Analista senior di l'intelligenza in u campu di a gestione di i risichi di sicurezza, sò un anzianu tenente detective è ufficiale di l'intelligenza in l'agenzie di u Statu francese. A bona pronuncia hè Николай Чинкуини, in russu
French State radio station RFI reveals that without knowledge or consent of the national legislature, active-duty military personnel are deployed in Ukraine. Their mission is involving maintaining French military equipment and training Ukrainian non-commissioned officers in close proximity to the combat zone. That secret operation is codenamed Volia and based in Poland, its official cover is known as Gerfaut
The Gallic rooster, Louis Carrier Belleuse, circa 1890
On November 17, 2026, with British support in intelligence and EW, scores of cruise missiles and drones manage before dawn to overwhelm air defense in Kerch and damage the Crimea bridge, a symbolic target.
in French, November 11, 2025 is an opportunity to highlight how the way Europe is sacrificing forcibly mobilized Ukrainian conscripts is reminiscent of the spectacular carnage of WW1
its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine, chronicle
chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia
If the door that Moscow says is open is actually closed, it’s closed on this side – and it wasn’t Rome that closed it of its own accord
A Valdai summit off-site
What I’m going to share in this article is less technical and more personal than usual. It concerns the information gathered over several days of dialogue, discussion, and, apparently, a “scandalous” question that became a media sensation in Europe – because I asked the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, what will become of Europe.
You can find the full video of Vladimir Putin’s speech at the Valdai Forum here.
You can find my remarks and Putin’s responses here.
This year, the Valdai Forum did not meet in Sochi. Invitations sent out in the summer still listed the Black Sea city as the venue, but then, in late August, the organizers announced the move to the Moscow region. According to FT, the Federal Protective Service demanded the relocation, concerned about the threat of Ukrainian drones following a summer of attacks on coastal refineries. This logistical detail carries its own weight. The war – which at Valdai is always discussed in the language of the international system – is now also influencing the practical organization of the forum.
The 23rd Annual Meeting took place from September 28 to October 1 under a title that to a European sounds almost like a personal question: “Responsibility for the Future: The Limits of the Possible or Limitless Possibilities?” The opening featured the Club’s annual report, Keep Calm. The State and Responsibility for the Future, which the authors present – with a nod to Kubrick – as a manual for stopping worrying and learning to love chaos. This was followed by nine thematic sessions, a special session, and, on the final day, the plenary session with the President.
I arrived as an Italian and a European, knowing that in those halls, the two identities carry different weight. Over the course of the week, I spoke, in particular, with four high-level interlocutors: Sergey Karaganov, Maksim Oreshkin, Sergey Lavrov, and, during the plenary session, Vladimir Putin. The first three conversations took place on the sidelines of the sessions, and I’m recounting them from my notes – in essence, not word for word. The fourth exchange is public and documented by a transcript, from which I’m quoting directly.
Taken one by one, the four dialogues convey things that anyone following the Russian debate is already familiar with. When viewed in sequence, however, they paint a clearer picture: a shared assessment of Europe and four different ways of drawing conclusions from it. And, above all, a future that is by no means bright.
Karaganov: Europe as the source of evil
Sergei Karaganov is one of the founders of the Valdai Club, honorary chairman of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, and for years has been the most radical voice of Russian realism. With him, the conversation began immediately with the most contentious point. Europe, he said, is the root of all evil. If it were destroyed, no one would mourn it. A tactical nuclear conflict on its territory would not involve other actors. Europeans have had plenty of time to find a solution to their own problems; now that they have chosen to prepare for war against Russia, it is too late to offer them another chance.
I must be honest: I’ve never been a fan of Karaganov; I’ve often found his views too radical and old-fashioned. But starting with an after-lunch coffee together – and continuing over the course of a week of discussions – I discovered that we think very similarly and that his views are by no means trivial. Anyone who has read his recent statements will recognize this line of thinking. In June 2023, Karaganov had publicly argued that Russia should lower the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons to restore credibility to its deterrence and induce the West to withdraw from the conflict in Ukraine. Part of that approach was subsequently incorporated into official documents: the Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence, updated in November 2024, treat an attack by a non-nuclear state carried out with the participation or support of a nuclear power as a joint attack.
His words, however, contain three distinct assertions, and it is worth keeping them separate. The first is a historical and civilizational judgment: Europe as the source of modernity’s great catastrophes, from the world wars to colonialism. This is a thesis that Karaganov has long argued and which can be contested, but it belongs to the realm of interpretation. The second – that no one would mourn Europe – is a prediction about others’ reactions; from what I observed during those days, it resonates with a significant portion of the Asian, African, and Latin American participants. The third is a strategic hypothesis that underpins everything else: a nuclear escalation in Europe would remain confined to Europe.
On this point, the literature on deterrence has been debating for seventy years, and – fortunately – empirical evidence is lacking. The factor that complicates this hypothesis lies within Europe itself. France and the United Kingdom possess national arsenals, and in March 2025, Paris formally opened the debate on the European dimension of its own deterrence. A “solely European” nuclear conflict presupposes that two European nuclear powers would stand idly by. This is the weakest assumption in the entire argument, regardless of how one assesses the other two.
It should also be noted that Karaganov does not speak on behalf of the government. At the Valdai Forum, he represents the wing of the Russian debate that pushes the Kremlin toward more definitive positions, and one of his roles is precisely to push the boundaries of what can be said. Viewed in this light, his “too late” is an indication of a trend rather than a doctrine.
Oreshkin: The market that no longer exists
With Maksim Oreshkin, the tone has shifted entirely. Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration, former Minister of Economic Development, and later the President’s economic advisor, Oreshkin reasons in terms of cash flows and balance sheets. His assessment was blunt: Europe is finished. There is no longer any viable competition in the energy market, because China and India now occupy the top spots among Russia’s customers. And there is no reason to invest in a European bailout, since the Europeans, to date, have shown no interest in finding a peaceful and reasonable solution. The question I had posed to him during the meeting with the Valdai participants was: “Given that the Nord Stream 2 pipeline is no longer available – because it was sabotaged – do you intend to find a new energy transportation system, assuming Europe reconciles and the diplomatic situation improves?” His blunt – and perhaps brutal – response is like a dagger of truth plunged into the conscience of every European.
“Over” should be understood in a technical sense. Oreshkin was not speaking directly about European civilization but about Europe as a trading partner: a market that has ceased to be central to Russia and therefore does not warrant political concessions to win it back. After 2022, Russian crude oil found its main buyers in China and India, while Brussels, through the agreement between the Council and the European Parliament in December 2025, committed to phasing out imports of Russian gas – including pipeline gas and LNG – by 2027. The energy interdependence that had kept Europe and Russia connected for half a century – even during the worst moments of the Cold War – has been dismantled by both sides. Oreshkin’s reasoning captures the simplest consequence of this: whoever is no longer the main customer no longer has leverage. These are the laws of the market, and neither in London, nor in Berlin, nor in Brussels are there any politicians or power groups left who can tell Russia “what to do”.
The flip side is well known in Moscow, too. A market dominated by two major buyers allows them to demand discounts, and replacing Europe with Asia comes at a cost in terms of price and access to technology. But according to the logic presented to me, the question is no longer whether Europe is in Russia’s interest. It is how much it would cost to make it beneficial again, and the implicit answer is that Europeans must bear that cost.
Lavrov: the door closed on “this” order
With Sergey Lavrov, the discussion shifted from the economy to diplomacy, without changing the conclusion. Europe, he said, had many opportunities to reestablish a dialogue with Russia and chose instead to fuel direct confrontation. Now it is too late to turn back: all limits have been crossed, and with the current European order, there is no way to return to previous relations.
I’d like us to pause for a moment to consider the weight of these words. Those who know Lavrov know that he is a politician capable of weighing every word with great intelligence, even in more relaxed settings such as the Valdai Summit. “The limits have been crossed.” It would be pointless to list these limits, because they are so obvious to the whole world that it would simply be a waste of time. But the look in Lavrov’s eyes as he spoke about Europe – I will never forget that. I have met him many other times, but on this occasion, there was something different.
The minister has a track record of events that Russian diplomacy regularly references: the Minsk agreements, the draft treaties on security guarantees submitted to the United States and NATO on December 17, 2021, and the Istanbul negotiations in the spring of 2022. The Russian interpretation of each of these developments is controversial, and it is contested in Europe. What interests me here is another element – a qualification that, upon re-reading after the plenary session, proved to be the key to the entire week. A return is impossible under this European framework. Not with Europe, in its current form – that is, the EU and NATO. The rejection concerns a ruling class and an institutional architecture, not the countries that are part of it.
I wonder just how much Russian patience has been abused to reach the point of saying such things? Classic Russian literature offers us admirable examples of how Russian politicians are capable of stalling, ignoring, and being patient. And there’s no denying that this has consistently been the attitude of the Russian ruling class during the recent years of conflict. To go so far as to say that the limit has been crossed – something Putin would later echo in the summit’s plenary session – means there are no more resources to waste on patient waiting; it means the Bear has been awakened from its hibernation at the wrong moment; it means the consequences of these actions will be of epochal significance.
Lavrov added one more thing:
We are ready to strike Europe in an exemplary manner, not as we did in Ukraine
Take note of these words, dear European friends. Reread them and reflect on their weight. Nothing more needs to be said.
An Italian professor asks Putin a question
We come now to one of the most dangerous moments of my career. The plenary session took place, as is traditional, with the Russian president in attendance and Fyodor Lukyanov moderating. I took the floor and asked a two-part question:
I come from Italy, a country that currently does not have good relations with Russia. As a European, I would like to ask you: What conditions will Russia set for developing a new security system for European countries? And, if we imagine a post-European Union Europe, will you consider it part of a great Eurasian partnership, or, in your view, will the United States and Russia always be competing for these territories?
Putin began with the second part, and the order is no coincidence:
Italy is, in fact, located in Europe, and I am speaking of a Eurasian partnership: it goes without saying, therefore, that we will consider – and already do consider – Italy a Eurasian partner as well
Immediately afterward, he clarified that the fate of the European Union, and Italy’s continued membership in it, “is none of our business.” Moscow does not even intend to discuss it, because any comment on the matter would be interpreted as an attempt to break up the EU, “while we do not want to break up anything at all. We only want to build and cooperate.”
On the conditions for a new security system, the response was clear: “We have no preconditions.” The obstacle, in his view, lies on the other side. Some European politicians consider it unacceptable for a single country to open a dialogue with Russia, and Putin has called this demand a diktat even harsher than that of the Soviet era. The comparison was carefully crafted: the USSR was a unitary and highly centralized state, whose republics were part of a single state structure; the European Union, in theory, is not, but in practice behaves as if it were. “No one is forbidding us; we’re ready.”
At that point, Lukyanov interjected with a provocative remark typical of an experienced moderator: since Brussels forbids it, wouldn’t it be better to contribute a little to the disintegration of the EU, so as to make it easier to deal with individual countries? The answer came without hesitation: “But there’s no need – they’ll fall apart on their own.”
Then Putin addressed me directly. “Our Italian colleague knows this better than we do,” he said, and began running the numbers: Italian public debt at 140%, the deficit around 3%, and in other European countries close to 5%. The figures were rounded but not far from the truth. According to Istat and Eurostat, at the end of 2024, Italy’s public debt stood at 135.3% of GDP and its net borrowing at 3.4%. The point of the passage, however, wasn’t about the decimal points. All problems start with the economy: living standards fall, unemployment rises, and citizens of the major European economies feel it firsthand – and this, he said, “also undermines the very foundations of the European Union. But that’s not our business; we don’t interfere.”
He concluded by reiterating the offer in a balanced manner: dialogue with the Union as a whole, if the Union so desires, or with individual countries, without preconditions. “But there must be no preconditions on the European side either.”
Trying to grasp the magnitude of these words, the political balance they reveal, and the strength of a statesman who cares not only about the good of his own country but also that of an entire other continent is a true lesson in what politics is all about.
Listen to Putin’s entire speech, and you will understand how, in less than five minutes, it is possible to capture the decline of all of Europe, in all its facets, while at the same time wistfully reiterating that Russia has done everything in its power to offer its assistance. But the choices of Europeans are their own, whatever flag they may fly. Russia respects and will always respect the fundamental principles of its foreign policy and its political tradition. No miraculous messianism, no improvised savior.
Europe – or rather, the Europeans of this Europe – what do they intend to do?
Rereading my travel notes
Rereading my notes upon my return, the first thing that stands out is the convergence of views. The strategist, the economist, the foreign minister, and the President have each expressed, in their own words, the same assessment: today’s Europe has exhausted its credit with Moscow. The second thing that stands out is that each draws a different conclusion from that diagnosis.
For Karaganov, the conclusion is coercive and takes on an almost eschatological tone: Europe has had its chance, and what follows is no longer a matter for diplomacy. For Oreshkin, it is a matter of cold, hard accounting: Europe is not worth the investment needed to win it back. For Lavrov, it is a limited diplomatic withdrawal, focused on the political structure rather than the people. Finally, for Putin, the door remains open – but toward individual states, not toward Brussels – accompanied by the expectation that economic erosion will do the rest.
The apparent contradiction between the “too late” stance of the first three and the “no preconditions” stance of the fourth is resolved precisely in Lavrov’s characterization. The result is a coherent line, which I would call “bilateralization”: Moscow will not deal with the Union as a political entity as long as its current leadership remains in place; it offers individual member states channels without preconditions and lets Europe’s internal difficulties make those channels attractive. The reference to Italy as a Eurasian partner “already today” must be understood within this framework: it is not a courtesy; it is an indication of which interlocutor Moscow prefers.
I certainly cannot claim that the four exceptional interlocutors had reached an agreement – that goes without saying – but I found this convergence truly “prophetic.” Valdai has always been the venue where the breadth of Russian debate is showcased to a foreign audience. I can say that these perspectives are compatible and mutually reinforcing: Karaganov’s tough stance makes Putin’s offer appear moderate; Oreshkin’s figures lend credibility to the idea that Moscow does not need to make concessions; and Lavrov’s formula balances firmness with openness.
The 2010–2012 sovereign debt crisis gave rise to the European Stability Mechanism and the banking union; the pandemic led to Next Generation EU and the first large-scale common debt. Within the Union, crises have generated at least as much centralization as fragmentation. “They will fall apart on their own” is therefore a gamble, not an observation – even if the gamble costs little to those making it: if the EU holds together, Moscow has at least offered dialogue; if it collapses, it already has bilateral channels in place.
The indicators to watch over the next twelve to eighteen months are fairly clear. The first concerns bilateral visits to Moscow by EU heads of government, in addition to the previous visits by Viktor Orbán in July 2024 and Robert Fico in May 2025. The second is whether unanimity holds during the semi-annual renewals of sanctions, where a single veto is enough to open a crack. The third concerns national exemptions from the timeline for phasing out Russian gas. The fourth – and most significant for us – is the possible opening of a structured channel by a major capital, including Rome.
What do I take away from this? As an Italian, the phrase I’m taking with me isn’t the one about disintegration; it’s the other one: “We already consider Italy a Eurasian partner as well.” It contains both an offer and an observation directed at us. If the door that Moscow says is open is actually closed, it’s closed on this side – and it wasn’t Rome that closed it of its own accord.
How long can a country with a debt exceeding 135% of GDP afford to leave it up to others to decide who can speak with whom? No one in Moscow asked me that. It’s a question I brought home with me on my own. And every Italian of good conscience, every European who still has a heart, knows the answer [end]
this article is the product of visits to Russia I made in June and September 2026 where I met with senior Russian leaders, leading academics, and specialists in military and security issues
in French, ce 11 novembre 2025 est l’occasion de souligner comme la façon dont l’Europe sacrifie les conscrits ukrainiens mobilisés de force rappelle le spectaculaire carnage de la 1ère guerre mondiale
chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia
This article is the product of visits to Russia I made in June and September 2026 where I met with senior Russian leaders, leading academics, and specialists in military and security issues
There has been a spate of irresponsibly aggressive rhetoric from within Europe strongly posturing for a conflict with Russia by the end of the decade. This rhetoric comes in the context of the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine, which is well into its fifth year, a conflict which both Europe and the United States openly acknowledge operates in the form of a proxy war between the collective West and Russia. The Russian response has been to accelerate its military efforts against Ukraine while putting NATO on notice that any effort to threaten Russian territory, and particularly the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, would see Russia responding with the full compliment of military capabilities, including nuclear weapons. The current situation in Europe today in many ways replicates the conditions that existed on the continent in the summer of 1914, where military mobilization and war preparations created a momentum that produced a war no politician was seriously looking to prosecute. The consequences of war in 1914 were a disaster for Europe; the consequences of a war today would be fatal to civilization as we know it.
In examining the geopolitical map of Europe/Eurasia today, one can assess four points of military friction between Russia, the United States and Europe. These are Ukraine, the Arctic, Kaliningrad, and Outer Space. While each represents a physically distinct problem set politically and militarily, they are all four inextricably linked through a common Russophobic mindset in Europe and the United States which treats Russia as a singular security issue. Moreover, both Europe and the US operate from a strategic mindset driven by zero-sum thinking, which postures Russia as being structurally motivated to bring harm to both Europe and the United States, thereby stifling the possibility of cooperation with Russia that could resolve many if not all of the underlying issues which are collectively construed by the West as presenting a threat. For its part, Russia operates from a mindset derived from the psychology of perpetual victimhood dating back centuries, and a historical foundation of resistance to aggression which seeks diplomatic resolution until which point military confrontation becomes the only solution
Ukraine: The (perceived) chink in the Soviet/Russian armor
The current conflict in Ukraine between Russia and the West did not begin in 2022 with the Russian invasion but rather represents the logical conclusion of a posture on the part of the United States and NATO which sought to exploit the ultra-nationalism of Western Ukraine in order to create a framework of instability designed to weaken the Soviet Union, and later Russia, from within. To understand this mindset, one first must delve into the psychology underpinning the concept of Ukrainian nationalism. For Russia, Ukraine represents part of a larger family of Slavic peoples which include the Russians and Belarussians; indeed, this notion is shared by millions of Ukrainians as well. One only need to look at the integration of Ukraine within the cultural and historical roots of Russia over time to understand the reality of this sentiment.
For the West, this reality presents a problem, since it lends itself toward the existence of a singular Slavic state possessing tremendous geographical advantages and unmatched natural resources which in turn creates massive economic penitential that competes with Western notions of global supremacy. Nazi Germany sought to nullify this Slavic potential through the implementation of Generalplan Ost, the literal cultural and physical genocide of the Slavic race. The United States and the United Kingdom (and later, NATO, inclusive of a newly militarized West Germany), continued this policy of Slavic nullification by promoting anti-Soviet resistance on the part of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), including military support of partisans operating in Ukraine loyal to Stepan Bandera, a former ally of Nazi Germany whose forces perpetrated large-scale atrocities against Jews, Poles and Russians during the Second World War. When the war ended, the German intelligence organization responsible for managing the OUN operations was taken over by the US military and later, under the auspices of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), used to direct anti-Soviet armed resistance up until 1954-55. The CIA continued to provide active support for the OUN, using the Ukrainian diaspora, through the 1990’s.
The role of western intelligence, led by the CIA and the British Special Intelligence Service (SIS), in post-Soviet Ukraine was singularly focused on promoting Ukrainian nationalism at the expense of Russia. The political campaign waged against the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine by western intelligence emerged front and center when the two-term President of Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma, stepped down in 2005 after carrying out policies designed to improve Ukraine-Russian relations. Kuchma threw his support behind the Russian-speaking Viktor Yanukovych. For the West, a Yanukovych presidency would undermine their strategic goal of stripping Ukraine away from Russia. The result was the so-called “Orange Revolution”, which saw Yanukovych’s electoral victory overturned in favor of Ukrainian nationalists who promoted a distinctly anti-Russian policy which saw Ukraine pivot toward the European Union and seek NATO membership. The latter development was seen by Russia as a red line which, if pursued, would inevitably lead to a military conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Yanukovych’s election in 2010 was deemed a setback to the Western designs on Ukraine, leading to the West supporting a violent coup in February 2014 that saw Yanukovych driven from power, replaced by pro-western Ukrainian nationalists.
It should be clear that a physical confrontation between Ukraine and Russia has always been the goal of the collective West. Efforts to take control of the Russian political space had, by 2014, failed. The so-called “reset” of 2009 was little more than a political cover for a regime change operation designed to replace Vladimir Putin, who had ruled Russia since taking over from Boris Yeltsin at the end of 1999, and in the intervening decade taken Russia down the road of economic and national recovery that the West, operating in full zero-sum mode, simply could not tolerate. The concerted efforts of President Obama to interfere in the Russian parliamentarian elections of 2011 and the presidential election of 2012 failed to remove Putin from power. The actions in Ukraine in 2014 and afterwards must be viewed in this light; nothing happens in a vacuum.
The Ukraine conflict was never avoidable, despite Russia’s concerted efforts to engage in diplomacy designed to do just that. The defeat of the Ukrainian army in 2014-15 at the hands of Russian-backed separatists in the Donbas led to the adoption of the Minsk peace accords. It is now established fact that neither Ukraine, its two European partners (France and Germany), nor the United States ever had any intention of following through on the Minsk process. Instead, the Minsk process was designed to buy time for NATO to build a new Ukrainian army capable of holding its own against Russia. Indeed, from 2015-to 2022, the United States and NATO did just that, training over 80,000 Ukrainian forces, including thousands of Ukrainian nationalists labeled as neo-Nazi by the United States Congress, to NATO military standards. The stated purpose of this training was to enable Ukraine to take physical possession of the Donbas and Crimea, which was annexed by Russia in 2014 following the CIA-backed coup in Kiev. When Ukraine began amassing these NATO-trained troops in the Donbas region in early 2022, Russia launched a pre-emptive action which, more than five years later, has become an openly acknowledged proxy war with the collective West, inclusive of the US and NATO.
The stated goal of both the US and Europe in pursuing this proxy conflict with Russia is nothing less than the strategic defeat of Russia. What does this mean in practice? First of all, the proxy war was never intended to result in a Ukrainian military victory against Russia. Rather, the goal was to draw Russia into a conflict which would exhaust its military potential, break its economy, and collapse its society to the point that the government of Vladimir Putin would be removed from power. This entire policy is postulated on the understanding that Vladimir Putin must be removed from power. As such, and solution that does not attain that objective is rejected out of hand, a pattern of behavior reflective of the zero-sum mentality that drives western policy making. As a result, every potential off-ramp that Russia has been willing to consider, from the Istanbul communique of 2022 to the Anchorage compromise of 2025, has been rejected by the West, exposing the reality that for the West diplomacy is just a tool to buy time to further strengthen Ukraine militarily in order to draw the Ukraine-Russian conflict out to its desired conclusion—the collapse of Russia. In short, Minsk on replay.
Russia has proven to be surprisingly resilient in the face of this concerted western effort designed to collapse it as a viable nation state. The Russia economy not only has survived in the face of western sanctions but, in concert with effective Russian diplomacy that has exploited western diplomatic miscues to build a large and supportive global constituency, thrived as it has found foreign markets in the Global South that have largely replaced the lost European and US markets. Russian society, blindsided by a war it was not prepared for, has rallied solidly behind President Putin, as the results of the recent parliamentarian elections underscored. And far from exhausting Russia militarily, the Ukraine conflict has enabled Russia to fine-tune its defense industrial base, producing significant quantities of advanced military equipment and weaponry that for the most part far exceeds that being produced by the collective West in both quality and quantity. When this material is matched up with a combat-hardened pool of manpower, the result is that Russia today possesses the most combat-capable military force in the world, far exceeding anything either NATO or the United States can put into the field.
In short, the western gambit targeting Russia has failed—the Russian military is stronger today by an order of magnitude, its economy far more diverse and self-sustaining, and its population far more unified than it was in 2022. Moreover, Russia shows no signs of faltering on any front—economically, diplomatically, socially, or politically.
The same cannot be said for either Europe or the United States. Despite the war-like rhetoric coming out of Germany and Poland and backed up by statements made by US military officers, both active duty and retired, the reality is that the proxy war between the collective West and Russia was always meant to be just that—a proxy war. There has never been a realistic plan for the conflict to become a direct clash between Russia and NATO, if for no other reason than NATO simply lacks the capacity to generate sufficient forces capable of high-intensity conflict for any sustainable period. NATO’s military power has largely atrophied in the decades since the end of the Cold War, requiring an infusion of investment over time to recover which Europe currently does not seem capable of providing. The United States is itself in a posture of global retrograde, seeking to withdraw from Europe rather than resume a Cold War-like posture that is neither politically or economically viable.
With Russia seemingly closing the door on the possibility of a negotiated settlement with the west over Ukraine, Europe and the United States are confronted with the uncomfortable reality that their strategic objectives in Ukraine will not reach fruition. Russia will continue to press for a military solution which meets all its stated objectives, including the kind of concerted de-Nazification which would make extinct the very virulent Ukrainian nationalism which has always fueled the western efforts in Ukraine against Russia.
In short, there will be no war between Europe and Russia over Ukraine. Europe will support Ukraine until Ukraine has exhausted its resources—manpower and economic—and then watch helplessly as Russia consolidates its position in what is left of the Ukrainian nation. “To the last Ukrainian” appears to be a concept that both Ukraine and its western supporters have taken to heart
The Arctic: The economic trigger of potential conflict
In a rational world, the collective West would regroup after its pending defeat in Ukraine and seek to repair its considerable losses. But in a zero-sum world, this is not possible. A Russian victory in Ukraine requires, in the minds of those Russophobes in the west still dreaming of the collapse of Vladimir Putin’s Russia, a “win” which will level the geopolitical playing field. Given the reality that one of the consequences of the west’s failed Ukrainian gambit is the economic decimation of Europe, issues of economic import, not surprisingly take on increased importance when configuring a post-Ukraine geopolitical posture in opposition to Russia.
One of the main issues confronting Europe today is discerning a coherent economic and foreign policy when it comes to China. European diplomacy in this regard has been disastrous, resulting in the collapse of critical sectors of the European economy (car manufacturing, for instance) as a result of ill-conceived notions of “de-risking” (an American-origin term designed to camouflage the real intent of such policy, which is “de-linking.”) But one cannot possibly speak of “de-risking/de-linking” when there are no viable alternative markets to replace that which one’s policies seek to vacate.
Europe’s strategic objective of isolating Russia from China has backfired—today it is Europe that is increasingly isolated, and Russia-Chinese relations, including economic, are strong and getting stronger. One of the critical areas of Russia-Chinese cooperation is the development of the Northeast Passage or, as it is often referred to in China, the “Ice Silk Road”, a 5,500-kilometer stretch of waterway running from the Bering Strait in the east to the Barents Sea in the west. Use of this waterway has become increasingly possible—and profitable—enabling container ships to make the journey from East China to European ports such as Rotterdam around 20-days faster that the current Suez Canal route used by most shipping companies.
The Northeast Passage operates exclusively in Russian territorial waters. It also transits the Arctic zone, meaning that for much of the year its functionality is dependent upon Russian icebreakers. The passage also operates under the umbrella of Russian security and legal norms. The economic potential of the Arctic used to the sole purview of the Arctic Council, who members used to meet on a regular basis to coordinate policies impacting on the economy, security, and ecology of the Arctic region. However, in 2022, following the invasion of Ukraine, Russia was kicked out of the Arctic Council. And, following the admission of Finland and Sweden to NATO, the Arctic Council has assumed a NATO-only posture, with its policies reflecting the strategic goals and objectives of its collective membership, namely being the strategic defeat of Russia.
Climate change has altered the geopolitical realities of the Arctic region, with melting ice caps not only opening sea lines of communication previously denied and/or restricted because of weather but also making economic exploitation of significant mineral resources exposed by the retreating ice physically possible and fiscally viable. Normally, the Arctic Council would seek to regulate access to the Arctic to balance economic and ecological concerns within a security framework where all parties’ interests are taken into consideration.
But in the zero-sum world, the Russo-Sino economic penetration of the Arctic space is deemed a threat to the collective West requiring a military response. This reality was underscored during the recently convened European Arctic Summit, hosted by Finland in mid-September. The European Union leadership, citing unsubstantiated claims of “significant and long-term threats” from Russia to Euro-Atlantic security, committed itself to strengthening its Arctic security posture—i.e., the militarization of the Arctic, focusing on military mobility, cross-border connectivity and necessary infrastructure in the northernmost regions of the Arctic.
The fact is, however, that NATO is non-competitive with Russia when it comes to Arctic security issues. What the European Arctic Summit gave lip service to about the militarization of the Arctic, Russia has already fully implemented and continues to improve. While NATO nations are capable of engaging in acts of provocation, such as the recent seizure of a Russian research vessel off the northern Norwegian island of Svalberg, the rapidity in which the Norwegian government most to ensure similar actions are not undertaken in Norwegian territorial waters underscores the fact that Norway is not keen of provoking any sort of direct confrontation with Russia in the Arctic. The real threat to the West in the Arctic is not Russia’s capable military forces, but the fact that Russia, together with China, are imposing a new transit-based economic reality which will provide extraordinary leverage going forward by making traditional shipping carriers and routes non-competitive with the new “Ice Silk Road” Russia and China have already implemented. The ability to sustainably ship containers to Europe at half the cost of the current shipping routes is a game changer in every way and creates a new reality that the West will not be able to catch up to for some time, if ever
Kaliningrad: low-hanging fruit, or impregnable fortress?
The psychosis of the zero-sum trap the West has set for itself when it comes to Russia requires that NATO manufacture a victory—perceived or otherwise—capable of off-setting its failures in Ukraine and impotence in the Arctic. In this regard, the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad has emerged as a perceived Russian Achilles Heel. The former commander of NATO ground forces in Europe, US General Chris Donahue, openly bragged this past July that NATO forces would be able to overwhelm Russian defenses in Kaliningrad in short order. Germany and Poland have argued for intensified NATO military exercises near the borders of Kaliningrad, the goal of which would be to generate sufficient concern within the Russian leadership to cause them to pull troops out from the Special Military Operation zone to Kaliningrad in response. Several western military and security analysts have articulated assessments which indicate that Russia’s actual military posture in Kaliningrad is much weaker that publicly acknowledged. And numerous western politicians have made declarations indicating that Russia is preparing to carry out acts of aggression against NATO using the Kaliningrad exclave as a base of operations.
But the reality is that while Russia is more than capable of defending Kaliningrad from any NATO aggression, the Russian military is not currently postured in the Kaliningrad exclave to carry out any sustainable offensive operations of any scale against any of its NATO neighbors—any contention to the contrary is simply rhetorical propaganda. Both the Russian 11th Army Corps and the Baltic Marines—the core ground combat forces stationed in Kaliningrad—have extensive combat experience in Ukraine and have developed a skill set with combat drones that would most likely disrupt and defeat any NATO offensive operations directed at the Kaliningrad exclave. The Russia military has likewise created an active reserve Rifle Regiment, BARS-39, which draws upon veteran soldiers possessing active-duty combat experience, especially in drone warfare.
But the real threat to Kaliningrad doesn’t come from any potential ground offensive launched by NATO. Rather, it would emerge in the form of a naval blockade of the exclave. Since 2022, the railway lines that connect Kaliningrad with Russia have been subjected to severe restrictions by Lithuania when it comes to the transit of good to and from Russia; the issue of compliance with European Union sanctions of Russia lays at the heart of this matter. Russian-registered vehicles are likewise not permitted to transit Lithuania and Poland. Russia has compensated for this loss of connectivity by increasing the scope and scale of water ferry service between Russia and Saint Petersburg. While Russia has been able to sustain economic growth through this resupply effort, the fact is that this ferry-boat lifeline is very expensive, and many goods, such as gasoline, are subsidized by the Russian government to keep prices under control. If NATO were to impose naval restrictions on shipping into and out of Kaliningrad, as some of its members have suggested, the economic viability of the exclave would be threatened. It is because of this vulnerability that the Russian government put NATO on notice that any effort to subject Kaliningrad to a naval blockade, or any other act of military aggression, would be responded to with the totality of Russia’s military capability, including nuclear weapons.
This nuclear muscle flexing appears to have dampened the enthusiasm on the part on some of the most vociferous NATO proponents of plucking what they thought would be low-hanging fruit; now that it is clear that any conflict involving a NATO attacks on Kaliningrad would not be treated in isolation, but rather constitute a conflict of existential proportions, the war drums have been muted
Space: The final frontier
The last topic on the list of potential points of conflict-generating friction between Russia and the US-European collective is outer space. Space-based sensors have played a critical role in the collection of intelligence used to support military operations in Ukraine and, in the case of Ukraine, to strike strategic targets in the depth of Russia. Likewise, the US commercial Starlink satellite communications system has assumed an essential role in Ukrainian military communications, to include playing a critical part in enabling Ukrainian long-range drone attacks on Russian energy infrastructure.
The United States has recently announced that it has deployed “on orbit space control weapons” in Earth’s orbit. While the technical characteristics of these weapons has not been detailed, evidence suggests that these weapons are non-kinetic in nature, using reversible technology such as electronic warfare to temporarily “blind” a targeted satellite. US President Donald Trump has alluded to the use of a space-based weapon operating in support of US military strikes on Iranian nuclear-related targets in June 2025.
Russia is in the process of deploying its own Starlink analog satellite constellation, known as Rassvet. When fully functional, Rassvet will provide Russia with satellite-based communications capability on par with Starlink. Ukraine, recognizing that Rassvet will enable Russia to more effectively guide its drones to their targets, has requested the United States to disable the Russian satellite network. Russia has indicated that it would take down the entire Starlink system in retaliation, using kinetic means which could threaten other satellites operating in earth orbit.
The weaponization of space represents a dangerous point of escalation, especially given the US capability of temporarily blinding satellites. In the zero-sum world that the US and Europe reside in, the need to be seen as offsetting a Russian win in Ukraine, and Russia’s stymying of NATO escalation efforts in the Arctic and against Kaliningrad, may prove too much of a temptation in the minds of western leaders unable to structure a behavioral model in relationship with Russia that isn’t premised on Russophobic goals and objectives requiring Russia’s strategic defeat.
Conclusion
The United States and Europe have, over the course of the past several decades, built a policy trap centered on using Ukraine as a vehicle for achieving the collapse of Russia and the government of Vladimir Putin. The “trap” is the zero-sum mentality which governs implementation of this policy, linking the political and economic viability of those pursuing such policy to its successful implementation. The looming failure in Ukraine has created a need for finding new vectors capable of furthering the policy objective of achieving a strategic victory over Russia, including options to expand the zone of conflict between the US-European collective and Russia into the Arctic, the Baltics, and Outer Space. Russia has effectively countered each one of these efforts which, when viewed in isolation, appear to be manageable problem sets with limited escalation potential. However, when viewed in the aggregate, the potential for a misunderstanding and/or miscalculation driven by domestic political imperatives existent in the nations comprising the US-European collective. Here, nations possessing considerable influence over the decisions being made by the collective, such as the US, France, and Germany, are undergoing political transformations that could alter the existing political posture, including policies related to the strategic defeat of Russia as a desirable outcome. The enemy in all of this is not Russia, but rather the zero-sum thinking of the collective West which leaves them married to a policy model that is incapable of being successfully implemented, and which, if pursued aggressively, will lead to their collective demise.
Note: I was able to visit the Special Military Operation zone, the Arctic region, oil fields, and Kaliningrad, in addition to participating in high level forums and meetings in Moscow and Saint Petersburg. The views expressed here are my personal assessment based upon these meetings, and are not meant as a formal expression of official Russian policy.
This article is the byproduct of the independent journalism I have been undertaking for the past several years, traveling to Russia for the singular purpose of capturing the Russian reality and bringing it to the attention of a western audience held hostage by Russophobic corporate media. I cover all of my expenses, which means that the trips necessary for the production of this article could not have taken place without the generous support of subscribers and followers who have provided donations for that purpose. I will continue to write articles and release videos about these past visits. I will also continue planning and preparing for future visits to Russia, including one scheduled for November where I will attend a conference on humanitarian issues and continue to meet and interview interesting and knowledgeable people. I thank everyone who has contributed to this work, past, present and future [end]
65-year-old Scott Ritter is a former intelligence officer within the US Marine Corps (USMC), then inspector of the United Nations in Iraq. When in 2003, the US and their British minions were about to invade the country under this false pretext, Ritter was claiming that there was no weapon of mass destruction (WMD) there. He was right.
its roots before WW2, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, its legacy in modern Ukraine, how NATO has continually supported Nazism in Ukraine, chronicle
Jacques Baud has been sanctioned by the European Union for speaking truth to power. He deserves the support of all freedom loving people around the world
in the Jacques Baud case, the EU is sanctioning, for the first time, an analyst not for spreading disinformation but for expressing a politically inconvenient truth, all while admitting he has broken no law. Will it have the courage to go after an American citizen?
operation enters the second week of Ukraine’s long-awaited and highly touted counteroffensive, some basic conclusions can be drawn even though the fighting continues, and will continue to rage, for some time to come
Jacques Baud has been sanctioned by the European Union for speaking truth to power. He deserves the support of all freedom loving people around the world
It has been nine months since the European Union (EU) implemented a sanctions package designed to impose “restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilizing activities”. These sanctions went into effect in December 2025.
Among the people impacted by these EU sanctions is Jacques Baud, a retired colonel in the Swiss army; former strategic analyst, intelligence and terrorism specialist.
Jacques Baud is being punished because his position and analysis of the war in Ukraine differs from that of the EU, which accuses Baud of being “a regular guest on pro-Russian television and radio programs”, for being a “mouthpiece for pro-Russian propaganda”, and claiming that Baud “makes conspiracy theories, for example, accusing Ukraine of orchestrating its own invasion in order to join NATO.”
The EU further accuses Baud of being “responsible for, implementing or supporting actions or policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in a third country (Ukraine) by engaging in the use of information manipulation and interference.”
The sanctions on Baud “provide for the freezing of the assets of sanctioned persons, a ban on entry into the EU and a ban on making funds available to them.”
In short, the EU imprisoned Jacques Baud, a citizen of Switzerland, against his will, compelling him to remain under what was in effect house arrest in Brussels, Belgium, while denying him access to the means to support himself and his family.
This is what passes for democracy in Europe today.
Jacques Baud denies the allegations, telling reporters shortly after the sanctions were imposed that “I never use Russian material for my books, but exclusively Ukrainian and Western information and that I consequently refused invitations from Russian media.”
He takes particular umbrage against the claim that he promoted a conspiracy theory that Ukraine somehow orchestrated its own invasion, noting that he instead quoted a Oleksiy Arestovych, made in 2019 when serving as a senior adviser to President Zelensky, in which he warned that Ukraine’s NATO ambitions could trigger a war with Russia.
Jacques Baud’s case is coming up for review before the EU, and in this context it is critical that as many Americans as possible understand what is happening inside Europe today, and that the people and institutions we Americans deem to be fellow defenders of shared values actually engage in actions that are unabashedly un-American in every sense of the word.
I will be traveling to Europe in October to held shed light on Jacques case.
The purpose of my visit is to meet and interview Jacques Baud (he has agreed whole heartedly to this endeavor.)
I plan on a series of interviews which will introduce Jacques Baud to a broader American audience, exploring his professional background, his assessments of the Ukraine-Russian conflict, the details of the EU case against him, what life under EU sanctions is like, and the importance of Swiss neutrality to international peace and security.
As an independent journalist, my work is only possible through the kind and generous donations of supporters and followers.
I thank you in advance for your support in this important work. Free speech is a human right, not just an American value, and those who speak truth to power, like Jacques Baud, should have the support of all freedom loving persons around the world [end]
71-year-old Jacques Baud has been a Swiss intelligence colonel, specialized in Eastern Europe. Between 2009 and 2011, he headed in New York the Policies and Doctrine team at the Office of Military Affairs of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. He participated in NATO programs in Ukraine in 2014 and 2017. His rigor and analytical skills are considerable.
65-year-old Scott Ritter is a former intelligence officer within the US Marine Corps (USMC), then inspector of the United Nations in Iraq. When in 2003, the US and their British minions were about to invade the country under this false pretext, Ritter was claiming that there was no weapon of mass destruction (WMD) there. He was right.
In the Jacques Baud case, the EU is sanctioning, for the first time, an analyst not for spreading disinformation but for expressing a politically inconvenient truth, all while admitting he has broken no law. Will it have the courage to go after an American citizen?
Operation enters the second week of Ukraine’s long-awaited and highly touted counteroffensive, some basic conclusions can be drawn even though the fighting continues, and will continue to rage, for some time to come
chronicle of censorship, fake news, whitewashing of the Ukrainian Nazism and war crimes, for the sake of the proxy war that NATO is conducting in Donbass and Ukraine, against Russia
Military engineers are now assisted by LLMs (Oxana Chorna / Global Images Ukraine)
Over the past year, the AI community has become increasingly worried over the behaviour of autonomous agents. Over the past week, that worry has hardened into panic — not least given the chatter, if vague and hard to verify, about a significant advance in recursive self-improvement at one of the world’s biggest frontier firms. Yet amid rumours and counter-rumours, and the recent suggestion by Donald Trump that “whoever wins AI wins”, one document may offer answers — less about the existential dangers of AI, and more about the threat it poses in the here-and-now.
Over 154 pages, a new report by Anthropic details some of the ways in which its Claude model has been misused over the past several months. With its talk of cyber-attacks, espionage and propaganda, it makes for terrifying reading, especially given how many actors — from Russian hackers to Chinese spies to Iranian propagandists — are now using the technology. As for Anthropic, it is able to monitor and assess how its systems are being used in real time, allowing the firm’s threat-intelligence team to track how Claude is being used.
One of the most eyebrow-raising examples comes from Yemen, particularly striking given the Houthis have established a presence on Perim Island, a strategically important position in the Bab al-Mandab Strait. Control of the island could strengthen the militants’ ability to threaten shipping through this narrow southern gateway to the Red Sea and Suez Canal, the primary maritime corridor linking Asia and Europe.
It’s striking, then, that Anthropic’s team identified a weapons-engineering cell in the north of the country that used Claude to work on three distinct programmes, including a guided rocket and a ballistic missile with a range exceeding 2,000 kilometres. Tracking this activity made it possible to reconstruct the militia’s engineering workflows.
To put simply: the Houthis — or their affiliates or hired helpers — effectively used Claude Code as a substitute for software engineers, getting it to help develop guidance, navigation and control systems; integrate an open-source autopilot into a flight computer; tune controls; and even run simulations. Several Claude operations ran at once: one coding, another researching, and a third checking the first agent’s work. This was not mere experimentation by geeks with laptops. After all, it apparently resulted in the test-firing of a guided rocket. When this seemingly failed, the results were quickly plugged back into Claude to diagnose what had gone wrong.
Anthropic says it has no evidence that an operational weapon was ultimately fielded, but the episode exposes an uncomfortable weakness in the way AI safety controls currently work. It is worth noting that Claude would not simply agree to design a missile on request; in fact, Anthropic says its safeguards blocked many of the Houthi cell’s requests. Still, they did not block all of them. By disguising the purpose of individual requests, and distributing the work across multiple sessions, the engineers were able to bypass controls.
Next stop: Iran. Here, we’re shown evidence of how Claude has been used to support propaganda, espionage and domestic repression. Again, this was not simply a matter of asking a chatbot to knock out a few inflammatory posts. Anthropic describes three operations in which Claude helped construct the machinery of an influence campaign: including writing campaign manuals; designing fake online personas; and compiling databases of people and organisations to target.
In one example, official intelligence bulletins were fed into Claude and transformed into content for different audiences — from Farsi to Arabic, Urdu to English — with the tone shifting alongside the language.
Iran also used Claude to disguise government narratives as the work of foreign writers. One network produced material intended for more than 100 online Iranian channels, including ones linked to the IRGC. More than that, Anthropic found evidence that Iranian propaganda was being camouflaged, falsely attributing arguments and findings to respected Western institutions like CSIS or the Brookings Institute.
More specific examples of Iranian AI-built propaganda are just as disturbing. Tehran-linked actors have been using Claude to build detailed profiles of hundreds of Israelis, and members of the Jewish diaspora, installing malicious software to steal people’s usernames, passwords and other login details. Elsewhere, Claude built a system to track US naval forces, securing personnel information from military photographs, among other sources.
The implications here are stark. Iran is hardly a superpower — and the Houthis certainly aren’t either — yet AI allows both to develop systems that would once have taken armies of engineers, programmers, analysts and linguists. That, in turn, opens the door to further disruption by non-state actors, causing chaos on the cheap. If the war in Ukraine shows how drones and other simple gadgets can nonetheless hamstring a well-armed opponent, AI could now do the same for espionage, cyber-warfare, propaganda and weapons development.
It’s telling, here, that even serious powers are learning these lessons too. After all, Anthropic’s tools have also been extensively used in Russia, despite the latter already boasting a formidable espionage apparatus of its own. That, however, hasn’t stopped Moscow from using Anthropic’s tech to make its activities better, faster and harder to tackle. That’s clear enough in the case of Midnight Blizzard, a hacking group closely linked to, or indeed part of, Russia’s SVR foreign intelligence service.
In practice, the hackers seemingly used Claude to make phishing attacks more convincing, while also helping them break into computer systems more effectively. For instance, hackers used the AI to double-check whether security software had spotted newly installed malware and, if it had, rewrite the code and try again until it slipped past the defences. These tools were then deployed against a swathe of targets outside Russia: including government ministries, intelligence and defence bodies, think-tanks, and more. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Ukraine and its drone industry feature prominently.
It has been fascinating, too, to see Claude turning up in the toolkit of another major power: China. Again, the examples here are remarkable in their scope, with an outfit likely based in central China using Claude to spy on roughly 50 organisations worldwide, spanning industries from energy and healthcare to finance and technology.
One obvious question is why China would plump for the foreign-made Claude, not least given the People’s Republic has DeepSeek, Qwen, Kimi and other domestic AI tools to choose from. Though Anthropic’s report does not address this, the obvious explanation is that, for some jobs — not least a Chinese police-surveillance project — China thought Claude was the best option: particularly for coding, technical research, and coordinating complicated tasks.
According to Anthropic’s report, Chinese companies have also attempted to scale and distil Claude’s capabilities. Again, China hardly lacks engineers, data or computing power. But, just as a pace-setter is invaluable in a marathon, so too can Anthropic be exploited by its rivals, another reason to doubt Trump’s latest claims.
Nevertheless, it would be a stretch to conclude, as Trump has done, that America is winning, let alone has “won”, the AI race. If anything, indeed, the episode illustrates the peculiar nature of that contest. American companies may build the most capable models — but once those capabilities exist, the US’s adversaries can use them to their own advantage.
In a broader sense, meanwhile, these varied use cases put a subtler spin on all that breathless talk of AI collapse. The technology has hardly invented espionage, or propaganda, or ballistic missiles. But it is reducing the amount of expertise, labour and time required to do them all. Whatever the claims of looming extinction, the technology is being used, in nefarious ways, by a variety of flesh-and-blood actors right now. Rather than mass suffering and death, we should perhaps be more immediately worrying about our credit-card details being sold and our accounts drained — not by AI agents, but by human criminals a lot like us.
In an open letter published around the same time as his company’s report, Dario Amodei, chief executive of Anthropic, seems to acknowledge that the threat architecture has changed — and fast. Building AI too quickly is dangerous, he writes, but failing to build it risks placing the most powerful technology of the age “in the hands of authoritarian powers”. Any attempt to slow AI and tech development in the US is a threat: if the democratic world slows down, Amodei argues, “CCP-associated projects will pull ahead, creating significant national security risk”.
Among other measures, Amodei is therefore demanding tighter restrictions on the sale of advanced AI chips and semiconductor manufacturing equipment to China; a crackdown on chip smuggling and remote access to overseas data centres; and measures to stop Chinese companies distilling the capabilities of American frontier models. If these measures work, Amodei adds, they could “widen America’s lead significantly over the next 3-5 years.”
Seen in another light, though, Amodei’s proposals look a little more complicated. As CEO of a company preparing one of the largest flotations in history, arguing that its technology is so dangerous that the government needs to intervene in the market around it is unusual. He wants tighter controls on advanced chips; stronger restrictions on the dissemination of frontier capabilities; measures to stop competitors catching up; and government assistance to overcome antitrust problems. In all, it looks like a bid towards establishing a monopoly, rather than simply a concern with the consequences of new technologies. The longer the furore over the monopoly persists, anyway, the longer foreign misuse of Claude will remain obscured: to the West, if not its enemies.
This is a field that is moving extraordinarily fast, reason enough to take the warnings seriously. But the last few days have raised more questions than they have answered: about how immediate the dangers really are, who should decide how quickly AI develops, and about where safety and national security end and commercial self-interest begins. The risks are plainly enormous, as are the opportunities. What is less clear is whether we are witnessing genuine panic among those closest to the technology, or the opening moves in a struggle over who gets to control it. It may well be both [end]
in the first week of the US-Israeli aggression on Iran, the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) conducted a series of precision strikes that systematically degraded the much-hyped US integrated air and missile defense architecture across the region
a private intelligence corporation billed as “Uber for war zones” is preparing to create what Israel hopes will be the model for supplanting Hamas rule in Gaza
in 2015, law enforcement secretly acquired surveillance video image analysis software from the Israeli company Briefcam. For eight years, the Ministry of the Interior concealed the use of his tool, which enables facial recognition
Zelensky and his Western overlords thought they could compel Russia to enter into peace negotiations. All they did is seal Ukraine’s tragic fate
Kiev burns following a Russian missile attack, August 5, 2026
On June 25, Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky ordered the initiation of a 40-day offensive intended to “influence” Russia to end the war. In a message delivered via social media, Zelensky announced that “I approved a 40-day influence operation for the service against the aggressor state aimed at compelling it to end the war.”
On August 3, on the eve of the expiration of the 40-day campaign, Zelensky acknowledged that the 40-day campaign had not achieved its objective of driving Russia to embrace peace. Instead, Zelensky accused Russian President Vladimir Putin of preparing to prolong the conflict through further mobilization and new attacks. Rather than acknowledging failure, however, Zelensky declared that Ukraine would double down on renewed diplomatic efforts, increased economic restrictions, and continued military actions to create conditions where Russia would have no alternative but to agree to negotiations on terms acceptable by Ukraine.
The 40-day gap between the commencement of Zelensky’s “influence operation”, and the admission by the Ukrainian President that Russia was far from acknowledging defeat, has created a widening chasm between fact and fantasy, between reality and fiction, that appears to be recognized by virtually everyone but the Ukrainian President.
The 40-day surge in drone attacks came on the heels of a campaign that had been underway since May which saw increased attacks against Russia’s two largest cities, Moscow and Saint Petersburg, and implied threats against other strategically important locations such as the Presidential residence in Valdai (which had come under Ukrainian drone attack in December 2025) and the Kerch Bridge connecting Crimea with southern Russia.
The goal of these attacks was to force Russia to redeploy air defense forces to protect these strategically important targets, thereby stripping away air defense units from other regions. The 40-day drone campaign announced by Zelensky would seek to exploit these gaps in air defense coverage to bring the “pain” of war home to the people of Russia.
None of the pressure points Zelensky hoped to engage by his 40-day drone campaign produced anything remotely resembling the desired results. Indeed, in every instance, the opposite outcome was achieved. Zelensky hoped to trigger an energy crisis by attacking Russian petroleum refineries. While a compliant pro-Ukrainian western media declared that Russia had lost up to 40% of its refining capacity, the reality was far different: far from breaking the spirit of the Russian population by denying them access to gasoline and making them wait in long lines to get gas at high prices, the fact is that gasoline in August 2026 is cheaper than it was this time last year (AI-95, the most popular grade of gasoline, was 63.06 rubles per liter in August 2025, as opposed to 61.71 rubles per liter today), and there are virtually no lines of vehicles waiting to refuel.
Moreover, the timing couldn’t have been worse for Ukraine when it came to reducing Russian refining capacity—Russia simply diverted the stocks of crude destined for domestic refining into the export pipeline at a time when global demand rapidly absorbed these increased exports at record high prices. Zelensky’s war on the Russian energy sector was a major contributor to Russia’s oil and gas revenue, which accounts for around a fifth of total budget income, rising by more than 60% in July 2026 from the same month a year ago.
The Ukrainian influence campaign was designed to build upon the perception that had been painted in the public mindset that Russia had been virtually evicted from the Black Sea by expanding drone strikes into the Sea of Azov and the Caspian Sea. Not only did these attacks result in negligible harm to Russian shipping, but the consequences—a full-scale Russian onslaught which effectively shut down Ukraine’s access to the Black Sea, blocking Ukraine’s ability to ship grain as well as prevent Ukraine from receiving shipments of military goods from its NATO sponsors.
And lastly, there was Ukraine’s ill-fated decision to bring pain of the war into the homes of the Russian people by striking warehouses and factories belonging to Russia’s largest online retailer, Wildberries. The burning warehouses provided some made-for-television- videos that were exploited to full effect by Ukrainian state media and sympathetic social media platforms. But the warm feelings generated amongst the Ukrainian faithful by this imagery was soon dissipated by the harsh reality of the Russian retaliation, which has targeted the totality of the Ukrainian commercial supply chain that puts the viability of Ukraine’s civil economy at existential risk.
Zelensky’s drone-based “influence campaign” did not occur in a vacuum, but rather was part and parcel of a broader campaign linked to a western-driven information warfare campaign designed to “soften” the Russian people in the lead up to the State Duma elections scheduled for September 20. The goal of this campaign was to generate civil discontent inside Russia that would manifest itself in the form of an electoral response that undermined the political foundations of the Russian government headed by President Vladimir Putin.
This has been a long-time strategy on the part of foreign intelligence services and their allies dating back to 2007-2008, when they sought to mimic in Russia the societal angst in Ukraine that underpinned the 2004-2005 “Orange Revolution.”
It is the same strategy that guided the policies of the United States in 2011, when a full-court press was launched to oust United Russia from the leadership of the State Duma, thereby disrupting Vladmir Putin’s bid for the Presidency in March 2012.
These campaigns all failed.
And the current campaign will fail as well.
Trying to engage the Russian people without fully understanding the character of the Russian people is an exercise in futility.
Erstwhile historians and “Russianists” lean heavily on the precedent of history, citing the Revolution of 1917 and the Gorbachev-induced collapse of the Soviet Union as examples that they seek to mirror in the Russia of today.
But Vladimir Putin is not a Tsar, nor is he a confused Soviet bureaucrat.
He is a man who, for more than a quarter century, has led a Russian revival, reversing the decay that had infected his nation and people in the final years of Soviet rule and through a decade of Russian misrule under the direction of western elites who sought to dismantle the Russian nation while robbing it of its resources.
The Russian people of 2026 are not the Russian people of 1917 or 1992.
Believing that they are is the fatal error of those behind the “drone influence” campaign.
This is the danger of systemic Russophobia.
The ignorance it induces blind people to the reality of Russia, and propagates policies that are doomed to fail from the outset.
Zelensky’s 4-Day War was always doomed to fail.
And now we know what failure looks like.
Ukraine has been abandoned by its Western masters.
No air defense.
No Patriot license.
No Patriot missiles.
No “magical” solution.
Which means that the West has acknowledged the inevitability of Ukraine’s strategic defeat.
Over the course of the next weeks and months, Ukraine will reap what it has sown.
Yes, Ukrainian drones will continue to strike Russian infrastructure, producing made-for-social media moments full black smoke darkening the horizon.
Meanwhile, Kiev will burn.
And so, too, will the other cities of Ukraine.
The Russian army will continue to advance.
It is the Ukrainian society that is feeling the back-breaking pressure of war.
No gas.
No water,
No heat.
No food.
This is the future of Ukraine under Zelensky.
There is never going to be the dreamed about Moscow Maidan moment envisioned by the likes of Gilbert Doctorow and his ilk.
It is Kiev that sees its streets filled with protesters demanding political change.
The collapse of Ukraine as a nation state is inevitable.
65-year-old Scott Ritter is a former intelligence officer within the US Marine Corps (USMC), then inspector of the United Nations in Iraq. When in 2003, the US and their British minions were about to invade the country under this false pretext, Ritter was claiming that there was no weapon of mass destruction (WMD) there. He was right.
In the Jacques Baud case, the EU is sanctioning, for the first time, an analyst not for spreading disinformation but for expressing a politically inconvenient truth, all while admitting he has broken no law. Will it have the courage to go after an American citizen?
Operation enters the second week of Ukraine’s long-awaited and highly touted counteroffensive, some basic conclusions can be drawn even though the fighting continues, and will continue to rage, for some time to come
Ukraine is defenseless in the face of Russian missile attacks. Now is not the time for negotiations. Russia must finish the job
The launch of a Russian Iskander missile
The United States Department of Defense defines the term “decision point” as “A geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving success.”
Today Russia has reached a decision point in its conflict with the collective West, inclusive of the United States, and their Ukrainian proxy.
The Russian leadership has, in my opinion, been preparing for some time for the confluence of the physical and psychological manifestation of a campaign designed to create an unbridgeable gap between perception and reality which, when exposed through action, will cause the artificially constructed edifice of Ukrainian defensive viability to collapse, and with it the false pillars of Western democracy, industry, and military might which propped it up.
This campaign wasn’t designed from scratch by the Russians, but rather emerged from the lies and deceit of those in the West who postured as peacemakers but in reality served as the promulgators of war.
The Europeans had long proved themselves to be charlatans, with their perfidy regarding Minsk forever exposing them as absolutely unreliable partners for resolving a Ukrainian crisis they themselves orchestrated.
The more curious thing is Russia’s attitude towards the United States. It was the United States which served as the architect of policies which have been in place for decades designed to weaken Russia and undermine to the point of collapse the government of Russia.
And yet Russia continued to hold out hope that the United States —especially under the second iteration of the Trump administration— could somehow serve as a force of rational stability when it came to managing both Europe and Ukraine.
The Anchorage Summit of August 2025 was the culminating moment of this conceptualization, manifesting itself into the so-called “Spirit of Anchorage”, the idea that through compromise a solution that addressed in serious fashion Russian concerns could be crafted that would be acceptable to all.
Within months, however, it became clear that the “Spirit of Alaska” was as illusory as the “Spirit of Minsk” that preceded it, another perfidious diplomatic ploy designed to buy time to build up Ukrainian military capability by lulling Russia into a false belief that a negotiated peace was possible.
But the United States, like Europe, never intended for the Ukrainian conflict to end in anything other than a strategic Russian defeat.
The Russian leadership has now come to embrace —however belatedly— this uncomfortable reality.
The ultimate question that now confronts Moscow is how to act on this realization.
Russia finds itself in a situation where it enjoys considerable strategic advantages over Ukraine and its Western partners across a broad spectrum of disciplines —diplomatic, economic, military, and social.
Russia, despite the concerted efforts of the West, is not isolated. Just the opposite, in fact. In many ways, Russia enjoys a stronger geopolitical posture today that it did before the initiation of the Special Military Operation if for no other reason that the conflict has exposed the nefarious nature of the so-called “rules-based international order” and those who conceived and implemented it, and as such breathed viability into the concepts of multilateralism that Russia and other nations, especially China, had been promoting with mixed results.
The Russian economy has withstood the challenges posed by economic sanctions and direct military action, and today is recognized by most of the world as a viable place to do business, as witnessed by the $84 billion in direct investments accrued during the Saint Petersburg International Economic Forum this past June.
Russia today possesses a large, well trained, well equipped, combat hardened military backed by a robust and capable defense industry which is not only prevailing in an extended war of attrition against Ukraine and the collective West, but has positioned itself to defend Russia’s interests in the Baltic, Arctic, Pacific, and the totality of its periphery, as well as defend and advance Russian interests in the Middle East and Africa. The advances in Russian technology —especially in ballistic missiles— has provided a qualitative edge which, when combined with Russia’s quantitative strengths, makes Russia a very formidable force.
Russian society continues its long and painful divorce with the West. The incomplete nature of this split, which sees small pockets of western liberalism holding on to relevance in the face of a larger societal gravitation toward a new Russian national awareness, has provided the collective West with its only opportunity to dismantle the advantages Russia has accrued diplomatically, economically, and militarily. The western intelligence services have worked with Ukraine to craft a narrative of Ukrainian resistance, resilience, and relevance that is then juxtaposed on the perception of Russian weakness that emerges in the wake of the false hope of negotiated peace that Russia had embraced in Minsk, Istanbul and Anchorage.
This hope was always designed to energize the residual western liberal elites inside Russia into believing everything would be better if Russia simply embraced the spirit of compromise. But the spirit of compromise was nothing more than a wolf in sheep’s clothing, a disguise to blind Russians from the reality that the collective West was seeking Russian surrender instead.
By planting the false hope of compromised-induced peace and prosperity in the minds of the residual Russian western liberal elites, western intelligence was sowing the seeds of a larger Russian societal disruption that was intended when the desired peaceful outcome failed to materialize. The fact that the failure to find a pathway to peace originated in the collective West’s perfidy didn’t matter in this regard —the Russian liberal elites were conditioned to blame their leadership for this failure, regardless of the truth.
Having sown the seeds of societal unrest, the western intelligence services themselves embarked on one of the largest information operations ever conducted, flooding the mainstream western press and social media outlets with an endless stream of stories designed to promote the narrative of Ukrainian victory and Russian defeat. This narrative would then be injected into Russian social discourse either through the resonance brought on by the incessant Western echo chamber, or through agents of influence —witting and unwitting alike— whose access to the Russian information market helped magnify a message of Russian weakness, corruption, and indecisiveness designed to collapse Russian public confidence in their leadership.
And now we find ourselves at the Point of Decision.
The information operation against Russia was backed by three supporting campaigns.
The first was the transition by Ukraine and its western supporters away from the traditional battlefield, where Russia was prevailing, to a drone-based war designed to create the perception of Ukrainian strength and, in doing so, the prospect of Ukrainian victory.
This campaign was not just designed to influence the Russian liberal elites, but also to build a foundation of political support within Europe and the United States for increased economic and military support for Ukraine.
The drone campaign served as the fuel that energized the G-7 meeting in June where pledges of economic support were made, as well as the NATO summit in July where similar pledges were made regarding military support.
But rather than constructing a structurally sound foundation upon which a viable Ukrainian counter to Russia could be assembled, the entire Western effort had produced little more than a ghost of what was being sought —a veritable house of cards that could collapse at the slightest of breezes.
The fact is the ability to turn the promises of the G-7 and NATO into reality are as illusory as the drone campaign upon which these promises were promulgated.
The European “Big 3” —Germany, France and the UK— are led by leaders who political viability is measured in months.
The United States is distracted by a losing military effort in the Middle East and a genuine lack of goodwill between American President Trump and his European and NATO partners.
The only thing that could coalesce this dysfunctional US-European alliance would be a Russian overreaction to the pressures brought on by the Ukrainian drone campaign.
This, of course, is one of the primary goals of the Western intelligence services through their information operation.
The “Russia must attack Europe” thematic has taken hold in Russia, promoted by western observers and analysts (I myself have been guilty of this) as well as Russian commentators and influencers.
But it has been resisted by the Russian leadership, simply because to attack Europe would undo all of the advantages Russia has accrued diplomatically, economically and militarily and, in doing so, potentially trigger the very collapse of Russian society the West has long sought.
A Russian attack on Europe would also create a window of viability for both the failing European leadership and the flagging US-NATO alliance.
A Russian attack on Europe is exactly what the Western intelligence seek.
Today Russia finds itself confronted by a confluence of events that has opened up a window of strategic opportunity.
The Ukraine drone campaign has failed. This conclusion has manifested itself in the political turmoil inside Ukraine as President Zelensky fired the person responsible for this campaign —Mikhailo Federov— and instead appeared to favor a reallocation of resources to the Ukrainian ground forces.
The Ukrainian public, which had embraced the narrative of Ukrainian drone dominance as the magic formula to bring an end to the war, have taken to the streets in protest, creating an unprecedented political crisis for Ukrainian President Zelensky.
Meanwhile Europe and the US struggle to follow through on the promises made at the G-7 and NATO Summits.
The gap between the theory of Ukrainian victory and the ability of Ukraine and its Western partners to achieve this has never been greater.
The only thing that could save the Ukraine project is either Russian indecision or Russian overreaction.
It is time, instead, for Russian action.
Russia has initiated a massive bombardment of Ukraine using missiles and drones.
Ukraine has no defense.
Neither Europe nor the US are in a position to change this calculus in the near term.
Every Russian missile attack underscores the false narrative of the Western intelligence information operation.
Every Russian missile attack exposes the impotence of Europe.
Every Russian missile attack underscores the dysfunction of NATO and the US.
And every Russian missile attack shreds the credibility of the residual Russian liberal elite.
This is the Decision Point.
Keep raining missiles down on Ukraine.
Confront the Ukrainian people with the inevitability of their collective demise should they continue to fight.
Confront Europe with the emptiness of their promised support.
Confront the US and NATO with their collective military impotence.
And confront the Russian people with the inevitability and necessity of a decisive Russian victory.
The collective West set itself up for disaster by engaging in perfidy designed to destroy Russia.
Policies based upon lies and deception cannot succeed if the lies and deception are exposed in time for an effective counter to be implemented.
Russia has exposed the lies and deception of the West.
Now it simply needs the courage to act.
This is the Decision Point that will decide the future of Russia.
The vulnerability of Ukraine to Russian missile and drone attack has presented itself.
Russia now needs to exploit this vulnerability with every resource it has.
Ukraine will be defeated.
Europe will collapse.
And the United States will be left holding an empty bag.
There’s no need to strike Europe.
Simply darken the skies of Ukraine with Russian missiles and drones [end]
65-year-old Scott Ritter is a former intelligence officer within the US Marine Corps (USMC), then inspector of the United Nations in Iraq. When in 2003, the US and their British minions were about to invade the country under this false pretext, Ritter was claiming that there was no weapon of mass destruction (WMD) there. He was right.
In the Jacques Baud case, the EU is sanctioning, for the first time, an analyst not for spreading disinformation but for expressing a politically inconvenient truth, all while admitting he has broken no law. Will it have the courage to go after an American citizen?
Operation enters the second week of Ukraine’s long-awaited and highly touted counteroffensive, some basic conclusions can be drawn even though the fighting continues, and will continue to rage, for some time to come
NATO forces have been unable to deter the pro-Palestine operations of the Yemeni armed forces despite heavily militarizing the Red Sea
(French navy)
France’s Aquitaine-class FREMM frigate Alsace has turned tail from the Red Sea after running out of missiles and munitions repelling attacks from the Yemeni armed forces, according to its commander, Jerome Henry.
We didn’t necessarily expect this level of threat. There was an uninhibited violence that was quite surprising and very significant. [The Yemenis] do not hesitate to use drones that fly at water level, to explode them on commercial ships, and to fire ballistic missiles
Henry told French news outlet Le Figaro in an exclusive interview published on 11 April.
We had to carry out at least half a dozen assistances following [Yemeni] strikes
he added.
The commander of the Alsace also revealed that, after a 71-day deployment, all combat equipment was depleted.
From the Aster missile to the 7.62 machine gun of the helicopter, including the 12.7mm, 20mm, or 76mm cannon, we dealt with three ballistic missiles and half a dozen drones
Henry adds.
According to the French commander, the Franco–Italian Aster missile – each carrying a price tag of up to $2 million – “was pushed to its limits” by the Yemeni armed forces, as the Alsace had to use it “on targets that we did not necessarily imagine at the start.”
Henry added that Sanaa has markedly increased its use of ballistic missiles after relying mainly on suicide drones at the start of the country’s pro-Palestine operations in the Red Sea and stressed that the French Navy has not faced such a tough battle since NATO collectively launched its 2011 war on Libya to depose the late ruler Muammar Gaddafi.
I was there too. It wasn’t the same thing. It has been even longer since we have engaged with this level of weaponry and violence. The threat to the boat was much greater in the Red Sea
Henry notes.
The Alsace entered the Red Sea in late January, a few weeks after the US and the UK launched an illegal war on Yemen to protect Israeli shipping interests. The frigate was deployed as part of the EU naval operation Aspides – Greek for shield.
With a mandate initially set for one year, Aspides saw the deployment of several EU warships and airborne early warning systems to the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and surrounding waters. According to authorities in Brussels, the mission is exclusively defensive, and its forces are not taking part in US-led attacks against Yemen.
Aspides came together after several NATO members proved hesitant or outright refused to join the floundering Operation Prosperity Guardian (OPG), which a top US commander called one of the largest battles the navy has fought since the end of World War II.
“We favor a diplomatic solution. We know that there is no military solution,” US Special Envoy for Yemen Timothy Lenderking said earlier this month, acknowledging the futility of Washington’s military strategy against the Arab world’s poorest country.
According to Yemeni sources who spoke with The Cradle, US officials recently offered Sanaa “an acknowledgment of its legitimacy” in exchange for its neutrality in the ongoing war on Gaza.
[Washington] pledged to repair the damages, remove foreign forces from all occupied Yemeni lands and islands, and remove Ansarallah from the State Department’s ‘terrorism list’ – as soon as they stop their attacks in support of Gaza
The Cradle columnist Khalil Nasrallah cited the sources as saying.
The offer also includes “severely reducing” the role of the Saudi-appointed Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) and “accelerating the signing of a roadmap” with the Saudi-led coalition to end the nine-year war that has decimated Yemen.
Nevertheless, Yemeni officials have maintained that their operations in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean will continue until Israel stops the genocide of Palestinians in Gaza.
From the coast of the Red Sea or from outside it, we can achieve the goals we want in defense of our country and support of Palestine … We still have many military surprises, and there are military operations that we are keeping secret as part of a specific media strategy
Mohammad Ali al-Houthi, a senior member of Yemen’s Supreme Political Council, announced on 3 April [end]
Almost 750 U.S. troops have been wounded or killed in the Middle East since October 2023, an analysis by The Intercept has found. But the Pentagon won’t acknowledge it
In the first week of the US-Israeli aggression on Iran, the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) conducted a series of precision strikes that systematically degraded the much-hyped US integrated air and missile defense architecture across the region
Eisenhower Media Network is an organization of expert former military, intelligence, and civilian national security officials who have an independent, alternative story to tell
The US-funded ecosystem of Iranian ‘rights groups,’ Israeli operatives, and monarchist activists has become a revolving door of unverifiable statistics and atrocity propaganda
As deadly riots burn Iranian cities, Western media ignores the shocking wave of violence, turning instead to US government-funded NGOs for data. The one-sided portrayal has helped push Trump to the brink of authorizing renewed US attacks
Cardinal Christophe Pierre was told American-born Pope Leo XIV had ‘better take’ the U.S. side in military matters, a news report stated
[my illustration: (The Free Press)]
The Vatican official who reportedly received a threat from the Trump administration against Pope Leo XIV spoke at the February installation ceremony for the new bishop of the Diocese of Palm Beach.
Cardinal Christophe Pierre, who served as the Holy See’s de facto ambassador to the United States, was the pontiff’s representative at the Mass welcoming Manuel de Jesús Rodríguez as the sixth bishop of the nearly 42-year-old diocese.
In his remarks at the Cathedral of St. Ignatius Loyola in Palm Beach Gardens on Feb. 24, Pierre noted the diocese’s diversity of peoples and cultures, but its unity in steadfast devotion to the faith’s core beliefs.
It is a church called to proclaim the gospel in a context shaped by mobility, diversity, and genuine human need
Pierre said of the diocese
In such a setting, the bishop is invited, not only to teach and govern, but to accompany, helping the faithful, recognize how Christ is already at work in their lives
What do news reports say of cardinal’s meeting at the Pentagon?
Pierre retired from the post on March 7 and was replaced by Archbishop Gabriele Giordano Caccia. But Pierre, who was in the post for a decade, is now in the center of yet another potential international diplomatic firestorm for President Donald Trump.
On April 6, news agencies reported that a top Pentagon civilian official — Elbridge Colby, the undersecretary of war for policy — attempted to bully Pierre and the Vatican to support U.S. military objectives. The story was first reported by the New York-based media company The Free Press, which was founded by current CBS News chief Bari Weiss.
The media site’s report said Colby and the other U.S. officials in the closed-door meeting delivered a bitter lecture to Pierre, saying the Vatican had been too hostile to Trump administration policies.
Pierre was told the American-born pontiff had “better take” the U.S. side, the Free Press story stated. To punctuate their demand, the news report said, Colby and others raised the Avignon papacy, a period in the 1300s when seven popes were under control of the French crown.
Regardless of whether the account of the meeting is as The Free Press reported, the publisher of a major Catholic news publication said a meeting between a high-ranking Pentagon official and a high-ranking Vatican diplomat raises questions.
It would be unusual, I think, for any diplomat to meet with military officials, as opposed to more diplomatic personnel
said Joe Ferullo of The National Catholic Reporter
But especially for a representative of the Vatican, which obviously has no real army, no military weapons, no air force, etc. The Vatican is the smallest ‘state’ in the world. It is not a military power. So it’s unusual
Pentagon, Vatican confirmed meeting. But what was said?
The Rev. Thomas J. Reese, senior analyst at the Religion News Service, says it appears the Pentagon requested the meeting with Pierre.
Most embassies have military attaches who meet with people in the Pentagon all the time
said Reese
The Vatican nunciature does not have a military attaché and would normally deal with the State Department, but if the Pentagon requests a meeting, they would respond. That is what appears to have happened
A story on April 9 by the Religion News Service included a statement by the Vatican confirming the meeting took place on Jan. 22. The Vatican did not comment on specifics of the talk.
The Pentagon also issued a prepared statement that said the conversation was “respectful and reasonable” in denying The Free Press report
The Free Press’s characterization of the meeting is highly exaggerated and distorted
the statement said
The meeting between Pentagon and Vatican officials was a respectful and reasonable discussion. We have nothing but the highest regard and welcome continued dialogue with the Holy See
Bryan Froehle, a professor of theology at Palm Beach Atlantic University in West Palm Beach, said the reported threat and discussion that Pope Leo XIV might not visit the U.S. in retaliation “is to profoundly misunderstand” the Gospels and their institutional role by comparing the Catholic Church, a pontiff or any church leader “to a power player” on the world political stage.
None of this is the point, however
Froehle wrote in an email
Empires, military powers, and narcissistic leaders have come and gone throughout human history, from Caesar Augustus to Napoleon and beyond. The Church has seen them all buried and gone
Froehle suggested people read the Gospel of Matthew, specifically verse 28:20, that instructs obedience to Jesus’ teachings.
In other words, to contrast Pope Leo’s words to those of U.S. political leaders or any political leader anywhere is not the point. This is not power politics
he added
This is the Gospel. The key is to for Pope Leo or any church leader to be consistent with the words of Jesus, the Prince of Peace
A rosary hangs on a statue at the Diocese of Palm Beach at the Cathedral of St. Ignatius Loyola in Palm Beach Gardens, Fla., on February 24, 2026 (Thomas Cordy / Palm Beach Post)
War, immigration drives friction between U.S. president, U.S.-born pope
The meeting early in the year took place before the Feb. 28 war that Trump launched against Iran, a conflict that has further frayed relations between Washington and the Vatican.
In recent days, Trump issued a profanity-laden post on Easter morning. That missive followed by another social-media post on April 7 threatening to annihilate and “entire civilization,” which drew a rebuke from the pontiff who called the language “truly unacceptable.”
Even before the war, Pope Leo and the president were at sharp odds over the second Trump administration’s nationwide effort to remove immigrants in the U.S. without documentation.
The pope had also given the green light to the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops to denounce the administration’s treatment of people seeking refuge, asylum and a better life in America
Christophe Cardinal Pierre, the Papa Nuncio to the United States, speaks at the ordination and installation ceremony for Bishop Manuel de Jesús Rodríguez of the Diocese of Palm Beach (Antonio Fins / Palm Beach Post)
Archbishop Thomas Wenski of Miami has been among the most outspoken Catholic prelates.
Wenski, who grew up in Palm Beach County, presided at the Feb. 24 Mass welcoming Rodríguez to Palm Beach County and the Treasure Coast. The archbishop criticized secular relativism and lamented that though “globalization made us all neighbors, it has not made us brothers and sisters” during his homily.
The globalization of indifference increasingly closes our hearts to the other, the stranger, the immigrant, all seen as dangers, and the weak and vulnerable as inconvenient nuisances
said Wenski.
What did Cardinal Pierre say at mass for new diocese Bishop Rodríguez
Pierre’s remarks at the ordination and installation ceremony were brief.
He lightheartedly commented on the new bishop’s height — he stands 6 feet 7 inches — and noted Rodriguez’s roots back to the Diocese of Brooklyn. He lauded outgoing Bishop Gerald Barbarito, who Rodríguez replaced, saying “steady encouragement have helped shape a church that seeks to live the truth in love.”
Pierre said Rodríguez arrived well-prepared for his new role after years of parish life that cultivated within the Dominican Republic-born bishop “a pastor’s hand, and a clear love for the Gospel.”
Pierre also stressed unity of purpose and faith as he concluded his talk.
Pope Leo XIV reminds bishops that the gift they receive is always for service
he said
As the Holy Father often expresses it, ‘In the one, we are one’ — a unity that does not erase differences but gathers them in Christ
Almost 750 U.S. troops have been wounded or killed in the Middle East since October 2023, an analysis by The Intercept has found. But the Pentagon won’t acknowledge it
In the first week of the US-Israeli aggression on Iran, the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) conducted a series of precision strikes that systematically degraded the much-hyped US integrated air and missile defense architecture across the region
Eisenhower Media Network is an organization of expert former military, intelligence, and civilian national security officials who have an independent, alternative story to tell
The US-funded ecosystem of Iranian ‘rights groups,’ Israeli operatives, and monarchist activists has become a revolving door of unverifiable statistics and atrocity propaganda
As deadly riots burn Iranian cities, Western media ignores the shocking wave of violence, turning instead to US government-funded NGOs for data. The one-sided portrayal has helped push Trump to the brink of authorizing renewed US attacks
The president also said that he believes the Kurds took a lot of the weapons
[my illustration: Donald Trump on April 6, 2026 (Alex Wong / Getty)]
President Trump has said that the US sent “a lot of guns” to protesters inside Iran during demonstrations and clashes that took place in January, though he believes the weapons may have been “kept” by Kurdish groups.
“President Trump told me the United States sent guns to the Iranian protesters,” Trey Yingst, a reporter for Fox News, said on Sunday. “He told me, ‘We sent them a lot of guns. We sent them to the Kurds.’ And the president says he thinks the Kurds kept them. He went on to say. ‘We sent guns to the protesters, a lot of them.’”
Trump told Yingst that he sent the weapons after Iranian forces killed demonstrators, but at the height of the unrest in Iran, Iranian authorities said they seized US-made weapons and ammunition from foreign-backed “militants” and frequently said their forces were fighting against US and Israeli-backed “terrorist groups.”
Trump repeated his claim that Iranian forces killed 45,000 protesters, a number that lacks any evidence or credibility. The Iranian government has acknowledged that more than 3,000 people, including over 200 Iranian security personnel, were killed, while the HRANA, a US-based and US-funded NGO, has said more than 7,000 were killed and says it is investigating more reported deaths, but nowhere near the number Trump claims.
On Monday [April 6, 2026], Trump told reporters that the US sent guns into the country and that a “certain group of people” kept them without mentioning the Kurds by name.
“We sent guns, a lot of guns. They were supposed to go to the people, so they could fight back against these thugs. You know what happened? The people that they sent them to kept them,” he said. “Because they said, ‘What a beautiful gun, I think I’ll keep it.’ So I’m very upset with a certain group of people, and they’re gonna pay a big price for that.”
In response to Trump’s initial comments, several Kurdish groups denied that they received guns from the US during the protests. Amid the unrest in January, Reuters reported that Kurdish fighters had been entering Iran through Iraqi Kurdistan to fight Iranian security forces.
The Kurdistan Freedom Party, or PAK, a Kurdish Iranian separatist group mainly based in Iraq, was announcing operations against Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and the IRGC had also reported clashes with armed Kurds. The US also reportedly smuggled Starlink terminals into Iran through Iraqi Kurdistan.
The US and Israel were looking to back armed Kurdish fighters on the ground at the start of the war they launched on February 28, but according to Israeli media, the potential offensive fell apart after a series of media leaks and the Kurdish group’s mistrust of the US-Israeli plan [end]
Almost 750 U.S. troops have been wounded or killed in the Middle East since October 2023, an analysis by The Intercept has found. But the Pentagon won’t acknowledge it
In the first week of the US-Israeli aggression on Iran, the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) conducted a series of precision strikes that systematically degraded the much-hyped US integrated air and missile defense architecture across the region
Eisenhower Media Network is an organization of expert former military, intelligence, and civilian national security officials who have an independent, alternative story to tell
The US-funded ecosystem of Iranian ‘rights groups,’ Israeli operatives, and monarchist activists has become a revolving door of unverifiable statistics and atrocity propaganda
As deadly riots burn Iranian cities, Western media ignores the shocking wave of violence, turning instead to US government-funded NGOs for data. The one-sided portrayal has helped push Trump to the brink of authorizing renewed US attacks