Analista senior di l'intelligenza in u campu di a gestione di i risichi di sicurezza, sò un anzianu tenente detective è ufficiale di l'intelligenza in l'agenzie di u Statu francese. A bona pronuncia hè Николай Чинкуини, in russu
Why are liberal institutions censoring discussion of forced mobilization in Ukraine? – Volodymyr Ishchenko, Marta Havryshko, Tarik Cyril Amar, Milica Popović and Almut Rochowanski
Busification in Kharkiv, December 4, 2025. Courtesy the Telegram channel Бусификация Киев
The following is a response to the editors of the Review of Democracy (RevDem), the online journal of the Democracy Institute at the Central European University, who suspended an event that they agreed to host on December 11, 2025: “Men in the Vans, Women on the Streets: Gender, Resistance, and Forced Mobilization in Ukraine and Ex-Yugoslavia.” Its authors are the panelists who were scheduled to speak at the event.
This case illustrates how academic freedom and open debate are eroding in Western institutions, including those that publicly position themselves against authoritarian trends. Concerns about “balance” and “public responsibility” in discussions of the Russia–Ukraine war are applied in a highly selective way, effectively excluding scholars who are among the very few conducting empirical research and publishing on silenced and inconvenient topics. While calls for “balance” are rarely voiced when events reproduce dominant narratives about the war, they are used to delegitimize discussions that highlight phenomena—such as mass draft dodging and forced mobilization—that expose growing tensions between hegemonic discourse and social realities in Ukraine and sit uneasily with the current climate of European remilitarization. Invoking “responsibility” has, in practice, meant devaluing and silencing the lived experiences of large numbers of people suffering and resisting serious human rights abuses, whose perspectives the suspended panel was explicitly designed to bring into the conversation.
We are profoundly shocked and saddened by the statement issued by the Review of Democracy (RevDem) and the CEU Democracy Institute, which we consider an attack on our academic freedom and our academic and professional integrity. We feel compelled to respond to this deplatforming, which is nothing less than an act of political censorship.
Our panel was scheduled to address the phenomenon of “busification” (forced mobilization in Ukraine). We were to examine its relationship to gender and nationalism, as well as the resistance and civil society responses it has provoked. The panel also planned to place these issues in a comparative context, exploring forced mobilization in Ukraine alongside similar practices during the Yugoslav wars. The event was proposed and organized with the utmost care to ensure the rigor of academic debate and to reflect the urgency of the human rights abuses on the ground. We proposed the speakers and the topic to the RevDem team on November 15, responding to all questions about structure, specific themes, and format by late November. The event was subsequently announced on the evening of December 3 and shared on RevDem and Democracy Institute social media on the afternoon of December 4. As we were proceeding with preparations, on the evening of December 5 we received an email announcing the event’s suspension. We later discovered that the RevDem team and the Democracy Institute had simultaneously issued a public statement on the suspension.
The statement claimed that the decision followed “careful consideration of concerns raised by colleagues, faculty, and students across the university, particularly members of CEU’s Ukrainian community.” However, RevDem and the Democracy Institute did not ask us, the speakers and organizers of the panel, to comment on these concerns while making the decision, giving us no possibility to respond and leaving us entirely excluded from the process. Nevertheless, the statement on the suspension plainly declared that “the current format of the event does not meet the standards required for an academically balanced and contextually grounded discussion of this subject” and, moreover, that the event does not seem to be structured in ways “that uphold academic integrity, provide appropriate expertise, and acknowledge the lived experiences of those directly affected.”
In the private email we received about the cancellation, we were informed that “the issues raised included: the need for a clearer contextualization of forced mobilization within the ongoing full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine; questions about the appropriateness of comparisons with the Yugoslav conflicts; the absence of scholars who have conducted direct research on forced mobilization or on civil society responses in Ukraine, and worries that the current setup may not be able to sustain the kind of balanced, rigorous academic debate that the topic requires and CEU stands for.” Essentially, the suggestion was that our proposal was not grounded in scholarly rigor and appropriate expertise, nor sensitive to the wider impact it may have on communities directly affected by the war. The statement promised “thoughtful reassessment” of the “event’s format, scope, and potential future iteration”; however, it called into question our academic integrity and research expertise as well as the lived experiences of some of the speakers before any proper reassessment was conducted.
The panel was organized by scholars who have been conducting direct research on forced mobilization and/or on civil society responses in Ukraine, as well as in the former Yugoslavia. We are among the few academics to have published on these topics.
Volodymyr Ishchenko has co-authored the essay “Why is Ukraine struggling to mobilize its citizens to fight?”, which is based, in particular, on recent empirical research, including interviews with Ukrainian volunteers and draft dodgers. This forms part of a large-scale cross-national research project he has been co-leading with the support of the Alameda Institute, which also included a representative survey commissioned this year in Ukraine exploring, among other questions, attitudes towards draft dodging.
Tarik Cyril Amar published the most comprehensive article to date focused on forced mobilization in Ukraine: “The Nation and Busification: Forced Mobilization in Wartime Ukraine,” published by the Institute for New Global Politics, a think tank founded by a network of scholars at Stanford, UC-Berkeley, and elsewhere.
Milica Popović is currently leading an extensive empirically-rooted project on desertion and forced mobilization during the Yugoslav wars at the Austrian Academy of Sciences in Vienna. Her project “The Silence of Saying No: (Un)Remembering Deserters from the Yugoslav Wars” has received funding from the FWF (Austrian Science Fund) based on international peer-review evaluation, and she has delivered several academic lectures on the topic.
Almut Rochowanski has decades-long experience supporting women’s civil society groups in Eastern Europe. She has worked on Ukraine and women, particularly women activists, since 2014, notably with the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, an international women’s peace organization founded in 1915, which has consistently worked on anti-militarism, including by defending conscientious objectors and deserters.
The above-mentioned publications are not yet in peer-reviewed journals precisely because careful empirical research of a new and silenced phenomenon requires time. It should be noted that academics routinely speak on issues on which they have not yet published peer-reviewed papers—as numerous events, panels, and podcasts at the Democracy Institute and CEU itself demonstrate.
We find the claimed “inappropriateness” of comparing the Russia-Ukraine and Yugoslav wars to be without serious grounds. We are aware of each other’s studies on forced mobilization in Ukraine and across ex-Yugoslav states: we find important convergences, and divergences, that help us see each case in comparative context. Furthermore, the Invisible University for Ukraine—one of CEU’s own projects—apparently finds such comparisons entirely appropriate, as it offers two courses: “Protests, Social Transformations and the EU: Rethinking the Balkans for Ukraine” (course co-directors: Marija Mandić, University of Belgrade, and Olesia Marković, Kyiv-Mohyla Academy); and “Facing the Legacy of the Yugoslav Wars” (course co-directors: Vladimir Petrović, NIOD Institute for War, Holocaust, and Genocide Studies, Amsterdam and Miloš Hrnjaz, University of Belgrade).
We are scholars and practitioners with deep expertise on the proposed topic of discussion and a long record of books and articles on directly related aspects of Ukrainian and (post-)Yugoslav societies and histories, including wars, nationalism, gender, violence, protests, and civil society. We are fully competent to contextualize forced mobilization appropriately—that was precisely the goal of our discussion.
We are able to sustain the balanced and rigorous academic debate that any serious topic requires, and we have proven this through our academic work and its recognition—unless “contextualization” and “balancing” means that we should, in effect, justify and legitimize the large-scale and serious human rights abuse that forced conscription represents.
Further accusing us of a lack of sensibility “to the wider impact that it may have on communities directly affected by the war” is particularly insulting, given that two of the panelists are Ukrainian citizens (Marta Havryshko and Volodymyr Ishchenko); and one of the panelists lived through the Yugoslav wars (Milica Popović). Acknowledging the experience of our close relatives and friends who have become victims of forced mobilization, had to become deserters, or hid from mobilization for years was one of our primary motivations for initiating an academic discussion on this topic.
We believe that RevDem and the Democracy Institute’s handling of the situation with our panel was unprofessional and unethical. The public allegations made about our integrity, expertise, and experiences before conducting any proper review are unacceptable.
We also believe that the real reason for this cancellation is our public stance and political views—in particular, critical views on the Russia-Ukraine war and nationalism—as well as the lack of readiness by the RevDem and the Democracy Institute to address the inconvenient complexities of wars not suitable for the dominant political discourses in the current atmosphere of Europe-wide militarization. Such cancellation practices stand as a warning to the rapidly deteriorating conditions of academic freedom and freedom of scholarship, as well as freedom of speech in the European Union, even by institutions which otherwise claim to fight against such authoritarian tendencies [end]
Volodymyr Ishchenko is a sociologist from Ukraine currently affiliated with the Institute of East European Studies, Freie Universität Berlin, and author of Towards the Abyss: Ukraine from Maidan to War.
Marta Havryshko is Dr. Thomas Zand Visiting Assistant Professor in Holocaust Pedagogy and Antisemitism Studies, Strassler Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies at Clark University.
Tarik Cyril Amar (@TarikCyrilAmar), is an historian from Germany currently at Koç University, Istanbul, and author of The Paradox of Ukrainian Lviv. A Borderland City between Stalinists, Nazis, and Nationalists.
Milica Popović is a political scientist, and currently, Senior Postdoctoral Researcher at the Institute of Culture Studies at the Austrian Academy of Sciences in Vienna, where she leads her project,”The Silence of Saying No: (Un)Remembering Deserters from the Yugoslav Wars.” Her first monograph, The Last Pioneers: Deconstructing Yugonostalgia and (post-)Yugoslavism, will be published with Amsterdam University Press in 2026.
Almut Rochowanski has been an activist for women’s rights and peace in countries of the former Soviet Union and is currently a fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft.
chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia
As panic-inducing travel advisories and doomsaying media reports prophesy the fall of Mali to an Al Qaeda affiliate attacking fuel convoys, the government has re-secured supply routes and hosted Mali’s first international defense expo in a supposedly besieged capital
BAMEX 25 is Mali’s first international defense expo (screenshot)
Amid a barrage of media reports prophesying the fall of Mali to an Al Qaeda affiliate disrupting its fuel supply by attacking tankers, delegates from ten African countries, Iran, and Turkey attended a defense expo in the capital Bamako from November 11 to 14.
Dismissing this portrayal as a scenario “concocted in the office of foreign intelligence services”, Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Diop insisted that “the fate of Mali, and the destiny of the people in the West African region will not be decided” by the media.
He made these remarks on November 12, addressing a press conference on the sidelines of BAMEX 25, Mali’s first international defense expo, aimed at building “an autonomous security architecture” for Africa in the face of “unprecedented security and geopolitical challenges”.
This expo, he said, is yet another indication of the Malian government’s priority to strengthen its defense and security to combat the threat of terror groups that were spawned across the Sahel by NATO’s destruction of Libya in 2011.
French-spawned terror groups
Mali was among the first and worst affected by these terror groups. Its former colonizer, France, which was a key participant in Libya’s destruction, then deployed its troops, ostensibly to protect Mali. Over the years, its military presence expanded across the Sahel. Alongside, the armed groups also grew in strength, increasing attacks and the area under their control.
This led to a growing perception that French troops in the region were not fighting the terror groups it helped create but guarding its own economic and political interests in maintaining its neocolonial grip over the troubled former colonies.
In 2021, then-prime minister Choguel Kokalla Maïga recalled in an interview the active role played by France in handing over Mali’s territory to terror groups.
“Upon arriving in” the northern town of Kidal in 2013, “France forbade the Malian army from entering. It created an enclave,” and handed it over to Al-Qaeda affiliate Ansar al Dine and Tuareg separatists brought together, he said. Later in 2017, Ansar al Dine coalesced with other terrorist groups to form the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), which became one of the most dangerous groups in the Sahel.
“It’s an enclave controlled by France. They have armed groups trained by French officers. And we have evidence of this,” Maiga added in his 2021 interview. “Mali has no access to Kidal.”
However, the new government retook Kidal in November 2023, less than a year and a half after expelling the French troops.
“On the ground today, terrorist groups are no match for Mali’s defense and security forces,” Diop told reporters at the press conference. “There have been enormous efforts to equip Mali’s defense and security forces, which have achieved resounding successes” against the terror groups, he said, adding that this has “forced them to change their strategy and now attack softer targets.”
Attacks on fuel convoys
Early this September, the JNIM started attacks on drivers and their tankers carrying fuel from the Ivory Coast in the Sikasso region of southern Mali. “Due to disruptions in fuel supplies that are affecting the movement of school staff,” the Education Ministry suspended classes for two weeks on October 26.
“Do Not Travel to Mali for any reason due to crime, terrorism, kidnapping, unrest, and health,” the US State Department said in a travel advisory on October 25. Three days later, the department issued a second alert, insisting that its citizens in Mali “should” leave the country “using commercial aviation, as overland routes to neighboring countries may not be safe for travel due to terrorist attacks along national highways.”
Australia followed suit on October 29, warning, “If you’re in Mali, you should depart immediately using commercial means while the international airport in Bamako remains open and flights are available. If you decide to remain in Mali, be prepared to shelter in place for an extended period.” Italy and Germany also asked their citizens to leave the country.
Amid the panic-inducing travel advisories and doomsaying media reports, Mali’s president, Col. Assimi Goïta, inaugurated the country’s second Lithium mine on November 3, setting Mali en route to becoming Africa’s leading Lithium producer by 2026.
“There have been disruptions in the supply system,” but “the state organized itself, put in place a strategic plan to resume supplies, to ensure the security of convoys … And gradually, you see that hundreds of trucks are arriving every day to resume supplies to Bamako and other localities,” Diop added in his press conference. “As I speak, Mali is able to ensure the supply of hydrocarbons and petroleum products to its population.”
However, two days after the fuel convoys started arriving, France “advised” its citizens on October 7 to leave Mali “as soon as possible using the remaining available commercial flights” because the “security situation has been deteriorating.”
Mali’s first-ever National Electronic Payments Exhibition was organized in the capital that day by the Professional Association of Banks and Financial Institutions of Mali (APBEF-Mali) and the West African Economic and Monetary Union’s Interbank Electronic Payment Group (GIM-UEMOA).
Schools reopened on schedule on November 10. That day, President Goïta inaugurated the Presidential Emergency Hospital Project to upgrade six existing health centers in Bamako to district hospitals by the end of 2026, for which a health budget of USD 349.2 million has been allocated. The inauguration also marked the start of construction of nine new hospitals, including in Bougouni, Bandiagara, and Nioro, where attacks had been reported in the recent past.
Despite these indications of improving security, the UK government claimed on November 13 that “Terrorist group Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) has implemented blockades on key routes throughout Southern and Western Mali, including the capital city of Bamako,” where the international defense expo was underway.
“These blockades are targeting fuel trucks and are enforcing checkpoints for individuals attempting to pass through them. Attacks can occur at any time,” added its travel advisory.
A proxy war
“We must not think we are simply facing terrorist groups,” Diop maintains. “No, this is a proxy war, where certain powers, cowardly and unable to confront us directly, are using terrorist groups and asymmetric forces to fight us … These terrorist groups have drones. Where do they come from? Who manufactures them? Who provides them in areas where people cannot even eat?”
Le Monde had reported last year that Ukrainian authorities are training an armed group to use drones. Spokesperson of Ukraine’s military intelligence, Andriy Yusov, had said in an interview that it provided “information, and not only information,” to armed groups fighting the state in Mali.
Earlier in 2022, Diop had written a letter to the UN Security Council, saying Mali had evidence that France was flying missions in Malian airspace to collect intelligence and airdrop arms and ammunition to terror groups.
Mali’s southern neighbor, Burkina Faso, and eastern neighbor, Niger, have also since accused France of supporting terror groups to destabilize their countries after its troops were expelled following a similar sequence of anti-France protests and popular coups.
“Africa is now the epicenter of terrorism,” Nicolas Lerner, head of France’s General Directorate for External Security (DGSE), told France Inter radio on November 10. Calling it a threat to Europe, he insisted it “directly threatens our interests,” effectively trying to set up the case for another military intervention.
Curiously, he went on to add that while the “JNIM wants the fall of the junta and the installation of authorities who back the establishment of a caliphate,” the group itself “is not necessarily capable of controlling Mali, nor does it actually want to.”
Lerner is “saying … it is not even their intention to take Bamako … How [does he] know their intention? Is it you who gives them this intention? Is it you who commands them? Is it you who decides,” questioned Diop.
“This should help us understand how deep the collusion is today between hybrid forces. These are not terrorists – it is a proxy war. But I can assure you that Mali will endure.”
He reiterated that Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, which have formed the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), are fighting together, convinced that this proxy war is waged on them because they “chose to break the chain of dependency, to break the chain of subjugation to colonial domination.”
He added, “Our countries are being attacked first to break this dynamic and then to prevent other African countries from following this path. And we have understood the political message behind this.” The African Union (AU), however, has not.
“We are not reaching out to the so-called international community to come to our aid”
Amid the chorus by Western countries, the AU’s chairperson, Mahamoud Ali Youssouf, called for “a robust, coordinated, and coherent international response to counter terrorism and violent extremism in the Sahel.”
“No action can be … taken in Mali without Malians, without the consent of the Malian state, without the Malian state requesting it,” Diop retorted, affirming, “we are not reaching out to the so-called international community to come to our aid.”
“This call for international action is all the more worrying since Mali has emerged from this type of paradigm,” he added. Having expelled the French troops and asserted sovereignty, “the new paradigm [in the AES] is to trust ourselves and take charge … to ensure the security of our countries rests first and foremost on the shoulders of the people and leaders of our countries” [end]
France’s recent parliamentary elections indicate a rapid political shift to the right. Africans both on the continent – where several nations remain French neo-colonies – and in France will undoubtedly experience the impact of this in the form of increased exploitation, reactionary immigration policy, and xenophobic oppression
Like dominos, African states are one by one falling outside the shackles of neocolonialism. Chad, Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and now Gabon are saying ‘non’ to France’s longtime domination of African financial, political, economic, and security affairs
Case study in ‘Azovization’? Zelensky’s latest SS scandal. Timothy Snyder’s favorite Colombian mercenaries. Neo-Nazis and ‘NATO standards’
[my illustration: On November 4, 2025, Volodymyr Zelenskyy awards fighters of the 2nd Army Corps, Khartiia, here members of Syla Svobody [Force of Freedom, SS], 4th battalion of the 4th national guard brigade]
During a recent trip to frontline areas near the encircled strategic city of Pokrovsk, the Ukrainian president, his chief of staff, and commander-in-chief visited the 1st Azov Corps from the National Guard of Ukraine, and they found themselves standing next to a neo-Nazi flag, awarding soldiers who appeared to be wearing SS bolts on their arms. Actually, that PR debacle (which the international press has dutifully ignored) occurred at another command post — a brigade from the National Guard’s 2nd Khartia Corps
The neo-Nazi flag in question not only featured an Azov-style wolfsangel but, as another researcher noted, includes “the cog-and-wreath that emphasizes this is a ‘social’ nationalism.” (Ukrainian Nazis often prefer to call themselves “social nationalists” instead of “national socialists”)
This year’s “corps reform” in the National Guard of Ukraine (NGU) elevated the 12th Azov and 13th Khartia brigades, which still exist within the larger units. It was the 4th Rubizh brigade that Zelensky visited from the 2nd NGU corps, another “elite” unit, which has two battalions (3rd and 4th) affiliated with the far-right political party “Svoboda.” Upon closer inspection, the “SS” troops were “trolling.” Their chevrons did not contain Nazi runes but a stylized 44, as in “4th brigade, 4th battalion,” as well as the fascist “44 Rules of Life of a Ukrainian Nationalist” from the 1930s
The prevalence of soldiers from this “SS” battalion at the ceremony, and a neo-Nazi (“social-nationalist”) flag prominently displayed at the Rubizh command post, obviously raises some questions about the brigade, which was “established as an elite unit trained and organized under NATO standards.” The Azov and Khartia brigades also pride themselves on training according to NATO standards, “to be a model” for a “new Ukrainian army” liberated from the “Soviet-era mindset.”
The famous historian Timothy Snyder is helping “pro-Ukraine” internet trolls to fundraise for Rubizh and other brigades of the 2nd NGU corps, including one which has a symbol that creates the visual impression of a swastika. But it’s the PR-driven Khartia brigade that appears to be Snyder’s favorite—a watered-down Azov copycat unit, led by a former Rubizh commander who quotes 20th century Ukrainian fascists. International volunteers have called it “the worst brigade,” but in another sense, it is an elite unit, founded by an oligarch who is “convinced the key to success is ‘radical’ reform of Ukraine’s military”
Timothy Snyder with Vsevolod Kozhemyako, oligarch Khartia founder
The Azov movement has its “White Fuhrer” (Andriy Biletsky), and Khartia has Vsevolod Kozhemyako, the founder and CEO of Agrotrade Group, “one of Ukraine’s largest grain production, storage and export companies.” In 2003, he received a degree from the Interregional Academy of Personnel Management, a private university in Kyiv that the historian Per Rudling wrote about in 2006 as a pillar of organized antisemitism in Ukraine. Now a proud nationalist who praises the memory of Stepan Bandera, even before 2022, Kozhemyako appears to have been a supporter of the “Da Vinci Wolves,” a far-right militia affiliated with the Nazi-infested “Right Sector” movement
Kozhemyako visiting the Da Vinci Wolves in 2019
Whereas the Azov units originated in an infamous volunteer battalion from 2014 and the NGU Azov Regiment made famous by the Russian siege of Mariupol, Khartia has also become “one of Ukraine’s most famous units” and much more quickly expanded, thanks to its unique financing and PR. This year, the country’s largest oil and gas producer, Ukrnafta, raised 100 million hryvnia (~$2.4 million) for the Khartia Corps. Just a year after Kozhemyako formed a territorial defense unit in March 2022, it joined the National Guard as a brigade. According to Forbes Ukraine,
If we describe Kozhemyako’s role at Khartia in business terms, he is an executive chairman, a founder who has moved away from operational management and focused on strategic interactions with the government, key partners, suppliers, and thought leaders. His interlocutors include [Ukrainian writer/singer] Serhiy Zhadan and Howard Buffett, [Ukrainian singer/politician] Slavko Vakarchuk and [former CEO of Google] Eric Schmidt, generals and deputy prime ministers, owners and managers of private companies with revenues in the hundreds of millions of dollars
Serhiy Zhadan, a famous poet in Ukraine, is a friend of Vsevolod Kozhemyako and the most prominent “culture warrior” in Khartia, who represents the unit publicly (and even wrote its anthem) but doesn’t actually fight. As “Events in Ukraine” tells us, “This phenomenon of culture-warriors is particularly widespread in the 13th ‘Khartiya’ brigade of the 2nd Corps of the National Guard”
Zhadan, wearing a Khartia shirt that reminds me of those from the NGU Azov unit
Khartia is supported by a high-level marketing agency in Ukraine, the Fedoriv Group, which started to work with the Ministry of Digital Transformation in 2022, and launched the wartime United24 fundraising platform and media brand on behalf of the Office of the President. Andriy Fedoriv became a “great friend for me and Khartia” says Kozhemyako. “He helped me build a creative team within Khartia, and then worked with us and continues to work on creating and promoting the brand”
Kozhemyako and Fedoriv, CEO of the Fedoriv Group
This year, United24 highlighted the Khartia brigade as a unit that is “changing the battlefield” with “Robotic Combat Systems.” The Azovites pride themselves as pioneers in this field, and I’ll be writing more about that soon. Andriy Biletsky, commander of the Azovite 3rd Army Corps, told the Yalta European Strategy (YES) conference in Kyiv this past summer, “the revolution of ground-based robotic systems … will radically change the battlefield.”
Ihor Obolensky, commander of the 2nd Khartia Corps, also remotely joined this panel discussion at YES 2025 with former CIA director David Petraeus, former Swedish prime minister Carl Bildt, and Ukrainian military brass. (Obolensky spoke at YES 2024 as well.) According to an ideological officer in Khartia, “our commander, Colonel Ihor Obolensky, can say in a conversation: ‘As Dontsov claimed…’ or ‘According to Konovalets…’” referring to the main ideologue of genocidal Ukrainian fascism (Dmytro Dontsov) and the founder of the fascist Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (Yevhen Konovalets)
Obolensky, who worked at Agrotrade before the 2022 Russian invasion
Before the corps reform, Obolensky commanded the Khartia brigade, which established a nationalist ideological department or “Khorunza service,” inspired by the Azov units, that uses the emblem of “Dontsov’s beast.” Khartia now promotes glorification of Stepan Bandera, the 1940s Ukrainian Insurgent Army, and even the pro-Nazi monarchist Pavlo Skoropadsky. Azov salutes and Azovite brands such as Company Group Team (CGT) are commonly seen in the Khartia brigade. For example, in a promotional video published this year by Khartia, and still pinned on the Facebook page of the 2nd NGU Corps, we can see soldiers making Azov salutes, a tank emblazoned with an emblem of the Wehrmacht, and someone wearing a CGT shirt who appears to be making a Nazi salute while riding another tank
There is another ugly side to the Khartia brigade, which has reportedly “developed a reputation as an elite brigade, making it highly desirable for foreign soldiers seeking opportunities to fight in Ukraine.” To hear it from members of the “Ukraine Foreign Legion” community on Reddit, dedicated to “news and information about joining foreign units in Ukraine,” Khartia is among “the worst” to join, at least for international volunteers
Adorable_Class_4733 (4 months ago): Khartiia is insane in the sane that just when you think it can’t possibly get any worse, it does. Nobody that has ever served in another unit and then came to Khartiia has ever liked it. I regret ever recruiting for this unit but I was naive and thought that maybe if I bring some good soldiers the problems would go away. They didn’t. Every person there with experience unanimously agree it’s the worst brigade they have ever seen. The battalion commanders either are completely dumb and retarded or intentionally lie to their soldiers saying the russians are all dead and they’re surrendering and that we cut off their logistics route and that you’re gonna be sent to clear trenches when you’re actually going on a suicide assault mission. … Khartiia is REALLY good at propaganda and hiding this shit, they had a camera crew following us 24/7, camera crew in the command centers, everywhere. But that’s it. They suck at everything else.
ATLAS_UA (4 months ago): I dont use reddit but i made an account just to write this. I fought in Ukraine on every front and this brigade is the worst it is the worst brigade I worked in. They said I will redo basic training when I came to this unit so I told them to fuck off and then they tried to send me on a mission one hour after with zero bullets or equipment. I agreed to go to the mission after a few days … I kept training for a while after this mission, really bad shitty training and then did another mission with a epileptic company commander who had a seizure in the middle of the mission after he slip in a mortar crater in nighttime. I guarantee you he bribed someone I don’t know why they made a epileptic guy company commander. and also everyone abuses drugs there. the platoon commander consumes drugs and alcohol all the time he is an alcoholic.
DonaFlotilde (1 week ago): I reactivated my account just to leave a comment here for whoever is still in doubt if they should join khartia, as i saw some posts asking about the unit … (forgive my english its not my first language) … khartia training is in the least mediocre, my training was literally how to run and how to shoot standing and kneeling, thats it, 1 month, doing this. … they call our group again, this time its an assault mission. Nice. sergeant, who is in ukraine for 5 months, says its an assault so we gonna stay there 5 days maximum, the vehicle will drop us 500m from assault point. … ended up walking 8km to position, we gotta stay in trench until we get green light. 13 days passed and we learn the fuckin assault point is 20 km away and we know theres no fuckin vehicles. they call us to advance. our guide gets lost he doesnt know how to use the FUCKIN COMPASS We walk 20km away to position, theres PLUS 4KM OF MINED OPEN FIELD TO REACH THE FIRST RUSSIAN POSITION AND A BUNCH OF FPV TRYING TO HIT US, AND OUR FUCKIN UNIT GAVE US 4 MAGAZINES, 2 GRENADES, AND ONE BOTTLE OF WATER FOR OUR WHOLE GROUP. WE HAD TO RUN, WE DISCOVER THAT THE ONE LINE OF ENEMY TRENCH IS ACTUALLY A RUSSIAN SECTOR WITH 4 LINES, 2 BMPS, AND I DONT EVEN KNOW HOW MANY FUVKIN SOLDIERS, SINCE WE MANAGED TO CLEAN ONLY THE FIRST POSITION. … [After the mission] they put me and another guy inside a a car, drive us to the woods and beat the shit out of us. they got pissed cuz of the report accuse us of treason and desertion cuz we didnt advance 2 weeks they hold our documents and cellphones. we never left the base we didnt advance cuz no fuckin ammo and no fuckin nothing.
FishAndChipsSalad (1 month ago): Just don’t! I’ve been contacted to 3 brigades and hands down Khartiia is the worst in every way. Everything from shoddy equipment, appalling command and reckless missions. I was unfortunate to suffer my worst injury in this sorry excuse for a unit and naturally received no compensation at all. On top of that you will be fighting alongside the Guajiro International Unit… These twats are often worse than the russian terrorists.
The Spanish-speaking Guajiro unit largely consists of right-wing Colombian soldiers who decided to fight in Ukraine instead of serve under the leftist president Gustavo Petro. “Perhaps hundreds of Colombians have passed through our brigade,” said a deputy battalion commander from Khartia, which claims that the Guajiro unit “undertakes extremely challenging combat missions.” They might have inspired the Azovite 3rd Assault Brigade (that now spearheads the 3rd Army Corps) to form a “Spanish Storm Company.” Earlier this year, members of Khartia even trained with the 3rd Assault Brigade
Khartia training with the 3rd Assault Brigade
In recent days, since Zelensky’s visit to the Donetsk region, the 2nd Khartia Corps of the National Guard hosted a delegation of NATO ambassadors from the United States, UK, Germany, France, Italy, Poland, the Netherlands, and Canada. Everyone seems to love the Khartia brigade: NATO, the historian Timothy Snyder, the artist Ai Weiwei, and even the “White Fuhrer” has said that it’s one of the best in Ukraine. But in my opinion, the most interesting thing about Khartia is the convergence of Banderite memory warriors and the “Azovization” of the Ukrainian armed forces—to be continued on my other Substack…
Ai Weiwei visiting the Khartia brigade in the summer of 2025
its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine, chronicle
chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia
deux jours après le 10e anniversaire de la débâcle politique et sécuritaire du 13 novembre 2015, une messe célèbre à Verdun l’ancien dirigeant fasciste de l’État français
Affiche de l’État français en 1943 (Bernard Villemot)
Cette mi-novembre 2025 est riche en évocations de l’Histoire de France, que j’appréhende du point de vue du peuple corse, armé de mes origines italienne et allemande.
Les études d’ADN ancien révèlent une forte continuité génétique entre les Gaulois de l’âge du fer et les Français modernes, qui clusterisent étroitement sur les analyses génomiques. Les apports germaniques ou romains ont été limités (5-10 %)
Insigne entre 1940 et 1944 de la Légion française des combattants, organisation vichyste d’anciens combattants (musée de Reims, 250 km au nord d’Alésia)
Et je me souviens que parmi mes ancêtres, en 52 avant Yeshoua ben Yosef, fantassins romains et cavaliers germains, côte à côte, écrasèrent à Alésia une armée gauloise cinq fois plus nombreuse. Cette information génétique pourrait être un indice, pour tenter de comprendre des causes ataviques, sinon congénitales, de la débâcle politique et sécuritaire que la France connut le 13 novembre 2015
(Pierre Terdjman / Paris Match)
Je ne m’habituerai jamais à la façon qu’ont les pinzuti de toujours ajouter des mensonges à leur perpétuelle mythologie nationale.
Immédiatement après les faits, quelques voix s’élevèrent pour questionner les échecs honteux des services de sûreté. L’opération terroriste fut un retour de bâton du soutien radicalisé de François Hollande à l’insurrection djihadiste de Syrie. En raison de l’incompétence des services de renseignement, de la Police nationale et de la Préfecture de police, le karma prit la forme d’un épouvantable massacre.
Mais en ce dixième anniversaire, les autorités occultent la réalité, afin de pouvoir célébrer l’unité nationale et les forces de l’ordre, dont elles ont un besoin vital dans le contexte social. Cette posture révolte la mouvance pétainiste (Rassemblement national, Les Républicains… etc), que je pense aujourd’hui majoritaire et qui voit le 10e anniversaire du 13 novembre 2015 comme une nouvelle opportunité d’exprimer son racisme et son islamophobie
le 22 mars 2025 (CGT)
Cette façon de faire des autorités rappelle la mythologie gaulliste, qui décréta en 1944 que la France aurait résisté, en réalité 30 000 personnes (Robert Paxton), quand grâce aux victoires de l’Union soviétique sur le front de l’est, des troupes anglo-états-uniennes purent débarquer en Normandie et libérer le pays. Cela se passait quatre ans après une autre débâcle, quand la France subit la plus spectaculaire et humiliante défaite militaire de l’Histoire de l’humanité
en janvier 1943 (Vsevolod Tarasevich)
À ce sujet, j’observai le 14 novembre la vidéo en Anglais que d’autres militants identitaires pro-Ukraine publièrent pour se réjouir de la messe prévue le lendemain à Verdun, en hommage à Philippe Pétain, dirigeant fasciste de l’État français entre 1940 et 1944
https://youtu.be/8m6HLbcfBJY
Le jour venu, la plupart des réactions sont encore et toujours biaisées. Le problème de Pétain n’est pas la trahison, pour laquelle il fut condamné en 1945. Du point de vue de l’État français en 1940 et de son immense soutien populaire, le traître était de Gaulle. Ni son antisémitisme, un détail de l’Histoire. Le problème est qu’il était fasciste. Et le fascisme pinzutu, ce sont les FAF (la France aux Français) qui en parlent le mieux.
republication of my article from November 13, 2022, three years ago, nothing has changed
(Pierre Terdjman / Paris Match)
The terrorist operation in Paris, on November 13, 2015, was collateral damage of the Western support to the so-called Syrian revolution, a Sunni radical uprising which began in 2011 and that worldwide jihadists reinforced, against a secular government in Syria
Al Nusra jihadists in Aleppo on October 17, 2013 (Medyan Dairieh / ZUMA)
In that Western proxy war against Russia, the local branch of al Qaeda, Jabhat al Nusra [Victory Front], was an objective ally, was doing a good job [Gulf and Western politicians]. An internal egos dispute triggered the split of the Iraqi branch of al Quaeda, wich became the Caliphate (ISIS) late June 2014, while already involved in Syria.
The new organization was more prejudicial to Western interests, but even in that case -John Kerry confessed it later during a private conversation- the US was regarding it as a leverage to oust Bashar Assad, did not counteract its expansion, until the Russian direct intervention late September 2015
Screenshot from a video in Mosul on July 4, 2014, when the new Caliph, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, appears for the first time
Among the Western leaders, François Hollande may have been the most fanatical against Syria, that France had occupied 26 years, until the independence in 1946. In August 2013, he attempted to convince Barack Obama to bomb the Syrian secular forces. The price will have been high: on November 13, 2015, the jihadists carried out in Paris a spectacular terrorist attack. The Caliphate managed the operation and al Nusra praised it
While attending a soccer game in the Stade de France, Saint Denis, François Hollande hears that France is under attack (Franck Fife / AFP)
The massacre lasted three hours, in a city which is yet numbering per capita twice more police officers than New York city. Nine jihadists killed 131 civilians; no police officer was injured. That toll was a sanction for incompetent intelligence and police services. The events were a kind of large scale Uvalde.
The director of the counter-intelligence agency was astonished when the prosecutor informed him of the terrorist operation. After a failed attack, with explosive vests but no assault rifle, at the gates of the suburban Stade de France, a second team shot bursts at cafés terraces in downtown Paris, rampaged along 5 km and during 20 minutes, without encountering a single cop. When it left freely the capital, a third team stormed the Bataclan, which was holding a gig. One cop, the exception to the rule, entered the theater on the footsteps of the terrorists and managed to kill one. Despite reinforcements, he was ordered to stand idle, until the assault of a specialized group, while victims were still shot or bleeding inside. That BRI (Brigade de recherche et d’intervention) neutralized the two other jihadists, one kill and one suicide… two hours and a half later.
As a former member of these agencies, I have written two articles, one in English and one in French. The first one is rather dealing with the Syrian context and the second is detailing the French debacle in the evening of that attack
Nazi militants in Lviv on April 28, 2013 (Yuriy Dyachyshyn / AFP)
History is shedding light on actuality; that is the interest of such post. When with the same fanaticism, the West is currently supporting in Ukraine, in a new proxy war against Russia, a Nazi deep State which is controlling the security services, the army and a nebula of Nazi paramilitary forces; when worldwide volunteers are often Nazi militants; when weapons that the West is sending there are spreading later on the black market, I think that the backlash may be cruel in Europe and even the US.
ce 11 novembre 2025 est l’occasion de souligner comme la façon dont l’Europe sacrifie les conscrits ukrainiens mobilisés de force rappelle le spectaculaire carnage de la 1ère guerre mondiale
Der Krieg, Otto Dix, 20 décembre 1916
Une guerre que la moindre bonne volonté occidentale aurait suffi à empêcher. Fomenté par la CIA et au bénéfice aussi de l’Union européenne, un coup d’État d’extrême-droite à Kiev en février 2014. Une guerre ethnique dans le Donbass, que les accords de Minsk auraient pu arrêter. Fallait il que l’Occident les respectât. Mais Allemagne et France en étaient hélas les garants. Après le déclenchement en 2022 de l’opération militaire spéciale russe pour la libération du Donbass, la démilitarisation et dénazification de l’Ukraine, Angela Merkel et François Hollande avouèrent que l’Occident concevait ces accords comme une escroquerie, pour donner à l’OTAN le temps d’armer l’Ukraine.
Une implacable stratégie russe d’attrition écrase l’armée atlantiste, malgré le ruissellement d’armes et munitions occidentales, dont une longue liste de vaines Wundervergeltungswaffen : HIMARS, Panzerkampfwagen, Patriot, F-16 et j’en passe. Les bénéfices de l’industrie militaire des États-unis sont proportionnels à la stupidité technocratique de Bruxelles. Ce sont aujourd’hui les contribuables européens qui paient l’addition. Justice.
Des conscrits ukrainiens mobilisés de force. Les réseaux sociaux en offrent les témoignages cruels et quotidiens. Des pertes militaires qui approchent les 2 millions de tués. Des as russes de l’informatique en ont apporté les preuves. De l’ordre des sacrifices consentis par la Russie, multipliés par 10.
Moscou dit et répète depuis juin 2024 que le retrait des troupes atlantistes des positions qu’elles occupent encore dans le Donbass suffirait à instaurer un cessez-le-feu. Mais rien n’y fait. Ursula vonder Leyen et son caniche Emmanuel Macron en tête, les Européens s’enferment dans le fantasme de remporter une victoire stratégique quand leur défaite est totale, s’appliquent depuis février à saper les initiatives de Donald Trump.
107 ans après un guerre absurde -bourgeois impérialistes contre bourgeois impérialistes- qui resterait une farce si elle n’avait fait quelques 19 millions de morts ; 80 ans après la seule victoire qui méritait d’être remportée, celle de l’Union soviétique sur les armées fascistes européennes ; le Vieux continent est ravagé par une épidémie de russophrénie. La victoire de l’Occident serait toujours à portée au Donbass et pourtant, ce serait maintenant pour sauver l’Europe, ses valeurs et la civilisation d’une invasion imminente que le conscrit ukrainien devrait continuer de se faire hacher avec discipline.
En réalité, mis à part les cabots et adeptes impotents des plateaux de chaînes dites d’information, c’est parmi les volontaires nazis partis affronter les hordes néo-bolcheviques asiatiques que les discours délirants des politiciens européens trouvent un véritable écho.
Cinq siècles d’hégémonie révolue : colonialisme, fascisme, guerres mondiales, néo-colonialisme et jardinage [Josep Borrell]. Quand est ce que l’Europe, cette vieille catin, paiera enfin le juste prix de ses crimes ?
chronique alphabétique et nécrologique de l’engagement français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas
chronique en Anglais, its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine
Leaked files show top UK military figures conspired to carry out the Kerch bridge bombing, covertly train “Gladio”-style stay-behind forces in Ukraine, and groom the British public for a drop in living standards caused by the proxy war against Russia
entre l’haleine fétide d’une vieille droite pétainiste qui s’insurge contre une chanteuse d’origine malienne, d’une part, la vulgarité et la vanité, d’autre part, d’un spectacle de drag queens qui se pense à tort l’antithèse des pétainistes, semble échappé d’un backroom gay de la ville devenue musée, égaré dans une cérémonie d’ouverture de jeux olympiques […]
« Poutine n’est qu’un gamin capricieux », voilà donc l’explication du conflit en Ukraine que désormais, on nous sert pour tenter de commencer à gérer la défaite militaire et politique qui se profile pour l’Occident.
Chacun à son poste !
Chacun est à son poste. Sur les réseaux on a les bricolos, aux CV désertiques mais spécialistes autoproclamés, on se demande bien de quoi. Qui vous affirment que pas du tout, Prokorsk n’est pas encerclé. Que sous les coups des drones ukrainiens l’industrie pétrolière russe est à genoux avec des queues de 1000 km devant les stations-service. Qu’avec les tomahawks (?) ça va pas s’arranger. Que l’armée russe a perdu au minimum 10 millions d’hommes. L’un de ces « spécialistes » n’hésitant pas à nous expliquer qu’il a eu un pote de l’armée ukrainienne au téléphone et que celui-ci lui a dit qu’il tuait 200 Russes par jour, sans une égratignure pour lui. Si c’est pas une preuve ça ! Dans cette catégorie des guignols, on n’hésitera pas à ranger le ministre des Affaires étrangères de la République française qui, complètement halluciné, nous annonce l’effondrement politique, économique, militaire imminent de la Russie.
Sur les chaînes d’info la cohorte habituelle des tapins continue à radoter ses inepties, en s’efforçant d’y ajouter un maximum de confusion pour tenter de masquer le désastre qui s’annonce. Malgré ces inflexions, force est de constater que la constance dans la désinformation est assortie désormais d’une forme de désenchantement.
Mais on voit désormais monter au front de la guerre de communication des gens ayant une certaine crédibilité médiatique. Un mélange de véritables spécialistes et d’imposteurs dont le vernis est parfois difficile à craqueler. Face à l’inéluctable, ils remplissent une mission particulière. Avec eux, pas de puces de machine à laver, pas d’assaut avec des pelles, pas de chars russes en plastique envoyé au combat, là c’est du sérieux. Donc ils sont chargés de vendre un récit concernant l’origine du conflit et les suites prévisibles de la défaite occidentale en Ukraine. La question de la responsabilité de cette guerre fait l’objet y compris en Occident d’un débat furieux depuis l’origine.
Les réalistes, parmi lesquels on pourrait placer Donald Trump, considèrent que ce conflit est le fruit d’une provocation occidentale ayant poussé la Russie à bout. Élargissement de l’OTAN et coup d’État américain du Maïdan, accompagné de la guerre civile infligée aux russophones de l’Est ukrainien, tous ces éléments ayant abouti à l’intervention russe. Dont l’objectif premier était d’imposer à l’Ukraine un certain nombre de contraintes permettant d’assurer sa neutralité. Au passage on notera que cet objectif était atteint sans perte territoriale avec « le Traité d’Istanbul » accepté par Kiev dans un premier temps.
De l’autre côté les tenants de la thèse portée par Joe Biden le prédécesseur de Donald Trump qualifiant le conflit de : « agression militaire non provoquée de l’Ukraine par la Russie ». Position des pays occidentaux, qui ont proposé au régime de Kiev de jouer le rôle du proxy militaire pour lancer contre la Russie une guerre globale visant à son effondrement économique, à y provoquer un changement politique, pour aboutir ensuite à son démantèlement en tant qu’État unitaire. C’est ce qui explique l’intervention de Boris Johnson alors premier ministre de Grande-Bretagne pour empêcher l’application du « Traité d’Istanbul ». Le fait que cet infect personnage ait été corrompu pour le faire, n’empêche pas la réalité de cette motivation.
Caramba, encore raté !
On sait ce qu’il est advenu des prévisions de Bruno Lemaire, de l’inutilité du soutien financier et militaire d’une quarantaine de pays occidentaux, de l’ampleur de la tragédie imposée à l’Ukraine, mais le réel s’impose. La Russie est solide. Devenue la première puissance militaire du monde, elle est alliée avec la première puissance économique, et la planète constate le tournant historique que constitue la sortie de l’Histoire de « l’Occident collectif ». Joli bilan que les dirigeants occidentaux vont devoir assumer, et cela ne pourra pas se réaliser grâce a ces rodomontades militaires ineptes, dont les dirigeants européens, Macron en tête, se sont faits une spécialité. Alors, pour tous ces incapables et pour certains criminels comme Boris Johnson, il devient difficile d’assumer la contradiction qui les amène à affirmer que la Russie s’effondre mais qu’elle va nous envahir. Demain matin, nous dit d’ailleurs le chef d’état-major de l’Armée de terre descendues en treillis sur un plateau pour l’occasion. Plus personne ne peut donc soutenir que la Russie va s’effondrer. Alors pour justifier leur maintien au pouvoir, la mise en place de régimes autoritaires, la soumission ruineuse au maître américain, il faut prétendre aujourd’hui qu’il ne s’agit là que d’une posture défensive. De nos « démocraties », de nos « valeurs », voire de notre « civilisation »… Le problème étant qu’il faut quand même expliquer pourquoi la Russie veut nous envahir et pourquoi il est indispensable de conserver notre président 11 % à la tête de l’État.
Parmi ceux qui s’y collent on ne retiendra que deux petits exemples assez significatifs des volontaires qui se chargent monter front de la communication et de la propagande. L’un d’entre eux correspond au profil de l’expert en tout habitué des plateaux et dont on se demande d’où sort sa compétence. Et l’autre est un véritable diplomate professionnel pratiquant habituellement la nuance, mais qui l’abandonne au profit d’un récit mensonger.
Vladimir Vladimirovitch Poutine est un gamin capricieux et obtus
Darius Rochebin affichant comme d’habitude cet air niais qui lui est propre, a décidé d’inviter Alain Bauer, dont on se demande ce qu’il fout là. Pour lui demander pourquoi la Russie n’accepte pas le cessez-le-feu exigé par la fameuse « coalition des chihuahuas ». Alors Bauer, ancien chef franc-maçon, autoproclamé criminologue, charlatan à la probité notoirement approximative, vient nous expliquer que Vladimir Poutine n’est rien qu’un enfant capricieux. Dans une séquence absolument grotesque il affirme que le président russe poursuit la guerre pour récupérer le petit bout d’une ville du Donbass qui n’a aucun intérêt. Épicétou, un caprice. Un gamin ce Poutine. Mais dangereux gamin. Par ce qu’ensuite Bauer nous explique qu’après Donetsk, il va vouloir récupérer Kaliningrad. Incroyable ce Poutine ! Il veut récupérer quelque chose qui appartient déjà à la Russie. Avant ça s’appelait Kœnigsberg et c’est revenu aux russes après la deuxième guerre mondiale.
Bauer s’arrête là, mais on imagine qu’il aurait pu continuer sur cette voie royale : « vous vous rendez compte ce gamin capricieux de Poutine il va bientôt exiger que Moscou et Saint-Pétersbourg soient aussi en Russie. Où s’arrêtera-t-il ! »
Et naturellement Rochebin en bon journaliste, bardé de son ignorance crasse, ne pipe pas un mot devant cette énormité
Gérard Araud, c’est différent. Ancien ambassadeur de France, et quoique occidentaliste indécrottable, il lui arrive d’être critique et de ne pas relayer systématiquement la propagande du système. C’est pour cela qu’il est toujours intéressant de l’écouter. Mais le voilà qui patrouille sur les réseaux pour y apporter la bonne parole et nous servir la sentence suivante
Alors comme ça, la ligne rouge fixée par la Russie d’une adhésion de l’Ukraine à l’OTAN n’est qu’un prétexte bidon ? Désolé Excellence, mais vous vous foutez du monde. Au moment de la réunification allemande, les États-Unis s’étaient engagés à ne pas étendre l’OTAN vers l’est c’est-à-dire aux pays de l’ancienne Union soviétique et ceux de l’ancien glacis. Ça c’est pour le contexte. Mais de déclarations officielles des présidents américains (George w Bush, Joe Biden) en communiqués multiples tout aussi officiels de l’OTAN, en déclarations des dirigeants occidentaux selon lesquels « la Russie n’avait pas son mot à dire », en déclarations des dirigeants ukrainiens post Maïdan, c’est une véritable litanie de prises de position officielles qui établissent que la décision occidentale était prise. Ce fut d’ailleurs une des raisons du coup d’État organisé par la CIA en en Ukraine. L’exemple le plus amusant pour caractériser le mensonge de Monsieur Araud est « l’accord entre la France et l’Ukraine » qui, pourquoi se gêner, commence par les termes : « L’accord, d’une durée de 10 ans, est valable tant que l’Ukraine n’aura pas rejoint l’OTAN » (!!!). Cet accord est destiné à créer immédiatement des obligations entre l’Ukraine et la France du type de celles qui existent au sein de l’OTAN. Et ce sans attendre l’adhésion ! Dites-nous excellence, vous arrive-t-il de prendre connaissance des textes officiels du gouvernement dont vous dépendez ?
Alors si l’on comprend bien, pour l’un Poutine fait la guerre en Ukraine parce qu’il veut récupérer un petit quartier d’une ville sans intérêt et conquérir un territoire qui lui appartient déjà. Et pour l’autre, c’est pour s’opposer à l’adhésion de l’Ukraine à l’OTAN, alors qu’il n’en a jamais été question et qu’en vrai en Occident tout le monde s’en fout. En février 2022, on nous a expliqué que le président russe était un satrape oriental qui mangeait des petits-enfants. Désormais qu’il fait la guerre sans raison ou pour assouvir ses caprices.
Impressionnant de constater comment vouloir servilement relayer la propagande du système, implique nécessairement de prendre ses auditeurs pour des imbéciles [fin]
chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia
The Russo-Ukrainian War seems to have been engineered in a laboratory to frustrate people with repetition and analytic paralysis. Headlines appear to be circulating on a choreographed loop, all the way down to the place names. Kaja Kallas at the European Commission recently announced, without a hint of irony, that Europe’s new sanctions package – the 19th one – is the toughest yet. Ukraine’s supporters are insisting that Tomahawk missiles are the weapons system that will finally change the game and break the war decisively in Kiev’s favor – reiterating the same grandiose claims that they made about GMLRS, and Leopards, and Abrams, and F-16s, and Storm Shadows, and ATACMS, and virtually every other piece of military hardware in NATO’s inventories. On the ground, Russia is attacking settlements named Pokrovsk and Pokrovs’ke; it recently captured Toretsk and Tors’ke and is now attacking Torets’ke. The more things change, the more things stay the same.
The analytic frameworks applied to the war have also changed relatively little, buried and obfuscated by the nebulous concept of attrition. On the Ukrainian side, there is continued insistence that Russia is suffering exorbitant losses and straining under the pressure of Ukrainian deep strikes, while Ukrainian setbacks are blamed in large part on the failure of the United States to expand its largesse and give Ukraine everything it needs. Many pro-Russian lines of thinking mirror this and suppose that the AFU is on the verge of disintegration, while the Kremlin is accused of failing to “take the gloves off”, particularly in regards to the Ukrainian energy grid, Dnieper bridges, and dams.
The result is a very strange sort of war. This is an extraordinarily high-intensity ground war. Both armies remain in the field, holding hundreds of miles of continuous front after years of bloody fighting. Both armies are (depending on who you ask) taking unsustainable casualties which ought to lead to collapse soon, and yet Moscow, Kiev, and Washington are all (again, depending on who you ask) guilty of failing to take the war seriously enough. All of this is maddeningly repetitive, and one could be forgiven for tuning out entirely. Even the diplomatic tango between Trump, Zelensky, and Putin, after delivering a few entertaining moments, failed to really move the needle in any discernable direction.
Few would argue that the trajectory of the war changed in an obviously dramatic way in 2025, and it is important to avoid the worn out and clichéd language about “turning points” or “collapse” or any such silly thing. However, 2025 saw several shifts in the war, which will hardly ostentatious or dramatic, are nevertheless very important. 2025 has been the first year of the war in which Ukraine launched no ground offensives or proactive operations of its own. This fact is not only a hint at the threadbare state of Ukraine’s ground forces, but also a testament to the way Russian forces transformed “attrition” from a buzzword into a method of persistent pressure across a variety of axes this year.
In lieu of initiative on the ground, and facing a slow but relentless rollback of their defenses in the Donbas, the theory of Ukrainian victory has shifted in an unacknowledged but dramatic way. After years of insisting that it would achieve maximal territorial integrity – an outcome which would require the total and decisive defeat of Russia’s ground forces – Ukraine has reframed its path to victory mainly as a process of inflicting strategic costs on Russia that mount until the Kremlin agrees to a ceasefire. Consequentially, the debate about arming Ukraine has shifted from a conversation about armor and artillery – equipment useful for retaking lost territories – to a discussion about deep striking weapons like Tomahawks, which can be used to shoot at Russian oil refineries and energy infrastructure. In short, rather than move to prevent Russian from achieving immediate operational objectives in the Donbas, Ukraine and its sponsors are now seeking ways to make Russia pay a price such that victory on the ground is no longer worth it. It is unclear whether they have thought about what price Ukraine will pay in the exchange. Perhaps they do not care.
About Tomahawks
Notwithstanding Ukraine’s attempts to jumpstart indigenous production, it is inevitable that Ukrainian capabilities will be largely determined by the largesse of western sponsors. This aspect of the war took a sudden turn at the beginning of the October when fresh reporting began to circulate that Tomahawk missiles might be on the table for Ukraine. Tomahawks have always been on Ukraine’s wish list (given that the Ukrainian wish list as such consists of essentially all the military equipment in NATO’s combined inventories) but this was the first reporting that they might be under serious consideration.
As is frequently the case, the discussion spiraled away from realistic grounding, with some suggesting that the Tomahawk would be a “game changer” for Ukraine (where have we heard that before?) and the pro-Russian sphere dismissing it as an irrelevant distraction. There’s a tendency to focus on the quality of American weapons systems, casting them as either unrivaled technological marvels or overhyped and overpriced baubles, but this is generally not productive and largely irrelevant to the matter at hand. The Tomahawk, broadly speaking, is exactly as advertised, and provides proven and reliable strike capability at strategic depths in excess of 1,000 miles. In role, range, and payload it is essentially an analog to Russia’s Kalibr missiles (I am begging the enthusiasts to note the phrase “essentially an analog” rather than rake me over the coals over the different guidance systems and other technical minutia). Such a system will always be valuable and would obviously improve Ukraine’s deep strike capabilities.
The “problem” with Tomahawks does not relate to any “problem” with the missile itself, but with its availability and Ukraine’s technical capability to launch them. The Tomahawk is conventionally a ship-launched missile (there is no extant air-launched variant) with a few novel options for ground launch. Ukraine, obviously, would require ground launch systems, and the problem is that these systems are essentially brand new and available in very limited quantities: more importantly, American service branches are in the process of trying to build out these capabilities throughout the decade. Providing ground-launchable Tomahawks to Ukraine in any meaningful numbers would therefore essentially require the US Army and Marines to scrap their own force buildout plans.
There are two basic options for ground launching Tomahawks. One of these is the US Army’s MRC (Mid-Range Capability) Launcher, dubbed the Typhon. This is an enormous tractor-trailer launcher with four launch tubes, first delivered in 2023. It has an enormous footprint – so large, apparently, that the Army is already asking for a smaller replacement – and is intended to give the Army an organic fires component in the gap between the shorter range Precision Strike Missile and hypersonic systems (which do not yet exist). The critical fact is this: the Army intends to field a total of five Typhon batteries by 2028, of which two have been delivered so far. Each battery consists in turn of four launchers, implying that eight out of a planned twenty launchers have been delivered. Even more importantly, both of the currently operational batteries are already deployed, with one in the Philippines and one in Japan. These systems are being actively used in exercises and trials, including an exercise this summer in Australia
The Typhon system gives ground launch capability to the Tomahawk but brings a massive footprint
The situation with the Marine Corps’ launch system is quite similar, although the launch platforms themselves could not be more different. Unlike the lumbering Typhon tractor trailer, the Marines are fielding a significantly more lithe and compact LMSL system, with the tradeoff of a single launch tube compared to the Typhon’s four. What matters is not so much the technical differences, as the fact that the Marines – like the Army – only received their first deliveries in 2023, and they are currently in the process of building out the force. In the case of the marines, the goal is to have a Tomahawk battalion built out by 2030. In fact, the production contract came into effect as recently as 2025.
What does all of that mean? It means that, although the Tomahawk itself is a fine missile, the systems for ground launch are so new and available in such limited quantities that equipping Ukraine with Tomahawks would require either the US Army or the Marines to materially alter their force structure in the near term (through 2030, essentially). These are essentially the opposite of much of the gear that’s been given to Ukraine to this point: far from being inventories of older systems that can be earmarked as surplus or tabbed for replacement, Tomahawk ground launch is a brand new capability that is in the middle of deployment and buildout for the first time.
This is, of course, a layered complication on top of Tomahawk quantities in and of themselves. The issue of Tomahawk availability is both over and under emphasized, depending on the context. The United States has something like 4,000 Tomahawks in its inventories (although half of these are currently inside their cells on American ships), so it is not quite correct to say (as some have) that America is running out of these critical weapons. The issue is that production rates are relatively anemic (generally between 55 and 90 per year) and are fail to replenish the expenditure from even relatively brief strike campaigns, such as the repeated strikes on Yemen. Broadly speaking, then, the issue is not so much that the United States is in immediate danger of running out of Tomahawks, but that procurement schedules are so slow that even relatively minor expenditures can erase multiple years worth of deliveries.
It may be useful, then, to consider Tomahawks in comparison to the ATACMS missiles which have already been provided to Ukraine. Unlike the Tomahawk, the ATACMS is a system which has already been tabbed for replacement, with the Precision Strike Missile in the early phases of its rollout. ATACMS were also compatible with launch systems that Ukraine already had. In comparison to Tomahawks, then, ATACMS are both vastly more strategically expendable, produced in larger numbers, and easier to deploy. Despite all these points in their favor, the United States provided Ukraine with just 40 ATACMS. Even if the Army could be pressured into handing over one or two of its brand new Typhon launchers, it is difficult to imagine that more than few dozen Tomahawks could be spared for Ukraine: a token inventory far too small to wage a sustained strike campaign in the Russian heartland
Peace, Sponsored by Raytheon
Given that Tomahawks for Ukraine would be measured in the dozens, rather than the hundreds, it’s worth asking whether this could actually change anything for the AFU at the front. The answer is clearly no in the long run, but it would be unwise to dismiss the possibility that even a limited tranche of Tomahawks (let’s say 40 to 50 missiles) could help alleviate pressure on Ukrainian forces at the front, provided they were used appropriately. A short term boost to Ukrainian strike capabilities, if deployed against Russian rear areas, could force further dispersal and rationing of Russian assets and temporarily stall Russia’s emerging multi-axis offensive. This could defer the loss of key positions until early 2026. This presumes, however, that the Ukrainians would be content to use Tomahawks against operational targets. In reality, Ukraine can never seem to resist lobbing missiles at targets that have little bearing on the front, like the Kerch Bridge. Indeed, a failure to synergize strikes at depth with operations on the ground is a major reason why the ATACMS achieved so little.
On the other side of this equation, it is a common complaint from the Russian perspective that Moscow has done too little to “deter” the United States from empowering Ukraine’s strike campaign – both by directly providing munitions and supplying the planning, ISR, and guidance systems. This, however, rather misses the point. Russia has done nothing of note to deter the United States because both Moscow and Washington understand fully that there is essentially no appetite (on either side) for a direct confrontation. In the (sensible) absence of a willingness to strike back at NATO targets, there is really nothing Russia can do to deter beyond maintaining its own retaliatory capabilities. The issue is not that Russia has failed to actively deter, but that there is nothing they could do even if they wanted to.
The basic pattern here is well established. The United States has done what it can to backstop Ukrainian strike capabilities, but it has held them at a level where Ukraine’s damage output falls far short of decisive levels. So long as that is the case, Russia has clearly demonstrated that it will simply eat the punches and retaliate against *Ukraine*. Hence, when the United States helps Ukraine target Russian oil facilities, it is Ukraine that receives the reprisal, and it is Ukraine which has its natural gas production annihilated as the winter approaches. In a sense, neither side is really trying to deter the other at all. The United States has raised the cost of this war for Russia, but not enough to create any real pressure for Moscow to end the conflict; in response, Russia punishes Ukraine, which is something the United States does not really care about. The result is a sort of geostrategic Picture of Dorian Gray, where the United States vicariously inflicts cathartic damage on Russia, but Ukraine accrues all the soul damage.
In the case of Tomahawks, the risk-reward calculus is just not there. Tomahawks are a strategically invaluable asset that the United States cannot afford to hand out like candy. Even if the launch systems could be provided (highly doubtful), the missiles could not be made available in sufficient quantities to make a difference. The range of the missiles, however, significantly raises the probability of miscalculation or uncontrolled escalation. Ukraine shooting American missiles at energy infrastructure in Belgorod or Rostov is one thing; shooting them at the Kremlin is another thing entirely.
There is, however, another aspect of this which seems to be garnering little attention. The biggest risk of sending Tomahawks is not that the Ukrainians will blow up the Kremlin and start World War Three. The bigger risk is that the Tomahawks are used, and Russia simply moves on after eating the strikes. Tomahawks are arguably one of the last – if not *the* last – rung in the escalation ladder for the USA. We have rapidly run through the chain of systems that can be given to the AFU, and little remains except a few strike systems like the Tomahawk or the JASSM. Ukraine has generally received everything it has asked for. In the case of Tomahawks, however, the United States is running the most serious risk of all: what if the Russians simply shoot down some of the missiles and eat the rest of the strikes? It’s immaterial whether the Tomahawks damage Russian powerplants or oil refineries. If Tomahawks are delivered and consumed without seriously jarring Russian nerves, the last escalatory card will have been played. If Russia perceives that America has reached the limits of its ability to raise the costs of the war for Russia, it undercuts the entire premise of negotiations. More simply put, Tomahawks are most valuable as an asset to threaten with.
Reading between the lines of President Trump’s public statements recently, it seems likely that he has rationally weighed these considerations. Publicly, he used the threat of Tomahawks to try and force Russia to keep negotiating, and he’s received a commitment for another meeting with Putin for his trouble (more on that later). He has now, for the time being, shelved the Tomahawk plan, commenting that “we need them” and applying the usual Trumpian linguistic style to the broadly accepted issue of inventories which I have outlined here. Tomahawks are simply more valuable to the United States as a tool to threaten escalation, rather than as an actual kinetic asset in Ukrainian hands, and so long as Trump keeps his powder dry he can re-raise the issue later.
Ultimately, perhaps, this discussion is not about Tomahawks at all. These missiles, rather, are simply a totem which demonstrate two important dovetailing points. First, that American resources are not infinite, and as the United States reaches deeper into its bag to help Ukraine, it begins to grab at strategically critical assets that the US military simply cannot spare. Secondly, we must remember that America’s policy in Ukraine is a game of titration, with Washington probing the limits of Russia’s willingness to “eat the strikes” without allowing the reprisal violence to spill out of Ukraine.
The Big Banana: Russia’s Operational Schema
At this point, it’s becoming increasingly difficult to say anything meaningful about the actual operational progression on the ground. There are several reasons for this. First and foremost, the war has now gone on so long and is consistently moving at such an apparently glacial pace that most people simply do not care at this point whether Russia holds Yampil or not, or whether they have advanced past the rail line in Pokrovsk. There is severe fatigue (or perhaps boredom is the better word) with the status of an interminable sequence of apparently small settlements, industrial complexes, and forestry plantations, and as a result most people have essentially checked out. Not the least among these must surely be President Trump, who apparently chucked Zelensky’s map of the frontline and complained that he was tired of being shown the same maps over and over again.
On the other hand, we have the true obsessives who continue to dutifully follow the frontlines regularly and are voluntarily intaking daily updates. We end up with a bifurcated system where some people are still highly plugged in to the micro movements on the battlefield, but most people just don’t care, and we can hardly blame the latter. I think it would be profitable, then, to think about the broader Russian operational scheme, what it has achieved, and what it aims to achieve in the coming year. This is probably more interesting and less repetitious than fixating on the exact positioning within Pokrovsk or Kupyansk.
There are two larger points that I think are worth making before we look at some specifics.
First and foremost, much of the battlefield analysis that comes out (particularly from western analysts) makes firm pronouncements as to what constitutes Russia’s “primary” and “secondary” efforts, but these are essentially interpolated and frequently incorrect. For example, it’s become a fairly mainstream conception that Russia’s “primary” point of effort right now is the capture of Pokrovsk, but this does not actually seem supported by Russian actions. There is no particular advantage to be gained for Russia by pushing to capture Pokrovsk as soon as possible – the city is already in a stranglehold partial encirclement. To be sure, Pokrovsk *was* a major logistic hub for Ukrainian forces, but it can no longer serve that role and was sterilized as a transit hub months ago, once it became a frontline city. The opposite side of this coin is that other Russian axes of advance, particularly in southern Donetsk and the bend of the Donets River, are dismissed as “secondary” efforts. This is a major mistake, and I will attempt to show that these are critical advances where Russia is shaping the battlefield to its advantage for follow on operations.
Secondly, it should be understood and appreciated that Ukraine has lost essentially all battlefield initiative. In 2024, the AFU was able to assembled a mechanized reserve and launch their operation into Kursk. This operation ultimately failed and resulted in severe Ukrainian losses, but this is unrelated to the fact that Ukraine was still able to accumulate forces and pursue offensive operations on its own initiative. In 2025, however, Ukraine has been in a permanent state of reactivity. This was the first year of the war in which Ukraine did not launch any proactive operations or counteroffensives of its own, and Ukrainian hopes have instead pivoted to their strategic strike campaign against Russian oil facilities.
In a larger sense, the effect of attrition can be seen year by year with the shrinking scope of Ukraine’s proactive operations. In 2022, Ukraine was able to launch a pair of widely separated offensives which yielded modest successes: an offensive out of Kharkov rolled the front back over the Oskil River (though it failed to collapse the Lugansk shoulder), meanwhile, a series of battles outside of Kherson failed to break through the Russian lines, but they did play a role in persuading the Russians to abandon their bridgehead over the Dnieper. The point of course is not to once again autopsy these offensives, but to point out that there were two of them, that they were meaningful in scale, and they did result in important territorial gains for Ukraine. In 2023, by contrast, Ukraine launched a single theater-level offensive in the south, which failed. In 2024, we got the Kursk operation: smaller and less lavishly equipped than 2023’s Zaoprizhia offensive, and aimed at a peripheral theater. This year, there were no proactive Ukrainian operations at all. There is a very clear pattern at play here, with Ukraine’s offensive punch progressively shrinking before disappearing entirely in 2025. This was a year of essentially uninterrupted Russian initiative
Putting Ukraine permanently on the backfoot is a significant Russian achievement, and it is owed to a few converging factors. Obviously, the attrition of Ukrainian forces is a major factor. We’ve gone through the flailing Ukrainian mobilization, the cannibalization of its forces, and the general lack of reserves in detail on several occasions, and there’s no need to retread that ground here. Suffice it to say, Ukraine’s ability to husband forces for offensive operations appears to be severely degraded. Russia has exacerbated this problem by pressing steadily on a variety of different axes. At the moment, there are no fewer than seven Russian axes of attack, pressuring a slew of cities all along the line. This creates a series of defensive emergencies, maintains the burn rate on Ukrainian forces, and fixes them on the line. Finally, in a point to be detailed shortly, Russian advances have begun unraveling Ukraine’s logistic connectivity, which puts strain on supply and prevents the concentration and accumulation of forces
Eastern Ukraine: Approximate Situation and Axes of Russian Advance
Now, for the development of the front and the premise of the Russian offensive scheme. The main point that I want to impress is essentially as follows: rather than fixating on Pokrovsk, Russia’s advances across Southern Donetsk and on the inner bend of the Donets River ought to be thought of as vital operations which have severely disrupted the coherence of both the Ukrainian front and their logistics. This has the triple effect of preventing the Ukrainians from launching offensives of their own, accelerating the attrition of Ukrainian forces, and shaping the front for the coming operation to capture the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration.
To begin, let’s consider the progress that Russia has made in southern Donetsk, both in raw territorial terms and its implications for Ukrainian logistic connectivity. To demonstrate this, I’ve pulled maps from DeepState (again, a Ukrainian mapping enterprise) for August 2023 (when Ukraine was attempting its counterattack out of Orikhiv) and for October 20th, the week of this writing. I have noted both the length of the southern front (obviously a linear approximate, as the actual front has many bends and bulges) and highlighted the key highways that Ukraine uses to run the backbone of its logistics
The Southern Front: 2023 vs 2025
Now, one thing that is worth noting is that the Russians are currently positioned to roll up this front even further. Ukrainian defensive lines are primarily oriented towards on a north-south axis. Once Russian forces cleared Kurakhove, they entered the seams in these defensive lines – that is to say, they are advancing laterally along the face of the prepared defenses, rather than trying to bash through them from the front. This is one reason why their progress has been relatively steady and uninterrupted. Now approaching the “elbow” in the lines, where they pivot southward, and having crossed the Yanchur River, the Russians are entering a substantial space that lacks meaningful prepared defenses. Using the Military Summary map (Ukrainian fortifications are mapped with yellow dots), the void in the defense is fairly obvious as the Russians work their way into the elbow of the line
Apart from the obvious development of note here – that Russian forces have, to this point, rolled up roughly half the length of the southern front and are positioned to roll up another ten to fifteen miles – we want to note two things which are emblematic of the way the war is going for Ukraine, but curiously receive little attention. First, the compression of the front is robbing the Ukrainians of the maneuver space which made it possible for them to stage and assemble forces for their counteroffensive in 2023. Two years ago, there was a wide, lateral buffer zone around the Ukrainian staging area in Orikhiv, and Ukrainian forces had access to multiple highways where they could disperse forces in their marching columns and run their logistics.
Today, that buffer zone is gone, as is the easy access to several of the branch highways. The Russian advance, which started with the breakthrough at Ugledar and Kurakhove last year and which has now rolled up some 50 miles of front, has essentially sterilized Ukraine’s capacity to attack in the south, because they have neither the space nor the roads to safely accumulate forces here. It has also shattered the interconnectivity of Ukrainian logistics: rather than having several highways to shuttle troops and material to the east, Ukraine now has to support several disconnected logistic fronts with individual highways. More to the point, there is no longer a single Donetsk “front” to speak of, but rather a series of logistic fronts: one in the south, around Orikhiv, another at Pokrovsk, and the largest one in the Slovyansk Banana. These are lacking lateral connectivity to each other for the Ukrainians due to the wedges that the Russians have forced in the front, particularly in the south, funneling logistics and reinforcements down individuated corridors.
The bigger issue, however, lies farther north on the Pokrovsk and Donets axes, and in the way that they synergize. People who are focusing, to the exclusion of all else, on when and how Russia will capture Pokrovsk are failing to see the bigger picture, and indeed are not even trying to understand it.
The ultimate Russian operational objective (in this phase of the war, at least) is the belt of cities which runs in an arc from Slovyansk to Kostyantinivka, which I affectionately call “the Slovyansk Banana” due to its curved shape. A cursory look at the map shows us why the very operations that are being dismissed as secondary efforts are in fact critical axes of Russian effort which are shaping the battlefield for the attack on the Banana
There are two very important facts about the Banana, from the perspective of operational geography. The first is that, although the combined mass of the agglomeration is far larger than any of the urban areas that have been fought over to this point, the Banana is relatively difficult to defend because it sits on the floor of a river valley: the Kazennyi Torets flows through all the cities in the Banana before it flows into the Donets. Russian forces approaching the city from the southwest, the east, and the north will all be advancing along the high ground that overlooks the cities on the floor.
The second important fact about the Banana is that, despite its size, it is supported by just two highways which approach from the southwest and northwest respectively, funneling into the Banana like a wedge. Taking the northern highway/MSR (the E40 highway) as an example, we see that Russia’s operations inside the Donets bend are hardly secondary efforts: they are vital shaping operations linked to the integrity of the Banana. The E40 highway tracks the Donets bend very closely (it generally stays within five miles of the river. If the Russians sustain their progress north of the Donets and reach the river at Bogorodychne or Svyatogirsk, it will not only put E40 under persistent drone attack but also curl the defensive line behind the Banana, to say nothing of the enormous pressure on the Siversk salient.
On the Pokrovsk front as well, Russia’s progress is being misinterpreted. After their breakthrough at the end of the summer, Russian forces have consolidated the bulge north of Pokrovsk (despite weeks of Ukrainian counterattacks) and are steadily working their way towards Rais’ke and Sergiivka. This is not about Pokrovsk at all – reaching Rais’ke would put Russian forces directly in the backfield of Kostyantinivka, on the supply lines to the underside of the Banana.
I am not suggesting at all that Russian forces are on the verge of some great offensive surge that will carry them into the heart of the Banana instantly. However, there is a fairly well established Russian operational methodology in this war, which involves working their way methodically into Ukraine’s logistical lanes and seams, segmenting the front and strangulating their strongpoints, forcing them to supply frontline strongholds with single file logistics and dirt roads. They did it in Bakhmut, and Avdiivka, they are doing it in Pokrovsk, and they are shaping the front to attempt this on a large scale in the Banana
Assault on the Banana: Coming 2026
The general point that we are trying to make here is that dismissing Russian advances in the Serebryanka Forest, the emerging bulge north of Pokrovsk, and their move into the Donets Bend as “secondary efforts” is mistaken. Zooming out to the appropriate scale shows that these are concentric operations, shaping the front for a 2026 assault on the Banana – moving towards the E40 road from the north, bending the defensive shield around Siversk, and working into the underbelly of the Banana through Rais’ke.
This is, perhaps, a long way to go for a short drink of water, but there are a few basic points here that get completely missed when the view of the front is preoccupied with the fighting inside Pokrovsk and Kupyansk:
Russia’s advance out of Kurakhove across the southern front is not a secondary axis. They have rolled up half of the southern front, condensing Ukrainian forces into a compact space which sterilizes their ability to attack in the south.
Broad Russian pressure across a half-dozen axes maintained a steady burn rate on Ukrainian forces and prevented the accumulation of forces for proactive operations. 2025 has been the first year of the war in which Ukraine has not launched any offensive operations on its own initiative.
Advances in the Donets bend and the interstitial space between Pokrovsk and Kostyantinivka are not subsidiary or secondary operations: they are critical shaping operations that are moving concentrically toward the Banana.
To be frank, the general mood of optimism in the Ukrainian infosphere, which lasted for much of the summer, struck me as remarkably odd. The frontline has yielded no real good news for Ukraine at any point this year. Beyond the broader strategic point, that Ukraine has lost the initiative and does not seem capable of getting it back, Russia is in the process of capturing two important urban centers (Russian troops are in the city centers of Pokrovsk and Kupyansk), it has begun the assault on at leas two more (Lyman and Kostyantinivka), it has rolled up half of the southern front, and cleared most of the inner Donets-Oskil bend. The Banana is on deck for 2026.
Ukraine’s Cost Theory of Victory
One thing that has become apparent over the last year is that Kiev has abandoned previous notions of outright victory on the battlefield and adopted a new strategic framework predicated on imposing unacceptable costs on Russia, so that Moscow will agree to freeze the conflict.
This is a subtle and unspoken yet extremely important distinction. It is easy to miss, because both Ukrainian leadership and Ukraine’s western backers continue to speak of Ukrainian “victory” and the possibility of Ukraine “winning” the war. What is crucial to understand is that the “victory” that they speak of now is categorically different than the victory of 2022 and 2023. In the first years of the war, it was possible to at least speak of Ukraine taking the initiative to advance on the ground and retake territory. There were concrete examples of Ukrainian offensives in 2022, and the battle in Zaporizhia – although unsuccessful – showed that it was at least possible for Ukraine to attempt a proper mechanized offensive.
Therefore, in the first years of the war, when leaders in Kiev and Brussels and London and Washington spoke of Ukrainian victory, they essentially meant the defeat of the Russian ground forces and the reconquest of much (or all) of the Donbas. The Kursk Operation of 2024 began to split the difference: Ukraine still had some resources to mount proactive operations, but these operations were no longer aimed at the dense eastern front and instead aimed at relatively soft subsidiary fronts with an eye to out-levering the Russians.
Today, with the Ukrainian army stuck in a permanent state of reactivity and slowly receding defense, it no longer makes any sense to speak of Ukrainian victory in the most straightforward sense, which is to say victory on the battlefield – no matter how tenaciously or bravely the Ukrainian rank and file continues to fight in essentially intolerable circumstances. Instead, Ukrainian “victory” has been transmogrified to mean essentially that Russia absorbs such exorbitant costs that it agrees to some sort of ceasefire without preconditions.
The costs to be imposed on Russia are implicitly assumed to be a mixture of battlefield casualties and damage to strategic assets inflicted by Ukrainian air strikes, and in regards to the latter Ukraine seems to be particularly placing its hopes in a strategic strike campaign against Russian oil. Ukraine’s attempts to disable Russian oil production and refining have dovetailed with ever more aggressive sanctions from the United States against Russian fossil fuel exports – although it is worth noting that the limited price response to these sanctions indicates that markets expect that Russian oil will continue to flow.
Trump’s suggestion that Tomahawks may be on the table for Ukraine must be seen as a constituent element of this new strategy and theory of victory. And this, ultimately, is very important to understand. Tomahawks are not being bandied about because anybody (in Kiev or Washington) believes that 50 cruise missiles will allow Ukraine to defeat the Russian Army and recapture the Donbas. Tomahawks were mentioned because the Ukrainian alliance is threatening to cripple the Russian fossil fuels industry (through a mixture of sanctions and kinetic strikes on production facilities) unless Putin agrees to a ceasefire.
This is why it is wrong to be surprised that Trump abruptly cancelled his meeting with Putin and instead announced more sanctions. There’s nothing abrupt or erratic about this. Threats to Russian oil are now, without exaggeration, the main lever that the Ukrainian bloc has against Russia. It certainly should not have been a surprise that the Kremlin, which has reiterated the same fundamental war aims since day one, was not excited about coming to Budapest to freeze the conflict, and neither should it surprise us that Trump would instead prefer to pull harder on the oil lever. The two powers are playing entirely different games: Russia is slow-walking negotiations while it advances on the ground, and the United States is playing a pain game designed to raise the costs for Russia
We have fundamentally reached an impasse when it comes to negotiations. For Moscow, negotiations with the United States are essentially a way to string Washington along. Moscow feels that it is winning on the ground, therefore a diplomatic impasse suits Russian interests. When western leadership complains that Russia does not seem interested in ending the war, they are correct, but they are missing the point. Russia is not interested in ending the war right now because doing so would not serve Russian interests. The Banana is in the crosshairs, and a ceasefire now would be an egregious compromise when victory on the ground is in sight.
The sense of urgency that Washington feels to end the war – mainly by yanking furiously on the oil lever until the Kremlin cries uncle – stems from the fact that this is now the only sort of victory that Ukraine can hope to win. The ground war has been written off as a total loss, and all that remains is to lob missiles and drones at Russian refineries, sanction Russian firms and banks, and harass shadow tankers until the costs become intolerable. The longer the Ukrainian ground forces can hold the line the better, but this is merely a matter of limiting the downside. The fact that Russia can retaliate disproportionately against Ukraine barely factors into this thinking.
The key point here, however, is that the concept of Ukrainian victory has been completely transformed. There is now no real discussion of how Ukraine can win on the ground. For the Ukrainian bloc, the war is no longer a contest against the Russian Army, but a more abstract contest against Russia’s willingness to incur strategic costs. Rather than preventing Russian capture of the Donbas, the west is testing how much Putin is willing to pay for it. If history is any guide, a game predicated on outlasting Russia’s strategic endurance and willingness to fight is a very bad game to play indeed [end]
Canada’s shameful refusal to acknowledge its support of the far right yesterday and today
Anti-Immigrant protesters engage in angry exchanges with counterprotesters at a Canada First rally in Toronto, Ontario, on September 13, 2025 (Michelle Mengsu / Getty Images)
Graham Platner’s problem is that he lives just a tad too far south. If the Democratic Senate candidate from Maine wanted to make all the hubbub about his Nazi tattoo go away, all he’d have to do is move to Canada.
The furor over Platner’s Totenkopf, or Death’s Head, tattoo stands in striking contrast to Canada, where both Nazi symbols and a shameful history of aiding Nazis is hushed over or, quite simply, blurred out.
The footage shows a burly Ukrainian military trainer discussing his country’s “shadow war” against Moscow. The interviewer is a veteran Western journalist. The video quality is excellent. The only problem is the giant red swastika tattoos emblazoned across the trainer’s arm.
After social media users began circulating stills with the swastikas, the Canadian Broadcast Corporation—the country’s government-owned media outlet—responded by blurring out the tattoos, sparing the readers the inconvenient truth that the man being presented as a hero fighting for a Canadian-backed military is a neo-Nazi. (In addition to the swastikas, he also has a winged odal rune popular with white supremacists.)
When reached for comment, a CBC spokesperson said, “The military trainer was provided to the reporter to speak generally about Russian tactics in Ukraine; we did not platform him, nor did we present him as a hero,” and pointed out that the network added a disclaimer that “a tattoo of an offensive symbol has been blurred.”
The CBC didn’t appear to be concerned that interviewing a man tattooed with neo-Nazi iconography is being legitimized—only that the “offensive” material is kept from the public.
This literally Orwellian action by Canada’s government media is indicative of the country’s relationship to both neo-Nazis and their World War II predecessors. The dark reality lurking beneath the placid demeanor of America’s northern neighbor is that Canada’s institutions have spent decades protecting fascists and sweeping evidence under the rug. Canada’s elites guard this bloodstained legacy to this day.
The CBC’s whitewashing a neo-Nazi isn’t an accident. The soldier being interviewed is in what the program describes as the “elite” 3rd Separate Assault Brigade. What the narrator omits is that the formation is led by Andriy Biletsky, Ukraine’s preeminent neo-Nazi who now has tens of thousands of men under his command. These men are trained, armed, and funded by the West. The CBC’s fawning profile says nothing about the unit’s neo-Nazi ties.
These omissions would be shameful in any country. But the situation is far more dire than this. Canada’s antisemitism is so ingrained, the nation is incapable of something as straightforward as condemning Nazis.
To examine Canada’s track record with the Third Reich is to enter a twisted world where following orders is a legitimate legal defense for participating in the Holocaust and SS fighters are portrayed as war victims. It’s a land where a street named for a German slaver isn’t considered problematic by the authorities and whose history of declassifying documents about harboring Nazis is worse than Argentina’s.
Canada’s history of going to bat for Holocaust perpetrators stretches back half a century. In 1967, Pierre Trudeau—a future prime minister as well as father of the recent prime minster Justin Trudeau—successfully opposed stripping the citizenship of a death squad leader responsible for murdering over 5,000 Jews. Three decades later, a Canadian court acquitted Hungarian collaborator Imre Finta, who had deported over 8,000 Jews to their deaths. The court deemed Finta’s plea of following orders an acceptable defense; it’s the only known such case in a Western nation.
Two years ago, Canada’s House of Commons shocked the world by giving a standing ovation to 98-year-old Yaroslav Hunka, a veteran of the Waffen-SS, the military wing of the Nazi Party and one of the main perpetrators of the Holocaust.
Hunka fought in the 14th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS (SS Galizien), a Ukrainian formation whose record of war crimes includes a 1943 massacre in which its subunits burned 500–1,000 Polish villagers alive.
Hunka was one of 2,000 SS Galizien soldiers welcomed to Canada after the war. Unlike other collaborators who kept a low profile in the New World, SS Galizien veterans felt comfortable enough to celebrate themselves by erecting monuments with Third Reich insignia and establishing scholarships in their honor. The University of Alberta, one of Canada’s largest institutes, had nearly a dozen endowments memorializing Hunka and his fellow SS men.
Images of Parliament enthusiastically applauding a Nazi soldier triggered international headlines and outraged the Canadian public. There were demands for UAlberta to eliminate its Nazi endowments. Then–Prime Minister Justin Trudeau ordered an inquiry into declassifying names of SS Galizien veterans admitted into Canada. For a moment, it seemed the country would face its dark past.
But within weeks, a fierce backlash to the Hunka affair revealed the astonishing extent of the bonds between Canada’s institutions and the Nazi collaborators they had so long protected.
Newspapers and even parliamentary testimony saw calls defending Hunka. The SS fighters were “in the wrong time at the wrong place,” averred a quote in one major outlet. All but one of UAlberta’s Nazi endowments remain. And after review, Ottawa refused to release the names of SS veterans welcomed into Canada, perversely citing privacy concerns: The same rationale used to protect children and sexual assault victims was invoked to hide names of Nazi collaborators. (By now, even Argentina has declassified its archives on sheltering Third Reich criminals.)
Canada’s elites have protected the original Nazis for the same reason Canadian media whitewashes their modern iteration in Ukraine: geopolitics. During the Cold War, Nazi collaborators were seen as a bulwark against Communism; as an additional benefit, the collaborators, eager for work and primed to hate anything that whiffed of socialism, were used to break the power of left-leaning unions.
The latest example of Canada’s callous indifference to Holocaust victims took place this summer, when I broke the news of a London, Ontario, street named for German industrialist Max Brose, who had been awarded the title Wehrwirtschaftsführer, or industry leader, by the Third Reich. Brose’s company, a fixture of Hitler’s military apparatus, used slaves, including prisoners of war.
London’s Max Brose Drive is the only known eponym to a Nazi Party member in the entire British Commonwealth, which includes Canada, Australia, and the UK, among other nations. Despite this and despite calls by the Simon Wiesenthal Center’s Canadian branch, a city representative confirmed that Brose’s street isn’t being considered for renaming.
Whether it’s bloodstained fascists of last century or their modern iteration, Canada’s response is inaction, denial, and the occasional well-placed blur. It’s an insult to the over 45,000 Canadians who gave their lives to prevent Nazi tributes erected on Canadian soil and the latest indication of erosion of basic standards in Western media [end]
Ottawa won’t disclose list of alleged war criminals believed to have sheltered here after the Second World War
September 29, 2023: Nazigate – Max Blumenthal & Aaron Mate, The Grayzone
Max Blumenthal and Aaron Mate cover the international scandal that unfolded when the Liberal Party of Canada’s Justin Trudeau honored a Ukrainian Nazi veteran of the Waffen-SS, and the dark history it forced to the surface
its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine, chronicle
chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia
Les références aux années 1930 se multiplient. La dégénérescence de la démocratie américaine semble nous ramener à celle de la république allemande de Weimar. Trump, par sa jouissance dans la violence et le mensonge, par l’exercice du mal, irrésistiblement nous ramène à Hitler. En Europe, la montée de mouvements catégorisés comme d’extrême-droite nous oblige à ce retour sur notre histoire.
Les sociétés occidentales ne ressemblent pourtant plus guère à ce qu’elles furent dans les années 1930. Elles sont vieillies, de consommation, tertiaires, les femmes y sont émancipées, le développement personnel y a remplacé l’adhésion partisane. Quel rapport avec les sociétés des années trente : jeunes, frugales, industrielles, ouvrières, masculines, encartées ? C’est cet éloignement socio-historique qui m’avait conduit à considérer jusqu’à ce jour comme a priori invalide le parallèle entre les « extrême-droites » du présent et celles du passé. Mais les doctrines politiques existent, aujourd’hui comme hier, et l’on ne peut se contenter de postuler l’impossibilité, par exemple, d’un nazisme de vieux, d’un franquisme de consommateurs, d’un fascisme de femmes libérées ou d’un LGBTisme Croix-de-Feu.
Le moment est venu de comparer les doctrines de notre présent à celles des années trente. Voici l’esquisse de ce que pourrait être l’étude comparative de cinq phénomènes historiques : l’hitlérisme, le trumpisme, le netanyahi(u)sme, le lepénisme. J’ajouterai en fin de parcours, brièvement, le macronisme. L’extrémisme centriste et européiste qui mène la France au chaos nous oblige à cet examen. Cet extrémisme est-il si centriste que ça ?
Il s’agira d’une approche impressionniste, sans prétention à l’exhaustivité ou même à la cohérence, dont le but est d’ouvrir des pistes, non de conclure. Je force les traits et les couleurs pour placer les concepts les uns par rapport aux autres. J’exagère à dessein, pour rattraper ou même anticiper une histoire qui s’accélère. Approche expressionniste serait peut-être une métaphore plus appropriée.
Commençons par la dimension générale du racisme ou de la xénophobie.
Le rejet d’un « autre » défini comme extérieur à la communauté nationale, avec des niveaux d’intensité très variables, est commun à l’hitlérisme, au trumpisme et au lepénisme. Dans le cas de l’hitlérisme et du trumpisme, c’est la notion de racisme, explicite ou implicite, qui est commune. Les Juifs étaient considérés par le nazisme comme constituant une race, au sens biologique. Les Noirs, ces cibles à peine cachées du parti républicain trumpisé, sont eux aussi définis biologiquement. Au lepénisme, en revanche, nous ne pouvons associer que le concept de xénophobie. Arabes ou Musulmans sont définis par leur culture. L’une des caractéristiques de l’obsession française de l’immigration reste sa fixation sur l’Islam et son incapacité à cibler les Noirs, dont l’arrivée massive pourtant est l’élément nouveau du processus migratoire. Le taux de mariages mixtes des femmes noires est très élevé en France, il reste insignifiant aux Etats-Unis.
Un trait commun aux « populismes » occidentaux est bien sûr leur refus de l’immigration : Reform UK, les Sverigedemokraterna (Démocrates de Suède), l’AfD, Viktor Orban en Hongrie, Droit et Justice en Pologne, Giorgia Meloni en Italie, passent, comme Trump ou le Pen, le test de ce dénominateur commun. Suffit-il à les définir comme d’extrême-droite, au sens où le nazisme et le fascisme étaient d’extrême-droite ? Je ne pense pas. Une différence capitale oppose le populisme d’aujourd’hui à l’extrême-droite de type hitlérien ou mussolinien : le nazisme et le fascisme était expansionnistes, avec pour but la projection vers l’extérieur de la puissance du peuple allemand (aryen) ou italien (romain). Ils étaient agressifs, nationalistes, conquérants. Ils s’appuyaient sur des partis de masse. On imagine mal les populistes actuels organiser des parades de style Nuremberg. Les apéritifs saucisson-pinard du RN sont certes antimusulmans mais, quand même, moins impressionnants que les cérémonies guerrières hitlériennes. De Nuremberg à Hénin-Beaumont ? Vraiment ?
Le seul populisme occidental qui passerait aujourd’hui à 100% le test de l’expansionnisme serait celui de Netanyahu. Colonies de Cisjordanie, génocide de Gaza : établir un lien entre hitlérisme et netanyah(u)isme – est inévitable.
Les xénophobies française, britannique, suédoise, finlandaise, polonaise, hongroise, italienne sont, à l’opposé du nazisme et du fascisme, défensives. Nous n’avons pas affaire à des peuples qui veulent conquérir mais à des peuples qui veulent rester maîtres chez eux. C’est pourquoi la dimension culturelle l’emporte aujourd’hui en Europe sur la notion raciale et pourquoi on ne peut parler ici que de xénophobie. Cette xénophobie est conservatrice, là où le racisme hitlérien était révolutionnaire parce qu’il bouleversait l’organisation sociale. La notion de nationalisme ne s’applique donc pas aux populismes européens actuels, la notion d’extrême-droite non plus, ou alors nous devrons introduire des oxymores comme « nationalisme modéré » et « extrême-droite modérée ». Je préfère parler de conservatisme populaire.
Personnellement favorable à une immigration contrôlée, je dois admettre la légitimité de cette xénophobie parce que j’accepte l’axiome qu’un groupe humain porteur d’une culture, conscient d’exister en tant que collectivité, bref un peuple, a le droit de vouloir continuer à exister. Concrètement : un peuple peut contrôler ses frontières. Le nazisme, avec ses soldats installés de l’Atlantique à la Volga pour y asservir ou y exterminer d’autres peuples était tout à fait autre chose.
Le trumpisme représente une forme mixte parce qu’il combine un élément central défensif, anti-immigration, à un fort potentiel d’agression du monde extérieur. Il ne s’agit pas à proprement parler d’expansionnisme. C’est l’expansion antérieure de l’appareil militaire américain et le rôle du dollar dans la prédation impériale qui ont rendu possibles les actes trumpiens violents dirigés contre d’autres peuples et nations : le Vénézuéla, l’Iran, nous, les peuples sujets européens de l’Ouest, et bien sûr les Arabes, avec les Palestiniens comme cible principale. L’intégration progressive d’Israël à l’Empire, à partir de 1967, fait qu’en 2025 on ne peut plus guère distinguer le trumpisme du netanyahisme. Mais Trump, au-delà de ses pitreries de nobélisable, est bien le coupable en chef du génocide de Gaza par ses encouragements de longue durée à la violence d’Israël : ce fait si simple fait tomber le trumpisme du côté de l’hitlérisme. Trump est toujours au volant : coups d’accélérateurs et coups de frein américains régulent l’agressivité génocidaire de Netanyahu. J’ai de la chance : au moment où j’écris, Trump, effrayé par la réaction des pays arabes au raid israélien sur le Qatar, et notamment par l’alliance stratégique entre l’Arabie saoudite et le Pakistan, recule. Il ordonne à Netanyahu de s‘excuser pour le bombardement au Qatar et celui-ci s’exécute. Trump impose à Israël un accord avec le Hamas et Netanyahu signe. Ensuite ? Trump est un pervers, impossible de dire.
Le concept de trumpo-netanyahisme, assez laid je l’admets, permet de cerner la question juive comme point commun à la crise américaine des années 2000-2035 et à la crise allemande des années 1920-1945.
La posture pro-Israël radicale du trumpisme masque selon moi un antisémitisme viscéral et vicieux : l’identification de tous les Juifs au netanyahisme, phénomène historique effectivement monstrueux, chancre dans l’histoire juive, n’aboutira qu’à renouveler la conception nazie d’un peuple juif monstrueux. Je parle ici d’antisémitisme 2.0.
Je suis conscient que peu de lecteurs me suivront sur ce point. Mais je ne fais ici que parler comme un banal prophète de l’Ancien testament. « Nous n’avons pas étés choisis pour être du côté des puissants. L’histoire n’en finit pas de nous tendre ce piège ». Combien de fois les Juifs se sont crus sauvés par les forts, par les puissants, par le pouvoir, par un empire, désignés même par un privilège – le succès financier, intellectuel, l’importance dans le parti bolchévique – pour être finalement jetés en pâture à des peuples furieux… Mon cœur saigne quand je vois tant de Juifs français, qui se croient aujourd’hui du côté du manche, justifier la politique de Netanyahu. Mais ce sont bien les mâchoires d’un piège qui sont en train de s’ouvrir. Par la grâce de Trump, la planète entière devient antisémite. Les Juifs américains, dont la majorité refuse la ligne Netanyahu, sont plus sages et plus justes. Mais, déjà, les Juifs hostiles à Netanyahu, universitaires ou non, sont soupçonnés par le pouvoir d’être antisémites. La perversité règne. Le trumpisme règne.
A quand la fermeture du piège ? Un jour, inévitablement les nations chrétiennes feront leur paix avec 1,6 milliards de musulmans. Les Juifs seront alors abandonnés par leurs fans et, désormais seuls, jetés en pâture à d’autres peuples furieux.
Les terres promises se succèdent, des désastres les suivent. Nightfall, précoce nouvelle d’Isaac Asimov, ce très grand auteur de science-fiction américain, me semble une métaphore de la longue suite de drames qui constitue l’histoire juive : au sein d’une civilisation puissante, un reste de prophétie annonce une mystérieuse catastrophe… elle arrive, surprenante… la civilisation s’effondre… puis, lentement, elle renaît, elle s’épanouit… un reste de prophétie annonce une mystérieuse catastrophe… elle arrive, surprenante…
En vérité, le seul retour de l’obsession juive au cœur de l’Occident valide l’hypothèse d’une continuité menaçante entre le passé et le présent.
Protestantisme zombie et nazisme, protestantisme zéro et trumpisme
La crise économique de 1929 fut un facteur déterminant, fort bien connu, de l’hitlérisation de l’Allemagne. 6 millions de chômeurs firent échapper la société allemande à toute force de rappel idéologique. La liquidation du chômage par Hitler en quelques mois scella le destin du libéralisme.
Le contexte religieux de l’ascension du nazisme, tout aussi important, est moins familier : entre 1870 et 1930, la foi protestante s’évanouit en Allemagne, d’abord dans le monde ouvrier, puis dans les classes moyennes et supérieures. Les régions catholiques résistèrent. En 1932 et 1933, la carte du vote nazi put donc reproduire, avec une exactitude fascinante, celle du luthéranisme. Le protestantisme ne croyait pas en l’égalité des hommes. Il y avait les élus, désignés comme tels par l’Éternel avant même leur naissance, et les damnés. La croyance métaphysique protestante une fois disparue, ce qui en resta fut l’hystérisation par la peur du vide de son contenu inégalitaire, avec les Juifs, les Slaves et tant d’autres comme damnés. Aux États-Unis, le protestantisme d’origine calviniste cibla les Noirs. Le peuple calviniste, fixé sur la Bible, s’identifiait aux Hébreux, ce qui borna l’antisémitisme américain des années trente et mis les Juifs à l’abri. Enfin… à l’abri jusqu’à l’émergence récente de la fixation évangéliste sur l’état d’Israël.
Dans la France catholique, (dans le Bassin parisien et sur la façade méditerranéenne particulièrement), l’effondrement de la foi et de la pratique firent à partir de 1730 muter l’égalité des chances d’accès au paradis (obtenue par le baptême, qui lave du péché originel) en égalité des citoyens et en émancipation des Juifs. L’idée républicaine d’homme universel remplaça celle du chrétien universel catholique (katholikos signifie universel en grec). Un tout autre programme que le nazisme mais qui avait représenté, bien avant lui, le premier remplacement massif d’une religion par une idéologie. Dans la France révolutionnaire comme dans l’Allemagne nazie, toutefois, le potentiel d’encadrement social et moral de la religion avait survécu à la croyance : l’individu restait membre de sa nation, de sa classe, porteur d’une éthique du travail et du sentiment d’obligations envers les membres du groupe. La capacité d’action collective était forte, décuplée peut-être. C’est ce que j’appelle stade zombie de la religion. Le nazisme correspondait à ce stade zombie, d’où, malheureusement, son efficacité économique et militaire.
Je pourrais compléter cette explication religieuse de l’idéologie par une explication de la religion elle-même, influencée par les structures familiales sous-jacentes, inégalitaires en Allemagne et égalitaires dans le Bassin parisien. Mais on peut se contenter ici d’une continuité du protestantisme au nazisme et du catholicisme à la Révolution française.
Nous retrouvons du protestantisme dans le trumpisme. Nous trouvons alors l’inégalité associée à la négrophobie. Nous ne sommes plus toutefois au stade zombie de la religion mais à son stade zéro. La moralité commune a disparu. L’efficacité sociale a disparu. L’individu flotte, particulièrement en cette Amérique de structure familiale nucléaire absolue, individualiste et sans règle d’héritage bien définie. C’est donc à autre chose qu’il faut s’attendre comme idéologie trumpiste : l’inégalité toujours, mais moins de stabilité dans le délire, des oscillations brutales qui ne proviennent pas, fondamentalement, du cerveau d’un président vulgaire et vicieux mais de la société elle-même. La capacité d’action collective, économique et militaire est, heureusement pour nous, très diminuée.
Notons dans le cas du trumpisme l’émergence de formes pseudo religieuse nihilistes qui incluent une réinterprétation obscène de la Bible, telle une glorification des riches. Nettement plus faible que le nazisme dans la dimension du racisme, le trumpisme va plus loin dans l’immoralité économique.
Le nazisme était simplement et explicitement antichrétien. Le trumpisme se veut religieux mais à la manière d’un culte satanique, par l’inversion des valeurs. Le mal c’est le bien, l’injustice c’est la justice. Hitler n’était que le Führer, guide du peuple allemand vers son martyr ; Trump n’est pas Satan mais je soupçonne que pour ses fans satanistes sa casquette rouge est celle de l’Antéchrist.
Dans le cas du lepénisme, aucun héritage inégalitaire protestant. C’est là le véritable mystère du Rassemblement National : xénophobe, il est né en terre catholique. Pire encore, ses premières zones de force, sur la façade méditerranéenne et dans le bassin parisien, furent celle de la Révolution : égalitaire sur le plan familial et déchristianisées dès le dix-huitième siècle. Alors ? Inégalitaire le Rassemblement National ? Égalitaire ? Mystère pour nous, le RN l’est probablement aussi pour lui-même. Son rejet de l’autre résulte d’un égalitarisme pervers qui exige une assimilation rapide des immigrés plutôt qu’il ne les ressent comme différents en essence. Surtout, le RN, fortement déterminé par le rejet des immigrés, et même de leurs enfants, n’en est pas moins sans cesse rappelé à la tradition égalitaire française parce que ses électeurs détestent les ultrariches, les puissants, bref nos élites imbéciles, et pas seulement les immigrés. C’est pourquoi l’union des droites peine à aboutir en France. Sous une forme ou sous une autre, l’union des oligarques et du peuple (blanc) contre l’étranger ne pose de problèmes ni aux États-Unis, ni au Royaume-Uni, ni en Scandinavie, où forces populaires conservatrices et forces de la droite classique s’entendent facilement. En France, la coalition des riches et des pauvres contre l’étranger se dérobe.
Ne sous-estimons pas toutefois la violence potentielle d’une xénophobie d’essence universaliste. Elle peut tout à fait devenir racisme. Si un homme pense a priori que les hommes sont partout les mêmes et qu’il se trouve confronté à des hommes porteurs de coutumes différentes, il peut très bien en conclure qu’ils ne sont pas des hommes.
Le RN est le produit d’un catholicisme zéro, comme la Révolution le fut d’un catholicisme zombie. C’est pourquoi il n’accouchera d’aucun projet collectif. Je renvoie l’examen détaillé du RN et de son rapport à l’avenir à un prochain texte, ni impressionniste, ni expressionniste, que je consacrerai tout entier à la logique interne et à la dynamique du chaos français.
Psychiatrie des classes moyennes supérieures
J’en viens maintenant à une différence capitale, qui devrait être évidente pour tous et rappelée par les commentateurs politiques qui nous renvoient sans cesse à 1930 par leur vocabulaire. Comprendre la dimension religieuse, ou post-religieuse, de l’hitlérisme, du trumpisme ou du lepénisme, présupposait des connaissances historiques qu’on ne peut exiger des politologues de plateau TV. En revanche, nous pouvons exiger d’eux qu’ils sachent situer socialement les idéologies du passé et du présent, qu’ils rapprochent sans relâche par le terme d’extrême-droite. La différence entre passé et présent est ici très claire.
Le nazisme et les mouvements d’extrême-droite d’avant-guerre trouvaient leur épicentre social dans les classes moyennes et particulièrement moyennes supérieures, menacées par le mouvement ouvrier, social-démocrate ou communiste. Ces classes moyennes étaient fébriles, fort occupées à enfermer leurs femmes et à persécuter les homosexuels. Aujourd’hui, les mouvements dits d’extrême-droite trouvent, à l’opposé, leur épicentre dans les milieux populaires, particulièrement dans un monde ouvrier appauvri, ébranlé ou détruit par la globalisation économique, menacé par l’immigration. Les classes moyennes d’aujourd’hui, largement définies par l’éducation supérieure, sont moins ou même faiblement touchées par « l’extrême droite ». Les classes moyennes supérieures, qui combinent éducation supérieure et revenus élevés, sont particulièrement immunes.
C’est pour cette raison que je préfère parler de conservatisme populaire plutôt que d’extrême droite. Son ancrage dans le groupe des dominés explique le caractère défensif du conservatisme populaire. Son électeur ne s’imagine pas conquérant de l’Europe ou du monde s’il pense sa propre vie comme une survie.
La vraie erreur intellectuelle serait de s’en tenir là. Continuons d’avancer, renversons même la problématique de l’association entre idéologie et classe. Nous avons comparé les idéologies du présent à celles du passé, comparons maintenant les classes du présent à celles du passé.
Certaines classes moyennes européennes de l’entre-deux-guerres entrèrent en folie. Le monde ouvrier fut plus raisonnable. Mais les classes moyennes d’aujourd’hui, particulièrement moyennes supérieures, sont-elles raisonnables ? Sont-elles pacifiques ? Quels sont leurs rêves ?
Ils sont fous. La construction d’une Europe post-nationale est un projet d’halluciné quand on connait la diversité du continent. Il a mené à l’expansion de Union européenne, bricolée et instable, dans l’ancien espace soviétique. L’UE est désormais russophobe, belliciste, avec une agressivité renouvelée par sa défaite économique face à la Russie. L’UE tente d’entraîner les peuples britannique, français, allemand et tant d’autres dans une vraie guerre. Mais quelle guerre étrange ce serait, dans laquelle les élites occidentales auraient adopté le rêve hitlérien de détruire la Russie !
La comparaison par les classes sociales nous permet donc une percée intellectuelle majeure. L’européisme, et donc le macronisme, tombent, par leur agressivité extérieure, du côté du nationalisme, du côté de l’extrême-droite d’avant-guerre. Si nous ajoutons les entorses à la liberté de l’information et à l’expression du suffrage populaire, entorses de plus en plus massives et systématiques dans l’espace UE, nous nous rapprochons plus encore de la notion d’extrême-droite. Fondé comme association de démocraties libérales, l’Europe mute en espace d’extrême droite. Oui, la comparaison avec les années trente est utile, indispensable même.
Nous retrouvons dans le grandiose projet européiste une dimension psychopathologique déjà observable dans l’hitlérisme : la paranoïa. La paranoïa européiste se concentre sur la Russie. Celle des nazis faisait de la menace juive une priorité, sans toutefois négliger le bolchévisme russe (dit judéo-bolchévisme).
Aujourd’hui comme hier nous pouvons donc analyser une psychopathologie des classes dirigeantes européennes. La séquence bizarre amorcée par l’élection de Trump, avec la volonté du président instable de discuter avec Poutine, nous a permis de suivre en direct la sortie de réalité de nos dirigeants à nous. Résumons notre processus délirant. Il a commencé vers 2014, avant, pendant et après Maidan, ce coup d’état qui a désintégré l’Ukraine, coup téléguidé par des stratèges américains et allemands. La suite maintenant :
2014-2022 : Provoquons la Russie qui avait averti qu’elle ne tolérerait pas l’annexion de l’Ukraine par l’Union européenne et l’Otan.
C’est fait. Poutine a envahi l’Ukraine.
2022-2025 : Perdons la guerre économique qui en a résulté pour nous.
C’est fait.Nos sociétés implosent.
2022-2025 : Perdons la guerre au sens strict menée pour notre compte par le régime de Kiev.
C’est en cours.
Le basculement des gouvernements européens dans une réalité parallèle commence en 2025.
Tirons de notre défaite l’idée que nous pouvons enfin imposer notre volonté et installer nos troupes en Ukraine, pour annexer à l’UE ce qui en restera. Mais comment ne pas penser à Hitler enfermé dans son bunker en 1945, pour y donner des ordres à des armées qui n’existent plus.
Nous avons aujourd’hui en Europe affaire à des fous, ou plutôt à une folie collective qui a saisi en masse les individus des milieux sociaux dominants. Rien qu’en France, des milliers de journalistes, d’hommes politiques, d’universitaires, de chefs d’entreprises, de hauts-fonctionnaires, participent à l’hallucination collective d’une Russie qui voudrait conquérir l’Europe (paranoïa). Tel ou tel individu ne saurait être tenu pour personnellement responsable. Nous avons affaire à une dynamique psychique collective.
Je suis convaincu que la diminution de l’individu né de l’état zéro de la religion explique la naissance de ces bancs de poissons russophobes.
Ainsi que je l’ai expliqué dans Les Luttes de classes en France au XXIème siècle, la disparition des croyances collectives – croyances religieuses puis croyances idéologiques de l’état religieux zombie – a conduit à un affaissement du surmoi humain. Au contraire des militants de la libération du moi, je ne définis pas le surmoi comme seulement ou même principalement répressif. Le surmoi, en tant qu’idéal du moi, ancre dans la personne des valeurs morales et sociales positives. Les notions d’honneur, de courage, de justice, d’honnêteté trouvent leur origine et leur force dans le surmoi. S’il s’affaiblit, elles s’affaiblissent. S’il disparaît, elles disparaissent. L’homme n’a donc pas été au final libéré par la fin de la religion et des idéologies mais au contraire diminué. Ce sont des hommes et des femmes fort éduqués mais rétrécis moralement et intellectuellement par l’état zéro de la religion qui sont, en masse, porteurs de la pathologie russophobe.
Les antisémites nazis avaient une tout autre constitution psychique. La mort de Dieu, pour parler comme Nietzsche, les avait certes lancés dans la quête d’un Führer mais ils n’étaient guère en déficit de surmoi et restaient capables d’action collective. Les tragiques performances de l’armée allemande durant la deuxième guerre mondiale en témoignent. Qui oserait imaginer aujourd’hui nos classes moyennes supérieures courant à la mort, à la tête de leurs peuples, vers Kiev et Kharkov ? Notre guerre d’Ukraine est pour rire, produit de l’émancipation du moi, fille du développement personnel. Seuls des Ukrainiens et des Russes mourront.
A moins que…
Les échanges thermonucléaires peuvent se passer de héros.
it was not easy to imagine, before the performance of Donald Trump in Israel and the meeting in Sharm El Sheikh, a more spectacular illustration of the repugnant political and social object that the Western world and its last auxiliaries are constituting today. Such depravity is calling for the most total destruction
Even leaders from the far-right Alternative for Germany party, which opposes aid to Ukraine, have embraced the jobs that come with new weapons production
Pour l’ancien premier ministre, se taire face à l’horreur de la situation dans l’enclave palestinienne n’est plus possible, le silence serait une forme de complicité. Chacun a le devoir d’agir et de nommer le crime en cours, affirme-t-il dans une tribune au « Monde »
chronique alphabétique et nécrologique de l’engagement français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas