Analista senior di l'intelligenza in u campu di a gestione di i risichi di sicurezza, sò un anzianu tenente detective è ufficiale di l'intelligenza in l'agenzie di u Statu francese. A bona pronuncia hè Николай Чинкуини, in russu
80 years later, Germany is still on the side of racism, supremacism, inequity, war crime, mass killing and genocide
The picture at right is taken at the Brandenburger Tor, Berlin, in the evening of October 7, 2024 (social networks)
On October 7, 2024, at the first anniversary ceremony of Hamas raid from the Palestinian ghetto of Gaza, Israel prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu states
We are the Eternal People. A people which is fighting to bring light to this world, which is aspiring to spread good and eradicate evil
Adolf Hitler added on March 30, 1942
This is a war of extermination
On May 2, 1945, Yevgeny Khaldei takes that photo at the Brandenburger Tor, after the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany
Abstract: This study analyses the nature and extent of involvement by neo-Nazi and other far-right Ukrainian organisations in the Donbas war (2014-2022) and the Odesa massacre (2014). This issue is highly politicised with contrasting narratives. The Russian and Donbas separatist governments, as well as their media, have contended that Ukraine has been a Nazi or neo-Nazi regime since a fascist coup took place in 2014, while Ukrainian and Western governments and media have maintained that such elements in the Ukrainian far-right were marginal, trivial, even non-existent. The article interrogates the historical record with primary sources in the three most relevant languages—Ukrainian, Russian, and English. The investigation reveals crucial far-right involvement in both the early stages of the war in Donbas and the Odesa massacre. Although the percentage of far-right supporters and fighters in Ukraine was relatively small, they exercised disproportionate influence in the country due to their greater reliance on violence and armed formations. The Russian government, however, exaggerated the role of the neo-Nazis in Ukraine to publicly justify the illegal invasion in February 2022.
Introduction
This study analyses the nature and extent of involvement by neo-Nazi and other far-right Ukrainian organisations during both the Donbas war from its start in April 2014 until the Russian invasion in February 2022 and the Odesa massacre on 2 May 2014. Other than the Maidan massacre in February 2014, these were the most significant and contested cases of political violence in Ukraine from its independence in 1991 to the commencement of the Russia-Ukraine war on 24 February 2022.1 The role of far-right Ukrainian groups during these major episodes of political violence is controversial because they are beset by duelling, self-serving narratives. Russian President Vladimir Putin has claimed that the principal goal of the invasion is to “denazify” Ukraine.2 But well before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, there have been several overt and covert Russian military interventions here, including the annexation of the Crimean peninsula and direct support for pro-Russian insurgencies in the Donbas region, particularly in August 2014 and February 2015. Following the overthrow of the pro-Russian Ukrainian government in February 2014, the United States and other Western governments have consistently opposed Russia’s interventions and backed the current central government of Ukraine. In addition to political support, financial and military assistance has been provided, including training during the Obama presidency.3 To justify this support, the US and other Western governments disputed any real power or even the existence of neo-Nazi armed formations in Ukraine or claimed that they abandoned their far-right elements. Understanding the contested issue of far-right involvement in the Donbas war (2014-2022) and the Odesa massacre (2014) is valuable not only for elucidating intrinsically important historical episodes of political violence but also due to the contemporary relevance given the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war.
This article proceeds in five sections. The first section highlights the contribution of our study by describing the weakness of the extant academic literature and our methodological approach to filling in important lacunae in the research landscape. The second section details the duelling of contemporary narratives over the political violence by the far-right in the war in Donbas and in the Odesa massacre. The third and fourth sections develop qualitative case studies with process tracing to illuminate the role of the far-right in the Donbas war and the Odesa massacre. The fifth section presents the conclusion.
Developing the Extant Literature
Research on the far-right in Ukraine since the Euromaidan has been spotty. Studies on neo-Nazi and other far-right organisations in Ukraine following the Euromaidan have been limited in quantity, quality, and scope. Most studies have been produced by researchers outside academe in partisan think tanks or non-government organisations, as well as by journalists who did not subject their work to peer review.4 Such assessments are more likely to be politically driven and less likely to exhibit methodological rigour, even professionalism. For example, Anton Shekhovtsov, the former leader of the Crimean branch of the pro-Russian far-right Eurasian Youth Union, likened the Trade Union building arson attack during the Odesa massacre on 2 May 2014, to his killing of Colorado potato beetles by collecting them in a box and burning them alive. He directly inferred that this was a massacre with far-right involvement but omitted this in his publications.5 Other works have relied on narrow metrics such as the vote-share of far-right parties in Ukraine, without assessing the violence itself in terms of the perpetrators and effects.6 Some researchers have claimed that the presence of Russian speakers in the Azov regiment and other neo-Nazi-led armed formations is evidence of their relative tolerance and asserted that the Azov regiment had moderated by abandoning its far-right roots.7 Such analyses have tended to uncritically rely on Ukrainian and Western government narratives, accepting their claims at face value.
By contrast, other studies suggest a greater degree of far-right involvement in Ukrainian political violence. One quantitative study found that far-right groups in Ukraine, such as Svoboda and Right Sector, fielded the most violent perpetrators and committed the lion’s share of attacks.8 That study is restricted temporally, however, to the 2014 Maidan protests, which led to the violent overthrow of the relatively pro-Russian government and ultimately spiralled into the civil war in Donbas, the Russian annexation of Crimea, and Russian military interventions in these regions of Ukraine.9 Similarly, qualitative studies have presented evidence in the form of videos, eyewitness testimonies, confessions, and forensic examinations of Svoboda and Right Sector involvement in the Maidan massacre.10 Some other studies have focused on specific aspects of the far-right paramilitary and other armed formations during the war in Donbas.11 One academic publication is specifically devoted to the Odesa massacre, which is called “The Odesa Tragedy,” though it concentrates on the public perceptions rather than the perpetrators and their consequences.12 This list of prior works is intended to be illustrative rather than exhaustive. The research landscape around these issues is growing, but uneven in scope and reliability; a lacuna remains in the literature in terms of evaluating rigorously, comprehensively, and dispassionately the nature and extent of far-right involvement in the Donbas war and Odesa massacre, which matters in terms of our understanding of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and political violence more generally.
To elucidate this understudied topic of the far-right in Ukraine, this study makes substantial use of primary source materials in Ukrainian and Russian—the main languages in Ukraine—as well as in English. This linguistic capability is conducive to a more nuanced, accurate assessment. Methodologically, the two case studies employ qualitative process tracing with the benefit of fluency in all three languages.13 The substantive focus and period of analysis are both tightly bounded; the role of the far-right on the Russian side and in the Russia-Ukraine war since February 2022, as well as during the Euromaidan, are weighty topics explored in our other works but fall outside the scope of this study.
The term “far-right” denotes ultranationalists and both racial and ethnic supremacists in accordance with prior scholarship.14 The term “neo-Nazi” refers to far-right organisations that revamp elements of Nazi ideology, particularly its racial and ethnic supremacism, and use symbols associated with Nazi Germany or their stylised versions. As with Nazis, neo-Nazi organisations represent a form of fascism. Major neo-Nazi organisations in Ukraine during the time period covered by this study include the Social-National Assembly, its paramilitary wing Patriot of Ukraine, the National Corps, the White Hammer, and C14. Also included in the analysis are paramilitary and other armed formations organised and led formally or informally by these neo-Nazi organisations, such as the Azov battalion and regiment. Admittedly, militant groups are known to exhibit ideological heterogeneity.15 Within the political violence literature, a burgeoning area of research emphasises that members of the rank-and-file may be motivated by a variety of factors that diverge from the leadership, leading to a principal-agent problem.16 In this study, we classify organisations as neo-Nazi, or at least neo-Nazi-led, when commanders are neo-Nazi, even if not all members can be presumed to share this exact ideology.
A prominent example is Andriy Biletsky, the leader of Patriot of Ukraine and the Social-National Assembly (SNA), both of which were transformed along with the Azov battalion and regiment veterans into the National Corps Party in 2016. He called the ideology of Patriot of Ukraine and SNA “Social Nationalism.” In a collection of his articles published in 2013, he described that social nationalism, as the name suggests, combines elements of ultranationalism of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists with elements of national socialism and called both radical nationalism and national socialism “great ideas.” He wrote that social nationalism is based on “Sociality, Racism, and Great Power.”17 Specifically, it is based on the ideas that the “white race” is “superior” to other races and is the foundation of the Aryan Ukrainian nation; the Ukrainian nation is a “blood-racial community”; and that “the historical mission of our Nation (…) is to head and lead the White Peoples of the world in the last crusade for their existence, a march against the Semitic-led subhumans.”18 Biletsky openly made antisemitic and racist statements, such as his claim that the Jew is “an economic and political parasite.” He saw “a serious clash of native European peoples with foreign colonisers, mainly of African and Muslim origin” and believed that “an ethnic civil war can be won by the native Europeans only under the banner of the New Right National Revolutions.”19
Biletsky was called the “White Leader” and his writings were published by both SNA and Patriot of Ukraine. He was the first commander of the Azov battalion, which was organised and led by Patriot of Ukraine and SNA in May 2014. Patriot of Ukraine, SNA, and the Azov battalion all used a symbol resembling a stylised swastika and Wolfsangel. Azov commanders and their historian, who himself serves in Azov, called the symbol the “Idea of the Nation” and claimed that it is an ancient Ukrainian symbol, even though it was created in 1992 for the Social National Party of Ukraine (SNPU). The creator of this symbol acknowledged that it was called “Idea of the Nation” to represent the radical nationalist ideas of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). He also admitted that SNPU deliberately chose this symbol with the Latin letter N, instead of the equivalent Ukrainian Cyrillic letter, fully aware of its resemblance to Nazi symbols and association with the swastika for many Ukrainians, in particular in Lviv. As with other extremist groups that rebrand out of political expedience, the Social National Party of Ukraine changed its name to Svoboda in 2014, because the Nazi association was politically inconvenient.20 However, this symbol was retained by the SNA and by Patriot of Ukraine, whose Kharkiv branch split from SNPU because of these changes.21 The Azov battalion and its propaganda magazine, which was named Black Sun, also used the Black Sun symbol, an ideological symbol used by Nazis and various neo-Nazi organisations. In addition, groups and individuals—including Patriot of Ukraine, SNA, National Corps, and Azov battalion and regiment leaders, commanders, and members—have displayed on their uniforms various neo-Nazi and Nazi symbols, such as the swastika, the SS sign, and 88 (Heil Hitler code). These, along with Hitler images, Nazi flags, and Totenkopf have also been seen in the form of patches, photographs, flags, and tattoos.
Although the term far-right incorporates both ultranationalist and neo-Nazi organisations, they are not ideologically identical despite their frequent overlap. This study empirically investigates the role of Ukrainian ultra-nationalist organisations such as Svoboda, the Right Sector, the Ukrainian National Assembly–Ukrainian People’s Self-Defence (UNA-UNSO), and Bratstvo; neo-Nazi organisations such as the Social-National Assembly, Patriot of Ukraine, the White Hammer, and C14; and various other paramilitary formations, special police forces, and National Guard units organised and controlled to various extents by them. These armed units include the Azov battalion and regiment, Dnipro, Donbas, Aidar, Sich, Carpathian Sich, OUN, and St. Mary’s battalions, and the Ukrainian Volunteer Corps. To assess these actors, this study analysed thousands of Russian and Ukrainian primary sources: online recordings of live broadcasts, videos of the armed conflict in Donbas and Odesa, and information posted on websites and social media by far-right organisations, their armed units, and activists. It also analysed media reports in Ukrainian, Russian, and English from diverse outlets such as Ukrainska pravda, Strana, BBC, The Guardian, The Washington Post, The New York Times, YouTube, Telegram, V Kontakte, Facebook, and Twitter. To mitigate bias, the authors analysed the primary source materials rather than relying on secondary interpretations.
The Conflicting Narratives
Assessments of the far-right in Ukraine have been wracked by self-serving and thus unreliable perspectives. Russian and separatist leaders, as well as the media, have described the post-Maidan violence in Ukraine, especially in Donbas and Odesa, as perpetrated by “fascists” and “Nazis” akin to genocidal massacres against Jews, Belarusians, Russians, and Ukrainians during the Holocaust and World War Two.22 They often called the Odesa massacre the “Odesa Khatyn,” a reference to the large-scale massacre of Belarusian villagers in 1943 by the Nazis and an auxiliary police battalion, which was based on a paramilitary formation of the Melnyk faction of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists. Based on this narrative, President Putin and his allies have claimed that invading Ukraine is not only justified, but “inevitable” to counter the “Nazi” or “Neo-Nazi regime” in Kyiv.23 Putin and his government thus declared the “de-Nazification” of Ukraine as a key goal of “the special military operation” launched in February 2022.24 This perspective—in its entirety—is widely assailed in the West.25
By contrast, the Ukrainian and Western governments and the media tend to claim that the far-right—including neo-Nazis—is marginal, even non-existent in Ukraine.26 They argue that since Euromaidan, Ukrainian fighters have almost entirely—if not entirely—shed their far-right elements, particularly neo-Nazi. To this end, it is a common point that the Azov Battalion ceased to be led by the neo-Nazi Patriot of Ukraine, a paramilitary wing of the SNA, since integrating into the National Guard as one of its regiments. Kyiv has stressed that the integration of Azov in November 2014 is proof of its transition to moderation and the absence of extremist fighters post-Maidan.27 Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky awarded “Hero of Ukraine” titles in 2022 to prominent Azov leaders such as regiment commander Denys Prokopenko, deputy commander Sviatoslav Palamar, and senior officer Oleh Khomenko.28 After the commencement of the Russia-Ukraine war in February 2022, many Western media outlets, politicians, government officials, and academics adopted this stance that Azov and other controversial Ukrainian fighters on the far-right had not only abandoned extremist elements, but were heroes against Russia’s illegal invasion.29
The Indexing Theory of political communications emphasises that Western media follow narratives of its governments in covering foreign conflicts, including in post-communist countries.30 In some cases, Western media may have taken their cues directly from the Ukrainian government. After the Odesa massacre on 2 May 2014, the Foreign Ministry of Ukraine blamed the arson attack on provocateurs that were “paid generously by the Russian special services”, and the New York Times immediately adopted the same line that pro-Russia groups may have been responsible for torching the building.31 The Western narrative of the far-right in Ukraine since the Euromaidan is not without controversy. Volodymyr Ishchenko, a Ukrainian sociologist who specialises in the far-right in Ukraine, concludes: “The dominant narrative since Maidan in Ukrainian and much of the Western public spheres has been systematically downplaying the problem” by arguing that “the Ukrainian far-right” is “small and marginal.” He stated that “often, the far-right is just ignored.”32
Notably, Western concerns over far-right fighters in Ukraine were more prevalent before the February 2022 invasion. For example, The Nation described Azov in 2018 as “pro-Nazi, as evidenced by its regalia, slogans, and programmatic statements.”33 In 2019, Radio Free Europe called Azov “far-right.”34 In 2020, The Guardian referred to Azov as a “neo-Nazi extremist movement.”35 Consistent with Indexing Theory, such coverage of the neo-Nazis in Ukraine before the February 2022 Russian invasion overlapped with similar expressions by Western governments. In its 2018 Human Rights report, the US State Department called the political wing of the Azov Regiment “a hate group.”36 In 2019, ambassadors from G7 countries warned against “extreme political movements in Ukraine, whose violent actions are worrying in themselves.” The warnings referred specifically to the Azov movement and its violence during the 2019 presidential elections.37 The US Congress has displayed longstanding ambivalence over its designation of Azov. In 2018, forty Congress members signed a letter to the State Department with the request to designate Azov as a terrorist organisation because of its links to terrorist attacks in multiple countries and its recruitment of neo-Nazis in its ranks.38 A defence appropriations bill amendment was adopted by the entire US Congress in 2018, which banned US government funding and training of the Azov regiment due to concerns over its neo-Nazi views and members. Such concerns had been expressed by American officials for several years after the Euromaidan. The amendment was first unanimously adopted by the US House of Representatives in 2015. Congressman John Conyers put it bluntly, “I am grateful that the House of Representatives unanimously passed my amendments last night to ensure that our military does not train members of the repulsive neo-Nazi Azov Battalion.”39 Under pressure from the Pentagon, however, Congress subsequently removed this first amendment. A similar amendment, proposing a ban on US military assistance to radical nationalist and neo-Nazi organisations, voluntary police, and paramilitary formations under their command, was blocked in Congress in 2014.40
In general, however, American and European governments have been careful not to issue public statements against the far-right in Ukraine or to call attention to it. This hesitancy began after the Euromaidan and became starker following the February 2022 Russian invasion. Indeed, Western governments and media increasingly whitewashed the empirical record to present the Ukrainian far-right formations as categorically moderate in order to boost international support. In June 2024, the US State Department stated that the Azov brigade was eligible to receive US weapons under the “Leahy Law” because it was cleared of human rights violations. It made this determination after claiming that the Azov brigade is a new unit that is not subject to the previous Congressional ban, even though in reality this brigade was created on the basis of the Azov regiment, celebrated the 10th anniversary of the Azov battalion creation as its own anniversary, and is led by original Azov battalion commanders.41 However, a subsequent amendment, which was included in the US defence bill which was passed by the US House of Representatives, specifically stated that “none of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available by this Act may be used to provide arms, training, intelligence, or other assistance to the Azov Battalion, the Third Separate Assault Brigade, or any successor organisation.”42
Such instrumental portrayals of allies are not limited to this conflict. Other recent cases of political violence have also featured public relations campaigns by governments and media to present allies as arguably more moderate than their history and contemporary ideology indicate. For example, in the Syrian war, anti-Assad jihadist organisations allied with the West were euphemistically referred to as “rebels,” sometimes “moderate” ones, even when they fought under the direction of a Foreign Terrorist Organisation, as designated by the US State Department.43 A large body of literature within terrorism studies has found that the labelling of violent perpetrators by governments and media is not value-neutral, but expedient to serve political agendas.44 Particularly in these controversial cases of political violence, academe can play an important role in interrogating the empirical record to adjudicate the truth.45
The Far-Right in the Donbas War
Research within the field of terrorism studies has repeatedly noted the difficulty of determining the ideological beliefs of participants in political violence.46 However, fine-grained knowledge of the organisations can substantially increase confidence. Svoboda and the main organisations that remained within the Right Sector after the Euromaidan were widely understood as far-right for maintaining ultra-nationalist and ethnically supremacist views. They openly described themselves as the natural successors of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), inspired by the notorious OUN leader and Nazi collaborator, Stepan Bandera.47 Along with the UNA-UNSO, these organisations used the “Glory to Ukraine! Glory to the Heroes!” slogan, the official greeting of the Bandera faction of the OUN (OUN-B). This greeting, along with a fascist-style hand salute, was modelled on greetings and salutes of other well-known fascist parties in European history, from the Nazi party in Germany to the Ustashe party in Croatia.48 The Right Sector also adopted its red and black flag from the OUN-B and the UPA, which symbolized Ukrainian blood and soil, which were also pervasive in Nazi ideology and flags.49 But the existence of these symbols alone offers weak evidence of far-right influence in the Donbas war without understanding the cultural and historical context.
The violent overthrow of the Viktor Yanukovych government by means of the Maidan massacre triggered the resurgence of separatism in Donbas.50 After his overthrow in February 2014, far-right parties and organisations in Ukraine expanded and organised their armed formations. Along with Ihor Kolomoisky, an oligarch who became the head of the Dnipropetrovsk regional administration, the Right Sector was instrumental in the formation of the Dnipro battalion in the spring of 2014.51 The Azov battalion, notorious for its use of neo-Nazi symbols in its official insignia, was also organised in the spring of 2014 and led by the SNA and the Patriot of Ukraine with the involvement of the Radical Party. As mentioned, “White Leader” Andrii Biletsky was the first commander of Azov.52 Based in Mariupol, the St. Mary’s battalion was formed in the fall of 2014 and led by the far-right Bratstvo party, which is described by its leader (Dmytro Korchynsky) as the “Christian Taliban.”53 Around this time, the Aidar battalion, nominally subordinated to the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, was formed by the Maidan Self-Defence. One of its platoons was led by the White Hammer, a neo-Nazi organisation belonging to the Right Sector during the Euromaidan. Ilia Kiva, a Right Sector member, was the commander of another volunteer police battalion. A previously convicted criminal with a swastika tattoo became the commander of the Tornado Company, a special police unit. He and seven other members of his company were arrested and convicted for various crimes in the warzone, such as torturing detainees. A Nazi-style flag with a swastika was found in their prison cell.54 These units were all under the formal jurisdiction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the National Guard, or the Ministry of Defence. From the start of their formation, they remained under de facto command of radical nationalist or neo-Nazi organisations. These armed formations sprouted up in the early stages of the conflict in Donbas and were stationed there in an attempt to suppress pro-Russian separatism in the region by force. The Right Sector and the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists actively organised various militia and paramilitary units that were not subordinate to the central government of Ukraine. The Volunteer Ukrainian Corps, the largest paramilitary formation, was formed and led by the Right Sector specifically for the war in Donbas, though it also included battalions in Western Ukraine.55
The paramilitary formations, special police, and National Guard units, organised and led by far-right organisations such as the Right Sector, the Social National Assembly, Patriot of Ukraine, Svoboda, C14, and Bratstvo, constituted a small minority of Ukrainian fighters in the Donbas. Based on reports, we estimate the number of members of radical nationalist and neo-Nazi organisations who served in various far right-led, regular, and other armed formations in the Donbas, at around five thousand. This estimate is conservative and represents just one percent of approximately 400,000 people who participated in this war on the side of the central government.56 Additional metrics of influence, however, are also important to consider.
Despite their relatively small numbers, far-right fighters exercised disproportionate influence in the Donbas civil war, particularly in the early stages before the first direct Russian military intervention in August 2014. Far-right Ukrainian groups proliferated after the Euromaidan because they were eager to fight and were responsible for a disproportionate level of violence, especially against civilians and prisoners of war in Mariupol and Krasnoarmiisk. Far-right organisations and far-right-linked battalions thus played a crucial role in escalating the armed conflict in the Donbas. Svoboda and C14, an avowedly neo-Nazi group affiliated with Svoboda until the summer of 2014, organised and led the Sich battalion from June 2014 onwards.57 Meanwhile, the Right Sector carried out a deadly attack on a separatist checkpoint in Sloviansk on 20 April 2014. While Ukrainian and Western media denied far-right involvement in these events, the evidence to the contrary includes business cards linked to far-right members found after the attack. As well, Ukrainian court proceedings revealed that the weapons used by the Right Sector checkpoint attackers were the same as the snipers from this group who killed and wounded police during the Maidan.58 And two years after the attack on the separatist checkpoint, Dmytro Yarosh—the leader of the Right Sector—admitted his personal involvement in thisattack.59 Oleksandr Turchynov, then acting president of Ukraine, and Kolomoisky’s deputy in the Dnipropetrovsk regional administration, reportedly orchestrated this Right Sector operation, aimed to seize and destroy a television transmitter near Sloviansk, several days after this area was seized by the Strelkov-led armed group of Russian nationalists and Ukrainian separatists.60 This attack by the Right Sector constituted a major escalation of the conflict in Donbas because it broke both the Geneva Agreement signed on 17 April 2014 by Ukraine, Russia, the EU, and the US for a peaceful resolution of the conflict, as well as the Orthodox Easter truce between the Ukrainian government and separatists in Donbas.
Far right-led armed formations were also behind many other violent attacks in the Donbas, further escalating the conflict into a civil war. Videos, media reports, and admissions from commanders and other members of the Azov and Dnipro battalions indicate that they participated in the storming of the district police headquarters in Mariupol on 9 May 2014. Approximately ten people, including at least one protester, were killed.61 Analysis of online video streams, media reports, and Ukrainian government documents, also make clear that Azov played a major role in taking back the city of Mariupol from the control of separatists in June 2014.62 The Dnipro battalion, along with other units, seized civilians in the Donetsk Region to prevent the separatist referendum on 11 May 2014. Videos show them shooting unarmed pro-separatist protesters with Kalashnikovs, killing two locals. The Ukrainian government denied the presence of the Dnipro battalion, but it was confirmed by other credible sources, including admissions by battalion members in videos, like Volodymyr Parasiuk’s statement on social media, who became the People’s Deputy of Ukraine.63
The far-right-led armed formations perpetrated a disproportionate amount of violence in the first few months of the Donbas conflict and thus played a major role in escalating it into a larger civil war because the radical nationalist and neo-Nazi-led groups were far more willing to use force at that time. The Ukrainian armed forces, the security service, police and National Guard units were more reluctant to use force against the separatists in Donbas because their commanders and members were publicly blamed by the new government for attempting to forcefully suppress the Maidan protests—and in particular, for the Maidan massacre. Because the new Maidan government came to power through violence, which included the killing of police and protesters, it lacked legitimacy among many military, police, and SBU members in the Donbas region during this initial period of the conflict. Further, compared to the newly ascendant far-right groups in the aftermath of Euromaidan, the regular Ukrainian armed forces, the security service, the police and National Guard units were known for lower morale and higher desertions. Examples of this included the Donetsk SBU Alfa commander and Luhansk Berkut members, who joined the separatists.64
The relative role of the far-right in the political violence was not constant; it began to decline in the Donbas when newly elected president Petro Poroshenko ordered the Ukrainian military, SBU, police, and National Guard to wield lethal force against the separatists and launch the offensive in June 2014.65 The war was most intense and violent in 2014 and 2015, but the fighting declined significantly following the Minsk Agreements in 2015. However, ultra-nationalist and neo-Nazi fighters continued to exert a non-trivial role, even after the Ukrainian military intensified its operations in Donbas and purported to moderate the far-right fighters. After its formal incorporation into the National Guard of Ukraine, the Azov regiment and its commanders maintained a close organisational and ideological relationship with the neo-Nazi National Corps party. This party was formed by the Azov battalion founder and the first commander on the basis of neo-Nazi SNA and Patriot of Ukraine, and it included many Azov battalion and regiment veterans. The Azov regiment functioned as a military wing of the National Corps, which, in essence, represented overlapping elements of the same Azov movement.66 Indeed, Azov regiment commanders shared a neo-Nazi background and had served in the neo-Nazi-led Azov battalion.67 In other words, the rebranding from “battalion” to “regiment” did not alter the key personnel.68 For example, Azov regiment commander Denys Prokopenko was a member of the neo-Nazi White Boys Club, which was formed by the ultras of the Dynamo Kyiv football club. This group of ultras displayed various Nazi symbols and the Nazi salute on their social media and during football games. His Azov battalion platoon had used the Totenkopf insignia of the Nazi SS.69 Andriy Biletsky became the commander of the Third Assault Brigade, which was created by veterans of the Azov battalion and regiment and activists of his neo-Nazi group, the National Corps.70 In 2023, he stated in an interview with Ukrainian media that the united Azov movement included this Azov brigade under his command along with the Azov regiment and the Kraken unit.71 Such admissions in Ukrainian media highlighting enduring far-right allegiances seldom make their way into the Western press.
Importantly, Azov commanders never publicly renounced their neo-Nazi views, symbols, and organisations. In fact, Azov leaders routinely denied in media interviews that they, their units, and organisations, were neo-Nazi, claiming that the well-documented Nazi symbols were fakes or Russian propaganda. Our research of Ukrainian social media as well as other researchers of the far-right in Ukraine, such as Lev Golinkin and Moss Robeson, have identified over one hundred cases of Nazi and neo-Nazi displays by at least several hundred Azov commanders and other members from 2014 to 2022. This number includes displays on uniforms, patches, photographs, flags, and tattoos of neo-Nazi and Nazi symbols, such as the swastika, SS sign, 88 (Heil Hitler code), Hitler images, Nazi flags, and Totenkopf, and a fascist hand salute.72 The continued relevance of far-right extremism in Azov was evident at the very top. Arsen Avakov, the Minister of Internal Affairs, was personally involved in the Azov battalion formation and its later expansion to a regiment.73 President Petro Poroshenko circulated photographs awarding Ukrainian national medals and commendations to some of the most well-known neo-Nazis in Azov.74 The Nazi connection to Azov was clearly not due to a loss of agency control.
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch reported that Azov was involved in many cases of torture, illegal detention, and disappearances during the war in Donbas.75 The impact of these far-right organisations cannot be measured strictly in terms of the direct physical effects, as terrorism researchers have emphasised in many other contexts.76 Ultra-nationalist and neo-Nazi organisations were instrumental in blocking or “spoiling” a peaceful resolution of the armed conflict in Donbas, another well-established source of leverage for extremists.77 Far-right groups such as the Right Sector, Svoboda, and the Radical Party opposed the adoption by the parliament of Constitutional amendments based on provisions from the Minsk Agreements.78 To this end, Svoboda activists launched a grenade attack on 31 August 2015 in front of the Ukrainian parliament, killing four and wounding dozens of policemen and National Guard troops, which helped to block these amendments, undercutting the logic of implementation.79
Far-right groups also challenged the implementation of President Volodymyr Zelensky’s electoral promise to peacefully resolve the Donbas war.80 In October 2019, Zelensky travelled to a front-line position in Donbas to personally convince the Azov fighters to stop blocking the implementation of the Minsk agreements by withdrawing along with separatist troops from the frontline, as he agreed during the summit with Putin and German and French leaders in Paris. But video of the encounter shows that Zelensky was taunted by activists of this neo-Nazi organisation who flouted his appeal.81 According to the Associated Press, thousands of far-right and nationalist activists shouting the far-right OUN and UPA slogan “Glory to Ukraine. Glory to the Heroes” marched through Kyiv protesting against a peace plan for eastern Ukraine.82
The radical flank threatened Zelensky for implementing Minsk on other occasions as well. In May 2019, Dmytro Yarosh, the former Right Sector leader, publicly threatened to hang the new Ukrainian president on a tree if he fulfilled his election promise of a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Donbas.83 In 2021, Yarosh, the commander of the Ukrainian Volunteer Army organised by the Right Sector, was appointed Adviser to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Valerii Zaluzhnyi.84 In the same year, videos, photos, and Ukrainian media reports show police standing down while neo-Nazi and other far-right protesters attacked the Office of the President of Ukraine and painted swastikas on its walls.85 The Russia scholar Stephen F. Cohen concluded that Zelensky “can’t go forward with peace negotiations” because “crazy fascist movements” in Ukraine “literally threatened his life.”86 Although far-right peace rejectionists posed political problems for Zelensky, they were also known to work closely with him. An activist of the neo-Nazi Patriot of Ukraine and former deputy commander of the Azov regiment was appointed the acting head of the National Police of Ukraine during the Poroshenko presidency and then became a deputy minister of Internal Affairs during the Zelensky presidency.87 Prime Minister Oleksii Honcharuk spoke at a “veterans party” organised by a front organisation for the neo-Nazi C14 with a stylised swastika of a neo-Nazi rock band behind him.88 The advisory council of the Ministry of Veteran Affairs under Zelensky retained activists of this neo-Nazi group, including those charged with assassinating the prominent opposition journalist, Oles Buzyna, in 2015.89
In sum, ultra-nationalist and neo-Nazi militant organisations were deeply involved on the side of the central government throughout the Donbas conflict. Although representing a small fraction of Ukrainian forces throughout the conflict, they committed a disproportionate amount of violence, particularly before President Poroshenko ordered the Ukrainian military to increase its use of force against the separatists in the summer of 2014. The much-touted absorption of Azov and other extreme right-wing militia under the official Ukrainian National Guard, police, and military command did not change either their command or their ideological displays. Many of the fighters worked closely with the Kyiv political leadership across administrations, when not using de facto veto power to block peaceful resolution of the conflict in this region.
This interpretation departs from others that rely strictly on vote-share as the proxy for far-right influence. The influence of the far-right in Ukraine after the Maidan far exceeded its electoral support and membership. Svoboda and Right Sector leaders each won only one percent of the votes in the snap presidential elections in May 2014. In the parliamentary elections of October 2014, Svoboda narrowly failed to clear the five percent threshold, receiving 4.7 percent. The Right Sector fared even worse, receiving only two percent of the votes. Ruslan Koshulynsky, one of Svoboda leaders, who was backed by the Right Sector, OUN, and C14, received only 1.7 percent of the votes in the 2019 presidential elections, while Svoboda won 2.2 percent of the votes in the 2019 parliamentary elections. These weak electoral results indicate the limited national support of the far-right in Ukraine, but not its outsized role in the Donbas conflict.
The Far-Right in the Odesa Massacre
Other than the Donbas war, the Odesa massacre was the most significant and deadly instance of political violence after the Maidan massacre in Ukraine since its independence in 1991 until the Russia-Ukraine war in February 2022. The violence took place on 2 May 2014, between a “United Ukraine” rally and pro-Russian separatists, carried out with petrol bombs, gunfire, and rock-throwing, which ended up killing 48 people, primarily separatist protesters.90 The vast majority of the fatalities took place in the Trade Unions House, where 42 separatist activists and employees (forty men, seven women, and one boy) were killed when the building was set ablaze.91
This massacre contributed to the escalation of the separatist conflict in Donbas into the civil war. As noted, the massacre was presented by separatist and Russian leaders and the media as akin to the Nazi massacre of Khatyn in Belarus, and many Odesa separatists joined the separatist forces in Donbas. Despite the importance of this massacre, the International Advisory Panel of the Council of Europe, among other international authorities, has noted that the Ukrainian government failed to properly investigate and prosecute those responsible.92 To ascertain the role of far-right groups in the Odesa massacre, a broad range of key information resources can be analysed, including videos and recordings of live broadcasts of the political violence (and the lead-up to it); published reports; primary source media in Ukrainian, Russian, and English; statements of responsibility; interviews; and testimonies from participants and eyewitnesses on both sides, as well as police commanders.
On 1 May 2014, the day before the mass violence, separatists protested in Odesa to demand a referendum on the newly installed government in Kyiv, which they blamed on far-right activists and Western interference.93 Based on testimonies from a special parliamentary commission report in the immediate aftermath of the May 2014 massacre, Ukrainian and regional government officials planned to use far-right activists and the Maidan Self-Defence to suppress the separatists in the Odesa region and disperse those who were encamped near the Trade Union building.94 Extensive evidence indicates that the police and firefighters were ordered by their superiors to stand by and not interfere during attacks. For instance, a special plan to deal with mass disturbances launched by the Odesa regional police was not authorised, reportedly because of decisions at the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ top level.95 Similarly, top regional officials of the police and other law enforcement agencies were ordered to attend a meeting with their national counterparts before and during the start of the clashes.96 The presence of Andriy Parubiy and five hundred Maidan Self-Defence members, who deployed from Kyiv to Odesa on the eve of the massacre, further suggests that the violent dispersal of the separatist camp by far-right activists was orchestrated by top government leaders.97 Parubiy was a founder and leader of the neo-Nazi Patriot of Ukraine, a paramilitary wing of the Social National Party of Ukraine in the 1990s. He was the head of the Maidan Self-Defence during the Euromaidan and headed the National Security and Defence Council at the time of the Odesa massacre. The State Bureau of Investigations of Ukraine launched a criminal investigation into Parubiy for the Odesa massacre soon after he was replaced as the ex-head of the Ukrainian parliament following the early parliamentary elections in 2019.98 One of the participants acknowledged in an Israeli documentary that he engaged in “provocations” in the Odesa massacre under the command of Parubiy, who had issued orders to attack the separatists and “burn everything.” We assess this acknowledgement as credible because he was filmed along with Maidan activists in the left wing of the Trade Union building in Odesa when the deadly fire began to burn the central entrance.99 He and five other Georgian ex-military members also stated in American, Italian, and Israeli TV documentaries, Russian media interviews, on Macedonian TV, in depositions to Berkut lawyers for the Maidan massacre trial, and in testimonies to the Prosecutor General Office of Belarus for the Prosecutor General Office of Ukraine investigation that their groups of Georgian, Baltic, and far-right-linked Ukrainian snipers received weapons, payments, and orders from specific Maidan and Georgian politicians, including Parubiy, to engage in a mass killing of police and protesters.100 The Maidan massacre trial subsequently confirmed their identities.101
A march led by the Right Sector and football ultras on 2 May 2014 was used as cover to implement this plan to destroy and burn the separatist tent camp.102 The SBU in the Odesa Region received advanced information about planned “provocations” and violent clashes between football ultras and pro-Russian separatists on game day between the Odesa and Kharkiv teams on 2 May. A special train transported hundreds of football ultras from Kharkiv to Odesa.103 Football ultras in Ukraine were notorious for displaying neo-Nazi symbols and expressing neo-Nazi slogans during games and have historically linked up with the Right Sector and other far-right organisations, as during the Maidan protests.104 Both the Right Sector and football ultras in Odesa and Kharkiv were dominated by the neo-Nazi Social National Assembly/Patriot of Ukraine, which organised the Azov battalion right after the Odesa massacre.
Odeska Druzhyna, a small separatist organisation in Odesa, was present among other separatist activists based on evidence from internet streams, videos, testimonies of participants and eyewitnesses, and special parliamentary commission reports.105 Odeska Druzhyna used identifiable red tape labels, and were not Right Sector agent provocateurs, as the Russian media and separatists claimed. However, the Ukrainian government and media also mischaracterised the involvement of Odeska Druzhyna by overstating its coordination with other separatist activists.106 The balance of forces was asymmetric; the groups of numerically superior activists of the Right Sector from Odesa and Kharkiv led by the neo-Nazi Social National Assembly/Patriot of Ukraine, far-right football ultras, and Maidan Self-Defence units from Odesa and other regions attacked the separatists. Numerically disadvantaged, the latter took cover behind a police cordon.107
An Odeska Druzhyna activist was filmed shooting in the direction of the far-right protesters with an AK-74-type assault rifle.108 The official investigation and the May 2 Group maintained that a Right Sector activist was killed by this separatist group member with a 5.45mm calibre bullet.109 However, leaked forensic medical expert reports describe a 5.65mm calibre bullet extracted from his body.110 This bullet reportedly disappeared and reappeared during the investigation. The fact that it did not match bullet samples of any legally registered firearms, the weak sound of the gunshots, as well as the lack of a recoil observed in the videos of the shooting, also suggest that the far-right protester may not have been killed by this separatist, who maintained that the weapon seen in the video was a movie studio prop.111 The killing of the Right Sector activist was not visible in that video nor in any videos of clashes. The investigation and various videos at the scene did not reveal the exact time or location of his killing, or the direction of the gunshot. An Odesa deputy police chief, who was filmed around the time of this killing before he himself was wounded, stated that he saw snipers in camouflage shooting from the second floor of a hotel there. He relayed that they killed this Right Sector activist and the second protester in order to blame the separatists for their killing and provoke a violent response against the separatists.112 Videos filmed before and after his shooting suggest that the second pro-Maidan activist was killed around the same time in the same area during the violent clashes with separatists and shooting from a Kalashnikov-type weapon by one of the separatists.113 However, the government forensic examination determined that he was killed by a bullet from a pneumatic sport-type weapon. Nobody was charged with his killing, and the moment and other circumstances of his killing remain not publicly known.114
In the clashes that followed the killings of these two pro-government protesters, four separatist protesters were killed and many other separatist protesters, policemen and at least one local journalist were wounded. The forensic examination determined that three separatists were killed with hunting ammunition.115 A pro-government activist was filmed shooting with a hunting rifle in the direction of these separatists.116 This pro-government activist was later identified by the Minister of Internal Affairs as a Right Sector member.117 The government investigation charged him with killing at least one of the separatists. However, he was released from arrest and his trial was suspended indefinitely because of threats by the Right Sector and other far-right activists against judges during his trial.118 Evidence—including a recorded phone call—revealed that the events on May 2nd were coordinated by the Odesa regional administration official in charge of law enforcement agencies, and involved the participation of the Maidan Self-Defence commander, Right Sector activists, football ultras, and Maidan Self-Defence units.119 They attacked and burned the tent camp of various separatist organisations, whose activists and supporters then escaped to the nearby Trade Union building and tried to barricade the main entrance doors. Videos, internet streams, and testimonies of eyewitnesses show that attackers threw Molotov cocktails and burning tyres at the main entrance, set the entrance doors on fire, and blocked other exits. Videos, recorded calls to firefighters, and eyewitness reports reveal that the fire and thick smoke started from those burning tyres and Molotov cocktails thrown at the main entrance.120 The evidence does not support claims that the separatist protesters killed in this incident were Russian citizens, that they burned themselves by throwing Molotov cocktails from the roof of the Trade Union building or inside of the building, or that there was no far-right involvement in their killing.
After initial denials, the May 2 Group admitted that the deadly fire started at the main entrance. The May 2 Group was a nominally independent association of mainly journalists, formed after the massacre supposedly to investigate it. It was created with the involvement of the Governor of the Odesa region who was appointed by Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko within a week of the massacre.121 This governor represented not only the central government, but also the Kolomoisky’s oligarchic network, which financed the Right Sector volunteers from the Volyn Region in the Azov battalion and the Right Sector-led Dnipro battalion.122 The Azov battalion was organised by the neo-Nazi SNA and its paramilitary wing, Patriot of Ukraine, which dominated the Right Sector in Odesa and Kharkiv, a few days after the Odesa massacre. But the May 2 Group still claimed that it was impossible to determine who started the fire because both sides were throwing Molotov cocktails. However, there is no public evidence of Molotov cocktails being thrown by separatists at the main entrance; on the contrary, numerous videos feature the far-right protesters throwing Molotov cocktails and burning tyres into the Trade Union building at that time.123
Within Ukraine, far-right activists—particularly from the Right Sector and the SNA— were notorious for using tyres and Molotov cocktails to burn public buildings. Forensic examinations in the government investigation, recordings of radiocommunications by SBU Alfa group, an unpublished admission by a far-right activist to a French journalist, and an academic study determined that the Trade Union headquarters in Kyiv were burned by Maidan activists, including far-right ones, in order to stop its takeover by the Security Service of Ukraine Alfa unit.124 Far-right protesters also started fires by burning tyres in the Inter TV channel building and threatened to burn down the parliament of Ukraine, the Lutsk City Council, the Sviatoshyn District Court that heard the Maidan massacre case, the Constitutional Court, and Inter and 112 Ukraina TV channels buildings by placing tyres next to their entrances.125 Prior usage of the same tactics by the far-right increases the likelihood of their direct involvement.
Analysis of online video streams, government investigation findings, May 2 Group reports, forensic medical examinations, eyewitness testimonies, and other evidence strongly indicate that 42 people perished as a result of the fire, smoke, and from trying to jump from the upper floors of the Trade Union building with far-right activists beating them on the ground and blocking the exits.. The victims were unarmed and included mainly separatists, their supporters, and several employees, in particular women, who were in the building at the time.126 Some of the strongest evidence of far-right involvement in the arson attack comes from the far-right itself, in the form of credit claiming. A growing body of research within terrorism studies focuses on credit claiming. An important finding is that perpetrators are far more likely to deny responsibility for their attacks than to take credit for ones that they did not perpetrate.127 This is particularly true when the targets are civilians. Nonetheless, many extremist groups do claim credit for civilian attacks.128 Statements posted by the Right Sector, the SNA, and the neo-Nazi Misanthropic Division on their websites and social media sites admitted the involvement of their organisations in the massacre. The Right Sector celebrated on its website the massacre by describing it as “another bright page in our fatherland’s history.” Claiming responsibility for the slaughter, it wrote: “In the first minutes of the battle, the ‘Right Sector’ activist was seriously wounded in the stomach. Several more PS [Right Sector] activists received injuries of varying degrees of severity. However, this did not prevent the rest of the PS fighters, together with football fans, from repelling the attack of pro-Russian provocateurs, and as a result, they successfully countered attempts to seize buildings in Odesa. Standing shoulder to shoulder, Odesa activists, football fans and ‘Right Sector’ fighters defeated the forces of pro-Russian mercenaries. Order has been restored in Odesa.”129 The Right Sector—which was dominated in Odesa and Kharkiv by the Social National Assembly and its paramilitary wing, Patriot of Ukraine—and the neo-Nazi Misanthropic Division (which joined the Azov battalion after the massacre) admitted on the social media platform V Kontakte and in other public statements that the fire was set deliberately.130
The official investigation of the Odesa massacre was a farce. Nobody was found guilty of perpetrating this mass killing. As noted, the Right Sector shooter was initially arrested but then released. Only separatists were among those arrested and tried for the Odesa massacre. The Odesa massacre trial of separatists resulted in their acquittal by a local court. The Ukrainian court based its decision on the lack of evidence in support of prosecution charges. Even the verdict acknowledged both the weakness of the investigation into the perpetrators and the role of Parubiy and other government officials.131 The Council of Europe and the UN Special Commission reports also noted the destruction of evidence.132 A report by the special commission of the Council of Europe found that the Ukrainian government’s investigation of the Odesa Massacre was inadequate, politically selective, and featured the falsification of evidence, despite the existence of video footage showing who threw the Molotov cocktails at the building.133
The Ukrainian media cited SBU sources that a far-right activist, who headed the Right Sector in Odesa during the Odesa Massacre, was a secret agent of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and that he and far-right associates were paid by SBU to attack opposition politicians, threaten judges, and conduct other illegal actions.134 This would be consistent with the fact that the Right Sector was not investigated for the Odesa massacre even though the Right Sector publicly admitted involvement. His secret collaboration with SBU would also be consistent with the fact that SBU and the Prosecutor General Office refused to charge him for killing another person in Odesa in 2018. Moreover, in 2020, the SBU gave this far-right activist the status of a victim in this case, even though he streamed this killing on his social media account and the police investigation determined that he was the killer.135 In this sense, the Odesa massacre was not entirely anomalous; it featured post-Maidan far-right involvement with apparent support from high-level political leaders in a corrupt country where investigations and media have inconsistently followed the evidence.
Conclusion
This study assesses the role of the far-right in post-Maidan Ukraine, specifically, in the Donbas war and the Odesa massacre. These were two of the biggest episodes of political violence in the country leading up to the February 2022 Russian invasion. This area of research is worth close investigation because it represents intrinsically important episodes of political violence that have not attracted objective analysis based on available primary sources in Ukrainian, Russian, and English. Investigating the role of the far-right is also timely because the far-right in Ukraine is riven by duelling, self-serving contemporary narratives.
The predominant narratives propagated by governments and the mainstream media in Ukraine, the West, Russia, and separatist-controlled Donbas, concerning the role of the far-right in the war in Donbas and the Odesa massacre, have evidently been partisan. Contrary to the Russian government, separatists, and associated media, the Ukrainian government and military are not Nazi or even neo-Nazi. There were no neo-Nazis among the upper echelon of the Ukrainian government. President Zelensky is certainly not a Jewish neo-Nazi. He tried to placate and mainstream the far-right for political reasons, but has no observable personal affinity to that extreme ideology.
Neo-Nazis constituted only about one percent of the Ukrainian forces before the Russian invasion in 2022, and there is weak electoral support for neo-Nazi parties throughout the country. Similarly, the policy of glorification of the OUN-UPA, their leaders, such as Stepan Bandera, and the adoption and use of their “Glory to Ukraine! Glory to the Heroes!” greeting by the state and the military, including Zelensky, do not make Ukraine a Nazi state. While the OUN and the UPA were far-right terrorist organisations, which collaborated with Nazi Germany and perpetrated the mass murders of Jews, Poles, and Ukrainians, they were not Nazis. Ukrainians could not join the Nazi party because Hitler and other Nazi leaders regarded Ukrainians as racially inferior and opposed independence of Ukraine while also dismissing the attempt to create even a puppet state by the Bandera faction of the OUN in Lviv shortly after the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union. Thus, Putin cannot credibly justify the illegal invasion in February 2022 as a war to “de-Nazify” the “Nazi regime.”136 The power of the far-right and the glorification of the OUN and the UPA in Ukraine under Poroshenko and Zelensky were exaggerated and exploited by the Russian leaders to justify the invasion.
But the West’s efforts to whitewash the far-right in Ukraine also rests on empirically shaky grounds. Despite their relatively small numbers militarily and politically, the far-right in Ukraine exercised outsized power. The far-right organisations, volunteer battalions, and paramilitary units organised and led by them played, along with separatists and Russian nationalists, a significant role in starting and escalating the incipient civil war in the Donbas and then impeding its peaceful resolution. Even after technically integrated into the official Ukrainian forces, Azov and other far-right groups continued to harbour extremist views. Often brandishing the same extremist symbols, the core leaders and members remained and even ascended within the police, military, and security services during the Donbas war. Western media accounts have drawn heavily from biased Ukrainian sources, including “official” investigations and the May 2 Group. Across numerous primary sources in Ukrainian, Russian, and English, we find evidence that the Right Sector, Social-National Assembly, its paramilitary wing Patriot of Ukraine, and groups of far-right football ultras from Odesa and Kharkiv played a critical role in the Odesa massacre against separatist protesters on 2 May 2014. Neo-Nazi SNA/Patriot of Ukraine, which dominated the Right Sector in Odesa and Kharkiv, organised the Azov battalion right after this massacre.
Despite the lack of international consensus over the definition of terrorism, a common interpretation is the use of violence by non-state actors aimed at creating fear for political ends, particularly when the targets are civilians.137 Depending on one’s definition, some attacks within the episodes of political violence covered in this study, such as the Odesa massacre, could, therefore, arguably be classified as terrorism. What is clear is that neither of the duelling narratives accurately captures the role of the far-right. This study has helped to fill that research lacuna by making use of substantial primary source materials in Ukrainian, Russian, and English. Besides the Maidan massacre, the Donbas war and the Odesa massacre are the two most substantial episodes of political violence from the independence of Ukraine in 1991 to the February 2022 illegal Russian invasion [end]
Ivan Katchanovski is a Ukrainian and Canadian political scientist. He teaches at the School of Political Studies and the Conflict Studies and Human Rights Program at the University of Ottawa in Canada. He specialises primarily in politics, conflicts, political violence, and the far right in Ukraine. His academic publications include five books, 21 articles in peer-reviewed journals, and twelve book chapters.
Max Abrahms is a professor of public policy and political science at Northeastern University, where he specialises in international security. Abrahms has published extensively in leading academic and popular outlets such as International Organization, International Security, International Studies Quarterly, Security Studies, Comparative Political Studies, Harvard Business Review, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, New York Times, Washington Post, USA Today, Newsweek, The Atlantic, and Los Angeles Times.
I disagree with the authors on two points
Stepan Bandera & friends were Nazis. How can the authors identify some neo-Nazis in modern Ukraine, while not regarding their historical mentors as Nazis ? Before WW2, they were praising either Adolf Hitler or Benito Mussolini. Their political project was authoritarian, racist and criminal. They were dreaming of ethnic cleansing. De facto during WW2, they committed mass killing of Jews and Poles.
Terrorism is not restricted to non-state actors. Terrorism is violent action to terror civilians, in order to achieve a common political goal. This is not even a value judgement, but Hiroshima bombing was terrorism. The Israeli targeting and mass killing of civilians, in the prospect of ethnic cleansing in Gaza, is terrorism.
chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia
Endnotes
Arel, Dominique and Jesse Driscoll. 2023. Ukraine’s Unnamed War. Before the Russian Invasion of 2022. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Black, J.L. and Michael Johns (Eds.). 2016. The Return of the Cold War: Ukraine, the West and Russia. Abingdon: Routledge; Hahn, Gordon M. 2018. Ukraine Over the Edge: Russia, the West and the “New Cold War.” Jefferson, NC: McFarland Books; Katchanovski, Ivan. 2016a. “The Separatist War in Donbas: A Violent Break-up of Ukraine?” European Politics and Society, 17 (4), 473-489; Kudelia, Serhiy. 2016. “The Donbas Rift.” Russian Politics & Law, 54 (1), 5-27; Pikulicka-Wilczewska, Agnieszka and Richard Sakwa (Eds.). 2015. Ukraine and Russia: People, Politics, Propaganda and Perspectives. Bristol: E-International Relations; Sakwa, Richard. 2015. Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands. London: I.B.Tauris. ↩︎
Danciu, Gabriela-Cătălina. 2023. “A Perspective on Justifying the Ukraine–Russia War. Elements Of Propaganda.” International Journal of Social and Educational Innovation, 10 (19), 224-239; “Address by the President of the Russian Federation” (2022, February 24) http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843. ↩︎
Black, J.L. and Michael Johns (Eds.). 2016. The Return of the Cold War: Ukraine, the West and Russia. Abingdon: Routledge; Katchanovski, Ivan. 2023a. “The Maidan Massacre Trial and Investigation Revelations and Their Implications for the Ukraine-Russia War and Relations.” Russian Politics, 8 (2),181-205. ↩︎
See, for example, Colborne, Michael. 2022. From the Fires of War: Ukraine’s Azov Movement and the Global Far Right, Stuttgart: Ibidem; Davidzon, Vladislav. 2023. “The Search for Neo-Nazis Under the Bedsheets Reflects American Progressive Hysteria, Not Ukrainian Reality.” Tablet Magazine, July. ↩︎
Umland, Andreas. 2019. “Irregular Militias and Radical Nationalism in PostEuromaydan Ukraine: The Prehistory and Emergence of the “Azov” Battalion in 2014.” Terrorism and Political Violence, 31 (1), 105- 131. ↩︎
Umland, Andreas. 2020. ‘The Far Right in Pre- and Post-Euromaidan Ukraine: From Ultra-Nationalist Party Politics to Ethno-Centric Uncivil Society.’ Demokratizatsiya, 28 (2), 247-268. ↩︎
Ishchenko, Volodymyr. 2016. “Far right participation in the Ukrainian Maidan protests: an attempt of systematic estimation.” European Politics and Society, 17 (4), 453-472. ↩︎
Hahn, Gordon M. 2018. Ukraine Over the Edge: Russia, the West and the “New Cold War.” Jefferson, NC: McFarland Books; Katchanovski, Ivan. 2016b. “The Maidan Massacre in Ukraine: A Summary of Analysis, Evidence, and Findings.” In The Return of the Cold War: Ukraine, the West and Russia, eds. J.L. Black and Michael Johns. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 220-224; Katchanovski, Ivan. 2020. “The far right, the Euromaidan, and the Maidan massacre in Ukraine.” Journal of Labor and Society, 23 (1), 5-29; Katchanovski, 2023a; Katchanovski, Ivan. 2023b. “The “Snipers’ Massacre” on the Maidan in Ukraine.” Cogent Social Sciences, 9 (2); Katchanovski, Ivan. 2024. The Maidan Massacre in Ukraine. London: Palgrave Macmillan. ↩︎
Khalil Mutallimzada and Kristian Steiner, (2022), Fighters’ motivations for joining extremist groups: Investigating the attractiveness of the Right Sector’s Volunteer Ukrainian Corps. European Journal of International Security, 1–23. Ilmari Käihkö, (2018), A nation-in-the-making, in arms: control of force, strategy and the Ukrainian Volunteer Battalions. Defence Studies 18:2, 147–166; Tetyana Malyarenko and David J. Galbreath, (2016), Paramilitary motivation in Ukraine: beyond integration and abolition, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 16:1, 113–138. ↩︎
Hale, Henry E., Oxana Shevel and Olga Onuch. 2018. “Believing Facts in the Fog of War: Identity, Media and Hot Cognition in Ukraine’s 2014 Odesa Tragedy.” Geopolitics, 23 (4), 851-881. A poll commissioned for that study found that 44% of Ukrainians believed that this mass killing was committed by provocateurs from Russia, while 11% blamed pro-Russian residents of Odesa. Ten percent of the respondents said that the Odesa massacre was perpetrated by “Ukrainian nationalists from Odesa” and 3% by “pro-Ukrainian” residents of Odesa. ↩︎
Van Evera, Stephen. 1997. Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. ↩︎
Griffin, Roger with Matthew Feldman (Eds.). 2003. Fascism: Critical Concepts in Political Science. London: Routledge. ↩︎
Brahimi, Alia. “Ideology and terrorism.” The Oxford handbook of terrorism (2019): 298. ↩︎
See, for example, Jadoon, Amira, Andrew Mines, and Daniel Milton. “Targeting quality or quantity? The divergent effects of targeting upper verses lower tier leaders of militant organizations.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 67, no. 5 (2023): 1007-1031; Schram, Peter. “Self-managing terror: Resolving agency problems with diverse teams.” Games and Economic Behavior 130 (2021): 240-257; Abrahms, Max, and Philip BK Potter. “Explaining terrorism: Leadership deficits and militant group tactics.” International Organization 69, no. 2 (2015): 311-342; Popovic, Milos. “The perils of weak organization: Explaining loyalty and defection of militant organizations toward Pakistan.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 38, no. 11 (2015): 919-937. ↩︎
Biletsky 2013; Biletsky, Andriy. “Nedochytanyi Franko.” Patriot Ukrainy, (2008). https://web.archive.org/web/20101120085407/http://patriotukr.org.ua/index.php?rub=stat&id=409. Also, please note that the ADL has adopted the spelling of “antisemitism” instead of “anti-Semitism.” After reviewing the history and consulting with other leading experts, they determined that this is the best way to refer to hatred toward Jews, so we have adopted the same spelling convention here. ↩︎
Clarke, Colin P. “The Terrorist Diaspora.” Testimony, House Homeland Security Committee Task Force on Denying Terrorists Entry into the United States (2017). ↩︎
Boyd-Barrett, Oliver. 2016. Western Mainstream Media and the Ukraine Crisis: A Study in Conflict Propaganda. New York: Routledge. ↩︎
Some researchers and Zelensky have cited the presence of Russian-speakers in the Azov regiment and other neo-Nazi-led armed formations as evidence of their relative tolerance and moderation and argued that the Azov regiment distanced itself from its far-right roots. (See Umland 2019; “Zelensky refutes Russian propaganda claim that Azov Regiment is ‘neo-Nazi.’” The New Voice of Ukraine (2022, May 2), https://news.yahoo.com/zelensky-refutes-russian-propaganda-claim-131100438.html. However, these formations were organized and led by neo-Nazi organizations, which had a racist ideology and cast themselves as defenders of the White race. For this reason, they included not only large numbers of Russian speakers from Ukraine but also neo-Nazis from Russia, Belarus, and the Western countries, such as Australia, Sweden, and the US. ↩︎
“Ukraine war: Ros Atkins on… Putin’s false ‘Nazi’ claims.” BBC, (2022, March 26) https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-europe-60853404; Five Azovstal defenders were awarded the title of Heroes of Ukraine. Svidomi, (2022, October 3). https://svidomi.in.ua/en/page/five-azovstal-defenders-were-awarded-the-title-of-heroes-of-ukraine. Loyd, Anthony. “‘Nonsense’: Heroes of Mariupol Denied US Weapons Over neo-Nazi Past.” Times, (2024 May 2). https://www.thetimes.com/world/russia-ukraine-war/article/nonsense-heroes-of-mariupol-denied-us-weapons-over-neo-nazi-past-kwnr0r0pw; “Boris Johnson Praises Nazi Azov Battalion,” YouTube. (2024, May 23). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_6g7i-4wswk. There was similar systematic and politically motivated whitewashing of the far-right in Ukraine in Wikipedia, especially, after the Russian invasion. A small number of Wikipedia editors systematically whitewashed neo-Nazi and other far-right parties, organizations, and their leaders, such as Azov regiment, Patriot of Ukraine, Svoboda, National Corps, the OUN, the UPA, Stepan Bandera, Roman Shukhevych, etc. They removed or deliberately excluded scholarly studies and other evidence of the extremist ideology and involvement in mass murder of the far-right, such as the Maidan and Odesa massacres, the Holocaust, and the Lviv pogrom in Ukraine and smeared in biographical entries scholars and other experts whose studies show such ideology and political violence by the far-right in Ukraine. (See, for example, Azov Brigade, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Azov_Brigade; Patriot of Ukraine, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patriot_of_Ukraine; 2014 Odesa clashes, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014_Odesa_clashes; Far-right politics in Ukraine, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Far-right_politics_in_Ukraine. They included editors who misrepresented the Holocaust in Poland using similar tactics in Wikipedia, which is unreliable but widely accessed source, compared to academic studies (Grabowski, Jan, and Shira Klein. 2023. “Wikipedia’s Intentional Distortion of the History of the Holocaust.” Journal of Holocaust Research 37 (2): 133–90). ↩︎
Katchanovski, Ivan and Alicen Morley. 2012. “Politics of US Television Coverage of Post-Communist Countries.” Problems of Post-Communism, 59 (1), 15-30. ↩︎
Bhatia, Michael. 2008. “Fighting words: naming terrorists, bandits, rebels and other violent actors, ”Third World Quarterly, 26 (1), 5-22; Schmid, Alex P. 2012. “The revised academic consensus definition of terrorism.” Perspectives on Terrorism, 6 (2), 158-159; Ganor, Boaz. 2002. “Defining terrorism: Is one man’s terrorist another man’s freedom fighter?” Police Practice and Research, 3 (4), 287-304. ↩︎
Although the focus of this analysis is on the portrayal of the far-right in Ukraine, a related narrative dispute has been over whether to characterise the conflict in the Donbas as a civil war. The Ukrainian and Western governments and the media described the war in Donbas as an interstate war between Russia and Ukraine or a hybrid war while denying that there was a civil war. By contrast, the Russian and Donbas separatist governments and associated media denied any Russian military involvement in the war and called it a purely civil war. The majority of scholars and datasets such as the Correlates of War Project and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program classified it as a civil war or an intrastate conflict, while also noting the Russian military interventions in Donbas prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in See, for example, Arel and Driscoll 2023; Black and Johns 2016; Hahn 2018; Katchanovski 2016a; Kudelia 2016. ↩︎
Abrahms, Max. “What terrorists really want: Terrorist motives and counterterrorism strategy.” International Security 32, no. 4 (2008): 78-105. ↩︎
Rossolinski-Liebe, Grzegorz. 2014. Stepan Bandera: The life and afterlife of a Ukrainian nationalist. Stuttgart: Ibidem. ↩︎
Yeomans, Rory, (Ed.). 2016. The Utopia of Terror: Life and Death in Wartime Croatia. Rochester: University of Rochester Press; Katchanovski, Ivan. 2015. “Terrorists or National Heroes? Politics and Perceptions of the OUN and the UPA in Ukraine.” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 48 (2-3), 217-228. ↩︎
Rudling, Per Anders. 2011. “The OUN, the UPA and the Holocaust. A Study in the Manufacturing of Historical Myths.” Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies, #2107, Center for Russian and East European Studies, Pittsburgh University. ↩︎
See Katchanovski, 2016a; Katchanovski, Ivan. 2006. Cleft Countries: Regional Political Divisions and Cultures in Post-Soviet Ukraine and Moldova. Stuttgart: Ibidem. ↩︎
Umland, Andreas. 2019. “Irregular Militias and Radical Nationalism in PostEuromaydan Ukraine: The Prehistory and Emergence of the “Azov” Battalion in 2014.” Terrorism and Political Violence, 31 (1), 105-131. ↩︎
Mueller, John E. 2006. Overblown: How politicians and the terrorism industry inflate national security threats, and why we believe them. New York: Simon and Schuster; Abrahms, Max. 2006. “Why terrorism does not work.” International Security, 31 (2), 42-78. ↩︎
Kydd, Andrew, and Barbara F. Walter. 2002. “Sabotaging the peace: The politics of extremist violence.” International Organization, 56 (2), 263-296. ↩︎
“Zvit tymchasovoi slidchoi komisii Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy z pytan rozsliduvannia faktiv zahybeli hromadian u mistakh Odesi, Nariupoli, a takozh inshykh mistakh Donetskoi ta Luhanskoi oblastei Ukrainy.” (2014, September 5). Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy. http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=52134↩︎
Abrahms, Max, and Justin Conrad. “The strategic logic of credit claiming: A new theory for anonymous terrorist attacks.” Security Studies 26, no. 2 (2017): 279-304. ↩︎
Schmid, Alex. “Terrorism-the definitional problem.” Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 36 (2004): 375; Schmid, Alex P. “The definition of terrorism.” In The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, pp. 39-157. Routledge, 2011; Schmid, Alex P. “Discussion 1-Revisiting the wicked problem of defining terrorism.” Terrorism: Its Past, Present & Future Study A Special Issue to Commemorate CSTPV at 25 (2020): 3. ↩︎
It is essential to close the circle of Nazi existence. The defeat of the Kiev regime is a fundamental step in this direction
(Public domain)
The infiltration of Nazis, Nazi sympathizers, descendants or not from Nazis, and Nazi collaborators, into the corridors of Western power does not mean a newly seized opportunity for the glorification and whitewashing of all those who were on the opposite side of the Russian, Soviet or Bolshevik divide. This authentic movement to rewrite history and reuse the ideological potential that has been installed represents, above all, the closing of a historical circle, initiated by the most reactionary and fascistic sectors of the Western elite.
Canada is the perfect example of this historical loop closure, namelly, about reusing this ideological installed capacity and recycling it (and bleaching it) in historical terms. That’s why the episode that took place in the Canadian House of Representatives, which in unison paid tribute to Yaroslv Honka as a fervent freedom fighter, as having “fought the Russians in the Second World War”, was very far from being a simple fluke, a lapse of judgment on the part of Anthony Rota — the House speaker — or a mere courtesy on the occasion of Volodomyr Zelensky’s visit.
Like Yaroslav Honka, countless figures from the Ukrainian diaspora, especially from Galicia, who have been documented as having collaborated with the Nazi forces and, above all, as having participated in crimes against humanity, have been or are remembered, honored and paid tribute to, on an ongoing basis, in Ukrainian society. From involvement in political parties, to public office election, to the funding and promotion of educational and academic activities, these figures with a dark past have found in contemporary Canada the perfect habitat for their historical recycling and recovery. Just as they have found in this country the perfect refuge for their economic recovery.
When Franklin Roosevelt, on the subject of the “Safe Haven” project — which aimed to identify and seize the wealth that the Nazi elite kept in neutral countries — said that if the Nazi elite managed to keep their wealth, they could later use it to regain power, perhaps he wasn’t too far off the mark. Indeed, Roosevelt should not have been unaware that people like the Dulles brothers (Allan Dulles and John Dulles) supported the Third Reich in various ways — including by raising funds on Wall Street — and, at the same time, not only participated in the U.S. Council of Foreign Relations, but, in the case of Allan Dulles, was also an agent of the OSS (Office of Strategic Services), which preceded the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency).
People like the Dulles brothers, supporters of the project to rearm Nazi Germany in order to use it as an element in the fight against “communism”, promoted this operation, supporting it financially in banks like the BIS (Bank of International Settlements), or even in J.P. Morgan, which called Roosevelt a “class traitor”, not only supported the strengthening of Nazi Germany and the Berlin-Rome axis, but later recruited prominent Nazi operatives to establish what would become the CIA and the U.S. secret services, in general.
This is why what is happening in Canada, particularly at the University of Alberta — but not only there — and with the CIUS (Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies), represents nothing more than the materialization of the fears of people like Roosevelt, who, while not fervent communists, were also far from representing the most reactionary factions of the Anglo-American financial elite.
Thus, when Petro Savaryn founded CIUS, it was he himself who made real the fears of those who knew what it would mean to house people of Bandera’s stature in free societies. Having been whitewashed and retrained, these figures, with their in-depth knowledge of how to fight — with extreme violence, it must be said — the Soviet enemy first and the Russian enemy second, could now be used as if they were prominent examples of the fight for freedom. In its memorial, the UCC (Ukrainian Congress of Canada) gives a recent account of Savaryn’s life, but carefully erases everything that didn’t happen in Canada. The dark past is not to be repeated, and to achieve this outcome these people relied on the description and complicit silence from Canadian authorities. Thus, Savaryn is presented as an honorable Ukrainian who, from “1982 to 1986, was Chancellor of the University of Alberta,
The University of Alberta’s memorial to Petro Savaryn says everything about this historical recycling and whitewashing: not a word about his participation in the infamous Waffen-SS Galician Division, which committed such brutal massacres against civilian populations of Poles, Jews, Gypsies and Soviets. It’s as if no such thing had ever happened and as if the most important event in Petro (Peter) Savaryn’s life was the founding of CIUS and not his collaboration with the Nazi forces. To say that Ukrainian diaspora organizations in Canada honor and sing the stories of Petro Savaryn in their ceremonies would be redundant. After all, Canada was one of the destinations for thousands of these operatives, who emigrated there from 1945 onwards. Many of them should have been present at Nuremberg, but instead they are honored in the “very democratic” Western parliaments.
However, Petro Savaryn’s example is far from the only one, and it has to be said that this reality is not unknown to the Canadian public. Several media outlets — more alternative than mainstream — have warned of the real scandal of “Nazi” subsidies at the University of Alberta. The “Honka” episode triggered the unearthing of a reality that was supposed to remain hidden for some time, until nothing could be done. Or until the generations who remember the Nazi horror die off. That’s why the Governor General of Canada’s office itself apologized for awarding the Order of Canada to a veteran of the Ukrainian SS Galicia Division. The recipient was none other than Petro Savaryn. Was it incompetence? Lack of knowledge? Don’t you investigate someone before awarding him or her a prize? Believe what you like, but it’s the practice that counts.
And the fundamental question remains. How is it possible that people like Savaryn, or Petro (Peter) Jacyk — who applied for conscription to the same Nazi forces and who has his name engraved on countless initiatives, organizations and academic programs in Ukraine, Canada and the USA — have managed to go unnoticed by anyone who repudiates Nazi ideology, however masked as it is?
This question is answered by the attitudes that today whitewash Stepan Bandera and the Kiev regime’s cult of this figure, as well as the slide of Western politics to the most backward ideologies (in so many ways), under the cover of this whitewashing and the resurgence of Russophobia, Islamophobia, xenophobia and the deepest and most atrocious reactionaryism. Petro Savaryn himself was president of the Progressive Conservative Association of Alberta, a so called “center-right” movement with a name likely to encompass the entire liberal, neoliberal and conservative political center.
People like Honka, who contributed $30,000 to CIUS, a sum that the University of Alberta has said it will return, are just the tip of a veil that courageous people like Owen Schalk, Taylor C. Noakes, Pers Rudling and Harrison Samphir have been uncovering and denouncing. Other paradigmatic examples of Nazi collaborationists who have gone unscathed and whose finances and CVs have flourished in the so-called “liberal democracies” are Levko Babij or Roman Kolinsnyk, both also from the SS Galician Division. The fact that there are monuments across Canada glorifying the 14th SS Division (14th Waffen SS Grenadier Division (1st Galician)) and the fact that they have been “vandalized” with graffiti denouncing their Nazi record, was not enough to cause an uproar, nor even from from those who present themselves as champions of Western democracy.
Millions of dollars for scholarships and study programs on “Ukrainian nationalism”, told under the fashion that, for example, appears in the Ukrainian Encyclopedia translated and published by CIUS, whitewashing Nazi collaborationism on the part of “Ukrainian nationalists” and sneaking Nazi-fascist ideology into Western academia, explain much of what is happening today and why it is possible to witness this Russophobic drift that could lead the world to a nuclear confrontation, without a vehement and comprehensive peace movement emerging. This episode, which took place in Canada, is no different from what is happening in many other places, particularly in the U.S. and throughout Europe. In Ukraine, it’s not even worth talking about. No one can say they don’t know.
But then, why don’t Jewish academics say anything? Why don’t they denounce it? This is where the connections are made between twin doctrines, daughters of the same father and mother, equally supremacist, extremist, sectarian and segregationist. This is the case of Zionism and Nazism. As Jeremy Appel points out in the “Expats & Allies” podcast, the exchange is simple: Ukrainian academics flag students and professors who take anti-Israel stances and, in return, the powerful Zionist academic diaspora turns a blind eye to the growing Nazism in Western academia.
For those who consider the Zionist-Nazi connection impossible and have learned nothing from the experience of Theodor Herzl (one of the fathers of Jewish Zionism), who considered anti-Semites to be his main allies, history has proved him right once again. When it comes to Palestine and the suppression of its national identity, Zionism’s most urgent priority, Nazism allies itself with this equally supremacist, extremist, genocidal and dictatorial form of governance. And this is another circle that is closing, demonstrating that the whitewashing and recycling of Nazi ideology is not a historical accident, but a project, which initially failed because the strength of the USSR and its peoples defeated it, but which, reused, recycled and whitewashed by the USA and its allies, is now, in a second historical opportunity, fulfilling its original role. The establishment of a world superfederation under U.S. leadership. The same superfederation that Mackinder spoke of with regard to the British Empire and its salvation.
The reality we are witnessing now is nothing more than the closing of a circle that began with the creation of fascism at the beginning of the 20th century, during the period of the decline of the British Empire, and which Cinthya Chung describes so well in her masterly book “The Empire on Which the Black Sun Never Set: The Birth of International Fascism and Anglo-American Foreign Policy”, in which she masterfully exposes, documents and substantiates how fascist doctrines were an instrument of the British and Western imperial and capitalist elite. In that initial phase of the fascist circle, which resulted in Nazism itself, at a time of vital challenge imposed by the very existence of the USSR, it wasn’t as easy as it is today to clearly identify in these doctrines their instrumental character in relation to Anglo-Saxon imperialism and the advanced, Western capitalist system itself, today known as neoliberalism, globalism or North American hegemonism and which corresponds to the imperialist phase of capitalism itself.
However, at the end of this circle, Nazism and its father, fascism, are once again used as an instrument of aggression against peoples who oppose Western imperialism, now in the era of financialized, transnational, imperial capitalism. Financial, rentier capitalism and its transnational, federative dimension, of which Ursula Von Der Leyen’s European Union is a corollary, emerged in the upper phase of capitalism. Once again, Nazism, as with Germany in the 1930s, is used, this time in relation to Ukraine, to contain, combat and attack any Russian, Chinese or other opponent that represents an acute or strategic threat to Anglo-American hegemonic designs.
In this sense, Zionism is not a different experience, implemented in a similar way by academia and the centers of political power. In this case, Israel and Jewish Zionism, as a reactionary, colonial and supremacist expression of Judaism, are used against the peoples in the Middle East who oppose U.S. hegemonic domination. Just like in Taiwan, the Philippines, or what about Venezuela, Argentina or Brazil, where the most reactionary and traitorous bigots, reminiscent of Pinochet and today (wrongly in my view) directly linked to Trump, is used to contain movements that resist handing over their natural resources to the supranational power of the USA.
And all this is happening at breakneck speed, not with Trump, but with the Biden administration. And right in the era of Macron, Von Der Leyen, Baerbock, Sholz, Costa and Sunak, in which the European Union is once again governed by a majority of ultra-reactionary, Russophobic executives, who make the rewriting of the history of the Second World War their red carpet (save the etymological error of the color used) for power. A power that annihilates sovereignties and submits peoples to rentier elites who make happen what they claimed that would only happen under socialism, but which is now happening instead and precisely under the advanced phase of capitalism: the suppression of individual property held by the working classes and its transformation into rentier property by the richest 1%.
Fascism, in the form of Nazism or Zionism, will always be the most violent, reactionary, chauvinistic and supremacist form of protecting the vital interests of the elite owners in the age of advanced capitalism. First, in its nationalist form, and today, taking it and using it as a way of imposing rentier, hegemonic and globalist imperialism. One and other coincide in handing over the property to a restricted owner elite, protected, rewarded and fed by the neoliberal state, born out from the Washington consensus and the Chicago school of thought.
And lest there be any doubt about the importance of this inhuman doctrine — such as Ukrainian Nazism — for neoliberal, globalist, transnational and supranational capitalism, disguising it under a cloak of “libertarian nationalism” against Russia’s opponent, Nazi-fascist ideology coexists not only with the most aggressive Zionism, but also with the most radical Wokism. Who hasn’t seen headlines like “Ukraine is gay” or “Azov is gay”? Who hasn’t seen the news in the NYT about the creation of LGBTQIA+ units in the Ukrainian army? Another circle closing!
They are tools of the same reality, covering a wide range of sectors in Western societies. From the radical feminist, to the homosexual, to the tattooed, machine-gun-wielding male, everyone feels comfortable under the Ukrainian trident flag, the Star of David or the U.S. flag, NATO or the starry blue of the EU. There is something that unites them all, even if, here and there, they sometimes seem different. This unity is built on the idea that, under the aura of empire, everyone fits in, as long as they don’t want the forbidden fruit of fighting imperialism and defending the sovereignty of the people. In attacking sovereign countries like Russia, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Iran, Syria, Cuba, People’s Korea, Vietnam or China, everyone converges, despite the superficial and epidermic ideological differences between them.
Both the LGBTQIA+ and the more musculated Trumpists coincide in their defense of the Kiev regime, their attack on Bolivarian Venezuela or Sandinista Nicaragua. Basically, those are all forms of affirmation of national sovereignty, of nation states that don’t bow to the Western superfederative yoke. No, it’s not communism that scares them: it’s the sovereignty of the peoples. And under this umbrella, everyone is united, with or without rainbows, with or without Palestine. The Palestinian struggle, in this respect, represents no more than a setback, not divisive enough to alienate them. Because the Palestinian struggle can be transported to the individualistic dimension of human dignity.
But when they address those who defend, with violence if necessary, this national dignity, aiming to reclaim it as a pillar of a desired nation-state, as a proud sovereign people and not as an oppressed people or as ”helpless” victims of Zionist brutality, Trumpists and LGBTs don’t hesitate to agree again and to consider Hamas a “terrorist” entity. When the victim turns to armed resistance and starts conquering it’s future collectively and through war — and even brutality — then all the previous Palestinian victims are suddenly classified as terrorists, by the same that vowed to defend them as unprotected victims. However, the same that classify those Palestinian fighters as “terrorists”, are the same that only exceptionally classify Israel as a terrorist state, and never, but never, classify it’s vital supporter — USA — under such designation.
After all, it’s Hamas that’s fighting, and with Hamas the poor man’s discourse ends and the fight against what unites them begins: the empire that convinces them that they live in freedom. Even though, every day, more and more of them wake up without a home, without a job, without their health and without prospects in life. Forced to emigrate and forced to receive emigration, because it’s important for those in charge to keep wages low and accumulation circles ever more intense. This is not about praising Hamas or not, it’s about recognizing that, when treated with violence, every victim has the write to use it against the oppressor and, it’s not possible to treat someone with violence and not expect violence in return.
This puerile idealism and political childishness, which does not take into account real life but an image constructed and implanted in their minds by a system of education created and perfected for this purpose, is the same thing that explains why Nazi ideals have been able to coexist, shape and prosper in a society that believes itself to be free. Because this society doesn’t take into account what is real, what is practical, as Marx and Engels pointed out, but an idyllic construction that exists less and less in their lives. What matters is “being”, even if you “are” living under a bridge, starving and with no prospects in life.
Freedom doesn’t lie in being independent of material economic burden; freedom is sold as a discourse that can be shared. Sharing discourse is very easy, it’s more difficult to share wealth. And in this fair sharing, yes, there would be the most challenging of freedoms and the most realistic of democracies, a democracy that is not measured by the amount of money with which each person lobbies, finances, promotes and makes famous their favorite candidates. Only then would their choice be validated by the blind vote of the masses.
And this is how Western history, in the aftermath of the Second World War, secretly took advantage of, recycled and promoted the Nazi potential that had been installed, without seeming to do so. When the Canadian parliament welcomed Yaroslav Honka, it was simply giving voice to the normal practice that exists in society. The practice that nobody sees, but which exists, despite the idealistic appearance that says it doesn’t accept Nazism! Only those who start from concrete, objective practice can identify it. And this is a merit not to be overlooked when seen in the light of socio-political engineering. How can you do something while, on the surface, you appear to be doing the opposite?
After all, when something reaches a parliament, it means that the practice that embodies that proposal already exists in practice, in real life. Therefore, the tribute to the member of the SS Galicia was only intended to formally recognize a practice that had already been instituted and especially promoted and intensified after the start of the Special Military Operation. Did all the idealists wake up at that point? Where were they until then? Where were they when people like Honka and Savaryn were thriving in Canadian society? Calling those who denounced them as “Putin propagandists”!
All of this is the result of a lengthy process, which began, first, with the whitewashing of Nazism and fascism, comparing it to communism — when you compare something unacceptable to something accepted, you make the unacceptable acceptable and the acceptable unacceptable — denigrating the USSR by system and by resorting to the worst and most perverse infamies invented — or inventable — by Goebbels. On the other hand, this misrepresentation was done by hiding the still existent Nazism, pointing to the non-existent communism — read also “Russianism” — as the main enemy. We’ve even gone so far as to find the “conservative” press accusing China of being the main promoter of the globalist hegemonic strategy of Davos. As if all the Western elites in power weren’t triumphantly parading in Davos, and as if the Chinese weren’t there in disguise and to make up the fluff (like many others and carefully chosen).
And this is how populations end up hating what is not a threat and not knowing what deeply threatens them. This is a very well thought-out process, which finds its practical expression in the naturalization of the Nazi past by those who, instead of being sent to Nuremberg for the trial they deserved, went to London, Toronto or Washington.
In this upper phase of the circle, the collective West, the Western superfederation, is betting everything! It is once again in this mortal struggle that we find ourselves and it is in this historical period, both dangerous and fascinating, that we are moving and that we will see the final defeat of a project that began a century ago. Will the peoples of the world be able to defeat it? The answer lies in the multipolar world and its ability to provide the world with an alternative model. Without this alternative model, we are doomed, because without it, what already exists will always prevail, using fascism and Nazism as an instrument of domination. Again and again, as many times as necessary.
It is essential to close the circle of Nazi existence. The defeat of the Kiev regime is a fundamental step in this direction [end]
en Anglais, its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine
Le chef de file du GUD Paris a discrètement été recruté début 2023 dans l’équipe de gardiens chargée de la surveillance de l’île du Loc’h, propriété de Vincent Bolloré. Depuis plus de dix ans, le milliardaire confie cette mission à une société directement liée à la “GUD connection”
Marc de Cacqueray-Valménier peut souffler un peu. Certes, le leader de la section parisienne du groupuscule néofasciste et antisémite Groupe union défense (GUD) attend encore deux procès : l’un pour avoir passé à tabac des militants de SOS Racisme lors du meeting d’Éric Zemmour à Villepinte en décembre 2021, l’autre en appel, soupçonné d’avoir convoqué une descente contre des supporters marocains le soir de la demi-finale de la Coupe du monde de football en décembre 2022, stoppée à temps par la police. Mais cet ultranationaliste peut se réjouir d’avoir retrouvé une stabilité financière, au moment où il commençait à perdre espoir de dénicher un employeur prêt à fermer les yeux sur les résultats renvoyés par une simple recherche Google sur son nom. Marc de Cacqueray-Valménier a un nouveau patron : Vincent Bolloré.
Selon nos informations, cette figure de l’extrême droite violente, âgée de 25 ans, a intégré en janvier 2023 la petite équipe de gardiens de l’île finistérienne du Loc’h, entièrement détenue par le milliardaire breton. Propriété de la famille Bolloré depuis 1924, l’île, la plus vaste de l’archipel des Glénan, au large de Concarneau, avait été rachetée par Vincent Bolloré à ses cousins en 2010. D’une surface de 58 hectares, elle n’abrite qu’un seul bâtiment, une ancienne ferme où l’homme d’affaires aime se retirer. Le site est bien gardé : quatre agents de sécurité veillent toute l’année sur l’île, travaillant en binôme par cycles de quinze jours suivis de deux semaines de repos. Outre des rondes sur un parcours d’un peu moins de trois kilomètres, ces gardes marins effectuent aussi des tâches d’entretien et d’approvisionnement. Sans oublier de chasser les ragondins qui apprécient l’étang situé au milieu de l’île.
Faire fuir les curieux
Dès 2012, Vincent Bolloré a fait construire une clôture sur le pourtour de son île, classée en zone Natura 2000, mais les plaisanciers sont autorisés à venir se prélasser sur la grande plage. Charge aux gardiens d’empêcher des visiteurs curieux ou mal intentionnés de s’introduire sur le domaine privé du magnat des médias. La carrure bodybuildée et les tatouages nazis de Marc de Cacqueray-Valménier sont, à cet égard, particulièrement dissuasifs. Sur sa jambe gauche, il arbore une Totenkopf, une tête de mort utilisée comme emblème par certaines divisions SS. Sur son coude gauche, un soleil noir, symbole mystique du IIIe Reich. Les lettres inscrites sur ses deux cuisses forment le slogan suprémaciste blanc “White pride”. Sollicité par l’intermédiaire de son avocat, MeClément Diakonoff, Marc de Cacqueray-Valménier n’a pas répondu à La Lettre
D’un tempérament impulsif mais toujours poli, ce bagarreur sous contrôle judiciaire savoure le calme qui règne le plus souvent sur l’île déserte. “Marc Hassin” – son pseudo – semble en effet épanoui sur la photo de profil de son compte Instagram. Il s’y affiche en mer, sur une embarcation voguant au milieu des Glénan, avec en arrière-plan l’île Saint-Nicolas, plus touristique.
Dans les prochaines semaines, il encadrera quelques-unes des messes ouvertes au public, organisées à la demande de Vincent Bolloré depuis cinq ans sur l’île du Loc’h, chaque dimanche entre mi-juillet et mi-août. Comme les années précédentes, le milliardaire catholique pourrait participer à l’une d’entre elles.
Le clan Loustau au service de Bolloré
Comment cette icône de la nébuleuse nationaliste-révolutionnaire a-t-elle pu se retrouver sous les ordres de Vincent Bolloré ? Au-delà de l’extrême droitisation progressive de ses médias (CNews, JDD, Europe 1…), l’industriel n’avait jusqu’ici pas de liens connus – contractuels ou personnels – avec des milieux aussi radicaux. D’après nos informations, il fait pourtant confiance, depuis 2013 au moins, à une société liée à la “GUD connection” pour protéger son île du Loc’h : Checkport. Derrière ce discret groupe de sécurité privée, on retrouve la famille Loustau, un nom bien connu du Front national (FN) puis du Rassemblement national (RN). L’entreprise est contrôlée et dirigée par Philippe Loustau, candidat FN aux cantonales de 2004 dans les Bouches-du-Rhône et surtout frère d’Axel Loustau. Cet ex-pilier du GUD est un proche de Marine Le Pen, longtemps trésorier de son microparti Jeanne, et prestataire historique pour la communication du parti à la flamme, avec son acolyte Frédéric Chatillon.
Spécialisé dans la sécurité des entreprises et la sûreté aéroportuaire, le groupe Checkport est issu de la société de gardiennage Normandy, fondée en 1977 par le père de Philippe et d’Axel Loustau, Fernand Loustau. Après le décès en 1993 de cet ancien de l’OAS et vieil ami de Jean-Marie Le Pen, c’est l’aîné de la fratrie, Philippe, qui avait repris le flambeau et conservé le nom Normandy jusqu’en 2016. Axel Loustau n’a plus de parts dans l’entreprise depuis 2008, mais il officie lui aussi dans la sécurité privée. Comme l’a remarqué le média StreetPress, le clan Loustau est passé maître dans l’art de brouiller les pistes pour ne pas directement apparaître au capital de leurs entreprises. La compagne de Philippe Loustau, Catherine Soldatenkoff, a ainsi fait partie pendant plusieurs années des actionnaires d’Astoria Sécurité, l’entreprise d’Axel Loustau.
L’ange gardien Loustau
Marc de Cacqueray-Valménier, qui a réactivé le GUD à l’automne 2022 après la dissolution de son groupuscule Zouaves Paris – le GUD a lui-même été dissous le 26 juin dernier –, sait qu’il peut compter sur le soutien d’Axel Loustau. Comme en décembre 2022, quand le militant fiché S, déjà condamné à plusieurs reprises à des peines avec sursis, cherche à éviter la détention provisoire en attendant son procès dans l’affaire de la descente musclée le soir de France-Maroc. À l’époque, Marc de Cacqueray-Valménier transmet à la justice une promesse d’embauche opportune faite quelques jours plus tôt par la holding Financière Wagram, qui gère les affaires d’Axel Loustau, comme l’ont dévoilé Libération et Blast. Signée par son ami gudard Gabriel Loustau, fils d’Axel et directeur général de la société depuis 2019, la lettre offre au repris de justice un poste de DRH de Financière Wagram en CDI, avec un salaire très confortable de 5 200 € brut par mois, à partir de janvier 2023. Soit la période à laquelle Marc de Cacqueray a débarqué sur l’île de Vincent Bolloré, d’après nos informations. Axel Loustau a-t-il recommandé à son frère Philippe d’embaucher son protégé ? Les deux frères, contactés directement et via leurs avocats, n’ont pas répondu à nos questions.
Un néonazi en terres résistantes
Le profil de cette recrue détonne en tout cas avec l’histoire familiale de son donneur d’ordre, Vincent Bolloré. Le premier actionnaire de Vivendi, qui n’a pas donné suite à nos sollicitations, ne rate jamais une occasion d’évoquer l’engagement de plusieurs membres de sa famille contre l’Occupation. “Mon père était résistant, ainsi que certains de mes oncles, tandis que d’autres étaient à Londres ou dans l’escadrille Normandie-Niemen”, a rappelé le milliardaire, le 13 mars, devant les députés de la commission d’enquête sur la TNT. Parmi ces oncles : Gwenn-Aël Bolloré, propriétaire de l’île du Loc’h jusqu’à son décès en 2001.
Adorateur du collaborateur Robert Brasillach – à qui il a rendu hommage devant sa tombe à Paris en février –, Marc de Cacqueray-Valménier a d’autres références. Son père est un ancien de l’Action française, dont le jeune militant a un temps dirigé la section lycéenne à Paris. “Marc Hassin” a lui-même été attiré par le conflit armé. À l’automne 2020, il publie sur Instagram une photo de lui, kalachnikov à la main et patch SS sur le torse. Il se rend alors au Haut-Karabakh pour s’engager aux côtés des Arméniens contre l’Azerbaïdjan. Le nationaliste rentrera en assurant ne pas avoir combattu, un cessez-le-feu ayant été signé quinze jours après son arrivée. Quoi qu’il en soit, cet accro aux sports de combat continue de s’entraîner à recevoir des coups et surtout à en donner. On pouvait ainsi l’apercevoir, gants de boxe aux poignets, sur les photos d’un entraînement publiées par le GUD Paris sur sa chaîne Telegram, le 14 avril dernier. Gare aux visiteurs de l’île du Loc’h [fin]
la partie consacrée à Marc, ci-devant, Cacqueray Valménier, dans la chronique alphabétique et nécrologique de l’engagement français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas
A uniquely Ukrainian strain of Neo-Nazism is spreading throughout Europe, which openly advocates violence against minorities while seeking new recruits. With Kiev’s army collapsing and a narrative of Western betrayal gaining currency, the horror inflicted on residents of Donbas for a decade could very soon be coming to a city near you
Centuria, an ultra-violent Ukrainian Neo-Nazi faction, has cemented itself in six cities across Germany, and is seeking to expand its local presence. According to Junge Welt, a Berlin-based Marxist daily, the Nazi organization’s growth has been “unhindered by local security services.”
Junge Welt traces Centuria’s origins to an August 2020 Neo-Nazi summit “at the edge of a forest near Kiev.” There, an ultranationalist named Igor “Tcherkas” Mikhailenko demanded the “hundreds of mostly masked vigilante fighters present,” who were members Kiev’s fascistic National Militia, “make sacrifices for the idea of ‘Greater Ukraine.’” As the former head of the Neo-Nazi Patriot of Ukraine’s Kharkiv division, and commander of the state sponsored Azov Battalion from 2014 to 2015, Mikhailenko has professed a desire to “destroy everything anti-Ukrainian.”
Junge Welt reports that since 2017, the National Militia “had been practicing brutal vigilante justice” throughout Ukraine, including “tyrannizing the LGBTQ scene.” Centuria was subsequently blamed for a terrifying November 2021 attack on a gay nightclub in Kiev, in which its operatives assaulted revelers with truncheons and pepper spray.
Now the same Neo-Nazi sect “has an offshoot in Germany,” Junge Welt revealed. On August 24 2023, the 32nd anniversary of Ukraine’s independence, Centuria convened a “nationalist rally” in the central city of Magdeburg, “unmolested by Antifa and critical media reporting.”
Participants proudly posed with the flag of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) founded by World War II-era Nazi collaborator Stepan Bandera. Centuria boasted at the time on Telegram, “although Ukrainian youth are not in their homeland, they are starting to unite.” Meanwhile, they threatened the “enemies” of their country with “hellish storm,” pledging that “Ukrainian emigrants” would not “forget their national identity for a few hundred euros.”
Junge Welt reports that Centuria “is currently raising funds for its parent organization’s combat unit,” which is commanded by Andriy Biletsky – the Azov Battalion founder who infamously stated in 2014 that the Ukrainian nation’s mission was to “lead the white races of the world in a final crusade… against Semite-led Untermenschen.” At home, Centuria’s members express similar attitudes towards Muslims, Africans, and gays, whom they refer to, respectively, as the “German Caliphate,” “black rapists,” and “pedophiles.”
Now, the group’s members are working hard to pass their ideological vision down to future racists across the continent. “We are creating a new generation of heroes!” Centuria’s Telegram channel boasts. Accordingly, the neo-Nazi group has been arranging hiking trips to Germany’s Harz mountains with a Ukrainian nationalist scout association called Plast. This outfit opened chapters across the Western world beginning in the 1950s, in response to the Soviet Union’s hounding of fascists and nationalists. Besides receiving ideological indoctrination, Plast’s youthful members may have the opportunity to improve their physical fitness and receive military training. As Centuria ominously declares on Telegram, “free people have weapons.”
Opening ceremonies at the Lithuanian camp “Iskra” with Plast youth in an apparent “scout’s honor” salute, 2022
As Washington gradually backs away from its sponsorship of Ukraine’s war with Russia, it has begun ceding responsibility for the military campaign’s management – and likely failure – to Berlin. If US arms shipments continue to dwindle, Germany will become Kiev’s chief supplier of weapons. And the Germans may find that saying “no” to Ukraine could result in some nasty surprises.
Unlike the US, Germany does not enjoy an ocean-length buffer between itself and the fascistic proxy warriors it sponsors in Ukraine. After Ukraine’s much-hyped counteroffensive finally collapsed in late 2023, its president, Volodymyr Zelensky, grumbled a veiled threat during an interview with the Economist: “There is no way of predicting how the millions of Ukrainian refugees in European countries would react to their country being abandoned.”
While Ukrainians have generally “behaved well” and are “very grateful” to those who sheltered them, it would not be a “good story” for Europe if it were to “drive these people into a corner,” Zelensky remarked to the outlet.
To understand how more radical elements of a spent proxy force could turn their guns on the Western governments that armed them, one need only look at the events of September 11, 2001.
A secret Western-backed Nazi network
Centuria is seemingly not the only Azov-related Ukrainian movement seeking to infiltrate Europe. An apparently separate but identically named Centuria is doing the same, with help from an entrenched structure of elite European support.
In September 2021, George Washington University’s Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies (IERES) published a detailed and deeply unsettling report which documents how a once-secret order called Centuria was nurtured by a “self-described order of ‘European traditionalist’ military officers that has the stated goals of reshaping the country’s military along right-wing ideological lines and defending the ‘cultural and ethnic identity’ of European peoples against ‘Brussels’ politicos and bureaucrats.’”
IERES reported that Centuria’s military wing began training in 2018 in Ukraine’s Hetman Petro Sahaidachny National Army Academy (NAA), Kiev’s “premier military education institution and a major hub for Western military assistance to the country.”
The paper revealed that “as recently as April 2021, [Centuria] claimed that since its launch, members have participated in joint military exercises with France, the UK, Canada, the US, Germany, and Poland.”
Indeed, many of the neo-Nazi group’s members have drilled at the de facto NATO base in Yavoriv, just a few kilometers east of the Polish border.
Photo posted by the Canadian Armed Forces in Ukraine in 2020 shows the NAA graduation ceremony at the International Peacekeeping and Security Center in Yavoriv
What’s more, “the group claims that its members serve as officers in several units of Ukraine’s military. Since at least 2019, Centuria has… [called] on ideologically aligned members of the AFU to seek transfer to specific units where the group’s members serve. To attract new members, the group – via its Telegram channel, which has over 1,200 followers and a dedicated mobilization bot – continues to tout its alleged role in the AFU and access to Western training, military, and exchange programs.”
Every Western government the IERES researchers approached claimed not to tolerate neo-Nazis in their militaries, insisting they “trusted the Ukrainian government to select and identify the right candidates” for their training programs. But Ukraine’s Hetman Petro Sahaidachny National Army Academy (NAA) has explicitly declared it carries out no such screenings, while also denying Centuria operates within its headquarters.
After the report’s author reached out to Centuria and the NAA for comment about the training of neo-Nazis, operatives of the extremist movement began purging their online footprints, and have concealed their real-world activities ever since.
Western media outlets have almost completely ignored the IERES report, save for a single article in the Jerusalem Post. The silence around the issue is all the more unusual given the credentials of its author, a Washington DC-based Ukrainian citizen whose work has been published by US government outlet Voice of America, and the US and UK-government funded “open source” investigative outfit Bellingcat.
Among Western officials, only the Canadian Armed Forces have commented on the report’s meticulously-documented findings, preposterously claiming that photos posted to Facebook by Centuria members had been “doctored” to advance “Russian disinformation.”
Such disingenuity is not surprising given the Canadian military’s well-documented history of providing training to hardened Ukrainian fascists — and its refusal to disavow Ukrainian Nazis
US and Canadian military officers meet uniformed members of the neo-Nazi Azov Battalion during a November 2017 multinational training session in Ukraine.
To this day, the leader of the country’s military, Gen. Wayne Eyre, continues to refuse to apologize for giving a standing ovation to Yaroslav Hunka, a WWII Nazi collaborator honored by Canada’s parliament.
According to researchers, Centuria fighters within Ukraine have spent at least the last five years attempting to indoctrinate their high-achieving comrades into Neo-Nazism. The IERES report notes that Centuria “has been able to proselytize Ukraine’s future military elite inside the NAA.”
Portrait of a British-trained Neo-Nazi
Underlining the extent of the neo-Nazi penetration of Western military apparatuses, NAA cadet Kyrylo Dubrovskyi, attended an 11-month Officer Training Course at Britain’s esteemed Sandhurst Royal Military Academy in 2020. Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs celebrated his graduation while the NAA published a 12-minute video profile of the new graduate’s path to military leadership. IERES noted that Dubrovskyi “showed very keen interest in Centuria matters” while attending the Academy
Dubrovskyi appears to have narrated a Centuria promotional video circulated on Telegram in May 2020, in which the group’s members are shown marching in Lviv, attending an NAA event, and firing their weapons. Dubrovskyi can be heard intoning, “our officers are raising the new army of Ukraine… We are the Centuria. We are everywhere… defend your territories, your traditions till the last drop of blood.”
A month before, Centuria posted an interview with an unnamed “cadet of Her Majesty’s Armed forces,” a description that could only match one individual: Dubrovskyi. He made clear he preferred training in Ukraine, as British training for military officers “put less emphasis on theory.” During this time, “Dubrovskyi enjoyed access to foreign cadets who visited the Academy,” and “on several occasions escorted foreign delegations that visited the Academy,” including cadets from the US Air Force and the French military.
It is unclear how much “theory” Dubrovskyi injected into the daily routines of Western soldiers with whom he crossed paths while at Sandhurst. IERES concluded that “Dubrovskyi and Centuria leveraged his status as a Sandhurst cadet” to promote the group and its ideology. On the “about” section of his personal YouTube channel, Dubrovskyi describes himself as “a cadet of the Royal Academy of Great Britain.” There, he posted multiple videos about his experiences at the academy, and at least one message expressing a desire to join the neo-Nazi Azov Regiment.
On Telegram in December 2020, Centuria made clear that infiltrating the Ukrainian military’s highest echelons was but the first step in a much wider ideological blitzkrieg: “Centuria is shaping a first-of-its-kind military elite whose goal is to attain the highest ranks inside the Armed Forces in order to become an authoritative core able to hold significant influence.” After consolidating its hold on the military, the group plans to penetrate the ranks of “Ukraine’s political elite,” in order to “carry out societal changes.”
Editor’s note: This article has been clarified to explain that Centuria exists as two separate organizations, both with origins in the neo-Nazi Azov movement [end]
in French, an alphabetical obituary chronicle of the French involvement in the Atlanticist ranks in Ukraine, what servile journalists will not tell you
Sur Telegram et Signal, ils s’inspirent des méthodes de Daech pour enclencher une guerre civile et faire advenir une société suprémaciste
(L’ADN)
« Le canal privé est prêt. Pour les vérifications, voilà l’exemple de candidature à m’envoyer. » Pour intégrer le canal en question, il faudra spécifier son âge, sa région, et envoyer une photo de sa main tenant un papier où est écrit « les Aryens français. »
Voilà quelques-unes des démarches à suivre pour intégrer l’une des 5 chaînes Telegram où se retrouvent quelque 4 500 néonazis français très remontés. Leur objectif : faire advenir une société organisée en fonction de la race. Depuis plusieurs années, le reporter indépendant Ricardo Parreira infiltre, cartographie et étudie l’extrême droite extraparlementaire. Dans Reflets, journal d’investigation en ligne, il livre les résultats d’une glaçante enquête sur l’essor du Terrorgram : les messageries cryptées où l’on discute en toute décontraction ventes d’armes, attentats et nettoyage ethnique. Surveillées par la DGSI, ces chaînes ouvertement terroristes nourrissent un agenda bien précis : contrecarrer le « déclin civilisationnel » et imposer une société dominée par les Blancs
De plus en plus, sur les canaux Telegram, on voit passer des vidéos de militants néonazis posant avec leurs armes, affirmant qu'ils sont prêts à tuer.
« Les terroristes suprémacistes français sont en roue libre depuis la dissolution de l’Assemblée. Avec les résultats du premier tour des législatives, cela part dans tous les sens, et sur Telegram l’obsession d’une guerre civile est de plus en plus palpable », affirme Ricardo Parreira dans une interview donnée à L’ADN. En ligne, la mouvance autoproclamée Terrorgram (néologisme composé de terror, terreur en anglais + Telegram) appelle à l’ « autodéfense nationaliste ». Parmi les chaînes concernées, celles des groupes FRDeter et Division Aryenne Française. Là, le ton est très vite donné : éloge de la « race blanche », appels à « casser du bougnoule » et systématiser les ratonnades, incitations aux assassinats d’élus, fichage ou doxxing de personnalités de gauche, et fantasmes génocidaires. Les formules antisémites, suprémacistes et néonazies abondent. Parmi eux : les slogans américains « white boy summer » (l’été du garçon blanc), « white rural rage » (haine rurale blanche), ou encore la devise allemande invitant à la déportation « Ausländer raus » (dehors les étrangers).
Capture d’écran issue du Terrogram français récupéré par Ricardo Parreira
« Il s’agit pour eux de déployer en Europe les techniques militaires et modes opératoires de Daech pour se débarrasser de toutes personnes considérées comme un ennemi : les migrants, les “étrangers”, les LGBTQA+ et les militants de gauche. Leur plan est clairement tracé : mener des actions terroristes de sabotage pour créer des pénuries, générer des pertes financières, stimuler une crise économique et sociale débouchant sur le chaos et l’effondrement de la société pour, ensuite, la reconstruire sous un régime néonazi totalitariste », explique Ricardo Parreira à L’ADN. Dans sa série d’enquêtes publiée sur Politis, la chef de rubrique Nadia Sweeny analyse plusieurs occurrences devenues emblématiques de la mouvance française. Tout d’abord, le cas de Nicolas N., condamné en 2021 à 9 ans de prison pour association de malfaiteurs terroriste. En 2015, il écrit sur Facebook : « Le terrorisme du style Daech : il ne nous reste que ça. (…) En prenant certaines villes moyennes, l’économie de l’État va s’écrouler. Tu laisses faire le travail. (…) Si t’as plusieurs villes, ça bougera : c’est ce qu’ont fait les jihadistes en Irak. » Ensuite, le projet WaffenKraft, mené en 2018 par une cellule terroriste impliquant un jeune gendarme adjoint volontaire et mêlant références nazies et fascination pour Daech et Al-Qaida
C’est aux États-Unis que la sphère Terrorgram se met peu à peu en place à partir de 2017 afin de renforcer les communications entre des groupes accélérationnistes militants. Parmi eux : des groupuscules issus du forum Iron March, plateforme néonazie et néofasciste fondée en 2011 et dissoute 6 ans plus tard ; The Base, organisation paramilitaire accélérationniste formée en 2018 par Rinaldo Nazzaro qui continuerait de diriger l’entité depuis la Russie ; et Atomwaffen Division, réseau terroriste néonazi développé en 2013 et responsable d’une vingtaine d’assassinats dans le monde, et première entité occidentale à revendiquer le droit de mener « un Djihad blanc » et une « charia blanche ».
« Le mouvement Terrorgram a connu différentes itérations en fonction de la naissance ou du démantèlement des groupes, mais le but était de constituer un réseau informel d’une multitude de chaînes et de canaux Telegram diffusant une esthétique, des manifestes et des écrits communs », explique Mathieu Colin, spécialiste des idéologies extrémistes. Parmi ces écrits : Siege, série d’essais écrits dans les années 80 par le néonazi américain James Mason, l’un des premiers pamphlets faisant l’apologie des tactiques accélérationnistes terroristes, le manifeste The Great Replacement du terroriste Brenton Tarrant baptisé en hommage à l’essayiste français, manuels d’instruction pour mener des attaques, manier des armes ou construire des explosifs. Et bien sûr, toute une ribambelle de propagandes visuelles, présentant les « Saints » de la mouvance. En plus des terroristes Anders Breivik et Brenton Tarrant encensés sur le Terrorgram français, la frange américaine de la sphère met en avant d’autres figures : Adolf Hitler, Timothy McVeigh, terroriste et vétéran de l’armée américaine exécuté en 2001, Dylann Roof, responsable du meurtre de 9 Afro-américains à Charleston en Caroline du Sud, ou encore Oskar Dirlewanger, dirigeant d’une brigade SS qui aurait reçu de la part d’Himmler « carte blanche pour violer, piller, torturer et massacrer » en Europe de l’Est. Lentement mais sûrement, Terrorgram internationalise et essaime son modèle, notamment avec la naissance de la Sonnenkrieg Division au Royaume-Uni, ou de la Feuerkrieg Division dans les Pays baltes, des groupes inspirés par Atomwaffen
Capture d’écran issue du Terrorgram américainCapture d’écran issue du Terrorgram américainCapture d’écran issue du Terrorgram américain
Concrètement, quelles actions violentes sont directement imputables à Terrorgram à ce jour ? Selon Mathieu Colin, Payton Gendron, coupable de l’attentat de Buffalo dans l’État de New York en 2022, aurait été largement inspiré par Brenton Tarrant ; Juraj Krajčík, responsable la même année de l’attentat de Bratislava, citait explicitement Terrorgram. Le projet d’attaque des centrales électriques de Baltimore en 2023 par Brandon Russell, fondateur d’Atomwaffen, aurait lui aussi été influencé par le réseau. « Pour l’instant, l’objectif est certes de radicaliser et d’inspirer des actes de violence, mais surtout de désensibiliser par rapport à l’emploi de la violence ou à ses conséquences. Il ne s’agit pas de radicaliser l’ensemble de la société, mais bien de pousser sa communauté, des gens déjà acquis à la cause, à procéder à des actes violents, par le biais du partage, de l’utilisation ou la glorification de l’ultra-violence, notamment djihadiste, puisque ces réseaux sont en effet fascinés par la force de l’esthétique de Daech ou Al Qaida », analyse le chercheur. « Le forum Iron March ne comptait que quelques milliers de membres, mais leur travail de propagande a ruisselé sur différents groupuscules et organisations d’extrême droite dans le monde », rapporte Ricardo Parreira à L’ADN.
Avant Terrorgram
Au Royaume-Uni, le ministère de l’intérieur britannique entendait en avril dernier faire interdire les différents canaux du Terrorgram, désigné comme « un réseau de terroristes néofascistes », indique Le Monde. En France, le ministère de l’Intérieur recensait en mai 2023 une dizaine d’attentats terroristes déjoués depuis 2017 liés à des groupuscules d’extrême droite, faisant de la mouvance la seconde menace après les attentats islamistes. Une situation alarmante qui ne s’est pas produite ex nihilo, et serait notamment alimentée par les discours des partis politiques. Dans son enquête, le reporter précise : « L’extrême droite parlementaire et ses programmes politiques ne reposent sur rien d’autre qu’une traduction sémantique des idéologies défendues par les franges les plus radicales de l’extrême droite depuis plus de cinquante ans. Les termes comme “guerre civilisationnelle”, “submersion migratoire” et, bien évidemment, la “préférence nationale ou le “grand remplacement” sont des exemples frappants du transfert idéologique qui s’opère entre l’extrême droite parlementaire et extraparlementaire » [fin]
Je déplore un point de détail dans cette série d’articles, imagine ce que peuvent être les impératifs éditoriaux par les temps qui courent.
Parler des ces nazis, en particulier français, sans jamais évoquer l’Ukraine, est une prouesse.
Alors que les plus dangereux, les César Aujard, Gwendal Delange et autres, se forment actuellement au combat et armes de guerre dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine. Alors que même les captures d’écran de Ricardo Parreira nous montrent l’insigne de la Misanthropic Division, organisation nazie internationale, fondée et basée en Ukraine depuis 2013. Mais sa confrère Laure Coromines trouve moyen de citer la Russie, comme villégiature hypothétique de Rinaldo Nazzaro, alors que les organisations nazies y sont interdites et leurs militants pourchassés par le FSB, comme ils ne le sont pas en France.
Si les adversaires du fascisme veulent vraiment le combattre, qu’ils commencent par ne pas se voiler la face, ne pas se censurer sur ses mécanismes et sa géographie.
où nous apprenons que le nazi français Allan Duchézeau, camarade de César Aujard dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, était surnommé Dox, quand il secondait à Paris le leader nazi Marc de Cacqueray Valménier
chronique alphabétique et nécrologique de l’engagement français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas
its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine and Baltic States, how NATO has supported Nazism in eastern Europe
In Lyon, France, on November 11, 2023, dozens masked Nazi militants, atavistic or congenital cowards, attack with baseball bats and other weapons an indoor political meeting, mostly women and elders, about Gaza, Palestine, where Israel is committing mass killing and ethnic cleansing. The cops come late, make no arrest
Kenneth in Ukraine (social networks)
These Nazi militants are also supporting Ukraine. One of them, Kenneth, has enlisted in Revansh battalion, the military branch of Tradytsiya ta poryadok [tradition and order] organization. The Ukrainian Nazi formation is based in Kharkov region, where however, Kenneth does not seem to be in a hurry to fight the Russian forces.
the Israeli air force targets an overcrowded hospital in the center of the palästinensisches Wohngebiet von Gaza [in German, Palestinian ghetto in Gaza]
[où nous apprenons que le nazi français Allan Duchézeau, camarade de César Aujard dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, était surnommé Dox, quand il secondait à Paris le leader nazi Marc de Cacqueray Valménier]
L’un était tatoueur, fils d’une légende de la photo, l’autre devait épouser l’actrice Béatrice Dalle. Aujourd’hui, les deux amis sont devenus des hooligans néonazis. César Aujard combat en Ukraine, alors que Paul Bichet fait des combats clandestins.
Janvier 2020. César Aujard est tatoueur. Il a d’abord fait partie d’un collectif de graffiti, avant de dessiner sur les corps. Cet hiver, il a gravé à l’encre une phrase en style gothique sur le ventre de son pote Paul Bichet : « Si un seul crime avait suffi, je n’en aurais commis aucun ». La même que sur le dos de son amoureuse, l’actrice Béatrice Dalle. Publiée sur Instagram, la photo du tatouage est immédiatement likée par le père de César, le célèbre photographe Richard Aujard, dont Béatrice Dalle est une amie de longue date. Quelques semaines plus tard, Paul Bichet et Béatrice Dalle affichent leur idylle dans les défilés pour Yves Saint Laurent et les magazines people. LSDémon et KetamineQueen, comme ils se surnomment, doivent même se marier.
Las, on ne sait pas ce qu’il est advenu du projet. Mais trois ans plus tard, Paul Bichet a agressé ce qu’il pensait être des antifascistes dans un métro à Paris, se revendique du hooliganisme le plus violent et participe à des combats clandestins en Pologne. Dans une vidéo promotionnelle de ces pugilats, il dédicace César et ses amis « qui se battent à balles réelles ». Ce dernier a quitté son salon et la France, en partie pour fuir la garde à vue et des perquisitions dans le cadre d’une enquête pour le tabassage de plusieurs personnes d’origine étrangère. Des agressions qui ont eu lieu avec des dizaines d’autres hooligans néonazis à la gare du Nord, fin avril dernier. Il se bat désormais sur le front de l’Est avec l’armée ukrainienne. Sur son compte Instagram, il distille des aperçus de sa vie, entre séances de muscu et entraînements au tir, comme l’ont raconté Mediapart, Libération ou L’Équipe. Ensemble, les deux hommes ont connu une trajectoire vers l’extrême droite la plus violente. Portrait croisé.
Le point de bascule
« César a dérivé dans la bêtise de l’extrémisme », lâche au téléphone Marco (1), une ancienne connaissance du désormais combattant de l’Est. « Mais avant, c’était quand même un mec malin. Son salon de tatouage marchait bien. » L’homme a d’abord vécu en région parisienne dans un milieu artistique. Son père est le célèbre photographe Richard Aujard, qui a réalisé des reportages sur les bikers australiens dans les années 80 ou des boxeurs new-yorkais. Il a immortalisé dans son style noir et blanc des grandes stars américaines comme Naomi Campbell, Mike Tyson, Cameron Diaz ou des personnalités hexagonales comme Monica Bellucci, Éric Cantona, Belmondo, Béatrice Dalle… Certains d’entre eux sont devenus de bons amis. « C’était un genre de hippie, vraiment baba cool. Il n’était pas du tout dans une idéologie d’extrême droite », se souvient son confrère, le photojournaliste émérite Yan Morvan
César se bat depuis mai 2023 sur le front de l’Est avec l’armée ukrainienne. Sur son compte Instagram, il distille des aperçus de sa vie, entre gros flingues, séances de muscu ou entraînements au tir. / Crédits : FafLeaks
La mort de « Richie », comme l’appelaient ses proches, en février 2021, a été un véritable choc. « J’ai perdu un pote… un frère !!! Quelqu’un qui m’a magnifié avec son œil », a par exemple lâché JoeyStarr. « Mes amis-amis, je les comptais sur les doigts d’une main de Django Reinhardt et je viens d’en perdre un », a écrit l’ancien joueur de Manchester United Éric Cantona. Quant à la vedette d’Hollywood Mickey Rourke, il a rendu hommage « à un des plus proches amis que j’ai jamais eu dans ma vie ».
À la mort de son père, César aurait vrillé. Une bascule vers les mouvances d’extrême droite à l’origine de fortes tensions dans la famille Aujard. « Ça a été très vite. Si Richard était encore là, il n’aurait pas basculé », présente l’un des amis du paternel. Plusieurs proches ont refusé de parler à StreetPress, préférant désavouer le rejeton et protéger la mémoire du photographe. « Il n’aurait jamais cautionné les activités de son fils. On n’est pas responsable du comportement de quelqu’un qui a 30 ans. Pour moi ce qu’il fait depuis, c’est qu’il se suicide », lance une autre très en colère face à notre demande d’interview. Marco, l’ex-connaissance, résume :
« Là, il a sali le nom de son père. »
Le Jackass français
Le nom de Paul Bichet apparaît sur les sites d’actus people à l’hiver 2020. Sur des dizaines de pages, il est présenté comme le nouveau compagnon et futur mari de l’actrice Béatrice Dalle. Le jeune homme n’a que 23 ans, mais possède déjà une petite notoriété dans le milieu du wakeboard français, sorte de snowboard sur l’eau. Un amateur de la discipline qui l’a connu dans sa jeunesse se souvient d’un garçon « atypique et engagé à 100% dans ce qu’il faisait ». Capable de « montrer son cul à 20.000 personnes depuis l’Hôtel de région à Montpellier (34) » lors du Festival international des sports extrêmes, complète le média Handle. Paul Bichet est un peu le Jackass français. « Il s’éclatait des planches de skate sur les couilles, il se les cramait. Il y avait un groupe Facebook où il y avait toutes ces conneries en vidéo », raconte Marco, l’ex-connaissance de César qui a aussi croisé le casse-cou :
« Paul s’était pété je ne sais pas combien de fois les dents. Tous les trucs hardcore, il les a faits. »
Son CV met également en lumière ces liens avec les milieux artistiques. Il a tourné dans un court-métrage en 2019, avant de s’afficher au sélect « dîner de la mode » organisé conjointement par la Fédération de la Haute Couture et de la Mode et le Sidaction, en janvier 2020. Line Renaud, la princesse Marie de Danemark, l’ancienne miss France Iris Mittenaere ou le créateur Jean-Paul Gaultier participent au gala. Ce soir-là, Béatrice Dalle pose à son bras pour le magazine Vanity Fair. L’occasion pour le couple d’officialiser leur relation.
Le jeune homme fait la rencontre de différentes personnalités, dont l’écrivaine féministe Virginie Despentes, grande amie de Dalle. / Crédits : FafLeaks
Aux médias people, la « figure rebelle du cinéma français » Dalle – comme la caractérise le Monde dans un portrait en 2020 – vante la « tendresse » et la « fantaisie » de Paul Bichet. Le mois suivant, ils sont aux premiers rangs du défilé d’Yves Saint Laurent, comme les stars internationales Charlotte Gainsbourg, Rami Malek ou Zoé Kravitz. Le jeune homme fait la rencontre de différentes personnalités, dont l’écrivaine féministe Virginie Despentes, grande amie de Dalle. Le couple manifeste contre la loi Sécurité globale – dont un des articles pénalisait la diffusion d’images des policiers. Au printemps 2021, Paul Bichet pose pour un shooting de la marque de luxe Jean-Paul Gaultier, habillé de la marinière iconique, qui apparaît dans L’uomo Vogue – la version masculine italienne du magazine.
Au printemps 2021, Paul Bichet pose pour un shooting de la marque de luxe Jean-Paul Gaultier avec la marinière iconique. / Crédits : Instagram
Les combats
Un an plus tard, Paul Bichet s’entraîne au combat avec César Aujard. « César s’occupait de recruter des mecs pour devenir… Fafs quoi », se souvient Marco, l’ex-connaissance :
Après un fight de leur ami hooligan Maxime Bellamy, Paul félicite le duo sur Instagram. « Merci mon George Floyd », lui répond le combattant. Paul renchérit : « I can’t breathe. » / Crédits : FafLeaks
César va aussi s’entraîner dans l’école de boxe thaï de Guillaume Kerner. Cet ancien international français s’est installé au milieu du 18e arrondissement de Paris. « Il ne passait pas inaperçu, il avait des tatouages partout et il savait déjà boxer », se souvient celui qui a été surnommé « l’Ange blond » durant sa carrière. Il poursuit :
« C’était “bonjour, au revoir” et il s’entraînait. Quand il mettait les gants, c’était brutal. »
Marco se souvient d’une vidéo de César. « Il y avait une bagarre entre son pote et un autre gars. Des mecs voulaient intervenir en faveur de l’autre. César a couché par terre deux mecs à coups de casque. »
Rapidement, César parle au coach Kerner des fight clubs clandestins. « J’ai compris qu’il était friand de ça, ça le fascinait un peu », lâche le boxeur. Au sein du club, des tensions commencent à naître entre César et les autres combattants. « Des gens m’ont dit que c’était un nazi. Ils ne voulaient pas de lui et disaient qu’on ne devait pas accepter les fachos », rembobine Guillaume Kerner :
« Ils m’envoyaient plein de trucs d’internet avec des tatouages et leurs significations nazies. »
Tatouages et salut de Kühnen
Depuis la mort de son père, César a de nouveaux tattoos. Ses deux étoiles, ancrées au-dessus des pectoraux ont été remplacées par des croix de fer, un symbole prisé des mouvements de bikers, mais aussi des groupes d’extrême droite. Il se fait également des runes d’Algiz et d’Odal ou un Kolovrat, des symboles nordiques et slaves repris par les néonazis.
La photo de César en train de faire le fameux salut de Kühnen à trois doigts au stade est publiée sur les réseaux sociaux par le journal sportif l’Équipe. Il est à ce moment-là membre des Jeunesses Boulogne, un groupe d’hooligans héritiers du Kop of Boulogne. Il continue de porter le t-shirt de la bande en Ukraine. / Crédits : FafLeaks
Un jour, les membres du club de boxe et César s’expliquent. « Il a dit qu’il avait fait partie des mecs qui font des combats de hooligans, mais il a nié être nazi », se rappelle son éphémère entraîneur. « Il nous a dit : “Dans ce pays, dès qu’on dit qu’on est fier d’être blanc ou qu’on est patriotique, on se fait cataloguer de facho” ». Guillaume Kerner tranche :
« J’avais l’impression de voir un gars un peu fragile psychologiquement et prédisposé à aller vers l’extrémisme. »
Il se dit que la boxe et son club « peuvent l’aider ». « J’ai voulu lui donner une chance », souffle l’ancien combattant qui connaissait lui aussi son père Richard.
La situation s’envenime lorsque César participe à une compétition à Nanterre de l’académie de muay thaï, dirigée par l’ex-champion Jo Prestia. Lui aussi était un ami de son paternel. À la fin du combat, « César aurait fait un salut à trois doigts » vers ses soutiens amassés dans les gradins, lâche Guillaume Kerner. C’est un salut de Kühnen, ersatz de salut nazi inventé par le néonazi allemand Michael Kühnen pour contourner l’interdiction de ce geste. « Ça a dégénéré en bagarre. Une connaissance à lui et des mecs de mon club se sont invectivés et frictionnés », raconte-t-il. Jo Prestia commente :
« On a dû s’en mêler pour sortir [César] d’un mauvais pas. Il a vraiment craint pour sa vie. Évidemment, par respect pour Richie, on l’a défendu. »
Selon l’ancien champion, César Aujard aurait été « menacé de mort pour ces faits » après le combat. Kerner, lui, a demandé à César d’arrêter de venir à son club :
« Il l’a compris. Mais comment ça se fait qu’il vient dans un club comme le mien au milieu des Noirs et des Maghrébins ? C’est ça qui m’a incité à croire à la repentance. »
La ratonnade et la fuite
Le 29 avril 2023, à 16h57, station La Chapelle, César Aujard descend de la ligne 2 du métro parisien avec un groupe de 80 hooligans néonazis, ces hommes qui gravitent autour du football, extrêmement violents et fans de bastons. Ceux-là sont de la capitale ou viennent de Toulouse (31). Reconnaissable à sa tête de squelette tatouée à l’arrière du crâne, César est habillé d’un bomber noir. Ses potes et lui se rendent au Stade de France à Saint-Denis (93), pour voir la finale de Coupe de France de football qui oppose Toulouse et Nantes (44). Rapidement, ils crient :
« La France aux Français. »
Dans les tunnels du métro, ils agressent des passants et des vendeurs à la sauvette d’origine maghrébine, sri lankaise ou africaine. Théo C., attaché parlementaire LFI, tente de les filmer et se fait tabasser en retour. Le soir même, la photo de César en train de faire le fameux salut de Kühnen à trois doigts au stade est publiée par le journal sportif l’Équipe. Théo C. le reconnaît et témoigne dans StreetPress. Une enquête policière est lancée et le domicile de César est perquisitionné.
Mais le tatoueur est déjà parti en Ukraine. C’est désormais un golgoth qui combat avec les forces locales contre l’envahisseur russe, une posture partagée par une grande partie de l’extrême droite française. Entre deux entraînements, il dessine des croix celtiques avec un ex de la Légion étrangère surnommé Dox. Un ancien lieutenant de Marc de Cacqueray-Valmenier au sein du Gud,. Le duo est complété par Kenneth, un néonazi lyonnais. Marco souffle :
« Il est vraiment parti trop loin. S’il survit à tout ça, il va finir mercenaire. »
Entre deux entraînements, César dessine des croix celtiques avec un ancien de la Légion étrangère surnommé Dox. À droite, ils soulignent les lettres « WP » car chez les fafs, c’est l’acronyme de « White Power », le « pouvoir blanc ». / Crédits : FafLeaks
Antifas et croix gammées
Quant à Paul, il commence comme ses potes hools parisiens à vouloir « éclater » des antifascistes, comme il l’explique dans un audio que StreetPress a pu consulter. Courant 2023, il publie une vidéo en public sur son compte Instagram. On le voit assis dans la ligne 14 du métro. Rapidement, il se lève et se place face à un groupe de cinq personnes visiblement fans de métal. Ils arborent sur leurs blousons des patchs Black Sabbath et Rammstein. Mais pour Paul Bichet, ce sont des antifas. « Agenouille-toi avant que je devienne une machine à douleur », lance-t-il à l’un des membres du groupe qui ne comprend pas. Paul l’empoigne, le frappe et répète :
« Agenouille-toi. Agenouille-toi avant que je t’éclate. Agenouillez-vous. Enculés d’antifas va ! »
Les métalleux sortent du métro et Paul Bichet les poursuit, comme possédé.
Après la vidéo, certains de ses proches se détournent de lui. « Il était vraiment instable. Quand on allait boire des bières, il n’avait jamais ce genre d’attitude », indique Antoine (1). Pour cet ancien pote, Paul Bichet « est vraiment un gentil ». « Je sais que ça peut paraître bizarre, mais c’est un gosse : on dirait qu’il a 40 balais alors qu’il en a 26. » Il se souvient du message d’excuses publié le lendemain de l’agression par Paul Bichet. Pour autant, l’homme ne cache pas ses opinions. Il indique dans un de ses posts qu’un « bon Arabe est un Arabe mort ». Sur une autre photo, on le voit avec un t-shirt marqué du blason de Paris. Sauf que les fleurs de lys ont été remplacées par des croix gammées.
Paul Bichet s’est déjà affiché sur les réseaux avec ce t-shirt floqué du blason de Paris. Sauf que les fleurs de lys y sont remplacées par… des croix gammées. / Crédits : FafLeaks
Des combats clandestins en Pologne
L’ancien Jackass a commencé à faire des combats clandestins en Pologne cet été. Dans une vidéo pour Gromda, l’organisation qui chapeaute ces fights, Paul Bichet se définit comme un « hooligan » du « Kop Boulogne », ce collectif de supporters du PSG actif des années 70 à 2010, noyauté par certains groupes d’extrême droite. Il détaille :
« J’ai commencé à rencontrer et traîner avec des gens du football, qui était plus axé sur la bagarre que sur le foot en lui-même. Et ça tombe bien car moi, j’en ai rien à foutre du football aussi. »
Si le hooligan parisien s’oriente désormais vers les combats clandestins, c’est qu’il n’aime « pas vraiment [se] battre dans la rue ». « Je ne me rappelle jamais de mes bagarres », renchérit-il dans la suite de cette vidéo. Quand il a vu ça, Antoine a été dégoûté : « Paul, c’est vraiment un suiveur. Il avait envie de pratiquer ce type de combat de barges. Dans cinq ou six ans, il se retournera et se dira : “J’ai fait de la merde”. » Le néonazi a toujours le soutien de Béatrice Dalle, qui a partagé l’annonce de ce combat en mai dernier sur Instagram, accompagnée du commentaire : « Mon p’tit Polo, je t’aime ».
Paul Bichet a toujours le soutien de Béatrice Dalle, qui a partagé l’annonce de ce combat en mai dernier sur Instagram, accompagnée du commentaire : « Mon p’tit Polo, je t’aime. » / Crédits : FafLeaks
Contactés, César Aujard, l’entreprise Jean-Paul Gaultier, Béatrice Dalle ou Virginie Despentes n’ont pas répondu aux sollicitations de StreetPress. Paul Bichet, lui, a répondu que nous nous mettions « le doigt dans l’oeil » après avoir lu notre « mail d’approche » à son entourage. Il a indiqué ne pas vouloir répondre à nos questions et il a supprimé son compte Instagram.
en Anglais, its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine
Max Blumenthal and Aaron Mate cover the international scandal that unfolded when the Liberal Party of Canada’s Justin Trudeau honored a Ukrainian Nazi veteran of the Waffen-SS, and the dark history it forced to the surface
The first time I learned about Kent McLellan “Boneface” was through the investigation of Vasily Prozorov a former employee of the Ukrainian Security Services now uncovering the hidden truths of Ukraine on his channel UKRLEAKS [on Telegram].
Then Boneface himself contacted my colleague Truthseeker77 wanting to challenge some of the reports I have made on my channel about him. We decided to ask Boneface for an interview, we would laid the questions together, and Truthseeker77 would conduct all the “interrogatory” to the US Neo Nazi.
The results of this work not only produced the written interview with Mclellan about his time in Ukraine but also videos and information about his past troubles with the American authorities and a insight to the mindset of a US white supremacist thanks to the excellent job of my colleague.
Kent Ryan McLellan, April 22, 1990, St. Cloud (Florida). Son of the front man of neo Nazi rock band Brutal Attack, in high school, he already became a member of the racist organization “The American Front”. He was first arrested at the age of 18 in September 2008 for racist graffiti. In 2010, he served time for vandalism and beating immigrants. In May 2012, the FBI detained McLellan and his accomplices from the “American Front” for preparing a terrorist act against national minorities in Florida.
He joined the ranks of the “Ukrainian Volunteer Corps of the Right Sector” (DUK RS) in 2014 for a number of months going back to the US to keep running Misanthropic Division and its recruitment campaign for Ukraine. In January 2022, returned to Ukraine and joined Azov Battalion.
When did you heard about Ukraine first?
Ukraine as political situation; I’ve always known it existed as a nation. That’s clear. As far as being a skinhead/white nationalist goes, the videos from Tesak, in which he had a huge following in Ukraine, not just Russia.
What organizations did you contact and how?
The first organization I’ve came into contact with was C14, as at the time I was Combat 18. Which is it’s Western equivalent.
I kept contact with them predominantly with vk.com [VKontakte, Russian social networking service], it was difficult and still is difficult to maintain a page on most social media. My original vk.com account was vk.com/kenthate [blocked for violation of VK terms of service].
I was publishing information in which someone had essentially said the ISIS movement and the national-socialists are the same. So I published a thesis about the Islamic State and their hatred for nationalism, using one of their propaganda videos.
After C14 shared it, Francisco got in contact with me. He was Misanthropic Division.
From there I didn’t immediately joined, but I respected a lot of their publishing. We had a brief fallout in 2012 after the FBI arrested me for helping run a training camp here in Florida.
I remember the Kiev protests were just starting. A lot of the guys from C14 and at the time what became Right Sector, (Svoboda, Blue Boys, C14, Blood and Honor, Slavic Union), we’re attending this. It wasn’t long before things got crazy into it. People we’re leaving the protest sites and simply vanishing. It wasn’t long before Vodafone started getting jammed up. So I formed a squad of guys to essentially get around the DNS, and create a patch in network so people could coordinate with one another
Boneface in Ukraine in the ranks of Right Sector. 2014
How did you travel there?
I earned an OSCP [hacking] certification with Offensive Security, got a passport. I got there in 2014. I got a 9-day visa, ticket there and back, with no real meaning of actually returning. That was the first time.
By the time I went I was already running Misanthropic Division in the United States.
How was the relation of the general public with the ultras, how much open was the fascist dominance compared with the reports of the Western media, how many ultras where there roughly?
The public were the ultras, as crazy as it sounds. Everyone was patriotic. Back then, everyone knew what was happening. BBC reported, Americans reported it.
As far as ultra groups went, there wasn’t that many in number of actual organizations. Everyone was pretty much C14 and the title “Pravyi sektor [Right Sector] absorbed everything else.
They hosted events nearly daily in every oblast that wasn’t seeing war.
How many people from foreign countries were there?
Foreign members included a lot from Georgia, Latvia, America, Finland, a lot of skinheads.
In case the world wonders what happened to all the real skinheads. They all went to Ukraine.
What groups in the US support them?
Ukraine doesn’t work very closely anymore with the Americans. There is a American DUK, even Misanthropic Division had its own goals here vs what they had going on there. Ukraine has their shit together.
Just look at Florida, It’s all literal trash. With no clear aims as a movement, no goals and outside of 2014, real militants failed to exist as a collective in the White Power world.
In fact, most militias existing in the United States today are a result of Atom Waffen [Atom Waffen Division, international Nazi group based in the US], and the Misanthropic Division [international Nazi organization based in Ukraine].
What you did while in Ukraine, what people and from where you met there?
I wasn’t by far the first person to go to Ukraine. We sent several others, we kept having hiccups in all this. Dalton; Lane, are noted individuals. We did this entirely on our own, out of our pockets, etc.
I never knew the circumstances of Lane, and what he was running from. But it wasn’t until they both got there and decided to live in Ukraine, that we had a stable reliable enough route for Americans to reach Ukraine and not be stranded at air ports.
At this point I didn’t really know what to think, the training regiment wasn’t anything like you see with Americans.
It wasn’t dehumanizing. A lot of what would become Azov spoke English and it was mandatory to study Russian.
Right Sector controlled nearly everything as far as the militant nationalists went.
How did fellow Azov members accepted you?
They weren’t Azov yet, but yeah they took me well. Ukrainians didn’t really, because of the language barrier. They must’ve thought I was retarded.
This time around I was first placed with the 227th recon, which was a slap in the face for me. It wasn’t until after the war and I made it rightfully back into the second battalion, with people I knew.
How was your deployment time in Mariupol with Azov Battalion?
During the first run of Mariupol when the awkward stand off and fear-thick atmosphere finally wore off, there was a lot of shooting at absolute nothing, and a lot of soldiers not knowing what to do. Myself included at that.
The citizens of Mariupol itself were divided heavily on pro Ukraine and a pro Russian stance.
There were occasional Russian soldiers in the mix of things, this can be attested to a dozen or so pro Russian separatist prisoners
Did the U.S. government entice you or help you in any way?
As far as the government goes. During the Maidan coup, I got caught teaching the UKR guys DNS poisoning (placing false information in a DNS resolver cache on internet).
They wanted to sit in and help. They didn’t want names or anything, but they wanted to monitor the situation. Without this backing I would’ve been charged with violation of American neutrality act. Which is a law written in 1784.
Have you witnessed war crimes committed by any Ukrainian battalions?
Before I was even deployed I remember hearing about a bunch of red anarchists killed in Odessa.
Tornado [Ukrainian Nazi battalion] was by far the most horrifying thing I’ve ever seen or dealt with in my life. I’m in that botched crucifying video I’m not even wearing a mask.
I remember being deployed from Kiev to Mariupol. The dress uniform of what became Azov, was not by any means tactical. We were told to expect the presence of GRU [Russian military intelligence] as-well as militia formed by leftists in Donbass.
I’ve seen some shit with the first go around in Ukraine. I can only really sum up Mariupol with, ” It’s war”. This is were a lot of heinous shit started.
Interrogation happens. I had a job interrogating a lot. The treatment of such people is the same with the Russians I would guess.
I remember being asked to photograph Aidar [Ukrainian Nazi battalion] and Tornado members posing with the corpses of a lynched pregnant woman and a man they said was her husband.
The video can be found it’s titled “Kikes get the rope” but it literally has nothing to do with Jewish people. I wouldn’t have supported an action like that anyway.
Tornado was a weird bunch of guys. Some of them were of Chechen decent and that’s were I learned the history of Dagestan and the insanity that happened in Grozny.
What is the weapon of your choice?
I was a gunner for the most part. PKM [light machine gun], Kalashnikov.
Why- being a gunner requires a knowledge of all aspects. It’s not simply firing blindly.
You have to understand infantry, you have to understand armor.
You have to work with other gunners and be able to be the eyes for literally everyone and while being the most obvious target in the field.
Without gunners, armored columns are useless.
Areas outside of a chain, that are not visible, you have to reach. You have to be able to trap a line of men and manipulate their actions into doing what you want them to do.
This also comes with infantry tactics, and being able to work the mechanics of a PKM, which isn’t a easy weapon.
Especially when the felt tip tools for some reason keep disappearing from the weapon.
Were you paid to do this? And by whom? Did you get a salary?
I was never paid, I in fact ruined myself economically by going to Ukraine. I couldn’t imagine doing that for any value.
I wasn’t paid. No.
During the time we were in talks with the CIA and the Pentagon, (Mariupol). It is true the Pentagon conducted intelligence operations during the war there.
Why did you return to the U.S.?
I didn’t intend too. I was shipped back on a order after some SBU [Ukrainian State security agency, counter-intelligence] guys got caught cooperating with Russians, they planned on apparently killing me in the SBU hospital in Kiev.
Are Russian and DNR [Donetsk People’s Republic] troops worthy opponents?
Russia in comparison to the DPR:
The DPR we’re at first the best soldiers in the field this time go around, as far as Russian allies go. Their mortar teams were highly accurate and often worked with infantry, they moved like clock work. They generally had no fear for any actions they carried out.
The first waves of Russian soldiers I nearly felt bad for. The air force, is obviously a very skilled endeavor on the Russian team.
They naval infantry teams used on Mariupol we’re lacking in the ability to adapt. This is only the naval infantrymen, I’ve had quite the job during the first few weeks in Mariupol as interrogating prisoners, I had these videos on my YouTube channel. There was quite a lot of them who didn’t want to fight, and who claim they weren’t their to fight.
Then the third guard Spetznaz [Russian special forces] came. Which was a entirely different story.
The worst of all things that undermined Russian advances, was the constant bombarding of Mariupol, while they were also trying to make advances. To understand this, you’ll have to understand how explosives work.
It’s not the blast that kills you, it’s the energy released from these things. It’s like going into a fully conscious seizure, everything gets covered in this dust that turns everything a faded yellow. You can literally taste it. It’s chemical as fuck.
Whereas the Azov Regiment, and The DPR both were native to Mariupol and the Donetsk oblast, in theory. The Russian infantry would often become lost on hostile land.
The DPR and LPR [Lugansk People’s Republic] guys seemed to be the ones who knew how to navigate through Mariupol a lot better. They were fearsome. The second battalion (Azov) and them (Sparta [pro-Russia battalion from Donetsk]) have a historic feud, as you know.
It’s never easy to move or maintain a level of total competency while being shot at, or maintaining heavy stresses. They did. You have got to respect them off the field
Are you in direct contact with your old comrades there?
I talk to a number of them daily.
Frostovik had most of my footage along as his own. David Ruslan as well. That guy’s a fucking beast. I was with him when he lost his leg. The attack killed another Azov member.
Will you go back to fight?
I’m not entirely sure of going back. Depends on my health. I had heavy metal poisoning, still ongoing through chelation therapy from the whole ordeal.
I support Azov, to the fullest. But I don’t support NATO, or the EU, but ultimately I feel as if NATO gets involved there won’t be anything, as far as a nationalist goes, worth or left fighting for.
How do you see the conflict from a geopolitical perspective?
American meddling in Ukraine has caused the Russian invasion.
Ukraine war can be simply placed by two prospectives, the nationalist war, and Zelenski’s war.
Zelenski is the powers which be, and the nationalists are the obvious.
It needs to be noted that;
The Ukrainian Government has tried to bench Azov, and the DUK on three different occasions. Once their usefulness for the NATO regime ran out.
The head of the Right Sector even said before he was assassinated in Kiev: “We’re not finished yet, in the Maidan”.
This is clearly World War three.
I would like to see Russia just go home, and while the government in Kiev is frail another (Maidan) revolution.
I don’t see Russia as the victim here. But I do see Russia as provoked. Beyond all realms of reason, people have to be able to see that not everything is black and white here.
In fact this war only helped us get denied for NATO. No one wants that war with Russia.
I don’t believe that Ukraine has any issues in the future with Russia nuclear capability. Russia can handle a loss to Ukraine, but I don’t for see Russia handling a loss if NATO jumps in this. Does that make sense?
Moscow won’t be Berlin in 1945.
As long as the war stays in Ukraine, I think nuclear war isn’t in the goal post.
What do you think of how Western media reports on it?
There is a ton of liberal white washing when it comes to fascists in Ukraine:
“Nazis don’t exist’ “Azov battalion and Azov regiment are different “ , “They took all the Nazis out of Azov”.
We know all these to be false, and to a guy who knew and been there; I see it has pure disrespect to tarnish the legacy of a lot of those who died.
Clearly they don’t know what to think of it. I speak out against the white washing of nationalists by the media. Despite the fact they blasted us for years and even the Ukrainians tried to force fully uproot Azov at one point.
I use Twitter to mainly troll the (western) left, as they believe Ukraine military isn’t full of nationalist ideals.
So you actually can grasp what’s happened. Do you admit that it was a mistake for you to go to Ukraine?
I don’t regret Ukraine. I just can’t make it clear enough that the nationalists in Ukraine are not the same as the nationalists here in the US who are all basically inbred.
I feel the war that the nationalists are fighting is entirely different than the one the state is fighting. I know there was massive celebration when Ukraine was denied for NATO.
I notice a lot of Americans don’t even know nations like Ossetia exist, the Georgian invasion of such places, so on so fourth. They just think Russia decides to bomb the fuck out of places for no reason.
Similar to World War two, everything and every move had a reason. Ukraine unfortunately is stuck in the middle of that.
The butler documentary strikes a chord.
The United States has only been at peace for 22 years of it’s existence.
The right to maintain a navy, (The Marines are owned by the department of the navy, though controlled by the president) has kept us in a state of conflict, which obviously keeps the military at a rate. The Obama administration hurt the American military. Badly. I can hardly tell what losses we will take as a nation if we put troops on the ground there.
Did you have a fascist upbringing? Someone in your family filling your head with that ideology? Just curious. US/CIA media brainwashed Americans to hate Russia. Is that what happened in your case?
Honestly I grew up in the north. When I was a skinhead originally I was a traditional. I didn’t have any say in politics. I was 12.
I didn’t really know how big of a deal my dad was as he lived in England.
Even growing up and eventually getting into third position politics I was asked to not talk about it, as it would piss off people, in the sense of making me look entitled to something. So I didn’t.
I came up under David Lynch, Mark Faella and James Porozzo in the American Front.
Smartest people I knew, they had differing beliefs and forming your own opinion was a big deal to them.
I think James is actually pro Russian for whatever reason. Dave is dead and Mark retired after the FBI arrest [end]
chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Ukraine against Russia