Analista senior di l'intelligenza in u campu di a gestione di i risichi di sicurezza, sò un anzianu tenente detective è ufficiale di l'intelligenza in l'agenzie di u Statu francese. A bona pronuncia hè Николай Чинкуини, in russu
The Russo-Ukrainian War seems to have been engineered in a laboratory to frustrate people with repetition and analytic paralysis. Headlines appear to be circulating on a choreographed loop, all the way down to the place names. Kaja Kallas at the European Commission recently announced, without a hint of irony, that Europe’s new sanctions package – the 19th one – is the toughest yet. Ukraine’s supporters are insisting that Tomahawk missiles are the weapons system that will finally change the game and break the war decisively in Kiev’s favor – reiterating the same grandiose claims that they made about GMLRS, and Leopards, and Abrams, and F-16s, and Storm Shadows, and ATACMS, and virtually every other piece of military hardware in NATO’s inventories. On the ground, Russia is attacking settlements named Pokrovsk and Pokrovs’ke; it recently captured Toretsk and Tors’ke and is now attacking Torets’ke. The more things change, the more things stay the same.
The analytic frameworks applied to the war have also changed relatively little, buried and obfuscated by the nebulous concept of attrition. On the Ukrainian side, there is continued insistence that Russia is suffering exorbitant losses and straining under the pressure of Ukrainian deep strikes, while Ukrainian setbacks are blamed in large part on the failure of the United States to expand its largesse and give Ukraine everything it needs. Many pro-Russian lines of thinking mirror this and suppose that the AFU is on the verge of disintegration, while the Kremlin is accused of failing to “take the gloves off”, particularly in regards to the Ukrainian energy grid, Dnieper bridges, and dams.
The result is a very strange sort of war. This is an extraordinarily high-intensity ground war. Both armies remain in the field, holding hundreds of miles of continuous front after years of bloody fighting. Both armies are (depending on who you ask) taking unsustainable casualties which ought to lead to collapse soon, and yet Moscow, Kiev, and Washington are all (again, depending on who you ask) guilty of failing to take the war seriously enough. All of this is maddeningly repetitive, and one could be forgiven for tuning out entirely. Even the diplomatic tango between Trump, Zelensky, and Putin, after delivering a few entertaining moments, failed to really move the needle in any discernable direction.
Few would argue that the trajectory of the war changed in an obviously dramatic way in 2025, and it is important to avoid the worn out and clichéd language about “turning points” or “collapse” or any such silly thing. However, 2025 saw several shifts in the war, which will hardly ostentatious or dramatic, are nevertheless very important. 2025 has been the first year of the war in which Ukraine launched no ground offensives or proactive operations of its own. This fact is not only a hint at the threadbare state of Ukraine’s ground forces, but also a testament to the way Russian forces transformed “attrition” from a buzzword into a method of persistent pressure across a variety of axes this year.
In lieu of initiative on the ground, and facing a slow but relentless rollback of their defenses in the Donbas, the theory of Ukrainian victory has shifted in an unacknowledged but dramatic way. After years of insisting that it would achieve maximal territorial integrity – an outcome which would require the total and decisive defeat of Russia’s ground forces – Ukraine has reframed its path to victory mainly as a process of inflicting strategic costs on Russia that mount until the Kremlin agrees to a ceasefire. Consequentially, the debate about arming Ukraine has shifted from a conversation about armor and artillery – equipment useful for retaking lost territories – to a discussion about deep striking weapons like Tomahawks, which can be used to shoot at Russian oil refineries and energy infrastructure. In short, rather than move to prevent Russian from achieving immediate operational objectives in the Donbas, Ukraine and its sponsors are now seeking ways to make Russia pay a price such that victory on the ground is no longer worth it. It is unclear whether they have thought about what price Ukraine will pay in the exchange. Perhaps they do not care.
About Tomahawks
Notwithstanding Ukraine’s attempts to jumpstart indigenous production, it is inevitable that Ukrainian capabilities will be largely determined by the largesse of western sponsors. This aspect of the war took a sudden turn at the beginning of the October when fresh reporting began to circulate that Tomahawk missiles might be on the table for Ukraine. Tomahawks have always been on Ukraine’s wish list (given that the Ukrainian wish list as such consists of essentially all the military equipment in NATO’s combined inventories) but this was the first reporting that they might be under serious consideration.
As is frequently the case, the discussion spiraled away from realistic grounding, with some suggesting that the Tomahawk would be a “game changer” for Ukraine (where have we heard that before?) and the pro-Russian sphere dismissing it as an irrelevant distraction. There’s a tendency to focus on the quality of American weapons systems, casting them as either unrivaled technological marvels or overhyped and overpriced baubles, but this is generally not productive and largely irrelevant to the matter at hand. The Tomahawk, broadly speaking, is exactly as advertised, and provides proven and reliable strike capability at strategic depths in excess of 1,000 miles. In role, range, and payload it is essentially an analog to Russia’s Kalibr missiles (I am begging the enthusiasts to note the phrase “essentially an analog” rather than rake me over the coals over the different guidance systems and other technical minutia). Such a system will always be valuable and would obviously improve Ukraine’s deep strike capabilities.
The “problem” with Tomahawks does not relate to any “problem” with the missile itself, but with its availability and Ukraine’s technical capability to launch them. The Tomahawk is conventionally a ship-launched missile (there is no extant air-launched variant) with a few novel options for ground launch. Ukraine, obviously, would require ground launch systems, and the problem is that these systems are essentially brand new and available in very limited quantities: more importantly, American service branches are in the process of trying to build out these capabilities throughout the decade. Providing ground-launchable Tomahawks to Ukraine in any meaningful numbers would therefore essentially require the US Army and Marines to scrap their own force buildout plans.
There are two basic options for ground launching Tomahawks. One of these is the US Army’s MRC (Mid-Range Capability) Launcher, dubbed the Typhon. This is an enormous tractor-trailer launcher with four launch tubes, first delivered in 2023. It has an enormous footprint – so large, apparently, that the Army is already asking for a smaller replacement – and is intended to give the Army an organic fires component in the gap between the shorter range Precision Strike Missile and hypersonic systems (which do not yet exist). The critical fact is this: the Army intends to field a total of five Typhon batteries by 2028, of which two have been delivered so far. Each battery consists in turn of four launchers, implying that eight out of a planned twenty launchers have been delivered. Even more importantly, both of the currently operational batteries are already deployed, with one in the Philippines and one in Japan. These systems are being actively used in exercises and trials, including an exercise this summer in Australia
The Typhon system gives ground launch capability to the Tomahawk but brings a massive footprint
The situation with the Marine Corps’ launch system is quite similar, although the launch platforms themselves could not be more different. Unlike the lumbering Typhon tractor trailer, the Marines are fielding a significantly more lithe and compact LMSL system, with the tradeoff of a single launch tube compared to the Typhon’s four. What matters is not so much the technical differences, as the fact that the Marines – like the Army – only received their first deliveries in 2023, and they are currently in the process of building out the force. In the case of the marines, the goal is to have a Tomahawk battalion built out by 2030. In fact, the production contract came into effect as recently as 2025.
What does all of that mean? It means that, although the Tomahawk itself is a fine missile, the systems for ground launch are so new and available in such limited quantities that equipping Ukraine with Tomahawks would require either the US Army or the Marines to materially alter their force structure in the near term (through 2030, essentially). These are essentially the opposite of much of the gear that’s been given to Ukraine to this point: far from being inventories of older systems that can be earmarked as surplus or tabbed for replacement, Tomahawk ground launch is a brand new capability that is in the middle of deployment and buildout for the first time.
This is, of course, a layered complication on top of Tomahawk quantities in and of themselves. The issue of Tomahawk availability is both over and under emphasized, depending on the context. The United States has something like 4,000 Tomahawks in its inventories (although half of these are currently inside their cells on American ships), so it is not quite correct to say (as some have) that America is running out of these critical weapons. The issue is that production rates are relatively anemic (generally between 55 and 90 per year) and are fail to replenish the expenditure from even relatively brief strike campaigns, such as the repeated strikes on Yemen. Broadly speaking, then, the issue is not so much that the United States is in immediate danger of running out of Tomahawks, but that procurement schedules are so slow that even relatively minor expenditures can erase multiple years worth of deliveries.
It may be useful, then, to consider Tomahawks in comparison to the ATACMS missiles which have already been provided to Ukraine. Unlike the Tomahawk, the ATACMS is a system which has already been tabbed for replacement, with the Precision Strike Missile in the early phases of its rollout. ATACMS were also compatible with launch systems that Ukraine already had. In comparison to Tomahawks, then, ATACMS are both vastly more strategically expendable, produced in larger numbers, and easier to deploy. Despite all these points in their favor, the United States provided Ukraine with just 40 ATACMS. Even if the Army could be pressured into handing over one or two of its brand new Typhon launchers, it is difficult to imagine that more than few dozen Tomahawks could be spared for Ukraine: a token inventory far too small to wage a sustained strike campaign in the Russian heartland
Peace, Sponsored by Raytheon
Given that Tomahawks for Ukraine would be measured in the dozens, rather than the hundreds, it’s worth asking whether this could actually change anything for the AFU at the front. The answer is clearly no in the long run, but it would be unwise to dismiss the possibility that even a limited tranche of Tomahawks (let’s say 40 to 50 missiles) could help alleviate pressure on Ukrainian forces at the front, provided they were used appropriately. A short term boost to Ukrainian strike capabilities, if deployed against Russian rear areas, could force further dispersal and rationing of Russian assets and temporarily stall Russia’s emerging multi-axis offensive. This could defer the loss of key positions until early 2026. This presumes, however, that the Ukrainians would be content to use Tomahawks against operational targets. In reality, Ukraine can never seem to resist lobbing missiles at targets that have little bearing on the front, like the Kerch Bridge. Indeed, a failure to synergize strikes at depth with operations on the ground is a major reason why the ATACMS achieved so little.
On the other side of this equation, it is a common complaint from the Russian perspective that Moscow has done too little to “deter” the United States from empowering Ukraine’s strike campaign – both by directly providing munitions and supplying the planning, ISR, and guidance systems. This, however, rather misses the point. Russia has done nothing of note to deter the United States because both Moscow and Washington understand fully that there is essentially no appetite (on either side) for a direct confrontation. In the (sensible) absence of a willingness to strike back at NATO targets, there is really nothing Russia can do to deter beyond maintaining its own retaliatory capabilities. The issue is not that Russia has failed to actively deter, but that there is nothing they could do even if they wanted to.
The basic pattern here is well established. The United States has done what it can to backstop Ukrainian strike capabilities, but it has held them at a level where Ukraine’s damage output falls far short of decisive levels. So long as that is the case, Russia has clearly demonstrated that it will simply eat the punches and retaliate against *Ukraine*. Hence, when the United States helps Ukraine target Russian oil facilities, it is Ukraine that receives the reprisal, and it is Ukraine which has its natural gas production annihilated as the winter approaches. In a sense, neither side is really trying to deter the other at all. The United States has raised the cost of this war for Russia, but not enough to create any real pressure for Moscow to end the conflict; in response, Russia punishes Ukraine, which is something the United States does not really care about. The result is a sort of geostrategic Picture of Dorian Gray, where the United States vicariously inflicts cathartic damage on Russia, but Ukraine accrues all the soul damage.
In the case of Tomahawks, the risk-reward calculus is just not there. Tomahawks are a strategically invaluable asset that the United States cannot afford to hand out like candy. Even if the launch systems could be provided (highly doubtful), the missiles could not be made available in sufficient quantities to make a difference. The range of the missiles, however, significantly raises the probability of miscalculation or uncontrolled escalation. Ukraine shooting American missiles at energy infrastructure in Belgorod or Rostov is one thing; shooting them at the Kremlin is another thing entirely.
There is, however, another aspect of this which seems to be garnering little attention. The biggest risk of sending Tomahawks is not that the Ukrainians will blow up the Kremlin and start World War Three. The bigger risk is that the Tomahawks are used, and Russia simply moves on after eating the strikes. Tomahawks are arguably one of the last – if not *the* last – rung in the escalation ladder for the USA. We have rapidly run through the chain of systems that can be given to the AFU, and little remains except a few strike systems like the Tomahawk or the JASSM. Ukraine has generally received everything it has asked for. In the case of Tomahawks, however, the United States is running the most serious risk of all: what if the Russians simply shoot down some of the missiles and eat the rest of the strikes? It’s immaterial whether the Tomahawks damage Russian powerplants or oil refineries. If Tomahawks are delivered and consumed without seriously jarring Russian nerves, the last escalatory card will have been played. If Russia perceives that America has reached the limits of its ability to raise the costs of the war for Russia, it undercuts the entire premise of negotiations. More simply put, Tomahawks are most valuable as an asset to threaten with.
Reading between the lines of President Trump’s public statements recently, it seems likely that he has rationally weighed these considerations. Publicly, he used the threat of Tomahawks to try and force Russia to keep negotiating, and he’s received a commitment for another meeting with Putin for his trouble (more on that later). He has now, for the time being, shelved the Tomahawk plan, commenting that “we need them” and applying the usual Trumpian linguistic style to the broadly accepted issue of inventories which I have outlined here. Tomahawks are simply more valuable to the United States as a tool to threaten escalation, rather than as an actual kinetic asset in Ukrainian hands, and so long as Trump keeps his powder dry he can re-raise the issue later.
Ultimately, perhaps, this discussion is not about Tomahawks at all. These missiles, rather, are simply a totem which demonstrate two important dovetailing points. First, that American resources are not infinite, and as the United States reaches deeper into its bag to help Ukraine, it begins to grab at strategically critical assets that the US military simply cannot spare. Secondly, we must remember that America’s policy in Ukraine is a game of titration, with Washington probing the limits of Russia’s willingness to “eat the strikes” without allowing the reprisal violence to spill out of Ukraine.
The Big Banana: Russia’s Operational Schema
At this point, it’s becoming increasingly difficult to say anything meaningful about the actual operational progression on the ground. There are several reasons for this. First and foremost, the war has now gone on so long and is consistently moving at such an apparently glacial pace that most people simply do not care at this point whether Russia holds Yampil or not, or whether they have advanced past the rail line in Pokrovsk. There is severe fatigue (or perhaps boredom is the better word) with the status of an interminable sequence of apparently small settlements, industrial complexes, and forestry plantations, and as a result most people have essentially checked out. Not the least among these must surely be President Trump, who apparently chucked Zelensky’s map of the frontline and complained that he was tired of being shown the same maps over and over again.
On the other hand, we have the true obsessives who continue to dutifully follow the frontlines regularly and are voluntarily intaking daily updates. We end up with a bifurcated system where some people are still highly plugged in to the micro movements on the battlefield, but most people just don’t care, and we can hardly blame the latter. I think it would be profitable, then, to think about the broader Russian operational scheme, what it has achieved, and what it aims to achieve in the coming year. This is probably more interesting and less repetitious than fixating on the exact positioning within Pokrovsk or Kupyansk.
There are two larger points that I think are worth making before we look at some specifics.
First and foremost, much of the battlefield analysis that comes out (particularly from western analysts) makes firm pronouncements as to what constitutes Russia’s “primary” and “secondary” efforts, but these are essentially interpolated and frequently incorrect. For example, it’s become a fairly mainstream conception that Russia’s “primary” point of effort right now is the capture of Pokrovsk, but this does not actually seem supported by Russian actions. There is no particular advantage to be gained for Russia by pushing to capture Pokrovsk as soon as possible – the city is already in a stranglehold partial encirclement. To be sure, Pokrovsk *was* a major logistic hub for Ukrainian forces, but it can no longer serve that role and was sterilized as a transit hub months ago, once it became a frontline city. The opposite side of this coin is that other Russian axes of advance, particularly in southern Donetsk and the bend of the Donets River, are dismissed as “secondary” efforts. This is a major mistake, and I will attempt to show that these are critical advances where Russia is shaping the battlefield to its advantage for follow on operations.
Secondly, it should be understood and appreciated that Ukraine has lost essentially all battlefield initiative. In 2024, the AFU was able to assembled a mechanized reserve and launch their operation into Kursk. This operation ultimately failed and resulted in severe Ukrainian losses, but this is unrelated to the fact that Ukraine was still able to accumulate forces and pursue offensive operations on its own initiative. In 2025, however, Ukraine has been in a permanent state of reactivity. This was the first year of the war in which Ukraine did not launch any proactive operations or counteroffensives of its own, and Ukrainian hopes have instead pivoted to their strategic strike campaign against Russian oil facilities.
In a larger sense, the effect of attrition can be seen year by year with the shrinking scope of Ukraine’s proactive operations. In 2022, Ukraine was able to launch a pair of widely separated offensives which yielded modest successes: an offensive out of Kharkov rolled the front back over the Oskil River (though it failed to collapse the Lugansk shoulder), meanwhile, a series of battles outside of Kherson failed to break through the Russian lines, but they did play a role in persuading the Russians to abandon their bridgehead over the Dnieper. The point of course is not to once again autopsy these offensives, but to point out that there were two of them, that they were meaningful in scale, and they did result in important territorial gains for Ukraine. In 2023, by contrast, Ukraine launched a single theater-level offensive in the south, which failed. In 2024, we got the Kursk operation: smaller and less lavishly equipped than 2023’s Zaoprizhia offensive, and aimed at a peripheral theater. This year, there were no proactive Ukrainian operations at all. There is a very clear pattern at play here, with Ukraine’s offensive punch progressively shrinking before disappearing entirely in 2025. This was a year of essentially uninterrupted Russian initiative
Putting Ukraine permanently on the backfoot is a significant Russian achievement, and it is owed to a few converging factors. Obviously, the attrition of Ukrainian forces is a major factor. We’ve gone through the flailing Ukrainian mobilization, the cannibalization of its forces, and the general lack of reserves in detail on several occasions, and there’s no need to retread that ground here. Suffice it to say, Ukraine’s ability to husband forces for offensive operations appears to be severely degraded. Russia has exacerbated this problem by pressing steadily on a variety of different axes. At the moment, there are no fewer than seven Russian axes of attack, pressuring a slew of cities all along the line. This creates a series of defensive emergencies, maintains the burn rate on Ukrainian forces, and fixes them on the line. Finally, in a point to be detailed shortly, Russian advances have begun unraveling Ukraine’s logistic connectivity, which puts strain on supply and prevents the concentration and accumulation of forces
Eastern Ukraine: Approximate Situation and Axes of Russian Advance
Now, for the development of the front and the premise of the Russian offensive scheme. The main point that I want to impress is essentially as follows: rather than fixating on Pokrovsk, Russia’s advances across Southern Donetsk and on the inner bend of the Donets River ought to be thought of as vital operations which have severely disrupted the coherence of both the Ukrainian front and their logistics. This has the triple effect of preventing the Ukrainians from launching offensives of their own, accelerating the attrition of Ukrainian forces, and shaping the front for the coming operation to capture the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration.
To begin, let’s consider the progress that Russia has made in southern Donetsk, both in raw territorial terms and its implications for Ukrainian logistic connectivity. To demonstrate this, I’ve pulled maps from DeepState (again, a Ukrainian mapping enterprise) for August 2023 (when Ukraine was attempting its counterattack out of Orikhiv) and for October 20th, the week of this writing. I have noted both the length of the southern front (obviously a linear approximate, as the actual front has many bends and bulges) and highlighted the key highways that Ukraine uses to run the backbone of its logistics
The Southern Front: 2023 vs 2025
Now, one thing that is worth noting is that the Russians are currently positioned to roll up this front even further. Ukrainian defensive lines are primarily oriented towards on a north-south axis. Once Russian forces cleared Kurakhove, they entered the seams in these defensive lines – that is to say, they are advancing laterally along the face of the prepared defenses, rather than trying to bash through them from the front. This is one reason why their progress has been relatively steady and uninterrupted. Now approaching the “elbow” in the lines, where they pivot southward, and having crossed the Yanchur River, the Russians are entering a substantial space that lacks meaningful prepared defenses. Using the Military Summary map (Ukrainian fortifications are mapped with yellow dots), the void in the defense is fairly obvious as the Russians work their way into the elbow of the line
Apart from the obvious development of note here – that Russian forces have, to this point, rolled up roughly half the length of the southern front and are positioned to roll up another ten to fifteen miles – we want to note two things which are emblematic of the way the war is going for Ukraine, but curiously receive little attention. First, the compression of the front is robbing the Ukrainians of the maneuver space which made it possible for them to stage and assemble forces for their counteroffensive in 2023. Two years ago, there was a wide, lateral buffer zone around the Ukrainian staging area in Orikhiv, and Ukrainian forces had access to multiple highways where they could disperse forces in their marching columns and run their logistics.
Today, that buffer zone is gone, as is the easy access to several of the branch highways. The Russian advance, which started with the breakthrough at Ugledar and Kurakhove last year and which has now rolled up some 50 miles of front, has essentially sterilized Ukraine’s capacity to attack in the south, because they have neither the space nor the roads to safely accumulate forces here. It has also shattered the interconnectivity of Ukrainian logistics: rather than having several highways to shuttle troops and material to the east, Ukraine now has to support several disconnected logistic fronts with individual highways. More to the point, there is no longer a single Donetsk “front” to speak of, but rather a series of logistic fronts: one in the south, around Orikhiv, another at Pokrovsk, and the largest one in the Slovyansk Banana. These are lacking lateral connectivity to each other for the Ukrainians due to the wedges that the Russians have forced in the front, particularly in the south, funneling logistics and reinforcements down individuated corridors.
The bigger issue, however, lies farther north on the Pokrovsk and Donets axes, and in the way that they synergize. People who are focusing, to the exclusion of all else, on when and how Russia will capture Pokrovsk are failing to see the bigger picture, and indeed are not even trying to understand it.
The ultimate Russian operational objective (in this phase of the war, at least) is the belt of cities which runs in an arc from Slovyansk to Kostyantinivka, which I affectionately call “the Slovyansk Banana” due to its curved shape. A cursory look at the map shows us why the very operations that are being dismissed as secondary efforts are in fact critical axes of Russian effort which are shaping the battlefield for the attack on the Banana
There are two very important facts about the Banana, from the perspective of operational geography. The first is that, although the combined mass of the agglomeration is far larger than any of the urban areas that have been fought over to this point, the Banana is relatively difficult to defend because it sits on the floor of a river valley: the Kazennyi Torets flows through all the cities in the Banana before it flows into the Donets. Russian forces approaching the city from the southwest, the east, and the north will all be advancing along the high ground that overlooks the cities on the floor.
The second important fact about the Banana is that, despite its size, it is supported by just two highways which approach from the southwest and northwest respectively, funneling into the Banana like a wedge. Taking the northern highway/MSR (the E40 highway) as an example, we see that Russia’s operations inside the Donets bend are hardly secondary efforts: they are vital shaping operations linked to the integrity of the Banana. The E40 highway tracks the Donets bend very closely (it generally stays within five miles of the river. If the Russians sustain their progress north of the Donets and reach the river at Bogorodychne or Svyatogirsk, it will not only put E40 under persistent drone attack but also curl the defensive line behind the Banana, to say nothing of the enormous pressure on the Siversk salient.
On the Pokrovsk front as well, Russia’s progress is being misinterpreted. After their breakthrough at the end of the summer, Russian forces have consolidated the bulge north of Pokrovsk (despite weeks of Ukrainian counterattacks) and are steadily working their way towards Rais’ke and Sergiivka. This is not about Pokrovsk at all – reaching Rais’ke would put Russian forces directly in the backfield of Kostyantinivka, on the supply lines to the underside of the Banana.
I am not suggesting at all that Russian forces are on the verge of some great offensive surge that will carry them into the heart of the Banana instantly. However, there is a fairly well established Russian operational methodology in this war, which involves working their way methodically into Ukraine’s logistical lanes and seams, segmenting the front and strangulating their strongpoints, forcing them to supply frontline strongholds with single file logistics and dirt roads. They did it in Bakhmut, and Avdiivka, they are doing it in Pokrovsk, and they are shaping the front to attempt this on a large scale in the Banana
Assault on the Banana: Coming 2026
The general point that we are trying to make here is that dismissing Russian advances in the Serebryanka Forest, the emerging bulge north of Pokrovsk, and their move into the Donets Bend as “secondary efforts” is mistaken. Zooming out to the appropriate scale shows that these are concentric operations, shaping the front for a 2026 assault on the Banana – moving towards the E40 road from the north, bending the defensive shield around Siversk, and working into the underbelly of the Banana through Rais’ke.
This is, perhaps, a long way to go for a short drink of water, but there are a few basic points here that get completely missed when the view of the front is preoccupied with the fighting inside Pokrovsk and Kupyansk:
Russia’s advance out of Kurakhove across the southern front is not a secondary axis. They have rolled up half of the southern front, condensing Ukrainian forces into a compact space which sterilizes their ability to attack in the south.
Broad Russian pressure across a half-dozen axes maintained a steady burn rate on Ukrainian forces and prevented the accumulation of forces for proactive operations. 2025 has been the first year of the war in which Ukraine has not launched any offensive operations on its own initiative.
Advances in the Donets bend and the interstitial space between Pokrovsk and Kostyantinivka are not subsidiary or secondary operations: they are critical shaping operations that are moving concentrically toward the Banana.
To be frank, the general mood of optimism in the Ukrainian infosphere, which lasted for much of the summer, struck me as remarkably odd. The frontline has yielded no real good news for Ukraine at any point this year. Beyond the broader strategic point, that Ukraine has lost the initiative and does not seem capable of getting it back, Russia is in the process of capturing two important urban centers (Russian troops are in the city centers of Pokrovsk and Kupyansk), it has begun the assault on at leas two more (Lyman and Kostyantinivka), it has rolled up half of the southern front, and cleared most of the inner Donets-Oskil bend. The Banana is on deck for 2026.
Ukraine’s Cost Theory of Victory
One thing that has become apparent over the last year is that Kiev has abandoned previous notions of outright victory on the battlefield and adopted a new strategic framework predicated on imposing unacceptable costs on Russia, so that Moscow will agree to freeze the conflict.
This is a subtle and unspoken yet extremely important distinction. It is easy to miss, because both Ukrainian leadership and Ukraine’s western backers continue to speak of Ukrainian “victory” and the possibility of Ukraine “winning” the war. What is crucial to understand is that the “victory” that they speak of now is categorically different than the victory of 2022 and 2023. In the first years of the war, it was possible to at least speak of Ukraine taking the initiative to advance on the ground and retake territory. There were concrete examples of Ukrainian offensives in 2022, and the battle in Zaporizhia – although unsuccessful – showed that it was at least possible for Ukraine to attempt a proper mechanized offensive.
Therefore, in the first years of the war, when leaders in Kiev and Brussels and London and Washington spoke of Ukrainian victory, they essentially meant the defeat of the Russian ground forces and the reconquest of much (or all) of the Donbas. The Kursk Operation of 2024 began to split the difference: Ukraine still had some resources to mount proactive operations, but these operations were no longer aimed at the dense eastern front and instead aimed at relatively soft subsidiary fronts with an eye to out-levering the Russians.
Today, with the Ukrainian army stuck in a permanent state of reactivity and slowly receding defense, it no longer makes any sense to speak of Ukrainian victory in the most straightforward sense, which is to say victory on the battlefield – no matter how tenaciously or bravely the Ukrainian rank and file continues to fight in essentially intolerable circumstances. Instead, Ukrainian “victory” has been transmogrified to mean essentially that Russia absorbs such exorbitant costs that it agrees to some sort of ceasefire without preconditions.
The costs to be imposed on Russia are implicitly assumed to be a mixture of battlefield casualties and damage to strategic assets inflicted by Ukrainian air strikes, and in regards to the latter Ukraine seems to be particularly placing its hopes in a strategic strike campaign against Russian oil. Ukraine’s attempts to disable Russian oil production and refining have dovetailed with ever more aggressive sanctions from the United States against Russian fossil fuel exports – although it is worth noting that the limited price response to these sanctions indicates that markets expect that Russian oil will continue to flow.
Trump’s suggestion that Tomahawks may be on the table for Ukraine must be seen as a constituent element of this new strategy and theory of victory. And this, ultimately, is very important to understand. Tomahawks are not being bandied about because anybody (in Kiev or Washington) believes that 50 cruise missiles will allow Ukraine to defeat the Russian Army and recapture the Donbas. Tomahawks were mentioned because the Ukrainian alliance is threatening to cripple the Russian fossil fuels industry (through a mixture of sanctions and kinetic strikes on production facilities) unless Putin agrees to a ceasefire.
This is why it is wrong to be surprised that Trump abruptly cancelled his meeting with Putin and instead announced more sanctions. There’s nothing abrupt or erratic about this. Threats to Russian oil are now, without exaggeration, the main lever that the Ukrainian bloc has against Russia. It certainly should not have been a surprise that the Kremlin, which has reiterated the same fundamental war aims since day one, was not excited about coming to Budapest to freeze the conflict, and neither should it surprise us that Trump would instead prefer to pull harder on the oil lever. The two powers are playing entirely different games: Russia is slow-walking negotiations while it advances on the ground, and the United States is playing a pain game designed to raise the costs for Russia
We have fundamentally reached an impasse when it comes to negotiations. For Moscow, negotiations with the United States are essentially a way to string Washington along. Moscow feels that it is winning on the ground, therefore a diplomatic impasse suits Russian interests. When western leadership complains that Russia does not seem interested in ending the war, they are correct, but they are missing the point. Russia is not interested in ending the war right now because doing so would not serve Russian interests. The Banana is in the crosshairs, and a ceasefire now would be an egregious compromise when victory on the ground is in sight.
The sense of urgency that Washington feels to end the war – mainly by yanking furiously on the oil lever until the Kremlin cries uncle – stems from the fact that this is now the only sort of victory that Ukraine can hope to win. The ground war has been written off as a total loss, and all that remains is to lob missiles and drones at Russian refineries, sanction Russian firms and banks, and harass shadow tankers until the costs become intolerable. The longer the Ukrainian ground forces can hold the line the better, but this is merely a matter of limiting the downside. The fact that Russia can retaliate disproportionately against Ukraine barely factors into this thinking.
The key point here, however, is that the concept of Ukrainian victory has been completely transformed. There is now no real discussion of how Ukraine can win on the ground. For the Ukrainian bloc, the war is no longer a contest against the Russian Army, but a more abstract contest against Russia’s willingness to incur strategic costs. Rather than preventing Russian capture of the Donbas, the west is testing how much Putin is willing to pay for it. If history is any guide, a game predicated on outlasting Russia’s strategic endurance and willingness to fight is a very bad game to play indeed [end]
[my illustration: a debris of US ATACMS ballistic missile has fallen on Kursk-Vostochny airfield on November 25, 2023 (Russian defense ministry)]
On March 5, 2022, the wreck of the sailing ship Endurance was found in the depths of the Weddell Sea off the coast of Antarctica. This, of course, was the vessel lost in Ernest Shackelton’s third expedition to Antarctica, which became trapped in the ice and sank in 1915. The story of that expedition is an extraordinary tale of human fortitude – with the Endurance lost to the ice, Shackleton’s crew evacuated to a loose ice flow where they camped for nearly 500 days, drifting about the Antarctic seas, before making a desperate dash across the open ocean in an open 20 foot lifeboat, finally reaching the southern shore of inhospitable and mountainous South Georgia Island, which they then had to cross on foot to reach the safety of a whaling station.
The story itself has an essentially mythic quality to it, with Shackleton’s crew surviving for years on free floating ice floes in the most inhospitable seas on earth. For our purposes, however, it is the story’s coda that is particularly interesting. In Shackleton’s memoirs, he remembered that, upon finally reaching the safety of the Stromness whaling station, one of his first questions was about the war in Europe. When Shackleton first set out on his ill-fated expedition on August 8, 1914, the First World War was less than a week old, and the German Army had just begun its invasion of Belgium. There was little expectation then that the war would proceed as it did, unleashing four years of slaughterous positional warfare that engulfed the continent.
Shackleton, having been adrift at sea for years, clearly did not imagine that the war could still be raging, and asked the commandant of the whaling station “tell me, when was the war over?”
The answer came back: “The war is not over. Millions are being killed. Europe is mad. The world is mad.”
The timing is serendipitous, since the discovery of the Endurance’s wreck, after more than a hundred years, happened to occur only a few weeks after the world again went mad, with the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian War in February 2022. As time continues its inexorable march and the calendar turns yet again, the war is passing through its third full winter. In February, Z-World will be three years old.
Of course, modern communications make it extremely unlikely that anybody could be cut fully out of the loop for years at a time, like Shackleton and his men. Instead of being ignorant as to whether or not the war is over, many of us are exposed on a daily basis to footage of men being killed, buildings being blown up, and vehicles being shredded. Twitter has made it essentially impossible to live under a rock, or on an ice floe, as it were.
If anything, we have the very opposite problem of Shackleton – at least as far as our wartime information infrastructure goes. We are saturated in information, with daily updates tracking advances of a few dozen meters and never ending bombast about new game changing weapons (which seem to change very little), and bluster about “red lines”. This war seems to have an unyielding dynamic on the ground, and no matter how many grand pronouncements we hear that one side or the other is on the verge of collapse, the sprawling front continues to grind up bodies and congeal with bloody positional fighting.
It would seem difficult to believe that a high intensity ground war in Europe with hundreds of miles worth of front could be boring, yet the static and repetitive nature of the conflict is struggling to hold the attention of foreign observers who have little immediately at stake.
My intention here is a radical zoom-out from these demoralizing and fatiguing small scale updates (as valuable as the work of the war mappers is), and consider the aggregate of 2024 – arguing that this year was, in fact, very consequential. Taken as a whole, three very important things happened in 2024 which create a very dismal outlook for Ukraine and the AFU in the new year. More specifically, 2024 brought three important strategic developments:
Russian victory in southern Donetsk which destroyed the AFU’s position on one of the war’s key strategic axes.
The expenditure of carefully husbanded Ukrainian resources on a failed offensive towards Kursk, which accelerated the attrition of critical Ukrainian maneuver assets and substantially dampened their prospects in the Donbas.
The exhaustion of Ukraine’s ability to escalate vis a vis new strike systems from NATO – more broadly, the west has largely run out of options to upgrade Ukrainian capabilities, and the much vaunted delivery of longer range strike systems failed to alter the trajectory of the war on the ground.
Taken together, 2024 revealed a Ukrainian military that is increasingly stretched to the limits, to the point where the Russians were able to largely scratch off an entire sector of front. People continue to wonder where and when the Ukrainian front might begin to break down – I would argue that it *did* break down in the south over the last few months, and 2025 begins with strong Russian momentum that the AFU will be hard pressed to arrest.
Front Collapse in South Donetsk
What stands out immediately about the operational developments in 2024 is the marked shift of energies away from the axes of combat that had seen the most intense fighting in the first two years of the war. In a sense, this war has seen each of its fronts activate in a sequence, one after the other.
After the opening Russian offensive, which boasted as its signature success the capture of the Azov coastline and the linkup of Donetsk and Crimea, the action shifted to the northern front (the Lugansk-Kharkov axis), with Russia fighting a summer offensive which captured Severodonetsk and Lysychansk. This was followed by a pair of Ukrainian counteroffensives in the fall, with a thrust out of Kharkov which pushed the front back over the Oskil, and an operation directed at Kherson which failed to breach Russian defenses but ultimately resulted in a Russian withdrawal in good order over the Dnieper due to concerns over logistical connectivity and an over-extended front. Energies then pivoted yet again to the Central Donbas axis, with the enormous battle around Bakhmut raging through the spring of 2023. This was followed by the failed Ukrainian offensive on Russia’s defenses in Zaporozhia, in the south.
Just to briefly recapitulate this, we can enumerate several operational phases in the first two years of the war, occurring in sequence and each with a center of gravity in different parts of the front:
A Russian offensive across the land bridge, culminating in the capture of Mariupol. (Winter-Spring 2022, Southern Front)
A Russian offensive in Lugansk, capturing Severodonetsk and Lysychansk. (Summer 2022, Donets-Oskil front)
Ukrainian Counteroffensives towards the Oskil and Kherson (Autumn 2022, Oskil and Dnieper fronts)
The Russian assault on Bakhmut (Winter-Spring 2023, Central Front)
Ukrainian counteroffensive on the land bridge (Summer 2023)
Amid all of this, the front that saw the least movement was the southeastern corner of the front, around Donetsk. This was somewhat peculiar. Donetsk is the urban heart of the Donbas – a vast and populous industrial city at the center of a sprawling conurbation, once home to some 2 million people. Even if Russia succeeds in capturing the city of Zaporizhia, Donetsk will be by far the most populous of Ukraine’s former cities to come under Moscow’s control.
In 2014, with the outbreak of the proto-Donbas war, Donetsk was the locus of much of the fighting, with the airport on the city’s northern approach the scene of particularly intense combat. This made it rather strange, then, that at the start of 2024 the Ukrainian Army continued to occupy many of the same positions that they built a decade prior. As intense fighting ebbed and flowed along other sectors of front, Donetsk remained besieged by a web of powerfully held Ukrainian defenses, anchored by heavily fortified urban areas stretching from Toretsk to Ugledar. Early Russian attempts to crack this iron ring open, including an assault on Ugledar in the winter of 2023, met with failure.
The signature operational development of 2024, then, was the re-activation of the Donetsk front, after years of static combat. It is not an exaggeration to say that after years of coagulation, the Russian Army cracked this front wide open in 2024 and Ukraine’s long and strongly held network of urban strongpoints collapsed
Russian Progress on the Donetsk Axis in 2024
The year began with the AFU fighting for its fortress in Avdiivka, where it continued to block the northern approach to Donetsk. At the time, the typical argument that one heard from the Ukrainian side was that the Russian assault on Avdiivka was pyrrhic – that the Russians were capturing the city with exorbitantly costly “meat assaults” that would inevitably sap Russian combat power and exhaust their ability to continue the offensive.
With the full measure of the year behind us, we can definitively say that this is not the case. After the fall of Avdiivka, Russian momentum never seriously slackened, and in fact it was the AFU that appeared to be increasingly exhausted. The Ukrainian breakwater position at Ocheretyne (which had previously been their staging point for counterattacks around Avdiivka) was overrun in a matter of days, and by the early summer the frontline had been pushed out towards the approach to Pokrovsk.
The Russian thrust towards Pokrovsk led many to believe that this city was itself the object of Russian energies, but this was a misread of the operational design. Russia did not need to capture Pokrovsk in 2024 to render it sterile as a logistical hub. Simply by advancing towards the E50 highway, Russian forces were able to cut off Pokrovsk from Ukrainian positions to the south on the Donetsk front, and Pokvrovsk is now a frontline city subject to the full spectrum of overwatch from Russian drones and tube artillery.
By autumn, the Russian advance had put the Ukrainians in a severe salient, creating an unstable chain of positions in Selydove, Kurakhove, Ugledar, and Krasnogorivka. Russia’s advance from Ocheretyne onto the southern approach to Pokrovsk acted like an enormous scythe, isolating the entire southeastern sector of the front and allowing Russian forces to carve through it in the closing months of the year
Russian Operations in 2024, Donetsk Axis
This war has turned the word “collapse” into a devalued buzzword. We are told repeatedly that one side or the other is on the verge of collapse: sanctions will “collapse” the Russian economy, the Wagner uprising of 2023 proved that the Russian political system was “collapsing”, and of course we hear that exorbitant losses have one army or the other on the verge of total failure – which army that may be depends on who you ask.
I would argue, however, that what we saw from October 2024 onward represents a real occurrence of this oft-repeated and discarded word. The AFU suffered a genuine collapse of the southeastern front, with the forces positioned in their strongpoints too attrited and isolated to make a determined defense, Russian fires becoming too heavily concentrated in ever more compressed areas to endure, and no mechanized reserve in the theater available to counterattack or relieve the incessant Russian pressure.
Ukraine does maintain enough drones and concentrated fires to limit a full Russian exploitation – that is, Russia is still not able to maneuver at depth. This gave the Russian advance a particular stop-start quality, leapfrogging from one settlement and fortress to the other. More generally, Russia’s preference to use dispersed small-unit assaults limits the potential for exploitation. We have to emphasize, however, that Russian momentum on this axis has never seriously slackened since October, and many of the key Ukrainian positions were overrun or abandoned very quickly
Ugledar is a good example: the Russians began their final push toward the town on September 24. By September 29, the 72nd Mechanized Brigade began evacuating. By October 1, Ugledar was fully under Russian control. This was a keystone Ukrainian position put in a completely untenable position and it went down in a week. One could argue, of course, that Ugledar held out for years (how then can we say with a straight face that it was captured in a week), but this is precisely the point. In early 2023 Ugledar (with the help of artillery stationed around Kurakhove) successfully repelled a multi-brigade Russian attack in months of heavy fighting. By October 2024, the position was completely untenable and was abandoned almost immediately when attacked.
The Ukrainians did no better trying to hold Kurakhove – previously a critical rear area that served as both a logistical hub and a base of fire for supporting (former) frontline strongpoints like Ugledar and Krasnogorivka. Kurakhove, now under full Russian control, will in turn serve as a base of support for the ongoing Russian push to the west towards Andriivka.
Taking the state of the front holistically, the AFU is currently holding two severe salients at the southernmost end of the line – one around Velyka Novosilka, and another around Andriivka. The former is likely to fall first, as the town has been fully isolated by Russian advances on the flanks. This is not a Bakhmut-like situation, where roads are described as “cut” because they are under Russian fire – in this case, all of the highways into Velyka Novosilka are cut by physical Russian blocking positions, making the loss of the position only a matter of waiting for the Russians to assault it. Further north, a more gentle and less strongly held salient exists between Grodivka and Toretsk. With Toretsk now in the final stages of capture (Ukrainian forces now hold only a small residential neighborhood on the city’s outskirts), the front should level here as well in the coming months.
This leaves the Russians more or less in full control of the approaches to Kostyantinivka and Pokrovsk, which are in many ways the penultimate Ukrainian held positions in Donetsk. Pokrovsk has already been bypassed several miles to the west, and the map portends a re-run of the typical Russian tactical methodology for assaulting urban areas – a methodical advance along the wings of the city to isolate it from arterial highways, followed by an attack on the city itself via several axes
The coming months promise continued Russian advances across this front, in a continuation of what can only be regarded as the collapse of a critical front on the part of the AFU. The Russian Army is advancing to the western border of Donetsk oblast and will ferret the Ukrainians out of their remaining strongpoints at Velyka Novosilka and Andriivka, while pushing into the belly of Pokrovsk. At no point since the fall of Avdiivka have the Ukrainians demonstrated the ability to seriously stymie Russian momentum along this 75 mile front, and the ongoing dissipation of Ukrainian combat resources indicates that little will change in this regard in 2025.
Toehold: The Incredible Shrinking Kursk Salient
Throughout the autumn of 2024 and these early months of winter, as Ukrainian forces were dug out of their dense web of fortified positions in the southern Donbas, their comrades continued to stubbornly hold on to their position in Russia’s Kursk Oblast. The basic shape of Ukraine’s offensive into Kursk is by now well known – billed by Kiev as a gambit to change the psychological trajectory of the war and strike a prestige blow to Russia, the Ukrainian attack had early momentum after achieving initial strategic surprise, but quickly faltered after Ukrainian columns ran into effective Russian blocking positions on the highways out of Sudzha. Efforts to force the roads through Korenovo and Bolshoe Soldatskoe were defeated, and the Ukrainian grouping was left holding on to a modest salient around Sudzha, jutting out into Russia.
Throughout the autumn, Russian counterattacks have focused on chiseling away at the base of the Ukrainian salient – forcing the Ukrainians out of Snagost and pushing them away from Korenovo. The progress here has been incremental, but significant, and by the start of January the “neck” of the Ukrainian salient had been compressed down to a little over nine miles wide, after their initial penetration in the summer had forced a breach of over twenty miles. All told, Ukraine has lost about 50% of the territory that they grabbed in August.
The Russian pressure on the flanks of the salient have amplified many of the qualities that make this position wasteful and dangerous for the AFU. There is limited road connectivity for Ukrainian forces – a problem amplified by the rollback from Snagost, which cost them access to the highway running from Korenovo to Sumy. Apart from a few circuitous side roads, Ukrainian forces only have a single highway – the R200 route – to run material and reinforcements into the pocket, which allows Russian forces to surveil their lines of communication and conduct effective interdiction strikes. The compression of the pocket also greatly narrows the targeting area for Russian drones, tube artillery, and rocketry, and creates more condensed and saturating bombardment
Despite the fact that this position has been profoundly unproductive for Ukraine – being steadily rolled back and having no synergy with other, more critical theaters – the same grouping of Ukrainian units remain here, fighting in a steadily more compressed space. Even more baffling, the Ukrainian grouping consists largely of premiere assets – Mechanized and Air Assault brigades – that could have contributed meaningfully as a reserve in the Donbas over the last three months.
The tactical particulars of the Ukrainian attack are interesting, and there’s ongoing speculation as to its purpose – perhaps it was intended to cover a rotation or withdrawal, to improve tactical positions on the northern edge of the salient, or for inscrutable propaganda purposes. However, these specifics are rather unimportant: attacking out the end of the salient (that is, trying to deepen the penetration into Russia) does nothing to reverse Ukraine’s problems in Kursk. These problems are first, on the tactical level, that the salient has been greatly compressed on the flanks and continues to narrow, and on the strategic level the willful expenditure of valuable mechanized assets on a front that does not impact the critical theaters of the war. More simply, Kursk is a sideshow, and it is a sideshow that has gone wrong even within its own operational logic.
One thing that has been of endless interest, of course, have been the continued rumors of North Korean troops fighting in Kursk. Western intelligence agencies have been adamant about the presence of North Koreans in Kursk. Some people are predisposed to instinctively disbelieve everything that western officialdom says – while I think some skepticism is warranted, I do not automatically assume that they are lying. One recent report lays out what would seem to be a plausible version of this story: that the idea actually originated in Pyongyang, not Moscow, and that a modest number of Korean troops (perhaps 10,000) are embedded with Russian units. The presumption here is that the Koreans hatched the idea as a way to gain combat experience, with the Russians in turn getting auxiliary forces, though of questionable combat effectiveness.
However, it is worth noting that this is not nearly as important as it has been made out to be. Much has been made of the idea that the North Korean presence proves some sort of Russian state of desperation, but this is fairly silly on its face – with more than 1.5 million active personnel in the Russian military, 10,000 Korean troops in Kursk represents a paltry appendage. More importantly, there has been an attempt to portray the North Korean contingent as a major departure point in the war. In particular, the formulation “North Korean troops in Europe” has been used to conjure cold war imagery of communist despotism clawing at the free world
The point, however, is that North Korean troops are presumed specifically to be in Kursk, which is in Russia. This is linked, of course, to the recently concluded mutual defense agreement signed between Moscow and Pyongyang. By attacking into Kursk – widening the front into prewar Russian territory – Ukraine created a defensive combat task for Russia which triggers the possibility of military assistance from North Korea. However much one may wish to link the Korean contingent to Russia’s dreaded “war of aggression”, the force in Kursk is very objectively engaged in the defense of Russian territory, and that makes it possible for Russia to use auxiliary forces – including conscripts and the troops of its allies – to fight there.
Ultimately, then, the presence of North Koreans in Kursk is interesting, but perhaps not very important after all. These troops are not in Ukraine (even under the most maximal definition of the Ukrainian territorial unit), they are not carrying the primary combat load, and they are unequivocally not the problem that the AFU is facing in Kursk. The “big problem” for Ukraine, very simply, is not the presence of some amorphous Korean horde dedicated to spreading Glorious Juche to Europe – it is the loitering of large grouping of their own precious mechanized brigades in a compressed salient, far far away from the Donbas, where they are greatly needed.
Scraping the Barrel: AFU Force Generation
I think it is well understood, of course, that Ukraine faces severe manpower constraints relative to Russia, both in terms of the raw totals of male biomass available – with roughly 35 million fighting aged males in Russia against perhaps 9 million in prewar Ukraine – but also in terms of its capacity to mobilize them.
Ukraine’s mobilization scheme is hampered by both widespread draft evasion (with willingness to serve decreasing as the war has stretched on) and a stubborn unwillingness to draft younger men, aged 18-25. Ukraine is structurally burdened with a deeply imbalanced population structure: there are roughly 60% more Ukrainian men in their 30’s than in their 20’s. Given the relative scarcity of young men, particularly in their early 20’s, the Ukrainian government rightly views this 18-25 year old cohort as a premium demographic cohort that it is loathe to burn away in combat. Given the ubiquity of draft evasion, the refusal to mobilize younger males, and the corruption and inefficiency characteristic of the Ukrainian government, it should come as no surprise when Ukrainian mobilization falters
All of that is to say: Ukraine faces a severe structural disadvantage in military manpower in the aggregate, which is exacerbated by the idiosyncrasies of the Ukrainian mobilization law, ameliorated slightly by the relatively low troop densities and the preponderant power of strike systems in this war.
The argument that I want to make here, however, is that Ukraine’s systemic problems matching Russian manpower have been exacerbated by several developments which specifically became prominent in 2024. In other words, 2024 can and should be marked as the year where Ukrainian manpower constraints became markedly and perhaps irretrievably worse due to specific decisions made in Kiev, and particular developments on the ground.
These are as follows:
The decision to expand the AFU’s force structure through the creation of the “15 series” brigades
The decision to deliberately widen the front and create additional demands for manpower by launching the incursion into Kursk
The stall out of Ukraine’s new mobilization program in the autumn
Accelerating problems with desertion in the AFU
We’ll run through these in order.
An army that is intaking new personnel has to decide between two possible allocations for them. New personnel can be used as replacements to replenish existing frontline units, or they can be used to expand the force structure by creating new units. That much seems fairly obvious, and ideally mobilization will exceed losses and make it possible to do both. Where armies face hard manpower constraints, however – that is, where losses are equal to or greater than intake of men, the decision to expand the force structure can have monumental consequences. The stereotypical example, of course, would be the late-war Wehrmacht, which created premiere new assets in the form of Waffen SS divisions, which received privileged access to recruits and equipment while regular army divisions in the line suffered from a trickle of replacements which could not keep up with losses.
Ukraine, with its garbled force structure, has created a mess through its own attempts to expand its force structure in the face of dwindling strength on the line. Late in 2023, the AFU announced intentions to form an entirely new grouping of brigades – the so-called “15 series”, given their designations as the 150th, 151st, 152nd, 153rd, and 154th Mechanized Brigades. This was followed in 2024 with the appending of the 155th Mechanized Brigade, which was to be trained and equipped in France.
Forming a new grouping of mechanized brigades is essential to the way that Ukraine is presenting its war. Because Ukraine still aims (at least on paper) to recapture all of its Russian held territory, there must always be the illusory possibility of a future offensive, and in order for that illusory possibility to remain, Ukraine must present itself as actively preparing for future offensive operations. Ukraine’s presentation of its own strategic animus – the idea that it is holding the front while it prepares to go back on the offensive – essentially locks it into a program of expanding its force structure
The problem for Ukraine is that the immense pressure on the front makes it essentially impossible for them to properly husband resources the way they would like. Properly training and equipping half a dozen fresh mechanized brigades and holding them in reserve would be very helpful, but they cannot really do this in light of the demands for personnel at the front. These brigades instead become “paper formations” that have a bureaucratic existence, while their organic assets are pulled apart and sucked into the front – stripped down into battalion or company sized elements that can be plugged into sectors of need on the frontline. At the moment, none of the 15 series brigades have seen action as organic units – that is, fighting as themselves.
The decision to allocate personnel to new mechanized brigades (though given stocks of armored vehicles it is questionable whether those designations mean anything) does not necessarily change Ukraine’s manpower balance in the aggregate, but it is certainly an inefficient way to use personnel. To return again to the 155th brigade, one problem noted by Ukrainian analysts was the fact that much of the brigade was formed whole cloth from forcibly mobilized personnel, without a proper cadre of veterans and experienced NCOs – some 75% of the brigade, it turns out, had been mobilized less than two months before arriving in France for training. This fact was certainly instrumental in the mass desertions and the brigade’s poor combat effectiveness.
Given Ukraine’s constraints, the best course of action would undoubtedly be to allocate new personnel and equipment as replacements to build out the depleted veteran brigades on the front lines, plugging in replacements around existing veterans and officers. Kiev, however, prizes the prestige that comes from force expansion and the “shiny new toy” factor of new formations equipped with scarce and valuable equipment like Leopard tanks. These new brigades, though billed as premiere assets, clearly have lower combat effectiveness than existing formations, given their lack of experience, shortage of veteran officers, and low unit cohesion.
In short, Ukraine’s decision to embark on force expansion in the face of significant manpower shortages has exacerbated the problem – both starving veteran units of replacements and concentrating newly mobilized personnel into combat ineffective formations that lack a veteran core, experienced officers, and vital equipment. They have tried, belatedly, to square this circle by parceling out new formations to backstop line brigades, but this is less than ideal – it leads to a patchwork order of battle with lower unit cohesion and a fragmented defense.
Unfortunately, this comes precisely as Ukraine has created additional self-imposed strains on its resources, in particular through its incursion into Kursk. At the moment, elements of at least seven mechanized brigades, two marine infantry brigades, and three air assault brigades are stationed on the Kursk axis. Without going too far into the weeds rehashing Ukraine’s operation here, it’s important to remember that Ukraine – facing extreme pressures on its force generation – voluntarily chose to widen the front into a secondary theater, diverting scarce assets and reducing its own ability to economize forces.
In summary, Ukraine has made deliberate decisions to widen the front and expand its force structure, both of which have been decidedly detrimental to its efforts to economize personnel. This comes precisely as a 2024 effort to ramp up mobilization has come off the rails.
A deadly feedback loop is now at work, with the lack of rotations and the shortage of replacements synergizing to accelerate the burn of Ukrainian personnel. The AFU is unable to regularly rotate units out of combat, and the inadequate flow of replacements causes frontline infantry complements to wear thin. Unable to rotate or reinforce, line brigades resort to cannibalization – scraping support personnel like mortar teams, drivers, and drone operators to fill out frontline positions. This further accelerates losses as brigades fight with thinned out support and fires elements, and makes Ukrainian men more unwilling to enlist – because there is now no guarantee that becoming a drone operator, for example, will save one from being sent to a frontline trench eventually.
Where does this leave us? Ukraine continues to dispose of a very large force, with more than a hundred brigades and hundreds of thousands of men under arms. This force, however, is both substantially outnumbered by the Russian army and in a clear trend of decay. Despite a highly touted attempt to reinvigorate the mobilization apparatus in 2024, the intake of new personnel is clearly too low to offset losses, and the heavy lifting formations in critical sectors of front have seen their strength – particularly in the infantry complements – decline, in some cases to critical levels.
The failure of Ukraine’s 2024 mobilization program has coincided with several strategic choices which have exacerbated manpower concerns – specifically the decision to embark on a program of force expansion even as the AFU voluntarily extended its commitments by opening a new secondary front in Kursk. In other words, Ukraine’s mobilization falls short of its force requirements, and the AFU has also made choices that sabotaged its ability to economize. Units are ground up, replacements come in a paltry trickle, rotations are late or absent, units cannibalize themselves, and angry and weary men desert.
It’s not at all clear that this will lead to a “breaking point”, in the sense that people are anticipating. Ukrainian strike capabilities and the Russian preference for dispersed, leapfrogging assaults limit the potential for grand breakthroughs and exploitation. However, what we saw over the past three months on the southern Donetsk axis offers a preview of what awaits: an exhausted force being steadily rolled back, dug out of its strongpoints, and mauled – covering its retreat with drones but losing position after position. The line holds, until it doesn’t.
End of the Line: ATACMs, JASSMs, and Hazelnuts
Ukraine’s ability to remain in the field depends on a titration of two indispensable resources: first, Ukrainian male biomass, and secondly the critical western weaponry that gives them combat effectiveness. We have evaluated the first: Ukraine is not exactly out of men, but the trends of its mobilization program are poor and personnel shortages are mounting. The trends regarding the second are, if anything, even more foreboding for Kiev.
There are two general dynamics that have emerged, neither of which create an optimistic picture for Ukraine, which we’ll examine in turn. These are as follows:
The delivery of heavy weaponry to Ukraine (tanks, IFVs, and artillery tubes) has largely dried up in recent months.
The west has essentially run out of escalatory weaponry (strike systems) to give, and those systems already given have failed to meaningfully altar the trajectory of the war.
In 2023, building out new mechanized units was the name of the game, with the Pentagon leading a multinational effort to stand up an entire army corps worth of units equipped with Leopards, Challengers, and a whole slew of western IFVs and APCs. When that lovingly assembled grouping bashed its head on a rock in the botched assault on the Zaporizhia line, the United States belatedly and begrudgingly dispatched its own Abrams to backstop the Ukrainian tank force. In 2024, however, deliveries of heavy weapons slowed to a trickle.
The role of the tank in Ukraine has been greatly misunderstood. The vulnerability of tanks to the myriad strike systems of the modern battlefield led some observers to declare that the tank as a weapons system was now obsolete, but this did not really square with the fact that both combatants in this war were eager to deploy as many as possible. Tanks need more critical enablers – more combat engineering, air defense, and electronic warfare support – but they continue to fill an indispensable role and remain an essential item in this war. The failure of Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive showed, if anything, that tanks simply are not “game changing” systems, but mass consumption items – but this has always been the case. The signature quality of iconic tanks like the Sherman and the T34 was that they were numerous
While 2023 was all about building out Ukraine’s mechanized package with tanks, IFVs, and engineering, 2024 has been largely about enhancing Ukraine’s strike capabilities. There have been two separate elements at play – first, the delivery of both air and ground launched systems (most notably the British Storm Shadows and American ATACMs respectively), and secondly the loosening of the rules of engagement to allow Ukraine to strike targets inside pre-war Russia.
This dovetailed, as it turned out, with Ukraine’s operation in Kursk, and in many ways the most direct impact of the Kursk incursion has been to force the west’s hand on the rules of engagement. While Ukraine has long been striking inside Russia with indigenous systems, most notably drones, the White House continued to drag its feet on formal approval for strikes with American systems. By launching a ground assault on Kursk, Ukraine made the decision for them: the United States gave clearance to use ATACMs to support the ground forces in Kursk, and this metastasized into general license to strike Russia with the full range of available systems. This was a poignant reminder that, however we conceive of the proxy-sponsor relationship, Ukraine has some ability to force America’s hand: a classic example of the tail wagging the dog.
In any case, 2024 saw Ukraine and its western backers slowly but surely bash through all the supposed red-lines in this domain: the British breached first with the delivery of Storm Shadows late in 2023, and this was followed by the delivery of ATACMs (with a handful of F16’s to boot), and finally the loosening of the rules of engagement to clear strikes on Russia.
Where does this leave us? There would seem to be three important things to consider.
The west has essentially reached the end of its escalation chain. The only remaining step that they can take would be to supply Ukraine with JASSMs (Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile), which would mark a quantitative but not a meaningful qualitative upgrade to Ukraine’s strike capabilities.
Ukraine’s use of western-supplied strike assets has been dissipated and has not materially improved their situation on the ground.
Russia maintains a dominant strike advantage, both qualitative and quantitative.
Ukraine faces a stark disadvantage in strike capability relative to Russia, in a variety of ways. Russian strike assets are far more numerous and have significant range advantages, but it is also important to take into consideration both Russia’s significantly greater strategic depth and its more dense and relatively unscathed air defense. Unlike Ukraine, which has seen its air defense stretch to the limit with destroyed launchers and a mounting interceptor shortage, Russia’s air defenses have been essentially untouched, as Ukraine has lacked the large numbers of assets required to conduct a proper SEAD/DEAD (Suppression/Destruction of Enemy Air Defense) campaign.
Given this basic calculus, using western strike systems to wage a blow for blow strategic air campaign is bad math for Ukraine. It is generally unwise to engage in a bat fight when your opponent is a bigger man with a much longer bat. Instead, Ukraine’s strike systems should have been leveraged to support ground operations – concentrating strikes spatially and in time to synergize with efforts on the ground. Just as a simple thought experiment, it is not difficult to imagine ATACMs making a difference if they had been available in 2023 and used to saturate Russian rear areas during the assault on the Zaporizhia line – striking in tempo with the mechanized assault to disrupt Russian command and control and prevent reinforcement of critical areas.
Two things need to be noted about the JASSM. First, the JASSM – while offering slightly longer ranges – would essentially serve as a backstop/replacement for the rapidly dwindling ATACMs and particularly the air launched Storm Shadows – instead of Ukraine’s native SU-24s launching Storm Shadows, they would utilize F-16s launching JASSMs. This would not represent a dramatic upgrade in Ukrainian capabilities, but would instead simply serve to maintain a bare minimum Ukrainian strike capability. JASSMs are a replacement for dwindling capabilities, not an augmentation to them.
Secondly, it must be understood that JASSMs are the last stop. We’re now entering the territory, not of artificially constructed red lines, but physical and real limits. Russia has essentially eaten the gifted stocks of ATACMs and Storm Shadows, with little discernable effect on their ability to fight, and JASSMs are the last extant item in the inventories to keep Ukrainian strike capabilities operative. We are at the last rung of the aid ladder.
In the case of JASSMs, however, there are notable downsides for the United States. This is an important case of putting all of one’s eggs in the same technological basket. In 2020, the United States scrapped the development of its conventionally armed Long Range Standoff Missile, making the JASSM – particularly the new extended range variants – the system for the United States, earmarked to play a critical role in future conflicts, particularly in the Pacific. This makes the JASSM an extremely sensitive system, as a centerpiece of American strike capabilities, particularly with the modernization of the Tomahawk system crawling along at a few dozen units per year.
Given the fact that JASSMs are GPS guided, there are real reasons to be reticent about giving Ukraine such a technologically sensitive system. Russian electronic warfare has enjoyed considerable success jamming GPS and disrupting similarly guided American systems. Allowing the Russians to gain familiarity with a keystone American system could wreak havoc on Pentagon war planning – most, if not all of the strike eggs are in this basket, so why let an adversary peek inside?
It’s probable, given what we have seen to this point, that these concerns will ultimately be dismissed and Ukraine will receive a line of JASSMs which will backstop their strike capabilities – but given the size of Ukraine’s F-16 fleet, the scale will be constrained. Furthermore, air launched systems are less optimal for Ukraine, given their dependence on large and easily targeted airfields, in contrast to ground launched systems which are mobile and more easily concealed.
There is also the matter of the new Russian missile system – the now famous Oreshnik, or Hazel Tree. Russia tested the Oreshnik system on a large machining plant in Dnipro on November 21, 2024, which allowed the basic capabilities of the system to be gauged. The Oreshnik is an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile, characterized by its hypersonic capabilities (exceeding Mach-10) and its Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle equipped with six separate warheads, with the potential for submunitions in each. Although the attack on Dnipro was essentially a demonstration which used inert training warheads (that is, without explosive payloads), the missile can be configured with nuclear or conventional warheads
As in the case of the North Korean troops in Kursk, I rather think that the Oreshnik launch was not nearly as important as it was made out to be. The system is expensive and likely impractical for conventional use. I understand the desire to conceive of Oreshnik as a massively powerful conventional weapon – showering its target with half a dozen warheads with the power of an entire flight of Kalibr missiles – but there are several problems with this. The accuracy of the system (the CEP, or “Circular Error Probable” in the technical parlance) is much more consistent with a nuclear delivery system than a conventional one. Furthermore, the problem with using an IRBM for conventional strikes is the danger of miscalculation – foreign adversaries may misinterpret the launch as a nuclear attack and respond appropriately. This is precisely why the Russian government actually alerted the United States to the launch ahead of time – a fine arrangement for a demonstration, but impractical for a weapon that is intended to be used regularly.
We may see another use of the Oreshnik against Ukraine, but ultimately this is unlikely to be a system of consequence in this war. The demonstration in Dnipro was instead likely intended to send a message to Europe – reminding NATO that Russia has the capacity to deliver strikes against European targets that cannot be intercepted. It also serves as a poignant reminder that Europe lacks the equivalent capability, and in essence provides a demonstration of Russia’s ability to launch missiles from far beyond the range of either Ukrainian or European response. The Hazelnut is a tangible reminder of Russia’s strategic depth and strike dominance in Ukraine.
Ultimately, Ukraine will lose the strike game. It’s strike capacity has dwindled, with missiles frittered away in a dissipated air campaign, and though the exhaustion of Storm Shadow and ATACMs stocks can be offset somewhat by JASSMs, Ukraine simply lacks the range or quantities necessary to match Russian capabilities. Needing to do more with less, Ukraine instead diffused its assets and failed to synergize its strikes with ground operations. We are now at the end of the line – after JASSMs, there’s nothing left in western warehouses to upgrade Ukrainian capabilities. Hazelnuts or no, the math on this bat fight is bad for Kiev.
Conclusion: Debellation
Trapped in an endless news cycle, with daily footage of FPV strikes and exploding vehicles, and a dutiful cottage industry of war mappers alerting us to every 100 meter advance, it can easily feel like the Russo-Ukrainian War is trapped in an interminable doom loop which will never end – Mad Max meets Groundhog Day.
What I have endeavored to do here, however, is argue that 2024 actually saw several very important developments which make the coming shape of the war relatively clear. To briefly recapitulate:
Russian forces caved in Ukrainian defenses at depth across an entire critical axis of front. After remaining static for years, Ukraine’s position in Southern Donetsk has been obliterated, with Russian forces advancing through an entire belt of fortified positions, pushing the front into Pokrovsk and Kostayantinivka.
The main Ukrainian gambit on the ground (the incursion into Kursk) failed spectacularly, with the salient being progressively caved in. An entire grouping of critical mechanized formations wasted much of the year fighting on this unproductive and secondary front, leaving Ukrainian positions in the Donbas increasingly threadbare and bereft of reserves.
An attempt by the Ukrainian government to reinvigorate its mobilization program failed, with enlistments quickly trailing off. Decisions to expand the force structure exacerbated the shortage of manpower, and as a result the decay of Ukraine’s frontline brigades has accelerated.
Long awaited western upgrades to Ukraine’s strike capabilities failed to defeat Russian momentum, and stocks of ATACMs and Storm Shadows are nearly exhausted. There are now few options remaining to prop up Ukrainian strike capacity, and no prospect of Ukraine gaining dominance in this dimension of the war.
In short, Ukraine is on the path to debellation – defeat through the total exhaustion of its capacity to resist. They are not exactly out of men and vehicles and missiles, but these lines are all pointing downward. A strategic Ukrainian defeat – once unthinkable to the western foreign policy apparatus and commentariat – is now on the table. Quite interestingly, now that Donald Trump is about to return to the White House, it is suddenly acceptable to speak of Ukrainian defeat. Robert Kagan – a stalwart champion of Ukraine if there ever was one – now says the quiet part out loud:
Ukraine will likely lose the war within the next 12 to 18 months. Ukraine will not lose in a nice, negotiated way, with vital territories sacrificed but an independent Ukraine kept alive, sovereign, and protected by Western security guarantees. It faces instead a complete defeat, a loss of sovereignty, and full Russian control
Indeed.
None of this should be particularly surprising. If anything, it is shocking that my position – that Russia is essentially a very powerful country that was very unlikely to lose a war (which it perceives as existential) right in its own belly – somehow became controversial or fringe. But here we are.
chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia
As the calendar barrels into another year and we tick away the days of February, notable anniversaries are marked off in sequence. It is now 2/22/2022 +2: two years since Putin’s address on the historic status of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions, followed on 2/24/2022 by the commencement of the Special Military Operation and the spectacular resumption of history.
The nature of the war changed dramatically after a kinetic and mobile opening phase. With the collapse of the negotiation process (whether thanks to Boris Johnson or not), it became clear that the only way out of the conflict would be through the strategic defeat of one party by the other. Thanks to a pipeline of western support (in the form of material, financial aid, and ISR and targeting assistance) which allowed Ukraine to transcend its rapidly evaporating indigenous war economy, it became clear that this would be a war of industrial attrition, rather than rapid maneuver and annihilation. Russia began to mobilize resources for this sort of attritional war in the Autumn of 2022, and since then the war has attained its present quality – that of a firepower intensive but relatively static positional struggle.
The nature of this attritional-positional war lends itself to analytic ambiguity, because it denies the most attractive and obvious signs of victory and defeat in large territorial changes. Instead, a whole host of anecdotal, small scale positional analysis, and foggy data has to suffice, and this can be easily misconstrued or misunderstood. Ukraine’s supporters point to nominally small scale advances to support their notion that Russia is suffering cataclysmic casualties to capture small villages. This suggests that Russia is winning meaningless, pyrrhic victories which will lead to its exhaustion, so long as Ukraine receives everything it asks for from the west. At the same time, the Z-sphere points to these same battles as evidence that Ukraine can no longer hold even its most heavily defended fortress cities.
What I intend to argue here is that 2024 will be highly decisive for the war, as the year in which Ukrainian strategic exhaustion begins to show out at the same time that Russia’s strategic investments begin to pay off on the battlefield. This is the way of such an attritional conflict, which burdens armies with cumulative and constant stressors in a test of their recuperative powers. Wear and tear and the raging of the waters will erode and burden the dike until it bursts. And then the deluge comes.
Avdiivka: Tactical Overmatch
The signature operational development of 2024 is at this point clearly the complete Russian capture of Avdiivka. The strategic significance of Avdiivka has itself been subject to debate, with some dismissing it as little more than a dingy suburb of Donetsk, targeted to give Putin a symbolic victory on the eve of Russian elections.
In fact, Avdiivka is clearly a locale with great operational significance. A Ukrainian fortress since the beginning of the Donbass War in 2014, Avdiivka served as a keystone blocking position for the AFU on the doorstep of Donetsk, sitting on a major supply corridor. Its capture creates space for Russia to begin a multi-pronged advance on next-phase Ukrainian strongholds like Konstantinivka and Pokrovsk (more on that later) and pushes Ukrainian artillery away from Donetsk.
The subject that would seem to be of particular importance, however, was the manner in which Russia captured Avdiivka. The struggle amid the wreckage of an industrial city provided something of a Rorschach test for the war, with some seeing the battle as yet another application of Russian “meat assaults”, overwhelming the AFU defenders with mass amid horrific casualties
This story does not hold up to scrutiny, as I would like to demonstrate from a variety of angles. First, we can try to gauge casualties. This is always difficult to do with a high degree of accuracy, but it would be useful to look for abnormalities or spikes in Russian loss patterns. The most widely accepted source for this would be the Mediazona casualty tracker (an explicitly anti-Putinist media project operated out of the west).
When one goes to examine the Mediazona counts, an interesting discrepancy manifests itself. The summary text notes that a four-month battle for Avdiivka has recently concluded, and Mediazona states: “We are seeing significant growth of Russian casualties since mid-October.” This is actually quite odd, because their data shows the literal opposite. Since October 10 (the day of the first major Russian mechanized assault on Avdiivka), Mediazona has counted an average of 48 Russian casualties per day, which is actually significantly less than the burn rate earlier in the year. In contrast, Mediazona counted 80 casualties per day on average from January 1 to October 9. This period, of course, includes heavy fighting in Bakhmut, so if one takes the period between the end of the Battle of Bakhmut and the beginning of the Battle of Avdiivka (May 20 to October 9) one finds an average of 60 Russian casualties per day. A time series of Mediazona’s weekly confirmed casualties also shows a downward trend, making one wonder how they can feel comfortable claiming that the action in Avdiivka has raised the burn rate
Furthermore, Ukrainian sources on the ground emphasized that the Russian assault in Avdiivka was quite certainly not a mere function of mass, and noted effective Russian small unit tactics with a powerful fire support. One Ukrainian officer told Politico: “That’s how they work in Avdiivka — artillery levels everything to the ground, and then professional landing troops come in small groups.” Another officer described Russian small unit assaults (5 to 7 men) occurring at night. All of this is inconsistent with the trope about Russian “human wave” assaults – which, we should note, have never been caught on camera. Given the Ukrainian fondness for sharing combat footage, oughtn’t we expect to see some alleged evidence of these Russian waves being mowed down?
All this is to say, the claim that Russia (yet again) suffered catastrophic losses in Avdiivka is simply not supported. Like a previous analysis in which I showed that Russian armor losses were not rising or showing abnormal patterns, we yet again have a major Russian assault failing to cause a spike in the loss data. This is not to deny that Russia has suffered casualties. The operation at Avdiivka was a high intensity, four month battle. Men are killed and vehicles are destroyed in such affairs, but there is little evidence that this occurred at abnormal or alarming rates for the Russian Armed Forces.
Now, you’re certainly free to make your own judgements, and I have no doubt that the belief in massive Russian casualties and human wave assaults will endure. However, to believe this, you must make an epistemological leap of faith – believing that the wasteful human waves exist despite Ukrainian fighters testifying to the opposite, and that Russian casualties have risen in a way that is somehow invisible to trackers like Warspotting and Mediazona.
In contrast, Avdiivka stands out as the first major engagement of the war where Ukraine’s growing material shortages have been acutely felt. After burning through much of their accumulated stock (including the large batch of shells purchased from South Korea by the United States), the AFU felt a glaring and painful artillery shortage in Avdiivka. Complaints about “shell hunger” were a motif of the coverage of the battle. Of course, we’ve heard about the growing shell shortage for months (and it is known that Ukraine simply does not have enough tubes to cover the entire front), but Avdiivka stands out as a keystone position, important enough for Ukraine to scramble premier assets to reinforce it, where they simply could not provide an adequate base of fire
Avdiivka
In the absence of adequate artillery, Ukraine has increasingly tried to lean on FPV drones as a substitute. There is a certain strategic logic to this, in that small drones can be manufactured in distributed facilities and do not require the capital intensive production centers (vulnerable to Russian strike systems) that artillery shells do.
However, drones are clearly not a panacea to Ukraine’s problems. In the simple technical sense, the destructive power of an FPV drone (which usually carries the warhead of a rocket propelled grenade) pales in comparison to an artillery shell and is thus unsuitable for suppressive fire or the reduction of strongpoints. Drones are also subject to disruptions from weather and electronic warfare in ways that artillery is not. More importantly, however, Ukraine is simply losing the drone race. Ukraine’s achievements ramping up drone production in wartime are genuinely impressive, but the country’s industrial base is still far smaller and more vulnerable than Russia’s, and Russia’s drone production is starting to widely outstrip Ukraine’s. Ukraine’s weakness in other arms prompted them to be the first party to lean heavily on FPVs, but that early lead has been lost.
So, drones clearly offer a lethal and important battlefield expedient, but they are neither a genuine replacement for artillery nor an arm of clear advantage for Ukraine. The result was a Ukrainian defense in Avdiivka that was substantially outgunned. The problem was compounded by the rapid proliferation of Russian air dropped glide bombs, alongside the degradation of Ukraine’s air defense. This allowed the Russian air force to operate around Avdiivka with something approaching impunity, dropping hundreds of glide bombs with the power to – unlike artillery shells, let alone tiny FPV warheads – level the fortified concrete blocks that normally make Soviet vintage cities so durable in urban fighting.
Thus, Avdiivka unfolded along a pattern that is now becoming very familiar, and indicates the emerging Russian preference for assaulting cities, at least of this mid-sized fortress variety. Once again the operation focused in its preliminary phase on flaring out Russian control over the flanks, beginning with the large mechanized assault in early November which secured positions on the railway line to the north of the city. Again (as in the case of Bakhmut and Lysychansk-Severodonetsk) there was an expectation among some that Russia would attempt to encircle the city, but this still does not look feasible in the current operating environment under the nexus of fires and ISR. Instead, positions on the flank allowed the Russians to launch concentric attacks into the city, entering on multiple axes that compressed the Ukrainian defenders into a tight interior position, where Russian fire could be heavily concentrated
Concentric Attack on Avdiivka: February 7-14 (Base Map courtesy of Kalibrated Maps)
The particular combination of concentric attack and overwhelming Russian fires led to a very rapid end to the battle once the Russian push into the city proper began. While the creep around the flanks occurred in a sequence of on and off pushes through the winter, the concentric crush on the city lasted scarcely more than a week. On February 7-8 the Russians achieved breakthroughs in both the northern and southern suburbs, and by February 14 the Ukrainians were in retreat. A few pockets of resistance would linger for only a few days.
The issue for Ukraine now goes beyond the loss of Avdiivka and the opportunities that this will create for Russia. Ukraine now has proof of failure on both the attack and the defense in operations where they concentrated significant forces. Their counteroffensive on Russia’s Zaporhzia Line was a catastrophic failure, wasting much of the AFU’s carefully husbanded mechanized package, and now they have a failed defense on their hands in Avdiivka, despite fighting out of a well prepared fortress and scrambling reserves into the sector to reinforce the defense.
The question now becomes fairly simple: if Ukraine failed to attack successfully over the summer, if they could not defend Bakhmut, and if they cannot defend in Avdiivka, is there anywhere that they can find a battlefield success? The dam is leaking. Can Ukraine plug it before it collapses?
Russia’s Full Court Press
Ukraine’s force structure is always notoriously difficult to parse out, due to their propensity for ad-hoc battlegroups and their practice of piecemeal allocation of forces to resident brigade commands (turning brigade headquarters into the cups in a shell game). Truth be told, Ukrainian ORBAT and force allocation is in a class all its own – to try and get a handle on it, you can do no better than Matt Davies’ excellent work over on X dot com. This generally makes the AFU’s organization and force generation more opaque and more difficult to parse out than Russia’s, for example. While Russia employs conventional army level groupings, Ukraine does not, and indeed lacks any organic commands above the brigade level.
That being said, the basic picture is one of three Ukrainian “Operational Strategic Groupings”, which are vaguely akin to army groups. These are, from north to south, Operation Strategic Groupings (OSGs) Khortytsia, Tavriya, and Odessa. Against these are arrayed four Russian Army Groups – from north to south, these are Army Groups West, Center, East, and Dnieper. Assessing the total line strength is always difficult, largely because we do not always have good insight into the actual combat rating of these units. However, we can make estimates of paper strength. Based on deployment information from the Project Owl Ukraine Control Map and the Militaryland Deployment Map, we can estimate that the nominal strength in the theater right now is some 33 Division Equivalents for Ukraine against perhaps 50 DEs for Russia – a significant, but not utterly overwhelming Russian advantage. We get a picture something like this (Ukrainian Army level formations are absent because they do not exist)
Ukrainian Theater Army and Group Level Commands (Base Control Map provided by Kalibrated Maps)
At the moment, Russia is grinding slowly forward on almost every axis in the theater. This has both strategic/attritional implications, in that the Ukrainians are forced to continually burn reserves while being denied the ability to rotate and reconstitute units, but there is also a clear operational formulation occurring.
The Russian maneuver scheme must be held in reference to their minimum end state objectives – namely, the capture of the remaining Donbas urban agglomerations around Slovyansk and Kramatorsk (though we should not assume that the war or Russian ambitions end there). At the moment, there are several major axes of advance, which I am labelling as follows
Russian Axes of Attack (Base Control Map provided by Kalibrated Maps)
The intention of these thrusts is fairly obvious. In the center of the front, Russian advances on the Avdiivka and Chasiv Yar axes converge on the critical Ukrainian hub of Konstyantinivka, the capture of which is one of the absolute prerequisites for any serious attempt to move on the Kramatorsk agglomeration. Russian bases of control around Avdiivka and Bakhmut provide the necessary space to begin a two-pronged operation towards Konstyantinivka, bypassing and enveloping the strongly held Ukrainian fortress of Toretsk. (See the map below, which I made in December before the capture of Avdiivka)
Meanwhile, continued Russian pressure on the northern front (via a slow squeeze on the city of Kupyansk, at the top of the Oskil line as well as operations towards Lyman on the Zherebets axis) provide a base of progress towards the other operational perquisite for Kramatorsk, which is the Russian recapture of the north bank of the Donets River, up to the confluence of the Oskil at Izyum
Russia’s North Donetsk Campaign
Meanwhile, on the more southerly axes, Russia continues to expand its zone of control after the capture of Marinka, likely with the aim of developing momentum towards Kurakhove, which would put the Ukrainian fortress of Ugledar in a more severe salient. Ugledar remains a thorn in Russia’s side, in that it lies uncomfortable close to Russian rail lines into the land bridge. Russia is also attacking the Ukrainian held Robotyne salient (the sparse fruits of Ukraine’s counteroffensive). While these attacks have, as we have mentioned, attritional benefits by way of pinning Ukrainian forces in the line, it seems likely that Russia would aim to recapture the Robotyne salient to preempt any Ukrainian designs of using it as a springboard for a future attempt to restart operations towards Tokmak. Thus, these southern operations have both attritive effects and offer the potential of preventatively neutralizing useful Ukrainian staging points
Overall, the broad operational situation suggests that Russia is developing offensive momentum across the entire theater. This will have deleterious effects on Ukrainian combat power by preventing rotation, reconstitution, and lateral troop redeployment, while sucking in the dwindling Ukrainian reserves. Shoigu recently made an uncharacteristically bold statement that the AFU was committing much of its remaining reserves:
“After the collapse of the counteroffensive, the Ukrainian army command has been trying to stabilize the situation at the expense of the remaining reserves and prevent the collapse of the frontline.”
This is, if not totally verifiable, at least notable given his general reticence to make sweeping statements about the state of the war.
In the near term (meaning the spring and summer months) we should expect Russia to progress towards the following intermediate operational goals:
Developing a concentric offensive towards the Ukrainian agglomerations around Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Kontyantinivka
An offensive along the Zherebets-Oskil line towards Lyman, to capture or screen the Donetsk River line as a prerequisite for an operation against Kramatorsk
Continued assaults towards Kurakhove in preparation for the liqudiation of the Ugledar salient
Preventative attacks towards the Orakhiv axis to prevent future Ukrainian attempts to exploit the Robotyne salient
Farwell Zaluzhny
Against the backdrop of Ukraine’s defeat at Avidiivka, President Zelensky began a long expected command overhaul when he fired Commander in Chief Valery Zaluzhny and replaced him the the commander of the ground forces, Oleksandr Syrski.
There a variety of amusing ethnic and political subplots to this, particularly the longstanding tensions between Zelensky and Zaluzhny, the many ridiculous rumors that Zaluzhny had become a political rival to Zelensky and might be the lead figure in a military takeover of the government, and the rather ironic fact that the new top man, Syrski, is a Russian born less than fifty miles outside of Moscow, who ended up in Ukrainian service simply because his unit was posted near Kharkov when the Soviet Union fell, and he opted not to resign his command.
This is all very interesting, of course, and perhaps might help demonstrate that the relationship between these countries is far more convoluted and nuanced that most westerners assume. What matters for our purposes, however, is the military implications
Farewell, Sweet Prince
What we should say about Zaluzhny is that, while he was not really Ukraine’s biggest problem, he did not have the answers. Zaluzhny displayed a bizarre timidity, particularly throughout the Battle of Bakhmut and the Ukrainian Counteroffensive. We constantly heard about Zaluzhny’s reservations and opposition to Ukrainian plans – he was against the costly defense of Bakhmut, skeptical of the attack out of Orikhiv, and so forth. There was even a rumor that Zaluzhny told Zelensky that the counteroffensive had failed already in the opening weeks of the operation.
The problem with all of this is simple: Zaluzhny cannot have it both ways. He seemed to be positioning himself as a voice of caution and reason, distancing himself from operations on the ground, while allowing those operations to go forward anyway. Over the summer, supposedly at the same time that Zaluzhny had concluded that the counteroffensive was failing, he continued to push Ukrainian mechanized forces into the Russian defenses in small, company sized battlegroups.
Ultimately, Zaluzhny strikes one as a non-entity: skeptical of Ukrainian battle plans, but willing to implement them anyway without offering alternatives of his own. In particular, his hesitation led the Ukrainian counteroffensive to devolve into a sequence of wasteful probing attacks which lacked the mass to achieve a decisive result and inevitably spiraled into a slow motion trainwreck. A commander who complains about battleplans while implementing them anyway is begging an obvious question: what is it that you do around here, anyway?
In contrast, Syrski is a man who clearly exerts some will on the battlefield, for good or ill. His preference for commitment and combat has resulted in several of Ukraine’s ugliest defeats – he is, after all, the architect of the Bakhmut defense and the firebag at Lysychansk. But he’s also the showrunner for Ukraine’s signature military success to this point, in the 2022 Kharkov Counteroffensive, where he successfully exploited a badly hollowed out section of Russian front and recaptured important positions over the Oskil
Syrski (2nd from left) checks the situation map
Syrski may very well lead Ukraine to disaster. He has shown a tolerance for casualties that could easily break the AFU’s back, and a preference for generating horrible, grinding positional defense. But Syrski at least has a propensity to look for decision points, unlike Zaluzhny, who seemed content to slowly wither away in positional battle against a superior foe. Aggression could easily cause disaster for Ukraine, but time had clearly run out on Zaluzhny’s way of war.
Outgunned: Ukraine and the Arms Race
The Russo-Ukrainian War is one of industrial attrition. Despite a variety of theories about this or that game changing weapon, clever maneuver scheme, or superior western training, the reality of this war for the last 18 months has been one of grinding and laborious industrial war, battering through fixed defenses in a maelstrom of concrete, steel, and high explosives. The central problem for Ukraine is fairly simple: Russian force generation is reaching the liftoff point, which will interminably shift combat power in Russia’s favor.
As artillery shells have become the totem item in this war, a commentary on the state of the artillery race is certainly warranted. Ukraine managed to build a large inventory of shells in preparation for its 2023 summer offensive, partially through careful husbanding of resources and partially through the United States tapping a few remaining reservoirs, like South Korea. After expending much of that stockpile in high intensity operations through the summer, the artillery advantage has once again swung heavily in favor of Russia, and “shell hunger” has become a ubiquitous complaint for Kiev.
After burning through excess stocks, Ukraine’s long-term supply has increasingly come to hinge on attempts to expand production in Europe and the United States. However, this plan is foundering on three separate rocks: 1) industry has been much slower to ramp up than expected; 2) even the expanded production targets are too low to win the war for Ukraine; and 3) even if adequate ammunition could be procured, Ukraine would quickly run into problems with barrel availability.
Thus far, the United States has been much more successful ramping up production than has Europe. While American targets have been revised several times, it now looks like the United States will produce something like 500,000 shells in 2024, which is a good number given the state of the American industrial plant and issues with labor shortages. The European Union initially hoped to deliver 1 million shells on an annualized basis, but they appear to be far short of this number. Europe faces a variety of problems, like labor shortages, exorbitant energy costs, and a consensus driven decision making culture that is slow to allocate significant resources. The European practice of small orders placed by individual member states also leaves manufacturers hesitant to make large investments in new production lines. Or, as one Belgian general put it: “We’re in deep shit.”
Let’s say that the USA and Europe both fulfill their current targeted deliveries to Ukraine in their entirety. What would that amount to? A recent study from two German analysts at the European Council on Foreign Relations estimated that, in the optimist scenario, the USA and Europe can supply Ukraine with approximately 1.3 million rounds of ammunition on an annualized basis. That would give Ukraine a budget of about 3,600 shells per day – enough to sustain moderate intensity, but far below what they need
The primary means of physical destruction
Last year, Ukrainian Minister of Defense Reznikov said that Ukraine would require nearly 12,000 shells per day to “successfully execute battlefield tasks”, particularly offensive actions. That works out to more than 350,000 shells per month – more than three times what the NATO bloc is hoping to produce. Obviously that large number is unrealistic, but a recent study from the Estonian Ministry of Defense estimated that at minimum Ukraine will need 200,000 shells per month (Roughly 6,600 per day). At the estimated long-run availability of 3,600 per day, Ukraine can have some basic functionality, but they will find it difficult to accumulate a stockpile to allow higher intensity offensive operations.
This runs into an additional, follow on problem, which is that simply pumping shells into Ukraine is not enough. Solving the shell shortage will exacerbate the barrel shortage. Artillery barrels, needless to say, wear out from extended use. Using a rule of thumb number which says that a howitzer barrel has a lifespan of about 2,500 shots, this means that Ukraine would be wearing out somewhere between 125-150 guns per month, assuming they could actually shoot as much as Reznikov wants. This would create yet another sustainment bottleneck, complicated by the fact that Ukraine has at least 17 different platforms in use.
Meanwhile, what of the Russians? It’s clear that Russia’s pool of shells has been vastly underestimated. First we have the news that North Korean deliveries have been far larger than initially expected; instead of 1 million, it’s something more like 3 million with deliveries ongoing. This number is dampened by the fact that some of the North Korean shells are defective (from long stays in depots and cannibalization), but the sheer size of the delivery can’t be ignored. Meanwhile, indigenous Russian production has skyrocketed, with the Estonians estimating some 3.5 million shells produced in 2023 for the Russians, with a figure of 4.5 million expected in 2024. Including North Korean shells, it seems highly likely that Russian can easily sustain a firing rate of up to 12,000 shells per day, with surge capacity in reserve
The upshot of all this is essentially that, even if the European production surge occurs on schedule, there’s at least a 3-1 advantage (potentially 5-1) in Russian artillery fire that’s baked into the calculus of this war, occurring alongside a substantial western acknowledged ramp up in Russian production of strike systems like cruise missiles, Geran drones, Lancets, and glide bombs of both greater power and greater range. A recent publication from the Royal United Services Institute noted that Russia can deliver 1,500 tanks (both new build and retrofitted depot stocks) and 3,000 armored vehicles per year – the report also notes that Russian stocks of Iskander and Kalibr missiles have grown significantly over the last year.
The standard argument – the sort of “Theory of Ukrainian Victory” – rests on the idea of disproportionate, catastrophic Russian casualties, and both sides love to throw around that cherished word “loss ratios.” However, this rather tends to obfuscate the issue. The most important question is simple whether an army’s relative combat power is growing or shrinking over time – that is, whether its ability to generate forces is greater than its rate of burn – can it reconstitute attrited units in a timely manner, generate replacements, recover, repair, and replace broken equipment, and so forth. The prototypical example of this is of course the Nazi-Soviet War. Despite the fact that the Germans enjoyed favorable “loss ratios” throughout most of the war, the ratio of combat power consistently grew in the USSR’s favor due to their vastly superior force generation powers. Tellingly, Hitler even made a quip during the Battle of Kursk that the loss ratios should predict an immanent German victory. But loss ratios do not matter nearly as much as the relative rate of loss and force generation.
Given that Russian casualties are obviously far below the phantasmagorical hundreds of thousands suggested by western Media and Ukrainian propogandists, it has become clear that Russia is generating more force over time. Estonian intelligence estimated that Russia can properly train, equip, and deploy roughly 130,000 additional troops every six months, which is more than adequate to overcome current loss rates. As if to emphasize the point, RUSI notes that the Russian grouping of forces in Ukraine (that is, only those forces deployed in theater at the moment) rose from 360,000 to 470,000 over the last year.
So, here we are. The current Theory of Ukrainian Victory is exhausted, intending as it did to leverage western ISR, training, and surplus equipment to deliver disproportionate casualties on Russia. 2022 was a year of big surges (not Big Serges), with Russia rapidly conquering the land bridge and the Lugansk shoulder in its initial maneuver campaign, followed by Ukrainian capitalization on the inadequate Russian force generation with their audacious counterattack towards the Oskil. But 2023 was different – Ukraine had a significant window of opportunity, flush with western equipment, training, and planning assistance while Russia’s mobilization ground into gear. That strategic window yielded nothing. Instead, Ukraine burned off valuable resources defending Bakhmut and then bashed uselessly against a well shaped and well defended Russian line in the south. Now the window is closed, and Russian force generation is inexorably rising, threatening Ukraine with the deluge of total strategic overmatch.
Ukraine is facing strategic defeat, and the only way out is to go all in – not only for Ukraine, in the form of a more radical and totalizing mobilization plan, but for its partners too, who will have to adopt a quasi-war economy and devote radically more resources to arming and training the AFU.
That leaves the NATO partners. Even if Ukraine adopts a radical mobilization policy, it lacks the indigenous capacity to train them, let alone arm them. Without the NATO training pipeline and robust material support, a Ukrainian total mobilization (even if it were possible with Ukraine’s limited state capacity) would serve only to inflate casualties and burn off what is left of the nation’s demographic base. With even a stable level of Ukraine aid struggling to get through an American congress that is suffering from Ukraine fatigue and a host of domestic crises, it seems unlikely that any by the Baltic States are in the mood to double down and begin sending daily trains full of material to Kiev.
And so, we once again return to the motif of strategic exhaustion. 2022 was the year of wild swings as the front stabilized into a conveniently shaped and easily supplied Russian position, and 2023 was the year of Ukraine’s strategic window of opportunity, frittered away at Bakhmut and Robotyne. 2024 is the year that Russia’s swelling force generation reaches a climax and the war turns in an obvious and irreversible way against Ukraine.
The great German soldier and author Ernst Jünger had the following comment on the prospect of war with Russia:
When Spengler warned against any invasion of Russia for reasons of space, he was, as we have since seen, right. Even more questionable become each of these invasions for metaphysical reasons, insofar as one approaches one of the great sufferers, a titan, a genius of suffering power. In its aura, in its sphere of influence, one will become acquainted with pain in a way that far exceeds any imagination.
Much is always made of Russia’s propensity for “suffering”, with interpretations ranging from a romantic Russian-patriotic notion of sacrifice for the motherland to an anti-Russian criticism of the Russian tolerance for casualties. Perhaps it means both: the individual Russian soldier is more willing to sit in a freezing trench and trade shells than his adversary, and the Russian state and people are able to lose more and last longer in the aggregate.
I rather think, however, that Jünger’s metaphysical “titan of suffering” is not so metaphysical at all. It rather refers to a mundane power of the Russian state, namely its excellence and willingness across the centuries to mobilize huge numbers of men and material for war, at the expense of other social goals. War with Russia sucks. It means mass casualties, cold trenches, scarred earth, and long nights of shelling. The Ukrainians have coped with this as well as anyone (because they are themselves quasi-Russian, however much they deny it), but it is an awful thing to trade shells for years on end. The Russian power of suffering is to willingly fight wars that devolve into bat fights, knowing they have a bigger bat.
The window of strategic opportunity has closed for Ukraine, and now opens wide for Russia. The earth opens wide for the dead [end]
An injured Ukrainian regular serviceman (yellow armbands) in Bakhmut on December 6, 2022 (Metin Aktaş – Anadolu Agency)
For Wagner private military company (PMC), a major Russian force involved so far in the area, Yevgeny Prigozhin has already stated on November 26
Bakhmut is a large, well-fortified area with roads, suburbs, and water barriers. The Ukrainian army is well-prepared and offers decent resistance. Our task is not Bakhmut itself, but the attrition of the Ukrainian army to reduce its combat potential, which is why this operation has been dubbed the ‘Bakhmut meat grinder.’ In this regard, do not run ahead of the locomotive, we will let you know, happiness loves silence
Businessman Yevgeny Prigozhin is second from left on September 24, 2022 (Konstantin Zavrikov)
The military episode is the latest in a long story. Lviv is in western Ukraine the epicenter of a Nazi legacy since WW2. Late 2013, an economical dispute with the European Union led, in the west and Kiev, to a pro-Europe uprising against the legal government. With the help of Nazi political organizations from Lviv and likely, foreign provocative gunmen, NATO achieved a rightist coup in February 2014. Later, Russian-speaking residents of Crimea and Donbass have risen up against the Russophobia of the new authorities, which called them terrorists, cracked down on them with the loyal members of the armed forces and the same Nazi militants, legalized meanwhile as paramilitaries. That was the outbreak of war in Donbass. NATO member countries are offering their military support to Ukraine since 2014. Galvanized, the successive governments did not seriously negotiate, have not implemented Minsk peace agreements. Former German Kanzlerin, Angela Merkel confessed to der Zeit on December 7, 2022
2014 Minsk agreement was an attempt to buy Ukraine time. It has used this time to strengthen itself, as can be seen today
Angela Merkel (left) is introduced at the carnival parade in Düsseldorf on March 3, 2014. The character at right is so shabby that he does not deserve to be named (Martin Meissner / AP)
France and Germany were hypocritical when they sponsored an agreement which was supposed to cease fire and bring peace. The Western goal was actually to gain time, in order for NATO to reinforce the military power of the Ukrainian Nazi deep State. Ukraine has carried on with the terrorist shelling of civilians and on February 24, 2022, Russia has started a special military operation, in order to liberate Donbass, demilitarize and denazify Ukraine. That is the proxy war that NATO was seeking. A happy event for the US and UK leaders, while Europe, as Victoria Nuland has already said in 2014, is fucked, starts understanding it. That is another subject
Victory in Lisichansk, Lugansk People’s Republic, on July 2, 2022 (RIA Novosti), a member of the 6th republican Cossacks regiment raises the replica of the victory flag in Berlin, 77 years earlier
In a first phase of operations, the Russian professional forces and people’s militia from Donbass seized large territories, reached the suburb of Kiev, encircled Mariupol, in the south, where the garrison surrendered on May 20. Negotiation began in March, could have brought peace, but the US and UK prevented it. Ukraine had enforced a general mobilization, took advantage of its numerical superiority early September, counterattacked east of Kharkov, in the north, an area without strategic interest for Russia, which conducted a partial mobilization, in order to balance the forces. Late September, locals voted with an overwhelming majority for the return to Russia of Donbass (Donetsk and Lugansk), Kherson and Zaporojie regions. For logistical reasons, the Russian forces withdrawn early November from the right bank of Dnieper river and Kherson city
Russia is conducting an attrition war, which is a carnage for the Ukrainian forces. While the Ukrainian artillery is firing around 6,000 shells a day all over the front line, the Russian consumption may raise to 50,000, has reminded a senior anonymous NATO official. In view of the Russian air supremacy, tactical, operational and strategic strikes on military targets, despite the massive involvement of Western intelligence, the Ukrainian casualties are obviously far higher. According to a Russian mathematical model, the Ukrainian military fatalities since February 24 are already above 100,000. What the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, confirmed on November 30. Lock of the Ukrainian defense system in the still occupied part of Donbass, Bakhmut is a hot spot, where Kiev is injecting reserves. The fatalities are not restricted to the Ukrainian cannon fodder. Western mercenaries are also killed in the ranks of that Atlanticist army
Coffins of Polish and US fighters near Kharkov on December 9 (social networks)
The frontline situation remains very difficult in the key areas of Donbas – Bakhmut, Soledar, Maryinka, Kreminna… For a long time already there is no living place left on the land of these areas – undamaged by shells and fire. The occupiers actually destroyed Bakhmut, another Donbas city that the Russian army turned into burnt ruins […]
As usual, Zelensky is addressing the Western media, is lying. The battlefield is hell, on the outskirts of the city, which is still safe except for specific targets like this one, maybe a HQ
(AP on December 9)
As retaliation for the military difficulties in Bakhmut, the Atlanticist artillery has amplified earlier this month its daily terrorist shelling of residential areas in Donetsk city. That specific use of a lower artillery is a strategic choice, that is terrorism
Aftermath of an Atlanticist shelling in Donetsk city in the evening of December 9 (screenshot from an official video)
December 10, 2022
The Atlanticist artillery targets the Hunter’s Rest, a recreation center where restaurants are working in the evening, in Melitopol, a city in Zaporojie region that the Russian forces have liberated on February 25, the day after the beginning of the special military operation
(Screenshot from Izvestia)
Unless a specific military target, like a secret meeting of staff, that is a new terrorist attack, more than 70 km from the current front line. At such range, the ammunition are obviously US-made highly precise GMLRS (GPS Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems), also called the 70km sniper rounds, that HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems) have launched.
The case is discussed on social networks. At least two people died, ten are injured, among staff and customers of restaurants. The target may have been the local governor Yevgeny Balitsky, on his birthday, but he was not there. Terrorism anyway. No change on the front line in Donbass, 350 km to the northeast
On the northern outskirts of Bakhmut, the Atlanticist forces have blown up a railway bridge whose debris are blocking the M03 highway to Slavyansk, 45 km to northwest. That may be the sign of a retreat from Podgorodnoye, a village in the northeastern suburb of the battered city
(Social networks)Position of the bridge on a previous map that day
In the evening, a video surfaces, is allegedly showing the battlefield from a drone, somewhere on the outskirts of Bakhmut
(Screenshot)
December 12, 2022
Ukrainian servicemen complain on line about lack of equipment, flight of officers and terrible casualties. These thirty men, one platoon, are the last able-bodied fighters, maybe 25%, within a whole company of the 25th airborne brigade
(Screenshot)
Olga Zaytseva is member of the Atlanticist forces. She suggests that the civilians in Bakhmut suburb should not be evacuated but used as human shields, because they are separatists. Indeed, the people in Donetsk, Kherson, Lugansk and Zaporojie regions have voted with an overwhelming majority, on September 27, for their return to Russia
Her nationalistic hate and propensity for war crime are not new. They are the legacy of the Ukrainian historical Nazism, have operated since 2014 in Donbass, when Ukraine had the upper hand, as for human shields tactics, during the siege of Mariupol.
December 13, 2022
The assault detachments of Wagner PMC have entered the eastern neighborhoods of Bakhmut
Like every day, the Atlanticist artillery is shelling residential areas in Donetsk city. From 7:00 am, forty 122 mm rockets hit apartments, other civilian facilities and the dome of the Holy Transfiguration cathedral
A rare reaction from the US. Geoffrey Young is an engineer and a Democratic politician in Kentucky (Paris time)
Yes, Donetsk is now part of Russia, and the entire Ukrainian “government” in Kiev is a CIA-controlled, Pentagon-controlled, Nazi government
December 16, 2022
Russia conducts new strategic raids all over Ukraine, against command and communication centers, power plants and other energy facilities, except nuclear ones. At least 76 cruise missiles are launched, according to the Ukrainian staff
In Krivoy Rog, the air defense manages to shoot down a house. The Ukrainian propaganda is denying, but Russia is not targeting homes and a cruise missile would have leveled the whole building
In Kiev, the subway is out of service
(Social networks)
In a foolish and crooked political move on November 23, the European Parliament accused Russia of terrorism. The misleading arguments were Ukrainian false flag war crimes like the slaughter in Bucha late March/early April and since October 10, the Russian strategic strikes. As retaliation for the vehicle-born explosive device (VBIED) attack that the Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR) has carried out on October 8 against Crimea bridge. Russian cruise missiles and drones are indeed targeting energy facilities all over Ukraine. The goal is also to deplete some Ukrainian military capacities, like movement of troops and materials, but the Russians are taking special care not to directly harm civilians. Unlike Ukrainians.
Meanwhile, the Atlanticist army is digging trenches in Festung Bakhmut
(Tyler Hicks / The New York Times)
December 18, 2022
Volodymyr Zelenskyy wanted to speak via video for peace, before the start of the final match at the football world cup in Qatar, but his demand was rejected. No peace in Donetsk city, where US independent journalist Patrick Lancaster is reporting from the sites of the daily Atlanticist shelling : homes, shops, the university
In the evening ten 155 mm shells hit Kalinin hospital, its neurosurgery department. At least one victim dies there
RIA Novosti (screenshots)
The day after, the Russian foreign ministry will officially stress that the Atlanticist weapons are in this case Swedish howitzers. Sweden has delivered 155 mm self propelled howitzers to Ukraine, some highly precise Archers, maybe 12 since late October.
December 20, 2022
Volodymyr Zelenskyy visits the armed forces in Bakhmut area, distributes medals, states
[…] I would like to have electricity, most important is the lightning to be inside […]
Amen
(Official)
Likely high on cocaine, on December 16, the president of Ukraine has bragged during an interview with TV channel LCI, the most zealous broadcaster of the Ukrainian propaganda in France, has claimed that he was eager to meet Vladimir Putin on a ring for a man-to-man fight. While he is visiting four days later the Atlanticist forces in Bakhmut area, from the other side of the front line, Herr Kapellmeister Yevgeny Prigozhin addresses a message to him : HELLO in artillery-Morse code
(Screenshot)
December 21, 2022
Ukrainian soldiers drive a US made Humvee in Bakhmut on December 21, 2022 (AP)
Early October 2022, the shipments or pledges of military equipment from foreign countries to Ukraine, since January 3, were already worth more than 36 billion dollars, including more than 27 from the US. On December 21, Joe Biden states that
Allies supplied 2,000 tanks and armored vehicles, 800 artillery systems and 2 million shells
That was already huge, for only nine months. By comparison, the US tax payers provided 87 billion for equipment, training and funding of the Afghan armed forces, around 300,000 strong, during 18 years, until late 2019. These 5 billion, at most per year, were also including training and funding. Ukraine is a high intensity battlefield, which is requiring much more ammunition, bigger guns, thicker armors, high technology.
Yet, Ukraine is not winning. The losses are still a secret because their reality is cruel. The military perspective is dark. Volodymyr Zelenskyy crosses the border to Poland, where he takes off in a US Air Force Boeing 737-700
(Paris time)
His US plane lands in Washington DC at about noon, local time, when the Atlanticist artillery starts a new terrorist shelling of residential areas in Donetsk city. At the same time, the White House and State Secretary Antony Blinken announce new military deliveries for $1.85 billion, which will include Patriot air defense systems, more than 100,000 rockets and artillery shells
(Official)
Later, the comic skills of both characters make hilarious an otherwise hollow press conference. I notice two sentences
[Joe Biden] Russia is using winter as a weapon
[Volodymyr Zelenskyy] there is no just peace and there cannot be in this war with which these nonhumans came to us
I can confirm that Paris is in winter since 10:48 pm, local time. The rest of his visit, his address to Congress, appear across the wide world, to anyone with a bit of culture and good taste, like a Barnum circus performance. Zelenskyy looks like a trained dog for the US citizens who would like to protract their belief in their leadership, in a world which has already rejected it
The flag from Bakhmut (Mandel Ngan / AFP)
About the current hot spot, he states with demagoguery
as like the battle of Saratoga, the fight for Bakhmut will change the trajectory of our war for independence and the freedom
I hope so and note it.
December 26, 2022
A Russian precision strike has burnt in Bakhmut a former store, where graffiti are portraying Ukrainian commander-in-chief Valerii Zaluzhnyi and claiming that Bakhmut loves Ukraine. The building was likely a garrison or HQ
(Clodagh Kilcoyne / Reuters)
December 28, 2022
According to Wagner PMC, no less than 27 Ukrainian brigades are involved at several echelons in the defense of Bakhmut, are regularly rotating on first line and replenished with fresh cannon fodder after huge casualties
December 29, 2022
A new Russian air offensive strikes all over Ukraine, 69 cruise missiles, according to the Ukrainian authorities, against the usual strategic targets and also air defense systems, according to witnesses on the ground. In Ukraine far west, the mayor of Lviv states in the afternoon that 90% of the city is without electricity
The Atlanticist authorities claim that a Russian missile has hit a house in Ivano Frankivsk, more than 500 km from the sea or the Russian lines. But the photos are showing once more the debris of a specific surface to air missile. Its range is far below, nothing but a Ukrainian S-300 air defense system has launched it
(Social networks)
Another Ukrainian missile falls in the countryside in Belarus. On November 15, the Ukrainian air defense killed two civilians on Polish territory. The incident was highly suspicious, may have been a deliberate false flag, in order to trigger the direct involvement of NATO.
December 30, 2022
In the suburb of Bakhmut, a Russian T-80 is collaborating with an observer and his drone, is treating an Atlanticist entrenchment at less than 30 m, in order to ease the advance of infantry
(Screenshot)
As often in Ukraine, here in Kiev, women are demonstrating for news about their missing relatives, members of the 93rd mechanized brigade, which has been engaged in Bakhmut area. They are likely dead but nobody has informed the families. The Atlanticist authorities of Ukraine are hiding the reality of severe military casualties
December 31, 2022
Midnight tolls in Kamchakta, when early afternoon in Ukraine, a new wave of cruise missiles strikes strategic targets
Sky of Astrakhan, southern Russia, where cruise missiles are flying from the Caspian sea, 1350 km from Kiev (screenshot)
Vladimir Putin has recorded a New Year address, which is broadcast for the citizens of far eastern Russia. Young service members are surrounding the president, in the context of the special military operation for liberation of Donbass, demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine
we will overcome all the challenges and keep our country great and independent
(Screenshot)
Wagner fighters address also their fellow citizens for the New Year
(Screenshot)
January 1, 2023
While people are celebrating the New Year, several Atlanticist GMLRS hit a facility where Russian reservists are garrisoned in Makeyevka, eastern suburb of Donetsk. The building is leveled, 89 service members are killed.
January 2, 2023
Bruno Lemaire is a French rightist politician and the current minister of economy and finance, under the second presidency of Emmanuel Macron. On March 1, 2022, he has stated in a martial resolve
we will cause the collapse of the Russian economy
On January 2, 2023, he is guest on the set of Quotidien, a TV show for French wokes. Journalist Paul Gasnier is reporting from the still Ukrainian occupied part of Donetsk People’s Republic, when the Russian forces strike. The anchorman purports that the scene is from Bakhmut, but the reporter is on the parking lot of his hotel in Druzhkovka, a rear base 45 km to the west. Gasnier claims later that he ignores what was the target, actually the railway station, where trains were unloading reinforcements and weapons, a few hundred meters from the hotel. Enjoy
(Screenshots)
January 5, 2023
Orthodox Christians celebrate Christmas on January 7. Vladimir Putin states
Taking into account the appeal of His Holiness Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and all Russia, I instruct the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation to declare a ceasefire along the entire line of contact of the parties in Ukraine from 12:00 on January 6, 2023 to 24:00 on January 7, 2023.
Considering the fact that a large number of citizens living in the areas of hostilities practice Orthodoxy, we call on the Ukrainian side to declare a ceasefire and allow the people to attend the Christmas Eve and Christmas Day services
Vladimir Putin listens to Patriarch Kirill on July 30, 2017, in Kronstadt (Alexei Nikolsky / Kremlin)
No surprise, Oleksiy Danilov is secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, replies
Ukraine will not conduct any negotiations with Russia about the Christmas truce
Decrepit Irish thug Joe Biden tells about himself
I think he [Vladimir Putin] is trying to find some oxygen
In 2023, Ukraine will receive Western armored fighting vehicles (AFV), in order of announces, 30 French armored reconnaissance vehicles (ARC) AMX-10 RC, 50 US infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) Bradley and 40 German IFV Marder
I am eager to watch their wrecks on the battlefield in Ukraine. Each time I hear or read Außenministerin Annalena Baerbock, I become nostalgic. Im Osten, nichts neues. Here is in April 1945 the vintage photo of a destroyed Sonderkraftfahrzeug (Sd.Kfz.) 251 in Berlin
January 7, 2023
The Russian forces cleanse Podgorodnoye, a village in the northeastern suburb of Bakhmut
The Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR) shares a new video on Twitter
Chechen volunteers as part of the International Legion @DI_Ukraine continue to defend #Ukraine in the hotpots of the front. Among the volunteers is Abdul Hakim,the hero of the Ichkerian people. Currently, the Chechen division is fighting against the #russian occupiers in #Bakhmutpic.twitter.com/peWochDtLj
— Defence Intelligence of Ukraine (@DI_Ukraine) January 7, 2023
Chechen volunteers as part of the International Legion @DI_Ukraine continue to defend #Ukraine in the hotpots of the front. Among the volunteers is Abdul Hakim,the hero of the Ichkerian people. Currently, the Chechen division is fighting against the #russian occupiers in #Bakhmut
(Screenshot)
The battle is real. In another version that Ukraine supporters are sharing but the authorities have censored, several fighters are injured. The scene is allegedly Bakhmut. Only close friends, the hero is 42-year-old Rustam Azhiev, alias Abdul Hakim al Shishani [Chechen], an alive icon
from Chechnya to Syria (my archives)
The intelligence agency stresses on Ichkeria, in the hopes of reigniting an uprising in Chechnya. Founded on January 14, 1994, as the result of a split from the Russian Federation, the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria became a theocracy run by warlords and in August 1999, its shura [council] demanded the creation of an Islamic confederation in the North Caucasus, which would have included nearby Russian territories, Dagestan and Ingushetia. The jihadist operations triggered the Russian military intervention which seized Grozny in February 2000. The Chechen Republic is now part of the Russian Federation.
Azhiev was a youngster when he joined jihadist rebels in the mountains of southern Chechnya. They were defeated in 2009 and only then, he became famous. Do you remember how Western politicians and mainstream media were whining about the fate of the freedom fighters, whom the barbarian forces of evil Bashar Assad were about to slaughter in Aleppo, northwestern Syria ? A similar disinformation is currently broadcast about Ukraine. Azhiev was there, leader in 2013 of Jamaat al Khilafa al Qawqazia [Caucasian Caliphate group], a part of the Chechen jihadist formations which were fighting under command of al Nusra, a subsidiary of al Qaeda, the main rebel force in Syria and the garrison of Aleppo
Rustam Azhiev in Syria before 2016 (social networks)
The Russian military intervention in September 2015 prevented the victory of the Syrian revolution, a Western expression, in fact, many foreign fighters. Damascus did not become the capital of a new Emirate or Caliphate, Syria is still a secular country, where anyone can practice his faith. Once more defeated, Azhiev was living so far in the jihadist enclave around Idlib, that NATO is protecting in northwestern Syria. On October 18, 2022, the Ukrainian parliament has recognized the deceased and buried Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. And here is again Azhiev, on the battlefield of a new proxy war that the West is conducting against Russia, through its support to a supremacist and Nazi deep State. That is for democracy.
Complicated ? No. In the 1980s, the US started supporting in Afghanistan an islamist uprising against Soviet Union and the local legal communist government. Arab volunteers joined there the mujahideen. The meeting between the Muslim Brotherhood and a Saudi golden boy, Osama bin Laden, produced al Qaeda in 1987
An article about Osama bin Laden on December 6, 1993, in a British newspaper, the Independent, makes me always laugh
The mujahideen won in the 90s and on September 11, 2001, al Qaeda achieved in the US the most ambitious, complex and spectacular terrorist attack so far. As a retaliation for 9/11, NATO invaded Afghanistan, in order to overthrow the taliban power, which was the result of the US support in the 1980s to the mujahideen and a safe heaven for al Qaeda. The war lasted 20 years and at the end, the taliban won. Despite many other warnings, nothing can move the US neocons away from their metaphysical goals, their own jihad, for the hegemony of a mechanically declining West, against Russia, China and most of the wide world. The so-called war on terror is a scam. The invasion of Iraq in 2003, the destruction of Libya in 2011, the support to the so-called Syrian revolution, have boosted the global jihad. Fortunately, Russia took action in September 2015.
Funny combination of circumstances, the Ukrainian intelligence releases that video on January 7, when in order to divert the social discontent, the French government pays tribute to the victims of the attack against Charlie Hebdo editorial team in 2015. The Atlanticist geopolitical strategy may cause sometimes collateral damage in Europe, but the actual tragedy is among the civilians on the battlefields of wars abroad. President Jacques Chirac opposed the invasion of Iraq in 2003, but since Nicolas Sarkozy in 2007, France is like the whole European Union, a minion of the US. And Sarkozy is the main culprit of the destruction of Libya in 2011, which has spread jihad across the Sahel.
January 9, 2023
Fraser Good is a British mercenary within the Atlanticist forces in Ukraine. In the afternoon, he warns on social networks of the near loss of Soledar, 15 km northeast of Bakhmut, still Ukrainian-occupied part of Donetsk People’s Republic
receiving reports from central UA brigades that Soledar is due to fall, please advise all contacts to depart immediately and ensure to avoid the crossroad between Krasna hora and Bakhmut
(Screenshots)
Yuri Yurchik (right) was colonel within the Atlanticist forces, member of the border guards of Ukraine, deputy commander of the special forces, has died in Soledar, write the Ukrainian media. He fell under a Russian artillery shelling
(Andrey Tsaplienko)
The Russians have broken the Atlanticist defenses along the highway to Slavyansk, between Bakhmut and Soledar, where Wagner is also storming the administrative center
Kein Panzer aber Annalena Baerbock, die in Kharkov die Ostfront besucht
80 years ago, Friedrich Paulus’ 6. Armee was rotting, encircled in Stalingrad (BILD)
The latest events in Ukraine confirm the liveliness of Germany’s historical and strategic fanaticism for the Ostgebiete, the eastern territories. Another German is currently president of the European Commission. Ursula von der Leyen stated on November 24
the European Union will not rest until Ukraine defeats Putin
Or a cyanide capsule ?
Das Bundeskommissariat für die Ostgebiete, the Helferinnen‘s blue and yellow uniform
For 80 years, Germany has always seen objective interests in the east : subcontracts for its industry, cheap Arbeit. But the posture is also irrational when ironically, its indirect consequences become a death threat to the industry. That neurosis is a tool for another ambition, the hegemony of the US and their British minions, its preservation at any cost. But history is cruel, an immanent justice is always threatening the irrational behaviors. How ironic that Germany is supporting in 2022 a Nazi deep State. Moreover, a NATO member country has secured on September 26 the loyalty of the European Union. Western sanctions against Russia and the sabotage of Nord Stream pipelines may destroy the German industry.
In the evening, Russia addresses an ultimatum to the Atlanticist forces which are now encircled in Soledar, where their surrender is demanded before midnight. Yevgeny Prigozhin and Wagner fighters appear in the salt mines, southwest of the town
(Social networks)
January 11, 2023
In the framework of Lublin Triangle, an alliance signed on July 28, 2020, Volodymyr Zelenskyy meets in Lviv, western Ukraine, his counterparts from Lithuania and Poland, Gitanas Nausėda and Andrzej Duda. Together, they decide to reinforce in Ukraine the defense of the so-called Euro-Atlantic coalition. Poland would transfer a company of German-made Leopards, the first ever Western tanks on the battlefield. France has already announced on January 4 the shipment of AMX-10 RCs, which are not tanks, despite their 105 mm gun, but old armored recce vehicles
In the wake of Poland, the UK announces later the delivery of Challengers.
These statements are obvious reactions to the Atlanticist defeat in the area of Bakhmut, despite the massive involvement of Ukrainian reserves and huge casualties. In the evening, Yevgeny Prigozhin states that Wagner has crushed the resistance in Soledar pocket, where about 500 Atlanticist fighters were refusing to surrender, have been killed
Russian war correspondents Alexander Simonov and Alexander Sladkov report from Soledar on January 12
John Kirby is a military spokesman at the White House, states
but even if Russia takes Bakhmut and Soledar, it will not have a strategic impact on the war itself
Volodymyr Zelenskyy does not agree, is still denying despite evidences the loss of Soledar. Anyway, thousands Atlanticist fighters, Ukrainian cannon fodder or Western mercenaries, will be comforted to hear that they have died for so little
That same day, a Russian mathematical model assesses that more than 150,000 Ukrainian service members have fallen since February 24. And the marketing has ravaged the West for decades.
Like most Western media, CNN is entertaining. Wagner has cleansed the residential areas of Soledar about 36 hours earlier, but Ukrainian officials are still denying the liberation of the town, where the fighting have ended and Russian journalists were already reporting the day before. Despite its editorial line, the US channel attempts to retain a semblance of credibility, reports that the situation is not clear, sees an organized pullout, from a forward position… which is 4 km from Soledar
(Screenshot)
January 14, 2023
Russia conducts new waves of strategic strikes all over Ukraine, a few ballistic missiles in the morning and 38 cruise ones in the afternoon, according to the Ukrainian command. In Dnieper city, a residential building is leveled. Maybe the Atlanticist air defense, but the damage are impressive, rather a shot down cruise missile or both, together
(Social networks)
Women protest once more in Kiev, are demanding news or the bodies of their missing relatives, likely dead on the front line. For propaganda reason, the authorities are hiding that the military losses are huge. Moreover, no pension is paid for a missing service member
(Bela Szandelszky / AP)
January 15, 2023
Former MMA fighter, Hayk Gasparyan (left) was arrested last year for an armed robbery, sentenced to seven years and jailed in Ryazan. The Orchestra has offered him an opportunity of redemption. On December 31, Vladimir Putin already awarded him for his courage during the special military operation. As leader of an assault squad, he is now a hero of Soledar liberation
(Wagner)
Wagner is recruiting volunteers among prisons inmates. The deal is precise. For desertion, the penalty is death, anywhere, anytime. If the volunteer fights six months and survive, he can leave the military organization, is free, his sentence has been served.
January 16, 2023
At noon, the Atlanticist forces have already shot one hundred rockets and shells at residential areas in Donetsk city and suburb. At about 8:30 am, a shopping center has been leveled in Kalininsky district. The shelling is continuing
(Screenshot)
That may be a retaliation for the destruction in Dnieper city, on January 14, of a residential building that the Russian forces did not target, but anyway, the Ukrainian deliberate terrorist shelling of Donbass is almost daily for more than eight years.
January 17, 2023
According later to the German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung, in a phone call with US president Joe Biden this day, Kanzler Olaf Scholz claims to be ready to deliver Leopard tanks to Ukraine, but on one condition : if the US in turn deliver Abrams
A destroyed Abrams in Iraq on April 6, 2003 (USMC)
Poland and others have previously committed to provide Leopards but need that Germany allows their export.
January 18, 2023
On January 18, 2023, a helicopter crashes in Brovary, eastern suburb of Kiev, on the left bank of Dnieper river. Onboard, Denis Monastyrsky, the interior minister, members of his staff, are killed. Sadly, people are living there. In sum, 14 victims die and 25 are injured, including children
(Social networks)
Two hypothesis surface quickly, pilot error or malfunction. The aircraft was a Super Puma that France has delivered in 2018.
January 19, 2023
Der Bundestag is debating the delivery of German Leopard tanks to Ukraine. Member of parliament Peter Bystron, AfD (Alternative für Deutschland, Alternative for Germany, right-wing), states
German Panzer against Russia in Ukraine ? By the way, you already tried that with the Melnyks and Banderas [Stepan Bandera, Ukrainian Nazi leader during WW2] and what is the result ? Unspeakable suffering, millions of dead on both sides and in the end, Russian tanks here in Berlin !
(Screenshot)
He adds
The conflict in Ukraine cannot be solved with Panzer, only with diplomacy […] Only the US armaments companies benefit from arms deliveries […] The majority of the German people reject arms deliveries to Ukraine. The traffic light government [red-green] should finally start conducting politics in the interests of the German people
A number of parties are opposing the transfer and the decision is postponed. Later, the US announce a new $2.5 billion military package for Ukraine, which will include 59 Bradley IFVs (infantry fighting vehicles) and 90 Stryker APCs (armored personnel carriers), but no Abrams tank.
Meanwhile in Donbass, Wagner liberates Kleshcheevka, a village southwest of Bakhmut
Andriy Melnyk is the previous ambassador to Germany, a revisionist and an apologist of his national hero, Ukrainian Nazi war criminal Stepan Bandera. On November 18, Volodymyr Zelenskyy has appointed him deputy foreign affairs minister. Melnyk calls for a tank coalition in Ukraine
Representatives of the Atlanticist coalition, the US, Ukraine and their auxiliaries, meet in the US military base in Ramstein, Rheinland-Pfalz, Germany
(Wolfgang Rattay / Reuters)
But the Westerners do not announce the delivery of Leopards or Abrams to Ukraine. Editor for German tabloid BILD and a mouthpiece of NATO, Julian Röpcke is angry. A few years before, he was already supporting the jihadist revolution in Syria
(Paris time)
According to dem Spiegel, the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND, German intelligence) is assessing that the Atlanticist forces are losing three-digit numbers of soldiers every day in Bakhmut area.
While Wagner is still bleeding the Ukrainian cannon fodder in Bakhmut area, the Russian regular forces are attacking in the south since the day before, January 19, gain 7 km on January 20, are threatening Orekhovsky, 65 km southeast of Ukrainian-occupied Zaporojie, on the left bank of Dnieper river. If confirmed and successful, such an offensive could lead to the destruction of the Atlanticist forces east of the river
A Wagner fighter proudly displays his trophies, including the chevrons that he has seized so far in Bakhmut area, on demilitarized foreign mercenaries from Canada, Georgia, Italy, Turkey, the UK and US
At the moment, such a question [from Poland, about Leopard Panzer] has not been asked, but if we were asked, we would not interfere
(Screenshot)
January 23, 2023
The psychodrama goes on in the Ostgebiete [eastern territories]. Polish prime minister Mateusz Morawiecki states
We will apply for such consent from Germany, but this is a secondary topic. Even if we do not get this consent at the end, as part of a small coalition, even if the Germans would not be in this coalition, we will still hand over our tanks [German Leopards] together with others to Ukraine. The condition for us at the moment is to build at least a just small coalition of States […] in Western Europe […]
I guess he needs the German industry, in order to maintain his Panzerkampfwagen
A Panzerkampfwagen IV has been demilitarized near Kursk in July 1943
Meanwhile, the campaign #FreeTheLeopards is trending on social networks, with involvement of characters like Finnish prime minister Sanna Marin
(Screenshots)
and German stylist Frank Peter Wild, who is advocating for a while on Instagram, from his elevator in Berlin
January 24, 2023
The French press may be the worst coterie worldwide of atavistic lackeys. The State is subsidizing them all. Their reports about the prospects of tanks delivery to Ukraine are hilarious. The public propaganda channel franceinfo asks
PANZER, MARSCH ! According to dem Spiegel and other German outlets, Kanzler Olaf Scholz has agreed to send German Panzerkampfwagen to Ukraine. The historians will measure the part of the submission to the US and that of a pure German neurosis
Hasso von Manteuffel in the Baltic States on August 31, 1944
My brief forecast : the Western tanks are carrying four crew members, require training, will not be soon on the front line. A few dozens will not turn the tide in Ukraine, but will be destroyed.
January 25, 2023
The government confirms that Germany will send 14 Leopards to Ukraine. The plan is to form two battalions, that is about 88 tanks, with contribution of other countries. New German defense minister, Boris Pistorius predicts that these formations may reach the front line in about three months, that is early May.
Poland has already announced the delivery of a company, that is 14 vehicles. Germany has managed to convince the US, which will deliver 31 Abrams, confirms Joe Biden. 14 British Challengers should be also part of the 88 Western Panzerkampfwagen ultimately engaged in Ukraine. 75% of mankind are eager to watch their wrecks on the battlefield. Government by grocers is a curse.
For a wide majority of Russians, the near involvement of Western tanks is a reminder of the Great Patriotic War against Nazi Europe. Some channels are giving advice on how to burn the new German Panzerkampfwagen
Ukraine needs now crew members and more broadly, a new batch of cannon fodder. I guess some recruits were volunteer in March 2022, but the most are likely dead, now. The scenes of forced mobilization are increasingly cruel. An amateur video surfaces from Cherkasy. The woman has attempted to record the abduction of the man
(Screenshots)
The same day, the Ukrainian press writes the obituary of Arkadiy Peschanskiy, a symbol of modern Ukraine, who has been killed on the battlefield around Bakhmut. 47 years old, Peschanskiy was a veteran of the riots at Maidan square and the right-wing coup in February 2014, leader in Poltava of Nazi Svoboda [liberty] party, serviceman within its military branch, special police battalion Sich. He had been recently transferred to the 116th territorial brigade, likely in a punitive function, in order to prevent desertion
(Facebook)
He was displaying as a banner of his Facebook account the red and black flag of Nazi Pravyi Sektor [right sector] organization, with the portrait of Stepan Bandera, a Ukrainian Nazi war criminal during WW2.
An alleged assessment from the Israeli intelligence has leaked to Turkey, where the press writes that by January 14, 165,000 Atlanticist fighters, including 8,000 foreigners, had been killed in Ukraine since February 24, 2022. Among the 8,000 foreigners, the most were mercenaries, but 2,692 were service members from NATO countries (Germany, Lithuania, Poland, UK, US… etc). According to the same piece, the Russian fatalities were 18,500, nine times less, at the same date. From March to September 2022, I have written a chronicle about the siege of Mariupol. I am still convinced that dozens French operatives were taken prisoners there.
January 28, 2023
At about 7:30 am, the Atlanticist artillery shells Novoaydar, Lugansk People’s Republic, more than 50 km from the front line. The rockets are highly precise, several US-made GMLRS, also called the 70km sniper rounds, that nothing but US-made HIMARS have launched. The target is the hospital. The Russian defense ministry does not hide that the building was also a military healthcare facility. Anyway, the shelling of a hospital, civilian or military, is a war crime and in this instance, an episode of the usual Atlanticist terrorist activity in Donbass for almost nine years. Among patients and medical personnel, 14 at least are killed and 24 are injured
(Screenshot)
Two political and social philosophies are confronting in Donbass and Ukraine. I have understood for a while that these events and crimes are a paroxysmal illustration of the rightist frame of mind which is currently ruling the arrogant Western societies. The LGBT bullshit, current flag of the self-called progressives, is a lure for dummies, at best. That is why, as a witness of these facts, I have become since February 2022 an enthusiastic partisan of a Russian victory, for the sake of the wide world and the working class in the West.
January 29, 2023
The Orchestra has found in Bakhmut area the corpses of Atlanticist fighters, whose heads and hands have been cut off, in order to prevent their identification. They were likely foreigners, may have been Western operatives. As a reminder, in June 2022, the Russian forces found burnt human remnants, several individuals, inside and nearby a blast furnace of Azovstal steel mill, Mariupol, with the scraps of a US passport card
(Screenshot)
January 30, 2023
From Kleshcheevka, a village cleansed on January 19, southwest of Bakhmut, Wagner is slowly advancing toward Chasov Yar. Its capture would cut one of the two main Atlanticist lines of communication west of the city
Wagner fighters in Kleshcheevka
February 1, 2023
In anticipation of their defeat in Bakhmut, Atlanticist servicemen are digging trenches west of the city
(Yasuyoshi Shiba / AFP)
That may be anywhere between the current front line and Kramatorsk, about 45 km to west. When Bakhmut will have been liberated, the Russian forces will have broken two consecutive lines of entrenchments, which have been built during years. Victory over the third line will mean the complete liberation of Donbass
While a splendid Chinese balloon is terrorizing the whole nation, the US announce that they will ship a new package to Ukraine, $2.175 billion worth of military aid, including Ground Launched Small Diameter Bombs (GLSDB), that the HIMARS, already delivered, will be able to launch up to 150 km.
Since the day before, Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the European Commission, is attending a summit in Kiev. During a joint press conference, Volodymyr Zelenskyy states
No one will surrender Bakhmut. We will fight for as long as we can. We see Bakhmut as our fortress
That criminal insanity sounds funny the day after the 80th anniversary of the Soviet victory in Stalingrad, where the annihilation of the German 6. Armee was the turning point of WW2, forecast the complete defeat of Nazi Europe. To a request for capitulation from Friedrich Paulus on January 24, 1943, Adolf Hitler replied
Surrender is forbidden. 6. Armee will hold its position to the last man and the last round and by its heroic endurance will make an unforgettable contribution toward the establishment of a defensive front and the salvation of the Western world
A usual contemporary question about WW2 is : how a character like Adolf Hitler may have led Germany between 1933 and 1945 ? Let us wonder nowadays. Zelenskyy is a cocaine addict actor, under the thumb of a Nazi deep State. All Europeans know for a while that Leyen is corrupted and unfit, whatever her job. European leaders appear as stooges of the US. And who is really leading the US ? Joe Biden ? A senile ham ?
February 5, 2023
Norwegian paramedic Sander Sorsven Trevlik is scorched in Bakhmut on February 2 (Emanuele Satolli / WSJ)
In a Ukrainian video which surfaces on social networks, a journalist has interviewed a member of the Atlanticist forces. She had previously investigated among military medics, who had assessed that the health expectancy for fresh recruits at forefront in Bakhmut area was four hours, before death or bad injury. The serviceman looks a bit embarrassed, replies after consideration, that the health expectancy may be a little longer
(Screenshot)
Whatever the length of the considered front line and the size of the military formation, on average, the losses are rising to 75% in about three hours of engagement. As we have witnessed before, the survivors are then brought to the rear and a new cannon fodder is replacing them at the forefront. A mitigating factor may be that the fighting are not everywhere, 24/7.
In all Ukrainian cities, the conscript chase has become a cops and robbers game. These violent videos are flooding the social networks. Curious phenomenon, everybody sees them, except Western mainstream media, the servile mouthpieces of bellicose, civilized and democratic governments. That is a clash of cultures, between reality and technocrats, maybe the main symptom of decadence, the intolerance to reality
Situation map around Bakhmut in the evening of February 5 (RYBAR)
February 7, 2023
Der Sozialdemokrat Boris Pistorius, Verteidigungsminister von Olaf Scholz, sprach bei seinem Besuch in Kiew mit Journalisten von BILD, dem reaktionären Boulevardblatt für germanische Rednecks
ohne Zögern und ohne Kompromisse – die Welt wäre ein besserer Ort ohne Putin [Wladimir, Wladimir Wladimirowitsch Putin]
(Twitter)
Was das deutsche Problem (Deutschefrage, in Gothic) anbelangt, so denke ich, dass sich die Lösung natürlich und mechanisch darstellt. Ich weiß nicht, ob die Frau von Pistorius noch im gebärfähigen Alter ist, aber allgemeiner gesagt, die sinkende Geburtenrate und der Große Ersatz, den ich stark unterstütze, werden es in angemessener Zeit lösen.
The disgrace is that so many Germans have forgotten so quickly that they are most offspring of Nazis. If modern Germany was a respectable country, its leaders would consider the legitimate demands of Russia, would strive to bring peace in such a situation, would not send Panzer.
February 9, 2022
On social networks, Ukrainian nationalist channels are sharing this view from a drone in Bakhmut area
February 10, 2023
A new wave of strategic raids, 71 cruise missiles, strike all over the country, from Kharkov to Lviv, according to the Ukrainian authorities, which forbid any amateur report about the results. On February 20, the New Yorker will publish photos of damaged power facilities in Western Ukraine
Many Western commenters are waiting for a Russian offensive and the New York Times releases its strategic prospect, a kind of revearsal battle, when the Atlanticist forces would push toward Melitopol and Crimea. But Russia is also attacking in the south
February 11, 2023
Maksym Zhorin is a member of the Nazi deep State in Ukraine, former commander of Azov regiment, currently major in another formation and also a war criminal. On October 9, 2022, his men slaughtered civilians in the vicinity of Kupyansk and he broadcast on social networks a video which was showing the victims thrown in a mass grave
(Screenshots)
He confirms publicly that Bakhmut is a slaughterhouse for the Atlanticist forces and that the losses there are jeopardizing military prospects on the whole battlefield
The situation in and around Bakhmut itself is becoming more difficult every day. At the moment, the enemy shifted his attention and most of his forces directly to the city itself. They are trying to advance in the territories of the private sector, industrial zones. Extremely heavy battles are going on for every house, for every meter. Our biggest problem is that now the most combat-ready units of our army are losing their best fighters. In contrast to the Russians, who threw garbage and unnecessary things here. Of course, with tanks and weapons from foreign partners, we have a better chance of a successful counteroffensive. But we will be able to find tanks and aircraft. And we will not find such people who are dying now at the front – while we are waiting for supplies
According to unofficial sources, a dispute has broken out for quite some time between the armed forces and Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who is rejecting the pleas for a retreat from the city.
February 12, 2023
The Orchestra is tightening its grip around Paraskovievka, last Atlanticist controlled village in the northern suburb of Bakhmut. From all sides, the fighting are converging to the city, where this Ukrainian photo is taken and shared on social networks
February 15, 2023
Northwest of Bakhmut, the Russian forces have cut M03 highway to Slavyansk
Russian reporter Dmitry Astrakhan is on the eastern outskirts of Paraskovievka, last village in the northern suburb of Bakhmut, that Wagner has outflanked and is storming
February 17, 2023
In the evening, the Orchestra has achieved the cleansing of Paraskovievka.
February 19, 2023
Held in check on the front line, where slowly, they are stepping back everywhere, the Atlanticist forces are still using their outperformed artillery to deliberately shell civilians. That is terrorism. Once more, a volley of forty rockets hit downtown Donetsk
February 21, 2023
During his speech before the Russian congress, Vladimir Putin announces that Russia withdraws from START (reduction of strategic offensive arms) treaty, will resume nuclear military tests if the West do so
(Social networks)
Meanwhile, the Russian forces are advancing in the northern neighborhoods of Bakhmut
In the night, with long range rockets, the Atlanticist forces target several cities and towns in Donetsk People’s Republic, as far as Mariupol. The Russian air defense does notmanage to shoot them all down. The projectiles may be GLSDBs. The US have announced their near shipment on February 3 (cf. supra).
February 23, 2023
The Russian forces have cleansed Berkhovka, northwestern suburb of Bakhmut
Since the morning, the Atlanticist forces are shelling Donetsk city with 155mm shells and US GMLRS. Despite the air defense, four members of a medical rescue team are killed, while they are searching for victims under the rubble in Petrovsky district.
February 24, 2023
A first batch of Panzerkampfwagen has arrived and as usual in Ukraine, here in Odessa, volunteers are rushing to become crew members of the new tanks and defend democracy. The two men in military fatigues are recruitment officers. In black uniforms, two police officers watch the abduction
(Screenshots from an amateur video)
February 25, 2023
Wagner fighters have seized Yagodnoye, at the northwestern periphery of Bakhmut, behind the Atlanticist defense in the city
(Social networks)
European TV channel Euronews broadcasts a drone footage from the city
(Screenshot)
February 26, 2023
Yevgeny Prigozhin states that according to intelligence, the Atlanticist command is sending four Leopards 2A4, one platoon that Poland has shipped two days before, to Chasov Yar, a town about 15 km west of Bakhmut.
I hope so, did not expect it.
The alternative is that the Panzerkampfwagen are game changers or they are not. In the first case, engagement by dropper will dilute them on the battlefield. In both cases, the pictures of destroyed machines will be a propaganda victory for Russia, while various countries are still wondering if they will deliver Western tanks.
never interrupt an enemy who is making a mistake
has said Corsican general Napoleone Buonaparte.
Give more weapons
February 27, 2023
Wagner fighters have liberated the northern neighborhoods of Bakhmut, where freed civilians are escaping from the battlefield
(Screenshot)
44-year-old Robert Brody, callsign Magyar, is commanding a Ukrainian drone operators platoon, has stated that the study of worms – invaders of the Ukrainian land – will continue, detoxification methods will improve until the very victory, is suspected of having already dropped poisonous volatile liquids on Russian troops. For the third evening running, he reports under shelling, from his underground shelter in Bakhmut, about the poor situation of the Atlanticist forces
I guess that the real bad place, where he has an appointment tomorrow, is the meat grinder, Bakhmut. CNN is not boosting his spirit, quotes an anonymous Atlanticist serviceman who says that the situation in the city is much worse than officially reported
Neil Hauer is a Canadian freelance journalist. His work exempts him so far from being suspect of sympathy for Russia. According to his sources, the last Atlanticist roads to Bakhmut are now under direct Russian fire
I would be disappointed if James Vasquez did not manage to reach the city.
March 2, 2023
But 46-year-old Yuriy Syrotyuk believes that the Atlanticist forces can keep Bakhmut. He is fighting there as grenadier with the 5th assault brigade. He is also deputy head of Nazi Svoboda party. The BBC has interviewed him
March 3, 2023
While the Atlanticist forces are blowing up the bridges, Robert Brody (cf. supra, February 27) states in a last video from the city that his platoon has been ordered to retreat. From the Russian side, Yevgeny Prigozhin adresses Volodymyr Zelenskyy, urges him to save the Atlanticist forces from an encirclement. He also introduces three Ukrainian prisoners, two youngsters and one elderly, who look like members of the Volkssturm during WW2
(Screenshot)
First in the world, some French mainstream journalists raise the white flag, announce that the Atlanticist forces have retreated from Bakhmut, which is, they stress,
without strategic importance
Tens thousand Ukrainians, mercenaries and NATO soldiers will be comforted to hear that they have died for so little. That will be in the coming days a mantra among the servile press of a defeated West.
February 4, 2023
The main roads from the west are under control or direct fire of the enemy. The Atlanticist forces are proceeding on trails, which are uncomfortable for wheeled vehicles this season. A video surfaces on social networks
(Screenshots)
A Ukrainian serviceman also complains about the inhabitants, who in Bakhmut, are waiting for the Russians as their liberators
(Screenshot)
That is not surprising, the city was in Donetsk region, its population is partisan since 2014 of Donetsk People’s Republic. And I guess that the contempt and brutality of the Ukrainian army did not make them change their minds.
Russian defense minister Sergey Shoigu visits southern Donetsk People’s Republic
(Vadim Savitsky / TASS)
February 5, 2023
With information from drone operators, the Russian artillery is pounding the Atlanticist formations which are attempting to escape from Bakhmut battlefield
(Evgeny Poddubny, screenshots)
Here, the infantrymen have left their armored vehicles for the cover of the woods, where they are chased.
Volodymyr Zelenskyy held a meeting of the staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief [himself]. Commanders of operational-strategic groups of troops reported on the situation in the main directions of the front. The members of the Stavka considered the situation in Bakhmut in particular detail. Evaluating the progress of the defense operation, the president asked questions to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Valery Zaluzhny and the commander of the Khortytsia operational-strategic group of troops Oleksandr Syrskyi regarding further actions in the Bakhmut direction. They spoke in favor of continuing the defensive operation and further strengthening our positions in Bakhmut. In addition, at the meeting of the headquarters, the issue of the supply of weapons and equipment and their distribution according to operational directions was considered
That statement is a lie. No soldier would advocate the continuation of defense in such configuration. Politics and propaganda are directing the military choices of Volodymyr Zelenskyy, with an absolute disregard for the Ukrainian cannon fodder. So are the Western so-called young leaders. To a request for capitulation from Friedrich Paulus on January 24, 1943, Adolf Hitler replied about Stalingrad
Surrender is forbidden. 6. Armee will hold its position to the last man and the last round and by its heroic endurance will make an unforgettable contribution toward the establishment of a defensive front and the salvation of the Western world
Ukraine is committing its strategic reserves, in an attempt to maintain lines of communication to Bakhmut. According to the usual mathematical model, about 180,000 Ukrainian service members have been killed in action since February 24, 2022.
In the city, a Russian assault squad reaches on Gorky street the memorial to the Red Army
That is obvious for many observers and me, but the anchorman looks surprised. The feelings of the Russian-speaking people in Donbass were the reason for their uprising after the rightist russophobic coup in Kiev in February 2014, the reason for the terrorist crackdown that the loyal members of the Ukrainian army and Nazi paramilitaries have carried out, the reason for the success of the referendums in September 2022. These feelings are why the Russians are liberators. Since 2014, the Western mainstream media have hidden that major aspect of the conflict -what the population is thinking- have repeated the tale of a Russian invasion in southeastern Ukraine
On December 1, 2021, Volodymyr Zelenskyy awards Dmitry Kotsyubaylo the title Hero of Ukrainewith the Order of the Golden Star, for his feats in Donbass (Голос UA)
Good shot : the Ukrainian media announce the death in Bakhmut area of Dmitry Kotsyubaylo, callsign Da Vinci, member of Nazi Pravyi Sektor [right sektor] organization, commander within the DUK (Dobrovolʹchyy ukrayinsʹkyy korpus, Ukrainian volunteer corps, its military branch, 67th mechanized brigade since November 2022) of the 1st battalion. One of his grandfathers was member of the UPA, the Ukrainian Nazi paramilitary organization during WW2, celebrated in Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s Ukraine as a pantheon of national heroes.
March 8, 2023
In Bakhmut area, Yevgeny Prigozhin visits an artillery formation which is shelling the usual military targets
(Screenshots)
As usual, the Atlanticist artillery is deliberately targeting residential areas in Donetsk
(Screenshot)
March 9, 2023
Launch of Kalibr sea-based cruise missiles (Russian defense ministry, screenshot)
As a retaliation for the Ukrainian terrorist raid in Russian territory on March 2, explains the Russian defense ministry, a new wave of strategic strikes is conducted in the night and morning all over Ukraine, against military infrastructure, enterprises of the military-industrial complex and energy facilities. The Ukrainian staff counts 81 missiles, including six hypersonic Kinzhal
A power plant is burning in Kiev (amateur video, screenshot)
A well known character : 29-year-old Aiden Aslin enrolled the Ukrainian army in 2018, was in the ranks of the 36th marine brigade, when in Mariupol, he surrendered to the Russian forces on April 12, 2022. As mercenary, the British national was sentenced to death in Donetsk People’s Republic on June 9, but released during a prisoners swap on September 21
A video surfaces on March 9, 2023, from Aiden Aslin’s GoPro camera (screenshot)
Aslin was lucky the first time, is back in Donbass, where he is leading an Atlanticist infantry squad at the front, allegedly in Bakhmut area.
March 10, 2023
The high command of the Ukrainian armed forces attends the funeral in Kiev of Dmitry Kotsyubaylo, killed in Bakhmut area on March 7. Voldoymyr Zelenskyy has stressed it, the awarded hero was a symbol. Kotsyubaylo was member of Nazi Pravyi Sektor [right sektor] organization, commander within the DUK (Dobrovolʹchyy ukrayinsʹkyy korpus, Ukrainian volunteer corps, its military branch, 67th mechanized brigade since November 2022) of the 1st battalion
(Ukrainian social networks)
Here are defense minister Oleksii Reznikov (fourth from left in the first rank), commander-in-chief Valerii Zaluzhnyi (third) and Kyrylo Budanov (first), head of the military intelligence (GUR). Even the president and an official guest, Finnish prime Minister Sanna Marin, tour the ceremony
Some Ukrainian servicemen do not agree with their sacrifice for political reasons in Bakhmut. Here is on Twitter a member of the 93rd mechanized brigade
As soon as the Russians take the road to Khromovo [a western suburb], Bakhmut will gradually begin to transform from a fortress into a large mass grave. Then there will be no point in keeping silent about things that have been bothering you for many months. Maybe someone will see treason in them, but I will already sneeze deeply. Patience is running out
(Screenshot)
Meanwhile in Donetsk, Denis Pushilin, the head of the People’s Republic, awards fighters of Wagner PMC.
March 11, 2023
Ukrainian colonel general Oleksandr Syrskyi is commanding the Khortytsia operational-strategic group, visits once more the headquarter which is managing the defense of Bakhmut
(Ukrainian social networks)
A video surfaces on Ukrainian social networks, is showing how the Atlanticist forces are slaughtering the forced conscripts who are attempting to surrender to the Russians
(Screenshots)
According to the source, the killing dates back to early March. The propaganda is broadcasting these images in order to deter such attempt.
Somewhere near the front line, a Russian high-precision loitering projectile, a Lancet kamikaze drone, has demilitarized a British-made Stormer HVM (high velocity missile), an air defense armored vehicle
(Russian defense ministry, screenshot)
In Kuibyshev district of Donetsk city, a NATO 155 mm shell kills 8-year-old Nikita and his father. His mother is not injured. US independent journalist Patrick Lancaster reports later from the crime scene
March 12, 2023
Along the highway to Slavyansk, the Russian forces have reached the outskirts of Minkivka, 20km northwest of Bakhmut, where the meat grinder is still working
In the northern part of the city, Wagner fighters have started to cleanse the network of underground, up to a dozen floors, of the metal processing plant (AZOM).
March 13, 2023
On March 11, 2022, the people’s militia has liberated Volnovakha, about 50 km southwest of Donetsk, 30 km southeast of the current front line. Atlanticist rockets target today the town. What may have been the target ? The dead victims are two women, who were in front of a supermarket
I have blurred the face of the victim (social networks)Daniela was niece of Valeria
In the evening, the Russian artillery pounds the Atlanticist reserves, from Chasov Yar to Konstantinovka, up to 30 km southwest of Bakhmut.
March 14, 2022
Within the metal processing plant (AZOM), in the northern neighborhoods of Bakhmut, Wagner assault squads have cleansed Vostokmash company
That was the place where Volodymyr Zelenskyy distributed medals on December 20, 2022 (cf. supra).
This second night in a row, the Russian artillery is heavily pounding the Ukrainian reserves in the rear of the city. From north to south, the areas of Slavyansk, Kramatorsk and Konstantinovka are targeted.
March 15, 2023
So sad they need so much iron to understand it. The Kyiv Independent is however a Ukrainian online newspaper, that is, due to the control, censorship and bans enforced by Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s regime, a propaganda outlet. Nationalism is a plague, a European plague
March 16, 2023
The 3rd Ukrainian assault brigade shares a video from the vicinity of Bakhmut. That regular formation has been formed on November 1, 2022, with elements of the national guard, the depot of Nazi Azov regiment, after its bulk had surrendered in Mariupol. Its commander is Andriy Biletsky, a police lieutenant colonel and Nazi militant, leader of the National Corps party
(Screenshots)
March 21, 2023
Control of the city on March 21, 2023
March 26, 2023
In the northern part of the city, the Russian forces have achieved the cleansing of AZOM plant and its underground, which was the strong point of the Atlanticist defense downtown
A video from the Ukrainian 93rd mechanized brigade is showing that the Atlanticist forces have started mining and destroying buildings in the city
(Screenshot)
Another picture from the Atlanticist side surfaces on the site of Radio Free Europe
(Libkos / AP)
March 31, 2023
Wagner releases a video from helicopter, which is showing that snow is falling in Bakhmut
(Screenshot)
April 2, 2023
In tribute to journalist Maxim Fomin, whom the Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR) has assassinated a few hours before in Saint Petersburg, Wagner fighters seize in Bakhmut the ruins of the administrative building, where they raise their flag
While new Atlanticist terrorist strikes, with US GMLRS rockets and NATO 155 mm shells, are killing 9 civilians in Donetsk city, 3 other ones in Lugansk People’s Republic, Russian journalist Semyon Pegov reports from the cleansed center of Bakhmut, near the city council
April 8, 2023
The Atlanticist defenses are slowly shrinking in Bakhmut Western neighborhoods. Ukrainian servicemen are writing on social networks how the battlefield is a hell, under the implacable fire of the Russian artillery
An amateur video surfaces, is showing the wrecks of tanks, other armored vehicles and soft ones, on a road to the west
(Screenshot)
April 10, 2023
Head of Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR), Denis Pushilin visits the liberated part of Bakhmut
(Screenshot)
Wagner PMC is using a seized US armored personnel carrier (APC) M113
(Screenshot)
April 11, 2023
A leak of classified documents from the Pentagon has wrecked havoc within the US intelligence community. They look authentic and as Big Serge writes, are a Russian nesting doll of embarrassment
(Social networks)
First of all, they are showing how in this case, the US intelligence is relying on open sources (OSINT), because Ukraine simply does not share its data. The known facts are ascertaining that the country is facing a critical shortage of artillery and air defense ammunition, a deficit that the West is unable to bridge.
Besides, Ukraine is planning a spring offensive, that 12 brigades should carry out. NATO is equipping nine of them, which appear understrengthed, according to Western standards, will still be ill trained by late April.
Big Serge concludes
To salvage the situation, Kiev must place its hopes on one desperate dice roll with a mechanized attack package comprised of half-strength brigades wielding a disparate inventory of different vehicles and systems. This Frankenstein’s monster of armies – sewn together with a bevy of different tanks, IFVs, APCs, and artillery systems drawn from all corners of the NATO alliance, will likely be asked to smash through the heavily fortified and robustly manned Russian lines in the south, where it will be pulverized and become only so much more mulch for the Pontic Steppe
April 12, 2023
RIA Novosti publishes a video from liberated downtown Bakhmut, I guess the square of the city council, that the Atlanticist forces have mined and destroyed before their retreat
(Screenshots)
April 13, 2023
French Chief of Staff Thierry Burkhard visits Ukraine, where he meets his counterpart, Valerii Zaluzhnyi
(Official)
The needs of the Ukrainian army are the issue, in order to repel the Russian forces [Ukrainian statement]. Such an official trip in the region at wartime, of a French serviceman commissioned by his government, is a first since the Légion des volontaires français contre le bolchevisme [French volunteers legion against Bolshevism] in 1941
(Bundesarchiv)
Meanwhile, the fighting are ongoing in Bakhmut, where Wagner fires a Fagot antitank guided missile (ATGM), in this splendid photo from RIA Novosti
In a video from Evgeny Poddubny’s team, a Russian T-90 is firing
(Screenshot)
April 16, 2023
Sad day in Odessa, where the Ukrainian recruitment sergeants do not find more cannon fodder, understand that they are about to leave for the meat grinder
(Screenshot)
While Wagner PMC is cleansing Bakhmut, Russian paratroopers are protecting the flanks, north and south of the city. Here is a light antitank team
Vladimir Putin visits military headquarters in Kherson and Lugansk regions
(Screenshot)
Meanwhile in Bakhmut, the retreating Atlanticist forces blow up the cultural center
(Screenshot)
The Washington Post interviews colonel Pavlo Palisa, Ukrainian 93rd mechanized brigade, in his underground HQ. He confirms that the Russian fire control over the Ukrainian supply lines is efficient. The Atlanticist forces are low in ammunition and the casualties are heavy
(Ed Ram / The Washington Post)
April 19, 2023
A photo surfaces on social networks, allegedly from members of the Ukrainian 47th assault brigade, is showing modernized T-55 tanks from Slovenia and US Bradley IFVs
From a TV set, Ukrainian unter-defense minister Hanna Maliar states that the counteroffensive has already begun, along four axes, Bakhmut, Marinka, Avdiivka and Liman, all in Donetsk People’s Republic, Donbass, Russia. She adds however that no offensive actions are conducted, but a set of strategic measures. Indeed, the Russian fighters have noticed nothing so far
(Screenshot)
NATO is eager, despite the clear Ukrainian incapacity to conduct offensives with success. In the evening, Moscow time, the US announces an umpteenth military package, artillery ammunition. That proxy war is such a crime, such a caricature of the West, that it will be likely the end of the Western hegemony. The wide world is disgusted.
April 21, 2023
During a new meeting on the US military base in Ramstein, Germany, defense secretary Lloyd Austin states that NATO countries
have provided more than $55 billion in security assistance for Ukraine
(Sebastian Christoph Gollnow / dpa)
According to Robert F. Kennedy, candidate at the Democratic nomination for 2024 presidential election, who spoke on TV the day before, Ukraine has already lost 300,000 killed service members, 7 or 8 times the Russian fatalities. The usual mathematical model has rather calculated 280,000 Ukrainian military deaths so far. In this case, NATO countries would have paid $200,000 for each Ukrainian life.
April 22, 2023
Wagner has seized the Upper Park and Bakhmut 2, the main railway station, only 3 km from the western outskirts of the city. The Atlanticist forces are still holding high buildings on the other side of the railway.
According to Yevgeny Prigozhin, some Ukrainian formations are mutinying in Konstantinovka and Chasov Yar, 15 km and further west of downtown Bakhmut, are declining the engagement that their command is offering them in the meat grinder
A new collection surfaces on social networks, international chevrons that Russian fighters have seized on the corpses of foreign mercenaries
Since the beginning of the Russian special military operation, the issue on the other side has always been the balance of forces between the cannon fodder and Nazi paramilitaries. I guess the latter too have suffered heavy losses in Bakhmut area. The situation will radically curb when the forced conscripts will have enough stomach to start shooting at the Nazis
Today is an anniversary. After the crossing of Oder river on April 16, 1945, breakthrough 3 days later, the Red Army completed on April 22 the cleansing of fortified Seelow Heights, 75 km from the center of Berlin.
April 23, 2023
The Ukrainian terrorist shelling of civilians in Donbass last for nine years. They are harsh that day, when dozens 122 mm rockets and NATO 155 mm shells target Donetsk city and vicinity. One man is killed in the regional capital and two female passersby, two sisters, die in Makeyevka
(CCTV screenshots)
The Russian forces have intercepted enemy communications, which are proving that the Ukrainians have assassinated in Bakhmut an injured Russian prisoner. Therefore, Yevgeny Prigozhin orders
We will wipe out everyone on the battlefield. Do not take a single prisoner anymore
No mercy is not a crime. War is not a game that a player could leave when it goes wrong. The least mistreatment of an enemy prisoner, whose surrender has been previously accepted, is a crime. But to deny the enemy the opportunity to survive the battle is not a crime.
43-year-old Caroline Nordengrip is a Swedish far-right politician, member of the so-called Sverigedemokraterna [Sweden Democrats], has enrolled in the Atlanticist forces in Ukraine
(Social networks)
My dearest wish is that the command sends her to the heart of the action, for example in Bakhmut. But I fear that I will not be granted.
Today is an anniversary. 78 years ago, one week after the breakthrough on Oder-Neisse river, 75 km east of the city, the Red Army completed the encirclement of Berlin, where denazification began
In Bakhmut, the retreating Atlanticist forces blow up the television tower.
April 26, 2023
A video surfaces from an Atlanticist trench in the vicinity of Bakhmut
A nine-story building has been leveled at the southwestern end of Bakhmut (48.576057022861114, 37.964094212950386), on the Atlanticist side of the current front line. A journalist who is working on the same side has taken the photo
(Libkos / AP)
Ukrainian channels are claiming that the destruction is the result of Russian shelling. Russian channels are claiming that the Ukrainian forces have mined and blown up the building. We already know that the Atlanticist forces are entrenched in high buildings, which are therefore military targets for Russia, have already mined other sites during their retreat.
Testimonies from civilians who have been evacuated to the Russian side are telling us that the Atlanticist forces have blown up buildings while civilians were still sheltered in the basement. They were disregarded because they had refused to evacuate to the Ukrainian side, were waiting for the Russians as their liberators.
The usual Atlanticist shelling, in Donetsk city, of civilian areas where no troops are stationed, no military value target is settled, have begun in the morning. The munitions are today West made JROF-M 122 mm rockets. Projectiles have hit a hospital where 10 victims are injured. The MRI room is destroyed. In another neighborhood, a civilian bus has been set ablaze while it was carrying passengers. Nine people, including one eight-year-old girl and her grandmother in the bus, are already dead. As usual for nine years, Ukrainian propaganda media are addressing their Western counterparts, are lying, are claiming that the shelling are Russian. But in the afternoon, the official channel on Telegram of Ukraine State border guards shares a video which is showing the launch as retaliation of 80 mm rockets
(Screenshot)
For Uman, the soldier is writing on the rockets. Last night, Russia has conducted a wave of strategic strikes against military targets all over Ukraine. An explosion has ravaged a residential building in Uman, 560 km west of Donetsk. Like previous confirmed failures, several times before, the projectile was certainly a Ukrainian air defense missile. Russia is using highly precise cruise missiles, that Ukraine is attempting to shoot down, is never targeting civilians.
Ukraine is deliberately shelling civilians in Donetsk for eight years, eleven months and two days.
At about 8:00 pm, Moscow time, Yevgeny Prigozhin states that the Atlanticist forces are controlling less than 3 square km in Bakhmut. Later, Russia has stricken Pavlograd railway junction, about 180 km to the West, where ammunition are still detonating. The target was likely the main supply hub for the troops on the front line in Donbass
(Social networks, screenshot)
May 1, 2023
Today is an anniversary. Adolf Hitler had shot himself the day before in his Bunker. 78 years ago, the Red Army seized the Reichstag, where 800 Nazi defenders surrendered, after 1200 had died
While Ukraine has lost on the battlefield -in my mind, the defeat is ascertained since the liberation of Mariupol, in May 2022, the military intelligence (GUR) is activating its networks in Russia, in order to conduct sabotages. In the previous night, a power line pole has been blown up in Leningrad region, northwestern Russia. Later, an explosion causes the derailment of a freight train near Bryansk, 1000 km to the south
(Screenshot)
From Bakhmut, Yevgeny Prigozhin congratulates Volodymyr Zelenskyy for the Workers’ Day
(Screenshot)
May 2, 2023
Today is an anniversary. Adolf Hitler had shot himself two days before, the Red Army had seized the day before the Reichstag, where 78 years ago, the victors against Nazism raised the flag, as the survivors of Berlin garrison surrendered
From the top of a building in Bakhmut, a camera records a salvo of thermobaric rockets which pound the Atlanticist entrenchments
(Screenshot)
In Donbass, a revolution had founded Donetsk People’s Republic on April 8, 2014. In order to crush federalism in Odessa, southern Ukraine, nationalist militants, many outsider, were clashing with local Russian-speaking autonomist protestors on May 2, 2014. The first attacked the Trade Unions House, where left militants had settled their headquarters. They yelled Kill the Russians, set ablaze the building with petrol bombs. People tried to escape through windows, some fell and while injured, were beaten in the street. 48 victims were killed, burned in the building or slaughtered outside
(Yevgeny Volokin / Reuters)
Nobody was sued in Ukraine for the mass-killing on May 2, 2014. Today, Ukrainian Nazis are still celebrating on social networks the day of Odessa barbecue
(Paris time)
May 4, 2023
Planet releases this satellite photo. Still under Atlanticist control, the western end of the city is smoky
May 5, 2023
After several previous public grievances about lack of ammunition for his men, Yevgeny Prigozhin releases a video where he threatens to withdraw from Bakhmut on May 10, the day after celebration in Russia of 1945 victory, if the issue is not solved
(Screenshot)
I have no strong views. The problem may not be any malice from the Russian command, but an enormous consumption of artillery shells, due to Wagner tactics. Later, the Russian commander in Mariupol during the victory in May 2022, colonel general Mikhail Mizintsev, is investigating on the front line in Bakhmut
Ramzan Kadyrov reacts later, Chechen troops would replace Wagner in Bakhmut. Here is his full statement
I appeal to the Minister of Defense, Sergey Shoigu, the Chief of General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, and the founder of the PMC “Wagner”.
I like everyone not indifferent to the fate of our country, hate to hear the latest statements by Yevgeny Viktorovich, and it is doubly unpleasant that the leadership of the Russian Ministry of Defense does not comment or does not meet with the leadership of the “Wagner” PMC to make any decision or clarification. After all, Prigozhin deserves respect for the invaluable contribution of the Wagnerians to the liberation of the cities of Donbass. If there is a shortage, then it is necessary to explain and show, on the basis of which the commanders will at least adjust the further tactics of the Wagner units, without relying on artillery.
I recall the experience of Chechen units in Mariupol. When we needed five tanks from the Ministry of Defense to support the infantry, we could only be allocated one, whose crew left the vehicle in the first battle. The tankers then had to be reassured, tuned up for combat, and put back in the vehicle so that they could cover at least one position of the Azov Satanists with salvos. There were problems with other equipment as well. We have not been able to replace 30 artillery cannons since the beginning of the SMO. I personally called Moscow and talked to commanders and superiors. In a month, the problem was solved. Yes, it did not work on the first call. But our units did not record the clips either; they did not give the enemy pleasant informational victory.
... By the way, it is not right to film the bodies of killed comrades-in-arms for the sake of public outcry is wrong. Let us never do that.
For example, the area of responsibility of Apta Alaudinov, my dear brother, commander of special forces “AKHMAT” and deputy commander of the 2nd army corps of the Russian Armed Forces, includes more than a hundred kilometers of the line of contact with the enemy. Not a day goes by that he does not have problems. But not once has Apty Aronovich announced it publicly over the Internet, but only through internal communication with the leadership. I should note that, with rare exceptions, the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff were always accommodating and helpful to Chechen units. And there are always misunderstandings in ordinary civilian life, not to mention the war, where there is always a shortage of ammunition! I do hope my appeal will be heeded by Sergey Kuzugetovich and that an order will be given to the General Staff to go there and sort it out. It is the only correct way out of the situation, in a soldier’s way.
Chechen units fought side by side with the Wagnerians in the most difficult areas in Popasna, Severodonetsk, Lisichansk, and other settlements in Donbass.Together, they fulfilled their sacred duty to the motherland without distinction of nationality or faith. The interests of the state and the security of the country must come first. And when the SMO is over, I would like all of us—every fighter, every commander, every Russian patriot—to be the winners. Together.
Yes, if the older brother Prigozhin and the Wagner leave, the General Staff will lose an experienced combat unit, and the younger brother Kadyrov and the Akhmat will take his place in Artemovsk. If the scenario nevertheless plays out that way, our fighters are already ready to move in and occupy the city. It’s a matter of hours. But we would like to take the remaining two kilometers of the city, not at the cost of soldiers’ lives but as a result of the mutual understanding, support, and determination of the commanders and fighters to carry out the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of Russia, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin
(Screenshot)
In the night, the Russian artillery is treating with incendiary rockets the neighborhoods that the Atlanticist forces are still holding at the west end of the city.
A church is burning in the evening, on the current front line, at the west end of Bakhmut
(Social networks, screenshot)
May 9, 2023
While along the path of the sun, from Vladivostok to Saint Petersburg, Russian cities are celebrating one after the other the victory against Nazi Germany, in 1945, the Atlanticist artillery targets in Bakhmut vicinity, a facility where Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) are accommodated. Four US made GMLRS (down right) hit the compound. Fortunately, no prisoner is killed, but all are stunned (down left)
Among several previous false flag war crimes, one with GMLRS already killed 53 Ukrainian inmates in Yelenovka, on July 28, 2022, after the Russian victory in Mariupol
The same day, French news agency AFP announces the death of journalist Arman Soldin, during a Russian shelling in the vicinity of Chasov Yar. My first question is why has he come to maybe the worst point of the whole front line, where the Russian artillery and air forces are pounding the Atlanticist reserves, only 15 km west of downtown Bakhmut.
(AFP)
Moreover, Ukraine pays tribute to Oleksiy Titarenko, a senior adviser to Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who has been killed the same day in Donetsk region [Donetsk People’s Republic], in Chasov Yar, Ukrainian private channels detailed. I guess alongside the French journalist.
May 10, 2023
Valerii Zaluzhnyi (center) on March 10, 2023, in Kiev (Oleg Petrasyuk / EFE / EPA)
NATO military committee states that Valery Zaluzhny, the Ukrainian chief of staff, does not participate that day in a scheduled joint video conference. The rumor of his death is spreading and the deputy defense minister, Hanna Maliar, is bound to publicly deny the allegedliquidation of our commanders.
Besides, Maria Zakharova, spokeswoman of the Russian foreign affairs ministry articulates a so true reality
On the eve of May 9, Zelenskyy canceled Victory Day, sacred to many Ukrainian citizens. He instead approved Europe Day, as if there was no other day among 365 ones, no other historical period either. To understand the underlying purpose of this replacement, one need only look at the officials who came to this celebration. That is the president of the European Commission, German Ursula von der Leyen. She is a representative of the vindictive Europeans, simply seeks revenge on our country for the crushing defeat her Nazi ancestors suffered 78 years ago
French recruitment poster in 1943
May 12, 2023
The fighting is going on in Bakhmut and in the evening, Yevgeny Prigozhin states that the Atlanticist forces are controlling less than two square km
(Screenshots, one, at left, with thermal camera)
May 15, 2023
(Screenshot)
A US Humvee is burning on the outskirts of Bakhmut, on a muddy road to Chasov Yar.
While the Atlanticist forces are now controlling less than 1.6 square km at the east end of the city, Wagner has managed in the previous night to demilitarize 46-year-old Nicholas Maimer, a US citizen and former member of the USSOF (US special operations forces).
May 17, 2023
Morning atmosphere in west Bakhmut on May 17 (Photo Sketches)The sun is shining in the afternoon (Photo Sketches)
Bild is a reactionary tabloid, pro-NATO and Russophobic. Its readers are mainly in West Germany, where their elders have not been enough cracked down for their Nazism during WW2
Bild is however more reliable than the atavistic, otherwise congenital courtiers, who are populating French mainstream media, acknowledges that the Atlanticist forces are now occupying less than 1% of the city, only one side of a street.
May 19, 2023
While G7 is meeting in Hiroshima, the site of the worst terrorist attack in history, Volodymyr Zelenskyy is travelling onboard a French military plane to join in and Yevgeny Prigozhin states in the evening that the Atlanticist forces are only controlling 0.6 square km at the southwestern end of Bakhmut. The Russian artillery is now focusing on that tiny area, are showing amateur videos
(Screenshot)
Under the shelling, a Ukrainian serviceman releases a video
(Screenshot)
What I want to say ? Bakhmut has fallen. Just in case, remember us, with a good word
May 20, 2023
At 3:50 pm, local time, one year after another liberation, the surrender in Mariupol of Nazi Azov regiment, Yevgeny Prigozhin announces that the Russian forces have achieved a complete victory in Bakhmut, Donetsk People’s Republic, Donbass, Russia. No Atlanticist fighter remains alive in the city
(Screenshot)
The liberators reached its eastern neighborhoods in August 2022, implemented attrition tactics in order to create there a meat grinder for the Ukrainian cannon fodder. In Washington DC on December 21, Voldodymyr Zelenskyy stated
as like the battle of Saratoga, the fight for Bakhmut will change the trajectory of our war for independence and the freedom
Despite advice from NATO and I guess, his own military staff, he refused to withdraw. Ukraine injected reserves in vain, has lost Bakhmut and likely, a huge number of servicemen.
During the battle, the Ukrainian propaganda and its lackeys within Western media were kidding Wagner PMCs, who were fighting with shovels. Indeed, they were digging manholes close to the defenses, in order to point precise shelling. Their victory is complete, on all grounds
The death toll
A few days later, Yevgeny Prigozhin details the human cost of victory. Wagner has lost 20,000 fighters killed in action. Ukraine has consumed 31 brigades. The Atlanticist military fatalities have been 55,000, including 6,500 foreigners.
The main material evidence is the wreckage of a Tochka-U ballistic missile
The first facts
On April 8, 2022, between 8:45 and 8:50 am UT, at least one missile hits the railway station in Kramatorsk, Donbass, where people are attempting to flee a future battlefield. Footage and photos are soon shared on social networks. Civilians are lying on the ground, dead or injured near their luggage, outside the railway station. According to the Ukrainian authorities, the provisional toll is 39 deceased and 87 wounded victims.
The political and military context
In southeastern Ukraine, the Russian-speaking Donbass region is war torn since 2014, between the Ukrainian forces and separatist ones, Donetsk and Lugansk people’s militias. After months of fighting, Ukraine has regained Kramatorsk on July 5, 2014. For eight years, government after government, Ukraine has refused to build a negotiated peace, has not implemented 2015 Minsk agreements. While the Ukrainian forces were still shelling residential areas in Donetsk and Lugansk, Russia has started on February 24, 2022, a special military operation, in order to secure the two separatist republics, demilitarize and denazify Ukraine.
On April 8, Russian and separatist forces are already besieging and cleansing Mariupol, a port on the Black sea, are also threatening to encircle and annihilate to the northeast the balance of Ukrainian forces in Donbass, where Kramatorsk is still a Ukrainian garrison. As a hub for reinforcements and supply, the city may be a strategic target. Russia has already struck military facilities and troops in whole Ukraine. But a civilian evacuation is scheduled at Kramatorsk railway station in the morning and Russia knows it.
More generally, the Ukrainian forces are contemning Russian-speaking civilians in Donbass and many witnesses in Mariupol are reporting for example that the garrison has used them as human shields
A military situation map in Ukraine on April 8
The Kuwaiti incubators syndrome
At 11:00 am UT, the Ukrainian propaganda machine is working at full steam and once more, most Western media are hysterical, based on Ukrainian information that they are regarding reliable.
According to the mayor at 12:30 pm UT, two children are so far among the 39 dead victims. The New York Times tells us that in a video from the scene, a woman screams, “There are so many corpses, there are children, there are just CHILDREN !” The word is written, intended to boost emotions and anesthetize analysis. The same basic method was used on March 16, when the Ukrainian forces committed a PSYOP in Mariupol.
Previously, on March 14, 2022, a Ukrainian Tochka-U missile targeted a residential area in Donetsk. Fortunately, the air defense managed to shoot it down. Wreckage fell on the city, 23 civilians were killed. Failing that, the toll would have been far higher. On March 16, Italian newspaper La Stampa published on its cover a photo of the shelling aftermath in Donetsk as a picture which would have been taken in Kiev. The wizardry of Western media turned civilian victims of a Ukrainian attack into the result of an alleged Russian strike
La Stampa cover on March 16 is fake news
The crime weapon : a Tochka-U ballistic missile
The first official Ukrainian statements have claimed that the weapon in Kramatorsk was an Iskander ballistic missile. Indeed, Russia is using cruise missiles (Kalibr, Onyx) and one ballistic model, the Iskander, which is in service since 2006.
The first amateur footage and photos are showing a wreckage outside the railway station (cf. title). I have cross checked their authenticity through Ukrainian channels on Telegram. No doubt, the wreckage is real, at Kramatorsk railway station in the morning of April 8.
But this wreckage is undoubtedly from a Tochka-U ballistic missile, without possible confusion with an Iskander. The Tochka dates back to 1976, is a Soviet era weapon. The Ukrainian forces are widely using it, are regularly targeting residential areas in Donbass
A Ukrainian Tochka-U is at left, with its fins, a Russian Iskander is at right
Last but not the least, a text in Russian is painted on the carcass : ДЛЯ ДЕТЕЙ, for the CHILDREN, like an evidence that the Russians would have targeted Kramatorsk railway station with the claimed intention to kill CHILDREN.
Childish.
The Russian statement
At 8:13 am UT, about half an hour before the attack in Kramatorsk, the Russian defense ministry stated
high-precision missiles air-based missiles in Donetsk region have destroyed weapons and military equipment of the Ukrainian military reserves arriving in Donbass at Pokrovsk, Slavyansk and Barvenkovo railway stations
Russia is indeed striking military targets where Ukraine is bringing reinforcements in Donbass. But what would be the reason, maybe one hour after cruise missiles have destroyed weapons and equipment in nearby railway stations, of an attack against civilians who are leaving Kramatorsk, with an antediluvian ballistic one ? That would be a PR nonsense and from a military point of view, the less civilians are in a city, easier is its cleansing
A Russian warship is launching Kalibr cruise missiles in the evening of March 26 (screenshot from an official video)
My expertise
That is appalling. When I watch a so coarse false flag and this ability to slaughter civilians, I am wondering who are the criminals, senior army officers or politicians ?
The woman who was screaming about children, according to the New York Times, may be a female member of the already well known psychological department of the GUR, the Ukrainian military intelligence.
The combination of circumstances is curious. Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European commission, was scheduled the same day in Kiev and Bucha, the site of another Ukrainian PSYOP, late March, early April. The last hope of Volodymyr Zelenskyy is to trigger a Western no-fly zone or the massive direct involvement of NATO. By all means ?