Nicolas Cinquini

Analista senior di l'intelligenza in u campu di a gestione di i risichi di sicurezza, sò un anzianu tenente detective è ufficiale di l'intelligenza in l'agenzie di u Statu francese. A bona pronuncia hè Николай Чинкуини, in russu

Category: social struggles

  • [Partage] La bourgeoisie n’a plus les moyens intellectuels, ni culturels, de sa domination de classe – Harold Bernat, Quartier Général

    Longtemps la culture de classe, une culture bourgeoise, a fait le travail pour tenir les hommes en respect et créer les conditions d’une humanisation partagée. Nous assistons pourtant, particulièrement en Europe, spécialement en France, à son exténuation. Une révolution culturelle à bas bruit est en train de tout emporter. Aussi bien l’humanisme abstrait issu des Lumières que le romantisme de réaction, à la fois les philosophies bourgeoises de l’arrachement à la nature que les philosophies bourgeoises de la renaturalisation de l’homme dans une histoire, une langue, une culture. En un mot, une crise sans précédent de la culture de classe dans sa fonction pratico-sociale d’institution des sociétés humaines. Cette crise emporte aussi bien la gauche que la droite pour ceux qui aiment les petits repères simplistes. Mes repères seront Kant et De Maistre.

    Culture de masse, culture populaire, culture mondaine, culture de cour, culture artistique, culture du génie, culture humaniste, culture romantique, nous parlons toujours d’une culture de classe qui tenait en respect les hommes et les peuples. Culture pourvoyeuse de sens, de significations imaginaires, d’un ordre socialisé. Tordons d’abord le cou à une croyance naïve qui consiste à penser qu’il existe une culture populaire spontanée et autonome qui ne serait pas une culture de classe ou que cette culture populaire serait écrasée, inhibée, par une culture de masse tombée du ciel de l’industrie culturelle elle-même produite par une classe dominante. Il n’y a pas et il n’y aura jamais de culture spontanée qui émanerait de la terre qui ne ment pas ou de l’esprit d’un peuple spontanément disponible pour une transcription littérale. Comme si la culture n’exigeait aucune maîtrise, aucun travail, aucune exigence, aucune verticalité. La culture serait, dans sa généalogie populaire, d’ailleurs largement mythifiée par la réaction à l’humanisme abstrait, une force disponible depuis le bas. Elle pousserait en continu, fond obscur localisé géographiquement et historiquement mais impensable rationnellement. Ce mythe feint d’oublier que la culture procède toujours du haut vers le bas, elle est descendante.

    Arnold Hauser a pu établir, en 1974, dans un excellent livre intitulé Fondements de la sociologie de l’art, qu’aucune forme d’art n’était réellement collective et d’emblée socialisée. Il en va de même de la création culturelle. Chaque forme culturelle particulière prend sa source dans une création individuelle qui se déploie ensuite dans une communauté qui peut se l’approprier a posteriori. La faire sienne. Ce n’est pas parce que l’auteur d’une chanson populaire est anonyme qu’il n’est pas issu d’une classe sociale lettrée. Hauser explique par exemple que le « genre épique  populaire » était le fait d’érudits. Il en va de même pour les idylles du Moyen-âge ou les recueils de proverbes dits « populaires ». Comme le rappelle Juan José Sebreli dans La modernité assiégée, Critique du relativisme culturel (Delga, 2020), cette compréhension de classe a prévalu dans toutes les cultures. « La sculpture africaine – tant vantée par les populistes – fut anonyme et là aussi non spontanée ; les sculpteurs noirs appartenaient à des castes consacrées au métier. » Seul le regard colonialiste sur ces œuvres a pu y voir l’expression d’un primitivisme spontanéiste. La plupart de ces œuvres étaient d’ailleurs contemporaines des collectionneurs parisiens, surréalistes, marchands d’art, amateurs alors qu’ils y voyaient l’expression naïve et innocente d’une humanité disparue. Méprise d’une classe qui ne peut pas reconnaître chez l’autre la même logique de classe sans se juger elle-même. Effet miroir pour mieux se persuader qu’il est toujours possible de saisir la culture à son état natif, originaire, primitif. La mauvaise conscience bourgeoise fantasme l’altérité pour s’oublier elle-même. Elle rencontre en réalité d’autres hiérarchies, d’autres verticalités. Une autre culture de classe. Illusion ethnocentrique et incompréhension de la logique de classe de la création culturelle. En d’autres termes, la culture, celle qui donne un sens à nos vies humaines, celle qui structure nos existences, « populaire » ou « élitiste », celle dont on ne peut pas se passer sous peine de dépérir, procède toujours du haut vers le bas. La culture est descendante. Ce n’est ni un mal, ni un bien mais un fait anthropologique. La question est donc de savoir ce qui descend encore quand la classe dominante est culturellement exténuée.

    La compréhension de ce fait anthropologique fondamental est essentielle pour saisir la crise de la culture de classe qui est en train de déployer toutes ses conséquences politiques en Europe. Lorsque nous parlons des Lumières, de l’universalisme, d’humanisme ou de la réaction aux Lumières, de romantisme, de particularismes culturels, nous nous situons toujours dans une culture de classe descendante. Kant et De Maistre étaient des bourgeois et leur représentation du monde une représentation de classe. Cela ne veut pas dire qu’ils pensaient mal. Le premier envisage l’homme dans sa capacité originaire à s’arracher à tout particularisme culturel pour signifier son humanité, le second ne pense l’humanité que dans son attachement à des particularités culturelles. Fer de lance de la réaction en France à la fin du XVIIIe siècle, ce dernier écrit, dans ses Considérations sur la France en 1796 : « J’ai vu, dans ma vie des Français, des Italiens, des Russes etc. Je sais même grâce à Montesquieu qu’on peut être Persan mais quant à l’homme, je déclare ne jamais l’avoir rencontré de ma vie ; s’il existe, c’est bien à mon, insu. » Les deux présupposent une culture qui puisse faire sens pour l’homme en tant qu’homme (Kant) ou l’homme en tant que Français, Italien, Russe, pour de Maistre. Tous deux produisent des représentations culturelles extrêmement sophistiquées de l’homme. Ils œuvrent pour donner un sens à la vie humaine. Il est évidemment possible de défendre l’héritage des Lumières et l’humanisme abstrait contre la réaction et l’humanité située, voire de composer dialectiquement avec les deux, ce qu’essaiera de faire Hannah Arendt dans La crise de la culture mais dans les deux cas nous avons affaire à une classe sociale qui n’est pas indifférente culturellement à l’édification d’un sens pour l’homme, une classe sociale bourgeoise qui fait de la question de l’homme une nécessité pour elle, une classe qui œuvre.

    Il ne faut pas regretter ce fait social mais partir de lui pour comprendre que l’effondrement anthropologique dont nous parlons aujourd’hui et exclusivement l’effondrement des capacités de la classe dominante, bourgeoise en l’occurrence, à produire encore des individualités capables de créer une culture susceptible d’organiser nos significations sociales, de leur donner un sens. La classe sociale dominante est désoeuvrée. Elle jouit mais ne pense plus, ne crée plus rien. Ce n’est pas que sa parole ne soit plus entendue comme elle cherche pourtant à nous le faire croire. Ce n’est pas non plus que des « populismes » soient sortis spontanément du siècle pour menacer l’ordre social en faisant peser la menace du chaos et de l’anomie. Ces mythes réactionnaires, car ce sont des mythes en réaction d’une impuissance propre, ne sont pas destinés aux peuples qu’ils semblent viser. Ce sont autant d’aveux d’impuissance. « Ne pouvant plus faire descendre une quelconque culture du haut vers le bas, étant incapables de signifier quoi que ce soi, étant engagés dans un survivalisme indifférents aux domaines de l’homme, nous ne pouvons que nous défier brutalement de ce qui nous menace. » Voilà ce qui devrait être énoncé par cette classe qui n’assume plus son rôle, pire, qui en est intellectuellement incapable. En France, elle a cherché à promouvoir une imposture en « président philosophe ». Elle sent en effet confusément que les références qui ont pu lui donner la légitimité d’une domination indiscutable lui échappent désormais. Elle recycle par conséquent les signifiés des Lumières, de la philosophie mais il n’y a plus rien derrière. Le néant. Tout un appareil médiatique est alors nécessaire pour promouvoir ce simulacre dans le temps, le faire tenir. Mais cela ne tient pas, cela ne tient plus. Le « président philosophe » n’était qu’une gidouille grotesque.

    Il faut bien comprendre que la bourgeoisie de connivence, nous parlons d’elle, n’a plus que des dadais incultes à offrir en spectacle pour armée de réserve. Elle n’a plus les ressources intellectuelles de sa prétention sociale à la domination. Elle n’est plus capable de gagner, par sa force culturelle propre, sa légitimité politique et sociale. Ne lui reste que la brutalité. Cette impuissance manifeste est évidemment la raison première d’une surenchère défensive de la part de bourgeois culturellement stériles. Cette brutalité est un symptôme. Il s’agit même du symptôme le plus manifeste d’une classe qui a perdu toute vocation à gouverner.

    Le phénomène premier est l’effondrement sidérant des classes dominantes. Culturellement, elles sont aujourd’hui incapables de faire ce qu’elles ont toujours fait : organiser la vie humaine en créant des significations imaginaires fécondes pour le plus grand nombre. Leur stérilité stérilise du haut vers le bas. Avec une haine farouche et une méticulosité d’experts, les classes sociales supérieures au pouvoir – ce mot en devient ridicule tant la misère spirituelle y est profonde et la corruption d’une bassesse odieuse – se sont évertuées depuis des années, des décennies, à détruire les espaces, les lieux, les supports qui rendaient possible la compréhension d’un problème qui nous concerne tous : sommes-nous encore capables de signifier ce qui nous arrive ? Avec Kant, De Maistre, Arendt, à ta guise. En guise d’économies justement, proposition vient d’être faite de fermer l’Université de Bordeaux-Montaigne, une semaine en mars 2025. Nous en sommes-là, en France. Cet exemple vaudra pour la myriade de destructions qui prend aujourd’hui le doux nom de progressisme. Il se trouve que le macronisme, cette bouillie salement managériale et prédatrice du commun, cornaquée sans direction par des drogués d’eux-mêmes, n’a fait qu’accélérer la tendance. Ces agents spécialisés du vide demandent encore, dans une fuite en avant qui signe leur démence, un surcroît d’accélération dans le vide. Au nom de l’Europe, de la paix ou des jeux olympiques, allez savoir. La devise Shadoks est appliquée à la lettre : « quand on ne sait pas où l’on va, autant y aller le plus vite possible ». Si au moins ces turbo-zombies proposaient comme chemin à suivre une pataphysique joyeusement désespérée, il y aurait encore quelque chose à penser. La stérilité de cette classe donneuse de leçons la rend pourtant incapable en tout.

    Entendons-nous bien. Il y a toujours eu et il y aura toujours des contradictions humaines et ce n’est pas à une classe qui vit aussi des contradictions sociales qu’elle exploite de les régler. Il y aura toujours malfaçon et l’existence de l’homme est de part en part tragique. La condition humaine est ainsi faite. Mais cette malfaçon doit pouvoir se dire, s’exposer, se penser. Toujours. Elle doit pouvoir, d’une époque à l’autre, ajuster ses institutions en fonction des représentations que l’homme se donne à lui-même. Avant d’accuser le « populisme » d’un tel, ou le « complotisme » d’un autre, avant de décider de ne pas penser, il est toujours préférable de se demander pourquoi le bas se défie à ce point du haut. Mieux encore, reste-t-il un haut ? Pour quelles raisons en sommes-nous là, à ce point de brutalité ? Pourquoi des hommes se retrouvent éborgnés alors qu’ils demandent à être reconnus en tant que citoyens ? Il y a bien adresse, demande, attente. Mais la réponse apportée par cette nouvelle classe du vide, culturellement stérile, ne vaut plus rien. Un monologue narcissique, un grand débat autour du nombril président, un pignolage, un néant. Ce n’est pas que les hommes ne l’entendent pas, c’est que la réponse n’est plus une parole. Elle ne fait plus sens, il n’y a donc rien à entendre. C’est un bruit de classe, un bruit de bouche, un bruit de bottes. Il ne s’agit plus de faire droit mais d’imposer son droit, dans le vide, sans justification. « Ordre, ordre, ordre ». Ordre d’un droit qui n’est plus que ordre.

    Alors que faire ? Accepter cette révolution à bas bruits qui est en train de nous emporter vers un autre horizon. Nous situer déjà après elle, la dépasser. Pour reprendre le mot de Pasolini dans Les lettres luthériennes en 1975, « les mutations anthropologiques sont irréversibles ». Les mutations du capitalisme ont profondément transformé les classes dominantes et par conséquent les formes culturelles qu’elles ont pu produire. Il n’y aura pas de retour en arrière. Lorsque nous témoignons du vide brutal et de la bêtise obscène de ce qui est supposé occuper le haut de la stratification sociale, nous n’avons aucun espoir d’un changement de la part de ceux que l’on vise. La nullité des dadais de la bourgeoisie incestueuse n’a pas à être corrigée. Elle est fatale. Ce serait d’ailleurs se méprendre sur nos intentions réelles. Il s’agit plutôt d’intérioriser le constat de cette nullité historique, inédite, tout en faisant valoir, face à elle, ce qui est vital pour nous. Oui, cela surprendra les plus nihilistes et les plus résignés, les plus drogués et les plus faux, nous avons encore des exigences à faire valoir en face du vide et de la nullité. Peut-être avons-nous à apprendre à ne plus frémir devant ce vide de significations venu d’en haut. Nous avons encore du chemin à faire de ce côté-là. Comme si, habitués depuis trop longtemps à recueillir une culture produite par d’autres, nous n’arrivions pas vraiment à mesurer à quel point nous avons encore à expérimenter ce vide, à le parcourir, à le signifier, pour nous.

    « En dépit de notre nullité manifeste, si nous ne sommes plus là, que vous restera-t-il ? » Tel serait le chantage warholien ultime de cette classe désoeuvrée. Ce chantage ne tient que par notre manque de force pour nous nommer, pour être nous-mêmes les dépositaires des signes susceptibles de nous signifier. C’est aussi ce qu’on appelle encore une culture de classe. La nôtre […]

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  • [Sharing] ‘Aiding chaos’: USAID’s role in engineering regime change, social unrest worldwide – Maryam Qarehgozlou, Press TV

    After President Donald Trump’s executive order suspending all US foreign aid programs, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) has again come under intense scrutiny

    This renewed attention casts a spotlight on USAID’s history of fomenting unrest and orchestrating “regime change” worldwide since it was established in 1961 by President John F. Kennedy.

    On January 21, on his first day back in office, Trump signed the order—among many others—to freeze funding for US foreign assistance for a 90-day review period to determine whether these programs align with his “America First” foreign policies.

    On January 25, the US State Department ordered a sweeping freeze on new funding for almost all US foreign assistance, exempting emergency food programs and military aid to Israel and Egypt.

    In fiscal year 2023, the US has disbursed $72 billion in assistance—approximately 1 percent of its budget—supporting programs in 204 countries and regions. These initiatives purportedly span various sectors, including disaster relief, health, and so-called pro-democracy endeavors.

    USAID, the agency responsible for implementing much of the US foreign aid program, is significantly impacted by Trump’s order. The directive effectively halts the agency’s current $42.8 billion budget allocated for global operations.

    Last week, reports revealed that many senior USAID officials were affected by furloughs, dismissals, and disciplinary leaves, amid an investigation into attempts to circumvent the executive order.

    In addition, several hundred Washington-based contractors and others around the world were laid off. On Saturday, the USAID website went offline. The agency’s computer servers were carted away.

    Trump administration has vowed to strip USAID of its independence as a government agency and place it under the State Department’s control, not to save taxpayer money but to spend it the way he deems fit, according to observers, including on the Tel Aviv regime and its lobbies. 

    Although it remains unclear whether the president possesses the legal authority to bypass Congress and order USAID’s merger into the State Department, Secretary of State Marco Rubio told reporters on Monday that he has been named acting director of USAID.

    On Monday, Trump stated that he doesn’t need Congress to scrap the agency. “Not when it comes to fraud. If there’s fraud, these people are lunatics,” Trump said.

    Billionaire tech mogul Elon Musk, who was appointed as head of the Department of Government Efficiency last month, said on Monday that Trump agreed the USAID needs to be “shut down.”

    “With regards to the USAID stuff, I went over it with (the president) in detail and he agreed that we should shut it down,” Musk said in an X Spaces conversation.

    On the same day a group of Senate and House Democrats, who are opposed to Trump’s efforts to shut down the agency, were blocked from entering the headquarters of the USAID.

    On Thursday, the Trump administration said it will keep 611 essential workers onboard at USAID out of a worldwide workforce that totals more than 10,000.

    Following a lawsuit by unions representing the USAID, US District Judge Carl Nichols on Friday temporarily allowed roughly 2,700 USAID employees put on leave by Trump’s administration to go back to work, pausing aspects of the plan to dismantle the agency

    ‘Arm of regime change’

    According to observers, there is a dark side to US-provided foreign aid, particularly involving USAID.

    Over the years, activists have frequently exposed the exploitation of USAID by successive US governments to push their nefarious agendas abroad. In numerous instances, the agency has served as a cover for US “regime change” plots in many countries, from Cuba to Syria to Venezuela. 

    Afshin Rattansi, British journalist and author, underscored that USAID functions as “an arm of regime change and subversion,” infiltrating societies in the Global South and inciting unrest against leaders who either refuse to comply with Washington’s economic or do not align with US foreign policy.

    “Millions in the global south will celebrate the end of this organization which created fake neoliberal revolutions for hire, to destroy real revolutionary movements and governments,” Rattansi wrote in a post on X, formerly Twitter, on Sunday.

    Furthermore, some activists perceived the move to suspend USAID funding as a direct affront to the interests of the “Deep State” to influence policy and pursue its own agendas.

    Independent journalist and documentary filmmaker James Li expressed this view on X.

    “The Trump admin is moving to shut down USAID. And the deep state is furious. Why? Because USAID isn’t really a ‘humanitarian aid agency’ — it’s a covert intelligence arm funding coups, protests & regime change,” he stated.

    USAID’s program in Cuba to foment rebellion

    As early as October 2009, a project overseen by USAID involved sending young people from Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Peru to Cuba under the guise of health and civic programs, with the covert intention of inciting rebellion.

    The travelers worked undercover, often posing as tourists, and traveled around the island scouting for people they could turn into political activists, an Associated Press investigation revealed in 2014.

    In one instance, the workers organized an HIV-prevention workshop, which internal memos obtained by the AP described as “the perfect excuse” to further the program’s hidden political objectives.

    USAID also created a fake Cuban Twitter platform, ZunZuneo, aiming to attract young users and gradually expose them to anti-government content to provoke protests

    However, the programs operated under USAID, which used its international aid work to cover its stealthy operations, didn’t appear to achieve their goals.

    The traveler’s program was launched when newly inaugurated President Barack Obama’s administration was talking about a “new beginning” with Cuba.

    USAID’s regime changes against Chavez, Maduro

    The USAID was known for funneling millions of dollars to opposition groups in efforts to overthrow Venezuelan presidents Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro from 2002 to the present.

    In 2002, the US sponsored a failed coup attempt against democratically-elected president Chavez, who was making major investments in social programs for Venezuelans while defying US demands.

    Although the George Bush administration attempted to distance itself from the coup, it promptly endorsed the government under businessman Pedro Carmona.

    However, the coup was dramatically reversed after 48 hours when Chavez’s supporters flooded the streets, demanding his return

    In 2013, WikiLeaks released a 2006 State Department cable outlining the Bush administration’s strategy to undermine Chavez by supporting so-called “pro-democracy” groups.

    The cable, signed by then-Ambassador William Brownfield in August 2004, described a five-point strategy including “penetrating Chavez’s political base,” “dividing Chavismo,” “protecting vital US business” and “isolating Chavez internationally.”

    Those goals were to be obtained by strengthening “democratic institutions,” according to the cable.

    Brownfield wrote that USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID/OTI) played a crucial role in this effort, saying that strengthening democratic institutions “represents the majority of USAID/OTI work in Venezuela.”

    “Organized civil society is an increasingly important pillar of democracy, one where President Chavez has not yet been able to assert full control.”

    American lawyer, writer, and journalist Eva Golinger noted that after failing to oust Chávez, USAID/OTI reoriented its funding, increased its budget and began focusing on crafting an opposition “youth movement” using new technologies like Twitter, Facebook, and other internet media to build an international campaign against the Venezuelan president.

    “From 2006 to 2010, more than 34 percent of USAID’s budget—which neared $15 million per year—was used to fund university programs, workshops, and other events to aid youth in building an anti-Chávez movement,” Golinger said.

    By 2010, external funding for West-backed opposition groups in Venezuela reportedly exceeded $57 million, primarily from USAID and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED)

    On Wednesday, Diosdado Cabello, the first vice president of Venezuela’s United Socialist Party (PSUV) said that several opposition leaders were involved in corruption scandals linked to the USAID.

    Cabello said that Juan Guaidó, Leopoldo López, and Carlos Vecchio, were involved in a scheme to misuse funds designated for humanitarian aid in an attempt to overthrow President Maduro.

    Cabello said that these leaders received substantial sums of money from USAID, with Guaidó receiving over $300 million, Vecchio around $160 million, and López $700 million.

    According to Cabello, these funds were used to finance a “regime change” operation instead of providing aid or assistance to the Venezuelan people.

    USAID and the 2014 Ukraine coup

    Former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych was illegitimately removed from office in a Western-backed coup in February 2014 in a plot engineered under the USAID program, according to observers.

    The coup was triggered by the Euromaidan or the Maidan Uprising, a wave of demonstrations and civil unrest in Ukraine, which began on November 21, 2013, with large protests in Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) in Kiev.

    The protests were sparked by Yanukovych’s decision not to sign the European Union–Ukraine Association Agreement, instead choosing closer ties to Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union.

    Documents suggest that before the Euromaidan, the USAID and NED provided significant funding to opposition groups and media in Ukraine.

    These reports have been confirmed by several US public figures, including former presidential candidate Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., filmmaker Oliver Stone, and defense expert from the Cato Institute, Ted Galen Carpenter.

    In an interview with journalist Tucker Carlson, Kennedy Jr., who is now the Health Secretary, said the CIA, operating through USAID, spent $5 billion to instigate the 2014 color revolution in Ukraine.

    “There are riots in Ukraine called Maidan, but we are not told that we are funding these riots. The newspapers never told us, our government never told us that USAID, which is a front for the CIA, has invested five billion dollars in funding these riots,” Kennedy Jr. said

    He added that these actions were carried out under the pretense of defending freedom and democracy in the country that has been embroiled in a devastating war for more than two years

    A leaked conversation between Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland and US Ambassador Geoffrey Pyatt in February 2014 further indicated US involvement in aiding the Ukrainian opposition.

    The audio clip exposed Nuland, weighing in on the makeup of the next Ukrainian government.

    Nuland was heard telling US Ambassador Geoffrey Pyatt that she doesn’t think Vitaly Klitschko, the boxer-turned-politician who is a main opposition leader, should be in a new government.

    The exchange validated suspicions of US involvement in shaping Ukraine’s political transition, intensifying debates about Western intervention in the country’s internal affairs.

    Bolivia expels USAID

    In 2013, Bolivian President Evo Morales kicked out the USAID for seeking to “conspire against” the Bolivian people and his government.

    According to Morales, USAID programs had “political rather than social” ends and were “manipulating” and “using” union leaders.

    Reports indicate that USAID was funding separatist movements in Bolivia’s richest provinces.

    According to USAID’s Bolivia website, the agency operated there since 1964 claiming to carry out health, sustainable development, and environmental programs.

    The agency stated that its 2011 budget for Bolivia amounted to $26.7

    USAID’s overthrow of Haiti’s leader

    USAID has also been implicated in the 1991 overthrow of Haiti’s democratically elected leader Jean-Bertrand Aristide.

    Evidence suggests that USAID backed opposition groups and death squads in the country, contributing to the destabilization of Aristide’s government and ultimately leading to his ouster.

    This involvement came to light following the coup, as it was revealed that USAID funds and resources had been used to support anti-Aristide groups, providing them with the means to undermine the government and sow discord

    These actions have been widely condemned as a blatant interference in Haiti’s internal affairs, disregarding the country’s democratic processes and sovereignty.

    The aftermath of Aristide’s removal saw Haiti plunge into political turmoil and violence, as various factions vied for power.

    This instability lasted for years, having long-lasting effects on the Haitian people and their prospects for a more prosperous future.

    USAID a front for ‘counterinsurgency operations’ in Afghanistan

    During the United States’ occupation of Afghanistan from 2001 to 2021, the USAID was reported to be “a front for counterinsurgency operations” while consolidating the occupation. 

    Aid workers mapped communities in the South Asian country, collected intelligence, and helped identify Taliban sympathizers for US drone strikes, reports said.

    In the 2010 report “Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan,” authored by Major General Michael T. Flynn and others, the authors highlighted the need for improved intelligence operations in Afghanistan.

    They emphasized the importance of understanding local socio-economic dynamics and suggested that information gathered by various entities, including aid groups, could be valuable for military operations

    Throughout the two decades of US military occupation in Afghanistan, thousands of civilians were killed in US drone strikes, and the perpetrators were never held accountable. 

    While the military has occasionally acknowledged responsibility for incidents involving airstrikes or ground raids that led to civilian casualties, no one was brought to justice.

    US-backed coup in Chile

    On September 11, 1973, Chile’s democratic process suffered a severe blow when Salvador Allende, South America’s first democratically elected president, was violently overthrown in a bloody coup led by General Augusto Pinochet.

    The United States primarily backed this coup, as according to analysts, Allende was perceived as a threat to the capitalist interests Washington sought to preserve in the region

    In the lead-up to the CIA-backed coup, USAID served as a channel for the spy agency to funnel millions of dollars into media campaigns and opposition groups that targeted Allende.

    This effort to undermine Allende’s presidency set the stage for the impending military takeover.

    Shortly before the September 1973 coup, Chile encountered bread shortages and requested credit from the United States to purchase 300,000 tons of wheat. The Richard Nixon administration denied this request, exacerbating economic turmoil and providing a pretext for the coup.

    Less than a month after the coup, on October 5, 1973, the Nixon administration extended $24.5 million in wheat credits to the Chilean Junta, which had seized power.

    In September 1974, President Gerald Ford defended the US role in the coup, asserting that it was “in the best interest of the people in Chile and certainly in our own best interests.”

    In 2011, the Chilean government acknowledged that more than 40,000 people had been murdered, disappeared, or tortured by the Pinochet dictatorship.

    USAID caught engineering a coup in Slovakia

    USAID, NED, and other NGOs have invested millions of dollars in Slovakia to manufacture protests, destabilize the government, and in favor of a pro-Western regime change.

    They have been caught funding Slovakian NGOs under the pretense of promoting “civil society” and “democracy promotion.”

    Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico has so far successfully countered attempts by foreign entities to destabilize his government. Fico maintains that the anti-government protests, which began last year, have been orchestrated by external forces.

    On Friday, Fico identified the Georgian National Legion, a military group associated with Ukraine’s war against Russia, as coordinating with the plotters.

    Reports suggest that up to one-third of the protesters are Ukrainian and other foreign nationals.

    Ukrainian media outlets are openly supporting the protests, with Kiev-linked organizations actively coordinating unrest. Western embassies have also been openly collaborating with opposition groups, a tactic reminiscent of previous color revolutions.

    On January 24, Slovakia’s General Health Insurance Company was hit by a cyberattack. Fico described the incident as a “textbook example” of pressure exerted on governments resisting Ukrainian and Western demands

    As Fico moved to limit NGO influence and deport foreign agents last May, a pro-Western assassin with connections to foreign-funded groups attempted to assassinate him.

    USAID funneled billions into Syria to topple Assad

    The USAID-backed regime change operation in Syria is considered one of the most extensive operations of the 21st century, ultimately leading to the overthrow of President Bashar al-Assad in 2024 by militant groups backed by the West and its regional allies.

    For over a decade, USAID, NED, and Western-backed NGOs played a central role in the foreign-instigated Syrian war, by financing opposition groups, crafting propaganda, and conducting intelligence operations under the guise of “humanitarian aid,” as reported by DD Geopolitics.

    USAID reportedly channeled more than $15 billion into the Arab country, covertly funding militant groups, mercenaries, opposition networks and various anti-government activities.

    One key group funded by USAID was the White Helmets, which was later exposed for its collaboration with the al-Qaeda terrorist group and the fabrication of propaganda videos to justify US intervention.

    Additionally, USAID provided logistical support to exiled opposition groups, assisting in the creation of a US-backed shadow government in the Arab country.

    President Assad’s government consistently pushed back against these foreign-backed attempts at destabilization. In 2014, Syria expelled several USAID-backed NGOs owing to their financial ties to insurgents.

    Two years later, the government exposed the collaboration between the USAID-funded White Helmets and various militant groups.

    Despite these efforts to push back against external interference, the US and its allies relentlessly pursued their objective to oust Assad.

    “NGOs are being used to destabilize Syria. They pretend to help, but in reality, they work for foreign intelligence services,” Assad said in 2018.

    USAID spends $600 million on anti-Russian media

    An X account with the handle @MyLordBobeo shared a passage, from a book or academic article, discussing US foreign policy concerning Russia and Venezuela and highlighting USAID’s role.

    The text focuses on political interventions and funding related to opposition efforts against the Venezuelan and Russian governments.

    The excerpt discussed the involvement of USAID in Venezuela, specifically highlighting its support for opposition leader Juan Guaidó in efforts to overthrow President Maduro.

    It stated that in 2019, USAID signed an agreement with Guaidó, providing $98 million in assistance.

    “In order to overthrow Venezuelan President Maduro and open up Venezuela and its oil reserves to US corporations, USAID signed an agreement with the US-backed opposition leader Guaidó in October 2019, according to which USAID will support Guaidó in his efforts to take power in Venezuela with 98 million dollars,” read the text, originally written in German.

    Additionally, the text references USAID’s budget allocation for “free media” to counter Russian influence, amounting to $598 million for 2020.

    “And because Russia does not want to hand over its oil to US corporations either, USAID has received a budget of 598 million dollars for 2020 alone to pay for “free media” that report anti-Russian and pro-Americans,” it added

    The citations to the Reuters and AP at the end suggest it might be part of a larger discussion on US influence in global politics, referencing specific news articles for support.

    Leaked doctrine on the use of USAID in economic warfare

    A leaked US Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) doctrine exposed the extent to which the US USES economic instruments, including USAID programs, as part of its unconventional warfare (UW) strategies.

    The document sheds light on the orchestrated interplay between various governmental entities, including the Army Special Operations Forces, the Department of State (DOS), the Intelligence Community (IC), the Department of Commerce (DOC), and USAID.

    According to the document, ARSOF is authorized to employ “measured and focused economic incentives and disincentives” across multiple levels to influence the behavior of “adversaries, allies, and surrogates.”

    Such economic maneuvers are executed under the guise of a carefully crafted and integrated unconventional warfare plan, it said.

    It highlights the need for ARSOF to work closely with the Department of State and the intelligence community to identify vulnerable groups in a targeted area and predict the potential outcomes of applying economic pressure

    USAID’s presence in foreign countries and its mission to engage with local populations provides an opportunity for the US to exert economic influence, it added.

    Similarly, it said, the Department of Commerce can use its connections with American companies operating overseas to further strategic objectives.

    The passage also underlines the significance of Information Operations (IO) in managing public perception of US unconventional warfare efforts. This includes anticipating and shaping the narrative around economic promises made (or unfulfilled) to maintain legitimacy.

    The leaked document offers an unprecedented glimpse into the US government’s orchestration of various agencies and resources, particularly USAID, to engage in economic warfare as a means to advance strategic objectives.

    This revelation raises critical questions about the covert use of humanitarian aid and development programs for ulterior political ends.

    “As clearly illustrated, USAID pretends to be about ‘democracy’ and ‘helping’ the world,” wrote journalist James Li in a post on X.

    “But in reality, it was always a covert tool of U.S. power — a front for CIA-backed regime change, election meddling, and civil destabilization disguised as ‘humanitarian aid,’” he added.

    El Salvador’s President Nayib Bukele has also said that cutting USAID funding would not only benefit the United States but also other countries around the world.

    He added that while USAID is marketed as a supporter of development, democracy, and human rights, a significant portion of its funds are channeled into opposition groups, politically motivated NGOs, and destabilizing movements.

    “Most governments don’t want USAID funds flowing into their countries because they understand where much of that money actually ends up,” Bukele wrote in a post on X on Sunday.

    “At best, maybe 10% of the money reaches real projects that help people in need (there are such cases), but the rest is used to fuel dissent, finance protests, and undermine administrations that refuse to align with the globalist agenda,” he added [end]

    The original article

    Related

    The Atlanticist defeat in Donbass and Ukraine

    chronicle of a new catastrophic NATO venture

    February 12, 2025: Tulsi Gabbard is Director of National Intelligence

    verbatim

    December 7, 2024: Abracadabra

    CNN journalists are wizards, able to transform a wanted Jihadist into a nice and moderate Syrian rebel, whose goal is to overthrow Bashar Assad

    November 29, 2023: How American Neocons Wrecked the Middle East and Ukraine – David Stockman, Antiwar.com

    This is part 2 of “Why There Is Still No Peace on Earth: Washington’s Folly From The Persian Gulf to Ukraine.”  Read part 1

  • [Sharing] The Fourth Reich demands peace and purges – Events in Ukraine, August 2, 2024

    Ukrainian hitlerites for ceasefire. Struggle between Zelenskyite opportunists and Azovite strategists. Poroshenko, Zaluzhny, Sodol. 100 million dollar bribes. The angry officers movement

    When it comes to hitler-loving military nationalists, you’d think they’d be lean more towards peace than a former comedian Jewish president who came to government on a peace platform, right? The reality is much more interesting

    Enter the fourth reich

    Tales of the IV Reich (now renamed Tales of the IV Empire), likely run by an Azov lieutenant, is characterized by more sobriety than other similar channels, which is why I love reading it

    Most interestingly, his posts often seem to hint at a sentiment among certain ‘army men’, that the 1991-borders slogan is unrealistic and is leading to the destruction of Ukraine’s finest nationalists through politically-motivated meat storms. Not without the insinuation, of course, that Zelensky is quite happy to see these dangerous competitors die.

    The fear of peace

    One of the reasons that Tales is worried about endless war is the political pressure it puts on the broader population, which has always been frustratingly disloyal to the aims of radical nationalism.

    Tales has always worried about popular demands for peace. Four days before February 24 2022, he was writing paranoid posts about how the west and Russia are trying to pressure Ukraine into implementing the Minsk peace agreements:

    Among the participants in the combat actions, I know many disappointed and disoriented people. Some are tired, some have not seen clear changes, some have started families. Not everyone is ready to take up arms again now. Such tendencies are detrimental in the current situation

    The implementation of the “Minsk” agreements into the Constitution of Ukraine is worse for us – the Ukrainian right-wing – than a full-scale war. We are accustomed to fighting the Russians – the thousand-year war of freedom-loving Eastern Europeans against the Tatar horde continues to this day. If the Ukrainian authorities are pressured by the Russians and [western – EIU] “partners”, we will get a “war zone” throughout the country. For us, the military veterans there will be no life in such a Ukraine. We will be under constant pressure from the system, with the possibility of being eliminated by amnestied separatist militants, and living in constant fear is not a life anyone wants

    If we fiercely resist the Russian army and unite the nation in the fight against the enemy, we cannot lose. Those who are burnt out and stay at home, in case of our defeat, will rot in prison or be killed. Some Ukrainians already believed the Bolsheviks in the 1920s and laid down their arms – they all either died of hunger or lived out their last years in camps

    To arms!

    On July 13, Tales published a telegram post in response to the calls by popular Ukrainian bloggers for peace through negotiations and compromise in response to Russian rocket strikes on the capital (see my post on the matter). He was also responding to the parliamentarian Artem Dmytruk, who vigorously supported the bloggers.

    Medvedchuk refers to the leader of Ukraine’s ‘Opposition Platform for Life’ party, whose main slogan was an end to the war through negotiations, until it was banned in 2022, along with the arrest and deportation of Medvedchuk.

    Here’s the post:

    If the war continues for another year, the population will bring the Dmytruks to power. So far, the Dmytruks are quite marginal. If it lasts two years, Medvedchuk will return here with the Russian flag. It’s simple

    Being in the [frontline] Zaporizhzhia steppes or the command posts of the Donetsk region, you become quite detached from the population: you don’t hear what ordinary citizens of Lviv, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia, or Kyiv are talking about and dreaming of. The fact that a huge number of people supported the Instabloggers (and how many were too embarrassed to write words of support?) irritates those who advocate for the continuation of the war. Because real people with open profiles wrote there, not Moscow bots. There are many of these people, and this must be taken into account. According to my observations, this number is increasing exponentially despite the fabricated results of sociological surveys

    The population sees corruption scandals. Constant loss of territories. Endless shelling. Inflation. Decline in the standard of living. Hundreds of new graves in cemeteries. Maimed veterans on the streets. Videos from the military registration and enlistment office. The West’s incomprehensible behavior. Now, there are also extremely uncomfortable conditions with power outages in +35°C heat and prospects of water supply cuts. This list can go on

    I’m surprised that people with higher education and quite a high level of intelligence do not see the pattern

    Hitlerite civil war

    In another recent post, he was openly pessimistic about Ukraine’s military prospects and its western allies:

    Once again, for a day, calls to “fight to victory” are spreading through social media following the terrorist attacks by Muscovites in Kyiv and Kryvyi Rih. Here are my thoughts in theses:

    1. Mobilization and a massive influx to the military registration and enlistment offices will not produce modern fighters, missile systems, or the latest strike UAVs. It won’t even add Patriot SAM systems and missiles to them. Unfortunately, even the mobilization of 10 million Ukrainians will not stop the takeoff of strategic fighters in Russia, will not destroy existing nuclear weapons, and will not significantly reduce the population of Russia, its natural resources, etc
    2. Strong entities respond to terrorist acts with double the force. Yesterday in Belgorod, in the evening, windows in residential buildings were shattered, one civilian died, two were slightly injured. Such a “response” personally shakes me with despair and hopelessness. I emphasize once again that our military capabilities can destroy everything living within a 100 km radius from the state border. Special thanks to the tactical level commanders who take responsibility for leveling the Shebekino and Rylsky districts of the Russian Federation. These are young officers up to the battalion commander level. In other words, this is the grassroots initiative of a conscious part of the army, there is no political will for such actions.
    3. We will not be invited to the NATO summit to join the alliance. We are not as cool as Albania. The topic of “Ukraine in NATO” will be a bargaining chip for many years, it will be a reason for wars and political crises. Moreover, in the coming days, NATO will solidify its impotence with a series of resolutions that will exclude the actual unilateral power of the United States in the alliance. The Western establishment is afraid of Trump coming to power, fearing that the war will end.
    4. NATO only needs to allocate 10% of its available weapons, which are gathering dust in warehouses since the alliance is not fighting anyone, and we would defeat the Muscovites. However, Western politicians are stretching this aid over the years, while hundreds of the best Ukrainians are dying and becoming disabled, and Ukrainian cities cease to exist because of the war. They have been juggling planes, high-precision MLRS, and missiles in front of the bloodied faces of Ukrainians for years

    Note also his praise for ‘tactical level commanders’ who take initiative in hitting Russian civilian targets. See my recent post about the Sodol drama for more on this emerging caste of young nationalists, which positions itself against the so-called ‘old corrupt Soviet general caste’.

    Anyway, given such sorry prospects for winning the war, Tales is clearly hinting that a ceasefire to regroup and strengthen defenses (as well as a good old-fashioned domestic purge) is a better idea than staying in the self-destructive meatgrinder.

    I’ve discussed on my substack Evgeny Dyky, the corpulent supposed ex-commander of the violent Aidar Batallion. Among his many achievements, he is also in charge of spending sizeable sums of money on Ukraine’s wartime antarctic research project (read about it here). Otherwise, he spends a great deal of time on the Ukrainian talk-show circuit, explaining viewers how Ukraine’s military industry is just getting started while that of Russia’s has already reached its final peak, and so on and on.

    Well, Dyky’s effusive optimism really annoys IV Reich. Yesterday, he posted this:

    ⚡️ An F-16 that managed to reach Ukraine crashed into a high-rise building in Nizhny Tagil (RF). The pilot was identified as Yevhen Dykyi, a military expert and former platoon commander of the Aidar Battalion (in 2015). According to preliminary reports, the fighter jet could not withstand the pilot’s weight. Another version suggests that the pilot’s unkempt homeless-like beard got tangled in the control stick

    Tales’ opinion on the 1991 borders slogan came out more clearly in March of this year. It all started in response to a hit-piece against a popular young commander by ‘the Centre for Countering of Disinformation’, a beautifully-named government-funded organ (my bolding). Here’s the hysterical hit-piece from the CCD:

    Center for Countering Disinformation - Wikipedia
    The CCD logo

    Recently, interviews with military personnel have gained immense popularity in the Ukrainian information space, where they talk about the problems they allegedly face at the front: lack of ammunition, incompetent command, mistakes of the country’s leadership, and so on

    A striking example of this is a recent interview with the commander of the K2 battalion, Kyrylo Veres, in which he claims that we will not be able to win this war, and his personal victory is when his battalion’s soldiers stop dying. Thus, he is effectively hinting at negotiations and freezing the conflict. Such statements are absolutely unacceptable – they contradict the task set by the Leader of our country: to reach the borders of 1991 at any cost

    Obviously, it is high time to move to healthy military censorship – military personnel should be prohibited from giving interviews. Endless whining about the lack of ammunition and “meat assaults” does not bring us any closer to victory but contributes to the spread of defeatist sentiments in society. Moreover, in reality, there are no “meat assaults” in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and the military personnel are fully provided with everything necessary to accomplish the assigned tasks

    We remind you that you can always get reliable information about what is happening at the front on the “Unified News” telethon

    Бои за Донбасс, зэки из ЧВК, зима на фронте и ракеты по Кремлю – интервью с  командиром подразделения К2 Кириллом Вересом | Украинская правда
    Commander Veres, the man being criticized. Looks a lot more trustworthy than the angry blue cube

    Ah, how times have changed over the past few months. Now even the Great Leader of is indulging in absolutely unacceptable narratives hinting at negotiations and freezing the conflict! But back to the response from Tales:

    I have personally known Kyrylo since 2017 to be a decent and dedicated officer, back when he was still a reconnaissance platoon commander in one of the mechanized brigade’s battalions. Over a few years, he rose to become the commander of one of the top battalions in the Armed Forces of Ukraine and received the “Hero’s Star.” We had many joint operations aimed at eliminating the Muscovites and their lackeys while the “defenders against disinformation” were siphoning grants in peaceful Kyiv

    Idiots don’t like that the battalion commander wants his personnel to live to see peace in the country and return home alive. This is an absolutely healthy and adequate position for a Ukrainian officer

    “What does victory mean to everyone? It’s when my people stop dying. If I said a year ago that victory is when the Russian Federation ends, then I was young and I did not command such a large number of people and did not give orders on who should go into battle and who should not”

    The last part is quoting Veres, the lines that made the Center for Countering Disinformation so furious.

    The heavyweights

    I know some people who regret having voted for Zelensky, who think that previous war-hawk president Petro Poroshenko, with his greater experience dealing with Russia and as a statesman (however reprehensible), wouldn’t have allowed the war to happen in 2022

    Ukraine accuses former president Poroshenko of treason
    Poroshenko in his signature black gloves and expensive vyshyvanka (the folk costume no bourgeois nationalist can leave home without)

    I think it’s possible that Zelensky’s curious talent for aggravating everyone imaginable played a special role. Recall Zelensky’s wise decision to start reminiscing about soviet Ukraine’s nuclear missile capacity on February 19 2022.

    But perhaps more importantly, Poroshenko hasn’t gone away either. He and his party certainly constitution the most powerful remaining opposition force in wartime. Could they be getting ready to attack Zelensky for wasting the army in an unwinnable war instead of preserving its fighting core?

    Until his early 2024 removal, Zaluzhny was juicing up head of the army Zaluzhny as an anti-Zelensky icebreaker. And Zaluzhny wrote a 2023 article he wrote in the Economist about how Ukraine has no real prospects of victory against Russia and finds itself in a stalemate position. Zelensky was enraged by this violation of his slogan ‘1991 borders or bust’, and it was this article, along with Zaluzhny’s excessive popularity, that led to his eventual replacement.

    It was Poroshenko that signed the Minsk agreements back in 2014 and 2015 to avert Ukraine’s military collapse. Maybe he can do it again, with the help of the ‘Iron General’ Zaluzhny.

    Kiev mayor Klitchko – a real heavyweight – also said in a recent western interview that Zelensky should conduct a referendum on peace and abandoning some territories. Klitchko is another open critic of Zelensky’s authoritarianism, and has allied with Poroshenko against Zelensky numerous times in the past. There are rumors he is coordinating actions with him at the moment as well.

    The angry officers movement

    Opposition heavyweights like Poroshenko, Zaluzhny and Klitchko (don’t laugh about the last one) also have an important base of supporters to draw on – young, confident nationalists in the army.

    A crucial fault-line at the moment is that between younger brigade commanders and the generals. The combrigs accuse the generals of sending them on pointless suicide missions because of the political leadership’s ‘obsession with maps’, rather than real strategic objectives. This ‘maps over strategy’ metaphor is often used by Azov spokesmen like Kukharchuk or Krotevych in their interviews with liberal nationalist (anti-Zelensky) media like Ukrainska Pravda.

    Indeed, Zelensky must be map-fixated. His key priority is opportunistic – stay in power, keep the aid flowing, desperately showcase small successes. To put off his many days of reckoning.

    For instance. with the countless businessmen he has imprisoned, extorted and otherwise enraged. Like the still-jailed Kolomoisky. Or a business partner of Kolomoisky, Bogolyubov, who recently escaped the country and claimed the government tried to extort him of 100 million USD in exchange for legal protection. Or, obviously, the questions society will have towards him after a war that cost the lives of hundreds of thousands, and brought… what?

    The young nationalists in the army launched the opening salvo in this increasingly public battle in late June, against General Sodol, who they accused of murderous graphomania. The battle has been rapidly developing in the past few weeks, a topic for a future post. But for now, I’d like to draw attention to Bohdan Krotevych, the Azovite who led the charge against General Sodol.

    Krotevych said in a July 26 interview that he is ‘angry’ with Zelensky for apparently never having visited Azov’s headquarters at the frontline, while he does visit other military units. He said he considers this condescension. The interview, titled ‘I am very angry’, has already received a million views

    Another major topic of discussion is how Lieutenant Colonel Prokopenko, Commander of the Azov Brigade, is a ‘genius’. This is in turn fairly obviously compared to the stupidity of the generals, who he castigates for wasting human resources in impossible goals, and never learning from their mistakes (unlike the Russians, he stresses). Among other things, Krotevych calls the 2023 counteroffensive ‘retarded’.

    A peaceful yet stern reich

    He also boasts about hanging out with his close friend Zaluzhny while in England recently. They and their wives met, and Krotevych gifted Zaluzhny an antique British army knife (knives are highly beloved among rightwing nationalists).

    Best of all, he cryptically promises that people would be hearing much more from Zaluzhny in the future.

    And Zaluzhny’s July 23 speech at the RUSI Land Warfare Conference in London on the topic of ‘Third World War’ made it clear that he’s hardly a democrat:

    Society must agree to temporarily give up a number of freedoms for the sake of survival,…

    Unfortunately, modern wars are total. They require the efforts not only of the army, but of the whole society. Politicians can and should mobilize society. To do so, they use military and other state resources in a comprehensive way. These resources include the economy, finance, the population, and allies. Such actions will, of course, influence the political processes in the country

    Any ceasefire of the type that Zaluzhny, Tales, or Krotevych or the rest may want would be a brutal one. On July 30, Commander Romanov of the Azov brigade published a video stating he had given the order to shoot to kill any civilians attempting to destroy Ukrainian military equipment.

    With less energy to spend on the foreign enemy, more to spend on purging the internal enemy. The bloggers won’t be bothering anyone else with their pacifist demands [end]

    The original article

    Related

    Nazism in Ukraine

    chronicle: its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine

    February 12, 2025: Donald Trump throws Volodymyr Zelenskyy under the bus

    in the chronicle of the Atlanticist defeat in Donbass and Ukraine

  • Volodymyr Zelenskyy signs a law banning organ harvesting from dead soldiers

    that new law is addressing a fact: in the context of war, Ukraine is a platform for organ trafficking

    On February 6, 2025, Volodymyr Zelenskyy signs a new law, that the parliament passed in January, which is banning the removal of organs for transplantation from fallen soldiers and victims of armed aggression.

    The Western propaganda is denying organ trafficking in Ukraine

    The trafficking of organs from killed Ukrainian service members is a well known issue, that even Ukrainian journalists have documented. Because these information are dehumanizing Ukrainians to damage their public support in the West, Western propaganda media are usually slamming them as disinformation. On January 24, in an article which regarded its readers as fools, Voice of America described the Ukrainian legal arsenal as a shield which would be preventing the issue, while the last law is rather addressing the reality of organ trafficking. Of course, that criminal activity is not official, but corrupt service members and medical professionals are conducting it, with complicity of corrupt civil servants, at all hierarchical levels. Here is the translation in English of my report, on October 5, 2024, while a Polish company was transporting biomaterial between the war zone and Warsaw.

    The carnage in Ukraine is a great opportunity for organ trafficking

    In Ukraine and other parts of the world, the trade in human organs is a lucrative cross-border activity, usually illegal when conducted outside national medical systems. The demand for organs is greater than supply and the buyer can pay, for example, up to $160,000 for a kidney. 10% of kidney transplants in the world are currently based on trafficking. Donors are most often people in poverty, who consent to the removal while they are still alive. This is not the only pattern.

    In July 2024, the Ukrainian press reported on a judicial investigation which was targeting a dozen doctors for fraud with the electronic system for registering and selling places in the transplant queue, illegal removal of anatomical materials from people who are in a helpless state. One of the suspects was Mykhailo Zagreychuk, former deputy minister of health. A Ukrainian page is offering since July 31 an excellent summary of the case. The characters are the gruesome representatives of a Ukrainian society and State that corruption is ravaging. Journalists are assuming ramifications as far as a clinic in the United Kingdom. The official investigation seems to have stalled now. No one has been formally jailed in pretrial detention or charged. Zagreychuk is free to move

    In August, as part of my usual work on French involvement in the Atlanticist ranks in Ukraine, I noted incidentally that suspected by Russian justice, for well-established facts in a criminal case of another kind, French volunteer Maxime Barrat, in a very clumsy defense, complained on social networks of having been victim in 2023 of the rumor of his involvement in trafficking organs from killed comrades. Which I was unaware of.

    Nothing conclusive so far, but through experience, I know how opportunities are making thugs when regulation of the scoundrel is deficient. There is much money at stake, the opportunity of appreciable additional incomes for a wide range of actors: the corrupt military who is supplying the corpses, the corrupt doctor who is removing organs, the steering body which is organizing collect, packaging and transport of a finished product, the local official who is turning a blind eye, the carrier who is delivering to the final medical structure.

    In order to add another brick to the bastion and confirm my suspicions, I have requested the assistance of confidential but reliable sources, who tell me and prove that in August 2024, despite public indictment in July of Mykhailo Zagreychuk, the private sector is still daring to recruit staff for dubious jobs in Ukraine. What can be the added value of a courier driver when he is paid up to €6,500, eighteen times the average Ukrainian monthly salary?

    Respect of the most absolute confidentiality over the transport between war zone and Warsaw, Poland, of suitably packaged biomaterial, by the courier driver who is also bearing all documents necessary for crossing borders and other checkpoints

    The company is Polish Sabinex LLC, whose main activity is direct sales. The recruitment campaign is conducted in Sumy region, rear base of the offensive that Ukraine started on August 6 in Kursk Russian region. Who can experience a more characteristic state of helplessness than the fighter freshly killed in Kursk region?

    The video

    Here is an extract from the video recording of an application interview of my human source by a courier recruiter for the transport of biomaterial from the Ukrainian war zone to Warsaw

    For investigation guidance, in October 2024, I forwarded the complete video to the Russian Military-Civil Administration in Kharkov Region, which released later that extract on October 31.

  • [Sharing] Germany’s new right: Trading on nostalgia for past prosperity in an age of uncertainty – Ingo Schmidt, Canadian Dimension

    Ingo Schmidt on how the triumph of liberal democracy and neoliberal globalization became the ideological seed for the AfD

    On November 6, 2024 German Chancellor Olaf Scholz fired Finance Minister Christian Lindner. Notwithstanding the broad agreement on policy goals, striking a balance between deficit reduction, support for renewable energy and increased arms spending turned out to be impossible. Lindner, a liberal, opted for social cuts; Scholz, a social democrat, wants to avoid them. They had to part ways. After Scholz lost a no-confidence vote, federal elections were scheduled for February 23, 2025. The question that worries everyone from old-school conservatives to new millennium lefties is: How many votes will go to the hard right (if not neo-Nazi) party Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland or AfD). In the last federal elections in 2021, the AfD got 10.4 percent of the total vote. Current polls put them at 20 percent, but nobody knows what will happen on election day. In this new age of uncertainty, polls don’t predict election results as reliably as in the past.

    Elections in the East German provinces Brandenburg, Saxony and Thuringia have already shown what hard-right success looks like. They also reveal the inability of the political centre to understand how much it contributed to the rise of a new right. Refashioning totalitarianism theory in the New Cold War climate, centrist politicians and pundits typically portray the success of the new right as the outgrowth of the Nazi and Communist dictatorships that ruled East Germany from 1933 to 1990. West Germany, which was spared Communist rule and, allegedly, shook off the burden of its Nazi past, appears as a role model in this democracy-versus-dictatorship story. Totalitarianism theory could possibly explain why the AfD is more successful, so far at least, in East than in West Germany. But it can’t explain right-wing success in other countries, like France, that were never under Communist rule and know Nazi rule only from occupation, which strengthened anti-fascist traditions in those countries. But even these traditions couldn’t stop the rise of the new right there.

    This article offers a different explanation for the hard-right surge in Germany. It shows that German unification in 1990, signalling the triumph of liberal democracy and the onset of neoliberal globalization, unleashed a new form of nationalism—Deutschmark nationalism—which, after mutating into export nationalism for a while, became the ideological seed for the AfD. West Germany, or, more precisely, the economic miracle that was West Germany in the post-war era, served as a role model during German unification. Promoted by West German elites and eagerly embraced by people in East Germany, it raised the expectation of a new economic miracle materializing in the West and extending to the East. However, these hopes were soon disappointed as political unification caused socioeconomic divisions between East and West Germany and, in the early 2000s, a turn to austerity policies that were highly unpopular in the East and the West. Just when it seemed that Germany would weather the world economic crisis of 2008-9 better than other Western countries, and maybe even become the European hegemon, things started falling apart. The Euro-crisis made clear that it was not only politically united Germany that was plagued by massive socioeconomic and geographical divisions but the European Union, too. Continued economic weakness combined with New Cold War marching orders from Washington fed a nostalgia for a supposedly great past—symbolized by the Deutschmark. This nostalgia, I argue, would not have taken root if the left had been able to channel growing discontent into mobilization for a more equitable and less insecure future.

    State elections in Brandenburg, Saxony, and Thuringia

    State elections don’t typically get international media attention. The September 1, 2024, elections in Thuringia and Saxony did. After all, it was the first time since the downfall of the Nazi-regime that a hard-right party, the AfD, pulled the majority of votes in a German election. It proved a bitter coincidence: The AfD celebrated their victory in Thuringia, obtaining 32.8 percent of the total vote, on the 85th anniversary of the Nazi-invasion of Poland that marked the beginning of the Second World War.

    The Conservative Christian Democrats (the Christlich-Demokratische Union or CDU) came in second with 23.6 percent. The parties of the federal government coalition, Social Democrats (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands or SPD), Greens (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) and Liberals (Freie Demokratische Partei or FDP) ended up with single-digit results, the FDP reduced to a mere 1.1 percent. At the time of the election, this was the party of the federal minister of finance. The Left Party (Die Linke), which in the previous election had become the strongest party for the first time in any German state, lost almost 18 percent and came in fourth, even trailing the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht or BSW), a breakaway group from the Left Party.

    In Saxony, the AfD won 30.6 percent of the votes, just behind the CDU’s 31.9 percent. As in Thuringia, none of the parties of the federal government coalition achieved double-digit results. The Left Party lost more than half of its vote and ended up with a devastating 4.5 percent. The BSW came in a distant third with 11.8 percent.

    Just three weeks after their election victories in Thuringia and Saxony, the AfD scored another success in Brandenburg. Narrowly beaten by the SPD that got 30.9 percent of the total vote, the AfD came in second with 29.2 percent, way ahead of the BSW’s 13.1 percent and the CDU’s 12.1 percent. The Left Party and the Greens obtained less than five percent of the vote, which is the minimum threshold for holding seats in provincial or federal parliament under the mixed-member proportional electoral system. The FDP pulled less than one percent.

    Mainstream media fails to explain right-wing success

    Barely beaten by the Conservatives in Saxony and the Social Democrats in Brandenburg, the AfD was elected by roughly a third of the electorate in three East German states, becoming the strongest party only in Thuringia. If ever there was a right-wing surge, this was it. Most media reports attributed the phenomenon to widespread dissatisfaction with the federal government, particularly regarding migration, climate policies and the war in Ukraine. Accounts of why the AfD is more popular in the East (approval ratings in the west of Germany range from 8.5 percent in Hamburg and the Saarland to 21 percent in Lower Saxony) focus mostly on disappointments caused by German unification, continuing socioeconomic disparities and a widespread feeling among erstwhile East Germans of being second class citizens. Other explanations invoke the authoritarian heritage of communist rule in East Germany, which is often presented as an extension of the Nazi-regime. Against the two dictatorships in the East, West Germany is presented as a role model of liberal democracy. This as if there hadn’t been considerable continuity between Third Reich and West German elites; as if East Germany’s ruling bureaucracy, despite all its dictatorial wrongs, wasn’t established by antifascists who had been exiled or jailed during the Nazi reign; as if the nationalization of the means of production, despite the wrongs of bureaucratic rule, had not marked a break from the West German capitalism that made West Germany a junior partner in the American Empire; as if West German capitalism had not dictated the terms of unification at the very time that a grassroots movement for democracy unsettled bureaucratic rule in East Germany. The destruction of the East German economy and the integration of the East into existing West German institutions left no room for the aspirations of East Germany’s civil rights movement. Rather than explaining growing support for the new right, media talk about the “peculiarities of the East” reinforces existing frustrations there—frustrations that help shed light on the relative strength, so far at least, of the right-wing surge in the East.

    The ‘two-dictatorships’ thesis that pits the East against the liberal democratic West revives the totalitarianism theory that was an integral part of the anti-communist, anti-Soviet consensus during the Cold War. It is now part of the New Cold War ideology that counterposes democracy and authoritarianism. As in the old Cold War, charges of totalitarianism serve to short circuit thinking about alternative economic and political systems, reinforcing the neoliberal creed that there is no alternative to capitalism. The lack of actually existing alternatives is, of course, also one of the reasons for the rise of the new right. Emerging out of an ailing neoliberalism, this right-wing force presents itself as an alternative to the status quo but actually just recasts neoliberalism in a nationalist and racist mould. Replacing neoliberalism’s earlier commitment to corporate globalization in Germany, as elsewhere, neoliberalism is haunted by the spectre of fascism, which, to centrist neoliberals, has everything to do with misled masses unable to understand the virtues of capitalist liberal democracy and nothing to do with capitalist crises that undermine the legitimacy of liberal democracy. Neoliberalism is also haunted by the spectre of communism as ruling classes worry that crisis of legitimacy could extend to capitalism itself. As the neoliberal centre denies the possibility of alternatives and the left generally (not only the Left Party in Germany) appears unable to advance real world alternatives, the growing appetite for change, spurred by recurrent crises wrought by capitalism, settles for right-wing fantasies of a harmonious life in a nation that competes successfully with other countries economically and is freed from job- and welfare-stealing migrants.

    The impact of German unification and the rise and decline of neoliberal globalization

    Capitalist crises and their exploitation by the right are common phenomena, certainly in the imperialist centres of the world system, but also in the peripheries. But they play out differently in different national contexts. Behind the AfD’s electoral successes in Thuringia and Saxony as well as its broader surge in popularity lie the combined histories of German unification and the rise and decline of neoliberal globalization. The upsurge of the new right is just one of the outcomes of these combined histories. Equally important is the defeat of the federal government coalition and the rout of the FDP, whose leader, former federal Minister of Finance Christian Lindner, promotes austerity policies that stymie government plans to subsidize the transition to non-fossil energies. These policies also lead to a creeping roll-back of social spending—except when it comes to arms spending. Little wonder a government that took office on the promise of something like a Green New Deal lost its credibility almost entirely and called for a federal election scheduled for February 23 of this year.

    And then there is the defeat of the Left Party that, despite programmatic commitments to progressive alternatives, is widely seen as the appendage of a lame-duck government in Berlin. At the other end of the political spectrum, the AfD is widely perceived as an oppositional force, even though its program blends austerity, nationalism and militarism in ways that are more extreme but qualitatively not much different from policies advanced by the CDU and the FDP.

    In the face of electoral defeat, the federal government, which embraced the US’s New Cold War policies a few weeks after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, also introduced dramatically tougher migration policies. Rather than representing any kind of alternative, as its name purports, the AfD is the black sheep of the establishment family, expressing racist views more radically and bluntly than even the Conservatives. While the Social Democrats, Liberals and Greens are intent on denying such views, they reveal themselves as Western supremacists when it comes to fending off so-called authoritarian threats arising from Russia and China, stirring up longstanding fears in the West that ‘the Russians are coming’ or that ‘Asian hordes’ augur “the decline of the West,” in the words of right-wing intellectual Oswald Spengler.

    The hypocrisy of the Greens, who advocate a green transition while supporting the purchase of dirty oil and gas (wherever they can get it ever since the Russian invasion of Ukraine ended Russian gas-flows to Germany), make them a prime target of AfD agitation. But in reality the AfD and the Greens share the fear of Western decline. The AfD engage in fearmongering around the replacement of white people by non-white immigrants and accuse the Greens and their coalition partners in the federal government of accelerating Western decline. But while the Greens may be the prime target of the AfD’s culture war, the truth is that despite significant differences in tone, the Greens and the AfD share a basic consensus on the decline of the West.

    AfD success in the east: history holds the key

    Encouraged by Glasnost in the Soviet Union, many East Germans took to the streets in the fall of 1989. Under the banner “We Are the People” they demanded democratic reforms of East Germany. Neither unification with West Germany nor a return to a capitalist economy was on their agenda—at least not initially. As protests grew, and especially after the ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED) had opened the border to the West, “We Are the People” was replaced by “We Are One People” more and more often. It was supplemented by the slogan “Germany, United Fatherland,” which is actually a quote from East Germany’s national anthem, written by the communist poet Johannes R. Becher in 1949, at a time when the leaders of the SED still thought a united Germany could be achieved—not necessarily socialist but not aligned on either the US or the Soviet Union. Such hopes were buried by the Cold War, for which the Berlin Wall became a symbol, casting a dark shadow over communist East Germany and allowing capitalist West Germany to present itself as a beacon of freedom. It was in a matter of weeks in the winter of 1989-90 that the abstract possibility became a demand, massively fanned by West German politicians—notably then chancellor Helmut Kohl—and mainstream media, which hinted at the possibility of East Germany adopting the West German Deutschmark. Many East Germans seized on such hints as an irresistible offer. “If the D-Mark comes, we’ll stay here; if it doesn’t come, we’ll go to it” became the next popular protest slogan. Since the opening of the border, thousands of East Germans had gone to the West, creating conditions reminiscent of the times before the wall was built in 1961. Back then, the East German economy lost so many people, most of them young and well-trained, that a collapse of social reproduction became a real threat. The wall stopped the bleeding of the East German economy but inflicted irreparable damage on the legitimacy of the political system.

    Almost 30 years later, the opening of the border by the SED-leadership came as a bit of a surprise to West German elites. Yet, they were quick to grasp the possibilities it created. To them, this meant the integration of East Germany into the West German political and economic system, not coexistence with a somehow reformed but still politically independent East Germany. The ‘take over the East’ goal of West German elites and the Deutschmark rush of East German masses fed each other. The civil rights movement that wanted to democratize East Germany was sidelined. Some of the groups active in that movement adjusted to the new zeitgeist quickly, some even entered into an electoral alliance with the East German conservative party, despite their having criticized it as a small but integral part of the SED-regime. Angela Merkel, who would later become chancellor, belonged to one of these East German groups that allied with other conservative-turned-civil-rights groups and the East German CDU. This Alliance for Germany easily won the last East German elections and negotiated the integration of East Germany into West Germany’s institutional structures. On July 1, 1990, the Deutschmark came to the East, three months later the independent state of East Germany vanished into an enlarged West Germany. Most of the Alliance for Germany dissolved into the West German CDU immediately after unification. In December this enlarged CDU won federal elections.

    In less than a year the Cold War had come to an end and an entire state had disappeared. However, the hopes pinned on unification, notably the introduction of the Deutschmark, were soon dashed. A year after unification, unemployment, which had existed in communist East Germany primarily in a hidden form, stood at 10.2 percent and rose to over 20 percent in the early 2000s. It didn’t fall below 10 percent until 2014, a quarter of a century after the Berlin Wall fell. Moreover, mass migration from East to West Germany, which the introduction of the Deutschmark was meant to curb, actually accelerated after the arrival of the Deutschmark. From 1990 to 2015, East Germany lost significantly more than one million people, the vast majority during the first two years after unification, and almost all of them of working age. Were it not for this emigration as well as early retirement schemes and retraining schemes for thousands of workers, unemployment in the East would have been even higher than it actually was. Introducing a new form of hidden unemployment, many of the participants in retraining were enrolled in one course after another, often in different fields, until they were old enough for early retirement.

    One of the main, if not the main, reasons for the collapse of the East German economy was the Deutschmark. Introduced at a rate of one Mark West for one Mark East, while average productivity of East Germany was estimated to be about a quarter that of West Germany, German monetary union gave private households the boost in purchasing power they so desired. But it made East German firms uncompetitive. Lower wages could not compensate productivity differentials between firms in East Germany and Western countries. The privatization of East Germany’s state-owned firms facilitated the downfall of the East German economy even further. In some cases, Western companies bought East German firms just to shut them down so that they would not become competitors in the future. In other cases, they wanted patents or certain segments of production that they could integrate into their own supply-chains, leaving everything else to be shut down. The closures and cherry-picking of some more desirable segments destroyed the reproduction process of the East German economy even beyond the damage done by rendering it uncompetitive through monetary union.

    The result was that bits and pieces of the East German economy became a periphery of production networks controlled by West German corporations. Ironically, the neoliberal restructuring of production processes went hand in hand with massive fiscal transfers from West to East Germany. A price that had to be paid to sustain some level of social cohesion while disappointment that political unification was followed by economic decline and continued social divisions between East and West instead of an Eastern economic miracle following the example of West Germany from the late 1950s to the early 1970s. At some point, a third of East German incomes came from fiscal transfers. As a result, government debt as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) rose from 41.8 percent in 1989 to 61.2 percent in 1999, which is nothing compared to today’s numbers. Yet, back then the lesson that had yet to be learned is that neoliberalism, despite its balanced-budget rhetoric, really is a mix of austerity and tax cuts for the rich that produces increasing debt levels at every slowdown or downturn of the economy. In the 1990s, government debt over 60 percent of GDP was a scandal. Not least because, at the urging of the conservative German government, 60 percent had become the benchmark for membership in the European monetary union, for which the roadmap had been laid out in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty.

    Budget deficits, accumulating into government debt, weren’t the only deficit scandal in 1990s Germany. The other was in the current account. From a surplus of 4.6 percent in 1989, the current account dropped to a –1.9 percent deficit in 1991 and remained in deficit territory until 2001. In most other countries, deficits between negative one and negative two percent wouldn’t be a matter of concern. In Germany they were. After all, West German prosperity—the very model East Germans admired so much—had been reliant on export-driven growth, which was always understood as export surpluses. As it turned out, unification in the early 1990s, led to a boom in West Germany as East Germans spent many of their newly acquired Deutschmarks on consumer goods ‘Made in (West) Germany’—despite massive job losses. This boom drove prices up and made German exports less competitive on the world market. At the same time, some of the money from the East German spending spree went to foreign companies. As exports took a hit and imports got a boost, the current account went from positive to negative.

    The East was integrated into the West German political system as it existed prior to unification. The Kohl government didn’t agree to any changes suggested by the East German government that formally negotiated unification but really rubberstamped the subordination of East German society to West German institutions. Economic integration was different though. The collapse of the East German economy, triggered by the design of monetary union and privatizations, had a lasting impact on the West German economic model that East Germans had been eager to embrace. The first decade after unification was marked by a twin deficit in government budgets and current accounts. During the unification boom from 1990 to 1993, inflation went up to levels not seen since the oil-price hikes and inflationary struggles between capital and labour from the 1970s to the early 1980s. At that time, however, the West German inflation rate was still below that of other Western countries, whereas in the early 1990s it was amongst the highest

    West Germany as a role model

    Running continued deficits—let alone a twin deficit—was unthinkable in a country that rebuilt its economy after the Second World War through integration into a world market with rules established and enforced by the US. In this American Empire, West Germany played the role of bulwark against Soviet Communism, including East Germany, and as a showcase of Western capitalism. To succeed in this role, foreign debt, accumulated by the Nazis and inherited by West Germany as legal successor of the Third Reich, was forgiven through the 1953 London Debt Agreement. West Germany also inherited low wages, industrial capacity and new technologies from the Nazi economy that, contrary to widespread assumptions, survived the war largely intact. This gave West German industries a competitive advantage that was further buttressed by favourable exchange rates on which basis West Germany was admitted to the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates in 1952. Reintegration into the world market also allowed West Germany to transition from a coal-based to an oil-based economy. Oil was cheaper than coal but its supplies were controlled by US companies and the American state.

    However, being a junior partner in the American Empire turned out to be a much better deal for the German bourgeoisie than its earlier quests for world power. The territory under its direct control was much smaller after two failed power grabs but profits were stellar. Driven by exports, or export surpluses more precisely, the West German economy didn’t require fiscal stimulus and kept growing until the US turned to floating exchange rates, which led to a significant appreciation of the Deutschmark. Further, oil prices exploded in the 1970s. But it was during these turbulences that West Germany consolidated its reputation as a beacon of economic stability. Political management of the crisis, notably codetermination (German lingo for the institutionalized cooperation between unions and employer association), kept wages and inflation lower than in most other Western countries. This helped to sustain export surpluses for much of the 1970s. In turn, export surpluses allowed the government to keep fiscal stimulus and unemployment rates low. Again, this is compared to other Western countries, not compared to the post-war boom.

    West Germany’s relative success in managing the economic crises of the 1970s raised some concerns among its allies, who considered this success a case of beggar-thy-neighbour policies. The US pressured the West German government to increase public spending in order to stimulate the world economy. The West German government couldn’t shrug off these US demands entirely. The social democratic party was led by Helmut Schmidt at the time, and some extra spending also appeased the left wing in his own party as well as some unionists. However, calls for a Keynesian fix of the economic crises never overcame the general preference for fiscal prudence and low inflation that marked West German society after two lost wars, each followed by the introduction of a new currency, one of them also by unprecedented hyperinflation. Not entirely without reason, export success after the Second World War was widely attributed to liberal economic principles, conveniently ignoring the fact that this ‘liberalism in one country’ could only work because other economies placed growing demand on the world market.

    Export success also created an ersatz-identity that allowed West Germans to repress the horrors of the Nazi regime and the roles most of them had played in these horrors, as perpetrators or bystanders. Social democrats never really fit into this picture. Willy Brandt, who spent the Nazi reign in underground resistance circles and exile and would later become West Germany’s first social democratic chancellor, was seen by many as a traitor. His successor Helmut Schmidt, who had served in the Nazi air force, opposed many of Brandt’s plans for social reform and applied Keynesian policies only in homeopathic doses. He was successfully branded as the one responsible for rising unemployment and inflation by the Conservatives and Liberals. Crossing the floor from SPD to CDU, the Liberals made Helmut Kohl chancellor. Kohl won two elections before unification on the promise of bringing post-war prosperity back. He won another two after unification on the promise of bringing the prosperity to East Germany.

    For a long time, Kohl presented himself successfully as the defender of the West German export model and guarantor of the collective identity tied to that model, despite the fact that 1980s West Germany never saw a return to postwar prosperity. Disappointment with his broken promises for a West German economic miracle 2.0 began spreading towards the end of the 1980s. Yet, the disintegration of the SED regime allowed him to renew and extend his promises to the East. The national euphoria that secured his 1990 election victory also saw a transformation of collective identity. West German pride in being export world champion turned into Deutschmark nationalism. Widely shared in the East, where people were happy to get the Deutschmark, and the West, where people saw it as symbol of their postwar achievements, this was not the pure money, or currency, fetishism Karl Marx wrote about in Capital. It had a distinctive nationalist character that was subdued in West Germany’s pre-unification export-identity. With unification, the nationalist seed blossomed. Not only did this help Kohl become the ‘chancellor of unity,’ but it also gave cover to a burst of neo-Nazi attacks on immigrants, leftists and queer people, culminating in arson attacks in Rostock, Mölln and Solingen. The latter two killed eight people, while the attack in Rostock laid a four-day siege on an apartment block inhabited by foreign workers who had been employed in East Germany’s now defunct state-owned economy. The openly neo-Nazi attacks of the early 1990s, later dubbed “baseball bat years,” were followed by a series of murders committed by the National Socialist Underground (NSU) that cost nine immigrants and one cop their lives from 2000 to 2007. The role of the German secret service in covering up, or even facilitating, these murders has never been investigated as key documents remain classified until this day. Hans-Georg Maaßen, head of the secret service from 2012 to 2018, was one of the individuals responsible for blocking investigations of the NSU-murders. He also heads up an ultra-conservative circle, initially inside the CDU and now operating in the right-wing space between the CDU und the AfD.

    Exports über alles: Eastern peripheries boost corporate profits

    During unification and in the first few years afterwards, nationalism was a mass ideology. It rallied flag-waving masses in the streets, it dominated German politics and inspired Nazi-skinheads to chase people they considered enemies. As it became clear that the hopes for an economic miracle 2.0 would not be realized, street protests receded, most skinheads scaled down their activism and just a few turned to clandestine terrorist attacks. It seemed that nationalism had lost the force it had just recently. However, the entanglements between Nazis and parts of the state apparatuses indicate that while nationalism wasn’t as visible as before, it had not disappeared.

    As it turned out, the opening of the Berlin Wall was a key step towards what would later be called neoliberal globalization. As the German bourgeoisie sought its place in a world seemingly governed by the invisible hand of the market—not Soviet planners or the milder version of Western government intervention—nationalism also found a new role as mass ideology. The ideological wind blowing from the ‘real West,’ that is, the United States, rebranded free trade theory going back to the days of David Ricardo as globalization. Sticking closely to Ricardo’s principles, academic globalists argued that firms, if left alone by the state, would specialize in the production of those goods they can produce more cheaply than firms in another country either because they possess more productive technologies or use input factors more plentiful and cheap than in another country. All countries will be better off if firms in each country specialize according to their comparative advantages.

    Globalization practitioners talked about entire countries as if they were firms competing against each other. Competitiveness of nation-states became the lodestar of capitalists, and their political executors, who used it to justify the roll-back of wages and social standards in all countries. Their run-the-country-like-a-business propaganda was so persuasive that even working class people whose wages, pensions and public services were cut fell for it in large numbers, electing and re-electing neoliberal globalizers over and over again. At the same time, fear that the policies just voted for would cause a race to the bottom spread in the rich countries that saw parts of their production outsourced to poor countries, where labour was really cheap, while immigrants from such countries would take on jobs in the burgeoning low-wage sectors of the rich countries. Migration, segmented labour markets and a global reserve army of labour, enabling capitalists to engage in global labour arbitrage, were neither part of academic globalization theory nor did they feature in politicians’ globalization propaganda. Absent from public debate, these real-life factors created fears that a new right could build on by portraying economic problems as questions of national identity. Translated into policy terms, that meant a program of keeping immigrants out and capital in. This protectionist backlash against neoliberal globalization, coupled with the rise of a new right ranging from populist to neo-Nazi formations, occurred all over the Global North. It began slowly in the late 1990s and early 2000s while globalization was still expanding, and then gathered steam in the wake of the 2008-9 world financial crisis that marked the end of accumulation driven by globalization. It has accelerated again since the COVID-19 recession as well as the escalating great power politics vis-à-vis Russia and China, which have led to openly imperialist policies couched in the same nationalist ideology which the new right thrives on. The competitive nation-as-corporation ideology and the policies that marked actually unfolding globalization was the breeding ground for today’s strange bedfellowship of globalizers-turned-great-power-warriors and national supremacists of the new right. Theories of unregulated free trade opening the path towards global prosperity were just an ideological tool that was useful as long the integration of more and more countries into the US-dominated world market fuelled capitalist accumulation, and thereby hopes for the eventual trickle-down. It was replaced with the rhetoric of concern for national security and democracy as accumulation ended in a new phase of stagnation.

    The German bourgeoisie had already adopted the logic of the state as business competitor after the Second World War when it traded world power ambitions for a junior partner role in the American Empire. Balanced budgets and tight money formed the core of its policies. That, along with competitive advantages inherited from the Nazis or granted by the US, enabled export-driven growth and, ultimately, export surpluses. Despite verbal commitments to liberalism, these policies were mercantilist in substance. Shattered but not derailed by the crises of the 1970s, West Germany’s mercantilist regime of accumulation survived until unification led to a twin deficit, slow growth and socioeconomic divisions between East and West. Unified Germany’s economy stumbled along while the US enjoyed its New Economy boom, even though that turned out to be short-lived, and China attained unprecedented levels of economic growth.

    The Kohl government didn’t respond to the bourgeoisie’s growing concerns about economic stagnation in Germany. Neither did it respond to growing dissatisfaction with social conditions among the popular classes. After uniting Germany, Kohl turned to further uniting Europe. Partly, he wanted to demonstrate Germany’s continued commitment to cooperation in the European Union as some European leaders—notably British Prime Minister Thatcher and French President François Mitterrand—had expressed reservations about German unification and worried about a return of German great power ambitions. European monetary union became Kohl’s preferred route to an “ever closer union,” as EU-parlance had it at the time. However, regarding other countries, notably in the Mediterranean, Kohl successfully pushed for tight fiscal and monetary rules—the same kind of rules West German policy makers followed in the postwar period. Under the favourable conditions granted by the US to integrate into the world market, this led to export-driven prosperity. However, other countries didn’t enjoy the same favourable conditions. What would upset governments and people in such countries even more was the fact that Kohl had abandoned the rules he was preaching to other European countries in his very own united Germany

    Helmut Kohl at the CDU national party convention in Hamburg, 1973. Photo from Wikimedia Commons

    There, European monetary union was widely seen as a top-down capitalist elite project, part of corporate globalization or as a handing over of the beloved Deutschmark to irresponsible Eurocrats and the Club Med, a derogatory term often used in public debates to denounce people in the Mediterranean countries as lazy, spend-thrifty and, worst of all, happily having a good time at the expense of others. Euro-scepticism added to disappointment with the collapse of East Germany’s economy after unification, growing income polarization and fears of job loss all over Germany and a sense of losing national sovereignty to global capital. Unresponsive to any of these concerns, Kohl and his coalition of Conservatives and Liberals eventually lost the 1998 election to the Social Democrats and Greens who formed a coalition government offering a blend of light Keynesianism, green transition and control of financial markets. This is where the German—and international—bourgeoisies got really concerned.

    The opening ideological salvos to derail the newly elected government’s plans came from the British tabloid The Sun, calling Oskar Lafontaine, the new finance minister who proposed the introduction of a Tobin tax, “Europe’s most dangerous man.” Next came Madeleine Albright, then US secretary of state, who gave Germany’s Green Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer the choice of joining the bombing campaign against Yugoslavia or having his country isolated from Western allies. Fischer, and the new Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, chose war. Seeing that his opposition to the war wasn’t supported by anyone else in the cabinet, Lafontaine resigned before the bombing began.

    A few months later, The Economist called Germany the “Sick man of the Euro.” Coming from the central organ of global capitalism and unrepentant advocate of liberalism since the days when England, not China, was the workshop of the world, this was not just another opinion piece. It was a warning that the international investment community—exactly the CEOs, bankers, brokers and financiers targeted by the then-emerging movement against corporate globalization—lost confidence in the German market and expected pro-business measures to boost their propensity to invest.

    After a few months in office, Schröder had to choose between meeting voters’ expectations (job creation, reduction of job insecurities and income inequality) and capitalists’ cost-reduction demands. He chose the capitalists’ side, earning him the nickname Genosse der Bosse (Comrade of the Bosses). In the absence of a social movement from below that could have pushed him to deliver on the election platforms of the SPD and the Greens, this choice might actually better be called caving to capitalist threats of an investment strike. From 2000 to 2005, the Schröder government axed corporate tax rates, exempted capital gains from taxation and lowered equity requirements for credits. The other side of the class divide saw drastic reductions in unemployment benefits, essentially slashing them to the level of welfare payment rates after one year of benefits. At the same time, legal obstacles to employing temporary workers were greatly reduced. Capitalists were thrilled. Profits and asset prices shot up, but capital formation declined during the years pro-business laws were passed.

    Reorganizing existing production capacities was more important to corporate executives than creating new capacities. This was not surprising as capacity utilization dropped when the New Economy bubble burst, triggering a downturn of the world economy that kept even booming China below double-digit growth. As it turned out, united Germany did not inherit the export successes of pre-unification West Germany, but was certainly heir to its export dependence.

    In the early 2000s, Germany’s current account turned positive again—not because exports grew so strongly (they actually stagnated due to the world economic downturn), but because imports declined owing to weak domestic demand associated with the Schröder government’s neoliberal policies. However, as the world economy bounced back (China saw growth rates of 10-14 percent from 2003 to 2006), German exports grew again. Eventually the reorganization of production processes in the aftermath of German unification paid off. West German corporations now controlled production networks linking corporate headquarters controlling finance, research and development, and capital-intensive parts of actual assembly in the centres with labour intensive production in low-wage areas in the peripheries from Eastern Germany all the way to China. In these networks, East Germany occupied the position of a semi-periphery. On the supply side, German export success in the early 2000s relied on continued wage inequality between centres and peripheries, which doesn’t mean that all workers in the centres earned high wages. The threat to relocate production to the East or the South put the brakes on all wages. The lowering of social standards propelled the growth of low-wage employment, notably in the service sector. Well-paying, permanent jobs began to decrease as a share of total employment even in West Germany. As a result, discontent that was widespread in the East since political unification was followed by economic collapse, and social downgrading began to creep into the West.

    2010s: Exporting the Euro-crisis

    The export surpluses of the early 2000s relied on the same mercantilism that had generated such surpluses during the postwar prosperity. However, during the postwar period, unprecedented growth rates across the Western, and parts of the non-Western, world made it possible to superimpose a welfare state on a mercantilist economy that didn’t squeeze profit rates but operated with capital’s consent in a way that seemed unthinkable during the age of catastrophe from 1914 to 1945. In the early 2000s, by contrast, successful mercantilism demanded the roll-back of the welfare state. Tragically, the extension of West Germany’s welfare state institutions to East Germany, where they were superimposed on a collapsing economy, created the profit squeeze that was needed to curtail the material protections granted by the welfare state. To sustain competitive advantages gained by scaling back the welfare state, it was imperative to keep wage-growth low even after surging exports pulled the economy out of the slump. Unlike during the period of postwar prosperity, export surpluses didn’t stimulate domestic demand very much. In fact, current account surpluses in the early 2000s, which surged from -1.8 percent in 2000 to 6.7 percent in 2007, were as much driven by rising exports as by weak growth of imports, a clear indicator of the overall sluggishness of domestic demand. Unemployment rates rose from 9.3 percent in 2000 to 12.1 percent in 2005. After that, unemployment went into long-term decline, briefly interrupted by the 2008/9 Great Recession and slowed down by the 2009/15 Euro-crisis, eventually reaching five percent before the 2020 COVID-19 Recession. However, this job growth occurred almost entirely in low wage occupations.

    Paradoxically, it was during the Euro-crisis that a wave of “export nationalism” covered up the discontent that was growing, at variable speeds, across Germany. The Deutschmark nationalism that emerged during German unification had taken a hit with the introduction of the Euro. However, when it turned out that the Euro was basically the old Deutschmark under a new name and export surplus levels were reaching unprecedented heights, it almost seemed that the long-awaited return of prosperity was about to materialize. But of course, it wasn’t the same as the postwar prosperity that saw strong growth almost everywhere. The 2010s, by contrast, were a time of stagnation. The rebound after the 2008/9 recession was stronger in Germany than in other countries, but then growth rates fell in line with the one-to-two percent range of other Western countries.

    It was during this time of recurrent crises and long-term stagnation that the German government, led by Angela Merkel with the Social Democrats as junior partner, felt compelled to lecture other governments on economic policy. Completely blind to the fact that beggar-thy-neighbour policies are a zero-sum game, the Merkel-government told Southern European countries to impose austerity despite the fact that they were suffering from a sovereign debt crisis due to the end of cheap credit that became available after the creation of the European monetary union, helping to pay for imports from Germany. Merkel also told them that, after a painful but unavoidable period of belt-tightening, they would eventually succeed as export countries like Germany.

    The European monetary union’s contradictory character torn between further integrating Europe and spreading German mercantilism shifted entirely to the latter. Southern Europeans, governments and ordinary people, understood that austerity would further subordinate their economies to Germany’s economic dominance. The Brits, like the Germans and the “Frugal Four” (Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden), although not warm to the idea of bailing out crisis-ridden Southern Europeans, were suspicious that Germany’s leading role in handling the crisis would turn the country’s economic dominance into fully-fledged hegemony. Brexit has its origin here. Eastern Europe’s post-communist comprador governments had imposed austerity on their countries in acts of pre-emptive obedience and now felt betrayed as they thought the bailout packages the Merkel government used as a means to impose austerity on the South were actually some sort of welfare package.

    Centrifugal forces in the EU were further fuelled when, in face of civil war and foreign interventions in Syria, Merkel unilaterally declared open borders for Syrian refuges and then told EU member states they all had to take their share of refugees. European governments already concerned over Germany’s domineering role in managing the Euro-crisis were dismayed. Public debate within Germany was sharply divided between liberals and leftists applauding Merkel’s humanist stance and right-wingers, including in her own party, warning of an uncontrolled flow of immigrants. Largely unnoticed was the fact that Merkel’s decision to open borders for Syrian refugees was tied to the anti-Russian turn in German foreign policy following the sharp polarization between pro- and anti-Russian forces in Ukraine during and after the Maidan protests in 2014. Most of the Syrian refugees were fleeing the Russian-backed Assad-regime, which was considered an adversary. Opening borders for these refugees set a precedent for the surge of Ukrainian refugees following Russia’s invasion of Eastern Ukraine in 2022. At that point, Merkel, who had already retired, told the media that her government saw the Minsk accords, officially meant to reach a settlement between contending political and military forces within Ukraine, as a means of buying time to arm the Zelensky government.

    2020s: Sick man of Europe 2.0

    As Ukraine, already torn by civil war, became the scene for a proxy war between NATO-countries and Russia, Germany was firmly subordinated to US foreign policy. Post-communist governments in Germany had, more or less enthusiastically, supported deepening trade relations with Russia. Oil and gas imports might have been the most significant part of German-Russian trade but were certainly not the only one. Torn between allegiance to the US and lucrative business deals with Russia, the German government, now headed by Social Democrat Olaf Scholz, cut its economic ties with Russia after the latter’s invasion of Ukraine. The price to be paid was a further spike in energy prices, on top of the increases attendant on the economic recovery from the COVID-19-recession.

    As part of current US efforts to contain China, the German government has been pressured to scale down its trade with China—Germany’s largest trading partner and also a prime outlet for German foreign direct investments. Since Germany’s economy is as much export-driven as export-dependent, the US turn from neoliberal globalization to escalating sanctions and protectionism in the name of national security has caused high levels of uncertainty within the German bourgeoisie. In addition to the return of secular stagnation after the very short post-COVID recovery in the West and the petering out of the China boom, this uncertainty is driving low levels of investment. Inflation, fuelled by post-COVID recovery and rising energy prices, and lower real incomes leading directly to less consumer spending, but also indirectly, as households build up their savings in anticipation of more economic shocks in the future. Meanwhile the Scholz government boosted arms spending while otherwise imposing austerity.

    After two years of recession, Germany is again being branded the “sick man of Europe” by The Economist. The last time Germany earned this title the neoliberal turn against the welfare state produced massive current account surpluses, meagre general growth rates and massive social and regional inequalities. The export nationalism that concealed the mounting discontent with neoliberalism was shaken by the US turn from neoliberal globalization to protectionism and militarism. Given its high level of export dependence, Germany was ill prepared for the turn against it, which unleashed pent-up disappointments and anxieties into the political sphere. This happened all over Germany but more so in the East than in the West as regional differences in income, wealth and representation in leadership positions had created widespread feelings of being second class citizens in a politically united Germany.

    In the absence of socialist imagination, German politics are haunted by the spectres of the past. An insurgent hard-right pins the labels of communism or Marxism on everything that ever came from the left, Social Democrats, the Greens and, of course, the Left Party, no matter how members, activists and supporters of these parties position themselves on the political spectrum. At the same time, the hard-right wants Germany to leave its Nazi past behind. Downplaying Nazi atrocities, accusing liberals and leftists of burdening Germans with a cult of guilt, they propagate the reclaiming of German national pride and sovereignty from allegedly cosmopolitan elites. Between the very real and growing right and a weak and largely imaginary left, centrist parties that proclaimed the end of history in the heyday of neoliberalism are also shifting to the right. The decline of the Left Party is a mirror image of the rise of the AfD.

    Alternative für Deutschland: A child of Deutschmark nationalism

    Mainstream media and centrist parties view the new right as if it were some external force inexplicably appearing on the political scene and threatening the liberal order. But this is empirically wrong. Almost all leading figures of the AfD come from conservative West German milieus where they previously held positions in public administration or private businesses. Although they present themselves as anti-establishment rebels, they are establishment people who turned from the centre-right to the hard-right. The AfD also includes party activists who come from militant neo-Nazi groups that have existed on the fringes of West German society since the CDU gave many old Nazis a political home after the downfall of the Third Reich. Making small advances into electoral politics in the late 1960s and again in the 1980s, the neo-Nazis remained marginal until they found common ground with disgruntled conservatives. Deutschmark nationalism served as the ideological bonding material for neo-Nazis and right-of-centre conservatives, and became a rallying point for growing numbers of people dissatisfied with the policies of neoliberal globalization advanced by the centrist parties. It emerged in the tumultuous days after the fall of the Berlin wall as a mass ideology that shaped East and West German politics in the direction of unification. After that, it became an ideological point of reference that allowed for the integration of different political ideas and currents into a new right political project, the AfD.

    Riding on the wave of Euro-scepticism that accompanied the Euro crisis, the AfD, founded in 2013, promoted a German exit from the EU, which would also have meant exit from the Euro. However, boosting the Deutschmark nostalgia associated with German-style Euro-scepticism got the newly minted party only so far. What really fuelled the AfD’s take-off was the wave of Syrian refugees coming to Germany (and other EU-countries) in 2015. The party’s approval ratings rose from roughly five percent in its first two years to around 12 percent in the next two years. With the surge in voter approval came a programmatic shift from ‘neoliberalism in one country’ to neoliberalism hidden behind ethnonationalist hate propaganda. Despite advocating for a strong state, the AfD also presents itself as a rebellious party of freedom. This paradox is resolved by portraying cosmopolitan elites, represented most notably by the Greens, as a force dominating state apparatuses and misusing them to bring excessive numbers of foreigners into the country with their cultures that allegedly threaten German people, suppress German heritage and push the economy into decay. Therefore a strong state is needed to defend Germany against foreign incursion and revive its inherent strength

    Election poster of the AfD in Thuringia supporting remigration. Photo from Wikimedia Commoms

    The Scholz government created the conditions in which the AfD’s self-portrayal as freedom fighters gave the party another boost. The modest Green New Deal platforms on which the SPD and Greens ran their 2021 election campaign didn’t gain enough traction to allow them to form a government, despite support from unions and even, more cautiously, employer associations. To obtain a majority in the Bundestag, SPD and Greens formed an ostensibly unlikely coalition with the FDP, a party mostly focused on cutting taxes and limiting public deficits. These commitments to tax breaks for the rich and austerity for the poor stood in the way of effective state-sponsored energy transition programs. Hence, the Scholz-government was perceived as weak from the start. Things went from bad to worse for the government after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Under pressure from the US, Scholz opted for sanctions against Russia, arms deliveries to Ukraine and a continued increase in arms spending. At a time when the prices of everything from butter to housing were soaring, making it clear that money would still be available for guns but maybe not for butter not only destroyed whatever support the government had before the Ukraine war but also gave the AfD another boost. A year and a half into the war, the SPD was trailing the AfD in federal polls. Picking up widespread, though by no means dominant, unease with arms support for Ukraine and fear of war with Russia, the AfD advocates a negotiated peace settlement between Russia and Ukraine and, more importantly to the AfD, the lifting of sanctions on Russia. For the AfD, urging peace with Russia is not a matter of a principled anti-militarism but a means of reviving German trade with Russia, notably Russian energy imports that are seen as a precondition for economic recovery. To achieve this, Germany has to free itself from the ‘cosmopolitan sell-out elite.’ Whether everybody now supporting the AfD subscribes to the freedom-for-German-supremacy-view is open to debate. What can’t be denied is the fact that many discontented people, whatever their main grievance, are looking to the right, not the left, for alternatives to a failing political centre. Some are also turning to the CDU, which claims to be different from both the AfD and the federal coalition government, without offering anything other than praise for the good old days. That served the party well at times when the German economy could thrive, to a greater or lesser degree, on US-enabled expansion of world markets. With the US protectionist turn, this is no longer possible and the party is torn between centrism and the new right. Current support for the CDU is highly unstable, which could easily work in the AfD’s favour, especially in the absence of persuasive alternatives from the left, which so far have not materialized.

    This wasn’t always the case. Something like a left renewal had once seemed to be in the offing in the most unlikely place: East Germany during the transition from state socialism to a peripheral position in an enlarged capitalist Germany. In West Germany, the nationalist wave that came with unification swept away much of the activist left that had rallied thousands—sometimes tens or even hundreds of thousands— of people in the 1980s against the stationing of US nuclear missiles, nuclear power plants, Nazis, and South Africa’s apartheid regime, among other causes. Left circles within the SPD, the Greens and the labour movement weathered the nationalist storm without leaving a mark on German politics. In this political climate, the Party of Democratic Socialism (Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus or PDS) stood out as a beacon of the left.

    Emerging from East Germany’s ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED), the PDS became the political home of many East Germans who lost their jobs, social status and cultural identity during the transition to capitalism. Quickly establishing a presence in East Germany’s provincial and municipal parliaments, the party expressed the discomfort of many East Germans who felt like second class citizens under the domination of West German institutions, politicians, corporations and culture. It highlighted East Germany’s socialist heritage, which encompassed commitments to anti-fascism, peace and international solidarity as much as the dictatorship of the politburo, Stasi-surveillance and an overbearing bureaucracy. The party hung itself up in endless debates between those who downplayed or justified East German communism’s dark sides and others who sought to disown that history by embracing liberal principles. Practically, these disputes didn’t make much difference. Upholding socialist principles didn’t stop the party from pragmatically working within the political and economic confines created by unification. At times, this included voting for privatization of public housing and infrastructure. For decades since the party was founded, the contradiction between socialist principles and the subordination to neoliberal policies imposed by the West German bourgeoisie didn’t stop the PDS or its successor organization Die Linke (the Left Party), from becoming something like a catch-all or people’s party in East Germany, a role long held by the CDU und the SPD in West Germany. For years, the PDS/Left Party achieved election results in the mid-20 percent range, peaking at 28 percent in Brandenburg in 2004 and 32 percent in Thuringia in 2019. It was also, and still is, part of various coalition governments in East German states. Until the September 2024 election, the Thuringian government was led by the Left Party’s Bodo Ramelow.

    Despite this overall success and despite the party’s fidelity to socialist principles, the social group that wasn’t interested in voting PDS consisted of workers, who still voted CDU in large numbers despite g the CDU’s failed to deliver on its big promises of post-unification prosperity. More recently they shifted to the AfD. Meanwhile, in West Germany, the PDS remained marginal throughout its existence, only attracting activists from various left grouplets. What little remained of left protest milieus after unification was still dominated by a mix of environmentalists, antifas and international solidarity activists who might vote Green, or maybe even SPD, but hardly ever PDS. The old working class milieus that were shrinking with the decline of smokestack industries were still dominated by unionists closer to the SPD than the PDS. This started to change when, under chancellor Schröder, the SPD implemented neoliberal counter-reforms on a scale his conservative predecessor Kohl had avoided throughout his 16-year tenure, despite his supposed commitment to unleashing market forces. Growing frustrations among left social democrats and unionists fed mass demonstrations against Schröder’s SPD and created a social and organizational base (including, most prominently, Schröder’s short-time finance minister Lafontaine) that merged with the PDS into the Left Party in 2007. In the federal elections two years later, the Left Party won 11.9 percent of the vote, then 9.2 percent in the 2017 elections, but fell to 4.9 percent in the 2021 elections. This was a worse result than the 5.1 percent the PDS obtained in 1998, an election that also saw an increased vote for the SPD, which allowed Schröder to succeed Kohl. It is worth noting that the PDS vote came almost entirely from East Germany, which represents less than a quarter of Germany’s total population.

    While the PDS mostly maintained peaceful coexistence between socialist theory and market-conforming practice, the Left Party continuously debated whether or not it should join centre-left governments, if given the chance. The bitterness with which party activists argued over this question stood in stark contrast to its actual relevance. In states where the party was relegated to opposition status by poor election results, this status didn’t attract additional voters keen on seeing a principled opposition in parliament. In states where the party joined governments, the results were mixed: sometimes it maintained its vote share in the subsequent election; sometimes it suffered losses. A paradoxical result came about in the Thuringian elections in September 2024: The Left Party lost massively, although, had there been direct elections for the minister-president (a position equivalent to provincial premier in Canada), the Left Party’s Bodo Ramelow would have won the election. This fits into a trend that became visible over the last few years in a number of state elections in East and West Germany. Party loyalties based on shared worldviews wear thin. Elections are often decided based on the media appeal of top politicians, regardless of party affiliation. Remarkably enough, Ramelow, just like Dietmar Woidke, the SPD’s lead candidate in the Brandenburg elections, dropped the name of his party on campaign posters, presenting himself as more of a provincial father figure than a man of the party.

    However, rather than signalling the end of ideology, as centrist politicians and postmodern philosophers might have argued before the rise of a very explicitly ideologically committed new right, the focus on limelight politicians pushes democratic debates into the shadows. In the case of the Left Party, it might also have been an attempt to distract from its own image as an organization mired in endless debates not producing any coherent, let alone persuasive, policies. The reasons for permanent internal discord are sociological and ideological. The Left Party was strongest in its early days, when the PDS’s social base still comprised a cross-section of the East German population, although workers remained underrepresented. It also attracted dissident social democrats and unionists from West Germany. To a limited extent, therefore the Left Party had the working class base the PDS never had.

    The blend of Keynesian and Marxist ideas around which social democratic dissidents and union leftists organized had been defeated as a significant political current during the crises of the 1970s by the Social Democratic right and corporatist union leaders who put competitiveness of the West German economy over income distribution from profits to wages. In the new millennium, when these currents joined forces with the PDS, they were still sizeable enough to give the newly founded Left Party a boost. But not for long. The smokestack industries around which these left currents were organizing were in continued decline, which made strategies based on that moribund reality obsolete. Moreover, these strategies often stood in the way of mobilizing and organizing the new working classes that emerged in the service sector and, on a much smaller scale, IT, bio tech, and green energy.

    As the ranks of the Left Party thinned out with the loss of members coming out of communist East Germany or from West German union and social democratic circles, the party was able to attract new blood mainly in the form of highly educated, often precariously employed, urban dwellers. The shift in membership from old left offspring to the children of neoliberal globalization was paralleled by a geographical shift in electoral support. In urban centres, losses among the party’s old left supporters could be partially compensated; in rural areas, however, where the PDS and the Left Party had always been weak, the party disappeared almost entirely. Often, there isn’t even anyone to put up election campaign posters

    Anti-AfD protest in Germany. Photo by strassenstriche.net/Flickr

    Unlike the original base of both the PDS and the Left Party, the urban hipsters who joined the Left Party had no old left reference points. Even when they talked about Marx and class they did so with postmodern accents. However, this did not help them to gain sizeable support among the working classes—sometimes lumped together as the “precariat”—that developed in expanding economic sectors. The political offerings of the Left Party seemed to exercise little appeal for both old and potentially new constituencies. The party’s founding basis of unity was opposition to neoliberalism. In the early days this left room for East German concerns about the outcomes of unification—arguably a kind of neoliberal restructuring—with opposition to the neoliberal turn of the Schröder-government in East and West Germany. It also left plenty of room for a variety of goals, from resurrecting the Keynesian welfare state to a multitude of vaguely defined socialisms for the future to opposition without a vision for the future. However, what sufficed to form the Left Party wasn’t enough to sustain and grow it, especially not as it became harder to label government policies neoliberal.

    The Great Recession, the COVID-19 pandemic, and commitments to ongoing arms production brought state intervention back to the centre of politics, contrary to the 1990s and early 2000s when politics was dominated by advancing capital mobility and free trade. Back then, ruling elites organized consent of the popular classes, more or less successfully, under the banner of “international competitiveness.” The new watchword “national security” is better at rallying the new right than building support for centrist parties. Left Party intellectuals debated the new political conjuncture under the label “post-neoliberalism,” a word-monster that hints, perhaps unwittingly, at the party’s inability to develop a strategy beyond rejecting neoliberalism. In reaction to the imposition of a party line by its predecessor organization, the PDS and the Left Party allowed a wide range of views. However, members of various organized currents, ranging from social-liberal to communist, tended to talk more about each other than with each other.

    Postmodernist philosophers’ contention that the days of master narratives are over was wrong with respect to neoliberalism—if there ever was a master narrative, it was neoliberalism—but it does apply to the Left Party, which could not synthesize different ideas into compelling left policies that could rally growing discontent. Instead, internal debates turned into factional turf wars in a party that resembled an appendix of the Scholz government, costing the Left Party more and more support.

    After years of bitter infighting, discontent with declining voter approval and accommodation of government policies led to the split of the federal party caucus and the formation of the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) in January 2024. As its name indicates, the party is entirely built around its frontwoman, who represented the Left Party in the Bundestag from 2009 to 2023. In the BSW, the cacophony that destructively marks the Left Party is replaced by closed-door debates. As in the Communist party of old, membership isn’t open to everyone; applications to join must be approved. Wagenknecht, originally a member of the Communist Platform (one of the organized currents inside the PDS), had shifted to left-Keynesian, pro-welfare state positions. But, years before her split from the Left Party, she began advocating ordoliberal positions—a branch of neoliberal thinking that stresses the role of the state in allowing businesses to compete without being bogged down by monopolies. This German version of neoliberalism has been the hallmark of economic policy and ideology since the early years of West German world market integration. In Wagenknecht’s current adaptation of ordoliberalism, the state guarantees competition, which, in turn, creates a strong economy capable of providing stable employment, social security and a fairer distribution of incomes. She combines this embrace of free markets plus the welfare state with a critique of the European Union as an institution operating in the interest of big corporations and a critique of NATO and US hegemony. Her condemnation of American hegemony appealed to some members of the Left Party, as did her critique of the EU, although her more recent favourable references to ordoliberalism and policies aiming at stricter migration controls were less popular.

    The BSW’s outlook is very much shaped by positive memories of West German postwar prosperity. Yet, the party’s advocacy of international cooperation, a position going back to 1970s detente policies, contrasts sharply with orientations of the centrist parties and some currents within her own former party. Demand for a negotiated settlement of the Ukraine war overlaps with AfD positions. However, the AfD considers this a matter of Germany’s national interest that doesn’t preclude support for rearmament and war in other regions, like Gaza most recently. The BSW, on the other hand, sees militarism largely as the US’s last recourse for defending its ailing empire. It remains to be seen how the BSW’s principled opposition to militarism and war can mesh with current negotiations for a coalition government with the CDU and the SPD, both committed to military support for Zelensky in Ukraine and Netanyahu in Israel. Polls suggest that electoral support for the BSW was largely driven by the desire for an anti-war voice in parliament. At the same time, there is considerable support for efforts to keep the AfD out of government, despite all the support the AfD garnered in the fall state elections in East Germany. If this means compromising its anti-militarism, the BSW may, like the Left Party before it, soon be seen as a superfluous appendix of unpopular centrist parties.

    After weeks of negotiations, the BSW entered into a coalition government with the SPD in Brandenburg as well as with the CDU and SPD in Thuringia. It also supports a minority government made up of the CDU and the SPD in Saxony. It did all this to keep the AfD out of government positions. Understandable as such efforts are, they have already cost the BSW in the polls. Hovering just above five percent, the BSW may not reach the five-percent threshold for obtaining seats in the upcoming federal elections. The Left Party, standing at 3.5 percent in the polls, will probably fall short. Founded as a project to unify left forces from East and West Germany, its split early last year already signalled the failure of that project. The next election may reduce it to insignificance, leaving lots of room for the AfD [end]

    The original article

    Ingo Schmidt is an economist and works as the coordinator of the Labour Studies Program at Athabasca University

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    clue: the same army has performed 80% of all German military losses during WW2

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    Besides forced labor for the sake of the German industry, the concentration camp system became a tool of genocide

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  • Images du jour : alors, p’tit gars, content d’être soldat ?

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    Il est toujours plus difficile de prendre Emmanuel Macron au sérieux. Je considère depuis longtemps ses déclarations avec dérision et à quelques 20% d’opinion favorable, son crédit est au plus bas parmi les Français. Il me semble que peu de journalistes ou citoyens ont pris la peine jusqu’à présent de commenter son ambition de mieux détecter et former de jeunes volontaires en renfort des armées.

    Je n’imagine pas un instant que la France puisse rétablir le service militaire tel que je l’ai connu dans les années 80, obligatoire et pour une durée d’un an. L’économie, la sociologie et l’opinion publique s’y opposent

    Son vague projet concerne la réserve. Aujourd’hui, l’armée française compte environ 40 000 réservistes, c’est insignifiant. Alors qu’il quittera le pouvoir en 2027, au plus tard, il en souhaite 80 000 pour 2030 et pour 2035, 100 000, soit un réserviste pour deux militaires d’active. Ce ne serait pas la levée en masse de 1793 (deux volontaires pour un militaire d’active, amalgamés dans les demi-brigades) et seulement dans dix ans. Or il adresse évidemment le contexte international actuel, au moment où le Néerlandais Mark Rutte (OTAN) et l’Estonienne Kaja Kallas (UE), deux autres épées, font des déclarations similaires dans leurs domaines de compétence. Il fait du Macron, c’est à dire de la communication, du vent.

    Nous entendons aussi un débat au sujet d’un maintien de la paix par des troupes occidentales en Ukraine, après un cessez-le-feu. Dans l’expectative de cet hypothétique cessez-le-feu, c’est mettre la charrue très avant les bœufs. Après l’arrivée au pouvoir de Donald Trump et avant des élections en Allemagne, les Européens donnent l’impression de paniquer

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    France is expelled from its former colonies in West Africa

  • [Sharing] Vietnam, Algeria, Palestine, passing on the torch of the anti-colonial struggle – Hamza Hamouchene, Transnational Institute

    The 70th anniversary of Dien Bien Phu and Algeria’s revolution highlights their profound influence on global decolonization. This longread explores their impact on the Palestinian resistance, shedding light on their shared struggle against colonial oppression and their continuing inspiration to the world

    Introduction

    Revolution is not a dinner party, or writing an essay, or painting a picture, or doing embroidery; it cannot be so refined, so leisurely and gentle

    Mao Zedong, 1927 (Zedong 1953)

    Colonialism is not a thinking machine, nor a body endowed with reasoning faculties. It is violence in its natural state, and it will only yield when confronted with greater violence

    Frantz Fanon, 1961 (Fanon 1967)

    Imperialism has laid its body over the world, the head in Eastern Asia, the heart in the Middle East, its arteries reaching Africa and Latin America. Wherever you strike it, you damage it, and you serve the World Revolution

    Ghassan Kanafani, 1972 (Kanafani 2023)

    This year, 2024, coincides with the 70th Anniversary of the Battle of Dien Bien Phu (May 1954), in which Vietnamese revolutionaries inflicted a crushing defeat on French colonialists. It also marks the 70th birthday of the Algerian revolution, which began in November of the same year. The Algerian and Vietnamese resisted colonial oppression for decades before leading two of the most significant revolutions in the twentieth century, against France (and its local collaborators), which was the second biggest European colonial power in the world at the time and which was also supported by NATO forces. No discussion of decolonisation and anti-imperialism can be complete without understanding the importance of Vietnam and Algeria, and how their revolutionary liberation struggles were (and continue to be) so inspiring to oppressed people all over the world, including the Palestinians.

    No one revolution exactly resembles another. This is because all revolutions are rooted in a specific national or regional history, are led by particular social and generational forces, and happen at a given moment in the development of a country. However, revolutions all share a common element, without which they would not be called revolutions: the arrival of a new bloc of classes who take up leadership of the state, or the transition from colonial dependence to national independence. In Lenin’s words (external link), ‘For a revolution to take place, it is usually insufficient for the lower classes not to want to live in the old way; it is also necessary that the upper classes should be unable to live in the old way.’ Despite all the elements that might point to continuity, it is this rupture that marks a revolutionary change. 

    Against this backdrop and understanding, my objectives in this longread are five-fold:

    1. To share some historical reflections on the Algerian and Vietnamese anti-colonial struggles, so as to bring to light important chapters in anti-colonial history.
    2. To draw connections and parallels between the two struggles, and between them and the ongoing Palestinian liberation struggle, to understand how Palestinians have been inspired by both struggles and at the same time themselves continue to inspire the world with their resolute resistance to Zionist settler-colonialism.
    3. To challenge and debunk attempts to portray a false equivalence between colonisers and those who are colonised.
    4. To highlight transnational solidarities between those who are oppressed and colonised.
    5. To firmly place the Palestinian resistance and liberation struggle within the long line of anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggles going back to the Haitian struggle at the end of the eighteenth century and start of the nineteenth century, when Haitian slaves rebelled against the French empire and established the first Black republic (James 2001)

    Colonialism Denies the Colonised Their Own History, National Liberation Re-invents it

    National liberation, national renaissance, the restoration of nationhood to the people, commonwealth: whatever may be the headings used or the new formulas introduced, decolonisation is always a violent phenomenon

    Frantz Fanon, 1961 (Fanon 1967)

    The Algerian independence struggle against French colonialists was one of the most inspiring anti-imperialist revolutions of the twentieth century. It was part of the wave of decolonisation that started after the Second World War in India, China, Cuba, Vietnam and many countries in Africa. It inscribed itself in the spirit of the Bandung Conference and the era of the ‘awakening of the South’, a South that has been subjected for decades (and in many cases for more than a century) to imperialist and capitalist domination under different forms, from protectorates to proper settler colonies (as was the case for Algeria).

    Retrospectively, French colonisation of Algeria can be seen as unique, as Algeria was the first Arabic-speaking country to be annexed by the West and one of the first countries in Africa to be officially subjugated by a Western empire, long before the Berlin Conference in 1884, when different European empires (British, French, German, Belgian, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese) met to carve up the continent amongst themselves.

    France invaded Algeria in June 1830. The French army was to spend the next 50 years suppressing an insurgency, 15 of them fighting the brilliant, fierce and dedicated resistance leader Abd-El-Kader. France’s war of conquest was conducted without let-up, especially under the command of the ruthless Marshal Bugeaud, who adopted a scorched earth policy (Fisk 2005), committing atrocities ranging from population displacement to land expropriation, massacres, and the infamous enfumades, where the French army eliminated whole tribes through asphyxiation.1

    Alongside Marshal Bugeaud’s “pacification” campaign, France actively encouraged colonisation of Algeria by its own population. In a statement before the National Assembly in 1840 Bugeaud said: ‘Wherever there is fresh water and fertile land, there one must locate colons [settlers], without concerning oneself to whom those lands belong’. (This is exactly the approach the Zionists were to apply in Palestine, a century later). By 1841, the number of such colons/settlers already totalled 37,374, in comparison with approximately 3 million indigènes (native peoples) (Horne 2006). By 1926, the number of settlers had reached some 833,000, 15% of the population, and it increased to just under 1 million by 1954.

    Colonisation involved the expropriation of the basic factor of production, land, from the indigenous peasantry and its redistribution to the settlers, destroying the foundation of the peasant subsistence economy (Lacheraf 1965). The rural masses fought the encroachment of the colonial army until 1884, but the core of the Algerian rural resistance to colonialism was smashed in 1871, when the big politico-agrarian revolt that had spread over three-quarters of the country was finally crushed. This historic peasant uprising was a reaction to a series of disastrous confiscatory measures during the 1860s that outraged the majority of rural Algerians and led them to fear for their lives and livelihoods. Their situation was made worse by drought, harvest failures, famine, locust invasions and disease, which resulted in the deaths of more than 500,000 victims (around one-fifth of the population). In the period between 1830 and 1870 it is estimated that several million Algerians died (Bennoune 1988, Davis 2007 and Lacheraf 1965).

    The Egyptian Marxist Samir Amin has described how the Algerian rural population transformed the colonial conquest into a protracted and devastating war: ‘The collapse of the regency government and the war of extermination undertaken by the French army gave this early period (1830–1884) certain special characteristics, which are not found elsewhere … faced with military power, the urban ruling class was thrown into thorough disarray and could think of no other alternative but flight … as for the peasants, flight was out of the question. Faced with the threat of extermination, they turned the Algerian countryside into the terrain for a fifty-year war which claimed millions of victims‘(Amin 1970).

    French colonial rule in Algeria lasted for 132 years (in comparison to 75 years of colonial rule in Tunisia and 44 in Morocco), having a duration and a depth that was unique in the experiences of colonialism in both Africa and the Arab world. In 1881, Algeria was administered for the first time as an integral part of France. With this extension of civilian rule to the country came the application of second-class status to Algeria’s Muslim population. The exclusion of Muslims was reflected at all levels of political representation, anti-Muslim discrimination was built into the electoral system, and the inferior status of Muslims was inscribed in law under the loathsome Code de l’Indigénat of 1881 (McDougall 2006).

    After the French success in violently suppressing Algeria’s anti-colonial rebellions, the last of which took place in the 1870s and 1880s, over half a century was to pass before the Algerian resistance movement once again took up the fight, in the shape of Algerian nationalism in its modern form.

    8 May 1945: ‘Victory in Europe Day’ and massacres in Algeria

    It was at Setif that my sense of humanity was affronted for the first time by the most atrocious sights. I was sixteen years old. The shock which I felt at the pitiless butchery that caused the deaths of thousands of Muslims, I have never forgotten. From that moment, my nationalism took definite form

    Kateb Yacine, Algerian writer and poet (quoted in Horne, 2006)

    On 8 May 1945 there were joyful celebrations across Europe as news spread of the Nazi capitulation. France rejoiced at being delivered from a five-year occupation. At precisely the same time, events in Algeria began that would lead to the colonial massacre of thousands of Algerian Muslims over the next two months. 

    On Victory in Europe Day, while Europeans celebrated, Algerians marched in Setif for independence and an end to colonisation, deploying banners bearing slogans such as ‘For the Liberation of the People, Long Live Free and Independent Algeria!’ They also brandished for the first time what would later become the flag of the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) liberation movement. The French colonial authorities violently repressed the march, triggering a rebellion that led to the murder of 103 Europeans. 

    The colonial retaliation to these murders was savage. The French military (air, navy and army) bombed several regions, and burnt and razed many villages to the ground in Setif, Guelma and Kherrata. Over the space of two months, the French gendarmerie2 and troops, alongside vengeful settlers, slaughtered tens of thousands of Algerian Muslims, with some estimates as high as 45,000. 

    The parallels between the Setif, Guelma and Kherrata massacres and the 7 October 2023 Al-Aqsa Flood operation by the Palestinian resistance against Israel, and the pitiless genocidal butchery that followed it, is too stark to ignore. In both cases, resistance whether peaceful or violent, was entirely disallowed, and aspirations for self-determination were crushed with grossly disproportionate force.

    At the time (in 1945), one analyst, trying to explain the ‘barbarism’ of the colonised and to justify France’s bloody repression, wrote: ‘The call to violence raises from the mountains a kind of evil genie, a wild and cruel Berber Caliban, whose movements can only be stopped by a force greater than his own. This is the historical and social explanation for the events that took place in Sétif on the very day that victory was celebrated‘ (Gresh 2023).

    The same supremacist colonial mindset and the same racist, orientalist and essentialist explanations of why the oppressed and colonised revolt persist today: the Palestinian attacks on 7 October are often put down to the pure evil, irrational savagery and timeless barbarism of medieval and sub-human terrorists, far removed from the political context of more than 75 years of settler colonialism, apartheid and occupation.

    The massacres that followed the demonstrations of 8 May 1945 had significant repercussions for the Algerian nationalist movement. For the young generation of militants, the Algerian war had already started and the preparation for armed struggle could no longer be postponed. Most historians agree that the massacres of 1945 were traumatic, marking every Algerian Muslim who lived through the period. Moreover, every Algerian nationalist who was prominent in the FLN traces their revolutionary determination back to May 1945. It will not be surprising if future generations of Palestinian and Arab revolutionaries (of all political tendencies) trace their commitment to liberatory struggle to the genocide that followed the 7 October attacks and the heroic resistance in Gaza, which continues at the time of writing.

    Ahmed Ben Bella, an FLN leader and head of the Algerian state from 1962 to 1965, had been a much-decorated sergeant in the 7th Regiment of Algerian Tirailleurs, a unit that distinguished itself in battle in Europe. But it was the events of 1945 that launched him on the path of revolution. He later wrote: ‘The horrors of the Constantine area in May 1945 succeeded in persuading me of the only path: Algeria for the Algerian.’ Similarly, for Mohammed Boudiaf, another revolutionary FLN leader and also a future head of state, the colonial massacres of 1945 led him to reject electoral politics and assimilation and to embrace armed resistance and direct action as the only way to achieve liberation (Evans & Phillips 2007).

    The traumatic events of 1945 were the first volleys in the Algerian struggle for independence. 

    Vietnam’s victory is Algeria’s inspiration

    Our actions aim to take the war to them, to let the whole world know that the Algerian people are leading a war of liberation against their European occupiers

    Djamila Bouhired (external link)

    The Algerian struggle for independence cannot be divorced from the global context of decolonisation. In 1945, the Arab League was formed, committed to Arab unity. In 1947, India won independence from Britain. In 1949, the Chinese Maoist revolution defeated the Nationalists of Chiang Kai-shek and established the People’s Republic of China. 1955 saw the rise of Arab nationalism/Nasserism and the holding of the Bandung Conference in Indonesia, where 29 non-aligned countries from Africa and Asia challenged colonialism and neocolonialism in a context of Cold War tensions.

    The FLN leaders were under no illusion about the scale of the task confronting them, but their confidence was bolstered by the humiliating French defeat in Indochina in May 1954. As Frantz Fanon explained, the great victory of the Vietnamese people at Dien Bien Phu was no longer, strictly speaking, just a Vietnamese victory: ‘Since July 1954, the question which the colonized peoples have asked themselves has been “What must be done to bring about another Dien Bien Phu? How can we manage it?”’ (Fanon 1967).

    Fanon was fascinated by what the Vietnamese had achieved at Dien Bien Phu. In his view, the Vietnamese victory over the French in this remote Southeast Asian valley had demonstrated that the colonised could generate the revolutionary violence needed to force decolonisation on the coloniser. News of the Vietnamese victory quickly reverberated across the French empire, shattering the myth of the coloniser’s invincibility and initiating cracks in the empire’s structure. The importance of Dien Bien Phu and its impact on the psyche of colonised people can hardly be overstated. Benyoucef Ben Khedda, president of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic, recalled: ‘In 7th May 1954, the army of Ho Chi Minh inflicted on the French expeditionary corps the humiliating disaster of Dien Bien Phu. This French defeat acted as a powerful catalyst on all those who had been thinking that an insurrection in the short term is by now the only remedy, the only possible strategy. … Direct action took precedence over all other considerations and became the priority of priorities‘ (Ben Khedda 1989).

    Ferhat Abbas, who became the first acting president of the newly independent Algerian Republic, cast the Vietnamese victory at Dien Bien Phu in epoch-changing terms, considering it as significant as the French revolutionary army’s victory over the Prussians in the historic battle of Valmy in 1792: ‘Dien Bien Phu was more than just a military victory. This battle is a symbol. It’s the “Valmy” of the colonised peoples. It’s the affirmation of the Asian and African vis-à-vis the European. It is the confirmation of the universality of human rights. At Dien Bien Phu, the French lost the only source of “legitimation” on which their presence turned, that is the right of the strongest [to rule the weakest]’ (Abbas 1962).

    Others have described Dien Bien Phu as the Stalingrad of decolonisation (Meaney 2024).

    Holding the Imperial Line and Solidarity Between the Colonised

    It is not because the Indo-Chinese has discovered a culture of his own that he is in revolt. It is because “quite simply” it was, in more than one way, becoming impossible for him to breathe

    Frantz Fanon (Fanon 1967)

    It is hard, at a distance of 70 years, to imagine the impact the first Indochina war, and especially Dien Bien Phu, had on the colonial world, particularly France’s overseas colonies, from Algeria to Senegal and from Morocco to Madagascar. A colonial power had been defeated. A regular army had been beaten!

    In the 1940s, during the Second World War, when France was invaded and occupied by Nazi Germany, tens of thousands of Algerians, Moroccans, Senegalese, Vietnamese and others bravely joined the battle for its liberation, which they hoped would in turn lead to their own liberation. But when it finally rose from the ruins, France set about restoring its shattered empire in all its colonial pomp. Despite negotiations in Paris between Jean Sainteny and Ho Chi Minh to find a compromise on the question of post-war Vietnam, and despite the victory of the Left, including the Communists, in the November 1946 French elections, the French government nevertheless decided to reconquer Vietnam. Whether it was led by the right, the centre, or the left, or by forces that were religious or secular, and from one republic to another, France continued to cling to its empire, from the Dien Bien Phu valley to the Kasbah of Algiers (Delanoë 2002).

    Following the outbreak of the war in December 1946, from 1947 to 1954, tens of thousands of North Africans were sent to fight for France in Indochina (the figure ultimately reaching 123,000), at a time when their own countries were experiencing the first stirrings of the struggle for independence. Once in Vietnam, hundreds of them deserted and joined the Viet-Minh. In doing so, they were responding to Vietnamese appeals for anti-colonial solidarity (Delanoë 2002). One such appeal was made in a letter a minister in Ho Chi Minh’s government sent to the Moroccan independence leader Abd El-Krim, in exile in Cairo, in early 1949. He wrote: ‘Our struggle is your struggle and your struggle is in no way different from ours. Also, the solidarity of the national liberation movements within the framework of the former French empire is capable of putting a final end to French imperialism. Your Excellency, the government of Ho Chi Minh asks you to use your great spiritual authority to ask the soldiers of North Africa to refuse to leave for Viet Nam, and also asks you to appeal to the dockers to boycott French ships‘ (Saaf 1996).

    Abd El-Krim, a revolutionary guerilla leader who had defeated the Spanish army in the epic battle of Annual in 1921 and who had set up the short-lived Republic of the Rif (1921-1926) before being ultimately defeated by the French and Spanish through air raids, gas and napalm bombing, self-propelled guns and tens of thousands of recruits from the Empire (Ayache 1990 and Daoud 1999), replied: ‘The victory of colonialism, even at the other end of the world, is our defeat and the failure of our cause. The victory of freedom anywhere in the world is … the signal of the approach of our independence‘ (Saaf 1996).

    The succession of setbacks suffered by the French army in Indochina only heightened awareness of the need for solidarity among colonised people. Responding to this need, Algerian dockers working in the ports Oran and Algiers refused to load war material bound for Indochina (Ruscio 2004). 

    The Vietnamese also asked Abd El-Krim and the Moroccan Communist Party to send them a North African who could establish a psychological warfare network that would encourage North African troops within the French Expeditionary Corps in the Far East (CEFEO) to desert, rally the Vietnamese, and ultimately return to their home countries to fight the French colonisers. This role was taken on by M’hamed Ben Aomar Lahrach (alias Maarouf). A Moroccan, like Abd El-Krim, Maarouf was a trade unionist and a member of the Moroccan Communist Party (Delanoë 2002). At the end of the 1940s, he travelled to Hanoi. He explained his activities with the North African soldiers who either rallied the Viet Minh or were captured as follows: ‘I try to create real villages for my Arab and Kabyle prisoners, I put them in self-contained huts, I manage to give them a life reminiscent of the country. We mustn’t make these guys Vietnamese; we must repatriate them as quickly as possible! They must remain themselves; they will form the cadres of our liberation armies… I won’t let my Moroccan or Algerian deserters die‘ (Delanoë 2002).

    In his appeals to North African soldiers fighting on the French side in Vietnam, and in his political education work with North African captives and rallied soldiers, Maarouf’s message was ‘Go back home: these people, like you in Morocco, are fighting for their independence. … Return home and use your fighting spirit to liberate your country’ (Saaf 1996). Above all, he sought to recuperate North Africans who were being used by the French as cannon fodder, and who found themselves lost in this distant Asian country, with the explicit aim of repatriating them as soon as possible to their own countries.

    The effectiveness of Maarouf’s work is best demonstrated by the hundreds of Algerian repatriates who became effective military cadres for the Algerian National Liberation Front starting from 1954/55. Maarouf’s activities were truly heroic; they included participating in the arrest of French General De Castries in Dien Bien Phu. Testifying to the high esteem in which he was held, Ho Chi Minh gave him the name Anh Ma, which literally means ‘Brother Horse’, and the Vietnamese awarded him the rank of general, and decorated him with medals (Saaf 1996 and Delanoë 2002). 

    For France, Dien Bien Phu became a symbol of anachronistic obstinacy leading to catastrophe. For Vietnam, it was a symbol of the recovery of national independence. But Dien Bien Phu was not just an historical event for these two countries alone: throughout the world, the battle was seen as a turning point that heralded the coming of other battles for liberation. The echo of gunshots had barely subsided in the Tonkin valley before it was heard in the Aurès mountains in Algeria. And within less than a year, the ‘wretched of the earth’ gathered in Bandung (Ruscio 2004). As for the colonialists, De Lattre, France’s commander-in-chief, confided to the officer he had put in charge of creating his Vietnamese army, that they had to hold the imperial line: ‘it’s in Tonkin that we are defending our positions in Africa. Everything must be subordinated to this imperative‘ (Goscha 2022).

    Today, it is in Gaza that US-led imperialism seeks to defend its global hegemony. 

    In the US-Israeli attempt to hold the imperial line in Gaza, they are applying similarly brutal methods to those applied by the French in Vietnam, including starvation of the civilian population. The French focused on breaking the Vietnamese’s access to rice, as part of French General Raoul Salan’s order to ‘Starve the adversary’ (Salan later founded the Organisation Armée Secrète (OAS), a clandestine terrorist organisation that sought to prevent Algerian independence). The use of food as a weapon was by no means new. Imperial armies have practised this form of warfare since antiquity. But the French were the first to apply this approach in a twentieth-century war of decolonisation – with terrible consequences for the Vietnamese. In doing so, they collapsed the dividing line between combatants and civilians, and between the home front and the battle front. This was la guerre totale (total war), as advocated by General Lionel-Max Chassin, commander-in-chief of the French air force in Indochina during the early 1950s. Chassin insisted that this was the only way to win a colonial war, arguing that ‘One must starve people to death’ (Goscha 2022). In 1956, Chassin told his superior that he was ‘convinced that had we killed all of the water buffalos, destroyed all of the rice in Indochina, we would have had the Vietnamese at our mercy whenever we wanted’.

    Similar logics prevailed in France’s attempt to ‘pacify’ Algeria between 1954 and 1962, and they are now again at work in Israel’s total war on Gaza. In fact, what is taking place today in Gaza is not just a genocide. Although it is almost impossible to find the right terminology to describe the level of destruction and death Israel is unleashing on Palestinians, a plethora of concepts are now being used to understand the enormity of what is taking place: urbicide, scholasticide, domicide, ecocide, and holocide – the annihilation of an entire social and ecological fabric.

    Revolutionary Violence and Urban Guerilla Warfare in a Time of Decolonisation

    We are advocates of the abolition of war, we do not want war; but war can only be abolished through war, and in order to get rid of the gun, it is necessary to take up the gun

    Mao Zedong (Zedong 1967)

    Knowing everything that had happened in our country, it was clear for us there was no option but an armed struggle, and that we had to confront the French, and with violence

    Zohra Drif (Drif 2017)

    The Indochinese and Algerian wars against French colonialism have become foundational to modern politics in both countries. Both independence struggles were to profoundly shape the character of anti-colonial thought over the subsequent decades. 

    Christopher Goscha argued in his excellent book The Road to Dien Bien Phu that Ho Chi Minh ended up administering two kinds of wartime states, one capable of holding out against the coloniser, in guerilla form, just as the Algerian FLN were to do in North Africa, the other capable of generating the required military and organisational force needed to defeat a Western colonial army in a set-piece battle, of the kind the Chinese communists had created. Thanks to Chinese military assistance and advisers, instruction in modern military science, and the introduction of the draft and mobilisation laws, the Vietnamese communists presided over a military revolution unknown in any other war of decolonisation in the twentieth century (Goscha 2022). Indeed, the Algerian nationalists were not alone in their inability to transition from guerilla warfare to conventional warfare: in no other twentieth-century war of decolonisation was there to be anything like the People’s Army of Vietnam, and there was never to be another Dien Bien Phu. But that did not mean that colonial powers could not be vanquished in other ways, including guerilla warfare.

    The Vietnamese anticolonial fight against the French did not take place independently of other events in Asia. The first Indochina war (1945–1954) was taking place in parallel to the Korean war in a context of an expansion of the Cold War in southeast Asia, where the US saw aiding France as a way to fight the Communists. The resumption of the war in Vietnam in 1960 saw the direct entry of the United State into the fray, with its formidable war technology and its belief that its victory was assured. The United States no longer needed the aid of a third country to inflict decisive blows on the Communists in Asia. The American war against Vietnam was to last 15 years before its ‘invincible armada’ was forced to withdraw without glory, leaving behind a devastated country.

    The devastation and violence were not unique to Vietnam’s anti-colonial revolutions. The declaration of war in Algeria on 1 November 1954 also initiated one of the longest and bloodiest wars in the history of decolonisation, replete with merciless atrocities (Stora 2004). The FLN leadership had a realistic appreciation of the military balance of power, which starkly favoured France, whose army was the fourth largest in the world at the time. In response to this reality, their strategy was inspired by Ho Chi Minh’s dictum ‘For every nine of us killed we will kill one – in the end you will leave’. The FLN wanted to create a climate of violence and insecurity that would be ultimately intolerable for the French, to internationalise the conflict, and to bring Algeria to the attention of the world (Evans & Phillips 2007). Following this logic, the revolutionary leaders Abane Ramdane and Larbi Ben M’hidi decided to take guerilla warfare into the country’s urban areas, and specifically to launch the battle of Algiers in September 1956. 

    There is no better way to fully appreciate this key and dramatic moment of sacrifice in the Algerian revolution than watching the classic realist film by Gillo Pontecorvo, The Battle of Algiers, released in 1966. Initially banned in France, the film powerfully reenacts some of the critical moments of the Algerian resistance in the capital and the French crackdown on it. In one dramatic moment, Colonel Mathieu, a thinly disguised General Massu (who had also fought in the first Indochina War), presents the captured FLN leader Larbi Ben M’Hidi at a press conference, where a journalist questions the morality of hiding bombs in women’s shopping baskets. The journalist asks: ‘Don’t you think it is a bit cowardly to use women’s baskets and handbags to carry explosive devices that kill so many people?’ Ben M’hidi replies: ‘And doesn’t it seem to you even more cowardly to drop napalm bombs on defenceless villages, so that there are a thousand times more innocent victims? Give us your bombers, and you can have our baskets’ (quoted in Fisk 2005).

    Djamila Bouhired, a revolutionary icon who has become an inspirational figure in the whole Arab world (especially for Palestinians), as well as beyond, was a key figure in the battle of Algiers and was, alongside Zohra Drif, and Samia Lakhdari and her mother, one of the women who planted bombs across the city. After being captured, raped and severely tortured, she heroically challenged her colonial captors and torturers (external link): ‘I know you will sentence me to death but do not forget that by killing me you will not only assassinate freedom in your country, but you will not prevent Algeria from becoming free and independent.’ 

    Zohra Drif, another heroine of the Algerian War of Independence, well-known for her involvement in the Milk Bar Café bombing in 1956, was an integral part of the FLN’s bombing network in Algiers, working with Ali La Pointe, Djamila Bouhired, Hassiba Ben Bouali and Yacef Saâdi, head of the Autonomous Zone of Algiers. She was eventually captured and was sentenced to 20 years of hard labour by the military tribunal of Algiers for terrorism. Drif was imprisoned in the women’s section of Barbarossa prison. In her memoires, she reflected on the role of Djamila Bouhired: ‘They had their Marianne, we had our Djamila … For colonial France, she was “the soul of terrorism”. For us and for all freedom-loving peoples, she became the soul of liberation and the symbol of Algeria at war, beautiful and rebellious’ (Drif 2017). 

    Bouhired’s heroic struggle, courage, abnegation, sumud (steadfastness) and sacrifice still reverberate in Palestine and still feed the beating heart and inspire the language and imaginaries of resistance, revolution and the struggle for liberation. Bouhired’s mantle was taken up by the Palestinian freedom fighter Leila Khaled, alongside many others.

    The urban revolt in Algiers was eventually crushed without mercy, through the resort to torture on a systematic scale to extract information, including fitting electrodes to genitals (Alleg 1958). By October 1957, the FLN network in Algiers was dismantled, after the blowing up of the last remaining leader Ali La Pointe along with Little Omar, Hassiba Ben Bouali, and Hamid Bouhamidi, in their hiding place in the Casbah. Despite this military loss, the FLN had scored a diplomatic victory: France was isolated internationally because of the scandalous methods of repression it used.

    The Algerian experience of urban warfare as part of a decolonisation struggle was not an unprecedented one. Over a decade before the FLN set off bombs in Algiers, the Vietnamese had already fought major urban battles in Saigon, Haiphong and Hanoi. They too were brutal affairs, with the French using tanks, artillery and bombers to blast Vietnamese urban positions. Like the Casbah in Algiers, the Old Quarter of Hanoi was ground zero for the battle for that city (1946–1947). During the fighting, the commander-in-chief of France’s Expeditionary Corps in Indochina, General Jean Vally, instructed his subordinates to ‘hit them hard with the cannon and the bomb….in order to put an end to the resistance and to prove to our adversary the overwhelming superiority of our capabilities’ (Goscha 2022). By the end of the battle, Hanoi’s ‘Casbah’ lay in ruins. 

    The level of violence inflicted by the French across the Red River Plain and the rest of upper Vietnam from January 1951 until mid-1954 had no equivalent in the preceding history of twentieth-century wars of decolonisation. Among the Vietnamese there were more than a million dead, and hundreds of thousands wounded, including victims of torture, while the losses of the French Expeditionary Corps amounted to 130,000 men. Similarly staggering levels of violence were reached in Algeria. Official estimates suggest a million and a half Algerians were killed in the eight-year war that ended in 1962. A quarter of the population (2.35 million) were confined in concentration camps, at least 3 million people (half the rural population) were displaced, around 8,000 villages were destroyed or burned, hundreds of thousands of hectares of forests were burned or defoliated by napalm bombs, cultivable lands were either sown with mines or declared ‘prohibited zones’, and the country’s livestock was decimated (Bourdieu and Sayad 1964; Bennoune 1973).

    In both cases (Algeria and Vietnam), the coloniser’s dirty work of vengeance against the colonised’s daring acts of resistance involved furthering and entrenching the dehumanisation of the ‘other’ and casting hate in racialised terms. For the French and their allies, the Vietnamese and the Algerians were no longer a people, they were bandits, criminals and terrorists. One young French soldier who lost a confidant in Vietnam explained what he wanted to do to the Vietnamese: ‘We have to destroy all of them, without any pity for them, they’re real savages’ (Goscha 2022). The practice of torture was endemic within the French army years before French paratroopers ever set foot in Algiers. The same mechanisms and tactics of dehumanisation are now being used by Israel in Palestine, with Israeli generals, officials and media figures describing Palestinians as ‘human animals’, ‘rats’, ‘barbarians’, and ‘terrorists’ to justify their war crimes, torture and genocidal massacres. Colonialism, and its racialisation strategies, has not ended yet.

    In Vietnam, Algeria and Palestine, it is not just the armed forces of the colonial powers that have applied these strategies: the colonists/settlers themselves have also played a role. When the elite paratroopers brought in by the French government to crush the uprising in Algiers, marched down the main street of the city, throngs of ecstatic French settlers came out to greet them. Similar scenes took place in Saigon in 1946 when settlers turned out in droves to welcome the soldiers liberating them from ‘native’ rule (Goscha 2022). In both cases, there was a close alliance between the army and the settler communities, which acquiesced in the colonial violence and cruel repression. Likewise, today, Israeli settler society is overwhelmingly in support of the Israeli military’s genocide in Gaza and pursuit of a full-blown war in the whole region. Countless videos and images show Israelis cheering and celebrating the death of Palestinians and explaining how they would like to see them disappear from the lands they have taken away from them.

    Palestine: Taking up the mantle of anti-colonial revolution

    What am I driving at? At this idea: that no one colonizes innocently, that no one colonizes with impunity either; that a nation which colonizes, that a civilization which justifies colonization—and therefore force—is already a sick civilization, a civilization that is morally diseased…

    Aimé Césaire(Césaire 2000)

    We remembered all the miseries, all the injustices, our people and the conditions they lived, the coldness with which world opinion looks at our cause, and so we felt that we will not permit them to crush us. We will defend ourselves and our revolution by every way and every means

    George Habash (external link), 1970

    What do the Algerian and Vietnamese struggles have to do with the Palestinian struggle today? The answer is that the Palestinian liberation struggle must be uncompromisingly situated within the long line of anti-colonial revolutionary efforts. Despite their own specificities and differences, these three struggles need to be understood as such: as anti-colonial struggles for liberation. At the same time, the events in Palestine, including the current genocide, also demonstrate that the colonial world has not yet been fully dismantled. 

    The sections below focus on the intersections between the Palestinian liberation struggle and its Algerian and Vietnamese counterparts.

    Palestine and Algeria: two sisters in the Arab world

    I travelled on an Algerian airplane under Algerian protection as if I was an Algerian envoy, not just a Palestinian one. [Boumediene] wanted to tell the world that Palestinian envoy Yasser Arafat wasn’t coming alone but with Algeria by his side

    Yasser Arafat (external link)

    For obvious reasons, there are multiple connections between the Palestinian and Algerian revolutionary liberation struggles. One of them is the deeply racist, inhumane and genocidal settler-colonial experience both nations have been subjected to, uniquely within the Arab region. Sharing this common experience, Palestinian revolutionaries look up to their Algerian brothers and sisters, while the Algerians see in the Palestinian resistance and revolutionary efforts a mirror image of their revolution against the French colonialists. The Algerian FLN inspired the Palestinian strategy of armed struggle (external link) and the union of different political groups under a common banner. It therefore comes as no surprise that the Algerians have assisted the Palestinians since the 1960s in every realm: diplomatic backing, military assistance, and the provision of weapons and financing.

    For a big part of the ‘Third World’, especially those countries that were still under the grip of colonial domination, Algeria’s liberation in 1962 provided hope and a model to follow. Its capital Algiers became a Mecca for revolutionaries from all over the world – from Vietnam to Palestine to southern Africa – who desired to bring down the imperialist and colonial order.  The 1964 charter of Algiers declared Algeria’s support for the ‘struggles of other people in the world’, including ‘armed struggle’ (Deffarge & Troeller 1972), and independent Algeria went on to provide asylum and financial support to movements all over the world fighting for independence and against racism, colonialism and imperialism. 

    In the Arab world, the new regime in Algeria established ties with the Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser, and was firmly part of the anti-colonial wave that chased out the French and the British after their pitiful adventure in the Suez in 1956, and which included independence in Tunisia and Morocco also in 1956, and the overthrow of the monarchies in Iraq (1958) and Northern Yemen (1962). In this period, the Palestinians also initiated their first actions to put their country back on the political map, from which it had been removed (Gresh 2012). 

    In the following paragraphs, I mainly rely on material gathered by the excellent educational website on the Palestinian revolution (https://learnpalestine.qeh.ox.ac.uk/ (external link)), curated by the Palestinian scholars Karma Nabulsi and Abdel Razzaq Takriti, as well as on the enlightening The Dig podcast series Thawra (external link), on Arab radicalisms in the twentieth century.

    The Palestinian liberation movement actively engaged with Algeria in the years after its independence in 1962, at a time when the country was a meeting point for various Afro-Asian liberation movements. The Palestinian writer and politician Muhammad Abu Meizar, who joined Fatah (the Palestinian National Liberation Movement) in 1962, has described how the first Palestinian meeting with the Cuban revolution took place in 1964, when Che Guevara travelled to Algiers. Palestinians at this time were establishing relations with various liberation movements from Africa, Asia and Latin America. It was also from Algeria that the first Palestinian delegation travelled to China in 1965.

    Abu Meizar (external link) describes Algeria’s support to the Palestinian struggle at this time: ‘through Algeria, several interactions took place with liberation movements, the Vietnamese, the Chinese, African movements, it was a meeting place. Algeria also hosted one of the most important institutions, the Cherchell Military Academy, where many Palestinians were enrolled. Until that time Fatah had not fired its first shot. However, through Algeria, it made connections with the Moroccans, the Tunisians, the Africans, the Vietnamese, the Chinese, Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Cuba. These were not minor relationships, they were extremely precious, and valuable.’

    The Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) opened its office in Algeria in 1965. Its first chairman (1964–1967), Ahmad al-Shukeiri, was known for his ardent support for the Algerian cause: As a representative of Saudi Arabia and then Syria at the United Nations in New York, he played an active role in defending the Algerian revolution from 1955 till 1962, during annual sessions and special meetings. Algeria repaid the debt in kind: the first public support for the Palestinian revolution from any government was from Algeria. It took the form of the cover page of the official newspaper Al-Moudjahid, on 1 January 1965, which bore an article titled ‘The Revolutionaries of the 1st of November Salute the Revolutionaries of the 1st of January’. 

    During this time, Fatah opened a training camp for Palestinian fighters in Algeria, outside the framework of the Cherchell Military Academy, in coordination with the Algerian Joint Forces Command. A large number of Palestinian volunteers from Europe and the Maghreb, and even from the USA, trained there, some of whom went on to conduct resistance operations, becoming themselves symbols of the liberation struggle, such as Mahmoud al-Hamshari, Ghazi al-Husseini and Abdullah Franji. 

    Abu Meizar (external link) described Algeria’s support to the Palestinian armed struggle: ‘[In 1967 [w]e secured the first weapons shipment from Algeria to Fatah, with the delivery facilitated by Mohammad Ibrahim al-Ali [Commander of the Syrian Popular Army]. The first plane flew to Damascus loaded with weapons for Fateh. … This was our first weapons deal, but it should be remembered that in the days of Boumediene in 1966, the first official financial support was offered by the Algerian government to Fatah.’

    Yasser Arafat, chairman of the PLO from 1969 to 2004, always acknowledged Algeria’s uncompromising and unshakable solidarity with the Palestinian cause, as well as its firm support for pan-Arab war efforts against the Zionist entity. For example, he explained how Algerian President Houari Boumediene sent forces to Egypt to fight in the 1967 Arab–Israeli war. Boumediene also went to Cairo and Damascus to ask what they needed for the war effort, and thereafter visited the Soviet Union to request they send Egypt and Syria tanks and weapons to replace those they had lost. Arafat recounted (external link) the negotiations between Boumediene and the Soviets at this time: ‘They told him they needed more time, and he said if by time they meant money then Algeria would pay. He immediately paid the Soviet Union 200 million dollars which would amount to 2 billion dollars today. He paid to make the Soviet Union expedite the delivery of weapons to Egypt and Syria. No one can forget this.’

    After the Naksa (defeat) of 1967, Boumediene declared: 

    ‘History will judge us as traitors and losers … if we accept the defeat … The Arab nation will not kneel. If Israel thinks that it captured the Sinai, the Golan and the west bank, it knows that the Arab depth reaches Algeria … Algeria cannot accept the defeat. Is the Arab nation using all its tremendous human resources? Is it using all the tremendous physical energies it has today … to say that it lost the battle. … The battle is not just a Palestinian battle. It is true that we are far geographically, but we have a role to play.’(Boumaza 2015)

    The Algerian troops Boumediene sent remained in Egypt to defend its borders until the 1973 Arab–Israeli war, during which they fought alongside Palestinian troops on the Suez front. 

    Finally, Algeria’s active support for the Palestinian liberation struggle was also seen in the choice of its capital Algiers as the site for the Declaration of Independence of the State of Palestine in November 1988, announced during the 19th session of the Palestine National Council.

    Every day in Gaza there’s another Kham Thien

    Like Palestine and Algeria, Palestine and Vietnam have a long history of fraternity. Vietnam’s fight for liberation, which pitted it first against France and then against the United States, inspired Palestinians in their struggle against Israel’s occupation of their lands. 

    One of the similarities in the Palestinian and Vietnamese struggles is their use of tunnels as a guerilla tactic against a superior and better equipped army. Perhaps inspired by the Chinese communists’ use of tunnels against the Japanese invaders, the Vietnamese first began digging their extensive network of tunnels during the 1940s, to hide from and launch attacks against French colonial troops. The 150-mile-long Cu Chi tunnels, located northwest of Saigon (Ho Chi Minh City), were a strategic stronghold for the Communist guerilla troops, known as Viet Cong (external link). They played a crucial role in the resistance against the American war on Vietnam, including acting as the base of operations for the Tet Offensive in 1968. Today, both the Palestinian and Lebanese resistance movements are using tunnels in their fight against Israel. The tunnels in Gaza serve as a base for the Palestinian resistance, which has used them to inflict significant losses on the Israeli military. 

    Another parallel between Palestine’s experience and that of Vietnam is the degree of destruction wreaked by their powerful oppressors. For Vietnamese, Israel’s destruction of Gaza today recalls the US bombing raids (external link) in 1972. Then-US President Richard Nixon ordered the bombing of the North Vietnamese capital Hanoi over Christmas 1972. Starting on 18 December and lasting for 12 consecutive days and nights, about 20,000 tonnes of bombs were dropped on Hanoi, as well as on the busy northern port city of Hai Phong and other localities. Hanoi’s Kham Thien neighbourhood suffered the most severe devastation. 

    These links between Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza and the US war on Vietnam are now being clearly articulated by young Vietnamese activists to introduce the Palestinian cause to new audiences (Dang 2024). The historical echoes of the two wars, including images of the destruction of urban centres (Gaza and Kham Thien), alongside the aggressor states’ violent threats – with Israel declaring it would ‘flatten Gaza’ and the United States declaring it would ‘bomb North Vietnam back to the Stone Age (external link)’ – form part of a reservoir of shared symbols that point to a common history of colonial wars and anti-colonial revolutionary resistance. This shared experience is fuelling a renewed sense of transnational solidarities between the formerly oppressed and currently oppressed peoples. 

    These solidarities, which are now being renewed, actually go back many years: Vietnam’s support for the Palestinian people and their struggle for liberation was unwavering during the Cold War and into the 1990s. This is undoubtedly because of the belief among the Vietnamese leadership that the Palestinian cause mirrored their own fight for unification and independence against foreign powers. The PLO established relations with North Vietnam in 1968 and set up a resident representative office after the end of the war in Vietnam in 1975. The office soon became the embassy of Palestine in Vietnam. In the 1990s, Vietnam welcomed Palestinian leaders, including Yasser Arafat, on many occasions. On the Palestinian side, the bonds of friendship between the two countries were summed up by Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish (external link) in 1973, as the war in Vietnam entered its final phase with the signing of the Paris Peace Accords:‘In the conscience of the peoples of the world, the torch has been passed from Vietnam to us.’ The PLO was among the small minority of groups and countries of the Global South that openly condemned China for its invasion of Vietnam in 1979.

    The Battle is Long, and the Road is Hard

    When the prison doors are opened, the real dragon will fly out

    Ho Chi Minh (Minh 1967)

    A freedom fighter learns the hard way that it is the oppressor who defines the nature of the struggle, and the oppressed is often left no recourse but to use methods that mirror those of the oppressor

    Nelson Mandela (Mandela 1994)

    Gaza was and will remain the capital of steadfastness, the heart of Palestine that does not stop beating even if the world closes in around us. … So hold on to the land as firmly as roots cling to the soil, for no wind can uproot a people who have chosen to live

    Younes Masskine (external link), 2024

    In the preceding sections I have argued that the Palestinian liberation struggle needs to be (re)situated within the long trajectory of anti-colonial/anti-imperialist/anti-apartheid struggles, and of decolonisation, including the liberation struggles of Haiti, Vietnam, Cuba, Algeria, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde and South Africa. It is therefore a struggle that should be supported, not demonised. But, as Edward Said once wrote (external link), ‘Palestine is the cruellest, most difficult cause to uphold, not because it is unjust, but because it is just and yet dangerous to speak about…’ Nevertheless, in these times of genocide, we cannot afford to be silent: we must speak about Palestine as honestly and concretely as possible.’

    The decolonisation of Palestine would entail the end of occupation, the liquidation of the apartheid regime and the dismantling of Israel as a settler-colonial project. All anti-colonial revolutionaries (whatever their ideology, whether communist, nationalist, religious conservative etc.) have been described by the colonisers and oppressors as terrorists, savages and barbarians. And all colonial powers have responded with savagery and inhumanity to acts of resistance by the oppressed and colonised. It is therefore time we stop entertaining any false equivalence (external link) between the legitimate violence (and right to resist) of the oppressed and colonised (fighting for their own liberation) and the infinitely greater violence of the oppressors and colonisers, which is used solely to enforce an unjust and cruel status quo. The Guyanese revolutionary Walter Rodney articulated this in the following powerful words: 

    We were told that violence in itself is evil, and that, whatever the cause, it is unjustified morally. By what standard of morality can the violence used by a slave to break his chains be considered the same as the violence of a slave master? By what standards can we equate the violence of blacks who have been oppressed, suppressed, depressed and repressed for four centuries with the violence of white fascists? Violence aimed at the recovery of human dignity and at equality cannot be judged by the same yardstick as violence aimed at maintenance of discrimination and oppression

    (Rodney 1969)

    In spite of all the horror, apocalyptic destruction and mass slaughter witnessed in Israel’s genocidal assault on Gaza over the last year, by carrying out the 7 October Toufan Al-Aqsa attacks, the Palestinian liberation movement began what may come to be seen as the beginning of the end of Israel’s settler-colonial regime (Pappé 2024). Moreover, despite the targeted assassinations of Hamas and Hezbollah leaders, the resistance forces remain intact and steadfast in the field of battle. Although it is too early to say for sure, what is now taking place in Palestine and Lebanon could turn out to be, like the 8 May 1945 events in Algeria, the first episode in a protracted people’s war to dismantle a settler colony. Hamas has shattered the myth of Israel’s invincibility, and through its heroic resistance in Gaza right now, is asserting itself as the leader of the Palestinian resistance to occupation, apartheid and settler-colonialism, garnering huge sympathy from all over the Arab world and beyond. The unfolding asymmetrical war is not simply a war between Hamas and Israel, it is a Palestinian war of liberation.It is also already a regional war, since Israel and its Western allies (chiefly the US and the UK) are fighting with varying degrees of intensity on five fronts: Gaza/West Bank, Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq/Syria, and Iran.

    We need to remember that armed struggle is necessary under certain conditions, and this is the case for occupied Palestine in its struggle against Zionist settler-colonialism. However, it is crucial to subordinate armed struggle to a broader range of revolutionary politics, to ensure it does not become arbitrary or random in its choice of targets. In such an approach, armed struggle can be understood as a tool for mobilising political support and not as a tactic that repels/alienates potential allies. Efficient resistance, as the Pakistani revolutionary scholar Eqbal Ahmad saw it, therefore needs a flexible strategy that mixes different militant and political tactics, based on the position the enemy occupies and the broader political context. In this understanding, violence and nonviolence should not be considered as mutually exclusive strategies standing in a binary opposition, with oppressed peoples needing to choose one or the other. Thus, our analysis of political violence must diverge (external link) from the purely normative/moralistic grounds on which some leftist condemnations of Hamas’s violence are based. Moreover, dismissing anti-colonial resistance because it is Islamist reflects the deeply rooted scourge of Islamophobia, which has unfortunately been internalised by some sections of the Euro-American left.

    Since its earliest days, the Palestinian liberation movement has understood the necessity of armed resistance in the face of a cruelly violent colonial, apartheid and occupying regime. At the same time, like its brothers and sisters in Algeria and Vietnam, it also knows that defeating, militarily, a highly sophisticated military power (backed by the US-led imperialist bloc) is an insurmountable task. To succeed and achieve its goals, the Palestinian armed struggle therefore needs to be firmly grounded in a broader revolutionary political strategy and led by a united anti-colonial front. 

    The truth of this proposition can be illustrated by the Algerian case, and specifically by the approach implemented by Abane Ramdane. Dubbed the architect of the Algerian independence struggle, Ramdane worked to organise the various political and military structures of the Algerian revolution and to create a stronger united front working with other political forces, specifically through the Congress of Soummam in August 1956 (Harbi 2024). It was Ramdane, alongside other brothers in arms, who emphasised the primacy of political action over military operations, but it was also Ramdane who insisted on taking the war to the capital Algiers, in the Battle of Algiers. The Algerian FLN did not win the war against the French militarily, but they did win the more decisive political and diplomatic battles, in terms of isolating and delegitimising the French colonial regime and building strong alliances in the international scene, including at the Bandung Conference in 1955, at pan-African fora, in Europe and at the UN General Assembly in the following years. 

    Obviously, the global political context has changed dramatically since the 1950s and 1960s. We are no longer living in the era of national liberation and Third-Worldism. Much worse, ours is an era in which international law is openly trampled upon by the most powerful, and in which the Western liberal establishment of human rights and democracy (political, intellectual, cultural and media) is collapsing in front of our eyes and showing its true genocidal and white-supremacist colours. The regional arena is no better: Palestine finds itself surrounded by reactionary and traitorous Arab regimes who have sold out the Palestinian cause to the US and Israel. This extremely challenging climate must be considered when seeking to devise an effective political strategy that can unite the Palestinian anti-colonial forces and efficiently articulate revolutionary tasks at the national, regional and international levels. As part of such a multi-tiered strategy, strengthening Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) efforts is of paramount importance.

    Gaza has awakened the world, and Palestine has become the quintessential defining struggle of our times. Palestine is the litmus test for progressive movements and organisations, and it is also a test for each and every one of us. As has been cogently argued by Adam Hanieh, the Palestine liberation struggle is not merely a moral and a human rights issue: it is fundamentally a struggle against US-led imperialism and global fossil capitalism, given that the two pillars of US hegemony in the region and beyond are Israel, a Euro-American settler colony, and the reactionary fossil fuel-rich Gulf monarchies, which are a key nodal point in global fossil capitalism. Palestine is thus a global front against colonialism, imperialism, fossil capitalism, and white supremacy. In this respect, the success of struggles (albeit suppressed and defeated for now) to overthrow the regional reactionary Arab regimes – chiefly the Gulf monarchies, and Egypt and Jordan – is essential for the victory of the Palestinian struggle. At the same time, what Israel’s genocidal war has also revealed, beyond the vacuity of the rule-based international (dis)order, is the moral and political bankruptcy of the Arab regimes, some of which gesticulate while doing nothing, and some of which are actively complicit in Zionist crimes (especially the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and Morocco). This fact has become starkly clear to Arab populations over the last year. This could consolidate their resolve to overthrow these regimes in the coming years (remembering that the Sudanese and Algerian revolutionary slogans of 2018 and 2019 were ‘Let them all fall’).

    The stubborn attempts by the French and their allies to hold the imperial line in Indochina in the 1940s and 1950s in order to defend their positions in Africa are mirrored today in the actions of the US, Israel and their allies to hold the imperial line in Palestine and the wider Middle East region against the axis of Resistance, represented by the Islamic Republic of Iran, Hezbollah and its sister organisations in the Lebanese resistance, alongside Hamas and its partners in the Palestinian resistance, as well as by Ansar Allah (known as the Houthis) in the Yemeni government and an assortment of Iraqi resistance groups. It thus becomes clear that for anti-imperialist forces globally, striking imperialism in Palestine and the Middle East is of utmost strategic importance to serve the world revolution, to borrow the words of the Palestinian revolutionary intellectual, poet and political activist Ghassan Kanafani that were quoted at the start of this article.

    My purpose throughout this contribution has not been to uncritically glorify or romanticise the various revolutions and forces of anti-colonial resistance, as these have all had their own problems, contradictions, shortcomings and failings. Moreover, the ‘post-colonial’ realities in the ‘independent’ countries that are the focus of this longread point to the pitfalls of national consciousness and the bankruptcy of certain national bourgeoisies, which were masterfully described by Fanon in his Wretched of the Earth. However, rather than adopting a nihilist stance and retrospectively pronouncing these revolutionary efforts not worthwhile, we need to see revolutions as ongoing long-term processes, with ebbs and flows, rather than as events that either succeed or fail at one particular moment. 

    To make an adequate materialist assessment of revolutionary struggles, it is also important to simultaneously consider the national, regional and international dimensions of such struggles. Transnational solidarity between oppressed and colonised peoples has been, and continues to be, a driving force in changing the world. We are currently witnessing the power and the significance of such South-South solidarity, in the form of Southern countries’ commitment to the Palestinian cause and efforts to isolate the criminal settler regime of Israel. South Africa’s case against Israel for breaching the Genocide Convention at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is one such effort, and it is an historic development: African men and women (with their allies) are shaking white-supremacy and colonialism and, to borrow the words of UN Special Rapporteur Francesca Albanese (external link), ‘fighting to save humanity & the international legal system against the ruthless attacks supported/enabled by most of the West’. Watching them wage this fight ‘will remain one of the defining images of our time. … [it] will make history whatever happens.’ At the Hague we saw representatives of the nation that suffered from, and defeated, apartheid standing up for basic human decency, justice and solidarity, and extending their hand to another nation that is undergoing and resisting colonial oppression and genocide while asserting their rights for freedom and justice. The South (whatever its imperfections and contradictions) is teaching the ‘human-rights- and democracy-loving’ North a lesson in political morality. In their actions, the heirs of Mandela are honouring his memory and underlining the truth of his words: ‘…we know too well that our freedom is incomplete without the freedom of the Palestinians’.3

    Many countries in the Global South are supporting South Africa’s case. They include Turkey, Indonesia, Jordan, Brazil, Colombia, Bolivia, Pakistan, Namibia, the Maldives, Malaysia, Cuba, Mexico, Libya, Egypt, Nicaragua, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (made up of 57 members), and the Arab League (made up of 22 members). In contrast, Western powers (the US, UK, Canada, and Germany) back Israel. Germany received a strong rebuke from Namibia, its former colony, shaming its stance of defending Israel’s genocide in Gaza and not learning from its murderous history of committing two genocides in the twentieth century (the genocide of the Herero and Namaqua in Namibia and the Holocaust in Europe). Moreover, Chile and Mexico have called on the International Criminal Court (ICC) to investigate war crimes committed by Israel in Gaza. This, alongside a dozen countries cutting diplomatic ties with Israel and moves by Colombia (and potentially South Africa) to ban exports of coal to Israel, points to a clear demarcation line between North and South (albeit with some unsustainable contradictions, especially when it comes to countries like Jordan and Egypt). These developments strengthen the trend of a move towards a multi-polar world where the South asserts itself politically and economically. We are not yet in a new Bandung phase, but this historical juncture will accelerate the decline (at least ideologically) of the US-led empire and will intensify its contradictions.

    The ICJ hearings and the developments that have followed it constitute a serious challenge to the white world (where white is not just a racial category but also an ideological construction), the Western establishment, their crumbling edifice of ‘human rights’ and their ‘universalism’, and may hasten the collapse of the international ‘rules-based’ (dis)order. It is very apparent that Western/Northern bourgeois democracy is undergoing a deep (if not mortal) crisis of legitimacy, and that its global hegemony (in the Gramscian sense) is waning. That explains the clear move towards, and the increasing reliance on, war and the entrenchment of a militarist/genocidal logic. Capitalism-imperialism is entering its openly barbaric stage. As Gramsci wrote (external link): ‘the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear’.

    At a time when the international political and economic system blames its victims rather than those who uphold it, diverts any attention away from the mechanisms of domination, and resorts to culturalist (often racist) explanations for its failures, it is crucial for us to immerse ourselves in revolutionary and progressive projects and experiences from the past. We need such clarity of purpose in order to create a break with the long history of plunder, violence and injustice endured by the majority of the planet. This can also help us to overcome the propaganda of an enslaving system that disguises its chains and shackles through the use of benign phrases like the ‘invisible hand of the market’, ‘happy globalisation’, ‘the humanitarian responsibility to protect’ – or ‘Israel has the right to defend itself’.

    It is becoming crystal clear that the oppressed majority can no longer breathe in a system that dehumanises people, a system that enshrines super-exploitation, a system that dominates nature and humanity, a system that generates massive inequality and untold poverty, a system that is prone to war and militarisation, and which causes ecological destruction and climate chaos. Luckily, revolts and rebellions that are fundamentally anti-systemic are taking place on all continents and in all regions. But for these episodic and largely geographically confined acts of resistance to succeed, they need to go beyond the local and to reach the global; they need to create enduring alliances in the face of capitalism, colonialism/imperialism, patriarchy and white supremacy.

    Can the various contemporary struggles – from the Arab, African, Asian and Latin American uprisings to Black Lives Matter, the resistance of Indigenous communities and the labour movement, and from the movements for climate justice, food sovereignty and peace, to the student encampments, anti-fascism/anti-racism and Palestinian/Lebanese resistance – converge and build strong global alliances that overcome their own contradictions and blind spots? Can they usher in a new moment where we question the colonial foundations of our current predicaments and truly decolonise our politics, economies, cultures and epistemologies? Such an aim is not only possible but necessary, and transnational solidarities and alliances are crucial in the global struggle for the emancipation of the wretched of the earth. Here, we can take inspiration from the past, by looking at the period of decolonisation, Bandung, Third- Worldism, the Tricontinental, and similar internationalist experiences. 

    Some histories are ignored, others are silenced in order to maintain certain hegemonies and to hide from view an inspiring era of revolutionary connections between struggles for liberation on different continents. We must dig into the past to familiarise ourselves with these histories, learn from them and discern some potential convergences across ongoing struggles. For example, we need to remember, and learn from the fact, that independent Algeria became a powerful symbol of revolutionary struggle and served as a model for different liberation fronts across the globe. With its audacious foreign policy, in the 1960s and 1970s, the Algerian capital become a Mecca for revolutionaries, as discussed above. It was Amilcar Cabral, the revolutionary leader from Guinea-Bissau, who announced at a press conference on the margins of the first Pan-African Festival held in Algiers in 1969: ‘Pick a pen and take note: the Muslims make the pilgrimage to Mecca, the Christians to the Vatican and the national liberation movements to Algiers!’ Likewise, we should take note of the fact that Vietnam’s struggle against US imperialism in the 1960s was also a rallying cause for progressive movements and influenced the upsurge of a global social revolt that led to the protests of 1968. 

    It is this global perspective on our struggles that we need to emphasise, in order to overcome the many constraints and limitations imposed on our movements and to embrace a radical internationalism that will actively promote solidarity. It is essential that we rediscover the revolutionary heritage of the Arab world, Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Global South, as recorded in the deeds and words of great minds like George Habash, Mahdi Amel, Frantz Fanon, Amilcar Cabral, Thomas Sankara, Walter Rodney, Ghassan Kanafani, Samir Amin, Che Guevara, Ho Chi Minh and Mao Zedong, to mention just a few. We need to revive the ambitious projects of the 1960s that sought emancipation from the imperialist-capitalist system. Building on this revolutionary heritage, being inspired by its insurgent hope and applying its internationalist perspective to the current context is of utmost importance to Palestine, and to other emancipatory struggles all over the world. 

    In the conclusion to The Wretched, Fanon wrote:

    Come, then, comrades; it would be as well to decide at once to change our ways. We must shake off the heavy darkness in which we were plunged and leave it behind. The new day, which is already at hand, must find us firm, prudent and resolute. … Let us waste no time in sterile litanies and nauseating mimicry. Leave this Europe where they are never done talking of Man, yet murder men everywhere they find them, at the corner of every one of their own streets, in all the corners of the globe. … Come, then, comrades, the European game has finally ended; we must find something different. We today can do everything, so long as we do not imitate Europe, so long as we are not obsessed by the desire to catch up with Europe. … For Europe, for ourselves and for humanity, comrades, we must turn over a new leaf, we must work out new concepts and try to set afoot a new man

    (Fanon 1967)

    In this vein, it is paramount to continue the tasks of decolonisation and delinking from the imperialist-capitalist system, in order to restore our denied humanity. Through resistance to colonial and capitalist logics of appropriation and extraction, new imaginaries and counter-hegemonic alternatives will be born. Let us not surrender. Let us be ‘a generation that rises from our ashes stronger’ (external link). And, to paraphrase a famous saying that is familiar to many Muslims, let us work for radical change as if it will take an eternity to realise but prepare the ground for it as if it is going to happen tomorrow.

    As revolutionaries sang at the Pan-African Festival of Algiers in 1969: ‘Down with imperialism, down with colonialism!’ ‘Colonialism, we must fight until we win! Imperialism, we must fight until we win!’4

    To which we can add: ‘From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free!’

    Notes and sources

    1. Les enfumades was a technique used by the French expeditionary corps during the conquest of Algeria in 1844/45. It consisted of asphyxiating people who had taken refuge or were trapped in a cave, and involved lighting fires in front of the entrance, which consumed the available oxygen and filled the cave with smoke. People annihilated in this way included women and children, with entire tribes killed, numbering thousands of people. ↩︎
    2. A gendarmerie is a military force that has law enforcement duties within a civilian population. The term gendarme is derived from the medieval French gens d’armes (‘men-at-arms’, literally ‘people of arms’). In France and some Francophone nations, the gendarmerie is a branch of the armed forces that is responsible for internal security in parts of the territory (in the case of France, primarily rural areas and small towns), with additional duties as military police for the armed forces. ↩︎
    3. This quote from Nelson Mandela is from a speech he made during the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People, in Pretoria, South Africa, on 4 December 1997. ↩︎
    4. These two chants by the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) militants from Namibia are heard in the opening scenes of the documentary The Pan-African Festival of Algiers 1969. For more details, see Hamouchene, H. (2014) ‘Culture and Revolution: The Pan-African Festival of Algiers’, 31 October. https://www.redpepper.org.uk/culture-media/stage-screen/culture-and-revolution-the-pan-african-festival-of-algiers/ ↩︎

    [end]

    The original article

  • [Sharing] Hind Rajab Foundation Files Complaint Against Maccabi Tel Aviv Supporters in Amsterdam

    Amsterdam, November 9, 2024 – The Hind Rajab Foundation, in partnership with the March 30 Movement, has taken an urgent legal step to combat rising instances of hate-fueled violence in Europe. Following disturbing incidents in Amsterdam, the two organizations have submitted a formal criminal complaint to the Amsterdam Public Prosecutor’s Office, seeking immediate action against supporters of Maccabi Tel Aviv who have reportedly engaged in acts of incitement, violence, and vandalism.

    ​This complaint, filed by attorney Mr. Haroon Raza on behalf of the Hind Rajab Foundation, cites multiple violent events that occurred in the streets of Amsterdam beginning on November 5, 2024. These actions reportedly include:

    • Incitement to Hatred and Genocidal Rhetoric: Maccabi supporters have been documented chanting slogans that incite violence against Palestinians and Arabs, especially children, echoing genocidal rhetoric that aligns with the ongoing atrocities in Gaza.
    • Assaults on Citizens and Targeted Hate Speech: Pro-Palestinian individuals were reportedly attacked by Maccabi supporters for displaying Palestinian symbols, leading to physical harm and creating an atmosphere of fear.
    • Vandalism and Property Destruction: Numerous incidents involved Maccabi supporters destroying Palestinian symbols and personal property, illustrating a targeted campaign of intimidation and hostility.

    The incidents in question occurred in highly public areas of Amsterdam, with supporters allegedly engaging in coordinated displays of hate and violence. Despite the presence of law enforcement, there was a conspicuous absence of arrests or intervention, a failure that the Hind Rajab Foundation and March 30 Movement have condemned.

    “The Hind Rajab Foundation is committed to ending impunity for those who commit or promote violence, particularly in a context that threatens vulnerable groups like children,” said Dyab Abou Jahjah, Chairman of the Hind Rajab Foundation and the March 30 Movement.

    “The inflammatory chants and violent acts witnessed in Amsterdam must be addressed urgently. We call on Dutch authorities to uphold the law and demonstrate that incitement and violence have no place in our society.”

    This urgent complaint underscores the need for swift action by the Amsterdam Public Prosecutor. The Hind Rajab Foundation and the March 30 Movement urge the authorities to secure social media footage, gather surveillance evidence, and investigate all responsible parties to bring perpetrators to justice [end]

    The original article

    About the Hind Rajab Foundation and March 30 Movement: the Hind Rajab Foundation, founded as a branch of the March 30 Movement, is dedicated to holding individuals and organizations accountable for crimes against humanity, particularly in the context of Palestinian rights. The foundation conducts thorough investigations, compiles evidence, and submits legal complaints on both national and international levels. Together with the March 30 Movement, the foundation aims to shift narratives and support justice for Palestine through sustained advocacy and legal action.

    [About Hind Rajab] on 29 January, 2024, a six-year-old Palestinian child in Gaza City, Hind Rajab, pleaded over the phone for emergency workers to rescue her from a car riddled with bullets. Her body was found two weeks later, on 10 February, alongside the bodies of six of her family members in the car they drove to flee their neighbourhood as Israeli forces invaded. The bodies of two Palestine Red Crescent Society (PRCS) paramedics, missing since the evening of the call when they were dispatched to rescue Hind, were discovered in their ambulance about 50 metres away.

    related

    Ajax-Maccabi Tel Aviv incidents: The hypocrisy of European media and politicians – DiEM25

    The recent incidents involving fans of Israeli football team Maccabi Tel Aviv in Amsterdam serve as a stark reminder of a recurring double standard in European discourse regarding Israel amid the ongoing genocide in Gaza

  • [En la memoria] La historia de Alexis Castillo, el colombiano que murió en la guerra entre Rusia y Ucrania – infobae (2022)

    El militar creció en Europa y decidió defender la bandera de Rusia, territorio en donde lo recuerdan también como ‘Alfonso Cano’

    En las últimas horas, se confirmó la muerte de Alexis Castillo, soldado colombiano que era militar activo en conflicto entre Rusia y Ucrania. La historía de este cafetero estuvo colmada de momentos álgidos, incluso, su fallecimiento no pasó desapercibido, pues el presidente Gustavo Petro envío un sentido mensaje sobre su partida, resaltando la convicción de paz que en su momento expuso Castillo, a pesar de defender los ideales prorrusos.

    Castillo arribó a territorio europeo desde muy joven, siendo España ese territorio que lo vería crecer y forjar sus ideales. El espacio ibérico fue fundamental para el desarrollo de su ideología, pues desde este lugar empezó a formarse en grupos de izquierda desde el concepto teórico y comunista, exponiendo diferentes contrastes ante la sociedad como activista, no obstante, a miles de kilómetros hacia el oriente, se desarrollaba el inicio de una guerra, hecho que le llamó la atención.

    Alexis partió a temprana edad, sobre el 2014 hacia la región del Donbáss en la frontera entre Rusia y Ucrania, según le relató en su momento a Los Informantes. En su extenso comentario, recordó que nació en Zarzal, Valle del Cauca, sin embargo, ahora buscaba abanderarse con los colores blanco, azul y rojo de la bandera rusa, para, según él, defenderse de los ataques ucranianos.

    Cabe resaltar que, el discurso que exponía el fallecido soldado en su momento, buscaba ponderar la idea antifascista y en contra del imperialismo. Durante su permanencia en Europa, también fue investigado por la justicia, pues tal como lo relata el medio El Confidencial, a Castillo se le señaló por varios delitos, incluyendo cooperación en asesinatos, no obstante, salió librado de dichos juicios.

    Asimismo, la prensa prorrusa lo recuerda como un voluntario internacional, que mediante su apoyo en las brigadas extranjeras, aportó a la lucha de dicho país. No obstante, cabe resaltar que, las opiniones son divididas sobre este tema, a pesar que, el apoyo occidental lo tiene Ucrania y el presidente de dicho país, Volodímir Zelenski.

    La versión sobre la muerte de este colombiano, apunta a que falleció en medio de un combate en dicha región, luego de combatir durante varios años y no superar las tres décadas de vida. Desde el golpe del Euromaidán en Ucrania, Castillo ya tenía conocimiento y la actitud para arribar a dicho país, pues quería “defender a la población del Donbáss”, en dicha población habría dejado un hijo.

    El presidente Petro lamentó la muerte

    Tan pronto se conoció el fallecimiento del vallecaucano, el mandatario nacional resaltó su lucha, dejando en entre dicho la viabilidad de sus ideales. Aseguró que Castillo murió con la idea de ser revolucionario e incluso, recalcó que la revolución era la paz.

    Alexis, es un colombiano que ha muerto en el Donbás; sus ideas revolucionarias, quizás equivocadas, quizás no, lo llevaron a esta guerra con los ojos abiertos. Ha muerto un joven que quizo ser revolucionario. La revolución es la Paz. Esto no saldrá en nuestros medios

    Cabe resaltar que, en la serie de documentales que Castillo protagonizó para varios medios, siempre resaltó que las armas eran un vehículo para la guerra, pues era necesario eliminar el uso de estas para construir la paz, pues siempre cuestionó las provisiones bélicas que recibía Ucrania por parte de Occident [fin]

    El artículo original