Analista senior di l'intelligenza in u campu di a gestione di i risichi di sicurezza, sò un anzianu tenente detective è ufficiale di l'intelligenza in l'agenzie di u Statu francese. A bona pronuncia hè Николай Чинкуини, in russu
Ukrainian hitlerites for ceasefire. Struggle between Zelenskyite opportunists and Azovite strategists. Poroshenko, Zaluzhny, Sodol. 100 million dollar bribes. The angry officers movement
[my illustration: on March 4, 2014, after the West-backed right-wing coup in Kiev, US Secretary of State John Kerry meets representatives of the parliament. Leader of Nazi Svoboda party, Oleh Tyahnybok is second from right. Petro Poroshenko, center, will become in June the new president of Ukraine (US Department of State)]
When it comes to hitler-loving military nationalists, you’d think they’d be lean more towards peace than a former comedian Jewish president who came to government on a peace platform, right? The reality is much more interesting
Enter the fourth reich
Tales of the IV Reich (now renamed Tales of the IV Empire), likely run by an Azov lieutenant, is characterized by more sobriety than other similar channels, which is why I love reading it
Most interestingly, his posts often seem to hint at a sentiment among certain ‘army men’, that the 1991-borders slogan is unrealistic and is leading to the destruction of Ukraine’s finest nationalists through politically-motivated meat storms. Not without the insinuation, of course, that Zelensky is quite happy to see these dangerous competitors die.
The fear of peace
One of the reasons that Tales is worried about endless war is the political pressure it puts on the broader population, which has always been frustratingly disloyal to the aims of radical nationalism.
Tales has always worried about popular demands for peace. Four days before February 24 2022, he was writing paranoid posts about how the west and Russia are trying to pressure Ukraine into implementing the Minsk peace agreements:
Among the participants in the combat actions, I know many disappointed and disoriented people. Some are tired, some have not seen clear changes, some have started families. Not everyone is ready to take up arms again now. Such tendencies are detrimental in the current situation
The implementation of the “Minsk” agreements into the Constitution of Ukraine is worse for us – the Ukrainian right-wing – than a full-scale war. We are accustomed to fighting the Russians – the thousand-year war of freedom-loving Eastern Europeans against the Tatar horde continues to this day. If the Ukrainian authorities are pressured by the Russians and [western – EIU] “partners”, we will get a “war zone” throughout the country. For us, the military veterans there will be no life in such a Ukraine. We will be under constant pressure from the system, with the possibility of being eliminated by amnestied separatist militants, and living in constant fear is not a life anyone wants
If we fiercely resist the Russian army and unite the nation in the fight against the enemy, we cannot lose. Those who are burnt out and stay at home, in case of our defeat, will rot in prison or be killed. Some Ukrainians already believed the Bolsheviks in the 1920s and laid down their arms – they all either died of hunger or lived out their last years in camps
To arms!
On July 13, Tales published a telegram post in response to the calls by popular Ukrainian bloggers for peace through negotiations and compromise in response to Russian rocket strikes on the capital (see my post on the matter). He was also responding to the parliamentarian Artem Dmytruk, who vigorously supported the bloggers.
Medvedchuk refers to the leader of Ukraine’s ‘Opposition Platform for Life’ party, whose main slogan was an end to the war through negotiations, until it was banned in 2022, along with the arrest and deportation of Medvedchuk.
Here’s the post:
If the war continues for another year, the population will bring the Dmytruks to power. So far, the Dmytruks are quite marginal. If it lasts two years, Medvedchuk will return here with the Russian flag. It’s simple
Being in the [frontline] Zaporizhzhia steppes or the command posts of the Donetsk region, you become quite detached from the population: you don’t hear what ordinary citizens of Lviv, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia, or Kyiv are talking about and dreaming of. The fact that a huge number of people supported the Instabloggers (and how many were too embarrassed to write words of support?) irritates those who advocate for the continuation of the war. Because real people with open profiles wrote there, not Moscow bots. There are many of these people, and this must be taken into account. According to my observations, this number is increasing exponentially despite the fabricated results of sociological surveys
The population sees corruption scandals. Constant loss of territories. Endless shelling. Inflation. Decline in the standard of living. Hundreds of new graves in cemeteries. Maimed veterans on the streets. Videos from the military registration and enlistment office. The West’s incomprehensible behavior. Now, there are also extremely uncomfortable conditions with power outages in +35°C heat and prospects of water supply cuts. This list can go on
I’m surprised that people with higher education and quite a high level of intelligence do not see the pattern
Hitlerite civil war
In another recent post, he was openly pessimistic about Ukraine’s military prospects and its western allies:
Once again, for a day, calls to “fight to victory” are spreading through social media following the terrorist attacks by Muscovites in Kyiv and Kryvyi Rih. Here are my thoughts in theses:
Mobilization and a massive influx to the military registration and enlistment offices will not produce modern fighters, missile systems, or the latest strike UAVs. It won’t even add Patriot SAM systems and missiles to them. Unfortunately, even the mobilization of 10 million Ukrainians will not stop the takeoff of strategic fighters in Russia, will not destroy existing nuclear weapons, and will not significantly reduce the population of Russia, its natural resources, etc
Strong entities respond to terrorist acts with double the force. Yesterday in Belgorod, in the evening, windows in residential buildings were shattered, one civilian died, two were slightly injured. Such a “response” personally shakes me with despair and hopelessness. I emphasize once again that our military capabilities can destroy everything living within a 100 km radius from the state border. Special thanks to the tactical level commanders who take responsibility for leveling the Shebekino and Rylsky districts of the Russian Federation. These are young officers up to the battalion commander level. In other words, this is the grassroots initiative of a conscious part of the army, there is no political will for such actions.
We will not be invited to the NATO summit to join the alliance. We are not as cool as Albania. The topic of “Ukraine in NATO” will be a bargaining chip for many years, it will be a reason for wars and political crises. Moreover, in the coming days, NATO will solidify its impotence with a series of resolutions that will exclude the actual unilateral power of the United States in the alliance. The Western establishment is afraid of Trump coming to power, fearing that the war will end.
NATO only needs to allocate 10% of its available weapons, which are gathering dust in warehouses since the alliance is not fighting anyone, and we would defeat the Muscovites. However, Western politicians are stretching this aid over the years, while hundreds of the best Ukrainians are dying and becoming disabled, and Ukrainian cities cease to exist because of the war. They have been juggling planes, high-precision MLRS, and missiles in front of the bloodied faces of Ukrainians for years
Note also his praise for ‘tactical level commanders’ who take initiative in hitting Russian civilian targets. See my recent post about the Sodol drama for more on this emerging caste of young nationalists, which positions itself against the so-called ‘old corrupt Soviet general caste’.
Anyway, given such sorry prospects for winning the war, Tales is clearly hinting that a ceasefire to regroup and strengthen defenses (as well as a good old-fashioned domestic purge) is a better idea than staying in the self-destructive meatgrinder.
I’ve discussed on my substack Evgeny Dyky, the corpulent supposed ex-commander of the violent Aidar Batallion. Among his many achievements, he is also in charge of spending sizeable sums of money on Ukraine’s wartime antarctic research project (read about it here). Otherwise, he spends a great deal of time on the Ukrainian talk-show circuit, explaining viewers how Ukraine’s military industry is just getting started while that of Russia’s has already reached its final peak, and so on and on.
Well, Dyky’s effusive optimism really annoys IV Reich. Yesterday, he posted this:
⚡️ An F-16 that managed to reach Ukraine crashed into a high-rise building in Nizhny Tagil (RF). The pilot was identified as Yevhen Dykyi, a military expert and former platoon commander of the Aidar Battalion (in 2015). According to preliminary reports, the fighter jet could not withstand the pilot’s weight. Another version suggests that the pilot’s unkempt homeless-like beard got tangled in the control stick
Tales’ opinion on the 1991 borders slogan came out more clearly in March of this year. It all started in response to a hit-piece against a popular young commander by ‘the Centre for Countering of Disinformation’, a beautifully-named government-funded organ (my bolding). Here’s the hysterical hit-piece from the CCD:
The CCD logo
Recently, interviews with military personnel have gained immense popularity in the Ukrainian information space, where they talk about the problems they allegedly face at the front: lack of ammunition, incompetent command, mistakes of the country’s leadership, and so on
A striking example of this is a recent interview with the commander of the K2 battalion, Kyrylo Veres, in which he claims that we will not be able to win this war, and his personal victory is when his battalion’s soldiers stop dying. Thus, he is effectively hinting at negotiations and freezing the conflict. Such statements are absolutely unacceptable – they contradict the task set by the Leader of our country: to reach the borders of 1991 at any cost
Obviously, it is high time to move to healthy military censorship – military personnel should be prohibited from giving interviews. Endless whining about the lack of ammunition and “meat assaults” does not bring us any closer to victory but contributes to the spread of defeatist sentiments in society. Moreover, in reality, there are no “meat assaults” in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and the military personnel are fully provided with everything necessary to accomplish the assigned tasks
We remind you that you can always get reliable information about what is happening at the front on the “Unified News” telethon
Commander Veres, the man being criticized. Looks a lot more trustworthy than the angry blue cube
Ah, how times have changed over the past few months. Now even the Great Leader of is indulging in absolutely unacceptable narratives hinting at negotiations and freezing the conflict! But back to the response from Tales:
I have personally known Kyrylo since 2017 to be a decent and dedicated officer, back when he was still a reconnaissance platoon commander in one of the mechanized brigade’s battalions. Over a few years, he rose to become the commander of one of the top battalions in the Armed Forces of Ukraine and received the “Hero’s Star.” We had many joint operations aimed at eliminating the Muscovites and their lackeys while the “defenders against disinformation” were siphoning grants in peaceful Kyiv
Idiots don’t like that the battalion commander wants his personnel to live to see peace in the country and return home alive. This is an absolutely healthy and adequate position for a Ukrainian officer
“What does victory mean to everyone? It’s when my people stop dying. If I said a year ago that victory is when the Russian Federation ends, then I was young and I did not command such a large number of people and did not give orders on who should go into battle and who should not”
The last part is quoting Veres, the lines that made the Center for Countering Disinformation so furious.
The heavyweights
I know some people who regret having voted for Zelensky, who think that previous war-hawk president Petro Poroshenko, with his greater experience dealing with Russia and as a statesman (however reprehensible), wouldn’t have allowed the war to happen in 2022
Poroshenko in his signature black gloves and expensive vyshyvanka (the folk costume no bourgeois nationalist can leave home without)
I think it’s possible that Zelensky’s curious talent for aggravating everyone imaginable played a special role. Recall Zelensky’s wise decision to start reminiscing about soviet Ukraine’s nuclear missile capacity on February 19 2022.
But perhaps more importantly, Poroshenko hasn’t gone away either. He and his party certainly constitution the most powerful remaining opposition force in wartime. Could they be getting ready to attack Zelensky for wasting the army in an unwinnable war instead of preserving its fighting core?
Until his early 2024 removal, Zaluzhny was juicing up head of the army Zaluzhny as an anti-Zelensky icebreaker. And Zaluzhny wrote a 2023 article he wrote in the Economist about how Ukraine has no real prospects of victory against Russia and finds itself in a stalemate position. Zelensky was enraged by this violation of his slogan ‘1991 borders or bust’, and it was this article, along with Zaluzhny’s excessive popularity, that led to his eventual replacement.
It was Poroshenko that signed the Minsk agreements back in 2014 and 2015 to avert Ukraine’s military collapse. Maybe he can do it again, with the help of the ‘Iron General’ Zaluzhny.
Kiev mayor Klitchko – a real heavyweight – also said in a recent western interview that Zelensky should conduct a referendum on peace and abandoning some territories. Klitchko is another open critic of Zelensky’s authoritarianism, and has allied with Poroshenko against Zelensky numerous times in the past. There are rumors he is coordinating actions with him at the moment as well.
The angry officers movement
Opposition heavyweights like Poroshenko, Zaluzhny and Klitchko (don’t laugh about the last one) also have an important base of supporters to draw on – young, confident nationalists in the army.
A crucial fault-line at the moment is that between younger brigade commanders and the generals. The combrigs accuse the generals of sending them on pointless suicide missions because of the political leadership’s ‘obsession with maps’, rather than real strategic objectives. This ‘maps over strategy’ metaphor is often used by Azov spokesmen like Kukharchuk or Krotevych in their interviews with liberal nationalist (anti-Zelensky) media like Ukrainska Pravda.
Indeed, Zelensky must be map-fixated. His key priority is opportunistic – stay in power, keep the aid flowing, desperately showcase small successes. To put off his many days of reckoning.
For instance. with the countless businessmen he has imprisoned, extorted and otherwise enraged. Like the still-jailed Kolomoisky. Or a business partner of Kolomoisky, Bogolyubov, who recently escaped the country and claimed the government tried to extort him of 100 million USD in exchange for legal protection. Or, obviously, the questions society will have towards him after a war that cost the lives of hundreds of thousands, and brought… what?
The young nationalists in the army launched the opening salvo in this increasingly public battle in late June, against General Sodol, who they accused of murderous graphomania. The battle has been rapidly developing in the past few weeks, a topic for a future post. But for now, I’d like to draw attention to Bohdan Krotevych, the Azovite who led the charge against General Sodol.
Krotevych said in a July 26 interview that he is ‘angry’ with Zelensky for apparently never having visited Azov’s headquarters at the frontline, while he does visit other military units. He said he considers this condescension. The interview, titled ‘I am very angry’, has already received a million views
Another major topic of discussion is how Lieutenant Colonel Prokopenko, Commander of the Azov Brigade, is a ‘genius’. This is in turn fairly obviously compared to the stupidity of the generals, who he castigates for wasting human resources in impossible goals, and never learning from their mistakes (unlike the Russians, he stresses). Among other things, Krotevych calls the 2023 counteroffensive ‘retarded’.
A peaceful yet stern reich
He also boasts about hanging out with his close friend Zaluzhny while in England recently. They and their wives met, and Krotevych gifted Zaluzhny an antique British army knife (knives are highly beloved among rightwing nationalists).
Best of all, he cryptically promises that people would be hearing much more from Zaluzhny in the future.
And Zaluzhny’s July 23 speech at the RUSI Land Warfare Conference in London on the topic of ‘Third World War’ made it clear that he’s hardly a democrat:
Society must agree to temporarily give up a number of freedoms for the sake of survival,…
Unfortunately, modern wars are total. They require the efforts not only of the army, but of the whole society. Politicians can and should mobilize society. To do so, they use military and other state resources in a comprehensive way. These resources include the economy, finance, the population, and allies. Such actions will, of course, influence the political processes in the country
Any ceasefire of the type that Zaluzhny, Tales, or Krotevych or the rest may want would be a brutal one. On July 30, Commander Romanov of the Azov brigade published a video stating he had given the order to shoot to kill any civilians attempting to destroy Ukrainian military equipment.
With less energy to spend on the foreign enemy, more to spend on purging the internal enemy. The bloggers won’t be bothering anyone else with their pacifist demands [end]
chronicle: its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine
The Russian Army continues to liberate the territories of the DPR from Ukrainian occupation. Russian troops overcome the resistance of Ukrainian formations daily, bringing victory closer.
The advance of the troops in ensured by the greatly increased professionalism of Russian soldiers and officers, as well as enhanced technical capabilities. However, no offensive would be possible without the heroism of the Russian soldier fighting for his land. Such acts of heroism occur daily along the entire front line.
And where there is a place for heroism, mercy is also possible. After all, in this bloody struggle, not only the citizens of a once united country clash, but also yesterday’s comrades-in-arms…
Active operations by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are taking place along the entire front. The area southwest of Donetsk, once a stronghold of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) -the fortress city of Vuhledar- is no exception.
For over two years, battles of varying intensity raged over this city. Yet they always ended without achieving the ultimate goal: its liberation. This outcome was influenced not only by the city’s strong fortifications but also by its location in open terrain and the advantages provided to the AFU by its industrial-high-rise buildings.
A change in tactics by the Russian Armed Forces, specifically encircling the city from the flanks and cutting off the supply and communication lines of the entrenched forces, altered the city’s situation. The area around the South Donbas Mine No. 3, once a symbol of labor achievements, has now become a fierce battleground.
[my illustration: a debris of US ATACMS ballistic missile has fallen on Kursk-Vostochny airfield on November 25, 2023 (Russian defense ministry)]
On March 5, 2022, the wreck of the sailing ship Endurance was found in the depths of the Weddell Sea off the coast of Antarctica. This, of course, was the vessel lost in Ernest Shackelton’s third expedition to Antarctica, which became trapped in the ice and sank in 1915. The story of that expedition is an extraordinary tale of human fortitude – with the Endurance lost to the ice, Shackleton’s crew evacuated to a loose ice flow where they camped for nearly 500 days, drifting about the Antarctic seas, before making a desperate dash across the open ocean in an open 20 foot lifeboat, finally reaching the southern shore of inhospitable and mountainous South Georgia Island, which they then had to cross on foot to reach the safety of a whaling station.
The story itself has an essentially mythic quality to it, with Shackleton’s crew surviving for years on free floating ice floes in the most inhospitable seas on earth. For our purposes, however, it is the story’s coda that is particularly interesting. In Shackleton’s memoirs, he remembered that, upon finally reaching the safety of the Stromness whaling station, one of his first questions was about the war in Europe. When Shackleton first set out on his ill-fated expedition on August 8, 1914, the First World War was less than a week old, and the German Army had just begun its invasion of Belgium. There was little expectation then that the war would proceed as it did, unleashing four years of slaughterous positional warfare that engulfed the continent.
Shackleton, having been adrift at sea for years, clearly did not imagine that the war could still be raging, and asked the commandant of the whaling station “tell me, when was the war over?”
The answer came back: “The war is not over. Millions are being killed. Europe is mad. The world is mad.”
The timing is serendipitous, since the discovery of the Endurance’s wreck, after more than a hundred years, happened to occur only a few weeks after the world again went mad, with the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian War in February 2022. As time continues its inexorable march and the calendar turns yet again, the war is passing through its third full winter. In February, Z-World will be three years old.
Of course, modern communications make it extremely unlikely that anybody could be cut fully out of the loop for years at a time, like Shackleton and his men. Instead of being ignorant as to whether or not the war is over, many of us are exposed on a daily basis to footage of men being killed, buildings being blown up, and vehicles being shredded. Twitter has made it essentially impossible to live under a rock, or on an ice floe, as it were.
If anything, we have the very opposite problem of Shackleton – at least as far as our wartime information infrastructure goes. We are saturated in information, with daily updates tracking advances of a few dozen meters and never ending bombast about new game changing weapons (which seem to change very little), and bluster about “red lines”. This war seems to have an unyielding dynamic on the ground, and no matter how many grand pronouncements we hear that one side or the other is on the verge of collapse, the sprawling front continues to grind up bodies and congeal with bloody positional fighting.
It would seem difficult to believe that a high intensity ground war in Europe with hundreds of miles worth of front could be boring, yet the static and repetitive nature of the conflict is struggling to hold the attention of foreign observers who have little immediately at stake.
My intention here is a radical zoom-out from these demoralizing and fatiguing small scale updates (as valuable as the work of the war mappers is), and consider the aggregate of 2024 – arguing that this year was, in fact, very consequential. Taken as a whole, three very important things happened in 2024 which create a very dismal outlook for Ukraine and the AFU in the new year. More specifically, 2024 brought three important strategic developments:
Russian victory in southern Donetsk which destroyed the AFU’s position on one of the war’s key strategic axes.
The expenditure of carefully husbanded Ukrainian resources on a failed offensive towards Kursk, which accelerated the attrition of critical Ukrainian maneuver assets and substantially dampened their prospects in the Donbas.
The exhaustion of Ukraine’s ability to escalate vis a vis new strike systems from NATO – more broadly, the west has largely run out of options to upgrade Ukrainian capabilities, and the much vaunted delivery of longer range strike systems failed to alter the trajectory of the war on the ground.
Taken together, 2024 revealed a Ukrainian military that is increasingly stretched to the limits, to the point where the Russians were able to largely scratch off an entire sector of front. People continue to wonder where and when the Ukrainian front might begin to break down – I would argue that it *did* break down in the south over the last few months, and 2025 begins with strong Russian momentum that the AFU will be hard pressed to arrest.
Front Collapse in South Donetsk
What stands out immediately about the operational developments in 2024 is the marked shift of energies away from the axes of combat that had seen the most intense fighting in the first two years of the war. In a sense, this war has seen each of its fronts activate in a sequence, one after the other.
After the opening Russian offensive, which boasted as its signature success the capture of the Azov coastline and the linkup of Donetsk and Crimea, the action shifted to the northern front (the Lugansk-Kharkov axis), with Russia fighting a summer offensive which captured Severodonetsk and Lysychansk. This was followed by a pair of Ukrainian counteroffensives in the fall, with a thrust out of Kharkov which pushed the front back over the Oskil, and an operation directed at Kherson which failed to breach Russian defenses but ultimately resulted in a Russian withdrawal in good order over the Dnieper due to concerns over logistical connectivity and an over-extended front. Energies then pivoted yet again to the Central Donbas axis, with the enormous battle around Bakhmut raging through the spring of 2023. This was followed by the failed Ukrainian offensive on Russia’s defenses in Zaporozhia, in the south.
Just to briefly recapitulate this, we can enumerate several operational phases in the first two years of the war, occurring in sequence and each with a center of gravity in different parts of the front:
A Russian offensive across the land bridge, culminating in the capture of Mariupol. (Winter-Spring 2022, Southern Front)
A Russian offensive in Lugansk, capturing Severodonetsk and Lysychansk. (Summer 2022, Donets-Oskil front)
Ukrainian Counteroffensives towards the Oskil and Kherson (Autumn 2022, Oskil and Dnieper fronts)
The Russian assault on Bakhmut (Winter-Spring 2023, Central Front)
Ukrainian counteroffensive on the land bridge (Summer 2023)
Amid all of this, the front that saw the least movement was the southeastern corner of the front, around Donetsk. This was somewhat peculiar. Donetsk is the urban heart of the Donbas – a vast and populous industrial city at the center of a sprawling conurbation, once home to some 2 million people. Even if Russia succeeds in capturing the city of Zaporizhia, Donetsk will be by far the most populous of Ukraine’s former cities to come under Moscow’s control.
In 2014, with the outbreak of the proto-Donbas war, Donetsk was the locus of much of the fighting, with the airport on the city’s northern approach the scene of particularly intense combat. This made it rather strange, then, that at the start of 2024 the Ukrainian Army continued to occupy many of the same positions that they built a decade prior. As intense fighting ebbed and flowed along other sectors of front, Donetsk remained besieged by a web of powerfully held Ukrainian defenses, anchored by heavily fortified urban areas stretching from Toretsk to Ugledar. Early Russian attempts to crack this iron ring open, including an assault on Ugledar in the winter of 2023, met with failure.
The signature operational development of 2024, then, was the re-activation of the Donetsk front, after years of static combat. It is not an exaggeration to say that after years of coagulation, the Russian Army cracked this front wide open in 2024 and Ukraine’s long and strongly held network of urban strongpoints collapsed
Russian Progress on the Donetsk Axis in 2024
The year began with the AFU fighting for its fortress in Avdiivka, where it continued to block the northern approach to Donetsk. At the time, the typical argument that one heard from the Ukrainian side was that the Russian assault on Avdiivka was pyrrhic – that the Russians were capturing the city with exorbitantly costly “meat assaults” that would inevitably sap Russian combat power and exhaust their ability to continue the offensive.
With the full measure of the year behind us, we can definitively say that this is not the case. After the fall of Avdiivka, Russian momentum never seriously slackened, and in fact it was the AFU that appeared to be increasingly exhausted. The Ukrainian breakwater position at Ocheretyne (which had previously been their staging point for counterattacks around Avdiivka) was overrun in a matter of days, and by the early summer the frontline had been pushed out towards the approach to Pokrovsk.
The Russian thrust towards Pokrovsk led many to believe that this city was itself the object of Russian energies, but this was a misread of the operational design. Russia did not need to capture Pokrovsk in 2024 to render it sterile as a logistical hub. Simply by advancing towards the E50 highway, Russian forces were able to cut off Pokrovsk from Ukrainian positions to the south on the Donetsk front, and Pokvrovsk is now a frontline city subject to the full spectrum of overwatch from Russian drones and tube artillery.
By autumn, the Russian advance had put the Ukrainians in a severe salient, creating an unstable chain of positions in Selydove, Kurakhove, Ugledar, and Krasnogorivka. Russia’s advance from Ocheretyne onto the southern approach to Pokrovsk acted like an enormous scythe, isolating the entire southeastern sector of the front and allowing Russian forces to carve through it in the closing months of the year
Russian Operations in 2024, Donetsk Axis
This war has turned the word “collapse” into a devalued buzzword. We are told repeatedly that one side or the other is on the verge of collapse: sanctions will “collapse” the Russian economy, the Wagner uprising of 2023 proved that the Russian political system was “collapsing”, and of course we hear that exorbitant losses have one army or the other on the verge of total failure – which army that may be depends on who you ask.
I would argue, however, that what we saw from October 2024 onward represents a real occurrence of this oft-repeated and discarded word. The AFU suffered a genuine collapse of the southeastern front, with the forces positioned in their strongpoints too attrited and isolated to make a determined defense, Russian fires becoming too heavily concentrated in ever more compressed areas to endure, and no mechanized reserve in the theater available to counterattack or relieve the incessant Russian pressure.
Ukraine does maintain enough drones and concentrated fires to limit a full Russian exploitation – that is, Russia is still not able to maneuver at depth. This gave the Russian advance a particular stop-start quality, leapfrogging from one settlement and fortress to the other. More generally, Russia’s preference to use dispersed small-unit assaults limits the potential for exploitation. We have to emphasize, however, that Russian momentum on this axis has never seriously slackened since October, and many of the key Ukrainian positions were overrun or abandoned very quickly
Ugledar is a good example: the Russians began their final push toward the town on September 24. By September 29, the 72nd Mechanized Brigade began evacuating. By October 1, Ugledar was fully under Russian control. This was a keystone Ukrainian position put in a completely untenable position and it went down in a week. One could argue, of course, that Ugledar held out for years (how then can we say with a straight face that it was captured in a week), but this is precisely the point. In early 2023 Ugledar (with the help of artillery stationed around Kurakhove) successfully repelled a multi-brigade Russian attack in months of heavy fighting. By October 2024, the position was completely untenable and was abandoned almost immediately when attacked.
The Ukrainians did no better trying to hold Kurakhove – previously a critical rear area that served as both a logistical hub and a base of fire for supporting (former) frontline strongpoints like Ugledar and Krasnogorivka. Kurakhove, now under full Russian control, will in turn serve as a base of support for the ongoing Russian push to the west towards Andriivka.
Taking the state of the front holistically, the AFU is currently holding two severe salients at the southernmost end of the line – one around Velyka Novosilka, and another around Andriivka. The former is likely to fall first, as the town has been fully isolated by Russian advances on the flanks. This is not a Bakhmut-like situation, where roads are described as “cut” because they are under Russian fire – in this case, all of the highways into Velyka Novosilka are cut by physical Russian blocking positions, making the loss of the position only a matter of waiting for the Russians to assault it. Further north, a more gentle and less strongly held salient exists between Grodivka and Toretsk. With Toretsk now in the final stages of capture (Ukrainian forces now hold only a small residential neighborhood on the city’s outskirts), the front should level here as well in the coming months.
This leaves the Russians more or less in full control of the approaches to Kostyantinivka and Pokrovsk, which are in many ways the penultimate Ukrainian held positions in Donetsk. Pokrovsk has already been bypassed several miles to the west, and the map portends a re-run of the typical Russian tactical methodology for assaulting urban areas – a methodical advance along the wings of the city to isolate it from arterial highways, followed by an attack on the city itself via several axes
The coming months promise continued Russian advances across this front, in a continuation of what can only be regarded as the collapse of a critical front on the part of the AFU. The Russian Army is advancing to the western border of Donetsk oblast and will ferret the Ukrainians out of their remaining strongpoints at Velyka Novosilka and Andriivka, while pushing into the belly of Pokrovsk. At no point since the fall of Avdiivka have the Ukrainians demonstrated the ability to seriously stymie Russian momentum along this 75 mile front, and the ongoing dissipation of Ukrainian combat resources indicates that little will change in this regard in 2025.
Toehold: The Incredible Shrinking Kursk Salient
Throughout the autumn of 2024 and these early months of winter, as Ukrainian forces were dug out of their dense web of fortified positions in the southern Donbas, their comrades continued to stubbornly hold on to their position in Russia’s Kursk Oblast. The basic shape of Ukraine’s offensive into Kursk is by now well known – billed by Kiev as a gambit to change the psychological trajectory of the war and strike a prestige blow to Russia, the Ukrainian attack had early momentum after achieving initial strategic surprise, but quickly faltered after Ukrainian columns ran into effective Russian blocking positions on the highways out of Sudzha. Efforts to force the roads through Korenovo and Bolshoe Soldatskoe were defeated, and the Ukrainian grouping was left holding on to a modest salient around Sudzha, jutting out into Russia.
Throughout the autumn, Russian counterattacks have focused on chiseling away at the base of the Ukrainian salient – forcing the Ukrainians out of Snagost and pushing them away from Korenovo. The progress here has been incremental, but significant, and by the start of January the “neck” of the Ukrainian salient had been compressed down to a little over nine miles wide, after their initial penetration in the summer had forced a breach of over twenty miles. All told, Ukraine has lost about 50% of the territory that they grabbed in August.
The Russian pressure on the flanks of the salient have amplified many of the qualities that make this position wasteful and dangerous for the AFU. There is limited road connectivity for Ukrainian forces – a problem amplified by the rollback from Snagost, which cost them access to the highway running from Korenovo to Sumy. Apart from a few circuitous side roads, Ukrainian forces only have a single highway – the R200 route – to run material and reinforcements into the pocket, which allows Russian forces to surveil their lines of communication and conduct effective interdiction strikes. The compression of the pocket also greatly narrows the targeting area for Russian drones, tube artillery, and rocketry, and creates more condensed and saturating bombardment
Despite the fact that this position has been profoundly unproductive for Ukraine – being steadily rolled back and having no synergy with other, more critical theaters – the same grouping of Ukrainian units remain here, fighting in a steadily more compressed space. Even more baffling, the Ukrainian grouping consists largely of premiere assets – Mechanized and Air Assault brigades – that could have contributed meaningfully as a reserve in the Donbas over the last three months.
The tactical particulars of the Ukrainian attack are interesting, and there’s ongoing speculation as to its purpose – perhaps it was intended to cover a rotation or withdrawal, to improve tactical positions on the northern edge of the salient, or for inscrutable propaganda purposes. However, these specifics are rather unimportant: attacking out the end of the salient (that is, trying to deepen the penetration into Russia) does nothing to reverse Ukraine’s problems in Kursk. These problems are first, on the tactical level, that the salient has been greatly compressed on the flanks and continues to narrow, and on the strategic level the willful expenditure of valuable mechanized assets on a front that does not impact the critical theaters of the war. More simply, Kursk is a sideshow, and it is a sideshow that has gone wrong even within its own operational logic.
One thing that has been of endless interest, of course, have been the continued rumors of North Korean troops fighting in Kursk. Western intelligence agencies have been adamant about the presence of North Koreans in Kursk. Some people are predisposed to instinctively disbelieve everything that western officialdom says – while I think some skepticism is warranted, I do not automatically assume that they are lying. One recent report lays out what would seem to be a plausible version of this story: that the idea actually originated in Pyongyang, not Moscow, and that a modest number of Korean troops (perhaps 10,000) are embedded with Russian units. The presumption here is that the Koreans hatched the idea as a way to gain combat experience, with the Russians in turn getting auxiliary forces, though of questionable combat effectiveness.
However, it is worth noting that this is not nearly as important as it has been made out to be. Much has been made of the idea that the North Korean presence proves some sort of Russian state of desperation, but this is fairly silly on its face – with more than 1.5 million active personnel in the Russian military, 10,000 Korean troops in Kursk represents a paltry appendage. More importantly, there has been an attempt to portray the North Korean contingent as a major departure point in the war. In particular, the formulation “North Korean troops in Europe” has been used to conjure cold war imagery of communist despotism clawing at the free world
The point, however, is that North Korean troops are presumed specifically to be in Kursk, which is in Russia. This is linked, of course, to the recently concluded mutual defense agreement signed between Moscow and Pyongyang. By attacking into Kursk – widening the front into prewar Russian territory – Ukraine created a defensive combat task for Russia which triggers the possibility of military assistance from North Korea. However much one may wish to link the Korean contingent to Russia’s dreaded “war of aggression”, the force in Kursk is very objectively engaged in the defense of Russian territory, and that makes it possible for Russia to use auxiliary forces – including conscripts and the troops of its allies – to fight there.
Ultimately, then, the presence of North Koreans in Kursk is interesting, but perhaps not very important after all. These troops are not in Ukraine (even under the most maximal definition of the Ukrainian territorial unit), they are not carrying the primary combat load, and they are unequivocally not the problem that the AFU is facing in Kursk. The “big problem” for Ukraine, very simply, is not the presence of some amorphous Korean horde dedicated to spreading Glorious Juche to Europe – it is the loitering of large grouping of their own precious mechanized brigades in a compressed salient, far far away from the Donbas, where they are greatly needed.
Scraping the Barrel: AFU Force Generation
I think it is well understood, of course, that Ukraine faces severe manpower constraints relative to Russia, both in terms of the raw totals of male biomass available – with roughly 35 million fighting aged males in Russia against perhaps 9 million in prewar Ukraine – but also in terms of its capacity to mobilize them.
Ukraine’s mobilization scheme is hampered by both widespread draft evasion (with willingness to serve decreasing as the war has stretched on) and a stubborn unwillingness to draft younger men, aged 18-25. Ukraine is structurally burdened with a deeply imbalanced population structure: there are roughly 60% more Ukrainian men in their 30’s than in their 20’s. Given the relative scarcity of young men, particularly in their early 20’s, the Ukrainian government rightly views this 18-25 year old cohort as a premium demographic cohort that it is loathe to burn away in combat. Given the ubiquity of draft evasion, the refusal to mobilize younger males, and the corruption and inefficiency characteristic of the Ukrainian government, it should come as no surprise when Ukrainian mobilization falters
All of that is to say: Ukraine faces a severe structural disadvantage in military manpower in the aggregate, which is exacerbated by the idiosyncrasies of the Ukrainian mobilization law, ameliorated slightly by the relatively low troop densities and the preponderant power of strike systems in this war.
The argument that I want to make here, however, is that Ukraine’s systemic problems matching Russian manpower have been exacerbated by several developments which specifically became prominent in 2024. In other words, 2024 can and should be marked as the year where Ukrainian manpower constraints became markedly and perhaps irretrievably worse due to specific decisions made in Kiev, and particular developments on the ground.
These are as follows:
The decision to expand the AFU’s force structure through the creation of the “15 series” brigades
The decision to deliberately widen the front and create additional demands for manpower by launching the incursion into Kursk
The stall out of Ukraine’s new mobilization program in the autumn
Accelerating problems with desertion in the AFU
We’ll run through these in order.
An army that is intaking new personnel has to decide between two possible allocations for them. New personnel can be used as replacements to replenish existing frontline units, or they can be used to expand the force structure by creating new units. That much seems fairly obvious, and ideally mobilization will exceed losses and make it possible to do both. Where armies face hard manpower constraints, however – that is, where losses are equal to or greater than intake of men, the decision to expand the force structure can have monumental consequences. The stereotypical example, of course, would be the late-war Wehrmacht, which created premiere new assets in the form of Waffen SS divisions, which received privileged access to recruits and equipment while regular army divisions in the line suffered from a trickle of replacements which could not keep up with losses.
Ukraine, with its garbled force structure, has created a mess through its own attempts to expand its force structure in the face of dwindling strength on the line. Late in 2023, the AFU announced intentions to form an entirely new grouping of brigades – the so-called “15 series”, given their designations as the 150th, 151st, 152nd, 153rd, and 154th Mechanized Brigades. This was followed in 2024 with the appending of the 155th Mechanized Brigade, which was to be trained and equipped in France.
Forming a new grouping of mechanized brigades is essential to the way that Ukraine is presenting its war. Because Ukraine still aims (at least on paper) to recapture all of its Russian held territory, there must always be the illusory possibility of a future offensive, and in order for that illusory possibility to remain, Ukraine must present itself as actively preparing for future offensive operations. Ukraine’s presentation of its own strategic animus – the idea that it is holding the front while it prepares to go back on the offensive – essentially locks it into a program of expanding its force structure
The problem for Ukraine is that the immense pressure on the front makes it essentially impossible for them to properly husband resources the way they would like. Properly training and equipping half a dozen fresh mechanized brigades and holding them in reserve would be very helpful, but they cannot really do this in light of the demands for personnel at the front. These brigades instead become “paper formations” that have a bureaucratic existence, while their organic assets are pulled apart and sucked into the front – stripped down into battalion or company sized elements that can be plugged into sectors of need on the frontline. At the moment, none of the 15 series brigades have seen action as organic units – that is, fighting as themselves.
The decision to allocate personnel to new mechanized brigades (though given stocks of armored vehicles it is questionable whether those designations mean anything) does not necessarily change Ukraine’s manpower balance in the aggregate, but it is certainly an inefficient way to use personnel. To return again to the 155th brigade, one problem noted by Ukrainian analysts was the fact that much of the brigade was formed whole cloth from forcibly mobilized personnel, without a proper cadre of veterans and experienced NCOs – some 75% of the brigade, it turns out, had been mobilized less than two months before arriving in France for training. This fact was certainly instrumental in the mass desertions and the brigade’s poor combat effectiveness.
Given Ukraine’s constraints, the best course of action would undoubtedly be to allocate new personnel and equipment as replacements to build out the depleted veteran brigades on the front lines, plugging in replacements around existing veterans and officers. Kiev, however, prizes the prestige that comes from force expansion and the “shiny new toy” factor of new formations equipped with scarce and valuable equipment like Leopard tanks. These new brigades, though billed as premiere assets, clearly have lower combat effectiveness than existing formations, given their lack of experience, shortage of veteran officers, and low unit cohesion.
In short, Ukraine’s decision to embark on force expansion in the face of significant manpower shortages has exacerbated the problem – both starving veteran units of replacements and concentrating newly mobilized personnel into combat ineffective formations that lack a veteran core, experienced officers, and vital equipment. They have tried, belatedly, to square this circle by parceling out new formations to backstop line brigades, but this is less than ideal – it leads to a patchwork order of battle with lower unit cohesion and a fragmented defense.
Unfortunately, this comes precisely as Ukraine has created additional self-imposed strains on its resources, in particular through its incursion into Kursk. At the moment, elements of at least seven mechanized brigades, two marine infantry brigades, and three air assault brigades are stationed on the Kursk axis. Without going too far into the weeds rehashing Ukraine’s operation here, it’s important to remember that Ukraine – facing extreme pressures on its force generation – voluntarily chose to widen the front into a secondary theater, diverting scarce assets and reducing its own ability to economize forces.
In summary, Ukraine has made deliberate decisions to widen the front and expand its force structure, both of which have been decidedly detrimental to its efforts to economize personnel. This comes precisely as a 2024 effort to ramp up mobilization has come off the rails.
A deadly feedback loop is now at work, with the lack of rotations and the shortage of replacements synergizing to accelerate the burn of Ukrainian personnel. The AFU is unable to regularly rotate units out of combat, and the inadequate flow of replacements causes frontline infantry complements to wear thin. Unable to rotate or reinforce, line brigades resort to cannibalization – scraping support personnel like mortar teams, drivers, and drone operators to fill out frontline positions. This further accelerates losses as brigades fight with thinned out support and fires elements, and makes Ukrainian men more unwilling to enlist – because there is now no guarantee that becoming a drone operator, for example, will save one from being sent to a frontline trench eventually.
Where does this leave us? Ukraine continues to dispose of a very large force, with more than a hundred brigades and hundreds of thousands of men under arms. This force, however, is both substantially outnumbered by the Russian army and in a clear trend of decay. Despite a highly touted attempt to reinvigorate the mobilization apparatus in 2024, the intake of new personnel is clearly too low to offset losses, and the heavy lifting formations in critical sectors of front have seen their strength – particularly in the infantry complements – decline, in some cases to critical levels.
The failure of Ukraine’s 2024 mobilization program has coincided with several strategic choices which have exacerbated manpower concerns – specifically the decision to embark on a program of force expansion even as the AFU voluntarily extended its commitments by opening a new secondary front in Kursk. In other words, Ukraine’s mobilization falls short of its force requirements, and the AFU has also made choices that sabotaged its ability to economize. Units are ground up, replacements come in a paltry trickle, rotations are late or absent, units cannibalize themselves, and angry and weary men desert.
It’s not at all clear that this will lead to a “breaking point”, in the sense that people are anticipating. Ukrainian strike capabilities and the Russian preference for dispersed, leapfrogging assaults limit the potential for grand breakthroughs and exploitation. However, what we saw over the past three months on the southern Donetsk axis offers a preview of what awaits: an exhausted force being steadily rolled back, dug out of its strongpoints, and mauled – covering its retreat with drones but losing position after position. The line holds, until it doesn’t.
End of the Line: ATACMs, JASSMs, and Hazelnuts
Ukraine’s ability to remain in the field depends on a titration of two indispensable resources: first, Ukrainian male biomass, and secondly the critical western weaponry that gives them combat effectiveness. We have evaluated the first: Ukraine is not exactly out of men, but the trends of its mobilization program are poor and personnel shortages are mounting. The trends regarding the second are, if anything, even more foreboding for Kiev.
There are two general dynamics that have emerged, neither of which create an optimistic picture for Ukraine, which we’ll examine in turn. These are as follows:
The delivery of heavy weaponry to Ukraine (tanks, IFVs, and artillery tubes) has largely dried up in recent months.
The west has essentially run out of escalatory weaponry (strike systems) to give, and those systems already given have failed to meaningfully altar the trajectory of the war.
In 2023, building out new mechanized units was the name of the game, with the Pentagon leading a multinational effort to stand up an entire army corps worth of units equipped with Leopards, Challengers, and a whole slew of western IFVs and APCs. When that lovingly assembled grouping bashed its head on a rock in the botched assault on the Zaporizhia line, the United States belatedly and begrudgingly dispatched its own Abrams to backstop the Ukrainian tank force. In 2024, however, deliveries of heavy weapons slowed to a trickle.
The role of the tank in Ukraine has been greatly misunderstood. The vulnerability of tanks to the myriad strike systems of the modern battlefield led some observers to declare that the tank as a weapons system was now obsolete, but this did not really square with the fact that both combatants in this war were eager to deploy as many as possible. Tanks need more critical enablers – more combat engineering, air defense, and electronic warfare support – but they continue to fill an indispensable role and remain an essential item in this war. The failure of Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive showed, if anything, that tanks simply are not “game changing” systems, but mass consumption items – but this has always been the case. The signature quality of iconic tanks like the Sherman and the T34 was that they were numerous
While 2023 was all about building out Ukraine’s mechanized package with tanks, IFVs, and engineering, 2024 has been largely about enhancing Ukraine’s strike capabilities. There have been two separate elements at play – first, the delivery of both air and ground launched systems (most notably the British Storm Shadows and American ATACMs respectively), and secondly the loosening of the rules of engagement to allow Ukraine to strike targets inside pre-war Russia.
This dovetailed, as it turned out, with Ukraine’s operation in Kursk, and in many ways the most direct impact of the Kursk incursion has been to force the west’s hand on the rules of engagement. While Ukraine has long been striking inside Russia with indigenous systems, most notably drones, the White House continued to drag its feet on formal approval for strikes with American systems. By launching a ground assault on Kursk, Ukraine made the decision for them: the United States gave clearance to use ATACMs to support the ground forces in Kursk, and this metastasized into general license to strike Russia with the full range of available systems. This was a poignant reminder that, however we conceive of the proxy-sponsor relationship, Ukraine has some ability to force America’s hand: a classic example of the tail wagging the dog.
In any case, 2024 saw Ukraine and its western backers slowly but surely bash through all the supposed red-lines in this domain: the British breached first with the delivery of Storm Shadows late in 2023, and this was followed by the delivery of ATACMs (with a handful of F16’s to boot), and finally the loosening of the rules of engagement to clear strikes on Russia.
Where does this leave us? There would seem to be three important things to consider.
The west has essentially reached the end of its escalation chain. The only remaining step that they can take would be to supply Ukraine with JASSMs (Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile), which would mark a quantitative but not a meaningful qualitative upgrade to Ukraine’s strike capabilities.
Ukraine’s use of western-supplied strike assets has been dissipated and has not materially improved their situation on the ground.
Russia maintains a dominant strike advantage, both qualitative and quantitative.
Ukraine faces a stark disadvantage in strike capability relative to Russia, in a variety of ways. Russian strike assets are far more numerous and have significant range advantages, but it is also important to take into consideration both Russia’s significantly greater strategic depth and its more dense and relatively unscathed air defense. Unlike Ukraine, which has seen its air defense stretch to the limit with destroyed launchers and a mounting interceptor shortage, Russia’s air defenses have been essentially untouched, as Ukraine has lacked the large numbers of assets required to conduct a proper SEAD/DEAD (Suppression/Destruction of Enemy Air Defense) campaign.
Given this basic calculus, using western strike systems to wage a blow for blow strategic air campaign is bad math for Ukraine. It is generally unwise to engage in a bat fight when your opponent is a bigger man with a much longer bat. Instead, Ukraine’s strike systems should have been leveraged to support ground operations – concentrating strikes spatially and in time to synergize with efforts on the ground. Just as a simple thought experiment, it is not difficult to imagine ATACMs making a difference if they had been available in 2023 and used to saturate Russian rear areas during the assault on the Zaporizhia line – striking in tempo with the mechanized assault to disrupt Russian command and control and prevent reinforcement of critical areas.
Two things need to be noted about the JASSM. First, the JASSM – while offering slightly longer ranges – would essentially serve as a backstop/replacement for the rapidly dwindling ATACMs and particularly the air launched Storm Shadows – instead of Ukraine’s native SU-24s launching Storm Shadows, they would utilize F-16s launching JASSMs. This would not represent a dramatic upgrade in Ukrainian capabilities, but would instead simply serve to maintain a bare minimum Ukrainian strike capability. JASSMs are a replacement for dwindling capabilities, not an augmentation to them.
Secondly, it must be understood that JASSMs are the last stop. We’re now entering the territory, not of artificially constructed red lines, but physical and real limits. Russia has essentially eaten the gifted stocks of ATACMs and Storm Shadows, with little discernable effect on their ability to fight, and JASSMs are the last extant item in the inventories to keep Ukrainian strike capabilities operative. We are at the last rung of the aid ladder.
In the case of JASSMs, however, there are notable downsides for the United States. This is an important case of putting all of one’s eggs in the same technological basket. In 2020, the United States scrapped the development of its conventionally armed Long Range Standoff Missile, making the JASSM – particularly the new extended range variants – the system for the United States, earmarked to play a critical role in future conflicts, particularly in the Pacific. This makes the JASSM an extremely sensitive system, as a centerpiece of American strike capabilities, particularly with the modernization of the Tomahawk system crawling along at a few dozen units per year.
Given the fact that JASSMs are GPS guided, there are real reasons to be reticent about giving Ukraine such a technologically sensitive system. Russian electronic warfare has enjoyed considerable success jamming GPS and disrupting similarly guided American systems. Allowing the Russians to gain familiarity with a keystone American system could wreak havoc on Pentagon war planning – most, if not all of the strike eggs are in this basket, so why let an adversary peek inside?
It’s probable, given what we have seen to this point, that these concerns will ultimately be dismissed and Ukraine will receive a line of JASSMs which will backstop their strike capabilities – but given the size of Ukraine’s F-16 fleet, the scale will be constrained. Furthermore, air launched systems are less optimal for Ukraine, given their dependence on large and easily targeted airfields, in contrast to ground launched systems which are mobile and more easily concealed.
There is also the matter of the new Russian missile system – the now famous Oreshnik, or Hazel Tree. Russia tested the Oreshnik system on a large machining plant in Dnipro on November 21, 2024, which allowed the basic capabilities of the system to be gauged. The Oreshnik is an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile, characterized by its hypersonic capabilities (exceeding Mach-10) and its Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle equipped with six separate warheads, with the potential for submunitions in each. Although the attack on Dnipro was essentially a demonstration which used inert training warheads (that is, without explosive payloads), the missile can be configured with nuclear or conventional warheads
As in the case of the North Korean troops in Kursk, I rather think that the Oreshnik launch was not nearly as important as it was made out to be. The system is expensive and likely impractical for conventional use. I understand the desire to conceive of Oreshnik as a massively powerful conventional weapon – showering its target with half a dozen warheads with the power of an entire flight of Kalibr missiles – but there are several problems with this. The accuracy of the system (the CEP, or “Circular Error Probable” in the technical parlance) is much more consistent with a nuclear delivery system than a conventional one. Furthermore, the problem with using an IRBM for conventional strikes is the danger of miscalculation – foreign adversaries may misinterpret the launch as a nuclear attack and respond appropriately. This is precisely why the Russian government actually alerted the United States to the launch ahead of time – a fine arrangement for a demonstration, but impractical for a weapon that is intended to be used regularly.
We may see another use of the Oreshnik against Ukraine, but ultimately this is unlikely to be a system of consequence in this war. The demonstration in Dnipro was instead likely intended to send a message to Europe – reminding NATO that Russia has the capacity to deliver strikes against European targets that cannot be intercepted. It also serves as a poignant reminder that Europe lacks the equivalent capability, and in essence provides a demonstration of Russia’s ability to launch missiles from far beyond the range of either Ukrainian or European response. The Hazelnut is a tangible reminder of Russia’s strategic depth and strike dominance in Ukraine.
Ultimately, Ukraine will lose the strike game. It’s strike capacity has dwindled, with missiles frittered away in a dissipated air campaign, and though the exhaustion of Storm Shadow and ATACMs stocks can be offset somewhat by JASSMs, Ukraine simply lacks the range or quantities necessary to match Russian capabilities. Needing to do more with less, Ukraine instead diffused its assets and failed to synergize its strikes with ground operations. We are now at the end of the line – after JASSMs, there’s nothing left in western warehouses to upgrade Ukrainian capabilities. Hazelnuts or no, the math on this bat fight is bad for Kiev.
Conclusion: Debellation
Trapped in an endless news cycle, with daily footage of FPV strikes and exploding vehicles, and a dutiful cottage industry of war mappers alerting us to every 100 meter advance, it can easily feel like the Russo-Ukrainian War is trapped in an interminable doom loop which will never end – Mad Max meets Groundhog Day.
What I have endeavored to do here, however, is argue that 2024 actually saw several very important developments which make the coming shape of the war relatively clear. To briefly recapitulate:
Russian forces caved in Ukrainian defenses at depth across an entire critical axis of front. After remaining static for years, Ukraine’s position in Southern Donetsk has been obliterated, with Russian forces advancing through an entire belt of fortified positions, pushing the front into Pokrovsk and Kostayantinivka.
The main Ukrainian gambit on the ground (the incursion into Kursk) failed spectacularly, with the salient being progressively caved in. An entire grouping of critical mechanized formations wasted much of the year fighting on this unproductive and secondary front, leaving Ukrainian positions in the Donbas increasingly threadbare and bereft of reserves.
An attempt by the Ukrainian government to reinvigorate its mobilization program failed, with enlistments quickly trailing off. Decisions to expand the force structure exacerbated the shortage of manpower, and as a result the decay of Ukraine’s frontline brigades has accelerated.
Long awaited western upgrades to Ukraine’s strike capabilities failed to defeat Russian momentum, and stocks of ATACMs and Storm Shadows are nearly exhausted. There are now few options remaining to prop up Ukrainian strike capacity, and no prospect of Ukraine gaining dominance in this dimension of the war.
In short, Ukraine is on the path to debellation – defeat through the total exhaustion of its capacity to resist. They are not exactly out of men and vehicles and missiles, but these lines are all pointing downward. A strategic Ukrainian defeat – once unthinkable to the western foreign policy apparatus and commentariat – is now on the table. Quite interestingly, now that Donald Trump is about to return to the White House, it is suddenly acceptable to speak of Ukrainian defeat. Robert Kagan – a stalwart champion of Ukraine if there ever was one – now says the quiet part out loud:
Ukraine will likely lose the war within the next 12 to 18 months. Ukraine will not lose in a nice, negotiated way, with vital territories sacrificed but an independent Ukraine kept alive, sovereign, and protected by Western security guarantees. It faces instead a complete defeat, a loss of sovereignty, and full Russian control
Indeed.
None of this should be particularly surprising. If anything, it is shocking that my position – that Russia is essentially a very powerful country that was very unlikely to lose a war (which it perceives as existential) right in its own belly – somehow became controversial or fringe. But here we are.
chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia
the victim is Annalena Baerbock, the most arrogant lettuce in the world
The image of Annalena Baerbock is blurred (Al Mharar)
After the victory on December 8, 2024, of the so-called Syrian revolution [most Western media], actually a Sunni radical uprising that the West was supporting since 2011 against Bashar Assad, former secular Syria is not in good shape.
Israel is occupying some strategic southern territories, but the authorities of the brand new jihadist emirate and their militias are considering more relevant to fight against the Lebanese army along the border. East of Euphrates, the Kurds (SDF / YPG) are still guarding oil fields on behalf of their US masters and are refusing to toe the line. Turkey and its Neo-Ottoman auxiliaries may attack them soon
Jean-Noël Barrot is the French foreign affairs minister (screenshots)
On January 3, 2025, Annalena Baerbock and Jean-Noël Barrot, for Germany and France, visit Damascus, where they meet Muhammad al Julani, former jihadist warlord and the leader of the so-called transitional government, that the two foreign ministers are attempting to lobby, in order to make the new emirate more compliant with the so-called European values.
The attempt seems a bitter failure, especially for Annalena Baerbock, the most arrogant lettuce in the world. First affront to swallow: Julani refuses to shake her hand
Annalena Baerbock and her Nazi grandpa Waldemar (BILD on February 8, 2024)
The Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA, 124 000 subscribers on Telegram) was already the public channel before the jihadist victory. Its target is rather international and SANA publishes without tampering the photo of the diplomatic meeting
The official channel of the Free Syria News Network – Comprehensive coverage of all events in Syria, moment by moment – A channel that races the event to transmit the news
Al Mharar is not even the voice of HTS, al Qaeda franchise in Syria and the main military force in the new emirate, is rather standing for what Western media used to call the Free Syrian Army (FSA), Turkey-backed Neo-Ottoman militias, supposed moderate [head choppers].
Baerbock’s misfortunes are negligible in comparison to the fate of Syrian minorities, Alawites, Christians or Sufis, whom the jihadist gunmen are currently persecuting in the Western part of former secular Syria
National anthem of former secular Syria, a TV broadcast in the morning of November 2, 2024
Until recently, a serious geopolitical working hypothesis was that West Asia and Ukraine were two vectors of the standard Hegemon modus operandi, which is to incite and unleash Forever Wars. Now both wars are united in an Omni-War
the jihadist operation in Paris, on November 13, 2015, was the collateral damage of the Western support to the so-called Syrian revolution, a Sunni radical uprising against the secular government of Syria, which began in 2011 and that global jihadists joined from worldwide
[my illustration : on June 4, 2019, the TIP (east Turkestan Islamic party, Doğu Türkistan İslâm Harriet in Turkish) releases a new propaganda video (screenshot). These Uyghur jihadists are fighting in northwestern Syria, against the Syrian secular forces, within al Qaeda’s local branch (Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, Organization for the Liberation of the Levant, HTS), which is settled under NATO protection in Idlib pocket]
Foreign jihadists have been appointed in senior positions in the new Syrian military, which is now led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an offshoot of al-Qaeda that led the offensive that ousted former President Bashar al-Assad.
Syrian sources told Reuters that the foreign fighters appointed to the military include Uyghurs, a Jordanian, a Turk, and an Albanian. “This is a small token of recognition for the sacrifices Islamist jihadists gave to our struggle for freedom from Assad’s oppression,” an HTS source told the media outlet.
Among the Uyghurs is Abdulaziz Dawood Khudaberdi, the commander of the Turkistan Islamic Party’s (TIP) forces in Syria. The TIP’s stated goal is to create an Islamic State in China’s western Xinjiang region. Khudaberdi was named a brigadier general in the Syrian military, and two other Uyghur fighters were appointed colonels.
Sources told Reuters that Turkish citizen Omar Mohammed Jaftashi and Jordanian citizen Abdul Rahman Hussein al-Khatib were also made brigadier-generals. Abdul Jashari, an Albanian fighter who was designated a terrorist by the US Treasury Department, was made a colonel.
HTS is still designated by the US as a foreign terrorist organization, but the Biden administration has celebrated its takeover of Syria. The US has also made clear it’s willing to work with the new government and its de facto leader, Abu Mohammad al-Julani, who has been going by his real name Ahmed al-Sharaa.
Earlier this month, Barbara Leaf, the US Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs, met with Julani and announced the US was removing a $10 million bounty on his head. Julani, a former al-Qaeda leader, appointed other HTS members in senior positions of the “transitional government” and has said elections in Syria probably won’t happen for at least four years [end]
Until recently, a serious geopolitical working hypothesis was that West Asia and Ukraine were two vectors of the standard Hegemon modus operandi, which is to incite and unleash Forever Wars. Now both wars are united in an Omni-War
the jihadist operation in Paris, on November 13, 2015, was the collateral damage of the Western support to the so-called Syrian revolution, a Sunni radical uprising against the secular government of Syria, which began in 2011 and that global jihadists joined from worldwide
[my illustration: on December 11, 2024, an Israeli tank is hanging around near the so-called Alpha line, between the already annexed Golan heights and former secular Syria (Morning Star)]
In the wake of ultra-extremist militants Hayat Tahrir al-Sham seizing Damascus, Zionist entity premier Benjamin Netanyahu gave a smug address from the Golan Heights, Syrian territory illegally occupied ever since 1967. Along the way, he took personal credit for the fall of Bashar Assad’s government and the Syrian Arab Army’s defeat, while pledging the ground on which he stood would be part of Israel “for eternity”. Ever since, Israeli Occupation Forces have pushed ever-deeper into Golan, unimpeded and unopposed.
Tel Aviv’s criminal seizure of yet further territory from its neighbours was an absolutely inevitable upshot of Syria’s collapse. However, some Western journalists and politicians have expressed dismay – in many cases, the same figures were cheering Assad’s fall just 24 hours prior. Consternation has also widely abounded over the foreign-dominated and controlled opposition groups that overran Damascus effusively praising the Zionist entity’s assistance in their offensive against the SAA
HTS militants celebrate after the fall of Damascus
Speaking to Israeli TV on December 2nd, one rebel fighter thanked Tel Aviv for striking Hezbollah and other Resistance groups, stating the opposition was “very satisfied” with the support. They added:
We love Israel and we were never its enemies…[Tel Aviv] isn’t hostile to those who are not hostile toward it. We don’t hate you, we love you very much
‘Striking Deeper’
While never acknowledged in the mainstream, the Zionist entity’s sinister alliance with extremist opposition groups arrayed against Damascus has long-laid in plain sight. A September 2018 investigation by US Empire house journal Foreign Policy spelled out in detail “Israel’s secret program to back Syrian rebels.” It documented how, since 2013, Tel Aviv “armed and funded at least 12 rebel groups” in the country. The ostensible purpose was to “prevent Iran-backed fighters and militants of the Islamic State from taking up positions near the Israeli border.”
The entity’s “military transfers” to anti-Assad opposition groups were vast. They “included assault rifles, machine guns, mortar launchers and transport vehicles.” The materiel was funnelled via the illegally occupied Golan Heights. Israel even “provided salaries to rebel fighters…and supplied additional money the groups used to buy arms on the Syrian black market.” Initially, arms transferred were “mostly US-manufactured”, but these were later “switched” to “non-American weapons…apparently to conceal the source of the assistance.”
Every step of the way, Israel’s backing of the Syrian opposition ratcheted. Foreign Policy attributes this ever-aggressive stance to Tel Aviv’s failed “appeals” to the US and Russia “to secure a deal that would ensure that Iranian-backed militias would be kept away from southern Syria.” This prompted the entity to “[begin] striking deeper inside Syrian territory, targeting not just individual weapons shipments from Iran to Hezbollah but also Iranian bases across the country.”
In providing this largesse, Tel Aviv “relied on relationships it developed with individual commanders” of extremist militias, sending “assistance directly to them.” Representatives of these factions “would communicate with Israeli officials by phone and occasionally meet them face to face” in the Golan Heights. “When commanders switched groups and locations, Israeli assistance followed them” – and the entity’s chosen proxies frequently served as distributors of Zionist-supplied weaponry “to other groups”, giving them “outsized influence” in the dirty war
The IOF careens around Golan Heights
Foreign Policy records, “as a result of Israel’s humanitarian and military assistance, many residents of southern Syria came to perceive it as an ally.” A nameless opposition fighter told the outlet, “Israel is the only one with interests in the region and a little bit of humanity and [provides] assistance to civilians.” However, “as troops loyal to Assad, aided by Russian and Iranian forces, reasserted control over more and more areas of Syria,” Tel Aviv cut a secret deal with Moscow, to the opposition’s detriment.
Under its auspices, SAA forces returned to “areas adjacent to the Golan Heights,” while Russia promised “to keep Iran-backed militias 80 kilometers” from the area, “and not to start hindering Israeli strikes on Iranian targets across Syria.” Despite this, Tel Aviv didn’t desert its murderous surrogates. As government forces closed in, “rebels reached out to their Israeli contacts and asked for asylum.” They and “their immediate family members” were duly permitted to flee to Israel, Jordan, and Turkey, with Tel Aviv’s assistance and protection.
With eerie foresight, Foreign Policy concluded that Israel’s policy of backing the rebels would contribute to significant and enduring unresolved security problems not only in Damascus, but throughout West Asia more widely:
[This] raises questions about the balance of power in Syria as the civil war there finally winds down. With the Iranian forces that helped Assad defeat the rebels showing no inclination to withdraw from Syria, the potential for the country to become a flash point between Israel and Iran looms large. Without deft diplomacy, confrontations in Syria, protests in Gaza, and tensions over the Iran nuclear deal could plunge the Middle East into chaos
‘Military Capabilities’
Foreign Policy was at pains to portray Israel’s assistance to the Syrian opposition as being predominantly informed by a desire to crush ISIS. For example, the outlet claimed Tel Aviv “provided fire support to rebel factions” fighting an Islamic State affiliate near the Yarmouk river. This purportedly extended to drone strikes targeting ISIS commanders, “and precision-missile strikes against the group’s personnel, fortifications, and vehicles during battles with the rebels.” Meanwhile, the Zionist entity “did not extend similar fire support for rebel assaults on regime forces.”
Yet, such an exculpatory narrative is at glaring odds with multiple public admissions by Israeli officials. For example, in April 2017 former entity defence minister Moshe Ya’alon revealed that “recently”, ISIS had “apologised” after “[opening] fire” on Tel Aviv’s forces in the Golan Heights. This contrition was expressed by the terror group despite the IOF responding to this broadside by bombarding Islamic State fighters with airstrikes and tank fire, killing four of them.
One might reasonably ponder why, despite these casualties, the monsters of ISIS felt the need to say sorry. An obvious explanation is the hyper-militant faction did not wish to offend Tel Aviv, lest the entity’s long-running operation to provide medical assistance to insurgents wounded in the Syrian dirty war in field hospitals dotted across Golan be terminated. From 2012 onwards, UN peacekeeping forces consistently testified to witnessing injured Al Qaeda, al-Nusra and ISIS fighters being treated by Israeli military doctors across the region.
Along the way, documentary filmmakers even captured video evidence of this practice. Once tended to, these belligerents were sent straight back into battle by their Zionist protectors, to fight Hezbollah and the Syrian Arab Army. These astonishing scenes went largely unremarked upon in the Western media, although in May 2016, ex-Mossad chief Efraim Halevy proudly boasted Tel Aviv was committed to a strategy of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” in its crusade to neutralise Assad:
It’s always useful to deal with your enemies in a humane way. When you have people who are wounded, considerations of whether to take them in are not simply whether it’s politically useful…I didn’t say there was no tactical [consideration]. I don’t think there’s going to be blowback…Al Qaeda to the best of my recollection hasn’t specifically targeted Israel…As Hezbollah fighters are concerned, we have a different account
Fast forward to today, and ever since Assad’s fall, Israel has relentlessly blitzed SAA sites in Syria. Entity officials boast the “historic” campaign has “destroyed most of the former [Assad] regime’s strategic military capabilities”, decimating up to 80% of the fallen government’s “strategic weapons stockpiles”. Markedly, there has been no attempt whatsoever by HTS to deter or respond to this bombardment, despite Damascus now being completely defenceless against future incursions from her adversaries. Group spokespeople have moreover actively refused to denounce the attacks.
Nonetheless, longtime Syrian “revolution” activists have expressed shock at Israel’s onslaught against the “newly liberated” country, and further illegal annexation of its territory, demanding Tel Aviv cease its inexorable assaults forthwith. We must ask ourselves whether such reactions are truly borne of ignorance and naivety about Israel’s rapacious expansionism. The reality may be the opposition all along knew precisely what would be unleashed following Assad’s ouster, and welcome it. After all, they were coordinating directly with the Zionist entity at every step of their struggle [end]
Until recently, a serious geopolitical working hypothesis was that West Asia and Ukraine were two vectors of the standard Hegemon modus operandi, which is to incite and unleash Forever Wars. Now both wars are united in an Omni-War
Sebastian Gorka’s involvement with British intelligence cost him a security clearance in Hungary. His longtime mentor is a UK spook currently engaged in covert operations against Russia. Is the Ukraine hawk and Trump counter-terror appointee operating on London time?
Leaked files show top UK military figures conspired to carry out the Kerch bridge bombing, covertly train “Gladio”-style stay-behind forces in Ukraine, and groom the British public for a drop in living standards caused by the proxy war against Russia
the jihadist operation in Paris, on November 13, 2015, was the collateral damage of the Western support to the so-called Syrian revolution, a Sunni radical uprising against the secular government of Syria, which began in 2011 and that global jihadists joined from worldwide
Ukrainian intelligence had provided Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an offshoot of al-Qaeda, with drone support weeks before the group launched the offensive in Syria that ousted former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, The Washington Post reported Tuesday.
“Ukrainian intelligence sent about 20 experienced drone operators and about 150 first-person-view drones to the rebel headquarters in Idlib, Syria, four to five weeks ago,” wrote Washington Post columnist David Ignatius.
While the US has celebrated Assad’s downfall, HTS is still listed by the US as a foreign terrorist organization, and its leader, Abu Mohammad al-Julani, has a $10 million US bounty on his head. That means Ukraine has supplied weapons and intelligence support to a group the US considers a terrorist organization.
Ukrainian and Russian reports have also reported that a special unit of Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (abbreviated GUR or HUR) had provided support to HTS and was involved in some attacks on Russian bases in Syria.
“Ukrainian military instructors from the GUR are present… training HTS fighters for combat operations,” Russian Ambassador to the UN Vassily Nebenzia said at the UN after the HTS offensive started.
The GUR has received significant support from the US over the years. The Washington Post reported last year that the CIA helped build up the GUR and the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) following the 2014 coup that ousted former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych. “GUR was our little baby. We gave them all new equipment and training,” a former US intelligence official who worked in Ukraine told the Post.
The GUR has also been involved in fighting Russia’s Wagner mercenary force in Africa. In Mali, the GUR provided support for a July ambush that killed 84 Wagner operatives and 47 Malians.
“The rebels received the necessary information, which enabled a successful military operation against Russian war criminals,” GUR official Andriy Yusov said of the attack. The rebel coalition that launched the attack in Mali included Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin, an affiliate of al-Qaeda [end]
Until recently, a serious geopolitical working hypothesis was that West Asia and Ukraine were two vectors of the standard Hegemon modus operandi, which is to incite and unleash Forever Wars. Now both wars are united in an Omni-War
the jihadist operation in Paris, on November 13, 2015, was the collateral damage of the Western support to the so-called Syrian revolution, a Sunni radical uprising against the secular government of Syria, which began in 2011 and that global jihadists joined from worldwide
Until recently, a serious geopolitical working hypothesis was that West Asia and Ukraine were two vectors of the standard Hegemon modus operandi, which is to incite and unleash Forever Wars. Now both wars are united in an Omni-War
(Hassan Ammar / AP)
A coalition of Straussian neo-cons in the US, hardcore revisionist Zionists in Tel Aviv and Ukrainian neo-nazi shades of grey is now betting on a Final Confrontation – with several overtones ranging from expanding lebensraum to provoking the Apocalypse.
What stands in their way is essentially two of the top BRICS: Russia and Iran.
China, self-protected by their collective lofty dream of “community of a shared future for mankind”, warily watches on the sidelines, as they know that at the end of the road, the true “existential” war by the Hegemon will be against them.
Meanwhile, Russia and Iran need to mobilize for Totalen Krieg. Because that’s what the enemy is launching.
Undermining BRICS and the INSTC
The total destabilisation of Syria, with heavy CIA-MI6 input, now proceeding in real time, is a carefully engineered gambit to undermine BRICS and beyond.
It proceeds in parallel to Pashinyan removing Armenia from the CSTO – based on a US promise to support Yerevan in a possible new clash with Baku; India being encouraged to ramp up a weapons race with Pakistan; and across-the-board intimidation of Iran.
As it stands, the INSTC is totally geopolitical risk-free. As a top BRICS corridor-in-the-making, it carries the potential to become even more effective than several of China’s cross-Heartland corridors of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
The INSTC would be a key lifeline for a great deal of the global economy in case of a direct confrontation between the US/Israel combo and Iran – with the possible shutdown of the Strait of Hormuz leading to the collapse of a multi-quadrillion pile of financial derivatives, economically imploding the collective West.
Turkiye under Erdogan, as usual, is playing a double game. Rhetorically, Ankara stands by a genocide-free and sovereign Palestine. In practice, the Turkiye supports and funds a motley crew of Greater Idlibistan jihadis – trained by Ukrainian Neo-nazis in drone warfare and with weapons financed by Qatar – who have just marched on and conquered Aleppo, Hama, and possibly beyond.
If this army of mercenaries were real followers of Islam, they would be marching in defense of Palestine.
At the same time, the real picture inside the corridors of power in Tehran is extremely murky. There are factions favoring getting closer to the West, which clearly would have ramifications for the Axis of Resistance’s ability to fight Tel Aviv.
On Lebanon, Syria never wavered. History explains why: from the point of view of Damascus, Lebanon historically remains a governorate, so Damascus is responsible for the security of Beirut.
And that’s one of Tel Aviv’s key motives to propel the current Salafi-jihadi offensive on Syria – after smashing virtually every communication corridor between Syria and Lebanon. What Tel Aviv could not accomplish on the ground – a victory over Hezbollah in southern Lebanon – has been replaced by isolating Hezbollah from the Axis of Resistance.
When in Doubt, Re-Read Xenophon
Wars in West Asia are a complex mix of national, sectarian, tribal and religious vectors. In a sense, they are endless wars; controllable to an extent, but then back again.
The Russian strategy in Syria seemed to be very precise. As it was impossible to normalize a completely fragmented nation, Moscow opted to free the Syria that really matters – the capital, the most important cities, and the Eastern Mediterranean coast – from the Salafi-jihadi mobs.
The problem is that freezing the war in 2020, with direct implication by Russia, Iran and (reluctantly) Turkiye, did not solve the “moderate rebel” problem. Now they’re back – in full force, supported by a vast Rent-a-Jihadi mob, with NATOstan Intel behind them.
Some things never change.
2012. Jake Sullivan, then an aide to Hillary Clinton: “AQ [al-Qaeda*] is on our side in Syria.”
2021. James Jeffrey, special envoy to Syria under Trump (2018-2020): “HTS [Hayat Tahrir al-Sham*] is an asset to the US’s strategy in Idlib.”
There could not be better timing for the revival of the HTS “asset”. HTS if filling an enormous void; beware when that happens in West Asia. Russia is fully concentrated on Ukraine. Hezbollah suffered heavily from Tel Aviv’s bombings and serial killing. Tehran is fully concentrated on how to deal with Trump 2.0.
History always teaches us. Syria is now a West Asian Anabasis. Xenophon – a soldier and writer – tell us how, in the 4th century B.C., an “expedition” (“anabasis”, in Ancient Greek) of 10,000 Greek mercenaries were engaged by Cyrus the Younger against his brother Artaxerxes II, King of Persia, from Armenia to the Black Sea. The expedition miserably failed – and the painful return journey was endless.
2,400 years later, we see governments, armies and mercenaries still plunging into the endless West Asia wars – and extracting themselves now is even more insoluble.
Syria now is tired, attritted, with the SAA becoming complacent with the long freeze of the war since 2020. All that coupled with the vicious starvation siege unleashed by the US Caesar Act, and the impossibility to start rebuilding the nation with the help of at least 8 million citizens who fled the endless war.
Over these past 4 years, problems piled up. There were endless breaches of the Astana process and Israel bombed Syria almost daily with impunity.
China was basically immobile. Beijing simply did not invest in the rebuilding of Syria.
Perspective is sobering. Even Russia – which is a de facto Resistance icon in itself, even if not formally part of the West Asian Axis of Resistance – has taken nearly three years of hard slog in its fight with Ukraine.
Only a cohesive, consolidated Axis of Resistance – after getting rid of countless 5thcolumnists working inside – would have a chance against being picked off one by one by the same consolidated enemy, over and over again.
Sometimes it feels like the BRICS – particularly China – haven’t learned anything from Bandung in 1955, and how the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) was neutralized.
You can’t beat a pitiless hegemonic hydra with flower power.
* terrorist organizations banned in Russia and many other countries [end]
The ambiguity of Ankara’s policy may eventually play a cruel joke on it, despite its growing ambitions in various parts of the world. No matter how confident Türkiye is in its ability to sit on two chairs simultaneously, at some point it will have to choose, risking to lose everything
The Russian Armed Forces continue to liberate the territory of the Donetsk People’s Republic. Ahead lies the city of Krasnohorivka. As often happens in urban areas, combat operations are complicated by the presence of civilians, who frequently find themselves trapped or even used as cover by the enemy.
The Russian troops face a difficult task: to organize the evacuation of civilians without losing soldiers. Under such conditions, the professionalism of drone operators is fully revealed-they not only conduct timely reconnaissance but also provide cover for assault troops evacuating people to safety.
Among the civilians trapped are relatives of those soldiers fighting on other fronts. The soldiers, performing their duty, cannot personally help their loved ones. But their comrades know that today they will rescue the families of their fellow soldiers, and tomorrow, it is quite likely that their comrades will return the favor by helping their families.