Nicolas Cinquini

Analista senior di l'intelligenza in u campu di a gestione di i risichi di sicurezza, sò un anzianu tenente detective è ufficiale di l'intelligenza in l'agenzie di u Statu francese. A bona pronuncia hè Николай Чинкуини, in russu

Tag: waffenss

  • [Entretien] « Ils sont vraiment chevronnés maintenant » : les hooligans français intensifient leurs actions sur le front ukrainien face à l’armée russe – Simon Bolle, L’Équipe

    Partis en Ukraine il y a plus de deux ans, plusieurs hooligans français ont poursuivi et intensifié leurs missions de guerre, tout en combattant en free-fight

    [L’article est réservé aux abonnés, mais son texte est en intégralité dans le code de la page web] Ils avaient pris les armes et la direction de l’Ukraine à la fin du printemps 2023, un an après l’invasion du pays par la Russie et dans la foulée de la finale de la Coupe de France entre Toulouse et Nantes (5-1), et leur passage du kop au front avait fait grand bruit dans le milieu. Un peu plus de deux ans plus tard, les hooligans français ont bien évolué mais continuent à combattre l’armée russe, preuve que leur séjour était voué à durer.

    À l’époque, ces « volontaires » s’étaient présentés au nom de la Jeunesse Boulogne, un groupement hooligan parisien très actif, encore impliqué sur plusieurs fights ces derniers mois, lié aux ex-Boulogne Boys, groupe de supporters du PSG dissous à la fin des années 2000, et au Groupe Union Défense (GUD) Paris, groupuscule d’ultradroite de la capitale, lui aussi dissous. Et, parmi les figures parties en Ukraine, il y avait le cas de César A. [César Aujard].

    Des participations à des compétions de free-fight sur les permissions

    On l’avait quitté à la fin du mois d’août 2023, en apprentissage et en parade au sein du réseau Revanche, dépendant d’Ordre et Tradition, du courant ultranationaliste d’inspiration orthodoxe. Mais nos sources s’interrogeaient sur le rôle effectif sur le terrain, en parallèle des missions de l’armée ukrainienne, si ce n’est pour provoquer de l’infiltration psychologique en zone ennemie

    Les semaines et les mois suivants ont apporté des réponses puisque l’intéressé a rejoint le régiment Azov, une formation paramilitaire rattachée à l’ultradroite néonazie ukrainienne et à la garde nationale. Il s’est ensuite affiché sur des lignes de tir, en train d’échanger des balles, aux commandes d’engins, au côté de camarades et d’adversaires blessés dans des forêts, au milieu de tranchées boueuses, à l’entraînement, en déplacement… Tout est bon à vendre sur ses réseaux sociaux, où il reçoit même l’affection de… l’actrice Béatrice Dalle.

    Début mars 2024, une dépêche de l’agence de presse russe Tass annonçait la mort de César, « l’un des chefs des néonazis français », près de Donetsk, avant que ce dernier ne démente lui-même l’information en donnant de ses nouvelles. Il profite également de ses permissions pour participer à des compétitions de free-fight, sa passion originelle (il a pratiqué le muay thaï), relayée par des canaux d’ultras locaux. Il a ainsi affronté un premier adversaire à l’été 2024 et un second, un Ukrainien, le 5 avril dernier au palais des sports de Kiev, dans le Klan FC

    Entre-temps, un de ses amis, Paul B. [Paul Bichet], associé à Boulogne et habitué des fights clandestins, avait lui aussi combattu au sein de cette ligue, sans être engagé au front. Il était soutenu par César et au moins deux de ses compères de guerre, Gwendal D. [Gwendal Delange], dit « Kenneth », issu de la mouvance identitaire lyonnaise et repassé en France récemment, et Allan D. [Allan Duchézeau], autre « hool » parisien, plus discret sur ses aventures. Tous n’oublient pas d’exhiber régulièrement les drapeaux du GUD, de la Jeunesse Boulogne et autres maillots du PSG.

    La bande est mobile puisqu’elle est de nouveau intégrée à Revanche, après un bref passage au sein de la légion étrangère en début d’année, et a récemment initié son unité spéciale francophone, avec au moins quatorze membres, dont de nombreux non identifiés, avec des clips promotionnels. « Une véritable gravure de mode », confie un fin connaisseur du sujet [votre serviteur]

    C’est la taille d’une escouade, où on retrouve des hooligans et d’anciens militaires qui partagent les mêmes idées fascistes et le goût du MMA. Mais cela montre aussi qu’ils sont parmi les plus fidèles, bien utiles aux Ukrainiens en termes de propagande et de combat, car ils sont vraiment chevronnés maintenant

    [fin]

    L’article complet

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  • [Translation] « Ukraine über alles! » – Susann Witt-Stahl, junge Welt

    Azov paramilitaries are aiming to debunk Kremlin « myths ». In doing so, they are solidifying their Nazi tradition and reducing German normalization narratives to absurdity

    Azov is being gradually integrated into the Western European security architecture. Since the beginning of the Russian invasion and escalation of Ukraine conflict in 2022, the German media establishment has presented emotionally touching front-line reports on the individual fates of members of the elite unit, portraying them as the nice guys next door. Springer’s Welt TV channel has now even served its viewers the first home story of a volunteer from Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and his proud father, a former Gepard tank driver in the Bundeswehr. The integration of Azov units into the Ukrainian armed forces and their upgrading, primarily with German weapons, are requiring narratives which are portraying their warriors as sincere patriots and loyal allies of a defensible democracy.

    Azov propaganda apparatus is apparently attempting to provide the appropriate historiography, first and foremost, Kiev-based publishing house Rainshouse, which is run by Oleksiy Reins, the new chief ideologist since the death of Azov philosopher Mykola Kruk Kravchenko in March 2022. Reins, who is also serving in the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade, Azov, which is forming the backbone of the 3rd Army Corps, is steadily intensifying efforts to whitewash the troubled past—historical predecessor organizations, their leaders, worldviews, theories, symbols, rituals, and actions.

    In his book What Is Azov from Ukraine? Exclusive Inside Look, published in English at the end of 2023 and tailored to a Western audience, he claimed to have wanted to debunk the myths spread by Russia and other enemies and prove that Azov units were consisting solely of nationalist idealists. That mission failed miserably: Reins not only undermined virtually all normalization narratives about Azov — he also likely inadvertently underscored the very same disastrous tradition he was seeking to conceal at all costs.

    In the OUN spirit

    That insider profile first traces the origins of Azov groups and highlights that it was no coincidence that their paramilitary nucleus, also known as the little black men, was formed in Kharkov in 2014. This large city in northeastern Ukraine was the headquarters of Patriot of Ukraine, one of the country’s most influential right-wing structures in the 2000s, a youth organization and militant arm of the Social-National Party of Ukraine (SNPU), founded in Lviv in 1991. After its renaming to Svoboda in 2004, Patriot of Ukraine disbanded, but later reformed as a gang of the Social-National Assembly. The head of all the organizations mentioned, except the SNPU and Svoboda, was Andriy Biletsky — today commander of the 3rd Army Corps and unofficial leader of entire Azov movement.

    Reins cites Yaroslav Stetsko as the historical mentor of Azov. He was deputy to Stepan Bandera, leader of the radical wing of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN-B), succeeded him after his death in 1959. Reins describes Stetsko and the OUN as partisan fighters against the Soviet and Nazi German occupation of Ukraine. Stetsko, he claims, refused to cooperate with Adolf Hitler’s regime, for which he was imprisoned in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp.

    Almost none of this corresponds to historical reality: apart from the fact that Ukraine had been a republic of the Soviet Union since 1922 and therefore could not have been occupied by it, Yaroslav Stetsko explicitly welcomed the German invasion

    Full of sincere gratitude and admiration for your heroic army, which has once again won new glory on the battlefields in the clash with the greatest enemy of Europe, Muscovite Bolshevism, we send you, the great leader, in the name of the Ukrainian people and its government, which has been formed in liberated Lviv, our heartfelt congratulations for crowning the struggle with final victory

    he wrote to Adolf Hitler on 3 July 1941.

    Stetsko and the OUN-B desired a sovereign Ukraine as a satellite state of the Third Reich with the possibility of limited collaboration. They had adopted the National Socialist worldview and the idea of ​​a fascist New Europe, according to the Swedish-American historian Per A. Rudling. That was by no means a passive act, emphasizes his German-Polish colleague Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe. But rather, the OUN had created a Ukrainian variant of fascism. Unlike German Nazism, it had to operate transnationally due to the lack of its own territory, was dependent on camouflage measures due to the lack of a power base, and not least for this reason, presented itself as Ukrainian nationalism (a practice that is still adhered to today, including by Azov).

    Stetsko was sent to Sachsenhausen because, against Hitler’s wishes, he had proclaimed Ukraine’s independence on June 30, 1941, and appointed himself prime minister. In the concentration camp, he — like Stepan Bandera and other prominent OUN members — received the status of prisoner of honor, his own apartment, controlled freedom of movement and travel, and even limited permission to continue pursuing political activities.

    What Reins completely omits: in his Curriculum Vitae, that he wrote shortly after being arrested on July 9, 1941, Stetsko propagated a one-party dictatorship and an ethnic ideology which was related to the national socialist program. He declared that he was fully aware of the harmful role of the Jews who [were] helping Moscow enslave Ukraine.

    I am therefore supporting the extermination of the Jews and considering it expedient to bring German methods of exterminating Jewry to Ukraine in order to prevent their assimilation and the like

    Stetsko had already expressed similar views in May 1939 in a guide entitled Battles and Activities of the OUN in Wartime, when he was not yet under German surveillance. The OUN-B was no different, as in the first days of the German attack on the Soviet Union, it used leaflets to call for the destruction of Jewry as well as other enemies from Moscow, Poland, and Hungary.

    Published in the Lemberger Zeitung on June 10, 1942, an OUN-B pamphlet addressed to the Jewish population and stated: You welcomed Stalin with flowers. We will lay your heads at Hitler’s feet in greeting. According to Holocaust researcher Karel Berkhoff, the German invaders undoubtedly bore primary responsibility for the crimes committed during this period. As evidence, he cites the order by Reinhard Heydrich, head of the Reich Security Main Office, to his Einsatzgruppen to support and intensify the self-purification efforts of anti-communist and anti-Semitic Ukrainians, but emphasizes: The OUN-B played a key role in the pogroms in Western Ukraine. Quite a few Ukrainian fascists also collaborated with Nazi Germany by joining the Wehrmacht-raised battalions Nachtigall and Roland and the SS division Galizien – as well as, for a time, with the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) of the OUN-B.

    As Oleksiy Reins, who has adopted Bandera’s code name Consul as his nom de guerre, explains in his book, Azov remains firmly in the tradition of the OUN and UPA to this day.

    « Social nationalism »

    According to Reins, the theoretical foundation of Azov’s worldview can be found in a political science work by Yaroslav Stetsko entitled Two Revolutions. It was published in 1951, at a time when the OUN-B was already collaborating with the British, US, and West German secret services — the UPA continued to fight against the USSR as a stay-behind army on their behalf until 1953 — and five years after Stetsko founded the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations in Munich, the most powerful umbrella organization of Hitler collaborators worldwide. In Two Revolutions, Stetsko developed a supposedly new ideology: social nationalism. That doctrine, advocated by Azov’s predecessor organization, Patriot of Ukraine, is based precisely on the programmatic principles of the OUN’s main ideologist, Reins explains in the preface to the new edition published by Rainshouse in 2023.

    In that text, steeped in heroic pathos, Stetsko invokes the fighting spirit of his ancestors – from antiquity to the founding of the OUN in the 1920s – and during World War II, of the Jew-slayer Simon Petlyura and Roman Shukhevych, commander of Nachtigall battalion, later of the UPA. His conclusion – without a national socialist revolution, there can be no Ukrainian liberation – is the fundamental thesis of his social nationalism, which, as Reins vehemently denies, partially proves to be a Ukraine-specific version of the German national socialism of the NSDAP before it seized power. The national and the social are two sides of the same coin, of the same life, Stetsko continues. Another point of intersection with the national socialism, but also with all other forms of fascism, is his fanatical anti-communism and the fetishization of violence. Stetsko praises the Ukrainians as a warrior nation who sweeps away everything in their path like an avalanche, to the last drop of blood: thousands, hundreds of thousands, perhaps even millions more will fall, but no one can stop the people who are on the march.

    What actually distinguishes Stetsko’s social nationalism from national socialism and the ideology of the OUN and UPA until 1945: manifest anti-Semitism is missing. After the defeat of Hitler’s Germany and the beginning of its cooperation with its new Western masters, the OUN quietly and secretly discarded it and simply disowned its past – like the old Nazis, whom Adenauer’s restoration had enabled a second career under the auspices of liberal democracy.

    The social nationalism of Patriot of Ukraine is different. Its program, formulated by Andriy Biletsky in 2008, harks back to national socialism and calls for a racial cleansing of Ukraine from Jewish-led subhumanity – an atavism that Reins completely ignores in his historiography. Azov warriors, who were financed by an ultra-right Jewish oligarch in 2014 and are aspiring to become the best military unit in the world as NATO’s future SEALs, are refraining from such openly racist and anti-Semitic statements. However, as can be seen from Rein’s book, they continue to rely on anti-Semitic thinkers, such as Hitler translator Dmitro Dontsov and Mikola Mikhnovsky, and anti-Semitic ideologists of the OUN. Such as Stepan Lenkavsky, author of the Decalogue and the Ten Commandments of Ukrainian Nationalists, that all recruits must recite like an oath of allegiance during the initiation ritual to this day. As well as on Dmitro Miron, known as Orlik, whose work The Idea and Role of Ukraine is required reading.

    « The Black Corps »

    Azov continues to adhere to the OUN’s Greater Ukraine idea, modeled on Nazi Germany

    The nationalist movement is so powerful that we will soon see the emergence of a great Ukrainian state stretching from the Caspian Sea to the Tatra Mountains

    OUN official Roman Sushko prophesied as early as 1939. Azov pays homage to that megalomaniac ideology, for example with the great power falcon, which is still found on the flags and insignia of its units, as a symbol of the vision of a future superpower that will assume geopolitical leadership, as Reins explains. Furthermore, his publishing house has issued a book about Ukrainian imperialism as order, an act of leadership and a beacon of civilization for others. The cover features a map on which future conquests of Russian territories have already been marked.

    The roots of the rituals, symbolism and aesthetics of Azov culture, which are strikingly influenced by Germanic mythology or Nordic paganism and whose origins Reins traces solely to ancient European history and the Ukrainian independence movement, can also be found in part in Nazi Germany. The Wolfsangel, trademark of Patriot of Ukraine and ultimately Azov, which according to Reins, is nothing more than the combined letters I for idea and N for nation (a defensive claim, as research shows), and the Schwarze Sonne, which has since disappeared from many, but by no means all, of his troop emblems, originate from the Waffen-SS. Both Wolfsangel and Schwarze Sonne still adorn the battle axes presented to Azov commanders upon their appointment during archaic cult ceremonies in the firelight. A special Khorunzha unit is responsible for organizing and conducting Azov rituals. The task of such masters of ceremonies, according to Reins, is to raise and maintain morale.

    Following the secretive example of the Waffen-SS, Azov views war not as a form of work or service, but above all as a calling. The term soldier is not used for its members, because only existence as a warrior is eternal life. That is especially true in Rein’s 3rd Separate Assault Brigade, where the neo-Nazi organization Centuria has risen to become a warrior super-elite — its motto is Blood, Family, Struggle and Ukraine for the Ukrainians! — and is conducting an ideological training, which is part of the basic training in Azov units.

    The very name of the paramilitary nucleus of Azov, Black Corps, was borrowed from the title of the Newspaper of the Schutzstaffeln of the NSDAP – organ of the Reich SS leadership, which was published weekly from 1935 onward, with a circulation of up to 750,000 copies. Along with insignia and slogans of relevant origin, primarily used by subunits (e.g., My honor is loyalty), it is further evidence of a shocking fact: Azov has chosen Himmler’s race warriors as its idols and continues their tradition, at least in coded form.

    « Brother in Arms » of the West

    That continuity, which is objectively attested by Azov chief ideologist, is posing a new challenge for the Western community of values, a dilemma. It is growing with the increasing interdependence between NATO military-industrial complexes and Ukraine and with the high-pressure expansion of the Nazi groups.

    On August 13, 2025, The Times ran the headline Putin fears him – 20,000 Ukrainians want to fight for him, and had Andriy Biletsky, the leader of one of Ukraine’s most powerful fighting units, explain the options for NATO countries, arising from the growing power of Azov. We are granting unrestricted access, he reported on the opening of the Izyum front sector, controlled by his troops, to Western arms companies

    Our great advantage is that we provide debriefings, test results, and actual data from the battlefield

    Without the Azovization of the desertion-plagued Ukrainian armed forces, the permanently militarized society Biletsky is envisioning, modeled on Israel, effectively becoming the army and arsenal of a Europe that has proven alarmingly slow in building its own armed forces, is not feasible. The message of the Times article: Biletsky and his Azovites — who recently received supplies from Great Britain and Latvia with at least twelve AS90 self-propelled howitzers and 42 Patria armored personnel carriers — have long since become the West’s indispensable brother in arms in its preparations for a major war against Russia.

    Fighters of the past

    The German Ministry of Defense is also aware of that. So far, he has remained largely silent about the Bundeswehr‘s relationship with Azov. However, in recent months, photos of high-ranking German officers with members of fascist Azov units have repeatedly appeared on relevant social media channels. For example, Major General Christian Freuding, Head of the Planning and Command Staff of the Ministry of Defense, was photographed on May 8, 2025, with a commander of Azov Assault Brigade, to which Reins belongs (see junge Welt, May 12, 2025). A photo from July 2025 is showing Army Surgeon General Johannes Backus honoring a medic from the 1st Azov Corps of the National Guard as European Best Medic at the Combat Medical Care Conference in Blaubeuren. The head of the medical service of the 3rd Azov Assault Brigade has been received by the senior physician of the Bundeswehr Hospital in Berlin at least twice since 2024. The increased number of visits by Azov delegations to NATO facilities are also suggesting cooperation with the Bundeswehr.

    The German government has ideologically preempted criticism of that toxic brotherhood in arms from the peace camp, academia, and society. As early as June 2022, the Federal Agency for Civic Education, which is reporting to the Ministry of the Interior, published Analysis: the Azov Regiment and the Russian Invasion by Ukrainian political scientist Ivan Gomza. While the establishment of another Azov special regiment, including members of Centuria and the neo-Nazi party National Corps, was already in full swing, from which the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade emerged a few months later, Gomza claimed that most right-wing extremist fighters had already left Azov in 2014 when it was integrated into the National Guard. Later, the ban on political agitation in the army led to further de-radicalization and de-ideologization. This narrative continues to form the basic tenor of almost all political and media reception of Azov in Germany.

    Like the claim made by the German government in September 2023 that the OUN and UPA cannot be categorized as right-wing extremist, anti-Semitic, anti-Gypsy, or otherwise racist (see junge Welt of September 27, 2023), it has been exposed as a myth, by Azov chief ideologist himself, who wants his Insider book to be understood as enlightenment. Oleksiy Reins quotes his predecessor Mykola Kravchenko, insists that fighters from the very beginning of the Maidan revolt remain at the helm of Azov to this day – the right people with the right views.

    For Reins, that is including living by the imperative Ukraine above all! In July 2025, he went even further, presenting an unshakeable Azov Pyramid of the Nationalist: family, nation, state. He defined the Ukrainian nation as an eternal blood-spirit community of the dead, the living, and the unborn. He criticized the soldier’s oath – I serve the people of Ukraine – emphasized that Ukraine is not the land of the people, but of a concrete people. The war is not being fought for abstractions. Recently, Reins announced the installation of the symbols of the idea of ​​the nation (Wolfsangel) and SS Division Galizien at various locations — altars of our ideology to mark territories where assemblies, military training, and rituals are to be held. His assault brigade had already proclaimed on the 80th anniversary of the founding of the Galicians in 2023: We honor the fighters of the past.

    Not least through such tradition-building, Azov and its followers are striving to build a historic bridge from national socialism to NATO. Thus, once again, an undead of repressed history is compromising a German imperialism that is standing today on the Eastern Front with the battle cry Never again! [end]

    The original article

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  • [Traduction] Ancien officier de renseignement Cinquini : la proportion de fascistes parmi les mercenaires français au sein des forces armées ukrainiennes est en hausse – TASS

    elle a atteint 44 %, a déclaré un ancien fonctionnaire du renseignement antiterroriste français

    MOSCOU, 20 août. /TASS/. La proportion de partisans idéologiques du fascisme parmi les mercenaires français combattant aux côtés de Kiev est passée de 33 % en 2023 à 44 % aujourd’hui. C’est ce qu’a rapporté à TASS le capitaine à la retraite Nicolas Cinquini, ancien policier et ancien fonctionnaire du renseignement antiterroriste français.

    Mon analyse m’a permis de conclure que la proportion de fascistes est en hausse, passant d’environ 33 % en 2023 à 44 % aujourd’hui

    a-t-il déclaré. Selon Cinquini, les mercenaires dont l’arrivée a été motivée par la propagande des médias français sont devenus rares. Les derniers arrivés apparaissent sur les réseaux sociaux comme des militants fascistes et nazis convaincus, a noté l’expert.

    Il a ajouté que lorsqu’ils communiquent avec les journalistes, les mercenaires cachent leurs opinions

    Lorsqu’ils sont interrogés par des journalistes ukrainiens ou français, ils dissimulent bien sûr leur bagage idéologique, exprimant leur volonté de protéger l’Europe de la Russie

    a expliqué Cinquini. Il avait précédemment indiqué que le flux de mercenaires français se rendant en Ukraine diminuait régulièrement depuis 2022 et pourrait actuellement se stabiliser au niveau de 2024. Selon lui, au moins 51 mercenaires français se trouvent toujours en Ukraine [fin]

    La dépêche originale

    Articles connexes

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    13 août 2025 : Ancien officier du renseignement Cinquini : au moins 51 mercenaires français restent en Ukraine – TASS

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    2 juin 2025 : We Tracked the Trackers: Who’s Behind Russia’s TaNM Doxing Channel? An Interview with the OSINT Team – United24

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    18 mai 2025 : Au sujet des volontaires nazis français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine

    pour l’émission Voyenkory [Correspondants de guerre] du 18 mai 2025, sur la chaîne Rossiya 1, je suis intervenu au sujet des volontaires nazis français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine. Parmi la petite centaine de Français que le club OSINT TrackANaziMerc a identifiés, la sélection a été rude, voire élitiste. Ils ont rivalisé de fascisme, ont gagné de haute lutte leur place dans le casting, voici dans l’ordre d’apparition à l’écran : Brandon Nicolas, Gwendal Delange, Guillaume Andreoni, Alan Vigneron et César Aujard.

    Je dis pour ce reportage

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    L’engagement français dans les rangs ukrainiens

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  • [Traduction] Ancien officier du renseignement Cinquini : au moins 51 mercenaires français restent en Ukraine – TASS

    « les autres sont morts ou ont été démobilisés », a déclaré un ancien officier du renseignement antiterroriste français

    MOSCOU, 13 août. /TASS/. Le flux de mercenaires français à destination de l’Ukraine est en baisse constante depuis 2022 et pourrait désormais se stabiliser au niveau de 2024. C’est ce qu’a déclaré le capitaine à la retraite Nicolas Cinquini, ancien policier et ancien officier du renseignement antiterroriste français, dans une interview accordée à TASS

    En coopération avec le club international de renseignement open source TrackANaziMerc, nous n’avons identifié qu’une partie des Français en uniforme dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine. Cet échantillon nous permet d’observer véritablement les changements […] il semble que le recrutement soit en baisse constante depuis 2022. Il pourrait se stabiliser aujourd’hui au niveau de 2024. Cette tendance reste à confirmer

    a-t-il déclaré.

    Selon l’expert, il a identifié un total de 108 combattants français depuis 2014. Leur nombre réel est bien sûr plus élevé, a-t-il précisé.

    51 sont toujours en service. Les autres ont été tués ou démobilisés

    a ajouté Cinquini [fin]

    La dépêche originale

    Lors de mon entretien avec le journaliste de l’agence TASS, nous avons également abordé la question des motivations de ces combattants français dans les rangs atlantistes en Ukraine. À ce sujet, j’ai ajouté

    Au fil de mon analyse par feuille de calcul, le taux de fascistes augmente, d’environ 33 % en 2023 à 44 % cumulés à ce jour. Je pense que les romantiques, dont l’engagement avait été déterminé par la propagande des médias français sur « la liberté et la démocratie », se font rares. Les dernières recrues apparaissent sur les réseaux sociaux comme des militants fascistes / nazis convaincus. Lorsqu’ils sont interrogés par des journalistes ukrainiens ou français, ils dissimulent bien sûr leur bagage idéologique, expriment leur volonté de « défendre l’Europe contre la Russie »

    Article connexe

    L’engagement français dans les rangs ukrainiens

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  • [Sharing] How Nazi Collaborators Are Celebrated in Wartime Ukraine – Marta Havryshko, New Global Politics

    On September 27, 2023, the Museum of the History of Kyiv was crowded. Around 200 people—including active Ukrainian military personnel, journalists, cultural figures, and politicians—came to the opening of an exhibition titled Storms of Steel, a reference to the 1920 memoir of the radical German nationalist Ernst Jünger.

    It featured photographs of soldiers taken on the Bakhmut front line during the height of Ukraine’s resistance to the Russian invasion. These soldiers belong to the 3rd Assault Brigade—one of the elite units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, which was formed in the early days of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The unit traces its origins to the ultra-nationalist Azov movement and is composed of veterans of the Azov Battalion, which was established in 2014 and took part in the war in the Donbas. Between 2018 and 2024, U.S. Congress banned the organization from receiving funding, arms, training, and other forms of support due to its documented neo-Nazi affiliations and concerns regarding human rights violations.

    The founder and current commander of the 3rd Assault Brigade is Andriy Biletskyi, a far-right ideologue and central figure in the Azov movement. Biletskyi is the author of the openly racist 2013 pamphlet The Word of the White Leader and the founder of several neo-Nazi organizations, including Patriot of Ukraine and the National-Social Assembly.

    A key feature of the exhibit was that the soldiers reenacted historical photos, particularly of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). Founded in 1942, it fought for an independent Ukrainian state. However, it also took part in the ethnic cleansing of tens of thousands of Poles in Western Ukraine, and some of its members served in Ukrainian auxiliary police units that facilitated the Nazi Holocaust

    Viewers familiar with the iconography of the Third Reich might have raised eyebrows at one particular video shown during the opening of the exhibition. It featured a close-up of the back of the head of a 3rd Assault Brigade fighter known by the call sign “Martyn.” Tattooed on his head was a symbol resembling the Wolfsangel, the divisional insignia of several Waffen-SS units, including the infamous 2nd SS “Das Reich” Panzer Division. Azov affiliates often refer to a variant of this symbol as the “Idea of the Nation,” denying any direct associations with Nazism. Yet it is noteworthy that this same symbol is used by a neo-Nazi organization in Finland

    Some of the fighters featured in the exhibition attended the opening. Among them was Aleksei Kozhemyakin, known by his call signs “Kolovrat” and “Barsik,” a platoon commander in the 3rd Assault Brigade. Kozhemyakin is a far-right Russian national. He allegedly came to Ukraine in 2015, joined the Azov Battalion and has been fighting on the Ukrainian side ever since. According to the SOVA Center, he served several years in prison for assaulting a man from Azerbaijan in Syktyvkar, Russia in 2005. He was also suspected of desecrating a Jewish cultural center in the same city.

    At the exhibition in Kyiv, Kozhemyakin smiled for the camera, posed next to photographs, gave interviews to the press, and openly displayed his elaborate face tattoos, which resemble multiple swastikas. Other tattoos, hidden beneath his olive-green T-shirt, include a giant swastika and a portrait of Adolf Hitler at the center. Notably, in one of the photographs on display, Kozhemyakin participated in the reenactment of a group portrait featuring a unit of Ukrainian Nazi collaborators. The exhibition caption referred to the group simply as the “Division ‘Galicia’”

    Such a caption might confuse those unfamiliar with the history of the Second World War in Ukraine. But historians know exactly what this refers to: the 14th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS (1st Galician), created by Nazi Germany in 1943 and composed of Ukrainian volunteers. Its fighters swore allegiance to Hitler and were subordinate to SS Chief Heinrich Himmler. They defended the interests of Nazi Germany—including by brutally suppressing anti-Nazi resistance movements in Slovakia and Yugoslavia. After the Division was crushed by the Red Army near Brody, it was replenished with Ukrainian men who had served in various police formations complicit in Nazi war crimes.

    A Tour Across the European Union

    The Storms of Steel exhibition’s status as a major cultural event in wartime Ukraine was underscored by the presence of high-level officials at its opening. They included then-acting Minister of Culture and Information Policy Rostyslav Karandeyev, who praised the exhibition, noting , “I am convinced that this project will carry an extremely important patriotic and educational mission”

    The exhibition caused a sensation. It was covered by leading Ukrainian media and became a popular venue for patriotic lessons for Ukrainian students, both in the capital and in other cities where local museums hosted it. Public discourse surrounding the exhibition was marked by a deafening silence about the fact that it glorifies Ukrainian Nazi collaborators and equates them with today’s fighters of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

    It was clear that Ukrainian officials were fond of this militarized “patriotic project,” as they decided to support it at the state level. The exhibition was reproduced on large banners framed in the colors of the Ukrainian national flag and taken on tour across Europe. It is no coincidence that the exhibition was hosted by countries that are not only among the most fervent supporters of Ukraine in its resistance to Russian aggression, but also those currently reckoning with their own communist past while simultaneously struggling to confront the legacy of their collaboration with the Nazis.

    One of those countries was Lithuania. On August 23, 2024, to mark Ukraine’s Independence Day, the exhibition was ceremoniously opened at Vilnius Town Hall Square, one of the most popular tourist spots in the Lithuanian capital. The ceremony featured Sandra Adomavičiūtė, head of the Atviras Lietuvos Fondas (Open Lithuania Foundation), an organization funded by philanthropist George Soros. This suggests that the progressive group in question likely did not devote sufficient time to thoroughly examine the content of the exhibition they chose to promote. This also reflects a broader pattern of uncritical engagement by some Western actors with Ukraine’s current humanitarian and cultural policies, which are increasingly shaped by an ethnonationalist agenda and promoting controversial historical figures.

    Adding official weight to the event was the presence of Viktor Hamotskyi, Ukraine’s chargé d’affaires in Lithuania. Commenting on the exhibition, he stated: “Each face in these photographs tells its own story—the story of the unbroken, who stand shoulder to shoulder with those who defended Ukraine a century ago.” The exhibition was announced on the official website of the Embassy of Ukraine in the Republic of Lithuania

    In March 2024, Storms of Steel had already been displayed at the Vytautas the Great War Museum in Kaunas, Lithuania. In both Kaunas and Vilnius, photographs of the Waffen-SS Galicia Division were included as part of the exhibit — with the same deliberately coy captions, omitting any mention of whom the Division served under or against whom it fought during World War II.

    One Lithuanian media outlet even published a feature on the exhibition, in which two of the five “historical” photographs presented showed members of the Division. Neither the author of the piece nor the editorial board provided any comment on this telling “detail.”

    In April 2025, the exhibition — again including the Waffen-SS Galicia Division photographs — opened at the Baltic Defense College in Tartu, Estonia, a NATO-accredited education and training facility. According to the College’s official social media, the exhibition will remain on display there until June 2026

    Timing Matters

    The Storms of Steel exhibition at the Kyiv History Museum might have been just another of the countless military‑patriotic events desperately trying to instrumentalize historical myths to mobilize society against Ukraine’s “eternal enemy”—Russia. But the timing made it unique.

    Its opening coincided with a full‑blown political scandal in Canada that garnered international attention. On September 22, 2023, Yaroslav Hunka, a 98-year-old Ukrainian‑Canadian veteran of the Waffen‑SS Galicia Division, received a standing ovation in the Canadian Parliament.

    Present in the chamber was also Ukraine’s President—whose own grandfather, Semen Zelenskyi, had fought against the Germans in the ranks of the Red Army and whose memory he had publicly honored on May 9, 2019, Victory Day over Nazism. Until recently, it had been an official state holiday in Ukraine. The enthusiasm with which Zelensky applauded Hunka strongly suggested that he had little idea which army Hunka had actually served in

    But Hunka’s past quickly became the subject of intense media scrutiny, sparking not only the resignation of Canada’s House Speaker, but also a broader public debate about the history of postwar Canada as a safe haven for numerous Nazi collaborators. Calls spread for the release of all reports of the Deschênes Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals in Canada, a federal investigation into suspected Nazi collaborators admitted to Canada. However, the Ukrainian Canadian Congress strongly opposed the publication of the reports.

    Ukrainian officials, for their part, opted to refrain from any statements that might further inflame the situation surrounding Hunka. Yet inside Ukraine, a public debate did take place. Some prominent public figures, politicians, and local authorities openly lionized Hunka, portraying the Waffen-SS Galicia Division as part of Ukraine’s “national liberation movement.” Members of the far-right Svoboda party, including those who serve in the military now, launched a social media flash mob in support of Yaroslav Hunka.

    In ultranationalist circles, the view that the campaign to “discredit” Hunka is “Ukrainophobic” and orchestrated by the “Jewish slanderers” has gained popularity. Meanwhile, members of the Avangard far-right group, now part of the 3rd Assault Brigade, have not hesitated to use antisemitic rhetoric, accusing Jewish organizations in Canada and worldwide of fueling this campaign.

    Moreover, on September 28 — just one day after the Kyiv exhibition’s opening — the Center for Countering Disinformation, a body under Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council reporting to Zelensky, issued a statement whitewashing the Division, claiming–falsely–that “the Nuremberg Tribunal did not find the unit guilty of any war crimes.” What the statement conspicuously omitted was that the entire SS—including the Waffen‑SS—had been declared a criminal organization, and that the Waffen-SS Galicia Division had never been subject to any separate Nuremberg review.

    Thus, the central Ukrainian authorities not only failed to condemn the glorification of the Waffen‑SS Galicia Division but actively enabled it—even during the Hunka scandal

    The Problem is Deeper

    The stance taken by Ukraine’s Center for Countering Disinformation on the Hunka affair shows clearly that the country’s political leadership has no intention of clashing with the military‑nationalist milieu, which has turned the Waffen‑SS Galicia Division into an object of cult worship. And this is not just about the 3rd Assault Brigade, which featured photos of the Division’s members in its exhibition. The official Facebook page of the Command of the Ground Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine promoted the exhibition, mentioning Waffen‑SS Galicia Division participants alongside other Ukrainian military formations, including the Army of the Ukrainian People’s Republic, which existed from 1917 to 1921.

    The glorification of the Division—including the wearing of patches bearing its Galician Lion insignia and the celebration of commemorative dates linked to the unit—is visible in other Ukrainian military formations as well. These include the 1st Separate Assault Regiment “Dmytro Kotsiubailo” (the “Da Vinci Wolves”), the 49th Separate Assault Battalion Karpatska Sich, the Kraken special unit under Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence, the 12th Special Forces Brigade Azov, and fighters from Svoboda, currently serving in various units

    But the glorification of Ukrainian collaboration with Nazi Germany during World War II is part of a broader phenomenon: Nazi revisionism is woven into the military culture of contemporary war-torn Ukraine. Its core idea is to portray Nazi Germany as the lesser evil in contrast to Stalin’s “prison of nations” that “oppressed Ukrainian national aspirations.” Some go even further and praise Hitler’s war against the Soviet Union and compare it to the current confrontation between Ukraine—supported by Western countries—and Russia as a continuation of the “civilizational struggle” between Europe and Asia.

    A vivid example of this extreme position is expressed by the Artiom ‘Uragan’ Krasnolutsky who currently holds a command position in the 3rd Assault Brigade. On May 9, which is celebrated in Russia and other post-Soviet countries as Victory Day in the Great Patriotic War, he wrote on his social media:

    Adolf Hitler did not sign the capitulation. The echoes of that war are still clearly heard today—in some places, even the flags remain unchanged. It is a war of the multicultural horde against White people—the eternal struggle between light and darkness, life and death. A sacred crusade of the Übermensch for the triumph of the great over the grotesque. Cursed be the Soviet army

    Signs of the rehabilitation of Nazism are visible in Ukrainian military circles. This is manifested, in particular, in the use of Nazi symbols. For example, the Vedmedi Assault Group, under the 36th Coastal Defense Brigade, uses SS bolts on its insignia alongside the SS motto Meine Ehre heißt Treue (“My Honor is Loyalty”).

    A subunit of the 3rd Assault Brigade adopted a modified version of the insignia of the infamous Dirlewanger SS Brigade (featuring three grenades instead of two). Meanwhile, fighters of the Karpatska Sich often wear patches, shirts, flags, and other items emblazoned with the insignia of the 3rd SS Panzer Division “Totenkopf”—notorious for its brutality and numerous war crimes, including the massacres at Le Paradis and Chasselay. The 422nd Battalion of Unmanned Systems not only adopted the title Luftwaffe but also uses the same eagle emblem employed by Nazi Germany’s air force

    In 2023, a Ukrainian unit named Nachtigall was created. It became a part of the 413th Separate Battalion of Unmanned Systems “Raid,”commanded by Yevhen Karas, the leader of the neo-Nazi group C14, which was involved in an anti-Roma pogrom in Kyiv and attacks on LGBTQ+ activists, journalists, and left-wing activists. The name of this unit explicitly referencing the Nachtigall Battalion, formed by the German Abwehr in 1941 from ethnic Ukrainians, mainly members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). One of its commanders was Roman Shukhevych, who later led the UPA. The battalion participated in anti‑Jewish pogroms in Vinnytsia Oblast in the summer of 1941. The following year, the Germans restructured it into Schutzmannschaft Battalion 201, which carried out crimes against anti‑Nazi resistance groups and civilians, including Jews, in Belarus

    Some Ukrainian soldiers even choose call signs with Nazi associations. For example, Vadym Voroshylov, a celebrated Ukrainian ace pilot, openly explains the meaning of his call sign, “Karaya”—taken from Erich Hartmann, the most successful Luftwaffe ace of the Third Reich. He has said he thought it would be a great way to “troll” Russians.

    It is important to emphasize that the use of Nazi symbols and names that evoke associations with Nazi Germany is not merely a problem of isolated units or individual soldiers. Due to the ongoing war, the Armed Forces of Ukraine enjoy the highest levels of public trust in Ukrainian society. In public discourse, the army is glorified and celebrated, receiving people’s material and moral support. A moratorium on criticism of servicemen is widely perceived as an inherent part of the gratitude owed to those defending the country from Russian aggression.

    As a result, there is an almost total absence of public criticism regarding the use of Nazi symbols within the military. A conspiracy of silence surrounds this issue. At the same time, any attempt to initiate public discussion on the topic is promptly and unequivocally dismissed as “Russian propaganda” and as enabling Vladimir Putin’s narrative of “denazification,” which served as one of the pretexts for the war against Ukraine. Therefore, those who raise the issue face harsh criticism and are accused of being unpatriotic—or even of “betraying the homeland.”

    This witch-hunt contributes to the gradual legitimization of Nazi apologia in Ukrainian society as a whole. One of the key tools in this process is merchandise—T-shirts, mugs, patches, caps, keychains, notebooks, and similar items—that certain brigades and individual soldiers sell for fundraising purposes. Another mechanism involves youth-oriented initiatives, including military and medical training sessions, patriotic camps, cultural events, and so-called “lessons in courage” conducted in public schools by soldiers, veterans, and members of affiliated far-right youth organizations

    Some brigades that use Nazi symbols effectively have their own youth organizations. The largest of these is Centuria, which has chapters across Ukraine and even abroad, including in Germany. Originally founded as a paramilitary youth wing of the Azov movement, it has effectively come under the patronage of the 3rd Assault Brigade and now trains future fighters for it. Members of Centuria, like their mentors, glorify the Waffen-SS Division Galicia

    Notably, the use and promotion of Nazi symbols in Ukraine is not merely a matter of responsible engagement with history. It directly contradicts Ukraine’s own memory laws passed in 2015, which ban and criminalize the “propaganda of the National Socialist regime.” More importantly, it constitutes a desecration of the memory of the millions murdered, maimed, and deported by the Nazis and their allies—and an insult to the millions, including over six million Ukrainians, who fought against Nazism in the ranks of the Red Army.

    This minimization of Nazi crimes not only distances Ukraine from European culture of memory—a culture built on the condemnation of Nazism and the commemoration of its victims. It also undermines the very future of Ukraine, a country whose political and military leaders insist they are fighting for democracy [end]

    The original article

    Marta Havryshko is Dr. Thomas Zand Visiting Assistant Professor in Holocaust Pedagogy and Antisemitism Studies, Strassler Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies at Clark University

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  • L’Assemblea di Corsica ricunnosce l’esistenza di u Statu di Palestina

    in cunfurmità cù e disposizioni precedenti di l’ONU

    U 27 di ghjugnu di u 2025, à l’iniziativa di a so presidente Marie-Antoinette Maupertuis, l’Assemblea di Corsica adotta a muzione 2025/E3/018, chì ricunnosce l’esistenza di u Statu di Palestina.

    dénonce les exactions commises par le gouvernement israélien ainsi que les « actes potentiellement génocidaires » à l’encontre de la population palestinienne comme l’indiquent les conclusions de la Commission d’enquête du Conseil des droits de l’homme de l’ONU en date du 13 mars 2025 ;

    exige un cessez le feu immédiat, inconditionnel et permanent, préalable indispensable à la paix, à la reconstruction et à la justice dans la région ;

    exprime sa vive préoccupation face aux silences politiques qui entourent l’action militaire menée par le gouvernement de Netanyahou et aux soutiens internationaux d’extrême-droite qui s’y rattachent ;

    renouvelle son appel au respect du droit humanitaire international pour les populations civiles ;

    réaffirme le droit d’Israël à exister dans la sécurité et la paix, dans le respect du droit international ;

    demande dans le cadre de la résolution du conflit, la libération des otages retenus par le Hamas ;

    demande aux États membres de l’Union européenne de mettre en œuvre tous les leviers diplomatiques, économiques et juridiques afin de faire pression sur le gouvernement israélien pour qu’il permette l’acheminement immédiat, total et sécurisé de l’aide humanitaire dans la bande de Gaza ;

    encourage le gouvernement français et l’Union européenne à engager des mesures concrètes, y compris des sanctions ciblées, pour garantir le respect du droit international, la protection des civils et la lutte contre l’impunité des crimes commis ;

    demande à ce qu’aucune entrave étatique ne soit faite aux dispositions judiciaires concernant le mandat d’arrêt de la Cour Pénale Internationale (CPI), émis le 21 novembre 2024 à l’encontre notamment de Benjamin Netanyahou;

    affirme son soutien au peuple palestinien, victime de décennies d’occupation, de colonisation, de discriminations et de violences systémiques, et sa solidarité pleine et entière avec toutes les organisations qui, sur le terrain, œuvrent pour la survie, les soins, la dignité et la paix ;

    soutient l’ensemble des initiatives citoyennes, associatives, syndicales et institutionnelles, en Corse comme ailleurs, qui sensibilisent l’opinion publique à la situation en Palestine et défendent la voix des peuples opprimés et agissent en faveur de la paix ;

    reconnaît l’existence de l’Etat de Palestine, conformément aux dispositions antérieures de l’ONU et affirme la nécessité urgente de la mise en œuvre d’une solution politique fondée sur la coexistence de deux États souverains respectueux des intérêts politiques, collectifs ou confessionnaux d’Israël et de la Palestine ;

    souhaite que le gouvernement de la République française reconnaisse sans délai l’existence de l’État de Palestine et qu’il suspende toute livraison d’armes, de munitions ou de matériel militaire à l’État d’Israël tant que celui-ci poursuit ses opérations contraires au droit international ;

    affirme dans le contexte actuel, son attachement à ce que les installations militaires françaises et de l’OTAN tant en Corse qu’en Sardaigne ne soient pas utilisées à des fins d’intervention au Moyen-Orient qui contreviendraient aux principes du droit des peuples à disposer d’eux-mêmes et au respect des droits humains universels

    A muzione hè cuntesta da i rapprisentanti lucali di l’urganisazioni pulitiche minoritarie ligate à a diritta pétainista francese. Hè u casu, per esempiu, di u deputatu francese François Xavier Ceccoli, membru di u partitu Les Républicains, elettu u 7 di lugliu di u 2024, in a 2a circuscrizione di Haute Corse, grazia à u trasferimentu di voti di u Rassemblement national. Hè u casu di u picculu gruppu Mossa Palatina, u nasu falsu corsu di u partitu pétainista Rassemblement nationale, chì si dice naziunalista corsu, autonomistu, identitariu è liberale, ma si distingue solu per u so racismu è a so islamofobia

    Altri sustenitori di u guvernu suprematista israelianu pensanu ch’elli stanu cuntestendu a muzione quandu ricordanu chì a Corsica hè l’isula di i ghjusti. Avemu bisognu di dà li una lezziò di Storia. À l’epica induve a grande maggioranza di i Francesi cantava Maréchal, nous voilà, i Corsi prutegianu in effetti l’Ebrei è, in preparazione di u sbarcu di e truppe marocchine di u 1943, anu affruntatu cù successu l’SS. A so azzione era principalmente di resistenza, è eranu l’oppressi chì i resistenti corsi prutegianu. Ma cum’è i mo amichi chinesi sò soliti à dì: quandu u saviu punta a luna, u scemu guarda u ditu

    L’estrema diritta, ch’ella sia francese o drappeggiata cù a bandera moresca, ferma una cancrena per u populu corsu

  • [Sharing] Ukrainian, Georgian, and British — all in one? – Igor Pshenichnikov, GEOFOR

    47-year-old Blaze Metreveli appointed as new head of Britain’s MI6 intelligence service

    For the first time in its history, Britain’s MI6 intelligence service will be led by a woman, career intelligence officer 47-year-old Blaze Metreveli. An intriguing move from Russia’s perennial adversaries — but what’s behind it?

    First, let’s consider Russia’s initial reaction. Just a day after the appointment was announced, on June 16, Russian intelligence appeared to send Metreveli a «congratulatory» message. While we can’t say for certain, coincidences seem unlikely. The press office of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) issued a notable statement claiming that Britain, jointly with Ukraine, is preparing provocations in the Baltic Sea aimed at sabotaging Russian-American negotiations and persuading the White House to continue military support to Kiev.

    One scenario involves staging a fake Russian torpedo attack on a U.S. Navy vessel. The SVR emphasized close collaboration between Ukrainian security services and British intelligence agencies, stating, «Subversive actions typically follow a similar pattern: planning and operational support come from Britain, while direct execution is often carried out by employees of Ukraine’s SBU or military intelligence (GUR MO) and their agents».

    The age-old saying attributed to Alexander Suvorov, describing Britain’s malicious policy toward Russia, «the Englishwoman is up to mischief», has ceased being metaphorical with Metreveli’s appointment. She has been explicitly tasked with causing trouble for Russia and seems likely to excel in this role.

    British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, introducing Metreveli, called her appointment «historic», noting that it comes at a time when «the work of Britain’s intelligence services has never been more critical». Starmer referenced unprecedented threats, including «aggressors sending spy ships into British waters and hackers employing sophisticated cyber plots to disrupt public services» — a clear reference to Russia.

    But why Blaze Metreveli? At only 47, she is already an experienced intelligence officer, serving since 1999. She will assume her new duties this autumn. Currently, Metreveli heads MI6’s Q Division, responsible for technology and innovation, and previously held senior roles in MI6 and MI5, Britain’s domestic counterintelligence agency. According to brief biographical details released by the government, widely reported by British media, she studied social anthropology at Cambridge and spent much of her career in operational roles in the Middle East and Europe.

    Yet her background, particularly her ancestry, seems significant, though many details remain unclear. Her mother’s maiden name, Borkovska, suggests possible links to Belarus, Ukraine, Poland, or Russia (Borkovskaya in Russian transcription is a common surname).

    Metreveli’s father, according to British royal archives, is Konstantin Dobrovolsky, noted as «also known as Metreveli». He naturalized in Britain in 1966 under the surname Dobrovolsky. Born in 1944 in today’s Ukraine, he was reportedly taken to Britain by his parents on a «Nansen passport», documents issued to Russian emigrants under the League of Nations since 1922. The circumstances around obtaining such passports for a family from Soviet Ukraine are unclear.

    Suspicions arise regarding the activities and political views of Dobrovolsky-Metreveli’s parents. Ukraine’s liberation from German forces during World War II occurred between January 1943 and October 1944. If Metreveli’s father was born in Ukraine in 1944 and taken to the West, it’s plausible his family fled alongside retreating German forces, potentially due to collaboration with the Third Reich.

    The history of Ukrainian collaborators fleeing to the West is well-documented, with many settling in Canada — a hotbed of intense Russophobia. Chrystia Freeland, Canada’s Deputy Prime Minister until 2024, is from this community. Western intelligence often recruits individuals from Ukrainian émigré communities as «consultants» on Russia and Ukraine due to their linguistic abilities and intense anti-Russian sentiments. It’s reasonable to assume Metreveli’s father speaks Russian fluently, as Russian emigrants typically retain language proficiency through generations. Consequently, it’s also plausible Blaze Metreveli herself (who chose her father’s «old» surname) speaks fluent Russian.

    Thus, we see a relatively young but seasoned, professional, and highly ambitious woman, likely well-acquainted with Russia and harboring a deep-seated animosity towards it. This was possibly a decisive factor in her appointment.

    Last year, Metreveli was awarded the Order of St. Michael and St. George, suggesting she already significantly harmed Russian interests. Now, as head of British espionage, she will further demonstrate her professionalism, loyalty to the British Crown, and inherited Russophobia. MI6, true to form, will continue harming Russia through proxies and false-flag operations [end]

    The original article

    related

    June 26, 2025: In a plot twist worthy of John le Carré, we reveal the grandfather of the brilliant new head of MI6 was a Nazi spy chief – Daily Mail

    Nazism in Ukraine

    its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine, chronicle.

    Specific point: after WW2, 8,500 Ukrainian SS found refuge in the UK.

    The Atlanticist defeat in Donbass and Ukraine

    chronicle of a new catastrophic NATO venture

  • [Aufteilung] Ukraine: Zwischen SS-Mythos und Gedenkkultur – wie der Westen zur Nazi-Apologie schweigt – Marta Havryshko, Berliner Zeitung

    Kiew ehrt den Sieg über Hitler – doch Gedenken mischt sich mit Heldenverehrung. Was steckt dahinter? Eine Kolumne

    Die Ukraine hat ranghohe Vertreter der Europäischen Union (EU) eingeladen, am 9. Mai Kiew zu besuchen – ein symbolischer Akt, um Wladimir Putins alljährliche Siegesparade in Moskau zu kontern. Damit soll in Erinnerung gerufen werden, dass Russland sich den Sieg über den Nationalsozialismus nicht aneignen kann, denn auch Millionen ukrainischer Männer und Frauen kämpften in den Reihen der Roten Armee gegen Nazi-Deutschland und seine Verbündeten.

    Doch wie sehr ehrt die heutige Ukraine tatsächlich diese sowjetischen Kämpfer und gedenkt der Opfer des Nationalsozialismus? Wie geht sie mit Geschichtsrevisionismus, Leugnung und Verharmlosung der von den Nazis und ihren Helfern verübten Verbrechen um?

    Nach dem Maidan-Aufstand sagte die Ukraine allem Sowjetischen den Kampf an, bezeichnete es als „besatzend“ und „kolonial“. Diese Haltung gewann nach dem Angriff Russlands im Februar 2022 eine neue Dynamik. Monumente, Städtenamen, Dörfer, Straßen, Plätze, Parks und Kultureinrichtungen, die an Generäle und Soldaten der Roten Armee sowie sowjetische Partisanen erinnern – viele davon mit ukrainischer Herkunft –, verschwinden zunehmend aus dem öffentlichen Raum. Ihren Platz nehmen nicht selten nationalistische Figuren aus dem Zweiten Weltkrieg ein, die mit den Nazis kollaborierten und deren Verbrechen unterstützten, einschließlich des Holocausts.

    Zweifelhafter Heldenkult findet auch im Militär Anklang

    „Ukrainische Freiwillige, die nur von einem träumten – unserer eigenen Armee und unserem eigenen Staat“, heißt es in einem Beitrag der 3. Sturmbrigade auf Telegram zur Erinnerung an die „Galizische Division“. Der Beitrag verschweigt jedoch den vollständigen Namen dieser am 28. April 1943 gegründeten Formation: die 14. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS (galizische Nr. 1). Ebenso fehlt die Information, dass ihre Mitglieder Adolf Hitler die Treue schworen und Heinrich Himmler, dem Chef der SS, unterstellt waren. Ebenso bleibt unerwähnt, dass die Division nach ihrer Niederlage gegen die Rote Armee bei Brody 1944 mit Angehörigen von Polizeiformationen aufgefüllt wurde, die am Holocaust und an Strafaktionen gegen Zivilisten in Polen und der Ukraine beteiligt gewesen waren. Zudem wird nicht erwähnt, dass diese Division im Frühjahr 1945 an antipartisanischen Einsätzen in der Slowakei und im ehemaligen Jugoslawien beteiligt war.

    2023 organisierte die 3. Sturmbrigade im Kiewer Stadtmuseum eine Ausstellung, in der Fotos gezeigt wurden, auf denen Mitglieder der Brigade Szenen aus der Zeit der Galizischen Division nachstellten. Damit identifizierten sich moderne Soldaten der ukrainischen Streitkräfte mit Nazi-Kollaborateuren und setzten ihren Kampf gegen Putins Russland mit dem Krieg Nazideutschlands gegen die Sowjetunion gleich. Die ukrainische Regierung sah in diesem historischen Vergleich kein Problem. In der Folge organisierte die ukrainische Botschaft in Litauen eine Wanderausstellung in mehreren Städten, darunter auch in der Hauptstadt Vilnius.

    Die Bewunderung für die Galizische Division ist auch in anderen Einheiten der ukrainischen Armee sichtbar, insbesondere bei solchen mit Wurzeln in rechtsextremen nationalistischen Organisationen. Einige Mitglieder des Carpathian-Sich-49. Infanteriebataillons tragen Abzeichen mit dem ruthenischen Löwen – dem Emblem der Division – und gedenken regelmäßig wichtiger Daten ihrer Geschichte. Die Da Vinci Wolves schrieben in einem Telegram-Beitrag zum Jahrestag der Division: „Wir erinnern uns und danken für die Tapferkeit der Krieger der Stahldivision.“

    Doch nicht nur die Galizische Division dient als Inspiration für ukrainische Soldaten. 2023 wurde eine Einheit namens „Nachtigall“ gegründet. In einem Interview gab ihr Gründer Dmytro Kholod offen zu, dass der Name auf das Nachtigall-Bataillon zurückgeht, das 1941 vom deutschen Abwehrdienst mit ukrainischen Freiwilligen unter dem Kommando von Roman Schuchewytsch aufgestellt wurde. Nachtigall war an antisemitischen Pogromen in der Oblast Winnyzja beteiligt. Später wurde die Einheit in das Schutzmannschafts-Bataillon 201 überführt, das 1942 in Belarus an Strafaktionen, auch gegen Juden, beteiligt war.

    Russisch-ukrainischer Krieg überschattet historische Aufarbeitung

    Werden europäische Staats- und Regierungschefs, die am 9. Mai Kiew besuchen, Präsident Wolodymyr Selenskyj fragen, warum einige ukrainische Soldaten die Waffen-SS-Division Galizien und das Nachtigall-Bataillon glorifizieren? Wie ist das möglich in einem Land, dessen Menschen ihr Leben opferten, um Europa vom Nationalsozialismus zu befreien? Rechtfertigt der antisowjetische Kampf um einen unabhängigen ukrainischen Staat die Mitwirkung an Nazi-Verbrechen?

    Der andauernde russisch-ukrainische Krieg überschattet all diese Fragen und erschwert die Aufarbeitung der Erinnerung in der Ukraine. Und all das geschieht vor den Augen des Westens, der zur wachsenden Nazi-Apologie in der Ukraine beredt schweigt [Ende]

    Der vollständiger Artikel

    Die ukrainische Historikerin Marta Havryshko lebt und arbeitet in den USA.

    One small comment

    […] Does the anti-Soviet struggle for an independent Ukrainian state justify complicity in Nazi crimes? […]

    Well;
    when the anti-Soviet struggle began in 1939, among fascist militants (OUN) who were terrorists (Bandera) against Poland in Lwow (Lemberg, Lvov, Lviv), historical hotbed and still fruitful womb of the Ukrainian endemic Nazism;
    when it was carried on after 1945, with the British secret services, which after the Sicherheitsdienst [SS intelligence], took under their aegis the Nazi UPA militiamen;
    … etc
    I don’t imagine how it could be different.

    Verwandter Artikel

    Nazism in Ukraine

    its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine

    The Western disinformation about Ukraine

    chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Ukraine against Russia

    20. April 2025: 19 Days to Victory Day – Sputnik

    14. April 2025: Oberscharführer Friedrich Merz

    in the chonicle of the Atlanticist defeat in Donbass and Ukraine

  • [Sharing] Total Kievan Debellation – Big Serge

    The Russo-Ukrainian War: Year 3

    On March 5, 2022, the wreck of the sailing ship Endurance was found in the depths of the Weddell Sea off the coast of Antarctica. This, of course, was the vessel lost in Ernest Shackelton’s third expedition to Antarctica, which became trapped in the ice and sank in 1915. The story of that expedition is an extraordinary tale of human fortitude – with the Endurance lost to the ice, Shackleton’s crew evacuated to a loose ice flow where they camped for nearly 500 days, drifting about the Antarctic seas, before making a desperate dash across the open ocean in an open 20 foot lifeboat, finally reaching the southern shore of inhospitable and mountainous South Georgia Island, which they then had to cross on foot to reach the safety of a whaling station.

    The story itself has an essentially mythic quality to it, with Shackleton’s crew surviving for years on free floating ice floes in the most inhospitable seas on earth. For our purposes, however, it is the story’s coda that is particularly interesting. In Shackleton’s memoirs, he remembered that, upon finally reaching the safety of the Stromness whaling station, one of his first questions was about the war in Europe. When Shackleton first set out on his ill-fated expedition on August 8, 1914, the First World War was less than a week old, and the German Army had just begun its invasion of Belgium. There was little expectation then that the war would proceed as it did, unleashing four years of slaughterous positional warfare that engulfed the continent.

    Shackleton, having been adrift at sea for years, clearly did not imagine that the war could still be raging, and asked the commandant of the whaling station “tell me, when was the war over?”

    The answer came back: “The war is not over. Millions are being killed. Europe is mad. The world is mad.”

    The timing is serendipitous, since the discovery of the Endurance’s wreck, after more than a hundred years, happened to occur only a few weeks after the world again went mad, with the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian War in February 2022. As time continues its inexorable march and the calendar turns yet again, the war is passing through its third full winter. In February, Z-World will be three years old.

    Of course, modern communications make it extremely unlikely that anybody could be cut fully out of the loop for years at a time, like Shackleton and his men. Instead of being ignorant as to whether or not the war is over, many of us are exposed on a daily basis to footage of men being killed, buildings being blown up, and vehicles being shredded. Twitter has made it essentially impossible to live under a rock, or on an ice floe, as it were.

    If anything, we have the very opposite problem of Shackleton – at least as far as our wartime information infrastructure goes. We are saturated in information, with daily updates tracking advances of a few dozen meters and never ending bombast about new game changing weapons (which seem to change very little), and bluster about “red lines”. This war seems to have an unyielding dynamic on the ground, and no matter how many grand pronouncements we hear that one side or the other is on the verge of collapse, the sprawling front continues to grind up bodies and congeal with bloody positional fighting.

    It would seem difficult to believe that a high intensity ground war in Europe with hundreds of miles worth of front could be boring, yet the static and repetitive nature of the conflict is struggling to hold the attention of foreign observers who have little immediately at stake.

    My intention here is a radical zoom-out from these demoralizing and fatiguing small scale updates (as valuable as the work of the war mappers is), and consider the aggregate of 2024 – arguing that this year was, in fact, very consequential. Taken as a whole, three very important things happened in 2024 which create a very dismal outlook for Ukraine and the AFU in the new year. More specifically, 2024 brought three important strategic developments:

    1. Russian victory in southern Donetsk which destroyed the AFU’s position on one of the war’s key strategic axes.
    2. The expenditure of carefully husbanded Ukrainian resources on a failed offensive towards Kursk, which accelerated the attrition of critical Ukrainian maneuver assets and substantially dampened their prospects in the Donbas.
    3. The exhaustion of Ukraine’s ability to escalate vis a vis new strike systems from NATO – more broadly, the west has largely run out of options to upgrade Ukrainian capabilities, and the much vaunted delivery of longer range strike systems failed to alter the trajectory of the war on the ground.

    Taken together, 2024 revealed a Ukrainian military that is increasingly stretched to the limits, to the point where the Russians were able to largely scratch off an entire sector of front. People continue to wonder where and when the Ukrainian front might begin to break down – I would argue that it *did* break down in the south over the last few months, and 2025 begins with strong Russian momentum that the AFU will be hard pressed to arrest.

    Front Collapse in South Donetsk

    What stands out immediately about the operational developments in 2024 is the marked shift of energies away from the axes of combat that had seen the most intense fighting in the first two years of the war. In a sense, this war has seen each of its fronts activate in a sequence, one after the other.

    After the opening Russian offensive, which boasted as its signature success the capture of the Azov coastline and the linkup of Donetsk and Crimea, the action shifted to the northern front (the Lugansk-Kharkov axis), with Russia fighting a summer offensive which captured Severodonetsk and Lysychansk. This was followed by a pair of Ukrainian counteroffensives in the fall, with a thrust out of Kharkov which pushed the front back over the Oskil, and an operation directed at Kherson which failed to breach Russian defenses but ultimately resulted in a Russian withdrawal in good order over the Dnieper due to concerns over logistical connectivity and an over-extended front. Energies then pivoted yet again to the Central Donbas axis, with the enormous battle around Bakhmut raging through the spring of 2023. This was followed by the failed Ukrainian offensive on Russia’s defenses in Zaporozhia, in the south.

    Just to briefly recapitulate this, we can enumerate several operational phases in the first two years of the war, occurring in sequence and each with a center of gravity in different parts of the front:

    • A Russian offensive across the land bridge, culminating in the capture of Mariupol. (Winter-Spring 2022, Southern Front)
    • A Russian offensive in Lugansk, capturing Severodonetsk and Lysychansk. (Summer 2022, Donets-Oskil front)
    • Ukrainian Counteroffensives towards the Oskil and Kherson (Autumn 2022, Oskil and Dnieper fronts)
    • The Russian assault on Bakhmut (Winter-Spring 2023, Central Front)
    • Ukrainian counteroffensive on the land bridge (Summer 2023)

    Amid all of this, the front that saw the least movement was the southeastern corner of the front, around Donetsk. This was somewhat peculiar. Donetsk is the urban heart of the Donbas – a vast and populous industrial city at the center of a sprawling conurbation, once home to some 2 million people. Even if Russia succeeds in capturing the city of Zaporizhia, Donetsk will be by far the most populous of Ukraine’s former cities to come under Moscow’s control.

    In 2014, with the outbreak of the proto-Donbas war, Donetsk was the locus of much of the fighting, with the airport on the city’s northern approach the scene of particularly intense combat. This made it rather strange, then, that at the start of 2024 the Ukrainian Army continued to occupy many of the same positions that they built a decade prior. As intense fighting ebbed and flowed along other sectors of front, Donetsk remained besieged by a web of powerfully held Ukrainian defenses, anchored by heavily fortified urban areas stretching from Toretsk to Ugledar. Early Russian attempts to crack this iron ring open, including an assault on Ugledar in the winter of 2023, met with failure.

    The signature operational development of 2024, then, was the re-activation of the Donetsk front, after years of static combat. It is not an exaggeration to say that after years of coagulation, the Russian Army cracked this front wide open in 2024 and Ukraine’s long and strongly held network of urban strongpoints collapsed

    Russian Progress on the Donetsk Axis in 2024

    The year began with the AFU fighting for its fortress in Avdiivka, where it continued to block the northern approach to Donetsk. At the time, the typical argument that one heard from the Ukrainian side was that the Russian assault on Avdiivka was pyrrhic – that the Russians were capturing the city with exorbitantly costly “meat assaults” that would inevitably sap Russian combat power and exhaust their ability to continue the offensive.

    With the full measure of the year behind us, we can definitively say that this is not the case. After the fall of Avdiivka, Russian momentum never seriously slackened, and in fact it was the AFU that appeared to be increasingly exhausted. The Ukrainian breakwater position at Ocheretyne (which had previously been their staging point for counterattacks around Avdiivka) was overrun in a matter of days, and by the early summer the frontline had been pushed out towards the approach to Pokrovsk.

    The Russian thrust towards Pokrovsk led many to believe that this city was itself the object of Russian energies, but this was a misread of the operational design. Russia did not need to capture Pokrovsk in 2024 to render it sterile as a logistical hub. Simply by advancing towards the E50 highway, Russian forces were able to cut off Pokrovsk from Ukrainian positions to the south on the Donetsk front, and Pokvrovsk is now a frontline city subject to the full spectrum of overwatch from Russian drones and tube artillery.

    By autumn, the Russian advance had put the Ukrainians in a severe salient, creating an unstable chain of positions in Selydove, Kurakhove, Ugledar, and Krasnogorivka. Russia’s advance from Ocheretyne onto the southern approach to Pokrovsk acted like an enormous scythe, isolating the entire southeastern sector of the front and allowing Russian forces to carve through it in the closing months of the year

    Russian Operations in 2024, Donetsk Axis

    This war has turned the word “collapse” into a devalued buzzword. We are told repeatedly that one side or the other is on the verge of collapse: sanctions will “collapse” the Russian economy, the Wagner uprising of 2023 proved that the Russian political system was “collapsing”, and of course we hear that exorbitant losses have one army or the other on the verge of total failure – which army that may be depends on who you ask.

    I would argue, however, that what we saw from October 2024 onward represents a real occurrence of this oft-repeated and discarded word. The AFU suffered a genuine collapse of the southeastern front, with the forces positioned in their strongpoints too attrited and isolated to make a determined defense, Russian fires becoming too heavily concentrated in ever more compressed areas to endure, and no mechanized reserve in the theater available to counterattack or relieve the incessant Russian pressure.

    Ukraine does maintain enough drones and concentrated fires to limit a full Russian exploitation – that is, Russia is still not able to maneuver at depth. This gave the Russian advance a particular stop-start quality, leapfrogging from one settlement and fortress to the other. More generally, Russia’s preference to use dispersed small-unit assaults limits the potential for exploitation. We have to emphasize, however, that Russian momentum on this axis has never seriously slackened since October, and many of the key Ukrainian positions were overrun or abandoned very quickly

    Ugledar is a good example: the Russians began their final push toward the town on September 24. By September 29, the 72nd Mechanized Brigade began evacuating. By October 1, Ugledar was fully under Russian control. This was a keystone Ukrainian position put in a completely untenable position and it went down in a week. One could argue, of course, that Ugledar held out for years (how then can we say with a straight face that it was captured in a week), but this is precisely the point. In early 2023 Ugledar (with the help of artillery stationed around Kurakhove) successfully repelled a multi-brigade Russian attack in months of heavy fighting. By October 2024, the position was completely untenable and was abandoned almost immediately when attacked.

    The Ukrainians did no better trying to hold Kurakhove – previously a critical rear area that served as both a logistical hub and a base of fire for supporting (former) frontline strongpoints like Ugledar and Krasnogorivka. Kurakhove, now under full Russian control, will in turn serve as a base of support for the ongoing Russian push to the west towards Andriivka.

    Taking the state of the front holistically, the AFU is currently holding two severe salients at the southernmost end of the line – one around Velyka Novosilka, and another around Andriivka. The former is likely to fall first, as the town has been fully isolated by Russian advances on the flanks. This is not a Bakhmut-like situation, where roads are described as “cut” because they are under Russian fire – in this case, all of the highways into Velyka Novosilka are cut by physical Russian blocking positions, making the loss of the position only a matter of waiting for the Russians to assault it. Further north, a more gentle and less strongly held salient exists between Grodivka and Toretsk. With Toretsk now in the final stages of capture (Ukrainian forces now hold only a small residential neighborhood on the city’s outskirts), the front should level here as well in the coming months.

    This leaves the Russians more or less in full control of the approaches to Kostyantinivka and Pokrovsk, which are in many ways the penultimate Ukrainian held positions in Donetsk. Pokrovsk has already been bypassed several miles to the west, and the map portends a re-run of the typical Russian tactical methodology for assaulting urban areas – a methodical advance along the wings of the city to isolate it from arterial highways, followed by an attack on the city itself via several axes

    The coming months promise continued Russian advances across this front, in a continuation of what can only be regarded as the collapse of a critical front on the part of the AFU. The Russian Army is advancing to the western border of Donetsk oblast and will ferret the Ukrainians out of their remaining strongpoints at Velyka Novosilka and Andriivka, while pushing into the belly of Pokrovsk. At no point since the fall of Avdiivka have the Ukrainians demonstrated the ability to seriously stymie Russian momentum along this 75 mile front, and the ongoing dissipation of Ukrainian combat resources indicates that little will change in this regard in 2025.

    Toehold: The Incredible Shrinking Kursk Salient

    Throughout the autumn of 2024 and these early months of winter, as Ukrainian forces were dug out of their dense web of fortified positions in the southern Donbas, their comrades continued to stubbornly hold on to their position in Russia’s Kursk Oblast. The basic shape of Ukraine’s offensive into Kursk is by now well known – billed by Kiev as a gambit to change the psychological trajectory of the war and strike a prestige blow to Russia, the Ukrainian attack had early momentum after achieving initial strategic surprise, but quickly faltered after Ukrainian columns ran into effective Russian blocking positions on the highways out of Sudzha. Efforts to force the roads through Korenovo and Bolshoe Soldatskoe were defeated, and the Ukrainian grouping was left holding on to a modest salient around Sudzha, jutting out into Russia.

    Throughout the autumn, Russian counterattacks have focused on chiseling away at the base of the Ukrainian salient – forcing the Ukrainians out of Snagost and pushing them away from Korenovo. The progress here has been incremental, but significant, and by the start of January the “neck” of the Ukrainian salient had been compressed down to a little over nine miles wide, after their initial penetration in the summer had forced a breach of over twenty miles. All told, Ukraine has lost about 50% of the territory that they grabbed in August.

    The Russian pressure on the flanks of the salient have amplified many of the qualities that make this position wasteful and dangerous for the AFU. There is limited road connectivity for Ukrainian forces – a problem amplified by the rollback from Snagost, which cost them access to the highway running from Korenovo to Sumy. Apart from a few circuitous side roads, Ukrainian forces only have a single highway – the R200 route – to run material and reinforcements into the pocket, which allows Russian forces to surveil their lines of communication and conduct effective interdiction strikes. The compression of the pocket also greatly narrows the targeting area for Russian drones, tube artillery, and rocketry, and creates more condensed and saturating bombardment

    Despite the fact that this position has been profoundly unproductive for Ukraine – being steadily rolled back and having no synergy with other, more critical theaters – the same grouping of Ukrainian units remain here, fighting in a steadily more compressed space. Even more baffling, the Ukrainian grouping consists largely of premiere assets – Mechanized and Air Assault brigades – that could have contributed meaningfully as a reserve in the Donbas over the last three months.

    On January 5, there was a surprise in the form of a renewed Ukrainian attack out of the salient. The internet of course jumped to the conclusion that the AFU was going back over to some sort of general offensive posture in Kursk, but the reality was very underwhelming – something like a battalion sized assault up the axis towards Bolshoe Soldaskoe, which got a few kilometers up the road before it ran out of steam. Ukrainian efforts to jam Russian drones were stymied by the increasing ubiquity of fiber-optic systems, and the Ukrainian attack collapsed within a day

    Kursk Salient – General Situation, January 2025

    The tactical particulars of the Ukrainian attack are interesting, and there’s ongoing speculation as to its purpose – perhaps it was intended to cover a rotation or withdrawal, to improve tactical positions on the northern edge of the salient, or for inscrutable propaganda purposes. However, these specifics are rather unimportant: attacking out the end of the salient (that is, trying to deepen the penetration into Russia) does nothing to reverse Ukraine’s problems in Kursk. These problems are first, on the tactical level, that the salient has been greatly compressed on the flanks and continues to narrow, and on the strategic level the willful expenditure of valuable mechanized assets on a front that does not impact the critical theaters of the war. More simply, Kursk is a sideshow, and it is a sideshow that has gone wrong even within its own operational logic.

    One thing that has been of endless interest, of course, have been the continued rumors of North Korean troops fighting in Kursk. Western intelligence agencies have been adamant about the presence of North Koreans in Kursk. Some people are predisposed to instinctively disbelieve everything that western officialdom says – while I think some skepticism is warranted, I do not automatically assume that they are lying. One recent report lays out what would seem to be a plausible version of this story: that the idea actually originated in Pyongyang, not Moscow, and that a modest number of Korean troops (perhaps 10,000) are embedded with Russian units. The presumption here is that the Koreans hatched the idea as a way to gain combat experience, with the Russians in turn getting auxiliary forces, though of questionable combat effectiveness.

    However, it is worth noting that this is not nearly as important as it has been made out to be. Much has been made of the idea that the North Korean presence proves some sort of Russian state of desperation, but this is fairly silly on its face – with more than 1.5 million active personnel in the Russian military, 10,000 Korean troops in Kursk represents a paltry appendage. More importantly, there has been an attempt to portray the North Korean contingent as a major departure point in the war. In particular, the formulation “North Korean troops in Europe” has been used to conjure cold war imagery of communist despotism clawing at the free world

    The point, however, is that North Korean troops are presumed specifically to be in Kursk, which is in Russia. This is linked, of course, to the recently concluded mutual defense agreement signed between Moscow and Pyongyang. By attacking into Kursk – widening the front into prewar Russian territory – Ukraine created a defensive combat task for Russia which triggers the possibility of military assistance from North Korea. However much one may wish to link the Korean contingent to Russia’s dreaded “war of aggression”, the force in Kursk is very objectively engaged in the defense of Russian territory, and that makes it possible for Russia to use auxiliary forces – including conscripts and the troops of its allies – to fight there.

    Ultimately, then, the presence of North Koreans in Kursk is interesting, but perhaps not very important after all. These troops are not in Ukraine (even under the most maximal definition of the Ukrainian territorial unit), they are not carrying the primary combat load, and they are unequivocally not the problem that the AFU is facing in Kursk. The “big problem” for Ukraine, very simply, is not the presence of some amorphous Korean horde dedicated to spreading Glorious Juche to Europe – it is the loitering of large grouping of their own precious mechanized brigades in a compressed salient, far far away from the Donbas, where they are greatly needed.

    Scraping the Barrel: AFU Force Generation

    I think it is well understood, of course, that Ukraine faces severe manpower constraints relative to Russia, both in terms of the raw totals of male biomass available – with roughly 35 million fighting aged males in Russia against perhaps 9 million in prewar Ukraine – but also in terms of its capacity to mobilize them.

    Ukraine’s mobilization scheme is hampered by both widespread draft evasion (with willingness to serve decreasing as the war has stretched on) and a stubborn unwillingness to draft younger men, aged 18-25. Ukraine is structurally burdened with a deeply imbalanced population structure: there are roughly 60% more Ukrainian men in their 30’s than in their 20’s. Given the relative scarcity of young men, particularly in their early 20’s, the Ukrainian government rightly views this 18-25 year old cohort as a premium demographic cohort that it is loathe to burn away in combat. Given the ubiquity of draft evasion, the refusal to mobilize younger males, and the corruption and inefficiency characteristic of the Ukrainian government, it should come as no surprise when Ukrainian mobilization falters

    Russia, in contrast, has both a much larger pool of potential recruits and a more efficient apparatus for mobilization. In contrast to Ukraine’s scheme of compulsory conscription, Russia has relied on generous sign-on bonuses to solicit volunteers. Russia’s incentive system, to this point, has provided a steady stream of enlistments that has been more than enough to offset Russian losses. Without going too far into the various speculative estimates of Russian casualties, it is widely acknowledged by western military leadership that Russia has significantly more personnel now than it did at the start of the war.

    All of that is to say: Ukraine faces a severe structural disadvantage in military manpower in the aggregate, which is exacerbated by the idiosyncrasies of the Ukrainian mobilization law, ameliorated slightly by the relatively low troop densities and the preponderant power of strike systems in this war.

    The argument that I want to make here, however, is that Ukraine’s systemic problems matching Russian manpower have been exacerbated by several developments which specifically became prominent in 2024. In other words, 2024 can and should be marked as the year where Ukrainian manpower constraints became markedly and perhaps irretrievably worse due to specific decisions made in Kiev, and particular developments on the ground.

    These are as follows:

    1. The decision to expand the AFU’s force structure through the creation of the “15 series” brigades
    2. The decision to deliberately widen the front and create additional demands for manpower by launching the incursion into Kursk
    3. The stall out of Ukraine’s new mobilization program in the autumn
    4. Accelerating problems with desertion in the AFU

    We’ll run through these in order.

    An army that is intaking new personnel has to decide between two possible allocations for them. New personnel can be used as replacements to replenish existing frontline units, or they can be used to expand the force structure by creating new units. That much seems fairly obvious, and ideally mobilization will exceed losses and make it possible to do both. Where armies face hard manpower constraints, however – that is, where losses are equal to or greater than intake of men, the decision to expand the force structure can have monumental consequences. The stereotypical example, of course, would be the late-war Wehrmacht, which created premiere new assets in the form of Waffen SS divisions, which received privileged access to recruits and equipment while regular army divisions in the line suffered from a trickle of replacements which could not keep up with losses.

    Ukraine, with its garbled force structure, has created a mess through its own attempts to expand its force structure in the face of dwindling strength on the line. Late in 2023, the AFU announced intentions to form an entirely new grouping of brigades – the so-called “15 series”, given their designations as the 150th, 151st, 152nd, 153rd, and 154th Mechanized Brigades. This was followed in 2024 with the appending of the 155th Mechanized Brigade, which was to be trained and equipped in France.

    Forming a new grouping of mechanized brigades is essential to the way that Ukraine is presenting its war. Because Ukraine still aims (at least on paper) to recapture all of its Russian held territory, there must always be the illusory possibility of a future offensive, and in order for that illusory possibility to remain, Ukraine must present itself as actively preparing for future offensive operations. Ukraine’s presentation of its own strategic animus – the idea that it is holding the front while it prepares to go back on the offensive – essentially locks it into a program of expanding its force structure

    The problem for Ukraine is that the immense pressure on the front makes it essentially impossible for them to properly husband resources the way they would like. Properly training and equipping half a dozen fresh mechanized brigades and holding them in reserve would be very helpful, but they cannot really do this in light of the demands for personnel at the front. These brigades instead become “paper formations” that have a bureaucratic existence, while their organic assets are pulled apart and sucked into the front – stripped down into battalion or company sized elements that can be plugged into sectors of need on the frontline. At the moment, none of the 15 series brigades have seen action as organic units – that is, fighting as themselves.

    The French-trained 155th brigade forms a useful example. Originally designed as an overweight formation of some 5800 men, equipped with premiere European equipment, the brigade was hemorrhaging personnel from the start, with Ukrainian sources reporting that some 1700 men – many of them forcibly conscripted off the streets of Ukraine – deserted the unit during training and formation. A collapse in the brigade’s leadership – with its commander resigning – made matters even more complicated, and the formation’s first action around Pokrovsk went badly. Now, the brigade is being dismembered, if not formally disbanded, with personnel and vehicles being stripped down and parceled out to bolster neighbor units.

    The decision to allocate personnel to new mechanized brigades (though given stocks of armored vehicles it is questionable whether those designations mean anything) does not necessarily change Ukraine’s manpower balance in the aggregate, but it is certainly an inefficient way to use personnel. To return again to the 155th brigade, one problem noted by Ukrainian analysts was the fact that much of the brigade was formed whole cloth from forcibly mobilized personnel, without a proper cadre of veterans and experienced NCOs – some 75% of the brigade, it turns out, had been mobilized less than two months before arriving in France for training. This fact was certainly instrumental in the mass desertions and the brigade’s poor combat effectiveness.

    Given Ukraine’s constraints, the best course of action would undoubtedly be to allocate new personnel and equipment as replacements to build out the depleted veteran brigades on the front lines, plugging in replacements around existing veterans and officers. Kiev, however, prizes the prestige that comes from force expansion and the “shiny new toy” factor of new formations equipped with scarce and valuable equipment like Leopard tanks. These new brigades, though billed as premiere assets, clearly have lower combat effectiveness than existing formations, given their lack of experience, shortage of veteran officers, and low unit cohesion.

    The simple reality, however, is that replacements for existing brigades are nowhere close to keeping up with burn rates. Frontline units have complained of increasingly dire infantry shortages for months, with some brigades on the Pokrovsk axis reporting that they are down to less than 40% of their allocated infantry complements.

    In short, Ukraine’s decision to embark on force expansion in the face of significant manpower shortages has exacerbated the problem – both starving veteran units of replacements and concentrating newly mobilized personnel into combat ineffective formations that lack a veteran core, experienced officers, and vital equipment. They have tried, belatedly, to square this circle by parceling out new formations to backstop line brigades, but this is less than ideal – it leads to a patchwork order of battle with lower unit cohesion and a fragmented defense.

    Unfortunately, this comes precisely as Ukraine has created additional self-imposed strains on its resources, in particular through its incursion into Kursk. At the moment, elements of at least seven mechanized brigades, two marine infantry brigades, and three air assault brigades are stationed on the Kursk axis. Without going too far into the weeds rehashing Ukraine’s operation here, it’s important to remember that Ukraine – facing extreme pressures on its force generation – voluntarily chose to widen the front into a secondary theater, diverting scarce assets and reducing its own ability to economize forces.

    In summary, Ukraine has made deliberate decisions to widen the front and expand its force structure, both of which have been decidedly detrimental to its efforts to economize personnel. This comes precisely as a 2024 effort to ramp up mobilization has come off the rails.

    Ukraine’s mobilization program suffered from a variety of defects, including gaps and errors in its databases and endemic corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency. Laws passed in 2024 aimed to rectify many of these problems, including through the rollout of an app that would allow draft-eligible men to register and check their status without having to visit recruitment offices. It appeared that matters had come to a head when Zelensky fired several recruitment chiefs in 2023, and there was a real sense of urgency. After some signs of initial promise, it is clear that this intensified mobilization drive has faltered over the autumn and early winter

    There were initially signs of optimism for Ukraine – in the first month after the new mobilization law was passed, there was a surge and the army enlisted 30,000 new personnel. However, by the end of the summer this initial burst of enlistments had faded, and mobilization was again running behind the AFU’s losses. An October briefing from the Ukrainian General Staff confirmed that enlistments had already declined by 40% after the brief surge brought on by the new mobilization law. Around the same time, officials in Odessa (Ukraine’s third largest city) admitted that they were running at only 20% of their mobilization quota.

    The problems are myriad. The new mobilization law led to some initial improvements but has ultimately failed to resolve problems with draft evasion, bureaucratic miscues remain endemic, and employers desperate to retain workers filed an avalanche of employment related draft deferments. Unable to sustain the initial surge of enlistments, Ukraine faces a looming manpower crisis.

    Furthermore, Ukraine’s continued inability to provide either demobilization or timely rotations means that mobilized personnel face the prospect of indefinite service on the frontlines. This is obviously bad for morale, with soldiers contemplating the possibility of years of uninterrupted service, and this in turn drives the desertions that are becoming a mounting problem for the AFU. Some reports indicate that as many as 100,000 Ukrainian troops have deserted by this point, many no doubt driven by the psychological and physical strains of endless combat with no prospect of rotation.

    A deadly feedback loop is now at work, with the lack of rotations and the shortage of replacements synergizing to accelerate the burn of Ukrainian personnel. The AFU is unable to regularly rotate units out of combat, and the inadequate flow of replacements causes frontline infantry complements to wear thin. Unable to rotate or reinforce, line brigades resort to cannibalization – scraping support personnel like mortar teams, drivers, and drone operators to fill out frontline positions. This further accelerates losses as brigades fight with thinned out support and fires elements, and makes Ukrainian men more unwilling to enlist – because there is now no guarantee that becoming a drone operator, for example, will save one from being sent to a frontline trench eventually.

    Where does this leave us? Ukraine continues to dispose of a very large force, with more than a hundred brigades and hundreds of thousands of men under arms. This force, however, is both substantially outnumbered by the Russian army and in a clear trend of decay. Despite a highly touted attempt to reinvigorate the mobilization apparatus in 2024, the intake of new personnel is clearly too low to offset losses, and the heavy lifting formations in critical sectors of front have seen their strength – particularly in the infantry complements – decline, in some cases to critical levels.

    The failure of Ukraine’s 2024 mobilization program has coincided with several strategic choices which have exacerbated manpower concerns – specifically the decision to embark on a program of force expansion even as the AFU voluntarily extended its commitments by opening a new secondary front in Kursk. In other words, Ukraine’s mobilization falls short of its force requirements, and the AFU has also made choices that sabotaged its ability to economize. Units are ground up, replacements come in a paltry trickle, rotations are late or absent, units cannibalize themselves, and angry and weary men desert.

    It’s not at all clear that this will lead to a “breaking point”, in the sense that people are anticipating. Ukrainian strike capabilities and the Russian preference for dispersed, leapfrogging assaults limit the potential for grand breakthroughs and exploitation. However, what we saw over the past three months on the southern Donetsk axis offers a preview of what awaits: an exhausted force being steadily rolled back, dug out of its strongpoints, and mauled – covering its retreat with drones but losing position after position. The line holds, until it doesn’t.

    End of the Line: ATACMs, JASSMs, and Hazelnuts

    Ukraine’s ability to remain in the field depends on a titration of two indispensable resources: first, Ukrainian male biomass, and secondly the critical western weaponry that gives them combat effectiveness. We have evaluated the first: Ukraine is not exactly out of men, but the trends of its mobilization program are poor and personnel shortages are mounting. The trends regarding the second are, if anything, even more foreboding for Kiev.

    There are two general dynamics that have emerged, neither of which create an optimistic picture for Ukraine, which we’ll examine in turn. These are as follows:

    1. The delivery of heavy weaponry to Ukraine (tanks, IFVs, and artillery tubes) has largely dried up in recent months.
    2. The west has essentially run out of escalatory weaponry (strike systems) to give, and those systems already given have failed to meaningfully altar the trajectory of the war.

    In 2023, building out new mechanized units was the name of the game, with the Pentagon leading a multinational effort to stand up an entire army corps worth of units equipped with Leopards, Challengers, and a whole slew of western IFVs and APCs. When that lovingly assembled grouping bashed its head on a rock in the botched assault on the Zaporizhia line, the United States belatedly and begrudgingly dispatched its own Abrams to backstop the Ukrainian tank force. In 2024, however, deliveries of heavy weapons slowed to a trickle.

    The role of the tank in Ukraine has been greatly misunderstood. The vulnerability of tanks to the myriad strike systems of the modern battlefield led some observers to declare that the tank as a weapons system was now obsolete, but this did not really square with the fact that both combatants in this war were eager to deploy as many as possible. Tanks need more critical enablers – more combat engineering, air defense, and electronic warfare support – but they continue to fill an indispensable role and remain an essential item in this war. The failure of Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive showed, if anything, that tanks simply are not “game changing” systems, but mass consumption items – but this has always been the case. The signature quality of iconic tanks like the Sherman and the T34 was that they were numerous

    Unfortunately for Ukraine, deliveries of tanks have dropped off dramatically after the failures of 2023. America’s drawdowns for Ukraine in 2024 were almost entirely devoid of armored vehicles of any kind. Data from the Kiel Institute, which has been meticulous tracking weaponry commitments and deliveries, confirms a sharp dropoff in heavy weapons in 2024. In 2023, Ukraine’s backers pledged 384 tanks. This dropped to just 98 in 2024 – which explains why the new Ukrainian mechanized brigades are perilously light on the equipment indicative of their designations.

    While 2023 was all about building out Ukraine’s mechanized package with tanks, IFVs, and engineering, 2024 has been largely about enhancing Ukraine’s strike capabilities. There have been two separate elements at play – first, the delivery of both air and ground launched systems (most notably the British Storm Shadows and American ATACMs respectively), and secondly the loosening of the rules of engagement to allow Ukraine to strike targets inside pre-war Russia.

    This dovetailed, as it turned out, with Ukraine’s operation in Kursk, and in many ways the most direct impact of the Kursk incursion has been to force the west’s hand on the rules of engagement. While Ukraine has long been striking inside Russia with indigenous systems, most notably drones, the White House continued to drag its feet on formal approval for strikes with American systems. By launching a ground assault on Kursk, Ukraine made the decision for them: the United States gave clearance to use ATACMs to support the ground forces in Kursk, and this metastasized into general license to strike Russia with the full range of available systems. This was a poignant reminder that, however we conceive of the proxy-sponsor relationship, Ukraine has some ability to force America’s hand: a classic example of the tail wagging the dog.

    In any case, 2024 saw Ukraine and its western backers slowly but surely bash through all the supposed red-lines in this domain: the British breached first with the delivery of Storm Shadows late in 2023, and this was followed by the delivery of ATACMs (with a handful of F16’s to boot), and finally the loosening of the rules of engagement to clear strikes on Russia.

    Where does this leave us? There would seem to be three important things to consider.

    1. The west has essentially reached the end of its escalation chain. The only remaining step that they can take would be to supply Ukraine with JASSMs (Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile), which would mark a quantitative but not a meaningful qualitative upgrade to Ukraine’s strike capabilities.
    2. Ukraine’s use of western-supplied strike assets has been dissipated and has not materially improved their situation on the ground.
    3. Russia maintains a dominant strike advantage, both qualitative and quantitative.

    Ukraine faces a stark disadvantage in strike capability relative to Russia, in a variety of ways. Russian strike assets are far more numerous and have significant range advantages, but it is also important to take into consideration both Russia’s significantly greater strategic depth and its more dense and relatively unscathed air defense. Unlike Ukraine, which has seen its air defense stretch to the limit with destroyed launchers and a mounting interceptor shortage, Russia’s air defenses have been essentially untouched, as Ukraine has lacked the large numbers of assets required to conduct a proper SEAD/DEAD (Suppression/Destruction of Enemy Air Defense) campaign.

    Given this basic calculus, using western strike systems to wage a blow for blow strategic air campaign is bad math for Ukraine. It is generally unwise to engage in a bat fight when your opponent is a bigger man with a much longer bat. Instead, Ukraine’s strike systems should have been leveraged to support ground operations – concentrating strikes spatially and in time to synergize with efforts on the ground. Just as a simple thought experiment, it is not difficult to imagine ATACMs making a difference if they had been available in 2023 and used to saturate Russian rear areas during the assault on the Zaporizhia line – striking in tempo with the mechanized assault to disrupt Russian command and control and prevent reinforcement of critical areas.

    Instead, Ukraine’s strike capacity has been largely dissipated in attacks that sometimes achieve success hitting Russian installations but fail to directly support successful operations on the ground. The result is a diffusion of Ukrainian striking power that is less than the sum of its parts. Now, Ukraine has essentially run dry on missiles – of the 500 ATACMs sent by the United States, perhaps 50 are left in Kiev’s stockpiles. Stocks of air launched Storm Shadow missiles are similarly low, and Britain’s commitment to resupply is limited to “a few dozen”

    The last option for the west to backstop Ukrainian strike capability are American JASSMs. While there is a longer-range variant in production (the JASSM-ER, or Extended Range), these are relatively new and expensive and are earmarked for American stocks – it is therefore presumed that the Ukrainians would receive the standard variant. The standard JASSM has slight range advantages over Storm Shadows and ATACMs, at roughly 230 miles. In the event that JASSMs are not given, there is a shorter range system called the SLAM (Standoff Land Attack Missile) with a range of some 170 miles. Both JASSMs and SLAMs would be compatible with Ukrainian F-16s.

    Two things need to be noted about the JASSM. First, the JASSM – while offering slightly longer ranges – would essentially serve as a backstop/replacement for the rapidly dwindling ATACMs and particularly the air launched Storm Shadows – instead of Ukraine’s native SU-24s launching Storm Shadows, they would utilize F-16s launching JASSMs. This would not represent a dramatic upgrade in Ukrainian capabilities, but would instead simply serve to maintain a bare minimum Ukrainian strike capability. JASSMs are a replacement for dwindling capabilities, not an augmentation to them.

    Secondly, it must be understood that JASSMs are the last stop. We’re now entering the territory, not of artificially constructed red lines, but physical and real limits. Russia has essentially eaten the gifted stocks of ATACMs and Storm Shadows, with little discernable effect on their ability to fight, and JASSMs are the last extant item in the inventories to keep Ukrainian strike capabilities operative. We are at the last rung of the aid ladder.

    In the case of JASSMs, however, there are notable downsides for the United States. This is an important case of putting all of one’s eggs in the same technological basket. In 2020, the United States scrapped the development of its conventionally armed Long Range Standoff Missile, making the JASSM – particularly the new extended range variants – the system for the United States, earmarked to play a critical role in future conflicts, particularly in the Pacific. This makes the JASSM an extremely sensitive system, as a centerpiece of American strike capabilities, particularly with the modernization of the Tomahawk system crawling along at a few dozen units per year.

    Given the fact that JASSMs are GPS guided, there are real reasons to be reticent about giving Ukraine such a technologically sensitive system. Russian electronic warfare has enjoyed considerable success jamming GPS and disrupting similarly guided American systems. Allowing the Russians to gain familiarity with a keystone American system could wreak havoc on Pentagon war planning – most, if not all of the strike eggs are in this basket, so why let an adversary peek inside?

    It’s probable, given what we have seen to this point, that these concerns will ultimately be dismissed and Ukraine will receive a line of JASSMs which will backstop their strike capabilities – but given the size of Ukraine’s F-16 fleet, the scale will be constrained. Furthermore, air launched systems are less optimal for Ukraine, given their dependence on large and easily targeted airfields, in contrast to ground launched systems which are mobile and more easily concealed.

    Certainly, JASSMs will never give Ukraine the ability to match Russia’s own strike capacity. After hearing endlessly about how Russia is running out of missiles, it has at last been concluded that this is simply not true, and indeed never was. Recently, Ukrainian defense intelligence admitted that per their own estimates Russia retains about 1,400 long range missiles in its reserves, with a monthly production of roughly 150 units. Russian production of inexpensive Geran drones has also skyrocketed, with Ukrainian intelligence estimating a ceiling as high as 2,000 drones per month.

    There is also the matter of the new Russian missile system – the now famous Oreshnik, or Hazel Tree. Russia tested the Oreshnik system on a large machining plant in Dnipro on November 21, 2024, which allowed the basic capabilities of the system to be gauged. The Oreshnik is an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile, characterized by its hypersonic capabilities (exceeding Mach-10) and its Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle equipped with six separate warheads, with the potential for submunitions in each. Although the attack on Dnipro was essentially a demonstration which used inert training warheads (that is, without explosive payloads), the missile can be configured with nuclear or conventional warheads

    As in the case of the North Korean troops in Kursk, I rather think that the Oreshnik launch was not nearly as important as it was made out to be. The system is expensive and likely impractical for conventional use. I understand the desire to conceive of Oreshnik as a massively powerful conventional weapon – showering its target with half a dozen warheads with the power of an entire flight of Kalibr missiles – but there are several problems with this. The accuracy of the system (the CEP, or “Circular Error Probable” in the technical parlance) is much more consistent with a nuclear delivery system than a conventional one. Furthermore, the problem with using an IRBM for conventional strikes is the danger of miscalculation – foreign adversaries may misinterpret the launch as a nuclear attack and respond appropriately. This is precisely why the Russian government actually alerted the United States to the launch ahead of time – a fine arrangement for a demonstration, but impractical for a weapon that is intended to be used regularly.

    We may see another use of the Oreshnik against Ukraine, but ultimately this is unlikely to be a system of consequence in this war. The demonstration in Dnipro was instead likely intended to send a message to Europe – reminding NATO that Russia has the capacity to deliver strikes against European targets that cannot be intercepted. It also serves as a poignant reminder that Europe lacks the equivalent capability, and in essence provides a demonstration of Russia’s ability to launch missiles from far beyond the range of either Ukrainian or European response. The Hazelnut is a tangible reminder of Russia’s strategic depth and strike dominance in Ukraine.

    Ultimately, Ukraine will lose the strike game. It’s strike capacity has dwindled, with missiles frittered away in a dissipated air campaign, and though the exhaustion of Storm Shadow and ATACMs stocks can be offset somewhat by JASSMs, Ukraine simply lacks the range or quantities necessary to match Russian capabilities. Needing to do more with less, Ukraine instead diffused its assets and failed to synergize its strikes with ground operations. We are now at the end of the line – after JASSMs, there’s nothing left in western warehouses to upgrade Ukrainian capabilities. Hazelnuts or no, the math on this bat fight is bad for Kiev.

    Conclusion: Debellation

    Trapped in an endless news cycle, with daily footage of FPV strikes and exploding vehicles, and a dutiful cottage industry of war mappers alerting us to every 100 meter advance, it can easily feel like the Russo-Ukrainian War is trapped in an interminable doom loop which will never end – Mad Max meets Groundhog Day.

    What I have endeavored to do here, however, is argue that 2024 actually saw several very important developments which make the coming shape of the war relatively clear. To briefly recapitulate:

    1. Russian forces caved in Ukrainian defenses at depth across an entire critical axis of front. After remaining static for years, Ukraine’s position in Southern Donetsk has been obliterated, with Russian forces advancing through an entire belt of fortified positions, pushing the front into Pokrovsk and Kostayantinivka.
    2. The main Ukrainian gambit on the ground (the incursion into Kursk) failed spectacularly, with the salient being progressively caved in. An entire grouping of critical mechanized formations wasted much of the year fighting on this unproductive and secondary front, leaving Ukrainian positions in the Donbas increasingly threadbare and bereft of reserves.
    3. An attempt by the Ukrainian government to reinvigorate its mobilization program failed, with enlistments quickly trailing off. Decisions to expand the force structure exacerbated the shortage of manpower, and as a result the decay of Ukraine’s frontline brigades has accelerated.
    4. Long awaited western upgrades to Ukraine’s strike capabilities failed to defeat Russian momentum, and stocks of ATACMs and Storm Shadows are nearly exhausted. There are now few options remaining to prop up Ukrainian strike capacity, and no prospect of Ukraine gaining dominance in this dimension of the war.

    In short, Ukraine is on the path to debellation – defeat through the total exhaustion of its capacity to resist. They are not exactly out of men and vehicles and missiles, but these lines are all pointing downward. A strategic Ukrainian defeat – once unthinkable to the western foreign policy apparatus and commentariat – is now on the table. Quite interestingly, now that Donald Trump is about to return to the White House, it is suddenly acceptable to speak of Ukrainian defeat. Robert Kagan – a stalwart champion of Ukraine if there ever was one – now says the quiet part out loud:

    Ukraine will likely lose the war within the next 12 to 18 months. Ukraine will not lose in a nice, negotiated way, with vital territories sacrificed but an independent Ukraine kept alive, sovereign, and protected by Western security guarantees. It faces instead a complete defeat, a loss of sovereignty, and full Russian control

    Indeed.

    None of this should be particularly surprising. If anything, it is shocking that my position – that Russia is essentially a very powerful country that was very unlikely to lose a war (which it perceives as existential) right in its own belly – somehow became controversial or fringe. But here we are.

    Carthago delenda est [end]

    The original article

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    The Western disinformation about Ukraine

    chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia

  • Le Pen est mort, vive Le Pen

    né en 1928, le militant pétainiste breton Jean-Marie Le Pen est décédé le 7 janvier 2025 dans les grand-bourgeois Hauts de Seine

    Les quelques nécrologies françaises que j’ai lues sont aseptisées, ennuyeuses, ou bien imprégnées des polémiques politiques locales d’un pays où la majorité est à nouveau pétainiste.

    Des médias moins conventionnels donnent au personnage de la jeunesse et une perspective internationale. Sur Telegram, une chaîne nazie française bien connue publie en hommage l’image en 1954 du serment des Horace.

    Les guerres coloniales étaient le contexte de ce mème. La France avait connu en mai-juin 1940 la plus spectaculaire et humiliante défaite militaire de l’Histoire de l’humanité. Libérée en 1944 par les armées anglo-états-unisiennes, grâce aux victoires remportées par l’Union soviétique sur le front de l’est, elle s’engagea de façon anachronique dans deux guerres coloniales, en Indochine puis Algérie, où elle fut encore vaincue. Chef de la France combattante en 1940, Charles de Gaulle fut aussi un libérateur de l’Algérie, mais au début des années 2000, Nicolas Sarkozy a effacé le gaullisme de l’échiquier politique français

    Un canal nazi ukrainien et un autre, fasciste italien, partagent cette photographie du 21 mai 2000. Le tribun pétainiste prit la parole lors du congrès à Lviv, berceau historique du nazisme endémique ukrainien, du Parti social national d’Ukraine (SNPU), dont l’emblème était alors le Wolfangel [crochet à loup], symbole nazi allemand de la 2e guerre mondiale, qu’arbore toujours aujourd’hui l’organisation nazie ukrainienne Azov

    Le symbole est fort, d’un point de vue français, car il était aussi celui de la 2. SS-Panzer-Division, Das Reich, qui nettoya le 10 juin 1944 le village d’Oradour sur Glane, Haute Vienne, où 643 habitants furent assassinés

    Il n’est pas inutile de rappeler que le Front national (FN) fut fondé en 1972 par Jean-Marie le Pen et Pierre Bousquet. Le premier n’avait que 16 ans en 1944, mais le second était un ancien Rottenführer [caporal] de la 33. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS Charlemagne, qui fut formée après que par décret au Journal officiel du 22 juillet 1943, l’État français eut permit les engagements dans la Schutzstaffel (SS)

    Sur un plan plus personnel, Jean-Marie Le Pen était un ami d’Andriy Paroubiy, cofondateur en 1991 du SNPU puis président du parlement ukrainien entre 2016 et 2019

    Ce qui fait de Le Pen un véritable totem de la jeune mouvance fasciste européenne, dont les militants défendent aujourd’hui l’Ukraine et assimilent la Russie à l’Union soviétique, est l’angoisse du grand remplacement et la haine du communisme.

    Plusieurs aspects sont paradoxaux et cocasses. Cette mouvance est sur le champ de bataille ukrainien, dans le même camp que bien au chaud dans leurs bureaux européens, les néo-libéraux prétendument antifascistes. Ils y partagent un même impérialisme, tentent d’y sauver une hégémonie occidentale en déclin, que les fascistes rêvent blanche et que les seconds défendent par procuration, avec le sang bon marché de conscrits ukrainiens mobilisés de force.

    Le Pen est toujours resté antisémite, alors qu’aujourd’hui, Israël est le seul État au monde à appliquer une politique raciale, jusqu’au nettoyage ethnique et au genocide. Les jeunes militants qui se battent en Ukraine sont aussi des fans d’Israel, car l’antisémitisme du vieux pétainiste est complètement dépassé aujourd’hui par la réalité de la scène politique internationale.

    Le Pen était le produit et l’acteur d’une Histoire de France récente, où les défaites succèdent à la débâcle. Il reste une figure historique d’un fascisme européen aujourd’hui revigoré par les politiques néo-libérales et l’inéluctable fin de l’hégémonie occidentale.

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