Analista senior di l'intelligenza in u campu di a gestione di i risichi di sicurezza, sò un anzianu tenente detective è ufficiale di l'intelligenza in l'agenzie di u Statu francese. A bona pronuncia hè Николай Чинкуини, in russu
Read on to learn how Nazis turned NATO into the organization it is today
The largest peacetime military alliance in the world has a dubious history of employing some of Hitler’s most renowned officers
The names Hans Speidel and Adolf Heusinger, among others, are unknown to most. But these persons were key figures in Hitler’s Nazi war machine who would later go on to hold some of the highest positions in NATO
43 year-old Hüseyin Doğru is a German journalist and documentary filmmaker based in Berlin. Early 2023, he founded Red., a revolutionary English-language website. But at the instigation of Germany, in May 2025, the European Union sanctioned both journalist and media, over alleged links to Russia
Jacques Baud has been sanctioned by the European Union for speaking truth to power. He deserves the support of all freedom loving people around the world
its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine, chronicle
chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine against Russia
[my illustration: a Teutonic knight in Alexander Nevsky, by Sergei Eisenstein, 1938]
The fate of Central and Eastern Europe after the People’s Democracies’ post-1989 fall cannot be fully appreciated without reference to the EU as an extension of German imperialism. Berlin’s drive to ensure the region remains composed of weak, frequently mutually-resentful microstates has endured for well-over a century. Over time, battlefield conquest and occupation has been supplanted by economic and monetary union, and ever-rising military, security and intelligence “interoperability” and “cooperation”, all conducted under “internationalist” auspices.
Comprehending this process and the consistent needs of German imperialism provides a typically absent, critical lens through which to view events such as Yugoslavia’s destruction, the rise and recent demise of Hungary’s Viktor Orban, and seen and unseen political machinations throughout the Balkans old and new. German imperialism is a potent, dangerous force frequently overlooked due to its nigh-invisible operation. With US global hegemony irreversibly faltering, it is vital to truly understand the phenomenon as it threatens to emerge in its own militarised right again.
Today, German imperialism is little-understood even in countries and regions intimately shaped if not outright created by Berlin’s colonial meddling and concomitant hegemonic expansion. Its historic apotheosis was the 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The terms and consequences provide an eerily precise blueprint for the EU’s modern day role as German empire via other means. Despite Brest-Litovsk’s seismic import, mainstream English language accounts are comparatively rare. A highly compelling, informative synthesis is nonetheless provided by Adam Tooze’s much-overlooked 2014 workThe Deluge.
Tooze writes of how “Brest gave birth to the precursors to the Baltic states in their modern form,” and an “independent Ukraine” for the very first time in history. Resource-rich territory that over prior centuries comprised much larger dynastic land empires was broken up into easily exploitable chunks. The newly-formed nations, and corresponding nationalisms, spread throughout ethnically, linguistically and religiously diverse swaths of Central and Eastern Europe constituted a formidable stronghold. Self-determination facilitated Germany’s untrammelled economic, military, and political penetration.
Commenting on Eurasia’s 21st century map, Tooze observes how since the Soviet Union’s 1991 dissolution, all Brest-Litovsk’s “creations” have “come to be regarded as legitimate members of the family of nations.” Moreover, states such as the Baltics and Poland then as now “look to protectors in the West,” being “keen members of an American-dominated NATO and the European Union, in which Germany is the dominant force.” Via Brest-Litovsk, “all of these polities fell willy-nilly under the ‘protection’ of Imperial Germany”
Brest-Litovsk delegates negotiate, early 1918
The Treaty was signed between Moscow and Austro-Hungary, Bulgaria, Germany and the Ottoman Empire in March 1918, following months of tense negotiations produced the previous December by revolutionary Russia signing an armistice with Berlin. At Brest-Litvosk, both sides had advanced their respective visions of “self-determination” for the Central and Eastern European components of the Tsar’s collapsed empire. Vladimir Lenin hoped newly-independent states in the region would be free to turn Bolshevik. Yet, Imperial Germany had no intention of letting that happen.
Instead, the country’s “more intelligent strategic thinkers” realised “there was no better means to dynamite the Tsarist Empire than for Berlin to espouse the demand for self-determination” at Brest-Litovsk. This “manipulative ruse” would allow Germany to extend her hegemony imperceptibly throughout enormously profitable territories. It was “a vision of negotiated sovereignty in which economic and military independence was pooled by smaller states with larger states.” Tooze reports how German imperialists argued “full, unfettered sovereignty” was “always a chimera” – “the real choice was one between hegemons”:
Germany would secure power on a continental scale not through annexation, but through the formation of an economic and military bloc of smaller Eastern European states…The autonomous Polish entity carved by Germany and Austria out of Russian territory in the autumn of 1916 was a start. While in economic and military terms the new Poland would be bound tightly and irrevocably to Germany, in the social and cultural sphere it would be given the freedom ‘to express itself nationally’
‘Military Protection’
From the Central Powers’ perspective, self-determination’s colonial windfall was immense. In territorial terms, Moscow lost control of today’s Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine. This prime former Tsarist real estate accounted for 34% of the fallen empire’s population, 54% of its industrial land, 89% of its coalfields, and 26% of its railways. Berlin well-knew the regional treasure trove would be hotly contested, and could easily “fall into the orbit of another great power” – “if not Germany or Russia, then Britain”.
Hence, Brest-Litovsk’s terms exclusively allowed for ‘independence’ under formal “German military protection.” This transformed millions of people throughout the region into potential proxy warriors arrayed against Russia, or other major powers threatening Berlin’s local hegemony, in the manner of NATO today. Rapidly collapsing into civil war, with Franco-British intervention to reverse the Revolution impending, the incipient Soviet Union acquiesced to the Treaty’s harsh stipulations. Lenin believed the Bolsheviks would eventually recapture the lost territories, by sheer force of radical gravity
Contemporary map of Central and Eastern European states created by Brest-Litovsk
Brest-Litovsk was torn up by the June 1919 Treaty of Versailles, compelling Berlin to grant independence to assorted German-conquered protectorates that had been established throughout the region. Chaotic, violent struggles unfolded over the next three years between Red Army-assisted local revolutionary elements and ‘independent’ states led by collaborationist puppets. Belarus and Ukraine were successfully absorbed as republics, while the Baltics and Poland remained autonomous. Meanwhile, the seed of German hegemony via self-determination had been decisively sown throughout Central and Eastern Europe.
German colonialism particularly left its mark post-Brest-Litovsk via the emergence of nationalisms and according national creation myths throughout the region, which were innately and rabidly antagonistic toward Moscow. In Poland in 1916, Berlin’s invading forces had successfully portrayed themselves as liberators. In the Baltics, Russians represented a large proportion of the country’s urban, land-owning elite. They were easily framed by German propagandists, and in ultranationalist imaginations, as parasitic overlords of largely illiterate ethnic Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian peasantry, who overwhelmingly resided in rural steppes.
Convincing Ukraine’s multiethnic population to embrace an anti-Russian ‘independence’ was considerably more difficult, given their similar backgrounds, customs and languages, and the substantial influence of each others’ culture in both directions since Kiev’s 1654 union with Moscow. Ukraine’s contemporaneous veneration of genocidal fascists, and indeed the wider ongoing proxy war, are direct upshots of efforts by German imperialists to promote enmity and antagonism between Russians and Ukrainians. This strategy was maintained throughout the Cold War by the CIA and MI6, with Nazi-riddled West Berlin’s assistance.
‘Civilising Mission’
Another enduring legacy of Brest-Litovsk was the transformation of “self-determination” from a liberal German imperialist crusade, to a fundamental principle of Anglo-American-dominated international relations. The cause was eagerly and cynically seized upon first by British Prime Minister Lloyd George, then US President Woodrow Wilson. The right to minority self-determination globally became absolutely central to the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. The world over, anti-colonial and nationalist movements saw an opportunity to achieve independence from foreign subjugation.
At the Conference, Austro-Hungary brutally fell victim to this self-determination push, with Britain successfully ordering its constituent territories be “liberated” via the empire’s total breakup. This created the independent states of Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. The latter pair were entirely new countries, with Yugoslavia forged from Austro-Hungary’s southern Slavic regions – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia – and the revolutionary kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro. In a bitter irony, Austro-Hungary herself had previously encouraged self-determination regionally à la Brest-Litovsk, to entrench her imperial rule.
In June 1878, the little-known Congress of Berlin was convened. Major European powers sought to reorganise the Balkans, in the wake of Russia’s victory over the Ottoman Empire three months earlier. The conflict ended with Moscow asserting hegemony over Constantinople’s remaining holdings in Southeastern Europe, via an allied Greater Bulgaria, and the newly-formed, independent states of Montenegro, Romania, and Serbia. However, Austria-Hungary, Britain, France, rapidly expanding host empire Germany, and Italy, wished for these terms to be revised
While the Congress recognised the three new Balkan states’ independence, attendees demanded Bosnia and Herzegovina become an Austro-Hungarian protectorate into the bargain, much to Serbia’s chagrin. Vienna’s resultant takeover of Sarajevo sent tens of thousands of Muslim inhabitants fleeing to Turkey. This exodus intensified in 1881, after the imposition of military conscription. The move was inspired by Serbia and Montenegro supporting local anti-imperial elements. It was just one Austro-Hungarian connivance intended to transform harmoniously multiethnic, multifaith Bosnia and Herzegovina into a fractious powder keg.
In service of this goal, Sarajevo’s Austro-Hungarian occupation authorities actively nurtured a nationhood centred exclusively on Bosniak – Bosnian Muslim – identity. The local Serbo-Croatian dialect was proclaimed a separate Bosnian language, Cyrillic text got suppressed, while Serbian books and newspapers were banned. Vienna’s meddling failed to incite violent, separatist division between Bosnia’s diverse peoples. It nonetheless created a vast army of conscripts for any future regional war, while providing Austro-Hungary with an imperial public relations victory. Per historian Maximilian Georg:
[Vienna’s] objects were to teach the population their supposed Bosnian, pro-Habsburg identity, legitimise the Austro-Hungarian rulers as the new Romans, and demonstrate to Europe and the world the success of Austro-Hungary’s ‘civilising mission’ in an ‘oriental’ country. This ‘civilising mission’ under military occupation was the strongest indicator of an Austro-Hungarian colonialism
‘Yugoslav Nationalist’
Austro-Hungary and Germany alike considered independent Serbia’s mere existence a permanent irritant to their Eastern European supremacy, in need of eventual neutralisation. Tensions constantly mounted after the turn of the century, leading in 1908 to Bosnia’s formal annexation by Vienna. All along, imperialists in Berlin were spectating Austro-Hungary’s colonial machinations with intense interest. In 1888, Chancellor Otto von Bismarck prophetically foresaw “some damned foolish thing in the Balkans” upsetting Europe’s delicate balance of power, and precipitating a major global conflict.
Serbia and Montenegro’s October 1912 invasion of Albania, in the wake of her declaration of independence from Ottoman rule, almost proved that “damned foolish thing.” Serb and Montenegrin forces sought to permanently capture territory, but retreated a year later under threat of Austro-Hungarian intervention. In the aftermath, Kaiser Wilhelm II visited Vienna, declaring to colonial officials “war between East and West was in the long run inevitable.” As Slavs “were born not to rule but to obey,” their anti-imperialist tendencies couldn’t be tolerated much longer.
Wilhelm II moreover pledged to “back” Austro-Hungary in any future conflict in Eastern Europe, assuring his Viennese counterparts Berlin was “ready to draw the saber any time your action makes it necessary.” Bosnian Serb Gavrilo Princip’s June 1914 assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo provided an ideal pretext for the Kaiser’s long-desired showdown between Slavs and Teutons. Pressured by Austro-Hungarian authorities to implicate Belgrade directly in his actions while on trial, Princip instead insisted he was ideologically motivated:
I am a Yugoslav nationalist, aiming for the unification of all Yugoslavs, and I do not care what form of state, but it must be free from Austria…The plan was to unite all South Slavs. It was understood that Serbia as the free part of the South Slavs had the moral duty to help in the unification, to be to the South Slavs as the Piedmont was to Italy…In my opinion every Serb, Croat and Slovene should be an enemy of Austria
In post-World War I Yugoslavia, Princip was elevated to national hero. In early 1930, a plaque was erected on the site of Ferdinand’s assassination, celebrating a foundational event in the new country’s creation. It was the sole trophy claimed by the Nazis following the Axis invasion of Yugoslavia, presented to Adolf Hitler at a formal ceremony on his 52nd birthday in April 1941, two days after Belgrade’s surrender. A potent totem of German embarrassment expunged, it was now time to erase Yugoslavia permanently
Adolf Hitler inspects the plundered plaque commemorating Archduke Ferdinand’s assassination by Gavrilo Princip
Carving up the country relied heavily on constructing genocidal, ethnonationalist puppet entities. Painful memories of these attempts to exert hegemony over the Balkans under the banner of “self-determination” remained visceral for many residents of Yugoslavia in December 1991. Then, newly-reunified Germany unilaterally recognised federation members Croatia and Slovenia as ‘independent’ states, while encouraging other republics comprising the collapsing country to follow the pair’s secessionist lead. It was widely predicted Yugoslavia’s demise would produce bloodshed, on a grand scale.
‘Fundamental Subordination’
Dissolving Yugoslavia began waging war on Croat and Slovene secessionists six months earlier. The latter conflict lasted just 10 days, but the former was still simmering. The European Community and UN futilely struggled all along to achieve peaceful settlements to Yugoslavia’s gravely worsening crisis, while formally committed to preserving the country in some form. Berlin’s recognition summarily sabotaged those efforts, removing any incentive for Yugoslav republics to negotiate their futures with Belgrade, while emboldening nationalists in every republic.
Fears of Berlin’s resurgent imperialism were not confined to Yugoslavia. As TIMEcontemporaneously observed, “it used to be a given of European political life Germany…would not take a leading or controversial role in world affairs,” which “suited its neighbors very well indeed.” While occupied West Germany operated throughout the Cold War as “an economic giant and a political dwarf,” unified Berlin’s “unexpected show of diplomatic muscle” in recognising Croatia and Slovenia as ‘independent’ countries was now causing “discomfort” throughout Western capitals.
In Britain’s parliament, then-Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd explicitly evoked the World Wars as disquieting precedents for Germany’s modern-day “self-determination” push in the soon-to-be former Yugoslavia. “There is a tradition of the main states of Western Europe splitting in rivalry on these Balkan questions, and this all ending up on the battlefield. I don’t think that tradition is a good one,” Hurd cautioned. Washington, immensely irritated by Berlin belligerently “getting out ahead of the US,” duly assumed management of the Yugoslav crisis, with disastrous consequences.
Fratricidal conflicts that subsequently engulfed Yugoslavia forged a highly invasive beachhead, via which German economic and political hegemony throughout the region surged, without direct military engagement. While Berlin framed her support for Croat and Slovene ‘independence’ in terms of human rights, the rich financial rewards of shattering the federation were plain. As by far the two wealthiest republics, Germany effectively granted herself access to “the best productive assets” in the soon-to-be former country by kickstarting its practical and physical collapse, per a 2008 academic paper.
The authors write of how Berlin’s “hegemonic relationship” with Yugoslav successor nations was thereafter writ considerably larger than even Germany’s imperial infiltration of “smaller states” elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe. This is due to the “specific dependence” of Balkan countries on Berlin’s “structural power”. In economic terms, this means vast national trade deficits with Germany across the region, with “Balkan pre-products and raw materials” flowing in vast, constant profusion to Berlin, while German corporations and products dominate many commercial, financial and industrial sectors locally.
Undergirding this extraordinary economic colonisation was adoption by Yugoslavia’s successor states of ‘independent’ currencies, pegged first to the former Deutschmark, now Euro. This proved pivotal to the “fundamental subordination of the political economies of the region to the ideological and operational norms” of the EU – or German empire, via other means. New national and private banking systems of post-Yugoslav countries were structured specifically according to Berlin’s own, with German banks ascendant, as elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe. That’s not all:
[Deutschmark/Euro pegging] was an essential precondition for the shaping of the macro-economic policies of these (and other transition) states, for their foreign economic relationships, for the further development of their capital markets and the programmes of liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation which ensued
‘European Continent’
Berlin’s Balkan banking takeover moreover fundamentally “facilitates the penetration of all German enterprises into the commercial life of the Balkan economies.” Berlin has gluttonously feasted on local resources and industry alike ever since, its investment regionally “characterised by takeovers.” For example, throughout Central and Eastern Europe German supermarkets are a near-monopoly, with prices of goods frequently higher than back home, despite meagre local purchasing power. Low wages, vast structural unemployment, and mass brain drain are all interlinked, ruinous inheritances.
The Balkans’ Western “transition” has been far more destructive than even the horrors unleashed upon the former Warsaw Pact in the 1990s. Heavily influenced “by prescriptive programmes emanating from the EU and from the World Bank,” Brussels has since 1999 also been “actively involved” in advising and guiding every country in the region towards bloc membership. After so much imposed impoverishment, it isn’t precisely clear what meaningful benefits Balkan states or populations will reap from their vassalage under German imperialism becoming formalised.
In late 2019, a Balkan liberal who once eagerly supported their country joining the EU wrote a sorrowful ode to “the process of so-called integration” Yugoslav successor states suffered by adopting “measures”, “instruments”, and “reforms” dictated by “Western technocrats”. Freshly ‘independent’ countries “were expected to build a fully developed Western liberal democracy from scratch…upon the ruins of a different yet fully developed system…while dragging behind us the burden of deepening poverty and trauma.” Several were and remain deeply scarred by Berlin and Brussels-encouraged ‘independence’ wars.
However, “this excruciating process of destroying and building anew a whole system…went neither fast enough nor successfully enough” for the new German empire. What’s more, “competition was not fair” – “opening our markets to the developed capitalism of the West and undertaking neoliberal reforms drained our human and economic resources while we kept trying to stay apace.” Socialism’s vestiges were eradicated, state industries sold off, and social spending slashed. The op-ed mysteriously failed to mention how Germany’s contemporary Balkan economic assault has a “strong security dimension”
Kosovo’s original KFOR occupation map, June 1999
The 2008 paper notes Berlin exerts direct colonial-style control across the region, for example via Bosnia and Herzegovina’s EU-chosen Office of the High Representative, which traditionally serves as Germany’s imperial viceroy in Sarajevo. Moreover, Berlin has always been a key contributor to NATO’s Kosovo peacekeeping force KFOR, sustaining a military occupation under which Pristina controversially declared independence from Serbia in February 2008. This summer, Washington’s KFOR contingent began departing Kosovo after 27 years.
Meanwhile, the Americans are openly signalling Bosnia’s abandonment, raising potentially urgent questions about the unified country’s future. In April, EU Commission Ursula von der Leyen made clear the EU and she personally intend to “[complete] the European continent so it does not fall under Russian, Turkish or Chinese influence,” in explicit reference to the former Yugoslavia. History shows us such declarations by German imperialists frequently result in world-threatening catastrophe. Meanwhile, “some damned foolish thing in the Balkans” could evidently today yet again trigger war [end]
this article is the product of visits to Russia I made in June and September 2026 where I met with senior Russian leaders, leading academics, and specialists in military and security issues
ce 11 novembre 2025 est l’occasion de souligner comme la façon dont l’Europe sacrifie les conscrits ukrainiens mobilisés de force rappelle le spectaculaire carnage de la 1ère guerre mondiale
leaked files show top UK military figures conspired to carry out the Kerch bridge bombing, covertly train “Gladio”-style stay-behind forces in Ukraine, and groom the British public for a drop in living standards caused by the proxy war against Russia
the Germans have bowed down to the US sabotage by Joe Biden administration of Nord Stream pipelines, only to end up with Donald Trump’s America First doctrine in economy and defense
If the door that Moscow says is open is actually closed, it’s closed on this side – and it wasn’t Rome that closed it of its own accord
A Valdai summit off-site
What I’m going to share in this article is less technical and more personal than usual. It concerns the information gathered over several days of dialogue, discussion, and, apparently, a “scandalous” question that became a media sensation in Europe – because I asked the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, what will become of Europe.
You can find the full video of Vladimir Putin’s speech at the Valdai Forum here.
You can find my remarks and Putin’s responses here.
This year, the Valdai Forum did not meet in Sochi. Invitations sent out in the summer still listed the Black Sea city as the venue, but then, in late August, the organizers announced the move to the Moscow region. According to FT, the Federal Protective Service demanded the relocation, concerned about the threat of Ukrainian drones following a summer of attacks on coastal refineries. This logistical detail carries its own weight. The war – which at Valdai is always discussed in the language of the international system – is now also influencing the practical organization of the forum.
The 23rd Annual Meeting took place from September 28 to October 1 under a title that to a European sounds almost like a personal question: “Responsibility for the Future: The Limits of the Possible or Limitless Possibilities?” The opening featured the Club’s annual report, Keep Calm. The State and Responsibility for the Future, which the authors present – with a nod to Kubrick – as a manual for stopping worrying and learning to love chaos. This was followed by nine thematic sessions, a special session, and, on the final day, the plenary session with the President.
I arrived as an Italian and a European, knowing that in those halls, the two identities carry different weight. Over the course of the week, I spoke, in particular, with four high-level interlocutors: Sergey Karaganov, Maksim Oreshkin, Sergey Lavrov, and, during the plenary session, Vladimir Putin. The first three conversations took place on the sidelines of the sessions, and I’m recounting them from my notes – in essence, not word for word. The fourth exchange is public and documented by a transcript, from which I’m quoting directly.
Taken one by one, the four dialogues convey things that anyone following the Russian debate is already familiar with. When viewed in sequence, however, they paint a clearer picture: a shared assessment of Europe and four different ways of drawing conclusions from it. And, above all, a future that is by no means bright.
Karaganov: Europe as the source of evil
Sergei Karaganov is one of the founders of the Valdai Club, honorary chairman of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, and for years has been the most radical voice of Russian realism. With him, the conversation began immediately with the most contentious point. Europe, he said, is the root of all evil. If it were destroyed, no one would mourn it. A tactical nuclear conflict on its territory would not involve other actors. Europeans have had plenty of time to find a solution to their own problems; now that they have chosen to prepare for war against Russia, it is too late to offer them another chance.
I must be honest: I’ve never been a fan of Karaganov; I’ve often found his views too radical and old-fashioned. But starting with an after-lunch coffee together – and continuing over the course of a week of discussions – I discovered that we think very similarly and that his views are by no means trivial. Anyone who has read his recent statements will recognize this line of thinking. In June 2023, Karaganov had publicly argued that Russia should lower the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons to restore credibility to its deterrence and induce the West to withdraw from the conflict in Ukraine. Part of that approach was subsequently incorporated into official documents: the Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence, updated in November 2024, treat an attack by a non-nuclear state carried out with the participation or support of a nuclear power as a joint attack.
His words, however, contain three distinct assertions, and it is worth keeping them separate. The first is a historical and civilizational judgment: Europe as the source of modernity’s great catastrophes, from the world wars to colonialism. This is a thesis that Karaganov has long argued and which can be contested, but it belongs to the realm of interpretation. The second – that no one would mourn Europe – is a prediction about others’ reactions; from what I observed during those days, it resonates with a significant portion of the Asian, African, and Latin American participants. The third is a strategic hypothesis that underpins everything else: a nuclear escalation in Europe would remain confined to Europe.
On this point, the literature on deterrence has been debating for seventy years, and – fortunately – empirical evidence is lacking. The factor that complicates this hypothesis lies within Europe itself. France and the United Kingdom possess national arsenals, and in March 2025, Paris formally opened the debate on the European dimension of its own deterrence. A “solely European” nuclear conflict presupposes that two European nuclear powers would stand idly by. This is the weakest assumption in the entire argument, regardless of how one assesses the other two.
It should also be noted that Karaganov does not speak on behalf of the government. At the Valdai Forum, he represents the wing of the Russian debate that pushes the Kremlin toward more definitive positions, and one of his roles is precisely to push the boundaries of what can be said. Viewed in this light, his “too late” is an indication of a trend rather than a doctrine.
Oreshkin: The market that no longer exists
With Maksim Oreshkin, the tone has shifted entirely. Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration, former Minister of Economic Development, and later the President’s economic advisor, Oreshkin reasons in terms of cash flows and balance sheets. His assessment was blunt: Europe is finished. There is no longer any viable competition in the energy market, because China and India now occupy the top spots among Russia’s customers. And there is no reason to invest in a European bailout, since the Europeans, to date, have shown no interest in finding a peaceful and reasonable solution. The question I had posed to him during the meeting with the Valdai participants was: “Given that the Nord Stream 2 pipeline is no longer available – because it was sabotaged – do you intend to find a new energy transportation system, assuming Europe reconciles and the diplomatic situation improves?” His blunt – and perhaps brutal – response is like a dagger of truth plunged into the conscience of every European.
“Over” should be understood in a technical sense. Oreshkin was not speaking directly about European civilization but about Europe as a trading partner: a market that has ceased to be central to Russia and therefore does not warrant political concessions to win it back. After 2022, Russian crude oil found its main buyers in China and India, while Brussels, through the agreement between the Council and the European Parliament in December 2025, committed to phasing out imports of Russian gas – including pipeline gas and LNG – by 2027. The energy interdependence that had kept Europe and Russia connected for half a century – even during the worst moments of the Cold War – has been dismantled by both sides. Oreshkin’s reasoning captures the simplest consequence of this: whoever is no longer the main customer no longer has leverage. These are the laws of the market, and neither in London, nor in Berlin, nor in Brussels are there any politicians or power groups left who can tell Russia “what to do”.
The flip side is well known in Moscow, too. A market dominated by two major buyers allows them to demand discounts, and replacing Europe with Asia comes at a cost in terms of price and access to technology. But according to the logic presented to me, the question is no longer whether Europe is in Russia’s interest. It is how much it would cost to make it beneficial again, and the implicit answer is that Europeans must bear that cost.
Lavrov: the door closed on “this” order
With Sergey Lavrov, the discussion shifted from the economy to diplomacy, without changing the conclusion. Europe, he said, had many opportunities to reestablish a dialogue with Russia and chose instead to fuel direct confrontation. Now it is too late to turn back: all limits have been crossed, and with the current European order, there is no way to return to previous relations.
I’d like us to pause for a moment to consider the weight of these words. Those who know Lavrov know that he is a politician capable of weighing every word with great intelligence, even in more relaxed settings such as the Valdai Summit. “The limits have been crossed.” It would be pointless to list these limits, because they are so obvious to the whole world that it would simply be a waste of time. But the look in Lavrov’s eyes as he spoke about Europe – I will never forget that. I have met him many other times, but on this occasion, there was something different.
The minister has a track record of events that Russian diplomacy regularly references: the Minsk agreements, the draft treaties on security guarantees submitted to the United States and NATO on December 17, 2021, and the Istanbul negotiations in the spring of 2022. The Russian interpretation of each of these developments is controversial, and it is contested in Europe. What interests me here is another element – a qualification that, upon re-reading after the plenary session, proved to be the key to the entire week. A return is impossible under this European framework. Not with Europe, in its current form – that is, the EU and NATO. The rejection concerns a ruling class and an institutional architecture, not the countries that are part of it.
I wonder just how much Russian patience has been abused to reach the point of saying such things? Classic Russian literature offers us admirable examples of how Russian politicians are capable of stalling, ignoring, and being patient. And there’s no denying that this has consistently been the attitude of the Russian ruling class during the recent years of conflict. To go so far as to say that the limit has been crossed – something Putin would later echo in the summit’s plenary session – means there are no more resources to waste on patient waiting; it means the Bear has been awakened from its hibernation at the wrong moment; it means the consequences of these actions will be of epochal significance.
Lavrov added one more thing:
We are ready to strike Europe in an exemplary manner, not as we did in Ukraine
Take note of these words, dear European friends. Reread them and reflect on their weight. Nothing more needs to be said.
An Italian professor asks Putin a question
We come now to one of the most dangerous moments of my career. The plenary session took place, as is traditional, with the Russian president in attendance and Fyodor Lukyanov moderating. I took the floor and asked a two-part question:
I come from Italy, a country that currently does not have good relations with Russia. As a European, I would like to ask you: What conditions will Russia set for developing a new security system for European countries? And, if we imagine a post-European Union Europe, will you consider it part of a great Eurasian partnership, or, in your view, will the United States and Russia always be competing for these territories?
Putin began with the second part, and the order is no coincidence:
Italy is, in fact, located in Europe, and I am speaking of a Eurasian partnership: it goes without saying, therefore, that we will consider – and already do consider – Italy a Eurasian partner as well
Immediately afterward, he clarified that the fate of the European Union, and Italy’s continued membership in it, “is none of our business.” Moscow does not even intend to discuss it, because any comment on the matter would be interpreted as an attempt to break up the EU, “while we do not want to break up anything at all. We only want to build and cooperate.”
On the conditions for a new security system, the response was clear: “We have no preconditions.” The obstacle, in his view, lies on the other side. Some European politicians consider it unacceptable for a single country to open a dialogue with Russia, and Putin has called this demand a diktat even harsher than that of the Soviet era. The comparison was carefully crafted: the USSR was a unitary and highly centralized state, whose republics were part of a single state structure; the European Union, in theory, is not, but in practice behaves as if it were. “No one is forbidding us; we’re ready.”
At that point, Lukyanov interjected with a provocative remark typical of an experienced moderator: since Brussels forbids it, wouldn’t it be better to contribute a little to the disintegration of the EU, so as to make it easier to deal with individual countries? The answer came without hesitation: “But there’s no need – they’ll fall apart on their own.”
Then Putin addressed me directly. “Our Italian colleague knows this better than we do,” he said, and began running the numbers: Italian public debt at 140%, the deficit around 3%, and in other European countries close to 5%. The figures were rounded but not far from the truth. According to Istat and Eurostat, at the end of 2024, Italy’s public debt stood at 135.3% of GDP and its net borrowing at 3.4%. The point of the passage, however, wasn’t about the decimal points. All problems start with the economy: living standards fall, unemployment rises, and citizens of the major European economies feel it firsthand – and this, he said, “also undermines the very foundations of the European Union. But that’s not our business; we don’t interfere.”
He concluded by reiterating the offer in a balanced manner: dialogue with the Union as a whole, if the Union so desires, or with individual countries, without preconditions. “But there must be no preconditions on the European side either.”
Trying to grasp the magnitude of these words, the political balance they reveal, and the strength of a statesman who cares not only about the good of his own country but also that of an entire other continent is a true lesson in what politics is all about.
Listen to Putin’s entire speech, and you will understand how, in less than five minutes, it is possible to capture the decline of all of Europe, in all its facets, while at the same time wistfully reiterating that Russia has done everything in its power to offer its assistance. But the choices of Europeans are their own, whatever flag they may fly. Russia respects and will always respect the fundamental principles of its foreign policy and its political tradition. No miraculous messianism, no improvised savior.
Europe – or rather, the Europeans of this Europe – what do they intend to do?
Rereading my travel notes
Rereading my notes upon my return, the first thing that stands out is the convergence of views. The strategist, the economist, the foreign minister, and the President have each expressed, in their own words, the same assessment: today’s Europe has exhausted its credit with Moscow. The second thing that stands out is that each draws a different conclusion from that diagnosis.
For Karaganov, the conclusion is coercive and takes on an almost eschatological tone: Europe has had its chance, and what follows is no longer a matter for diplomacy. For Oreshkin, it is a matter of cold, hard accounting: Europe is not worth the investment needed to win it back. For Lavrov, it is a limited diplomatic withdrawal, focused on the political structure rather than the people. Finally, for Putin, the door remains open – but toward individual states, not toward Brussels – accompanied by the expectation that economic erosion will do the rest.
The apparent contradiction between the “too late” stance of the first three and the “no preconditions” stance of the fourth is resolved precisely in Lavrov’s characterization. The result is a coherent line, which I would call “bilateralization”: Moscow will not deal with the Union as a political entity as long as its current leadership remains in place; it offers individual member states channels without preconditions and lets Europe’s internal difficulties make those channels attractive. The reference to Italy as a Eurasian partner “already today” must be understood within this framework: it is not a courtesy; it is an indication of which interlocutor Moscow prefers.
I certainly cannot claim that the four exceptional interlocutors had reached an agreement – that goes without saying – but I found this convergence truly “prophetic.” Valdai has always been the venue where the breadth of Russian debate is showcased to a foreign audience. I can say that these perspectives are compatible and mutually reinforcing: Karaganov’s tough stance makes Putin’s offer appear moderate; Oreshkin’s figures lend credibility to the idea that Moscow does not need to make concessions; and Lavrov’s formula balances firmness with openness.
The 2010–2012 sovereign debt crisis gave rise to the European Stability Mechanism and the banking union; the pandemic led to Next Generation EU and the first large-scale common debt. Within the Union, crises have generated at least as much centralization as fragmentation. “They will fall apart on their own” is therefore a gamble, not an observation – even if the gamble costs little to those making it: if the EU holds together, Moscow has at least offered dialogue; if it collapses, it already has bilateral channels in place.
The indicators to watch over the next twelve to eighteen months are fairly clear. The first concerns bilateral visits to Moscow by EU heads of government, in addition to the previous visits by Viktor Orbán in July 2024 and Robert Fico in May 2025. The second is whether unanimity holds during the semi-annual renewals of sanctions, where a single veto is enough to open a crack. The third concerns national exemptions from the timeline for phasing out Russian gas. The fourth – and most significant for us – is the possible opening of a structured channel by a major capital, including Rome.
What do I take away from this? As an Italian, the phrase I’m taking with me isn’t the one about disintegration; it’s the other one: “We already consider Italy a Eurasian partner as well.” It contains both an offer and an observation directed at us. If the door that Moscow says is open is actually closed, it’s closed on this side – and it wasn’t Rome that closed it of its own accord.
How long can a country with a debt exceeding 135% of GDP afford to leave it up to others to decide who can speak with whom? No one in Moscow asked me that. It’s a question I brought home with me on my own. And every Italian of good conscience, every European who still has a heart, knows the answer [end]
this article is the product of visits to Russia I made in June and September 2026 where I met with senior Russian leaders, leading academics, and specialists in military and security issues
in French, ce 11 novembre 2025 est l’occasion de souligner comme la façon dont l’Europe sacrifie les conscrits ukrainiens mobilisés de force rappelle le spectaculaire carnage de la 1ère guerre mondiale
chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia
Ukraine has struck the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant using a Flamingo cruise missile. The ramifications of this event could reverberate globally
The launch of a Flamingo cruise missile by Ukraine
On the night of February 20-21, 2026, Ukraine launched an intermediate-range missile at the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, a strategic defense industrial facility located in the Republic of Udmurtia, some 1,300 kilometers from the Russian-Ukrainian border. The missile, equipped with a 1,000-kilogram warhead, struck a building housing Workshop 19, which houses a critical electroplating and stamping workshop. It is here that Russian technicians carry out the metal stamping and forming processes related to the manufacture of missile body elements, as well as the galvanic processing of parts, including the application of protective and functional coatings and surface preparation for further assembly. Workshop 19 plays a critical role in the manufacture of some of Russia’s most strategically vital ballistic missiles. The Flamingo’s warhead blasted a 30-by-24-meterhole in the roof of the structure, setting its interior on fire. At least 11 workers were wounded in the attack.
It is not known the extent to which the attack on Workshop 19 has impacted Russia’s ability to produce strategically important missiles such as the Topol-M and Yars intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), the Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missile. The Iskander and Oreshnik missiles are manufactured at the Votkinsk plant, as well as research and development on follow-on strategic delivery systems like the Kedr ICBM.
What is known is that the Ukrainian’s have struck at the very heart of Russia’s strategic defense industry, delivering a blow which is not just politically damaging in terms of the image it creates regarding the status of Russia’s war with Ukraine, which is entering its 5th year, but also potentially crippling Russia’s ability to keep pace with any increase in strategic nuclear delivery systems now that the last remaining arms control treaty between the US and Russia—New START—has expired
Russian President Putin meets with the Russian Security Council to discuss an draft agreement of strategic stability in Europe
Russia has long been alerted to this very possibility. Back in December 2021, Russia sent a clear signal to both the United States and NATO that it viewed the stationing of intermediate- or short-range missiles on the territory of Ukraine was a red line which, if crossed, presented an unacceptable threat to the security of Russia. In draft treaties addressed to both parties, Russia defined one of the bedrock conditions needed to be met for stability in Europe. Article 6 of the US treaty stated that “The Parties shall undertake not to deploy ground-launched intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles outside their national territories, as well as in the areas of their national territories, from which such weapons can attack targets in the national territory of the other Party.” Article 5 of the draft NATO treaty likewise stated that “The Parties shall not deploy land-based intermediate- and short-range missiles in areas allowing them to reach the territory of the other Parties.”
In the weeks prior to the Russian initiation of the Special Military Operation, the Russians went out of their way to communicate to the Biden administration the seriousness to which they attached this issue. Senior Biden administration officials acknowledge that Russian President Vladimir Putin had specifically accused the United States of seeking to place missiles inside Ukraine, something the Biden administration assured Russia it had no intention of doing. While the US declared that it was open to “discussing the future of certain missile systems in Europe, along the lines of the INF treaty, which Russia violated and the previous U.S. administration withdrew from,” little movement in that direction took place when US Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov met for more than seven hours in Geneva, Switzerland on January 10, 2022. The two sides talked cross purposes, with Russia looking for a concrete response to its December draft treaties, and the US indicating there could be no agreement without additional consultation with allies, including Ukraine
US Secretary of State Tony Blinken shakes hands with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, January 21, 2022
A follow-on meeting between US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov held on January 21 produced no results, other than a pledge by the United States to provide a written response to the Russian draft treaties “soon.” On January 26, the US and NATO did just that, rejecting outright Russia’s conditions for European stability and security, including a rejection of Russia’s concerns about the stationing of intermediate- and short-range missiles on Ukrainian soil. A follow-on meeting between Sergei Ryabkov and US Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller in Berlin on February 9 yielded no results.
Since the SMO began, Russia has made it clear that the provision of long-range strike capability to Ukraine by the US and NATO represented a serious threat to Russian national security. The use by Ukraine of British-made Storm Shadow missiles and their French analog, the SCALP, together with US-provided ATACMS missiles, were permitted by the providing nations only on the conditions that these weapons not be used to strike targets inside the boundaries of the Russian Federation as recognized in 1991. Russian threats about holding Germany accountable helped convince the German government not to provide the Taurus cruise missile to Ukraine (the Storm Shadow/SCALP missiles possess a range of 250 kilometers, while the ATACMS possesses a range of up to 300 kilometers; the Taurus, with a range of up to 500 kilometers, would have represented a major upgrade to Ukraine’s ability to strike targets inside Russia).
In September 2024 the US and UK governments were actively considering authorizing Ukraine to use Storm Shadow and ATACMS missiles to strike targets inside Russia proper. Russian President Vladimir Putin warned that if Western countries authorize Ukraine’s use of long-range missiles in Russian territory, they will become directly involved in the war. “It will mean nothing less than the direct involvement of NATO countries, the United States and European countries in the war in Ukraine,” Putin said. “This will be their direct participation, and this, of course, will significantly change the very essence, the very nature of the conflict.” Based on such threats, Putin warned, Russia would be forced to take “appropriate actions.” Putin’s threats came at a time when Russia had issued a new nuclear doctrine which allowed Russia to use nuclear weapons in retaliation for the very kind of attacks the US and UK were considering
Rear Admiral Thomas Buchanan addresses CSIS, November 2024
The danger of nuclear conflict was very high. In November, the head of plans for Strategic Command, Rear Admiral Thomas Buchanan, told a Washington, DC think-tank that the Biden administration was ready to fight and win a nuclear exchange with Russia, and in early December 2024 the CIA, responding to an announcement by the administration that it would greenlight the use by Ukraine of ATACMS missiles to strike targets inside Russia, briefed members of Congress that there was a greater than 50% chance there would be a nuclear war between Russia and the US before years end.
While President-elect Trump helped lower tensions by pledging that he would reverse the Biden administration’s decision once he came into office (something he did, in fact, do), his inability to follow through on his pledge to bring a rapid end to the Russian-Ukraine conflict led to increasing frustration and resentment toward Russia and its leadership, prompting President Trump to announce that he was considering providing Ukraine with the Tomahawk cruise missile—the very weapons system Russia had declared would never be permitted to be stationed on Ukrainian soil.
The threats to provide Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles were more of a negotiating ploy than real threat, however. The real threat came from elsewhere—a missile designed by the British using indigenous Ukrainian parts and manufacturing infrastructure known as the FP-5 Flamingo.
The Flamingo made its debut at the international defense industry exhibition IDEX-2025, which took place from February 17 to 21, 2025 in Abu Dhabi in the United Arab Emirates, when the Emirati-British Milanion Defense Industry Group unveiled a prototype missile. Built around the Ivchenko AI-25 turbo-fan jet engine, which had been developed in the 1950s by the Ivchenko Design Bureau in the Soviet Union, and produced at the Motor Sich aircraft factory in Zaparozhia, the Flamingo was a derivative of the Soviet-era Tu-141and Tu-143 reconnaissance drones, which had been repurposed by Ukraine into ground-attack cruise missiles. The warhead appeared to be based upon Ukrainian gravity bombs. The goal behind the Milanion design was to provide Ukraine with an affordable indigenous long-range strike capability which bypassed the Russian restrictions on foreign weapons
The Milanion-designed FP-5 Flamingo
This subterfuge, however, is shallow. Fire Point, the company which oversees the manufacture of the FP-5 Flamingo, is little more than a shell company overseen by a CEO, Iryna Terekh, who has zero education or experience which would lend itself to missile production. The task of coordinating Ukrainian defense manufacturing with foreign suppliers is well above her paygrade. The FP-5 Flamingo is exactly what it portends to be—a British-made weapon designed to get around the legalities, and consequences, of Russian red lines regarding the use of long-range missiles based in Ukraine against Russia targets.
Moreover, Russian military strikes have severely disrupted Ukraine’s ability to assemble the FP-5 on Ukrainian soil—the near complete destruction of the Motor Sich factory earlier this year stands as a harsh example. Fire Point has opened a Flamingo production facility in Denmark, near Skrydstrup Air Base and the town of Vojens in Southern Jutland, that will produce solid rocket propellant used to boost the FP-5 into flight during ground operations. The Danish defense minister, when asked whether establishing Ukrainian arms production in Denmark would make the country a target for Russian attacks, noted that Denmark was not at war and that an open Russian attack on Denmark would constitute an attack on a NATO country.
No mention was made about the role Denmark was playing in helping Ukraine produce a missile which has now been used to strike one of the most important strategic missile production facilities in Russia—the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant
Sergei Karaganov (right) with Russian President Vladimir Putin (left)
Sergei Karaganov, the head of Russia’s Council for Foreign and Defense Policy, has been warning about the use of Ukraine as a dagger to wound Russia on behalf of the collective West, writing in mid-June 2023 that Russia needed to lower the threshold for use of nuclear weapons to break Western support for Ukraine. If the West did not back down, Karaganov stated, then “we will have to hit [with nuclear weapons] a group of targets in a number of countries,” adding that if Russia failed to do this, “not only may Russia perish, but most likely the whole of human civilization will end.”
At the time, Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected the Karaganov Doctrine, stating that “we see no need to use it [a tactical nuclear strike]; and second, considering this, even as a possibility, factors into lowering the threshold for the use of such weapons.”
Such “factors” included the use by Russia of the Oreshnik intermediate range ballistic missile twice against targets inside Ukraine—both times to send a signal to Ukraine and its supporters in the West about the dangers inherent in any escalation of the conflict.
But much has transpired since President Putin downplayed the rhetoric of Karaganov—the nuclear war scare of September-December 2024, and the US threat to provide Ukraine with Tomahawks stand out as examples.
And now the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant has been attacked by a missile designed by the British to replicate the strategic impact of the Tomahawk missile.
Votkinsk is the heart and soul of Russia’s strategic defense industry.
And now it has been attacked by a British-designed weapon using intelligence provided by the CIA.
This attack is as close to an act of war by both the United States and the United Kingdom as one can imagine.
Suddenly Karaganov’s June 2023 nuclear posturing doesn’t seem so far-fetched.
Russia is at a crossroads.
In the short term, Russia needs to find a solution to the Flamingo threat to Votkinsk and other strategic defense industries located in the Ural regions that are now under threat of attack (a solid rocket motor production facility in Perm, for example.) Given the role played by Europe in designing, funding, and manufacturing the Flamingo, a response limited to striking targets inside Ukraine would achieve no fundamental change.
Missiles would still be built, and these missiles would continue to be launched at strategic targets deep inside Russia.
If Europe is not deterred once and for all from delivering this kind of military assistance to Ukraine, then Russia will be at risk of dying a death by a thousand cuts.
But then there is the larger issue of what to do with Ukraine itself. Russia is currently engaged in a drawn out “peace” negotiation with Ukraine, overseen by the United States, which has now been exposed—thanks to the attack on Votkinsk—as little more than a cover for Ukraine to develop the military capacity to strike Russia’s strategic interior in an effort to pressure Russia into ending the conflict on terms less than those previously set forth by President Putin.
If the Russian-Ukrainian conflict ends on such terms, then Russia will have conceded the very thing it said was a red line back in December 2021—the deployment of NATO-affiliated intermediate-range missiles on the soil of Ukraine.
It will represent a strategic defeat for Russia in every sense of the term
Kiril Dmitriev (left) with Steve Witkoff (right)
It is well past time for Russia to stop participating in such a self-defeating exercise. The United States is not a trustworthy negotiating partner in this regard—the attempted assassination of President Putin on December 29, 2025, by 91 Ukrainian drones guided to their target by CIA intelligence should underscore this reality. The continued use by President Trump of sanctions designed to cripple the Russian economy should be viewed not in the light of “business as usual”, but rather from the perspective of its current author, Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent, who envisions such sanctions as “bringing Russia to its knees”, a literal overt act of surrender. And the 7-point economic plan being promulgated by Kiril Dmitriev at the behest of Steve Witkoff is nothing more than a re-working of the economic domination plans of the US employed in the 1990’s and attempted to foist on Russia during the regime change-disguised-as-reset policies promoted under the Obama administration.
The Trump administration is not looking for a mutually beneficial peace with Russia, but rather to achieve a strategic victory over Russia, just like the Biden administration before.
If this wasn’t clear before the Flamingo attack on Votkinsk, there is no excuse for it not being painfully so now.
Simply put, the Votkinsk attack underscores the reality that Ukraine as it is currently configured cannot be allowed to exist once the conflict is ended. As former Russian President Dmitri Medvedev has pointed out, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is a “green bug” that needs to be “swatted.”
The same holds for the totality of the existing Ukrainian government. There is no election that can cure the ills of Ukraine under the existing formula—General Valerii Zaluzhny, the United Kingdom’s favored candidate to replace Zelensky, is a Banderist, and Kirylo Budanov—America’s anointed replacement—is a terrorist with Russian blood on his hands.
If Ukraine survives intact, so, too, does the FP-5 Flamingo missile program, meaning Russia will never again go to sleep at night without the fear of a Ukrainian attack.
The FP-5 Flamingo must be eradicated in totality.
And to do that, Ukraine in its current configuration must likewise be eradicated.
This is the very definition of an existential issue for Russia.
One that demands an adequate response to Europe as well.
Anything less will be interpreted as nothing less than a Russian surrender [end]
64-year-old Scott Ritter is a former intelligence officer within the US Marine Corps (USMC), then inspector of the United Nations in Iraq. When in 2003, the US and their British minions were about to invade the country under this false pretext, Ritter was claiming that there was no weapon of mass destruction (WMD) there. He was right.
In the Jacques Baud case, the EU is sanctioning, for the first time, an analyst not for spreading disinformation but for expressing a politically inconvenient truth, all while admitting he has broken no law. Will it have the courage to go after an American citizen?
Operation enters the second week of Ukraine’s long-awaited and highly touted counteroffensive, some basic conclusions can be drawn even though the fighting continues, and will continue to rage, for some time to come