Nicolas Cinquini

Analista senior di l'intelligenza in u campu di a gestione di i risichi di sicurezza, sò un anzianu tenente detective è ufficiale di l'intelligenza in l'agenzie di u Statu francese. A bona pronuncia hè Николай Чинкуини, in russu

Tag: europeanunion

  • [Chia sẻ] Cựu sĩ quan tình báo Pháp kể chuyện lính đánh thuê bị dụ dỗ tới Ukraina – Sputnik

    MOSKVA (Sputnik) – Quân nhân Pháp sang tham gia chiến đấu ở Ukraina được hứa sẽ làm giả giấy xuất ngũ và được trả tiền lương hậu hĩnh, một cựu nhân viên cơ quan tình báo chống khủng bố của Pháp, người hiện đang thu thập thông tin về việc người Pháp tham gia các trận chiến bên phía Ukraina cho biết

    Các nguồn tin cho chúng tôi biết rằng trong hàng ngũ quân đội Pháp các chuyên gia đã đưa ra những lời đề nghị hấp dẫn: giấy xuất ngũ giả, lời hứa đảm bảo sẽ phục hồi quân ngũ sau khi kết thúc tham chiến, đồng thời được hứa mức thu nhập cao hơn đáng kể so với thu nhập thông thường của họ

    người đối thoại cho biết.

    Theo thông tin của người này, các đặc vụ Pháp có thể đã có mặt ở Ukraina ngay từ những ngày đầu Nga mở chiến dịch quân sự đặc biệt cùng với những người Pháp bình thường tình nguyện sang chiến đấu bên phía Kiev.

    Đây là những đặc vụ vẫn còn rất bí mật và khó xác định

    cựu sĩ quan tình báo Pháp cho biết.

    Vào tháng 2 Tổng thống Pháp Emmanuel Macron nói rằng Paris sẽ làm mọi cách để ngăn chặn Nga “chiến thắng trong cuộc chiến này”. Tại một hội nghị ủng hộ chế độ Kiev, ông đã nêu ra vấn đề đưa quân Pháp đến vùng chiến sự, nhưng cả các nhà lãnh đạo châu Âu lẫn phe đối lập trong nước đều không ủng hộ ông. Đầu tháng 3, người đứng đầu nước này cũng nhấn mạnh rằng Pháp “không có giới hạn hay ranh giới đỏ” trong vấn đề hỗ trợ Ukraina [KẾT THÚC]

    Bài viết gốc

  • [Sharing] Secret list of a French intelligence officer: how NATO soldiers end up in Ukraine – Zvezda

    [
    🇬🇧 it was with great pleasure that I have been involved in an investigation by Zvezda, the channel of the Russian Ministry of Defense,
    🇷🇺 с большим удовольствием принял участие в расследовании канала Минобороны России “Звезда”,
    🇫🇷 c’est avec grand plaisir que j’ai participé à une enquête de Zvezda, la chaîne du ministère russe de la défense]

    How are “death travel agencies” organized for those who like to hunt people in foreign lands, and who want to send regular French and Polish units to Ukraine?

    French military in Ukraine. Why did Paris’s statements about its official dispatch alarm the whole of Europe, but did not surprise Moscow? Is it true that career officers of the French army appeared in the Donbass even before the start of the Northern Military District?

    A new investigation of the “Evidence from the Past” program about the presence in Ukraine of foreign “soldiers of fortune” and military personnel of the regular troops of NATO countries. How many mercenaries from which countries are currently fighting on the side of the Ukrainian Armed Forces? How is the recruitment of thugs around the world going through Ukrainian embassies?

    Through a risky and visual experiment, we will show the secret mechanics of recruiting mercenaries in Western Europe. How are “death travel agencies” organized for those who like to hunt people in foreign lands, and who want to send regular French and Polish units to Ukraine? Watch the new episode from the series “Evidence from the Past”

    Our world is holding many secrets, from ancient mysteries and inexplicable miracles to incredible turns in human history. One thing is certain: these events are leaving us with more questions than answers. It would seem that nothing can shed light on these mysterious incidents, but is this so? Armed with the latest discoveries in science, we will try to get to the bottom of the truth, and evidence from the past will help in the investigation. Nothing will remain unsolved, because after any crime there remains evidence. In our case, this is evidence from the past.

    English mercenaries, Poles, miraculously, the French survived. There are plenty of soldiers of fortune from European countries in Ukraine from the very beginning. Europe needs to prepare its regular units to be sent to Ukraine. We are certainly approaching a point in Europe where it will be appropriate not to be a coward. I think our countries are well aware that war has returned to our soil.

    When asked whether France itself would send its troops to Ukraine, the president gave an unequivocal answer. Representatives of Britain and Germany, Canada and the United States hastened to soften Macron’s belligerent statements. President Biden has made it incredibly clear that the United States is opposed to sending troops to Ukraine, and the NATO Secretary General has repeated that. Maybe he’s just trying to stop hiding the obvious fact of the presence of professional Western military personnel in Ukraine? German Chancellor Olaf Scholz added fuel to the fire when he casually blurted out that the British and French were helping to launch Storm Shadow missiles. The French, apparently, did not bypass Ukraine either.

    Spring 2022: Russian units were liberating Azovstal metallurgical plant in Mariupol. Militants of the Ukrainian National Battalions were holed up in concrete basements. Our intelligence service then more than once intercepted enemy communications which included French speech. When it became obvious that there were only a few days left before the capture of the metallurgical bastion, President Macron himself sounded the alarm. Like, let’s open a humanitarian corridor for the wounded. Representatives of the Elysee Palace began calling our Foreign Ministry directly to the Kremlin. And the real reason for the fuss of French politicians became clear only when the helicopters were shot down. And at the crash site near the village of Rybatskoye, these tokens and berets were found among the remains. The same ones can be seen on soldiers of the French Foreign Legion. So who was hiding at Azovstal? Career French soldiers dressed as mercenaries? And besides, who organized the death travel agency for foreign specialists? Let’s try to figure it all out.

    Mercenaries or professional soldiers? Who is now joining the ranks of the Ukrainian foreign legion? How were more than 20 thousand foreigners lured to Ukraine to fight for the Kiev regime? And why did they run back en masse? I hit a mine and may lose my leg. How much were and are paid to the soldiers of fortune in Ukraine? Why do some mercenaries from Western countries leave their wives and children and go to Kyiv? How do Ukrainian diplomats recruit thugs through embassies? We will find out during the investigative experiment. Thank you for filling out the form to the International Legion of Ukraine. Why are Poles less and less welcome in Ukraine? Revelation of soldiers of fortune from Warsaw: we ourselves ate rotten meat and cereals. Why do Odessa beaches attract French strategists? The French are now actively working in Moldova. And this must also be understood.

    January 2024: a high-precision strike in Kharkov destroyed the location of foreign mercenaries. According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, as a result, about 60 Frenchmen who fought on the side of Ukraine were killed. But in that case there was no point in denying it, because French volunteers quickly published a list of foreigners killed in Kharkov. Some studied these names in their homeland with alarm, others with interest. Former French intelligence officer Nicolas Cinquini is bit by bit collecting information about his fellow countrymen who disappeared in Kharkov, Ukraine, since official Paris is silent about the tragedies of its citizens who became mercenaries. Especially for Evidence from the Past, Cinquini shared secret information about the French in Ukraine. To date, there are 63 French fighters on the list, some of whom have already left Ukraine. Ten or so were killed and at least three of them were permanently disabled due to severe wounds. 20% of irretrievable losses among the French is an excellent indicator for Russian troops. Cinquini obtained these figures through painstaking private investigation. However, he admits that his list of losses among the French military is far from complete.

    The camera lenses repeatedly caught the patches of the French killed in Ukraine. These, for example, were found at the site of a helicopter crash that was trying to get some important people out of the Azovstal plant. What can these insignia tell about their owners? To find out, we will conduct an investigative examination. This is, accordingly, a Legionnaire’s field patch. The historian of the Museum of Military Uniforms identified them as signs of the French Foreign Legion. Foreigners are taken into this unit, promising them a residence permit in France. And they can even receive French citizenship five years after the end of the contract. According to the statute, the Legion is personally subordinate to the President of France. This is almost his personal army. Now there are about nine thousand soldiers. This patch is assigned to the third regiment of the foreign legion, which is stationed in French Guiana. If this is indeed a patch from a killed Frenchman, then it could be an officer who either coordinated the troops, or was, accordingly, well, in the capacity of such a military adviser. The sending of military personnel from the remaining colonies to Ukraine is not surprising. After all, almost 200 years ago, the French Foreign Legion was created by King Louis Philippe in order to use it not in Europe, but somewhere far away, in overseas territories. Until recently, the command of that unit was not very interested in the background of the recruits, so fugitives often joined it under false names.

    Ukrainian recruiters also adopted this experience from the French. Ukraine also has its own international legion. Back in March 22, Minister of Foreign Affairs Dmytro Kuleba said without hesitation that the Kiev regime was using mercenaries from 52 countries. Unless they tried to recruit penguins from Antarctica here. In total, at that time, about twenty thousand soldiers of fortune were among the participants in the international Ukrainian legion. By the spring of 2024, their ranks, however, are very cold. Here is a report from the Russian Ministry of Defense on foreign mercenaries killed in Ukraine. Almost one and a half thousand irretrievable Polish losses. Behind them are Georgian militants. In third place are US citizens. Not even one and a half hundred French mercenaries returned home. But how were they recruited? And for what money were they willing to give their lives? To understand this, let’s follow the path of one of the French mercenaries.

    Maxime Bronchain, former chef. In July 22, he left his child and wife at home, and he went to work to the same International Legion of Ukraine. True, Maxim did not have time to get rich. Max, we are right with you, you will be evacuated. Soon after the start of his service, the soldier’s luck was very bad. He hit a mine. In this footage, he is being evacuated with a serious leg injury. I heard the call of President Zelensky and since I once served in the army and was a firefighter, I decided that I could be useful. But did the desire to help Zelensky really bring Bronchain to Ukraine? Weren’t there other motives? Thirst for fame, extreme sports, money? Or maybe hatred of Russia and Russians? To understand the Frenchman’s true reasons, during the investigation we carefully studied his biography. Who or what kept Bronchain in Ukraine, even after being seriously wounded? We’ll tell you a little later.

    Why do some mercenaries from Western countries leave their wives and children and go to Kyiv? He longs for fame so that society will recognize him as a hero. How do Ukrainian diplomats recruit thugs through embassies? We will find out during the investigative experiment. Thank you for filling out the form to the International Region of Ukraine. How were more than 20 thousand foreigners lured to Ukraine to fight for the Kiev regime? And why did they run back en masse? I hit a mine and may lose my leg. How much were and are paid to the soldiers of fortune in Ukraine? Why do Odessa beaches attract French strategists? The French are now actively working in Moldova. And this must also be understood. Why are Poles less and less welcome in Ukraine? We ourselves ate rotten meat and cereals. Who is now joining the ranks of the Ukrainian foreign legion? We spoke with a career military man who served in the US Navy with a classified clearance.

    Bronchain’s boss and fellow countryman Gaston Besson will definitely not return home. Once upon a time, this is how he lured everyone into the International Legion of Ukraine, the creator of which Besson is considered. A variety of people from Finland, Norway, England, France, Italy are coming to our International Legion. As much as we may look like crazy fanatics, we are actually here to gain combat experience. And Ukraine was not Besson’s first military experience. A former paratrooper and special forces soldier. Back in the 90s, he realized that on the battlefield you can not only risk your life, but also make good money. I went through three revolutions and two wars. Besson settled in Ukraine back in 2014, immediately after the coup in Kyiv. In 2014, he became one of the founders of Azov battalion. The second was Karel Cherel Salzburg, also French. In December 2022, a friend of Besson said that the recruiter had died. But how and when in France did it become more profitable to be a soldier of fortune than a career French officer? Who and why becomes a mercenary in Europe? He longs for fame so that society will recognize him as a hero. To understand the motivations of modern Western mercenaries, let’s look at important clues from the past: 60s of the 20th century.

    The old colonial system is coming apart at the seams. Because of this, in the newly liberated young states, mini-Maidans and military coups occur every now and then, during which the places of the killed leaders of national liberation movements are taken by puppet dictators. Look, it’s like Che Guevara in reverse. Yes, if Che Guevara, appearing in the Congo or Bolivia, was a revolutionary who risked his life, the tyrants who eliminated Che Guevara, Patrice Lumumba or Salvador Allende, valued their lives and tried to get along with military advisers from Europe, who in fact, were mercenaries. They no longer had formal relations with the official armies of the colonial countries.

    Take a look at the face of this good-natured man with blue eyes. At first glance, it may seem that he is an ordinary European pensioner. But in the circles of the military and intelligence services, this person will not be confused with anyone. This is the most famous French mercenary of the second half of the last century: Bob Denard. Congo, Nigeria, Angola, Gabon, Benin. That list can be continued for a long time. In Comoro Islands, by his own admission, Denard staged either two or three coups. And it was here that he began to build his republic of mercenaries. Yes, at first it was a small base, and already in 1989 the presidential guard of that state was subordinate to him. How did Denard manage to stage military coups for decades and still remain unscathed? While doing his dirty work, the legendary French soldier of fortune never hid his face, as if emphasizing that he was not afraid of either criminal prosecution at home or assassination attempts in overseas countries. Bob Denard, like all other mercenaries who do not hide their faces, unmasks, so to speak. Ambition, then, allows these people to make themselves simply famous. Because of Denard’s ostentatious fearlessness, many believed that very influential patrons were behind him. It seemed that he was specially made a hero, a kind of exemplary super-soldier and an example for young Frenchmen. But the 60s and 70s in the West became the era of hippies and pacifism. Many politicians liked their politics to be conducted with clean hands, so that someone did the dirty work for them, organized genocide of the population in some country, took away power, took away resources, and handed it all over on a silver platter. Instead of their own armies, leaders undesirable to the West were overthrown by private military companies, of which Denard became a pioneer. Such formations helped former empires maintain influence in their former colonies, while seemingly maintaining neutrality. But even the services provided by Bob Denard to Paris officials did not save him from criminal prosecution. He was captivated by various crimes, including attempts on political figures, in particular, the murder of one of the leaders of African states. Once in the dock, the fearless Denard eventually stopped pretending to be a gallant soldier of fortune and spoke up. It turned out that no matter where he fought, his actions were always coordinated with the official French authorities. I worked with the secret services, they were aware of everything that I did, because such things are not done without the consent of your country. So they have their own archives, but often I supplied them with certain information. Sometimes I was not hired by the French authorities, but paid by the states for which I worked. Since Denard’s time, cooperation between Western PMCs and official security forces has only become even closer.

    Satellite communications, weapons, some kind of satellite portals which are providing target designations for drones and other types of technical support, equipment. All that, of course, is provided to the Main Directorate of Defense of Ukraine. Experts are claiming that even before the North Military District, Western PMCs and NGOs, under the leadership of NATO intelligence services, began recruiting mercenaries for Ukraine around the world. Those who most actively agreed to the adventure were nationalists, neo-Nazis and professional soldiers of fortune who killed in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria.

    Many people become hooked on Ukrainian Nazi propaganda from sources such as the Right Sector or the Misanthropic Division. Isn’t it for that reason that the Frenchman Maxime Bronchain, who was blown up by a mine, went to Ukraine? During the interview in the hospital, the patches on his uniform were caught in the frame. One of them depicts the so-called valknut, the sign of the Scandinavian pagans, popular among the nationalists of Western Europe, is no less than the so-called wolf hook of werewolves. Maxime Bronchain fought with typical patches. Also a diamond with the battalion number and, accordingly, he had a Right Sector badge on his backpack. It is possible that it was precisely because of Bronchain’s radical views that French officials were in no hurry to return him to his homeland, even when he began to openly ask for it ? I hit a mine and may lose my leg. It all depends on how long my repatriation will take. Bronchain’s leg really wasn’t saved. We’ll tell you. Very soon.

    Apparently, professional military personnel from Western countries also received serious injuries in Ukraine. Former French intelligence officer Nicolas Cinquini has an explanation why Emmanuel Macron was so nervous and asked Moscow to open a humanitarian corridor for militant groups settled in Azovstal. In the days following the failure of Emmanuel Macron’s plan to remove French operatives from Mariupol, Ukrainian military intelligence attempted evacuation by helicopter. As far as I know, at least seven sorties were made and at least five helicopters were shot down. These repeated failures led to the dismissal of the French general who at the time, was heading France’s military intelligence agency. It is known from reliable sources that active military personnel, specialists in their field, are offered fictitious resignations by their superiors with a guarantee of subsequent reinstatement in service. During their retirement, military personnel are receiving a salary that is difficult to refuse. And these seemingly retired military personnel, while in Ukraine, are continuing to carry out orders from NATO headquarters. Roughly speaking, these are people not from a private company, these are former military people who were recruited by official structures. But this process is simply veiled. The scheme has become so transparent that real mercenaries themselves are already openly talking about professional Western security forces in Ukraine. I know that there were often CIA operatives or special forces here. They were trying to convey to certain members of the Ukrainian command structure a very good idea of what to do. This confession was made by a high-ranking Polish military officer during a risky investigative experiment carried out by Russian pranksters known under the pseudonyms Vovan and Lexus.

    This is the largest PMC in Europe at the moment. It is known about this academy that the entire Azov battalion was trained there. Since 2014, all Azov members learned both coordination and combat operations from these very clearings. The Polish mercenary commander opened up, thinking that he was communicating with former Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, who judging by leaks from Kyiv, indeed, from the beginning of 2024, personally began inviting foreign officers to join the new PMC. I was surprised by the ending, how they joyfully swore allegiance to Petro Poroshenko and were even ready to go and stage a coup in Ukraine, overthrow Zelensky, so that the wonderful Poroshenko would become the new president, because he promised them mountains of everything. Cooperation with official recruiters from Kyiv in 2024 no longer attracts soldiers of fortune. According to the Polish mercenary with whom Lexus and Vovan spoke, foreigners in Ukraine were too often deceived. The amounts that are needed are not paid, and there is no security which is prescribed there. Of course, all mercenaries are complaining a lot about Ukrainians. Weapons are often hidden and lost. I’ve met officers selling new weapons. Foreigners who have visited Ukraine believe that even from the deaths of mercenaries, Ukrainian partners manage to make money. And they are rather treated as consumables, which is why they hate their Ukrainian commanders. The commanders of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are directly interested in the quick death of foreigners, since the contract concluded with the mercenaries stipulates that in the event of his death, compensation to the family is not guaranteed.

    Although overall the agreement looks quite solid, the whole process is taking place officially. In Ukraine, the recruitment method is extremely simple. The Americans and Australians with whom we communicated, as a rule, they all did this through embassies. The Ukrainian embassies, which had already directly contacted the Ministry of Defense, assigned them a person who met them directly at the border. Is this system of recruitment through embassies well established? Let’s check it out during another investigative experiment. French military pensioner Nicolas Cinquini will help implement it. On the website of the Ukrainian embassy, he filled out a form to join the International Legion. We will tell you very soon how quickly and what exactly the Ukrainians will respond.

    Until recently, Ukrainian Internet resources lured volunteers in many countries with videos like this. The mercenaries were promised not only allowances, but also comfortable barracks, and in the evenings a song by the fire in warm company. This brave warrior from the Bolivar battalion is confident that he will return home a winner. True, he fights not with a machine gun in his hands, but with a smartphone. In fact in Ukraine, mercenaries from other countries sometimes have to fight with Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers. I instructed people, and we were treated like animals. Here you see how the Ukrainian authorities are treating those who help them. How Colombians are treated. They came in wearing balaclavas and beat our guys. Actually, there are not enough so-called volunteers in Ukraine.

    This is Krzysztof, the only Pole who was at Azovstal when our troops surrounded the territory of the plant. His shocking revelations scared off many potential mercenaries. We ourselves ate rotten meat and cereals. This entire foreign legion, of course, was destroyed in the first year, most of it. And then many left, disappointed. The shortage of personnel in the Armed Forces of Ukraine is acute.

    During the experiment, pranksters Vovan and Lexus found out that, for example, the American military, although unofficially, has been in Ukraine for a long time. We spoke with a career military man who served in the US Navy with a classified clearance. But American military personnel disguised as mercenaries are an expensive commodity. And Kyiv cannot afford it in large quantities. Prices on the mercenary market have been steadily falling since February 2022. If at the beginning of the Special Operation, the Ukrainian authorities were ready to pay up to 5,000 euros per month to every foreigner who wanted to fight, then two years later the average salary is fluctuating no more than three thousand euros. The cheapest personnel, of course, are from Latin American countries. Here you can find soldiers of fortune for two thousand dollars. At the same time, not everyone receives this money either. And if a mercenary dies, it is almost impossible to obtain compensation from Ukrainian or international recruiters.

    So why do people agree to go to certain death for next to nothing? Why do some mercenaries from Western countries leave their wives and children and go to Kyiv? How do Ukrainian diplomats recruit thugs through embassies? We will find out during the investigative experiment. Thank you for filling out the form to the International Legion of Ukraine. Why do Odessa beaches attract French strategists? And what is the chance that the history of the French on the Black Sea will repeat itself a hundred years later?

    During the investigation, we received this copy of an email from a Mexican citizen. He wrote to the Russian authorities about the recruitment in Latin America for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. We cannot disclose the author’s personal information for security reasons. Both units do not guarantee the return of the bodies of killed mercenaries to their homeland or payments to their families. This same Mexican found that many of his fellow countrymen who went to Ukraine were connected with drug cartels in their homeland and were recruited, most likely, simply to escape prison. If we talk about the Mexican drug cartels, then these organizations are tightly tied to the Central Intelligence Agency. From that, we can draw a very simple conclusion that some militants from these drug cartels, on the instructions of the CIA or other American intelligence services, may well be transferred to various locations of military conflicts. While remaining free, Mexican drug traffickers can simultaneously develop new markets for selling datura. Perhaps this motive forces them to go to Ukraine even more than the mercy of a mercenary or a CIA agent.

    But what made the now legless French soldier of fortune Maxime Brochain return to Ukraine? The fact is that he was not a member of the French Foreign Legion, and for mercenarism in the Fifth Republic, one can give a real sentence of up to five years, plus a fine of 75 thousand euros. Maxime Brochain, this Frenchman, certainly did not find support for social payments after he was maimed in Ukraine, for the simple reason that, by and large, all these countries will disown their dead or wounded soldiers. In Ukraine, he married again. And he clearly doesn’t want to help his first wife, who is left in France, alone with the child. The Kyiv regime has little hope left for rabble like Bronchain or for the fed-up units in the armed forces.

    But even if emboldened President Macron dares to send regular French troops to Ukraine, will that be able to seriously affect the course of the Northern Military District? That is, from two to four and a half, five thousand people at best. Such a contingent, of course, will not be able to significantly influence the course of the Northern Military District. And even Macron is not convinced to send more soldiers to Ukraine. French society remembers too well how the French military presence on the historical lands of Russia ended. Novorossia, that is the Black Sea, south of our country, including Crimea and Odessa, was considered theirs in Paris. Then a French contingent of 15 thousand people landed in Odessa. But in fact, the French got along poorly with Denikin’s White Guards. Numerous disagreements ultimately contributed to the victory of the Bolsheviks, who also freed Ukraine from dictator Semyon Petliura. The French fled from Odessa in the spring of 1919. Perhaps history really doesn’t teach us anything. And why is Odessa so important to them? Odessa has really been exciting the minds of French politicians for a long time. It’s not about the beaches of the Black Sea, but about the trade routes which are going through the city. Look, with the Black Sea cities, the French want to control grain. They want to somehow participate in the grain deal, because they have a certain friction in the middle of the Earth with Turkey. And this must also be taken into account. What Odessa has in quality, Macron did not name the possible landing site for the French by chance. Paris’s activity in neighboring Moldova also proves it. The French are now actively working in Moldova. And this must also be understood. They landed troops there in quotation marks in order to somehow influence Maia Sandu. And that region, Moldova, is not adjacent to Odessa, but very close to the Black Sea. Therefore, the French will try to be there.

    To understand this, let’s see how our investigative experiment ended with an attempt to recruit a French citizen through the Ukrainian embassy in Paris. It would seem that a retired career military man is a godsend for Kyiv. But Monsieur Nicolas had to wait more than two weeks for an answer. And judging by the message in Ukraine, the French are not so welcome. Thank you for filling out the form to the International Region of Ukraine. We will compile all the data and transmit it to the recruiting officer. Essentially, this is an unsubscribe. A polite Ukrainian official named Kormin informs that he has handed over the documents of a potential volunteer to the right person, and asks to continue to wait for an answer. But he was not there a week or two later. Thus, it turns out that the interest of the Ukrainian authorities in French mercenaries is not so great now. It is difficult to imagine that all that recruitment could have taken place without the participation of the secret services of NATO countries, but the secret services are secret for that reason, their involvement is difficult to prove. Did NATO really understand that relying on mercenaries didn’t work? Or did the military in Ukraine begin to tinker with wayward foreigners who do not want to die silently in ridiculous and murderous attacks? However, even without taking into account Kyiv’s policies, Paris officials have their own motives for openly sending at least some of their soldiers to Ukraine. The desire of French politicians to wave their fists seems to have several reasons. First. Prove your leadership in the European Union. In the absence of a powerful German economy and advanced German technology, Paris is showing its willingness to take political risks. And finally, the third thing is the thirst for historical revenge. After all, the French had to flee Russia not only in 1919, but also in 1812. And here’s the funny thing. Macron’s harsh statements strangely come exactly 210 years after the fall of the French capital. You had the program “Evidence from the Past”. See you in a week [end]

    The documentary

    Related

    L’engagement français dans les rangs ukrainiens

    in French, my alphabetical chronicle of the French involvement in the Atlanticist ranks in Ukraine: several characters of the report, Mickaël Sciacca, Maxime Bronchain, Gaston Besson…, by order of appearance, as well as many others, are precisely identified

    The Western operatives in Mariupol

    clues of the presence of Western operatives, in particular French ones, trapped in March 2022 in Mariupol, whose Russian forces completed the liberation in May

  • Images du jour : message de l’ataman Nikolaï Diakonov à Emmanuel Macron et ses mignons

    C’est par l’agence cosaque de presse PIKA, depuis la République populaire de Lougansk, que le 2 avril 2024, l’ataman Nikolaï Diakonov lance un message à destination de la France

    Nous sommes les cosaques du Don, voulons lancer un appel à Monsieur Macron et tous les Français.

    Nous sommes ici avec la grande armée du Don à Stanitsa Louganskaïa, République populaire de Lougansk, Fédération de Russie.

    Écoutez attentivement.

    Il y a derrière moi un kouren [maison] construit en 1804. Son propriétaire, le cosaque Nikolaïev, a participé à la Première coalition, puis il a pourchassé les régiments du prince de Beauharnais sur les champs de bataille de Borodino et de toute la Mère Russie, où vos ancêtres ont rampé. Il a éclairé la grande armée du Don jusqu’à la Bérézina et plus tard avec ses camarades, bu le café dans les bistrots parisiens et baigné les chevaux dans la Seine. En 1945, les descendants du cosaque Nikolaïev achevèrent à Berlin la division SS Charlemagne.

    Les descendants du cosaque Nikolaïev ont vécu ici jusqu’en 2014, lorsqu’un obus ukrainien a frappé ce kouren. Messieurs les Français, Monsieur Macron, cet obus a volé ici parce qu’après avoir donné des garanties à Ianoukovitch [président de l’Ukraine, renversé par un coup d’État d’extrême-droite en 2014], vous n’avez pas tenu parole et l’avez trahi. Par votre politique, vous avez permis l’arrivée des nazis au pouvoir à Kiev. Messieurs les Français, votre gouvernement soutient toujours les nazis aujourd’hui. N’est ce pas, Monsieur Macron ?

    Une autre maison se trouve à côté de ces ruines. Elle fut construite pour un Français capturé, qui ne voulait pas rentrer en France et a vécu dans le village avec les cosaques. Il leur cousait des vêtements, raccommodait leurs chaussures. De quelque manière que ce soit, personne ne devrait l’agresser ou se moquer de lui. Cette maison est toujours debout, pour votre édification, Messieurs les Français.

    Nous conserverons la maison du cordonnier français comme un monument. Nous reconstruirons aussi les kouren de Stanitsa Louganskaïa et des fermes voisines. Les cosaques continueront d’y vivre et donneront naissance à des enfants auxquels nous raconterons notre histoire commune. Nous les élèverons pour qu’ils deviennent de vrais guerriers. Nous éduquerons toujours des combattants, soyez en sûrs.

    Mais si vous ne reprenez pas vos esprits, peut être que d’autres kouren apparaîtrons dans toute la Russie pour les prisonniers français. Pensez y. Pensez y bien.

    Monsieur Macron, retirez vos Légionnaires, mercenaires, commandos de notre sainte terre russe. Sinon, nous vous rappellerons ce qu’est la Bérézina.

    J’ai failli oublier : apprendre le Russe vous sera utile. Peut être découvrirez vous la célèbre chansons des cosaques du Don de la guerre de 1812-1814 :

    Nous louons le héros Platov [général Matveï Platov (1753-1818), commandant des troupes cosaques], qui a vaincu nos ennemis.
    Nous n’avons pas peur des Français… etc

    Au revoir [en Français], chers amis.

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  • [Partage] Troupes françaises en Ukraine, une gaffe présidentielle sous escorte médiatique : les nouveaux chiens de guerre – Serge Halimi & Pierre Rimbert, Le Monde diplomatique

    Des combats entre la France et la Russie ? Autrefois inimaginable, l’hypothèse s’est installée après les déclarations de M. Emmanuel Macron évoquant une « guerre existentielle » et l’envoi de « troupes au sol » en Ukraine. Depuis, le ton ne cesse de monter à Paris comme à Moscou. Une escalade qui semble ravir les médias français, au diapason du président de la République

    Les alchimistes ont enfin trouvé des successeurs à leur quête infructueuse. À la fin de l’hiver, les journalistes français se sont évertués à transformer une gaffe présidentielle en un joyau de l’analyse géopolitique. Il n’y a « pas de consensus aujourd’hui pour envoyer de manière officielle, assumée et endossée, des troupes au sol », lance M. Emmanuel Macron, le lundi 26 février 2024, à l’issue d’une réunion internationale de soutien à l’Ukraine qui vient de se conclure à Paris. « Mais, en dynamique, rien ne doit être exclu. Nous ferons tout ce qu’il faut pour que la Russie ne puisse pas gagner cette guerre », prévient-il.

    Dans les heures qui suivent, la déclaration du président de la République provoque une pluie de démentis. Répliquant à un partenaire français toujours trop bavard, le chancelier allemand Olaf Scholz s’en tient à quelques mots : « Une chose est claire : il n’y aura pas de troupes au sol d’États européens ou de l’OTAN [Organisation du traité de ­l’Atlantique nord]  » (X, 27 février). Deux des principaux soutiens de Kiev se mettent au diapason : « Nous n’envisageons pas d’envoyer nos troupes en Ukraine et nous avons sur ce point une position commune » avec Prague, explique le premier ministre polonais Donald Tusk lors d’une conférence de presse avec son homologue tchèque. « Il n’y a aucun projet de troupes de combat de l’OTAN sur le terrain en Ukraine », renchérit auprès de l’Agence France-Presse (AFP) un responsable de cette organisation militaire pilotée par Washington.

    Aux États-Unis, justement, les porte-­parole de la Maison Blanche, du département d’État et du Pentagone se relaient pour tenir la lance à incendie : « Il n’y aura pas de troupes américaines engagées au sol en Ukraine », martèlera M. John Kirby, porte-parole du président américain. Le premier ministre britannique Rishi Sunak fait chorus : « Nous ne prévoyons pas de déploiement à grande échelle. » L’Espagne, l’Italie, la Hongrie, la Suède opposent la même fin de non-recevoir […]

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  • Terrorist attack in Krasnogorsk

    chronicle of a Ukrainian secret operation

    On March 7, 2024, the US embassy to Russia issued a security alert

    The Embassy is monitoring reports that extremists have imminent plans to target large gatherings in Moscow, to include concerts, and U.S. citizens should be advised to avoid large gatherings over the next 48 hours

    Krasnogorsk is a city in Moscow northwestern suburb. In the evening of March 22, 2024, a concert is sold out in Crocus City Hall, which can seat 6,200 spectators

    About 10 minutes before the show, at least 4 gunmen enter the building, start shooting at unarmed people

    The evacuation has begun, when the terrorists burst in the auditorium, where the slaughter is going on

    None of them yell any jihadist cry. Their action is methodical. A blaze has broken out in the upper floors, when the Russian security forces storm the building, about one hour after the beginning of the attack

    On social networks, Ukrainian Nazis channels and also less extremist Ukrainian nationalists are already celebrating the attack

    As usual in the case of a tragic event in Russia, Ukrainian calls are overloading the Russian emergency lines with fake alerts. Russian media release the description of the car that the terrorists have used to flee

    Later, Amaq publishes a first statement

    A security source told Amaq agency : Islamic State fighters have attacked a large gathering of Christians in the city of Krasnogorsk, on the outskirts of the Russian capital, Moscow, killing and wounding hundreds, and causing great destruction to the place, before their safe withdrawal to their bases

    Amaq is the news agency of the Caliphate, not its official channel. The statement could be opportunistic, but the afterwards will show it is not.

    • March 23, 2024

    The blaze is extinguished but the auditorium ceiling has collapsed. Some victims have died of asphyxiation, while they were hiding in the premises. In the morning the provisional death toll is 93

    While they are on duty in Bryansk region, in order to usually prevent the infiltration of Atlanticist groups under command of the Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR), operatives of the Russian security agency (FSB) and Chechen Akhmat regiment manage to intercept and take alive four terrorists, who are attempting to seek safety in Ukraine

    All are Tajik. One of them tells his recruitment, while he was attending a series of lectures on Telegram. He was enticed with an offer of half a million Russian rubles, roughly equivalent to 5,000 euros, in order to slaughter people in Crocus City Hall, has received half of the reward before the attack. Amaq releases later its second statement, a usual practice, in order to prove with pictures that the assailants have been in touch with the Caliphate

    The statement clarifies that the terrorists have set the building ablaze with petrol bombs.

    For Andrew Napolitano’s Judging Freedom, former CIA analyst Larry Johnson is explaining the best theory so far. The terrorist attack in Moscow is a Ukrainian plot. Increasingly frustrated by unauthorized, Ukrainian blatant actions, the US knows it, were terrified for weeks.

    Since Afghanistan in the 80s, the West is using the Jihadists for its geopolitical interests. The terrorist operation in Paris on November 13, 2015, was the result, the collateral damage, of the Western support to the so-called Syrian revolution, a radical Sunni uprising against the secular government in Syria. Even the Caliphate. Then Secretary of State, John Kerry explained in a conversation recorded on September 22, 2016, how until the Russian intervention one year before, against the Jihadists and other rebels, the US did not prevent the expansion of the Caliphate, regarded as a leverage to constrain Bashar Assad to negotiate his ouster

    Known Jihadists, usually called Freedom Fighters in the West, are currently in the Atlanticist ranks, under command of the Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR)

    Here is Rustam Azhiev, alias Abdul Hakim al Shishani [Chechen], an alive icon. In Syria in 2013, he was leading Jamaat al Khilafa al Qawqazia [Caucasian Caliphate group], a part of the Chechen jihadist formations which were fighting under command of al Nusra, a local subsidiary of al Qaeda

    Besides, the Ukrainian Nazis are no less danger to the personal safety of the inhabitants of the West, especially Europe.

    Vladimir Putin addresses the peoples of the Russian Federation

    No one will be able to sow the poisonous seeds of discord in our multinational society

    In the evening, Amaq releases a video of the slaughter in the premises. One terrorist has slit the throat of an injured man.

    • March 24, 2024

    Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, Dmitry Medvedev writes

    The Kingdom of Heaven to all those innocently killed!
    We will avenge everyone. And everyone involved, regardless of country of origin and status, is now our legal and main target.
    Wait, bastards

    from Arkhangelsk spetsnaz for Crocus City Hall

    is written on that ODAB-1500, a 1,500 kg thermobaric bomb

    The four terrorists are taken to the Investigative Committee and later, appear before the court, over their pretrial detention

    • March 25, 2024

    With hypersonic missiles, according to Ukraine, Russia strikes Kiev, wipes out some US Patriot air defense systems and levels buildings where are working officials of the Ukrainian security agency (SBU)

    The particularity of hypersonic missiles is that air warning sirens sound after the strike. In Bryansk border region, the governor awards the officers who have arrested alive the four Tajik terrorists, prevented them from seeking refuge in Ukraine

    • March 26, 2024

    ISIS or Ukraine ?

    Of course Ukraine

    the Secretary of the Russian Security Council, Nikolai Patrushev, replies to journalists, about the terrorist attack on March 22, in Krasnogorsk, that Ukraine has subcontracted with remnants of the Caliphate

    Director of the security agency (FSB), Alexander Bortnikov, adds that Kyrylo Budanov, head of the Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR), is a legitimate target

    The file is enriched in the evening. A new clue corroborates my general knowledge of the subject: Western leaders are nowadays a breed of cowardly scoundrels, rarely equaled in history. The French are the worst and unfit enough to commit blunders like this one. Journalist Laurent Brayard reports that on the afternoon of March 22, about five hours before the beginning of the attack in Krasnogorsk, a French administrative authority canceled for security reasons the next day face-to-face classes at the French high school Alexandre Dumas in Moscow.

    • March 28, 2024

    The Russian Investigative Committee reports so far financial links between the terrorists and Ukraine

    Investigators have reported on the ongoing active work to reconstruct the full picture of the crime committed, both at the stages of preparation and planning, and the commission of a terrorist attack on unarmed citizens. The initial results of the investigation are fully confirming the planned nature of the terrorists action, careful preparation and financial support from the organizers of the crime. As a result of work with detained terrorists, study of the technical devices seized from them, and analyze of information about financial transactions, evidence was obtained of their connection with Ukrainian nationalists. The investigation has at its disposal confirmed data that the perpetrators of the terrorist attack received significant amounts of money and cryptocurrency from Ukraine, which were used in preparing the crime. Another suspect involved in a terrorist financing scheme has been identified and detained. The investigation will petition the court to select a preventive measure in the form of detention in relation to him

    • April 2, 2024

    On April 2, 2024, The Times reports that Ukraine stokes anti-immigrant tensions in Russia. Head of the Information Center of the Security Council of Ukraine, Andriy Kovalenko has explained that Ukrainian agents are conducting PSYOP on social networks, after the Crocus City Hall terrorist attack, in order to stir up ethnic tensions and destabilize Russian society.

    • April 6, 2024

    Dmitry Medvedev states

    1. Perpetrators. With them, everything is clear: these underdeveloped bastards are caught, investigative actions are being carried out with them. Moreover, it is obvious that despite numerous references to their affiliation with IS/ISIS/ ISIS-K* (terrorist organizations banned in Russia), these scum are by no means religious fanatics ready to die for their faith. They did not demonstrate any external or internal attributes of being such. They are primitive hired killers, hired for relatively small amounts of money and trained to shoot. Just animals, human scum.

    2. Organizers. Dealing with them is somewhat more complex, which is why a narrative about IS’ responsibility was crafted and then eagerly affirmed by IS itself. But they always act this way, simply to increase their own significance. And the role of money is still valid—they likely got their share. However, the true organizers are still hiding in the shadows of IS. That was the plan. Yet, just the initial information, obtained from the phones of hired degenerates, already unmistakably points to the national identity of the organizers. Like so many other things—some are already disclosed (like the destination point), while others remain undisclosed for now. These are the officials of the Nazi “Ukraine.” It is in their twisted minds that the idea of compensating for failures on the front with terrorist acts was born, which, however, is not surprising. They will have to answer, either by law or otherwise. Just as terrorists are dealt with worldwide. Without a statute of limitations.

    3. Accomplices. There are many of them. Their circle is widening and includes those who provided property, money, those who organized transfers, taught shooting, and so on. With them, too, everything is clear, and they will answer for what they have done. Much more interesting are other accomplices, or international sponsors of terrorists. And here, alas, the situation is such that they include top officials from NATO countries. They vary. Just take Macron, for example. His rhetoric, his actions, and most importantly, his approval to conduct covert operations with the banderite regime could well be classified as complicity in the March 22 terrorist attack. That’s why this champagne and oyster lover got so messed up that he had to publicly deny France’s involvement in the attack both personally and through his subordinates. Obviously, Macron and several other Western leaders are sponsors of this horrific terrorist act. There is no forgiveness for this. Immunities cannot protect from this. And from now on, they are not just banal enemies of Russia.

    • April 7, 2024

    The Russian television releases a video of interrogations, where Krasnogorsk terrorists explain that they had an appointment in Ukraine, in order to be rewarded by one million rubles each, that the Atlanticist forces had cleared a path for them in the minefield at the border.

  • [Sharing] Russo-Ukrainian war: The Deluge – Big Serge

    Z World Turns Two

    As the calendar barrels into another year and we tick away the days of February, notable anniversaries are marked off in sequence. It is now 2/22/2022 +2: two years since Putin’s address on the historic status of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions, followed on 2/24/2022 by the commencement of the Special Military Operation and the spectacular resumption of history.

    The nature of the war changed dramatically after a kinetic and mobile opening phase. With the collapse of the negotiation process (whether thanks to Boris Johnson or not), it became clear that the only way out of the conflict would be through the strategic defeat of one party by the other. Thanks to a pipeline of western support (in the form of material, financial aid, and ISR and targeting assistance) which allowed Ukraine to transcend its rapidly evaporating indigenous war economy, it became clear that this would be a war of industrial attrition, rather than rapid maneuver and annihilation. Russia began to mobilize resources for this sort of attritional war in the Autumn of 2022, and since then the war has attained its present quality – that of a firepower intensive but relatively static positional struggle.

    The nature of this attritional-positional war lends itself to analytic ambiguity, because it denies the most attractive and obvious signs of victory and defeat in large territorial changes. Instead, a whole host of anecdotal, small scale positional analysis, and foggy data has to suffice, and this can be easily misconstrued or misunderstood. Ukraine’s supporters point to nominally small scale advances to support their notion that Russia is suffering cataclysmic casualties to capture small villages. This suggests that Russia is winning meaningless, pyrrhic victories which will lead to its exhaustion, so long as Ukraine receives everything it asks for from the west. At the same time, the Z-sphere points to these same battles as evidence that Ukraine can no longer hold even its most heavily defended fortress cities.

    What I intend to argue here is that 2024 will be highly decisive for the war, as the year in which Ukrainian strategic exhaustion begins to show out at the same time that Russia’s strategic investments begin to pay off on the battlefield. This is the way of such an attritional conflict, which burdens armies with cumulative and constant stressors in a test of their recuperative powers. Wear and tear and the raging of the waters will erode and burden the dike until it bursts. And then the deluge comes.

    Avdiivka: Tactical Overmatch

    The signature operational development of 2024 is at this point clearly the complete Russian capture of Avdiivka. The strategic significance of Avdiivka has itself been subject to debate, with some dismissing it as little more than a dingy suburb of Donetsk, targeted to give Putin a symbolic victory on the eve of Russian elections.

    In fact, Avdiivka is clearly a locale with great operational significance. A Ukrainian fortress since the beginning of the Donbass War in 2014, Avdiivka served as a keystone blocking position for the AFU on the doorstep of Donetsk, sitting on a major supply corridor. Its capture creates space for Russia to begin a multi-pronged advance on next-phase Ukrainian strongholds like Konstantinivka and Pokrovsk (more on that later) and pushes Ukrainian artillery away from Donetsk.

    The subject that would seem to be of particular importance, however, was the manner in which Russia captured Avdiivka. The struggle amid the wreckage of an industrial city provided something of a Rorschach test for the war, with some seeing the battle as yet another application of Russian “meat assaults”, overwhelming the AFU defenders with mass amid horrific casualties

    This story does not hold up to scrutiny, as I would like to demonstrate from a variety of angles. First, we can try to gauge casualties. This is always difficult to do with a high degree of accuracy, but it would be useful to look for abnormalities or spikes in Russian loss patterns. The most widely accepted source for this would be the Mediazona casualty tracker (an explicitly anti-Putinist media project operated out of the west).

    When one goes to examine the Mediazona counts, an interesting discrepancy manifests itself. The summary text notes that a four-month battle for Avdiivka has recently concluded, and Mediazona states: “We are seeing significant growth of Russian casualties since mid-October.” This is actually quite odd, because their data shows the literal opposite. Since October 10 (the day of the first major Russian mechanized assault on Avdiivka), Mediazona has counted an average of 48 Russian casualties per day, which is actually significantly less than the burn rate earlier in the year. In contrast, Mediazona counted 80 casualties per day on average from January 1 to October 9. This period, of course, includes heavy fighting in Bakhmut, so if one takes the period between the end of the Battle of Bakhmut and the beginning of the Battle of Avdiivka (May 20 to October 9) one finds an average of 60 Russian casualties per day. A time series of Mediazona’s weekly confirmed casualties also shows a downward trend, making one wonder how they can feel comfortable claiming that the action in Avdiivka has raised the burn rate

    Furthermore, Ukrainian sources on the ground emphasized that the Russian assault in Avdiivka was quite certainly not a mere function of mass, and noted effective Russian small unit tactics with a powerful fire support. One Ukrainian officer told Politico: “That’s how they work in Avdiivka — artillery levels everything to the ground, and then professional landing troops come in small groups.” Another officer described Russian small unit assaults (5 to 7 men) occurring at night. All of this is inconsistent with the trope about Russian “human wave” assaults – which, we should note, have never been caught on camera. Given the Ukrainian fondness for sharing combat footage, oughtn’t we expect to see some alleged evidence of these Russian waves being mowed down?

    All this is to say, the claim that Russia (yet again) suffered catastrophic losses in Avdiivka is simply not supported. Like a previous analysis in which I showed that Russian armor losses were not rising or showing abnormal patterns, we yet again have a major Russian assault failing to cause a spike in the loss data. This is not to deny that Russia has suffered casualties. The operation at Avdiivka was a high intensity, four month battle. Men are killed and vehicles are destroyed in such affairs, but there is little evidence that this occurred at abnormal or alarming rates for the Russian Armed Forces.

    Now, you’re certainly free to make your own judgements, and I have no doubt that the belief in massive Russian casualties and human wave assaults will endure. However, to believe this, you must make an epistemological leap of faith – believing that the wasteful human waves exist despite Ukrainian fighters testifying to the opposite, and that Russian casualties have risen in a way that is somehow invisible to trackers like Warspotting and Mediazona.

    In contrast, Avdiivka stands out as the first major engagement of the war where Ukraine’s growing material shortages have been acutely felt. After burning through much of their accumulated stock (including the large batch of shells purchased from South Korea by the United States), the AFU felt a glaring and painful artillery shortage in Avdiivka. Complaints about “shell hunger” were a motif of the coverage of the battle. Of course, we’ve heard about the growing shell shortage for months (and it is known that Ukraine simply does not have enough tubes to cover the entire front), but Avdiivka stands out as a keystone position, important enough for Ukraine to scramble premier assets to reinforce it, where they simply could not provide an adequate base of fire

    Avdiivka

    In the absence of adequate artillery, Ukraine has increasingly tried to lean on FPV drones as a substitute. There is a certain strategic logic to this, in that small drones can be manufactured in distributed facilities and do not require the capital intensive production centers (vulnerable to Russian strike systems) that artillery shells do.

    However, drones are clearly not a panacea to Ukraine’s problems. In the simple technical sense, the destructive power of an FPV drone (which usually carries the warhead of a rocket propelled grenade) pales in comparison to an artillery shell and is thus unsuitable for suppressive fire or the reduction of strongpoints. Drones are also subject to disruptions from weather and electronic warfare in ways that artillery is not. More importantly, however, Ukraine is simply losing the drone race. Ukraine’s achievements ramping up drone production in wartime are genuinely impressive, but the country’s industrial base is still far smaller and more vulnerable than Russia’s, and Russia’s drone production is starting to widely outstrip Ukraine’s. Ukraine’s weakness in other arms prompted them to be the first party to lean heavily on FPVs, but that early lead has been lost.

    So, drones clearly offer a lethal and important battlefield expedient, but they are neither a genuine replacement for artillery nor an arm of clear advantage for Ukraine. The result was a Ukrainian defense in Avdiivka that was substantially outgunned. The problem was compounded by the rapid proliferation of Russian air dropped glide bombs, alongside the degradation of Ukraine’s air defense. This allowed the Russian air force to operate around Avdiivka with something approaching impunity, dropping hundreds of glide bombs with the power to – unlike artillery shells, let alone tiny FPV warheads – level the fortified concrete blocks that normally make Soviet vintage cities so durable in urban fighting.

    Thus, Avdiivka unfolded along a pattern that is now becoming very familiar, and indicates the emerging Russian preference for assaulting cities, at least of this mid-sized fortress variety. Once again the operation focused in its preliminary phase on flaring out Russian control over the flanks, beginning with the large mechanized assault in early November which secured positions on the railway line to the north of the city. Again (as in the case of Bakhmut and Lysychansk-Severodonetsk) there was an expectation among some that Russia would attempt to encircle the city, but this still does not look feasible in the current operating environment under the nexus of fires and ISR. Instead, positions on the flank allowed the Russians to launch concentric attacks into the city, entering on multiple axes that compressed the Ukrainian defenders into a tight interior position, where Russian fire could be heavily concentrated

    Concentric Attack on Avdiivka: February 7-14 (Base Map courtesy of Kalibrated Maps)

    The particular combination of concentric attack and overwhelming Russian fires led to a very rapid end to the battle once the Russian push into the city proper began. While the creep around the flanks occurred in a sequence of on and off pushes through the winter, the concentric crush on the city lasted scarcely more than a week. On February 7-8 the Russians achieved breakthroughs in both the northern and southern suburbs, and by February 14 the Ukrainians were in retreat. A few pockets of resistance would linger for only a few days.

    Despite statements alleging that they had conducted an “orderly withdrawal”, there is abundant evidence that the Ukrainians were taken aback by the tempo of the Russian assault, and the evacuation was hastily organized and only partially completed. A large number of personnel were unable to escape and are now POWs, and it is clear that Ukraine did not have time or energies to evacuate the wounded, instead ordering that they simply be left behind. The general picture is of a chaotic and ad-hoc retreat from the city, not an orderly and pre-planned withdrawal.

    The issue for Ukraine now goes beyond the loss of Avdiivka and the opportunities that this will create for Russia. Ukraine now has proof of failure on both the attack and the defense in operations where they concentrated significant forces. Their counteroffensive on Russia’s Zaporhzia Line was a catastrophic failure, wasting much of the AFU’s carefully husbanded mechanized package, and now they have a failed defense on their hands in Avdiivka, despite fighting out of a well prepared fortress and scrambling reserves into the sector to reinforce the defense.

    The question now becomes fairly simple: if Ukraine failed to attack successfully over the summer, if they could not defend Bakhmut, and if they cannot defend in Avdiivka, is there anywhere that they can find a battlefield success? The dam is leaking. Can Ukraine plug it before it collapses?

    Russia’s Full Court Press

    Ukraine’s force structure is always notoriously difficult to parse out, due to their propensity for ad-hoc battlegroups and their practice of piecemeal allocation of forces to resident brigade commands (turning brigade headquarters into the cups in a shell game). Truth be told, Ukrainian ORBAT and force allocation is in a class all its own – to try and get a handle on it, you can do no better than Matt Davies’ excellent work over on X dot com. This generally makes the AFU’s organization and force generation more opaque and more difficult to parse out than Russia’s, for example. While Russia employs conventional army level groupings, Ukraine does not, and indeed lacks any organic commands above the brigade level.

    That being said, the basic picture is one of three Ukrainian “Operational Strategic Groupings”, which are vaguely akin to army groups. These are, from north to south, Operation Strategic Groupings (OSGs) Khortytsia, Tavriya, and Odessa. Against these are arrayed four Russian Army Groups – from north to south, these are Army Groups West, Center, East, and Dnieper. Assessing the total line strength is always difficult, largely because we do not always have good insight into the actual combat rating of these units. However, we can make estimates of paper strength. Based on deployment information from the Project Owl Ukraine Control Map and the Militaryland Deployment Map, we can estimate that the nominal strength in the theater right now is some 33 Division Equivalents for Ukraine against perhaps 50 DEs for Russia – a significant, but not utterly overwhelming Russian advantage. We get a picture something like this (Ukrainian Army level formations are absent because they do not exist)

    Ukrainian Theater Army and Group Level Commands (Base Control Map provided by Kalibrated Maps)

    At the moment, Russia is grinding slowly forward on almost every axis in the theater. This has both strategic/attritional implications, in that the Ukrainians are forced to continually burn reserves while being denied the ability to rotate and reconstitute units, but there is also a clear operational formulation occurring.

    The Russian maneuver scheme must be held in reference to their minimum end state objectives – namely, the capture of the remaining Donbas urban agglomerations around Slovyansk and Kramatorsk (though we should not assume that the war or Russian ambitions end there). At the moment, there are several major axes of advance, which I am labelling as follows

    Russian Axes of Attack (Base Control Map provided by Kalibrated Maps)

    The intention of these thrusts is fairly obvious. In the center of the front, Russian advances on the Avdiivka and Chasiv Yar axes converge on the critical Ukrainian hub of Konstyantinivka, the capture of which is one of the absolute prerequisites for any serious attempt to move on the Kramatorsk agglomeration. Russian bases of control around Avdiivka and Bakhmut provide the necessary space to begin a two-pronged operation towards Konstyantinivka, bypassing and enveloping the strongly held Ukrainian fortress of Toretsk. (See the map below, which I made in December before the capture of Avdiivka)

    Concentric Operation toward Konstyantinikva (Base map from Suriyak)

    Meanwhile, continued Russian pressure on the northern front (via a slow squeeze on the city of Kupyansk, at the top of the Oskil line as well as operations towards Lyman on the Zherebets axis) provide a base of progress towards the other operational perquisite for Kramatorsk, which is the Russian recapture of the north bank of the Donets River, up to the confluence of the Oskil at Izyum

    Russia’s North Donetsk Campaign

    Meanwhile, on the more southerly axes, Russia continues to expand its zone of control after the capture of Marinka, likely with the aim of developing momentum towards Kurakhove, which would put the Ukrainian fortress of Ugledar in a more severe salient. Ugledar remains a thorn in Russia’s side, in that it lies uncomfortable close to Russian rail lines into the land bridge. Russia is also attacking the Ukrainian held Robotyne salient (the sparse fruits of Ukraine’s counteroffensive). While these attacks have, as we have mentioned, attritional benefits by way of pinning Ukrainian forces in the line, it seems likely that Russia would aim to recapture the Robotyne salient to preempt any Ukrainian designs of using it as a springboard for a future attempt to restart operations towards Tokmak. Thus, these southern operations have both attritive effects and offer the potential of preventatively neutralizing useful Ukrainian staging points

    Overall, the broad operational situation suggests that Russia is developing offensive momentum across the entire theater. This will have deleterious effects on Ukrainian combat power by preventing rotation, reconstitution, and lateral troop redeployment, while sucking in the dwindling Ukrainian reserves. Shoigu recently made an uncharacteristically bold statement that the AFU was committing much of its remaining reserves:

    “After the collapse of the counteroffensive, the Ukrainian army command has been trying to stabilize the situation at the expense of the remaining reserves and prevent the collapse of the frontline.”

    This is, if not totally verifiable, at least notable given his general reticence to make sweeping statements about the state of the war.

    In the near term (meaning the spring and summer months) we should expect Russia to progress towards the following intermediate operational goals:

    • Developing a concentric offensive towards the Ukrainian agglomerations around Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Kontyantinivka
    • An offensive along the Zherebets-Oskil line towards Lyman, to capture or screen the Donetsk River line as a prerequisite for an operation against Kramatorsk
    • Continued assaults towards Kurakhove in preparation for the liqudiation of the Ugledar salient
    • Preventative attacks towards the Orakhiv axis to prevent future Ukrainian attempts to exploit the Robotyne salient

    Farwell Zaluzhny

    Against the backdrop of Ukraine’s defeat at Avidiivka, President Zelensky began a long expected command overhaul when he fired Commander in Chief Valery Zaluzhny and replaced him the the commander of the ground forces, Oleksandr Syrski.

    There a variety of amusing ethnic and political subplots to this, particularly the longstanding tensions between Zelensky and Zaluzhny, the many ridiculous rumors that Zaluzhny had become a political rival to Zelensky and might be the lead figure in a military takeover of the government, and the rather ironic fact that the new top man, Syrski, is a Russian born less than fifty miles outside of Moscow, who ended up in Ukrainian service simply because his unit was posted near Kharkov when the Soviet Union fell, and he opted not to resign his command.

    This is all very interesting, of course, and perhaps might help demonstrate that the relationship between these countries is far more convoluted and nuanced that most westerners assume. What matters for our purposes, however, is the military implications

    Farewell, Sweet Prince

    What we should say about Zaluzhny is that, while he was not really Ukraine’s biggest problem, he did not have the answers. Zaluzhny displayed a bizarre timidity, particularly throughout the Battle of Bakhmut and the Ukrainian Counteroffensive. We constantly heard about Zaluzhny’s reservations and opposition to Ukrainian plans – he was against the costly defense of Bakhmut, skeptical of the attack out of Orikhiv, and so forth. There was even a rumor that Zaluzhny told Zelensky that the counteroffensive had failed already in the opening weeks of the operation.

    The problem with all of this is simple: Zaluzhny cannot have it both ways. He seemed to be positioning himself as a voice of caution and reason, distancing himself from operations on the ground, while allowing those operations to go forward anyway. Over the summer, supposedly at the same time that Zaluzhny had concluded that the counteroffensive was failing, he continued to push Ukrainian mechanized forces into the Russian defenses in small, company sized battlegroups.

    Ultimately, Zaluzhny strikes one as a non-entity: skeptical of Ukrainian battle plans, but willing to implement them anyway without offering alternatives of his own. In particular, his hesitation led the Ukrainian counteroffensive to devolve into a sequence of wasteful probing attacks which lacked the mass to achieve a decisive result and inevitably spiraled into a slow motion trainwreck. A commander who complains about battleplans while implementing them anyway is begging an obvious question: what is it that you do around here, anyway?

    In contrast, Syrski is a man who clearly exerts some will on the battlefield, for good or ill. His preference for commitment and combat has resulted in several of Ukraine’s ugliest defeats – he is, after all, the architect of the Bakhmut defense and the firebag at Lysychansk. But he’s also the showrunner for Ukraine’s signature military success to this point, in the 2022 Kharkov Counteroffensive, where he successfully exploited a badly hollowed out section of Russian front and recaptured important positions over the Oskil

    Syrski (2nd from left) checks the situation map

    Syrski may very well lead Ukraine to disaster. He has shown a tolerance for casualties that could easily break the AFU’s back, and a preference for generating horrible, grinding positional defense. But Syrski at least has a propensity to look for decision points, unlike Zaluzhny, who seemed content to slowly wither away in positional battle against a superior foe. Aggression could easily cause disaster for Ukraine, but time had clearly run out on Zaluzhny’s way of war.

    Outgunned: Ukraine and the Arms Race

    The Russo-Ukrainian War is one of industrial attrition. Despite a variety of theories about this or that game changing weapon, clever maneuver scheme, or superior western training, the reality of this war for the last 18 months has been one of grinding and laborious industrial war, battering through fixed defenses in a maelstrom of concrete, steel, and high explosives. The central problem for Ukraine is fairly simple: Russian force generation is reaching the liftoff point, which will interminably shift combat power in Russia’s favor.

    As artillery shells have become the totem item in this war, a commentary on the state of the artillery race is certainly warranted. Ukraine managed to build a large inventory of shells in preparation for its 2023 summer offensive, partially through careful husbanding of resources and partially through the United States tapping a few remaining reservoirs, like South Korea. After expending much of that stockpile in high intensity operations through the summer, the artillery advantage has once again swung heavily in favor of Russia, and “shell hunger” has become a ubiquitous complaint for Kiev.

    In particular, Zelensky has recently begun to complain of what he calls an “artificial shortage”, blaming the Republican opposition in the US Congress for Ukraine’s supply difficulties. Zelensky is wrong. The shortage is real, and not easily fixed.

    After burning through excess stocks, Ukraine’s long-term supply has increasingly come to hinge on attempts to expand production in Europe and the United States. However, this plan is foundering on three separate rocks: 1) industry has been much slower to ramp up than expected; 2) even the expanded production targets are too low to win the war for Ukraine; and 3) even if adequate ammunition could be procured, Ukraine would quickly run into problems with barrel availability.

    Thus far, the United States has been much more successful ramping up production than has Europe. While American targets have been revised several times, it now looks like the United States will produce something like 500,000 shells in 2024, which is a good number given the state of the American industrial plant and issues with labor shortages. The European Union initially hoped to deliver 1 million shells on an annualized basis, but they appear to be far short of this number. Europe faces a variety of problems, like labor shortages, exorbitant energy costs, and a consensus driven decision making culture that is slow to allocate significant resources. The European practice of small orders placed by individual member states also leaves manufacturers hesitant to make large investments in new production lines. Or, as one Belgian general put it: “We’re in deep shit.”

    Let’s say that the USA and Europe both fulfill their current targeted deliveries to Ukraine in their entirety. What would that amount to? A recent study from two German analysts at the European Council on Foreign Relations estimated that, in the optimist scenario, the USA and Europe can supply Ukraine with approximately 1.3 million rounds of ammunition on an annualized basis. That would give Ukraine a budget of about 3,600 shells per day – enough to sustain moderate intensity, but far below what they need

    The primary means of physical destruction

    Last year, Ukrainian Minister of Defense Reznikov said that Ukraine would require nearly 12,000 shells per day to “successfully execute battlefield tasks”, particularly offensive actions. That works out to more than 350,000 shells per month – more than three times what the NATO bloc is hoping to produce. Obviously that large number is unrealistic, but a recent study from the Estonian Ministry of Defense estimated that at minimum Ukraine will need 200,000 shells per month (Roughly 6,600 per day). At the estimated long-run availability of 3,600 per day, Ukraine can have some basic functionality, but they will find it difficult to accumulate a stockpile to allow higher intensity offensive operations.

    This runs into an additional, follow on problem, which is that simply pumping shells into Ukraine is not enough. Solving the shell shortage will exacerbate the barrel shortage. Artillery barrels, needless to say, wear out from extended use. Using a rule of thumb number which says that a howitzer barrel has a lifespan of about 2,500 shots, this means that Ukraine would be wearing out somewhere between 125-150 guns per month, assuming they could actually shoot as much as Reznikov wants. This would create yet another sustainment bottleneck, complicated by the fact that Ukraine has at least 17 different platforms in use.

    Meanwhile, what of the Russians? It’s clear that Russia’s pool of shells has been vastly underestimated. First we have the news that North Korean deliveries have been far larger than initially expected; instead of 1 million, it’s something more like 3 million with deliveries ongoing. This number is dampened by the fact that some of the North Korean shells are defective (from long stays in depots and cannibalization), but the sheer size of the delivery can’t be ignored. Meanwhile, indigenous Russian production has skyrocketed, with the Estonians estimating some 3.5 million shells produced in 2023 for the Russians, with a figure of 4.5 million expected in 2024. Including North Korean shells, it seems highly likely that Russian can easily sustain a firing rate of up to 12,000 shells per day, with surge capacity in reserve

    The upshot of all this is essentially that, even if the European production surge occurs on schedule, there’s at least a 3-1 advantage (potentially 5-1) in Russian artillery fire that’s baked into the calculus of this war, occurring alongside a substantial western acknowledged ramp up in Russian production of strike systems like cruise missiles, Geran drones, Lancets, and glide bombs of both greater power and greater range. A recent publication from the Royal United Services Institute noted that Russia can deliver 1,500 tanks (both new build and retrofitted depot stocks) and 3,000 armored vehicles per year – the report also notes that Russian stocks of Iskander and Kalibr missiles have grown significantly over the last year.

    The standard argument – the sort of “Theory of Ukrainian Victory” – rests on the idea of disproportionate, catastrophic Russian casualties, and both sides love to throw around that cherished word “loss ratios.” However, this rather tends to obfuscate the issue. The most important question is simple whether an army’s relative combat power is growing or shrinking over time – that is, whether its ability to generate forces is greater than its rate of burn – can it reconstitute attrited units in a timely manner, generate replacements, recover, repair, and replace broken equipment, and so forth. The prototypical example of this is of course the Nazi-Soviet War. Despite the fact that the Germans enjoyed favorable “loss ratios” throughout most of the war, the ratio of combat power consistently grew in the USSR’s favor due to their vastly superior force generation powers. Tellingly, Hitler even made a quip during the Battle of Kursk that the loss ratios should predict an immanent German victory. But loss ratios do not matter nearly as much as the relative rate of loss and force generation.

    Given that Russian casualties are obviously far below the phantasmagorical hundreds of thousands suggested by western Media and Ukrainian propogandists, it has become clear that Russia is generating more force over time. Estonian intelligence estimated that Russia can properly train, equip, and deploy roughly 130,000 additional troops every six months, which is more than adequate to overcome current loss rates. As if to emphasize the point, RUSI notes that the Russian grouping of forces in Ukraine (that is, only those forces deployed in theater at the moment) rose from 360,000 to 470,000 over the last year.

    So, Russian force generation is growing over time, and not simply regenerating losses. Meanwhile, Ukrainian forces are increasingly undermanned, with understrength brigades asked to perform increasingly heavy lift. We know that Ukrainian reserves are running low. This was clearly demonstrated in Avdiivka, when the AFU scrambled brigades from other fronts (like the 47th Mechanized) that had been fighting all summer, indicating that there was a lack of adequate strategic reserves, and then throwing in the elite 3rd Assault Brigade in the closing days of the battle to try and stem the bleeding. Meanwhile, formations like the 110th Mechanized, which had been fighting in Avdiivka for months, were essentially burned off entirely because they could not be rotated out. Russia conducts regular troop rotations, while Ukrainian forces remain on the line due to the lack of replacements.

    So, here we are. The current Theory of Ukrainian Victory is exhausted, intending as it did to leverage western ISR, training, and surplus equipment to deliver disproportionate casualties on Russia. 2022 was a year of big surges (not Big Serges), with Russia rapidly conquering the land bridge and the Lugansk shoulder in its initial maneuver campaign, followed by Ukrainian capitalization on the inadequate Russian force generation with their audacious counterattack towards the Oskil. But 2023 was different – Ukraine had a significant window of opportunity, flush with western equipment, training, and planning assistance while Russia’s mobilization ground into gear. That strategic window yielded nothing. Instead, Ukraine burned off valuable resources defending Bakhmut and then bashed uselessly against a well shaped and well defended Russian line in the south. Now the window is closed, and Russian force generation is inexorably rising, threatening Ukraine with the deluge of total strategic overmatch.

    Ukraine is facing strategic defeat, and the only way out is to go all in – not only for Ukraine, in the form of a more radical and totalizing mobilization plan, but for its partners too, who will have to adopt a quasi-war economy and devote radically more resources to arming and training the AFU.

    There are signs that Ukraine might be ready to take that plunge, from Zelensky’s claim that the army is asking for 500,000 more men, to the ongoing deliberation over an expanded draft, to comments about the need for “total mobilization” and laws against capital flight (to prevent men from fleeing the country with their money). This is only natural; due to Russia’s vastly superior resource base, Ukraine can only hope to match them with a totalizing and far more extractive mobilization policy

    Russia’s Secret Weapon: Bombs

    That leaves the NATO partners. Even if Ukraine adopts a radical mobilization policy, it lacks the indigenous capacity to train them, let alone arm them. Without the NATO training pipeline and robust material support, a Ukrainian total mobilization (even if it were possible with Ukraine’s limited state capacity) would serve only to inflate casualties and burn off what is left of the nation’s demographic base. With even a stable level of Ukraine aid struggling to get through an American congress that is suffering from Ukraine fatigue and a host of domestic crises, it seems unlikely that any by the Baltic States are in the mood to double down and begin sending daily trains full of material to Kiev.

    And so, we once again return to the motif of strategic exhaustion. 2022 was the year of wild swings as the front stabilized into a conveniently shaped and easily supplied Russian position, and 2023 was the year of Ukraine’s strategic window of opportunity, frittered away at Bakhmut and Robotyne. 2024 is the year that Russia’s swelling force generation reaches a climax and the war turns in an obvious and irreversible way against Ukraine.

    The great German soldier and author Ernst Jünger had the following comment on the prospect of war with Russia:

    When Spengler warned against any invasion of Russia for reasons of space, he was, as we have since seen, right. Even more questionable become each of these invasions for metaphysical reasons, insofar as one approaches one of the great sufferers, a titan, a genius of suffering power. In its aura, in its sphere of influence, one will become acquainted with pain in a way that far exceeds any imagination.

    Much is always made of Russia’s propensity for “suffering”, with interpretations ranging from a romantic Russian-patriotic notion of sacrifice for the motherland to an anti-Russian criticism of the Russian tolerance for casualties. Perhaps it means both: the individual Russian soldier is more willing to sit in a freezing trench and trade shells than his adversary, and the Russian state and people are able to lose more and last longer in the aggregate.

    I rather think, however, that Jünger’s metaphysical “titan of suffering” is not so metaphysical at all. It rather refers to a mundane power of the Russian state, namely its excellence and willingness across the centuries to mobilize huge numbers of men and material for war, at the expense of other social goals. War with Russia sucks. It means mass casualties, cold trenches, scarred earth, and long nights of shelling. The Ukrainians have coped with this as well as anyone (because they are themselves quasi-Russian, however much they deny it), but it is an awful thing to trade shells for years on end. The Russian power of suffering is to willingly fight wars that devolve into bat fights, knowing they have a bigger bat.

    The window of strategic opportunity has closed for Ukraine, and now opens wide for Russia. The earth opens wide for the dead [end]

    The original article

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    The Atlanticist defeat in Donbass and Ukraine

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  • [Sharing] Russian Missile Strike on French Contractor Base in Ukraine Highlights Heated Franco-Russian Cold War – Military Watch Magazine

    The Russian Armed Forces on the evening of January 16 were reported to have launched a missile strike targeting the headquarters of predominantly French European foreign fighters in Ukraine. Russian sources subsequently reported that the personnel targeted were military contractors, and that the strike caused at least 80 casualties 60 or more of which were killed. Russian state media reported that these personnel were “highly trained specialists who work on specific weapons systems too complex for the average Ukrainian conscripts,” which “put some of the most lethal and long-range weapons in the Ukrainian arsenal out of service until more specialists are found” to replace them. These claims align with a strong consensus among analysts that in order to allow the Ukrainian Armed Forces to absorb very large quantities of complex Western weaponry, much of which takes several years of training to operate, contractors from across the Western world have played a significant role in operating this hardware. A key example has been the American MIM-104 Patriot air defence system, which Ukrainian personnel were considered unable to operate before 2024 at the earliest, but which began to operate in the country in early 2023. This was difficult to explain other than with the presence of foreign personnel.

    Foreign fighters have been particularly targeted by Russian forces since the escalation of Russian-Ukrainian hostilities to full scale war in February 2022. An early example was the targeting on March 13, 2022 of a military training base in Yavoriv under 15km from the Polish border where close to 1000 foreign fighters were based, killing an estimated 180 personnel. Another was the precision strike launched by Iskander-M ballistic missile systems on Georgian Legion foreign fighters in late April 2023, destroying 15 vehicles, killing up to 60 personnel and seriously wounding more than 20 more. As Ukraine faces increasingly serious personnel shortages, Russian sources have reported that an influx of “high quality mercenaries with special skill sets” from late 2023 to replace the significant number of Ukrainian specialists killed in failed months long offensives against Russian forces which began in June 2023. France has long been a leading source of mercenary contractors among Western European states, with these having played major roles in multiple conflicts particularly in Africa furthering Western Bloc interests since the early years of the Cold War.

    As the United States has suspended further military assistance to Ukraine due to Republican opposition to further spending on the war effort, while Germany has struggled to gain domestic approval for the donation of new cruise missiles to the Ukrainian Air Force, France has played an increasingly prominent role in the conflict. This has included escalated transfers of SCALP cruise missiles and “several hundred” bombs which will be delivered in the coming week, with French President Emanuel Macron indicating that Paris could provide formal security guarantees to Kiev as the war effort looks increasingly unfavourable for Western interests. Russia has notably played a central role in undermining French influence its most critical foreign sphere, namely West and Central Africa, through its support for new military governments in former French colonies after a series of coups across the region. This has included not only an expansion of economic ties, but also support of arms, training and security through the presence of Russian contractors which has seriously limited France’s ability to assert its influence or forcefully restore Francophone governments in the region. With French ties to former colonies in Africa being of existential importance to the country’s economic health, an outsized French commitment to the war effort in Ukraine has been interpreted by a number of analysts in the context of the particularly poor relations Paris has with Moscow as a result of their strategic competition in Africa [end]

    The original article

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  • [Sharing] Gaza, Yemen & Ukraine Sound Death Knell for U.S.-Led ‘Rules-Based Global Order’ – Strategic Culture Foundation

    The world has reached a point of no return. The fraud of Western powers is spectacularly exposed and has become untenable

    Whatever moral authority or superiority Western states may have presumed to have had in the past, all that is now shredded – irreparably.

    The hypocrisy and duplicity of the United States and its Western allies have been perceived for many years, indeed centuries. There is nothing new in that. But what is new now is how glaringly obvious to the world the fraudulent pretense has become. Global consciousness is, in turn, leading to global contempt.

    There is, too, an unmistakable sense that Western leaders have become aware of their charade having been rumbled and of their imminent downfall.

    This week saw British government ministers issuing desperate scaremongering warnings about global threats as a way to rally public support for their vanishing authority. In doing so, they just sound laughable.

    Elsewhere this week, France’s President Emmanuel Macron delivered a bizarre nationwide address pleading for national unity amid global chaos. Macron sounded pathetic as if begging to be given respect.

    The irony is that the threats and chaos that these political charlatans adduce are largely the result of Western lawlessness, as evidenced by their de facto support for the genocide in Gaza and the relentless funding of a Neo-Nazi regime in Ukraine to provoke Russia. For decades, the Western powers have gotten away with mass murder, illegal wars, and global vandalism. The difference now is that a convergence of crises has exposed their malevolence and machinations.

    The slaughter in Gaza has exceeded 100 days and the death toll is approaching 30,000. It is the most transparent genocide in history, as Richard Falk deplores. And, what is more, the United States and its European allies are fully complicit in the shocking crimes committed by the Israeli regime.

    Hospitals are shelled by the Israelis, medics and journalists are murdered, as are hungry people running to occasional food aid trucks. Unicef calls it a “war on children”. Up to 800,000 people in Gaza are reportedly facing starvation, and yet the arrogant Western powers do nothing to stop this annihilation nor even condemn it.

    The complacency and smugness of Western political leaders like U.S. President Joe Biden and his Secretary of State Antony Blinken are nauseating. The United States as well as the European Union are enabling and arming the Israeli regime with no restraint.

    Indeed, when South Africa presented its charges of genocide against Israel at the United Nations International Court of Justice at the Hague last week, it was apparent to the world that the U.S., Britain, and other European powers were de facto in the dock as well over their complicity.

    Washington, London, and Brussels have pointedly refused to demand a ceasefire in Gaza under the guise of cynical excuses that recycle odious Israeli propaganda lies, such as the Palestinian militant group Hamas allegedly using human shields or hospitals as bases.

    Yet these Western powers turn around and suddenly bomb Yemen, the poorest country in the Arab region because it has taken the principled action of blocking Red Sea shipping as a leverage point to force a ceasefire in Gaza. The Yemenis are invoking their right under the 1948 Genocide Convention to act in solidarity to prevent the genocide of Palestinian people.

    Thus the Western powers are not only arming, enabling, and justifying the Israeli crimes in Gaza. When another party, Yemen, takes action to help the Palestinians, the Western powers double down on their criminality by assaulting Yemen.

    The Red Sea shipping crisis could be easily averted by calling a ceasefire in Gaza, as the Yemenis are contending. So, why don’t the Western powers comply? The conclusion is that they are unwilling to stop the genocide in Gaza. The Israeli regime is a bastion of U.S. and Western imperialism in the geo-strategically important Middle East. It is effectively mandated to get away with murder as it has done for decades since its inception in 1948 under the auspices of American and British neocolonial chicanery.

    Let’s be clear. The U.S. and its British attack dog have no legal right to launch strikes on Yemen, as Scott Ritter explains. What these Western powers are committing is criminal aggression against a country where over half of the population of 33 million is reliant on food aid. The deprivation in Yemen is a direct result of the U.S., Britain, and France’s bombing of that country, along with their clients Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, from 2015 to 2022 in an attempt to oust the Ansar Allah government.

    The depravity of the United States and its Western Neo-imperialist partners is plain to see. The presumed moral authority they proclaim is bankrupt. These powers are nothing but lawless rogue states whose much-vaunted “rules-based global order” is an audacious cover for their unilateral barbarity and banditry to ransack the rest of the world.

    Blinken, the U.S. top diplomat, was in Davos this week for the annual Western elite summit. That gathering is now a parody of pretenses. Blinken was pontificating about Gaza and how the suffering “breaks his heart”. Listening to this narcissistic non-entity is an affront to moral decency and common intelligence.

    His British counterpart, Lord [sic] David Cameron, was also at the Swiss Alpine resort holding forth about international law and security. Cameron even had the brainless temerity to claim that the current global situation was reminiscent of the 1930s by comparing Russian President Vladimir Putin to Adolf Hitler and Russia to Nazi Germany. Cameron has got history upside down. The correct comparison is Western powers to Nazi fascism.

    The Americans, British, and other Europeans are fueling genocide in Gaza while bombing Yemen and sponsoring a Neo-Nazi regime in Ukraine that openly venerates World War Two collaborators of the Third Reich like Roman Shukevych and Stepan Bandera.

    Also attending the Davos mountaintop circus was Ukrainian puppet president Vladimir Zelensky who was, as usual, begging for billions more in financial and military aid. That U.S.-led proxy war against Russia has caused the deaths of 500,000 Ukrainian soldiers and up to $200 billion in wasted Western taxpayer money. Ukrainian pensioners, women, and disabled people are now being dragged off the streets to join the slaughter facilitated by the Western-sponsored Kiev regime.

    The massive crimes in Gaza, Yemen, and Ukraine are an integral part of the Western “rules-based order”. It is an object lesson of the same root cause. That is, the Western imperialist system, headed by the United States.

    The world has reached a point of no return. The fraud of Western powers is spectacularly exposed and has become untenable. The Western imperial facade is imploding from its inherent corruption. It is a perilous time but the harsh truth can set the world free of hegemony and the systemic violence of Western elitist power [end]

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  • [Sharing] The Russian Art of War: How the West Led Ukraine to Defeat – Jacques Baud, The Postil Magazine

    We are very happy to bring you this excerpt from Colonel Jacques Baud’s latest book, The Russian Art of War: How the West Led Ukraine to Defeat (L’art de la guerre russe : Comment l’Occident conduisit l’Ukraine à l’échec). This is a detailed study of the two-year old conflict in which the West has brutally used the Ukrainians to pursue an old pipedream: the conquest of Russia.

    The book is being translated into English, and we will update this page when it is published. In the meantime, we provide a generous excerpt, along with a detailed Table of Contents, to give you a taste of this very important and much-needed book.

    Russian Military Thought

    Throughout the Cold War period, the Soviet Union saw itself as the spearhead of a historical struggle that would lead to a confrontation between the “capitalist” system and “progressive forces.” This perception of a permanent and inescapable war led the Soviets to study war in a quasi-scientific way, and to structure this thinking into an architecture of military thought that has no equal in the Western world.

    The problem with the vast majority of our so-called military experts is their inability to understand the Russian approach to war. It is the result of an approach we have already seen in waves of terrorist attacks—the adversary is so stupidly demonized that we refrain from understanding his way of thinking. As a result, we are unable to develop strategies, articulate our forces, or even equip them for the realities of war. The corollary of this approach is that our frustrations are translated by unscrupulous media into a narrative that feeds hatred and increases our vulnerability. We are thus unable to find rational, effective solutions to the problem.

    The way Russians understand conflict is holistic. In other words, they see the processes that develop and lead to the situation at any given moment. This explains why Vladimir Putin’s speeches invariably include a return to history. In the West, we tend to focus on X moment and try to see how it might evolve. We want an immediate response to the situation we see today. The idea that “from the understanding of how the crisis arose comes the way to resolve it” is totally foreign to the West. In September 2023, an English-speaking journalist even pulled out the “duck test” for me: “if it looks like a duck, swims like a duck and quacks like a duck, it’s probably a duck.” In other words, all the West needs to assess a situation is an image that fits their prejudices. Reality is much more subtle than the duck model….

    The reason the Russians are better than the West in Ukraine is that they see the conflict as a process; whereas we see it as a series of separate actions. The Russians see events as a film. We see them as photographs. They see the forest, while we focus on the trees. That is why we place the start of the conflict on February 24, 2022, or the start of the Palestinian conflict on October 7, 2023. We ignore the contexts that bother us and wage conflicts we do not understand. That is why we lose our wars…

    ****

    In Russia, unsurprisingly, the principles of the military art of the Soviet forces inspired those currently in use:

    • readiness to carry out assigned missions;
    • concentration of efforts on solving a specific mission;
    • surprise (unconventionality) of military action vis-à-vis the enemy;
    • finality determines a set of tasks and the level of resolution of each one;
    • totality of available means determines the way to resolve the mission and achieve the objective (correlation of forces);
    • coherence of leadership (unity of command);
    • economy of forces, resources, time and space;
    • support and restoration of combat capability;
    • freedom of maneuver.

    It should be noted that these principles apply not only to the implementation of military action as such. They are also applicable as a system of thought to other non-operational activities.

    An honest analysis of the conflict in Ukraine would have identified these various principles and drawn useful conclusions for Ukraine. But none of the self-proclaimed experts on TV were intellectually able to do so.

    Thus, Westerners are systematically surprised by the Russians in the fields of technology (e.g., hypersonic weapons), doctrine (e.g., operative art) and economics (e.g., resilience to sanctions). In a way, the Russians are taking advantage of our prejudices to exploit the principle of surprise. We can see this in the Ukrainian conflict, where the Western narrative led Ukraine to totally underestimate Russian capabilities, which was a major factor in its defeat. That is why Russia did not really try to counter this narrative and let it play out—the belief that we are superior makes us vulnerable….

    Correlation of Forces

    Russian military thought is traditionally linked to a holistic approach to warfare, which involves the integration of a large number of factors in the development of a strategy. This approach is materialized by the concept of “correlation of forces” (Соотношение сил).

    Often translated as “balance of forces” or “ratio of forces,” this concept is only understood by Westerners as a quantitative quantity, limited to the military domain. In Soviet thinking, however, the correlation of forces reflected a more holistic reading of war:

    There are several criteria for assessing the correlation of strengths. In the economic sphere, the factors usually compared are gross national product per capita, labor productivity, the dynamics of economic growth, the level of industrial production, particularly in high-tech sectors, the technical infrastructure of the production tool, the resources and degree of qualification of the workforce, the number of specialists and the level of development of theoretical and applied sciences.

    In the military field, the factors compared are the quantity and quality of armaments, the firepower of the armed forces, the fighting and moral qualities of the soldiers, the level of staff training, the organization of the troops and their combat experience, the character of the military doctrine and the methods of strategic, operative and tactical thinking.

    In the political sphere, the factors that come into consideration are the breadth of the social base of state authority, its organization, the constitutional procedure for relations between the government and legislative bodies, the ability to take operational decisions, and the degree and character of popular support for domestic and foreign policy.

    Finally, when assessing the strength of the international movement, the factors taken into consideration are its quantitative composition, its influence with the masses, its position in the political life of each country, the principles and norms of relations between its components and the degree of their cohesion.

    In other words, the assessment of the situation is not limited to the balance of forces on the battlefield, but takes into account all the elements that have an impact on the evolution of the conflict. Thus, for their Special Military Operation, the Russian authorities had planned to support the war effort through the economy, without moving to a “war economy” regime. Thus, unlike in Ukraine, there was no interruption in the tax and welfare mechanisms.

    This is why the sanctions applied to Russia in 2014 had a double positive effect. The first was the realization that they were not only a short-term problem, but above all a medium- and long-term opportunity. They encouraged Russia to produce goods it had previously preferred to buy abroad. The second was the signal that the West would increasingly use economic weapons as a means of pressure in the future. It therefore became imperative, for reasons of national independence and sovereignty, to prepare for more far-reaching sanctions affecting the country’s economy.

    In reality, it has long been known that sanctions do not work. Logically enough, they have had the opposite effect, acting as protectionist measures for Russia, which has thus been able to consolidate its economy, as had been the case after the 2014 sanctions. A sanctions strategy might have paid off if the Russian economy had effectively been the equivalent of the Italian or Spanish economy, i.e., with a high level of debt; and if the entire planet had acted in unison to isolate Russia.

    The inclusion of the correlation of forces in the decision-making process is a fundamental difference from Western decision-making processes, which are linked more to a policy of communication than to a rational approach to problems.

    This explains, for example, Russia’s limited objectives in the Ukraine, where it does not seek to occupy the entire territory, as the correlation of forces in the western part of the country would be unfavorable.

    At every level of leadership, the correlation of forces is part of situation assessment. At the operational level, it is defined as follows:

    The result of comparing the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of the forces and resources (sub-units, units, weapons, military equipment, etc.) of one’s own troops (forces) and those of the enemy. It is calculated on an operational and tactical scale throughout the area of operations, in the main and other directions, in order to determine the degree of objective superiority of one of the opposing camps. Force correlation assessment is used to make an informed decision about an operation (battle), and to establish and maintain the necessary superiority over the enemy for as long as possible, when decisions are redefined (modified) during military (combat) operations.

    This simple definition is the reason why the Russians committed themselves with forces inferior to those of Ukraine in February 2022, or why they withdrew from Kiev, Kharkov and Kherson in March, September and October 2022.

    ****

    Structure of the Doctrine

    The Russians have always attached particular importance to doctrine. Better than the West, they have understood that “a common way of seeing, thinking and acting”—as Marshal Foch put it—gives coherence, while allowing for infinite variations in the conception of operations. Military doctrine is a kind of “common core” that serves as a reference for designing operations.

    Russian military doctrine divides military art into three main components: strategy (strategiya), operative art (operativnoe iskoustvo) and tactics (taktika). Each of these components has its own characteristics, very similar to those found in Western doctrines. Using the terminology of French doctrine on the use of forces:

    • The strategic level is that of conception. The aim of strategic action is to lead the adversary to negotiation or defeat.
    • The operative level is that of cooperation and coordination of inter-force actions, with a view to achieving a given military objective.
    • The tactical level, finally, is that of maneuver execution at weapon level as an integral part of the operational maneuver.

    These three components correspond to levels of leadership, which translate into leadership structures and the space in which military operations are conducted. For simplicity’s sake, let us say that the strategic level ensures the management of the theater of war (Театр Войны) (TV); a geographically vast entity, with its own command and control structures, within which there are one or more strategic directions. The theater of war comprises a set of theaters of military operations (Театр Военных Действий) (TVD), which represent a strategic direction and are the domain of operative action. These various theaters have no predetermined structure and are defined according to the situation. For example, although we commonly speak of the “war in Afghanistan” (1979-1989) or the “war in Syria” (2015-), these countries are considered in Russian terminology as TVDs and not TVs.

    The same applies to Ukraine, which Russia sees as a theater of military operations (TVD) and not a theater of war (TV), which explains why the action in Ukraine is designated as a “Special Military Operation” (Специальная Военная Операция – Spetsial’naya Voyennaya Operatsiya—SVO, or SMO in English abbreviation) and not a “war.”

    The use of the word “war” would imply a different structure of conduct than that envisaged by the Russians in Ukraine, and would have other structural implications in Russia itself. Moreover—and this is a central point—as NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg himself acknowledges, “the war began in 2014” and should have been ended by the Minsk Agreements. The SMO is therefore a “military operation” and not a new “war,” as many Western “experts” claim.

    ****

    The Special Military Operation in Ukraine

    The Correlation of Forces

    Consider all the factors that directly or indirectly influence the conflict. Conversely, as we have seen in Ukraine and elsewhere, Westerners have a much more political reading of the war, and end up mixing the two. This is why communication plays such an essential role in the conduct of war: the perception of the conflict plays an almost more important role than its reality. This is why, in Iraq, the Americans literally invented episodes that glorified their troops.

    Russia’s analysis of the situation in February 2022 was undoubtedly considerably more pertinent than that of the West. They knew that a Ukrainian offensive against the Donbass was underway and that it could endanger the government. In 2014-2015, after the massacres in Odessa and Mariupol, the Russian population was very much in favor of intervention. Vladimir Putin’s stubborn clinging to the Minsk Agreements was poorly understood in Russia.

    The factors that contributed to Russia’s decision to intervene were twofold: the expected support of Ukraine’s ethnically Russian population (which we will call “Russian-speaking” for convenience) and an economy robust enough to withstand sanctions.

    The Russian-speaking population had risen up en masse against the new authorities following the coup d’état of February 2014, whose first decision had been to strip the Russian language of its official status. Kiev tried to backtrack, but in April 2019, the 2014 decision was definitively confirmed.

    Since the adoption of the Law on Indigenous Peoples on July 1, 2021, Russian speakers (ethnic Russians) are no longer considered normal Ukrainian citizens and no longer enjoy the same rights as ethnic Ukrainians. They can therefore be expected to offer no resistance to the Russian coalition in the eastern part of the country….

    Since March 24, 2021, Ukrainian forces have been stepping up their presence around the Donbass and have increased the pressure against the autonomists with their fire.

    Zelensky’s decree of March 24, 2021 for the reconquest of Crimea and the Donbass was the real trigger for the SMO. From that moment on, the Russians understood that if there was military action against them, they would have to intervene. But they also knew that the cause of the Ukrainian operation was NATO membership, as Oleksei Arestovitch had explained. That is why, in mid-December 2021, they were submitting proposals to the USA and NATO on extending the Alliance: their aim was then to remove Ukraine’s motive for an offensive in the Donbass.

    The reason for the Russian Special Military Operation (SMO) is indeed the protection of the populations of Donbass; but this protection was necessary because of Kiev’s desire to go through a confrontation to enter NATO. The extension of NATO is therefore only the indirect cause of the conflict in Ukraine. The latter could have spared itself this ordeal by implementing the Minsk Agreements—but what we wanted was a defeat for Russia.

    In 2008, Russia intervened in Georgia to protect the Russian minority then being bombed by its government, as confirmed by the Swiss ambassador, Heidi Tagliavini, who was responsible for investigating this event. In 2014, many voices were raised in Russia to demand intervention when the new regime in Kiev had engaged its army against the civilian population of the five autonomist oblasts (Odessa, Dnepropetrovsk, Kharkov, Lugansk and Donetsk) and applied a fierce repression. In 2022, it could be expected that the population of Russia would not understand the government’s inaction, after no efforts were made from the Ukrainian and Western sides to enforce the Minsk Agreements. They knew that they did not have the means to launch an economic retaliation. But they also knew that an economic war against Russia would inevitably backfire on Western countries.

    An important element of Russian military and political thinking is its legalistic dimension. The way our media present events, systematically omitting facts that could explain, justify, legitimize or even legalize Russia’s actions. We tend to think that Russia is acting outside any legal framework. For example, our media present the Russian intervention in Syria as having been decided unilaterally by Moscow; whereas it was carried out at the request of the Syrian government, after the West had allowed the Islamic State to move closer to Damascus, as confessed by John Kerry, then Secretary of State. Nevertheless, there is never any mention of the occupation of eastern Syria by American troops, who were never even invited there!

    We could multiply the examples, to which our journalists will counter with the war crimes committed by Russian forces. This may well be true, but the simple fact that these accusations are not based on any impartial and neutral investigation (as required by humanitarian doctrine), nor on any international one, since Russia is systematically refused participation, casts a shadow over the honesty of these accusations. For example, the sabotage of the Nord Stream 1 and 2 gas pipelines was immediately attributed to Russia, which was accused of violating international law.

    In fact, unlike the West, which advocates a “rules-based international order,” the Russians insist on a “law-based international order.” Unlike the West, they will apply the law to the letter. No more, no less.

    The legal framework for Russia’s intervention in Ukraine has been meticulously planned. As this subject has already been covered in one of my previous books, I will not go into details here…

    ****

    The Objectives and Strategy of Russia

    On February 23, 2023, Swiss military “expert” Alexandre Vautravers commented on Russia’s objectives in Ukraine:

    The aim of the Special Military Operation was to decapitate Ukrainian political and military governance in the space of five, ten, maybe even two weeks. The Russians then changed their plan and their objectives with a number of other failures; so they change their objectives and their strategic orientations almost every week or every month.

    The problem is that our “experts” themselves define Russia’s objectives according to what they imagine, only to be able to say that it has not achieved them. So. Let us get back to the facts.

    On February 24, 2022, Russia launched its “Special Military Operation” (SMO) in Ukraine “at short notice.” In his televised address, Vladimir Putin explained that its strategic objective was to protect the population of Donbass. This objective can be broken down into two parts:

    • “demilitarize” the Ukrainian armed forces regrouped in the Donbass in preparation for the offensive against the DPR and LPR; and
    • “denazify” (i.e. “neutralize”) the ultra-nationalist and neo-Nazi paramilitary militias in the Mariupol area.

    The formulation chosen by Vladimir Putin has been very poorly analyzed in the West. It is inspired by the 1945 Potsdam Declaration, which envisaged the development of defeated Germany according to four principles: demilitarization, denazification, democratization and decentralization.

    The Russians understand war from a Clausewitzian perspective: war is the pursuit of politics by other means. This then means that they seek to transform operational successes into strategic successes, and military successes into political objectives. So, while the demilitarization evoked by Putin is clearly linked to the military threat to the populations of the Donbass in application of the decree of March 24, 2021, signed by Zelensky.

    But this objective conceals a second: the neutralization of Ukraine as a future NATO member. This is what Zelensky understood when he proposed a resolution to the conflict in March 2022. At first, his proposal was supported by Western countries, probably because at this stage they believed that Russia had failed in its bid to take over Ukraine in three days, and that it would not be able to sustain its war effort because of the massive sanctions imposed on it. But at the NATO meeting of March 24, 2022, the Allies decided not to support Zelensky’s proposition.

    Nevertheless, on March 27, Zelensky publicly defended his proposal and on March 28, as a gesture of support for this effort, Vladimir Putin eased the pressure on the capital and withdrew his troops from the area. Zelensky’s proposal served as the basis for the Istanbul Communiqué of March 29, 2022, a ceasefire agreement as a prelude to a peace agreement. It was this document that Vladimir Putin presented in June 2023, when an African delegation visited Moscow. It was Boris Johnson’s intervention that prompted Zelensky to withdraw his proposal, exchanging peace and the lives of his men for support “for as long as it takes.”

    This version of events—which I have already presented in my previous works—was finally confirmed in early November 2023 by David Arakhamia, then chief negotiator for Ukraine196. He explained that Russia had never intended to seize Kiev.

    In essence, Russia agreed to withdraw to the borders of February 23, 2022, in exchange for a ceiling on Ukrainian forces and a commitment not to become a NATO member, along with security guarantees from a number of countries….

    Two conclusions can be drawn:

    • Russia’s objective was not to conquer territory. If the West had not intervened to push Zelensky to withdraw his offer, Ukraine would probably still have its army.
    • While the Russians intervened to ensure the security and protection of the population of the Donbass, their SMO enabled them to achieve a broader objective, which involves Russia’s security.

    This means that, although this objective is not formulated, the demilitarization of Ukraine could open the door to its neutralization. This is not surprising since, conversely, in an interview with the Ukrainian channel Apostrof’ on March 18, 2019, Volodymyr Zelensky’s advisor Oleksei Arestovitch cynically explains that, because Ukraine wants to join NATO, it will have to create the conditions for Russia to attack Ukraine and be definitively defeated.

    The problem is that Ukrainian and Western analysis is fueled by their own narratives. The conviction that Russia will lose has meant that no alternative contingency has been prepared. In September 2023, the West, beginning to see the collapse of this narrative and its implementation, tried to move towards a “freeze” in the conflict, without taking into account the opinion of the Russians, who dominate on the ground.

    Yet Russia would have been satisfied with a situation such as that proposed by Zelensky in March 2022. What the West wants in September 2023 is merely a pause until an even more violent conflict breaks out, after Ukrainian forces have been rearmed and reconstituted.

    ****

    Ukrainian Strategy

    The strategic objective of Volodymyr Zelensky and his team is to join NATO, as a prelude to a brighter future within the EU. It complements that of the Americans (and therefore of the Europeans). The problem is that tensions with Russia, particularly over Crimea, are causing NATO members to put off Ukraine’s participation. In March 2022, Zelensky revealed on CNN that this is exactly what the Americans told him.

    Before coming to power in April 2019, Volodymyr Zelensky’s discourse was divided between two antagonistic policies: the reconciliation with Russia promised during his presidential campaign and his goal of joining NATO. He knows that these two policies are mutually exclusive, as Russia does not want to see NATO and its nuclear weapons installed in Ukraine and wanted neutrality or non-alignment.

    What is more, he knows that his ultra-nationalist allies will refuse to negotiate with Russia. This was confirmed by Praviy Sektor leader Dmitro Yarosh, who openly threatened him with death in the Ukrainian media a month after his election. Zelensky therefore knew from the start of the election campaign that he would not be able to fulfill his promise of reconciliation, and that there was only one solution left: confrontation with Russia.

    But this confrontation could not be waged by Ukraine alone against Russia, and it would need the material support of the West. The strategy devised by Zelensky and his team was revealed before his election in March 2019 by Oleksei Arestovitch, his personal advisor, on the Ukrainian media Apostrof’. Arestovitch explained that it would take an attack by Russia to provoke an international mobilization that would enable Ukraine to defeat Russia once and for all, with the help of Western countries and NATO. With astonishing precision, he described the course of the Russian attack as it would unfold three years later, between February and March 2022. Not only did he explain that this conflict was unavoidable if Ukraine is to join NATO, but he also placed this confrontation in 2021-2022! He outlined the main areas of Western aid:

    In this conflict, we will be very actively supported by the West. Weapons. Equipment. Assistance. New sanctions against Russia. Most likely, the introduction of a NATO contingent. A no-fly zone, and so on. In other words, we won’t lose it.

    As we can see, this strategy has much in common with the one described by the RAND Corporation at the same time. So much so, in fact, that it is hard not to see it as a strategy strongly inspired by the United States. In his interview, Arestovitch singled out four elements that would become the pillars of the Ukrainian strategy against Russia, and to which Zelensky returned regularly:

    • International aid and arms supplies,
    • International sanctions,
    • NATO intervention,
    • Creation of a no-fly zone.

    It should be noted that these four pillars are understood by Zelensky as promises whose fulfillment is essential to the success of this strategy. In February 2023, Oleksiy Danilov, Secretary of Ukraine’s Defense and National Security Council, declared in The Kyiv Independent that Ukraine’s objective was the disintegration of Russia. The mobilization of Western countries to supply Ukraine with heavy weapons then seems to give substance to this objective, which is consistent with what Oleksiy Arestovich had declared in March 2019.

    A few months later, however, it became clear that the equipment supplied to Ukraine was not sufficient to ensure the success of its counter-offensive, and Zelensky asked for additional, better-adapted equipment. At this point, there was a certain amount of Western irritation at these repeated demands. Former British Defense Minister Ben Wallace declared that Westerners “are not Amazon.” In fact, the West does not respect its commitments.

    Contrary to what our media and pseudo-military experts tell us, since February 2022, it has been clear that Ukraine cannot defeat Russia on its own. As Obama put it, “Russia [there] will always be able to maintain its escalation dominance.” In other words, Ukraine will only be able to achieve its goals with the involvement of NATO countries. This means that its fate will depend on the goodwill of Western countries. So, we need to maintain a narrative that encourages the West to keep up this effort. This narrative will then become what we call, in strategic terms, its “center of gravity.”

    As the months went by, the course of operations showed that the prospect of a Ukrainian victory was becoming increasingly remote, as Russia, far from being weakened, was growing stronger, militarily and economically. Even General Christopher Cavoli, Supreme American Commander Europe (SACEUR), told a US congressional committee that “Russia’s air, naval, space, digital and strategic capabilities have not suffered significant degradation during this war.”

    The West, expecting a short conflict, is no longer able to maintain the effort promised to Ukraine. The NATO summit in Vilnius (July 11-12, 2023) ended in partial success for Ukraine. Its membership is postponed indefinitely. Its situation is even worse than it was at the beginning of 2022, since there is no more justification for its entry into NATO than there was before the SMO.

    Ukraine then turned its attention to a more concrete objective: regaining sovereignty over its entire 1991 territory.

    Thus, the Ukrainian notion of “victory” rapidly evolved. The idea of a “collapse of Russia” quickly faded, as did that of its dismemberment. There was talk of “regime change,” which Zelensky made his objective by forbidding any negotiations as long as Vladimir Putin was in power. Then came the reconquest of lost territories, thanks to the counter-offensive of 2023. But here, too, hopes quickly faded. The plan was simply to cut the Russian forces in two, with a thrust towards the Sea of Azov. But by September 2023, this objective had been reduced to the liberation of three cities.

    In the absence of concrete successes, narrative remains the only element Ukraine can rely on to maintain Western attention and willingness to support it. For, as Ben Wallace, ex-Defence Minister, put it in The Telegraph on October 1, 2023: “The most precious commodity is hope.” True enough. But Western appraisal of the situation must be based on realistic analyses of the adversary. However, since the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis, Western analyses have been based on prejudice.

    ****

    The Notion of Victory

    Russia operates within a framework of Clausewitzian thinking, in which operational successes are exploited for strategic ends. Operational strategy (“operative art”) therefore plays an essential role in the definition of what is considered a victory.

    As we saw during the battle of Bakhmut, the Russians adapted perfectly to the strategy imposed on Ukraine by the West, which prioritizes the defense of every square meter. The Ukrainians thus played into the hands of the attrition strategy officially announced by Russia. Conversely, in Kharkov and Kherson, the Russians preferred to cede territory in exchange for the lives of their men. In the context of a war of attrition, sacrificing potential in exchange for territory, as Ukraine is doing, is the worst strategy of all.

    This is why General Zaluzhny, commander of the Ukrainian forces, tried to oppose Zelensky and proposed withdrawing his forces from Bakhmut. But in Ukraine, it is the Western narrative that guides military decisions. Zelensky preferred to follow the path laid out for him by our media, in order to retain the support of Western opinion. In November 2023, General Zaluzhny had to openly admit that this decision was a mistake, because prolonging the war will only favor Russia.

    The Ukrainian conflict was inherently asymmetrical. The West wanted to turn it into a symmetrical conflict, proclaiming that Ukraine’s capabilities could be enough to topple Russia. But this was clearly wishful thinking from the outset, and its sole purpose was to justify non-compliance with the Minsk Agreements. Russian strategists have turned it into an asymmetrical conflict.

    Ukraine’s problem in this conflict is that it has no rational relationship with the notion of victory. By comparison, the Palestinians, who are aware of their quantitative inferiority, have switched to a way of thinking that gives the simple act of resisting a sense of victory. This is the asymmetrical nature of the conflict that Israel has never managed to understand in 75 years, and which it is reduced to overcoming through tactical superiority rather than strategic finesse. In Ukraine, it is the same phenomenon. By clinging to a notion of victory linked to the recovery of territory, Ukraine has locked itself into a logic that can only lead to defeat.

    On November 20, 2023, Oleksiy Danilov, Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council, painted a gloomy picture of Ukrainian prospects for 2024. His speech showed that Ukraine had neither a plan to emerge from the conflict, nor an approach that would associate a sense of victory with that emergence: he was reduced to linking Ukraine’s victory to that of the West. In the West, however, the end of the conflict in Ukraine is increasingly perceived as a military, political, human and economic debacle.

    In an asymmetrical situation, each protagonist is free to define his or her own criteria for victory, and to choose from a range of criteria under his or her control. This is why Egypt (1973), Hezbollah (2006), the Islamic State (2017), the Palestinian resistance since 1948 and Hamas in 2023 are victorious, despite massive losses. This seems counter-intuitive to a Western mind, but it is what explains why Westerners are unable to really “win” their wars.

    In Ukraine, the political leadership has locked itself into a narrative that precludes a way out of the crisis without losing face. The asymmetrical situation now working to Ukraine’s disadvantage stems from a narrative that has been confused with reality, and has led to a response that is ill-suited to the nature of the Russian operation [end]

    The original article

    Jacques Baud was a member of the Swiss strategic intelligence, a specialist of Eastern European and a former head of the United Nations peace operations doctrine. In NATO, he was involved in programs in Ukraine in 2014 and 2017

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    The Atlanticist defeat in Donbass and Ukraine

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  • [Sharing] The EU Is Willing to Go to War Over Lithium? – Phil Butler, New Eastern Outlook

    The riddle of unhinged EU support for the Zelensky regime in Kyiv is now solved. Anyone inclined can unravel why the Germans, in particular, backstabbed Russia in the Minsk peace boondoggle. Lithium.

    Energy Monitor’s parent company, GlobalData, recently released a report showing that Europe’s biggest lithium reserves lie in the Donbass region of Russia. The former Ukrainian Shevchenkivske field in the Donetsk region and the Kruta Balka block in the Zaporizhzhia region are now part of Russia. These reserves add tremendously to Russia’s humongous Lithium deposits (now 1.5M metric tons) and solidify the country’s top ten position globally. If we consider other BRICS nations’ reserves, including China (2M metric tons), EU industry is at a leverage point.

    What’s most significant about this is that the EU, and Germany in particular, desperately need the rare mineral to manufacture green energy technologies such as wind turbines, electric vehicles, and a wide variety of electronic devices. This text from the Critical Minerals Thematic Intelligence Report overview is telling:

    “Critical minerals are key to transitioning to a low-carbon world. There are over 70 countries globally that have set net-zero targets and pledged to lower their emissions. However, these widespread measures for a greener future are straining natural resources, especially the minerals required to produce energy transition technologies such as electric vehicles (EVs) and solar panels…”

    The report goes on to reveal how these rare minerals are monopolized by just a few regions and how supply chain problems affect their recovery and distribution. In short, if Europe does not procure more Lithium, the energy transition EU President Ursula von der Leyen toots her horn about every other day will either be delayed or made unfeasible because of demand shortages.

    While the United States, Australia, and a few Latin American countries hold the lion’s share of Lithium reserves, EU access to these supplies will be expensive. In addition, the U.S. and these emerging nations will surely use the biggest part of their reserves for domestic needs.

    The demand (need) for European Lithium supply is so intense, German CDU MP Roderich Kiesewetter came right out and admitted the Russia-Ukraine conflict is all about the 500,000 tons or more of the mineral under the ground of the Donbass region. Kiesewetter said, “The European Union supports Ukraine because of lithium deposits in the Donbass.” The politician also took note of the Donbass being part of Russia now, means Berlin’s dependence on Moscow.

    Kiesewetter, a retired colonel, is also suggesting that Germany provide Zelensky’s regime with the highly accurate Taurus cruise missiles, which have a 500km range. The Swedish/German air-launched missile carries a 1,100-pound warhead and is essentially a bunker-buster type weapon. The missiles would be far more useful for Zelensky’s remaining Nazi battalions than a few rusty old Leopard tanks. What the MP’s statements mean, however, is that Germany and the EU intend on taking Ukraine’s vast resources by force now. The Euromaidan Coup only got the Western elites’ feet in the door, and now the singular order has few options left since the failed Ukraine offensive.

    The EU commissars are in the process of slitting their own throats. Just the other day, the commission passed another round of sanctions aimed at Russia’s luxury diamond exports to the bloc. This will not affect the average EU citizen, but the upper-middle class and the wealthy will have to fork over more Euros to get pretty round diamonds. The Americans (or British) blowing up the gas pipelines, the potential for grain shortages in the EU, and other key minerals Russia and nations friendly to her export begin to take their toll on an already shaky confederation of member states.

    Consider what EU member states manufacture and export to elevate their GNP. In the lists here, you’ll click on two vital exports. Cars and/or refined petroleum are vital to every country. Cars are, by far, the biggest import and export commodities. So, when these autos finally go electric, just imagine how desperate EU industry and consumers will be for Lithium! The Europeans will flounder if forced to import quantities of this strategic mineral from distant sources that have their own batteries to make. If there is a WWIII over the Russia/Ukraine situation, I am sure we’ll be able to name it “The Great Lithium War.” [end]

    The original article

    Phil Butler, is a policy investigator and analyst, a political scientist and expert on Eastern Europe, he’s an author of the recent bestseller “Putin’s Praetorians” and other books. He writes exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

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