Strategy in Ukraine, between policy and warfare

Situation map on November 11 (RYBAR)

After the failures of military operations carried out for strictly political goals on the right bank of Dnieper river, the Russian military may be able now to achieve what an army is made for, in the absence of political noise, the destruction of the enemy battle corps

On February 24, Russian airborne paratroopers stormed Antonov airport (screenshot from a video of the Russian defense ministry)

In March, the offensive toward Kiev was an obvious attempt to trigger the collapse of the Ukrainian regime or the liberation of Donbass through quick negotiations. Under basic military rules, the manpower was insufficient and the assailants could not seize the capital by force. The Ukrainian regime was on the verge of collapse or capitulation over Donbass, but the West salvaged it and prevented the culmination of negotiations. NATO is not seeking a fair peace. NATO is conducting an attrition war with Ukrainian cheap blood, for the fantasy of a regime change in Russia. The psychological imbalance of Volodymyr Zelenskyy makes him the perfect minion of the Western fantasy

Kherson on May 20 (Andrey Borodulin / AFP)

Seized in the same context in March, Kherson was later defended in the perspective of a political settlement. The referendum was one political step. But the military position on the right bank of Dnieper river was untenable for logistical reasons, untenable from the beginning. After the general mobilization in Ukraine, its numerical superiority was large. The counterattacks started late August. The Russian partial mobilization is balancing now the forces, but around Kherson, the logistical nightmare would have worsened in proprortion of reinforcements. Withdrawal was the military solution

Ukrainian cannon fodder (social networks on October 25)

These political operations were relevant but failed. Twice, the troops managed to withdraw with their material. They failed due to the Western support to Ukraine and likely, the intellectual weakness of the Ukrainian masses, cretins who are accepting their slaughter under Russian firepower, like so many died for trivial reasons in western Europe one century ago

Tyulpan (Tulip) 240 mm mortar is firing at the Ukrainian forces (Russian defense ministry on July 22, 2022)

Strongly based now behind Dnieper river in the south, on Russian border in the north, the army may be able now to devote itself to military goals. No new offensive toward Odessa or Kiev, ideas from remote strategists, who in their life, have never carried an assault rifle. Odessa would require a numerical superiority that Russia does not have. But maneuvers to successively isolate and destroy large Ukrainian formations on the left bank. That was how Syria and Russia won against the West-backed Jihadists

Victory in Lisichansk, Lugansk People’s Republic, on July 2, 2022 (RIA Novosti), a member of the 6th republican Cossacks regiment raised the replica of the victory flag in Berlin, 77 years earlier

With tactics which would still limit the Russian casualties, the goal would be the incineration or surrender of the Ukrainian cannon fodder on the left bank, would require the prior destruction of the bridges still up on Dnieper river. NATO would have already blown them up.

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