Analista senior di l'intelligenza in u campu di a gestione di i risichi di sicurezza, sò un anzianu tenente detective è ufficiale di l'intelligenza in l'agenzie di u Statu francese. A bona pronuncia hè Николай Чинкуини, in russu
pertinente mais incomplète affiche de la CGT, pour une journée de manifestations à travers la France, contre racisme et xénophobie
Des manifestations contre racisme et xénophobie sont organisées à travers la France le 22 mars 2025, par des partis de gauche, syndicats et associations.
L’affiche de la CGT est pertinente. Nul ne peut sérieusement nier qu’elle expose des personnalités qui s’inscrivent toutes dans la tradition de l’État français, gouvernement fasciste de Philippe Pétain entre 1940 et 1944.
À l’instar d’un Eric Zemmour, d’autres figures de cette affiche sont de confession juive et origines pieds-noirs. Elles n’ont toujours pas digéré la victoire des peuples d’Afrique du Nord sur le colonialisme français et à ces événements historiques, perçoivent sans doute un écho en Palestine, où l’État israélien commet crimes de guerre, crimes de masse et nettoyage ethnique.
L’affiche me paraît cependant incomplète. Un Bruno Retailleau, qui rappelle tant Philippe Henriot, une grande voix française, emploie sa fonction de préposé à l’intérieur à rejouer la guerre de libération de l’Algérie. Ne pas l’avoir représenté est à mon avis une grave injustice.
Emmanuel Macron, enfin, est certes un politicien d’une profonde vacuité, mais il mérite aussi d’y figurer. Il n’est pas raciste ou xénophobe, car ses aversions sont plutôt sociales. Mais quand son action a du sens politique, destruction des bienfaits sociaux de la résistance, répression des mouvements sociaux, tentative de réhabilitation de Philippe Pétain, soutien hystérique à l’Ukraine contre la Russie, il s’inscrit incontestablement dans la tradition pétainiste. À l’intar des ploutocrates européens qui l’emploient, il est épouvanté par l’inéluctable effondrement de l’hégémonie occidentale.
Si personne ne peut vraiment le qualifier d’homme intelligent, il est cependant malin comme un singe, sait comment faire avaler des couleuvres. Son terrain est facile : il flatte la vanité nationale des Français.
Le racisme et la xénophobie sont corollaires du nationalisme. Quant à la capacité de celui-ci à agglomérer petits bourgeois et ce que Karl Marx appelait Lumpenprolétaires, le philosophe allemand Arthur Schoppenhauer (1788-1860) avait déjà énoncé auparavant
La fierté nationale est la forme la moins coûteuse de fierté. Si un homme est fier de sa nation, cela signifie qu’il n’a aucune qualité dont il puisse être fier. Autrement, il ne pourrait pas faire appel à celles qu’il partage avec des millions de ses concitoyens. L’homme qui possède des qualités personnelles importantes ne verra que trop bien dans quels domaines sa propre nation est déficiente, car ses défauts seront constamment sous ses yeux. Mais tout misérable imbécile qui n’a rien dont il puisse être fier, adopte en dernier recours la fierté de la nation à laquelle il appartient ; il est prêt et heureux de défendre bec et ongles tous les défauts et les folies de la nation, se dédommageant ainsi de sa propre infériorité
Le racisme et la xénophobie sont en France une tradition historique, aujourd’hui revigorés par un déclin inéluctable et vertigineux, les politiques néolibérales que dictent des ploutocrates européens.
chronique alphabétique et nécrologique de l’engagement français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas
[my illustration: on September 16, 2012, al Nusra Jihadists attend the funeral in Aleppo countryside, northwestern Syria, of a fellow fighter (Reuters). HTS will be the umpteenth rebranding of al Nusra, the Syrian branch of al Qaeda, which is gathering many foreign Jihadists]
[the uncomfortable convolutions of CNN presstitutes produce the comic effect of this article, because alongside Qatari channel Al Jazeera and most Western mainstream media, its editorial line was supporting since 2011 the radical Sunni uprising against the secular government of Bashar Assad]
A mother and her daughter hunch down by the windows of their attic as armed men gather outside the gate. They try not to make a sound. But in the video that they furtively recorded of this fraught moment, it’s clear they can barely control their panicked breathing.
Earlier that day, on March 7, the patriarch of the Khalil family had assured them that they were not in danger. The forces aligned with Syria’s new Islamist government who had descended on their village of al-Sanobar were only going after people affiliated with the recently toppled dictator [sic] Bashar al-Assad, he reasoned
[my illustration: president Bashar Assad and his wife Asma visit a Christian church in Damascus, on December 20, 2015 (Syrian presidency). Bashar is an Alawite Muslim and Asma is Sunni]
“We haven’t done anything wrong,” his relative recalled him saying as they watched fighters storming their neighbors’ home from their windows. Hours later, she said the patriarch was dead, his lifeless body splayed out on the patio next to his son’s corpse.
A masked fighter filmed himself parading around the ransacked home, singing “ethnic cleansing, ethnic cleansing” and posted the video to his Facebook page for 28,000 followers to see. Family members hiding in the upper floor told CNN they heard the raid, including the executions, unfold.
The killings at the Khalils’ home, recounted through video and survivor testimonies, was one of many similar incidents that played out across Alawite communities in Syria’s coastal region earlier this month.
Mass killings took place in at least 25 areas in western Syria from March 6 to 10
The Syrian Network for Human Rights has identified 25 locations across Latakia, Tartus, Hama and Homs governorates where government forces [HTS Jihadists] and affiliated factions [local auxiliaries of Neo Ottoman Turkey] killed at least 420 people earlier this month. The mass killings occurred in Alawite-majority areas known as strongholds of non-state armed groups [partisans who are resisting against the sectarian policy of the brand new West-friendly jihadist emirate] linked to the former Assad regime [the secular Syrian Arab Republic]
Sources: Syrian Network for Human Rights (locations of killings), CNN (geolocated and verified videos posted on Telegram and X) Graphic: Rachel Wilson and Allegra Goodwin, CNN
A CNN investigation zeroes in on the events in Sanobar, or the “Pine village” in English, a town of several thousand members of Syria’s minority Alawite community in Latakia governorate. The attacks on the village, where swathes of farmland surround small clusters of buildings, reveal fresh details about the intensity of some of the sectarian violence that swept Syria’s coast.
Drawing on interviews with seven survivors, satellite imagery and verified footage from the ground, CNN was able to shed light on the scale of the carnage in the town, where government-aligned forces subjected largely unarmed villagers to summary executions, looting, arson and sectarian slurs, and bodies were piled up in two mass graves.
CNN tallied at least 84 bodies in videos geolocated to the Pine village, which has a population of a few thousand. Locals said they counted over 200 dead – the vast majority of whom were male. The eyewitnesses spoke on condition of anonymity for fear of reprisals.
The attacks against Alawites raise questions about whether interim president Ahmad al-Sharaa [a former Syrian executive of Abu Bakr al Baghdadi’s Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), former jihadist warlord during the Syrian civil war, current dictator of Syria, the leader of HTS and as Muhammad al Julani, a wanted terrorist since 2013] can fulfill his promise to rule Syria in an inclusive way [what did you expect?], ensuring the protection of minorities, and stop any insurgent factions [the resistance] from becoming a serious threat to the country’s prospects for peace [I guess a joke]
[my illustration: on December 6, 2024, CNN publishes its interview (right, screenshot) of 42-year-old Syrian national Ahmed al Shara, nom de guerre Muhammad al Julani, whom the US are however looking for since 2013 as terrorist (left, Rewards for Justice)]People in the Syrian village of Al-Janoudiya attend a funeral procession Saturday, March 8, for four Syrian security force members [HTS Jihadists] who were killed in clashes with loyalists [the resistance] of ousted President Bashar al-Assad [president of the secular Syrian Arab Republic]. Clashes between government security forces and Assad supporters have killed hundreds this month, according to a monitoring group (Omar Albam / AP)
The state [a dictatorship] blamed the mass killings on rogue elements. Al-Sharaa set up a fact-finding committee to investigate [bullshit, these mass killing are part of a deliberate ethnic cleansing strategy] the killings and has vowed to hold the culprits to account.
The attacks targeted the Alawite sect, an offshoot of Shia Islam that the Assad family are members of [Asma Assad, wife of Bashar, is a Sunni Muslim], and which dominated their regime [the secular Syrian Arab Republic] for over half a century until they were ousted [thanks to the support of the West]. Videos reviewed by CNN posted by Sunni Islamist militants loyal to Sharaa’s government called for the “ethnic cleansing” of Alawites.
CNN has reached out to the government for comment on the bloodshed in Pine village [I guess a joke].
‘They called us Alawite dogs’
Human rights watchdog, the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), said more than 800 people were killed in attacks following the ambush. Other rights groups say the number is even higher.
Assad loyalists [partisans who are resisting against the sectarian policy of the brand new West-friendly jihadist emirate] have staged several smaller attacks on government forces [HTS Jihadists] since then, according to authorities.
Survivors said the attacks in Pine village began in the early hours of Friday, March 7, a day after the initial ambush by Assadist loyalists was reported.
Mohamed Khalil, left, is pictured with his son Zain. They were gunned down on March 7. Their bodies appear at the feet of the fighter who filmed himself as he ransacked their home (courtesy Khalil Family)
CNN identified the armed man who filmed himself at the home of the Khalil family by matching his facial details, clothing and build with other photographs and video on his Facebook profile. A cached version of his account shows the video was later deleted. Two survivors, who viewed the footage of him shared on social media, also said he was the same man who was rampaging through their town.
CNN reached out to the man on Facebook but has not received a reply.
In the days that followed, another video surfaced on social media showing him singing, with bodies littered behind him. “We’ve come to you. We’ve come to you with the taste of death.”
CNN was able to verify the location in the video as the entrance to the village using a line of pine trees, utility poles and a curving road, which corresponded to satellite imagery. Residents also identified the bodies of the men pictured in the video.
“The sword of the people of Idlib [the sanctuary for years of HTS Jihadists] wants only you,” he sings, referring to the territory in northern Syria that was ruled by al-Sharaa’s now dissolved Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS), before the forces wrested control from the old regime and became the de-facto government. HTS fighters now compose most of the country’s General Security forces.
In his Facebook profile picture, the fighter is seen in fatigues embroidered with what appears to be HTS insignia. Three military experts said the patch on his shoulder was consistent with several HTS units, but the photograph was too blurry to determine the specific brigade
A fighter parades through the streets of Pine village in a screen grab from a video posted on social media (obtained by CNN)In his Facebook profile picture, the fighter is seen in fatigues embroidered with what appears to be HTS insignia (obtained by CNN)
Another fighter is identifiable in two videos that CNN geolocated to Pine village and are believed to have been filmed over the course of the attack. The bearded man with red hair is seen in the footage taken in the Khalil home and at the entrance of Pine village.
Another clip verified by CNN shows a militant dragging a middle-aged man – identified by local sources as villager Yazan Mostafa – out to his execution, carried by other unidentified fighters.
Eyewitnesses who spoke to CNN detailed the hours leading up to the executions. “They came in (to our home) saying they were looking for remnants of the (Assad) regime, or any armed people,” one woman told CNN on Tuesday, three days after she said her father and two brothers were executed. Images that she shared of the aftermath at the household helped CNN corroborate her account.
“At first, they went to homes and confiscated mobile phones they were able to find… and then they left the village. Then they returned and ransacked our home. Then they left,” she added between tears. “And then a third time, they entered the house and demanded that all the men step outside.”
“My father and my two brothers. My father was a 75-year-old retired teacher… they shot my father in the head… they shot my brother in the heart.”
She said another brother, who was injured by a bullet to the right side of his body, pretended to be dead while he bled out. As night fell, he attempted to escape. According to the woman, the fighters shot him six times as he limped through the fields.
Her mother was sitting in shock and grief between her dead male relatives when, she said, one armed fighter pulled a gun to her head and called her an “‘Alawite dog’”
A destroyed home in Pine village lies in ruin in Latakia, Syria, on March 13 (Khalil Ashawi / Reuters)
Another local woman also told CNN that fighters had entered her home several times before they dragged her husband outside and shot him and several other men in a ditch.
Locals said only a handful of men survived. One man told CNN that he tried to reason with the fighters, ultimately saving his own life, but was unable to stop them from killing his brother who he said they executed.
“I did not run away. I confronted them wisely, and they shot the ground beneath us to intimidate me and my family,” he told CNN. “I opened my house to every faction that asked, and they pointed their guns at my chest more than once.”
“God’s will saved me,” he added. “I begged them to release my brother, but no one listened.”
One woman told CNN she was rescued by a fighter, who she said was from Idlib, who granted her safe passage. “The man who killed my family was from Idlib. The man who saved my life was also from Idlib,” she said.
Collecting the bodies
For nearly three days, corpses littered the streets of Pine village, after villagers said fighters forbade them from collecting their dead, according to three of the locals CNN spoke to. On March 10, armed men oversaw the retrieval of bodies that took place over two days, according to residents
Bodies are laid in a mass grave in Pine village (obtained by CNN)A video verified by CNN shows bodies piled up along the side of the road (obtained by CNN)
Locals said the bodies were piled into mass graves near the village’s Alawite shrine. Some of this was captured in videos and imagery that CNN geolocated to the area, matching it against satellite imagery to verify the date.
A photograph, which CNN determined was taken at the cemetery of the village shrine, captured at least 10 bodies wrapped in shrouds, laid in two narrow graves.
In one video, CNN counted at least 42 shrouded bodies dumped along a roadside, with three more in a shallow grave. Nearby mounds of earth suggested additional burials.
Another verified video showed at least 29 bodies in two shallow graves, where an excavator appeared to be refilling one of them with soil.
CNN could not confirm whether the bodies in the two videos and photograph depict different individuals or the same.
The bodies and graves can also be seen in satellite imagery reviewed and verified by CNN.
Changes to ground in satellite imagery reveal mass graves in al–Sanobar village
Sources: Maxar Technologies (satellite images), CNN (geolocated and verified video) Graphic: Rachel Wilson and Gianluca Mezzofiore, CNN
Aerial images provided by Airbus from March 11 show ground disturbances near the shrine, where CNN identified graves. The imagery also appears to capture bodies covered in shrouds and the excavator seen in one of the videos geolocated to the same site.
Maxar imagery from March 14 also shows evidence of the soil being displaced. Maxar told CNN the approximate dimensions of the excavated and then smoothed-over grave site were 26 meters by 16 meters (about 85 feet by 52 feet).
The villagers said they were still trying to give their loved ones a burial in accordance with Islamic rites.
“Without a doubt, we will give our dead a proper religious burial,” said the survivor whose father and brothers were killed. “But for that we will need to return to the village, and we are too afraid to return” [end]
Secretary of State Marco Rubio is supporting the Uyghur Jihadists
On October 20, 2020, already, through public notice 11252 (billing code 4710-AD-P), Secretary of State Mike Pompeo removed the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Party (ETIP or ETIM or TIP) from the list of terrorist organizations
In the context of their strategy of proxy war against China, US neocons do not baulk at supporting Uyghur Jihadists. One of them, Secretary of State Marco Rubio confirms it on March 14, 2025, under the usual false pretext of human rights
Beijing is pressuring other governments to send Uyghurs and other groups back to China where they will be subject to torture and enforced disappearances. In response, @StateDept will immediately take steps to impose visa restrictions on government officials involved in these forced returns, including the recent instance of 40 Uyghurs from Thailand. Individuals complicit in China’s atrocities will be held accountable
While representatives of that Uyghur radical Sunni movement are currently involved in the slaughter of religious minorities in the West-friendly jihadist emirate in former secular Syria.
Depuis l’allocution d’Emmanuel Macron à propos de la guerre en Ukraine, le 5 mars, les grands médias sont en ordre de marche. Réhabilitation du président en « chef de guerre », patriotisme exacerbé, concert militariste et glorification des industriels de guerre… Mené tambour battant, le SAV du discours présidentiel s’accompagne d’une nouvelle séquence de matraquage patronal contre le « modèle social » et pour « travailler plus » au nom, prétendument, de l’« effort de guerre » : « Pensions ou munitions ? » ; « Les canons ou les allocations ? » Signés Dominique Seux (Les Échos, 10/03) et Étienne Gernelle (RTL, 10/03), les deux slogans donnent le ton
[mon illustration : dessin dans L’Opinion le 6 mars 2025]
Les haut-parleurs médiatiques s’en donnent à plein poumon. « Faire le tri des dépenses budgétaires et sociales au profit de l’impératif militaire », sermonne Nicolas Beytout dans L’Opinion (5/03), dont la Une s’enthousiasme pour « cette rigueur qui vient » : « Concrètement, détaille un second journaliste, il pourrait s’agir de travailler plus longtemps (de quoi torpiller le conclave sur les retraites…), de ne plus indexer les retraites sur l’inflation, de supprimer les dépenses sociales les moins utiles, d’augmenter le taux d’emploi… » Et c’est peu dire que le quotidien entend peser sur les « réformes » envisagées par Emmanuel Macron. « Pas d’échappatoire, il faut réduire les dépenses publiques », prescrit de nouveau Nicolas Beytout deux jours plus tard (7/03), listant les coups de boutoir à imposer « aux collectivités locales et à la sphère sociale » : « âge de la retraite, assurance maladie, chômage, charges sociales, tout devra être questionné. » « Effort de guerre : bientôt la retraite à 70 ans ? », martèle la rédaction, préconisant que la France adopte à cet égard une « Danemark attitude ».
Même tonalité aux Échos (10/03), où Dominique Seux affirme que « travailler plus est le meilleur moyen de financer l’effort nécessaire pour nos armées », tout en suggérant à Emmanuel Macron de se tenir à distance de ce débat – « méthode » oblige –, afin de ne pas offrir « un angle d’attaque trop facile à ses adversaires », lequel risquerait de fragiliser l’impérieux « consensus sur l’effort en faveur des armées. » Saigneur en chef… et conseiller du prince.
Par intérêt bien compris, Le Figaro – propriété du groupe Dassault, fleuron de l’armement français ayant réalisé plus de six milliards d’euros de chiffre d’affaires en 2024 –, ne prend quant à lui aucune pincette dans cette vaste opération de propagande. Tous ses lieutenants sont d’ailleurs sur le pied de guerre. Le 7 mars, Guillaume Tabard et Gaëtan de Capèle parlent d’une seule voix : « Il n’y a pas d’autres solutions que de s’attaquer enfin sérieusement aux dépenses de l’État », écrit le premier, avant que le second enjoigne de « dire la vérité crue, telle qu’elle est, en cessant de tourner autour du pot. La voici : notre sacro-saint modèle social […] ruine consciencieusement le pays et le prive de toute marge de manœuvre financière. » Les discussions syndicales et patronales en cours sur la réforme des retraites imposée au forceps ? « Quel clin d’œil pathétique », se désespère Dupond ; Dupont communie : « Il faut se pincer pour le croire. » Le 9, c’est au tour de l’inénarrable Nicolas Baverez de rédiger modestement le « mode d’emploi » du « réarmement ». Sans surprise, « réorienter […] les dépenses de l’État-providence […] vers la défense » et « renouer avec la croissance, la compétitivité et le plein-emploi » via « la modernisation du pacte social » constituent « la seule solution ». Et ainsi de suite.
« C’est ce comportement collectif de cigale qu’il va falloir payer aujourd’hui »
Dans la matinale de France Info (11/03), face à Manuel Bompard (LFI) qui dénonce une « stratégie du choc » visant à faire accepter des « politiques de régression sociale » la journaliste Salhia Brakhlia joue (très mal) l’ingénue – « Vous pensez à quoi ? » – avant de soutenir mordicus qu’un tel cap « ne vient pas du gouvernement […]. Et ça ne vient pas du président. » Fichtre ! « Face aux défis que soulèvent la menace russe et l’agressivité commerciale américaine, le ministre délégué à l’Europe Benjamin Haddad […] assume de dire aux Français qu’il faudra travailler plus. Assurance chômage, taux d’emploi, retraites par capitalisation… Il faut, selon lui, accélérer les réformes », lisait-on pourtant le même jour dans La Voix du Nord. Et le 6 mars, dans la matinale de RTL, le même ministre déclarait : « Vous ne pouvez pas dire, le mardi : “Il faut continuer à soutenir l’Ukraine, il faut augmenter nos budgets de défense, il faut faire l’autonomie stratégique” et le mercredi, dire […] : “On va revenir à la retraite à 60, 62 ans et on va travailler moins”. […] Quand vous voyez les voisins autour de nous qui travaillent plus, c’est ça aussi qui donne des marges de manœuvre pour pouvoir augmenter nos budgets défense. » Salhia Brakhlia n’a pas bien lu ses fiches 1 …
À sa décharge, il serait injuste de s’écharper sur le suivisme (ou non) des médias dans cette affaire, tant les injonctions à « travailler plus » y sont déclinées sur tous les tons depuis un siècle… en toute « autonomie ». Ainsi, nul besoin qu’Emmanuel Macron dicte aux éditorialistes la ligne à prescrire : homogénéisation libérale oblige, ils le font très bien tous seuls ! Le Monde notamment, qui, par voie d’éditorial, ne résiste pas à « sonner l’heure d’un douloureux réveil budgétaire. […] Le réarmement du pays, bien plus endetté que ses voisins, place l’exécutif dans la situation très délicate d’avoir à remettre à plat les dépenses de l’État, des collectivités locales et de la Sécurité sociale pour trouver des gisements durables d’économies. » (7/03) Ni une ni deux, Françoise Fressoz profite de cette ligne éditoriale officielle pour enfoncer le clou – « le mot “économies” reste […] tabou » –, fustiger « les partenaires sociaux » qui « peinent à prendre la dimension du moment » et, bien sûr, parfaire son opus courtisan : « Depuis sa réélection en 2022, Emmanuel Macron tente, en vain, de convaincre le pays qu’il ne parviendra à préserver son modèle qu’en travaillant plus. » (Le Monde, 12/03)
Au Parisien, c’est François Lenglet qui est appelé en renfort pour dispenser, avec toute la mesure qu’on lui connaît, la leçon de catéchisme – version « revancharde » (9/03) :
François Lenglet :Nous avons affecté les dividendes de la paix à l’État-providence. Son développement a atteint son sommet sous Macron, avec les dispositifs Covid uniques au monde par leur générosité. Avec l’assurance-chômage pour les démissionnaires, les lunettes à zéro euro, le plan Vélo, le pass Culture, le bonus pour faire réparer son grille-pain, les subventions pour faire repriser ses chaussettes… Du délire. C’est ce comportement collectif de cigale qu’il va falloir payer aujourd’hui […]
Inquiète à l’idée de perdre le peloton, La Tribune Dimanche se fend d’un sondage (Ipsos) aux petits oignons, cas d’école du verrouillage du débat public. Interrogés sur les modes de financement du réarmement, les sondés ne disposent que de trois « choix » : « Augmenter le déficit en sortant les dépenses liées au budget de la défense de la règle des 3% » ; « Faire des économies sur d’autres dépenses (éducation, environnement, santé…) » ; « Augmenter le temps de travail ». Et rien d’autre. En guise de deuxième corde au cou – les sondeurs débordent d’idées novatrices pour neutraliser à l’avance d’éventuels désagréments –, Ipsos offre à ses interviewés la possibilité d’approuver ces propositions, de s’y opposer… mais aussi de faire valoir une « approbation de principe car la situation le justifie » ! Vous avez dit « l’opinion, ça se travaille » ? Sauf que patatras ! 49% des sondés sont opposés au sacrifice des services publics (seuls 15% l’approuvent) et 50% n’entendent pas travailler plus (ce à quoi ne consentent que 13% du petit échantillon). Qu’à cela ne tienne pour le directeur de l’hebdomadaire, Bruno Jeudy : « La victoire aime l’effort » titre-t-il son éditorial, dans lequel il affirme que « dans ce contexte qui exacerbe les peurs et les passions, les Français – comme le montre notre sondage – semblent prêts à accepter des sacrifices pour doter notre pays de moyens nécessaires à une augmentation importante du budget militaire et à la garantie d’une paix solide et durable en Ukraine. » Sans doute rattrapé par son inconscient déontologique, il poursuit, un tantinet amer :
Bruno Jeudy :Reste à savoir si, demain, les actionnaires renonceront à une partie de leurs dividendes, les retraités consentiront une désindexation de leur pension sur l’inflation, les jeunes donneront quelques mois pour la réserve militaire, les actifs sacrifieront quelques jours de RTT. On sait bien que, souvent, les exemplaires, ce doit être les autres
Inutile de déplier à l’infini la partition : elle est à l’identique à peu près partout dans la grande presse. Vissée à ses penchants militaires aux accents glucksmaniens, Libération ne peut faire valoir sa « distinction » qu’à travers des filets d’eau tiède. Jonathan Bouchet-Petersen : « En France, si l’augmentation des dépenses militaires devaient abîmer encore un peu plus nos services publics et notre modèle social, ou servir de prétexte à une moindre prise en compte de l’urgence climatique, “l’effet drapeau” dont l’exécutif profite risque d’être de courte durée. » (11/03) Si patronat et gouvernement n’étaient pas déjà KO debout, peu de chance qu’ils survivent à l’uppercut de la directrice adjointe de la rédaction :
Alexandra Schwartzbrod :Le chef de l’État en profiterait-il, au prétexte qu’il faut financer le réarmement du pays, pour étouffer le débat renaissant sur l’opportunité de sa sacro-sainte réforme des retraites et affaiblir le modèle social ? Ce serait dommage. Et un jeu périlleux. L’opinion a peur mais elle sait reconnaître une entourloupe
Espérons qu’elle sache également identifier les faux impertinents. Ainsi, si Libération s’oppose sans ambages à la curée sociale – et le fait savoir, notamment dans son édition du 13 mars où des journalistes dénoncent plus frontalement l’« offensive sur le “si-généreux-modèle-social-français” » et un débat public sous forme de « foire aux idées (de droite) » –, la direction ne cesse de jouer la carte de « la raison ». Pour Alexandra Schwartzbrod en effet (13/03), si le cadrage médiatico-politique est « extrêmement dommage », c’est surtout, au bout du compte, parce qu’il « ne fera pas du bien à une société déjà très clivée » et nuira, par conséquent, à l’impérieux consensus : « Le renforcement de la défense du pays et de l’UE […] se fera d’autant plus facilement qu’il obtiendra l’adhésion du plus grand nombre », avance doctement la co-directrice de Libération, pour mieux camper le rôle d’éditorialiste-prescriptrice : « Les hausses d’impôts […] permettraient, convenablement dosées, de demander un effort aux Français qui en ont les moyens, salariés ou retraités, patrons ou artistes, et aux grandes entreprises. »
« Il faut choisir : se reposer… ou être libre »
Dans un tel climat, il semble pour le moins superflu que le patron du Medef se fatigue à courir les studios de RMC dès potron-minet pour vanter le « modèle danois » de retraite à 70 ans (4/03). L’AFP peut également se dispenser de donner de l’écho aux premières mesquineries patronales venues, parmi lesquelles celles du directeur général de BPI France2, lancées lors de l’interview qui lui fut généreusement accordée dans la matinale de France Culture (5/03). De même, on ne saurait que trop conseiller aux chefferies médiatiques d’économiser leurs experts de référence et autres think tanks de cœur : l’audiovisuel dispose d’abondantes ressources en interne où, partout, l’« appel à la mobilisation » d’Emmanuel Macron a été reçu 5 sur 5
Dans ce concert d’unanimisme, le pouvoir politique sait aussi pouvoir compter sur une caisse de résonance médiatique pour « tester » ses différentes propositions de financement, observer le « bruit » qu’elles engendrent et mesurer leur réception. Quitte à ce que tout et n’importe quoi soit aussi vite périmé qu’écrit ? Le 9 mars par exemple, dans La Tribune dimanche, la journaliste économique Fanny Guinochet fait savoir que « selon nos informations, la préférence de Bercy pour financer les dépenses militaires est de réorienter les fonds du livret A. » Deux jours plus tard (11/03), Le Parisien fait savoir que « le ministère de l’Économie privilégie, selon nos informations, l’assurance vie et l’épargne retraite » avant de lister « les pistes écartées » par Bercy… parmi lesquelles « le livret A, “faiblement compatible” »… De-ci, de-là, en fonction des jours et des humeurs, les grands médias certifient également l’inclinaison du pouvoir pour un « grand emprunt national ». Au rythme où vont les choses, et si tel devait être le cas, ne doutons pas que l’éditocratie saura (nous) mettre la main à la poche. Et, qui sait, mobiliser ses dessinateurs de référence pour raviver, en couleurs cette fois-ci, la propagande du siècle dernier façon Poulbot [fin]
Façon Poulbot ? Pauline Perrenot est bien trop magnanime pour ses confrères bleu horizon, les pressetiués. Ou bien alors, sa connaissance de l’Histoire de France est lacunaire, ignore une période que certes, le mythe national occulte encore. Guerre par procuration, le sang des autres, une aubaine pour la politique réactionnaire du gouvernement, tout est dans cette affiche de l’État français en 1943, pour sauver l’Europe du Bolchevisme
en Anglais, chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia
chronique alphabétique et nécrologique de l’engagement français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas
chronique en Anglais, its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine
La journaliste, qui dédouane également le président de la République, est sans doute passée à côté de la vaste opération de communication qu’orchestrait la PQR il y a moins d’un mois : « Emmanuel Macron prévient les Français qu’ils doivent se préparer à des sacrifices au moment où le Danemark réfléchit à repousser l’âge de la retraite à 70 ans pour financer sa défense », rapportait ainsi Le Progrès (19/02), mais aussi – au mot près – le Dauphiné Libéré (18/02), Le Bien public, Le Journal de Saône et Loire ou encore L’Est Républicain (19/02). Autant de sources que Salhia Brakhlia aurait pu corroborer en lisant sa propre presse locale : « Le Danemark a la cote auprès du pouvoir » (Le Parisien, 20/02). ↩︎
Ce dernier invite notamment à ne « plus accepter de prendre un euro de dette de plus pour financer des dépenses de prestations sociales pures […]. La dette, ça sert à financer les investissements, des canons ou des centrales nucléaires, pas le Doliprane de ma mère ! » ↩︎
The SMO [Special Military Operation] will keep rollin’ on. And as the Europeans want it, to the last Ukrainian
[my illustration: a German prisoner in Stalingrad in January 1943 (Soviet archives)]
Let’s start with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s Road to Damascus moment:
Frankly, it’s a proxy war between nuclear powers, the United States helping Ukraine and Russia, and it needs to come to an end
Now that’s a howler. Jeffrey Sachs to the rescue. Of course, the correct formulation would be “proxy war launched by the United States”. But still: Hallelujah! Such illumination – by proxy – from Heavens Above could never had hit the previous American Secretary of Genocide.
Now cut to panic. Total European panic.
Le Petit Roi, as popular in France as nighttime mosquitoes in a five-star beach resort, has declared that peace in Europe is only possible with a “tamed” Russia – and that Russia is a direct threat to France and Europe.
On Ukraine, he pontificated that peace simply cannot take place under Russian terms or via the – inevitable – Ukrainian surrender.
Le breathless Petit Roi literally went nuclear. He stressed that France possesses a nuclear deterrent – and offered it to the rest of Europe, while insisting that Europe’s future should not be dictated by Moscow or Washington.
Le Petit Roi napoleonically all but declared war on Russia. Well, the fact remains that the overwhelming majority of France would gladly agree that mini-Napoleon should be dispatched to the battlefields in the black soil of Novorossiya right away – where he would surrender in less than 5 minutes, waving a rainbow flag, as he realizes he’s about to be turned into an instant steak tartare.
Now couple this Moliere farce with the fate of the much larger, fatter, pan-European New Model Woke Army regimented by the Fuhrerin SS von der Lugen out of Brussels, allegedly to be financed to the tune of 800 billion euros – money that no one has, and would have to be loaned then repaid with sky-high extorsion interest rates to the usual international financial system vultures.
SS von der Lugen insists Europe is in danger, so the solution is a massive expansion of the military-industrial complex – in practice, buying more overpriced American weapons – and “rearmament”.
Talk about Gotterdammerung on crack.
Were the New Model Woke Army ever come to light, surrender would also be a matter of less than 5 minutes – brandishing rainbow flags – as its woke warriors would face the dire prospect of being Oreshniked to a pile of charcoal grilled burgers.
Add to it the Return of the Nord Stream Saga – with a new plot twist. Sy Hersh conclusively proved that the Nord Streams were bombed under orders of the previous Crash Test Dummy regime in Washington. Now Nord Stream 2, at least, could be back in business via a not-so-secret U.S.-Russia deal involving Gazprom and American oligarchs.
All that while fanatics in Berlin assure right and left they want to explore every possible way to prevent (italics mine) the Nord Stream system from being repaired – because after all no one, especially the new BlackRock chancellor, can deviate from the official policy of destroying the German economy by all means necessary.
Compounding the Kafkaesque scenario, the Prime Minister of Denmark – which is on the brink of losing Greenland “one way or another” to Trump 2.0 – immortalized the words, “peace in Ukraine will be more dangerous than war.” The Polish Prime Minister did not miss a beat, adding that “Europe is stronger than Russia and capable of winning in any military, financial, or economic confrontation.” Europe is in such a “winning” streak now – as the record shows.
All this discombobulated Tower of Babel proves, without a shadow of a doubt, that Europe is geopolitically – and geoeconomically – dead and buried. No Teutonic Gods – complete with fat lady singin’ – will be able to resurrect it.
Flirting with a one-way ticket back to the Stone Age
The notion that Europe is able to pose a military threat to Russia does not even qualify as trashy propaganda for sub-zero IQs. It would take at least a decade to re-militarize Germany as its economy is moribund, serially stabbed by unmanageable energy costs. Russia for its part is protected from a possible nuclear attack by Le Petit Roi’s puny “umbrella” arsenal by the most sophisticated missile defenses in the world.
The Aegis defensive missiles in Poland are relatively worthless – even if their prime danger to Russia remains that the system can be converted to handle offensive missiles. As a whole, the Aegis, Patriot, THAAD-PAC-3, SBIR-HIGH Ground Based Infrared Systems are all relatively useless.
Other than the U.S., NATO simply has no military worth. And Washington under Trump 2.0 simply will not be involved in the next European War.
The U.S. has satellite systems for targeting but no one else in NATO has them. With the U.S. pulling out, and in the event of a hypothetical von der Lugen-led New Woke Army attack against Russia, Russian missiles can knock out all European ports, airports and manufacturing and energy systems in a day max – instantly returning Europe to the stone age.
This applies to England, France, Germany, not to mention assorted chihuahuas: all of NATO. Russia can knock out all British power systems with Zircons launched from a conventional submarine. Stone Age, here we come. Russian hypersonic missiles cannot be intercepted.
Meanwhile, President Putin insists on talking sense to lunatics. At the Collegia of the FSB on February 27, he noted how, “some Western elites are still determined to maintain instability in the world, and these forces will try to disrupt and compromise the dialogue [with the U.S.] that has begun. We see this. We need to take this into account and use all the possibilities of diplomacy and special services to disrupt such attempts.”
As Andrei Martyanov has noted, superpowers have “only two options in the 21st century: either start WWIII which will end with nuclear exchange or find a modus vivendi.” That’s a conversation for adults that automatically excludes the European hospice and the childish tantrums of the cracked actor in Kiev.
The cracked actor never had any (italics mine) cards. He now cuts a pathetic figure, doing somersaults to cling to power, propped by (former) collective West money, weapons and massive propaganda. Now the 404 nation he “created” is losing not only the war but the P.R. war as well.
The former adviser to the head of Zelensky’s office, Oleksiy Arestovych, as slimy as they come, but always with his pulse on reliable info, is convinced that the Ukrainian Army, blind and cross-eyed, can hold out at best for another one and a half to two months without all those American goodies. Without intel data, Kiev’s forces cannot prepare strikes against the Russian federation or conduct reconnaissance and cyber ops.
Country 404 as a whole is now entering Walking Dead territory. Europe, with or without its SS von der Lugen Invincible Armada, does not have the industrial capacity, the financial might, and the military capability to stop the debacle. Russia has already stated that any European “peacekeeping” troops will immediately become legitimate targets.
The spectacular failure of Project Ukraine is a sight to behold. It’s no wonder the current, tawdry, ghastly political “elites” are in total panic. Without Project Ukraine, and without the Mafia protection of His Master’s Voice, they are just, geopolitically, an irrelevant, post-colonial small peninsula on the western borders of fast-integrating Eurasia.
As for Trump 2.0 and the Kremlin already having hit some sort of pre-deal – even before the start of serious negotiations – there’s no evidence yet to corroborate it. According to Russian intel sources, what has been struck is a general agreement on the framework of discussions, and what can be achieved in practice. This initial stage will last at least a few months.
Themes on the table range from lifting sanctions on Russian banks and the use of MIR cards to restoring direct flights and curbing the militarization of the Arctic.
Everything essentially hinges on whether Trump wants – and is able to ensure – a fast endgame in Ukraine while disengaging, slowly but surely, from NATO.
Considering what seems to be his strategic direction, Trump wants to make sure he won’t have to offer Mafia protection to European NATO members if they insist on keep going with their Forever War against Russia. It’s clear that shutting off Starlink and shutting off satellite ISR would lead to a much faster endgame in the battlefield.
The SMO, meanwhile, will keep rollin’ on. And as the Europeans want it, to the last Ukrainian [end]
Until recently, a serious geopolitical working hypothesis was that West Asia and Ukraine were two vectors of the standard Hegemon modus operandi, which is to incite and unleash Forever Wars. Now both wars are united in an Omni-War
Leaked files show top UK military figures conspired to carry out the Kerch bridge bombing, covertly train “Gladio”-style stay-behind forces in Ukraine, and groom the British public for a drop in living standards caused by the proxy war against Russia
President Putin’s plenary session performance (address + Q&A) at the annual Valdai Club meeting in Sochi felt like a high-speed train on cruise control
Interpellés quelques heures après avoir jeté des bouteilles “détonantes” dans les jardins du consulat de Russie, les auteurs présumés, deux chercheurs du CNRS soutenant la cause ukrainienne, ont reconnu les faits
(Philippe Laurenson)
Au matin du lundi 24 février dernier, trois projectiles jetés par-dessus le portail noir du consulat de Russie et le bruit sourd d’une explosion avaient mis sous cloche tout un quartier du 8e arrondissement de Marseille. Tandis qu’un périmètre de sécurité mettait à vif les nerfs des automobilistes empruntant la rue Paradis, le service de déminage, appuyé par les forces de l’ordre et les marins-pompiers de Marseille, opérait dans le calme et la minutie pour neutraliser trois bouteilles en plastique jonchant la cour dallée de l’élégant bâtiment en pierres blondes de l’avenue Ambroise Paré.
Des “bouteilles de soda de 50 cl dont les résidus sont en cours d’analyse” avait précisé la préfecture de police peu avant midi lundi, une fois tout risque écarté, le personnel du consulat déconfiné et le périmètre de sécurité levé.
Interpellés dès lundi soir alors qu’ils participaient à une manifestation de soutien à l’Ukraine sur le Vieux-Port, les deux protagonistes présumés au cœur de l’enquête ouverte en flagrance le jour même pour “dégradation par substances explosives ou incendiaires [article 322-6 du Code pénal, jusqu’à 10 ans], auraient livré dès ce mardi 25 février, la recette de leur cocktail détonant.
Un cocktail d’azote et de substances chimiques
Ces deux hommes, respectivement âgés d’une cinquantaine et d’une quarantaine d’années, auraient non seulement reconnu les faits, expliquant avoir agi pour soutenir la cause ukrainienne, mais aussi détaillé leur modus operandi. Ces deux chercheurs du CNRS (le prestigieux centre national de la recherche scientifique), l’un ingénieur, l’autre chimiste, auraient en effet mis à profit leurs connaissances pour garnir les trois bouteilles en plastique d’un mélange d’azote et de substances chimiques susceptibles de produire un effet “détonant“.
Un cocktail dont ils devront s’expliquer prochainement devant la justice [fin]
chronique alphabétique et nécrologique de l’engagement français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine, ce que les journalistes serviles ne vous raconteront pas
Une crise sans précédent de la culture de classe est en train de se dérouler sous nos yeux. Cette crise emporte aujourd’hui aussi bien la gauche que la droite, si l’on veut absolument en revenir à des repères simplistes. La classe sociale dominante jouit, mais ne pense plus, ne crée plus. Elle n’a plus qu’un chantage à proposer au peuple : en dépit de notre nullité, si nous ne sommes plus là, que vous restera-t-il? Ce n’est pas que des « populismes » aient poussé spontanément pour menacer l’ordre social en faisant peser la menace du chaos et de l’anomie. Ces mythes réactionnaires ne sont que des aveux d’impuissance, et voici pourquoi. Un nouveau grand texte d’Harold Bernat, agrégé de philosophie et collaborateur de « Quartier Populaire », à lire aujourd’hui sur QG
Longtemps la culture de classe, une culture bourgeoise, a fait le travail pour tenir les hommes en respect et créer les conditions d’une humanisation partagée. Nous assistons pourtant, particulièrement en Europe, spécialement en France, à son exténuation. Une révolution culturelle à bas bruit est en train de tout emporter. Aussi bien l’humanisme abstrait issu des Lumières que le romantisme de réaction, à la fois les philosophies bourgeoises de l’arrachement à la nature que les philosophies bourgeoises de la renaturalisation de l’homme dans une histoire, une langue, une culture. En un mot, une crise sans précédent de la culture de classe dans sa fonction pratico-sociale d’institution des sociétés humaines. Cette crise emporte aussi bien la gauche que la droite pour ceux qui aiment les petits repères simplistes. Mes repères seront Kant et De Maistre.
Culture de masse, culture populaire, culture mondaine, culture de cour, culture artistique, culture du génie, culture humaniste, culture romantique, nous parlons toujours d’une culture de classe qui tenait en respect les hommes et les peuples. Culture pourvoyeuse de sens, de significations imaginaires, d’un ordre socialisé. Tordons d’abord le cou à une croyance naïve qui consiste à penser qu’il existe une culture populaire spontanée et autonome qui ne serait pas une culture de classe ou que cette culture populaire serait écrasée, inhibée, par une culture de masse tombée du ciel de l’industrie culturelle elle-même produite par une classe dominante. Il n’y a pas et il n’y aura jamais de culture spontanée qui émanerait de la terre qui ne ment pas ou de l’esprit d’un peuple spontanément disponible pour une transcription littérale. Comme si la culture n’exigeait aucune maîtrise, aucun travail, aucune exigence, aucune verticalité. La culture serait, dans sa généalogie populaire, d’ailleurs largement mythifiée par la réaction à l’humanisme abstrait, une force disponible depuis le bas. Elle pousserait en continu, fond obscur localisé géographiquement et historiquement mais impensable rationnellement. Ce mythe feint d’oublier que la culture procède toujours du haut vers le bas, elle est descendante.
Arnold Hauser a pu établir, en 1974, dans un excellent livre intitulé Fondements de la sociologie de l’art, qu’aucune forme d’art n’était réellement collective et d’emblée socialisée. Il en va de même de la création culturelle. Chaque forme culturelle particulière prend sa source dans une création individuelle qui se déploie ensuite dans une communauté qui peut se l’approprier a posteriori. La faire sienne. Ce n’est pas parce que l’auteur d’une chanson populaire est anonyme qu’il n’est pas issu d’une classe sociale lettrée. Hauser explique par exemple que le « genre épique populaire » était le fait d’érudits. Il en va de même pour les idylles du Moyen-âge ou les recueils de proverbes dits « populaires ». Comme le rappelle Juan José Sebreli dans La modernité assiégée, Critique du relativisme culturel (Delga, 2020), cette compréhension de classe a prévalu dans toutes les cultures. « La sculpture africaine – tant vantée par les populistes – fut anonyme et là aussi non spontanée ; les sculpteurs noirs appartenaient à des castes consacrées au métier. » Seul le regard colonialiste sur ces œuvres a pu y voir l’expression d’un primitivisme spontanéiste. La plupart de ces œuvres étaient d’ailleurs contemporaines des collectionneurs parisiens, surréalistes, marchands d’art, amateurs alors qu’ils y voyaient l’expression naïve et innocente d’une humanité disparue. Méprise d’une classe qui ne peut pas reconnaître chez l’autre la même logique de classe sans se juger elle-même. Effet miroir pour mieux se persuader qu’il est toujours possible de saisir la culture à son état natif, originaire, primitif. La mauvaise conscience bourgeoise fantasme l’altérité pour s’oublier elle-même. Elle rencontre en réalité d’autres hiérarchies, d’autres verticalités. Une autre culture de classe. Illusion ethnocentrique et incompréhension de la logique de classe de la création culturelle. En d’autres termes, la culture, celle qui donne un sens à nos vies humaines, celle qui structure nos existences, « populaire » ou « élitiste », celle dont on ne peut pas se passer sous peine de dépérir, procède toujours du haut vers le bas. La culture est descendante. Ce n’est ni un mal, ni un bien mais un fait anthropologique. La question est donc de savoir ce qui descend encore quand la classe dominante est culturellement exténuée.
La compréhension de ce fait anthropologique fondamental est essentielle pour saisir la crise de la culture de classe qui est en train de déployer toutes ses conséquences politiques en Europe. Lorsque nous parlons des Lumières, de l’universalisme, d’humanisme ou de la réaction aux Lumières, de romantisme, de particularismes culturels, nous nous situons toujours dans une culture de classe descendante. Kant et De Maistre étaient des bourgeois et leur représentation du monde une représentation de classe. Cela ne veut pas dire qu’ils pensaient mal. Le premier envisage l’homme dans sa capacité originaire à s’arracher à tout particularisme culturel pour signifier son humanité, le second ne pense l’humanité que dans son attachement à des particularités culturelles. Fer de lance de la réaction en France à la fin du XVIIIe siècle, ce dernier écrit, dans ses Considérations sur la France en 1796 : « J’ai vu, dans ma vie des Français, des Italiens, des Russes etc. Je sais même grâce à Montesquieu qu’on peut être Persan mais quant à l’homme, je déclare ne jamais l’avoir rencontré de ma vie ; s’il existe, c’est bien à mon, insu. » Les deux présupposent une culture qui puisse faire sens pour l’homme en tant qu’homme (Kant) ou l’homme en tant que Français, Italien, Russe, pour de Maistre. Tous deux produisent des représentations culturelles extrêmement sophistiquées de l’homme. Ils œuvrent pour donner un sens à la vie humaine. Il est évidemment possible de défendre l’héritage des Lumières et l’humanisme abstrait contre la réaction et l’humanité située, voire de composer dialectiquement avec les deux, ce qu’essaiera de faire Hannah Arendt dans La crise de la culture mais dans les deux cas nous avons affaire à une classe sociale qui n’est pas indifférente culturellement à l’édification d’un sens pour l’homme, une classe sociale bourgeoise qui fait de la question de l’homme une nécessité pour elle, une classe qui œuvre.
Il ne faut pas regretter ce fait social mais partir de lui pour comprendre que l’effondrement anthropologique dont nous parlons aujourd’hui et exclusivement l’effondrement des capacités de la classe dominante, bourgeoise en l’occurrence, à produire encore des individualités capables de créer une culture susceptible d’organiser nos significations sociales, de leur donner un sens. La classe sociale dominante est désoeuvrée. Elle jouit mais ne pense plus, ne crée plus rien. Ce n’est pas que sa parole ne soit plus entendue comme elle cherche pourtant à nous le faire croire. Ce n’est pas non plus que des « populismes » soient sortis spontanément du siècle pour menacer l’ordre social en faisant peser la menace du chaos et de l’anomie. Ces mythes réactionnaires, car ce sont des mythes en réaction d’une impuissance propre, ne sont pas destinés aux peuples qu’ils semblent viser. Ce sont autant d’aveux d’impuissance. « Ne pouvant plus faire descendre une quelconque culture du haut vers le bas, étant incapables de signifier quoi que ce soi, étant engagés dans un survivalisme indifférents aux domaines de l’homme, nous ne pouvons que nous défier brutalement de ce qui nous menace. » Voilà ce qui devrait être énoncé par cette classe qui n’assume plus son rôle, pire, qui en est intellectuellement incapable. En France, elle a cherché à promouvoir une imposture en « président philosophe ». Elle sent en effet confusément que les références qui ont pu lui donner la légitimité d’une domination indiscutable lui échappent désormais. Elle recycle par conséquent les signifiés des Lumières, de la philosophie mais il n’y a plus rien derrière. Le néant. Tout un appareil médiatique est alors nécessaire pour promouvoir ce simulacre dans le temps, le faire tenir. Mais cela ne tient pas, cela ne tient plus. Le « président philosophe » n’était qu’une gidouille grotesque.
Il faut bien comprendre que la bourgeoisie de connivence, nous parlons d’elle, n’a plus que des dadais incultes à offrir en spectacle pour armée de réserve. Elle n’a plus les ressources intellectuelles de sa prétention sociale à la domination. Elle n’est plus capable de gagner, par sa force culturelle propre, sa légitimité politique et sociale. Ne lui reste que la brutalité. Cette impuissance manifeste est évidemment la raison première d’une surenchère défensive de la part de bourgeois culturellement stériles. Cette brutalité est un symptôme. Il s’agit même du symptôme le plus manifeste d’une classe qui a perdu toute vocation à gouverner.
Le phénomène premier est l’effondrement sidérant des classes dominantes. Culturellement, elles sont aujourd’hui incapables de faire ce qu’elles ont toujours fait : organiser la vie humaine en créant des significations imaginaires fécondes pour le plus grand nombre. Leur stérilité stérilise du haut vers le bas. Avec une haine farouche et une méticulosité d’experts, les classes sociales supérieures au pouvoir – ce mot en devient ridicule tant la misère spirituelle y est profonde et la corruption d’une bassesse odieuse – se sont évertuées depuis des années, des décennies, à détruire les espaces, les lieux, les supports qui rendaient possible la compréhension d’un problème qui nous concerne tous : sommes-nous encore capables de signifier ce qui nous arrive ? Avec Kant, De Maistre, Arendt, à ta guise. En guise d’économies justement, proposition vient d’être faite de fermer l’Université de Bordeaux-Montaigne, une semaine en mars 2025. Nous en sommes-là, en France. Cet exemple vaudra pour la myriade de destructions qui prend aujourd’hui le doux nom de progressisme. Il se trouve que le macronisme, cette bouillie salement managériale et prédatrice du commun, cornaquée sans direction par des drogués d’eux-mêmes, n’a fait qu’accélérer la tendance. Ces agents spécialisés du vide demandent encore, dans une fuite en avant qui signe leur démence, un surcroît d’accélération dans le vide. Au nom de l’Europe, de la paix ou des jeux olympiques, allez savoir. La devise Shadoks est appliquée à la lettre : « quand on ne sait pas où l’on va, autant y aller le plus vite possible ». Si au moins ces turbo-zombies proposaient comme chemin à suivre une pataphysique joyeusement désespérée, il y aurait encore quelque chose à penser. La stérilité de cette classe donneuse de leçons la rend pourtant incapable en tout.
Entendons-nous bien. Il y a toujours eu et il y aura toujours des contradictions humaines et ce n’est pas à une classe qui vit aussi des contradictions sociales qu’elle exploite de les régler. Il y aura toujours malfaçon et l’existence de l’homme est de part en part tragique. La condition humaine est ainsi faite. Mais cette malfaçon doit pouvoir se dire, s’exposer, se penser. Toujours. Elle doit pouvoir, d’une époque à l’autre, ajuster ses institutions en fonction des représentations que l’homme se donne à lui-même. Avant d’accuser le « populisme » d’un tel, ou le « complotisme » d’un autre, avant de décider de ne pas penser, il est toujours préférable de se demander pourquoi le bas se défie à ce point du haut. Mieux encore, reste-t-il un haut ? Pour quelles raisons en sommes-nous là, à ce point de brutalité ? Pourquoi des hommes se retrouvent éborgnés alors qu’ils demandent à être reconnus en tant que citoyens ? Il y a bien adresse, demande, attente. Mais la réponse apportée par cette nouvelle classe du vide, culturellement stérile, ne vaut plus rien. Un monologue narcissique, un grand débat autour du nombril président, un pignolage, un néant. Ce n’est pas que les hommes ne l’entendent pas, c’est que la réponse n’est plus une parole. Elle ne fait plus sens, il n’y a donc rien à entendre. C’est un bruit de classe, un bruit de bouche, un bruit de bottes. Il ne s’agit plus de faire droit mais d’imposer son droit, dans le vide, sans justification. « Ordre, ordre, ordre ». Ordre d’un droit qui n’est plus que ordre.
Alors que faire ? Accepter cette révolution à bas bruits qui est en train de nous emporter vers un autre horizon. Nous situer déjà après elle, la dépasser. Pour reprendre le mot de Pasolini dans Les lettres luthériennes en 1975, « les mutations anthropologiques sont irréversibles ». Les mutations du capitalisme ont profondément transformé les classes dominantes et par conséquent les formes culturelles qu’elles ont pu produire. Il n’y aura pas de retour en arrière. Lorsque nous témoignons du vide brutal et de la bêtise obscène de ce qui est supposé occuper le haut de la stratification sociale, nous n’avons aucun espoir d’un changement de la part de ceux que l’on vise. La nullité des dadais de la bourgeoisie incestueuse n’a pas à être corrigée. Elle est fatale. Ce serait d’ailleurs se méprendre sur nos intentions réelles. Il s’agit plutôt d’intérioriser le constat de cette nullité historique, inédite, tout en faisant valoir, face à elle, ce qui est vital pour nous. Oui, cela surprendra les plus nihilistes et les plus résignés, les plus drogués et les plus faux, nous avons encore des exigences à faire valoir en face du vide et de la nullité. Peut-être avons-nous à apprendre à ne plus frémir devant ce vide de significations venu d’en haut. Nous avons encore du chemin à faire de ce côté-là. Comme si, habitués depuis trop longtemps à recueillir une culture produite par d’autres, nous n’arrivions pas vraiment à mesurer à quel point nous avons encore à expérimenter ce vide, à le parcourir, à le signifier, pour nous.
« En dépit de notre nullité manifeste, si nous ne sommes plus là, que vous restera-t-il ? » Tel serait le chantage warholien ultime de cette classe désoeuvrée. Ce chantage ne tient que par notre manque de force pour nous nommer, pour être nous-mêmes les dépositaires des signes susceptibles de nous signifier. C’est aussi ce qu’on appelle encore une culture de classe. La nôtre […]
Je ne consulte la presse bleu horizon que d’un cul distrait et c’est sur les réseaux sociaux que j’apprends qu’aux dernières nouvelles, les pinzuti, ou une grande partie d’entre eux, se sentent submergés
parmi les plus vains et vaniteux, les Français étaient naturellement les plus à même de démontrer de façon éclatante que l’Occident en déclin accéléré n’est plus en capacité à prétendre à une quelconque universalité
After President Donald Trump’s executive order suspending all US foreign aid programs, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) has again come under intense scrutiny
This renewed attention casts a spotlight on USAID’s history of fomenting unrest and orchestrating “regime change” worldwide since it was established in 1961 by President John F. Kennedy.
On January 21, on his first day back in office, Trump signed the order—among many others—to freeze funding for US foreign assistance for a 90-day review period to determine whether these programs align with his “America First” foreign policies.
On January 25, the US State Department ordered a sweeping freeze on new funding for almost all US foreign assistance, exempting emergency food programs and military aid to Israel and Egypt.
In fiscal year 2023, the US has disbursed $72 billion in assistance—approximately 1 percent of its budget—supporting programs in 204 countries and regions. These initiatives purportedly span various sectors, including disaster relief, health, and so-called pro-democracy endeavors.
USAID, the agency responsible for implementing much of the US foreign aid program, is significantly impacted by Trump’s order. The directive effectively halts the agency’s current $42.8 billion budget allocated for global operations.
Last week, reports revealed that many senior USAID officials were affected by furloughs, dismissals, and disciplinary leaves, amid an investigation into attempts to circumvent the executive order.
In addition, several hundred Washington-based contractors and others around the world were laid off. On Saturday, the USAID website went offline. The agency’s computer servers were carted away.
Trump administration has vowed to strip USAID of its independence as a government agency and place it under the State Department’s control, not to save taxpayer money but to spend it the way he deems fit, according to observers, including on the Tel Aviv regime and its lobbies.
Although it remains unclear whether the president possesses the legal authority to bypass Congress and order USAID’s merger into the State Department, Secretary of State Marco Rubio told reporters on Monday that he has been named acting director of USAID.
On Monday, Trump stated that he doesn’t need Congress to scrap the agency. “Not when it comes to fraud. If there’s fraud, these people are lunatics,” Trump said.
Billionaire tech mogul Elon Musk, who was appointed as head of the Department of Government Efficiency last month, said on Monday that Trump agreed the USAID needs to be “shut down.”
“With regards to the USAID stuff, I went over it with (the president) in detail and he agreed that we should shut it down,” Musk said in an X Spaces conversation.
On the same day a group of Senate and House Democrats, who are opposed to Trump’s efforts to shut down the agency, were blocked from entering the headquarters of the USAID.
On Thursday, the Trump administration said it will keep 611 essential workers onboard at USAID out of a worldwide workforce that totals more than 10,000.
Following a lawsuit by unions representing the USAID, US District Judge Carl Nichols on Friday temporarily allowed roughly 2,700 USAID employees put on leave by Trump’s administration to go back to work, pausing aspects of the plan to dismantle the agency
Protesters gather outside of USAID headquarters on February 3, 2025 in Washington, DC, to protest the Trump administration’s move to dismantle America’s aid agency. (Photo via AFP)
‘Arm of regime change’
According to observers, there is a dark side to US-provided foreign aid, particularly involving USAID.
Over the years, activists have frequently exposed the exploitation of USAID by successive US governments to push their nefarious agendas abroad. In numerous instances, the agency has served as a cover for US “regime change” plots in many countries, from Cuba to Syria to Venezuela.
Afshin Rattansi, British journalist and author, underscored that USAID functions as “an arm of regime change and subversion,” infiltrating societies in the Global South and inciting unrest against leaders who either refuse to comply with Washington’s economic or do not align with US foreign policy.
“Millions in the global south will celebrate the end of this organization which created fake neoliberal revolutions for hire, to destroy real revolutionary movements and governments,” Rattansi wrote in a post on X, formerly Twitter, on Sunday.
Furthermore, some activists perceived the move to suspend USAID funding as a direct affront to the interests of the “Deep State” to influence policy and pursue its own agendas.
Independent journalist and documentary filmmaker James Li expressed this view on X.
“The Trump admin is moving to shut down USAID. And the deep state is furious. Why? Because USAID isn’t really a ‘humanitarian aid agency’ — it’s a covert intelligence arm funding coups, protests & regime change,” he stated.
USAID’s program in Cuba to foment rebellion
As early as October 2009, a project overseen by USAID involved sending young people from Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Peru to Cuba under the guise of health and civic programs, with the covert intention of inciting rebellion.
The travelers worked undercover, often posing as tourists, and traveled around the island scouting for people they could turn into political activists, an Associated Press investigation revealed in 2014.
In one instance, the workers organized an HIV-prevention workshop, which internal memos obtained by the AP described as “the perfect excuse” to further the program’s hidden political objectives.
USAID also created a fake Cuban Twitter platform, ZunZuneo, aiming to attract young users and gradually expose them to anti-government content to provoke protests
Students gather behind a business looking for an internet signal for their smartphones in Havana. (Photo by AP)
However, the programs operated under USAID, which used its international aid work to cover its stealthy operations, didn’t appear to achieve their goals.
The traveler’s program was launched when newly inaugurated President Barack Obama’s administration was talking about a “new beginning” with Cuba.
USAID’s regime changes against Chavez, Maduro
The USAID was known for funneling millions of dollars to opposition groups in efforts to overthrow Venezuelan presidents Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro from 2002 to the present.
In 2002, the US sponsored a failed coup attempt against democratically-elected president Chavez, who was making major investments in social programs for Venezuelans while defying US demands.
Although the George Bush administration attempted to distance itself from the coup, it promptly endorsed the government under businessman Pedro Carmona.
However, the coup was dramatically reversed after 48 hours when Chavez’s supporters flooded the streets, demanding his return
President Hugo Chavez holds up a copy of the Venezuelan constitution at a rally with supporters in Caracas shortly after the 2002 coup attempt. (Photo by AP)
In 2013, WikiLeaks released a 2006 State Department cable outlining the Bush administration’s strategy to undermine Chavez by supporting so-called “pro-democracy” groups.
The cable, signed by then-Ambassador William Brownfield in August 2004, described a five-point strategy including “penetrating Chavez’s political base,” “dividing Chavismo,” “protecting vital US business” and “isolating Chavez internationally.”
Those goals were to be obtained by strengthening “democratic institutions,” according to the cable.
Brownfield wrote that USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID/OTI) played a crucial role in this effort, saying that strengthening democratic institutions “represents the majority of USAID/OTI work in Venezuela.”
“Organized civil society is an increasingly important pillar of democracy, one where President Chavez has not yet been able to assert full control.”
American lawyer, writer, and journalist Eva Golinger noted that after failing to oust Chávez, USAID/OTI reoriented its funding, increased its budget and began focusing on crafting an opposition “youth movement” using new technologies like Twitter, Facebook, and other internet media to build an international campaign against the Venezuelan president.
“From 2006 to 2010, more than 34 percent of USAID’s budget—which neared $15 million per year—was used to fund university programs, workshops, and other events to aid youth in building an anti-Chávez movement,” Golinger said.
By 2010, external funding for West-backed opposition groups in Venezuela reportedly exceeded $57 million, primarily from USAID and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED)
Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro flashes victory hand signs at supporters during a pro-government rally, in Caracas, Venezuela, Saturday, Aug. 17, 2024. (Photo by AP)
On Wednesday, Diosdado Cabello, the first vice president of Venezuela’s United Socialist Party (PSUV) said that several opposition leaders were involved in corruption scandals linked to the USAID.
Cabello said that Juan Guaidó, Leopoldo López, and Carlos Vecchio, were involved in a scheme to misuse funds designated for humanitarian aid in an attempt to overthrow President Maduro.
Cabello said that these leaders received substantial sums of money from USAID, with Guaidó receiving over $300 million, Vecchio around $160 million, and López $700 million.
According to Cabello, these funds were used to finance a “regime change” operation instead of providing aid or assistance to the Venezuelan people.
USAID and the 2014 Ukraine coup
Former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych was illegitimately removed from office in a Western-backed coup in February 2014 in a plot engineered under the USAID program, according to observers.
The coup was triggered by the Euromaidan or the Maidan Uprising, a wave of demonstrations and civil unrest in Ukraine, which began on November 21, 2013, with large protests in Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) in Kiev.
The protests were sparked by Yanukovych’s decision not to sign the European Union–Ukraine Association Agreement, instead choosing closer ties to Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union.
Documents suggest that before the Euromaidan, the USAID and NED provided significant funding to opposition groups and media in Ukraine.
These reports have been confirmed by several US public figures, including former presidential candidate Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., filmmaker Oliver Stone, and defense expert from the Cato Institute, Ted Galen Carpenter.
In an interview with journalist Tucker Carlson, Kennedy Jr., who is now the Health Secretary, said the CIA, operating through USAID, spent $5 billion to instigate the 2014 color revolution in Ukraine.
“There are riots in Ukraine called Maidan, but we are not told that we are funding these riots. The newspapers never told us, our government never told us that USAID, which is a front for the CIA, has invested five billion dollars in funding these riots,” Kennedy Jr. said
He added that these actions were carried out under the pretense of defending freedom and democracy in the country that has been embroiled in a devastating war for more than two years
Caption: Anti-government protests in Kiev, Ukraine in December 2013.
A leaked conversation between Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland and US Ambassador Geoffrey Pyatt in February 2014 further indicated US involvement in aiding the Ukrainian opposition.
The audio clip exposed Nuland, weighing in on the makeup of the next Ukrainian government.
Nuland was heard telling US Ambassador Geoffrey Pyatt that she doesn’t think Vitaly Klitschko, the boxer-turned-politician who is a main opposition leader, should be in a new government.
The exchange validated suspicions of US involvement in shaping Ukraine’s political transition, intensifying debates about Western intervention in the country’s internal affairs.
Bolivia expels USAID
In 2013, Bolivian President Evo Morales kicked out the USAID for seeking to “conspire against” the Bolivian people and his government.
According to Morales, USAID programs had “political rather than social” ends and were “manipulating” and “using” union leaders.
Reports indicate that USAID was funding separatist movements in Bolivia’s richest provinces.
According to USAID’s Bolivia website, the agency operated there since 1964 claiming to carry out health, sustainable development, and environmental programs.
The agency stated that its 2011 budget for Bolivia amounted to $26.7
USAID’s overthrow of Haiti’s leader
USAID has also been implicated in the 1991 overthrow of Haiti’s democratically elected leader Jean-Bertrand Aristide.
Evidence suggests that USAID backed opposition groups and death squads in the country, contributing to the destabilization of Aristide’s government and ultimately leading to his ouster.
This involvement came to light following the coup, as it was revealed that USAID funds and resources had been used to support anti-Aristide groups, providing them with the means to undermine the government and sow discord
The 1991 coup led to the overthrow of Haiti’s democratically elected leader Jean-Bertrand Aristide.
These actions have been widely condemned as a blatant interference in Haiti’s internal affairs, disregarding the country’s democratic processes and sovereignty.
The aftermath of Aristide’s removal saw Haiti plunge into political turmoil and violence, as various factions vied for power.
This instability lasted for years, having long-lasting effects on the Haitian people and their prospects for a more prosperous future.
USAID a front for ‘counterinsurgency operations’ in Afghanistan
During the United States’ occupation of Afghanistan from 2001 to 2021, the USAID was reported to be “a front for counterinsurgency operations” while consolidating the occupation.
Aid workers mapped communities in the South Asian country, collected intelligence, and helped identify Taliban sympathizers for US drone strikes, reports said.
In the 2010 report “Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan,” authored by Major General Michael T. Flynn and others, the authors highlighted the need for improved intelligence operations in Afghanistan.
They emphasized the importance of understanding local socio-economic dynamics and suggested that information gathered by various entities, including aid groups, could be valuable for military operations
The aftermath of a US drone strike in the Afghan capital, Kabul, in August 2021, which killed 10 people, including seven children.
Throughout the two decades of US military occupation in Afghanistan, thousands of civilians were killed in US drone strikes, and the perpetrators were never held accountable.
While the military has occasionally acknowledged responsibility for incidents involving airstrikes or ground raids that led to civilian casualties, no one was brought to justice.
US-backed coup in Chile
On September 11, 1973, Chile’s democratic process suffered a severe blow when Salvador Allende, South America’s first democratically elected president, was violently overthrown in a bloody coup led by General Augusto Pinochet.
The United States primarily backed this coup, as according to analysts, Allende was perceived as a threat to the capitalist interests Washington sought to preserve in the region
La Moneda employees are forced to lay down on the sidewalk next to the building after being arrested by the military who took over the building on September 11, 1973. (Photo by AP)
In the lead-up to the CIA-backed coup, USAID served as a channel for the spy agency to funnel millions of dollars into media campaigns and opposition groups that targeted Allende.
This effort to undermine Allende’s presidency set the stage for the impending military takeover.
Shortly before the September 1973 coup, Chile encountered bread shortages and requested credit from the United States to purchase 300,000 tons of wheat. The Richard Nixon administration denied this request, exacerbating economic turmoil and providing a pretext for the coup.
Less than a month after the coup, on October 5, 1973, the Nixon administration extended $24.5 million in wheat credits to the Chilean Junta, which had seized power.
In September 1974, President Gerald Ford defended the US role in the coup, asserting that it was “in the best interest of the people in Chile and certainly in our own best interests.”
In 2011, the Chilean government acknowledged that more than 40,000 people had been murdered, disappeared, or tortured by the Pinochet dictatorship.
USAID caught engineering a coup in Slovakia
USAID, NED, and other NGOs have invested millions of dollars in Slovakia to manufacture protests, destabilize the government, and in favor of a pro-Western regime change.
They have been caught funding Slovakian NGOs under the pretense of promoting “civil society” and “democracy promotion.”
Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico has so far successfully countered attempts by foreign entities to destabilize his government. Fico maintains that the anti-government protests, which began last year, have been orchestrated by external forces.
On Friday, Fico identified the Georgian National Legion, a military group associated with Ukraine’s war against Russia, as coordinating with the plotters.
Reports suggest that up to one-third of the protesters are Ukrainian and other foreign nationals.
Ukrainian media outlets are openly supporting the protests, with Kiev-linked organizations actively coordinating unrest. Western embassies have also been openly collaborating with opposition groups, a tactic reminiscent of previous color revolutions.
On January 24, Slovakia’s General Health Insurance Company was hit by a cyberattack. Fico described the incident as a “textbook example” of pressure exerted on governments resisting Ukrainian and Western demands
Slovakia’s Prime Minister bundled into car after being shot in May 2024.
As Fico moved to limit NGO influence and deport foreign agents last May, a pro-Western assassin with connections to foreign-funded groups attempted to assassinate him.
USAID funneled billions into Syria to topple Assad
The USAID-backed regime change operation in Syria is considered one of the most extensive operations of the 21st century, ultimately leading to the overthrow of President Bashar al-Assad in 2024 by militant groups backed by the West and its regional allies.
For over a decade, USAID, NED, and Western-backed NGOs played a central role in the foreign-instigated Syrian war, by financing opposition groups, crafting propaganda, and conducting intelligence operations under the guise of “humanitarian aid,” as reported by DD Geopolitics.
USAID reportedly channeled more than $15 billion into the Arab country, covertly funding militant groups, mercenaries, opposition networks and various anti-government activities.
One key group funded by USAID was the White Helmets, which was later exposed for its collaboration with the al-Qaeda terrorist group and the fabrication of propaganda videos to justify US intervention.
Additionally, USAID provided logistical support to exiled opposition groups, assisting in the creation of a US-backed shadow government in the Arab country.
President Assad’s government consistently pushed back against these foreign-backed attempts at destabilization. In 2014, Syria expelled several USAID-backed NGOs owing to their financial ties to insurgents.
Two years later, the government exposed the collaboration between the USAID-funded White Helmets and various militant groups.
Despite these efforts to push back against external interference, the US and its allies relentlessly pursued their objective to oust Assad.
“NGOs are being used to destabilize Syria. They pretend to help, but in reality, they work for foreign intelligence services,” Assad said in 2018.
USAID spends $600 million on anti-Russian media
An X account with the handle @MyLordBobeo shared a passage, from a book or academic article, discussing US foreign policy concerning Russia and Venezuela and highlighting USAID’s role.
The text focuses on political interventions and funding related to opposition efforts against the Venezuelan and Russian governments.
The excerpt discussed the involvement of USAID in Venezuela, specifically highlighting its support for opposition leader Juan Guaidó in efforts to overthrow President Maduro.
It stated that in 2019, USAID signed an agreement with Guaidó, providing $98 million in assistance.
“In order to overthrow Venezuelan President Maduro and open up Venezuela and its oil reserves to US corporations, USAID signed an agreement with the US-backed opposition leader Guaidó in October 2019, according to which USAID will support Guaidó in his efforts to take power in Venezuela with 98 million dollars,” read the text, originally written in German.
Additionally, the text references USAID’s budget allocation for “free media” to counter Russian influence, amounting to $598 million for 2020.
“And because Russia does not want to hand over its oil to US corporations either, USAID has received a budget of 598 million dollars for 2020 alone to pay for “free media” that report anti-Russian and pro-Americans,” it added
A text that appears to be from a book or an academic article discusses US foreign policy, particularly in relation to Russia and Venezuela and the role of USAID.
The citations to the Reuters and AP at the end suggest it might be part of a larger discussion on US influence in global politics, referencing specific news articles for support.
Leaked doctrine on the use of USAID in economic warfare
A leaked US Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) doctrine exposed the extent to which the US USES economic instruments, including USAID programs, as part of its unconventional warfare (UW) strategies.
The document sheds light on the orchestrated interplay between various governmental entities, including the Army Special Operations Forces, the Department of State (DOS), the Intelligence Community (IC), the Department of Commerce (DOC), and USAID.
According to the document, ARSOF is authorized to employ “measured and focused economic incentives and disincentives” across multiple levels to influence the behavior of “adversaries, allies, and surrogates.”
Such economic maneuvers are executed under the guise of a carefully crafted and integrated unconventional warfare plan, it said.
It highlights the need for ARSOF to work closely with the Department of State and the intelligence community to identify vulnerable groups in a targeted area and predict the potential outcomes of applying economic pressure
Leaked US Special Forces doctrine on use of USAID in economic warfare
USAID’s presence in foreign countries and its mission to engage with local populations provides an opportunity for the US to exert economic influence, it added.
Similarly, it said, the Department of Commerce can use its connections with American companies operating overseas to further strategic objectives.
The passage also underlines the significance of Information Operations (IO) in managing public perception of US unconventional warfare efforts. This includes anticipating and shaping the narrative around economic promises made (or unfulfilled) to maintain legitimacy.
The leaked document offers an unprecedented glimpse into the US government’s orchestration of various agencies and resources, particularly USAID, to engage in economic warfare as a means to advance strategic objectives.
This revelation raises critical questions about the covert use of humanitarian aid and development programs for ulterior political ends.
“As clearly illustrated, USAID pretends to be about ‘democracy’ and ‘helping’ the world,” wrote journalist James Li in a post on X.
“But in reality, it was always a covert tool of U.S. power — a front for CIA-backed regime change, election meddling, and civil destabilization disguised as ‘humanitarian aid,’” he added.
El Salvador’s President Nayib Bukele has also said that cutting USAID funding would not only benefit the United States but also other countries around the world.
He added that while USAID is marketed as a supporter of development, democracy, and human rights, a significant portion of its funds are channeled into opposition groups, politically motivated NGOs, and destabilizing movements.
“Most governments don’t want USAID funds flowing into their countries because they understand where much of that money actually ends up,” Bukele wrote in a post on X on Sunday.
“At best, maybe 10% of the money reaches real projects that help people in need (there are such cases), but the rest is used to fuel dissent, finance protests, and undermine administrations that refuse to align with the globalist agenda,” he added [end]
that new law is addressing a fact: in the context of war, Ukraine is a platform for organ trafficking
(Brendan Smialowski / AFP)
On February 6, 2025, Volodymyr Zelenskyy signs a new law, that the parliament passed in January, which is banning the removal of organs for transplantation from fallen soldiers and victims of armed aggression.
The Western propaganda is denying organ trafficking in Ukraine
The trafficking of organs from killed Ukrainian service members is a well known issue, that even Ukrainian journalists have documented. Because these information are dehumanizing Ukrainians to damage their public support in the West, Western propaganda media are usually slamming them as disinformation. On January 24, in an article which regarded its readers as fools, Voice of America described the Ukrainian legal arsenal as a shield which would be preventing the issue, while the last law is rather addressing the reality of organ trafficking. Of course, that criminal activity is not official, but corrupt service members and medical professionals are conducting it, with complicity of corrupt civil servants, at all hierarchical levels. Here is the translation in English of my report, on October 5, 2024, while a Polish company was transporting biomaterial between the war zone and Warsaw.
The carnage in Ukraine is a great opportunity for organ trafficking
In Ukraine and other parts of the world, the trade in human organs is a lucrative cross-border activity, usually illegal when conducted outside national medical systems. The demand for organs is greater than supply and the buyer can pay, for example, up to $160,000 for a kidney. 10% of kidney transplants in the world are currently based on trafficking. Donors are most often people in poverty, who consent to the removal while they are still alive. This is not the only pattern.
In July 2024, the Ukrainian press reported on a judicial investigation which was targeting a dozen doctors for fraud with the electronic system for registering and selling places in the transplant queue, illegal removal of anatomical materials from people who are in a helpless state. One of the suspects was Mykhailo Zagreychuk, former deputy minister of health. A Ukrainian page is offering since July 31 an excellent summary of the case. The characters are the gruesome representatives of a Ukrainian society and State that corruption is ravaging. Journalists are assuming ramifications as far as a clinic in the United Kingdom. The official investigation seems to have stalled now. No one has been formally jailed in pretrial detention or charged. Zagreychuk is free to move
A family business: Mykhailo Zagreychuk’s sister-in-law, Dr. Tatiana Enright, is owner in Cambridge of Hardwick Clinic, where Zagreychuk’s son is also working (Hardwick Clinic). In matter of transplantation, as you can imagine, Cambridge is counting more recipients than donors
In August, as part of my usual work on French involvement in the Atlanticist ranks in Ukraine, I noted incidentally that suspected by Russian justice, for well-established facts in a criminal case of another kind, French volunteer Maxime Barrat, in a very clumsy defense, complained on social networks of having been victim in 2023 of the rumor of his involvement in trafficking organs from killed comrades. Which I was unaware of.
Nothing conclusive so far, but through experience, I know how opportunities are making thugs when regulation of the scoundrel is deficient. There is much money at stake, the opportunity of appreciable additional incomes for a wide range of actors: the corrupt military who is supplying the corpses, the corrupt doctor who is removing organs, the steering body which is organizing collect, packaging and transport of a finished product, the local official who is turning a blind eye, the carrier who is delivering to the final medical structure.
In order to add another brick to the bastion and confirm my suspicions, I have requested the assistance of confidential but reliable sources, who tell me and prove that in August 2024, despite public indictment in July of Mykhailo Zagreychuk, the private sector is still daring to recruit staff for dubious jobs in Ukraine. What can be the added value of a courier driver when he is paid up to €6,500, eighteen times the average Ukrainian monthly salary?
Respect of the most absolute confidentiality over the transport between war zone and Warsaw, Poland, of suitably packaged biomaterial, by the courier driver who is also bearing all documents necessary for crossing borders and other checkpoints
Fragment of an employment contract, the entirety of which is in my possession, written in English and Ukrainian. I am also owning the video of a job interview
The company is Polish Sabinex LLC, whose main activity is direct sales. The recruitment campaign is conducted in Sumy region, rear base of the offensive that Ukraine started on August 6 in Kursk Russian region. Who can experience a more characteristic state of helplessness than the fighter freshly killed in Kursk region?
The video
Here is an extract from the video recording of an application interview of my human source by a courier recruiter for the transport of biomaterial from the Ukrainian war zone to Warsaw
For investigation guidance, in October 2024, I forwarded the complete video to the Russian Military-Civil Administration in Kharkov Region, which released later that extract on October 31.
Ingo Schmidt on how the triumph of liberal democracy and neoliberal globalization became the ideological seed for the AfD
Co-leader of the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party and the party’s candidate for chancellor, Alice Weidel, features on the cover of a 2023 edition of Stern magazine (conceptphoto.info)
On November 6, 2024 German Chancellor Olaf Scholz fired Finance Minister Christian Lindner. Notwithstanding the broad agreement on policy goals, striking a balance between deficit reduction, support for renewable energy and increased arms spending turned out to be impossible. Lindner, a liberal, opted for social cuts; Scholz, a social democrat, wants to avoid them. They had to part ways. After Scholz lost a no-confidence vote, federal elections were scheduled for February 23, 2025. The question that worries everyone from old-school conservatives to new millennium lefties is: How many votes will go to the hard right (if not neo-Nazi) party Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland or AfD). In the last federal elections in 2021, the AfD got 10.4 percent of the total vote. Current polls put them at 20 percent, but nobody knows what will happen on election day. In this new age of uncertainty, polls don’t predict election results as reliably as in the past.
Elections in the East German provinces Brandenburg, Saxony and Thuringia have already shown what hard-right success looks like. They also reveal the inability of the political centre to understand how much it contributed to the rise of a new right. Refashioning totalitarianism theory in the New Cold War climate, centrist politicians and pundits typically portray the success of the new right as the outgrowth of the Nazi and Communist dictatorships that ruled East Germany from 1933 to 1990. West Germany, which was spared Communist rule and, allegedly, shook off the burden of its Nazi past, appears as a role model in this democracy-versus-dictatorship story. Totalitarianism theory could possibly explain why the AfD is more successful, so far at least, in East than in West Germany. But it can’t explain right-wing success in other countries, like France, that were never under Communist rule and know Nazi rule only from occupation, which strengthened anti-fascist traditions in those countries. But even these traditions couldn’t stop the rise of the new right there.
This article offers a different explanation for the hard-right surge in Germany. It shows that German unification in 1990, signalling the triumph of liberal democracy and the onset of neoliberal globalization, unleashed a new form of nationalism—Deutschmark nationalism—which, after mutating into export nationalism for a while, became the ideological seed for the AfD. West Germany, or, more precisely, the economic miracle that was West Germany in the post-war era, served as a role model during German unification. Promoted by West German elites and eagerly embraced by people in East Germany, it raised the expectation of a new economic miracle materializing in the West and extending to the East. However, these hopes were soon disappointed as political unification caused socioeconomic divisions between East and West Germany and, in the early 2000s, a turn to austerity policies that were highly unpopular in the East and the West. Just when it seemed that Germany would weather the world economic crisis of 2008-9 better than other Western countries, and maybe even become the European hegemon, things started falling apart. The Euro-crisis made clear that it was not only politically united Germany that was plagued by massive socioeconomic and geographical divisions but the European Union, too. Continued economic weakness combined with New Cold War marching orders from Washington fed a nostalgia for a supposedly great past—symbolized by the Deutschmark. This nostalgia, I argue, would not have taken root if the left had been able to channel growing discontent into mobilization for a more equitable and less insecure future.
State elections in Brandenburg, Saxony, and Thuringia
State elections don’t typically get international media attention. The September 1, 2024, elections in Thuringia and Saxony did. After all, it was the first time since the downfall of the Nazi-regime that a hard-right party, the AfD, pulled the majority of votes in a German election. It proved a bitter coincidence: The AfD celebrated their victory in Thuringia, obtaining 32.8 percent of the total vote, on the 85th anniversary of the Nazi-invasion of Poland that marked the beginning of the Second World War.
The Conservative Christian Democrats (the Christlich-Demokratische Union or CDU) came in second with 23.6 percent. The parties of the federal government coalition, Social Democrats (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands or SPD), Greens (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) and Liberals (Freie Demokratische Partei or FDP) ended up with single-digit results, the FDP reduced to a mere 1.1 percent. At the time of the election, this was the party of the federal minister of finance. The Left Party (Die Linke), which in the previous election had become the strongest party for the first time in any German state, lost almost 18 percent and came in fourth, even trailing the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht or BSW), a breakaway group from the Left Party.
In Saxony, the AfD won 30.6 percent of the votes, just behind the CDU’s 31.9 percent. As in Thuringia, none of the parties of the federal government coalition achieved double-digit results. The Left Party lost more than half of its vote and ended up with a devastating 4.5 percent. The BSW came in a distant third with 11.8 percent.
Just three weeks after their election victories in Thuringia and Saxony, the AfD scored another success in Brandenburg. Narrowly beaten by the SPD that got 30.9 percent of the total vote, the AfD came in second with 29.2 percent, way ahead of the BSW’s 13.1 percent and the CDU’s 12.1 percent. The Left Party and the Greens obtained less than five percent of the vote, which is the minimum threshold for holding seats in provincial or federal parliament under the mixed-member proportional electoral system. The FDP pulled less than one percent.
Mainstream media fails to explain right-wing success
Barely beaten by the Conservatives in Saxony and the Social Democrats in Brandenburg, the AfD was elected by roughly a third of the electorate in three East German states, becoming the strongest party only in Thuringia. If ever there was a right-wing surge, this was it. Most media reports attributed the phenomenon to widespread dissatisfaction with the federal government, particularly regarding migration, climate policies and the war in Ukraine. Accounts of why the AfD is more popular in the East (approval ratings in the west of Germany range from 8.5 percent in Hamburg and the Saarland to 21 percent in Lower Saxony) focus mostly on disappointments caused by German unification, continuing socioeconomic disparities and a widespread feeling among erstwhile East Germans of being second class citizens. Other explanations invoke the authoritarian heritage of communist rule in East Germany, which is often presented as an extension of the Nazi-regime. Against the two dictatorships in the East, West Germany is presented as a role model of liberal democracy. This as if there hadn’t been considerable continuity between Third Reich and West German elites; as if East Germany’s ruling bureaucracy, despite all its dictatorial wrongs, wasn’t established by antifascists who had been exiled or jailed during the Nazi reign; as if the nationalization of the means of production, despite the wrongs of bureaucratic rule, had not marked a break from the West German capitalism that made West Germany a junior partner in the American Empire; as if West German capitalism had not dictated the terms of unification at the very time that a grassroots movement for democracy unsettled bureaucratic rule in East Germany. The destruction of the East German economy and the integration of the East into existing West German institutions left no room for the aspirations of East Germany’s civil rights movement. Rather than explaining growing support for the new right, media talk about the “peculiarities of the East” reinforces existing frustrations there—frustrations that help shed light on the relative strength, so far at least, of the right-wing surge in the East.
The ‘two-dictatorships’ thesis that pits the East against the liberal democratic West revives the totalitarianism theory that was an integral part of the anti-communist, anti-Soviet consensus during the Cold War. It is now part of the New Cold War ideology that counterposes democracy and authoritarianism. As in the old Cold War, charges of totalitarianism serve to short circuit thinking about alternative economic and political systems, reinforcing the neoliberal creed that there is no alternative to capitalism. The lack of actually existing alternatives is, of course, also one of the reasons for the rise of the new right. Emerging out of an ailing neoliberalism, this right-wing force presents itself as an alternative to the status quo but actually just recasts neoliberalism in a nationalist and racist mould. Replacing neoliberalism’s earlier commitment to corporate globalization in Germany, as elsewhere, neoliberalism is haunted by the spectre of fascism, which, to centrist neoliberals, has everything to do with misled masses unable to understand the virtues of capitalist liberal democracy and nothing to do with capitalist crises that undermine the legitimacy of liberal democracy. Neoliberalism is also haunted by the spectre of communism as ruling classes worry that crisis of legitimacy could extend to capitalism itself. As the neoliberal centre denies the possibility of alternatives and the left generally (not only the Left Party in Germany) appears unable to advance real world alternatives, the growing appetite for change, spurred by recurrent crises wrought by capitalism, settles for right-wing fantasies of a harmonious life in a nation that competes successfully with other countries economically and is freed from job- and welfare-stealing migrants.
The impact of German unification and the rise and decline of neoliberal globalization
Capitalist crises and their exploitation by the right are common phenomena, certainly in the imperialist centres of the world system, but also in the peripheries. But they play out differently in different national contexts. Behind the AfD’s electoral successes in Thuringia and Saxony as well as its broader surge in popularity lie the combined histories of German unification and the rise and decline of neoliberal globalization. The upsurge of the new right is just one of the outcomes of these combined histories. Equally important is the defeat of the federal government coalition and the rout of the FDP, whose leader, former federal Minister of Finance Christian Lindner, promotes austerity policies that stymie government plans to subsidize the transition to non-fossil energies. These policies also lead to a creeping roll-back of social spending—except when it comes to arms spending. Little wonder a government that took office on the promise of something like a Green New Deal lost its credibility almost entirely and called for a federal election scheduled for February 23 of this year.
And then there is the defeat of the Left Party that, despite programmatic commitments to progressive alternatives, is widely seen as the appendage of a lame-duck government in Berlin. At the other end of the political spectrum, the AfD is widely perceived as an oppositional force, even though its program blends austerity, nationalism and militarism in ways that are more extreme but qualitatively not much different from policies advanced by the CDU and the FDP.
In the face of electoral defeat, the federal government, which embraced the US’s New Cold War policies a few weeks after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, also introduced dramatically tougher migration policies. Rather than representing any kind of alternative, as its name purports, the AfD is the black sheep of the establishment family, expressing racist views more radically and bluntly than even the Conservatives. While the Social Democrats, Liberals and Greens are intent on denying such views, they reveal themselves as Western supremacists when it comes to fending off so-called authoritarian threats arising from Russia and China, stirring up longstanding fears in the West that ‘the Russians are coming’ or that ‘Asian hordes’ augur “the decline of the West,” in the words of right-wing intellectual Oswald Spengler.
The hypocrisy of the Greens, who advocate a green transition while supporting the purchase of dirty oil and gas (wherever they can get it ever since the Russian invasion of Ukraine ended Russian gas-flows to Germany), make them a prime target of AfD agitation. But in reality the AfD and the Greens share the fear of Western decline. The AfD engage in fearmongering around the replacement of white people by non-white immigrants and accuse the Greens and their coalition partners in the federal government of accelerating Western decline. But while the Greens may be the prime target of the AfD’s culture war, the truth is that despite significant differences in tone, the Greens and the AfD share a basic consensus on the decline of the West.
AfD success in the east: history holds the key
Encouraged by Glasnost in the Soviet Union, many East Germans took to the streets in the fall of 1989. Under the banner “We Are the People” they demanded democratic reforms of East Germany. Neither unification with West Germany nor a return to a capitalist economy was on their agenda—at least not initially. As protests grew, and especially after the ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED) had opened the border to the West, “We Are the People” was replaced by “We Are One People” more and more often. It was supplemented by the slogan “Germany, United Fatherland,” which is actually a quote from East Germany’s national anthem, written by the communist poet Johannes R. Becher in 1949, at a time when the leaders of the SED still thought a united Germany could be achieved—not necessarily socialist but not aligned on either the US or the Soviet Union. Such hopes were buried by the Cold War, for which the Berlin Wall became a symbol, casting a dark shadow over communist East Germany and allowing capitalist West Germany to present itself as a beacon of freedom. It was in a matter of weeks in the winter of 1989-90 that the abstract possibility became a demand, massively fanned by West German politicians—notably then chancellor Helmut Kohl—and mainstream media, which hinted at the possibility of East Germany adopting the West German Deutschmark. Many East Germans seized on such hints as an irresistible offer. “If the D-Mark comes, we’ll stay here; if it doesn’t come, we’ll go to it” became the next popular protest slogan. Since the opening of the border, thousands of East Germans had gone to the West, creating conditions reminiscent of the times before the wall was built in 1961. Back then, the East German economy lost so many people, most of them young and well-trained, that a collapse of social reproduction became a real threat. The wall stopped the bleeding of the East German economy but inflicted irreparable damage on the legitimacy of the political system.
Almost 30 years later, the opening of the border by the SED-leadership came as a bit of a surprise to West German elites. Yet, they were quick to grasp the possibilities it created. To them, this meant the integration of East Germany into the West German political and economic system, not coexistence with a somehow reformed but still politically independent East Germany. The ‘take over the East’ goal of West German elites and the Deutschmark rush of East German masses fed each other. The civil rights movement that wanted to democratize East Germany was sidelined. Some of the groups active in that movement adjusted to the new zeitgeist quickly, some even entered into an electoral alliance with the East German conservative party, despite their having criticized it as a small but integral part of the SED-regime. Angela Merkel, who would later become chancellor, belonged to one of these East German groups that allied with other conservative-turned-civil-rights groups and the East German CDU. This Alliance for Germany easily won the last East German elections and negotiated the integration of East Germany into West Germany’s institutional structures. On July 1, 1990, the Deutschmark came to the East, three months later the independent state of East Germany vanished into an enlarged West Germany. Most of the Alliance for Germany dissolved into the West German CDU immediately after unification. In December this enlarged CDU won federal elections.
In less than a year the Cold War had come to an end and an entire state had disappeared. However, the hopes pinned on unification, notably the introduction of the Deutschmark, were soon dashed. A year after unification, unemployment, which had existed in communist East Germany primarily in a hidden form, stood at 10.2 percent and rose to over 20 percent in the early 2000s. It didn’t fall below 10 percent until 2014, a quarter of a century after the Berlin Wall fell. Moreover, mass migration from East to West Germany, which the introduction of the Deutschmark was meant to curb, actually accelerated after the arrival of the Deutschmark. From 1990 to 2015, East Germany lost significantly more than one million people, the vast majority during the first two years after unification, and almost all of them of working age. Were it not for this emigration as well as early retirement schemes and retraining schemes for thousands of workers, unemployment in the East would have been even higher than it actually was. Introducing a new form of hidden unemployment, many of the participants in retraining were enrolled in one course after another, often in different fields, until they were old enough for early retirement.
One of the main, if not the main, reasons for the collapse of the East German economy was the Deutschmark. Introduced at a rate of one Mark West for one Mark East, while average productivity of East Germany was estimated to be about a quarter that of West Germany, German monetary union gave private households the boost in purchasing power they so desired. But it made East German firms uncompetitive. Lower wages could not compensate productivity differentials between firms in East Germany and Western countries. The privatization of East Germany’s state-owned firms facilitated the downfall of the East German economy even further. In some cases, Western companies bought East German firms just to shut them down so that they would not become competitors in the future. In other cases, they wanted patents or certain segments of production that they could integrate into their own supply-chains, leaving everything else to be shut down. The closures and cherry-picking of some more desirable segments destroyed the reproduction process of the East German economy even beyond the damage done by rendering it uncompetitive through monetary union.
The result was that bits and pieces of the East German economy became a periphery of production networks controlled by West German corporations. Ironically, the neoliberal restructuring of production processes went hand in hand with massive fiscal transfers from West to East Germany. A price that had to be paid to sustain some level of social cohesion while disappointment that political unification was followed by economic decline and continued social divisions between East and West instead of an Eastern economic miracle following the example of West Germany from the late 1950s to the early 1970s. At some point, a third of East German incomes came from fiscal transfers. As a result, government debt as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) rose from 41.8 percent in 1989 to 61.2 percent in 1999, which is nothing compared to today’s numbers. Yet, back then the lesson that had yet to be learned is that neoliberalism, despite its balanced-budget rhetoric, really is a mix of austerity and tax cuts for the rich that produces increasing debt levels at every slowdown or downturn of the economy. In the 1990s, government debt over 60 percent of GDP was a scandal. Not least because, at the urging of the conservative German government, 60 percent had become the benchmark for membership in the European monetary union, for which the roadmap had been laid out in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty.
Budget deficits, accumulating into government debt, weren’t the only deficit scandal in 1990s Germany. The other was in the current account. From a surplus of 4.6 percent in 1989, the current account dropped to a –1.9 percent deficit in 1991 and remained in deficit territory until 2001. In most other countries, deficits between negative one and negative two percent wouldn’t be a matter of concern. In Germany they were. After all, West German prosperity—the very model East Germans admired so much—had been reliant on export-driven growth, which was always understood as export surpluses. As it turned out, unification in the early 1990s, led to a boom in West Germany as East Germans spent many of their newly acquired Deutschmarks on consumer goods ‘Made in (West) Germany’—despite massive job losses. This boom drove prices up and made German exports less competitive on the world market. At the same time, some of the money from the East German spending spree went to foreign companies. As exports took a hit and imports got a boost, the current account went from positive to negative.
The East was integrated into the West German political system as it existed prior to unification. The Kohl government didn’t agree to any changes suggested by the East German government that formally negotiated unification but really rubberstamped the subordination of East German society to West German institutions. Economic integration was different though. The collapse of the East German economy, triggered by the design of monetary union and privatizations, had a lasting impact on the West German economic model that East Germans had been eager to embrace. The first decade after unification was marked by a twin deficit in government budgets and current accounts. During the unification boom from 1990 to 1993, inflation went up to levels not seen since the oil-price hikes and inflationary struggles between capital and labour from the 1970s to the early 1980s. At that time, however, the West German inflation rate was still below that of other Western countries, whereas in the early 1990s it was amongst the highest
Germany’s continued economic weakness, combined with New Cold War marching orders from Washington, fed a nostalgia for a supposedly great past—symbolized by the Deutschmark
West Germany as a role model
Running continued deficits—let alone a twin deficit—was unthinkable in a country that rebuilt its economy after the Second World War through integration into a world market with rules established and enforced by the US. In this American Empire, West Germany played the role of bulwark against Soviet Communism, including East Germany, and as a showcase of Western capitalism. To succeed in this role, foreign debt, accumulated by the Nazis and inherited by West Germany as legal successor of the Third Reich, was forgiven through the 1953 London Debt Agreement. West Germany also inherited low wages, industrial capacity and new technologies from the Nazi economy that, contrary to widespread assumptions, survived the war largely intact. This gave West German industries a competitive advantage that was further buttressed by favourable exchange rates on which basis West Germany was admitted to the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates in 1952. Reintegration into the world market also allowed West Germany to transition from a coal-based to an oil-based economy. Oil was cheaper than coal but its supplies were controlled by US companies and the American state.
However, being a junior partner in the American Empire turned out to be a much better deal for the German bourgeoisie than its earlier quests for world power. The territory under its direct control was much smaller after two failed power grabs but profits were stellar. Driven by exports, or export surpluses more precisely, the West German economy didn’t require fiscal stimulus and kept growing until the US turned to floating exchange rates, which led to a significant appreciation of the Deutschmark. Further, oil prices exploded in the 1970s. But it was during these turbulences that West Germany consolidated its reputation as a beacon of economic stability. Political management of the crisis, notably codetermination (German lingo for the institutionalized cooperation between unions and employer association), kept wages and inflation lower than in most other Western countries. This helped to sustain export surpluses for much of the 1970s. In turn, export surpluses allowed the government to keep fiscal stimulus and unemployment rates low. Again, this is compared to other Western countries, not compared to the post-war boom.
West Germany’s relative success in managing the economic crises of the 1970s raised some concerns among its allies, who considered this success a case of beggar-thy-neighbour policies. The US pressured the West German government to increase public spending in order to stimulate the world economy. The West German government couldn’t shrug off these US demands entirely. The social democratic party was led by Helmut Schmidt at the time, and some extra spending also appeased the left wing in his own party as well as some unionists. However, calls for a Keynesian fix of the economic crises never overcame the general preference for fiscal prudence and low inflation that marked West German society after two lost wars, each followed by the introduction of a new currency, one of them also by unprecedented hyperinflation. Not entirely without reason, export success after the Second World War was widely attributed to liberal economic principles, conveniently ignoring the fact that this ‘liberalism in one country’ could only work because other economies placed growing demand on the world market.
Export success also created an ersatz-identity that allowed West Germans to repress the horrors of the Nazi regime and the roles most of them had played in these horrors, as perpetrators or bystanders. Social democrats never really fit into this picture. Willy Brandt, who spent the Nazi reign in underground resistance circles and exile and would later become West Germany’s first social democratic chancellor, was seen by many as a traitor. His successor Helmut Schmidt, who had served in the Nazi air force, opposed many of Brandt’s plans for social reform and applied Keynesian policies only in homeopathic doses. He was successfully branded as the one responsible for rising unemployment and inflation by the Conservatives and Liberals. Crossing the floor from SPD to CDU, the Liberals made Helmut Kohl chancellor. Kohl won two elections before unification on the promise of bringing post-war prosperity back. He won another two after unification on the promise of bringing the prosperity to East Germany.
For a long time, Kohl presented himself successfully as the defender of the West German export model and guarantor of the collective identity tied to that model, despite the fact that 1980s West Germany never saw a return to postwar prosperity. Disappointment with his broken promises for a West German economic miracle 2.0 began spreading towards the end of the 1980s. Yet, the disintegration of the SED regime allowed him to renew and extend his promises to the East. The national euphoria that secured his 1990 election victory also saw a transformation of collective identity. West German pride in being export world champion turned into Deutschmark nationalism. Widely shared in the East, where people were happy to get the Deutschmark, and the West, where people saw it as symbol of their postwar achievements, this was not the pure money, or currency, fetishism Karl Marx wrote about in Capital. It had a distinctive nationalist character that was subdued in West Germany’s pre-unification export-identity. With unification, the nationalist seed blossomed. Not only did this help Kohl become the ‘chancellor of unity,’ but it also gave cover to a burst of neo-Nazi attacks on immigrants, leftists and queer people, culminating in arson attacks in Rostock, Mölln and Solingen. The latter two killed eight people, while the attack in Rostock laid a four-day siege on an apartment block inhabited by foreign workers who had been employed in East Germany’s now defunct state-owned economy. The openly neo-Nazi attacks of the early 1990s, later dubbed “baseball bat years,” were followed by a series of murders committed by the National Socialist Underground (NSU) that cost nine immigrants and one cop their lives from 2000 to 2007. The role of the German secret service in covering up, or even facilitating, these murders has never been investigated as key documents remain classified until this day. Hans-Georg Maaßen, head of the secret service from 2012 to 2018, was one of the individuals responsible for blocking investigations of the NSU-murders. He also heads up an ultra-conservative circle, initially inside the CDU and now operating in the right-wing space between the CDU und the AfD.
Exports über alles: Eastern peripheries boost corporate profits
During unification and in the first few years afterwards, nationalism was a mass ideology. It rallied flag-waving masses in the streets, it dominated German politics and inspired Nazi-skinheads to chase people they considered enemies. As it became clear that the hopes for an economic miracle 2.0 would not be realized, street protests receded, most skinheads scaled down their activism and just a few turned to clandestine terrorist attacks. It seemed that nationalism had lost the force it had just recently. However, the entanglements between Nazis and parts of the state apparatuses indicate that while nationalism wasn’t as visible as before, it had not disappeared.
As it turned out, the opening of the Berlin Wall was a key step towards what would later be called neoliberal globalization. As the German bourgeoisie sought its place in a world seemingly governed by the invisible hand of the market—not Soviet planners or the milder version of Western government intervention—nationalism also found a new role as mass ideology. The ideological wind blowing from the ‘real West,’ that is, the United States, rebranded free trade theory going back to the days of David Ricardo as globalization. Sticking closely to Ricardo’s principles, academic globalists argued that firms, if left alone by the state, would specialize in the production of those goods they can produce more cheaply than firms in another country either because they possess more productive technologies or use input factors more plentiful and cheap than in another country. All countries will be better off if firms in each country specialize according to their comparative advantages.
Globalization practitioners talked about entire countries as if they were firms competing against each other. Competitiveness of nation-states became the lodestar of capitalists, and their political executors, who used it to justify the roll-back of wages and social standards in all countries. Their run-the-country-like-a-business propaganda was so persuasive that even working class people whose wages, pensions and public services were cut fell for it in large numbers, electing and re-electing neoliberal globalizers over and over again. At the same time, fear that the policies just voted for would cause a race to the bottom spread in the rich countries that saw parts of their production outsourced to poor countries, where labour was really cheap, while immigrants from such countries would take on jobs in the burgeoning low-wage sectors of the rich countries. Migration, segmented labour markets and a global reserve army of labour, enabling capitalists to engage in global labour arbitrage, were neither part of academic globalization theory nor did they feature in politicians’ globalization propaganda. Absent from public debate, these real-life factors created fears that a new right could build on by portraying economic problems as questions of national identity. Translated into policy terms, that meant a program of keeping immigrants out and capital in. This protectionist backlash against neoliberal globalization, coupled with the rise of a new right ranging from populist to neo-Nazi formations, occurred all over the Global North. It began slowly in the late 1990s and early 2000s while globalization was still expanding, and then gathered steam in the wake of the 2008-9 world financial crisis that marked the end of accumulation driven by globalization. It has accelerated again since the COVID-19 recession as well as the escalating great power politics vis-à-vis Russia and China, which have led to openly imperialist policies couched in the same nationalist ideology which the new right thrives on. The competitive nation-as-corporation ideology and the policies that marked actually unfolding globalization was the breeding ground for today’s strange bedfellowship of globalizers-turned-great-power-warriors and national supremacists of the new right. Theories of unregulated free trade opening the path towards global prosperity were just an ideological tool that was useful as long the integration of more and more countries into the US-dominated world market fuelled capitalist accumulation, and thereby hopes for the eventual trickle-down. It was replaced with the rhetoric of concern for national security and democracy as accumulation ended in a new phase of stagnation.
The German bourgeoisie had already adopted the logic of the state as business competitor after the Second World War when it traded world power ambitions for a junior partner role in the American Empire. Balanced budgets and tight money formed the core of its policies. That, along with competitive advantages inherited from the Nazis or granted by the US, enabled export-driven growth and, ultimately, export surpluses. Despite verbal commitments to liberalism, these policies were mercantilist in substance. Shattered but not derailed by the crises of the 1970s, West Germany’s mercantilist regime of accumulation survived until unification led to a twin deficit, slow growth and socioeconomic divisions between East and West. Unified Germany’s economy stumbled along while the US enjoyed its New Economy boom, even though that turned out to be short-lived, and China attained unprecedented levels of economic growth.
The Kohl government didn’t respond to the bourgeoisie’s growing concerns about economic stagnation in Germany. Neither did it respond to growing dissatisfaction with social conditions among the popular classes. After uniting Germany, Kohl turned to further uniting Europe. Partly, he wanted to demonstrate Germany’s continued commitment to cooperation in the European Union as some European leaders—notably British Prime Minister Thatcher and French President François Mitterrand—had expressed reservations about German unification and worried about a return of German great power ambitions. European monetary union became Kohl’s preferred route to an “ever closer union,” as EU-parlance had it at the time. However, regarding other countries, notably in the Mediterranean, Kohl successfully pushed for tight fiscal and monetary rules—the same kind of rules West German policy makers followed in the postwar period. Under the favourable conditions granted by the US to integrate into the world market, this led to export-driven prosperity. However, other countries didn’t enjoy the same favourable conditions. What would upset governments and people in such countries even more was the fact that Kohl had abandoned the rules he was preaching to other European countries in his very own united Germany
Helmut Kohl at the CDU national party convention in Hamburg, 1973. Photo from Wikimedia Commons
There, European monetary union was widely seen as a top-down capitalist elite project, part of corporate globalization or as a handing over of the beloved Deutschmark to irresponsible Eurocrats and the Club Med, a derogatory term often used in public debates to denounce people in the Mediterranean countries as lazy, spend-thrifty and, worst of all, happily having a good time at the expense of others. Euro-scepticism added to disappointment with the collapse of East Germany’s economy after unification, growing income polarization and fears of job loss all over Germany and a sense of losing national sovereignty to global capital. Unresponsive to any of these concerns, Kohl and his coalition of Conservatives and Liberals eventually lost the 1998 election to the Social Democrats and Greens who formed a coalition government offering a blend of light Keynesianism, green transition and control of financial markets. This is where the German—and international—bourgeoisies got really concerned.
The opening ideological salvos to derail the newly elected government’s plans came from the British tabloid The Sun, calling Oskar Lafontaine, the new finance minister who proposed the introduction of a Tobin tax, “Europe’s most dangerous man.” Next came Madeleine Albright, then US secretary of state, who gave Germany’s Green Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer the choice of joining the bombing campaign against Yugoslavia or having his country isolated from Western allies. Fischer, and the new Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, chose war. Seeing that his opposition to the war wasn’t supported by anyone else in the cabinet, Lafontaine resigned before the bombing began.
A few months later, The Economist called Germany the “Sick man of the Euro.” Coming from the central organ of global capitalism and unrepentant advocate of liberalism since the days when England, not China, was the workshop of the world, this was not just another opinion piece. It was a warning that the international investment community—exactly the CEOs, bankers, brokers and financiers targeted by the then-emerging movement against corporate globalization—lost confidence in the German market and expected pro-business measures to boost their propensity to invest.
After a few months in office, Schröder had to choose between meeting voters’ expectations (job creation, reduction of job insecurities and income inequality) and capitalists’ cost-reduction demands. He chose the capitalists’ side, earning him the nickname Genosse der Bosse (Comrade of the Bosses). In the absence of a social movement from below that could have pushed him to deliver on the election platforms of the SPD and the Greens, this choice might actually better be called caving to capitalist threats of an investment strike. From 2000 to 2005, the Schröder government axed corporate tax rates, exempted capital gains from taxation and lowered equity requirements for credits. The other side of the class divide saw drastic reductions in unemployment benefits, essentially slashing them to the level of welfare payment rates after one year of benefits. At the same time, legal obstacles to employing temporary workers were greatly reduced. Capitalists were thrilled. Profits and asset prices shot up, but capital formation declined during the years pro-business laws were passed.
Reorganizing existing production capacities was more important to corporate executives than creating new capacities. This was not surprising as capacity utilization dropped when the New Economy bubble burst, triggering a downturn of the world economy that kept even booming China below double-digit growth. As it turned out, united Germany did not inherit the export successes of pre-unification West Germany, but was certainly heir to its export dependence.
In the early 2000s, Germany’s current account turned positive again—not because exports grew so strongly (they actually stagnated due to the world economic downturn), but because imports declined owing to weak domestic demand associated with the Schröder government’s neoliberal policies. However, as the world economy bounced back (China saw growth rates of 10-14 percent from 2003 to 2006), German exports grew again. Eventually the reorganization of production processes in the aftermath of German unification paid off. West German corporations now controlled production networks linking corporate headquarters controlling finance, research and development, and capital-intensive parts of actual assembly in the centres with labour intensive production in low-wage areas in the peripheries from Eastern Germany all the way to China. In these networks, East Germany occupied the position of a semi-periphery. On the supply side, German export success in the early 2000s relied on continued wage inequality between centres and peripheries, which doesn’t mean that all workers in the centres earned high wages. The threat to relocate production to the East or the South put the brakes on all wages. The lowering of social standards propelled the growth of low-wage employment, notably in the service sector. Well-paying, permanent jobs began to decrease as a share of total employment even in West Germany. As a result, discontent that was widespread in the East since political unification was followed by economic collapse, and social downgrading began to creep into the West.
2010s: Exporting the Euro-crisis
The export surpluses of the early 2000s relied on the same mercantilism that had generated such surpluses during the postwar prosperity. However, during the postwar period, unprecedented growth rates across the Western, and parts of the non-Western, world made it possible to superimpose a welfare state on a mercantilist economy that didn’t squeeze profit rates but operated with capital’s consent in a way that seemed unthinkable during the age of catastrophe from 1914 to 1945. In the early 2000s, by contrast, successful mercantilism demanded the roll-back of the welfare state. Tragically, the extension of West Germany’s welfare state institutions to East Germany, where they were superimposed on a collapsing economy, created the profit squeeze that was needed to curtail the material protections granted by the welfare state. To sustain competitive advantages gained by scaling back the welfare state, it was imperative to keep wage-growth low even after surging exports pulled the economy out of the slump. Unlike during the period of postwar prosperity, export surpluses didn’t stimulate domestic demand very much. In fact, current account surpluses in the early 2000s, which surged from -1.8 percent in 2000 to 6.7 percent in 2007, were as much driven by rising exports as by weak growth of imports, a clear indicator of the overall sluggishness of domestic demand. Unemployment rates rose from 9.3 percent in 2000 to 12.1 percent in 2005. After that, unemployment went into long-term decline, briefly interrupted by the 2008/9 Great Recession and slowed down by the 2009/15 Euro-crisis, eventually reaching five percent before the 2020 COVID-19 Recession. However, this job growth occurred almost entirely in low wage occupations.
Paradoxically, it was during the Euro-crisis that a wave of “export nationalism” covered up the discontent that was growing, at variable speeds, across Germany. The Deutschmark nationalism that emerged during German unification had taken a hit with the introduction of the Euro. However, when it turned out that the Euro was basically the old Deutschmark under a new name and export surplus levels were reaching unprecedented heights, it almost seemed that the long-awaited return of prosperity was about to materialize. But of course, it wasn’t the same as the postwar prosperity that saw strong growth almost everywhere. The 2010s, by contrast, were a time of stagnation. The rebound after the 2008/9 recession was stronger in Germany than in other countries, but then growth rates fell in line with the one-to-two percent range of other Western countries.
It was during this time of recurrent crises and long-term stagnation that the German government, led by Angela Merkel with the Social Democrats as junior partner, felt compelled to lecture other governments on economic policy. Completely blind to the fact that beggar-thy-neighbour policies are a zero-sum game, the Merkel-government told Southern European countries to impose austerity despite the fact that they were suffering from a sovereign debt crisis due to the end of cheap credit that became available after the creation of the European monetary union, helping to pay for imports from Germany. Merkel also told them that, after a painful but unavoidable period of belt-tightening, they would eventually succeed as export countries like Germany.
The European monetary union’s contradictory character torn between further integrating Europe and spreading German mercantilism shifted entirely to the latter. Southern Europeans, governments and ordinary people, understood that austerity would further subordinate their economies to Germany’s economic dominance. The Brits, like the Germans and the “Frugal Four” (Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden), although not warm to the idea of bailing out crisis-ridden Southern Europeans, were suspicious that Germany’s leading role in handling the crisis would turn the country’s economic dominance into fully-fledged hegemony. Brexit has its origin here. Eastern Europe’s post-communist comprador governments had imposed austerity on their countries in acts of pre-emptive obedience and now felt betrayed as they thought the bailout packages the Merkel government used as a means to impose austerity on the South were actually some sort of welfare package.
Centrifugal forces in the EU were further fuelled when, in face of civil war and foreign interventions in Syria, Merkel unilaterally declared open borders for Syrian refuges and then told EU member states they all had to take their share of refugees. European governments already concerned over Germany’s domineering role in managing the Euro-crisis were dismayed. Public debate within Germany was sharply divided between liberals and leftists applauding Merkel’s humanist stance and right-wingers, including in her own party, warning of an uncontrolled flow of immigrants. Largely unnoticed was the fact that Merkel’s decision to open borders for Syrian refugees was tied to the anti-Russian turn in German foreign policy following the sharp polarization between pro- and anti-Russian forces in Ukraine during and after the Maidan protests in 2014. Most of the Syrian refugees were fleeing the Russian-backed Assad-regime, which was considered an adversary. Opening borders for these refugees set a precedent for the surge of Ukrainian refugees following Russia’s invasion of Eastern Ukraine in 2022. At that point, Merkel, who had already retired, told the media that her government saw the Minsk accords, officially meant to reach a settlement between contending political and military forces within Ukraine, as a means of buying time to arm the Zelensky government.
2020s: Sick man of Europe 2.0
As Ukraine, already torn by civil war, became the scene for a proxy war between NATO-countries and Russia, Germany was firmly subordinated to US foreign policy. Post-communist governments in Germany had, more or less enthusiastically, supported deepening trade relations with Russia. Oil and gas imports might have been the most significant part of German-Russian trade but were certainly not the only one. Torn between allegiance to the US and lucrative business deals with Russia, the German government, now headed by Social Democrat Olaf Scholz, cut its economic ties with Russia after the latter’s invasion of Ukraine. The price to be paid was a further spike in energy prices, on top of the increases attendant on the economic recovery from the COVID-19-recession.
As part of current US efforts to contain China, the German government has been pressured to scale down its trade with China—Germany’s largest trading partner and also a prime outlet for German foreign direct investments. Since Germany’s economy is as much export-driven as export-dependent, the US turn from neoliberal globalization to escalating sanctions and protectionism in the name of national security has caused high levels of uncertainty within the German bourgeoisie. In addition to the return of secular stagnation after the very short post-COVID recovery in the West and the petering out of the China boom, this uncertainty is driving low levels of investment. Inflation, fuelled by post-COVID recovery and rising energy prices, and lower real incomes leading directly to less consumer spending, but also indirectly, as households build up their savings in anticipation of more economic shocks in the future. Meanwhile the Scholz government boosted arms spending while otherwise imposing austerity.
After two years of recession, Germany is again being branded the “sick man of Europe” by The Economist. The last time Germany earned this title the neoliberal turn against the welfare state produced massive current account surpluses, meagre general growth rates and massive social and regional inequalities. The export nationalism that concealed the mounting discontent with neoliberalism was shaken by the US turn from neoliberal globalization to protectionism and militarism. Given its high level of export dependence, Germany was ill prepared for the turn against it, which unleashed pent-up disappointments and anxieties into the political sphere. This happened all over Germany but more so in the East than in the West as regional differences in income, wealth and representation in leadership positions had created widespread feelings of being second class citizens in a politically united Germany.
In the absence of socialist imagination, German politics are haunted by the spectres of the past. An insurgent hard-right pins the labels of communism or Marxism on everything that ever came from the left, Social Democrats, the Greens and, of course, the Left Party, no matter how members, activists and supporters of these parties position themselves on the political spectrum. At the same time, the hard-right wants Germany to leave its Nazi past behind. Downplaying Nazi atrocities, accusing liberals and leftists of burdening Germans with a cult of guilt, they propagate the reclaiming of German national pride and sovereignty from allegedly cosmopolitan elites. Between the very real and growing right and a weak and largely imaginary left, centrist parties that proclaimed the end of history in the heyday of neoliberalism are also shifting to the right. The decline of the Left Party is a mirror image of the rise of the AfD.
Alternative für Deutschland: A child of Deutschmark nationalism
Mainstream media and centrist parties view the new right as if it were some external force inexplicably appearing on the political scene and threatening the liberal order. But this is empirically wrong. Almost all leading figures of the AfD come from conservative West German milieus where they previously held positions in public administration or private businesses. Although they present themselves as anti-establishment rebels, they are establishment people who turned from the centre-right to the hard-right. The AfD also includes party activists who come from militant neo-Nazi groups that have existed on the fringes of West German society since the CDU gave many old Nazis a political home after the downfall of the Third Reich. Making small advances into electoral politics in the late 1960s and again in the 1980s, the neo-Nazis remained marginal until they found common ground with disgruntled conservatives. Deutschmark nationalism served as the ideological bonding material for neo-Nazis and right-of-centre conservatives, and became a rallying point for growing numbers of people dissatisfied with the policies of neoliberal globalization advanced by the centrist parties. It emerged in the tumultuous days after the fall of the Berlin wall as a mass ideology that shaped East and West German politics in the direction of unification. After that, it became an ideological point of reference that allowed for the integration of different political ideas and currents into a new right political project, the AfD.
Riding on the wave of Euro-scepticism that accompanied the Euro crisis, the AfD, founded in 2013, promoted a German exit from the EU, which would also have meant exit from the Euro. However, boosting the Deutschmark nostalgia associated with German-style Euro-scepticism got the newly minted party only so far. What really fuelled the AfD’s take-off was the wave of Syrian refugees coming to Germany (and other EU-countries) in 2015. The party’s approval ratings rose from roughly five percent in its first two years to around 12 percent in the next two years. With the surge in voter approval came a programmatic shift from ‘neoliberalism in one country’ to neoliberalism hidden behind ethnonationalist hate propaganda. Despite advocating for a strong state, the AfD also presents itself as a rebellious party of freedom. This paradox is resolved by portraying cosmopolitan elites, represented most notably by the Greens, as a force dominating state apparatuses and misusing them to bring excessive numbers of foreigners into the country with their cultures that allegedly threaten German people, suppress German heritage and push the economy into decay. Therefore a strong state is needed to defend Germany against foreign incursion and revive its inherent strength
Election poster of the AfD in Thuringia supporting remigration. Photo from Wikimedia Commoms
The Scholz government created the conditions in which the AfD’s self-portrayal as freedom fighters gave the party another boost. The modest Green New Deal platforms on which the SPD and Greens ran their 2021 election campaign didn’t gain enough traction to allow them to form a government, despite support from unions and even, more cautiously, employer associations. To obtain a majority in the Bundestag, SPD and Greens formed an ostensibly unlikely coalition with the FDP, a party mostly focused on cutting taxes and limiting public deficits. These commitments to tax breaks for the rich and austerity for the poor stood in the way of effective state-sponsored energy transition programs. Hence, the Scholz-government was perceived as weak from the start. Things went from bad to worse for the government after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Under pressure from the US, Scholz opted for sanctions against Russia, arms deliveries to Ukraine and a continued increase in arms spending. At a time when the prices of everything from butter to housing were soaring, making it clear that money would still be available for guns but maybe not for butter not only destroyed whatever support the government had before the Ukraine war but also gave the AfD another boost. A year and a half into the war, the SPD was trailing the AfD in federal polls. Picking up widespread, though by no means dominant, unease with arms support for Ukraine and fear of war with Russia, the AfD advocates a negotiated peace settlement between Russia and Ukraine and, more importantly to the AfD, the lifting of sanctions on Russia. For the AfD, urging peace with Russia is not a matter of a principled anti-militarism but a means of reviving German trade with Russia, notably Russian energy imports that are seen as a precondition for economic recovery. To achieve this, Germany has to free itself from the ‘cosmopolitan sell-out elite.’ Whether everybody now supporting the AfD subscribes to the freedom-for-German-supremacy-view is open to debate. What can’t be denied is the fact that many discontented people, whatever their main grievance, are looking to the right, not the left, for alternatives to a failing political centre. Some are also turning to the CDU, which claims to be different from both the AfD and the federal coalition government, without offering anything other than praise for the good old days. That served the party well at times when the German economy could thrive, to a greater or lesser degree, on US-enabled expansion of world markets. With the US protectionist turn, this is no longer possible and the party is torn between centrism and the new right. Current support for the CDU is highly unstable, which could easily work in the AfD’s favour, especially in the absence of persuasive alternatives from the left, which so far have not materialized.
This wasn’t always the case. Something like a left renewal had once seemed to be in the offing in the most unlikely place: East Germany during the transition from state socialism to a peripheral position in an enlarged capitalist Germany. In West Germany, the nationalist wave that came with unification swept away much of the activist left that had rallied thousands—sometimes tens or even hundreds of thousands— of people in the 1980s against the stationing of US nuclear missiles, nuclear power plants, Nazis, and South Africa’s apartheid regime, among other causes. Left circles within the SPD, the Greens and the labour movement weathered the nationalist storm without leaving a mark on German politics. In this political climate, the Party of Democratic Socialism (Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus or PDS) stood out as a beacon of the left.
Emerging from East Germany’s ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED), the PDS became the political home of many East Germans who lost their jobs, social status and cultural identity during the transition to capitalism. Quickly establishing a presence in East Germany’s provincial and municipal parliaments, the party expressed the discomfort of many East Germans who felt like second class citizens under the domination of West German institutions, politicians, corporations and culture. It highlighted East Germany’s socialist heritage, which encompassed commitments to anti-fascism, peace and international solidarity as much as the dictatorship of the politburo, Stasi-surveillance and an overbearing bureaucracy. The party hung itself up in endless debates between those who downplayed or justified East German communism’s dark sides and others who sought to disown that history by embracing liberal principles. Practically, these disputes didn’t make much difference. Upholding socialist principles didn’t stop the party from pragmatically working within the political and economic confines created by unification. At times, this included voting for privatization of public housing and infrastructure. For decades since the party was founded, the contradiction between socialist principles and the subordination to neoliberal policies imposed by the West German bourgeoisie didn’t stop the PDS or its successor organization Die Linke (the Left Party), from becoming something like a catch-all or people’s party in East Germany, a role long held by the CDU und the SPD in West Germany. For years, the PDS/Left Party achieved election results in the mid-20 percent range, peaking at 28 percent in Brandenburg in 2004 and 32 percent in Thuringia in 2019. It was also, and still is, part of various coalition governments in East German states. Until the September 2024 election, the Thuringian government was led by the Left Party’s Bodo Ramelow.
Despite this overall success and despite the party’s fidelity to socialist principles, the social group that wasn’t interested in voting PDS consisted of workers, who still voted CDU in large numbers despite g the CDU’s failed to deliver on its big promises of post-unification prosperity. More recently they shifted to the AfD. Meanwhile, in West Germany, the PDS remained marginal throughout its existence, only attracting activists from various left grouplets. What little remained of left protest milieus after unification was still dominated by a mix of environmentalists, antifas and international solidarity activists who might vote Green, or maybe even SPD, but hardly ever PDS. The old working class milieus that were shrinking with the decline of smokestack industries were still dominated by unionists closer to the SPD than the PDS. This started to change when, under chancellor Schröder, the SPD implemented neoliberal counter-reforms on a scale his conservative predecessor Kohl had avoided throughout his 16-year tenure, despite his supposed commitment to unleashing market forces. Growing frustrations among left social democrats and unionists fed mass demonstrations against Schröder’s SPD and created a social and organizational base (including, most prominently, Schröder’s short-time finance minister Lafontaine) that merged with the PDS into the Left Party in 2007. In the federal elections two years later, the Left Party won 11.9 percent of the vote, then 9.2 percent in the 2017 elections, but fell to 4.9 percent in the 2021 elections. This was a worse result than the 5.1 percent the PDS obtained in 1998, an election that also saw an increased vote for the SPD, which allowed Schröder to succeed Kohl. It is worth noting that the PDS vote came almost entirely from East Germany, which represents less than a quarter of Germany’s total population.
While the PDS mostly maintained peaceful coexistence between socialist theory and market-conforming practice, the Left Party continuously debated whether or not it should join centre-left governments, if given the chance. The bitterness with which party activists argued over this question stood in stark contrast to its actual relevance. In states where the party was relegated to opposition status by poor election results, this status didn’t attract additional voters keen on seeing a principled opposition in parliament. In states where the party joined governments, the results were mixed: sometimes it maintained its vote share in the subsequent election; sometimes it suffered losses. A paradoxical result came about in the Thuringian elections in September 2024: The Left Party lost massively, although, had there been direct elections for the minister-president (a position equivalent to provincial premier in Canada), the Left Party’s Bodo Ramelow would have won the election. This fits into a trend that became visible over the last few years in a number of state elections in East and West Germany. Party loyalties based on shared worldviews wear thin. Elections are often decided based on the media appeal of top politicians, regardless of party affiliation. Remarkably enough, Ramelow, just like Dietmar Woidke, the SPD’s lead candidate in the Brandenburg elections, dropped the name of his party on campaign posters, presenting himself as more of a provincial father figure than a man of the party.
However, rather than signalling the end of ideology, as centrist politicians and postmodern philosophers might have argued before the rise of a very explicitly ideologically committed new right, the focus on limelight politicians pushes democratic debates into the shadows. In the case of the Left Party, it might also have been an attempt to distract from its own image as an organization mired in endless debates not producing any coherent, let alone persuasive, policies. The reasons for permanent internal discord are sociological and ideological. The Left Party was strongest in its early days, when the PDS’s social base still comprised a cross-section of the East German population, although workers remained underrepresented. It also attracted dissident social democrats and unionists from West Germany. To a limited extent, therefore the Left Party had the working class base the PDS never had.
The blend of Keynesian and Marxist ideas around which social democratic dissidents and union leftists organized had been defeated as a significant political current during the crises of the 1970s by the Social Democratic right and corporatist union leaders who put competitiveness of the West German economy over income distribution from profits to wages. In the new millennium, when these currents joined forces with the PDS, they were still sizeable enough to give the newly founded Left Party a boost. But not for long. The smokestack industries around which these left currents were organizing were in continued decline, which made strategies based on that moribund reality obsolete. Moreover, these strategies often stood in the way of mobilizing and organizing the new working classes that emerged in the service sector and, on a much smaller scale, IT, bio tech, and green energy.
As the ranks of the Left Party thinned out with the loss of members coming out of communist East Germany or from West German union and social democratic circles, the party was able to attract new blood mainly in the form of highly educated, often precariously employed, urban dwellers. The shift in membership from old left offspring to the children of neoliberal globalization was paralleled by a geographical shift in electoral support. In urban centres, losses among the party’s old left supporters could be partially compensated; in rural areas, however, where the PDS and the Left Party had always been weak, the party disappeared almost entirely. Often, there isn’t even anyone to put up election campaign posters
Anti-AfD protest in Germany. Photo by strassenstriche.net/Flickr
Unlike the original base of both the PDS and the Left Party, the urban hipsters who joined the Left Party had no old left reference points. Even when they talked about Marx and class they did so with postmodern accents. However, this did not help them to gain sizeable support among the working classes—sometimes lumped together as the “precariat”—that developed in expanding economic sectors. The political offerings of the Left Party seemed to exercise little appeal for both old and potentially new constituencies. The party’s founding basis of unity was opposition to neoliberalism. In the early days this left room for East German concerns about the outcomes of unification—arguably a kind of neoliberal restructuring—with opposition to the neoliberal turn of the Schröder-government in East and West Germany. It also left plenty of room for a variety of goals, from resurrecting the Keynesian welfare state to a multitude of vaguely defined socialisms for the future to opposition without a vision for the future. However, what sufficed to form the Left Party wasn’t enough to sustain and grow it, especially not as it became harder to label government policies neoliberal.
The Great Recession, the COVID-19 pandemic, and commitments to ongoing arms production brought state intervention back to the centre of politics, contrary to the 1990s and early 2000s when politics was dominated by advancing capital mobility and free trade. Back then, ruling elites organized consent of the popular classes, more or less successfully, under the banner of “international competitiveness.” The new watchword “national security” is better at rallying the new right than building support for centrist parties. Left Party intellectuals debated the new political conjuncture under the label “post-neoliberalism,” a word-monster that hints, perhaps unwittingly, at the party’s inability to develop a strategy beyond rejecting neoliberalism. In reaction to the imposition of a party line by its predecessor organization, the PDS and the Left Party allowed a wide range of views. However, members of various organized currents, ranging from social-liberal to communist, tended to talk more about each other than with each other.
Postmodernist philosophers’ contention that the days of master narratives are over was wrong with respect to neoliberalism—if there ever was a master narrative, it was neoliberalism—but it does apply to the Left Party, which could not synthesize different ideas into compelling left policies that could rally growing discontent. Instead, internal debates turned into factional turf wars in a party that resembled an appendix of the Scholz government, costing the Left Party more and more support.
After years of bitter infighting, discontent with declining voter approval and accommodation of government policies led to the split of the federal party caucus and the formation of the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) in January 2024. As its name indicates, the party is entirely built around its frontwoman, who represented the Left Party in the Bundestag from 2009 to 2023. In the BSW, the cacophony that destructively marks the Left Party is replaced by closed-door debates. As in the Communist party of old, membership isn’t open to everyone; applications to join must be approved. Wagenknecht, originally a member of the Communist Platform (one of the organized currents inside the PDS), had shifted to left-Keynesian, pro-welfare state positions. But, years before her split from the Left Party, she began advocating ordoliberal positions—a branch of neoliberal thinking that stresses the role of the state in allowing businesses to compete without being bogged down by monopolies. This German version of neoliberalism has been the hallmark of economic policy and ideology since the early years of West German world market integration. In Wagenknecht’s current adaptation of ordoliberalism, the state guarantees competition, which, in turn, creates a strong economy capable of providing stable employment, social security and a fairer distribution of incomes. She combines this embrace of free markets plus the welfare state with a critique of the European Union as an institution operating in the interest of big corporations and a critique of NATO and US hegemony. Her condemnation of American hegemony appealed to some members of the Left Party, as did her critique of the EU, although her more recent favourable references to ordoliberalism and policies aiming at stricter migration controls were less popular.
The BSW’s outlook is very much shaped by positive memories of West German postwar prosperity. Yet, the party’s advocacy of international cooperation, a position going back to 1970s detente policies, contrasts sharply with orientations of the centrist parties and some currents within her own former party. Demand for a negotiated settlement of the Ukraine war overlaps with AfD positions. However, the AfD considers this a matter of Germany’s national interest that doesn’t preclude support for rearmament and war in other regions, like Gaza most recently. The BSW, on the other hand, sees militarism largely as the US’s last recourse for defending its ailing empire. It remains to be seen how the BSW’s principled opposition to militarism and war can mesh with current negotiations for a coalition government with the CDU and the SPD, both committed to military support for Zelensky in Ukraine and Netanyahu in Israel. Polls suggest that electoral support for the BSW was largely driven by the desire for an anti-war voice in parliament. At the same time, there is considerable support for efforts to keep the AfD out of government, despite all the support the AfD garnered in the fall state elections in East Germany. If this means compromising its anti-militarism, the BSW may, like the Left Party before it, soon be seen as a superfluous appendix of unpopular centrist parties.
After weeks of negotiations, the BSW entered into a coalition government with the SPD in Brandenburg as well as with the CDU and SPD in Thuringia. It also supports a minority government made up of the CDU and the SPD in Saxony. It did all this to keep the AfD out of government positions. Understandable as such efforts are, they have already cost the BSW in the polls. Hovering just above five percent, the BSW may not reach the five-percent threshold for obtaining seats in the upcoming federal elections. The Left Party, standing at 3.5 percent in the polls, will probably fall short. Founded as a project to unify left forces from East and West Germany, its split early last year already signalled the failure of that project. The next election may reduce it to insignificance, leaving lots of room for the AfD [end]
the Germans have bowed down to the US sabotage by Joe Biden administration of Nord Stream pipelines, only to end up with Donald Trump’s America First doctrine in economy and defense