Nicolas Cinquini

Analista senior di l'intelligenza in u campu di a gestione di i risichi di sicurezza, sò un anzianu tenente detective è ufficiale di l'intelligenza in l'agenzie di u Statu francese. A bona pronuncia hè Николай Чинкуини, in russu

Tag: sochi

  • [Sharing] Too late to save Europe: What Putin, Lavrov, Oreshkin, and Karaganov told me at the Valdai Summit 2026 – Lorenzo Maria Pacini, Strategic Culture Foundation

    If the door that Moscow says is open is actually closed, it’s closed on this side – and it wasn’t Rome that closed it of its own accord

    A Valdai summit off-site

    What I’m going to share in this article is less technical and more personal than usual. It concerns the information gathered over several days of dialogue, discussion, and, apparently, a “scandalous” question that became a media sensation in Europe – because I asked the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, what will become of Europe.

    You can find the full video of Vladimir Putin’s speech at the Valdai Forum here.

    You can find my remarks and Putin’s responses here.

    This year, the Valdai Forum did not meet in Sochi. Invitations sent out in the summer still listed the Black Sea city as the venue, but then, in late August, the organizers announced the move to the Moscow region. According to FT, the Federal Protective Service demanded the relocation, concerned about the threat of Ukrainian drones following a summer of attacks on coastal refineries. This logistical detail carries its own weight. The war – which at Valdai is always discussed in the language of the international system – is now also influencing the practical organization of the forum.

    The 23rd Annual Meeting took place from September 28 to October 1 under a title that to a European sounds almost like a personal question: “Responsibility for the Future: The Limits of the Possible or Limitless Possibilities?” The opening featured the Club’s annual report, Keep Calm. The State and Responsibility for the Future, which the authors present – with a nod to Kubrick – as a manual for stopping worrying and learning to love chaos. This was followed by nine thematic sessions, a special session, and, on the final day, the plenary session with the President.

    I arrived as an Italian and a European, knowing that in those halls, the two identities carry different weight. Over the course of the week, I spoke, in particular, with four high-level interlocutors: Sergey Karaganov, Maksim Oreshkin, Sergey Lavrov, and, during the plenary session, Vladimir Putin. The first three conversations took place on the sidelines of the sessions, and I’m recounting them from my notes – in essence, not word for word. The fourth exchange is public and documented by a transcript, from which I’m quoting directly.

    Taken one by one, the four dialogues convey things that anyone following the Russian debate is already familiar with. When viewed in sequence, however, they paint a clearer picture: a shared assessment of Europe and four different ways of drawing conclusions from it. And, above all, a future that is by no means bright.

    Karaganov: Europe as the source of evil

    Sergei Karaganov is one of the founders of the Valdai Club, honorary chairman of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, and for years has been the most radical voice of Russian realism. With him, the conversation began immediately with the most contentious point. Europe, he said, is the root of all evil. If it were destroyed, no one would mourn it. A tactical nuclear conflict on its territory would not involve other actors. Europeans have had plenty of time to find a solution to their own problems; now that they have chosen to prepare for war against Russia, it is too late to offer them another chance.

    I must be honest: I’ve never been a fan of Karaganov; I’ve often found his views too radical and old-fashioned. But starting with an after-lunch coffee together – and continuing over the course of a week of discussions – I discovered that we think very similarly and that his views are by no means trivial. Anyone who has read his recent statements will recognize this line of thinking. In June 2023, Karaganov had publicly argued that Russia should lower the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons to restore credibility to its deterrence and induce the West to withdraw from the conflict in Ukraine. Part of that approach was subsequently incorporated into official documents: the Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence, updated in November 2024, treat an attack by a non-nuclear state carried out with the participation or support of a nuclear power as a joint attack.

    His words, however, contain three distinct assertions, and it is worth keeping them separate. The first is a historical and civilizational judgment: Europe as the source of modernity’s great catastrophes, from the world wars to colonialism. This is a thesis that Karaganov has long argued and which can be contested, but it belongs to the realm of interpretation. The second – that no one would mourn Europe – is a prediction about others’ reactions; from what I observed during those days, it resonates with a significant portion of the Asian, African, and Latin American participants. The third is a strategic hypothesis that underpins everything else: a nuclear escalation in Europe would remain confined to Europe.

    On this point, the literature on deterrence has been debating for seventy years, and – fortunately – empirical evidence is lacking. The factor that complicates this hypothesis lies within Europe itself. France and the United Kingdom possess national arsenals, and in March 2025, Paris formally opened the debate on the European dimension of its own deterrence. A “solely European” nuclear conflict presupposes that two European nuclear powers would stand idly by. This is the weakest assumption in the entire argument, regardless of how one assesses the other two.

    It should also be noted that Karaganov does not speak on behalf of the government. At the Valdai Forum, he represents the wing of the Russian debate that pushes the Kremlin toward more definitive positions, and one of his roles is precisely to push the boundaries of what can be said. Viewed in this light, his “too late” is an indication of a trend rather than a doctrine.

    Oreshkin: The market that no longer exists

    With Maksim Oreshkin, the tone has shifted entirely. Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration, former Minister of Economic Development, and later the President’s economic advisor, Oreshkin reasons in terms of cash flows and balance sheets. His assessment was blunt: Europe is finished. There is no longer any viable competition in the energy market, because China and India now occupy the top spots among Russia’s customers. And there is no reason to invest in a European bailout, since the Europeans, to date, have shown no interest in finding a peaceful and reasonable solution. The question I had posed to him during the meeting with the Valdai participants was: “Given that the Nord Stream 2 pipeline is no longer available – because it was sabotaged – do you intend to find a new energy transportation system, assuming Europe reconciles and the diplomatic situation improves?” His blunt – and perhaps brutal – response is like a dagger of truth plunged into the conscience of every European.

    “Over” should be understood in a technical sense. Oreshkin was not speaking directly about European civilization but about Europe as a trading partner: a market that has ceased to be central to Russia and therefore does not warrant political concessions to win it back. After 2022, Russian crude oil found its main buyers in China and India, while Brussels, through the agreement between the Council and the European Parliament in December 2025, committed to phasing out imports of Russian gas – including pipeline gas and LNG – by 2027. The energy interdependence that had kept Europe and Russia connected for half a century – even during the worst moments of the Cold War – has been dismantled by both sides. Oreshkin’s reasoning captures the simplest consequence of this: whoever is no longer the main customer no longer has leverage. These are the laws of the market, and neither in London, nor in Berlin, nor in Brussels are there any politicians or power groups left who can tell Russia “what to do”.

    The flip side is well known in Moscow, too. A market dominated by two major buyers allows them to demand discounts, and replacing Europe with Asia comes at a cost in terms of price and access to technology. But according to the logic presented to me, the question is no longer whether Europe is in Russia’s interest. It is how much it would cost to make it beneficial again, and the implicit answer is that Europeans must bear that cost.

    Lavrov: the door closed on “this” order

    With Sergey Lavrov, the discussion shifted from the economy to diplomacy, without changing the conclusion. Europe, he said, had many opportunities to reestablish a dialogue with Russia and chose instead to fuel direct confrontation. Now it is too late to turn back: all limits have been crossed, and with the current European order, there is no way to return to previous relations.

    I’d like us to pause for a moment to consider the weight of these words. Those who know Lavrov know that he is a politician capable of weighing every word with great intelligence, even in more relaxed settings such as the Valdai Summit. “The limits have been crossed.” It would be pointless to list these limits, because they are so obvious to the whole world that it would simply be a waste of time. But the look in Lavrov’s eyes as he spoke about Europe – I will never forget that. I have met him many other times, but on this occasion, there was something different.

    The minister has a track record of events that Russian diplomacy regularly references: the Minsk agreements, the draft treaties on security guarantees submitted to the United States and NATO on December 17, 2021, and the Istanbul negotiations in the spring of 2022. The Russian interpretation of each of these developments is controversial, and it is contested in Europe. What interests me here is another element – a qualification that, upon re-reading after the plenary session, proved to be the key to the entire week. A return is impossible under this European framework. Not with Europe, in its current form – that is, the EU and NATO. The rejection concerns a ruling class and an institutional architecture, not the countries that are part of it.

    I wonder just how much Russian patience has been abused to reach the point of saying such things? Classic Russian literature offers us admirable examples of how Russian politicians are capable of stalling, ignoring, and being patient. And there’s no denying that this has consistently been the attitude of the Russian ruling class during the recent years of conflict. To go so far as to say that the limit has been crossed – something Putin would later echo in the summit’s plenary session – means there are no more resources to waste on patient waiting; it means the Bear has been awakened from its hibernation at the wrong moment; it means the consequences of these actions will be of epochal significance.

    Lavrov added one more thing:

    We are ready to strike Europe in an exemplary manner, not as we did in Ukraine

    Take note of these words, dear European friends. Reread them and reflect on their weight. Nothing more needs to be said.

    An Italian professor asks Putin a question

    We come now to one of the most dangerous moments of my career. The plenary session took place, as is traditional, with the Russian president in attendance and Fyodor Lukyanov moderating. I took the floor and asked a two-part question:

    I come from Italy, a country that currently does not have good relations with Russia. As a European, I would like to ask you: What conditions will Russia set for developing a new security system for European countries? And, if we imagine a post-European Union Europe, will you consider it part of a great Eurasian partnership, or, in your view, will the United States and Russia always be competing for these territories?

    Putin began with the second part, and the order is no coincidence:

    Italy is, in fact, located in Europe, and I am speaking of a Eurasian partnership: it goes without saying, therefore, that we will consider – and already do consider – Italy a Eurasian partner as well

    Immediately afterward, he clarified that the fate of the European Union, and Italy’s continued membership in it, “is none of our business.” Moscow does not even intend to discuss it, because any comment on the matter would be interpreted as an attempt to break up the EU, “while we do not want to break up anything at all. We only want to build and cooperate.”

    On the conditions for a new security system, the response was clear: “We have no preconditions.” The obstacle, in his view, lies on the other side. Some European politicians consider it unacceptable for a single country to open a dialogue with Russia, and Putin has called this demand a diktat even harsher than that of the Soviet era. The comparison was carefully crafted: the USSR was a unitary and highly centralized state, whose republics were part of a single state structure; the European Union, in theory, is not, but in practice behaves as if it were. “No one is forbidding us; we’re ready.”

    At that point, Lukyanov interjected with a provocative remark typical of an experienced moderator: since Brussels forbids it, wouldn’t it be better to contribute a little to the disintegration of the EU, so as to make it easier to deal with individual countries? The answer came without hesitation: “But there’s no need – they’ll fall apart on their own.”

    Then Putin addressed me directly. “Our Italian colleague knows this better than we do,” he said, and began running the numbers: Italian public debt at 140%, the deficit around 3%, and in other European countries close to 5%. The figures were rounded but not far from the truth. According to Istat and Eurostat, at the end of 2024, Italy’s public debt stood at 135.3% of GDP and its net borrowing at 3.4%. The point of the passage, however, wasn’t about the decimal points. All problems start with the economy: living standards fall, unemployment rises, and citizens of the major European economies feel it firsthand – and this, he said, “also undermines the very foundations of the European Union. But that’s not our business; we don’t interfere.”

    He concluded by reiterating the offer in a balanced manner: dialogue with the Union as a whole, if the Union so desires, or with individual countries, without preconditions. “But there must be no preconditions on the European side either.”

    Trying to grasp the magnitude of these words, the political balance they reveal, and the strength of a statesman who cares not only about the good of his own country but also that of an entire other continent is a true lesson in what politics is all about.

    Listen to Putin’s entire speech, and you will understand how, in less than five minutes, it is possible to capture the decline of all of Europe, in all its facets, while at the same time wistfully reiterating that Russia has done everything in its power to offer its assistance. But the choices of Europeans are their own, whatever flag they may fly. Russia respects and will always respect the fundamental principles of its foreign policy and its political tradition. No miraculous messianism, no improvised savior.

    Europe – or rather, the Europeans of this Europe – what do they intend to do?

    Rereading my travel notes

    Rereading my notes upon my return, the first thing that stands out is the convergence of views. The strategist, the economist, the foreign minister, and the President have each expressed, in their own words, the same assessment: today’s Europe has exhausted its credit with Moscow. The second thing that stands out is that each draws a different conclusion from that diagnosis.

    For Karaganov, the conclusion is coercive and takes on an almost eschatological tone: Europe has had its chance, and what follows is no longer a matter for diplomacy. For Oreshkin, it is a matter of cold, hard accounting: Europe is not worth the investment needed to win it back. For Lavrov, it is a limited diplomatic withdrawal, focused on the political structure rather than the people. Finally, for Putin, the door remains open – but toward individual states, not toward Brussels – accompanied by the expectation that economic erosion will do the rest.

    The apparent contradiction between the “too late” stance of the first three and the “no preconditions” stance of the fourth is resolved precisely in Lavrov’s characterization. The result is a coherent line, which I would call “bilateralization”: Moscow will not deal with the Union as a political entity as long as its current leadership remains in place; it offers individual member states channels without preconditions and lets Europe’s internal difficulties make those channels attractive. The reference to Italy as a Eurasian partner “already today” must be understood within this framework: it is not a courtesy; it is an indication of which interlocutor Moscow prefers.

    I certainly cannot claim that the four exceptional interlocutors had reached an agreement – that goes without saying – but I found this convergence truly “prophetic.” Valdai has always been the venue where the breadth of Russian debate is showcased to a foreign audience. I can say that these perspectives are compatible and mutually reinforcing: Karaganov’s tough stance makes Putin’s offer appear moderate; Oreshkin’s figures lend credibility to the idea that Moscow does not need to make concessions; and Lavrov’s formula balances firmness with openness.

    The 2010–2012 sovereign debt crisis gave rise to the European Stability Mechanism and the banking union; the pandemic led to Next Generation EU and the first large-scale common debt. Within the Union, crises have generated at least as much centralization as fragmentation. “They will fall apart on their own” is therefore a gamble, not an observation – even if the gamble costs little to those making it: if the EU holds together, Moscow has at least offered dialogue; if it collapses, it already has bilateral channels in place.

    The indicators to watch over the next twelve to eighteen months are fairly clear. The first concerns bilateral visits to Moscow by EU heads of government, in addition to the previous visits by Viktor Orbán in July 2024 and Robert Fico in May 2025. The second is whether unanimity holds during the semi-annual renewals of sanctions, where a single veto is enough to open a crack. The third concerns national exemptions from the timeline for phasing out Russian gas. The fourth – and most significant for us – is the possible opening of a structured channel by a major capital, including Rome.

    What do I take away from this? As an Italian, the phrase I’m taking with me isn’t the one about disintegration; it’s the other one: “We already consider Italy a Eurasian partner as well.” It contains both an offer and an observation directed at us. If the door that Moscow says is open is actually closed, it’s closed on this side – and it wasn’t Rome that closed it of its own accord.

    How long can a country with a debt exceeding 135% of GDP afford to leave it up to others to decide who can speak with whom? No one in Moscow asked me that. It’s a question I brought home with me on my own. And every Italian of good conscience, every European who still has a heart, knows the answer [end]

    The original article

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    October 5, 2026: A Report from Russia: How Close are Europe and Russia to a Wider Conflict? – Scott Ritter

    this article is the product of visits to Russia I made in June and September 2026 where I met with senior Russian leaders, leading academics, and specialists in military and security issues

    September 26, 2026: Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s statement at the General Debate of the 81st Session of the UN General Assembly

    September 24, 2026: Four thousand pages of plans, none for peace: NATO’s insane provocations toward war – Lorenzo Maria Pacini, Strategic Culture Foundation

    What does Europe gain from a war it can’t win? Nothing. 1914 is calling

    September 8, 2026: The West has engineered its own downfall – Kishore Mahbubani, Institute of Art and Ideas

    the West has become a lonely, narcissistic civilization

    August 6, 2026: 40 Days that Shook the West – Scott Ritter

    Zelensky and his Western overlords thought they could compel Russia to enter into peace negotiations. All they did is seal Ukraine’s tragic fate

    July 19, 2026: Decision Point – Scott Ritter

    Ukraine is defenseless in the face of Russian missile attacks. Now is not the time for negotiations. Russia must finish the job

    February 23, 2026: The Flamingo Effect – Scott Ritter

    Ukraine has struck the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant using a Flamingo cruise missile. The ramifications of this event could reverberate globally

    November 11, 2025: Der Krieg

    in French, ce 11 novembre 2025 est l’occasion de souligner comme la façon dont l’Europe sacrifie les conscrits ukrainiens mobilisés de force rappelle le spectaculaire carnage de la 1ère guerre mondiale

    September 28, 2025: Dislocation de l’Occident : les menaces – Emmanuel Todd

    in French, la perversité de Trump se déploie au Moyen-Orient, le bellicisme de l’OTAN en Europe

    September 16, 2025: On European imperialism – Events in Ukraine

    EU responsibility and hypocrisy. The angry, betrayed Ukrainians. Update on the forever war

    August 2, 2025: Russophrenia: the West’s favourite delusion about Russia – Brian McDonald

    ten years after I coined the term, the media’s still convinced Russia is both collapsing, and conquering the world

    March 7, 2025: Paralyzed by acute dementia, Europe declares war on Russia all over again – Pepe Escobar, Strategic Culture Foundation

    the SMO will keep rollin’ on. And as the Europeans want it, to the last Ukrainian

    March 6, 2023: How Could Western Intelligence Have Got It Wrong, Again? They Didn’t. They Had Other Purposes – Alastair Crooke, Strategic Culture Foundation

    the West now faces the task of de-fusing the landmine of their own electorate’s conviction of a Ukraine ‘win’, and of Russian humiliation

    The Atlanticist defeat in Donbass and Ukraine

    chronicle of a new catastrophic NATO venture

    The Western disinformation about Ukraine

    chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia

  • [Sharing] The ‘shadow fleet’ tanker raid was pure theatre – Owen Matthews, The Spectator

    The news footage was satisfyingly reminiscent of Mission: Impossible. Masked French commandoes swarmed up the side of the rusty oil tanker Boracay, assault rifles drawn, and commenced their search for evidence the vessel had been responsible for launching Russian drones at Danish airports. The captain and first officer – both Chinese nationals – were taken into custody. France’s president Emmanuel Macron could not confirm that the Boracay was responsible for the drone attacks – but did make it clear that stopping the vessel off the coast of St Nazaire was intended as ‘a step moving towards a policy of obstruction of suspicious ships in our waters that are involved in trafficking’ Russian oil. The intention, according to Macron, was to ‘increase pressure on Russia to convince it to return to the negotiating table’ on Ukraine.   

    Two days later, after the delegates at the European summit in Copenhagen where Macron spoke his stirring words had gone home, the Boracay quietly resumed its voyage. The vessel’s captain was charged with nothing more menacing than disobeying orders to halt by the French Navy. No evidence was found of involvement with the drones that supposedly buzzed Copenhagen airport on September 30th. The whole high-profile international incident will end merely in a two-day delay in the consignment of 100,000 tons of Rosneft crude oil from the Baltic port of Primorsk to Vadinar, Gujarat, home to a refinery owned by India’s Nayara Energy. 

    Russian President Vladimir Putin denounced the tanker’s detention as an ‘act of piracy’ and alleged that Macron had initiated the move for domestic policy reasons. ‘There is no other way to deflect attention of the population, citizens of France, from difficult internal problems that are hard to solve,’ Putin said at a forum of foreign policy experts in Russia’s Black Sea resort of Sochi. 

    For once, Putin may have a point. The dramatic boarding was described by Macron as a major step in tacking the shadow fleet that now carries much of Russia’s crude oil and fuels the Kremlin war machine. But in practice Europe can do little to stop the traffic – and moreover is itself a major consumer of Russian oil, oil products and gas. 

    Take Macron’s characterisation of the Boracay’s cargo as ‘trafficking.’ Buying and selling Russian oil is not banned. Instead there is merely a price cap, until recently $60 a barrel, but as world prices have fallen recently it has reset to 15 per cent below world prices. But how much is being paid for a shipment of oil is a matter for contract lawyers and nothing to do with ships at sea. Indeed the price cap has proved childishly easy to avoid. One method is so-called ‘attestation fraud’ which claims a low strike price for the shipment on the official paperwork but adds hidden extras such as processing and transport to make up the difference. Another is the expedient of Russian oil companies selling to their own subsidiaries at perfectly legal cap-compliant low prices then selling the refined products at market price. Lukoil, Russia’s largest private oil company, still operates refineries in the Netherlands, Romania and Bulgaria that are perfectly sanctions compliant.  

    As for the so-called ‘shadow fleet’, what this nefarious-sounding term actually means is oil tankers that are flagged in low-regulation jurisdictions and not insured in London but instead carry policies underwritten by Russian, Indian or Chinese insurers. The Boracay is a poster child for this kind of vessel. Built in 2007, she is currently registered in Benin. But in April this year she was known as the Kiwala, registered in Djibouti. 

    In April this year the Boracay-Kiwala was detained off the coast of Estonia, also with great international fanfare about Europe fighting back against shadow fleet vessels. Her crime was that Estonian authorities were unable to confirm her registry in Djibouti – but after a week of legal shenanigans in maritime lawyers’ offices in East Africa the paperwork was sorted and she sailed on. 

    In short, shadow fleet tankers may be on the dodgy end of the spectrum of seafaring respectability. But they are not, as Macron suggests, maritime outlaws. Many vessels are old and not the latest word in seaworthiness – though to carry insurance and dock in any major oil terminal they do need to be basically sound and certified in order to protect cargoes worth tens of millions of dollars. Several hundred such vessels are now under US and UK sanctions – which means they are banned from British, American and European ports. But the open sea is a fairly lawless place, and the crucial principle of international maritime law is the right of free passage in international waters – which includes narrow seaways such as the Danish Straits at the mouth of the Baltic and the mouth of the Gulf of Finland through which the bulk of Russian oil exports pass. Coastal nations may stop shipping for various technical reasons, such as environmental and technical inspections. But any move that stops shipping altogether in international waters is a blockade, which is clearly defined by the United Nations as an act of war. 

    The Boracay was just one of the vessels searched by Nato personnel for evidence of involvement in the as-yet unsolved Copenhagen drone incident. Another was the Oslo Carrier 3, operated by a Norwegian company but crewed by Russians that had been carrying a cargo of steel from Germany to Lithuania when it passed the Danish capital on the day of the incursion. Nothing was found on board her, either. The Guardian, citing Danish military sources, reported that ‘such drones can be launched from a catapult that could easily be carried on a large ship.’ Denmark’s Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen warned that Europe faced a ‘hybrid war’ and that ‘there is only one country that is willing to threaten us, and it is Russia.’ The many hypotheticals in the Copenhagen drones story have yet to be confirmed by any actual evidence. 

    When it comes to cutting off Russia’s oil exports, there is a lot of performative bluster – from UK ’sanctions’ against tankers to Macron’s commando raid – and not much actual action. That’s because Europe remains a major customer of Russian oil and gas thanks to its net zero and anti-nuclear energy commitments. Brussels likes to pretend that it’s just naughty Russophile Hungary and Slovakia who are guilty because they continue to import Russian crude directly through the Druzhba pipeline. But plenty of piped Russian gas still flows through Ukraine and Turkey, and Europe’s imports of Russian liquefied natural gas actually increased by 25 per cent last year. Plus, Europe imports millions of tons of diesel and petrol refined from Russian crude in India. 

    Commando raids make for great TV. But they’re just a distraction from the real issue, which is that European energy consumers remain among the biggest funders of Putin’s war machine [end]

    The original article

    Related

    August 5, 2025: The British intelligence is planning secret operations of sabotage in order to trigger the overt and shameless Western piracy of tankers transporting Russian oil

    The Atlanticist defeat in Donbass and Ukraine

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    The Western disinformation about Ukraine

    chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia

  • [Sharing] Putin Outlines The ‘Moment of Truth’ – Pepe Escobar, Sputnik

    President Putin’s plenary session performance (address + Q&A) at the annual Valdai Club meeting in Sochi felt like a high-speed train on cruise control

    Totally cool, calm, comfortable, in full command of a Himalaya of facts, no political leader anywhere – recent past and present – would even come close to delivering what amounts to an extensive, detailed world view deeply matured over a quarter of a century at the highest geopolitical level.

    Putin began his address referring to the October 1917 revolution, drawing a direct parallel with our turbulent times: “The moment of truth is coming”. In a clear tribute to Gramsci, he stated how a “completely new world order” is “being formed before our eyes.”

    The subtle reference to the recent BRICS summit in Kazan could not possibly escape critical minds across the Global Majority. Kazan was a living, breathing testimony that “the old order is irrevocably disappearing, one might say, has already disappeared, and a serious, irreconcilable struggle is unfolding for the formation of a new one. Irreconcilable, first of all, because this is not even a fight for power or geopolitical influence, this is a clash of the very principles on which relations between countries and peoples will be built at the next historical stage.”

    As concisely as possible, that should be taken as the current Big Picture framework: we are not mired inside a reductionist clash of civilizations or the “end of History” – which Putin defined as “myopic” – but facing a make-or-break systemic clash of fundamental principles. The result will define this century – arguably the Eurasia Century, as “the dialectics of History continues.”

    Putin himself quipped that he would drive into “philosophical asides” during his address. In fact that went much further than a mere refutation of unilateral conceptual fallacies, as “the Western elites thought that their monopoly is the final stop for humanity” and “modern neoliberalism degenerated into a totalitarian ideology.”

    Referring to AI, he asked rhetorically, “will human remain human?” He praised the building of a new global architecture, moving towards a “polyphonic” and “polycentric” world where “maximum representation” is paramount and the BRICS are “coming up with a coordinated approach” based on “sovereign equality.”

    Six Principles For Global Sustainable Development

    Sovereignty had to be one of the predominant themes during the Valdai Q&A. Putin was adamant that Russia must “develop our own sovereign AI. As algorithms are biased and give massive power to a few big companies that control the internet, the need is imperative for “sovereign algorithms.”

    Answering a question on Eurasian security and the US as the dominant maritime power v. a multipolar Eurasia, he stressed the “consensus and desire in Eurasia for an anti-hegemonic movement”, and not for Eurasia constituted “as a bloc”. That’s the appeal of Eurasia’s “multi-vector foreign policy”, implying “more political independence”. The key example of “harmonizing interests”, Putin stressed, is the Russia-China partnership, and that was also what “made BRICS successful.”

    Compare it in contrast to “the inability in Europe to establish a system of “indivisibility of security” and to “overcome bloc politics”; Europe instead went for NATO expansion: “After the end of the Cold War there was an opportunity to overcome bloc politics. But the US had fear of losing Europe. The US installed almost a colonial dependence. Honestly I did not expect that.”

    Putin introduced a fascinating personal experience tidbit referring to a conversation – in German – with former German chancellor Helmut Kohl in 1993, when Kohl said flat out that “the future of Europe” is linked to Russia.

    Yet that ended up leading to “the most important problem on our Eurasian continent, the main problem between Russia and European countries: the trust deficit (…) When they tell us that ‘we signed the Minsk agreements on Ukraine only to give Ukraine an opportunity to rearm, and we had no intention of resolving this conflict peacefully,’ what kind of trust can we talk about? (…) You have directly publicly stated that you have cheated us! Lied to us and deceived us! What kind of trust is that? But we need to get back to that system of mutual trust.”

    Putin then added that Europe should consider becoming part and parcel of a Chinese concept straight from Chinese philosophy (“they do not strive for domination”). With panache, he stressed that the Chinese uber-geoeconomic trade/connectivity project should be interpreted as One Belt, One Common Road.

    And that extrapolates to Central Asia, with all those nations “very young in their statehood” interested in “stable development”. For Russia-China, there’s “no competition” in the Heartland: “we only have cooperation.”

    Putin once again enumerated what he considers the 6 key principles for global sustainable development: openness of interaction (implying no “artificial barriers”); diversity (“a model of one country or a relatively small part of humanity should not be imposed as something universal”); maximum representativeness; security for all without exception; justice for all (erasing “the gap between the ‘golden billion’ and the rest of humanity); and equality.

    “Make Civilizations, Not War”

    On Ukraine, this was the money quote: “If there is no neutrality, then it’s difficult to imagine any kind of good neighborly relations between Russia and Ukraine.” In a nutshell: Moscow is ready for negotiations, but based on facts on the battlefield and what was agreed upon in Istanbul in April 2022.

    That may be interpreted as a direct message to President Trump. To whom the door is open: “Russia has not damaged its relations with the US and is open to their restoration, but the ball is in the Americans’ court.”

    Putin on US Presidents (he met quite a few): “All of them are interesting people.” On Trump: “His behavior when there was an attempt on his life, I was impressed. He is a courageous person. He acquitted himself valiantly.” On the open door: “Whatever he does it’s up to him to decide.” Then Putin offered his own congratulations for the re-election – on the record. The dialogue may be on: “We are willing to talk to Trump.”

    Putin extolled Russia-China relations as part of their strategic partnership as being “at the highest level in modern history.” He also praised his own personal relation with Xi Jinping. That paved the way for the real killer, when it comes to US-Russia-China: “If the US had chosen a trilateral cooperation instead of double constraint – everyone would win.”

    An excellent question by Brazilian economist Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr – a former vice-president of the NDB, the BRICS bank – led Putin to clarify his own position on de-dollarization. He stated flatly that “my role is to see ideas shaped that we then propose to our partners”.

    The key target is “proposing to create a new investment platform using electronic payments.” That will address the “most promising markets” in the near future – South Asia, Africa, parts of Latin America: “They will need investment, technologies.” And “tools independent from inflation” – with regulation “through Central Banks and the NDB. We agreed to have a working group meeting regularly at government level. We are in no hurry.”

    So that puts to rest any scenario of an immediate BRICS financial bombshell – even as “two-thirds of our trade is being serviced in national currencies” and among BRICS the figures are also high.

    BRICS Bridge will be tested – soon. As for creating a single currency, that’s “premature. We need to achieve greater integration of economies, increase the quality of economies to a certain – compatible – level.”

    Then, the bombshell: “We never wanted to abandon the dollar!” That goes a long way to explain Putin’s own view on de-dollarization: “They are undoing it with their own hand – the power of the dollar.”

    All of the above is just a sample of the width and breath of themes addressed by the President during the Valdai Q&A. The forum itself offered precious nuggets all across the spectrum. Some participants – correctly – noted the absence of “the majority of the majority”: youth and women. Africans were impressed with “the sharp mind of Russian bureaucracy.”

    A Chinese view noted how “the Chinese don’t swim against the current; they cross the river and reach the other bank.” There was a near consensus that development should be “based in different cultural values of civilizations” – actually Putin’s own view. Also imperative is the “need for aggregate authority” among the Global South.

    A Greek insight was particularly powerful when it comes to the civilizational approach to politics: “Civilizations don’t clash. States do.” Thus the new – playful – motto that could guide not only BRICS but the whole Global Majority: “Make Civilizations, Not War.” [end]

    The original article

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