Nicolas Cinquini

Analista senior di l'intelligenza in u campu di a gestione di i risichi di sicurezza, sò un anzianu tenente detective è ufficiale di l'intelligenza in l'agenzie di u Statu francese. A bona pronuncia hè Николай Чинкуини, in russu

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  • [Sharing] From De Gaulle to Macron: The place where every French leader makes the same mistakes – Tamara Andreeva, Russia Today

    For decades, Africa has consistently been viewed by Paris as a space to offset its lost global influence

    Africa has historically been a foundational pillar of France’s influence and a cornerstone of its global status. Africa provided France with raw materials, geopolitical weight, and economic advantages. All this formed the system known as ‘Francafrique’. 

    However, this system is currently facing an acute crisis. It’s clear that France has failed to maintain a stable presence on the African continent. From de Gaulle to Macron, French leaders have repeatedly made the same mistakes, which eventually resulted in the failure of France’s Africa policy. 

    Prestige through Africa

    Every nation aspiring to be a leader aims to uphold its image as a ‘great power’. France particularly cherishes this image, but current economic and political realities no longer allow for such status. French philosophers noted the decline of the nation’s grandeur as early as the post-WWII era, describing France as a “second-rate power.” It was during this time that Africa became the cornerstone of French foreign policy, one that allowed Paris to sustain and extend its influence on the global stage.

    France and Africa have a long shared history rooted in the expansion of the French colonial empire at the end of the 19th century. France’s colonial expansion, unlike that of other European countries, was driven not merely by economic gain but by a quest for international prestige.

    The modern strategy for maintaining French power is often associated with Gaullism – the philosophy of General Charles de Gaulle, who sought to restore France’s greatness while “totally lacking resources to make it possible.” This logic has shaped France’s Africa policy for decades, with leaders from de Gaulle to Macron facing the same challenges.

    Monsieur Afrique

    De Gaulle’s philosophy laid the groundwork for France’s modern Africa policy. At first glance, the general appeared to sacrifice France’s interests by acknowledging the independence of its colonies. However, behind this apparent withdrawal lay a pragmatic calculation aimed at preserving economic, political, and strategic advantages.

    Key tools of influence following decolonization included the CFA franc zone and military cooperation agreements that allowed French troops to be stationed in various African nations. Jacques Foccart played a pivotal role in this system; appointed by de Gaulle, he was tasked with establishing a network of clientelist relationships with the new African leaders. Thus emerged France’s unofficial policy in Africa, known as Francafrique – a term coined by economist and historian Francois-Xavier Verschave.

    Foccart, nicknamed ‘Monsieur Afrique’, headed the General Secretariat for the Community and African and Malagasy Affairs, which reported directly to the president rather than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This department was initially small and the staff was likely handpicked by Foccart, who preferred former colonial officials and high-ranking civil servants, so-called ‘universalists’. This group also included several African agents. This department established the mechanisms for controlling the politics of the former colonies.

    As Dr. Vasily Filippov notes, alongside official structures, shadow structures were also active. In 1960, the Civic Action Service was established, which “engaged in a range of militarized activities – from extortion to illegal arms trade and money laundering.”

    Language as a tool of influence

    France’s next president, Georges Pompidou, inherited de Gaulle’s Africa policy, advocating for “continuity and dialogue.” He aimed to soften the approach, shifting the focus toward economic and cultural engagement. Under his leadership, regular Franco-African summits began – a tradition that endures to this day.

    Pompidou placed significant importance on promoting the French language as a means to counter Anglo-Saxon influence, thereby extending France’s reach not only to its former colonies but also to former Belgian territories.

    His administration supported the establishment of universities, contributing over a million books and training teachers according to the French educational method. However, the Cold War atmosphere fueled increasing anti-colonial sentiments and led to deteriorating relations with several Francophone African nations.

    From paternalism to the Rwandan genocide

    Pompidou’s successor, Valery Giscard d’Estaing, preferred a tougher stance, including military methods. He sought to inject “new momentum” into France’s relationship with Africa, yet under him, the unified Francafrique network splintered into numerous autonomous lobbying groups tied to the interests of the president’s circle. During this time, Foccart’s General Secretariat became known as the Ministry of Cooperation. 

    Although d’Estaing aimed to expand collaboration by involving Portuguese and English-speaking countries in negotiations, his Africa policy ended in scandal. Le Canard enchaine published information that he had received diamonds worth at least €800,000 in today’s currency from the president of the Central African Republic, Jean-Bedel Bokassa. As French expert Claude Vautier wrote, “While Africa brought de Gaulle success, it brought Giscard d’Estaing defeat.”

    In 1981, socialist Francois Mitterrand came to power in France. Many African nations anticipated change, given the socialists’ promises to reconsider neocolonial approaches and integrate the ‘cellule africaine de l’Elysee’ (the so-called Africa Cell, a specialized unit of the French government dealing with African affairs) into the French Foreign Ministry. However, the reforms turned out to be largely symbolic, as Mitterrand’s Africa policy gradually took on the characteristics of “authoritarian paternalism.” 

    Initially, some ‘idealists’ in the Elysee Palace aimed to reform the system of aid to Africa, but they were soon displaced by the ‘Francophiles’ who viewed the continent as a zone of special interest. Despite rhetoric about national independence, self-determination, and the development of impoverished nations, Mitterrand’s policies inherited the Gaullist spirit and logic of Francafrique.

    These practices involved active intervention in the internal affairs of Chad, Burkina Faso, the Comoros, as well as Zaire (now DR Congo), Djibouti, Somalia, and Rwanda. Development aid was linked to democratization and cooperation with Bretton Woods institutions (known as the Balladur Doctrine) which, just like the devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994, determined the developmental model for the region for years to come.

    The most tragic episode was the Rwandan genocide. Though Rwanda was never a French colony, experts call it “the dirtiest chapter in the history of Francafrique.” France acknowledged its responsibility only in 2021.

    First, the Duclert Report was released. While it did not directly acknowledge the complicity of the French authorities in the genocide, it pointed out that they were responsible for turning a blind eye to what was happening in Rwanda. Then, French President Emmanuel Macron publicly admitted this responsibility

    [France] was not complicit… But France has a role, a history, and a political responsibility in Rwanda. And it has a duty: that of facing history head-on and recognizing the share of suffering it had inflicted on the Rwandan people by making silence prevail over the examination of truth for too long

    Rwandans were divided in their opinions: some saw the French president’s speech as a breakthrough, while others felt that Macron avoided the most important part and failed to offer genuine apologies. For instance, Alain Gauthier, president of the Collective of Civil Parties for Rwanda, an association that tracks down genocide perpetrators in France, noted that

    what President Macron said is what the Duclert Report has already stated about the heavy responsibilities, and we would have hoped for even more committed words, but President Macron did not have that courage

    Are ‘inadequate interventions’ a thing of the past?

    With Jacques Chirac’s rise to power in 1995, many in France anticipated a revival of Gaullism, and in line with this continuity, he appointed Foccart as his adviser on Africa. Observers noted that Foccart served as a ‘living link’ to the era of de Gaulle and Pompidou. However, he soon passed away and France’s Africa policy lost its systemic character and increasingly became situational.

    African leaders increasingly accused Paris of neo-colonialism, and the region gravitated towards the US and China. In 1997, then-French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin declared,

    The politics of spheres of influence and inadequate interventions in Africa must be left behind

    Indeed, France gradually shifted its attention toward short-term missions and training programs; by 2002, the number of French troops in Africa had nearly halved. Then-French Prime Minister Alain Juppe, who was foreign minister during the Rwandan genocide, suggested putting Africans themselves in charge of peacekeeping responsibilities.

    This idea materialized in 1998 through the Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities (RECAMP) initiative, developed with the support of the US and the UK. However, the attempt was not particularly successful and Paris continued to intervene directly (as seen from the military operations in Comoros, the Central African Republic, Niger, and Cote d’Ivoire, where Operation Licorne (Operation Unicorn) began in 2002 and involved around 5,000 troops).

    ‘The colonizer took but also gave’ 

    In 2007, Nicolas Sarkozy became president of France. He had previously served as minister of the interior and was known for his tough stance on illegal immigration.

    Even before his election as president, he made some bold statements, saying that “those who don’t like France are free to leave” and emphasizing that the French are not obliged to abandon their values for a “tiny minority.” This rhetoric garnered him substantial domestic support: between 2002 and 2005, his approval rating soared from 29% to 51%.

    During his presidency, France’s focus shifted significantly towards North Africa, including support for protests in Tunisia, operations in Libya, and the Mediterranean Union project. Sarkozy’s first visit to the African continent began with a trip to Libya, where he met the country’s leader, Muammar Gaddafi. In an interview, he spoke about the need to turn a new page in Franco-African relations, saying that the “old demons of clientelism, paternalism, and dependence on aid” would no longer have a place.

    However, Sarkozy’s speech in Dakar in 2007 drew sharp criticism, particularly for his controversial comment: “the colonizer took [resources], but I want to say with respect that he also gave.” Perhaps the final straw was his assertion that colonization wasn’t the root cause of all the continent’s problems. This rhetoric was deemed arrogant and even dangerous by many Africans. Philosopher Achille Mbembe wrote in an open letter to Sarkozy,

    Who gave him the right to talk about Africa and Africans in a manner of a master who has the habit of ill-treating his slave?

    At the same time, Sarkozy implemented institutional reforms: he dissolved the Cellule Africaine, transferred the management of African affairs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and, in the interests of increased ‘transparency’, revised and made public defense agreements with eight countries. 

    France also expressed support for the African Union and in 2010-2012 pledged around €300 million for the development of regional peacekeeping forces. Nevertheless, operations in Libya and Cote d’Ivoire, along with a strict migration policy, reinforced perceptions that France continued to operate within a neocolonial framework.

    Africa increasingly came to be viewed through the lenses of migration, terrorism, and instability, paving the way for the ‘securitization’ of Africa policy under Hollande and Macron.

    A record number of military interventions

    Francois Hollande, who became president of France in 2012, promised to “end parallel diplomacy” and reform French foreign policy in regard to Africa. He continued the trend of ‘Africanizing’ peacekeeping efforts, emphasizing that Africa’s future depended on empowering Africans to manage crises independently, in collaboration with the African Union and regional organizations.

    However, just a year later, in January 2013, France launched Operation Serval in Mali to halt the advance of Islamist militants. Instead of relying on ‘African solutions’ the crisis was addressed by French fighter jets and 3,000 troops. France’s motives extended beyond security: neighboring Niger was a key supplier of uranium for France’s energy needs and a destination for investments in infrastructure and water supply.

    Later, Operation Serval evolved into Operation Barkhane, which spanned the Sahel countries -Mali, Chad, Niger, Mauritania, and Burkina Faso. Up to 3,000 French soldiers were deployed as part of the operation. In the same year, France initiated Operation Sangaris in the Central African Republic under a UN mandate, sending 2,000 troops.

    Despite claims of a “new phase of partnership” a record number of military interventions were carried out under Hollande. The ambiguity surrounding the objectives and timelines of these missions, particularly Operation Barkhane, sparked criticism both in Africa and France. By the end of Hollande’s term, 76% of the French populace expressed dissatisfaction with his policies.

    Macron’s promises and France’s withdrawal

    Emmanuel Macron initially proclaimed his intention to pursue a “new policy in Africa,” one rooted in peace and entrepreneurship. Like his predecessors, he vowed to break away from the legacy of Francafrique and wanted to position himself as a representative of a new generation. 

    In the fall of 2017, he delivered a speech at the University of Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso, asserting that France “no longer had an Africa policy” and that any future interactions would occur under the auspices of the European Union. This statement aimed to both deflect accusations of France’s unilateral influence and add legitimacy to its initiatives through a European framework. His speech emphasized security concerns, especially the fight against terrorism in the Sahel – a conflict inherited from Hollande.

    Operation Barkhane, which deployed up to 5,000 French troops, gradually undermined France’s standing in the region. The mission became drawn out due to ambiguous objectives and a lack of a clear timeline; all this led to rising anti-French sentiments. 

    Paris sought to internationalize the conflict by acting as a mediator between Europe and Africa and supporting the establishment of a counter-terrorism group, the G5 Sahel, with backing from the UN, African Union, and EU. However, military coups, particularly in Mali, prevented this. By 2022-2023, France announced the end of Operation Barkhane and the withdrawal of its troops. This was perceived in Africa as a symbol of diminishing French influence amid the rise of the influence of countries such as China, Türkiye, Germany, and Russia.

    The new authorities demanded a reevaluation of France’s military presence, and sometimes managed to expel French forces entirely. As a result, France completely withdrew from Mali, the Central African Republic, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad. In Senegal, Paris closed permanent bases but maintained cooperation in the field of security. The French military presence in Cote d’Ivoire and Gabon became more limited in scope. Currently, Djibouti has become France’s key military hub with approximately 1,500 troops stationed there. 

    Despite Macron’s attempts to reshape France’s presence in Africa (shifting from large military bases to training centers) and to engage with African youth through Africa-France summits, he could not reverse the negative trends. Macron’s blunt remarks in 2023 – when he said that France played a crucial role in maintaining the statehood of the Sahel countries – underscored the persistence of a paternalistic rhetoric.


    Clearly, continuity is a defining characteristic of France’s Africa policy. Presidents may change and various reforms may be declared, but, essentially, the strategy remains the same. From de Gaulle to Macron, Africa has consistently been viewed by Paris primarily as a space for compensating lost global influence.

    Attempts to move away from the logic of Francafrique have yielded no real changes; in times of crisis, France invariably returned to coercive tactics, and even the careful official speeches of the French presidents retained the paternalistic tone. These processes culminated under Macron, when France experienced a historic decline in its military, political, and symbolic presence in key regions of Africa [end]

    The original article

    Tamara Andreeva is Junior Researcher at the Institute for African Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences.

    The French State is censoring Russia Today. Therefore, some readers may need a web proxy, in order to access the original article.

    Related

    November 19, 2025: Mali Defends Sovereignty Against a Western-Backed “Proxy War” – Pavan Kulkarni, Internationalist 360°

    As panic-inducing travel advisories and doomsaying media reports prophesy the fall of Mali to an Al Qaeda affiliate attacking fuel convoys, the government has re-secured supply routes and hosted Mali’s first international defense expo in a supposedly besieged capital

    October 20, 2024: Assassination for fraudulent motives

    Pan-Africanist leader Muammar Gaddafi was killed on October 20, 2011

    July 3, 2024: France, its Far-Right, and Africa – Kossi “Ayomide” Paul, Internationalist 360°

    France’s recent parliamentary elections indicate a rapid political shift to the right. Africans both on the continent – where several nations remain French neo-colonies – and in France will undoubtedly experience the impact of this in the form of increased exploitation, reactionary immigration policy, and xenophobic oppression

    January 19, 2024: Russian Missile Strike on French Contractor Base in Ukraine Highlights Heated Franco-Russian Cold War – Military Watch Magazine

    October 10, 2023: African revolution

    France is expelled from its former colonies in West Africa

    September 6, 2023: No respite for France as a ‘New Africa’ rises – Pepe Escobar, The Cradle

    Like dominos, African states are one by one falling outside the shackles of neocolonialism. Chad, Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and now Gabon are saying ‘non’ to France’s longtime domination of African financial, political, economic, and security affairs

    August 5, 2023: One of the results of the US-Russia war: Africa rebels against imperialism – Elijah J. Magnier, dossierSul

    July 30, 2023: Africa and a new world order – Stephen Sefton, Tortilla con Sal

  • [Sharing] Mali Defends Sovereignty Against a Western-Backed “Proxy War” – Pavan Kulkarni, Internationalist 360°

    As panic-inducing travel advisories and doomsaying media reports prophesy the fall of Mali to an Al Qaeda affiliate attacking fuel convoys, the government has re-secured supply routes and hosted Mali’s first international defense expo in a supposedly besieged capital

    Amid a barrage of media reports prophesying the fall of Mali to an Al Qaeda affiliate disrupting its fuel supply by attacking tankers, delegates from ten African countries, Iran, and Turkey attended a defense expo in the capital Bamako from November 11 to 14.

    The city was reported to be “under siege”, encircled by jihadists closing in on power. Some version of “Is Mali about to fall?” was a rhetorical question across headlines, while the Atlantic Council declared the country was “unraveling”.

    Dismissing this portrayal as a scenario “concocted in the office of foreign intelligence services”, Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Diop insisted that “the fate of Mali, and the destiny of the people in the West African region will not be decided” by the media.

    He made these remarks on November 12, addressing a press conference on the sidelines of BAMEX 25, Mali’s first international defense expo, aimed at building “an autonomous security architecture” for Africa in the face of “unprecedented security and geopolitical challenges”.

    This expo, he said, is yet another indication of the Malian government’s priority to strengthen its defense and security to combat the threat of terror groups that were spawned across the Sahel by NATO’s destruction of Libya in 2011.

    French-spawned terror groups

    Mali was among the first and worst affected by these terror groups. Its former colonizer, France, which was a key participant in Libya’s destruction, then deployed its troops, ostensibly to protect Mali. Over the years, its military presence expanded across the Sahel. Alongside, the armed groups also grew in strength, increasing attacks and the area under their control.

    This led to a growing perception that French troops in the region were not fighting the terror groups it helped create but guarding its own economic and political interests in maintaining its neocolonial grip over the troubled former colonies.

    Amid mass protests against the French troop deployment, Mali’s France-backed regime of the then-president Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta was removed in a popular military coup in 2020. A military government replaced the regime with the support of the protest movement, trade unions, and other progressive formations.

    In 2021, then-prime minister Choguel Kokalla Maïga recalled in an interview the active role played by France in handing over Mali’s territory to terror groups.

    “Upon arriving in” the northern town of Kidal in 2013, “France forbade the Malian army from entering. It created an enclave,” and handed it over to Al-Qaeda affiliate Ansar al Dine and Tuareg separatists brought together, he said. Later in 2017, Ansar al Dine coalesced with other terrorist groups to form the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), which became one of the most dangerous groups in the Sahel.

    “It’s an enclave controlled by France. They have armed groups trained by French officers. And we have evidence of this,” Maiga added in his 2021 interview. “Mali has no access to Kidal.”

    However, the new government retook Kidal in November 2023, less than a year and a half after expelling the French troops.

    “On the ground today, terrorist groups are no match for Mali’s defense and security forces,” Diop told reporters at the press conference. “There have been enormous efforts to equip Mali’s defense and security forces, which have achieved resounding successes” against the terror groups, he said, adding that this has “forced them to change their strategy and now attack softer targets.”

    Attacks on fuel convoys

    Early this September, the JNIM started attacks on drivers and their tankers carrying fuel from the Ivory Coast in the Sikasso region of southern Mali. “Due to disruptions in fuel supplies that are affecting the movement of school staff,” the Education Ministry suspended classes for two weeks on October 26.

    “Do Not Travel to Mali for any reason due to crime, terrorism, kidnapping, unrest, and health,” the US State Department said in a travel advisory on October 25. Three days later, the department issued a second alert, insisting that its citizens in Mali “should” leave the country “using commercial aviation, as overland routes to neighboring countries may not be safe for travel due to terrorist attacks along national highways.”

    Australia followed suit on October 29, warning, “If you’re in Mali, you should depart immediately using commercial means while the international airport in Bamako remains open and flights are available. If you decide to remain in Mali, be prepared to shelter in place for an extended period.” Italy and Germany also asked their citizens to leave the country.

    Amid the panic-inducing travel advisories and doomsaying media reports, Mali’s president, Col. Assimi Goïta, inaugurated the country’s second Lithium mine on November 3, setting Mali en route to becoming Africa’s leading Lithium producer by 2026.

    The mine is located in Bougouni, about 170km south of Bamako in the Sikasso region, where the JNIM had attacked fuel convoys in September.

    Government restores fuel supply

    Two days later, on November 5, residents of Bamako cheered on the streets as large convoys of fuel tankers entered the city under the protection of the armed forces. Nevertheless, France 24 persisted with headlines like “Jihadists threaten to overrun Mali as blockades continue“, “fuel blockade squeezes Mali’s military rulers“, etc.

    “There have been disruptions in the supply system,” but “the state organized itself, put in place a strategic plan to resume supplies, to ensure the security of convoys … And gradually, you see that hundreds of trucks are arriving every day to resume supplies to Bamako and other localities,” Diop added in his press conference. “As I speak, Mali is able to ensure the supply of hydrocarbons and petroleum products to its population.”

    However, two days after the fuel convoys started arriving, France “advised” its citizens on October 7 to leave Mali “as soon as possible using the remaining available commercial flights” because the “security situation has been deteriorating.”

    Mali’s first-ever National Electronic Payments Exhibition was organized in the capital that day by the Professional Association of Banks and Financial Institutions of Mali (APBEF-Mali) and the West African Economic and Monetary Union’s Interbank Electronic Payment Group (GIM-UEMOA).

    Schools reopened on schedule on November 10. That day, President Goïta inaugurated the Presidential Emergency Hospital Project to upgrade six existing health centers in Bamako to district hospitals by the end of 2026, for which a health budget of USD 349.2 million has been allocated. The inauguration also marked the start of construction of nine new hospitals, including in Bougouni, Bandiagara, and Nioro, where attacks had been reported in the recent past.

    Despite these indications of improving security, the UK government claimed on November 13 that “Terrorist group Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) has implemented blockades on key routes throughout Southern and Western Mali, including the capital city of Bamako,” where the international defense expo was underway.

    “These blockades are targeting fuel trucks and are enforcing checkpoints for individuals attempting to pass through them. Attacks can occur at any time,” added its travel advisory.

    A proxy war

    “We must not think we are simply facing terrorist groups,” Diop maintains. “No, this is a proxy war, where certain powers, cowardly and unable to confront us directly, are using terrorist groups and asymmetric forces to fight us … These terrorist groups have drones. Where do they come from? Who manufactures them? Who provides them in areas where people cannot even eat?”

    Le Monde had reported last year that Ukrainian authorities are training an armed group to use drones. Spokesperson of Ukraine’s military intelligence, Andriy Yusov, had said in an interview that it provided “information, and not only information,” to armed groups fighting the state in Mali.

    Earlier in 2022, Diop had written a letter to the UN Security Council, saying Mali had evidence that France was flying missions in Malian airspace to collect intelligence and airdrop arms and ammunition to terror groups.

    Mali’s southern neighbor, Burkina Faso, and eastern neighbor, Niger, have also since accused France of supporting terror groups to destabilize their countries after its troops were expelled following a similar sequence of anti-France protests and popular coups.

    “Africa is now the epicenter of terrorism,” Nicolas Lerner,  head of France’s General Directorate for External Security (DGSE), told France Inter radio on November 10. Calling it a threat to Europe, he insisted it “directly threatens our interests,” effectively trying to set up the case for another military intervention.

    Curiously, he went on to add that while the “JNIM wants the fall of the junta and the installation of authorities who back the establishment of a caliphate,” the group itself “is not necessarily capable of controlling Mali, nor does it actually want to.”

    Lerner is “saying … it is not even their intention to take Bamako … How [does he] know their intention? Is it you who gives them this intention? Is it you who commands them? Is it you who decides,” questioned Diop.

    “This should help us understand how deep the collusion is today between hybrid forces. These are not terrorists – it is a proxy war. But I can assure you that Mali will endure.”

    He reiterated that Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, which have formed the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), are fighting together, convinced that this proxy war is waged on them because they “chose to break the chain of dependency, to break the chain of subjugation to colonial domination.”

    He added, “Our countries are being attacked first to break this dynamic and then to prevent other African countries from following this path. And we have understood the political message behind this.” The African Union (AU), however, has not.

    “We are not reaching out to the so-called international community to come to our aid”

    Amid the chorus by Western countries, the AU’s chairperson, Mahamoud Ali Youssouf, called for “a robust, coordinated, and coherent international response to counter terrorism and violent extremism in the Sahel.”

    “No action can be … taken in Mali without Malians, without the consent of the Malian state, without the Malian state requesting it,” Diop retorted, affirming, “we are not reaching out to the so-called international community to come to our aid.”

    “This call for international action is all the more worrying since Mali has emerged from this type of paradigm,” he added. Having expelled the French troops and asserted sovereignty, “the new paradigm [in the AES] is to trust ourselves and take charge … to ensure the security of our countries rests first and foremost on the shoulders of the people and leaders of our countries” [end]

    The original article

    Related

    October 20, 2024: Assassination for fraudulent motives

    Pan-Africanist leader Muammar Gaddafi was killed on October 20, 2011

    July 3, 2024: France, its Far-Right, and Africa – Kossi “Ayomide” Paul, Internationalist 360°

    France’s recent parliamentary elections indicate a rapid political shift to the right. Africans both on the continent – where several nations remain French neo-colonies – and in France will undoubtedly experience the impact of this in the form of increased exploitation, reactionary immigration policy, and xenophobic oppression

    January 19, 2024: Russian Missile Strike on French Contractor Base in Ukraine Highlights Heated Franco-Russian Cold War – Military Watch Magazine

    October 10, 2023: African revolution

    France is expelled from its former colonies in West Africa

    September 6, 2023: No respite for France as a ‘New Africa’ rises – Pepe Escobar, The Cradle

    Like dominos, African states are one by one falling outside the shackles of neocolonialism. Chad, Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and now Gabon are saying ‘non’ to France’s longtime domination of African financial, political, economic, and security affairs

    August 5, 2023: One of the results of the US-Russia war: Africa rebels against imperialism – Elijah J. Magnier, dossierSul

    July 30, 2023: Africa and a new world order – Stephen Sefton, Tortilla con Sal

  • [Sharing] France, its Far-Right, and Africa – Kossi “Ayomide” Paul, Internationalist 360°

    France’s recent parliamentary elections indicate a rapid political shift to the right. Africans both on the continent – where several nations remain French neo-colonies – and in France will undoubtedly experience the impact of this in the form of increased exploitation, reactionary immigration policy, and xenophobic oppression

    Elections for the European Parliament took place on June 9, 2024. These elections are generally shunned by the French electorate, and the latest was no exception with nearly 50% abstaining from voting. This is one of the highest abstention rates in the region – a clear sign of the disconnect between the people and its institutions. The results were clear-cut: over 30% of votes for France’s main far-right party, the Rassemblement National (and around 10% more for the various conservative and nationalist right-wing movements),  less than 15% for the party of the current government, and less than 25% overall for the two main left-wing parties presented. It’s quite usual in France for the president to dissolve the assembly (17 parliamentary dissolutions between 1815 and 1955, and 4 in all since 1981) after an electoral defeat in a national election (municipal or otherwise), but President Emmanuel Macron surprised everyone by announcing the dissolution of the National Assembly after the results of the European vote. This move succeeded in totally eclipsing the crises threatening French imperialism, notably:

    • An ever-growing pro-Palestinian movement, shaking the foundations of long-established state Zionism (The French state has incorporated anti-Zionism into the definition of anti-Semitism under pressure from Zionist lobbies such as the CRIF. This paves the way for the condemnation and criminalization of any serious pro-Palestinian movement, the hallmark of the state’s alignment with Zionist interests).
    • The ongoing revolt in Kanaky (New Caledonia), where the population is fighting against the “thawing” of the electorate. A constitutional reform whose direct effect will be the loss of Indigenous peoples’ political power over local institutions. This was a  power obtained by the natives through struggle. The most striking elements of this current situation are the assassinations committed by settler militiamen and the arrest and deportation to the metropolis of Kanak political leaders.
    • A popular movement to challenge French influence in West Africa was crystallized by military coups and the formation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) in Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, and the election in Senegal of Bassirou Diomaye Faye[7] after a campaign waged on a clearly anti-colonial line.

    Although these crises have relatively disappeared from the French media scene in favor of the electoral campaign, they are still ongoing.

    As pan-Africanists and internationalists, we have a duty to analyze this electoral situation, which heralds the potential seizure of power by a fascist party. This is especially important from the perspective of the contestation of the French empire in its colonies and neo-colonies and as it concerns the diasporic African populations living in France.

    I. The French Far-Right and Africa

    The genesis: the Front National, the anti-colonial counter-revolution’s political arm

    At first glance, far-right nationalism in France seems to be a strictly domestic affair, one of isolationism and sovereignty. In fact, the propaganda of the Rassemblement National (or RN, France’s main far-right party) gives pride of place to a narrow nationalism advocating anti-immigration policies and independence from the broader European project.  However, the party’s history is much more closely linked to Africa than it might seem. Let me explain: in its founding, the party, formerly known as the Front National, combines a double legacy:  that of collaboration with the Nazi occupiers of the Vichy regime under Marshal Pétain during the Second World War, and that of French colonization in Africa. Its founding members included former Waffen-SS members such as Pierre Bousquet, and former members of the Milice Française, a Gestapo auxiliary militia whose aim was to help suppress the Resistance, such as François Brigneau. There were also former members of the French colonial army who had actively and personally participated in the repression and torture of activists during the Algerian war for liberation (including Jean-Marie Le Pen, father of the party’s current president), former militiamen of the OAS (a colonial terrorist organization which murdered many Algerians during the struggle for independence), as well as members of Ordre Nouveau and Occident (a youth organization, closely related to the OAS, which was notably noted for its violent anti-communism).

    The FN, now RN, was born in a particular context, not unlike that of today. Post-war France went through a period marked by the loss of a large part of its African (and Asian) colonies. Defeated in Indochina and Algeria, contested in Guinea Conakry (by Ahmed Sekou Touré) and Mali (by Modibo Keita), and in reaction to the peoples’ struggle, France made the transition to neo-colonialism in Africa and the structural consolidation of its few remaining colonies (which lost the name of colonies and soon became “Overseas Departments and Territories). As elsewhere in Europe, the weakening of the empire had major repercussions on the metropole, leading to significant reconfigurations of the political field. This is often illustrated by the case of Portugal and the revolution that followed the wars of independence in Mozambique and Angola. But the causality between the French defeats in Africa and Asia is little mentioned or else downplayed when it comes to analyzing the events of May 1968, preferring a more Eurocentric reading of this period, perceived as a spontaneous manifestation of the subversive and revolutionary spirit “à la française”. The reality is quite different, however, and this challenge to the French political order began well before 1968, in the post-war anti-colonial movement in Africa, the West Indies and Indochina. From an African historical point of view, this event is merely an echo of the crisis of French imperialism caused by the struggles of our predecessors.

    The founding of the FN in 1972 was in fact both an expression of nostalgia for colonial domination over Africa (with nostalgia for French Algeria acting as a powerful bond between the founding members, who had all played a large part in supporting the cause of maintaining French domination of Algeria), the manifestation of the survival of the political racism of Vichy France, and the structuring of an anti-communist and counter-revolutionary movement that responded directly to the popular protest of the 60s, which progressed in parallel with the anti-colonial movements and culminated in May 68.

    Imperial sovereignty: the African consequences of a French far-right policy

    Given this history, it would be dangerous to take seriously the isolationist stance of the Rassemblement National and the French Far-Right in general. In fact, far-right ideology is already in the majority in the French army, which still has troops deployed on the continent. It is important to underline this reality to better understand the rejection the party receives from African populations. Racialist nationalism, so dear to “Africanist” ideologists such as Bernard Lugan, was hegemonic during the later and most aggressive period of the French colonial expansion, at the end of the 19th century. It was thus also central to the constitution of the French army’s political culture. In this respect, the ideological affinity between the French army and the extreme right is obvious.

    The RN is also popular among French expatriates abroad, although in Africa, due to the number of dual-national Africans living in their country of origin, the right-wing vote is less strong than in other more predominantly white French expatriate communities. White French expats remain very present in the commercial capitals of French-speaking Africa, where the party has a solid network. Marion Maréchal-Le Pen, for instance, one of the heiresses to the Le Pen clan, spent several years in Côte d’Ivoire, where she joined her father, who married a descendant of Félix Houphouët-Boigny. Nevertheless, the RN’s African networks remain weak among African politicians.

    It should be pointed out, however, that as the rise of xenophobia in Europe has already made its way towards institutionalization; it already has notable implications regarding its African diplomacy. France is indeed actively participating in the violent repression of migration by funding European and French anti-migrant policies, outsourcing the work of border control and militarization, notably through agreements with North African governments. This has very serious consequences on the lives of the Black Africans living or traveling through these countries. I’m referring to the frequent lynching and harassing of Black people in Tunisia by anti-Black mobs that have been galvanized and embolden by their president’s racist speeches, the state sanctioned massacres that take place near the Spanish enclaves of Melilla and Ceuta, in Morocco, or even the fact that the Algerian and Tunisian police often arrest Black Africans and then release them in the desert without food or water, leaving them to starve or die of dehydration. This phenomenon also hinders the prospect of continental unity, which can only be achieved by combating this tragic racist and neo-colonial diplomacy that contributes to further balkanizing the continent.

    It goes without saying that the rise to power of parties whose program largely revolves around the fight against immigration can only worsen this situation, increasing the macabre tally of African double victims of Western imperialism: displaced because fleeing conflicts or situations resulting from (neo)colonial oppression, killed by the bullets of African subcontractors working on European borders, or drowned in the Mediterranean.

    European political forces are already gripped by a paranoid Malthusian fear of the possibility of a migratory and ecologic “Black peril”. Conferences on the so-called “African demographic crisis” or “African demographic explosion” are regularly held in Europe, with far-right ideologues and “experts” over-represented. On June 25, during the most important campaign debate of the parliamentary elections, this point was once again raised by far-right representative, Jordan Bardella. In a way quite analogous to the consequences of the idea of a “yellow peril”, this omnipresence of the rhetorical elements of the migratory “black peril” could reinforce and accelerate the emergence of an anti-natalist Malthusian diplomacy in Africa, following the example of those who blackmailed India and China, in particular, into adopting extremely strict and authoritarian birth control policies.

    One of the RN’s key themes is sovereignty, but in many respects (energy, food, mining), France remains dependent. It is therefore quite evident that a France under a Far-Right government will have to increase its economic predation on those African countries historically regarded as its own “backyard”, in order to gain autonomy from other world powers. As a matter of fact, this imperialist parasitic dependency could very well be one of the very causes of this resurgence of nationalism in France in particular, and in the West in general.

    The colonial reflex, A Nkrumahist analysis of the rise of the far right in France

    Rather than the theses on populism and “the affects” popular with Western leftists, Kwame Nkrumah built on Lenin’s investigation of the parasitic relations between the imperialists and its dependencies, offering an anti-colonial analysis of the fluctuations in the political system of colonial metropoles. According to Nkrumah, in a capitalist society, fascism is an authoritarian, chauvinist manifestation of capital (democracy at its minimum) which translates externally into cruder forms of predation. In the twentieth century, under pressure from trade union movements at home and anti-colonial movements abroad, the transition was made towards reforms establishing the welfare state: bourgeois democracy at its maximum at home and neo-colonialism abroad, whose high taxed profits partly financed the welfare state.

    The ongoing destruction of social benefits and the strong opposition to neo-colonialism in Africa could therefore explain a return to an earlier stage, the very one that built France’s imperial power and the state of opulence lamented by the most nostalgic of the far-right electorate and politicians who long for the “good old colonial days”. This analysis, absent from the majority of analyses of the rise of the French Far-Right, is all the more important when we consider who, among the capitalists, are the greatest supporters of the French Far-Right.

    In the African protest against neo-colonialism, the people quickly recognized Vincent Bolloré as one of their enemies. Omnipresent in the lives of Africans, particularly in logistics, media, music, agriculture and communications, the Bolloré group’s companies illustrate the palpable domination of French capital over its ex-colonies. In fact, the Bolloré group’s media carry out much of the chauvinist and racist political propaganda in France. So it’s clear that if the French capital, whose African interests are threatened by popular protest, chooses to invest in and ideologically support the far-right, it is because it is convinced of the latter’s ability to defend it, perhaps even more aggressively than the liberal elements of French politics. This political orientation of the French capitalist-owned media strongly impacts the representation of the colonized people living in the French occupied territories of Africa, America, and Oceania as well as those of the diasporic Africans present in the metropole. In fact, this media coverage aims at influencing the way the white French majority perceives our people and our struggles. Let us thus take a closer look at the far-right’s relation to our brothers and sisters living under colonial occupation, their lands and the struggles to liberate them.

    II. The French Far-Right and the overseas colonies

    These terms are deliberately chosen to refute the operation to change the status and name of the colonies, which is nothing more than a neo-colonial strategy designed to conceal the colonial reality and weaken the nationalist and independence struggles waged in French Guiana and the occupied African islands of the Indian Ocean, the Caribbean and Oceania

    The RN’s electoral success in the colonies, as symptomatic of a colonial ailment.

    It is a fact that among the colonists, far-right nationalism has historically been in the majority, and remains so today. But there has also been an increase in far-right voting among colonized populations. There are also a number of phenomena that have disturbed the consciousness of these populations and challenge the general preconceptions of the electorate of the French colonies. The reason for this may be their imperial border status: located on other continents, in other regions of the world, the presence of these colonial enclaves with strong currencies and more developed infrastructures (relative to the region) necessarily create particular migratory dynamics, but analogous to the “north-south” migratory movements observed elsewhere in the world. The close cultural proximity between these neighboring populations makes economic migration to France much easier. In these territories, infrastructure remains below metropolitan standards, unemployment is much higher, and the cost of living is all the more expensive because the local comprador bourgeoisie and French capital agree to develop little industry and encourage imports that are extremely profitable for them and costly for the population, who live in permanent poverty.

    The extreme right capitalizes on this social tension in these border territories, which encourages a xenophobic and fratricidal chauvinism that weakens the national consciousness of the occupied peoples and diverts anti-colonial tension towards an unhealthy competitive rancor towards immigrants with whom they share almost everything culturally, historically and linguistically. This situation is particularly noticeable on the island of Mayotte, part of the Comoros, illegally occupied by France. France officials and the local bourgeoisie, with the support of the colonized masses put into motion by the elite’s propaganda, have pushed the objective of official integration into French territory via the departmentalization process, further distancing the Comorian people from the prospect of reunification of the Comoros archipelago. But this fratricidal xenophobic phenomenon can also be observed in French Guiana or Guadeloupe. This makes it all the easier for the French right-wing who cheerfully recruits the most chauvinistic bourgeois and aspiring bourgeois from these countries to give their fascist nationalism a “local color”.

    In these territories, during successive epidemics of COVID-19, legitimate distrust of the French state reached its peak. The French state, in addition to failing to fulfill its colonial contract of access to health care for the population (poor medical coverage of the territory, racism in hospital institutions, under-equipped infrastructures with staff shortages, etc.) was also found to have participated in and covered up a health scandal. Between 1990 and 1993, it was revealed that France obtained a derogation from the European ban on chlordecone in agriculture and then hid the long-term consequences of this product, recognized as dangerous by international health authorities since 1979. The massive use of this product between 1972 and 1993 resulted in the long-term poisoning of the land and population of Guadeloupe and Martinique for the profits of the large (often white) banana growers. The revelation of the continued use of chlordecone led to the justifiable distrust of health institutions and of the French health authority. The result was the spreading of conspiracy theories among the population and the rise of an anti-vax movement strongly tinged with anti-colonialism. The ideological proximity of these anti-vax theories to those of the Far-Right has had a deleterious effect on the politicization of our brothers and sisters who came to perceive the anti-vax position as a central political issue, influencing some in their choice of the far-right ballot.

    Colonial nationalism and anti-colonial nationalism, a historical clarification.

    Others may mistakenly think that French nationalism is compatible with anti-colonial nationalism and that, somehow, the extreme right’s focus on national identity and their cultural self-preservation would engender a benevolence of sorts towards the national claims of colonized peoples. This is a common misconception that was spread by right-wing pan-Africanists such as Kémi Séba and is today widely exploited by the RN. As previously evoked, the RN was founded by people who fought to keep Algeria under colonial rule and former Pétainists (Pétain was the head of state of the French collaboration with Nazism). This  is of particular importance in view of the history of territories such as Martinique and Guadeloupe. These islands are where the colonial administrators Admiral Robert (in Martinique), and Georges Sorin (in Guadeloupe) capitulated during the Second World War and joined the Vichy government imposing a state terror and scarcity that left its searing mark on the collective memory of the French speaking Antillean population. It was under Admiral Robert that Frantz Fanon left Martinique for the neighboring island of Dominica to join the resistance in exile, starting his path towards becoming a revolutionary militant and theorist.

    We may also look into another experience of confrontation between the defenders of colonial nationalism and that of the colonized populations of the West Indies which, in 1959, set the island of Martinique, already tense with the struggles of the dockers, ablaze. Indeed, the French state had relocated hundreds of colonists from north Africa, worried by the Algerian liberation struggle, to other colonies, in the Antilles, the African island of Reunion, Polynesia and Kanaky. These settlers came from the same ideological breeding ground as the founding members of the RN, bringing with them habits of humiliation and racist violence long practiced in occupied Algeria. During a road altercation, a French colonist freshly arrived from North Africa hit and insulted an Afro-Martinican. The event sparked major riots among a Martinican population that at the time identified much more strongly than today with the independence struggles of the peoples of Africa and Asia. Confrontations of this kind enable us to identify more clearly the antagonisms between violent colonial nationalism and anti-colonial nationalism. Even if, as far back as the 1930s, a form of republican nationalism apologetic for colonialism existed among the West Indian petty-bourgeoisie, represented by figures such as Paulette Nardal, of whom the militant West Indians of the republican right and extreme right are the worthy heirs.

    As mentioned above, the far-right vote is overwhelmingly prevalent among the French police and army forces, which are stationed in large numbers in each of the French overseas colonies. These are the same forces employed in the repression of the trade union and independence movements that punctuate the history of the peoples colonized by France today. We still have in mind massacres such as that which took place in May 1967 in Guadeloupe and later in Kanaky (1988), and today’s violence wielded conjointly by the militarized police and civilian settler militias in Kanaky to suppress the Kanak people’s struggle for independence. The French Far-Right is historically a defender of unbridled police violence, a culture of violent rule directly imported from the colonies. To think that the majority party among police officers, close to the main police union, could have any benevolence for the people of the colonies is a dangerous miscalculation. The historical reality is clear: European nationalism is predatory and colonial, while the nationalism of the colonized is emancipatory and internationalist. Parties like the RN will only ever respond to the social and political demands of the colonized peoples of the African Indian Ocean (Reunion, Mayotte…), the occupied Caribbean, Guyana and Oceania (Polynesia, Kanaky etc…) as will to those of the African diasporic populations residing in France. Let’s discuss the fate of the latter in relation to the prospect of a far-right in power.

    III. The Far-Right and Africans in France

    The African post-colonial migration, both exploited and oppressed

    African populations in France stem from several migratory movements. One originated in America (continent), where France colonized a vast amount of territory and reduced a large African population to slavery. Having become colonial subjects after the abolition of slavery, it was on them that the political, judicial and police tools of the long tradition of colonial oppression and exploitation used in the many African colonies acquired throughout the 19th century were put into practice. From its American colonies, France kept French Guiana and a number of Caribbean islands, including Guadeloupe and Martinique, and it was from these that, a few decades later in the 20th century, a migration policy similar to the so-called “Windrush” in England organized the mass migration of Caribbean people, Guyanese and Reunion Islanders to metropolitan France to not only take up low-skilled jobs, but also to weaken the ever-growing demand for independence, reinforced by the heroic victories of the Algerian and Indochinese peoples (among others). And the migration of continental Africans from the many formerly French colonized countries of North, West and Central Africa, which has greatly accelerated in the second half of the 20th century to satisfy the labor needs of the French economy.

    Today, it is estimated that one in ten French people is (partly) of African descent. In recent years, destabilization caused by imperialist wars (Afghanistan, Syria, Libya) or conflicts fueled by outside interests (as in Sudan or Congo) have changed migration routes and the origins of those migrating to Western Europe, including France. Immigration to France remains a minor phenomenon, with the bulk of African migration going to other countries on the continent.

    Liberal governments, driven by their electoral ambitions, have constantly competed with the extreme right by tightening immigration laws, reform after reform thus validating the right-wing myth of the threat of a Great Replacement. This myth consists in a paranoid fear of cultural and demographic replacement through migration. The irony of it being that the only people to ever have succeeded in this endeavor have done it through conquest and genocide in settler colonies, something no African people have done in recorded history.

    Neoliberal pseudo-fascism: systemic racism in the neo-liberal state

    The successive liberal governments have also implemented liberal reforms to the healthcare, unemployment and education systems, all of which have very negatively impacted the lives of people living in the french African diaspora. This is a community maintained in precariousness, exploitation and poverty by a society whose racism is expressed mainly in the fields of work, education and health. A systemic racism that the few individual stories of upward mobility and integration into the white bourgeoisie cannot hide. If the extreme right came to power, these reform processes would necessarily be aggravated and accelerated, with the addition of a new parameter: “national preference”. Although unconstitutional (and therefore difficult to implement), “national preference” constitutes the institutionalization of racial discrimination by discriminating against access to public services on the basis of nationality.

    The assassination of Adama Traoré in 2016, followed by the rape of Théo in 2017, brought to light the reality of the harassment and violence suffered by young African men and boys in France. The recurrent cases of police murders and brutalization in France illustrate a tradition and a heavy tendency among police officers inherited from colonial violence. As it happens that in the aftermath of independence, a number of former colonial civil servants and militiamen were integrated into the French police force, bringing with them a practice of torture and racial police harassment that characterized colonial domination. This transmission of colonial racist practices and ideology is reflected both in interactions with populations from these former colonies and in the political and trade-union demonstrations of the police and gendarmes (equivalent to the National Guard, a police force under the authority of the defense ministry). Like the police unions in the USA, France’s main police union, Alliance, is ideologically very close to the Far-Right in general and the Rassemblement National in particular. Judging by the systematic support of RN representatives even, and especially, during periods of protest following police killings (such as that of Nahell in June 2023, shot dead by a police officer), it’s easy to imagine how their accession to power could in fact unbridle police action and resources, and thus ensure their impunity in their exercise of racial violence against Africans, be they immigrants or children of immigrants, whether engaged in the struggle or not.

    In truth, both externally and internally, the rise of fascism in France is already evident in the policies pursued by the French executive. Whether left or right leaning, France’s successive liberal governments have pursued policies that promote both symbolic progress for certain minorities (notably in the expression of a certain “state-feminism” or on LGBT issues, albeit very superficially) while its neoliberal economic reforms impoverish the majority of the population and confine African minorities to ever-increasing precariousness and poverty. Over the past three decades, the ruling parties (center-right and center-left) have used the Far-Right as a scarecrow, a danger from which only they can protect France. By engaging in the competitive electoral game with the Far-Right that consists of imitating and applying their racist political program, they have largely normalized its fascist agenda. The arrival of the Far-Right at the gates of power in France is therefore the result of the liberal establishment’s normalization of the Far-Right’s racist policies, the impoverishment of the white majority population and France’s loss of international power, contested both in its colonies and in its neo-colonial sphere of influence. Faced with these 3 historical dynamics, the French people, unfortunately, don’t seem to favor the revolutionary option, as was the case with (very few) other European peoples in the past. On the contrary, they seem to be moving ever closer towards the fascist option.

    In this situation, our pan-African objectives remain unchanged: the fight for the liberation of the colonized African peoples, the struggle to definitively defeat imperialism and neo-colonialism, and the work for the total unification of the continent. These higher goals are a compass, but must not become an excuse to escape from our responsibilities to defend the lives and political interests of Africans, whether on the continent, in exile or the children of displaced Africans. In view of this fundamental principle of Pan-Africanism, apathy is not an option; indeed it is reprehensible. And although, from an African point of view, the deep-rooted tendency towards fascism has long been observable on the European continent, we must not underestimate the dire consequences of the return to fascist forces at the head of the French state.

    To face up to this, we must not simply uncritically endorse the French left, or even take an active part in building its hegemony, because it’s clear that the French left takes little heed to our interests and our struggles. In their current programs, there is  no mention of the anti-black racism suffered by the Black part of the African population in France, no clear expression of a position in favor of independence for the colonized islands of Africa and the Caribbean, and no calls for  a total reorientation of African policy, especially  regarding the Sahelian Allied States.

    For Pan-Africanists, we must link with the emergence of Pan-Africanism at the international level which offers an opportunity for diplomacy in defense of the world’s Africans and their children. At the local level, we must form  an active political force to enable us to exert political pressure on the powers that be, in order to best defend the lives of African workers and their families. Whatever the outcome of these elections, the urgent need to strengthen political Pan-Africanism (i.e. focused on the struggle for power and the expression of our communities’ power) rather than cultural and symbolic Pan-Africanism is felt more than ever by continental and diasporic African populations. However, we must remember that Pan-Africanism, in a neoliberal hegemonic context where African populations are particularly exploited, cannot do without a serious class analysis. Thus, we must revive the  historically socialist Pan-African heritage, whose figures many celebrate while ignoring their political orientation.

    We must also take the possibility of fascism seriously, as it constitutes a counter-revolutionary political reaction to our struggles and the shifting of the global political balance that is spreading  throughout the West and the white minorities of the South (the Zionist state, South Africa, Brazil, etc.). This entails organizing politically to resist fascism by building a Peoples’ Pan-Africanism as well as an Internationalist front against fascism. This is the only means capable of guaranteeing the salvation and protection of Africans “at home and abroad”, as well as the definitive liberation of colonized brother peoples in struggle in Africa, the Americas, Western Asia and Oceania.

    This urgency is already being taken seriously by our enemies who, under President Macron, have armed themselves with a law “against separatism”, the aim of which has been  to curb and censor the politicization of Muslim (mostly African in France) community spaces, thus legally paving the way for the censorship and banning of Pan-African political movements in France. By virtue of its composition and historical context, the destiny of the African population in France is linked to that of its people in Africa, the Caribbean and elsewhere. And in the face of a France that is making its return to nationalism clearer by the day, African people  still find themselves enjoined to take up the generational challenge posed by Frantz Fanon: our generation must  “discover its mission, fulfill it or betray it” [end]

    The original article

    Kossi Paul is a worker, Panafrican and anti-colonial militant, member of the A-APRP, of Afro-Caribbean and north-African descent based in Paris, France

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