Analista senior di l'intelligenza in u campu di a gestione di i risichi di sicurezza, sò un anzianu tenente detective è ufficiale di l'intelligenza in l'agenzie di u Statu francese. A bona pronuncia hè Николай Чинкуини, in russu
ce sont des pseudonymes, est l’aîné de ce panthéon, BHL mis à part. Vétéran du 1er REC (régiment étranger de cavalerie) puis 1er régiment de spahis, il était à Beyrouth en 1983, en Irak en 1991. Peut être par corporatisme, il a assuré la sûreté du général à la retraite Christian Piquemal, dont les opinions xénophobes et islamophobes en ont fait en 2016 une icône de l’extrême droite. Le 14 mars 2022, il franchit la frontière entre Pologne et Ukraine
(Captures d’écran)
Dans la Légion internationale, il effectue des missions de liaison entre Kiev et le front, près de Kherson ou dans la partie du Donbass encore occupée par l’Ukraine, visite notamment le champ de bataille de Bakhmout. Il alterne repos en France et nouvelles missions en Ukraine, où il connaît Franck Malandain et Juan Sanchez Da Silva, un ancien du 1er régiment de spahis. Il est aussi un recruteur de vétérans pour la Légion internationale.
Le seul à le faire parmi les Français que je connais alors, le 26 septembre 2022, il rend hommage à Yevhen Brach, un combattant nazi ukrainien et surtout je pense, un ancien de la Légion étrangère, qui a été tué le 21
(Compte Telegram de feu Yevhen Brach)
Pour le première fois, le 19 juin 2023, il se montre armé d’un fusil d’assaut
Des nazis (la race, supra-nationale, détermine tout) ou pétainistes (lA drOITe NaTIonalE) s’illustrent ici sans fard, l’étaient avant de gagner l’Ukraine. Je suis convaincu que d’autres dans cette liste veillent à ne pas le laisser apparaître. Beaucoup ne sont ni de grands littéraires ni de brillants matheux et parmi eux, d’autres encore sont nazis ou pétainistes mais s’ignorent
Le 30 juin 2022, la philatélie ukrainienne rend hommage au criminel de guerre nazi Roman Choukhevytch (1907-1950), militant fasciste, auxiliaire en 1941 de l’Abwehr [renseignement militaire allemand] puis officier jusqu’en 1943 de la Schutzmannschaft [police auxiliaire], contre les partisans antinazis. En août 1943, il prit le commandement de l’UPA, formation paramilitaire nationaliste, qui a massacré entre 50 000 et 100 000 civils polonais, avec la bienveillance de l’occupant, affronté jusqu’en 1950 l’Armée rouge victorieuse, d’abord au bénéfice des Allemands puis à partir de 1945, sous la houlette des services secrets anglo-états-uniens
L’environnement est particulièrement délétère en Ukraine, où la chimie est complexe, car si les références historiques nazies y sont encore restées plus ou moins refoulées après la dissolution de l’Union soviétique, une culture populaire nazie revendiquée s’est développée après 2014 et son expression s’accentue naturellement vers l’ouest, culmine à Lviv, berceau historique du nazisme ukrainien.
À cet égard, le conflit nous offre le 22 septembre 2023, le spectacle grand-guignolesque de la standing ovation du parlement canadien pour l’ancien Waffen-SS ukrainien Yaroslav Hunka, son épilogue psychodramatique. Cet environnement propice, conjugué à l’amertume d’une défaite devenue inéluctable à la fin de l’été, conduira je pense à des phénomènes intéressants
Fier comme Artaban, McKenzie présente sur les réseaux sociaux, le 24 septembre, son écusson de la brigade nazie ukrainienne Azov, reconnaissable au Wolfsangel [crochet à loup] de plusieurs anciennes divisions SS
La tendance se confirme le 30 octobre, avec l’étendard de la même brigade Azov, le Schwarze Sonne [soleil noir, héritage du Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler] en fond du Wolfsangel, dans les tribunes d’un match de football. Pourtant, Lens n’est pas du tout sa région. McKenzie ou Fred, comme l’appellent sur les réseaux sociaux ceux qui le connaissent, est patron d’une entreprise de vitrage automobile dans la région de Valence, garnison du 1er régiment de spahis
(Réseaux sociaux)
Ses publications en mars 2024 et ses pseudonymes successifs sur les réseaux sociaux –Karl, Ulman– effacent les derniers doutes quant à son inspiration fasciste.
chronique alphabétique et nécrologique de l’engagement français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas
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chronique en Anglais, censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia
une saga française, entre Ukraine et Lyon, où apparaissent aussi des morceaux de SS de la division Charlemagne et plus récemment, Alice Kerviel, dite Cordier. L’affaire Deranque révèle comme la France est infectée par le pétainisme, en particulier parmi les soutiens d’Israël ou de l’Ukraine, deux théâtres d’opérations où l’Occident tente de ralentir son déclin
En 2025, une nouvelle unité de Français combattant pour l’Ukraine s’est structurée autour d’un noyau de néonazis, ayant pour objectif d’attirer des recrues. Parmi ces volontaires, d’anciens militaires. StreetPress les a identifiés
En Ukraine, les volontaires français pro-ukrainiens et pro-russes se partagent l’imaginaire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Les premiers se revendiquent des collabos de l’Allemagne nazie, les seconds de l’escadrille mythique « Normandie – Niémen »
deux jours après le 10e anniversaire de la débâcle politique et sécuritaire du 13 novembre 2015, une messe célèbre à Verdun l’ancien dirigeant fasciste de l’État français
ce 11 novembre 2025 est l’occasion de souligner comme la façon dont l’Europe sacrifie les conscrits ukrainiens mobilisés de force rappelle le spectaculaire carnage de la 1ère guerre mondiale
c’est par l’agence cosaque de presse PIKA, depuis la République populaire de Lougansk, que le 2 avril 2024, l’ataman Nikolaï Diakonov lance un message à destination de la France
ce papier est le premier des grands médias français qui s’attaque à la question des militants nazis français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, le nouveau danger qu’ils présenteront à terme pour la sûreté intérieure
où nous apprenons que le nazi français Allan Duchézeau, camarade de César Aujard dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, était surnommé Dox, quand il secondait à Paris le leader nazi Marc de Cacqueray Valménier
en Anglais, les indices de la présence d’opérateurs occidentaux, en particulier Français, pris au piège en mars 2022 à Marioupol, dont les forces russes achevèrent la libération en mai
de quoi faire trembler le microcosme politico-médiatique parisien
Le 17 mai 2026, différents canaux fascistes ukrainiens et européens partagent cette image du peloton français dans le bataillon nazi ukrainien Revansh (réseaux sociaux)
Même parmi les tifosi les plus radicalisés de l’Ukraine ou les commentateurs les plus corrompus, rares sont ceux qui nient l’existence de formations militaires nazies dans les rangs atlantistes. Mais beaucoup, comme les journalistes du monde le 18 juin 2025, limitent leur envergure à Azov et s’empressent de préciser
ces unités [qui émanent d’Azov] et leurs références néonazies ne représentent qu’une petite minorité
Fondateur d’Azov en 2014 et dirigeant aujourd’hui du parti nazi ukrainien Corps national, Andriy Biletsky commande le 3e corps de l’armée régulière ukrainienne (image officielle)
En réalité, l’organisation nazie Azov est loin d’être groupusculaire, contrôle aujourd’hui deux corps d’armées ukrainiens, le 1er de la garde nationale et le 3e de l’armée régulière. En outre, les formations nazies existent largement en dehors de la sphère d’Azov, tels les organes militaires de partis politiques comme Pravyi sektor [Secteur droit] ou Svoboda [Liberté]. Émanation de l’organisation Tradytsiya ta poryadok [Tradition et ordre], le bataillon Revansh en est une et opère sous le commandement du renseignement militaire ukrainien (HUR).
Ces formations militaires nazies ukrainiennes recrutent de nombreux volontaires étrangers et bénéficient parfois même de pages publicitaires dans la presse occidentale. Comme pour Revansh, un reportage le 27 mai 2025 d’Agathe Mahuet, une employée de Radio France qui omit d’éclairer ses auditeurs quant à l’identité politique de ce bataillon de défenseurs de l’Europe.
Sur cette photographie publiée le 29 juin 2023, quatre Français du bataillon Revansh visitent à l’hôpital un compatriote blessé dans les rangs de la 3e brigade d’assaut (réseaux sociaux)
Notre club OSINT (open source intelligence) TrackANaziMerc a détecté un renfort substantiel au printemps 2025. Les Français ont alors constitué une escouade appelée WAR (War Aggressive Rota) puis Légion pirates, qui comptait des figures historiques comme César Aujard et Gwendal Delange
Parmi ces nouvelles recrues, nous retrouvâmes alors le militant nazi breton Karel Cherel Salzburg, dont le premier séjour belliqueux au Donbass date de 2018
Le 27 janvier 2022, Karel Cherel Salzburg, au centre, bascule les pintes en compagnie d’Alice Kerviel, dite Cordier, la muse de feu le nervi nazi Quentin Deranque (reflets.info)
Et puis de nouvelles têtes, que nous n’avons pas encore identifiées, connaissons seulement par leurs indicatifs radio. Charlemagne est un ancien du 13e BCA (bataillon de chasseurs alpins), où il pourrait avoir connu le nazi Alan Vigneron, qui jusqu’à la dissolution fin 2025 de la Légion internationale, opérait dans son 1er bataillon
(Capture d’écran de la vidéo du 28 octobre 2025)
Charlemagne se signala chef de groupe, dans une vidéo de promotion que Revansh diffusa le 28 octobre 2025, où il affirma aussi son projet en Ukraine de
défendre l’Europe contre le communisme
Plus libre sur les réseaux sociaux, il y précise en Allemand et caractères gothiques
𝕸𝖊𝖎𝖓𝖊 𝕰𝖍𝖗𝖊 𝖍𝖊𝖎ß𝖙 𝕿𝖗𝖊𝖚𝖊 [mon honneur s’appelle fidélité, la devise des SS]
et dévoile fièrement son torse, que décorent une swastika et l’accouplement du Schwarze Sonne avec une croix occitane
Sur les réseaux sociaux, il enrichit parfois ses publications par les extraits sonores de discours d’Adolf Hitler ou Léon Degrelle, d’abord dirigeant du parti Rex [extrême-droite catholique belge], qui prit sa retraite en Espagne en 1945, avec le grade de Standartenführer [colonel SS].
Le 15 février 2026, il réagit de façon très personnelle au psychodrame causé en France par la mort de Quentin Deranque. Au pétainiste d’origine égyptienne et copte Hossam Messiha, dit Jean Messiha, qui s’attaqua alors au député de LFI Raphaël Arnault, il répondit
Ne compare pas cette merde à un SS
et courroucé, changea la bannière de l’un de ces comptes de réseaux sociaux
Une garde d’honneur de la Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler (nouvelle bannière de Roque)
Le ministère ukrainien de la défense reconnaît ses mérites et lui décerna en avril la Croix de la valeur, mais sans feuilles de chêne
(Réseaux sociaux)
Roque fut aussi la cause d’un court psychodrame qui secoua le microcosme politico-médiatique parisien. Le 20 janvier 2026, StreetPress publia un article intitulé
En Ukraine, des néonazis et ex-militaires français s’engagent pour se battre contre la Russie [ici avec mes annotations]
Roque s’entraîne au tir (de petit calibre) sur une cible nommée Clément Méric, militant antifasciste tué à Paris le 5 juin 2013 (réseaux sociaux)
Le journaliste Sébastien Bourdon précisa dans son article que lorsque Roque s’entraîne au tir, certaines cibles peuvent porter les sigles du Parti communiste français, du Nouveau Front populaire ou de La France insoumise.
La Russie déclencha son opération militaire spéciale le 24 février 2022, voila 4 ans, 2 mois et 22 jours. Des militants nazis français ont combattu dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine avant même cette date, car la guerre au Donbass commença en mai 2014, 3 mois après qu’un État profond nazi eût été installé à Kiev. Mais à la petite chaleur qu’elle sentit au fondement, une partie de la gauche hexagonale découvrit brutalement des nazis français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine
(Ian Brossat sur X)
Ce fut en vertu de l’article 40 du Code de procédure pénale que le sénateur communiste de Paris Ian Brossat fit un signalement au parquet. En d’autres termes, il déposa plainte.
chronique alphabétique et nécrologique de l’engagement français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas
Articles connexes
Pruvate à truvà me, canaglia di l’OTAN, pruvate solu
chronique en Anglais, its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine
chronique en Anglais, censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia
une saga française, entre Ukraine et Lyon, où apparaissent aussi des morceaux de SS de la division Charlemagne et plus récemment, Alice Kerviel, dite Cordier. L’affaire Deranque révèle comme la France est infectée par le pétainisme, en particulier parmi les soutiens d’Israël ou de l’Ukraine, deux théâtres d’opérations où l’Occident tente de ralentir son déclin
En 2025, une nouvelle unité de Français combattant pour l’Ukraine s’est structurée autour d’un noyau de néonazis, ayant pour objectif d’attirer des recrues. Parmi ces volontaires, d’anciens militaires. StreetPress les a identifiés
En Ukraine, les volontaires français pro-ukrainiens et pro-russes se partagent l’imaginaire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Les premiers se revendiquent des collabos de l’Allemagne nazie, les seconds de l’escadrille mythique « Normandie – Niémen »
deux jours après le 10e anniversaire de la débâcle politique et sécuritaire du 13 novembre 2015, une messe célèbre à Verdun l’ancien dirigeant fasciste de l’État français
ce 11 novembre 2025 est l’occasion de souligner comme la façon dont l’Europe sacrifie les conscrits ukrainiens mobilisés de force rappelle le spectaculaire carnage de la 1ère guerre mondiale
c’est par l’agence cosaque de presse PIKA, depuis la République populaire de Lougansk, que le 2 avril 2024, l’ataman Nikolaï Diakonov lance un message à destination de la France
ce papier est le premier des grands médias français qui s’attaque à la question des militants nazis français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, le nouveau danger qu’ils présenteront à terme pour la sûreté intérieure
où nous apprenons que le nazi français Allan Duchézeau, camarade de César Aujard dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, était surnommé Dox, quand il secondait à Paris le leader nazi Marc de Cacqueray Valménier
en Anglais, les indices de la présence d’opérateurs occidentaux, en particulier Français, pris au piège en mars 2022 à Marioupol, dont les forces russes achevèrent la libération en mai
nous apparaît au départ déjà comme un sympathisant de droite, canal Vendée militaire. À l’été 2023, le Breton cabotait encore en Europe, puis il rejoignit les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, au plus tard en septembre, avec son ami Allan Leroy
(Réseaux sociaux)
Les deux gamins tiennent habituellement garnison dans la même maison que les vétérans Maxime Barrat et Christopher Perryman. Le Britannique est tué dans la nuit du 24 au 25 octobre. Pour les raisons évoquées dans l’histoire qu’il a partagée avec Barrat avant l’arrivée des jeunes, sa disparition n’a sans doute pas traumatisé d’anciens camarades véreux. La version politiquement correcte de sa mort nous raconte un raid contre les forces russes, semble t il à travers le Dniepr, dans la région de Kherson. Le doute est permis.
C’est avec fierté que le 17 décembre, le naufragé breton affiche sur les réseaux sociaux une photographie de nouveaux petits camarades ukrainiens
Tous sont tellement timides que sur l’image retouchée, leurs visages sont masqués par la Totenkopf SS. Le groupe est fortement typé, au point d’étonner la maman de son petit camarade français Allan Leroy, qui commente
C qui les gens mdr
c’est les copaings
répond Coyote. En tous cas, Enzo Proupin, le petit nouveau, aime
Alors qu’il est en réalité en France depuis le début de l’année, Coyote publie le 8 mars 2024 l’image de son Schwarze Sonne [soleil noir], symbole nazi hérité du Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler
Un touriste (réseaux sociaux)
Après une longue absence, il semble de retour en Ukraine début mai, partage le 19 une photo qui fait mal aux yeux. Même à l’entraînement, car il est toujours loin du front, un vrai soldat ne laisserait pas traîner son fusil comme cela.
Des recherches approfondies nous font connaître sa véritable identité : Quentin Evanno, de Languidic, Morbihan. Son idéologie suprémaciste et nazie est clairement affichée sur un ancien compte Twitter
La phrase exacte
We must secure the existence of our people and a future for white children
constitue les 14 mots, le slogan des suprémacistes aux États-unis. Evanno n’est pas un grand littéraire, a interverti deux termes et en a rajouté un. Dans Dixon14_88, Dixon évoque la ligne de démarcation Mason-Dixon, qui de 1767 à 1865, avant la conclusion de la guerre civile, séparait États du nord de ceux du sud, esclavagistes. 88 signifie HH, pour Heil Hitler.
Je le soupçonne fortement d’avoir été coauteur d’un viol commis dans la région de Kharkov le 5 mai 2024. Dans le village de Glubokoe, une semaine avant sa prise par l’armée russe, deux soldats francophones battirent et violèrent une Ukrainienne. Une procédure judiciaire russe a été ouverte et l’affaire nous est révélée le 15 août par un avis de recherche, car les enquêteurs ont présenté des photographies de volontaires français à la victime, qui a formellement reconnu Maxime Barrat
Le 21 mai 2024, Quentin Evanno publie sur les réseaux sociaux sa version modifiée d’une photographie originale qui est également partagée par d’autres membres de la même escouade, dont Maxime Barrat. Evanno et Barrat y sont à genoux, premier et second par la gauche
Après un long séjour en France début 2024, Evanno est réapparu en Ukraine en mai, comme camarade de Barrat, le seul autre Français à notre connaissance, dans une escouade internationale de l’UDA, (Ukrayinsʹka dobrovolʹcha armiya, Armée des volontaires ukrainiens), formation paramilitaire nazie de Dmytro Iarosh, fondateur en 2014 de Pravyi sektor [Secteur droit].
Les enquêteurs russes le confirment, procèdent à son identification auprès de la victime et le 18 septembre, il est officiellement recherché par la justice, comme coauteur présumé du viol commis dans la région de Kharkov le 5 mai, avec Maxime Barrat
Communiqué le 18 septembre 2024 du Département des affaires intérieures de l’administration militaro-civil de la région de Kharkov (capture d’écran)
Les agents de la Direction des affaires intérieures ont mené une procédure d’identification, pour laquelle ils ont utilisé des photographies de Quentin Evanno en uniforme militaire, publiées début juin 2024 sur les réseaux sociaux et sur lesquelles la victime l’a identifié. La femme a reconnu le suspect à ses traits extérieurs, ainsi qu’à un patch avec l’indicatif d’appel « Marcus » et un chevron rond avec le drapeau français sur sa pochette. La procédure d’identification a également porté sur les enregistrements audio des conversations d’Evanno, publiés par le suspect sur les réseaux sociaux. La jeune fille a confirmé qu’à ce moment fatidique, elle avait entendu exactement cette voix
Dans le cadre de leurs opérations en direction de Pokrovsk, les combattants russes libèrent en octobre la petite ville minière de Selidovo, une quarantaine de km au nord-ouest de Donetsk
Le drapeau russe est hissé à Selidovo le 29 octobre 2024 (Ministère russe de la défense / capture d’écran)
Ils y découvrent les corps de civils assassinés par balle. Les survivants racontent qu’au cours de leur retraite, les troupes atlantistes ont abattu les résidents qui n’avaient pas évacué et qu’elles y découvraient, accusés à juste titre d’attendre leurs libérateurs russes. Point particulier : certains des assassins parlaient Français
(Réseaux sociaux)
À l’été 2025, au plus tard, après le viol d’une civile ukrainienne pour seul fait d’armes, le nazi Quentin Evanno retrouve ses activités habituelles, la motocyclette et le transport routier dans sa chère Bretagne.
chronique alphabétique et nécrologique de l’engagement français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas
Articles connexes
Pruvate à truvà me, canaglia di l’OTAN, pruvate solu
chronique en Anglais, its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine
chronique en Anglais, censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia
une saga française, entre Ukraine et Lyon, où apparaissent aussi des morceaux de SS de la division Charlemagne et plus récemment, Alice Kerviel, dite Cordier. L’affaire Deranque révèle comme la France est infectée par le pétainisme, en particulier parmi les soutiens d’Israël ou de l’Ukraine, deux théâtres d’opérations où l’Occident tente de ralentir son déclin
En 2025, une nouvelle unité de Français combattant pour l’Ukraine s’est structurée autour d’un noyau de néonazis, ayant pour objectif d’attirer des recrues. Parmi ces volontaires, d’anciens militaires. StreetPress les a identifiés
En Ukraine, les volontaires français pro-ukrainiens et pro-russes se partagent l’imaginaire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Les premiers se revendiquent des collabos de l’Allemagne nazie, les seconds de l’escadrille mythique « Normandie – Niémen »
deux jours après le 10e anniversaire de la débâcle politique et sécuritaire du 13 novembre 2015, une messe célèbre à Verdun l’ancien dirigeant fasciste de l’État français
ce 11 novembre 2025 est l’occasion de souligner comme la façon dont l’Europe sacrifie les conscrits ukrainiens mobilisés de force rappelle le spectaculaire carnage de la 1ère guerre mondiale
c’est par l’agence cosaque de presse PIKA, depuis la République populaire de Lougansk, que le 2 avril 2024, l’ataman Nikolaï Diakonov lance un message à destination de la France
ce papier est le premier des grands médias français qui s’attaque à la question des militants nazis français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, le nouveau danger qu’ils présenteront à terme pour la sûreté intérieure
où nous apprenons que le nazi français Allan Duchézeau, camarade de César Aujard dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, était surnommé Dox, quand il secondait à Paris le leader nazi Marc de Cacqueray Valménier
en Anglais, les indices de la présence d’opérateurs occidentaux, en particulier Français, pris au piège en mars 2022 à Marioupol, dont les forces russes achevèrent la libération en mai
Dehee, Benjamin, né le 13 novembre 2003, dit Benson,
est blessé à la tête, hospitalisé, quand il surgit le 26 octobre 2024 dans le chat de la chaîne Telegram TrackANaziMerc. Il ne pouvait pas mieux tomber.
Il est incité à y venir défendre l’honneur de son unité, quand est publiée l’identité d’un camarade, le militant nazi turc Eyüp Görkem Yilmaz, qui a perdu ses papiers sur le champ de bataille
Autoportraits d’un suprémaciste français
Comme preuves de sa bravoure et de sa contribution au rayonnement de la France, il nous envoie quelques images via la messagerie cryptée.
Leur humiliation date du 11 octobre, quand une attaque surprise mis en déroute des volontaires étrangers du 16e bataillon de fusiliers, alors attaché à la 60e brigade mécanisée, que le commandement ukrainien avait disposés en défense dans un secteur présumé calme de la région de Zaporojie. Mais des éléments de l’infanterie navale russe les assaillirent après avoir accompli une marche forcée.
Pour leur baptême du feu, les Étrangers ont fui en désordre et abandonné quantité d’effets personnels. Au moins un autre Français fut blessé dans les mêmes circonstances, le militant islamophobe Loïc Perdriel
Son hommage à la division SS française Charlemagne
Nous ne connaissons alors que son indicatif radio : Benson. Ses interventions dévoilent un Français chauvin et suprémaciste blanc, tellement raciste qu’il s’en prend même à ses camarades colombiens
Eyüp Görkem Yilmaz est à gauche, fait le signe des Bozkurtlar [Loups gris]
Il apparaît sur une image sans doute antérieure à leur défaite du 11 octobre, quand tous deux furent blessés, que son camarade nazi turc publie le 7 novembre
Benson écrit le 17 que les tranchées lui manquent et ses photos rétrospectives illustrent sa grande culture nazie, avec les insignes Idel-Ural [Volga-Oural, en Tatar, supplétifs des SS de 1942 à 1945] et Russkaya osvoboditelnaya armiya [Armée de libération russe, ROA, auxiliaires russes de la Wehrmacht entre 1943 et 1945].
Le second est souvent porté aujourd’hui par les membres du RDK, des militants nazis russes réfugiés en Ukraine après le coup d’État de 2014, qui opérent sous commandement du renseignement militaire ukrainien (HUR)
Un drapeau aux couleurs nationales ukrainiennes affiche aussi l’insigne de la division SS Galizien (1943-1945) et la mention manuscrite du 16e bataillon de fusiliers.
Décidément nostalgique, il partage la vidéo du discours à Paris, le 5 mars 1944, du Hauptsturmführer [capitaine SS] belge Léon Degrelle. En matière artistique, il est fan de Death in June, groupe britannique d’apocalyptic folk, dont la figure de proue, Douglas Pearce, homosexuel passionné d’occultisme, est fascinée par l’iconographie nazie
(Death in June)
De l’aveu même de Pearce, Death in June est un hommage à Ernst Röhm, chef homosexuel du Sturmabteilung [détachement d’assaut, formation paramilitaire des débuts du nazisme en Allemagne], jusqu’à sa dénazification par les SS, lors de la purge déclenchée au matin du 30 juin 1934. Car c’est bien connu, Adolf Hitler a trahi le national-socialisme [un militant du GUD dans les années 80]
La caduta degli dei [Les Damnés], Luchino Visconti, 1969
Sur les réseaux sociaux, Benson suit Cyrille Amoursky, chroniqueur de LCI. Et pas Xavier Tytelman ? Il semble être arrivé en Ukraine en juin 2024. Y est il pour défendre la LibERtÉ et la dÉmoCRatIe ? Ich frag mich, warum ?
https://youtu.be/jV4Cafusd0E
Le 6 février 2025, toujours très proche du militant nazi turc Eyüp Görkem Yilmaz, il me fait parvenir cette image et un message trop… personnel, pour être publié ici, exprime son désir de me faire subir des outrages de caractère… sexuel
Le militant nazi français déploie ici le drapeau blanc à bande bleue (belo-sine-belyy flag), conçu à Berlin en février 2022 par des opposants en exil, dont le militantisme est bien ingrat, car en Russie, le taux d’approbation de Vladimir Poutine est de l’ordre de 80%
Mes craintes sont d’un autre ordre. En marge de cette posture, je le soupçonne d’être aussi doté de capacités hétérosexuelles. À cet égard, je garde mon sang-froid et traite la problématique sur le ton adopté par des employés de presse française, quand ils abordent le projet de Donald Trump de nettoyage ethnique à Gaza : stériliser Benson ? Pourquoi pas ?
Le club OSINT TrackANaziMerc doit déployer des trésors d’ingéniosité pour l’identifier. Nous sommes enfin récompensés par la découverte d’un document d’une grande richesse, en terme de renseignement. Coucou, Benjamin, nul ne suscite ma curiosité en vain
Il s’appelle Dehee, Benjamin Dehee, était âgé de seulement 18 ans, quand il apparut dans une vidéo que l’influenceur Hayssam Hoballah publia le 12 mai 2022, dans la série Et maintenant on fait quoi ? Le synopsis disait
Nous sommes en colère. Et à juste titre: notre belle France est devenue rance et ce qu’il en reste est bradé au bénéfice d’intérêts supra-nationaux
(Capture d’écran)
Dehee était présenté comme
jeune citoyen témoin de la misère dans les campagnes en Bretagne
https://youtu.be/BzLwXSfXaKs
Interlude musical : chanson écrite par Pascal Sevran
Breton, vivant et travaillant alors à Paris, il témoigna en particulier de ce qu’il avait déjà vécu dans l’est de la France, Bas-Rhin, Meuse et Argonne. Disparition des services publics, raréfaction des emplois, l’ancien Gilet Jaune était révolté par la précarité et la misère qu’il y avait observées, causées en effet par des politiques néo-libérales dictées par des pouvoirs supra-nationaux. Bigre, voila qui me le rend sympathique. Hélas, sa personnalité était déjà plus compliquée
(Capture d’écran)
Au travers de son intervention, il me rappelle un autre nazi breton de ce panthéon : Karel Cherel Salzburg. En Allemagne des années 30, Dehee aurait en effet intégré le Sturmabteilung. Il affirma que les deux tiers des habitants de ces campagnes vivent de la criminalité, notamment ceux d’origine immigrée. Les méchants y étaient Turcs ou Hells Angels allemands. Il en concluait
il faut commencer à se débrouiller sans le régime républicain, tout seul, à se communautariser
Je pense qu’en réalité, le contexte social lui offrait l’opportunité d’exprimer des pulsions politiques plus ou moins antérieures à ces douloureuses expériences.
Par anticipation, il ajouta en ce mois de mai 2022 que la misère poussait de jeunes Bretons, Alsaciens ou Lorrains à devenir mercenaires, à se battre contre les Russes pour seulement €800 par mois. Sublimation.
Il est encore en vie le 29 juin 2025, après le partage sur des réseaux sociaux de la mise à jour ci-dessus, se signale sur Telegram. Verbatim
Ça manque de mise a jour tout ça je suis arrivé bien avant. Vos petits amis n’était pas si vaillant courant 2022. J’attends toujours un combat équitable de la part des katsap [boucs, Russes]
(Capture d’écran)
Il dit vrai, fut interrogé par LCI au soir du 26 août 2022. Il était alors à Kharkov et sa formation militaire allait commencer le lendemain.
Sur ses motivations, il voulait gagner de l’expérience. Nous avons bien compris que les fascistes français cherchent en Ukraine l’expérience du combat avec armes de guerre.
Un combat équitable ? Dehee devra commencer par apprendre qu’en cas de guerre, là bas ou ici, le combat efficace, plutôt qu’équitable, est l’objectif de toute pensée stratégique ou tactique. Interlude musical
https://youtu.be/t847b97PgN8
Commémoration à Moscou le 9 mai 2025 de la victoire de l’Union soviétique sur les armées fascistes européennes
Sa dernière publication sur les réseaux sociaux date du 1er novembre 2025, où il présente aussi un dernier autoportrait
Membres divers de l’organisation nazie Azov, des camarades ukrainiens écrivent son épitaphe le 7 et partagent cette autre image
(Réseaux sociaux)
Selon la photographie qu’il publia lui-même en octobre d’une liste d’attente pour le Valhalla, il aurait été alors dans les rangs du 1er bataillon de la 4e brigade de garde nationale, Rubizh [Frontière]
Il aurait donc été tué en République populaire de Donetsk, dans le secteur de Dobropolie, au nord de Krasnoarmeïsk, que les Ukrainiens appellent Pokrovsk mais que les Russes sont sur le point de libérer
(2e corps d’armée, Khartiia)
Volodymyr Zelenskyy visita le 4 novembre le quartier général des troupes atlantistes engagées dans ce secteur et décora des soldats du 4e bataillon de la même brigade, dont l’insigne perpétue l’héritage des SS.
La mort de Benjamin Dehee suscite les jours suivants une rafale d’hommages d’anciens camarades, dont le nazi turc Eyüp Görkem Yilmaz, alors affecté à la 3e brigade d’assaut, émanation de l’organisation nazie Azov dans l’armée régulière ukrainienne
(Réseaux sociaux)
Ces images montrent encore une fois l’épanouissement des militants nazis français dans une Ukraine qui par l’entremise de la Russie, constitue aussi une plateforme d’accès prématuré au Valhalla.
Dehee fut bien tué en République populaire de Donetsk, dans le secteur de Krasnoarmeïsk. Mais il opérait dans les rangs du bataillon nazi ukrainien Revansh
(Captures d’écran)
Son image nous apparaît en janvier 2026 sur le mémorial mural du bataillon. Deux autres Français, Arnaud Ghizzo et Hippolyte Payen, y sont aussi honorés.
chronique alphabétique et nécrologique de l’engagement français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas
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en Anglais, les indices de la présence d’opérateurs occidentaux, en particulier Français, pris au piège en mars 2022 à Marioupol, dont les forces russes achevèrent la libération en mai
(Capture d’écran de la vidéo publiée pour le recrutement du bataillon Revansh, le 28 octobre 2025)
son surnom, désignait aussi la 33. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS, dont la formation commença quand en juillet 1943, l’État français permit les engagements dans le Schutzstaffel (SS). En mars 1945, l’Armée rouge eut le bon goût d’écraser la division SS française. Membres d’un bataillon qui avait échappé au joyeux holocauste de Poméranie, car resté en réserve, 300 SS français participèrent encore en avril à la vaine défense de la capitale du Reich. D’ailleurs sur les réseaux sociaux, le Français précise en Allemand et caractères gothiques
𝕸𝖊𝖎𝖓𝖊 𝕰𝖍𝖗𝖊 𝖍𝖊𝖎ß𝖙 𝕿𝖗𝖊𝖚𝖊 [mon honneur s’appelle fidélité, la devise des SS]
Affiche française de recrutement en 1943
En août 2025, le club OSINT (open source intelligence) international TrackANaziMerc le détecte dans les rangs de WAR (cf. César Aujard), une escouade de nazis français, sous commandement du renseignement militaire ukrainien (HUR) au sein du bataillon Revansh, branche militaire de l’organisation nazie ukrainienne Tradytsiya ta poryadok [Tradition et ordre].
Au côté de son camarade Gwendal Delange, il célèbre le 1er septembre l’anniversaire de la 2de guerre mondiale par l’exhibition d’un drapeau à swastika et son tatouage assorti
(Réseaux sociaux)
L’État ukrainien nous le présente très officiellement le 28 octobre 2025, dans une vidéo de recrutement pour le bataillon Revansh. Charlemagne explique qu’il est un ancien militaire français et opère dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine pour
défendre l’Europe contre le communisme
Je pense qu’il me connaît un peu par cette chronique. Par tradition corse, je lui souhaite le même succès que ses compatriotes en 1945
(Réseaux sociaux)
Le 4 décembre, ses tatouages ont été enrichis d’une croix occitane et du Schwarze Sonne [soleil noir, héritage du Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler]
(Caroline Varon / StreetPress)
Nous le supposions par l’observation des t-shirts portés par les nazis français du bataillon Revansh. Dans un article du 20 janvier 2026, StreetPress nous confirme qu’à l’instar d’Alan Vigneron, combattant pour sa part dans le 1er bataillon de Légion internationale, Charlemagne est un ancien du 13e BCA (bataillon de chasseurs alpins).
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vit à Metz, employé en restauration, a connu une courte expérience militaire, un an dans l’armée française à l’âge de 18 ans, quand il gagne l’Ukraine en mai 2022. Combattant dans un peloton de reconnaissance engagé en République populaire de Lougansk le 27 novembre, il marche du pied gauche sur une mine anti-personnel. Un camarade US est tué lorsqu’il se porte à son secours
L’image à droite est une capture d’écran diffusée par des médias français de la vidéo de l’évacuation sanitaire de Maxime Bronchain
Hospitalisé à Kharkov puis Kiev, opéré plusieurs fois, il refuse l’amputation que lui proposent les médecins Ukrainiens. Le 12 décembre, des organes de presse et télévision française relaient son appel à l’aide. Il souhaite être rapatrié et soigné en France, où selon ses déclarations, le gouvernement semble freiner des quatre fers depuis le lendemain de sa blessure
L’archéologie numérique est édifiante. Ainsi a t il été militaire du 3e RH (régiment de hussards), formation de reconnaissance blindée à Immendingen, Baden-Württemberg, de la Brigade franco-allemande. Son bagage idéologique apparaît sur une image plus récente, en Ukraine. Il porte sur l’épaule gauche le drapeau rouge et noir des nazis ukrainiens de la 2de guerre mondiale. Il est alors affecté à l’UDA (Ukrayinsʹka dobrovolʹcha armiya, Armée des volontaires ukrainiens), dont l’écusson apparaît en dessous, formation paramilitaire de Dmytro Iarosh, fondateur en 2014 de Pravyi sektor [Secteur droit], héritier des mêmes nazis historiques. C’est un festival sur son épaule droite : le badge de la Misanthropic Division, confrérie nazie internationale fondée en 2013 en Ukraine, surplombe un splendide Schwarze Sonne [soleil noir], héritage du Reichsführer SS Henrich Himmler
Son identité politique n’a sans doute pas accéléré son rapatriement et il perd son pied, après son hospitalisation à Strasbourg le 21 décembre. La sanction semble insuffisante, puisque le matamore prétend sur LCI le 2 janvier qu’il aurait tué une cinquantaine de Russes. Un fantasme malsain, quand selon toutes les estimations sérieuses, les pertes atlantistes en Ukraine sont alors 8 à 10 fois celles des Russes. La guerre est un art simple, tout d’exécution, disait le général corse Napoleone Buonaparte. Plus de pièces, plus de munitions, l’artillerie russe tire huit fois plus. Supériorité aérienne, aviation, missiles de croisière et balistiques, frappent les forces atlantistes au front et dans des missions stratégiques, en profondeur. Les Ukrainiens et par une justice émanante, nombre de combattants occidentaux, sont la chair à canon de la guerre par procuration que l’OTAN conduit contre la Russie. Mais le carnage est émaillé parfois d’anecdotes cocasses. Pour avoir seulement détruit son pied, la mine antipersonnel était probablement une PFM-1 Lepestok [Pétale], que seuls les Ukrainiens emploient. Les adversaires afghans des Soviétiques s’en souviennent. Elle pullule aujourd’hui dans de larges zones, où elle est dispersée en sous-munition de roquettes de 220 mm. Les forces atlantistes arrosent aussi des quartiers civils de Donetsk
Alors qu’il soigne le traumatisme de son amputation, il publie une vidéo rétrospective à la date anniversaire du 8 mai, 2023. Je ne pense pas que ce soit une coïncidence. Il y affiche sans détour son idéologie, apparaît dans la mouvance du suprémaciste Marc de Cacqueray Valménier, ex chef des ex Zouaves, qui réalise la fusion entre Action française et GUD (Groupe union défense). Il me précisera ultérieurement, par message sur Telegram le 28 août, qu’il n’est pas l’auteur de la vidéo qu’il a complaisamment partagée. Elle montre Gwendal Delange, le militant nazi lyonnais. Les volontaires français en Ukraine forment une grande famille. À Lviv en septembre 2022, Bronchain a même fait chauffeur de maître Delange, selon Rue89Lyon
(Captures d’écran)
Le 11 juillet 2023, il présente son nouveau tatouage, sur le mollet qui lui reste, le droit
(Capture d’écran)
Le texte est la transcription en runes de la phrase anglaise
NOT ALL WHO WANDER ARE LOST [tous ceux qui errent ne sont pas perdus]
second vers du poème The Riddle of Strider [l’énigme du marcheur], de John Ronald Reuel Tolkien, vétéran britannique de la bataille de la Somme, en 1916, auteur plus tard du Seigneur des Anneaux. Information plus opérationnelle, il serait de retour en Ukraine, région de Kharkov, où sont affectés la plupart des Français.
Droit de réponse, il commente ici-même le 17 juillet
Revoit te informations la moitié et fausse quitte à me fiche fait bien ton travail merci d’avance Maxime bronchain
Je ne peux y répondre car il ne dit pas quelles informations seraient fausses. Par leurs propres publications sur les réseaux sociaux, les intéressés sont une source inépuisable d’inspiration.
Le 25 juillet 2023, il est en pélerinage à Kiev, au mémorial à la chair à canon ukrainienne et internationale de la guerre par procuration que l’OTAN mène au Donbass et en Ukraine, contre la Russie
(Captures d’écran)
En lecteur assidu de cette page, il ne porte plus d’emblèmes nazis sur son uniforme, a aussi effacé les vidéos compromettantes de son compte TikTok. Qu’il ne s’inquiète surtout pas d’en perdre les originales, je dispose de copies en dur
(Captures d’écran)
Le 15 septembre, il publie des images où il apparaît avec un tee-shirt du renseignement militaire et l’écusson d’un bataillon à usage spécial (ОБСП / OBSP) de la Légion internationale, probablement le 3e.
Le 25 décembre, la région de Kharkov est enneigée. Il y circule sous les couleurs des nazis ukrainiens de la 2de guerre mondiale. Nous voyons aussi à l’épaule du conducteur le patch never lose your smile, une fantaisie des réseaux nazis internationaux, illustrée par la Totenkopf SS. Une croix chrétienne est tatouée sur la main gauche du passager
(Captures d’écran)
Au fait de cette chronique et soucieux d’exactitude, il me précise par message sur Telegram que le véhicule est doté d’une boîte de vitesse manuelle et qu’il n’est pas le chauffeur. Passer ses journées, depuis l’UDA et Delange, au côté de nazis qui narguent leur environnement démocratique avec leurs emblèmes fascistes, la charge émotionnelle doit être terrible pour un antiraciste comme lui. Joyeux Noël.
Il nous dévoile enfin le 29 décembre 2023 le fond de sa pensée politique, au travers de la bande son, préenregistrée par un barde moderne, d’une vidéo où se succède sa propre image en tenues militaires
Le Gaulois, c’est celui qui est là depuis 3000 ans […] et il sera toujours là dans 100 ans […] parce qu’un Gaulois qui finit par se réveiller, c’est le monde qui n’en finit pas de trembler
Il est nationaliste gaulois, par Toutatis. Je comprends maintenant pourquoi nos relations sont tendues. À l’époque antique, mes ancêtres étaient Germains, d’un côté, Romains de l’autre. Ensemble, les premiers à cheval, les seconds à pied, ils écrasèrent à Alésia, en 52 avant Yeshoua ben Yosef, une armée gauloise cinq fois plus nombreuse, par Juppiter
Insigne entre 1940 et 1944 de la Légion française des combattants, organisation vichyste d’anciens combattants (musée de Reims, 250 km au nord d’Alésia)
C’est en qualité de figure emblématique que Bronchain apparaît dans une enquête que Zvezda [Étoile], la chaîne de télévision du ministère russe de la défense, publie le 9 avril 2024 au sujet de l’engagement français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine. J’y ai participé avec une grande joie dans les semaines précédentes
(Zvezda)
Il grossit, se notabilise, est déjà une vedette de télévision russe (144 millions de spectateurs), un peu grâce à moi, quand BFMTV en fait la tête de gondole d’un reportage diffusé le 22 avril. Il y partage l’affiche avec Allan Leroy, Charly Logereau et Enzo Proupin
(BFMTV)
Il y raconte pour la nième fois l’histoire de sa jambe bionique, confirme ce que nous supposions. Il est aujourd’hui employé à des tâches administratives, à la base du 3e bataillon de la Légion internationale
(Capture d’écran)
Dans une vidéo publiée par le propagandiste Xavier Tytelman, Maxime Bronchain apparaît le 13 août 2024, chef adjoint de la salle des drones du 3e bataillon de la Légion internationale, qui opère au nord de Kharkov, en support de la 92e brigade mécanisée de l’armée régulière ukrainienne.
Pour ses loisirs et plaisirs personnels, il a détourné €57 654 de dons. Le compte est précis, car sa hiérarchie militaire le démasque puis le confesse le 12 août 2025. Son autocritique est publiée le 24 sur son propre Instagram
Je trouve excessifs les commentaires des guerriers de canapé pour l’Ukraine. N’oubliez pas qu’il a perdu une jambe au combat, que Volodymyr Zelenskyy et sa clique ont mis de côté des sommes bien plus considérables.
chronique alphabétique et nécrologique de l’engagement français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas
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chronique en Anglais, its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine
chronique en Anglais, censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia
une saga française, entre Ukraine et Lyon, où apparaissent aussi des morceaux de SS de la division Charlemagne et plus récemment, Alice Kerviel, dite Cordier. L’affaire Deranque révèle comme la France est infectée par le pétainisme, en particulier parmi les soutiens d’Israël ou de l’Ukraine, deux théâtres d’opérations où l’Occident tente de ralentir son déclin
En 2025, une nouvelle unité de Français combattant pour l’Ukraine s’est structurée autour d’un noyau de néonazis, ayant pour objectif d’attirer des recrues. Parmi ces volontaires, d’anciens militaires. StreetPress les a identifiés
En Ukraine, les volontaires français pro-ukrainiens et pro-russes se partagent l’imaginaire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Les premiers se revendiquent des collabos de l’Allemagne nazie, les seconds de l’escadrille mythique « Normandie – Niémen »
deux jours après le 10e anniversaire de la débâcle politique et sécuritaire du 13 novembre 2015, une messe célèbre à Verdun l’ancien dirigeant fasciste de l’État français
ce 11 novembre 2025 est l’occasion de souligner comme la façon dont l’Europe sacrifie les conscrits ukrainiens mobilisés de force rappelle le spectaculaire carnage de la 1ère guerre mondiale
c’est par l’agence cosaque de presse PIKA, depuis la République populaire de Lougansk, que le 2 avril 2024, l’ataman Nikolaï Diakonov lance un message à destination de la France
ce papier est le premier des grands médias français qui s’attaque à la question des militants nazis français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, le nouveau danger qu’ils présenteront à terme pour la sûreté intérieure
où nous apprenons que le nazi français Allan Duchézeau, camarade de César Aujard dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, était surnommé Dox, quand il secondait à Paris le leader nazi Marc de Cacqueray Valménier
en Anglais, les indices de la présence d’opérateurs occidentaux, en particulier Français, pris au piège en mars 2022 à Marioupol, dont les forces russes achevèrent la libération en mai
n’a connu qu’une courte et lointaine expérience militaire, au 6e RG (régiment du génie), à Angers. Le Normand se précipite début mars 2022 en Ukraine, où il arbore des emblèmes de la Misanthropic Division, confrérie nazie internationale qui y fut fondée en 2013
(Réseaux sociaux)
Pour illustrer brièvement ce qu’est cette organisation, voici des écussons qu’elle propose à la vente sur les réseaux sociaux, dont la Totenkopf SS, le Schwarze Sonne [soleil noir] du Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler et l’insigne de la 1. SS-Panzer-Division, Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler
Interviewé en Pologne avant la frontière par un journaliste espagnol, il s’est déclaré prêt à mourir pour l’Ukraine, pour l’Europe. Il est tué dans la région de Kharkov le 1er juin 2022. La Misanthropic Division fait alors en Anglais son éloge, que je traduis ici
Un héros français, Wilfried Blériot (33 ans). Fier membre français de la WSMDivision, légionnaire français, homme qui a combattu le bolchevisme/afa [antifascistes] toute sa vie, grand homme, notre ami et frère d’armes, est mort (01.06.2022) en défendant l’Europe/Ukraine des hordes asiatiques. Il est mort en tant qu’homme avec un Ak [une arme asiatique] dans les mains, [sous le feu] de l’artillerie russe dans la région de Kharkiv. Merci frère, pour votre aide. Votre vie sera vengée. Heil Victoire [Sieg Heil en allemand]. Gloire aux héros. À bientôt au Walahalle [Valhalla], frère !
Ses thuriféraires lui ont dessiné ici une auréole, qui est aussi un Schwarze Sonne. Le rouge et le noir du fond étaient les couleurs pendant la 2de guerre mondiale de la milice nazie ukrainienne UPA. Mais selon Karel Cherel Salzburg, qui l’a connu, Blériot n’était pas un authentique national-socialiste. Il n’était donc pas prêt de passer Unterscharführer [sergent SS].
chronique alphabétique et nécrologique de l’engagement français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas
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ce 11 novembre 2025 est l’occasion de souligner comme la façon dont l’Europe sacrifie les conscrits ukrainiens mobilisés de force rappelle le spectaculaire carnage de la 1ère guerre mondiale
c’est par l’agence cosaque de presse PIKA, depuis la République populaire de Lougansk, que le 2 avril 2024, l’ataman Nikolaï Diakonov lance un message à destination de la France
ce papier est le premier des grands médias français qui s’attaque à la question des militants nazis français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, le nouveau danger qu’ils présenteront à terme pour la sûreté intérieure
où nous apprenons que le nazi français Allan Duchézeau, camarade de César Aujard dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, était surnommé Dox, quand il secondait à Paris le leader nazi Marc de Cacqueray Valménier
en Anglais, les indices de la présence d’opérateurs occidentaux, en particulier Français, pris au piège en mars 2022 à Marioupol, dont les forces russes achevèrent la libération en mai
défend la démocratie en Ukraine depuis le mois de mai 2023
(Réseaux sociaux)
Dans le style
a rejoint la Légion internationale pour se battre au côté des Ukrainiens et témoigne de son engagement héroïque au service de la liberté
la presse bleu horizon a coutume de porter aux nues les militants nazis partis combattre dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine. Aujard ne devrait pourtant pas bénéficier du même traitement, car il a commis un impair.
À la périphérie des ex Zouaves, groupe nazi que le ministère de l’intérieur dissolut en janvier 2022, le Parisien aime le football et exprime ses opinions, comme à l’occasion de la finale de la Coupe de France, le 29 avril 2023, par un Kühnengruss, le salut nazi mais trois doigts écartés, un subterfuge pour échapper aux poursuites en Allemagne moderne. Jusque là, tout allait bien. Dans le métro avant le match, lui et ses camarades ont aussi molesté des personnes dont la couleur de peau n’était pas assez claire ou les vêtements, trop exotiques. Qui le réprouve vraiment dans la France de 2023, dont le ministre de l’intérieur est un opposant farouche aux rayons communautaires dans les magasins ? Rien n’aurait du le priver des louanges ultérieures de la presse. Mais le héros en devenir a aussi battu un attaché parlementaire qui filmait la scène avec son smartphone, déchéance.
C’est alors seulement qu’il s’est porté volontaire pour défendre l’Europe en Ukraine, où en armes début mai, il arbore les couleurs rouge et noir que portaient pendant la 2de guerre mondiale les nazis ukrainiens de Stepan Bandera. Il a rejoint les rangs de la branche militaire de l’organisation nazie Tradytsiya ta poryadok [Tradition et ordre], où il a retrouvé Gwendal Delange
(Réseaux sociaux nazis)
Le FAF [la France aux Français] est terriblement ritualiste et je soupçonne Aujard d’être l’auteur de cette carte postale de Lviv, face au momument en hommage à Stepan Bandera, qui nous parvient le 13 mai
Sous le titre Jeunesse Boulogne, KOB youth hooligans, un réseau nazi anglophone partage le 18 juin une nouvelle photographie. Aujard se tient à gauche, au côté d’un militant du GUD qui pourrait être Allan Duchézeau
Il nous donne de ses nouvelles le 1er août 2023. Va t il expérimenter cette solution tactique contre les défenses russes ?
Le 31 octobre, il apparaît enfin dans les tranchées. Son pectoral est un Schwarze Sonne [soleil noir], héritage du Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler. Une autre photographie, le 29 novembre, illustre la fraternité et la porosité entre les différentes formations nazies ukrainiennes
L’anniversaire de Yeshoua ben Yosef approche et Aujard fait déjà la fête dans la journée du 24 décembre. C’est avec de gais compagnons de la 3e brigade d’assaut, émanation de l’organisation nazie Azov dans l’armée régulière ukrainienne, qu’il lâche avec émotion sa première rafale de mitrailleuse de calibre .50, du matériel occidental.
Début 2024, la 110e brigade mécanisée agonise dans sa forteresse d’Avdeevka, que les Ukrainiens occupent depuis 2014, 15 km au nord du centre de Donetsk, lorsque le nouveau chef d’état-major, Oleksandr Syrsky, pour tenter de desserrer l’étau, y engage en février l’élite de ses forces, la 3e brigade d’assaut, émanation dans l’armée régulière de l’organisation nazie Azov
À Avdeevka, le 17 février 2024, les combattants de Pyatnashka [Les Quinze], un bataillon de la République populaire de Donetsk, ont écrit vous avez coupé l’eau pour nous et nous avons coupé Avdeevka pour vous. La forteresse était aussi depuis 2014 une des plateformes du bombardement délibéré des civils de Donetsk
Le 4 mars, Thibault Far évoque sur les réseaux sociaux la mort en Ukraine d’un camarade prénommé César. Mais le 11, Aujard nous salue et abrège mon inquiétude. Reste un Français de plus, qui n’a pas été identifié et dont la mort n’a pas été rendue publique dans l’hexagone
Il arbore le Schwarze Sonne, l’insigne de la brigade et à droite, celui de Centuria, du nom de l’organisation de jeunesse d’Azov, 3e compagnie du bataillon antichar
(Réseaux sociaux)
Il s’est rasé le lendemain, quand il montre à ceux qui ont prématurément annoncé son décès comme il est heureux d’être toujours en vie
(Réseaux sociaux)
Une chaîne Telegram de footeux nazis ukrainiens nous apporte enfin de ses nouvelles le 18 août 2024. Il défend sur le ring les couleurs de la 3e brigade d’assaut. Dans l’intervalle, le Wolfsangel a été tatoué sur son sein gauche. ADRIAN !
(Capture d’écran)
Il remporte une victoire, dans une vidéo que son fight club préféré diffuse le 21 octobre. Le 23 décembre, un média nazi européen bien connu partage cette autre image et commente en Anglais, que je traduis ici
En permission, des volontaires français de la 3e brigade séparée d’assaut ont participé au nouveau tournoi de combat clandestin Klanfighting à Kiev
Le 12 mai 2025, César Aujard apparaît dans une vidéo pour stimuler les enrôlements de volontaires étrangers dans le bataillon Revansh, branche militaire de l’organisation nazie ukrainienne Tradytsiya ta poryadok [Tradition et ordre]. À l’instar des réfugiés nazis russes du RDK, la formation paramilitaire opère sous commandement du renseignement militaire ukrainien (HUR)
Comme ce pauvre petit bras droit aimerait pouvoir se déplier. César Aujard exécute ici le salut en vigueur dans les formations militaires d’Azov. Gwendal Delange est à droite. La vidéo affiche les insignes du bataillon Revansh et du renseignement militaire ukrainien (capture d’écran)
Lui et Gwendal Delange sont déjà passés dans ses rangs en 2023. Cette campagne de promotion du bataillon nazi est relayée le 27 mai (cf. Bravo 1) par un reportage français d’Agathe Mahuet, une employée de Radio France, autrefois appelée Radio Paris, qui se garde bien de soumettre à l’appréciation de ses auditeurs l’identité politique de ces défenseurs de l’Europe
En août 1941, l’État français publie cette affiche de recrutement de volontaires, pour l’Europe et contre l’Union soviétique
Début juillet 2025, il s’entraîne au nettoyage de tranchée. Son groupe est francophone, s’appelle War Aggressive Rota [en Anglais dans le texte, rotation agressive de guerre, WAR], arbore fleur de lys et Totenkopf SS
Les réseaux sociaux nous offrent le 10 septembre une scène mémorable. Quand Aujard se détend vraiment, il laisse s’exprimer son inconscient malien. On a tous quelque chose en nous de malien
https://youtu.be/Z4B9Bo_l3mU
Après Aymeric Albert, qui lança l’idée, puis Gwendal Delange le 2 septembre, il montre aussi le 12 comme il est fier de son évolution dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, depuis le militantisme nazi à Paris. Tout cela ne nous rajeunit pas.
Renommé dans l’intervalle Légion pirates, le groupe français éclate en décembre 2025 (cf. Lucas Barraud). Pour une question de discipline, Gwendal Delange est expulsé du bataillon
le 26 janvier 2026 (capture d’écran)
D’autres partent, mais la plupart restent. Sur ce, César Aujard quitte l’Ukraine pour les tropiques.
chronique alphabétique et nécrologique de l’engagement français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas
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chronique en Anglais, its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine
chronique en Anglais, censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia
une saga française, entre Ukraine et Lyon, où apparaissent aussi des morceaux de SS de la division Charlemagne et plus récemment, Alice Kerviel, dite Cordier. L’affaire Deranque révèle comme la France est infectée par le pétainisme, en particulier parmi les soutiens d’Israël ou de l’Ukraine, deux théâtres d’opérations où l’Occident tente de ralentir son déclin
En 2025, une nouvelle unité de Français combattant pour l’Ukraine s’est structurée autour d’un noyau de néonazis, ayant pour objectif d’attirer des recrues. Parmi ces volontaires, d’anciens militaires. StreetPress les a identifiés
En Ukraine, les volontaires français pro-ukrainiens et pro-russes se partagent l’imaginaire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Les premiers se revendiquent des collabos de l’Allemagne nazie, les seconds de l’escadrille mythique « Normandie – Niémen »
deux jours après le 10e anniversaire de la débâcle politique et sécuritaire du 13 novembre 2015, une messe célèbre à Verdun l’ancien dirigeant fasciste de l’État français
ce 11 novembre 2025 est l’occasion de souligner comme la façon dont l’Europe sacrifie les conscrits ukrainiens mobilisés de force rappelle le spectaculaire carnage de la 1ère guerre mondiale
c’est par l’agence cosaque de presse PIKA, depuis la République populaire de Lougansk, que le 2 avril 2024, l’ataman Nikolaï Diakonov lance un message à destination de la France
ce papier est le premier des grands médias français qui s’attaque à la question des militants nazis français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, le nouveau danger qu’ils présenteront à terme pour la sûreté intérieure
où nous apprenons que le nazi français Allan Duchézeau, camarade de César Aujard dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, était surnommé Dox, quand il secondait à Paris le leader nazi Marc de Cacqueray Valménier
en Anglais, les indices de la présence d’opérateurs occidentaux, en particulier Français, pris au piège en mars 2022 à Marioupol, dont les forces russes achevèrent la libération en mai
Azov paramilitaries are aiming to debunk Kremlin « myths ». In doing so, they are solidifying their Nazi tradition and reducing German normalization narratives to absurdity
Azov military ceremony in Kiev on July 28, 2024
Azov is being gradually integrated into the Western European security architecture. Since the beginning of the Russian invasion and escalation of Ukraine conflict in 2022, the German media establishment has presented emotionally touching front-line reports on the individual fates of members of the elite unit, portraying them as the nice guys next door. Springer’s Welt TV channel has now even served its viewers the first home story of a volunteer from Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and his proud father, a former Gepard tank driver in the Bundeswehr. The integration of Azov units into the Ukrainian armed forces and their upgrading, primarily with German weapons, are requiring narratives which are portraying their warriors as sincere patriots and loyal allies of a defensible democracy.
Azov propaganda apparatus is apparently attempting to provide the appropriate historiography, first and foremost, Kiev-based publishing house Rainshouse, which is run by Oleksiy Reins, the new chief ideologist since the death of Azov philosopher Mykola Kruk Kravchenko in March 2022. Reins, who is also serving in the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade, Azov, which is forming the backbone of the 3rd Army Corps, is steadily intensifying efforts to whitewash the troubled past—historical predecessor organizations, their leaders, worldviews, theories, symbols, rituals, and actions.
In his book What Is Azov from Ukraine? Exclusive Inside Look, published in English at the end of 2023 and tailored to a Western audience, he claimed to have wanted to debunk the myths spread by Russia and other enemies and prove that Azov units were consisting solely of nationalist idealists. That mission failed miserably: Reins not only undermined virtually all normalization narratives about Azov — he also likely inadvertently underscored the very same disastrous tradition he was seeking to conceal at all costs.
In the OUN spirit
That insider profile first traces the origins of Azov groups and highlights that it was no coincidence that their paramilitary nucleus, also known as the little black men, was formed in Kharkov in 2014. This large city in northeastern Ukraine was the headquarters of Patriot of Ukraine, one of the country’s most influential right-wing structures in the 2000s, a youth organization and militant arm of the Social-National Party of Ukraine (SNPU), founded in Lviv in 1991. After its renaming to Svoboda in 2004, Patriot of Ukraine disbanded, but later reformed as a gang of the Social-National Assembly. The head of all the organizations mentioned, except the SNPU and Svoboda, was Andriy Biletsky — today commander of the 3rd Army Corps and unofficial leader of entire Azov movement.
Reins cites Yaroslav Stetsko as the historical mentor of Azov. He was deputy to Stepan Bandera, leader of the radical wing of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN-B), succeeded him after his death in 1959. Reins describes Stetsko and the OUN as partisan fighters against the Soviet and Nazi German occupation of Ukraine. Stetsko, he claims, refused to cooperate with Adolf Hitler’s regime, for which he was imprisoned in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp.
Almost none of this corresponds to historical reality: apart from the fact that Ukraine had been a republic of the Soviet Union since 1922 and therefore could not have been occupied by it, Yaroslav Stetsko explicitly welcomed the German invasion
Full of sincere gratitude and admiration for your heroic army, which has once again won new glory on the battlefields in the clash with the greatest enemy of Europe, Muscovite Bolshevism, we send you, the great leader, in the name of the Ukrainian people and its government, which has been formed in liberated Lviv, our heartfelt congratulations for crowning the struggle with final victory
he wrote to Adolf Hitler on 3 July 1941.
Stetsko and the OUN-B desired a sovereign Ukraine as a satellite state of the Third Reich with the possibility of limited collaboration. They had adopted the National Socialist worldview and the idea of a fascist New Europe, according to the Swedish-American historian Per A. Rudling. That was by no means a passive act, emphasizes his German-Polish colleague Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe. But rather, the OUN had created a Ukrainian variant of fascism. Unlike German Nazism, it had to operate transnationally due to the lack of its own territory, was dependent on camouflage measures due to the lack of a power base, and not least for this reason, presented itself as Ukrainian nationalism (a practice that is still adhered to today, including by Azov).
Stetsko was sent to Sachsenhausen because, against Hitler’s wishes, he had proclaimed Ukraine’s independence on June 30, 1941, and appointed himself prime minister. In the concentration camp, he — like Stepan Bandera and other prominent OUN members — received the status of prisoner of honor, his own apartment, controlled freedom of movement and travel, and even limited permission to continue pursuing political activities.
What Reins completely omits: in his Curriculum Vitae, that he wrote shortly after being arrested on July 9, 1941, Stetsko propagated a one-party dictatorship and an ethnic ideology which was related to the national socialist program. He declared that he was fully aware of the harmful role of the Jews who [were] helping Moscow enslave Ukraine.
I am therefore supporting the extermination of the Jews and considering it expedient to bring German methods of exterminating Jewry to Ukraine in order to prevent their assimilation and the like
Stetsko had already expressed similar views in May 1939 in a guide entitled Battles and Activities of the OUN in Wartime, when he was not yet under German surveillance. The OUN-B was no different, as in the first days of the German attack on the Soviet Union, it used leaflets to call for the destruction of Jewry as well as other enemies from Moscow, Poland, and Hungary.
Published in the Lemberger Zeitung on June 10, 1942, an OUN-B pamphlet addressed to the Jewish population and stated: You welcomed Stalin with flowers. We will lay your heads at Hitler’s feet in greeting. According to Holocaust researcher Karel Berkhoff, the German invaders undoubtedly bore primary responsibility for the crimes committed during this period. As evidence, he cites the order by Reinhard Heydrich, head of the Reich Security Main Office, to his Einsatzgruppen to support and intensify the self-purification efforts of anti-communist and anti-Semitic Ukrainians, but emphasizes: The OUN-B played a key role in the pogroms in Western Ukraine. Quite a few Ukrainian fascists also collaborated with Nazi Germany by joining the Wehrmacht-raised battalions Nachtigall and Roland and the SS division Galizien – as well as, for a time, with the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) of the OUN-B.
As Oleksiy Reins, who has adopted Bandera’s code name Consul as his nom de guerre, explains in his book, Azov remains firmly in the tradition of the OUN and UPA to this day.
« Social nationalism »
According to Reins, the theoretical foundation of Azov’s worldview can be found in a political science work by Yaroslav Stetsko entitled Two Revolutions. It was published in 1951, at a time when the OUN-B was already collaborating with the British, US, and West German secret services — the UPA continued to fight against the USSR as a stay-behind army on their behalf until 1953 — and five years after Stetsko founded the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations in Munich, the most powerful umbrella organization of Hitler collaborators worldwide. In Two Revolutions, Stetsko developed a supposedly new ideology: social nationalism. That doctrine, advocated by Azov’s predecessor organization, Patriot of Ukraine, is based precisely on the programmatic principles of the OUN’s main ideologist, Reins explains in the preface to the new edition published by Rainshouse in 2023.
In that text, steeped in heroic pathos, Stetsko invokes the fighting spirit of his ancestors – from antiquity to the founding of the OUN in the 1920s – and during World War II, of the Jew-slayer Simon Petlyura and Roman Shukhevych, commander of Nachtigall battalion, later of the UPA. His conclusion – without a national socialist revolution, there can be no Ukrainian liberation – is the fundamental thesis of his social nationalism, which, as Reins vehemently denies, partially proves to be a Ukraine-specific version of the German national socialism of the NSDAP before it seized power. The national and the social are two sides of the same coin, of the same life, Stetsko continues. Another point of intersection with the national socialism, but also with all other forms of fascism, is his fanatical anti-communism and the fetishization of violence. Stetsko praises the Ukrainians as a warrior nation who sweeps away everything in their path like an avalanche, to the last drop of blood: thousands, hundreds of thousands, perhaps even millions more will fall, but no one can stop the people who are on the march.
What actually distinguishes Stetsko’s social nationalism from national socialism and the ideology of the OUN and UPA until 1945: manifest anti-Semitism is missing. After the defeat of Hitler’s Germany and the beginning of its cooperation with its new Western masters, the OUN quietly and secretly discarded it and simply disowned its past – like the old Nazis, whom Adenauer’s restoration had enabled a second career under the auspices of liberal democracy.
The social nationalism of Patriot of Ukraine is different. Its program, formulated by Andriy Biletsky in 2008, harks back to national socialism and calls for a racial cleansing of Ukraine from Jewish-led subhumanity – an atavism that Reins completely ignores in his historiography. Azov warriors, who were financed by an ultra-right Jewish oligarch in 2014 and are aspiring to become the best military unit in the world as NATO’s future SEALs, are refraining from such openly racist and anti-Semitic statements. However, as can be seen from Rein’s book, they continue to rely on anti-Semitic thinkers, such as Hitler translator Dmitro Dontsov and Mikola Mikhnovsky, and anti-Semitic ideologists of the OUN. Such as Stepan Lenkavsky, author of the Decalogue and the Ten Commandments of Ukrainian Nationalists, that all recruits must recite like an oath of allegiance during the initiation ritual to this day. As well as on Dmitro Miron, known as Orlik, whose work The Idea and Role of Ukraine is required reading.
« The Black Corps »
Azov continues to adhere to the OUN’s Greater Ukraine idea, modeled on Nazi Germany
The nationalist movement is so powerful that we will soon see the emergence of a great Ukrainian state stretching from the Caspian Sea to the Tatra Mountains
OUN official Roman Sushko prophesied as early as 1939. Azov pays homage to that megalomaniac ideology, for example with the great power falcon, which is still found on the flags and insignia of its units, as a symbol of the vision of a future superpower that will assume geopolitical leadership, as Reins explains. Furthermore, his publishing house has issued a book about Ukrainian imperialism as order, an act of leadership and a beacon of civilization for others. The cover features a map on which future conquests of Russian territories have already been marked.
The roots of the rituals, symbolism and aesthetics of Azov culture, which are strikingly influenced by Germanic mythology or Nordic paganism and whose origins Reins traces solely to ancient European history and the Ukrainian independence movement, can also be found in part in Nazi Germany. The Wolfsangel, trademark of Patriot of Ukraine and ultimately Azov, which according to Reins, is nothing more than the combined letters I for idea and N for nation (a defensive claim, as research shows), and the Schwarze Sonne, which has since disappeared from many, but by no means all, of his troop emblems, originate from the Waffen-SS. Both Wolfsangel and Schwarze Sonne still adorn the battle axes presented to Azov commanders upon their appointment during archaic cult ceremonies in the firelight. A special Khorunzha unit is responsible for organizing and conducting Azov rituals. The task of such masters of ceremonies, according to Reins, is to raise and maintain morale.
Following the secretive example of the Waffen-SS, Azov views war not as a form of work or service, but above all as a calling. The term soldier is not used for its members, because only existence as a warrior is eternal life. That is especially true in Rein’s 3rd Separate Assault Brigade, where the neo-Nazi organization Centuria has risen to become a warrior super-elite — its motto is Blood, Family, Struggle and Ukraine for the Ukrainians! — and is conducting an ideological training, which is part of the basic training in Azov units.
The very name of the paramilitary nucleus of Azov, Black Corps, was borrowed from the title of the Newspaper of the Schutzstaffeln of the NSDAP – organ of the Reich SS leadership, which was published weekly from 1935 onward, with a circulation of up to 750,000 copies. Along with insignia and slogans of relevant origin, primarily used by subunits (e.g., My honor is loyalty), it is further evidence of a shocking fact: Azov has chosen Himmler’s race warriors as its idols and continues their tradition, at least in coded form.
« Brother in Arms » of the West
That continuity, which is objectively attested by Azov chief ideologist, is posing a new challenge for the Western community of values, a dilemma. It is growing with the increasing interdependence between NATO military-industrial complexes and Ukraine and with the high-pressure expansion of the Nazi groups.
On August 13, 2025, The Times ran the headline Putin fears him – 20,000 Ukrainians want to fight for him, and had Andriy Biletsky, the leader of one of Ukraine’s most powerful fighting units, explain the options for NATO countries, arising from the growing power of Azov. We are granting unrestricted access, he reported on the opening of the Izyum front sector, controlled by his troops, to Western arms companies
Our great advantage is that we provide debriefings, test results, and actual data from the battlefield
Without the Azovization of the desertion-plagued Ukrainian armed forces, the permanently militarized society Biletsky is envisioning, modeled on Israel, effectively becoming the army and arsenal of a Europe that has proven alarmingly slow in building its own armed forces, is not feasible. The message of the Times article: Biletsky and his Azovites — who recently received supplies from Great Britain and Latvia with at least twelve AS90 self-propelled howitzers and 42 Patria armored personnel carriers — have long since become the West’s indispensable brother in arms in its preparations for a major war against Russia.
Fighters of the past
The German Ministry of Defense is also aware of that. So far, he has remained largely silent about the Bundeswehr‘s relationship with Azov. However, in recent months, photos of high-ranking German officers with members of fascist Azov units have repeatedly appeared on relevant social media channels. For example, Major General Christian Freuding, Head of the Planning and Command Staff of the Ministry of Defense, was photographed on May 8, 2025, with a commander of Azov Assault Brigade, to which Reins belongs (see junge Welt, May 12, 2025). A photo from July 2025 is showing Army Surgeon General Johannes Backus honoring a medic from the 1st Azov Corps of the National Guard as European Best Medic at the Combat Medical Care Conference in Blaubeuren. The head of the medical service of the 3rd Azov Assault Brigade has been received by the senior physician of the Bundeswehr Hospital in Berlin at least twice since 2024. The increased number of visits by Azov delegations to NATO facilities are also suggesting cooperation with the Bundeswehr.
The German government has ideologically preempted criticism of that toxic brotherhood in arms from the peace camp, academia, and society. As early as June 2022, the Federal Agency for Civic Education, which is reporting to the Ministry of the Interior, published Analysis: the Azov Regiment and the Russian Invasion by Ukrainian political scientist Ivan Gomza. While the establishment of another Azov special regiment, including members of Centuria and the neo-Nazi party National Corps, was already in full swing, from which the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade emerged a few months later, Gomza claimed that most right-wing extremist fighters had already left Azov in 2014 when it was integrated into the National Guard. Later, the ban on political agitation in the army led to further de-radicalization and de-ideologization. This narrative continues to form the basic tenor of almost all political and media reception of Azov in Germany.
Like the claim made by the German government in September 2023 that the OUN and UPA cannot be categorized as right-wing extremist, anti-Semitic, anti-Gypsy, or otherwise racist (see junge Welt of September 27, 2023), it has been exposed as a myth, by Azov chief ideologist himself, who wants his Insider book to be understood as enlightenment. Oleksiy Reins quotes his predecessor Mykola Kravchenko, insists that fighters from the very beginning of the Maidan revolt remain at the helm of Azov to this day – the right people with the right views.
For Reins, that is including living by the imperative Ukraine above all! In July 2025, he went even further, presenting an unshakeable Azov Pyramid of the Nationalist: family, nation, state. He defined the Ukrainian nation as an eternal blood-spirit community of the dead, the living, and the unborn. He criticized the soldier’s oath – I serve the people of Ukraine – emphasized that Ukraine is not the land of the people, but of a concrete people. The war is not being fought for abstractions. Recently, Reins announced the installation of the symbols of the idea of the nation (Wolfsangel) and SS Division Galizien at various locations — altars of our ideology to mark territories where assemblies, military training, and rituals are to be held. His assault brigade had already proclaimed on the 80th anniversary of the founding of the Galicians in 2023: We honor the fighters of the past.
Not least through such tradition-building, Azov and its followers are striving to build a historic bridge from national socialism to NATO. Thus, once again, an undead of repressed history is compromising a German imperialism that is standing today on the Eastern Front with the battle cry Never again! [end]
its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine, chronicle
chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia
Abstract: This study analyses the nature and extent of involvement by neo-Nazi and other far-right Ukrainian organisations in the Donbas war (2014-2022) and the Odesa massacre (2014). This issue is highly politicised with contrasting narratives. The Russian and Donbas separatist governments, as well as their media, have contended that Ukraine has been a Nazi or neo-Nazi regime since a fascist coup took place in 2014, while Ukrainian and Western governments and media have maintained that such elements in the Ukrainian far-right were marginal, trivial, even non-existent. The article interrogates the historical record with primary sources in the three most relevant languages—Ukrainian, Russian, and English. The investigation reveals crucial far-right involvement in both the early stages of the war in Donbas and the Odesa massacre. Although the percentage of far-right supporters and fighters in Ukraine was relatively small, they exercised disproportionate influence in the country due to their greater reliance on violence and armed formations. The Russian government, however, exaggerated the role of the neo-Nazis in Ukraine to publicly justify the illegal invasion in February 2022.
Introduction
This study analyses the nature and extent of involvement by neo-Nazi and other far-right Ukrainian organisations during both the Donbas war from its start in April 2014 until the Russian invasion in February 2022 and the Odesa massacre on 2 May 2014. Other than the Maidan massacre in February 2014, these were the most significant and contested cases of political violence in Ukraine from its independence in 1991 to the commencement of the Russia-Ukraine war on 24 February 2022.1 The role of far-right Ukrainian groups during these major episodes of political violence is controversial because they are beset by duelling, self-serving narratives. Russian President Vladimir Putin has claimed that the principal goal of the invasion is to “denazify” Ukraine.2 But well before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, there have been several overt and covert Russian military interventions here, including the annexation of the Crimean peninsula and direct support for pro-Russian insurgencies in the Donbas region, particularly in August 2014 and February 2015. Following the overthrow of the pro-Russian Ukrainian government in February 2014, the United States and other Western governments have consistently opposed Russia’s interventions and backed the current central government of Ukraine. In addition to political support, financial and military assistance has been provided, including training during the Obama presidency.3 To justify this support, the US and other Western governments disputed any real power or even the existence of neo-Nazi armed formations in Ukraine or claimed that they abandoned their far-right elements. Understanding the contested issue of far-right involvement in the Donbas war (2014-2022) and the Odesa massacre (2014) is valuable not only for elucidating intrinsically important historical episodes of political violence but also due to the contemporary relevance given the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war.
This article proceeds in five sections. The first section highlights the contribution of our study by describing the weakness of the extant academic literature and our methodological approach to filling in important lacunae in the research landscape. The second section details the duelling of contemporary narratives over the political violence by the far-right in the war in Donbas and in the Odesa massacre. The third and fourth sections develop qualitative case studies with process tracing to illuminate the role of the far-right in the Donbas war and the Odesa massacre. The fifth section presents the conclusion.
Developing the Extant Literature
Research on the far-right in Ukraine since the Euromaidan has been spotty. Studies on neo-Nazi and other far-right organisations in Ukraine following the Euromaidan have been limited in quantity, quality, and scope. Most studies have been produced by researchers outside academe in partisan think tanks or non-government organisations, as well as by journalists who did not subject their work to peer review.4 Such assessments are more likely to be politically driven and less likely to exhibit methodological rigour, even professionalism. For example, Anton Shekhovtsov, the former leader of the Crimean branch of the pro-Russian far-right Eurasian Youth Union, likened the Trade Union building arson attack during the Odesa massacre on 2 May 2014, to his killing of Colorado potato beetles by collecting them in a box and burning them alive. He directly inferred that this was a massacre with far-right involvement but omitted this in his publications.5 Other works have relied on narrow metrics such as the vote-share of far-right parties in Ukraine, without assessing the violence itself in terms of the perpetrators and effects.6 Some researchers have claimed that the presence of Russian speakers in the Azov regiment and other neo-Nazi-led armed formations is evidence of their relative tolerance and asserted that the Azov regiment had moderated by abandoning its far-right roots.7 Such analyses have tended to uncritically rely on Ukrainian and Western government narratives, accepting their claims at face value.
By contrast, other studies suggest a greater degree of far-right involvement in Ukrainian political violence. One quantitative study found that far-right groups in Ukraine, such as Svoboda and Right Sector, fielded the most violent perpetrators and committed the lion’s share of attacks.8 That study is restricted temporally, however, to the 2014 Maidan protests, which led to the violent overthrow of the relatively pro-Russian government and ultimately spiralled into the civil war in Donbas, the Russian annexation of Crimea, and Russian military interventions in these regions of Ukraine.9 Similarly, qualitative studies have presented evidence in the form of videos, eyewitness testimonies, confessions, and forensic examinations of Svoboda and Right Sector involvement in the Maidan massacre.10 Some other studies have focused on specific aspects of the far-right paramilitary and other armed formations during the war in Donbas.11 One academic publication is specifically devoted to the Odesa massacre, which is called “The Odesa Tragedy,” though it concentrates on the public perceptions rather than the perpetrators and their consequences.12 This list of prior works is intended to be illustrative rather than exhaustive. The research landscape around these issues is growing, but uneven in scope and reliability; a lacuna remains in the literature in terms of evaluating rigorously, comprehensively, and dispassionately the nature and extent of far-right involvement in the Donbas war and Odesa massacre, which matters in terms of our understanding of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and political violence more generally.
To elucidate this understudied topic of the far-right in Ukraine, this study makes substantial use of primary source materials in Ukrainian and Russian—the main languages in Ukraine—as well as in English. This linguistic capability is conducive to a more nuanced, accurate assessment. Methodologically, the two case studies employ qualitative process tracing with the benefit of fluency in all three languages.13 The substantive focus and period of analysis are both tightly bounded; the role of the far-right on the Russian side and in the Russia-Ukraine war since February 2022, as well as during the Euromaidan, are weighty topics explored in our other works but fall outside the scope of this study.
The term “far-right” denotes ultranationalists and both racial and ethnic supremacists in accordance with prior scholarship.14 The term “neo-Nazi” refers to far-right organisations that revamp elements of Nazi ideology, particularly its racial and ethnic supremacism, and use symbols associated with Nazi Germany or their stylised versions. As with Nazis, neo-Nazi organisations represent a form of fascism. Major neo-Nazi organisations in Ukraine during the time period covered by this study include the Social-National Assembly, its paramilitary wing Patriot of Ukraine, the National Corps, the White Hammer, and C14. Also included in the analysis are paramilitary and other armed formations organised and led formally or informally by these neo-Nazi organisations, such as the Azov battalion and regiment. Admittedly, militant groups are known to exhibit ideological heterogeneity.15 Within the political violence literature, a burgeoning area of research emphasises that members of the rank-and-file may be motivated by a variety of factors that diverge from the leadership, leading to a principal-agent problem.16 In this study, we classify organisations as neo-Nazi, or at least neo-Nazi-led, when commanders are neo-Nazi, even if not all members can be presumed to share this exact ideology.
A prominent example is Andriy Biletsky, the leader of Patriot of Ukraine and the Social-National Assembly (SNA), both of which were transformed along with the Azov battalion and regiment veterans into the National Corps Party in 2016. He called the ideology of Patriot of Ukraine and SNA “Social Nationalism.” In a collection of his articles published in 2013, he described that social nationalism, as the name suggests, combines elements of ultranationalism of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists with elements of national socialism and called both radical nationalism and national socialism “great ideas.” He wrote that social nationalism is based on “Sociality, Racism, and Great Power.”17 Specifically, it is based on the ideas that the “white race” is “superior” to other races and is the foundation of the Aryan Ukrainian nation; the Ukrainian nation is a “blood-racial community”; and that “the historical mission of our Nation (…) is to head and lead the White Peoples of the world in the last crusade for their existence, a march against the Semitic-led subhumans.”18 Biletsky openly made antisemitic and racist statements, such as his claim that the Jew is “an economic and political parasite.” He saw “a serious clash of native European peoples with foreign colonisers, mainly of African and Muslim origin” and believed that “an ethnic civil war can be won by the native Europeans only under the banner of the New Right National Revolutions.”19
Biletsky was called the “White Leader” and his writings were published by both SNA and Patriot of Ukraine. He was the first commander of the Azov battalion, which was organised and led by Patriot of Ukraine and SNA in May 2014. Patriot of Ukraine, SNA, and the Azov battalion all used a symbol resembling a stylised swastika and Wolfsangel. Azov commanders and their historian, who himself serves in Azov, called the symbol the “Idea of the Nation” and claimed that it is an ancient Ukrainian symbol, even though it was created in 1992 for the Social National Party of Ukraine (SNPU). The creator of this symbol acknowledged that it was called “Idea of the Nation” to represent the radical nationalist ideas of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). He also admitted that SNPU deliberately chose this symbol with the Latin letter N, instead of the equivalent Ukrainian Cyrillic letter, fully aware of its resemblance to Nazi symbols and association with the swastika for many Ukrainians, in particular in Lviv. As with other extremist groups that rebrand out of political expedience, the Social National Party of Ukraine changed its name to Svoboda in 2014, because the Nazi association was politically inconvenient.20 However, this symbol was retained by the SNA and by Patriot of Ukraine, whose Kharkiv branch split from SNPU because of these changes.21 The Azov battalion and its propaganda magazine, which was named Black Sun, also used the Black Sun symbol, an ideological symbol used by Nazis and various neo-Nazi organisations. In addition, groups and individuals—including Patriot of Ukraine, SNA, National Corps, and Azov battalion and regiment leaders, commanders, and members—have displayed on their uniforms various neo-Nazi and Nazi symbols, such as the swastika, the SS sign, and 88 (Heil Hitler code). These, along with Hitler images, Nazi flags, and Totenkopf have also been seen in the form of patches, photographs, flags, and tattoos.
Although the term far-right incorporates both ultranationalist and neo-Nazi organisations, they are not ideologically identical despite their frequent overlap. This study empirically investigates the role of Ukrainian ultra-nationalist organisations such as Svoboda, the Right Sector, the Ukrainian National Assembly–Ukrainian People’s Self-Defence (UNA-UNSO), and Bratstvo; neo-Nazi organisations such as the Social-National Assembly, Patriot of Ukraine, the White Hammer, and C14; and various other paramilitary formations, special police forces, and National Guard units organised and controlled to various extents by them. These armed units include the Azov battalion and regiment, Dnipro, Donbas, Aidar, Sich, Carpathian Sich, OUN, and St. Mary’s battalions, and the Ukrainian Volunteer Corps. To assess these actors, this study analysed thousands of Russian and Ukrainian primary sources: online recordings of live broadcasts, videos of the armed conflict in Donbas and Odesa, and information posted on websites and social media by far-right organisations, their armed units, and activists. It also analysed media reports in Ukrainian, Russian, and English from diverse outlets such as Ukrainska pravda, Strana, BBC, The Guardian, The Washington Post, The New York Times, YouTube, Telegram, V Kontakte, Facebook, and Twitter. To mitigate bias, the authors analysed the primary source materials rather than relying on secondary interpretations.
The Conflicting Narratives
Assessments of the far-right in Ukraine have been wracked by self-serving and thus unreliable perspectives. Russian and separatist leaders, as well as the media, have described the post-Maidan violence in Ukraine, especially in Donbas and Odesa, as perpetrated by “fascists” and “Nazis” akin to genocidal massacres against Jews, Belarusians, Russians, and Ukrainians during the Holocaust and World War Two.22 They often called the Odesa massacre the “Odesa Khatyn,” a reference to the large-scale massacre of Belarusian villagers in 1943 by the Nazis and an auxiliary police battalion, which was based on a paramilitary formation of the Melnyk faction of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists. Based on this narrative, President Putin and his allies have claimed that invading Ukraine is not only justified, but “inevitable” to counter the “Nazi” or “Neo-Nazi regime” in Kyiv.23 Putin and his government thus declared the “de-Nazification” of Ukraine as a key goal of “the special military operation” launched in February 2022.24 This perspective—in its entirety—is widely assailed in the West.25
By contrast, the Ukrainian and Western governments and the media tend to claim that the far-right—including neo-Nazis—is marginal, even non-existent in Ukraine.26 They argue that since Euromaidan, Ukrainian fighters have almost entirely—if not entirely—shed their far-right elements, particularly neo-Nazi. To this end, it is a common point that the Azov Battalion ceased to be led by the neo-Nazi Patriot of Ukraine, a paramilitary wing of the SNA, since integrating into the National Guard as one of its regiments. Kyiv has stressed that the integration of Azov in November 2014 is proof of its transition to moderation and the absence of extremist fighters post-Maidan.27 Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky awarded “Hero of Ukraine” titles in 2022 to prominent Azov leaders such as regiment commander Denys Prokopenko, deputy commander Sviatoslav Palamar, and senior officer Oleh Khomenko.28 After the commencement of the Russia-Ukraine war in February 2022, many Western media outlets, politicians, government officials, and academics adopted this stance that Azov and other controversial Ukrainian fighters on the far-right had not only abandoned extremist elements, but were heroes against Russia’s illegal invasion.29
The Indexing Theory of political communications emphasises that Western media follow narratives of its governments in covering foreign conflicts, including in post-communist countries.30 In some cases, Western media may have taken their cues directly from the Ukrainian government. After the Odesa massacre on 2 May 2014, the Foreign Ministry of Ukraine blamed the arson attack on provocateurs that were “paid generously by the Russian special services”, and the New York Times immediately adopted the same line that pro-Russia groups may have been responsible for torching the building.31 The Western narrative of the far-right in Ukraine since the Euromaidan is not without controversy. Volodymyr Ishchenko, a Ukrainian sociologist who specialises in the far-right in Ukraine, concludes: “The dominant narrative since Maidan in Ukrainian and much of the Western public spheres has been systematically downplaying the problem” by arguing that “the Ukrainian far-right” is “small and marginal.” He stated that “often, the far-right is just ignored.”32
Notably, Western concerns over far-right fighters in Ukraine were more prevalent before the February 2022 invasion. For example, The Nation described Azov in 2018 as “pro-Nazi, as evidenced by its regalia, slogans, and programmatic statements.”33 In 2019, Radio Free Europe called Azov “far-right.”34 In 2020, The Guardian referred to Azov as a “neo-Nazi extremist movement.”35 Consistent with Indexing Theory, such coverage of the neo-Nazis in Ukraine before the February 2022 Russian invasion overlapped with similar expressions by Western governments. In its 2018 Human Rights report, the US State Department called the political wing of the Azov Regiment “a hate group.”36 In 2019, ambassadors from G7 countries warned against “extreme political movements in Ukraine, whose violent actions are worrying in themselves.” The warnings referred specifically to the Azov movement and its violence during the 2019 presidential elections.37 The US Congress has displayed longstanding ambivalence over its designation of Azov. In 2018, forty Congress members signed a letter to the State Department with the request to designate Azov as a terrorist organisation because of its links to terrorist attacks in multiple countries and its recruitment of neo-Nazis in its ranks.38 A defence appropriations bill amendment was adopted by the entire US Congress in 2018, which banned US government funding and training of the Azov regiment due to concerns over its neo-Nazi views and members. Such concerns had been expressed by American officials for several years after the Euromaidan. The amendment was first unanimously adopted by the US House of Representatives in 2015. Congressman John Conyers put it bluntly, “I am grateful that the House of Representatives unanimously passed my amendments last night to ensure that our military does not train members of the repulsive neo-Nazi Azov Battalion.”39 Under pressure from the Pentagon, however, Congress subsequently removed this first amendment. A similar amendment, proposing a ban on US military assistance to radical nationalist and neo-Nazi organisations, voluntary police, and paramilitary formations under their command, was blocked in Congress in 2014.40
In general, however, American and European governments have been careful not to issue public statements against the far-right in Ukraine or to call attention to it. This hesitancy began after the Euromaidan and became starker following the February 2022 Russian invasion. Indeed, Western governments and media increasingly whitewashed the empirical record to present the Ukrainian far-right formations as categorically moderate in order to boost international support. In June 2024, the US State Department stated that the Azov brigade was eligible to receive US weapons under the “Leahy Law” because it was cleared of human rights violations. It made this determination after claiming that the Azov brigade is a new unit that is not subject to the previous Congressional ban, even though in reality this brigade was created on the basis of the Azov regiment, celebrated the 10th anniversary of the Azov battalion creation as its own anniversary, and is led by original Azov battalion commanders.41 However, a subsequent amendment, which was included in the US defence bill which was passed by the US House of Representatives, specifically stated that “none of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available by this Act may be used to provide arms, training, intelligence, or other assistance to the Azov Battalion, the Third Separate Assault Brigade, or any successor organisation.”42
Such instrumental portrayals of allies are not limited to this conflict. Other recent cases of political violence have also featured public relations campaigns by governments and media to present allies as arguably more moderate than their history and contemporary ideology indicate. For example, in the Syrian war, anti-Assad jihadist organisations allied with the West were euphemistically referred to as “rebels,” sometimes “moderate” ones, even when they fought under the direction of a Foreign Terrorist Organisation, as designated by the US State Department.43 A large body of literature within terrorism studies has found that the labelling of violent perpetrators by governments and media is not value-neutral, but expedient to serve political agendas.44 Particularly in these controversial cases of political violence, academe can play an important role in interrogating the empirical record to adjudicate the truth.45
The Far-Right in the Donbas War
Research within the field of terrorism studies has repeatedly noted the difficulty of determining the ideological beliefs of participants in political violence.46 However, fine-grained knowledge of the organisations can substantially increase confidence. Svoboda and the main organisations that remained within the Right Sector after the Euromaidan were widely understood as far-right for maintaining ultra-nationalist and ethnically supremacist views. They openly described themselves as the natural successors of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), inspired by the notorious OUN leader and Nazi collaborator, Stepan Bandera.47 Along with the UNA-UNSO, these organisations used the “Glory to Ukraine! Glory to the Heroes!” slogan, the official greeting of the Bandera faction of the OUN (OUN-B). This greeting, along with a fascist-style hand salute, was modelled on greetings and salutes of other well-known fascist parties in European history, from the Nazi party in Germany to the Ustashe party in Croatia.48 The Right Sector also adopted its red and black flag from the OUN-B and the UPA, which symbolized Ukrainian blood and soil, which were also pervasive in Nazi ideology and flags.49 But the existence of these symbols alone offers weak evidence of far-right influence in the Donbas war without understanding the cultural and historical context.
The violent overthrow of the Viktor Yanukovych government by means of the Maidan massacre triggered the resurgence of separatism in Donbas.50 After his overthrow in February 2014, far-right parties and organisations in Ukraine expanded and organised their armed formations. Along with Ihor Kolomoisky, an oligarch who became the head of the Dnipropetrovsk regional administration, the Right Sector was instrumental in the formation of the Dnipro battalion in the spring of 2014.51 The Azov battalion, notorious for its use of neo-Nazi symbols in its official insignia, was also organised in the spring of 2014 and led by the SNA and the Patriot of Ukraine with the involvement of the Radical Party. As mentioned, “White Leader” Andrii Biletsky was the first commander of Azov.52 Based in Mariupol, the St. Mary’s battalion was formed in the fall of 2014 and led by the far-right Bratstvo party, which is described by its leader (Dmytro Korchynsky) as the “Christian Taliban.”53 Around this time, the Aidar battalion, nominally subordinated to the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, was formed by the Maidan Self-Defence. One of its platoons was led by the White Hammer, a neo-Nazi organisation belonging to the Right Sector during the Euromaidan. Ilia Kiva, a Right Sector member, was the commander of another volunteer police battalion. A previously convicted criminal with a swastika tattoo became the commander of the Tornado Company, a special police unit. He and seven other members of his company were arrested and convicted for various crimes in the warzone, such as torturing detainees. A Nazi-style flag with a swastika was found in their prison cell.54 These units were all under the formal jurisdiction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the National Guard, or the Ministry of Defence. From the start of their formation, they remained under de facto command of radical nationalist or neo-Nazi organisations. These armed formations sprouted up in the early stages of the conflict in Donbas and were stationed there in an attempt to suppress pro-Russian separatism in the region by force. The Right Sector and the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists actively organised various militia and paramilitary units that were not subordinate to the central government of Ukraine. The Volunteer Ukrainian Corps, the largest paramilitary formation, was formed and led by the Right Sector specifically for the war in Donbas, though it also included battalions in Western Ukraine.55
The paramilitary formations, special police, and National Guard units, organised and led by far-right organisations such as the Right Sector, the Social National Assembly, Patriot of Ukraine, Svoboda, C14, and Bratstvo, constituted a small minority of Ukrainian fighters in the Donbas. Based on reports, we estimate the number of members of radical nationalist and neo-Nazi organisations who served in various far right-led, regular, and other armed formations in the Donbas, at around five thousand. This estimate is conservative and represents just one percent of approximately 400,000 people who participated in this war on the side of the central government.56 Additional metrics of influence, however, are also important to consider.
Despite their relatively small numbers, far-right fighters exercised disproportionate influence in the Donbas civil war, particularly in the early stages before the first direct Russian military intervention in August 2014. Far-right Ukrainian groups proliferated after the Euromaidan because they were eager to fight and were responsible for a disproportionate level of violence, especially against civilians and prisoners of war in Mariupol and Krasnoarmiisk. Far-right organisations and far-right-linked battalions thus played a crucial role in escalating the armed conflict in the Donbas. Svoboda and C14, an avowedly neo-Nazi group affiliated with Svoboda until the summer of 2014, organised and led the Sich battalion from June 2014 onwards.57 Meanwhile, the Right Sector carried out a deadly attack on a separatist checkpoint in Sloviansk on 20 April 2014. While Ukrainian and Western media denied far-right involvement in these events, the evidence to the contrary includes business cards linked to far-right members found after the attack. As well, Ukrainian court proceedings revealed that the weapons used by the Right Sector checkpoint attackers were the same as the snipers from this group who killed and wounded police during the Maidan.58 And two years after the attack on the separatist checkpoint, Dmytro Yarosh—the leader of the Right Sector—admitted his personal involvement in thisattack.59 Oleksandr Turchynov, then acting president of Ukraine, and Kolomoisky’s deputy in the Dnipropetrovsk regional administration, reportedly orchestrated this Right Sector operation, aimed to seize and destroy a television transmitter near Sloviansk, several days after this area was seized by the Strelkov-led armed group of Russian nationalists and Ukrainian separatists.60 This attack by the Right Sector constituted a major escalation of the conflict in Donbas because it broke both the Geneva Agreement signed on 17 April 2014 by Ukraine, Russia, the EU, and the US for a peaceful resolution of the conflict, as well as the Orthodox Easter truce between the Ukrainian government and separatists in Donbas.
Far right-led armed formations were also behind many other violent attacks in the Donbas, further escalating the conflict into a civil war. Videos, media reports, and admissions from commanders and other members of the Azov and Dnipro battalions indicate that they participated in the storming of the district police headquarters in Mariupol on 9 May 2014. Approximately ten people, including at least one protester, were killed.61 Analysis of online video streams, media reports, and Ukrainian government documents, also make clear that Azov played a major role in taking back the city of Mariupol from the control of separatists in June 2014.62 The Dnipro battalion, along with other units, seized civilians in the Donetsk Region to prevent the separatist referendum on 11 May 2014. Videos show them shooting unarmed pro-separatist protesters with Kalashnikovs, killing two locals. The Ukrainian government denied the presence of the Dnipro battalion, but it was confirmed by other credible sources, including admissions by battalion members in videos, like Volodymyr Parasiuk’s statement on social media, who became the People’s Deputy of Ukraine.63
The far-right-led armed formations perpetrated a disproportionate amount of violence in the first few months of the Donbas conflict and thus played a major role in escalating it into a larger civil war because the radical nationalist and neo-Nazi-led groups were far more willing to use force at that time. The Ukrainian armed forces, the security service, police and National Guard units were more reluctant to use force against the separatists in Donbas because their commanders and members were publicly blamed by the new government for attempting to forcefully suppress the Maidan protests—and in particular, for the Maidan massacre. Because the new Maidan government came to power through violence, which included the killing of police and protesters, it lacked legitimacy among many military, police, and SBU members in the Donbas region during this initial period of the conflict. Further, compared to the newly ascendant far-right groups in the aftermath of Euromaidan, the regular Ukrainian armed forces, the security service, the police and National Guard units were known for lower morale and higher desertions. Examples of this included the Donetsk SBU Alfa commander and Luhansk Berkut members, who joined the separatists.64
The relative role of the far-right in the political violence was not constant; it began to decline in the Donbas when newly elected president Petro Poroshenko ordered the Ukrainian military, SBU, police, and National Guard to wield lethal force against the separatists and launch the offensive in June 2014.65 The war was most intense and violent in 2014 and 2015, but the fighting declined significantly following the Minsk Agreements in 2015. However, ultra-nationalist and neo-Nazi fighters continued to exert a non-trivial role, even after the Ukrainian military intensified its operations in Donbas and purported to moderate the far-right fighters. After its formal incorporation into the National Guard of Ukraine, the Azov regiment and its commanders maintained a close organisational and ideological relationship with the neo-Nazi National Corps party. This party was formed by the Azov battalion founder and the first commander on the basis of neo-Nazi SNA and Patriot of Ukraine, and it included many Azov battalion and regiment veterans. The Azov regiment functioned as a military wing of the National Corps, which, in essence, represented overlapping elements of the same Azov movement.66 Indeed, Azov regiment commanders shared a neo-Nazi background and had served in the neo-Nazi-led Azov battalion.67 In other words, the rebranding from “battalion” to “regiment” did not alter the key personnel.68 For example, Azov regiment commander Denys Prokopenko was a member of the neo-Nazi White Boys Club, which was formed by the ultras of the Dynamo Kyiv football club. This group of ultras displayed various Nazi symbols and the Nazi salute on their social media and during football games. His Azov battalion platoon had used the Totenkopf insignia of the Nazi SS.69 Andriy Biletsky became the commander of the Third Assault Brigade, which was created by veterans of the Azov battalion and regiment and activists of his neo-Nazi group, the National Corps.70 In 2023, he stated in an interview with Ukrainian media that the united Azov movement included this Azov brigade under his command along with the Azov regiment and the Kraken unit.71 Such admissions in Ukrainian media highlighting enduring far-right allegiances seldom make their way into the Western press.
Importantly, Azov commanders never publicly renounced their neo-Nazi views, symbols, and organisations. In fact, Azov leaders routinely denied in media interviews that they, their units, and organisations, were neo-Nazi, claiming that the well-documented Nazi symbols were fakes or Russian propaganda. Our research of Ukrainian social media as well as other researchers of the far-right in Ukraine, such as Lev Golinkin and Moss Robeson, have identified over one hundred cases of Nazi and neo-Nazi displays by at least several hundred Azov commanders and other members from 2014 to 2022. This number includes displays on uniforms, patches, photographs, flags, and tattoos of neo-Nazi and Nazi symbols, such as the swastika, SS sign, 88 (Heil Hitler code), Hitler images, Nazi flags, and Totenkopf, and a fascist hand salute.72 The continued relevance of far-right extremism in Azov was evident at the very top. Arsen Avakov, the Minister of Internal Affairs, was personally involved in the Azov battalion formation and its later expansion to a regiment.73 President Petro Poroshenko circulated photographs awarding Ukrainian national medals and commendations to some of the most well-known neo-Nazis in Azov.74 The Nazi connection to Azov was clearly not due to a loss of agency control.
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch reported that Azov was involved in many cases of torture, illegal detention, and disappearances during the war in Donbas.75 The impact of these far-right organisations cannot be measured strictly in terms of the direct physical effects, as terrorism researchers have emphasised in many other contexts.76 Ultra-nationalist and neo-Nazi organisations were instrumental in blocking or “spoiling” a peaceful resolution of the armed conflict in Donbas, another well-established source of leverage for extremists.77 Far-right groups such as the Right Sector, Svoboda, and the Radical Party opposed the adoption by the parliament of Constitutional amendments based on provisions from the Minsk Agreements.78 To this end, Svoboda activists launched a grenade attack on 31 August 2015 in front of the Ukrainian parliament, killing four and wounding dozens of policemen and National Guard troops, which helped to block these amendments, undercutting the logic of implementation.79
Far-right groups also challenged the implementation of President Volodymyr Zelensky’s electoral promise to peacefully resolve the Donbas war.80 In October 2019, Zelensky travelled to a front-line position in Donbas to personally convince the Azov fighters to stop blocking the implementation of the Minsk agreements by withdrawing along with separatist troops from the frontline, as he agreed during the summit with Putin and German and French leaders in Paris. But video of the encounter shows that Zelensky was taunted by activists of this neo-Nazi organisation who flouted his appeal.81 According to the Associated Press, thousands of far-right and nationalist activists shouting the far-right OUN and UPA slogan “Glory to Ukraine. Glory to the Heroes” marched through Kyiv protesting against a peace plan for eastern Ukraine.82
The radical flank threatened Zelensky for implementing Minsk on other occasions as well. In May 2019, Dmytro Yarosh, the former Right Sector leader, publicly threatened to hang the new Ukrainian president on a tree if he fulfilled his election promise of a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Donbas.83 In 2021, Yarosh, the commander of the Ukrainian Volunteer Army organised by the Right Sector, was appointed Adviser to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Valerii Zaluzhnyi.84 In the same year, videos, photos, and Ukrainian media reports show police standing down while neo-Nazi and other far-right protesters attacked the Office of the President of Ukraine and painted swastikas on its walls.85 The Russia scholar Stephen F. Cohen concluded that Zelensky “can’t go forward with peace negotiations” because “crazy fascist movements” in Ukraine “literally threatened his life.”86 Although far-right peace rejectionists posed political problems for Zelensky, they were also known to work closely with him. An activist of the neo-Nazi Patriot of Ukraine and former deputy commander of the Azov regiment was appointed the acting head of the National Police of Ukraine during the Poroshenko presidency and then became a deputy minister of Internal Affairs during the Zelensky presidency.87 Prime Minister Oleksii Honcharuk spoke at a “veterans party” organised by a front organisation for the neo-Nazi C14 with a stylised swastika of a neo-Nazi rock band behind him.88 The advisory council of the Ministry of Veteran Affairs under Zelensky retained activists of this neo-Nazi group, including those charged with assassinating the prominent opposition journalist, Oles Buzyna, in 2015.89
In sum, ultra-nationalist and neo-Nazi militant organisations were deeply involved on the side of the central government throughout the Donbas conflict. Although representing a small fraction of Ukrainian forces throughout the conflict, they committed a disproportionate amount of violence, particularly before President Poroshenko ordered the Ukrainian military to increase its use of force against the separatists in the summer of 2014. The much-touted absorption of Azov and other extreme right-wing militia under the official Ukrainian National Guard, police, and military command did not change either their command or their ideological displays. Many of the fighters worked closely with the Kyiv political leadership across administrations, when not using de facto veto power to block peaceful resolution of the conflict in this region.
This interpretation departs from others that rely strictly on vote-share as the proxy for far-right influence. The influence of the far-right in Ukraine after the Maidan far exceeded its electoral support and membership. Svoboda and Right Sector leaders each won only one percent of the votes in the snap presidential elections in May 2014. In the parliamentary elections of October 2014, Svoboda narrowly failed to clear the five percent threshold, receiving 4.7 percent. The Right Sector fared even worse, receiving only two percent of the votes. Ruslan Koshulynsky, one of Svoboda leaders, who was backed by the Right Sector, OUN, and C14, received only 1.7 percent of the votes in the 2019 presidential elections, while Svoboda won 2.2 percent of the votes in the 2019 parliamentary elections. These weak electoral results indicate the limited national support of the far-right in Ukraine, but not its outsized role in the Donbas conflict.
The Far-Right in the Odesa Massacre
Other than the Donbas war, the Odesa massacre was the most significant and deadly instance of political violence after the Maidan massacre in Ukraine since its independence in 1991 until the Russia-Ukraine war in February 2022. The violence took place on 2 May 2014, between a “United Ukraine” rally and pro-Russian separatists, carried out with petrol bombs, gunfire, and rock-throwing, which ended up killing 48 people, primarily separatist protesters.90 The vast majority of the fatalities took place in the Trade Unions House, where 42 separatist activists and employees (forty men, seven women, and one boy) were killed when the building was set ablaze.91
This massacre contributed to the escalation of the separatist conflict in Donbas into the civil war. As noted, the massacre was presented by separatist and Russian leaders and the media as akin to the Nazi massacre of Khatyn in Belarus, and many Odesa separatists joined the separatist forces in Donbas. Despite the importance of this massacre, the International Advisory Panel of the Council of Europe, among other international authorities, has noted that the Ukrainian government failed to properly investigate and prosecute those responsible.92 To ascertain the role of far-right groups in the Odesa massacre, a broad range of key information resources can be analysed, including videos and recordings of live broadcasts of the political violence (and the lead-up to it); published reports; primary source media in Ukrainian, Russian, and English; statements of responsibility; interviews; and testimonies from participants and eyewitnesses on both sides, as well as police commanders.
On 1 May 2014, the day before the mass violence, separatists protested in Odesa to demand a referendum on the newly installed government in Kyiv, which they blamed on far-right activists and Western interference.93 Based on testimonies from a special parliamentary commission report in the immediate aftermath of the May 2014 massacre, Ukrainian and regional government officials planned to use far-right activists and the Maidan Self-Defence to suppress the separatists in the Odesa region and disperse those who were encamped near the Trade Union building.94 Extensive evidence indicates that the police and firefighters were ordered by their superiors to stand by and not interfere during attacks. For instance, a special plan to deal with mass disturbances launched by the Odesa regional police was not authorised, reportedly because of decisions at the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ top level.95 Similarly, top regional officials of the police and other law enforcement agencies were ordered to attend a meeting with their national counterparts before and during the start of the clashes.96 The presence of Andriy Parubiy and five hundred Maidan Self-Defence members, who deployed from Kyiv to Odesa on the eve of the massacre, further suggests that the violent dispersal of the separatist camp by far-right activists was orchestrated by top government leaders.97 Parubiy was a founder and leader of the neo-Nazi Patriot of Ukraine, a paramilitary wing of the Social National Party of Ukraine in the 1990s. He was the head of the Maidan Self-Defence during the Euromaidan and headed the National Security and Defence Council at the time of the Odesa massacre. The State Bureau of Investigations of Ukraine launched a criminal investigation into Parubiy for the Odesa massacre soon after he was replaced as the ex-head of the Ukrainian parliament following the early parliamentary elections in 2019.98 One of the participants acknowledged in an Israeli documentary that he engaged in “provocations” in the Odesa massacre under the command of Parubiy, who had issued orders to attack the separatists and “burn everything.” We assess this acknowledgement as credible because he was filmed along with Maidan activists in the left wing of the Trade Union building in Odesa when the deadly fire began to burn the central entrance.99 He and five other Georgian ex-military members also stated in American, Italian, and Israeli TV documentaries, Russian media interviews, on Macedonian TV, in depositions to Berkut lawyers for the Maidan massacre trial, and in testimonies to the Prosecutor General Office of Belarus for the Prosecutor General Office of Ukraine investigation that their groups of Georgian, Baltic, and far-right-linked Ukrainian snipers received weapons, payments, and orders from specific Maidan and Georgian politicians, including Parubiy, to engage in a mass killing of police and protesters.100 The Maidan massacre trial subsequently confirmed their identities.101
A march led by the Right Sector and football ultras on 2 May 2014 was used as cover to implement this plan to destroy and burn the separatist tent camp.102 The SBU in the Odesa Region received advanced information about planned “provocations” and violent clashes between football ultras and pro-Russian separatists on game day between the Odesa and Kharkiv teams on 2 May. A special train transported hundreds of football ultras from Kharkiv to Odesa.103 Football ultras in Ukraine were notorious for displaying neo-Nazi symbols and expressing neo-Nazi slogans during games and have historically linked up with the Right Sector and other far-right organisations, as during the Maidan protests.104 Both the Right Sector and football ultras in Odesa and Kharkiv were dominated by the neo-Nazi Social National Assembly/Patriot of Ukraine, which organised the Azov battalion right after the Odesa massacre.
Odeska Druzhyna, a small separatist organisation in Odesa, was present among other separatist activists based on evidence from internet streams, videos, testimonies of participants and eyewitnesses, and special parliamentary commission reports.105 Odeska Druzhyna used identifiable red tape labels, and were not Right Sector agent provocateurs, as the Russian media and separatists claimed. However, the Ukrainian government and media also mischaracterised the involvement of Odeska Druzhyna by overstating its coordination with other separatist activists.106 The balance of forces was asymmetric; the groups of numerically superior activists of the Right Sector from Odesa and Kharkiv led by the neo-Nazi Social National Assembly/Patriot of Ukraine, far-right football ultras, and Maidan Self-Defence units from Odesa and other regions attacked the separatists. Numerically disadvantaged, the latter took cover behind a police cordon.107
An Odeska Druzhyna activist was filmed shooting in the direction of the far-right protesters with an AK-74-type assault rifle.108 The official investigation and the May 2 Group maintained that a Right Sector activist was killed by this separatist group member with a 5.45mm calibre bullet.109 However, leaked forensic medical expert reports describe a 5.65mm calibre bullet extracted from his body.110 This bullet reportedly disappeared and reappeared during the investigation. The fact that it did not match bullet samples of any legally registered firearms, the weak sound of the gunshots, as well as the lack of a recoil observed in the videos of the shooting, also suggest that the far-right protester may not have been killed by this separatist, who maintained that the weapon seen in the video was a movie studio prop.111 The killing of the Right Sector activist was not visible in that video nor in any videos of clashes. The investigation and various videos at the scene did not reveal the exact time or location of his killing, or the direction of the gunshot. An Odesa deputy police chief, who was filmed around the time of this killing before he himself was wounded, stated that he saw snipers in camouflage shooting from the second floor of a hotel there. He relayed that they killed this Right Sector activist and the second protester in order to blame the separatists for their killing and provoke a violent response against the separatists.112 Videos filmed before and after his shooting suggest that the second pro-Maidan activist was killed around the same time in the same area during the violent clashes with separatists and shooting from a Kalashnikov-type weapon by one of the separatists.113 However, the government forensic examination determined that he was killed by a bullet from a pneumatic sport-type weapon. Nobody was charged with his killing, and the moment and other circumstances of his killing remain not publicly known.114
In the clashes that followed the killings of these two pro-government protesters, four separatist protesters were killed and many other separatist protesters, policemen and at least one local journalist were wounded. The forensic examination determined that three separatists were killed with hunting ammunition.115 A pro-government activist was filmed shooting with a hunting rifle in the direction of these separatists.116 This pro-government activist was later identified by the Minister of Internal Affairs as a Right Sector member.117 The government investigation charged him with killing at least one of the separatists. However, he was released from arrest and his trial was suspended indefinitely because of threats by the Right Sector and other far-right activists against judges during his trial.118 Evidence—including a recorded phone call—revealed that the events on May 2nd were coordinated by the Odesa regional administration official in charge of law enforcement agencies, and involved the participation of the Maidan Self-Defence commander, Right Sector activists, football ultras, and Maidan Self-Defence units.119 They attacked and burned the tent camp of various separatist organisations, whose activists and supporters then escaped to the nearby Trade Union building and tried to barricade the main entrance doors. Videos, internet streams, and testimonies of eyewitnesses show that attackers threw Molotov cocktails and burning tyres at the main entrance, set the entrance doors on fire, and blocked other exits. Videos, recorded calls to firefighters, and eyewitness reports reveal that the fire and thick smoke started from those burning tyres and Molotov cocktails thrown at the main entrance.120 The evidence does not support claims that the separatist protesters killed in this incident were Russian citizens, that they burned themselves by throwing Molotov cocktails from the roof of the Trade Union building or inside of the building, or that there was no far-right involvement in their killing.
After initial denials, the May 2 Group admitted that the deadly fire started at the main entrance. The May 2 Group was a nominally independent association of mainly journalists, formed after the massacre supposedly to investigate it. It was created with the involvement of the Governor of the Odesa region who was appointed by Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko within a week of the massacre.121 This governor represented not only the central government, but also the Kolomoisky’s oligarchic network, which financed the Right Sector volunteers from the Volyn Region in the Azov battalion and the Right Sector-led Dnipro battalion.122 The Azov battalion was organised by the neo-Nazi SNA and its paramilitary wing, Patriot of Ukraine, which dominated the Right Sector in Odesa and Kharkiv, a few days after the Odesa massacre. But the May 2 Group still claimed that it was impossible to determine who started the fire because both sides were throwing Molotov cocktails. However, there is no public evidence of Molotov cocktails being thrown by separatists at the main entrance; on the contrary, numerous videos feature the far-right protesters throwing Molotov cocktails and burning tyres into the Trade Union building at that time.123
Within Ukraine, far-right activists—particularly from the Right Sector and the SNA— were notorious for using tyres and Molotov cocktails to burn public buildings. Forensic examinations in the government investigation, recordings of radiocommunications by SBU Alfa group, an unpublished admission by a far-right activist to a French journalist, and an academic study determined that the Trade Union headquarters in Kyiv were burned by Maidan activists, including far-right ones, in order to stop its takeover by the Security Service of Ukraine Alfa unit.124 Far-right protesters also started fires by burning tyres in the Inter TV channel building and threatened to burn down the parliament of Ukraine, the Lutsk City Council, the Sviatoshyn District Court that heard the Maidan massacre case, the Constitutional Court, and Inter and 112 Ukraina TV channels buildings by placing tyres next to their entrances.125 Prior usage of the same tactics by the far-right increases the likelihood of their direct involvement.
Analysis of online video streams, government investigation findings, May 2 Group reports, forensic medical examinations, eyewitness testimonies, and other evidence strongly indicate that 42 people perished as a result of the fire, smoke, and from trying to jump from the upper floors of the Trade Union building with far-right activists beating them on the ground and blocking the exits.. The victims were unarmed and included mainly separatists, their supporters, and several employees, in particular women, who were in the building at the time.126 Some of the strongest evidence of far-right involvement in the arson attack comes from the far-right itself, in the form of credit claiming. A growing body of research within terrorism studies focuses on credit claiming. An important finding is that perpetrators are far more likely to deny responsibility for their attacks than to take credit for ones that they did not perpetrate.127 This is particularly true when the targets are civilians. Nonetheless, many extremist groups do claim credit for civilian attacks.128 Statements posted by the Right Sector, the SNA, and the neo-Nazi Misanthropic Division on their websites and social media sites admitted the involvement of their organisations in the massacre. The Right Sector celebrated on its website the massacre by describing it as “another bright page in our fatherland’s history.” Claiming responsibility for the slaughter, it wrote: “In the first minutes of the battle, the ‘Right Sector’ activist was seriously wounded in the stomach. Several more PS [Right Sector] activists received injuries of varying degrees of severity. However, this did not prevent the rest of the PS fighters, together with football fans, from repelling the attack of pro-Russian provocateurs, and as a result, they successfully countered attempts to seize buildings in Odesa. Standing shoulder to shoulder, Odesa activists, football fans and ‘Right Sector’ fighters defeated the forces of pro-Russian mercenaries. Order has been restored in Odesa.”129 The Right Sector—which was dominated in Odesa and Kharkiv by the Social National Assembly and its paramilitary wing, Patriot of Ukraine—and the neo-Nazi Misanthropic Division (which joined the Azov battalion after the massacre) admitted on the social media platform V Kontakte and in other public statements that the fire was set deliberately.130
The official investigation of the Odesa massacre was a farce. Nobody was found guilty of perpetrating this mass killing. As noted, the Right Sector shooter was initially arrested but then released. Only separatists were among those arrested and tried for the Odesa massacre. The Odesa massacre trial of separatists resulted in their acquittal by a local court. The Ukrainian court based its decision on the lack of evidence in support of prosecution charges. Even the verdict acknowledged both the weakness of the investigation into the perpetrators and the role of Parubiy and other government officials.131 The Council of Europe and the UN Special Commission reports also noted the destruction of evidence.132 A report by the special commission of the Council of Europe found that the Ukrainian government’s investigation of the Odesa Massacre was inadequate, politically selective, and featured the falsification of evidence, despite the existence of video footage showing who threw the Molotov cocktails at the building.133
The Ukrainian media cited SBU sources that a far-right activist, who headed the Right Sector in Odesa during the Odesa Massacre, was a secret agent of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and that he and far-right associates were paid by SBU to attack opposition politicians, threaten judges, and conduct other illegal actions.134 This would be consistent with the fact that the Right Sector was not investigated for the Odesa massacre even though the Right Sector publicly admitted involvement. His secret collaboration with SBU would also be consistent with the fact that SBU and the Prosecutor General Office refused to charge him for killing another person in Odesa in 2018. Moreover, in 2020, the SBU gave this far-right activist the status of a victim in this case, even though he streamed this killing on his social media account and the police investigation determined that he was the killer.135 In this sense, the Odesa massacre was not entirely anomalous; it featured post-Maidan far-right involvement with apparent support from high-level political leaders in a corrupt country where investigations and media have inconsistently followed the evidence.
Conclusion
This study assesses the role of the far-right in post-Maidan Ukraine, specifically, in the Donbas war and the Odesa massacre. These were two of the biggest episodes of political violence in the country leading up to the February 2022 Russian invasion. This area of research is worth close investigation because it represents intrinsically important episodes of political violence that have not attracted objective analysis based on available primary sources in Ukrainian, Russian, and English. Investigating the role of the far-right is also timely because the far-right in Ukraine is riven by duelling, self-serving contemporary narratives.
The predominant narratives propagated by governments and the mainstream media in Ukraine, the West, Russia, and separatist-controlled Donbas, concerning the role of the far-right in the war in Donbas and the Odesa massacre, have evidently been partisan. Contrary to the Russian government, separatists, and associated media, the Ukrainian government and military are not Nazi or even neo-Nazi. There were no neo-Nazis among the upper echelon of the Ukrainian government. President Zelensky is certainly not a Jewish neo-Nazi. He tried to placate and mainstream the far-right for political reasons, but has no observable personal affinity to that extreme ideology.
Neo-Nazis constituted only about one percent of the Ukrainian forces before the Russian invasion in 2022, and there is weak electoral support for neo-Nazi parties throughout the country. Similarly, the policy of glorification of the OUN-UPA, their leaders, such as Stepan Bandera, and the adoption and use of their “Glory to Ukraine! Glory to the Heroes!” greeting by the state and the military, including Zelensky, do not make Ukraine a Nazi state. While the OUN and the UPA were far-right terrorist organisations, which collaborated with Nazi Germany and perpetrated the mass murders of Jews, Poles, and Ukrainians, they were not Nazis. Ukrainians could not join the Nazi party because Hitler and other Nazi leaders regarded Ukrainians as racially inferior and opposed independence of Ukraine while also dismissing the attempt to create even a puppet state by the Bandera faction of the OUN in Lviv shortly after the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union. Thus, Putin cannot credibly justify the illegal invasion in February 2022 as a war to “de-Nazify” the “Nazi regime.”136 The power of the far-right and the glorification of the OUN and the UPA in Ukraine under Poroshenko and Zelensky were exaggerated and exploited by the Russian leaders to justify the invasion.
But the West’s efforts to whitewash the far-right in Ukraine also rests on empirically shaky grounds. Despite their relatively small numbers militarily and politically, the far-right in Ukraine exercised outsized power. The far-right organisations, volunteer battalions, and paramilitary units organised and led by them played, along with separatists and Russian nationalists, a significant role in starting and escalating the incipient civil war in the Donbas and then impeding its peaceful resolution. Even after technically integrated into the official Ukrainian forces, Azov and other far-right groups continued to harbour extremist views. Often brandishing the same extremist symbols, the core leaders and members remained and even ascended within the police, military, and security services during the Donbas war. Western media accounts have drawn heavily from biased Ukrainian sources, including “official” investigations and the May 2 Group. Across numerous primary sources in Ukrainian, Russian, and English, we find evidence that the Right Sector, Social-National Assembly, its paramilitary wing Patriot of Ukraine, and groups of far-right football ultras from Odesa and Kharkiv played a critical role in the Odesa massacre against separatist protesters on 2 May 2014. Neo-Nazi SNA/Patriot of Ukraine, which dominated the Right Sector in Odesa and Kharkiv, organised the Azov battalion right after this massacre.
Despite the lack of international consensus over the definition of terrorism, a common interpretation is the use of violence by non-state actors aimed at creating fear for political ends, particularly when the targets are civilians.137 Depending on one’s definition, some attacks within the episodes of political violence covered in this study, such as the Odesa massacre, could, therefore, arguably be classified as terrorism. What is clear is that neither of the duelling narratives accurately captures the role of the far-right. This study has helped to fill that research lacuna by making use of substantial primary source materials in Ukrainian, Russian, and English. Besides the Maidan massacre, the Donbas war and the Odesa massacre are the two most substantial episodes of political violence from the independence of Ukraine in 1991 to the February 2022 illegal Russian invasion [end]
Ivan Katchanovski is a Ukrainian and Canadian political scientist. He teaches at the School of Political Studies and the Conflict Studies and Human Rights Program at the University of Ottawa in Canada. He specialises primarily in politics, conflicts, political violence, and the far right in Ukraine. His academic publications include five books, 21 articles in peer-reviewed journals, and twelve book chapters.
Max Abrahms is a professor of public policy and political science at Northeastern University, where he specialises in international security. Abrahms has published extensively in leading academic and popular outlets such as International Organization, International Security, International Studies Quarterly, Security Studies, Comparative Political Studies, Harvard Business Review, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, New York Times, Washington Post, USA Today, Newsweek, The Atlantic, and Los Angeles Times.
I disagree with the authors on two points
Stepan Bandera & friends were Nazis. How can the authors identify some neo-Nazis in modern Ukraine, while not regarding their historical mentors as Nazis ? Before WW2, they were praising either Adolf Hitler or Benito Mussolini. Their political project was authoritarian, racist and criminal. They were dreaming of ethnic cleansing. De facto during WW2, they committed mass killing of Jews and Poles.
Terrorism is not restricted to non-state actors. Terrorism is violent action to terror civilians, in order to achieve a common political goal. This is not even a value judgement, but Hiroshima bombing was terrorism. The Israeli targeting and mass killing of civilians, in the prospect of ethnic cleansing in Gaza, is terrorism.
chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia
Endnotes
Arel, Dominique and Jesse Driscoll. 2023. Ukraine’s Unnamed War. Before the Russian Invasion of 2022. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Black, J.L. and Michael Johns (Eds.). 2016. The Return of the Cold War: Ukraine, the West and Russia. Abingdon: Routledge; Hahn, Gordon M. 2018. Ukraine Over the Edge: Russia, the West and the “New Cold War.” Jefferson, NC: McFarland Books; Katchanovski, Ivan. 2016a. “The Separatist War in Donbas: A Violent Break-up of Ukraine?” European Politics and Society, 17 (4), 473-489; Kudelia, Serhiy. 2016. “The Donbas Rift.” Russian Politics & Law, 54 (1), 5-27; Pikulicka-Wilczewska, Agnieszka and Richard Sakwa (Eds.). 2015. Ukraine and Russia: People, Politics, Propaganda and Perspectives. Bristol: E-International Relations; Sakwa, Richard. 2015. Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands. London: I.B.Tauris. ↩︎
Danciu, Gabriela-Cătălina. 2023. “A Perspective on Justifying the Ukraine–Russia War. Elements Of Propaganda.” International Journal of Social and Educational Innovation, 10 (19), 224-239; “Address by the President of the Russian Federation” (2022, February 24) http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843. ↩︎
Black, J.L. and Michael Johns (Eds.). 2016. The Return of the Cold War: Ukraine, the West and Russia. Abingdon: Routledge; Katchanovski, Ivan. 2023a. “The Maidan Massacre Trial and Investigation Revelations and Their Implications for the Ukraine-Russia War and Relations.” Russian Politics, 8 (2),181-205. ↩︎
See, for example, Colborne, Michael. 2022. From the Fires of War: Ukraine’s Azov Movement and the Global Far Right, Stuttgart: Ibidem; Davidzon, Vladislav. 2023. “The Search for Neo-Nazis Under the Bedsheets Reflects American Progressive Hysteria, Not Ukrainian Reality.” Tablet Magazine, July. ↩︎
Umland, Andreas. 2019. “Irregular Militias and Radical Nationalism in PostEuromaydan Ukraine: The Prehistory and Emergence of the “Azov” Battalion in 2014.” Terrorism and Political Violence, 31 (1), 105- 131. ↩︎
Umland, Andreas. 2020. ‘The Far Right in Pre- and Post-Euromaidan Ukraine: From Ultra-Nationalist Party Politics to Ethno-Centric Uncivil Society.’ Demokratizatsiya, 28 (2), 247-268. ↩︎
Ishchenko, Volodymyr. 2016. “Far right participation in the Ukrainian Maidan protests: an attempt of systematic estimation.” European Politics and Society, 17 (4), 453-472. ↩︎
Hahn, Gordon M. 2018. Ukraine Over the Edge: Russia, the West and the “New Cold War.” Jefferson, NC: McFarland Books; Katchanovski, Ivan. 2016b. “The Maidan Massacre in Ukraine: A Summary of Analysis, Evidence, and Findings.” In The Return of the Cold War: Ukraine, the West and Russia, eds. J.L. Black and Michael Johns. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 220-224; Katchanovski, Ivan. 2020. “The far right, the Euromaidan, and the Maidan massacre in Ukraine.” Journal of Labor and Society, 23 (1), 5-29; Katchanovski, 2023a; Katchanovski, Ivan. 2023b. “The “Snipers’ Massacre” on the Maidan in Ukraine.” Cogent Social Sciences, 9 (2); Katchanovski, Ivan. 2024. The Maidan Massacre in Ukraine. London: Palgrave Macmillan. ↩︎
Khalil Mutallimzada and Kristian Steiner, (2022), Fighters’ motivations for joining extremist groups: Investigating the attractiveness of the Right Sector’s Volunteer Ukrainian Corps. European Journal of International Security, 1–23. Ilmari Käihkö, (2018), A nation-in-the-making, in arms: control of force, strategy and the Ukrainian Volunteer Battalions. Defence Studies 18:2, 147–166; Tetyana Malyarenko and David J. Galbreath, (2016), Paramilitary motivation in Ukraine: beyond integration and abolition, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 16:1, 113–138. ↩︎
Hale, Henry E., Oxana Shevel and Olga Onuch. 2018. “Believing Facts in the Fog of War: Identity, Media and Hot Cognition in Ukraine’s 2014 Odesa Tragedy.” Geopolitics, 23 (4), 851-881. A poll commissioned for that study found that 44% of Ukrainians believed that this mass killing was committed by provocateurs from Russia, while 11% blamed pro-Russian residents of Odesa. Ten percent of the respondents said that the Odesa massacre was perpetrated by “Ukrainian nationalists from Odesa” and 3% by “pro-Ukrainian” residents of Odesa. ↩︎
Van Evera, Stephen. 1997. Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. ↩︎
Griffin, Roger with Matthew Feldman (Eds.). 2003. Fascism: Critical Concepts in Political Science. London: Routledge. ↩︎
Brahimi, Alia. “Ideology and terrorism.” The Oxford handbook of terrorism (2019): 298. ↩︎
See, for example, Jadoon, Amira, Andrew Mines, and Daniel Milton. “Targeting quality or quantity? The divergent effects of targeting upper verses lower tier leaders of militant organizations.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 67, no. 5 (2023): 1007-1031; Schram, Peter. “Self-managing terror: Resolving agency problems with diverse teams.” Games and Economic Behavior 130 (2021): 240-257; Abrahms, Max, and Philip BK Potter. “Explaining terrorism: Leadership deficits and militant group tactics.” International Organization 69, no. 2 (2015): 311-342; Popovic, Milos. “The perils of weak organization: Explaining loyalty and defection of militant organizations toward Pakistan.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 38, no. 11 (2015): 919-937. ↩︎
Biletsky 2013; Biletsky, Andriy. “Nedochytanyi Franko.” Patriot Ukrainy, (2008). https://web.archive.org/web/20101120085407/http://patriotukr.org.ua/index.php?rub=stat&id=409. Also, please note that the ADL has adopted the spelling of “antisemitism” instead of “anti-Semitism.” After reviewing the history and consulting with other leading experts, they determined that this is the best way to refer to hatred toward Jews, so we have adopted the same spelling convention here. ↩︎
Clarke, Colin P. “The Terrorist Diaspora.” Testimony, House Homeland Security Committee Task Force on Denying Terrorists Entry into the United States (2017). ↩︎
Boyd-Barrett, Oliver. 2016. Western Mainstream Media and the Ukraine Crisis: A Study in Conflict Propaganda. New York: Routledge. ↩︎
Some researchers and Zelensky have cited the presence of Russian-speakers in the Azov regiment and other neo-Nazi-led armed formations as evidence of their relative tolerance and moderation and argued that the Azov regiment distanced itself from its far-right roots. (See Umland 2019; “Zelensky refutes Russian propaganda claim that Azov Regiment is ‘neo-Nazi.’” The New Voice of Ukraine (2022, May 2), https://news.yahoo.com/zelensky-refutes-russian-propaganda-claim-131100438.html. However, these formations were organized and led by neo-Nazi organizations, which had a racist ideology and cast themselves as defenders of the White race. For this reason, they included not only large numbers of Russian speakers from Ukraine but also neo-Nazis from Russia, Belarus, and the Western countries, such as Australia, Sweden, and the US. ↩︎
“Ukraine war: Ros Atkins on… Putin’s false ‘Nazi’ claims.” BBC, (2022, March 26) https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-europe-60853404; Five Azovstal defenders were awarded the title of Heroes of Ukraine. Svidomi, (2022, October 3). https://svidomi.in.ua/en/page/five-azovstal-defenders-were-awarded-the-title-of-heroes-of-ukraine. Loyd, Anthony. “‘Nonsense’: Heroes of Mariupol Denied US Weapons Over neo-Nazi Past.” Times, (2024 May 2). https://www.thetimes.com/world/russia-ukraine-war/article/nonsense-heroes-of-mariupol-denied-us-weapons-over-neo-nazi-past-kwnr0r0pw; “Boris Johnson Praises Nazi Azov Battalion,” YouTube. (2024, May 23). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_6g7i-4wswk. There was similar systematic and politically motivated whitewashing of the far-right in Ukraine in Wikipedia, especially, after the Russian invasion. A small number of Wikipedia editors systematically whitewashed neo-Nazi and other far-right parties, organizations, and their leaders, such as Azov regiment, Patriot of Ukraine, Svoboda, National Corps, the OUN, the UPA, Stepan Bandera, Roman Shukhevych, etc. They removed or deliberately excluded scholarly studies and other evidence of the extremist ideology and involvement in mass murder of the far-right, such as the Maidan and Odesa massacres, the Holocaust, and the Lviv pogrom in Ukraine and smeared in biographical entries scholars and other experts whose studies show such ideology and political violence by the far-right in Ukraine. (See, for example, Azov Brigade, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Azov_Brigade; Patriot of Ukraine, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patriot_of_Ukraine; 2014 Odesa clashes, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014_Odesa_clashes; Far-right politics in Ukraine, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Far-right_politics_in_Ukraine. They included editors who misrepresented the Holocaust in Poland using similar tactics in Wikipedia, which is unreliable but widely accessed source, compared to academic studies (Grabowski, Jan, and Shira Klein. 2023. “Wikipedia’s Intentional Distortion of the History of the Holocaust.” Journal of Holocaust Research 37 (2): 133–90). ↩︎
Katchanovski, Ivan and Alicen Morley. 2012. “Politics of US Television Coverage of Post-Communist Countries.” Problems of Post-Communism, 59 (1), 15-30. ↩︎
Bhatia, Michael. 2008. “Fighting words: naming terrorists, bandits, rebels and other violent actors, ”Third World Quarterly, 26 (1), 5-22; Schmid, Alex P. 2012. “The revised academic consensus definition of terrorism.” Perspectives on Terrorism, 6 (2), 158-159; Ganor, Boaz. 2002. “Defining terrorism: Is one man’s terrorist another man’s freedom fighter?” Police Practice and Research, 3 (4), 287-304. ↩︎
Although the focus of this analysis is on the portrayal of the far-right in Ukraine, a related narrative dispute has been over whether to characterise the conflict in the Donbas as a civil war. The Ukrainian and Western governments and the media described the war in Donbas as an interstate war between Russia and Ukraine or a hybrid war while denying that there was a civil war. By contrast, the Russian and Donbas separatist governments and associated media denied any Russian military involvement in the war and called it a purely civil war. The majority of scholars and datasets such as the Correlates of War Project and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program classified it as a civil war or an intrastate conflict, while also noting the Russian military interventions in Donbas prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in See, for example, Arel and Driscoll 2023; Black and Johns 2016; Hahn 2018; Katchanovski 2016a; Kudelia 2016. ↩︎
Abrahms, Max. “What terrorists really want: Terrorist motives and counterterrorism strategy.” International Security 32, no. 4 (2008): 78-105. ↩︎
Rossolinski-Liebe, Grzegorz. 2014. Stepan Bandera: The life and afterlife of a Ukrainian nationalist. Stuttgart: Ibidem. ↩︎
Yeomans, Rory, (Ed.). 2016. The Utopia of Terror: Life and Death in Wartime Croatia. Rochester: University of Rochester Press; Katchanovski, Ivan. 2015. “Terrorists or National Heroes? Politics and Perceptions of the OUN and the UPA in Ukraine.” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 48 (2-3), 217-228. ↩︎
Rudling, Per Anders. 2011. “The OUN, the UPA and the Holocaust. A Study in the Manufacturing of Historical Myths.” Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies, #2107, Center for Russian and East European Studies, Pittsburgh University. ↩︎
See Katchanovski, 2016a; Katchanovski, Ivan. 2006. Cleft Countries: Regional Political Divisions and Cultures in Post-Soviet Ukraine and Moldova. Stuttgart: Ibidem. ↩︎
Umland, Andreas. 2019. “Irregular Militias and Radical Nationalism in PostEuromaydan Ukraine: The Prehistory and Emergence of the “Azov” Battalion in 2014.” Terrorism and Political Violence, 31 (1), 105-131. ↩︎
Mueller, John E. 2006. Overblown: How politicians and the terrorism industry inflate national security threats, and why we believe them. New York: Simon and Schuster; Abrahms, Max. 2006. “Why terrorism does not work.” International Security, 31 (2), 42-78. ↩︎
Kydd, Andrew, and Barbara F. Walter. 2002. “Sabotaging the peace: The politics of extremist violence.” International Organization, 56 (2), 263-296. ↩︎
“Zvit tymchasovoi slidchoi komisii Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy z pytan rozsliduvannia faktiv zahybeli hromadian u mistakh Odesi, Nariupoli, a takozh inshykh mistakh Donetskoi ta Luhanskoi oblastei Ukrainy.” (2014, September 5). Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy. http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=52134↩︎
Abrahms, Max, and Justin Conrad. “The strategic logic of credit claiming: A new theory for anonymous terrorist attacks.” Security Studies 26, no. 2 (2017): 279-304. ↩︎
Schmid, Alex. “Terrorism-the definitional problem.” Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 36 (2004): 375; Schmid, Alex P. “The definition of terrorism.” In The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, pp. 39-157. Routledge, 2011; Schmid, Alex P. “Discussion 1-Revisiting the wicked problem of defining terrorism.” Terrorism: Its Past, Present & Future Study A Special Issue to Commemorate CSTPV at 25 (2020): 3. ↩︎