Analista senior di l'intelligenza in u campu di a gestione di i risichi di sicurezza, sò un anzianu tenente detective è ufficiale di l'intelligenza in l'agenzie di u Statu francese. A bona pronuncia hè Николай Чинкуини, in russu
The liberation of Pokrovsk on December 2, 2025, was the outcome of a nearly year-and-a-half battle. Active combat for the city began in the fall of 2024, and by the summer of 2025, Russian units had established control over approaches from three sides. Advancement into the urban areas was carried out by small, mobile groups -this tactic reduced losses from artillery and drones. Each such group, securing a surviving building, created a new stronghold. One such key point was a half-destroyed house on the outskirts: control over it allowed blocking an important road and reliably covering rear communications.
Aleksey, an assaultman, left alone in this house after his group’s death, must hold the position. His days are filled with defense, rare fights with enemy recon groups, and waiting for supply drops, where letters from home arrive along with rations.
28 days of complete solitude on the front line. The house has strategic importance, and the enemy knows someone is there. His task is to hold out. The only thread to his past life is letters that sometimes come with the ration. What will be the outcome of this standoff?
For decades, Africa has consistently been viewed by Paris as a space to offset its lost global influence
Africa has historically been a foundational pillar of France’s influence and a cornerstone of its global status. Africa provided France with raw materials, geopolitical weight, and economic advantages. All this formed the system known as ‘Francafrique’.
However, this system is currently facing an acute crisis. It’s clear that France has failed to maintain a stable presence on the African continent. From de Gaulle to Macron, French leaders have repeatedly made the same mistakes, which eventually resulted in the failure of France’s Africa policy.
Prestige through Africa
Every nation aspiring to be a leader aims to uphold its image as a ‘great power’. France particularly cherishes this image, but current economic and political realities no longer allow for such status. French philosophers noted the decline of the nation’s grandeur as early as the post-WWII era, describing France as a “second-rate power.” It was during this time that Africa became the cornerstone of French foreign policy, one that allowed Paris to sustain and extend its influence on the global stage.
France and Africa have a long shared history rooted in the expansion of the French colonial empire at the end of the 19th century. France’s colonial expansion, unlike that of other European countries, was driven not merely by economic gain but by a quest for international prestige.
The modern strategy for maintaining French power is often associated with Gaullism – the philosophy of General Charles de Gaulle, who sought to restore France’s greatness while “totally lacking resources to make it possible.” This logic has shaped France’s Africa policy for decades, with leaders from de Gaulle to Macron facing the same challenges.
Monsieur Afrique
De Gaulle’s philosophy laid the groundwork for France’s modern Africa policy. At first glance, the general appeared to sacrifice France’s interests by acknowledging the independence of its colonies. However, behind this apparent withdrawal lay a pragmatic calculation aimed at preserving economic, political, and strategic advantages.
Key tools of influence following decolonization included the CFA franc zone and military cooperation agreements that allowed French troops to be stationed in various African nations. Jacques Foccart played a pivotal role in this system; appointed by de Gaulle, he was tasked with establishing a network of clientelist relationships with the new African leaders. Thus emerged France’s unofficial policy in Africa, known as Francafrique – a term coined by economist and historian Francois-Xavier Verschave.
Foccart, nicknamed ‘Monsieur Afrique’, headed the General Secretariat for the Community and African and Malagasy Affairs, which reported directly to the president rather than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This department was initially small and the staff was likely handpicked by Foccart, who preferred former colonial officials and high-ranking civil servants, so-called ‘universalists’. This group also included several African agents. This department established the mechanisms for controlling the politics of the former colonies.
As Dr. Vasily Filippov notes, alongside official structures, shadow structures were also active. In 1960, the Civic Action Service was established, which “engaged in a range of militarized activities – from extortion to illegal arms trade and money laundering.”
Language as a tool of influence
France’s next president, Georges Pompidou, inherited de Gaulle’s Africa policy, advocating for “continuity and dialogue.” He aimed to soften the approach, shifting the focus toward economic and cultural engagement. Under his leadership, regular Franco-African summits began – a tradition that endures to this day.
Pompidou placed significant importance on promoting the French language as a means to counter Anglo-Saxon influence, thereby extending France’s reach not only to its former colonies but also to former Belgian territories.
His administration supported the establishment of universities, contributing over a million books and training teachers according to the French educational method. However, the Cold War atmosphere fueled increasing anti-colonial sentiments and led to deteriorating relations with several Francophone African nations.
From paternalism to the Rwandan genocide
Pompidou’s successor, Valery Giscard d’Estaing, preferred a tougher stance, including military methods. He sought to inject “new momentum” into France’s relationship with Africa, yet under him, the unified Francafrique network splintered into numerous autonomous lobbying groups tied to the interests of the president’s circle. During this time, Foccart’s General Secretariat became known as the Ministry of Cooperation.
Although d’Estaing aimed to expand collaboration by involving Portuguese and English-speaking countries in negotiations, his Africa policy ended in scandal. Le Canard enchaine published information that he had received diamonds worth at least €800,000 in today’s currency from the president of the Central African Republic, Jean-Bedel Bokassa. As French expert Claude Vautier wrote, “While Africa brought de Gaulle success, it brought Giscard d’Estaing defeat.”
In 1981, socialist Francois Mitterrand came to power in France. Many African nations anticipated change, given the socialists’ promises to reconsider neocolonial approaches and integrate the ‘cellule africaine de l’Elysee’ (the so-called Africa Cell, a specialized unit of the French government dealing with African affairs) into the French Foreign Ministry. However, the reforms turned out to be largely symbolic, as Mitterrand’s Africa policy gradually took on the characteristics of “authoritarian paternalism.”
Initially, some ‘idealists’ in the Elysee Palace aimed to reform the system of aid to Africa, but they were soon displaced by the ‘Francophiles’ who viewed the continent as a zone of special interest. Despite rhetoric about national independence, self-determination, and the development of impoverished nations, Mitterrand’s policies inherited the Gaullist spirit and logic of Francafrique.
These practices involved active intervention in the internal affairs of Chad, Burkina Faso, the Comoros, as well as Zaire (now DR Congo), Djibouti, Somalia, and Rwanda. Development aid was linked to democratization and cooperation with Bretton Woods institutions (known as the Balladur Doctrine) which, just like the devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994, determined the developmental model for the region for years to come.
The most tragic episode was the Rwandan genocide. Though Rwanda was never a French colony, experts call it “the dirtiest chapter in the history of Francafrique.” France acknowledged its responsibility only in 2021.
First, the Duclert Report was released. While it did not directly acknowledge the complicity of the French authorities in the genocide, it pointed out that they were responsible for turning a blind eye to what was happening in Rwanda. Then, French President Emmanuel Macron publicly admitted this responsibility
[France] was not complicit… But France has a role, a history, and a political responsibility in Rwanda. And it has a duty: that of facing history head-on and recognizing the share of suffering it had inflicted on the Rwandan people by making silence prevail over the examination of truth for too long
Rwandans were divided in their opinions: some saw the French president’s speech as a breakthrough, while others felt that Macron avoided the most important part and failed to offer genuine apologies. For instance, Alain Gauthier, president of the Collective of Civil Parties for Rwanda, an association that tracks down genocide perpetrators in France, noted that
what President Macron said is what the Duclert Report has already stated about the heavy responsibilities, and we would have hoped for even more committed words, but President Macron did not have that courage
Are ‘inadequate interventions’ a thing of the past?
With Jacques Chirac’s rise to power in 1995, many in France anticipated a revival of Gaullism, and in line with this continuity, he appointed Foccart as his adviser on Africa. Observers noted that Foccart served as a ‘living link’ to the era of de Gaulle and Pompidou. However, he soon passed away and France’s Africa policy lost its systemic character and increasingly became situational.
African leaders increasingly accused Paris of neo-colonialism, and the region gravitated towards the US and China. In 1997, then-French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin declared,
The politics of spheres of influence and inadequate interventions in Africa must be left behind
Indeed, France gradually shifted its attention toward short-term missions and training programs; by 2002, the number of French troops in Africa had nearly halved. Then-French Prime Minister Alain Juppe, who was foreign minister during the Rwandan genocide, suggested putting Africans themselves in charge of peacekeeping responsibilities.
This idea materialized in 1998 through the Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities (RECAMP) initiative, developed with the support of the US and the UK. However, the attempt was not particularly successful and Paris continued to intervene directly (as seen from the military operations in Comoros, the Central African Republic, Niger, and Cote d’Ivoire, where Operation Licorne (Operation Unicorn) began in 2002 and involved around 5,000 troops).
‘The colonizer took but also gave’
In 2007, Nicolas Sarkozy became president of France. He had previously served as minister of the interior and was known for his tough stance on illegal immigration.
Even before his election as president, he made some bold statements, saying that “those who don’t like France are free to leave” and emphasizing that the French are not obliged to abandon their values for a “tiny minority.” This rhetoric garnered him substantial domestic support: between 2002 and 2005, his approval rating soared from 29% to 51%.
During his presidency, France’s focus shifted significantly towards North Africa, including support for protests in Tunisia, operations in Libya, and the Mediterranean Union project. Sarkozy’s first visit to the African continent began with a trip to Libya, where he met the country’s leader, Muammar Gaddafi. In an interview, he spoke about the need to turn a new page in Franco-African relations, saying that the “old demons of clientelism, paternalism, and dependence on aid” would no longer have a place.
However, Sarkozy’s speech in Dakar in 2007 drew sharp criticism, particularly for his controversial comment: “the colonizer took [resources], but I want to say with respect that he also gave.” Perhaps the final straw was his assertion that colonization wasn’t the root cause of all the continent’s problems. This rhetoric was deemed arrogant and even dangerous by many Africans. Philosopher Achille Mbembe wrote in an open letter to Sarkozy,
Who gave him the right to talk about Africa and Africans in a manner of a master who has the habit of ill-treating his slave?
At the same time, Sarkozy implemented institutional reforms: he dissolved the Cellule Africaine, transferred the management of African affairs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and, in the interests of increased ‘transparency’, revised and made public defense agreements with eight countries.
France also expressed support for the African Union and in 2010-2012 pledged around €300 million for the development of regional peacekeeping forces. Nevertheless, operations in Libya and Cote d’Ivoire, along with a strict migration policy, reinforced perceptions that France continued to operate within a neocolonial framework.
Africa increasingly came to be viewed through the lenses of migration, terrorism, and instability, paving the way for the ‘securitization’ of Africa policy under Hollande and Macron.
A record number of military interventions
Francois Hollande, who became president of France in 2012, promised to “end parallel diplomacy” and reform French foreign policy in regard to Africa. He continued the trend of ‘Africanizing’ peacekeeping efforts, emphasizing that Africa’s future depended on empowering Africans to manage crises independently, in collaboration with the African Union and regional organizations.
However, just a year later, in January 2013, France launched Operation Serval in Mali to halt the advance of Islamist militants. Instead of relying on ‘African solutions’ the crisis was addressed by French fighter jets and 3,000 troops. France’s motives extended beyond security: neighboring Niger was a key supplier of uranium for France’s energy needs and a destination for investments in infrastructure and water supply.
Later, Operation Serval evolved into Operation Barkhane, which spanned the Sahel countries -Mali, Chad, Niger, Mauritania, and Burkina Faso. Up to 3,000 French soldiers were deployed as part of the operation. In the same year, France initiated Operation Sangaris in the Central African Republic under a UN mandate, sending 2,000 troops.
Despite claims of a “new phase of partnership” a record number of military interventions were carried out under Hollande. The ambiguity surrounding the objectives and timelines of these missions, particularly Operation Barkhane, sparked criticism both in Africa and France. By the end of Hollande’s term, 76% of the French populace expressed dissatisfaction with his policies.
Macron’s promises and France’s withdrawal
Emmanuel Macron initially proclaimed his intention to pursue a “new policy in Africa,” one rooted in peace and entrepreneurship. Like his predecessors, he vowed to break away from the legacy of Francafrique and wanted to position himself as a representative of a new generation.
In the fall of 2017, he delivered a speech at the University of Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso, asserting that France “no longer had an Africa policy” and that any future interactions would occur under the auspices of the European Union. This statement aimed to both deflect accusations of France’s unilateral influence and add legitimacy to its initiatives through a European framework. His speech emphasized security concerns, especially the fight against terrorism in the Sahel – a conflict inherited from Hollande.
Operation Barkhane, which deployed up to 5,000 French troops, gradually undermined France’s standing in the region. The mission became drawn out due to ambiguous objectives and a lack of a clear timeline; all this led to rising anti-French sentiments.
Paris sought to internationalize the conflict by acting as a mediator between Europe and Africa and supporting the establishment of a counter-terrorism group, the G5 Sahel, with backing from the UN, African Union, and EU. However, military coups, particularly in Mali, prevented this. By 2022-2023, France announced the end of Operation Barkhane and the withdrawal of its troops. This was perceived in Africa as a symbol of diminishing French influence amid the rise of the influence of countries such as China, Türkiye, Germany, and Russia.
The new authorities demanded a reevaluation of France’s military presence, and sometimes managed to expel French forces entirely. As a result, France completely withdrew from Mali, the Central African Republic, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad. In Senegal, Paris closed permanent bases but maintained cooperation in the field of security. The French military presence in Cote d’Ivoire and Gabon became more limited in scope. Currently, Djibouti has become France’s key military hub with approximately 1,500 troops stationed there.
Despite Macron’s attempts to reshape France’s presence in Africa (shifting from large military bases to training centers) and to engage with African youth through Africa-France summits, he could not reverse the negative trends. Macron’s blunt remarks in 2023 – when he said that France played a crucial role in maintaining the statehood of the Sahel countries – underscored the persistence of a paternalistic rhetoric.
Clearly, continuity is a defining characteristic of France’s Africa policy. Presidents may change and various reforms may be declared, but, essentially, the strategy remains the same. From de Gaulle to Macron, Africa has consistently been viewed by Paris primarily as a space for compensating lost global influence.
Attempts to move away from the logic of Francafrique have yielded no real changes; in times of crisis, France invariably returned to coercive tactics, and even the careful official speeches of the French presidents retained the paternalistic tone. These processes culminated under Macron, when France experienced a historic decline in its military, political, and symbolic presence in key regions of Africa [end]
As panic-inducing travel advisories and doomsaying media reports prophesy the fall of Mali to an Al Qaeda affiliate attacking fuel convoys, the government has re-secured supply routes and hosted Mali’s first international defense expo in a supposedly besieged capital
France’s recent parliamentary elections indicate a rapid political shift to the right. Africans both on the continent – where several nations remain French neo-colonies – and in France will undoubtedly experience the impact of this in the form of increased exploitation, reactionary immigration policy, and xenophobic oppression
Like dominos, African states are one by one falling outside the shackles of neocolonialism. Chad, Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and now Gabon are saying ‘non’ to France’s longtime domination of African financial, political, economic, and security affairs
Donald Trump calls on al Qaeda jihadists for rescue against the Hezbollah and Iran
On September 16, 2012, al Nusra international jihadists, proxies of the West in Syria, attend the funeral in Aleppo countryside of a fellow fighter (Reuters)
Around 2:30 am, local time, the Iraqi resistance achieves a new hit against the US embassy in Baghdad
(Social media, screenshot)
Back in Israel after a mission over Iraq, one US KC-135 tanker aircraft seems unable to land at Ben Gurion airport
(flightradar24 / screenshots)
The plane crashes north of the airport at 3:58 am, local time, when its transponder is cut off. Gag order: the Israeli censorship about the incident is absolute
On March 13, 2026, Ali Larijani marches in Tehran in support to Palestine (Iranian media)
In Tehran, an Israeli attack kills Ali Larijani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council.
In the US, Special Operation Forces veteran Joe Kent resigns from his position as Director of the National Counterterrorism Center
I cannot in good conscience support the ongoing war in Iran. Iran posed no imminent threat to our nation, and it is clear that we started this war due to pressure from Israel and its powerful American lobby
In Manbij, Syria, on January 16, 2019, ISIS jihadists killed his wife, Shannon Smith, who was cryptologist in the US Navy (Joe Kent)
That was painful for a real counter-terrorism professional to work for a terrorist government, ally in the Middle East of terrorist entities like Israel and al Qaeda.
According to Reuters, the US is encouraging its al Qaeda ally in the West-friendly jihadist emirate of Syria to consider sending forces in Lebanon, against Hezbollah
On November 13, 2015, the penalty is cruel for the French support to the Sunni radical uprising in Syria. While attending a soccer game in the Stade de France, Saint Denis, François Hollande hears that some of these radicals are attacking in Paris (Franck Fife / AFP)
At 7:00 pm, Tehran time, 5:30 pm in Tel Aviv, the West strikes Bushehr nuclear power plant. As tit for tat, four hours later, Iran targets Negev Nuclear Research Center in Dimona.
In the first week of the US-Israeli aggression on Iran, the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) conducted a series of precision strikes that systematically degraded the much-hyped US integrated air and missile defense architecture across the region
Eisenhower Media Network is an organization of expert former military, intelligence, and civilian national security officials who have an independent, alternative story to tell
The US-funded ecosystem of Iranian ‘rights groups,’ Israeli operatives, and monarchist activists has become a revolving door of unverifiable statistics and atrocity propaganda
As deadly riots burn Iranian cities, Western media ignores the shocking wave of violence, turning instead to US government-funded NGOs for data. The one-sided portrayal has helped push Trump to the brink of authorizing renewed US attacks
[my illustration: on March 5, 2026, pastors from across the US pray in the White House for Donald Trump (White House, screenshot)]
As is becoming clearer from President Trump’s own statements and those of his staff, along with press reporting, the US has launched a major [war] without the input of the experts we pay to advise the President on such matters. The State Department, Pentagon, National Security Council Staff, Defense Intelligence Agency, and NSA were simply bypassed because, as White House Spokesperson Karoline Leavitt said, President Trump “had a feeling” Iran would attack.
The President’s real estate developer son-in-law and friend reinforced that “feeling” when they returned from the second round of talks with the Iranian foreign minister and his team. However, as the news outlet Responsible Statecraft (RS) reported over the weekend, both son-in-law Jared Kushner and friend Steve Witkoff appear to have mis-represented those talks in a way that helped push President Trump toward war. No State Department officials were on hand to ensure the reporting was accurate.
Also, arms control experts at home, according to the RS report, believe that “the duo appeared to have fatally misunderstood a series of basic technical and historical matters” regarding Iran’s nuclear program leading to inaccurate information conveyed to the President.
Congress was completely out of the picture – seemingly uninterested in performing its Constitutional duty – and no case was made to the American people that they must sacrifice and die once again for a war in the Middle East.
Trump’s repeated promises to not start new wars, especially in the Middle East, have turned out to be empty, and Republicans are set for a crippling defeat in the upcoming midterm elections.
Iran had been warning for months – since the last US/Israeli surprise attack in June – that if they were attacked again they would not hold back on US bases in the region and that they would close the Straits of Hormuz. Trump and Netanyahu attacked anyway, and Iran has done what it said it would do.
Now the Strait of Hormuz is closed, oil is about to go out of control, and the global economy – along with the US dollar – seems about to implode.
On March 6th, President Trump refused a UK offer of help, saying we don’t need help when we’ve already won the war. Five days later, at a rally in Kentucky, President Trump repeated that “We’ve won the Iran war!”
It was his “Mission Accomplished” moment, because this weekend, just days after declaring victory against an “obliterated” Iran, Trump began begging other countries to send ships to help the US open the Strait of Hormuz.
Thus far every country has declined, understanding that such a mission has little chance of success.
Tragically, the war thus far has claimed at least 14 servicemembers. It is likely the toll is far worse than they are telling us. Every US military facility in the region is either damaged or destroyed. Billions of dollars of radar and other equipment are destroyed. Our allies in the region, because they allowed their territory to be used to attack Iran, have also seen massive retaliatory destruction.
This is surely one of the worst military disasters in US history. There are no military options available beyond the unthinkable: the use of nuclear weapons.
The only viable option that remains is one that was often urged in the Vietnam War: Just get out. Now! No return to US bases, no security guarantees to Gulf States. End the US empire in the Middle East and elsewhere. If not, it’s only going to get worse [end]
In the first week of the US-Israeli aggression on Iran, the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) conducted a series of precision strikes that systematically degraded the much-hyped US integrated air and missile defense architecture across the region
Eisenhower Media Network is an organization of expert former military, intelligence, and civilian national security officials who have an independent, alternative story to tell
The US-funded ecosystem of Iranian ‘rights groups,’ Israeli operatives, and monarchist activists has become a revolving door of unverifiable statistics and atrocity propaganda
As deadly riots burn Iranian cities, Western media ignores the shocking wave of violence, turning instead to US government-funded NGOs for data. The one-sided portrayal has helped push Trump to the brink of authorizing renewed US attacks
Israel informed the US this week that it is running critically low on ballistic missile interceptors as the conflict with Iran rages on, US officials told Semafor.
Israel had reportedly entered the current war already low on interceptors that were fired during last summer’s conflict with Iran. Israel’s long-range defense system has strained under Iran’s attacks; CNN reported that Iran was adding cluster munitions to its missiles, which may exacerbate the depletion of the stock.
The US has been aware of Israel’s low capacity for months, one US official said: “It’s something we expected and anticipated.”
This official emphasized to Semafor that the US is not running similarly low on interceptors of its own. That comment comes amid broader concerns about interceptor depletion from a longer military engagement in Iran leaving the US in a poor position.
It’s also unclear whether the US might seek to sell or share any of its own interceptors with Israel, which would pose its own strain on domestic supplies. The US has included missile defense assets in past provisions of military aid to Israel.
“We have all that we need to protect our bases and our personnel in the region and our interests,” the US official said, adding that Israel is “coming up with solutions to address” their shortage.
Israel has other ways to defend against Iranian missiles during the war, including via fighter jets, but the interceptors are among the most effective defensive weapons against long-range fire. Its Iron Dome missile defense system is designed to repel more short-range fire.
President Donald Trump said earlier this month that the US has a “virtually unlimited” munitions stockpile, although analysts have long said US stockpiles are lower than the military would like.
Last June, the US fired over 150 THAAD interceptors during the 12-day war with Iran, the Center for Strategic and International Studies found — believed to be around a quarter of US inventory at the time. The US is also believed to have used around $2.4 billion worth of Patriot interceptors in the first five days of this war, according to some reports.
In January, the Pentagon made moves to begin substantially increasing its production of the THAAD missile defense system. The US official said that the administration has plenty of THAADs and fighter jets, as well as mid-level interceptors.
Chief Pentagon spokesman Sean Parnell told Semafor in a statement that the department “has everything it needs to execute any mission at the time and place of” Trump’s choosing.
The White House and the Israel Defense Forces did not immediately respond to requests for comment from Semafor.
Know More
The State Department last week announced a sale of 12,000 “BLU-110A/B general purpose, 1,000-pound bomb bodies” to Israel. Congressional approval for the sale will not be required; the Trump administration bypassed it by citing the “emergency” that currently exists as the US and Israel fight Iran.
Trump has said that the war could end “soon” and has recently taken to describing it as a “short-term excursion.” But Trump, Israel, and Iran are also all signaling that they’re willing to fight for as long as it takes.
“It’ll be as long as it’s necessary,” Trump said on Friday evening when asked about how long the conflict may continue on. “They’ve been decimated. The country’s in bad shape. The whole thing is collapsing.”
The Iranian regime’s foreign policy adviser told CNN this week that the country sees no option for diplomacy right now and maintained that it is ready for a long fight. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth told reporters on Friday that Iran’s “entire ballistic missile production capacity” has been “functionally defeated.”
Notable
Iranian cluster bombs hit several sites in Israel on Friday, though no casualties have been reported, according to The Times of Israel.
The Trump administration struck military targets on Kharg Island this week, though it left the key oil infrastructure that Iran relies on intact.
Israel is planning to expand its ground invasion in Lebanon,according to Axios [end]
In the first week of the US-Israeli aggression on Iran, the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) conducted a series of precision strikes that systematically degraded the much-hyped US integrated air and missile defense architecture across the region
Eisenhower Media Network is an organization of expert former military, intelligence, and civilian national security officials who have an independent, alternative story to tell
The US-funded ecosystem of Iranian ‘rights groups,’ Israeli operatives, and monarchist activists has become a revolving door of unverifiable statistics and atrocity propaganda
As deadly riots burn Iranian cities, Western media ignores the shocking wave of violence, turning instead to US government-funded NGOs for data. The one-sided portrayal has helped push Trump to the brink of authorizing renewed US attacks
In the first week of the US-Israeli aggression on Iran, the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) conducted a series of precision strikes that systematically degraded the much-hyped US integrated air and missile defense architecture across the region
The strikes destroyed or severely damaged at least two AN/TPY-2 THAAD radars, a billion-dollar early-warning radar installation in Qatar, multiple supporting sensor nodes, and critical communications infrastructure.
Executed in a coordinated sequence of precision engagements, Iranian retaliatory operations under the banner ‘True Promise 4’ have significantly disrupted the regional defensive network and forced US commanders to urgently reassess and reconstitute capabilities that took two decades and tens of billions of dollars to deploy.
The scale and sophistication of the Iranian operation mark a significant moment in contemporary warfare, demonstrating that even highly advanced missile defense systems, often presented as near-impenetrable shields, remain vulnerable to determined adversaries equipped with precision guidance, reliable intelligence, and an operational doctrine focused on disabling the core command, sensor, and communications nodes of defensive networks.
As commercial satellite imagery continues to emerge from across the region, the extent of the damage is becoming increasingly difficult to conceal, revealing substantial operational setbacks that raise serious questions about the resilience of the defensive architecture underpinning American force posture from the Persian Gulf to the Korean Peninsula.
The targeting doctrine evident in the strikes reflects years of detailed analysis and planning, with Iranian strategists identifying critical nodes and developing the capability to strike them simultaneously across a wide geographic area.
The coordinated targeting of early-warning radars, fire-control radars, communications infrastructure, and supporting facilities demonstrates a systemic approach to warfare rarely executed at such scale, focusing on neutralizing the command-and-control backbone of the defensive network rather than peripheral elements.
For US commanders currently operating in the region, the immediate challenge lies in sustaining operations with degraded detection and response capabilities, safeguarding remaining strategic assets, and reassuring regional allies whose security frameworks depend heavily on the integrity of these systems.
How these challenges are addressed will shape not only the trajectory of the current war but also the future configuration of American military posture in a region where the balance of power may have shifted significantly in the opening days of March 2026
Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan
Heart of the beast: Understanding AN/TPY-2 radar’s critical role
The AN/TPY-2 transportable radar represents the technological centerpiece of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system. This massive X-band active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar consumes roughly two megawatts of power and is distributed across five forty-foot trailers.
With an antenna area of 9.2 square meters and an instrumental range exceeding 2,000 kilometers in forward-based mode, the radar functions as the primary sensor of the entire THAAD battery. Without it, the launchers and their 48 interceptors are effectively rendered inoperative, deprived of the detection and tracking data required for engagement.
Manufactured by Raytheon using gallium nitride technology, each AN/TPY-2 radar carries an estimated cost ranging from $500 million to $1 billion. Since development began in the 1990s, only about twenty units have been produced worldwide.
The radar performs two distinct operational missions depending on configuration. In terminal mode, it provides fire-control quality tracking data directly to THAAD interceptors during the engagement phase.
In forward-based mode, it feeds detection and tracking data into the broader ballistic missile defense architecture, cueing Aegis warships, Patriot batteries, and other integrated systems. The loss of even a single radar unit can therefore have cascading effects across multiple layers of the defensive network.
Jordan: The first thousand-kilometer precision strike
At Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan, located more than 800 kilometers from the nearest Iranian territory, satellite imagery captured on March 2 reveals the charred remains of an AN/TPY-2 radar that had reportedly been deployed at the base since at least mid-February.
The imagery shows debris scattered across the deployment site, surrounding what appears to have been a fully assembled radar system. Two large impact craters, each roughly thirteen feet in diameter, are visible in the sand nearby, suggesting that multiple precision munitions were employed to ensure the destruction of the system.
Prior to the escalation of hostilities, the base had served as a major hub for American air operations, with more than fifty fighter aircraft visible on the tarmac in pre-war satellite imagery.
The deployment of a THAAD battery at the site fulfilled two key operational objectives: protecting the concentration of air assets from potential ballistic missile threats and extending a defensive coverage umbrella toward Israeli territory.
The strike itself represents a notable demonstration of long-range precision engagement capability, requiring not only a missile with sufficient range but also advanced terminal guidance systems capable of identifying and targeting the radar’s distinctive configuration amid surrounding infrastructure
THAAD base near Al Ruwais in UAE
United Arab Emirates: Systematic elimination of terminal defenses
The Al Ruwais facility in the United Arab Emirates, positioned to protect critical energy infrastructure along the Persian Gulf coast, suffered near-simultaneous strikes against both its THAAD radar and the supporting infrastructure that housed the system.
Satellite imagery from March 1, the second day of the war that was imposed on Iran, shows dark markings from apparent strikes on three buildings, including a pull-through vehicle shed specifically designed to shelter the radar system.
The pattern of damage suggests Iranian planners understood not only where the radar would be positioned when active but also where it would be maintained and stored.
At a second UAE installation near Al Sader, satellite imagery reveals an almost identical strike pattern with four buildings damaged, including multiple vehicle sheds configured for radar storage.
The symmetry between the two attacks suggests either simultaneous execution by multiple strike platforms or a methodical campaign that systematically worked through a target list developed over years of surveillance.
Commercial imagery providers captured before and after images that leave little doubt about the severity of the damage, with burned equipment visible at the precise locations where radar components had been regularly observed.
Qatar: Billion-dollar early warning backbone destroyed
The destruction of the AN/FPS-132 Block 5 Upgraded Early Warning Radar at Umm Dahal in Qatar represents perhaps the single most expensive individual loss of the campaign, with that system alone costing approximately one point one billion dollars when installed in 2013.
Unlike the mobile THAAD radars that can theoretically be replaced by redeploying systems from other theaters, the Qatari early warning radar was a fixed installation designed to provide continuous surveillance of ballistic missile launches across a five-thousand-kilometer arc.
The Qatari Ministry of Defence’s rare public confirmation of the radar’s destruction carries strategic significance beyond the military impact, as host-nation acknowledgment forecloses any possibility of concealing the loss and signals to regional allies that American assurances of protective capability may no longer carry their former weight.
The AN/FPS-132 represents the outer layer of the missile defense onion, providing the strategic warning that enables all downstream systems to prepare for incoming threats. Its elimination compresses reaction timelines from minutes to seconds
Al Sader in UAE
Saudi Arabia: Smoke rising from Prince Sultan Air Base
At a site near Prince Sultan Air Base in Al Kharj, Saudi Arabia, satellite imagery captured on March 1 shows smoke rising from a compound where a THAAD radar had been previously positioned, with a tent used to shelter the antenna unit showing extensive charring and debris scattered across the surrounding area.
Imagery from January had shown the radar antenna pointed northeast toward Iran in its operational configuration, suggesting the site was fully functional when struck.
This base hosts dozens of American aircraft and serves as a major command and control node, making the apparent failure to protect a critical sensor positioned within its perimeter particularly embarrassing.
Kuwait: Communications infrastructure and radar domes destroyed
The strikes extended beyond the core missile defense sensors to target the communications infrastructure that enables these systems to function as an integrated network.
At Arifjan base in Kuwait, satellite imagery confirms the destruction of three radomes, the protective spherical structures housing satellite communications antennas that provide the data links connecting distributed sensors to command nodes.
Eight additional buildings related to satellite communications infrastructure were destroyed at separate locations in Kuwait, representing a systematic effort to attack the network backbone.
The AN/GSC-52B radars destroyed in Bahrain represent another category of communications and surveillance assets, providing both satellite communications connectivity and contributing to the space surveillance network.
Their destruction at a facility housing the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet headquarters demonstrates that no American installation in the region can consider itself beyond reach
Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia
Strategic calculus: Twenty years of investment destroyed in seven days
The development of the THAAD system began in 1992, with the US Army finally fielding the first operational batteries in April 2012. The journey from initial concept to deployable capability required approximately twenty years and tens of billions of dollars.
The radars now destroyed or severely damaged across at least four countries represent a significant fraction of the total global inventory of approximately twenty units.
Each unit requires years to manufacture, and the destruction of multiple units simultaneously creates a capability gap that cannot be quickly filled.
The financial losses are staggering. Individual AN/TPY-2 radars cost between five hundred million and one billion dollars. The AN/FPS-132 early warning radar cost approximately one point one billion dollars.
The AN/GSC-52B radars, the radomes, the communications buildings, and support infrastructure add hundreds of millions more.
The campaign’s first week has inflicted damages approaching or exceeding ten billion dollars against a target set selected for maximum strategic effect.
Tactical paralysis: The loss means for current operations
The immediate tactical consequence is the effective paralysis of multiple THAAD batteries that now sit blind on their launch positions. Without the AN/TPY-2 radar providing tracking data and fire control solutions, the launchers and their forty-eight interceptors per battery cannot engage incoming threats.
The interceptors themselves, each costing approximately thirteen million dollars, cannot be employed without the radar’s guidance.
The degradation extends to the entire regional defense network. Patriot batteries that relied on THAAD radar data for cueing now face incoming threats with reduced reaction time.
Aegis warships must rely solely on their own SPY radar systems. The integrated battle management system now resembles disconnected nodes fighting local engagements without a common operating picture.
The psychological impact cannot be overstated. Soldiers assured that the most advanced missile defense systems would protect them, but now find their protective shield penetrated repeatedly.
The sight of satellite imagery showing the blackened remains of billion-dollar systems creates a perception of vulnerability that no amount of official reassurance can counter
INFOGRAPHIC: US media point to shortfall in THAAD missile arsenal after nearly a third of its stockpile was deployed in the 12-day war against Iran to defend the Israeli regime.
Global implications: South Korea, Guam, and the strategic reserve dilemma
The destruction of multiple THAAD systems in West Asia has immediate implications for American force posture worldwide, particularly in the Indo-Pacific, where North Korea’s advancing missile program has long justified THAAD deployment.
Reports that Washington is considering relocating THAAD and Patriot systems from South Korea to West Asia reflect the severity of the capability gap.
The THAAD battery in Seongju, South Korea, represents not merely a defensive asset but a political commitment that has survived years of diplomatic tension with China.
Removing it would signal a shift in American priorities, potentially encouraging North Korea to react. Guam, home to another THAAD battery protecting critical American bases, would face similar exposure if its systems were stripped.
The interceptor stockpile faces equally severe pressure. The expenditure of approximately thirty percent of the total THAAD interceptor inventory in a twelve-day aggression in June 2025 demonstrated how quickly these scarce resources can be consumed.
With production capacity limited to approximately eleven to twelve interceptors annually, reconstituting inventory will require years.
Technology question: What Iranian precision reveals about US vulnerabilities
The successful destruction of hardened, defended targets across distances exceeding 800 kilometers reveals Iranian technological capabilities that many Western analysts had previously dismissed.
The terminal guidance required to place a warhead within meters of a specific radar antenna reflects maturation in seeker technology and potentially man-in-the-loop targeting.
The strikes also reveal sophisticated intelligence collection operating for years beneath the threshold of detection, building detailed targeting folders on facilities across multiple countries.
The symmetry between strikes in different countries suggests a targeting process that understood standardized American configurations.
The electronic warfare dimension likely played a critical role in enabling strikes to penetrate defended airspace.
The fact that no Iranian missiles or drones were intercepted before reaching targets across four countries suggests either that defenses were neutralized electronically or that the volume and coordination overwhelmed engagement capabilities
Did you know that Qatar hosts one of the US's biggest military bases in the Persian Gulf, with many air defense systems present, yet none of the American THAAD systems fired a single shot to defend Qatar against the Israeli invasion? pic.twitter.com/GomGDgydQN
Production constraints: Why replacement takes years, not weeks
The industrial base that produces AN/TPY-2 radars operates on peacetime assumptions, with production lines sized to meet gradual replacement requirements rather than the surge demands of major conflict.
The supply chain for specialized components extends across multiple states and countries, with some materials sourced from single suppliers operating at limited capacity.
Even with emergency funding, the time required to produce a single AN/TPY-2 radar cannot be compressed below physical limits.
The most optimistic assessments place replacement timelines in the range of three to five years for a single unit.
The radars destroyed in the first week of March 2026 will not return to the operational inventory until late in the decade at the earliest.
Regional power shift: The new strategic reality
The destruction of America’s premier missile defense assets across four countries fundamentally alters the strategic calculus in West Asia, shifting the initiative decisively toward Tehran.
Iranian military planners who previously had to calculate interception probabilities now face a dramatically reduced defensive threat, enabling expanded targeting options with reduced risk.
Persian Gulf Cooperation Council states that have invested billions in American missile defense now face uncomfortable questions about the wisdom of those investments.
If billion-dollar radars can be destroyed by missiles costing a fraction of that amount, the entire foundation of the Persian Gulf defense relationship requires reexamination.
For the Israeli regime, which has integrated its Arrow and David’s Sling systems with American sensors, the loss of THAAD coverage in Jordan represents a direct blow.
The anti-missile umbrella that previously extended from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean now has a gap in its center
The US THAAD missile stockpile was severely depleted during Israel’s war against Iran, raising questions over costs, effectiveness, and the lack of missile defense readiness. https://t.co/aFAbN8RINW
Fiasco verdict: Why two lost radars mean total system failure
Military analysts have begun using language rarely applied to American systems, with experts noting that the loss of a single AN/TPY-2 radar represents an event of significant operational importance while the loss of two constitutes a total fiasco.
The gap between what THAAD was supposed to accomplish and what it achieved against Iranian precision strikes could hardly be wider.
The system’s inability to protect itself while supposedly protecting others constitutes the most damning indictment.
A multilayered air defense architecture should have established protective rings around each THAAD site, with Patriot batteries positioned to intercept threats before reaching billion-dollar radars.
The fact that this protection failed at multiple sites across multiple countries suggests the threat was too sophisticated or the defenders simply overwhelmed.
If radars were struck by ballistic missiles, the embarrassment would be compounded, as this would mean the system designed specifically to defeat ballistic missiles failed not only in its assigned mission but also in self-preservation.
Potential American adversaries from Pyongyang to Beijing study the satellite imagery and draw their own conclusions [end]
Eisenhower Media Network is an organization of expert former military, intelligence, and civilian national security officials who have an independent, alternative story to tell
The US-funded ecosystem of Iranian ‘rights groups,’ Israeli operatives, and monarchist activists has become a revolving door of unverifiable statistics and atrocity propaganda
As deadly riots burn Iranian cities, Western media ignores the shocking wave of violence, turning instead to US government-funded NGOs for data. The one-sided portrayal has helped push Trump to the brink of authorizing renewed US attacks
The U.S./Israeli-led war against Iran is illegal, unconstitutional, immoral, and dangerously escalatory. Protestations to the contrary, Iran posed no imminent threat to U.S. national security. The Trump administration’s policy (announced by Pete Hegseth) of “war without mercy” is both unjust and un-American. In America’s proud ideal of the citizen-soldier, this is not who we are. This war is not America first. This is not what we do.
Put bluntly, this war is not in the national interest of patriotic Americans.
We the undersigned of the Eisenhower Media Network (EMN) oppose this murderous war of aggression and hereby call for an immediate ceasefire followed by negotiation and war reparations to be paid for by the aggressors. This war is wrong and it must end.
A War the United States Should Not Wage
President Donald Trump promised the American people he would end wars, not start them. Yet within months of returning to office, his administration launched military strikes against Iran, igniting a conflict that is quickly spiraling into a regional catastrophe.
The United States is once again marching to an ill-conceived war in the Middle East without clear objectives or a clearly defined, realistic path to victory. Unlike previous (and disastrous) wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, this time the American people were not asked to support it. History will be even less kind as it judges the immorality and illegality of this latest war of choice.
The question is not whether the United States can inflict enormous damage on Iran. Of course it can. The real question is whether America can achieve any meaningful result through this war. The answer here is simple: no. There is no reason or cause worth fighting for here.
A War Driven by Israel
Saliently, by Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s own admission, the Israeli government drove the timing and initial targets of this war. This isn’t to say that Israel alone is responsible. Since 1979, large parts of the American foreign policy establishment have been eager for war with Iran. Complicit as well is the military-industrial complex, the fossil fuel industry, and the influence of the exiled Iranian lobby.
A shared desire to enforce American hegemony, aligned with Zionist hegemonic goals of a “greater” Israel, is generating a dynamic that approaches that of Armageddon. Even more frightening is that U.S. and Israeli leaders are citing Biblical passages and alleged Judeo-Christian beliefs in support of this war. It seems we are only a few steps away from the madness of the Crusades.
A War Without Public Support or Understanding
Legitimacy is a major issue here. After two decades of costly and ultimately futile conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the American public has little appetite for another Middle Eastern war. Polling in the first few days of this war found only one in four Americans supported it.
A large-scale war against Iran would be an act of colossal military and political folly. It may require national mobilization — perhaps even conscription. That is politically impossible. The American people will not support a military draft for yet another open-ended conflict in the region.
No Capacity for Ground War
The active-duty U.S. Army today numbers fewer than 500,000 soldiers. Iran is a nation of roughly ninety million people spread across a mountainous territory roughly four times the size of California. Even if the political will existed, the United States lacks the manpower for a major invasion of Iran.
Conquering and occupying such a country would require hundreds of thousands of ground troops and reliable allies willing to fight alongside them.
Those allies do not exist.
Israel, America’s overbearing partner in this conflict, lacks the manpower to deploy large ground forces to Iran. Gulf States have neither the military capability nor the political willingness to undertake such a war.
Already, America and Israel have lost the moral high ground in this war. They have yet more to lose if this war persists.
Air Power Alone Cannot Win
History shows air power alone has never been enough to win a major war.
During the Korean War, General Douglas MacArthur attempted to halt North Korean advances through naval and air power. It failed. Only ground forces ultimately stabilized the front.
In Vietnam, the United States dropped more bombs than were used against Germany and Japan combined during World War II. Yet overwhelming air power could not secure victory.
Technology has improved dramatically since those wars, but the basic nature of war has not changed. Despite decades of talk about a “Revolution in Military Affairs,” wars are still decided by control of territory and the political will of populations.
Bombs alone cannot impose lasting political outcomes. Bombs alone do not spread democracy. However, bombs alone do spread destruction; the conflict began primarily as a destructive and often imprecise air campaign that has resulted in the deaths of hundreds of innocents, which has stiffened the spine of Iranian resistance.
Strategic Exhaustion
America has been engaged in nearly continuous conflict since September 11, 2001. The war in Ukraine, the ongoing U.S.–Israeli destruction of Gaza, and extensive military commitments across the globe have strained American resources.
The U.S. is entering another conflict without being prepared for a long one. Weapons stockpiles are being depleted faster than they can be replenished. Industrial production has not kept pace with demand. Rebuilding the capacity necessary for a prolonged war would take years.
Poor preparation is a recipe for calamitous defeat; meanwhile, the broader the war, the less sustainable it will prove.
Iran Is Ready for This War
Iran, by contrast, has spent decades preparing for precisely this scenario.
Iranian strategy is built around attrition. Rather than trying to match U.S. conventional military power, Iran has invested heavily in asymmetric capabilities — ballistic missiles, drones, cyber warfare, and networks of aligned militias throughout the region.
Instead of seeking decisive battlefield victories, Iran will attempt to impose steady costs on U.S. forces and its allies. U.S. bases across the Middle East, Israeli cities, shipping lanes, and global infrastructure are all potential targets.
Great Power Complications
In an era of great-power competition, regional wars rarely remain isolated. This conflict is happening within a broader geopolitical struggle.
China and Russia have strong incentives to prevent an American-Israeli victory in Iran. Neither wants the U.S. or Israel to dominate the Middle East unchallenged. Both possess advanced missile, radar, and electronic warfare technologies that could assist Iran with intelligence sharing, technological support, and economic backing. Such assistance could significantly complicate U.S. and Israeli operations.
While direct military intervention is unlikely, retaliation for blocking much needed energy supplies to China should be considered. Among other considerations, America remains vulnerable to Chinese restrictions on exports to the U.S. of rare earth minerals and metals. This war may soon dramatically degrade our economy.
The Pattern of American War
There is also a deeper structural problem in the way the United States fights wars.
In Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, American leaders repeatedly entered conflicts without clearly defined political objectives. Goals shifted as conditions changed. Military strategies often bore little relationship to achievable political outcomes.
The result was a recurring pattern: enormous expenditures of blood and treasure without success of any measurable kind. Exploding national deficits were among the chief results of exploding U.S. bombs. That, and millions of dead around the world, as planeloads of caskets draped in American flags returned to the homeland.
With its allies, Americans won World War II because we were united and because we knew what we were fighting for. Right made might, as President Abraham Lincoln once said. Our leaders today believe only that might makes right—and they couldn’t be more wrong.
The Iran War risks becoming the next chapter in that same tragic story of wrong.
Military strategy requires harmony between three elements: the political objective, the resources committed, and the methods used to achieve the goal. When those elements are misaligned, failure becomes almost inevitable.
In this war, the objective remains vague, the resources limited, and the strategy uncertain. That makes one thing certain: defeat.
The Danger of Escalation
The greatest danger now is further escalation.
Already there is discussion of deploying U.S. Special Forces inside Iran to support opposition groups. Such missions begin small but often expand rapidly, as they did in Vietnam and Afghanistan.
The moment American troops begin operating on Iranian soil, the risk of a wider and far more destructive war will increase dramatically. So too will the risk of disastrous, Bay of Pigs-like, operations involving U.S. troops and foreign proxies.
A Moment for Congress to Act
Under the Constitution, the authority to declare war belongs to Congress. That responsibility exists precisely to prevent this nation from drifting into unnecessary and illegal conflicts at the whim of a president enabled and empowered by a misbegotten warrior ethos. America has fought too many wars based on illusions of technological superiority and quick victory. Those illusions have repeatedly collided with reality. And reality always wins over illusion.
A war with Iran will almost certainly follow the same path and continued external attacks will likely strengthen Iran politically. History shows that foreign intervention often unifies societies rather than dividing them.
Congress must now decide whether to continue funding and expanding this disastrous war — $1 billion U.S. per day—or to assert its constitutional role and stop it. The longer the conflict continues, the higher the cost in lives and resources, and the greater the threat to global stability.
Unless American leaders find the spine to stop it, the United States will once again learn that starting a war is easy, but ending one is not. And that fighting a war for the wrong reasons, at the wrong time, with the wrong enemy, is not just foolish, not just indefensible, but a supreme exercise in folly that will deeply harm our country and our prospects as a people.
SIGNERS
Anthony Aguilar, former Ltc. US Army Special Operations Officer, Green Beret
William J. Astore, former Ltc. U.S. Air Force (Ret.)
Michael Baker, former Rear Admiral U.S. Navy (Ret.)
Gregory A. Daddis, former Col. U.S. Army, (Ret.) and West Point professor
Dennis Fritz, former CMD CMSgt U.S. Air Force (Ret.)
Josephine Guilbeau, former U.S. Army All-Source Intel Analyst
Matthew Hoh, former Capt., USMC, Iraq & Foreign Service Officer, Afghanistan (associate VIPS)
Karen Kwiatkowski, former Lt. Col., U.S. Air Force (ret.), at Office of Secretary of Defense watching the manufacture of lies on Iraq, 2001-2003
Dennis Laich, Director of EMN. former Maj. Gen. U.S. Army, (Ret.) & USA Reserve
Adrian R. Lewis, Professor and former U.S. Army, (Ret.)
Ray McGovern, former U.S. Army infantry/intelligence officer & C.I.A. analyst; C.I.A. Presidential briefer (ret.)
Elizabeth Murray, former Deputy National Intelligence Officer for the Near East, National Intelligence Council & C.I.A. political analyst (ret.)
John D. Rosenberger, former Col. U.S. Army, (Ret.)
Coleen Rowley, F.B.I. Special Agent and former Minneapolis Division Legal Counsel (ret.)
Christian Sorensen, Assoc. Director of EMN, former U.S. Air Force Arabic linguist
Ted Strickland, EMN Senior Political Advisor and former Ohio Governor
Brett R. Weimer, former Sgt. Maj. U.S. Army, (Ret.)
Lawrence Wilkerson, EMN Senior Advisor, former Col. U.S. Army, (Ret.)
Ann Wright, Col., U.S. Army (ret.); Foreign Service Officer (resigned in opposition to the war on Iraq)
Eisenhower Media Network is an organization of expert former military, intelligence, and civilian national security officials who have an independent, alternative story to tell
The US-funded ecosystem of Iranian ‘rights groups,’ Israeli operatives, and monarchist activists has become a revolving door of unverifiable statistics and atrocity propaganda
As deadly riots burn Iranian cities, Western media ignores the shocking wave of violence, turning instead to US government-funded NGOs for data. The one-sided portrayal has helped push Trump to the brink of authorizing renewed US attacks
Story: Escalation of the conflict between Israel, the US, and Iran in 2026
(Social media)
The weekly results of the sudden aggression of the US-Israeli coalition against Iran appear contradictory.
Tehran, the victim of aggression, is gradually gaining the upper hand. According to aif.ru experts and former intelligence officers, Washington’s initial plans for the operation collapsed within the first hours — on March 1, US President Donald Trump was ready to negotiate a ceasefire.
On one hand, Washington and Tel Aviv truly dealt a heavy blow, eliminating a significant portion of the Islamic Republic’s military leadership and gaining temporary air superiority.
American Plan A, that is regime change in Iran after the assassination of its leaders, has failed
On the other hand, Operation Epic Fury clearly didn’t go according to the Pentagon’s plan: Iran not only refused to capitulate, but is finding ways to deliver painful retaliatory strikes, putting an end to the blitzkrieg.
News of the downing of elite F-15 fighter jets emerged within the first few days. Military experts believe this was no accident, but the result of a well-planned tactic by Iranian air defense forces, which turned the skies over their country into a trap for the enemy.
The Trap Has Sprung: How the Iranians Destroy F-15s
According to Major General Vladimir Popov, the Iranian military relied on deception. They were able to lure the American pilots into a false sense of security by luring them into a deadly firefight.
It is possible the American pilots were flying at night and weren’t expecting an attack. This incident was likely an ambush. That is the radar stations located along the coast from Iran to the Persian Gulf weren’t activated, in order to create a false sense of impunity. Actually, the Iranians were tracking the American fighters. Several aircraft may have been flying in loose formation, and when the group began to turn, the last aircraft came under fire. The strike was unexpected
The problems of the coalition aren’t limited to air power. According to Ali Larijani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, more than 500 American troops have been killed since the fighting began on February 28. Iranian strikes have hit oil tankers and military bases in the region. Military experts are increasingly warning that Washington is entering a dangerous phase: at the current rate of use, its stockpiles of precision-guided weapons will only last a few weeks, after which a shortage of ammunition will inevitably become apparent.
A few days after the launch of the US operation, grandiosely titled « Epic Fury », American political commentator Jackson Hinkle published a photo of President Trump yelling at Pentagon chief Pete Hegseth.
« The operation failed within the first hours »
According to retired Captain Nicolas Cinquini, a former French counterterrorism intelligence officer, the joint US-Israeli operation failed within the first hours.
The plan to achieve « regime change through decapitation » — the assassination of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei — failed to bring about the collapse of Iranian statehood.
The « regime change through decapitation » operation was already a failure just hours after it began. According to an Israeli source, Donald Trump even tried, via Italian diplomats, to secure a ceasefire as early as March 1, before the stock market opened the following day
The balance of power is already tipping in Iran’s favor
After a week of fighting, the former intelligence officer notes a change in the strategic picture. The conflict has ceased to be a series of targeted strikes and is becoming a war of attrition, the terms of which are dictated by Iran
The struggle has become a war of attrition. The limited size of Israel and the fragility of its infrastructure, the depletion of Western high-end air defense munitions, the blockade of Hormuz strait, constraints on exports from oil monarchies and their worldwide economic consequences… the balance is tipping in favor of Iran
France is also under attack – That is the price of its alliance with the US
Cinquini also commented on Paris’ position. Despite initial criticism of the actions of the US-Israeli alliance, the French leadership ultimately allowed American aircraft to use their airbases in the Middle East. This decision, according to the expert, automatically made French facilities a legitimate target for retaliatory strikes
Since France announced today that it had authorized the US to use its military bases in the Middle East, they have become, in my opinion, legitimate targets. They are also legitimate from the perspective of Iran, which has already struck military installations in non-belligerent countries, when the facilities were involved in the Western aggression since February 28
World War III has not begun, but the risk of escalation is high
Despite the heightened tensions, the expert urges against overdramatizing the global situation. Fake news about the outbreak of World War III are actively spreading on social media, but the reality is more modest.
I don’t see so far a world war; the only belligerents are Iran and its Western aggressors: Israel, the US and to lesser extent, their European and Arab proxies
Nicolas Cinquini reassured the public.
Nevertheless, the danger of an escalation remains. It is directly related to the attempts of the US and Israel to « save face » amid obvious tactical failures and mounting losses
The conflict is already drawing new states into its orbit. Britain, France, and Germany have declared their readiness to provide defensive measures to their allies. London has allowed the US to use its bases and Canada has permitted the participation of its armed forces. NATO, for its part, has signaled its readiness to invoke Article 5 in the event of further escalation.
Russia, while condemning the aggression, is currently limiting itself to diplomatic and military-technical support for Iran, while maintaining open channels of communication with Washington [end]
Partis en Ukraine il y a plus de deux ans, plusieurs hooligans français ont poursuivi et intensifié leurs missions de guerre, tout en combattant en free-fight
They dox and harass foreign volunteers and spread Kremlin propaganda. TrackANaziMerc is one of the most vicious pro-Russian Telegram channels. Now, an OSINT group has turned the tables, unmasking the admins and doxxing the doxxers
pour l’émission Voyenkory [Correspondants de guerre] du 18 mai 2025, sur la chaîne Rossiya 1, je suis intervenu au sujet des volontaires nazis français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine. Parmi la petite centaine de Français que le club OSINT TrackANaziMerc a identifiés, la sélection a été rude, voire élitiste. Ils ont rivalisé de fascisme, ont gagné de haute lutte leur place dans le casting, voici dans l’ordre d’apparition à l’écran : Brandon Nicolas, Gwendal Delange, Guillaume Andreoni, Alan Vigneron et César Aujard
Dans la zone de l’OMS [Opération militaire spéciale], des citoyens français se battent aux côtés de la Russie. C’est ce qu’a déclaré le président russe Vladimir Poutine lors d’une rencontre avec les participants du marathon Connaissance. D’abord. Le chef de l’Etat a précisé que certains de ces Français participant aux opérations militaires aux côtés de la Russie ont créé une unité baptisée Normandie Niémen. Cette information a provoqué un choc à Paris. Les autorités de la Ve République veulent punir les Français qui combattent pour la Russie
Norwegian journalists are keen on triggering the censorship of Telegram channels which are identifying international Nazi volunteers and other mercenaries who are fighting in the Atlanticist ranks in Ukraine
A former French counter-terrorism intelligence officer Nicolas Cinquini is actively pursuing information regarding French citizens participating in the war on Ukraine’s side