Nicolas Cinquini

Analista senior di l'intelligenza in u campu di a gestione di i risichi di sicurezza, sò un anzianu tenente detective è ufficiale di l'intelligenza in l'agenzie di u Statu francese. A bona pronuncia hè Николай Чинкуини, in russu

Tag: strategicculturefoundation

  • [Sharing] Declassified: CIA’s Covert Ukraine Invasion Plan – Kit Klarenberg

    On August 7th, US polling giant Gallup published the remarkable results of a survey of Ukrainians. Public support for Kiev “fighting until victory” has plummeted to a record low “across all segments” of the population, “regardless of region or demographic group.” In a “nearly complete reversal from public opinion in 2022,” 69% of citizens “favor a negotiated end to the war as soon as possible.” Just 24% wish to keep fighting.  However, vanishingly few believe the proxy war will end anytime soon.

    The reasons for Ukrainian pessimism on this point are unstated, but an obvious explanation is the intransigence of President Volodymyr Zelensky, encouraged by his overseas backers – Britain in particular. London’s reverie of breaking up Russia into readily-exploitable chunks dates back centuries, and became turbocharged in the wake of the February 2014 Maidan coup. In July that year, a precise blueprint for the current proxy conflict was published by the Institute for Statecraft, a NATO/MI6 cutout founded by veteran British military intelligence apparatchik Chris Donnelly, who now oversees London’s management of the proxy conflict

    In response to the Donbass civil war, Statecraft advocated targeting Moscow with a variety of “anti-subversive measures”. This included “economic boycott, breach of diplomatic relations,” as well as “propaganda and counter-propaganda, pressure on neutrals.” The objective was to produce “armed conflict of the old-fashioned sort” with Russia, which “Britain and the West could win.” While we are now witnessing in real-time the brutal unravelling of Donnelly’s monstrous plot, Anglo-American designs of using Ukraine as a beachhead for all-out war with Moscow date back far further.

    In August 1957, the CIA secretly drew up elaborate plans for an invasion of Ukraine by US special forces. It was hoped neighbourhood anti-Communist agitators would be mobilized as footsoldiers to assist in the effort. A detailed 200-page report, Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas, set out demographic, economic, geographical, historical and political factors throughout the then-Soviet Socialist Republic that could facilitate, or impede, Washington’s quest to ignite local insurrection, and in turn the USSR’s ultimate collapse

    The mission was forecast to be a delicate and difficult balancing act, as much of Ukraine’s population held “few grievances” against Russians or Communist rule, which could be exploited to foment an armed uprising. Just as problematically, “the long history of union between Russia and Ukraine, which stretches in an almost unbroken line from 1654 to the present day,” resulted in “many Ukrainians” having “adopted the Russian way of life”. Problematically, there was thus a pronounced lack of “resistance to Soviet rule” among the population.

    The “great influence” of Russian culture over Ukrainians, “many influential positions” in local government being held “by Russians or Ukrainians sympathetic to [Communist] rule, and “relative similarity” of their “languages, customs, and backgrounds”, meant there were “fewer points of conflict between the Ukrainians and Russians” than in Warsaw Pact nations. Throughout those satellite states, the CIA had to varying success already recruited clandestine networks of “freedom fighters” as anti-Communist Fifth Columnists. Yet, the Agency remained keen to identify potential “resistance” actors in Ukraine:

    Some Ukrainians are apparently only slightly aware of the differences which set them apart from Russians and feel little national antagonism. Nevertheless, important grievances exist, and among other Ukrainians there is opposition to Soviet authority which often has assumed a nationalist form. Under favorable conditions, these people might be expected to assist American Special Forces in fighting against the regime

    ‘Nationalist Activity’

    A CIA map split Ukraine into 12 separate zones, ranked on “resistance” potential, and how “favorable population attitudes [are] toward the Soviet regime.” South and eastern regions, particularly Crimea and Donbass, rated poorly. Their populations were judged “strongly loyal” to Moscow, having never “displayed nationalist feelings or indicated any hostility to the regime,” while viewing themselves as “a Russian island in the Ukrainian sea.” In fact, as the study recorded, during and after World War I, when Germany created a fascist puppet state in Ukraine:

    Inhabitants of Donbass strongly resisted Ukrainian nationalists and at one point created a separate republic, independent of the rest of Ukraine. In the following years, they defended Soviet rule and Russian interests, often attacking the Ukrainian nationalists with more zeal than the Russian leaders themselves. During the German occupation in the Second World War, there was not a single recorded case of support for the Ukrainian nationalists or Germans

    Still, invading and occupying Crimea was considered of paramount importance. On top of its strategic significance, the peninsula’s landscape was forecast as ideal for guerrilla warfare. The terrain offered “excellent opportunities for concealment and evasion,” the CIA report noted. While “troops operating in these sectors must be specially trained and equipped,” it was forecast the local Tatar population, “which fought so fiercely” against the Soviets in World War II, “would probably be willing to help” invading US forces.

    Areas of western Ukraine, including former regions of Poland such as Lviv, Rivne, Transcarpathia and Volyn, which were heavily under control of “Ukrainian insurgents” – adherents of MI6-supported Stepan Bandera – during World War II, were judged most fruitful “resistance” launchpads. There, “nationalist activity was extensive” during World War II, with armed militias opposing “pro-Soviet partisans with some success.” Conveniently too, mass extermination of Jews, Poles and Russians by Banderites in these regions meant there was virtually no non-ethnic Ukrainian population left.

    Furthermore, in the post-war period, “resistance to Soviet rule” had been “expressed on a great scale” in western Ukraine. Despite “extensive deportations”, “many nationalists” remained in Lviv et al, and “nationalist cells” created by Bandera’s “task forces” remained dotted around the country. For example, anti-Communist “partisan bands” had taken up residence in the Carpathian Mountains. The review concluded, “it is in this region [US] Special Forces could expect considerable support from the local Ukrainian population, including active participation in measures directed against the Soviet regime.”

    It was also determined that “Ukrainian nationalist, anti-Soviet sentiment” in Kiev was “apparently moderately strong,” and elements of the population “might be expected to provide active assistance to Special Forces.” The capital’s “large Ukrainian population” was reportedly “little affected by Russian influence,” and during the Russian Revolution “provided greater support than any other region for Ukrainian, nationalist, anti-Soviet forces.” Resultantly, “uncertainty about the attitudes of the local population” prompted Moscow to designate the Ukrainian SSR’s capital, which it remained until 1934.

    The CIA document further offered highly detailed assessments of Ukrainian territory, based on their utility for warfare. For example, “generally forbidding” Polesia – near Belarus – was noted to be “almost impossible” to traverse during spring. Conversely, winter provided “most favorable to movement, depending on the depth to which the ground freezes.” Overall, the area had “proved its worth as an excellent refuge and evasion area by supporting large-scale guerilla activities in the past.” Meanwhile, “swampy valleys of the Dnieper and Desna rivers” were of particular interest:

    The area is densely forested in its north-western part, where there are excellent opportunities for concealment and manoeuvre…There are extensive swamps, interspersed with patches of forest, which also provide good hiding places for the Special Forces. Conditions in the Volyno-Podolskaya Highlands are less suitable, although small groups may find temporary shelter in the sparse forests

    ‘Strongly Anti-Nationalist’

    The CIA’s invasion plan never formally came to pass. Yet, areas of Ukraine forecast by the Agency to be most welcoming of US special forces were precisely where support for the Maidan coup was highest. Moreover, in a largely unknown chapter of the Maidan saga, fascist Right Sector militants were bussed en masse to Crimea prior to Moscow’s seizure of the peninsula. Had they succeeded in overrunning the territory, Right Sector would’ve fulfilled the CIA’s objective, as outlined in Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas

    A civilian defence barricade constructed to prevent Right Sector entering Crimea, February 2014

    Given what transpired elsewhere in Ukraine following February 2014, other sections of the CIA report take on a distinctly eerie character. For instance, despite its strategic position facing the Black Sea, the Agency warned against attempting to foment anti-Soviet rebellion in Odessa. The agency noted the city is “the most cosmopolitan area in Ukraine, with a heterogeneous population including significant numbers of Greeks, Moldovans and Bulgarians, as well as Russians and Jews.” As such:

    Odessa…has developed a less nationalistic character. Historically, it has been considered more Russian than Ukrainian territory. There was little evidence of nationalist or anti-Russian sentiment here during the Second World War, and the city…was in fact controlled by a strongly anti-nationalist local administration [during the conflict]

    Odessa became a key battleground between pro- and anti-Maidan elements, from the moment the Maidan protests erupted in November 2013. By March the next year, Russophone Ukrainians had occupied the city’s historic Kulykove Pole Square, and were calling for a referendum on the establishment of an “Odessa Autonomous Republic”. Tensions came to a head on May 2nd, when fascist football ultras – who subsequently formed Azov Battalion – flooded Odessa and forced dozens of anti-Maidan activists into the Trade Unions House, before setting it ablaze.

    In all, 42 people were killed and hundreds injured, while Odessa’s anti-Maidan movement was comprehensively neutralised. In March this year, the European Court of Human Rights issued a damning ruling against Kiev over the massacre. It concluded local police and fire services “deliberately” failed to respond appropriately to the inferno, and authorities insulated culpable officials and perpetrators from prosecution despite possessing incontrovertible evidence. Lethal “negligence” by officials on the day, and ever after, was found to go far “beyond an error of judgment or carelessness.”

    The ECHR was apparently unwilling to consider that the lethal incineration of anti-Maidan activists was an intentional and premeditated act of mass murder, conceived and directed by Kiev’s US-installed fascist government. However, the findings of a Ukrainian parliamentary commission point ineluctably towards this conclusion. Whether, in turn, the Odessa massacre was intended to trigger Russian intervention in Ukraine, thus precipitating “armed conflict of the old-fashioned sort” with Moscow that “Britain and the West could win” is a matter of speculation [end]

    The original article

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    The Atlanticist defeat in Donbass and Ukraine

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    June 11, 2025: Secret British plans to ‘defeat entire Russian Black Fleet’ revealed in leaks – Kit Klarenberg, The Grayzone

    Leaked files reviewed by The Grayzone expose the covert war waged by British intelligence against Russia in the Black Sea, outlining Ukrainian “honey trap” plots along with blueprints for blowing up the Kerch Bridge

    May 9, 2025: Victory Day

    April 2, 2025: It’s Official: Ukraine Conflict is British ‘Proxy War’ – Kit Klarenberg

    March 26, 2025: “Ukrainian History X”: How the State Department Secretly Funded the Azov* Regiment – Andrey Zhuravlev

    With the start of the Special Military Operation in February 2022, the nationalist Azov Regiment became one of Ukraine’s most widely recognized military formations. Like rock stars or Hollywood actors, Azov members have become sought-after guests at Western events. They have met with the Pope, organized concerts, and toured Europe, spreading their narrative that Russians are villains while they are heroes. Only in Russia is this regiment, along with similar formations, officially recognized as a terrorist organization

    February 8, 2025: ‘Aiding chaos’: USAID’s role in engineering regime change, social unrest worldwide – Maryam Qarehgozlou, Press TV

    After President Donald Trump’s executive order suspending all US foreign aid programs, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) has again come under intense scrutiny

    November 16, 2024: Leaks expose secret British military cell plotting to ‘keep Ukraine fighting’ – Kit Klarenberg, The Grayzone

    Leaked files show top UK military figures conspired to carry out the Kerch bridge bombing, covertly train “Gladio”-style stay-behind forces in Ukraine, and groom the British public for a drop in living standards caused by the proxy war against Russia

    August 11, 2024: Western globalism and its Nazi-fascist instrument will be defeated in Kiev – Hugo Dionisio, Strategic Culture Foundation

    It is essential to close the circle of Nazi existence. The defeat of the Kiev regime is a fundamental step in this direction

    July 28, 2024: Ultra-nationalist linked to Maidan false flag assassinated – Kit Klarenberg, The Grayzone

    The killing of ultra-nationalist Ukrainian politician Iryna Farion at the hands of a Neo-Nazi is filled with irony. Linked to the Maidan false flag massacre, Farion was instrumental in bringing fascist forces into the mainstream

    June 26, 2024: The Franco-British Plot to Dismember Russia [1917 – ?] – Kit Klarenberg

    April 9, 2024: Secret list of a French intelligence officer: how NATO soldiers end up in Ukraine – Zvezda

    [it was with great pleasure that I have been involved in an investigation by Zvezda, the channel of the Russian Ministry of Defense]

    February 2, 2024: EPER, personne morale

    deux Français sont tués en Ukraine le 1er février 2024

    January 19, 2024: Russian Missile Strike on French Contractor Base in Ukraine Highlights Heated Franco-Russian Cold War – Military Watch Magazine

    June 6, 2023: First there were Neo-Nazis, then there were no Nazis, then there were – Patrick Lawrence, ScheerPost

    October 14, 2020: Liberalism And Fascism: Partners In Crime – Gabriel Rockhill, Counterpunch

  • [Sharing] Russophrenia: the West’s favourite delusion about Russia – Brian McDonald

    Ten years after I coined the term, the media’s still convinced Russia is both collapsing, and conquering the world

    There’s a peculiar affliction that’s gripped the Western commentariat for decades now. I first diagnosed it in June 2015 and gave it a name: Russophrenia. The tell-tale sign? That deep-set conviction that Russia’s about to keel over economically—then somehow rise from the wreckage to take Brussels by breakfast. In those ten years, the condition’s only become more widespread—like a political variant of Covid, except there’s no PCR tests, and the worst sufferers have column inches.

    Back in 2015, it was already clear. Read any English-language piece on Russia and you’d find the same breathless contradictions. “The ruble is in freefall”… followed two paragraphs later by “Russian ‘oligarchs’ (sic) are buying up half of France.” Russia, we were told, was a “gas station with nukes,” a “mafia state,” “on the brink of collapse.” That was just before the same experts warned it could manipulate every Western election, hack every NATO server, and brainwash half of Ohio.

    So let’s rummage through the old press clippings, shall we? Some of them haven’t aged as well as their writers hoped.

    In 2001, The Atlantic boldly declared “Russia Is Finished.” Spoiler: as we know, it wasn’t. Nearly a quarter century on, that headline now looks more like a cry for help.

    In 2008, the Guardian’s Luke Harding—who’s always good for a prediction—declared Russia “close to economic collapse” due to falling oil prices. Within a year, the economy had bounced back and Harding was warning of a “new arms race.” Later, he authored an extensively debunked book built around the mirage of “RussiaGate”—now widely discredited thanks to U.S. intelligence disclosures.

    Julia Ioffe joined in 2014 with her own “Russia is falling apart” prophecy—echoing Masha Gessen’s 2011 forecast that “Putin’s world is falling apart.” Over a decade later, Putin’s still at the desk, and those takes have aged like unrefrigerated milk.

    And then there was Mark Galeotti, who warned in 2015 that Putin’s brief disappearance might trigger “succession wars.” He reappeared days later looking mildly bored. Leaving a lot of ridiculous-looking tweets.

    But perhaps the finest specimen of advanced-stage Russophrenia was the late US Senator John McCain, who famously called Russia “a gas station masquerading as a country.” This from a man who once took a break from posing with Islamist rebels to compare Putin to Hitler. The irony? Russia’s economy—gas station or not— is now the largest in Europe. After passing out Germany a few years ago on PPP rankings. And McCain’s rhetorical gas ran out long before Russia’s did.

    Of course, none of this means Russia is a utopia. Far from it. The economy has structural problems. The political system is more fortress than forum. And yes, the Ukraine conflict has triggered enormous costs. But facts are stubborn things. Despite the most aggressive sanctions regime in history, Russia hasn’t imploded. The Moscow stock exchange, after being written off in early 2022, was at 2,727 points on Friday. Far off its all time high (4,292), but hardly on its knees. Agricultural exports have soared. The birth rate, albeit not great, is still better than much of Europe. And those American-made “devastating sanctions”? India, China, Turkey, and most of the Global South didn’t get the memo.

    The Western media, however, hasn’t changed its tune. They’ve just layered it. Now it’s: yes, Russia is collapsing… but it’s also exporting authoritarianism, destabilising Africa, puppeteering Hungary, and might invade the Baltics on Tuesday. Russophrenia 2.0.

    And what drives it all? Familiarity’s absence. Sanctions, the forced closure of consulates, shuttered news bureaus—it’s never been harder for a Westerner to visit Russia. And the fewer people who go, the more powerful the myths become. Russia becomes a Rorschach test—some see Mordor, others a 1980s cartoon villain. Almost no one sees it as it is: complex, contradictory, sometimes maddening, sometimes magnificent. In short, a real country, not a narrative prop.

    Back in Ireland, when I mention Russia, I often get two reactions: one, that Russia’s economy is in ruins; two, that it’s plotting world domination. The contradiction passes without comment. That’s the thing about Russophrenia—you don’t notice the absurdity when you’re living inside it.

    Meanwhile, most coverage of Russia isn’t even produced from inside Russia anymore. It’s written from Riga, or Warsaw, or Zoom calls with the same four exiled pundits. The actual country is missing. And with it, any chance of nuance.

    Of course, Russia’s no tidy postcard. It sprawls out like it means to confuse you. One minute it’s throwing you a smile over breakfast, and by tea it’s broken your heart. You touch down thinking you’ve got the place half-sussed, and by the time you hit passport control, you’re not so sure of anything. That’s not some bug in the system—it’s the system. And for all its mess and mischief, it’s still real. Real enough to deserve being seen on its own terms, not squeezed to fit the shape of someone’s word count.

    It’s been ten years since I first gave a name to this fever, and still it burns. The same old phantoms—maps from another century, clichés with the ink worn thin—held up as gospel. The patient isn’t getting better. Just louder.

    So here’s my prescription: less punditry, more plane tickets. Less projection, more proximity. And above all, less fear.

    You don’t have to toast the place or take its side. Just stop seeing ghosts. Wipe your lens, look again. That’s where recovery begins [end]

    The original article

    Related

    July 17, 2025: La Russie est notre Rorschach – Emmanuel Todd

    May 9, 2025: Victory Day

    April 30, 2025: IGNORANCE – Scott Ritter

    December 13, 2024: McCarthyism, European style: The elite crackdown on Ukraine dissent – Eldar Mamedov, Responsible Statecraft

    Experts lambasted as Kremlin mouthpieces turned out to be right

    October 7, 2024: Is Russia Really The “Greatest Threat” To France? – Andrew Korybko, Oriental Review

    Russia’s support of multipolar processes in West Africa has dealt a heavy blow to French hegemony there, which France has responded to by waging a proxy war on Russia in Mali while going on the strategic offensive in the South Caucasus and Eastern Europe

    July 5, 2024: The Franco-British Plot to Dismember Russia [1917 – ?] – Kit Klarenberg

    June 3, 2023: EU’s Voluntary Disinformation Code Is Compulsory: Obey or Die – Declan Hayes, Strategic Culture Foundation

    Though Musk is still playing at being NATO’s token non-conformist, the EU is essentially telling him and all of us that any dissent from its Russophobic, Slavophobic and Sinophobic narratives will be severely punished

    The Western disinformation about Ukraine

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    The Atlanticist defeat in Donbass and Ukraine

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  • [Sharing] Even if the war ended tomorrow, Ukraine could end up broke by 2026 – Ian Proud, Responsible Statecraft

    There’s a gaping hole in Kyiv’s finances that no amount of tax increases or Western donations will be able to fill

    There is no plan in place to fund the Ukrainian budget after 2025.

    Even if the war ends by the summer of 2025, it will take some time to reduce military expenditures, leaving European nations on the hook. It’s not clear that European elites have fully understood the political costs, however much longer the war continues.

    With intensive, U.S.-brokered negotiations ongoing in Saudi Arabia involving separate Ukrainian and Russian delegations, hopes are rising that the Trump administration will finally be able to bring an end to the war.

    But even if the war ends tomorrow, it would be unwise to assume that Ukraine could reduce military spending close to prewar levels.

    Ukraine now has almost 900,000 men and women at arms, a threefold increase from peacetime, and that doesn’t take into account irrecoverable losses through death and injury. Estimates vary widely, but the casualty rate is commonly thought to number in the hundreds of thousands, with compensation provided to the injured and families of the deceased.

    The war in Ukraine has therefore come at a vast financial cost to that country. Ukraine’s defense spending has risen tenfold since the 2021 budget was announced, when social welfare payments were the country’s biggest expenditure.

    This has left a gaping hole in Ukraine’s finances that no amount of tax increases or Western donations will be able to fill over a sustained period without political consequences.

    Since 2022, Ukraine has run an average budget deficit of over 22% of GDP. Based on the current exchange rate, Ukraine’s budget shortfall in 2025 amounts to around $41.5 billion. And that assumes defense spending falling slightly this year. In the hopefully unlikely event that war continues to the end of the year, the Ukrainian state would need to revise its budget upwards as it did in 2024.

    Today, Ukraine’s domestic revenue, including taxes, excise, and duties, just about covers the cost of the defense effort, which in 2024 accounted for 64% of its total budget expenditure. That includes significant tax increases as the war has gone on. Total tax revenue will have risen by more than 100% since the war started and personal income taxes by over 200%. This in a country in which, according to the Wilson Center, 50% of the population lives at a basic subsistence level.

    As Ukraine is cut off from international capital markets, it has had to meet the difference through aid and loans from Western nations.

    Put simply, Western donations and loans have paid the salaries of Ukrainian state officials and kept the lights on in their buildings. At the start of the war, donations took the form of free financial aid to meet the country’s budgetary and military needs. According to the Kiel Institute, the United States has provided just above $50 billion in direct budgetary assistance. The European Union provided $51.5 billion in financial assistance – i.e., budgetary support – between 2022 and 2024.

    However, since the start of 2024, free aid has progressively shifted to lending as Western governments have felt the political and economic cost of unlimited financial assistance.

    So, Ukraine has increasingly resorted to borrowing money. In some regards, that is to be expected. Governments tend to borrow heavily at times of war. The UK only settled its World War II war debts to the United States and Canada in 2006.

    Ukrainian debt has therefore soared to over 100% of GDP and, critically, the cost of servicing its debt has tripled, and now makes up the second largest line of expenditure in Ukraine’s budget, after military spending. To put that into context, Ukraine will spend more than twice the amount on servicing its debt in 2025 than it spends on the health of its population. That ratio will only widen the longer the war continues.

    Ukraine should just about be able to make ends meet in 2025 thanks to the G7 Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration loan agreed in June 2024. As part of a last-ditch compromise by the outgoing Biden Administration, the $20 billion U.S. contribution to the G7 loan was directed through the World Bank to provide specific project-based support – i.e., to help rebuild power infrastructure – rather than generalized budgetary support.

    The crucial point is that I’ve seen no plans for how Ukraine’s budgetary needs will be met from 2026 onward. Even if the war ends tomorrow, Ukraine may still be at risk of running out of money in 2026 if Western donor countries falsely assume that it will be able to return to prewar spending on Day One.

    Therefore, the big question is how quickly Ukraine can reduce military spending in 2026 and who will cover the shortfall. To balance the books in 2026, Ukraine would need to reduce its military spending by 80%, or around $41 billion.

    But decision-makers in Kyiv may understandably push to maintain a big army against the threat of future Russian aggression. While the huge expenditure in weapons and ammunition from war fighting may fall away, maintaining a standing army, even if its numbers are reduced, would still carry a heavy price. Even if Ukraine’s future budget deficit wasn’t as high as $41 billion, it is easy to imagine that it might be $20 billion.

    The International Monetary Fund also doesn’t expect Ukraine to be able to access international lending markets before 2027. That will leave the Ukrainian state reaching out to donor nations for additional funding. With the Trump administration looking to pare back its financial commitments to Ukraine and focus instead on investing, including in minerals, the pressure will be on European states. There is significant political risk here. In the past few days, the Europeans struggled to agree to an additional weapons package of $5 billion for Ukraine. Funding $20 billion in budgetary support to Ukraine in 2026 following a ceasefire this year may still herald a backlash from those on the nationalist left and right who believe the war should have ended in 2022. I assess the UK and Europe would find it economically and politically unsustainable to prop up the war beyond this year without the United States. That’s another reason why European leaders should get behind ongoing peace negotiations [end]

    The original article

    Ian Proud was a member of His Britannic Majesty’s Diplomatic Service from 1999 to 2023. He served as the Economic Counsellor at the British Embassy in Moscow from July 2014 to February 2019. Prior to Moscow, he organized the 2013 G8 Summit in Lough Erne, Northern Ireland, working out of 10 Downing Street. He recently published his memoir, “A Misfit in Moscow: How British diplomacy in Russia failed, 2014-2019”

    Related

    March 16, 2025: The Minsk Agreements and why they failed – Ian Proud, Strategic Culture Foundation

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  • [Sharing] Paralyzed by acute dementia, Europe declares war on Russia all over again – Pepe Escobar, Strategic Culture Foundation

    The SMO [Special Military Operation] will keep rollin’ on. And as the Europeans want it, to the last Ukrainian

    Let’s start with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s Road to Damascus moment:

    Frankly, it’s a proxy war between nuclear powers, the United States helping Ukraine and Russia, and it needs to come to an end

    Now that’s a howler. Jeffrey Sachs to the rescue. Of course, the correct formulation would be “proxy war launched by the United States”. But still: Hallelujah! Such illumination – by proxy – from Heavens Above could never had hit the previous American Secretary of Genocide.

    Now cut to panic. Total European panic.

    Le Petit Roi, as popular in France as nighttime mosquitoes in a five-star beach resort, has declared that peace in Europe is only possible with a “tamed” Russia – and that Russia is a direct threat to France and Europe.

    On Ukraine, he pontificated that peace simply cannot take place under Russian terms or via the – inevitable – Ukrainian surrender.

    Le breathless Petit Roi literally went nuclear. He stressed that France possesses a nuclear deterrent – and offered it to the rest of Europe, while insisting that Europe’s future should not be dictated by Moscow or Washington.

    Le Petit Roi napoleonically all but declared war on Russia. Well, the fact remains that the overwhelming majority of France would gladly agree that mini-Napoleon should be dispatched to the battlefields in the black soil of Novorossiya right away – where he would surrender in less than 5 minutes, waving a rainbow flag, as he realizes he’s about to be turned into an instant steak tartare.

    Now couple this Moliere farce with the fate of the much larger, fatter, pan-European New Model Woke Army regimented by the Fuhrerin SS von der Lugen out of Brussels, allegedly to be financed to the tune of 800 billion euros – money that no one has, and would have to be loaned then repaid with sky-high extorsion interest rates to the usual international financial system vultures.

    SS von der Lugen insists Europe is in danger, so the solution is a massive expansion of the military-industrial complex – in practice, buying more overpriced American weapons – and “rearmament”.

    Talk about Gotterdammerung on crack.

    Were the New Model Woke Army ever come to light, surrender would also be a matter of less than 5 minutes – brandishing rainbow flags – as its woke warriors would face the dire prospect of being Oreshniked to a pile of charcoal grilled burgers.

    Add to it the Return of the Nord Stream Saga – with a new plot twist. Sy Hersh conclusively proved that the Nord Streams were bombed under orders of the previous Crash Test Dummy regime in Washington. Now Nord Stream 2, at least, could be back in business via a not-so-secret U.S.-Russia deal involving Gazprom and American oligarchs.

    All that while fanatics in Berlin assure right and left they want to explore every possible way to prevent (italics mine) the Nord Stream system from being repaired – because after all no one, especially the new BlackRock chancellor, can deviate from the official policy of destroying the German economy by all means necessary.

    Compounding the Kafkaesque scenario, the Prime Minister of Denmark – which is on the brink of losing Greenland “one way or another” to Trump 2.0 – immortalized the words, “peace in Ukraine will be more dangerous than war.” The Polish Prime Minister did not miss a beat, adding that “Europe is stronger than Russia and capable of winning in any military, financial, or economic confrontation.” Europe is in such a “winning” streak now – as the record shows.

    All this discombobulated Tower of Babel proves, without a shadow of a doubt, that Europe is geopolitically – and geoeconomically – dead and buried. No Teutonic Gods – complete with fat lady singin’ – will be able to resurrect it.

    Flirting with a one-way ticket back to the Stone Age

    The notion that Europe is able to pose a military threat to Russia does not even qualify as trashy propaganda for sub-zero IQs. It would take at least a decade to re-militarize Germany as its economy is moribund, serially stabbed by unmanageable energy costs. Russia for its part is protected from a possible nuclear attack by Le Petit Roi’s puny “umbrella” arsenal by the most sophisticated missile defenses in the world.

    The Aegis defensive missiles in Poland are relatively worthless – even if their prime danger to Russia remains that the system can be converted to handle offensive missiles. As a whole, the Aegis, Patriot, THAAD-PAC-3, SBIR-HIGH Ground Based Infrared Systems are all relatively useless.

    Other than the U.S., NATO simply has no military worth. And Washington under Trump 2.0 simply will not be involved in the next European War.

    The U.S. has satellite systems for targeting but no one else in NATO has them. With the U.S. pulling out, and in the event of a hypothetical von der Lugen-led New Woke Army attack against Russia, Russian missiles can knock out all European ports, airports and manufacturing and energy systems in a day max – instantly returning Europe to the stone age.

    This applies to England, France, Germany, not to mention assorted chihuahuas: all of NATO. Russia can knock out all British power systems with Zircons launched from a conventional submarine. Stone Age, here we come. Russian hypersonic missiles cannot be intercepted.

    Meanwhile, President Putin insists on talking sense to lunatics. At the Collegia of the FSB on February 27, he noted how, “some Western elites are still determined to maintain instability in the world, and these forces will try to disrupt and compromise the dialogue [with the U.S.] that has begun. We see this. We need to take this into account and use all the possibilities of diplomacy and special services to disrupt such attempts.”

    As Andrei Martyanov has noted, superpowers have “only two options in the 21st century: either start WWIII which will end with nuclear exchange or find a modus vivendi.” That’s a conversation for adults that automatically excludes the European hospice and the childish tantrums of the cracked actor in Kiev.

    The cracked actor never had any (italics mine) cards. He now cuts a pathetic figure, doing somersaults to cling to power, propped by (former) collective West money, weapons and massive propaganda. Now the 404 nation he “created” is losing not only the war but the P.R. war as well.

    The former adviser to the head of Zelensky’s office, Oleksiy Arestovych, as slimy as they come, but always with his pulse on reliable info, is convinced that the Ukrainian Army, blind and cross-eyed, can hold out at best for another one and a half to two months without all those American goodies. Without intel data, Kiev’s forces cannot prepare strikes against the Russian federation or conduct reconnaissance and cyber ops.

    Country 404 as a whole is now entering Walking Dead territory. Europe, with or without its SS von der Lugen Invincible Armada, does not have the industrial capacity, the financial might, and the military capability to stop the debacle. Russia has already stated that any European “peacekeeping” troops will immediately become legitimate targets.

    The spectacular failure of Project Ukraine is a sight to behold. It’s no wonder the current, tawdry, ghastly political “elites” are in total panic. Without Project Ukraine, and without the Mafia protection of His Master’s Voice, they are just, geopolitically, an irrelevant, post-colonial small peninsula on the western borders of fast-integrating Eurasia.

    As for Trump 2.0 and the Kremlin already having hit some sort of pre-deal – even before the start of serious negotiations – there’s no evidence yet to corroborate it. According to Russian intel sources, what has been struck is a general agreement on the framework of discussions, and what can be achieved in practice. This initial stage will last at least a few months.

    Themes on the table range from lifting sanctions on Russian banks and the use of MIR cards to restoring direct flights and curbing the militarization of the Arctic.

    Everything essentially hinges on whether Trump wants – and is able to ensure – a fast endgame in Ukraine while disengaging, slowly but surely, from NATO.

    Considering what seems to be his strategic direction, Trump wants to make sure he won’t have to offer Mafia protection to European NATO members if they insist on keep going with their Forever War against Russia. It’s clear that shutting off Starlink and shutting off satellite ISR would lead to a much faster endgame in the battlefield.

    The SMO, meanwhile, will keep rollin’ on. And as the Europeans want it, to the last Ukrainian [end]

    The original article

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  • [Partage] La bourgeoisie n’a plus les moyens intellectuels, ni culturels, de sa domination de classe – Harold Bernat, Quartier Général

    Longtemps la culture de classe, une culture bourgeoise, a fait le travail pour tenir les hommes en respect et créer les conditions d’une humanisation partagée. Nous assistons pourtant, particulièrement en Europe, spécialement en France, à son exténuation. Une révolution culturelle à bas bruit est en train de tout emporter. Aussi bien l’humanisme abstrait issu des Lumières que le romantisme de réaction, à la fois les philosophies bourgeoises de l’arrachement à la nature que les philosophies bourgeoises de la renaturalisation de l’homme dans une histoire, une langue, une culture. En un mot, une crise sans précédent de la culture de classe dans sa fonction pratico-sociale d’institution des sociétés humaines. Cette crise emporte aussi bien la gauche que la droite pour ceux qui aiment les petits repères simplistes. Mes repères seront Kant et De Maistre.

    Culture de masse, culture populaire, culture mondaine, culture de cour, culture artistique, culture du génie, culture humaniste, culture romantique, nous parlons toujours d’une culture de classe qui tenait en respect les hommes et les peuples. Culture pourvoyeuse de sens, de significations imaginaires, d’un ordre socialisé. Tordons d’abord le cou à une croyance naïve qui consiste à penser qu’il existe une culture populaire spontanée et autonome qui ne serait pas une culture de classe ou que cette culture populaire serait écrasée, inhibée, par une culture de masse tombée du ciel de l’industrie culturelle elle-même produite par une classe dominante. Il n’y a pas et il n’y aura jamais de culture spontanée qui émanerait de la terre qui ne ment pas ou de l’esprit d’un peuple spontanément disponible pour une transcription littérale. Comme si la culture n’exigeait aucune maîtrise, aucun travail, aucune exigence, aucune verticalité. La culture serait, dans sa généalogie populaire, d’ailleurs largement mythifiée par la réaction à l’humanisme abstrait, une force disponible depuis le bas. Elle pousserait en continu, fond obscur localisé géographiquement et historiquement mais impensable rationnellement. Ce mythe feint d’oublier que la culture procède toujours du haut vers le bas, elle est descendante.

    Arnold Hauser a pu établir, en 1974, dans un excellent livre intitulé Fondements de la sociologie de l’art, qu’aucune forme d’art n’était réellement collective et d’emblée socialisée. Il en va de même de la création culturelle. Chaque forme culturelle particulière prend sa source dans une création individuelle qui se déploie ensuite dans une communauté qui peut se l’approprier a posteriori. La faire sienne. Ce n’est pas parce que l’auteur d’une chanson populaire est anonyme qu’il n’est pas issu d’une classe sociale lettrée. Hauser explique par exemple que le « genre épique  populaire » était le fait d’érudits. Il en va de même pour les idylles du Moyen-âge ou les recueils de proverbes dits « populaires ». Comme le rappelle Juan José Sebreli dans La modernité assiégée, Critique du relativisme culturel (Delga, 2020), cette compréhension de classe a prévalu dans toutes les cultures. « La sculpture africaine – tant vantée par les populistes – fut anonyme et là aussi non spontanée ; les sculpteurs noirs appartenaient à des castes consacrées au métier. » Seul le regard colonialiste sur ces œuvres a pu y voir l’expression d’un primitivisme spontanéiste. La plupart de ces œuvres étaient d’ailleurs contemporaines des collectionneurs parisiens, surréalistes, marchands d’art, amateurs alors qu’ils y voyaient l’expression naïve et innocente d’une humanité disparue. Méprise d’une classe qui ne peut pas reconnaître chez l’autre la même logique de classe sans se juger elle-même. Effet miroir pour mieux se persuader qu’il est toujours possible de saisir la culture à son état natif, originaire, primitif. La mauvaise conscience bourgeoise fantasme l’altérité pour s’oublier elle-même. Elle rencontre en réalité d’autres hiérarchies, d’autres verticalités. Une autre culture de classe. Illusion ethnocentrique et incompréhension de la logique de classe de la création culturelle. En d’autres termes, la culture, celle qui donne un sens à nos vies humaines, celle qui structure nos existences, « populaire » ou « élitiste », celle dont on ne peut pas se passer sous peine de dépérir, procède toujours du haut vers le bas. La culture est descendante. Ce n’est ni un mal, ni un bien mais un fait anthropologique. La question est donc de savoir ce qui descend encore quand la classe dominante est culturellement exténuée.

    La compréhension de ce fait anthropologique fondamental est essentielle pour saisir la crise de la culture de classe qui est en train de déployer toutes ses conséquences politiques en Europe. Lorsque nous parlons des Lumières, de l’universalisme, d’humanisme ou de la réaction aux Lumières, de romantisme, de particularismes culturels, nous nous situons toujours dans une culture de classe descendante. Kant et De Maistre étaient des bourgeois et leur représentation du monde une représentation de classe. Cela ne veut pas dire qu’ils pensaient mal. Le premier envisage l’homme dans sa capacité originaire à s’arracher à tout particularisme culturel pour signifier son humanité, le second ne pense l’humanité que dans son attachement à des particularités culturelles. Fer de lance de la réaction en France à la fin du XVIIIe siècle, ce dernier écrit, dans ses Considérations sur la France en 1796 : « J’ai vu, dans ma vie des Français, des Italiens, des Russes etc. Je sais même grâce à Montesquieu qu’on peut être Persan mais quant à l’homme, je déclare ne jamais l’avoir rencontré de ma vie ; s’il existe, c’est bien à mon, insu. » Les deux présupposent une culture qui puisse faire sens pour l’homme en tant qu’homme (Kant) ou l’homme en tant que Français, Italien, Russe, pour de Maistre. Tous deux produisent des représentations culturelles extrêmement sophistiquées de l’homme. Ils œuvrent pour donner un sens à la vie humaine. Il est évidemment possible de défendre l’héritage des Lumières et l’humanisme abstrait contre la réaction et l’humanité située, voire de composer dialectiquement avec les deux, ce qu’essaiera de faire Hannah Arendt dans La crise de la culture mais dans les deux cas nous avons affaire à une classe sociale qui n’est pas indifférente culturellement à l’édification d’un sens pour l’homme, une classe sociale bourgeoise qui fait de la question de l’homme une nécessité pour elle, une classe qui œuvre.

    Il ne faut pas regretter ce fait social mais partir de lui pour comprendre que l’effondrement anthropologique dont nous parlons aujourd’hui et exclusivement l’effondrement des capacités de la classe dominante, bourgeoise en l’occurrence, à produire encore des individualités capables de créer une culture susceptible d’organiser nos significations sociales, de leur donner un sens. La classe sociale dominante est désoeuvrée. Elle jouit mais ne pense plus, ne crée plus rien. Ce n’est pas que sa parole ne soit plus entendue comme elle cherche pourtant à nous le faire croire. Ce n’est pas non plus que des « populismes » soient sortis spontanément du siècle pour menacer l’ordre social en faisant peser la menace du chaos et de l’anomie. Ces mythes réactionnaires, car ce sont des mythes en réaction d’une impuissance propre, ne sont pas destinés aux peuples qu’ils semblent viser. Ce sont autant d’aveux d’impuissance. « Ne pouvant plus faire descendre une quelconque culture du haut vers le bas, étant incapables de signifier quoi que ce soi, étant engagés dans un survivalisme indifférents aux domaines de l’homme, nous ne pouvons que nous défier brutalement de ce qui nous menace. » Voilà ce qui devrait être énoncé par cette classe qui n’assume plus son rôle, pire, qui en est intellectuellement incapable. En France, elle a cherché à promouvoir une imposture en « président philosophe ». Elle sent en effet confusément que les références qui ont pu lui donner la légitimité d’une domination indiscutable lui échappent désormais. Elle recycle par conséquent les signifiés des Lumières, de la philosophie mais il n’y a plus rien derrière. Le néant. Tout un appareil médiatique est alors nécessaire pour promouvoir ce simulacre dans le temps, le faire tenir. Mais cela ne tient pas, cela ne tient plus. Le « président philosophe » n’était qu’une gidouille grotesque.

    Il faut bien comprendre que la bourgeoisie de connivence, nous parlons d’elle, n’a plus que des dadais incultes à offrir en spectacle pour armée de réserve. Elle n’a plus les ressources intellectuelles de sa prétention sociale à la domination. Elle n’est plus capable de gagner, par sa force culturelle propre, sa légitimité politique et sociale. Ne lui reste que la brutalité. Cette impuissance manifeste est évidemment la raison première d’une surenchère défensive de la part de bourgeois culturellement stériles. Cette brutalité est un symptôme. Il s’agit même du symptôme le plus manifeste d’une classe qui a perdu toute vocation à gouverner.

    Le phénomène premier est l’effondrement sidérant des classes dominantes. Culturellement, elles sont aujourd’hui incapables de faire ce qu’elles ont toujours fait : organiser la vie humaine en créant des significations imaginaires fécondes pour le plus grand nombre. Leur stérilité stérilise du haut vers le bas. Avec une haine farouche et une méticulosité d’experts, les classes sociales supérieures au pouvoir – ce mot en devient ridicule tant la misère spirituelle y est profonde et la corruption d’une bassesse odieuse – se sont évertuées depuis des années, des décennies, à détruire les espaces, les lieux, les supports qui rendaient possible la compréhension d’un problème qui nous concerne tous : sommes-nous encore capables de signifier ce qui nous arrive ? Avec Kant, De Maistre, Arendt, à ta guise. En guise d’économies justement, proposition vient d’être faite de fermer l’Université de Bordeaux-Montaigne, une semaine en mars 2025. Nous en sommes-là, en France. Cet exemple vaudra pour la myriade de destructions qui prend aujourd’hui le doux nom de progressisme. Il se trouve que le macronisme, cette bouillie salement managériale et prédatrice du commun, cornaquée sans direction par des drogués d’eux-mêmes, n’a fait qu’accélérer la tendance. Ces agents spécialisés du vide demandent encore, dans une fuite en avant qui signe leur démence, un surcroît d’accélération dans le vide. Au nom de l’Europe, de la paix ou des jeux olympiques, allez savoir. La devise Shadoks est appliquée à la lettre : « quand on ne sait pas où l’on va, autant y aller le plus vite possible ». Si au moins ces turbo-zombies proposaient comme chemin à suivre une pataphysique joyeusement désespérée, il y aurait encore quelque chose à penser. La stérilité de cette classe donneuse de leçons la rend pourtant incapable en tout.

    Entendons-nous bien. Il y a toujours eu et il y aura toujours des contradictions humaines et ce n’est pas à une classe qui vit aussi des contradictions sociales qu’elle exploite de les régler. Il y aura toujours malfaçon et l’existence de l’homme est de part en part tragique. La condition humaine est ainsi faite. Mais cette malfaçon doit pouvoir se dire, s’exposer, se penser. Toujours. Elle doit pouvoir, d’une époque à l’autre, ajuster ses institutions en fonction des représentations que l’homme se donne à lui-même. Avant d’accuser le « populisme » d’un tel, ou le « complotisme » d’un autre, avant de décider de ne pas penser, il est toujours préférable de se demander pourquoi le bas se défie à ce point du haut. Mieux encore, reste-t-il un haut ? Pour quelles raisons en sommes-nous là, à ce point de brutalité ? Pourquoi des hommes se retrouvent éborgnés alors qu’ils demandent à être reconnus en tant que citoyens ? Il y a bien adresse, demande, attente. Mais la réponse apportée par cette nouvelle classe du vide, culturellement stérile, ne vaut plus rien. Un monologue narcissique, un grand débat autour du nombril président, un pignolage, un néant. Ce n’est pas que les hommes ne l’entendent pas, c’est que la réponse n’est plus une parole. Elle ne fait plus sens, il n’y a donc rien à entendre. C’est un bruit de classe, un bruit de bouche, un bruit de bottes. Il ne s’agit plus de faire droit mais d’imposer son droit, dans le vide, sans justification. « Ordre, ordre, ordre ». Ordre d’un droit qui n’est plus que ordre.

    Alors que faire ? Accepter cette révolution à bas bruits qui est en train de nous emporter vers un autre horizon. Nous situer déjà après elle, la dépasser. Pour reprendre le mot de Pasolini dans Les lettres luthériennes en 1975, « les mutations anthropologiques sont irréversibles ». Les mutations du capitalisme ont profondément transformé les classes dominantes et par conséquent les formes culturelles qu’elles ont pu produire. Il n’y aura pas de retour en arrière. Lorsque nous témoignons du vide brutal et de la bêtise obscène de ce qui est supposé occuper le haut de la stratification sociale, nous n’avons aucun espoir d’un changement de la part de ceux que l’on vise. La nullité des dadais de la bourgeoisie incestueuse n’a pas à être corrigée. Elle est fatale. Ce serait d’ailleurs se méprendre sur nos intentions réelles. Il s’agit plutôt d’intérioriser le constat de cette nullité historique, inédite, tout en faisant valoir, face à elle, ce qui est vital pour nous. Oui, cela surprendra les plus nihilistes et les plus résignés, les plus drogués et les plus faux, nous avons encore des exigences à faire valoir en face du vide et de la nullité. Peut-être avons-nous à apprendre à ne plus frémir devant ce vide de significations venu d’en haut. Nous avons encore du chemin à faire de ce côté-là. Comme si, habitués depuis trop longtemps à recueillir une culture produite par d’autres, nous n’arrivions pas vraiment à mesurer à quel point nous avons encore à expérimenter ce vide, à le parcourir, à le signifier, pour nous.

    « En dépit de notre nullité manifeste, si nous ne sommes plus là, que vous restera-t-il ? » Tel serait le chantage warholien ultime de cette classe désoeuvrée. Ce chantage ne tient que par notre manque de force pour nous nommer, pour être nous-mêmes les dépositaires des signes susceptibles de nous signifier. C’est aussi ce qu’on appelle encore une culture de classe. La nôtre […]

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  • [Sharing] Germany’s new right: Trading on nostalgia for past prosperity in an age of uncertainty – Ingo Schmidt, Canadian Dimension

    Ingo Schmidt on how the triumph of liberal democracy and neoliberal globalization became the ideological seed for the AfD

    On November 6, 2024 German Chancellor Olaf Scholz fired Finance Minister Christian Lindner. Notwithstanding the broad agreement on policy goals, striking a balance between deficit reduction, support for renewable energy and increased arms spending turned out to be impossible. Lindner, a liberal, opted for social cuts; Scholz, a social democrat, wants to avoid them. They had to part ways. After Scholz lost a no-confidence vote, federal elections were scheduled for February 23, 2025. The question that worries everyone from old-school conservatives to new millennium lefties is: How many votes will go to the hard right (if not neo-Nazi) party Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland or AfD). In the last federal elections in 2021, the AfD got 10.4 percent of the total vote. Current polls put them at 20 percent, but nobody knows what will happen on election day. In this new age of uncertainty, polls don’t predict election results as reliably as in the past.

    Elections in the East German provinces Brandenburg, Saxony and Thuringia have already shown what hard-right success looks like. They also reveal the inability of the political centre to understand how much it contributed to the rise of a new right. Refashioning totalitarianism theory in the New Cold War climate, centrist politicians and pundits typically portray the success of the new right as the outgrowth of the Nazi and Communist dictatorships that ruled East Germany from 1933 to 1990. West Germany, which was spared Communist rule and, allegedly, shook off the burden of its Nazi past, appears as a role model in this democracy-versus-dictatorship story. Totalitarianism theory could possibly explain why the AfD is more successful, so far at least, in East than in West Germany. But it can’t explain right-wing success in other countries, like France, that were never under Communist rule and know Nazi rule only from occupation, which strengthened anti-fascist traditions in those countries. But even these traditions couldn’t stop the rise of the new right there.

    This article offers a different explanation for the hard-right surge in Germany. It shows that German unification in 1990, signalling the triumph of liberal democracy and the onset of neoliberal globalization, unleashed a new form of nationalism—Deutschmark nationalism—which, after mutating into export nationalism for a while, became the ideological seed for the AfD. West Germany, or, more precisely, the economic miracle that was West Germany in the post-war era, served as a role model during German unification. Promoted by West German elites and eagerly embraced by people in East Germany, it raised the expectation of a new economic miracle materializing in the West and extending to the East. However, these hopes were soon disappointed as political unification caused socioeconomic divisions between East and West Germany and, in the early 2000s, a turn to austerity policies that were highly unpopular in the East and the West. Just when it seemed that Germany would weather the world economic crisis of 2008-9 better than other Western countries, and maybe even become the European hegemon, things started falling apart. The Euro-crisis made clear that it was not only politically united Germany that was plagued by massive socioeconomic and geographical divisions but the European Union, too. Continued economic weakness combined with New Cold War marching orders from Washington fed a nostalgia for a supposedly great past—symbolized by the Deutschmark. This nostalgia, I argue, would not have taken root if the left had been able to channel growing discontent into mobilization for a more equitable and less insecure future.

    State elections in Brandenburg, Saxony, and Thuringia

    State elections don’t typically get international media attention. The September 1, 2024, elections in Thuringia and Saxony did. After all, it was the first time since the downfall of the Nazi-regime that a hard-right party, the AfD, pulled the majority of votes in a German election. It proved a bitter coincidence: The AfD celebrated their victory in Thuringia, obtaining 32.8 percent of the total vote, on the 85th anniversary of the Nazi-invasion of Poland that marked the beginning of the Second World War.

    The Conservative Christian Democrats (the Christlich-Demokratische Union or CDU) came in second with 23.6 percent. The parties of the federal government coalition, Social Democrats (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands or SPD), Greens (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) and Liberals (Freie Demokratische Partei or FDP) ended up with single-digit results, the FDP reduced to a mere 1.1 percent. At the time of the election, this was the party of the federal minister of finance. The Left Party (Die Linke), which in the previous election had become the strongest party for the first time in any German state, lost almost 18 percent and came in fourth, even trailing the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht or BSW), a breakaway group from the Left Party.

    In Saxony, the AfD won 30.6 percent of the votes, just behind the CDU’s 31.9 percent. As in Thuringia, none of the parties of the federal government coalition achieved double-digit results. The Left Party lost more than half of its vote and ended up with a devastating 4.5 percent. The BSW came in a distant third with 11.8 percent.

    Just three weeks after their election victories in Thuringia and Saxony, the AfD scored another success in Brandenburg. Narrowly beaten by the SPD that got 30.9 percent of the total vote, the AfD came in second with 29.2 percent, way ahead of the BSW’s 13.1 percent and the CDU’s 12.1 percent. The Left Party and the Greens obtained less than five percent of the vote, which is the minimum threshold for holding seats in provincial or federal parliament under the mixed-member proportional electoral system. The FDP pulled less than one percent.

    Mainstream media fails to explain right-wing success

    Barely beaten by the Conservatives in Saxony and the Social Democrats in Brandenburg, the AfD was elected by roughly a third of the electorate in three East German states, becoming the strongest party only in Thuringia. If ever there was a right-wing surge, this was it. Most media reports attributed the phenomenon to widespread dissatisfaction with the federal government, particularly regarding migration, climate policies and the war in Ukraine. Accounts of why the AfD is more popular in the East (approval ratings in the west of Germany range from 8.5 percent in Hamburg and the Saarland to 21 percent in Lower Saxony) focus mostly on disappointments caused by German unification, continuing socioeconomic disparities and a widespread feeling among erstwhile East Germans of being second class citizens. Other explanations invoke the authoritarian heritage of communist rule in East Germany, which is often presented as an extension of the Nazi-regime. Against the two dictatorships in the East, West Germany is presented as a role model of liberal democracy. This as if there hadn’t been considerable continuity between Third Reich and West German elites; as if East Germany’s ruling bureaucracy, despite all its dictatorial wrongs, wasn’t established by antifascists who had been exiled or jailed during the Nazi reign; as if the nationalization of the means of production, despite the wrongs of bureaucratic rule, had not marked a break from the West German capitalism that made West Germany a junior partner in the American Empire; as if West German capitalism had not dictated the terms of unification at the very time that a grassroots movement for democracy unsettled bureaucratic rule in East Germany. The destruction of the East German economy and the integration of the East into existing West German institutions left no room for the aspirations of East Germany’s civil rights movement. Rather than explaining growing support for the new right, media talk about the “peculiarities of the East” reinforces existing frustrations there—frustrations that help shed light on the relative strength, so far at least, of the right-wing surge in the East.

    The ‘two-dictatorships’ thesis that pits the East against the liberal democratic West revives the totalitarianism theory that was an integral part of the anti-communist, anti-Soviet consensus during the Cold War. It is now part of the New Cold War ideology that counterposes democracy and authoritarianism. As in the old Cold War, charges of totalitarianism serve to short circuit thinking about alternative economic and political systems, reinforcing the neoliberal creed that there is no alternative to capitalism. The lack of actually existing alternatives is, of course, also one of the reasons for the rise of the new right. Emerging out of an ailing neoliberalism, this right-wing force presents itself as an alternative to the status quo but actually just recasts neoliberalism in a nationalist and racist mould. Replacing neoliberalism’s earlier commitment to corporate globalization in Germany, as elsewhere, neoliberalism is haunted by the spectre of fascism, which, to centrist neoliberals, has everything to do with misled masses unable to understand the virtues of capitalist liberal democracy and nothing to do with capitalist crises that undermine the legitimacy of liberal democracy. Neoliberalism is also haunted by the spectre of communism as ruling classes worry that crisis of legitimacy could extend to capitalism itself. As the neoliberal centre denies the possibility of alternatives and the left generally (not only the Left Party in Germany) appears unable to advance real world alternatives, the growing appetite for change, spurred by recurrent crises wrought by capitalism, settles for right-wing fantasies of a harmonious life in a nation that competes successfully with other countries economically and is freed from job- and welfare-stealing migrants.

    The impact of German unification and the rise and decline of neoliberal globalization

    Capitalist crises and their exploitation by the right are common phenomena, certainly in the imperialist centres of the world system, but also in the peripheries. But they play out differently in different national contexts. Behind the AfD’s electoral successes in Thuringia and Saxony as well as its broader surge in popularity lie the combined histories of German unification and the rise and decline of neoliberal globalization. The upsurge of the new right is just one of the outcomes of these combined histories. Equally important is the defeat of the federal government coalition and the rout of the FDP, whose leader, former federal Minister of Finance Christian Lindner, promotes austerity policies that stymie government plans to subsidize the transition to non-fossil energies. These policies also lead to a creeping roll-back of social spending—except when it comes to arms spending. Little wonder a government that took office on the promise of something like a Green New Deal lost its credibility almost entirely and called for a federal election scheduled for February 23 of this year.

    And then there is the defeat of the Left Party that, despite programmatic commitments to progressive alternatives, is widely seen as the appendage of a lame-duck government in Berlin. At the other end of the political spectrum, the AfD is widely perceived as an oppositional force, even though its program blends austerity, nationalism and militarism in ways that are more extreme but qualitatively not much different from policies advanced by the CDU and the FDP.

    In the face of electoral defeat, the federal government, which embraced the US’s New Cold War policies a few weeks after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, also introduced dramatically tougher migration policies. Rather than representing any kind of alternative, as its name purports, the AfD is the black sheep of the establishment family, expressing racist views more radically and bluntly than even the Conservatives. While the Social Democrats, Liberals and Greens are intent on denying such views, they reveal themselves as Western supremacists when it comes to fending off so-called authoritarian threats arising from Russia and China, stirring up longstanding fears in the West that ‘the Russians are coming’ or that ‘Asian hordes’ augur “the decline of the West,” in the words of right-wing intellectual Oswald Spengler.

    The hypocrisy of the Greens, who advocate a green transition while supporting the purchase of dirty oil and gas (wherever they can get it ever since the Russian invasion of Ukraine ended Russian gas-flows to Germany), make them a prime target of AfD agitation. But in reality the AfD and the Greens share the fear of Western decline. The AfD engage in fearmongering around the replacement of white people by non-white immigrants and accuse the Greens and their coalition partners in the federal government of accelerating Western decline. But while the Greens may be the prime target of the AfD’s culture war, the truth is that despite significant differences in tone, the Greens and the AfD share a basic consensus on the decline of the West.

    AfD success in the east: history holds the key

    Encouraged by Glasnost in the Soviet Union, many East Germans took to the streets in the fall of 1989. Under the banner “We Are the People” they demanded democratic reforms of East Germany. Neither unification with West Germany nor a return to a capitalist economy was on their agenda—at least not initially. As protests grew, and especially after the ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED) had opened the border to the West, “We Are the People” was replaced by “We Are One People” more and more often. It was supplemented by the slogan “Germany, United Fatherland,” which is actually a quote from East Germany’s national anthem, written by the communist poet Johannes R. Becher in 1949, at a time when the leaders of the SED still thought a united Germany could be achieved—not necessarily socialist but not aligned on either the US or the Soviet Union. Such hopes were buried by the Cold War, for which the Berlin Wall became a symbol, casting a dark shadow over communist East Germany and allowing capitalist West Germany to present itself as a beacon of freedom. It was in a matter of weeks in the winter of 1989-90 that the abstract possibility became a demand, massively fanned by West German politicians—notably then chancellor Helmut Kohl—and mainstream media, which hinted at the possibility of East Germany adopting the West German Deutschmark. Many East Germans seized on such hints as an irresistible offer. “If the D-Mark comes, we’ll stay here; if it doesn’t come, we’ll go to it” became the next popular protest slogan. Since the opening of the border, thousands of East Germans had gone to the West, creating conditions reminiscent of the times before the wall was built in 1961. Back then, the East German economy lost so many people, most of them young and well-trained, that a collapse of social reproduction became a real threat. The wall stopped the bleeding of the East German economy but inflicted irreparable damage on the legitimacy of the political system.

    Almost 30 years later, the opening of the border by the SED-leadership came as a bit of a surprise to West German elites. Yet, they were quick to grasp the possibilities it created. To them, this meant the integration of East Germany into the West German political and economic system, not coexistence with a somehow reformed but still politically independent East Germany. The ‘take over the East’ goal of West German elites and the Deutschmark rush of East German masses fed each other. The civil rights movement that wanted to democratize East Germany was sidelined. Some of the groups active in that movement adjusted to the new zeitgeist quickly, some even entered into an electoral alliance with the East German conservative party, despite their having criticized it as a small but integral part of the SED-regime. Angela Merkel, who would later become chancellor, belonged to one of these East German groups that allied with other conservative-turned-civil-rights groups and the East German CDU. This Alliance for Germany easily won the last East German elections and negotiated the integration of East Germany into West Germany’s institutional structures. On July 1, 1990, the Deutschmark came to the East, three months later the independent state of East Germany vanished into an enlarged West Germany. Most of the Alliance for Germany dissolved into the West German CDU immediately after unification. In December this enlarged CDU won federal elections.

    In less than a year the Cold War had come to an end and an entire state had disappeared. However, the hopes pinned on unification, notably the introduction of the Deutschmark, were soon dashed. A year after unification, unemployment, which had existed in communist East Germany primarily in a hidden form, stood at 10.2 percent and rose to over 20 percent in the early 2000s. It didn’t fall below 10 percent until 2014, a quarter of a century after the Berlin Wall fell. Moreover, mass migration from East to West Germany, which the introduction of the Deutschmark was meant to curb, actually accelerated after the arrival of the Deutschmark. From 1990 to 2015, East Germany lost significantly more than one million people, the vast majority during the first two years after unification, and almost all of them of working age. Were it not for this emigration as well as early retirement schemes and retraining schemes for thousands of workers, unemployment in the East would have been even higher than it actually was. Introducing a new form of hidden unemployment, many of the participants in retraining were enrolled in one course after another, often in different fields, until they were old enough for early retirement.

    One of the main, if not the main, reasons for the collapse of the East German economy was the Deutschmark. Introduced at a rate of one Mark West for one Mark East, while average productivity of East Germany was estimated to be about a quarter that of West Germany, German monetary union gave private households the boost in purchasing power they so desired. But it made East German firms uncompetitive. Lower wages could not compensate productivity differentials between firms in East Germany and Western countries. The privatization of East Germany’s state-owned firms facilitated the downfall of the East German economy even further. In some cases, Western companies bought East German firms just to shut them down so that they would not become competitors in the future. In other cases, they wanted patents or certain segments of production that they could integrate into their own supply-chains, leaving everything else to be shut down. The closures and cherry-picking of some more desirable segments destroyed the reproduction process of the East German economy even beyond the damage done by rendering it uncompetitive through monetary union.

    The result was that bits and pieces of the East German economy became a periphery of production networks controlled by West German corporations. Ironically, the neoliberal restructuring of production processes went hand in hand with massive fiscal transfers from West to East Germany. A price that had to be paid to sustain some level of social cohesion while disappointment that political unification was followed by economic decline and continued social divisions between East and West instead of an Eastern economic miracle following the example of West Germany from the late 1950s to the early 1970s. At some point, a third of East German incomes came from fiscal transfers. As a result, government debt as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) rose from 41.8 percent in 1989 to 61.2 percent in 1999, which is nothing compared to today’s numbers. Yet, back then the lesson that had yet to be learned is that neoliberalism, despite its balanced-budget rhetoric, really is a mix of austerity and tax cuts for the rich that produces increasing debt levels at every slowdown or downturn of the economy. In the 1990s, government debt over 60 percent of GDP was a scandal. Not least because, at the urging of the conservative German government, 60 percent had become the benchmark for membership in the European monetary union, for which the roadmap had been laid out in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty.

    Budget deficits, accumulating into government debt, weren’t the only deficit scandal in 1990s Germany. The other was in the current account. From a surplus of 4.6 percent in 1989, the current account dropped to a –1.9 percent deficit in 1991 and remained in deficit territory until 2001. In most other countries, deficits between negative one and negative two percent wouldn’t be a matter of concern. In Germany they were. After all, West German prosperity—the very model East Germans admired so much—had been reliant on export-driven growth, which was always understood as export surpluses. As it turned out, unification in the early 1990s, led to a boom in West Germany as East Germans spent many of their newly acquired Deutschmarks on consumer goods ‘Made in (West) Germany’—despite massive job losses. This boom drove prices up and made German exports less competitive on the world market. At the same time, some of the money from the East German spending spree went to foreign companies. As exports took a hit and imports got a boost, the current account went from positive to negative.

    The East was integrated into the West German political system as it existed prior to unification. The Kohl government didn’t agree to any changes suggested by the East German government that formally negotiated unification but really rubberstamped the subordination of East German society to West German institutions. Economic integration was different though. The collapse of the East German economy, triggered by the design of monetary union and privatizations, had a lasting impact on the West German economic model that East Germans had been eager to embrace. The first decade after unification was marked by a twin deficit in government budgets and current accounts. During the unification boom from 1990 to 1993, inflation went up to levels not seen since the oil-price hikes and inflationary struggles between capital and labour from the 1970s to the early 1980s. At that time, however, the West German inflation rate was still below that of other Western countries, whereas in the early 1990s it was amongst the highest

    West Germany as a role model

    Running continued deficits—let alone a twin deficit—was unthinkable in a country that rebuilt its economy after the Second World War through integration into a world market with rules established and enforced by the US. In this American Empire, West Germany played the role of bulwark against Soviet Communism, including East Germany, and as a showcase of Western capitalism. To succeed in this role, foreign debt, accumulated by the Nazis and inherited by West Germany as legal successor of the Third Reich, was forgiven through the 1953 London Debt Agreement. West Germany also inherited low wages, industrial capacity and new technologies from the Nazi economy that, contrary to widespread assumptions, survived the war largely intact. This gave West German industries a competitive advantage that was further buttressed by favourable exchange rates on which basis West Germany was admitted to the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates in 1952. Reintegration into the world market also allowed West Germany to transition from a coal-based to an oil-based economy. Oil was cheaper than coal but its supplies were controlled by US companies and the American state.

    However, being a junior partner in the American Empire turned out to be a much better deal for the German bourgeoisie than its earlier quests for world power. The territory under its direct control was much smaller after two failed power grabs but profits were stellar. Driven by exports, or export surpluses more precisely, the West German economy didn’t require fiscal stimulus and kept growing until the US turned to floating exchange rates, which led to a significant appreciation of the Deutschmark. Further, oil prices exploded in the 1970s. But it was during these turbulences that West Germany consolidated its reputation as a beacon of economic stability. Political management of the crisis, notably codetermination (German lingo for the institutionalized cooperation between unions and employer association), kept wages and inflation lower than in most other Western countries. This helped to sustain export surpluses for much of the 1970s. In turn, export surpluses allowed the government to keep fiscal stimulus and unemployment rates low. Again, this is compared to other Western countries, not compared to the post-war boom.

    West Germany’s relative success in managing the economic crises of the 1970s raised some concerns among its allies, who considered this success a case of beggar-thy-neighbour policies. The US pressured the West German government to increase public spending in order to stimulate the world economy. The West German government couldn’t shrug off these US demands entirely. The social democratic party was led by Helmut Schmidt at the time, and some extra spending also appeased the left wing in his own party as well as some unionists. However, calls for a Keynesian fix of the economic crises never overcame the general preference for fiscal prudence and low inflation that marked West German society after two lost wars, each followed by the introduction of a new currency, one of them also by unprecedented hyperinflation. Not entirely without reason, export success after the Second World War was widely attributed to liberal economic principles, conveniently ignoring the fact that this ‘liberalism in one country’ could only work because other economies placed growing demand on the world market.

    Export success also created an ersatz-identity that allowed West Germans to repress the horrors of the Nazi regime and the roles most of them had played in these horrors, as perpetrators or bystanders. Social democrats never really fit into this picture. Willy Brandt, who spent the Nazi reign in underground resistance circles and exile and would later become West Germany’s first social democratic chancellor, was seen by many as a traitor. His successor Helmut Schmidt, who had served in the Nazi air force, opposed many of Brandt’s plans for social reform and applied Keynesian policies only in homeopathic doses. He was successfully branded as the one responsible for rising unemployment and inflation by the Conservatives and Liberals. Crossing the floor from SPD to CDU, the Liberals made Helmut Kohl chancellor. Kohl won two elections before unification on the promise of bringing post-war prosperity back. He won another two after unification on the promise of bringing the prosperity to East Germany.

    For a long time, Kohl presented himself successfully as the defender of the West German export model and guarantor of the collective identity tied to that model, despite the fact that 1980s West Germany never saw a return to postwar prosperity. Disappointment with his broken promises for a West German economic miracle 2.0 began spreading towards the end of the 1980s. Yet, the disintegration of the SED regime allowed him to renew and extend his promises to the East. The national euphoria that secured his 1990 election victory also saw a transformation of collective identity. West German pride in being export world champion turned into Deutschmark nationalism. Widely shared in the East, where people were happy to get the Deutschmark, and the West, where people saw it as symbol of their postwar achievements, this was not the pure money, or currency, fetishism Karl Marx wrote about in Capital. It had a distinctive nationalist character that was subdued in West Germany’s pre-unification export-identity. With unification, the nationalist seed blossomed. Not only did this help Kohl become the ‘chancellor of unity,’ but it also gave cover to a burst of neo-Nazi attacks on immigrants, leftists and queer people, culminating in arson attacks in Rostock, Mölln and Solingen. The latter two killed eight people, while the attack in Rostock laid a four-day siege on an apartment block inhabited by foreign workers who had been employed in East Germany’s now defunct state-owned economy. The openly neo-Nazi attacks of the early 1990s, later dubbed “baseball bat years,” were followed by a series of murders committed by the National Socialist Underground (NSU) that cost nine immigrants and one cop their lives from 2000 to 2007. The role of the German secret service in covering up, or even facilitating, these murders has never been investigated as key documents remain classified until this day. Hans-Georg Maaßen, head of the secret service from 2012 to 2018, was one of the individuals responsible for blocking investigations of the NSU-murders. He also heads up an ultra-conservative circle, initially inside the CDU and now operating in the right-wing space between the CDU und the AfD.

    Exports über alles: Eastern peripheries boost corporate profits

    During unification and in the first few years afterwards, nationalism was a mass ideology. It rallied flag-waving masses in the streets, it dominated German politics and inspired Nazi-skinheads to chase people they considered enemies. As it became clear that the hopes for an economic miracle 2.0 would not be realized, street protests receded, most skinheads scaled down their activism and just a few turned to clandestine terrorist attacks. It seemed that nationalism had lost the force it had just recently. However, the entanglements between Nazis and parts of the state apparatuses indicate that while nationalism wasn’t as visible as before, it had not disappeared.

    As it turned out, the opening of the Berlin Wall was a key step towards what would later be called neoliberal globalization. As the German bourgeoisie sought its place in a world seemingly governed by the invisible hand of the market—not Soviet planners or the milder version of Western government intervention—nationalism also found a new role as mass ideology. The ideological wind blowing from the ‘real West,’ that is, the United States, rebranded free trade theory going back to the days of David Ricardo as globalization. Sticking closely to Ricardo’s principles, academic globalists argued that firms, if left alone by the state, would specialize in the production of those goods they can produce more cheaply than firms in another country either because they possess more productive technologies or use input factors more plentiful and cheap than in another country. All countries will be better off if firms in each country specialize according to their comparative advantages.

    Globalization practitioners talked about entire countries as if they were firms competing against each other. Competitiveness of nation-states became the lodestar of capitalists, and their political executors, who used it to justify the roll-back of wages and social standards in all countries. Their run-the-country-like-a-business propaganda was so persuasive that even working class people whose wages, pensions and public services were cut fell for it in large numbers, electing and re-electing neoliberal globalizers over and over again. At the same time, fear that the policies just voted for would cause a race to the bottom spread in the rich countries that saw parts of their production outsourced to poor countries, where labour was really cheap, while immigrants from such countries would take on jobs in the burgeoning low-wage sectors of the rich countries. Migration, segmented labour markets and a global reserve army of labour, enabling capitalists to engage in global labour arbitrage, were neither part of academic globalization theory nor did they feature in politicians’ globalization propaganda. Absent from public debate, these real-life factors created fears that a new right could build on by portraying economic problems as questions of national identity. Translated into policy terms, that meant a program of keeping immigrants out and capital in. This protectionist backlash against neoliberal globalization, coupled with the rise of a new right ranging from populist to neo-Nazi formations, occurred all over the Global North. It began slowly in the late 1990s and early 2000s while globalization was still expanding, and then gathered steam in the wake of the 2008-9 world financial crisis that marked the end of accumulation driven by globalization. It has accelerated again since the COVID-19 recession as well as the escalating great power politics vis-à-vis Russia and China, which have led to openly imperialist policies couched in the same nationalist ideology which the new right thrives on. The competitive nation-as-corporation ideology and the policies that marked actually unfolding globalization was the breeding ground for today’s strange bedfellowship of globalizers-turned-great-power-warriors and national supremacists of the new right. Theories of unregulated free trade opening the path towards global prosperity were just an ideological tool that was useful as long the integration of more and more countries into the US-dominated world market fuelled capitalist accumulation, and thereby hopes for the eventual trickle-down. It was replaced with the rhetoric of concern for national security and democracy as accumulation ended in a new phase of stagnation.

    The German bourgeoisie had already adopted the logic of the state as business competitor after the Second World War when it traded world power ambitions for a junior partner role in the American Empire. Balanced budgets and tight money formed the core of its policies. That, along with competitive advantages inherited from the Nazis or granted by the US, enabled export-driven growth and, ultimately, export surpluses. Despite verbal commitments to liberalism, these policies were mercantilist in substance. Shattered but not derailed by the crises of the 1970s, West Germany’s mercantilist regime of accumulation survived until unification led to a twin deficit, slow growth and socioeconomic divisions between East and West. Unified Germany’s economy stumbled along while the US enjoyed its New Economy boom, even though that turned out to be short-lived, and China attained unprecedented levels of economic growth.

    The Kohl government didn’t respond to the bourgeoisie’s growing concerns about economic stagnation in Germany. Neither did it respond to growing dissatisfaction with social conditions among the popular classes. After uniting Germany, Kohl turned to further uniting Europe. Partly, he wanted to demonstrate Germany’s continued commitment to cooperation in the European Union as some European leaders—notably British Prime Minister Thatcher and French President François Mitterrand—had expressed reservations about German unification and worried about a return of German great power ambitions. European monetary union became Kohl’s preferred route to an “ever closer union,” as EU-parlance had it at the time. However, regarding other countries, notably in the Mediterranean, Kohl successfully pushed for tight fiscal and monetary rules—the same kind of rules West German policy makers followed in the postwar period. Under the favourable conditions granted by the US to integrate into the world market, this led to export-driven prosperity. However, other countries didn’t enjoy the same favourable conditions. What would upset governments and people in such countries even more was the fact that Kohl had abandoned the rules he was preaching to other European countries in his very own united Germany

    Helmut Kohl at the CDU national party convention in Hamburg, 1973. Photo from Wikimedia Commons

    There, European monetary union was widely seen as a top-down capitalist elite project, part of corporate globalization or as a handing over of the beloved Deutschmark to irresponsible Eurocrats and the Club Med, a derogatory term often used in public debates to denounce people in the Mediterranean countries as lazy, spend-thrifty and, worst of all, happily having a good time at the expense of others. Euro-scepticism added to disappointment with the collapse of East Germany’s economy after unification, growing income polarization and fears of job loss all over Germany and a sense of losing national sovereignty to global capital. Unresponsive to any of these concerns, Kohl and his coalition of Conservatives and Liberals eventually lost the 1998 election to the Social Democrats and Greens who formed a coalition government offering a blend of light Keynesianism, green transition and control of financial markets. This is where the German—and international—bourgeoisies got really concerned.

    The opening ideological salvos to derail the newly elected government’s plans came from the British tabloid The Sun, calling Oskar Lafontaine, the new finance minister who proposed the introduction of a Tobin tax, “Europe’s most dangerous man.” Next came Madeleine Albright, then US secretary of state, who gave Germany’s Green Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer the choice of joining the bombing campaign against Yugoslavia or having his country isolated from Western allies. Fischer, and the new Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, chose war. Seeing that his opposition to the war wasn’t supported by anyone else in the cabinet, Lafontaine resigned before the bombing began.

    A few months later, The Economist called Germany the “Sick man of the Euro.” Coming from the central organ of global capitalism and unrepentant advocate of liberalism since the days when England, not China, was the workshop of the world, this was not just another opinion piece. It was a warning that the international investment community—exactly the CEOs, bankers, brokers and financiers targeted by the then-emerging movement against corporate globalization—lost confidence in the German market and expected pro-business measures to boost their propensity to invest.

    After a few months in office, Schröder had to choose between meeting voters’ expectations (job creation, reduction of job insecurities and income inequality) and capitalists’ cost-reduction demands. He chose the capitalists’ side, earning him the nickname Genosse der Bosse (Comrade of the Bosses). In the absence of a social movement from below that could have pushed him to deliver on the election platforms of the SPD and the Greens, this choice might actually better be called caving to capitalist threats of an investment strike. From 2000 to 2005, the Schröder government axed corporate tax rates, exempted capital gains from taxation and lowered equity requirements for credits. The other side of the class divide saw drastic reductions in unemployment benefits, essentially slashing them to the level of welfare payment rates after one year of benefits. At the same time, legal obstacles to employing temporary workers were greatly reduced. Capitalists were thrilled. Profits and asset prices shot up, but capital formation declined during the years pro-business laws were passed.

    Reorganizing existing production capacities was more important to corporate executives than creating new capacities. This was not surprising as capacity utilization dropped when the New Economy bubble burst, triggering a downturn of the world economy that kept even booming China below double-digit growth. As it turned out, united Germany did not inherit the export successes of pre-unification West Germany, but was certainly heir to its export dependence.

    In the early 2000s, Germany’s current account turned positive again—not because exports grew so strongly (they actually stagnated due to the world economic downturn), but because imports declined owing to weak domestic demand associated with the Schröder government’s neoliberal policies. However, as the world economy bounced back (China saw growth rates of 10-14 percent from 2003 to 2006), German exports grew again. Eventually the reorganization of production processes in the aftermath of German unification paid off. West German corporations now controlled production networks linking corporate headquarters controlling finance, research and development, and capital-intensive parts of actual assembly in the centres with labour intensive production in low-wage areas in the peripheries from Eastern Germany all the way to China. In these networks, East Germany occupied the position of a semi-periphery. On the supply side, German export success in the early 2000s relied on continued wage inequality between centres and peripheries, which doesn’t mean that all workers in the centres earned high wages. The threat to relocate production to the East or the South put the brakes on all wages. The lowering of social standards propelled the growth of low-wage employment, notably in the service sector. Well-paying, permanent jobs began to decrease as a share of total employment even in West Germany. As a result, discontent that was widespread in the East since political unification was followed by economic collapse, and social downgrading began to creep into the West.

    2010s: Exporting the Euro-crisis

    The export surpluses of the early 2000s relied on the same mercantilism that had generated such surpluses during the postwar prosperity. However, during the postwar period, unprecedented growth rates across the Western, and parts of the non-Western, world made it possible to superimpose a welfare state on a mercantilist economy that didn’t squeeze profit rates but operated with capital’s consent in a way that seemed unthinkable during the age of catastrophe from 1914 to 1945. In the early 2000s, by contrast, successful mercantilism demanded the roll-back of the welfare state. Tragically, the extension of West Germany’s welfare state institutions to East Germany, where they were superimposed on a collapsing economy, created the profit squeeze that was needed to curtail the material protections granted by the welfare state. To sustain competitive advantages gained by scaling back the welfare state, it was imperative to keep wage-growth low even after surging exports pulled the economy out of the slump. Unlike during the period of postwar prosperity, export surpluses didn’t stimulate domestic demand very much. In fact, current account surpluses in the early 2000s, which surged from -1.8 percent in 2000 to 6.7 percent in 2007, were as much driven by rising exports as by weak growth of imports, a clear indicator of the overall sluggishness of domestic demand. Unemployment rates rose from 9.3 percent in 2000 to 12.1 percent in 2005. After that, unemployment went into long-term decline, briefly interrupted by the 2008/9 Great Recession and slowed down by the 2009/15 Euro-crisis, eventually reaching five percent before the 2020 COVID-19 Recession. However, this job growth occurred almost entirely in low wage occupations.

    Paradoxically, it was during the Euro-crisis that a wave of “export nationalism” covered up the discontent that was growing, at variable speeds, across Germany. The Deutschmark nationalism that emerged during German unification had taken a hit with the introduction of the Euro. However, when it turned out that the Euro was basically the old Deutschmark under a new name and export surplus levels were reaching unprecedented heights, it almost seemed that the long-awaited return of prosperity was about to materialize. But of course, it wasn’t the same as the postwar prosperity that saw strong growth almost everywhere. The 2010s, by contrast, were a time of stagnation. The rebound after the 2008/9 recession was stronger in Germany than in other countries, but then growth rates fell in line with the one-to-two percent range of other Western countries.

    It was during this time of recurrent crises and long-term stagnation that the German government, led by Angela Merkel with the Social Democrats as junior partner, felt compelled to lecture other governments on economic policy. Completely blind to the fact that beggar-thy-neighbour policies are a zero-sum game, the Merkel-government told Southern European countries to impose austerity despite the fact that they were suffering from a sovereign debt crisis due to the end of cheap credit that became available after the creation of the European monetary union, helping to pay for imports from Germany. Merkel also told them that, after a painful but unavoidable period of belt-tightening, they would eventually succeed as export countries like Germany.

    The European monetary union’s contradictory character torn between further integrating Europe and spreading German mercantilism shifted entirely to the latter. Southern Europeans, governments and ordinary people, understood that austerity would further subordinate their economies to Germany’s economic dominance. The Brits, like the Germans and the “Frugal Four” (Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden), although not warm to the idea of bailing out crisis-ridden Southern Europeans, were suspicious that Germany’s leading role in handling the crisis would turn the country’s economic dominance into fully-fledged hegemony. Brexit has its origin here. Eastern Europe’s post-communist comprador governments had imposed austerity on their countries in acts of pre-emptive obedience and now felt betrayed as they thought the bailout packages the Merkel government used as a means to impose austerity on the South were actually some sort of welfare package.

    Centrifugal forces in the EU were further fuelled when, in face of civil war and foreign interventions in Syria, Merkel unilaterally declared open borders for Syrian refuges and then told EU member states they all had to take their share of refugees. European governments already concerned over Germany’s domineering role in managing the Euro-crisis were dismayed. Public debate within Germany was sharply divided between liberals and leftists applauding Merkel’s humanist stance and right-wingers, including in her own party, warning of an uncontrolled flow of immigrants. Largely unnoticed was the fact that Merkel’s decision to open borders for Syrian refugees was tied to the anti-Russian turn in German foreign policy following the sharp polarization between pro- and anti-Russian forces in Ukraine during and after the Maidan protests in 2014. Most of the Syrian refugees were fleeing the Russian-backed Assad-regime, which was considered an adversary. Opening borders for these refugees set a precedent for the surge of Ukrainian refugees following Russia’s invasion of Eastern Ukraine in 2022. At that point, Merkel, who had already retired, told the media that her government saw the Minsk accords, officially meant to reach a settlement between contending political and military forces within Ukraine, as a means of buying time to arm the Zelensky government.

    2020s: Sick man of Europe 2.0

    As Ukraine, already torn by civil war, became the scene for a proxy war between NATO-countries and Russia, Germany was firmly subordinated to US foreign policy. Post-communist governments in Germany had, more or less enthusiastically, supported deepening trade relations with Russia. Oil and gas imports might have been the most significant part of German-Russian trade but were certainly not the only one. Torn between allegiance to the US and lucrative business deals with Russia, the German government, now headed by Social Democrat Olaf Scholz, cut its economic ties with Russia after the latter’s invasion of Ukraine. The price to be paid was a further spike in energy prices, on top of the increases attendant on the economic recovery from the COVID-19-recession.

    As part of current US efforts to contain China, the German government has been pressured to scale down its trade with China—Germany’s largest trading partner and also a prime outlet for German foreign direct investments. Since Germany’s economy is as much export-driven as export-dependent, the US turn from neoliberal globalization to escalating sanctions and protectionism in the name of national security has caused high levels of uncertainty within the German bourgeoisie. In addition to the return of secular stagnation after the very short post-COVID recovery in the West and the petering out of the China boom, this uncertainty is driving low levels of investment. Inflation, fuelled by post-COVID recovery and rising energy prices, and lower real incomes leading directly to less consumer spending, but also indirectly, as households build up their savings in anticipation of more economic shocks in the future. Meanwhile the Scholz government boosted arms spending while otherwise imposing austerity.

    After two years of recession, Germany is again being branded the “sick man of Europe” by The Economist. The last time Germany earned this title the neoliberal turn against the welfare state produced massive current account surpluses, meagre general growth rates and massive social and regional inequalities. The export nationalism that concealed the mounting discontent with neoliberalism was shaken by the US turn from neoliberal globalization to protectionism and militarism. Given its high level of export dependence, Germany was ill prepared for the turn against it, which unleashed pent-up disappointments and anxieties into the political sphere. This happened all over Germany but more so in the East than in the West as regional differences in income, wealth and representation in leadership positions had created widespread feelings of being second class citizens in a politically united Germany.

    In the absence of socialist imagination, German politics are haunted by the spectres of the past. An insurgent hard-right pins the labels of communism or Marxism on everything that ever came from the left, Social Democrats, the Greens and, of course, the Left Party, no matter how members, activists and supporters of these parties position themselves on the political spectrum. At the same time, the hard-right wants Germany to leave its Nazi past behind. Downplaying Nazi atrocities, accusing liberals and leftists of burdening Germans with a cult of guilt, they propagate the reclaiming of German national pride and sovereignty from allegedly cosmopolitan elites. Between the very real and growing right and a weak and largely imaginary left, centrist parties that proclaimed the end of history in the heyday of neoliberalism are also shifting to the right. The decline of the Left Party is a mirror image of the rise of the AfD.

    Alternative für Deutschland: A child of Deutschmark nationalism

    Mainstream media and centrist parties view the new right as if it were some external force inexplicably appearing on the political scene and threatening the liberal order. But this is empirically wrong. Almost all leading figures of the AfD come from conservative West German milieus where they previously held positions in public administration or private businesses. Although they present themselves as anti-establishment rebels, they are establishment people who turned from the centre-right to the hard-right. The AfD also includes party activists who come from militant neo-Nazi groups that have existed on the fringes of West German society since the CDU gave many old Nazis a political home after the downfall of the Third Reich. Making small advances into electoral politics in the late 1960s and again in the 1980s, the neo-Nazis remained marginal until they found common ground with disgruntled conservatives. Deutschmark nationalism served as the ideological bonding material for neo-Nazis and right-of-centre conservatives, and became a rallying point for growing numbers of people dissatisfied with the policies of neoliberal globalization advanced by the centrist parties. It emerged in the tumultuous days after the fall of the Berlin wall as a mass ideology that shaped East and West German politics in the direction of unification. After that, it became an ideological point of reference that allowed for the integration of different political ideas and currents into a new right political project, the AfD.

    Riding on the wave of Euro-scepticism that accompanied the Euro crisis, the AfD, founded in 2013, promoted a German exit from the EU, which would also have meant exit from the Euro. However, boosting the Deutschmark nostalgia associated with German-style Euro-scepticism got the newly minted party only so far. What really fuelled the AfD’s take-off was the wave of Syrian refugees coming to Germany (and other EU-countries) in 2015. The party’s approval ratings rose from roughly five percent in its first two years to around 12 percent in the next two years. With the surge in voter approval came a programmatic shift from ‘neoliberalism in one country’ to neoliberalism hidden behind ethnonationalist hate propaganda. Despite advocating for a strong state, the AfD also presents itself as a rebellious party of freedom. This paradox is resolved by portraying cosmopolitan elites, represented most notably by the Greens, as a force dominating state apparatuses and misusing them to bring excessive numbers of foreigners into the country with their cultures that allegedly threaten German people, suppress German heritage and push the economy into decay. Therefore a strong state is needed to defend Germany against foreign incursion and revive its inherent strength

    Election poster of the AfD in Thuringia supporting remigration. Photo from Wikimedia Commoms

    The Scholz government created the conditions in which the AfD’s self-portrayal as freedom fighters gave the party another boost. The modest Green New Deal platforms on which the SPD and Greens ran their 2021 election campaign didn’t gain enough traction to allow them to form a government, despite support from unions and even, more cautiously, employer associations. To obtain a majority in the Bundestag, SPD and Greens formed an ostensibly unlikely coalition with the FDP, a party mostly focused on cutting taxes and limiting public deficits. These commitments to tax breaks for the rich and austerity for the poor stood in the way of effective state-sponsored energy transition programs. Hence, the Scholz-government was perceived as weak from the start. Things went from bad to worse for the government after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Under pressure from the US, Scholz opted for sanctions against Russia, arms deliveries to Ukraine and a continued increase in arms spending. At a time when the prices of everything from butter to housing were soaring, making it clear that money would still be available for guns but maybe not for butter not only destroyed whatever support the government had before the Ukraine war but also gave the AfD another boost. A year and a half into the war, the SPD was trailing the AfD in federal polls. Picking up widespread, though by no means dominant, unease with arms support for Ukraine and fear of war with Russia, the AfD advocates a negotiated peace settlement between Russia and Ukraine and, more importantly to the AfD, the lifting of sanctions on Russia. For the AfD, urging peace with Russia is not a matter of a principled anti-militarism but a means of reviving German trade with Russia, notably Russian energy imports that are seen as a precondition for economic recovery. To achieve this, Germany has to free itself from the ‘cosmopolitan sell-out elite.’ Whether everybody now supporting the AfD subscribes to the freedom-for-German-supremacy-view is open to debate. What can’t be denied is the fact that many discontented people, whatever their main grievance, are looking to the right, not the left, for alternatives to a failing political centre. Some are also turning to the CDU, which claims to be different from both the AfD and the federal coalition government, without offering anything other than praise for the good old days. That served the party well at times when the German economy could thrive, to a greater or lesser degree, on US-enabled expansion of world markets. With the US protectionist turn, this is no longer possible and the party is torn between centrism and the new right. Current support for the CDU is highly unstable, which could easily work in the AfD’s favour, especially in the absence of persuasive alternatives from the left, which so far have not materialized.

    This wasn’t always the case. Something like a left renewal had once seemed to be in the offing in the most unlikely place: East Germany during the transition from state socialism to a peripheral position in an enlarged capitalist Germany. In West Germany, the nationalist wave that came with unification swept away much of the activist left that had rallied thousands—sometimes tens or even hundreds of thousands— of people in the 1980s against the stationing of US nuclear missiles, nuclear power plants, Nazis, and South Africa’s apartheid regime, among other causes. Left circles within the SPD, the Greens and the labour movement weathered the nationalist storm without leaving a mark on German politics. In this political climate, the Party of Democratic Socialism (Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus or PDS) stood out as a beacon of the left.

    Emerging from East Germany’s ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED), the PDS became the political home of many East Germans who lost their jobs, social status and cultural identity during the transition to capitalism. Quickly establishing a presence in East Germany’s provincial and municipal parliaments, the party expressed the discomfort of many East Germans who felt like second class citizens under the domination of West German institutions, politicians, corporations and culture. It highlighted East Germany’s socialist heritage, which encompassed commitments to anti-fascism, peace and international solidarity as much as the dictatorship of the politburo, Stasi-surveillance and an overbearing bureaucracy. The party hung itself up in endless debates between those who downplayed or justified East German communism’s dark sides and others who sought to disown that history by embracing liberal principles. Practically, these disputes didn’t make much difference. Upholding socialist principles didn’t stop the party from pragmatically working within the political and economic confines created by unification. At times, this included voting for privatization of public housing and infrastructure. For decades since the party was founded, the contradiction between socialist principles and the subordination to neoliberal policies imposed by the West German bourgeoisie didn’t stop the PDS or its successor organization Die Linke (the Left Party), from becoming something like a catch-all or people’s party in East Germany, a role long held by the CDU und the SPD in West Germany. For years, the PDS/Left Party achieved election results in the mid-20 percent range, peaking at 28 percent in Brandenburg in 2004 and 32 percent in Thuringia in 2019. It was also, and still is, part of various coalition governments in East German states. Until the September 2024 election, the Thuringian government was led by the Left Party’s Bodo Ramelow.

    Despite this overall success and despite the party’s fidelity to socialist principles, the social group that wasn’t interested in voting PDS consisted of workers, who still voted CDU in large numbers despite g the CDU’s failed to deliver on its big promises of post-unification prosperity. More recently they shifted to the AfD. Meanwhile, in West Germany, the PDS remained marginal throughout its existence, only attracting activists from various left grouplets. What little remained of left protest milieus after unification was still dominated by a mix of environmentalists, antifas and international solidarity activists who might vote Green, or maybe even SPD, but hardly ever PDS. The old working class milieus that were shrinking with the decline of smokestack industries were still dominated by unionists closer to the SPD than the PDS. This started to change when, under chancellor Schröder, the SPD implemented neoliberal counter-reforms on a scale his conservative predecessor Kohl had avoided throughout his 16-year tenure, despite his supposed commitment to unleashing market forces. Growing frustrations among left social democrats and unionists fed mass demonstrations against Schröder’s SPD and created a social and organizational base (including, most prominently, Schröder’s short-time finance minister Lafontaine) that merged with the PDS into the Left Party in 2007. In the federal elections two years later, the Left Party won 11.9 percent of the vote, then 9.2 percent in the 2017 elections, but fell to 4.9 percent in the 2021 elections. This was a worse result than the 5.1 percent the PDS obtained in 1998, an election that also saw an increased vote for the SPD, which allowed Schröder to succeed Kohl. It is worth noting that the PDS vote came almost entirely from East Germany, which represents less than a quarter of Germany’s total population.

    While the PDS mostly maintained peaceful coexistence between socialist theory and market-conforming practice, the Left Party continuously debated whether or not it should join centre-left governments, if given the chance. The bitterness with which party activists argued over this question stood in stark contrast to its actual relevance. In states where the party was relegated to opposition status by poor election results, this status didn’t attract additional voters keen on seeing a principled opposition in parliament. In states where the party joined governments, the results were mixed: sometimes it maintained its vote share in the subsequent election; sometimes it suffered losses. A paradoxical result came about in the Thuringian elections in September 2024: The Left Party lost massively, although, had there been direct elections for the minister-president (a position equivalent to provincial premier in Canada), the Left Party’s Bodo Ramelow would have won the election. This fits into a trend that became visible over the last few years in a number of state elections in East and West Germany. Party loyalties based on shared worldviews wear thin. Elections are often decided based on the media appeal of top politicians, regardless of party affiliation. Remarkably enough, Ramelow, just like Dietmar Woidke, the SPD’s lead candidate in the Brandenburg elections, dropped the name of his party on campaign posters, presenting himself as more of a provincial father figure than a man of the party.

    However, rather than signalling the end of ideology, as centrist politicians and postmodern philosophers might have argued before the rise of a very explicitly ideologically committed new right, the focus on limelight politicians pushes democratic debates into the shadows. In the case of the Left Party, it might also have been an attempt to distract from its own image as an organization mired in endless debates not producing any coherent, let alone persuasive, policies. The reasons for permanent internal discord are sociological and ideological. The Left Party was strongest in its early days, when the PDS’s social base still comprised a cross-section of the East German population, although workers remained underrepresented. It also attracted dissident social democrats and unionists from West Germany. To a limited extent, therefore the Left Party had the working class base the PDS never had.

    The blend of Keynesian and Marxist ideas around which social democratic dissidents and union leftists organized had been defeated as a significant political current during the crises of the 1970s by the Social Democratic right and corporatist union leaders who put competitiveness of the West German economy over income distribution from profits to wages. In the new millennium, when these currents joined forces with the PDS, they were still sizeable enough to give the newly founded Left Party a boost. But not for long. The smokestack industries around which these left currents were organizing were in continued decline, which made strategies based on that moribund reality obsolete. Moreover, these strategies often stood in the way of mobilizing and organizing the new working classes that emerged in the service sector and, on a much smaller scale, IT, bio tech, and green energy.

    As the ranks of the Left Party thinned out with the loss of members coming out of communist East Germany or from West German union and social democratic circles, the party was able to attract new blood mainly in the form of highly educated, often precariously employed, urban dwellers. The shift in membership from old left offspring to the children of neoliberal globalization was paralleled by a geographical shift in electoral support. In urban centres, losses among the party’s old left supporters could be partially compensated; in rural areas, however, where the PDS and the Left Party had always been weak, the party disappeared almost entirely. Often, there isn’t even anyone to put up election campaign posters

    Anti-AfD protest in Germany. Photo by strassenstriche.net/Flickr

    Unlike the original base of both the PDS and the Left Party, the urban hipsters who joined the Left Party had no old left reference points. Even when they talked about Marx and class they did so with postmodern accents. However, this did not help them to gain sizeable support among the working classes—sometimes lumped together as the “precariat”—that developed in expanding economic sectors. The political offerings of the Left Party seemed to exercise little appeal for both old and potentially new constituencies. The party’s founding basis of unity was opposition to neoliberalism. In the early days this left room for East German concerns about the outcomes of unification—arguably a kind of neoliberal restructuring—with opposition to the neoliberal turn of the Schröder-government in East and West Germany. It also left plenty of room for a variety of goals, from resurrecting the Keynesian welfare state to a multitude of vaguely defined socialisms for the future to opposition without a vision for the future. However, what sufficed to form the Left Party wasn’t enough to sustain and grow it, especially not as it became harder to label government policies neoliberal.

    The Great Recession, the COVID-19 pandemic, and commitments to ongoing arms production brought state intervention back to the centre of politics, contrary to the 1990s and early 2000s when politics was dominated by advancing capital mobility and free trade. Back then, ruling elites organized consent of the popular classes, more or less successfully, under the banner of “international competitiveness.” The new watchword “national security” is better at rallying the new right than building support for centrist parties. Left Party intellectuals debated the new political conjuncture under the label “post-neoliberalism,” a word-monster that hints, perhaps unwittingly, at the party’s inability to develop a strategy beyond rejecting neoliberalism. In reaction to the imposition of a party line by its predecessor organization, the PDS and the Left Party allowed a wide range of views. However, members of various organized currents, ranging from social-liberal to communist, tended to talk more about each other than with each other.

    Postmodernist philosophers’ contention that the days of master narratives are over was wrong with respect to neoliberalism—if there ever was a master narrative, it was neoliberalism—but it does apply to the Left Party, which could not synthesize different ideas into compelling left policies that could rally growing discontent. Instead, internal debates turned into factional turf wars in a party that resembled an appendix of the Scholz government, costing the Left Party more and more support.

    After years of bitter infighting, discontent with declining voter approval and accommodation of government policies led to the split of the federal party caucus and the formation of the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) in January 2024. As its name indicates, the party is entirely built around its frontwoman, who represented the Left Party in the Bundestag from 2009 to 2023. In the BSW, the cacophony that destructively marks the Left Party is replaced by closed-door debates. As in the Communist party of old, membership isn’t open to everyone; applications to join must be approved. Wagenknecht, originally a member of the Communist Platform (one of the organized currents inside the PDS), had shifted to left-Keynesian, pro-welfare state positions. But, years before her split from the Left Party, she began advocating ordoliberal positions—a branch of neoliberal thinking that stresses the role of the state in allowing businesses to compete without being bogged down by monopolies. This German version of neoliberalism has been the hallmark of economic policy and ideology since the early years of West German world market integration. In Wagenknecht’s current adaptation of ordoliberalism, the state guarantees competition, which, in turn, creates a strong economy capable of providing stable employment, social security and a fairer distribution of incomes. She combines this embrace of free markets plus the welfare state with a critique of the European Union as an institution operating in the interest of big corporations and a critique of NATO and US hegemony. Her condemnation of American hegemony appealed to some members of the Left Party, as did her critique of the EU, although her more recent favourable references to ordoliberalism and policies aiming at stricter migration controls were less popular.

    The BSW’s outlook is very much shaped by positive memories of West German postwar prosperity. Yet, the party’s advocacy of international cooperation, a position going back to 1970s detente policies, contrasts sharply with orientations of the centrist parties and some currents within her own former party. Demand for a negotiated settlement of the Ukraine war overlaps with AfD positions. However, the AfD considers this a matter of Germany’s national interest that doesn’t preclude support for rearmament and war in other regions, like Gaza most recently. The BSW, on the other hand, sees militarism largely as the US’s last recourse for defending its ailing empire. It remains to be seen how the BSW’s principled opposition to militarism and war can mesh with current negotiations for a coalition government with the CDU and the SPD, both committed to military support for Zelensky in Ukraine and Netanyahu in Israel. Polls suggest that electoral support for the BSW was largely driven by the desire for an anti-war voice in parliament. At the same time, there is considerable support for efforts to keep the AfD out of government, despite all the support the AfD garnered in the fall state elections in East Germany. If this means compromising its anti-militarism, the BSW may, like the Left Party before it, soon be seen as a superfluous appendix of unpopular centrist parties.

    After weeks of negotiations, the BSW entered into a coalition government with the SPD in Brandenburg as well as with the CDU and SPD in Thuringia. It also supports a minority government made up of the CDU and the SPD in Saxony. It did all this to keep the AfD out of government positions. Understandable as such efforts are, they have already cost the BSW in the polls. Hovering just above five percent, the BSW may not reach the five-percent threshold for obtaining seats in the upcoming federal elections. The Left Party, standing at 3.5 percent in the polls, will probably fall short. Founded as a project to unify left forces from East and West Germany, its split early last year already signalled the failure of that project. The next election may reduce it to insignificance, leaving lots of room for the AfD [end]

    The original article

    Ingo Schmidt is an economist and works as the coordinator of the Labour Studies Program at Athabasca University

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  • [Sharing] Israel’s Support for Syrian Opposition Exposed – Kit Klarenberg

    In the wake of ultra-extremist militants Hayat Tahrir al-Sham seizing Damascus, Zionist entity premier Benjamin Netanyahu gave a smug address from the Golan Heights, Syrian territory illegally occupied ever since 1967. Along the way, he took personal credit for the fall of Bashar Assad’s government and the Syrian Arab Army’s defeat, while pledging the ground on which he stood would be part of Israel “for eternity”. Ever since, Israeli Occupation Forces have pushed ever-deeper into Golan, unimpeded and unopposed.

    Tel Aviv’s criminal seizure of yet further territory from its neighbours was an absolutely inevitable upshot of Syria’s collapse. However, some Western journalists and politicians have expressed dismay – in many cases, the same figures were cheering Assad’s fall just 24 hours prior. Consternation has also widely abounded over the foreign-dominated and controlled opposition groups that overran Damascus effusively praising the Zionist entity’s assistance in their offensive against the SAA

    HTS militants celebrate after the fall of Damascus

    Speaking to Israeli TV on December 2nd, one rebel fighter thanked Tel Aviv for striking Hezbollah and other Resistance groups, stating the opposition was “very satisfied” with the support. They added:

    We love Israel and we were never its enemies…[Tel Aviv] isn’t hostile to those who are not hostile toward it. We don’t hate you, we love you very much

    ‘Striking Deeper’

    While never acknowledged in the mainstream, the Zionist entity’s sinister alliance with extremist opposition groups arrayed against Damascus has long-laid in plain sight. A September 2018 investigation by US Empire house journal Foreign Policy spelled out in detail “Israel’s secret program to back Syrian rebels.” It documented how, since 2013, Tel Aviv “armed and funded at least 12 rebel groups” in the country. The ostensible purpose was to “prevent Iran-backed fighters and militants of the Islamic State from taking up positions near the Israeli border.”

    The entity’s “military transfers” to anti-Assad opposition groups were vast. They “included assault rifles, machine guns, mortar launchers and transport vehicles.” The materiel was funnelled via the illegally occupied Golan Heights. Israel even “provided salaries to rebel fighters…and supplied additional money the groups used to buy arms on the Syrian black market.” Initially, arms transferred were “mostly US-manufactured”, but these were later “switched” to “non-American weapons…apparently to conceal the source of the assistance.”

    Every step of the way, Israel’s backing of the Syrian opposition ratcheted. Foreign Policy attributes this ever-aggressive stance to Tel Aviv’s failed “appeals” to the US and Russia “to secure a deal that would ensure that Iranian-backed militias would be kept away from southern Syria.” This prompted the entity to “[begin] striking deeper inside Syrian territory, targeting not just individual weapons shipments from Iran to Hezbollah but also Iranian bases across the country.”

    In providing this largesse, Tel Aviv “relied on relationships it developed with individual commanders” of extremist militias, sending “assistance directly to them.” Representatives of these factions “would communicate with Israeli officials by phone and occasionally meet them face to face” in the Golan Heights. “When commanders switched groups and locations, Israeli assistance followed them” – and the entity’s chosen proxies frequently served as distributors of Zionist-supplied weaponry “to other groups”, giving them “outsized influence” in the dirty war

    The IOF careens around Golan Heights

    Foreign Policy records, “as a result of Israel’s humanitarian and military assistance, many residents of southern Syria came to perceive it as an ally.” A nameless opposition fighter told the outlet, “Israel is the only one with interests in the region and a little bit of humanity and [provides] assistance to civilians.” However, “as troops loyal to Assad, aided by Russian and Iranian forces, reasserted control over more and more areas of Syria,” Tel Aviv cut a secret deal with Moscow, to the opposition’s detriment.

    Under its auspices, SAA forces returned to “areas adjacent to the Golan Heights,” while Russia promised “to keep Iran-backed militias 80 kilometers” from the area, “and not to start hindering Israeli strikes on Iranian targets across Syria.” Despite this, Tel Aviv didn’t desert its murderous surrogates. As government forces closed in, “rebels reached out to their Israeli contacts and asked for asylum.” They and “their immediate family members” were duly permitted to flee to Israel, Jordan, and Turkey, with Tel Aviv’s assistance and protection.

    With eerie foresight, Foreign Policy concluded that Israel’s policy of backing the rebels would contribute to significant and enduring unresolved security problems not only in Damascus, but throughout West Asia more widely:

    [This] raises questions about the balance of power in Syria as the civil war there finally winds down. With the Iranian forces that helped Assad defeat the rebels showing no inclination to withdraw from Syria, the potential for the country to become a flash point between Israel and Iran looms large. Without deft diplomacy, confrontations in Syria, protests in Gaza, and tensions over the Iran nuclear deal could plunge the Middle East into chaos

    ‘Military Capabilities’

    Foreign Policy was at pains to portray Israel’s assistance to the Syrian opposition as being predominantly informed by a desire to crush ISIS. For example, the outlet claimed Tel Aviv “provided fire support to rebel factions” fighting an Islamic State affiliate near the Yarmouk river. This purportedly extended to drone strikes targeting ISIS commanders, “and precision-missile strikes against the group’s personnel, fortifications, and vehicles during battles with the rebels.” Meanwhile, the Zionist entity “did not extend similar fire support for rebel assaults on regime forces.”

    Yet, such an exculpatory narrative is at glaring odds with multiple public admissions by Israeli officials. For example, in April 2017 former entity defence minister Moshe Ya’alon revealed that “recently”, ISIS had “apologised” after “[opening] fire” on Tel Aviv’s forces in the Golan Heights. This contrition was expressed by the terror group despite the IOF responding to this broadside by bombarding Islamic State fighters with airstrikes and tank fire, killing four of them.

    One might reasonably ponder why, despite these casualties, the monsters of ISIS felt the need to say sorry. An obvious explanation is the hyper-militant faction did not wish to offend Tel Aviv, lest the entity’s long-running operation to provide medical assistance to insurgents wounded in the Syrian dirty war in field hospitals dotted across Golan be terminated. From 2012 onwards, UN peacekeeping forces consistently testified to witnessing injured Al Qaeda, al-Nusra and ISIS fighters being treated by Israeli military doctors across the region.

    Along the way, documentary filmmakers even captured video evidence of this practice. Once tended to, these belligerents were sent straight back into battle by their Zionist protectors, to fight Hezbollah and the Syrian Arab Army. These astonishing scenes went largely unremarked upon in the Western media, although in May 2016, ex-Mossad chief Efraim Halevy proudly boasted Tel Aviv was committed to a strategy of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” in its crusade to neutralise Assad:

    It’s always useful to deal with your enemies in a humane way. When you have people who are wounded, considerations of whether to take them in are not simply whether it’s politically useful…I didn’t say there was no tactical [consideration]. I don’t think there’s going to be blowback…Al Qaeda to the best of my recollection hasn’t specifically targeted Israel…As Hezbollah fighters are concerned, we have a different account

    Fast forward to today, and ever since Assad’s fall, Israel has relentlessly blitzed SAA sites in Syria. Entity officials boast the “historic” campaign has “destroyed most of the former [Assad] regime’s strategic military capabilities”, decimating up to 80% of the fallen government’s “strategic weapons stockpiles”. Markedly, there has been no attempt whatsoever by HTS to deter or respond to this bombardment, despite Damascus now being completely defenceless against future incursions from her adversaries. Group spokespeople have moreover actively refused to denounce the attacks.

    Nonetheless, longtime Syrian “revolution” activists have expressed shock at Israel’s onslaught against the “newly liberated” country, and further illegal annexation of its territory, demanding Tel Aviv cease its inexorable assaults forthwith. We must ask ourselves whether such reactions are truly borne of ignorance and naivety about Israel’s rapacious expansionism. The reality may be the opposition all along knew precisely what would be unleashed following Assad’s ouster, and welcome it. After all, they were coordinating directly with the Zionist entity at every step of their struggle [end]

    The original article

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    November 13, 2022: America’s Neo-Nazi bedfellows in Ukraine are latest in long line of odious allies Washington has used against Russia – Tony Cox, Russia Today

    From pogrom-mongers to Hitlerites to radical Islamists, the US has collaborated with repugnant partners for more than a century

    November 13, 2022: The French debacle on November 13, 2015

    the jihadist operation in Paris, on November 13, 2015, was the collateral damage of the Western support to the so-called Syrian revolution, a Sunni radical uprising against the secular government of Syria, which began in 2011 and that global jihadists joined from worldwide

    August 2, 2022: Gone with the wind

    45 years of Western collusion with evil, from Afghanistan to Ukraine

    November 13, 2020: The path to November 13, 2015

  • [Sharing] Exposing CIA/MI6 ‘Justice’ Operations in Syria – Kit Klarenberg

    In the immediate wake of the Syrian government’s abrupt collapse, much remains uncertain about the country’s future. While longtime leader Bashar Assad has sought refuge in Moscow, most of his government and its military, security, and intelligence apparatus remains in Damascus. Calls for reconciliation between officials and the predominantly foreign “opposition” abound, but the prospect of show trials for state apparatchiks is high. After all, elements of Anglo-American intelligence have been planning for such an eventuality since before the Syrian civil war even started.

    In May 2011, the Commission for International Justice and Accountability (CIJA) was birthed by shadowy NATO state contractors, ARK and Tsamota. Its first act was to train handpicked Syrian “investigators, lawyers, and activists in basic international criminal and humanitarian law…enabling [them] to link state and non-state actors to underlying criminal acts.” Dedicated “teams of investigators according to their regions” – including Aleppo, Hama, Homs, and Idlib – were created, “and equipped with field investigative kits.”

    Their objective was to gather evidence of war crimes committed by Syrian government forces, in support of a “domestic justice process in a future transitional Syria.” We must ask ourselves how such a project came to be before the Syrian army was formally deployed by Damascus, in response to the foreign-fomented crisis that commenced in mid-March that year. Particularly given bringing officials to trial in a “future transitional Syria” was wholly contingent on all-out regime change.

    The timing of CIJA’s launch is a palpable indication foreign actors were laying foundations for that eventuality from the very first days of Syria’s “peaceful revolution”, before full-blown civil war had erupted. Given the affiliations of ARK and Tsamota, the pair were well-placed to know in advance of plans by Western governments to topple the Assad government via brute force. Now that has come to pass, it may be time for their long-standing plan to at last be put into action.

    ‘Regime Change’

    Founded by MI6 journeyman Alistair Harris, ARK was one of a constellation of contractors, staffed by military and intelligence veterans, employed by British intelligence at a cost of many millions to conduct covert psychological warfare campaigns in Syria, from the initial days of the crisis. The aim was to destabilise Assad’s government, convince the domestic population, international bodies and Western citizens that genocidal CIA and MI6-backed militant groups pillaging the country were a “moderate” alternative, and deluge media the world over with pro-opposition propaganda.

    Under this operation’s auspices, ARK founded and ran numerous ostensibly independent opposition media outlets targeting Syrians of all ages, while tutoring and equipping countless local “citizen journalists”, teaching them “camera handling, lighting, sound, interviewing, filming a story…video and sound editing…voice-over, scriptwriting,” and “graphics and 2D and 3D animation design.” The firm’s students were also instructed in practical propaganda theory, such as “target audience identification, media narrative analysis and monitoring, behavioral identification/understanding, campaign planning, behavioral change, and how communications can influence it”

    Such was ARK’s intimate proximity with anti-Assad elements, it boasted in leaked submissions to the Foreign Office of being entrusted by Western governments to develop a dedicated Office for Syrian Opposition Support. This entity identified the most promising groups for the proxy war’s sponsors to finance, in turn “[helping] present them to international donors, and provide access to networks that could deliver assistance.” These efforts intensified “as the conflict deepened and it became apparent that regime change would not occur in the short term.”

    Tsamota’s primitive official website describes the company as “a security and justice sector consultancy which provides rule of law, forensics and natural resources advisory services,” working in “in politically, legally, socially and logistically challenging environments” for Western governments. The firm is not a compelling candidate for holding government officials anywhere accountable for war crimes. Tsamota has since inception offered guidance to major corporations on how to maximise profits in the Global South, while limiting their local and international legal liabilities.

    In 2013, Tsamota director William Wiley gave a scandalous presentation to Canadian consortium MineAfrica Inc. In it, he set out a series of hypothetical scenarios in which mining companies operating in countries such as the Congo and Mali employed private security firms to crack down on striking workers, or deal with “local militias” interfering with their operations. Wiley outlined a number of means by which companies could be insulated from repercussions of heavy-handed responses to such incidents, up to and including murder

    That presentation described Tsamota as composed of “experts” drawn from “national police, military and intelligence forces.” Wiley is no exception, having served in the Canadian military for almost two decades. Subsequently, he turned to international law, among other things overseeing the trial of Saddam Hussein October 2005 – December 2006, for crimes against humanity. Mainstream accounts acknowledge Wiley was imposed on the former Iraqi leader’s defence team without consent – a major breach of basic legal norms – by the US embassy in Baghdad’s Regime Crimes Liaison Office.

    After capture, Hussein was initially interrogated by the CIA. Contemporary media reports note there was significant concern within the Agency that “their questioning could become public during his eventual trial,” raising issues around “how to conduct the questioning and record the conversations.” The reasons why were unstated, although a likely explanation was Washington wished to avoid awkward disclosures in court about Hussein’s long-running relationship with the CIA, and active US complicity in many of the most heinous crimes of which he was accused.

    To say the least, this was a sensitive role indeed. Even prominent Iraqi supporters of US invasion and occupation charged Baghdad’s “interim” puppet government was seeking “show trials followed by speedy executions” of Hussein et al to boost its credibility. That Wiley was entrusted with this mission speaks volumes about his reliability from the US government’s perspective. It also raises obvious questions about the nature of his relationship with the CIA, and whether that bond influenced CIJA’s creation half a decade later.

    ‘Moving Documents’

    A series of leaked ARK files on CIJA’s activities authored in the years immediately following its creation make grand claims about its achievements. One declares the Commission “innovated in the field of transitional justice…aiding the collection of evidence to document war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other violations of International Humanitarian Law” in Syria. Another states its work represented “a landmark development in international justice: the contemporaneous gathering of evidence of violations of international humanitarian law conducted by regime forces”:

    [CIJA], through expert training, effective equipment provision and a commitment to the truth were able to ensure that when the conflict ends, the raw material of a post-conflict war crimes process is ready for trial, in turn providing a key contribution to truth telling, reconciliation and the future of Syria

    Elsewhere, ARK boasted how CIJA had seized thousands of kilograms of “contemporaneous documentation”, hundreds of thousands of pages of “evidential material” and thousands of videos from Syria, “all of which had to be hand carried” out of the country. Cut to February 2021, and Commission chair Stephen Rapp, a US diplomatic warhorse, bragged to CBS about the sheer volume of evidence CIJA collected. He claimed the papertrail exposed a systematic strategy of Assad government-directed executions of opposition activists, along with ensuing coverups:

    Now we have 800,000 pages of original documents, signed and sealed with original signatures going all the way up to Assad that document this whole strategy…We see reports back about ‘well, we’ve got a real problem here, there are too many corpses stacking up, somebody’s gonna have to help us with that’…Everything is handled in this sort of totalitarian system where they frankly think they can get away with things…they were almost stupid…they created evidence

    If such damning, incontrovertible proof was bagged at any stage by CIJA, it has never emerged publicly. Still, throughout the Syrian dirty war, the Commission enjoyed glowing profiles in Western media, while providing journalists and rights groups with multiple scoops supposedly exposing Syrian government atrocities. At no point did any mainstream reporter or NGO question, let alone raise concerns about, the manner in which the Commission garnered the material upon which its cases against government officials in Damascus was “hand carried” out of the country.

    CIJA chief Wiley acknowledged in 2014 that his organisation smuggled evidence from Syria by working with every opposition group “up to but excluding Jabhat al-Nusra and Islamic State.” However, a 2019 investigation by The Grayzone amply indicates that CIJA was frequently in extremely close quarters with both groups. Moreover, they were paid handsomely for their assistance in securing documentation. This included material seized in Raqqa after its January 2014 capture by ISIS, right when the ultra-extremist group was massacring Alawites and Christians.

    In a 2016 New Yorker profile of CIJA, Wiley detailed the practical hassles and financial drain inherent in “moving documents [over] international borders” and opposition-controlled “checkpoints”, while relying on “rebel groups and couriers for logistical support.” He described how bundles of government files “typically” arrived at the Commission’s offices “in a dizzying array of crappy suitcases.” Wiley lamented, “we burn enormous sums of money moving this stuff.”

    Accordingly, CIJA received tens of millions of dollars for its efforts from a variety of Western governments, including those at the forefront of the Syrian dirty war. Despite the vast windfall, the Commission’s work produced zero prosecutions for many years. This changed in late 2019, when Anwar Raslan and Eyad Gharib, two former members of Damascus’ General Intelligence Directorate, were indicted in Germany for crimes against humanity.

    ‘Many Contradictions’

    Raslan headed the Directorate’s domestic security unit, while Gharib was one of his departmental subordinates. The pair defected to the opposition in December 2012. Raslan and his family fled to Jordan, where he played “an active and visible role in the Syrian opposition.” He was part of the anti-Assad delegation at the Geneva II conference on Syria in January 2014, and in July that year, was granted asylum in Germany.

    After his escape from Syria, Raslan told numerous lurid tales of abuse and atrocities perpetrated by his unit, and the Assad government more widely, during his 20 years of state service. He claimed his defection was spurred after learning an apparent opposition attack in Damascus that he was charged with investigating was, in fact, staged by security forces. Significant doubts about his accounts, and whether his defection was principled or just cynical opportunism, have been raised in many quarters

    Artist’s rendition of Raslan’s trial

    In a perverse irony, Raslan’s loudmouth propensity was his undoing. His assorted claims post-defection provided grounds for arrest by German authorities, and were used against him and Gharib in their prosecutions. These legal actions heavily relied on documents seized by CIJA, including Central Crisis Management Cell records. This unit was created in March 2011 by Damascus, to manage responses to mass rioting that erupted this month. These documents have been widely described as the “linchpin” of the Commission’s case against “the Syrian regime.”

    Yet, as this journalist has previously exposed, the Central Crisis Management Cell files in fact show the Assad government explicitly and repeatedly instructed security forces to protect protesters, prevent violence, and keep the situation under control. The documents also detail how from inception, many “peaceful” demonstrators were extremely violent, while opposition fighters systematically murdered security service operatives, pro-government figures, and demonstrators to foment catastrophe, in a manner eerily similar to many CIA/MI6 regime change operations old and new.

    In February 2021, Gharib was found guilty of aiding and abetting crimes against humanity. He received four-and-a-half years in prison. A year later, Raslan was given life for crimes including mass torture, rape, and murder. The pair were not convicted for personally perpetrating these horrors, but serving in the General Intelligence Directorate at the time they were allegedly committed. “Expert” witness evidence provided at their trials left much to be desired.

    For example, judges and prosecutors alike expressed disquiet at “many contradictions” in the testimony of “P3”, a Syrian government operative who purportedly worked in a security service “mail department”, and was central to Gharib’s conviction. P3 professed to seeing sensitive documents “related to the transfer of corpses” of opposition activists “to burial sites.” They “provided contradictory information” in statements to German police and the court, and were “visibly nervous” while testifying. Throughout, their seemingly aghast attorney sat nearby “putting his hands behind his head.”

    Meanwhile, during Raslan’s prosecution, “P4” – a nameless individual who claimed to have been detained in a Syrian prison, and bribed his way out – testified he saw 500,000 corpses buried via a “bulldozer and a truck” next to his house, in an area which was previously “a desert”. Reports of the trial indicate there “was a feeling” among those present in court, including “the public”, that these numbers were greatly “exaggerated.”

    The sense that Gharib and Raslan were prosecuted because they were within easy reach, and CIJA needed something to show for all its well-remunerated efforts, is ineluctable. The Commission had strong grounds to be anxious about failing to fulfill its founding objective. In March 2020, the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) formally accused the organization of “submission of false documents, irregular invoicing, and profiteering” relating to an EU “Rule of Law” project it ran in Syria.

    Fast forward to today, and The Guardian reports that “the abrupt implosion of the infrastructure of state terror” in Syria “has made available a huge volume of evidence.” The outlet quoted CIJA chief William Wiley at some length. He compared Assad’s fall to “a situation much like Germany in 1945 or Iraq in 2003,” with “a sudden availability of all state records” making prosecution of state officials a fait accompli:

    It’s a very unusual situation, and its suddenness creates challenges and opportunities in simply dealing with the material…If there’s any security intelligence guy that rocks up in Europe, there’s typically going to be enough material already to hand

    [end]

    The original article

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    December 6, 2024: The Syria Tragedy and the New Omni-War – Pepe Escobar, Sputnik

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    November 26, 2024: Sebastian Gorka: British intelligence asset? – Kit Klarenberg and Max Blumenthal, The Grayzone

    Sebastian Gorka’s involvement with British intelligence cost him a security clearance in Hungary. His longtime mentor is a UK spook currently engaged in covert operations against Russia. Is the Ukraine hawk and Trump counter-terror appointee operating on London time?

    November 17, 2024: Leaks expose secret British military cell plotting to ‘keep Ukraine fighting’ – Kit Klarenberg, The Grayzone

    Leaked files show top UK military figures conspired to carry out the Kerch bridge bombing, covertly train “Gladio”-style stay-behind forces in Ukraine, and groom the British public for a drop in living standards caused by the proxy war against Russia

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    This is part 2 of “Why There Is Still No Peace on Earth: Washington’s Folly From The Persian Gulf to Ukraine.”  Read part 1

    March 9, 2023: How Could Western Intelligence Have Got It Wrong, Again? They Didn’t. They Had Other Purposes – Alastair Crooke, Strategic Culture Foundation

    The West now faces the task of de-fusing the landmine of their own electorate’s conviction of a Ukraine ‘win’, and of Russian humiliation

    January 7, 2023: Freedom fighters are defending Ukraine

    Jihadists in Ukraine, that is for democracy

    November 13, 2022: America’s Neo-Nazi bedfellows in Ukraine are latest in long line of odious allies Washington has used against Russia – Tony Cox, Russia Today

    From pogrom-mongers to Hitlerites to radical Islamists, the US has collaborated with repugnant partners for more than a century

    November 13, 2022: The French debacle on November 13, 2015

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  • [Sharing] The Syria Tragedy and the New Omni-War – Pepe Escobar, Sputnik

    Until recently, a serious geopolitical working hypothesis was that West Asia and Ukraine were two vectors of the standard Hegemon modus operandi, which is to incite and unleash Forever Wars. Now both wars are united in an Omni-War

    A coalition of Straussian neo-cons in the US, hardcore revisionist Zionists in Tel Aviv and Ukrainian neo-nazi shades of grey is now betting on a Final Confrontation – with several overtones ranging from expanding lebensraum to provoking the Apocalypse.

    What stands in their way is essentially two of the top BRICS: Russia and Iran.

    China, self-protected by their collective lofty dream of “community of a shared future for mankind”, warily watches on the sidelines, as they know that at the end of the road, the true “existential” war by the Hegemon will be against them.

    Meanwhile, Russia and Iran need to mobilize for Totalen Krieg. Because that’s what the enemy is launching.

    Undermining BRICS and the INSTC

    The total destabilisation of Syria, with heavy CIA-MI6 input, now proceeding in real time, is a carefully engineered gambit to undermine BRICS and beyond.

    It proceeds in parallel to Pashinyan removing Armenia from the CSTO – based on a US promise to support Yerevan in a possible new clash with Baku; India being encouraged to ramp up a weapons race with Pakistan; and across-the-board intimidation of Iran.

    So this is also a war to destabilize the International North South Transportation Corridor (INSTC), of which the three major protagonists are BRICS members Russia, Iran and India.

    As it stands, the INSTC is totally geopolitical risk-free. As a top BRICS corridor-in-the-making, it carries the potential to become even more effective than several of China’s cross-Heartland corridors of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

    The INSTC would be a key lifeline for a great deal of the global economy in case of a direct confrontation between the US/Israel combo and Iran – with the possible shutdown of the Strait of Hormuz leading to the collapse of a multi-quadrillion pile of financial derivatives, economically imploding the collective West.

    Turkiye under Erdogan, as usual, is playing a double game. Rhetorically, Ankara stands by a genocide-free and sovereign Palestine. In practice, the Turkiye supports and funds a motley crew of Greater Idlibistan jihadis – trained by Ukrainian Neo-nazis in drone warfare and with weapons financed by Qatar – who have just marched on and conquered Aleppo, Hama, and possibly beyond.

    If this army of mercenaries were real followers of Islam, they would be marching in defense of Palestine.

    At the same time, the real picture inside the corridors of power in Tehran is extremely murky. There are factions favoring getting closer to the West, which clearly would have ramifications for the Axis of Resistance’s ability to fight Tel Aviv.

    On Lebanon, Syria never wavered. History explains why: from the point of view of Damascus, Lebanon historically remains a governorate, so Damascus is responsible for the security of Beirut.

    And that’s one of Tel Aviv’s key motives to propel the current Salafi-jihadi offensive on Syria – after smashing virtually every communication corridor between Syria and Lebanon. What Tel Aviv could not accomplish on the ground – a victory over Hezbollah in southern Lebanon – has been replaced by isolating Hezbollah from the Axis of Resistance.

    When in Doubt, Re-Read Xenophon

    Wars in West Asia are a complex mix of national, sectarian, tribal and religious vectors. In a sense, they are endless wars; controllable to an extent, but then back again.

    The Russian strategy in Syria seemed to be very precise. As it was impossible to normalize a completely fragmented nation, Moscow opted to free the Syria that really matters – the capital, the most important cities, and the Eastern Mediterranean coast – from the Salafi-jihadi mobs.

    The problem is that freezing the war in 2020, with direct implication by Russia, Iran and (reluctantly) Turkiye, did not solve the “moderate rebel” problem. Now they’re back – in full force, supported by a vast Rent-a-Jihadi mob, with NATOstan Intel behind them.

    Some things never change.

    2012. Jake Sullivan, then an aide to Hillary Clinton: “AQ [al-Qaeda*] is on our side in Syria.”

    2021. James Jeffrey, special envoy to Syria under Trump (2018-2020): “HTS [Hayat Tahrir al-Sham*] is an asset to the US’s strategy in Idlib.”

    There could not be better timing for the revival of the HTS “asset”. HTS if filling an enormous void; beware when that happens in West Asia. Russia is fully concentrated on Ukraine. Hezbollah suffered heavily from Tel Aviv’s bombings and serial killing. Tehran is fully concentrated on how to deal with Trump 2.0.

    History always teaches us. Syria is now a West Asian Anabasis. Xenophon – a soldier and writer – tell us how, in the 4th century B.C., an “expedition” (“anabasis”, in Ancient Greek) of 10,000 Greek mercenaries were engaged by Cyrus the Younger against his brother Artaxerxes II, King of Persia, from Armenia to the Black Sea. The expedition miserably failed – and the painful return journey was endless.

    2,400 years later, we see governments, armies and mercenaries still plunging into the endless West Asia wars – and extracting themselves now is even more insoluble.

    Syria now is tired, attritted, with the SAA becoming complacent with the long freeze of the war since 2020. All that coupled with the vicious starvation siege unleashed by the US Caesar Act, and the impossibility to start rebuilding the nation with the help of at least 8 million citizens who fled the endless war.

    Over these past 4 years, problems piled up. There were endless breaches of the Astana process and Israel bombed Syria almost daily with impunity.

    China was basically immobile. Beijing simply did not invest in the rebuilding of Syria.

    Perspective is sobering. Even Russia – which is a de facto Resistance icon in itself, even if not formally part of the West Asian Axis of Resistance – has taken nearly three years of hard slog in its fight with Ukraine.

    Only a cohesive, consolidated Axis of Resistance – after getting rid of countless 5thcolumnists working inside – would have a chance against being picked off one by one by the same consolidated enemy, over and over again.

    Sometimes it feels like the BRICS – particularly China – haven’t learned anything from Bandung in 1955, and how the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) was neutralized.

    You can’t beat a pitiless hegemonic hydra with flower power.

    * terrorist organizations banned in Russia and many other countries [end]

    The original article

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    December 4, 2024: Türkiye’s mistakes may cost it dearly in Africa – Mikhail Gamandiy-Egorov, New Eastern Outlook

    The ambiguity of Ankara’s policy may eventually play a cruel joke on it, despite its growing ambitions in various parts of the world. No matter how confident Türkiye is in its ability to sit on two chairs simultaneously, at some point it will have to choose, risking to lose everything

    November 28, 2024: Al’Asad ‘iilaa al’abad

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    The plutocracy believes that afterwards they can buy the whole thing for a pittance while flies are still laying eggs in European carcasses

    October 1, 2024: Kill this beast

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    January 7, 2023: Freedom fighters are defending Ukraine

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    November 13, 2022: America’s Neo-Nazi bedfellows in Ukraine are latest in long line of odious allies Washington has used against Russia – Tony Cox, Russia Today

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  • [Sharing] Putin Outlines The ‘Moment of Truth’ – Pepe Escobar, Sputnik

    President Putin’s plenary session performance (address + Q&A) at the annual Valdai Club meeting in Sochi felt like a high-speed train on cruise control

    Totally cool, calm, comfortable, in full command of a Himalaya of facts, no political leader anywhere – recent past and present – would even come close to delivering what amounts to an extensive, detailed world view deeply matured over a quarter of a century at the highest geopolitical level.

    Putin began his address referring to the October 1917 revolution, drawing a direct parallel with our turbulent times: “The moment of truth is coming”. In a clear tribute to Gramsci, he stated how a “completely new world order” is “being formed before our eyes.”

    The subtle reference to the recent BRICS summit in Kazan could not possibly escape critical minds across the Global Majority. Kazan was a living, breathing testimony that “the old order is irrevocably disappearing, one might say, has already disappeared, and a serious, irreconcilable struggle is unfolding for the formation of a new one. Irreconcilable, first of all, because this is not even a fight for power or geopolitical influence, this is a clash of the very principles on which relations between countries and peoples will be built at the next historical stage.”

    As concisely as possible, that should be taken as the current Big Picture framework: we are not mired inside a reductionist clash of civilizations or the “end of History” – which Putin defined as “myopic” – but facing a make-or-break systemic clash of fundamental principles. The result will define this century – arguably the Eurasia Century, as “the dialectics of History continues.”

    Putin himself quipped that he would drive into “philosophical asides” during his address. In fact that went much further than a mere refutation of unilateral conceptual fallacies, as “the Western elites thought that their monopoly is the final stop for humanity” and “modern neoliberalism degenerated into a totalitarian ideology.”

    Referring to AI, he asked rhetorically, “will human remain human?” He praised the building of a new global architecture, moving towards a “polyphonic” and “polycentric” world where “maximum representation” is paramount and the BRICS are “coming up with a coordinated approach” based on “sovereign equality.”

    Six Principles For Global Sustainable Development

    Sovereignty had to be one of the predominant themes during the Valdai Q&A. Putin was adamant that Russia must “develop our own sovereign AI. As algorithms are biased and give massive power to a few big companies that control the internet, the need is imperative for “sovereign algorithms.”

    Answering a question on Eurasian security and the US as the dominant maritime power v. a multipolar Eurasia, he stressed the “consensus and desire in Eurasia for an anti-hegemonic movement”, and not for Eurasia constituted “as a bloc”. That’s the appeal of Eurasia’s “multi-vector foreign policy”, implying “more political independence”. The key example of “harmonizing interests”, Putin stressed, is the Russia-China partnership, and that was also what “made BRICS successful.”

    Compare it in contrast to “the inability in Europe to establish a system of “indivisibility of security” and to “overcome bloc politics”; Europe instead went for NATO expansion: “After the end of the Cold War there was an opportunity to overcome bloc politics. But the US had fear of losing Europe. The US installed almost a colonial dependence. Honestly I did not expect that.”

    Putin introduced a fascinating personal experience tidbit referring to a conversation – in German – with former German chancellor Helmut Kohl in 1993, when Kohl said flat out that “the future of Europe” is linked to Russia.

    Yet that ended up leading to “the most important problem on our Eurasian continent, the main problem between Russia and European countries: the trust deficit (…) When they tell us that ‘we signed the Minsk agreements on Ukraine only to give Ukraine an opportunity to rearm, and we had no intention of resolving this conflict peacefully,’ what kind of trust can we talk about? (…) You have directly publicly stated that you have cheated us! Lied to us and deceived us! What kind of trust is that? But we need to get back to that system of mutual trust.”

    Putin then added that Europe should consider becoming part and parcel of a Chinese concept straight from Chinese philosophy (“they do not strive for domination”). With panache, he stressed that the Chinese uber-geoeconomic trade/connectivity project should be interpreted as One Belt, One Common Road.

    And that extrapolates to Central Asia, with all those nations “very young in their statehood” interested in “stable development”. For Russia-China, there’s “no competition” in the Heartland: “we only have cooperation.”

    Putin once again enumerated what he considers the 6 key principles for global sustainable development: openness of interaction (implying no “artificial barriers”); diversity (“a model of one country or a relatively small part of humanity should not be imposed as something universal”); maximum representativeness; security for all without exception; justice for all (erasing “the gap between the ‘golden billion’ and the rest of humanity); and equality.

    “Make Civilizations, Not War”

    On Ukraine, this was the money quote: “If there is no neutrality, then it’s difficult to imagine any kind of good neighborly relations between Russia and Ukraine.” In a nutshell: Moscow is ready for negotiations, but based on facts on the battlefield and what was agreed upon in Istanbul in April 2022.

    That may be interpreted as a direct message to President Trump. To whom the door is open: “Russia has not damaged its relations with the US and is open to their restoration, but the ball is in the Americans’ court.”

    Putin on US Presidents (he met quite a few): “All of them are interesting people.” On Trump: “His behavior when there was an attempt on his life, I was impressed. He is a courageous person. He acquitted himself valiantly.” On the open door: “Whatever he does it’s up to him to decide.” Then Putin offered his own congratulations for the re-election – on the record. The dialogue may be on: “We are willing to talk to Trump.”

    Putin extolled Russia-China relations as part of their strategic partnership as being “at the highest level in modern history.” He also praised his own personal relation with Xi Jinping. That paved the way for the real killer, when it comes to US-Russia-China: “If the US had chosen a trilateral cooperation instead of double constraint – everyone would win.”

    An excellent question by Brazilian economist Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr – a former vice-president of the NDB, the BRICS bank – led Putin to clarify his own position on de-dollarization. He stated flatly that “my role is to see ideas shaped that we then propose to our partners”.

    The key target is “proposing to create a new investment platform using electronic payments.” That will address the “most promising markets” in the near future – South Asia, Africa, parts of Latin America: “They will need investment, technologies.” And “tools independent from inflation” – with regulation “through Central Banks and the NDB. We agreed to have a working group meeting regularly at government level. We are in no hurry.”

    So that puts to rest any scenario of an immediate BRICS financial bombshell – even as “two-thirds of our trade is being serviced in national currencies” and among BRICS the figures are also high.

    BRICS Bridge will be tested – soon. As for creating a single currency, that’s “premature. We need to achieve greater integration of economies, increase the quality of economies to a certain – compatible – level.”

    Then, the bombshell: “We never wanted to abandon the dollar!” That goes a long way to explain Putin’s own view on de-dollarization: “They are undoing it with their own hand – the power of the dollar.”

    All of the above is just a sample of the width and breath of themes addressed by the President during the Valdai Q&A. The forum itself offered precious nuggets all across the spectrum. Some participants – correctly – noted the absence of “the majority of the majority”: youth and women. Africans were impressed with “the sharp mind of Russian bureaucracy.”

    A Chinese view noted how “the Chinese don’t swim against the current; they cross the river and reach the other bank.” There was a near consensus that development should be “based in different cultural values of civilizations” – actually Putin’s own view. Also imperative is the “need for aggregate authority” among the Global South.

    A Greek insight was particularly powerful when it comes to the civilizational approach to politics: “Civilizations don’t clash. States do.” Thus the new – playful – motto that could guide not only BRICS but the whole Global Majority: “Make Civilizations, Not War.” [end]

    The original article

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