts and try to set afoot a new man
(Fanon 1967)
In this vein, it is paramount to continue the tasks of decolonisation and delinking from the imperialist-capitalist system, in order to restore our denied humanity. Through resistance to colonial and capitalist logics of appropriation and extraction, new imaginaries and counter-hegemonic alternatives will be born. Let us not surrender. Let us be ‘a generation that rises from our ashes stronger’ (external link). And, to paraphrase a famous saying that is familiar to many Muslims, let us work for radical change as if it will take an eternity to realise but prepare the ground for it as if it is going to happen tomorrow.
As revolutionaries sang at the Pan-African Festival of Algiers in 1969: ‘Down with imperialism, down with colonialism!’ ‘Colonialism, we must fight until we win! Imperialism, we must fight until we win!’4
To which we can add: ‘From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free!’
Notes and sources
Les enfumades was a technique used by the French expeditionary corps during the conquest of Algeria in 1844/45. It consisted of asphyxiating people who had taken refuge or were trapped in a cave, and involved lighting fires in front of the entrance, which consumed the available oxygen and filled the cave with smoke. People annihilated in this way included women and children, with entire tribes killed, numbering thousands of people. ↩︎
A gendarmerie is a military force that has law enforcement duties within a civilian population. The term gendarme is derived from the medieval French gens d’armes (‘men-at-arms’, literally ‘people of arms’). In France and some Francophone nations, the gendarmerie is a branch of the armed forces that is responsible for internal security in parts of the territory (in the case of France, primarily rural areas and small towns), with additional duties as military police for the armed forces. ↩︎
This quote from Nelson Mandela is from a speech he made during the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People, in Pretoria, South Africa, on 4 December 1997. ↩︎
El militar creció en Europa y decidió defender la bandera de Rusia, territorio en donde lo recuerdan también como ‘Alfonso Cano’
Alexis Castillo, el colombiano que murió en la guerra entre Ucrania y Rusia. Foto: PCPE – Partido Comunista de los Pueblos de España
En las últimas horas, se confirmó la muerte de Alexis Castillo, soldado colombiano que era militar activo en conflicto entre Rusia y Ucrania. La historía de este cafetero estuvo colmada de momentos álgidos, incluso, su fallecimiento no pasó desapercibido, pues el presidente Gustavo Petro envío un sentido mensaje sobre su partida, resaltando la convicción de paz que en su momento expuso Castillo, a pesar de defender los ideales prorrusos.
Castillo arribó a territorio europeo desde muy joven, siendo España ese territorio que lo vería crecer y forjar sus ideales. El espacio ibérico fue fundamental para el desarrollo de su ideología, pues desde este lugar empezó a formarse en grupos de izquierda desde el concepto teórico y comunista, exponiendo diferentes contrastes ante la sociedad como activista, no obstante, a miles de kilómetros hacia el oriente, se desarrollaba el inicio de una guerra, hecho que le llamó la atención.
Alexis partió a temprana edad, sobre el 2014 hacia la región del Donbáss en la frontera entre Rusia y Ucrania, según le relató en su momento a Los Informantes. En su extenso comentario, recordó que nació en Zarzal, Valle del Cauca, sin embargo, ahora buscaba abanderarse con los colores blanco, azul y rojo de la bandera rusa, para, según él, defenderse de los ataques ucranianos.
Cabe resaltar que, el discurso que exponía el fallecido soldado en su momento, buscaba ponderar la idea antifascista y en contra del imperialismo. Durante su permanencia en Europa, también fue investigado por la justicia, pues tal como lo relata el medio El Confidencial, a Castillo se le señaló por varios delitos, incluyendo cooperación en asesinatos, no obstante, salió librado de dichos juicios.
Asimismo, la prensa prorrusa lo recuerda como un voluntario internacional, que mediante su apoyo en las brigadas extranjeras, aportó a la lucha de dicho país. No obstante, cabe resaltar que, las opiniones son divididas sobre este tema, a pesar que, el apoyo occidental lo tiene Ucrania y el presidente de dicho país, Volodímir Zelenski.
La versión sobre la muerte de este colombiano, apunta a que falleció en medio de un combate en dicha región, luego de combatir durante varios años y no superar las tres décadas de vida. Desde el golpe del Euromaidán en Ucrania, Castillo ya tenía conocimiento y la actitud para arribar a dicho país, pues quería “defender a la población del Donbáss”, en dicha población habría dejado un hijo.
El presidente Petro lamentó la muerte
Tan pronto se conoció el fallecimiento del vallecaucano, el mandatario nacional resaltó su lucha, dejando en entre dicho la viabilidad de sus ideales. Aseguró que Castillo murió con la idea de ser revolucionario e incluso, recalcó que la revolución era la paz.
Alexis, es un colombiano que ha muerto en el Donbás; sus ideas revolucionarias, quizás equivocadas, quizás no, lo llevaron a esta guerra con los ojos abiertos. Ha muerto un joven que quizo ser revolucionario. La revolución es la Paz. Esto no saldrá en nuestros medios
Petro lamenta la muerte de un soldado colombiano en Rusia
Cabe resaltar que, en la serie de documentales que Castillo protagonizó para varios medios, siempre resaltó que las armas eran un vehículo para la guerra, pues era necesario eliminar el uso de estas para construir la paz, pues siempre cuestionó las provisiones bélicas que recibía Ucrania por parte de Occident [fin]
A uniquely Ukrainian strain of Neo-Nazism is spreading throughout Europe, which openly advocates violence against minorities while seeking new recruits. With Kiev’s army collapsing and a narrative of Western betrayal gaining currency, the horror inflicted on residents of Donbas for a decade could very soon be coming to a city near you
Centuria, an ultra-violent Ukrainian Neo-Nazi faction, has cemented itself in six cities across Germany, and is seeking to expand its local presence. According to Junge Welt, a Berlin-based Marxist daily, the Nazi organization’s growth has been “unhindered by local security services.”
Junge Welt traces Centuria’s origins to an August 2020 Neo-Nazi summit “at the edge of a forest near Kiev.” There, an ultranationalist named Igor “Tcherkas” Mikhailenko demanded the “hundreds of mostly masked vigilante fighters present,” who were members Kiev’s fascistic National Militia, “make sacrifices for the idea of ‘Greater Ukraine.’” As the former head of the Neo-Nazi Patriot of Ukraine’s Kharkiv division, and commander of the state sponsored Azov Battalion from 2014 to 2015, Mikhailenko has professed a desire to “destroy everything anti-Ukrainian.”
Junge Welt reports that since 2017, the National Militia “had been practicing brutal vigilante justice” throughout Ukraine, including “tyrannizing the LGBTQ scene.” Centuria was subsequently blamed for a terrifying November 2021 attack on a gay nightclub in Kiev, in which its operatives assaulted revelers with truncheons and pepper spray.
Now the same Neo-Nazi sect “has an offshoot in Germany,” Junge Welt revealed. On August 24 2023, the 32nd anniversary of Ukraine’s independence, Centuria convened a “nationalist rally” in the central city of Magdeburg, “unmolested by Antifa and critical media reporting.”
Participants proudly posed with the flag of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) founded by World War II-era Nazi collaborator Stepan Bandera. Centuria boasted at the time on Telegram, “although Ukrainian youth are not in their homeland, they are starting to unite.” Meanwhile, they threatened the “enemies” of their country with “hellish storm,” pledging that “Ukrainian emigrants” would not “forget their national identity for a few hundred euros.”
Junge Welt reports that Centuria “is currently raising funds for its parent organization’s combat unit,” which is commanded by Andriy Biletsky – the Azov Battalion founder who infamously stated in 2014 that the Ukrainian nation’s mission was to “lead the white races of the world in a final crusade… against Semite-led Untermenschen.” At home, Centuria’s members express similar attitudes towards Muslims, Africans, and gays, whom they refer to, respectively, as the “German Caliphate,” “black rapists,” and “pedophiles.”
Now, the group’s members are working hard to pass their ideological vision down to future racists across the continent. “We are creating a new generation of heroes!” Centuria’s Telegram channel boasts. Accordingly, the neo-Nazi group has been arranging hiking trips to Germany’s Harz mountains with a Ukrainian nationalist scout association called Plast. This outfit opened chapters across the Western world beginning in the 1950s, in response to the Soviet Union’s hounding of fascists and nationalists. Besides receiving ideological indoctrination, Plast’s youthful members may have the opportunity to improve their physical fitness and receive military training. As Centuria ominously declares on Telegram, “free people have weapons.”
Opening ceremonies at the Lithuanian camp “Iskra” with Plast youth in an apparent “scout’s honor” salute, 2022
As Washington gradually backs away from its sponsorship of Ukraine’s war with Russia, it has begun ceding responsibility for the military campaign’s management – and likely failure – to Berlin. If US arms shipments continue to dwindle, Germany will become Kiev’s chief supplier of weapons. And the Germans may find that saying “no” to Ukraine could result in some nasty surprises.
Unlike the US, Germany does not enjoy an ocean-length buffer between itself and the fascistic proxy warriors it sponsors in Ukraine. After Ukraine’s much-hyped counteroffensive finally collapsed in late 2023, its president, Volodymyr Zelensky, grumbled a veiled threat during an interview with the Economist: “There is no way of predicting how the millions of Ukrainian refugees in European countries would react to their country being abandoned.”
While Ukrainians have generally “behaved well” and are “very grateful” to those who sheltered them, it would not be a “good story” for Europe if it were to “drive these people into a corner,” Zelensky remarked to the outlet.
To understand how more radical elements of a spent proxy force could turn their guns on the Western governments that armed them, one need only look at the events of September 11, 2001.
A secret Western-backed Nazi network
Centuria is seemingly not the only Azov-related Ukrainian movement seeking to infiltrate Europe. An apparently separate but identically named Centuria is doing the same, with help from an entrenched structure of elite European support.
In September 2021, George Washington University’s Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies (IERES) published a detailed and deeply unsettling report which documents how a once-secret order called Centuria was nurtured by a “self-described order of ‘European traditionalist’ military officers that has the stated goals of reshaping the country’s military along right-wing ideological lines and defending the ‘cultural and ethnic identity’ of European peoples against ‘Brussels’ politicos and bureaucrats.’”
IERES reported that Centuria’s military wing began training in 2018 in Ukraine’s Hetman Petro Sahaidachny National Army Academy (NAA), Kiev’s “premier military education institution and a major hub for Western military assistance to the country.”
The paper revealed that “as recently as April 2021, [Centuria] claimed that since its launch, members have participated in joint military exercises with France, the UK, Canada, the US, Germany, and Poland.”
Indeed, many of the neo-Nazi group’s members have drilled at the de facto NATO base in Yavoriv, just a few kilometers east of the Polish border.
Photo posted by the Canadian Armed Forces in Ukraine in 2020 shows the NAA graduation ceremony at the International Peacekeeping and Security Center in Yavoriv
What’s more, “the group claims that its members serve as officers in several units of Ukraine’s military. Since at least 2019, Centuria has… [called] on ideologically aligned members of the AFU to seek transfer to specific units where the group’s members serve. To attract new members, the group – via its Telegram channel, which has over 1,200 followers and a dedicated mobilization bot – continues to tout its alleged role in the AFU and access to Western training, military, and exchange programs.”
Every Western government the IERES researchers approached claimed not to tolerate neo-Nazis in their militaries, insisting they “trusted the Ukrainian government to select and identify the right candidates” for their training programs. But Ukraine’s Hetman Petro Sahaidachny National Army Academy (NAA) has explicitly declared it carries out no such screenings, while also denying Centuria operates within its headquarters.
After the report’s author reached out to Centuria and the NAA for comment about the training of neo-Nazis, operatives of the extremist movement began purging their online footprints, and have concealed their real-world activities ever since.
Western media outlets have almost completely ignored the IERES report, save for a single article in the Jerusalem Post. The silence around the issue is all the more unusual given the credentials of its author, a Washington DC-based Ukrainian citizen whose work has been published by US government outlet Voice of America, and the US and UK-government funded “open source” investigative outfit Bellingcat.
Among Western officials, only the Canadian Armed Forces have commented on the report’s meticulously-documented findings, preposterously claiming that photos posted to Facebook by Centuria members had been “doctored” to advance “Russian disinformation.”
Such disingenuity is not surprising given the Canadian military’s well-documented history of providing training to hardened Ukrainian fascists — and its refusal to disavow Ukrainian Nazis
US and Canadian military officers meet uniformed members of the neo-Nazi Azov Battalion during a November 2017 multinational training session in Ukraine.
To this day, the leader of the country’s military, Gen. Wayne Eyre, continues to refuse to apologize for giving a standing ovation to Yaroslav Hunka, a WWII Nazi collaborator honored by Canada’s parliament.
According to researchers, Centuria fighters within Ukraine have spent at least the last five years attempting to indoctrinate their high-achieving comrades into Neo-Nazism. The IERES report notes that Centuria “has been able to proselytize Ukraine’s future military elite inside the NAA.”
Portrait of a British-trained Neo-Nazi
Underlining the extent of the neo-Nazi penetration of Western military apparatuses, NAA cadet Kyrylo Dubrovskyi, attended an 11-month Officer Training Course at Britain’s esteemed Sandhurst Royal Military Academy in 2020. Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs celebrated his graduation while the NAA published a 12-minute video profile of the new graduate’s path to military leadership. IERES noted that Dubrovskyi “showed very keen interest in Centuria matters” while attending the Academy
Dubrovskyi appears to have narrated a Centuria promotional video circulated on Telegram in May 2020, in which the group’s members are shown marching in Lviv, attending an NAA event, and firing their weapons. Dubrovskyi can be heard intoning, “our officers are raising the new army of Ukraine… We are the Centuria. We are everywhere… defend your territories, your traditions till the last drop of blood.”
A month before, Centuria posted an interview with an unnamed “cadet of Her Majesty’s Armed forces,” a description that could only match one individual: Dubrovskyi. He made clear he preferred training in Ukraine, as British training for military officers “put less emphasis on theory.” During this time, “Dubrovskyi enjoyed access to foreign cadets who visited the Academy,” and “on several occasions escorted foreign delegations that visited the Academy,” including cadets from the US Air Force and the French military.
It is unclear how much “theory” Dubrovskyi injected into the daily routines of Western soldiers with whom he crossed paths while at Sandhurst. IERES concluded that “Dubrovskyi and Centuria leveraged his status as a Sandhurst cadet” to promote the group and its ideology. On the “about” section of his personal YouTube channel, Dubrovskyi describes himself as “a cadet of the Royal Academy of Great Britain.” There, he posted multiple videos about his experiences at the academy, and at least one message expressing a desire to join the neo-Nazi Azov Regiment.
On Telegram in December 2020, Centuria made clear that infiltrating the Ukrainian military’s highest echelons was but the first step in a much wider ideological blitzkrieg: “Centuria is shaping a first-of-its-kind military elite whose goal is to attain the highest ranks inside the Armed Forces in order to become an authoritative core able to hold significant influence.” After consolidating its hold on the military, the group plans to penetrate the ranks of “Ukraine’s political elite,” in order to “carry out societal changes.”
Editor’s note: This article has been clarified to explain that Centuria exists as two separate organizations, both with origins in the neo-Nazi Azov movement [end]
in French, an alphabetical obituary chronicle of the French involvement in the Atlanticist ranks in Ukraine, what servile journalists will not tell you
[où nous apprenons que le nazi français Allan Duchézeau, camarade de César Aujard dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, était surnommé Dox, quand il secondait à Paris le leader nazi Marc de Cacqueray Valménier]
L’un était tatoueur, fils d’une légende de la photo, l’autre devait épouser l’actrice Béatrice Dalle. Aujourd’hui, les deux amis sont devenus des hooligans néonazis. César Aujard combat en Ukraine, alors que Paul Bichet fait des combats clandestins.
Janvier 2020. César Aujard est tatoueur. Il a d’abord fait partie d’un collectif de graffiti, avant de dessiner sur les corps. Cet hiver, il a gravé à l’encre une phrase en style gothique sur le ventre de son pote Paul Bichet : « Si un seul crime avait suffi, je n’en aurais commis aucun ». La même que sur le dos de son amoureuse, l’actrice Béatrice Dalle. Publiée sur Instagram, la photo du tatouage est immédiatement likée par le père de César, le célèbre photographe Richard Aujard, dont Béatrice Dalle est une amie de longue date. Quelques semaines plus tard, Paul Bichet et Béatrice Dalle affichent leur idylle dans les défilés pour Yves Saint Laurent et les magazines people. LSDémon et KetamineQueen, comme ils se surnomment, doivent même se marier.
Las, on ne sait pas ce qu’il est advenu du projet. Mais trois ans plus tard, Paul Bichet a agressé ce qu’il pensait être des antifascistes dans un métro à Paris, se revendique du hooliganisme le plus violent et participe à des combats clandestins en Pologne. Dans une vidéo promotionnelle de ces pugilats, il dédicace César et ses amis « qui se battent à balles réelles ». Ce dernier a quitté son salon et la France, en partie pour fuir la garde à vue et des perquisitions dans le cadre d’une enquête pour le tabassage de plusieurs personnes d’origine étrangère. Des agressions qui ont eu lieu avec des dizaines d’autres hooligans néonazis à la gare du Nord, fin avril dernier. Il se bat désormais sur le front de l’Est avec l’armée ukrainienne. Sur son compte Instagram, il distille des aperçus de sa vie, entre séances de muscu et entraînements au tir, comme l’ont raconté Mediapart, Libération ou L’Équipe. Ensemble, les deux hommes ont connu une trajectoire vers l’extrême droite la plus violente. Portrait croisé.
Le point de bascule
« César a dérivé dans la bêtise de l’extrémisme », lâche au téléphone Marco (1), une ancienne connaissance du désormais combattant de l’Est. « Mais avant, c’était quand même un mec malin. Son salon de tatouage marchait bien. » L’homme a d’abord vécu en région parisienne dans un milieu artistique. Son père est le célèbre photographe Richard Aujard, qui a réalisé des reportages sur les bikers australiens dans les années 80 ou des boxeurs new-yorkais. Il a immortalisé dans son style noir et blanc des grandes stars américaines comme Naomi Campbell, Mike Tyson, Cameron Diaz ou des personnalités hexagonales comme Monica Bellucci, Éric Cantona, Belmondo, Béatrice Dalle… Certains d’entre eux sont devenus de bons amis. « C’était un genre de hippie, vraiment baba cool. Il n’était pas du tout dans une idéologie d’extrême droite », se souvient son confrère, le photojournaliste émérite Yan Morvan
César se bat depuis mai 2023 sur le front de l’Est avec l’armée ukrainienne. Sur son compte Instagram, il distille des aperçus de sa vie, entre gros flingues, séances de muscu ou entraînements au tir. / Crédits : FafLeaks
La mort de « Richie », comme l’appelaient ses proches, en février 2021, a été un véritable choc. « J’ai perdu un pote… un frère !!! Quelqu’un qui m’a magnifié avec son œil », a par exemple lâché JoeyStarr. « Mes amis-amis, je les comptais sur les doigts d’une main de Django Reinhardt et je viens d’en perdre un », a écrit l’ancien joueur de Manchester United Éric Cantona. Quant à la vedette d’Hollywood Mickey Rourke, il a rendu hommage « à un des plus proches amis que j’ai jamais eu dans ma vie ».
À la mort de son père, César aurait vrillé. Une bascule vers les mouvances d’extrême droite à l’origine de fortes tensions dans la famille Aujard. « Ça a été très vite. Si Richard était encore là, il n’aurait pas basculé », présente l’un des amis du paternel. Plusieurs proches ont refusé de parler à StreetPress, préférant désavouer le rejeton et protéger la mémoire du photographe. « Il n’aurait jamais cautionné les activités de son fils. On n’est pas responsable du comportement de quelqu’un qui a 30 ans. Pour moi ce qu’il fait depuis, c’est qu’il se suicide », lance une autre très en colère face à notre demande d’interview. Marco, l’ex-connaissance, résume :
« Là, il a sali le nom de son père. »
Le Jackass français
Le nom de Paul Bichet apparaît sur les sites d’actus people à l’hiver 2020. Sur des dizaines de pages, il est présenté comme le nouveau compagnon et futur mari de l’actrice Béatrice Dalle. Le jeune homme n’a que 23 ans, mais possède déjà une petite notoriété dans le milieu du wakeboard français, sorte de snowboard sur l’eau. Un amateur de la discipline qui l’a connu dans sa jeunesse se souvient d’un garçon « atypique et engagé à 100% dans ce qu’il faisait ». Capable de « montrer son cul à 20.000 personnes depuis l’Hôtel de région à Montpellier (34) » lors du Festival international des sports extrêmes, complète le média Handle. Paul Bichet est un peu le Jackass français. « Il s’éclatait des planches de skate sur les couilles, il se les cramait. Il y avait un groupe Facebook où il y avait toutes ces conneries en vidéo », raconte Marco, l’ex-connaissance de César qui a aussi croisé le casse-cou :
« Paul s’était pété je ne sais pas combien de fois les dents. Tous les trucs hardcore, il les a faits. »
Son CV met également en lumière ces liens avec les milieux artistiques. Il a tourné dans un court-métrage en 2019, avant de s’afficher au sélect « dîner de la mode » organisé conjointement par la Fédération de la Haute Couture et de la Mode et le Sidaction, en janvier 2020. Line Renaud, la princesse Marie de Danemark, l’ancienne miss France Iris Mittenaere ou le créateur Jean-Paul Gaultier participent au gala. Ce soir-là, Béatrice Dalle pose à son bras pour le magazine Vanity Fair. L’occasion pour le couple d’officialiser leur relation.
Le jeune homme fait la rencontre de différentes personnalités, dont l’écrivaine féministe Virginie Despentes, grande amie de Dalle. / Crédits : FafLeaks
Aux médias people, la « figure rebelle du cinéma français » Dalle – comme la caractérise le Monde dans un portrait en 2020 – vante la « tendresse » et la « fantaisie » de Paul Bichet. Le mois suivant, ils sont aux premiers rangs du défilé d’Yves Saint Laurent, comme les stars internationales Charlotte Gainsbourg, Rami Malek ou Zoé Kravitz. Le jeune homme fait la rencontre de différentes personnalités, dont l’écrivaine féministe Virginie Despentes, grande amie de Dalle. Le couple manifeste contre la loi Sécurité globale – dont un des articles pénalisait la diffusion d’images des policiers. Au printemps 2021, Paul Bichet pose pour un shooting de la marque de luxe Jean-Paul Gaultier, habillé de la marinière iconique, qui apparaît dans L’uomo Vogue – la version masculine italienne du magazine.
Au printemps 2021, Paul Bichet pose pour un shooting de la marque de luxe Jean-Paul Gaultier avec la marinière iconique. / Crédits : Instagram
Les combats
Un an plus tard, Paul Bichet s’entraîne au combat avec César Aujard. « César s’occupait de recruter des mecs pour devenir… Fafs quoi », se souvient Marco, l’ex-connaissance :
Après un fight de leur ami hooligan Maxime Bellamy, Paul félicite le duo sur Instagram. « Merci mon George Floyd », lui répond le combattant. Paul renchérit : « I can’t breathe. » / Crédits : FafLeaks
César va aussi s’entraîner dans l’école de boxe thaï de Guillaume Kerner. Cet ancien international français s’est installé au milieu du 18e arrondissement de Paris. « Il ne passait pas inaperçu, il avait des tatouages partout et il savait déjà boxer », se souvient celui qui a été surnommé « l’Ange blond » durant sa carrière. Il poursuit :
« C’était “bonjour, au revoir” et il s’entraînait. Quand il mettait les gants, c’était brutal. »
Marco se souvient d’une vidéo de César. « Il y avait une bagarre entre son pote et un autre gars. Des mecs voulaient intervenir en faveur de l’autre. César a couché par terre deux mecs à coups de casque. »
Rapidement, César parle au coach Kerner des fight clubs clandestins. « J’ai compris qu’il était friand de ça, ça le fascinait un peu », lâche le boxeur. Au sein du club, des tensions commencent à naître entre César et les autres combattants. « Des gens m’ont dit que c’était un nazi. Ils ne voulaient pas de lui et disaient qu’on ne devait pas accepter les fachos », rembobine Guillaume Kerner :
« Ils m’envoyaient plein de trucs d’internet avec des tatouages et leurs significations nazies. »
Tatouages et salut de Kühnen
Depuis la mort de son père, César a de nouveaux tattoos. Ses deux étoiles, ancrées au-dessus des pectoraux ont été remplacées par des croix de fer, un symbole prisé des mouvements de bikers, mais aussi des groupes d’extrême droite. Il se fait également des runes d’Algiz et d’Odal ou un Kolovrat, des symboles nordiques et slaves repris par les néonazis.
La photo de César en train de faire le fameux salut de Kühnen à trois doigts au stade est publiée sur les réseaux sociaux par le journal sportif l’Équipe. Il est à ce moment-là membre des Jeunesses Boulogne, un groupe d’hooligans héritiers du Kop of Boulogne. Il continue de porter le t-shirt de la bande en Ukraine. / Crédits : FafLeaks
Un jour, les membres du club de boxe et César s’expliquent. « Il a dit qu’il avait fait partie des mecs qui font des combats de hooligans, mais il a nié être nazi », se rappelle son éphémère entraîneur. « Il nous a dit : “Dans ce pays, dès qu’on dit qu’on est fier d’être blanc ou qu’on est patriotique, on se fait cataloguer de facho” ». Guillaume Kerner tranche :
« J’avais l’impression de voir un gars un peu fragile psychologiquement et prédisposé à aller vers l’extrémisme. »
Il se dit que la boxe et son club « peuvent l’aider ». « J’ai voulu lui donner une chance », souffle l’ancien combattant qui connaissait lui aussi son père Richard.
La situation s’envenime lorsque César participe à une compétition à Nanterre de l’académie de muay thaï, dirigée par l’ex-champion Jo Prestia. Lui aussi était un ami de son paternel. À la fin du combat, « César aurait fait un salut à trois doigts » vers ses soutiens amassés dans les gradins, lâche Guillaume Kerner. C’est un salut de Kühnen, ersatz de salut nazi inventé par le néonazi allemand Michael Kühnen pour contourner l’interdiction de ce geste. « Ça a dégénéré en bagarre. Une connaissance à lui et des mecs de mon club se sont invectivés et frictionnés », raconte-t-il. Jo Prestia commente :
« On a dû s’en mêler pour sortir [César] d’un mauvais pas. Il a vraiment craint pour sa vie. Évidemment, par respect pour Richie, on l’a défendu. »
Selon l’ancien champion, César Aujard aurait été « menacé de mort pour ces faits » après le combat. Kerner, lui, a demandé à César d’arrêter de venir à son club :
« Il l’a compris. Mais comment ça se fait qu’il vient dans un club comme le mien au milieu des Noirs et des Maghrébins ? C’est ça qui m’a incité à croire à la repentance. »
La ratonnade et la fuite
Le 29 avril 2023, à 16h57, station La Chapelle, César Aujard descend de la ligne 2 du métro parisien avec un groupe de 80 hooligans néonazis, ces hommes qui gravitent autour du football, extrêmement violents et fans de bastons. Ceux-là sont de la capitale ou viennent de Toulouse (31). Reconnaissable à sa tête de squelette tatouée à l’arrière du crâne, César est habillé d’un bomber noir. Ses potes et lui se rendent au Stade de France à Saint-Denis (93), pour voir la finale de Coupe de France de football qui oppose Toulouse et Nantes (44). Rapidement, ils crient :
« La France aux Français. »
Dans les tunnels du métro, ils agressent des passants et des vendeurs à la sauvette d’origine maghrébine, sri lankaise ou africaine. Théo C., attaché parlementaire LFI, tente de les filmer et se fait tabasser en retour. Le soir même, la photo de César en train de faire le fameux salut de Kühnen à trois doigts au stade est publiée par le journal sportif l’Équipe. Théo C. le reconnaît et témoigne dans StreetPress. Une enquête policière est lancée et le domicile de César est perquisitionné.
Mais le tatoueur est déjà parti en Ukraine. C’est désormais un golgoth qui combat avec les forces locales contre l’envahisseur russe, une posture partagée par une grande partie de l’extrême droite française. Entre deux entraînements, il dessine des croix celtiques avec un ex de la Légion étrangère surnommé Dox. Un ancien lieutenant de Marc de Cacqueray-Valmenier au sein du Gud,. Le duo est complété par Kenneth, un néonazi lyonnais. Marco souffle :
« Il est vraiment parti trop loin. S’il survit à tout ça, il va finir mercenaire. »
Entre deux entraînements, César dessine des croix celtiques avec un ancien de la Légion étrangère surnommé Dox. À droite, ils soulignent les lettres « WP » car chez les fafs, c’est l’acronyme de « White Power », le « pouvoir blanc ». / Crédits : FafLeaks
Antifas et croix gammées
Quant à Paul, il commence comme ses potes hools parisiens à vouloir « éclater » des antifascistes, comme il l’explique dans un audio que StreetPress a pu consulter. Courant 2023, il publie une vidéo en public sur son compte Instagram. On le voit assis dans la ligne 14 du métro. Rapidement, il se lève et se place face à un groupe de cinq personnes visiblement fans de métal. Ils arborent sur leurs blousons des patchs Black Sabbath et Rammstein. Mais pour Paul Bichet, ce sont des antifas. « Agenouille-toi avant que je devienne une machine à douleur », lance-t-il à l’un des membres du groupe qui ne comprend pas. Paul l’empoigne, le frappe et répète :
« Agenouille-toi. Agenouille-toi avant que je t’éclate. Agenouillez-vous. Enculés d’antifas va ! »
Les métalleux sortent du métro et Paul Bichet les poursuit, comme possédé.
Après la vidéo, certains de ses proches se détournent de lui. « Il était vraiment instable. Quand on allait boire des bières, il n’avait jamais ce genre d’attitude », indique Antoine (1). Pour cet ancien pote, Paul Bichet « est vraiment un gentil ». « Je sais que ça peut paraître bizarre, mais c’est un gosse : on dirait qu’il a 40 balais alors qu’il en a 26. » Il se souvient du message d’excuses publié le lendemain de l’agression par Paul Bichet. Pour autant, l’homme ne cache pas ses opinions. Il indique dans un de ses posts qu’un « bon Arabe est un Arabe mort ». Sur une autre photo, on le voit avec un t-shirt marqué du blason de Paris. Sauf que les fleurs de lys ont été remplacées par des croix gammées.
Paul Bichet s’est déjà affiché sur les réseaux avec ce t-shirt floqué du blason de Paris. Sauf que les fleurs de lys y sont remplacées par… des croix gammées. / Crédits : FafLeaks
Des combats clandestins en Pologne
L’ancien Jackass a commencé à faire des combats clandestins en Pologne cet été. Dans une vidéo pour Gromda, l’organisation qui chapeaute ces fights, Paul Bichet se définit comme un « hooligan » du « Kop Boulogne », ce collectif de supporters du PSG actif des années 70 à 2010, noyauté par certains groupes d’extrême droite. Il détaille :
« J’ai commencé à rencontrer et traîner avec des gens du football, qui était plus axé sur la bagarre que sur le foot en lui-même. Et ça tombe bien car moi, j’en ai rien à foutre du football aussi. »
Si le hooligan parisien s’oriente désormais vers les combats clandestins, c’est qu’il n’aime « pas vraiment [se] battre dans la rue ». « Je ne me rappelle jamais de mes bagarres », renchérit-il dans la suite de cette vidéo. Quand il a vu ça, Antoine a été dégoûté : « Paul, c’est vraiment un suiveur. Il avait envie de pratiquer ce type de combat de barges. Dans cinq ou six ans, il se retournera et se dira : “J’ai fait de la merde”. » Le néonazi a toujours le soutien de Béatrice Dalle, qui a partagé l’annonce de ce combat en mai dernier sur Instagram, accompagnée du commentaire : « Mon p’tit Polo, je t’aime ».
Paul Bichet a toujours le soutien de Béatrice Dalle, qui a partagé l’annonce de ce combat en mai dernier sur Instagram, accompagnée du commentaire : « Mon p’tit Polo, je t’aime. » / Crédits : FafLeaks
Contactés, César Aujard, l’entreprise Jean-Paul Gaultier, Béatrice Dalle ou Virginie Despentes n’ont pas répondu aux sollicitations de StreetPress. Paul Bichet, lui, a répondu que nous nous mettions « le doigt dans l’oeil » après avoir lu notre « mail d’approche » à son entourage. Il a indiqué ne pas vouloir répondre à nos questions et il a supprimé son compte Instagram.
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